

The true advantage of experience:
Anglo-American military leadership on the Pennsylvania frontier from 1750-1765

by

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Abstract

The British and colonial military commanders on the Pennsylvania frontier between 1750 and 1765 developed a successful decentralized command culture independently of similar changes which happened at the same time in Europe. Characteristics of this command culture included: trust, independence, flexibility, focus, and cultural education, a willingness to take responsibility and bias for action among leaders at all levels. The more complex the environment or situation, the more beneficial these characteristics became within a decentralized command culture. In the mid-eighteenth century this culture showed itself in the use of light infantry, disciplined initiative among aggressive offensive minded commanders and subordinates, operational diplomacy, secure offensive bases of operation, and the use of situational expertise to better inform decision making. The implementation of this command culture did not come to the British and colonial leaders without significant frustration and sacrifice before and during the French and Indian War. The foundation lay in the character of the Pennsylvania frontier. The complex nature of the Pennsylvania frontier formed a zone of conflict and cooperation that military leaders, in both peace and war, had to learn to navigate not only just to succeed but just to survive. Early in the period, the French and their Canadian and Indian allies were successful because they were more adept at implementing portions of the new decentralized command culture, though the British and colonials showed signs of a growing sense of the change that would be needed to defeat their enemies. Leaders on both sides of the battles of Jumonville Glen, Great Meadows, and the Monongahela exhibited the characteristics and showed indicators (or lack thereof) of this new command culture. Responding to Braddock's defeat, Pennsylvania leaders were forced to seek independent solutions to the catastrophic raids on frontier settlements

by the French and Indians. The new British and colonial command culture was fully formed by the time of John Forbes's capture of Fort Duquesne and the Battle of Bushy Run during Pontiac's War in 1763.

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Dedication


This thesis is dedicated to Dr. David Dixon (1954-2008), a history professor at Slippery Rock University of Pennsylvania, who showed a young cadet that to understand military history, one must try to understand culture.

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Chapter 1 - Introduction

“Those who have experienced the severities and dangers of a campaign in Europe can scarcely form an idea of what is to be done in an American War...” – Colonel Henry Bouquet¹

Just after the Seven Year’s War, or the French and Indian War as it was known in the American colonies, British Army Captain John Knox wrote in his memoirs of the fighting in North America, “the most profitable instruction that history could give was by shewing the steps which have led to success; the true advantage of experience.”² Knox fought in the memorable and decisive battles at Quebec and Montreal during the war, but he also spent two years at Fort Cumberland, on the Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia frontier.



Map 1. Map of the Province of Pennsylvania and Its Extensive Frontiers by Georges-Louis Le Rouge and William

¹ Henry Bouquet, *The Papers of Henry Bouquet*, Edited by Sylvester Kirby Stevens, Donald H. Kent, and Autumn L. Leonard, (Harrisburg: The Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1951), 5: 544.

<https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/001262955>. Accessed August 22, 2020.

² John Knox, *Historical Journal of the Campaigns in North America for the Years 1757, 1758, 1759 and 1760*, Edited by Arthur Doughty, (Edmonton: Champlain Society, 1982), 15.

Scull, 1777, (Library of Congress). The frontier extends from the Wyoming River Valley in the northeast to the Upper Ohio River Valley in the west. ³

One hundred and fifty years of political, diplomatic, economic, and military machinations shaped the essential social and cultural character of the Pennsylvania backcountry and frontier.⁴ From the Ohio Country in the west to vallies of the Susquehanna River and its tributaries in the east, the Pennsylvania frontier was inhabited by an eclectic mix of political, social, and cultural groups with often conflicting agendas. The French and British empires, the colony of Connecticut, the proprietary colonies of Maryland and Pennsylvania, and Crown colonies of Virginia and New York vied for hegemony in part or all of the Pennsylvania frontier. These metropolitan and Euro-American political bodies strove to influence the many American Indian political entities on the Pennsylvania frontier. Indigenous polities struggled with each other for power and resources while the individual nations of the Haudenosaunee Confederacy – the Seneca, Cayuga, Onondaga, Oneida, Tuscarora, and Mohawk – themselves sometimes worked at cross purposes inside the Pennsylvania frontier.⁵ Dozens of small refugee Indian nations populated the Ohio country. The varied political entities encompassed dozens of ethnicities who mingled and quarreled, fought and married, and celebrated and did business together inside a

³ Georges-Louis Le Rouge, and William Scull. *La Pensilvanie en trois feuilles, traduite des meilleures cartes anglaises. A map of Pennsylvania exhibiting not only the improved parts of that Province, but also its extensive frontiers: Laid down from actual surveys and chiefly from the late map of W. Scull published in ; and humbly inscribed to the Honourable Thomas Penn and Richard Penn, Esquires, true and absolute proprietaries and Governors of the Province of Pennsylvania and the territories thereunto belonging*, (Paris, Chez Le Rouge, 1777), Map. <https://www.loc.gov/item/74692509/>.

⁴ Eric Hinderaker and Peter C. Mancall, *At the Edge of Empire: The Backcountry in British North America*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 1-3 for the definitions of “backcountry” and “frontier.”

⁵ The “Haudenosaunee Confederacy” is more commonly known as the Five (later six) Nations of the Iroquois Confederacy. “Haudenosaunee” is used in place of the word “Iroquois” for this thesis.

complex competition and cooperation zone that encompassed the Pennsylvania frontier.⁶ The Proprietary Party, as well as the peace and war factions of the Quaker Party in Pennsylvania struggled with each other and against New York's Crown controlled legislature and the Virginia politicians who dominated the Ohio Company. These various competing and cooperating groups created a complex culture on the Pennsylvania frontier and backcountry.⁷ The complex demands of the Pennsylvania frontier forced individuals to focus on kinship and community, which were required not just for prosperity, nor for implementing the wishes of a far-off authority figure, but for survival against a nearby competitor. The frontier was a harsh learning environment that forged a generation of highly competent and distinctly American leaders who were forced to adapt or else see their way of life perish.

Military commanders, civil leaders, adventurous traders, and frontier diplomats, with many individuals combining all four roles, adapted to the realities of fighting on the Pennsylvania frontier. With only rivers and Indian paths crisscrossing the frontier, colonial and Indian leaders were forced by the limited means of communication to trust their subordinates in wartime to accomplish a mission as they saw fit. A surveyor or trader one day and militia officer or ranger the next, the commanders and leaders on the frontier established the foundations of mission command. Commanders on the frontier had to be experts in diplomacy, politics, trade, and military operations – or else surround themselves with those who were. Failure to do so was not just painful, but deadly.

⁶ Hinderaker, *Edge*, 1-3. Ned C. Landsman, *Crossroads of Empire: the Middle Colonies in British North America*, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2010), 1-7. Michael N. McConnell, *A Country Between: The Upper Ohio Valley and Its People, 1724-1774* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 1-4.

⁷ Jane T. Merritt, *At the Crossroads; Indians and Empires on a Mid-Atlantic Frontier, 1700-1763*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 4-6.



Map 2. A trader's map of the Ohio country before 1753 by John Patten, 1753 (Library of Congress)⁸

Imperfect communications with gridlocked colonial and metropolitan governments far from the realities of the frontier forced individuality, independence, and initiative. The mutual trust between volunteer commanders and their subordinates gave focus and direction to operations. Their intuitive knowledge of the frontier and political adeptness enhanced confidence and a willingness to take on the burden of command. The successful fighters on the frontier – Indian, French, colonial and British alike – shared a mutual trust with their superiors, subordinates, and peers due to their shared experience on the frontier. Failure to accomplish a

⁸ John Patten, *A trader's map of the Ohio country before 1753*, Map. <https://www.loc.gov/item/gm71002324/>.

mission had gruesome and most likely permanent consequences. This was no different than peace on the frontier, where failure to cope with its realities brought about the same permanent consequences – economic ruin, maiming, or death. The Pennsylvania frontier created an organic leadership culture that was different from the one being developed contemporaneously in Prussia but which valued many of the same principles of military leadership.

The focus of this thesis is on British and Colonial American leadership on the Pennsylvania frontier from 1750 through 1765 from the British and colonial perspective because it relies on English-language sources. Any references to French and Canadian commanders are found in French primary sources that have been translated and included in English-language secondary works. For analysis on French and Canadian leadership, I relied heavily on Claiborne A. Skinner's *The Upper Country: French Enterprise in the Colonial Great Lakes* and Francis Jennings's *Empires of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies and Tribes in the Seven Years War in America*.⁹ The Eastern Woodland Indian oral tradition precludes primary written sources by North American Indian military leadership and analysts. Therefore any analysis of Indian military leadership is necessarily from the British and colonial perspectives. For general Indian military cultural history and analysis on the Pennsylvania frontier and Ohio Country I used Ian K. Steele's *Warpaths: Invasions of North America*, Richard White's *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815*, Michael N. McConnell's *A Country Between: The Upper Ohio Valley and Its People, 1724-1774*, and finally, Jane T. Merritt's *At the Crossroads: Indians and Empires on a Mid-Atlantic Frontier*,

⁹ Claiborne, A. Skinner, *The Upper Country: French Enterprise in the Colonial Great Lakes*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008). Francis Jennings, *Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies and Tribes in the Seven Year War on America*, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1988).

1700-1763.¹⁰

In the general histories of the French and Indian War, the development and evolution of colonial and British leadership is not analyzed at any great length. Fred Anderson's magisterial *Crucible of War* only discusses British, colonial and Indian leadership in terms of cooperation and coercion among these three broad factions.¹¹ Walter Borneman's *The French and Indian War: Deciding the Fate of North America* discusses only the impact British and colonial leadership had on the American Revolution and does not examine military leadership culture.¹² Finally William M. Fowler Jr.'s *Empires at War: The French and Indian War and the Struggle for North America, 1754-1763* examines only political leadership and its international impact.¹³

Several authors have touched upon colonial military leadership in their discussions on tactical changes in colonial American warfare, but not in a comprehensive way and only in the context of the broader analyses of tactics. John Grenier's excellent *The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier* shows the evolution of "petite guerre," or "little war," in the British Army from its initial rejection to its eventual adoption but does not explore its place

¹⁰ Ian K. Steele, *Warpaths: The Invasions of North America*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). Michael N. McConnell, *A Country Between: The Upper Ohio Valley and Its People, 1724-1774*, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997). Jane T. Merritt, *At the Crossroads; Indians and Empires on a Mid-Atlantic Frontier, 1700-1763*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003). Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indian, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

¹¹ Fred Anderson, *Crucible of War; The Seven Year's War and the Fate of Empire in British North America 1754-1766*, (New York: Vintage Books, 2001), xxii-xxv.

¹² Walter Borneman, *The French and Indian War: Deciding the Fate of North America*, (New York: Harper Perennial, 2007), xxi-xxiii, 296-308.

¹³ William M. Fowler, Jr., *Empires at War: The French and Indian War and the Struggle for North America, 1754-1763*, (New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2006), 1-284.

within a larger leadership culture.¹⁴ However, Grenier emphasizes the total war aspect of “petit guerre” and not its military efficacy. For example, Grenier mentions Colonel Henry Bouquet just three times in *The First Way*, whereas he is central to my thesis. Grenier mentions Bouquet is twice in the matter of the infamous plague blankets, but only once in his capacity as a military leader.¹⁵ One of the central themes of this thesis’ third chapter expands on Grenier’s second mention of Bouquet: “Colonel Henri [sic] Bouquet, Forbes noted, attempted to ‘learn the Art of War, from Enemy Indians or anything else who have seen the Country and War carried on it.’”¹⁶ Grenier also argues that the British success with “petit guerre” during the French and Indian War was due to the incorporation of American rangers into their ranks, and not specifically due to differences in American leadership qualities or the transition of regular line infantry to light infantry.¹⁷

John Ross’s *War on the Run* is a narrative biography of Robert Rogers that deals with frontier warfare by examining Roger’s rangers and their operations, which did not occur on the Pennsylvania frontier. Though all of the facets of command I explore in this thesis are present in the work, Ross does not discuss the impact of leadership beyond Rogers’s life, except tangentially.¹⁸ In *Conquering the American Wilderness: The Triumph of European Warfare in the Colonial Northeast*, Guy Chet argues that tactically British and colonial military forces had

¹⁴ John Grenier, *The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 103-114.

¹⁵ Grenier, *The First Way*, 120, 144.

¹⁶ Grenier, *The First Way*, 136. Forbes to Bouquet, June 27 1758, *The Writings of General John Forbes Relating to His Service in North America*, ed. Alfred Procter James (Menasha, WI: The Collegiate Press, 1938), 125.

¹⁷ Grenier, *The First Way*, 103, 115-145.

¹⁸ John F. Ross, *War of the Run: The Epic Story of Robert Rogers and the Conquest of America’s First Frontier*, (New York: Bantam Books, 2009), 1-442

more continuity than innovation within European military tradition.¹⁹ He argues that then-current British doctrine of regular defensive warfare was sufficient to defeat the French and Indians in the French and Indian War. However, he does not explore the transition from the leadership shown in times of repeated British defeat to what was shown when British victories were almost constant, exemplified by British and colonial leaders on the Pennsylvania frontier.²⁰ Nor does Chet examine the impacts of leaders' actions that permitted British regulars to overcome the French and Indians, such as the use of operational diplomacy or the complementary use of regular, light, irregular, and militia troops.

Ben Scharff makes a similar argument in *Skulking in the Woods* about the tactical superiority of regulars over irregulars in the American wilderness, as does Stephen Brumwell in *Redcoats*, despite the popular myth stating otherwise.²¹ Both Armstrong Starkey (*European and Native American Warfare*) and Patrick Malone (*The Skulking Way of War*) argue that colonists were forced to adjust their tactics to their Indian enemies and wilderness surroundings.²² None of these focus in detail on the Pennsylvania frontier in the French and Indian War nor the changes in leadership culture that occurred there. Finally, James H. Merrell's *Into the American Woods: Negotiators on the Pennsylvania Frontier* examines "the go-betweens" who were instrumental in maintaining the peace for decades on the Pennsylvania frontier. Merrell's excellent work did not

¹⁹ Guy Chet, *Conquering the American Wilderness: The Triumph of European Warfare in the Colonial Northeast*, (Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003), 3.

²⁰ Chet, *Conquering*, 123-125.

²¹ Ben Scharff, *Skulking in the Woods* (Berwyn Heights, MD: Heritage Books, 2014), xvi-xix, Brumwell *Redcoats*, 191-226.

²² Armstrong Starkey, *European and Native American Warfare 1675-1815*, (Tulsa: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998), x. Patrick M. Malone, *The Skulking Way of War: Technology and Tactics Among the New England Indians*, (Lanham: Madison Books, 2000), 1-2.

however examine their impact on leadership and warfare during the French and Indian War. Merrell's description of their sub-culture and their place in the culture of the Pennsylvania frontier greatly informed this work, along with Grenier's *The First Way of War*, and provided the genesis for this thesis.

