The non-existence of equilibrium in sequential auctions when bids are revealed.
| dc.citation.epage | 157 | en_US |
| dc.citation.issue | 2 | en_US |
| dc.citation.jtitle | Journal of Electronic Commerce Research | en_US |
| dc.citation.spage | 141 | en_US |
| dc.citation.volume | 8 | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | Cai, Gangshu | |
| dc.contributor.author | Wurman, Peter R. | |
| dc.contributor.author | Chao, Xiuli | |
| dc.contributor.authoreid | gcai | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2011-10-25T15:11:39Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2011-10-25T15:11:39Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2011-10-25 | |
| dc.date.published | 2007 | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | Sequential auctions of homogeneous objects are common in public and private marketplaces. Weber derived equilibrium results for what is now a classic model of sequential auctions. However, Weber’s results are derived in the context of two particular price quote assumptions. In this paper, we examine a model of sequential auctions based on online auctions, in which, after each auction, all bids are revealed. We show that a pure-strategic, symmetric equilibrium does not exist, regardless of whether the auctions are first- or second-price, if all bids are revealed at the end of each auction. | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2097/12440 | |
| dc.relation.uri | http://www.csulb.edu/journals/jecr/p_i.htm | en_US |
| dc.subject | Sequential auctions | en_US |
| dc.subject | Online auctions | en_US |
| dc.subject | E-commerce | en_US |
| dc.subject | Nash equilibrium | en_US |
| dc.title | The non-existence of equilibrium in sequential auctions when bids are revealed. | en_US |
| dc.type | Article (publisher version) | en_US |
