Gayle, Philip G.2014-04-182014-04-182013-11-01http://hdl.handle.net/2097/17336Previous research has suggested that codeshare agreements eliminate double marginalization that exists when unaffiliated airlines independently determine the price for different segments of an interline trip. Using a structural econometric model, this paper investigates whether codeshare contracts do eliminate double marginalization. The results suggest that both upstream and downstream margins persist when the operating carrier of a codeshare product also offers competing single-carrier product(s) in the concerned market. Furthermore, counterfactual simulations from the model suggest that efficient pricing of these codeshare products would lower their price, and yield nontrivial increases in consumer welfare.en-USThis Item is protected by copyright and/or related rights. You are free to use this Item in any way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-holder(s).Double marginalizationAirlinesCodeshare contractsArticle (publisher version)