In what follows, I explore military leadership on the Pennsylvania frontier before and during the French and Indian War as I perceive it through the lens of a decentralized leadership culture. On the Pennsylvania frontier between 1750 and 1765, the American colonial and British leaders developed a successful decentralized leadership culture. For the purpose of this argument, "culture" refers to the socially transmitted habits of mind, traditions and preferred methods of operations that are more or less specific to a particular geographically based security community"²³ I specifically use John Boyd's criteria listed in an organizational climate for operational success.²⁴ John Boyd developed his organizational climate for operational success in

²³ Charles H. Coates and Roland J. Pellegrin, *Military Sociology: A Study of American Military Institutions and Military Life* (Baltimore: SocialSciencesPress, 1965), 26-27. Michael A. Bonura, *Under the Shadow of Napoleon: French Influence on the American Way of Warfare from the War of 1812 to the Outbreak of WWII*, (New York: New York University Press, 2012), 4.

²⁴ Chet Richards, *Certain to Win: The Strategy of John Boyd, Applied to Business*, (Middletown: Xlibris, 2004), 51. Donald Vandergriff, and Stephen Webber eds. *Mission Command: The Who, What, Where, When, and Why, An Anthology*, (Kabul: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2017), 55. In addition to Boyd's model of organizational climate for operational success, there are several different models of *auftragstaktik* and similar leadership cultures. In 2014, Marco Sigg developed an Idealized Model of *Auftragstaktik* in which he used to explore the extent that the Prussian and later German Army actually applied *auftragstaktik* to its operations. The Idealized Model of *Auftragstaktik* consisted of seven principles: Judgement, Independence Obedience, Determination, Offensive Spirit, Command Process, and Unity of Action. Martin Samuels, *Piercing the Fog of War: The Theory and Practice of Command in the British and German Armies, 1981-194* (Warwick: Helion & Company Limited 2019), 47-48. About the same time Sigg developed his model for *auftragstaktik* in Germany, Ritchie Dunham and Bettye Pruitt wrote, "Ecosynomics, the Science of Abundancy". Inside this fascinating book, the word "*auftragstaktik*" is not mentioned a single time. However, in an attempt to explain Malcolm Gladwell's "Outliers", Ritchie's details a model for collaboration and competition to recognize abundance where one once saw

the 1980s after studying maneuver warfare while developing his magisterial briefings, *Patterns of Conflict* and a *Discourse on Winning and Losing*. The first criterion in an organizational climate for operational success is flexibility and mental agility born of joy and willingness to take responsibility.²⁵ Next is the intuitive feel and knowledge of a situation.²⁶ The third is independence born from mutual trust, unity, and cohesion.²⁷ Next is the social contract between

only scarcity. The model is “The Five Agreements” of Self, Group, Other, Nature, and Spirit. The most productive and satisfying position in the Five Agreements model for a person’s situation is a perfect balance of the five agreements called “Harmonic Vibrancy”. Professional soldiers would recognize the position of Harmonic Vibrancy as the culture of *auftragstaktik* or mission command. James L. Ritchie-Dunham, *Ecosynomics: The Science of Abundance*. Edited by Bettye Pruitt. (New York: Vibrancy Ins, LLC, 2014), 6-57. Boyd and his acolytes’ “Blitzkrieg culture” model covers the same principles as Sigg’s Idealized Model of *Auftragstaktik* and Ritchie-Dunham’s and Pruitt’s Five Agreements Model, but is easier to adapt to historical cultural analysis of leadership on the Pennsylvania frontier. Boyd’s is the model I will use to analyze operations and diplomacy on the Pennsylvania Frontier from 1750-1765. See also: Robert Coram, *Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War*. (New York: Black Bay Books / Little, Brown and Company, 2002), 330-339.

²⁵ *Behendigkeit* in German. According to Boyd mental agility is necessary for the implicit communication required to effectively operate in his famous OODA Loop (Observe-Orient-Decide-Act). *Behendigkeit* is a result of *verantwortungsfreudigkeit*, German for “the joy and satisfaction in the willingness of taking responsibility.” *verantwortungsfreudigkeit* is product of *bildung*. *Bildung* is a culture that espouses “the perfectibility of the individual’s character and intellect through education.” Charles Edward White, *The Enlightened Soldier; Scharnhorst and the Militarische Gellschaft in Berlin, 1801-1805*, (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1989), xii, xiii, 2, 4. *Bildung* is a combination of education, culture, and self-cultivation. White, *Enlightened*, 21.

²⁶ *Fingerspitzengefuehl* in German, literally “fingertip feeling,” *fingerspitzengefuehl* is also a product of *bildung*. *Fingerspitzengefuehl* is the intuitive feel of a complex or chaotic situation and the sense of being “at home” in a situation. Robert Coram, *Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War*. (New York: Black Bay Books / Little, Brown and Company, 2002), 334. Richards, *Certain*, 54-55. Vandergriff, *Mission Command Vol. 1*, 50-52.

²⁷ *Einheit* in German. *Einheit* is the mutual trust, unity, and cohesion between commanders and their commands. *Einheit* is the trust necessary to act independently. Boyd, *Patterns*, 118. Vandergriff, *Mission Command Vol.1*, 51. *Einheit* is the positive result of the mutual confidence, shared experiences, and the honor and character of the commander and their subordinates. Karl Demeter, *The German Officer-Corps in Society and State, 1650-1945*. Translated by Angus Malcolm (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965), 174. *Einheit* is the measure of the followers’ willingness to act in the name of the commander positively and that the commander has the wellbeing of

commanders and subordinates that fosters leadership and appreciation.²⁸ And the final criterion is the focus and direction provided by a commander for subordinates.²⁹

In the middle of the 18th century, the colonials on the Pennsylvania frontier and the Prussians on the northern European plain were learning similar lessons about how to command military forces and wage war effectively. Though differing in details, American colonials' evolving system of command was conceptually aligned with the more famous Prussian and later German system of "mission command" or *auftragstaktik*, as it is known today.³⁰ While Prussian

their command in mind, even if the situations suggests differently. Demeter *Officer-Corps*, 139, 180. Coram, *Boyd*, 337.

²⁸ *Auftragstaktik* in German, is the social contract between commanders and subordinate whom will honor the commander's intent, and the coordination between peers. *Auftragstaktik* allows independent decision-making within those parameters. Coram, Boyd 337. *Auftragstaktik* had a limited meaning in the early 19th and 20th century before it became a reference to the overall command culture, and synonymous with Mission Command in the 1990s and early 21st century. Antulio J. Echevarria, *After Clausewitz; German Military Thinkers Before the Great War*. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 38. *Auftragstaktik* allows for *selbständigkeit*, German for the ability to change an order, especially if the original order is no longer relevant to the situation. White, *Enlightened*, 139. See Robert M. Citino, *The German Way of War: From the Thirty Year's War to the Third Reich*, (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005) and Antulio J. Echevarria, *After Clausewitz; German Military Thinkers before the Great War*, (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000) for further explanation of definitions.

²⁹ *Schwerpunkt* in German is the focus and direction among superiors, subordinates, and peers. The most common interpretation of *schwerpunkt* is "spearhead", which is only partially correct. *Schwerpunkt* encompasses all supporting and subordinate efforts, not just the main effort. The *schwerpunkt* is the focus of all of the command's activities, and it gives an objective to achieve in the absence of orders. Boyd, *Patterns*, 78; Coram, *Boyd*, 334.

³⁰ Though originally just referring to the agreement between a superior and subordinate on the best way to accomplish a mission, *auftragstaktik* has become the catch-all term describing a successful command culture based on trust between and among superiors, subordinates, and peers. In 2012, Jochen Wittmann pointed out that there was, and still is, no consistent definition of the concept of *auftragstaktik*, even in German literature on the subject which remains richer than the English language literature. Wittmann, *Auftragstaktik*, 18. Few scholars agree on more than its roots are in the Greek word "tattein" or "purposeful leadership of troops". Wittmann, *Auftragstaktik*, 33. *Auftragstaktik* is variously defined as "Mission Command" Long, *Mission Command*, 1, 72; Brender, *Mission Command Vol 2*, 20, Vandergriff *Adopting*, 19; "Mission Tactics" Schell, *Battle Leadership*, Uhle-Wheeler, *Maneuver*, 236. Samuels, *Piercing*, 2, "Mission Contract" Richards, *Certain*, 51. , or "Mission Orders" Boyd,

leaders looked to train their army to compensate for his inferior strategic position, the commanders in America ignored the realities of the Pennsylvania frontier at their peril. The Prussian and then German concept of *auftragstaktik* evolved from formal education, while the American mission command from informal education on the frontier.³¹ America developed a less conventional, but no less effective, military tradition of mission command.³² The colonial Pennsylvania backcountry between 1750 and 1765 perfectly illustrates Clausewitz' uncertainty, friction, and complexity.³³ Whereas the Prussian military revolution of mission command was

Patterns, among others. "Task Tactics" Long MC 1, 72. "Mission Concept" Boyd *Patterns*. "Mission-Type Orders" Condell *Truppen* 3; Vandergriff *Adopting*, 19. "Mission Oriented Command and Control" Wittmann, *Auftragstaktik*, 5. "Mission Oriented Tactics" Nelsen, *Auftragstaktik*, 21. These translations and interpretations are all correct, and all incorrect, at the same time. Both the terms of mission command and *auftragstaktik* are evolutionary in nature. Nelsen, *Auftragstaktik*, 22. The best translation seems to be 'mission-oriental command system' (*fuhren mit auftrag*) Jorg Muth, *Command Culture: Officer Education in the U.S. Army and the German Armed Forces, 1901-1940, and the Consequences for World War II*, (Denton: University of North Texas Press, 2011), 173. For simplicity's sake, the English speaking *auftragstaktik* scholarly community has settled on "mission command" as their unifying terms, mostly because the US Army replaced the "Command and Control" Warfighting Function with the terms "Mission Command". "Mission Command" became the official Army command and control doctrine. Unfortunately, it was mostly in name only, especially in peacetime. Despite the name change, the U.S. Army continues to practice *befehlstaktik* or "detailed tactics" Detailed tactics are more easily quantified, "tangible metrics at the expense of holistic understanding." Vandergriff, *Mission Command*, 51. Mission Command or *auftragstaktik* is a comprehensive leadership culture and cultural philosophy. Jorg Muth, "An Elusive Command Philosophy and a Different Command Culture" *Foreign Policy*, September 9, 2011. Vandergriff, *Mission Command*, 50.

³¹ Muth, *Command Culture*, 173.

³² Grenier, *First Way*, 3.

³³ I originally used the term "frontier" but the term does not entirely apply until after 1765, according to some authors. Prior to 1765, the term applied to the nebulous western edge of the colonies of Pennsylvania and Virginia was "backcountry". However, "backcountry" only applies when speaking of the English, then later British, empires since the "forward" focus was towards London. Andrew R. L. Cayton, and Frederika J. Teute eds, *Contact Points: American Frontiers from the Mohawk Valley to the Mississippi, 1750-1830*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 1-5. The colonial forward focus was increasingly west over the years, hence the term "frontier". As a result, I use the term "backcountry" in relation to imperial and Atlantic events, and "frontier" for colonial and Indian expansion.

pushed from the “top-down”, the constant fighting on the Pennsylvania frontier from 1750 to 1763 provided the foundation for a bottom-up process. Unwittingly, British and colonial military leaders found solutions to their problems on the Pennsylvania frontier remarkably similar to those found by the Prussians.

Several indicators of decentralized military leadership appeared on both the Pennsylvania frontier and Prussia. These indicators were: the use of light infantry, disciplined initiative among aggressive offensive minded commanders and subordinates, operational diplomacy, secure offensive bases of operation, and the use of situational expertise to better inform decision making.³⁴

The command culture of the Pennsylvania frontier’s most effective practitioners favored disciplined and trained light infantry who could take advantage of open order tactics and autonomous operations. Static defenses and closed-order formations provided only temporary refuges and were vulnerable to cunning light infantry under creative and aggressive leaders on the Pennsylvania frontier. The Pennsylvania frontier forced individual initiative and voluntarism on its inhabitants and leaders to combat the French and Indian threat.

The willingness of frontier commanders to take on responsibility for defending their home region almost always meant going on the offensive because only offensive maneuver yielded positive decisive results. With no enemy capitals to threaten, moral conflict ruled warfare on the frontier and only its masterful application brought decisive results.³⁵ Operational

³⁴ T.N. Dupuy, *A Genius For War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807-1945* (Falls Church: NOVA Publications, 1984), 12-36, 25-43. Peter Paret, *Clausewitz and the State*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), 3-12, 327-395. Peter Paret, *Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform, 1807-1815*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 20-21, 23-46, 37, 175-179, et al. White, *Enlightened*, 58-60, 62, 76-80, 122-124, 138-139.

³⁵ Coram, *Boyd*, 33, 7.

diplomacy yielded tactical effects which were exploited by independent decision makers working within the overall commander's intent. The contract and mutual trust between superiors and subordinates gave the leadership on the frontier the flexibility and agility to overcome the military prowess and superior expertise of their opponents.

There was neither an organized Pennsylvania provincial militia nor British military garrison on the frontier to protect against French and allied Indian attacks. The first to respond to the French and Indian threat were the frontier traders, who had the deepest connections with the Indian nations on the frontier and the most to lose from the disruption of commerce. Accustomed to the inherent risk of frontier trading and possessing a deep knowledge of the volatile dynamics of the frontier, traders such as George Croghan and Jon Fraser were the first colonial leaders willing to respond to the emerging threat in the Ohio Country. Colonial and Indian leaders with deep ties and interests to the frontier, most notably Mingo chief Tanaghrisson and Virginia militia officer George Washington, also attempted to mitigate the French threat, first through diplomacy and then through force. As relations with the Ohio Indians deteriorated, the colonial leaders from the towns on the frontier followed the traders' example and organized a response to the new danger. Religious leaders such as Conrad Weiser, colonial leaders such as Benjamin Franklin, and influential local leaders such as John Armstrong, among many others, took charge of the defense of the frontier. As they waited, mostly in vain, for the political leaders in New York, Philadelphia, Williamsburg, and London to make decisions and support their endeavors, they rallied the frontier population. Their agile and well considered actions reduced the casualties suffered in the frontier attacks, but their defensive response could not end death and destruction.

In the early 1750s, France and its Indian allies were more effective at offensive operations than were the British and colonials. British and colonial leaders understood the need

for offensive operations prior to the French and Indian War and in its early stages; however they struggled to adapt their offensive operations to the realities of the colonial frontier and the expertise of their opponents. Beginning in 1750, the French and their Indian allies went on the tactical and operational offensive against the British colonials, evicting many traders and killing others, while building forts to secure their communications between Quebec and Louisiana. The British and colonials responded with their own offensives: first by Colonel George Washington and later by General Edward Braddock. Both were defeated, not by French defenses, but by French and Indian attacks. These defeats led to widespread French and Indian raids along the frontier, to which the colonial leaders of Pennsylvania responded with ineffective static defenses.

