The non-existence of equilibrium in sequential auctions when bids are revealed.

dc.contributor.author	Cai, Gangshu
dc.contributor.author	Wurman, Peter R.
dc.contributor.author	Chao, Xiuli
dc.date.accessioned	2011-10-25T15:11:39Z
dc.date.available	2011-10-25T15:11:39Z
dc.date.issued	2011-10-25
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/2097/12440
dc.description.abstract	Sequential auctions of homogeneous objects are common in public and private marketplaces. Weber derived equilibrium results for what is now a classic model of sequential auctions. However, Weber’s results are derived in the context of two particular price quote assumptions. In this paper, we examine a model of sequential auctions based on online auctions, in which, after each auction, all bids are revealed. We show that a pure-strategic, symmetric equilibrium does not exist, regardless of whether the auctions are first- or second-price, if all bids are revealed at the end of each auction.	en_US
dc.relation.uri	http://www.csulb.edu/journals/jecr/p_i.htm	en_US
dc.subject	Sequential auctions	en_US
dc.subject	Online auctions	en_US
dc.subject	E-commerce	en_US
dc.subject	Nash equilibrium	en_US
dc.title	The non-existence of equilibrium in sequential auctions when bids are revealed.	en_US
dc.type	Article (publisher version)	en_US
dc.date.published	2007	en_US
dc.citation.epage	157	en_US
dc.citation.issue	2	en_US
dc.citation.jtitle	Journal of Electronic Commerce Research	en_US
dc.citation.spage	141	en_US
dc.citation.volume	8	en_US
dc.contributor.authoreid	gcai	en_US