Brase, Gary L.2009-03-102009-03-102007-10-29http://hdl.handle.net/2097/1290Both the theoretical frameworks that organize the first part of Barbey & Sloman's (B&S's) target article and the empirical evidence marshaled in the second part are marked by distinctions that should not exist (i.e., false dichotomies), conflations where distinctions should be made, and selective omissions of empirical results - within the very studies discussed - that create illusions of theoretical and empirical favor.This Item is protected by copyright and/or related rights. You are free to use this Item in any way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-holder(s).Bayesian reasoningFrequenciesOmissions, conflations, and false dichotomies: Conceptual and empirical problems with the Barbey & Sloman account.Article (publisher version)