The more technical and/or local knowledge was provided by individuals well versed in their areas of expertise. Due to the chaotic and complex nature of the frontier and back-country, diplomacy was conducted through “go-betweens” – cultural experts with long experience living on the frontier among the Indian nations.³⁶ Experts in reconnaissance, intelligence, logistics, diplomacy, politics, and engineering advised commanders on the best ways to navigate the intricacies of the Pennsylvania frontier. These advisors were selected based on merit, knowledge, and competence, and not because of their station. These experts formed nascent and rudimentary staffs that eventually became commonplace by the American Revolution. Conrad Weiser’s and Israel Pemberton’s knowledge of diplomacy, Franklin’s expertise in politics, Arthur St. Clair’s engineering expertise, George Washington’s operational experience, and James Baker’s intimate familiarity with Kittanning, among many other influences, were all instrumental in whatever limited and temporary successes British and colonial commanders achieved in the early days of

³⁶ James H. Merrell, *Into the American Woods; Negotiators on the Pennsylvania Frontier*, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1999) 1, 225-254.

the French and Indian War. Moreover, when this expertise was ignored or spurned, defeat often followed in its wake, as we shall see at the Battles of the Monongahela and Great Meadows.

The French commanders' greater experience on the frontier allowed them to leverage their most valuable warfighting asset: the light infantry warriors of their allied Indian nations of the *Pays d'en Haut*, or Upper Country, and the Ohio Country. Commanders required trust in their light infantry to not desert and maintain cohesion while adapting formations and tactics to the terrain. This trust was uncommon in the rigid linear tactics of eighteenth century warfare. In the early battles of the French and Indian War, the French and their Indian allies excelled at light infantry warfare and inflicted several defeats, and much frustration and consternation, on the British and colonial authorities on the frontier. Learning from the experiences, the colonials eventually used the French and Indian tactics against them.

The French and their Indian allies were unable to decisively exploit their victories early in the French and Indian War, and British and colonial commanders were permitted to learn from their experiences. Despite the French and Indian tactical advantages, New York, Philadelphia and Williamsburg were not seriously threatened. The British and colonials capitalized on this operational weakness and used the newfound knowledge to directly threaten Fort Duquesne and the Ohio Indian villages which formed the French and Indian bases of operation. From these limited successes and widespread defeats, came the hallmarks of mission command in the eighteenth century – trusted aggressive subordinates, disciplined light infantry, operational and tactical diplomatic and military operations, and specialist staffs under flexible, agile, intuitive, generalist commanders willing to accept responsibility for their subordinates' actions as well as their own. The surviving commanders, and several new commanders appointed to operate on the Pennsylvania frontier, internalized these lessons and used them to great effect in the second half

of the French and Indian War and the later during Pontiac's War. It took time and many setbacks for American colonials to develop their habits of decentralized military leadership. For the British and colonists, the warfighting lessons pertinent to the frontier had to be learned in combat and at the expense of the people they were charged to serve. Simultaneously, previous ways of fighting that worked well in other areas during King George's War, had to be slowly reformed at great expense to meet the challenges of the French and Indian War and Pontiac's War.

This study is shaped as a narrative, showing the slow and painful, but ultimately successful, development of a decentralized leadership culture in the British and colonial militaries. In chapter one, "Trial by Fire", I detail the leadership challenges and solutions during the undeclared war with the French and Indians on the Pennsylvania frontier up to and including Braddock's failed expedition against Fort Duquesne in 1755. With few militia and no British regulars initially, local colonial and Indian leaders who were used to acting independently, volunteered to stop French expansion. In chapter two, "Transition", I explore the transition of colonial military leadership on the frontier from reactive, ad hoc, and defensive to active, formal, and offensive, though only in a limited capacity. In chapter three, "Lessons Learned", I show the culmination of years of British and colonial warfighting and leadership experience. The successful campaigns by Forbes in 1758 against Fort Duquesne and Bouquet against Guyasuta in 1763 were characterized by decentralized and engaged British and colonial leadership using all of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic tools at their disposal.

Chapter 2 - Trial by Fire, 1750-1755

“*[The Ohio Country] – a Republic composed of all sorts of Nations*” – Cayuga sachem to Phillipe-Thomas Chabert de Joncaire, 1750.³⁷

The Undeclared War on the Frontier

In the wake of King George’s War British colonial traders and diplomats made important gains in the Pennsylvania backcountry and among the Ohio Indians. Pennsylvania traders, most notably George Croghan, had followed the transplanted nations west since their expulsion from the Lower Susquehanna Valley. Go-betweens like Conrad Weiser and Christopher Gist exploited their contacts, and a dearth of French-supplied trade goods, to expand British influence at the expense of France through the region. Virginia traders of the Ohio Company, such as John Fraser and William Trent, established trading posts around Logstown, an important Haudenosaunee and Ohio Indian trading village on the Ohio River above its convergence with the Allegheny and Monongahela Rivers. The French were forced to react, lest the link between Canada and Louisiana was broken permanently.

By 1749, the governor general of New France, Roland-Michel Barrin, the marquis de La Galissonnière, saw the threat the Virginia surveyors and Pennsylvania traders posed to the connection of Quebec to New Orleans through the Ohio Country. For fifty years, the French had used diplomacy and trade to break Haudenosaunee hegemony over the Ohio, Great Lakes, and Far Indians, or the French-allied Algonquians of the *Pays d’en Haut* and upper Mississippi Valley. Those choices no longer existed in 1750. La Galissonnière’s successor Jacques-Pierre de Taffanel de la Jonquière, the Marquis de la Jonquière saw no remaining options except forcibly

³⁷ E. B. O’Callaghan, and Berthold Fernow, eds. *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York, Vol. 10*, (Albany: Weed, Parsons, 1855), 206.

evicting the traders and establishing French military dominance in the Ohio Country to secure the vital link between Quebec and Louisiana.

The task of securing the Ohio Country for France fell to La Galissonière's protégé Michel-Ange Duquesne de Menneville after la Jonquière's sudden death in 1752. Between 1752 and 1754 it seemed that the traditional colonial roles were reversed on the frontier. Now it was France that was expanding its settlements, destroying Indian villages, and building forts, while the British colonials built alliances with trade.³⁸ In 1752, Weiser, Gist, and Croghan, and Mingo-Seneca Chief Tanaghrisson concluded the Treaty of Logstown which established trading posts, a plan to build a fort nearby for protection, and solidified Tanaghrisson's leadership over the Ohio Indians, independent of the Haudenosaunee.³⁹

The French and their Indian allies were not idle and responded to British colonial inroads with force. They drove the British and colonial traders from the Ohio Country and violently chastised the Ohio Indians for their desertion of the French and connections to the British colonial traders, especially at Pickawillany where an Ottawa, Chippewa, and Potawatomie war party led by French-Ottawa fur trader and war chief Charles Langlade destroyed the town and ritually ate Miami chief Memeskia.⁴⁰ As a result, the years of 1752 and 1753 were a time of

³⁸ McConnell, *A Country Between*, 87-88.

³⁹ William A. Hunter, *Forts on the Pennsylvania Frontier, 1753-1758* (Lewisburg: Wennawork Publishing, 1999), 14-15, 168. I have chosen to use "Tanaghrisson" since most historians seem to prefer that version, with noted exceptions of Sipe and most museums curators. I have left "Tanacharison" only when it is part of the title of a primary source document. Francis Jennings, *Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies and Tribes in the Seven Year War on America*, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1988), 21-45.

⁴⁰ Jennings, *Empire*, 49.

great hardship for the Ohio Indians.⁴¹

In 1753, a larger expedition of more than 2000 French soldiers and Indian warriors invaded the Ohio country. The French established a chain of forts securing their water transportation routes in the Ohio country. The first was Fort Presque Isle on Lake Erie, in May. In July, they built Fort Le Boeuf at the far end of the portage from Lake Erie to “Cattle River,” known today as French Creek. Then at the mouth of French Creek where it empties into the Allegheny River, they confiscated a British trading post called Venango and converted it into Fort Machault. The French used the forts to control operationally and logistically significant terrain features that allowed them to project force into the Ohio Country, their eventual object being the control of the Forks of the Ohio.⁴² It would take four more years, and several defeats in the Ohio Country, before the British learned that offensive operations in the Ohio Country needed secure bases of operation. In June, the British lost their greatest Indian ally when the Haudenosaunee declared their neutrality to the French at Presque Isle.⁴³

Simultaneously, in the summer of 1754, delegates from seven British colonies – Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island – and the Six Nations of the Haudenosaunee Confederacy met at Albany, New York.⁴⁴ The sachems from the Onondaga Council Fire were displeased with the British colonists and the

⁴¹ Albert T. Volwiler, *George Croghan and the Westward Movement 1741-1782*, (Lewisburg: Wennawoods Publishing, 2000), 36, 72-80. C. Hale Sipe, *Indian Chiefs of Pennsylvania*, (Lewisburg: Wennawoods Publishing, 1998), 181-182. Jennings, *Empire*, 46, 48-50

⁴² Charles Morse Stotz, *Outposts of the War for Empire: The French and English in Western Pennsylvania: Their Armies, Their Forts, Their People, 1749-1764* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005), 73-75.

⁴³ Jennings, *Empire*, 46, 52.

⁴⁴ Made famous by Benjamin Franklin’s plan to create a unified colonial administration in North America i.e. the “Join or Die” cartoon.

Ohio Indians for treating with one another directly, which gave the Ohio Indians pretenses of independence.⁴⁵ They did not openly support the French, but nor were they willing to help the British drive the French out of their western gains, at the expense of the Ohio Indians.⁴⁶

Diplomatic efforts led by representatives from Virginia and Pennsylvania, and by William Johnson a trader, friend of the Mohawk, and the Crown's Indian agent in North America, failed to evict the French. The British colonies struggled to make headway against the French and their allies. The militia of the Virginia Regiment were defeated by the French and their Far Indian allies at the Forks of the Ohio and the Battle of Great Meadows in July, 1754. Moreover, Pennsylvania had little militia of its own to speak of, and that which it did have were volunteers paid with private funds.⁴⁷ Frustrated by the lack of colonial cooperation against the French, the Newcastle government in London decided that only regular troops from Europe could eject the French from the Ohio Country.

Colonial Military Leadership during the Undeclared War on the Frontier in the Early 1750s

Pennsylvanians had a history of volunteering for frontier defense and militia duty. With no appropriations for defense in any of the previous French and Indian Wars, Pennsylvanians were left to defend themselves and the political gridlock in Philadelphia spawned voluntary militias. Pennsylvanians formed their own militias, as Benjamin Franklin did with the “voluntary

⁴⁵ Jennings, *Empire*, 98-100.

⁴⁶ William A. Pencak, Christian B. Keller, and Barbara A. Gannon, *Pennsylvania: A Military History* (Yardley: Westholme Publishing, LLC, 2016), 24. David Dixon, *Never Come to Peace Again: Pontiac's Uprising and the Fate of the British Empire in North America* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2005), 29. Pencak, Keller, and Gannon, 38. Jennings, *Empire*, 98-100.

⁴⁷ Alexander V. Campbell, *The Royal American Regiment, An Atlantic Microcosm, 1755-1772*, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2010), 15-23.

associations” in Philadelphia during King George’s War. These associations of volunteers were uniquely American invention.⁴⁸ The “Associators”, and the smaller militia companies on the frontier formed around the same time and under the same circumstances, provided the nucleus and leadership of the regiment formed a decade later during the French and Indian War.⁴⁹ Pennsylvanians were even forced to defend themselves from other colonies. During “Cresap’s War” against colonists from Maryland, Pennsylvanians formed volunteer militia companies to stop raids on homesteads by Maryland militia.⁵⁰

The diplomatic, commercial, and political efforts of several influential men ended French influence in the upper Ohio Valley. Conrad Weiser was the most influential man in Pennsylvania in his areas of expertise – Indian politics and religion. Weiser’s frontier knowledge and Indian diplomacy were not developed for trade with Indians but to build on his religious convictions and his commitment to bring Christianity to his Indian neighbors. A “pillar of the Lutheran Church”, and patron of Moravian missions to the Indian nations Weiser was a true “jack of all trades” on the Pennsylvania frontier, as at home in a small frontier homestead as he was at an Haudenosaunee council or a Philadelphia ball.⁵¹ Working on behalf of Pennsylvania, Weiser organized an expedition to spread the word of the upcoming council at Lancaster in 1748 was notably on behalf of Pennsylvania, and not for William Johnson and the Haudenosaunee.⁵²

⁴⁸ Newland, *Pennsylvania Militia*, 41.

⁴⁹ William A. Hunter, *Forts on the Pennsylvania Frontier, 1753-1758*, (Lewisburg: Wennawork Publishing, 1999), 170. Newland, *Pennsylvania Militia*, 71.

⁵⁰ Sperro, *Frontier*, 77-98. Sipe, *War*, 496.

⁵¹ Wallace, *Weiser*, 1.

⁵² William Johnson was Crown’s Indian agent in North America and primary “go-between” with Haudenosaunee, especially the Mohawk. The then English Empire and the Haudenosaunee formed the Covenant Chain in 1675. The Covenant Chain was a multiparty confederation with affiliated allied tributaries. The Covenant Chain dominated Haudenosaunee and British Crown Indian relations for nearly century until the American Revolution. The “steering

It was the first diplomatic expedition for which he was singly responsible. Weiser was wildly successful and dozens of Ohio Indian chiefs and sachems arrived in Lancaster, including chiefs from the Miami Indians in the distant Wabash River Valley.⁵³ They came to discuss frontier matters, including trade and defense, with Pennsylvania diplomats led by Benjamin Franklin. Franklin was the most influential man in the Pennsylvania Assembly's Quaker Party and the Penn family Proprietary Party's nemesis in Philadelphia. A printer, writer, bookseller, and amateur scientist, Franklin took to colonial politics like Croghan and Weiser took to Indian politics. Croghan's trading acumen, Weiser's knowledge of Indian rituals and culture, and Franklin's deal making and diplomatic savvy resulted in the "Chain of Friendship" between the Ohio Indians and Pennsylvania which replaced most Haudenosaunee and French influence in the Ohio Country.⁵⁴

The indefatigable Irish-born Pennsylvania trader and entrepreneur George Croghan was already a fixture on the Pennsylvania frontier since his arrival in 1741. Croghan was among the most influential men in Pennsylvania in his area of expertise – trading and Indian politics. George Croghan was in the vanguard of British traders who pushed further and further west to maintain contact with Ohio Country Indians. He was a veteran Indian diplomat and wise in the complex tangle of cultures intermixed on the frontier.⁵⁵ Early on, Croghan established his trading headquarters for the next decade west of Harris' Ferry at Aughwick near a gap in the

committee" of the Covenant Chain was the British Crown colony of New York and the Haudenosaunee "Keepers of the Eastern Door" the Mohawk nation. Jennings, *Ambiguous*, 9, 148-149, 167.

⁵³ Wallace, *Weiser*, 159-161,

⁵⁴ Jennings, *Empire*, 87-88.

⁵⁵ Albert T. Volwiler, *George Croghan and the Westward Movement, 1741-1782*, (Lewisburg: Wennawoods Publishing, 2000), 1.

Blue Mountains. Along with Carlisle and Shippensburg, “Croghan’s Gap” was a frequent stop for Indians and traders moving across the mountains, and the site of one of the first defensive forts erected by frontier leaders.⁵⁶ When the Haudenosaunee abandoned Shamokin and the Susquehanna Indians moved west to merge with the Ohio Indians, Croghan’s packhorse trains were not far behind. Known as “the Buck” to the Haudenosaunee and Ohio Indians, Croghan could not only speak Haudenosaunee and Algonquin, he was well versed in their customs, ceremonies, and their “figurative” speech.⁵⁷ In the late 1740s, during and after King George’s War Croghan ventured west on the Haudenosaunee “Great Trail” that ran from Shamokin to Detroit establishing trading posts in Indian villages along the way. Apart from the one he established at Logstown, Croghan also established trading posts at the mouths of Beaver and Venango Creeks, among others. Croghan also received permission in 1750 to build a fort at the Forks of the Ohio.⁵⁸ Following Indian trade routes further west, Croghan, adopted into the Seneca nation, became known to the Ohio Indians as “The Trader to the Indians seated on Lake Erie.” As he expanded his trading network into previously French-dominated areas including doing business until he was conducting “business just outside the gates of Fort DeTroit”.⁵⁹ With Ohio Indian allies, most prominently Memeskia, Croghan started a low-level insurgency to drive out his French competition, and their political influence, from the Ohio Country.⁶⁰

Initiative, agility and cultural expertise were not limited to the colonials in the run up to

⁵⁶ Volwiler, *Croghan*, 32-33.

⁵⁷ Volweiler, *Croghan*, 44-45.

⁵⁸ "George Croghan to the Governor of Pennsylvania," December 16, 1750, *Pennsylvania Colonial* (Harrisburg, PA: Theo. Fenn & Co., 1851) 496-497. Merrell, *Woods*, 208-209.

⁵⁹ Volweiler, *Croghan*, 35. Dixon, *Peace*, 20.

⁶⁰ Jennings, *Empire*, 36.

the French and Indian War. In 1749, the governor general of New France, the Marquis de La Galissonière had sent Celèron de Blainville with 300 troops on an unsuccessful mission to reestablish French control of the region. Unable to persuade the Ohio Indians with diplomacy, trade, or de Blainville's show of force, the French turned to a military solution as British colonial traders continued to evict French influence from the Ohio River watershed.

The French arrogance infuriated Tanaghrisson, the Haudenosaunee's chosen viceroy over the Ohio Indians.⁶¹ The independence-minded Tanaghrisson was a half-Catawba and Mingo half-king with dreams of a sovereign Ohio Indian nation, free of French, Haudenosaunee, and (eventually) colonial and British influence.⁶² But the pragmatic Tanaghrisson knew he needed British trade goods, so in the Haudenosaunee diplomatic tradition, he decided to set everyone – British, French, Colonials, and Haudenosaunee alike – against each other. Tanaghrisson's council at Logstown in May 1752 was a who's who of frontier fixers, "go-betweens", diplomats, and traders assembled to conclude a treaty to keep the trade goods flowing: Marylander Christopher Gist and Virginian William Trent of the Ohio Company, Joshua Fry from Virginia, George Croghan from Pennsylvania, and many Miami, Seneca, Delaware, Shawnee, and Mingo chiefs, all of whom were upset with the way they were treated by de Blainville two years before.⁶³ At the conference, Tanaghrisson agreed that Pennsylvania and Virginia could reestablish their trading posts along the Ohio at a more defensible locations where Chartier's

⁶¹ Jennings, *Empire*, 41.

⁶² Sipe, *Chiefs*, 179-212. Jennings, *Empire*, 39-54.

⁶³ Merrel, *Woods*, 32. "The Treaty of Logstown, 1752," VMHB, 13, (1906), 156-172.

Creek empties into the Ohio River.⁶⁴ As a representative of the Ohio Company, William Trent enthusiastically volunteered to build a fort there to protect against a repeat of de Blainville's expedition.⁶⁵ Finally, Tanaghrisson renewed his fealty to King George and expected to be treated no different than any other colonial governor.⁶⁶ The Treaty of Logstown was approved in 1752.⁶⁷ The Seneca quickly returned to Onondaga to report the half-king for usurping Haudenosaunee's authority and violating their express orders to maintain strict neutrality between the French and British.⁶⁸ Tanaghrisson and other Ohio Indian leaders travelled to Fort Presque Isle to demand the French leave, but the French forcibly rebuffed their ultimatums.⁶⁹

In January 1754, Virginia's Governor Robert Dinwiddie commissioned William Trent, a trader, captain in the militia and ordered him to raise a hundred men to build and defend the new fort.⁷⁰ Trent's men were mostly displaced former Indian traders.⁷¹ He finally arrived at the proposed site at the mouth of Chartiers Creek in February 1754, after cutting a road from Cumberland, Maryland to the junction of Redstone Creek and the Monongahela River. But at the

⁶⁴ Tanacharison at Logstown Council, January 28, 1754, Colonial Records 5, 734–735. Tanaghrisson agreed as it was below the Ohio-Monongahela River boundary that he considered the southern boundary of his new realm. Jennings, *Empire*, 44.

⁶⁵ It was at this council where a Delaware chief asked Gist that "You English claim the south of the (Ohio) river, and the French the north. Where is the Indian land?" Dixon, *Peace*, 21, 48. Tanaghrisson endorsed Trent's Fort as a way to protect everyone's claims.

⁶⁶ Sipe, *Chiefs*, 180-181.

⁶⁷ "The Treaty of Logstown, 1752," VMHB, 13, (1906), 156-172.

⁶⁸ Colin G. Calloway, *The Indian World of George Washington: The First President, The First Americans, and the Birth of the Nation*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 58-64.

⁶⁹ Anderson, *Washington Remembers*, 31. Pencak, Keller, and Gannon, *Pennsylvania*, 21. Sipe, *Chiefs*, 185.

⁷⁰ Anderson, *George Washington Remembers*, 34.

⁷¹ Matthew C Ward, *Breaking the Backcountry: The Seven Years' War in Virginia and Pennsylvania, 1754-1765*, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2003), 49.

suggestion of another captain of the Virginia militia, a young 21-year-old George Washington, Trent decided to move the fort to a far superior position at the Forks of the Ohio about a mile away across the Monongahela.⁷² Trent was loath to break the Logstown Treaty but the site set in the treaty was redundant if the forks of the Ohio River were in friendly hands and untenable if they were in French hands. Moreover, Trent, a fur trader himself, had a small post near the new site and he would be able to stay out of the elements at night as the weather got colder without having to row across the river twice a day. Trent broke ground on “Fort Prince George” at the Forks of the Ohio on 17 February 1754. Tanaghrisson laid the first log of the first building: the storehouse.⁷³

George Washington was not part of Trent’s expedition, but was just returning from his own diplomatic mission for Governor Robert Dinwiddie in December of 1753 to warn the French to leave.⁷⁴ Tanaghrisson reported the French rejection of his ultimatum to the Ohio Company of which Dinwiddie was a member. In September 1753, Dinwiddie received word from the Duke of Newcastle, the Secretary of State for the Southern Department, that he was authorized to use force to expel the French from the Ohio Country.⁷⁵ Dinwiddie charged Washington to formally declare to the French that the Ohio Country was a British possession and then respectfully demand their withdrawal. Washington enthusiastically left Williamsburg with Christopher Gist as his guide on 31 October. At Logstown, Washington befriended Mingo war chief Guyasuta (or Kiasutha), known to Washington as “The Hunter” to act as a guide, along

⁷² Hugh Cleland, ed., *George Washington in the Ohio Valley* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Press, 1955), 6.

⁷³ Deposition of Ensign Edward Ward," June 30, 1754, Bailey, ed., *The Ohio Company Papers*, 28. Pencak, Keller, and Gannon, 22. Anderson, *George Washington Remembers*, 36.

⁷⁴ Cleland, *Washington*. 60, 67.

⁷⁵ Anderson, *George Washington Remembers*, 34.

with several other Indians.⁷⁶ The party was politely rebuffed by the French officers at Venango who asserted that the Ohio Country was French and had been for almost a hundred years.⁷⁷

When Washington returned, Dinwiddie promoted him to major and authorized him to raise 100 more men to assist and resupply Trent, and to take over construction and garrison of the fort. However, Washington's recruiting effort was delayed and by the middle of March 1754, Trent was running out of provisions. Trent left the fort to travel back down the road to request more supplies from Dinwiddie, leaving his second, Lieutenant John Fraser, in command.⁷⁸

John Fraser was also a fur trader, and he had only accepted his commission on the condition he was able to conduct his business simultaneously.⁷⁹ As soon as Trent departed, Fraser also left for his own trading post eight miles up the Monongahela leaving young Ensign Edward Ward in charge.⁸⁰ Despite Ward's and Tanaghrisson's best efforts, they only constructed a hasty palisade around the completed storehouse before the French arrived. On 17 April, 600 French regulars and another 400 militia and Indians under Captain Claude-Pierre Pécaudy de Contrecoeur landed from the river just outside musket range.⁸¹

Ward and Tanaghrisson's 41 men were no match and they surrendered that day. Contrecoeur tore down the palisade and began building a fort of his own, Duquesne. Fort Duquesne was a star fort in the European style and after completion would be nearly

⁷⁶ Koontz, *Virginia*, 49-52

⁷⁷ Anderson, *George Washington Remembers*, 33. Koontz, *Virginia*, 51-52.

⁷⁸ Mulkearn, ed., *George Mercer Papers*, 86-87. Koontz, *Virginia*, 53-56.

⁷⁹ Washington to Dinwiddie 12 June 1754 in *Writings of George Washington*, Fitzpatrick. "Ensign Ward's Deposition," May 7, 1754, Darlington, ed., *Gist's Journals*, 278. 68.

⁸⁰ Douglas MacGregor, "The Shot Not Heard around the World: Trent's Fort and the Opening of the War for Empire," *PH 74* (Summer 2007): 366-368.

⁸¹ Sipe, *Chiefs*, 198-199

impregnable against any small colonial force lacking siege artillery.⁸² Though technically the French capture of Trent's Fort was an act of war, there were no casualties on either side.⁸³ After Ward informed Washington of the loss, Washington requested artillery and reinforcements from Dinwiddie, and more information from Tanaghrisson.⁸⁴

After being rebuffed by Pennsylvania, Tanaghrisson and Scarouady, an Oneida chief and half king over the Ohio Shawnee, asked Virginia for arms to fight the French.⁸⁵ Governor Robert Dinwiddie responded by suggesting an expansion of Trent's Fort at the Forks of the Ohio, and an expedition of Virginia militia under Colonel Joshua Fry. Fry was a professor of mathematics and natural philosophy at William and Mary.⁸⁶ Tanaghrisson and the Ohio Indians wanted British traders but not British settlers, which an expansion of the trading fort would most certainly bring. However, at Fort Cumberland in Maryland, Fry died falling off of his horse and command of the expedition went to Washington.⁸⁷

After Fry's death in May, Dinwiddie promoted Washington to lieutenant colonel and

⁸² Sipe, *Chiefs*, 198-199. Mulkearn, ed., *George Mercer Papers*, 623.

⁸³ Anderson, *War*, 46. A French fort at the forks of the Ohio made any colonial trading posts on any of its tributaries untenable and unprofitable. This was an unacceptable situation for Tanaghrisson. The French had to be removed. But Tanaghrisson did not personally lead enough men to do it himself, and he would receive no assistance from his erstwhile, and now estranged, superiors, the Haudenosaunee. The only remaining option was to remove the French from the Forks of the Ohio. Tanaghrisson's authority depended on British trade goods. In order to maintain his position as the chief Indian power broker in the Ohio Country, Tanaghrisson needed a war between Britain and France. Tanaghrisson feared that without spilt blood the possibility existed for a French and British diplomatic settlement, especially if the French finished the fort before Washington could adequately attack.

⁸⁴ "Ensign Ward's Deposition," May 7, 1754, Darlington, ed., *Gist's Journals*, 280. Washington to Dinwiddie April 1754 in *Writings of George Washington*, Fitzpatrick.

⁸⁵ Hunter, *Forts*, 14-15, 168, Sperro, 25-26.

⁸⁶ Anderson, *George Washington Remembers*, 32.

⁸⁷ Anderson, *George Washington Remembers*, 32, 119. Cleland, *George Washington*, 67.

reinforced him with more Virginians and a company of South Carolina militia sent by the southern colony to assist Virginia.⁸⁸ On 24 May 1754, Washington received a letter from Tanaghrisson that the French were on their way to defeat him and Tanaghrisson asked Washington to strike first. Washington, who assumed hostilities between the French and British empires had already begun with the loss of Fort Prince George the month before, agreed and decided to attack.⁸⁹ The camp described by Tanaghrisson was that of Ensign Joseph Coulon de Villiers Sieurs de Jumonville accompanied by 40 French marines and Canadian militia. Jumonville was moving toward Washington, not to attack him, but to demand his withdrawal from French territory, a mission identical to the one Washington had performed at Venango.

Washington took forty men of Wagoner's company to meet Tanaghrisson outside the French camp. He was surprised to find Tanaghrisson and Scarouady had just twelve Mingo warriors with them, two of whom were little more than boys.⁹⁰ Nevertheless, the young Washington was committed since he did not want to lose face in front of the respected half-king. Washington and the half-king sortied from Great Meadows with about forty men to confront the French. At Tanaghrisson's urging, they ambushed the French force while they were cooking breakfast in a small glen on the morning of 28 May 1754.

The Battle of Jumonville Glen lasted less than fifteen minutes before a wounded Jumonville surrendered his small command after Tanaghrisson cut off any escape.⁹¹ Ten French

⁸⁸ Anderson, *George Washington Remembers*, 16, 36.

⁸⁹ Washington to Dinwiddie 18 May 1754 in *Writings of George Washington*, Fitzpatrick. Washington to Dinwiddie 12 June 1754 in *ibid.*

⁹⁰ Washington to Journal 27 May 1754 in *Writings of George Washington*, Fitzpatrick.

⁹¹ "The Pennsylvania Gazette, June 27th 1754, September 19th, 1754; George Washington to Robert Dinwiddie, May 29th, 1754, in *Writings of George Washington*, Fitzpatrick.

marines were killed and 21 more captured. As the prisoners were sorted, Tanaghrisson found Jumonville. In front of Washington, their men and the prisoners, he tomahawked Jumonville and then scalped him.⁹²

Tanaghrisson got his war. The loss of Trent's Fort, or Fort Prince George as it was known to the Ohio Company, was arguably the first act of war between Britain and France that would eventually grow into the Seven Years' War or the French and Indian War as it was known in North America but the murder of Jumoville sparked the war into life.⁹³ When the news reached London, Sir Horace Walpole quipped on Washington, "The volley fired by a young Virginian in the backwoods of America has just set the world on fire."⁹⁴

With no direct support from any British or colonial authorities, the Indians of the Ohio Country did not rally to throw out the French invaders. When Fry died in a riding accident, George Washington seamlessly took command of Virginia's forces on the frontier, but no Indian army reinforced Washington's meager force.⁹⁵ Washington withdrew to Great Meadows where he hastily constructed the aptly named "Fort Necessity," a simple poorly constructed circular palisade surrounded by trenches which Tanaghrisson called, "that little thing upon the meadow."⁹⁶ Washington received reinforcements and his command grew to over 400, many more than Fort Necessity could shelter, but too few to drive the French out of the region. Nonetheless Washington was certain he could defeat a French force sent against him and stood

⁹² "The Pennsylvania Gazette, June 27th 1754, September 19th, 1754; Jennings, *Empire*, 69.

⁹³ MacGregor, "Shot", 354-73.

⁹⁴ Dixon, *Peace*, 26-27.

⁹⁵ Pencak, Keller, and Gannon, *Pennsylvania*, 23.

⁹⁶ Hunter 57-59, McConnell, *A Country Between*, 110-111

on the defensive instead of either retreating or seeking out and attacking French forces.⁹⁷ When the French arrived, they did not oblige Washington's attempt to force a field battle. Instead, the French and their Indian allies laid siege to the fort. Fort Necessity was poorly placed, and Washington faced rampant discipline problems.⁹⁸ Washington saw no choice but to surrender after the French offered surprisingly lenient terms.⁹⁹ Instead of a "charming little encounter," Washington ingloriously succumbed to the larger, but not overwhelming, French and Indian force sent to expel him from the Ohio country.¹⁰⁰ At Great Meadows, George Washington learned serious lessons in command and in the ways of frontier warfare. Withdrawing to fight another day and the primacy of offensive warfare were but two. The lessons served him well in the American Revolution but they were costly: the French and their Indian allies were the undisputed masters of the Ohio Country.¹⁰¹

Braddock's Expedition

The colonies needed a coordinated response to the French aggression in the Ohio country and the French and Indian raiding that historically occurred along the New England, Pennsylvania, and New York frontiers at the advent of war with the French and Indians. In response to the French victories in the Ohio Country, the new prime minister of Great Britain, the Duke of Newcastle, dispatched an expeditionary force led by General Edward Braddock to

⁹⁷ George Washington to Robert Dinwiddie, May 1754, in *The Writings of George Washington*, Fitzpatrick; and George Washington to Robert Dinwiddie, May 9th 1754, *ibid.*.

⁹⁸ *The Pennsylvania Gazette*, August 1st 1754. George Washington to Robert Dinwiddie, March 20th 1754, in *Writings of George Washington*, Fitzpatrick. George Washington to Robert Dinwiddie, May 18th 1754, in *Writings of George Washington*, Fitzpatrick; and George Washington to Robert Dinwiddie, May 9th, 1754, in *Ibid.*.

⁹⁹ Koontz, *Virginia Frontier*, 57

¹⁰⁰ *Writings of George Washington*, Fitzpatrick. Pencak, Keller, and Gannon, *Pennsylvania*, 23.

¹⁰¹ *The Pennsylvania Gazette*, August 1st, 1754.

North America to dislodge the French.

In the winter of 1755, British planners in Whitehall secretly authorized a “madly ambitious” four-pronged assault to throw the French out of North America.¹⁰² Their plan did not account for realities of distance, climate, ecology, and logistics, nor did it show any regard for colonial and Indian warfare, culture, and politics in North America. One prong was to seize the French forts south of the Great Lakes. This task was assigned to a regular British Army officer, Major-General Edward Braddock and his two understrength regiments, the 44th and 48th, who sailed for Virginia in the spring of 1755. Braddock’s mission was ambitious: follow Washington’s and Gist’s trail north, capture all of the recently placed French forts in the Ohio Country, proceed up Lake Erie, capture Fort Niagara, and head east to link up with another prong sent to clear the French from Montreal.¹⁰³ To prepare to implement this fantastical plan, Braddock demanded support from Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and the Carolinas. Braddock browbeat the governors, assemblies, and the Ohio Company demanding men and resources at the Alexandria conference in April 1755. Braddock’s expedition grew to an impressive size: 2100 men with siege cannon, field pieces and heavy mortars capable of breaching Fort Duquesne if need be, and all the support necessary to make the trek across the Appalachian Mountains. Braddock was assured full cooperation of the colonies and of the Indian nations allied with the British.

Despite ending in a decisive military defeat, Braddock’s expedition showed that the British and colonial militaries and societies were developing a military culture capable of winning the war on the Pennsylvania frontier. Many colonists volunteered their support despite

¹⁰² Anderson, *Crucible*, 88.

¹⁰³ Preston, *Braddock*, 30-31.

their own circumstances and the realities on the ground, and even against the wishes of their colonial legislatures. To assist the expedition Braddock used experienced frontiersmen such as Gist and Croghan to act as guides.¹⁰⁴ He also employed teams of civilian wagon drivers: one of the most famous was an ornery young Virginian named Daniel Morgan, who followed the road Braddock cut on his way to seize Fort Duquesne.¹⁰⁵ Due to the gridlock with Pennsylvania's General Assembly, Braddock's wagon trains were assembled by Franklin outside of any official capacity in Pennsylvania.¹⁰⁶ Franklin swayed Braddock against the Proprietors, and ingratiated himself to Braddock, who commented later on the "industriousness" of the Pennsylvanians.¹⁰⁷

Benjamin Franklin of Pennsylvania assembled 150 wagons for baggage and supply of the expedition.¹⁰⁸ Working against the Proprietary politics that had plagued Pennsylvania's defense spending for the last 60 years, Franklin found Pennsylvania's niche in logistics. Unwilling to be seen as a "pacifist", a position that was politically toxic in Pennsylvania in 1754, but unable to budge the Penn family's negative stance on taxation of their property, Franklin positioned himself as supporting the troops by soliciting donations to buy wagons and hire teamsters for the expedition. Braddock was deeply grateful for Franklin's assistance, saying that Virginia and Maryland "had promised everything and performed nothing," while Pennsylvania "had promised nothing and performed everything."¹⁰⁹

Though overbearing and dismissive of many aspects of his soldiers' lives, Braddock

¹⁰⁴ Preston, *Braddock*, 201, 217.

¹⁰⁵ Pencak, Keller, and Gannon, *Pennsylvania*, 27.

¹⁰⁶ Preston, *Braddock*, 294-295.

¹⁰⁷ Stanley Pargellis, ed. *Military Affairs in North America, 1748-1765: Selected Documents from the Cumberland Papers in Windsor Castle*, (London: Acton Books, 1969), 84-85.

¹⁰⁸ Preston, *Braddock*, 294-295.

¹⁰⁹ Bornemen, *French and Indian War*, 48-49.

nonetheless micromanaged the preparations for the expedition, trying to tailor his army for fighting in the French in North America. Braddock was meticulous and exhausting in every aspect of his preparations for the expedition, and even adapted his men's equipment to the realities of the Allegheny wilderness.¹¹⁰ He left behind the ceremonial equipment: NCOs' halberds, the officers' spontoons (short pikes) and the soldiers' hangers (short swords).¹¹¹ He even had gaiters crafted for his men, to protect them on the march, and had new lighter weight linen waistcoats and breeches tailored for the men, since the wool ones were "unsupportable" in the heat.¹¹² Braddock took a direct professional interest in nearly every aspect of the expedition's planning and preparation, except Indian affairs. As a result, most Ohio Indians did not just refuse to assist the British, but actively sided with the French for the upcoming campaign.

Although eager to accept Pennsylvania's unofficial assistance through Franklin in securing wagons and teamsters, Braddock did not accept Franklin's assistance in Indian affairs. Franklin offered the services of George Croghan and warned, "The events of war are subject to great uncertainty."¹¹³ Braddock dismissed the warning. The frontier was much more complex than Braddock arrogantly believed. Braddock did not ignore Indian affairs, he just delegated it to William Johnson. Johnson was one of the most knowledgeable Europeans on the continent in the intricacies of frontier diplomacy. But Johnson's experience was mostly with the Mohawk, who promoted the fiction that the other four nations and the Ohio Indians would follow their lead.¹¹⁴ Nevertheless Croghan, the quintessential "go-between," worked independently to smooth any

¹¹⁰ Pagellis *North America*, 83.

¹¹¹ St. Clair to Napier, February 15, 1755, *JSCL*, 30. Preston, *Braddock*, 85.

¹¹² Preston, *Braddock*, 84.

¹¹³ Walter Isaacson, *Benjamin Franklin: An American Life*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2003), 108.

¹¹⁴ Preston, *Braddock*, 205-306.

difficulties and tried to maintain colonial and Indian relations.¹¹⁵ The good relations with the Ohio Indians, whose aims to expel the French and Great Lakes Indians from the Ohio Country clearly aligned with the colonials and the British, did not survive a council with Braddock.

Croghan, working outside of Johnson's influence, arranged a meeting between the Ohio Indian chiefs and Braddock.¹¹⁶ Six chiefs and their entourages participated, including the Delaware chief Shingas, Mingo half king Scarouady from the Shawnee. The French had brought their Indian allies to Fort Duquesne from the Great Lakes, and the Ohio Indians were keen to have them removed. Braddock alienated the chiefs almost immediately. The only question of importance to the Ohio Indians was whether the British would allow settlers into the Ohio Valley. Braddock replied unconditionally, "No savage shall inherit the land."¹¹⁷ All but seven Mingo warriors departed. When told of Braddock's response, most of the Shawnee warriors, and many of the Delaware, joined the French.

Edward Braddock was a confident and experienced officer who had fought in all Great Britain's continental wars in the previous 40 years and was member of one of its finest regiments, the Coldstream Guards. Though blunt, uncouth, and boorish, he was a "soldiers' general" and cared deeply for his men, like his idol, the Duke of Marlborough.¹¹⁸ Braddock's expedition consisted of the two British regiments, 700 mostly Virginia militia, 50 sailors to assist with the ropes to haul the wagons over the mountains, and experienced frontiersmen such as Gist

¹¹⁵ Preston, *Braddock*, 113-117. *Minutes*, 483.

¹¹⁶ Volwiler, *Croghan*, 90-99.

¹¹⁷ Daniel P. Barr, "'A road for warriors:' The Western Delawares and The Seven Years War." *Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies* 73, no. 1 (January 1, 2006), 27-28. Brady J. Crytzer, *War in the Peaceable Kingdom: the Kittanning Raid of 1756* (Yardley, PA: Westholme Publishing LLC., 2016), 58-59. Anderson, *Crucible*, 95.

¹¹⁸ Preston, *Braddock*, 46-47.

and Croghan to act as guides.¹¹⁹

Conspicuously absent were Indian allies. Some Cherokee warriors were hired from farther south: but they grew bored and, though showered with gifts, chafed under Braddock's disdain for Indians.¹²⁰ Even the faithful Scarouady said of Braddock, "He looked upon us as dogs, and would never hear anything that was said to him."¹²¹ Braddock had no respect for the Indian warriors he expected to encounter in the ensuing campaign. Benjamin Franklin wrote to Braddock and warned him that his only fear was from "ambuscade by Indians." To this Braddock replied: "The savages may indeed be a formidable enemy to your raw American militia, but upon the King's regulars and disciplined troops, Sir, it is impossible they should make an impression."¹²² Despite his disdain for Indian warriors, virtually all of his intelligence on French dispositions was from Indian scouts, who scoured the countryside, according to Washington.¹²³ Braddock did however send Christopher Gist to scout Fort Duquesne in order to independently confirm the reports of his few remaining Indian scouts.¹²⁴ Nonetheless, few battles in colonial America ended with European troops victorious against the indigenous people without either the assistance of other indigenous troops or the use of light troops. Braddock's expedition was no different.

The regulars of the 44th and 48th were garrison units in the Irish establishment, who had

¹¹⁹ Pencak, Keller, and Gannon, *Pennsylvania*, 27.

¹²⁰ Dixon, *Peace*, 31.

¹²¹ Sipe, *Chiefs*, 230. Preston, *Braddock*, 201, although Preston attributes this quote to Pennsylvania officials, not Scarouady.

¹²² Pencak, Keller, and Gannon, *Pennsylvania*, 26. Dixon, *Peace*, 31.

¹²³ Pargelis, *North America*, 85. George Washington to Augustine Washington, June 28th 1755, in *Writings of George Washington*, Fitzpatrick.

¹²⁴ Preston, *Braddock*, 201.

seen limited action since the Jacobite Rebellion of 1745. Among the officers of the 44th was young Lieutenant Charles Lee. With the exception of a few officers, the men of neither regiment had been in battle or even on campaign.¹²⁵ Due to their garrison duties, they rarely drilled at the company level, much less drilled together.¹²⁶ Spread out in small platoon formation across the countryside, the strict rhythm and monotony of garrison duty in Ireland meant that most junior officers knew nothing of life on campaign, and they knew little of the manual of drill beyond what was needed for daily tasks.¹²⁷ For the expedition to America, the two regiments were reinforced by stripping other Irish regiments. Still far below their authorized strength, the two regiments recruited in Virginia to make up the shortfall.¹²⁸ The lack of training, monotonous garrison duty, the influx of large numbers of new and unmotivated troops, and the new operating environment had a serious detrimental effect on unit cohesion.

¹²⁵ Preston, *Braddock*, 55-58.

¹²⁶ Preston, *Braddock*, 108.

¹²⁷ Preston, *Braddock*, 56-57.

¹²⁸ Pargellis, *North American Military Affairs*, 34.



Map 3. Braddock's route, 1755, Fort Cumberland to Fort Pitt. (Library of Congress).¹²⁹

With few Indian allies, Braddock's expedition departed Fort Cumberland late in May 1755, led by Scarouady, his six remaining Mingo warriors, George Croghan and Braddock's chief of scouts, Lieutenant John Fraser, who had a trading post on the Monongahela about 12 miles from Fort Duquesne.¹³⁰ They followed the path that Fraser usually took to his post, the same one Washington had followed the previous year. The trail advanced 110 miles through nearly uninhabited wilderness, marked "with steep rocky mountains and impassable

¹²⁹ *Braddock's route, Fort Cumberland to Fort Pitt.* [?, 1760] Map. <https://www.loc.gov/item/gm71002325/>.

¹³⁰ Preston, *Braddock*, 117-119.

morasses.”¹³¹ After months of preparation, the column’s logistician and engineer, the irascible Sir John St. Clair, had to expand the Indian trail into a road ahead of the column to accommodate the baggage wagons and the artillery train of six-pound cannon and heavy eight-inch mortars. Braddock’s expedition averaged just two miles a day.¹³²

At Little Meadows, after travelling just 36 miles in three weeks, the exasperated Braddock learned of French reinforcements headed to Fort Duquesne. He formed a “flying column” of about 1400 men to reach Fort Duquesne before the French column.¹³³ The flying column had only five cannon and a few dozen of the lighter and sturdier wagons. The flying column did not have to cut as substantial a road, which made the rough going faster. The “supply column” left behind under the 48th’s commander, Colonel Thomas Dunbar, enlarged the road for the heavier wagons and artillery train. Braddock’s flying column averaged six miles a day, and soon left the supply column far behind.¹³⁴

Just behind the scouts in the flying column was a formation of 200 light infantry and grenadiers under a young Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Gage. Behind Gage was an independent militia company from New York commanded by Captain Horatio Gates. Gates was tasked with securing St. Clair’s six tool-laden wagons and 250 or so pioneers, who widened the road. The main body followed the pioneers, and consisted of the wagons, artillery, cattle, camp followers, and more workmen, flanked in the trees by two columns of 250 regulars. Braddock and his staff, including a dysentery-wracked Washington who had volunteered to serve as Braddock’s aide, accompanied the main body. Small parties of flankers watched for French scouts. One hundred

¹³¹ Preston, *Braddock*, 179.

¹³² Preston, *Braddock*, 180.

¹³³ Preston, *Braddock*, 182.

¹³⁴ Preston, *Braddock*, 183-189.

Virginia rangers, most of whom had been at Fort Necessity the previous year with Washington, brought up the rear of the column.¹³⁵

On 8 July 1755, the column reached the ford at the junction of Turtle Creek and the Monongahela River. On the morning of 9 July, Braddock crossed the Monongahela and expected to make camp that night about halfway between the ford and Shannopin's Town, about four miles north of Fort Duquesne on the Allegheny River. There he would cross the Allegheny with half his column and travel down both sides of the river, and invest Fort Duquesne from the north and east, effectively isolating it from any outside assistance.¹³⁶

Across the ford was Fraser's trading post, which was at the limit of the wilderness. The Ohio Indians' hunting grounds began at the now burnt-out ruins of Fraser's cabin. Unlike the dense terrain Braddock's Expedition had spent the last month hacking through, the hunting grounds were relatively open and easy to traverse. The Ohio Indians managed their hunting grounds.¹³⁷ There was little ground foliage because the Indian hunters burned the undergrowth annually.¹³⁸ This improved animal fodder, removed cover for their prey, and allowed the hunters ease of movement. Before crossing the ford, the column could see no more than twenty meters ahead, but now the scouts could see two hundred or even three hundred meters in all directions.

If the French were going to ambush, the British believed, they would have done it in the wilderness, or at the ford.¹³⁹ To Braddock's surprise, the crossing of the ford was unhindered,

¹³⁵ Preston, *Braddock*, 195-220.

¹³⁶ Preston, *Braddock*, 225, 229.

¹³⁷ Wallace, *Paths*, 2.

¹³⁸ Daniel K. Richter, *Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America*, (USA: President and Fellows of Harvard College, 2001), 32.

¹³⁹ Preston, *Braddock*, 221.

though not unobserved. The British were jubilant, believing that the worst part of the campaign was over. Most of Braddock's column fully expected to hear the explosions of the French demolishing the works as they withdrew ahead of the far superior force.¹⁴⁰ Fort Duquesne was just ahead. Braddock and his officers assumed that the French commander had deliberately failed to respond and proceeded accordingly. They were mistaken.

The French did not respond to their scouts' reports of Braddock's progress because the French commander, Claude-Pierre Pécaudy de Contrecoeur, assumed that attacks by his irregulars would slow Braddock down or even defeat him before he reached Fort Duquesne. Contrecoeur lamented that this had not proven to be the case and was taken aback by Braddock's relatively rapid progress after forming the flying column, once his scouts found it. He also needed to convince any wavering Indian allies to participate in the coming battle which he did at a conference on 8 July.¹⁴¹ The French reinforcements arrived in the first week of July. Consequently, he had 1,600 French marines, Canadian militia, and Indian warriors. However, Fort Duquesne could only house 200, and Contrecoeur knew his Indian allies would disperse if he allowed the British to begin a siege. Also, Contrecoeur's Indian allies held a conference on 7 July to determine whether to abandon the post against such an intimidating force. The stubbornness of the Potawatomi caused the conference to go another day. Only when Contrecoeur opened his stores up to the Indians to take what they wished did they agree to attack. Thankful for the war chiefs' renewed pledges, Contrecoeur gave half his men to Canadian militia Captain Daniel Liénard de Beaujeu, about seventy marines, 150 Canadian militia, and 650 Ottawa, Chippewa, Delaware, Shawnee, and Potawatomi warriors to ambush Braddock. This was a far smaller

¹⁴⁰ Preston, *Braddock*, 220-223.

¹⁴¹ Preston, *Braddock*, 205, 209.

number than Braddock's force. However, Canadian militia and regulars were far more experienced in the ways of frontier warfare than were the British or colonists because New France had few large towns, and the lower classes were encouraged to marry into nearby Indian society. Moreover, many were *coureurs des bois* who lived on the fringes of New France trading among the Great Lakes Indians. In most cases, Canadian militiamen were as much at home with frontier warfare as were their Indian allies. Finally, the elite *Troupes de la Marine* were the finest regular infantry in the New World, able to operate independently with disciplined initiative and able to transition between regular and irregular tactics seamlessly.¹⁴² Beaujeu's men had a significant qualitative edge in the coming fight with Braddock's column if they could ambush it.

On the afternoon of 9 July 1755, Beaujeu knew from the morning reports from the scouts that the British had crossed the river and that the delay had cost the French and Indians the good ambush sites.¹⁴³ Instead he conducted a hasty attack on the British after making contact with them.¹⁴⁴ Without consulting Contrecoeur, Beaujeu seized the initiative and adapted his plan to the new realities of the tactical situation. Every one of his officers had spent years and sometimes decades living among the Indian nations and fighting and trading on the frontier. Many dressed and looked so much like the Indian warriors that they could only be distinguished by their gorgets. Beaujeu attached one French officer to each of the Indian small war parties that made up the bulk of his force. As Beaujeu fixed Braddock's vanguard, his officers advised the small bands to envelop Braddock's mile-long column, destroy the flank guards, and prevented Braddock from creating a cohesive defense. The wagons at the rear provided incentive for many

¹⁴² Preston, *Braddock*, 222.

¹⁴³ *The Pennsylvania Gazette*, August 22th 1754.

¹⁴⁴ Preston, *Braddock*, 225.

warriors to continue moving down the column.

Braddock's advanced guard spotted Beaujeu's force cresting the ridge about 200 meters away. Gage formed his men into a line and opened fire, even though the range was more than twice the limit within which the Brown Bess musket was usually accurate. Gage hoped to surprise the French and let them know they were dealing with disciplined professionals. But Beaujeu was also a seasoned professional, experienced in the ways of warfare on the frontier and working with Indian allies.

One of the first shots Gage's men fired struck Beaujeu and killed him instantly. Seeing their leader go down, and unwilling to get closer and weather the fire, especially from the two cannon, some of the Canadian militia and many Indians broke and ran back to Fort Duquesne to report the battle lost. However, the death of their commander did not dissuade most of the French, Canadians and Indians. Beaujeu's officers knew his intent and they had already discussed the battle plan.¹⁴⁵ His officers and cadets rallied many of the fleeing Indians, while those who did not flee continued enveloping the column. Beaujeu's second, Captain Jean-Daniel Dumas, and another officer, French-Canadian and Ottawa war chief Charles de Langlade, rallied the marines and remaining militia and followed the Indian warriors into the attack.¹⁴⁶ The open spaces of the Indian hunting ground were punctuated by stout old growth trees, fallen timbers, and tall shrubberies, essentially natural breastworks. The terrain was perfect for the Indians' bounding advances.¹⁴⁷ Instead of hunting game, they hunted soldiers in bright red coats clustered in small groups. In less than ten minutes, nearly all of Gage's officers were killed or

¹⁴⁵ Preston, *Braddock*, 235.

¹⁴⁶ George Washington to Robert Dinwiddie, May 29th 1754, in *Writings of George Washington*, Fitzpatrick.

¹⁴⁷ Archibald Loudon. *Loudon's Indian Narratives*, (Lewisburg: Wennawoods Publishing, 1996), 126.

incapacitated and dozens of his men were wounded on the ground, many more than were standing. The Indian war cries, including from those observed behind their formations, unnerved the remaining advanced guard. Gage ordered a retreat toward the main body before he was cut off and destroyed.

Gage's men slammed into Gates' militiamen who had hurried forward when they heard shots fired. Crude platoons formed in an ad hoc manner. The impromptu reorganization of Gates's and Gage's men's staved off immediate defeat, but the inevitable was only delayed. The British and New Yorkers were still fighting as heavy infantry in an environment that best suited free-form light infantry.¹⁴⁸ They blazed away at the brush, while the Indians sniped the officers, or rushed in while the British were reloading. The Indians continued to envelop the British and colonials.¹⁴⁹ The flank guards were isolated and destroyed.¹⁵⁰ The line tactics that worked so well on Europe's battlefields were inappropriate to the close quarters fighting in the confines of the Ohio Country. Even the devastating massed volley-s by rank that were so brutally effective against the Scots at Culloden left the exposed soldiers vulnerable for a few critical moments; just long enough for an Indian or Frenchman fighting in the "frontier" or "Indian style" to emerge from cover and fire into the mass of men or quickly close with the tomahawk.¹⁵¹ The British regulars had no idea how to fight in the wilderness, and even their bayonets were unwieldy against the tomahawk and war club.¹⁵² Soon the main body devolved into individual clusters of

¹⁴⁸ *Minutes*, 514.

¹⁴⁹ Charles Morse Stotz, *Outposts of the War for Empire: The French and English in Western Pennsylvania: Their Armies, Their Forts, Their People, 1749-1764* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005), 97.

¹⁵⁰ Preston, *Braddock*, 237.

¹⁵¹ George Washington to Augustine Washington, May 31st, 1754, in *Writings of George Washington*, Fitzpatrick.

¹⁵² *The Pennsylvania Gazette*, August 1st, 1755, August 22nd, 1755.

regulars doing the only thing they knew how to do in tough situations – reload and fire.

The pioneers and militia however did know how to fight on the frontier. Gates' New Yorkers eventually took to the trees. They hid in the trees and brush and fought the Indians in the same way. With the death of most of the British regular officers, the American provincials also took to the trees to fight, the most effective being the Virginia rangers, and the South Carolina and New York independent companies.¹⁵³ The Virginia rangers also attempted to take the high ground but were massacred when the main body on the road mistook them for Indians and put several volleys into them from behind. Many flank guards fell back to the column to avoid fire from the main body.¹⁵⁴ French marines pushed down the road and forced the main body back into the wagon train. Many of the wagon drivers joined in, such as Daniel Morgan, but others fled, such as Morgan's cousin, Daniel Boone.¹⁵⁵ Braddock's one asymmetrical advantage: the three cannon in the train – kept the Indians at bay for most of the battle. At least, until there was no more crew to reload.¹⁵⁶

Braddock rode forward and found most of his officers dead or wounded. He ordered the regulars near the baggage to reinforce the main body, but when they arrived, all they did was add to the confusion. For the next three hours, Braddock single-handedly kept the main body in the fight, intent on having British discipline and firepower defeat the French and Indian attacks. Braddock had three horses shot out from under him. Nevertheless, he reformed ranks, while the British regulars loaded and fired like clockwork, defiantly taking the punishment from unknown

¹⁵³ Anderson, *Washington Remembers*, 33.

¹⁵⁴ Preston, *Braddock*, 248, 252-253.

¹⁵⁵ Preston, *Braddock*, 255.

¹⁵⁶ Preston, *Braddock*, 240, 243.

sources.¹⁵⁷ In the confusion, several groups of regulars fired upon each other. Braddock ordered several counter-attacks. One was to retrieve the cannon in the advanced guard and another was to aim at some high ground further up the slope. Each attack was defeated by murderously accurate Indian fire as the Indians isolated and then overran the attackers.

Shrouded in smoke, the remnants of the column continued firing blindly, becoming even more unnerved by the Indian war cries and the prospect of a warrior appearing out of the smoke with a tomahawk and scalping knife. At Washington's constant urging, Braddock finally saw the utility of fighting as light infantry in the trees. Washington continually pointed out that Braddock's most effective units were not the regulars in the open, but the provincials Braddock had dismissed.¹⁵⁸ But by then it was too late, there were too few officers to effect the change, and the regulars were bunched together in the open seeking safety in numbers, oblivious to the hell around them. Many were terrified, and few were still shooting since many of their muskets were fouled, and they were desperately attempting to clear them.¹⁵⁹

Shortly thereafter, Braddock was shot in the arm, which penetrated into his lungs, possibly by his own men.¹⁶⁰ When Braddock fell from his horse, the defense collapsed with him. The French marines pushed the assault. By ones and twos, and then by whole groups the expedition fell back to the ford over the Monongahela. No one wanted to be the last one on this side of the ford. Braddock's staff carried him across the river. A silence descended on the battlefield, punctuated only by the screams and moans of the wounded. The French and Indians

¹⁵⁷ Preston, *Braddock*, 253.

¹⁵⁸ Preston, *Braddock*, 249, 251-254.

¹⁵⁹ Preston, *Braddock*, 248, 249.

¹⁶⁰ *Wills De Hass History of the Early Settlement and Indian Wars of Virginia* (Parsons, WV: McClain Printing Company, 2000, 128.

were reorganizing for the final attack. As one, the Indians resumed their war cries. At the ford, the victorious war whoops of the Indians broke what remained of British cohesion, as the men assumed they were going to be massacred.¹⁶¹

Though he had no official position in the expedition Washington voluntarily took command at the ford and formed a rear guard.¹⁶² After a brief fight the Indians quit the pursuit and concentrated on gathering captives and loot.¹⁶³

With Braddock fatally wounded, command of the flying column fell to Thomas Gage, the senior surviving British regular officer. At the previous night's camp, Gage reorganized the defenders. Gage sent Washington, who was sick with dysentery and had just fought in the battle, to ride the sixty miles back to Dunbar, and then return with all the remaining troops.¹⁶⁴

Washington did so, and eventually the reorganized column withdrew back to Dunbar. Fearing the French and Indians were pursuing after their victory, Dunbar, now in command, had the men set fire to Franklin's 150 wagons and headed back to Fort Cumberland. Braddock finally succumbed to his wound on 13 July. To prevent his body from being taken as a trophy by the Indians, Washington and Dunbar had him buried in the road, and the entire expedition marched over it to conceal the grave.

Braddock's expedition had 467 killed and another 450 wounded. The several dozen men who were captured were taken back to Fort Duquesne, where they were ritually tortured and

¹⁶¹ George Washington to Robert Dinwiddie, July 18 1755, in *Writings of George Washington*, Fitzpatrick; "George Washington to Memorandum", July 9th, 1755, in *Writings of George Washington*, Fitzpatrick. *The Pennsylvania Gazette*, August 28th 1755,

¹⁶² Anderson, *George Washington Remembers*, 18.

¹⁶³ Sipe, *War*, 187.

¹⁶⁴ Preston, *Braddock*, 261-262.

burned at the stake. The cattle provided the meat for the victory feast. Of the 50 or so female camp followers who accompanied the flying column as maids and cooks, only four returned. The rest were kept as captives and assimilated into the various tribes.

Many junior officers, militiamen, and soldiers, including Fraser, Gates, Boone, Gage, and Morgan, blamed Braddock for not preparing his army to fight on the frontier. Although his arrogance was certainly a factor, particularly with those Indians who might have become his allies, Braddock went to war with the army he thought he had adapted to the realities of the situation. The Battle of the Monongahela was subsequently characterized as the defeat of a regular army which refused to learn how to fight on the frontier.¹⁶⁵ Washington learned a variety of lessons from the defeat. He saw Braddock courageously rally his men who fought on for three hours, despite the French and Indians having every advantage. The disciplined British regulars broke because of a dearth of training and leadership at the lower levels. Unlike the French, Canadians and Indians, the British lacked focus and direction, flexibility and agility. The British regulars lacked cohesion not only among themselves, but, more disastrously, with their adjacent units. They were not coordinated with the militia and rangers, much to the latter's mortification. The leadership refused to change orders or adjust tactics, until late in the battle, despite the intuitive knowledge of those advising a change in tactics. Washington knew how to fight on the frontier, but he would not forget what he saw Braddock nonetheless accomplish with regulars. For the rest of his life, Washington would not disparage Braddock's memory. However, the French won the Battle of the Monongahela not just because of British failures. They won because of Beaujeu's focus and direction. Even after Beaujeu's death, his subordinates took command and seized the initiative. They understood the plan, and their cohesive bands, many of

¹⁶⁵ *Minutes*, 514.

whom had lived with each other all their lives, automatically continued the attack. They flowed around the British column, continually seeking and exploiting weakness.

For the colonists, the Battle of the Monongahela was a great awakening. The myth of invincibility enjoyed by British regulars was shattered. They fought *la terra guerre* large war, and were defeated by *la petit guerre*, or small war. The most effective units in Braddock's army were American, fighting as the Indians *la petit guerre*.¹⁶⁶ The colonials took great pride in their culture that allowed them to adapt. Furthermore, after the battle the British regular army abandoned the Middle Colonies, leaving them to fend for themselves against the Indians' "*la sauvage guerre*" the total war on the colonists.¹⁶⁷ The Americans were on their own, at least in the short term. Consequently, the term "American" came into more common usage to distinguish British colonials in North America from citizens of the British Isles.¹⁶⁸ The tactics and spirit that Washington and the American colonials, and also by Beaujeu and his subordinates, showed at the Battle of the Monongahela hinted at a new warfighting culture. It was one that placed a primacy on cohesion, adaptability, flexibility and offensive spirit.

When Washington was given command of the Virginia Regiment later that year to protect the frontier, he demanded it was trained in both *la terra guerre* and *la petit guerre*.¹⁶⁹ They could fight in closed or open order on command. His Virginians fought jointly with the Cherokee, who turned down the Great Lakes and Ohio Indian request to drive the Americans into the sea. Ranger companies formed in the colonies to protect the frontier.

The Battle of the Monongahela was the worst British defeat at the hands of an indigenous

¹⁶⁶ Preston, *Braddock*, 249, 251-254.

¹⁶⁷ Preston, *Braddock*, 328.

¹⁶⁸ Preston, *Braddock*, 328-329.

¹⁶⁹ Preston, *Braddock*, 303-305.

enemy until the Battle of Isandlwana, 124 years later. The British however, did not have to worry about the French or Indians in its immediate aftermath. Between the loot and captives, the French were not be able to convince the Indians to complete the destruction of Dunbar's column nor to launch a general attack against frontier settlements. Many of France's Indian allies departed Fort Duquesne the day after the battle. By August, Contrecoeur reported that he had only 260 French Canadian marines and militia remaining, and just two Abenaki Indian warriors.¹⁷⁰

What the French, Canadians and their Indian allies had in tactical agility, aggressiveness, and offensive spirit, they lacked in operational focus, direction, and an understanding of what it took to decisively defeat the British and the colonists. The ignorance of both sides for what was necessary for victory was on display in the next phase of the French and Indian War on the Pennsylvania frontier. However, the British and their colonial allies benefitted from their harsh learning environment, and gradually understood the prerequisites for defeating the French. The path to effective military leadership on the Pennsylvania frontier, and eventual victory over the French and their Indian allies, was fraught with ignorance, difficulty, hubris, and setback. However, the French and Indian inability to decisively push the British and colonials from North America permitted their adversaries on the Pennsylvania frontier to learn from their mistakes. Forged by the chaotic and complex culture of the Pennsylvania frontier, British and colonial military leaders rose to meet the threat and successfully parried French and their allied Indian advances. Unfortunately for Pennsylvania, that understanding required a year of devastation.

¹⁷⁰ Preston, *Braddock*, 290.

Chapter 3 - Transition, Late 1755-1756

“In an American campaign everything is terrible, the face of the country, the climate, the enemy. There is no refreshment for the healthy, nor relief for the sick. A vast inhospitable desert, unsafe and treacherous, surrounds them, where victories are not decisive, but defeats are ruinous, and simple death is the least misfortune which can happen to them.”
– William Smith, 1763¹⁷¹

Braddock’s defeat convinced the Ohio Indians that it was time to join the French. Many of the Indians had not participated in the battle, remaining neutral since they could not afford to side with the loser. The land that had been given away by the Haudenosaunee at Albany and stolen in the duplicitous Walking Purchase of 1739 lay undefended due to the deadlock between the Penn proprietors and the Pennsylvania Provincial Assembly. No official colonial militia or British regulars were available to guard the thousands of Scots-Irish and German settlers on the Pennsylvania frontier. In the Juniata, Susquehanna, and Wyoming valleys the individual homesteads and small hamlets were especially vulnerable to the quick moving Indian war parties.¹⁷² Ohio Indian war parties ranged as far east as New Jersey, and thousands of refugees packed into the towns of southeast Pennsylvania. The frontier was rolled back over a hundred miles.¹⁷³ By the spring of 1756, more than 3,000 Pennsylvanians were killed or taken captive.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷¹ William Smith, *An Historical Account of the Expedition against the Ohio Indians, in the year 1764. Under the Command of Henry Bouquet Esq – Colonel of Foot, and now Brigadier General in America. Including transactions with the Indians*, (USA: Gale ECCO Print Editions, 2020), 19.

¹⁷² Pencak, Keller, and Gannon, *Pennsylvania*, 30.

¹⁷³ Montgomery, Report, 1:557, 1:610. *The Pennsylvania Gazette*, August 19, 1756.

¹⁷⁴ Pencak, Keller, and Gannon, *Pennsylvania*, 32.



Map 3. Map of the Improved Part of the Province of Pennsylvania. Nicolas Scull, 1759 (Library of Congress).¹⁷⁵

Though Pennsylvania leaders on the frontier responded of their own accord, the lieutenant governor and Pennsylvania General Assembly in Philadelphia were slow to respond to the Ohio Indian raids. The Quaker Party refused to appropriate any funds for defense unless they could be partly paid for by a tax on Penn family property. After several months of negotiation, during which the Ohio Indians raided the frontier settlements, a compromise was reached to raise a militia regiment and fund the construction of forts. Pennsylvania initially adopted a purely defensive policy based on a chain of forts to shield the frontier settlements from Indian, and later, combined French, Canadian, and Indian raids. Three lieutenant colonels were hand-picked by the lieutenant governor to command the Pennsylvania Provincial Regiment's three battalions: Benjamin Franklin, Conrad Weiser, and John Armstrong. Franklin's battalion garrisoned the

¹⁷⁵ Nicholas Scull, James Turner, and John Davis. *To the Honourable Thomas Penn and Richard Penn, Esqrs., true & absolute proprietaries & Governours of the Province of Pennsylvania & counties of New-Castle, Kent & Sussex on Delaware this map of the improved part of the Province of Pennsylvania*. Philadelphia; Sold by the author, Nicholas Scull, 1759. Map. <https://www.loc.gov/item/74692506/>.

forts along the Delaware River to the Schuylkill. Weiser's battalion had the forts from the Schuylkill to the Susquehanna, and Armstrong's had the most dangerous area in the west from the Susquehanna along the Allegheny Mountains to Maryland. These leaders and many of their subordinates knew that the frontier obviously needed a warning system with depth, official string of forts, men to garrison them, patrols between the forts, and the capability to quickly pursue raiders. More importantly, they believed that only aggressive action could save their homes and families. It took less than six months for the rest of Pennsylvania to agree.

This defensive policy was ineffective against the agile and stealthy raiders. Only offensive action against the raiders' bases of supply and operations, the Indian villages and French forts, allowed any reprieve. The first hints of an offensive strategy to deal with the raids came in February 1756 at Carlisle. Heavy snows in the Alleghenies had delayed the raids until February. However, the raids conducted from then until April made clear that changes had to be made on the frontier immediately. In the spring, increasingly devastating raids were carried out with the garrisons unable to detect them before they struck, much less prevent them. Eventually, the raids became so brazen that Indians struck at the forts themselves. The futility of a passive defense was obvious to the colonial leadership. Pennsylvania's transition from defensive operations to offensive operation in the volatile year from mid-1755 to mid-1756 was fraught with difficulty, frustration, and set back. First, Pennsylvania politics delayed an official response to the raids, such as funding for a militia or construction of forts. These delays in Philadelphia resulted in an ad hoc response by individual frontier leaders. Next, the purely defensive forts proved unable to stop the raids, and colonial patrols failed to find, much less counter, the Indian raids. Also, the desperate attempts to stop the Indian raids left the forts themselves vulnerable; they soon became high profile targets for the French and Indian raids. After months of defeat,

Pennsylvania militia and political leaders finally concluded that only offensive operations, in the form of raids of Indian villages that differed little from what they were experiencing, could bring relief to the beleaguered frontier. Unfortunately, for many colonial inhabitants of the Pennsylvania backcountry that realization came much too late.

Military Leadership on the Pennsylvania Frontier from late 1755 to mid-1756

As was usual for the Penn family and the Quakers of the Pennsylvania Provincial Assembly, only the chaotic aftermath of disaster spurred them to appropriate funds for fortifications and militias. The danger on the frontier was continuous and obvious. The counties and settlements of the frontier furiously petitioned Philadelphia for assistance.¹⁷⁶ The Pennsylvania Militia Act of 1755 authorized the formation of the Pennsylvania Regiment. Written by Benjamin Franklin, the act passed because it exempted Quakers and other conscientious objectors from the militia specifically and limited the militias to volunteers only.¹⁷⁷ Nevertheless, the Militia Act was the first true and dedicated defense authorization in Pennsylvania's history. The subsequent Supply Act was the actual defense appropriation which committed the funds for the forts and their garrisons. Unfortunately, it took time to build the forts, and to raise, organize, and train the regiment.¹⁷⁸

Early in 1755, there were no official government arms and ammunition stockpiles in Pennsylvania as a result of provincial politics. Thus, colonials had to purchase their own arms and ammunition in great quantities from traders.¹⁷⁹ Leaders in Pennsylvania's frontier region were forced to action in the wake of Braddock's defeat. Ad hoc companies under John Harris Jr.

¹⁷⁶ Hunter, *Forts*, 170-173.

¹⁷⁷ Crytzer, *War*, 83

¹⁷⁸ Newland, *Early Years*, 85-91.

¹⁷⁹ The Pennsylvania Gazette, April 10, 1755.

(son of the builder and founder of Harris' Ferry), Conrad Weiser, and Thomas McKee, among many others, reacted to raids or reports of raiding parties from frontier hunters turned scouts and rangers. On 2 November, Anglican minister Thomas Barton declared to Lieutenant Governor Robert Hunter Morris: "I intend this morning to return to Carlisle with a Party of men to guard that Town; the Gentlemen there desire me to request your assistance without delay."¹⁸⁰

Unfortunately, Pennsylvania politics caused a delay.

The legislative gridlock was broken by two major incidents among many minor ones before any money was allocated for provincial defense. First, Dunbar's withdrawal from the Middle Colonies meant that, at least in the short term, the Middle Colonies had to defend themselves. Faced with the legislature's paralysis, Conrad Weiser led a thousand German refugees with pitch forks and torches on Philadelphia to protest the inaction.¹⁸¹ In a legislative coup led by Franklin, the assembly voted on 25 November 1755 to approve £55,000 for a defense budget but only after the Penn family donated £5,000 in order to prevent their lands from being taxed.¹⁸² There was little problem filling the rolls of the new provincial regiment. Of the thirty forts built on the Pennsylvania frontier between 1753 and 1758, the regiment provided garrisons for thirteen and then for seventeen larger forts that bore the names of prominent Pennsylvanians and British officials such as Fort Franklin and Fort Halifax.¹⁸³ Also, the provincial regiment supported the various local volunteer militias, aptly named "associated companies" or "associators," who would likely be closer to the scenes of attack and would

¹⁸⁰ Thomas Barton to Robert Hunter Morris, November 2, 1755, *Colonial Records* 6, 675–676.

¹⁸¹ Hunter, *Forts*, 171, Crytzer, *War*, 84-85. Newland, *Pennsylvania Militia*, 74.

¹⁸² Dixon, *Peace*, 33.

¹⁸³ Dixon, *Peace*, 33-35. Hunter, *Forts*, 2.

respond more quickly.¹⁸⁴ These local militias constructed the smaller forts, which were usually fortified homes on stilts with a retractable ladder below the entrance, with loopholes for their trusty Pennsylvania long rifles. At first, these private forts were built without provincial assistance, though funds were slowly distributed later. While Pennsylvania was building forts and recruiting men for the regiment and the militia, the Ohio Indians and their French, Canadian, and Great Lakes Indian benefactors raided all along the frontier.¹⁸⁵ Leaving Philadelphia for the frontier to assist in recruiting and construction, prominent Pennsylvanians such as Benjamin Franklin served as militia commissioners and paymasters.¹⁸⁶

As late as fall 1755, there was only one fort in all of Pennsylvania: the “Association Battery” below Philadelphia, which had been built, armed and maintained with private funds.¹⁸⁷ From October 1755, when the raids began in earnest, the colonists on the frontier were forced to defend themselves mostly without outside assistance. Most of the future forts began as trading posts and magazines, first to gather donations for Braddock’s expedition and later for the protection of militia supplies as the militiamen reacted to the increasing number of Indian raids. After Braddock’s defeat, these magazines became natural meeting places and refuges.¹⁸⁸

The people of the frontier did not wait for the gridlock and indecision in Philadelphia to resolve itself. As early as the beginning of October, George Croghan, who survived the Battle of the Monongahela, had built stockades around his trading posts. One of the first was on his

¹⁸⁴ Dixon, *Peace*, 32. Hunter, *Forts*, 171-172.

¹⁸⁵ Pencak, Keller, and Gannon, *Pennsylvania*, 32.

¹⁸⁶ Sipe, *War*, 252-260.

¹⁸⁷ Hunter, *Forts*, 16. Stephenson, “Provincial” 196-198.

¹⁸⁸ Hunter, *Forts*, 170-171

plantation at Aughwick, destined to be Fort Shirley.¹⁸⁹ He and Andrew Montour formed ad hoc militia companies of traders and friendly Indians.¹⁹⁰ The colonists on the frontier organized and built on their own initiative.¹⁹¹ Even before the Supply Act, the many magazines were expanded into “private forts” for the protection not just of supplies, but of people.¹⁹² In one of his first letters to Morris, Armstrong noted that Hans Hamilton, a local leader of the upper Cumberland, had already organized 60 men.¹⁹³

The regulations from the Militia Act and appropriations from the Supply Act created a regular Pennsylvania regiment of 1,400 men in 25 companies.¹⁹⁴ The provincials conduct of war on the frontier fell below expectations. Most of the recruits were not experienced frontiersmen but laborers and tradesmen.¹⁹⁵ Furthermore, most were recent immigrants and impoverished.¹⁹⁶ Few had experience with firearms. Until they were trained, many were afraid to depart the gates of their fort. Completely reactive to the Indian raids, the militia companies more often than not arrived only in time to bury the dead.¹⁹⁷ By late winter 1756, thirteen provincial forts in various stages of construction stretched northeast to southwest from the New Jersey border on the Delaware River to the passes through the Allegheny Mountains on the Maryland border, based on Armstrong’s plan. Also, there were private forts interspersed and further east than the

¹⁸⁹ Hunter, *Forts*, 173.

¹⁹⁰ Stephenson, “Provincials”, 192, Crytzer, *War*, 72.

¹⁹¹ Hunter, *Forts*, 179.

¹⁹² Hunter, *Forts*, 171-175, 178.

¹⁹³ John Armstrong to Robert Hunter Morris, November 2, 1755, *Colonial Records*, 6, 452–453.

¹⁹⁴ Crytzer, *War*, 86.

¹⁹⁵ Stephenson, “Provincials”, 202, 208.

¹⁹⁶ Matthew C. Ward, *Breaking the Backcountry: The Seven Years’ War in Virginia and Pennsylvania, 1754-1765*, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2003), 89.

¹⁹⁷ Montgomery, *Report*, 2:72.

provincial forts. Most provincial forts had begun as private forts and then were converted to a nominally standard design of an enclosed area of about 2500 square feet, with a storehouse and ready water supply. However, in the early days of the scouring of the Pennsylvania frontier in the autumn and winter of 1755/6, these forts were purely defensive.¹⁹⁸ Colonial leaders surmised as early as January 1756 that the defensive forts had little impact discouraging the Indian raids or protecting the frontier settlements.

The appointment of officers reflected the balance of political power in Pennsylvania. Overall, the appointment of politically-influential officers helped accelerate the formation of the Pennsylvania Regiment. The three lieutenant colonels Morris appointed exemplified competence, though most of their subordinates also fell into this category. Conrad Weiser was an obvious choice for lieutenant colonel. He routinely worked on behalf of Pennsylvania as a diplomat, and his expertise in Indian culture and wilderness survival made him one of the mavens of the frontier. More importantly, Weiser was long considered the spokesman for the numerous and varied German settlers in the colony. Since 1756 was also an election year in Pennsylvania, it helped the Proprietary Party to have Weiser personally tied to it, especially because campaigning was sure to be bitter and contentious. And if things went horribly wrong, Weiser could carry some of the blame instead of the proprietors. Next, John Armstrong was the most powerful man in Carlisle, the largest town in Pennsylvania's far western Cumberland County, which bore the brunt of the raids. Armstrong was a solid supporter of the Anglican Proprietary Party against the Quaker Party that dominated the assembly. The final lieutenant colonel commission was his most controversial, but the charismatic, educated, and intelligent Benjamin Franklin was simply the most influential man in the assembly. The Quaker Party

¹⁹⁸ Hunter, *Forts*, 187-193.

would accept no alternative. Morris' choice was an easy one – he wanted Franklin as far away from the assembly as he could get him in an election year.

Unlike Weiser and Armstrong, Franklin' kept his tenure short. Franklin established his headquarters on the ruins of Gnadenhütten. By all accounts he was a splendid military commander. He was a competent and resourceful natural leader who genuinely cared about his men, their families, and the people he was charged to protect. However, his calling was in the Assembly, and he could not be away during an election year. In March, 1756, he resigned his commission in the Pennsylvania Provincial Regiment and resumed his duties as Assemblyman. That was not the end of his military career though – he used his service as lieutenant colonel to get elected as commanding officer of the “City Regiment” of Philadelphia, the Associators. Morris had no choice but to acquiesce to Franklin's new commission.¹⁹⁹ As much as Franklin was needed on the frontier to see to the administration of the troops and construction of the forts, he was needed more in Philadelphia to ensure support for the Pennsylvania Provincial Regiment.

As the General Assembly debated in Philadelphia, the colonists on the frontier had to react to the actual, and imaginary, events on the frontier. The initiative and flexibility of the frontier leaders began to have detrimental effects on the situation. Rumors abounded and were acted upon immediately, which affected the militia readiness, both good and bad. One rumor which held that killing an Indian would result in prosecution, which had certainly been true before the emergency, dispersed eleven companies.²⁰⁰ Another rumor claimed that “1,500 French and Indians” had burnt Lancaster to the ground on 3 November. The rumor was disproved but not before 2,500 militiamen in Cecil, Kent, and Queen Anne's counties assembled to march

¹⁹⁹ Crytzer, *War*, 101-102.

²⁰⁰ Hunter, *Forts*, 176.

against the French and Indians on the 6th. A rumor of French plans to build a fort at Shamokin galvanized Morris to find funds and material to build a fort to protect the area.²⁰¹ Shamokin at the time was occupied by the Scarouady and Ohio Indian refugees from the west who refused to fight for the French. At Scarouady's insistence, Morris had Fort Augusta built, though Shamokin was still on Haudenosaunee land. The rumor was false and Fort Augusta became one of Pennsylvania's gateways to the west, ironically at the head of the Haudenosaunee's Great Path to the west.²⁰²

Typical of the initial chaos on the frontier following Braddock's defeat were the raids on Big Cove and along Tonoloway Creek by a warband of about 100 Shawnee and Delaware warriors led by Shingas and Captain Jacobs in the beginning of November 1755. Forty-seven of the 93 families affected by the raids were killed and captured in their entirety, and 27 homesteads destroyed.²⁰³ A hundred militia that were building nearby forts quickly assembled, but the majority declined to pursue the raiders when the issue came to a vote. The officers' commissions had yet to arrive, and the specter of Indian ambush terrified the surprised militiamen. The aggressive leaders who wanted to pursue became household names in the future Commonwealth of Pennsylvania: John Potter, Adam Hoops, and Reverend James Steel. The nameless militia who voted them down were eventually joined by leaders of a different caliber: John Armstrong from Carlisle, James Burd from Shippensburg, Hance Hamilton, and William Buchanan among others. Unfortunately for the colonists, the lack of offensive spirit guaranteed that the initial response was inadequate; Shingas and Jacobs were safely over the Allegheny Mountains with

²⁰¹ Hunter, *Forts*, 508-512. Stotz, *Outposts*, 101-103.

²⁰² Wallace, *Paths*, 62.

²⁰³ Crytzer, *War*, 69-71.

their many captives before Armstrong could pursue.²⁰⁴ The militiamen regretted their decision not to immediately pursue, if only because those who lost family would never let them forget. Nonetheless, Armstrong sent a strong request to the assembly for funds to implement a more aggressive plan, but it took more than words to convince the General Assembly to act.

In November 1755, Conrad Weiser warned that protesters returned and, on the steps of the Pennsylvania State House, dumped stinking bodies of several settlers slain by the Indians.²⁰⁵ Pressured by the public, the Assembly's funds were sent to the settlements on the frontier to enact Armstrong's plan. Usually the frontier leaders were required to come to Philadelphia for funds, but the threat, from both the Indians and the protesters, convinced the assemblymen to be proactive.²⁰⁶

At Carlisle, Morris met a few of Croghan's trusted Indian contacts who were neutral in the conflict with the Ohio Indians. Two Haudenosaunee sachems, "Seneca George" and "Chief Belt", and a scout known as "Delaware Joe" brought grim and surprising news from the Ohio Country. At Kittanning, Delaware Joe counted 100 Christian prisoners and 140 Western Delaware warriors. At Logstown were 100 more Shawnee warriors, and 30 prisoners. Both towns had a significant French presence, who supported the raids, and there were at least 400 French troops and hundreds more Great Lakes Indians at Fort Duquesne. Most distressingly to Morris was the information confirming Haudenosaunee participation in the raids and implicating Eastern Delaware Indians as well. Though Delaware Joe could not confirm that Eastern Delaware of the Susquehanna Valley took part in the raids, he did say that most had chosen this

²⁰⁴ Hunt, *Forts*, 182-184.

²⁰⁵ Council at Philadelphia, November 24, 1755, *Colonial Records* 6, 729. Newland, *Militia*, 74.

²⁰⁶ Peter Silver, *Our Savage Neighbors; How Indian War Transformed Early America*, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2008), 77-78.

particular time to go “a-hunting.”²⁰⁷ The only good news to come out of the meeting were the locations of Shingas and Teweia, better known to Morris and Croghan as “Captain Jacobs”. Both lived in Kittanning village. As the two most frequent and proficient leaders of Indian raiders, Shingas and Teweia were the most wanted men in Maryland, Pennsylvania and Virginia. With the exact location of their homes known, they could be targeted with a counterraid. The meeting was the genesis of John Armstrong’s offensive strategy which had yet to get approval in the Assembly.

When promotions were assigned to lieutenant colonel for Pennsylvania’s newly formed provincial regiment, John Armstrong of Cumberland County seemed a natural choice to Lieutenant Governor Robert Hunter Morris.²⁰⁸ Cumberland County bore the brunt of the French, Canadian, Great Lakes and Ohio Indian raids after Braddock’s Defeat in 1755. Armstrong had the respect of both Indian and colonist alike on the frontier. John Armstrong had been born in Ulster, where he was educated as civil engineer before migrating to Pennsylvania. He became one of the founding fathers of Carlisle. Armstrong led the construction of the General Braddock’s auxiliary supply road through Pennsylvania before Braddock’s defeat left the road unnecessary. Most important to Morris was that Armstrong, as a Scots-Irish Presbyterian frontiersman, solidly supported the Anglican Proprietary Party against the Quaker Party. Lieutenant Colonel John Armstrong’s battalion of Pennsylvania Provincial Militia defended the most dangerous area in the west from the Susquehanna along the Allegheny Mountains to Maryland. Armstrong’s initial plan to build and garrison forts at operationally significant choke points in Cumberland County proved a failure. The defensive mindset of the Pennsylvania

²⁰⁷ Thwaites, *Early Western Travels, 1748–1846*, 12.

²⁰⁸ Betts, *Rank and Gravity*, 45.

provincial militia and other militiamen in late 1755 was simply not adequate to protect the remaining population on the frontier from French and Indian raids.

On 1 April 1756, Tewa and a band of Western Delaware raided the tiny settlement of Rocky Fields in the Cumberland Valley and burned down McCord's Fort, a private fort, capturing 27, including a eight-month pregnant Jean Lowry and her six children.²⁰⁹ Militia from the two nearby provincial forts pursued but they were defeated by Tewa after Shingas' band arrived to assist Tewa. Shingas' band ran to the sounds of the fighting at Sideling hill and fell upon the flank of the militiamen.²¹⁰ The loss did not stop the militiamen from falsely claiming they had Tewa's scalp though. The destruction of McCord's Fort, the abduction of Jean Lowry, and the Battle of Sideling Hill confirmed what everyone knew: The "chain of forts" was a failure.

In response, Governor Robert Morris declared war on the Western Delaware. Never before had William Penn's "holy experiment" and "peaceable kingdom" formally declared war on an enemy.²¹¹ The news of Pennsylvania's declaration of war was overshadowed when, a few weeks later, King George II officially announced war with France. The hostilities that had begun in the Ohio Country two years before, engulfed the world in war. The declaration did not immediately change anything in Pennsylvania – the raids continued and intensified throughout the late spring and early summer. Several more high-profile attacks demanded further action.²¹² At the height of summer 1756, Pennsylvania was officially at war with France and the Western Delaware nation, and it was losing badly.

²⁰⁹ Hunter, *Forts*, 557-563.

²¹⁰ *The Pennsylvania Gazette*, April 15, 1756, April 22, 1756, September 9, 1756.

²¹¹ Crytzer, *War*, 111-116.

²¹² Pencak, Keller, and Gannon, *Pennsylvania*, 30.

To give the declaration of war on the Ohio Indians some teeth, Morris signed the “Scalp Act”, which provided increased bounties for Shingas and Teweia specifically and more generally for the scalp of “every male Indian over the age of twelve”, in addition to a lower bounty for the scalp of every Indian woman.²¹³ The Scalp Act represented a major escalation of the conflict and signaled the Pennsylvania government’s intent to wage war aggressively against the Indian nations as a whole. The Scalp Act also brought professional bounty hunters to the frontier who augmented the militia in times of need while providing a pool of intimate frontier knowledge and expertise that might later be tapped. Mercenaries and bounty hunters descended upon the Pennsylvania frontier but it would take another disaster to usher in a true offensive mindset.²¹⁴

The destruction of Fort Granville on 30 July 1756 gave the impetus needed to allow an offensive policy. Fort Granville was the showpiece of Armstrong’s and Morris’ chain of forts along the western frontier. Even before it was finished, Morris’ praise for it appeared in the Philadelphia newspapers and it was trumpeted by Morris to his peers in Virginia, Maryland, and New York.²¹⁵ Before the British declaration of war against France in May 1756, the French had not played an active role in the bloodshed on the Pennsylvania frontier. They supplied powder, shot and trade goods to their Indian allies; but they did not accompany them on the actual raids. That changed with the declaration of war between the empires. The 60-odd strong war party of French, Canadians and Indians that attacked Fort Granville at the end of July was led by Delaware war chief Teweia and French Captain Louis Coulon de Villiers, the same man who had captured Fort Necessity from George Washington two years before.

²¹³ Dixon, *Peace*, 33. Crytzer, *War*, 112.

²¹⁴ Silver, *Neighbors*, 97.

²¹⁵ Crytzer, Kittanning 180. Montgomery, *Report*, 1:557-558.

In late July, 1756 Fort Granville was commanded by Lieutenant Edward Ward with Lieutenant Edward Armstrong as his second. Armstrong was the brother-in-law of Lieutenant Colonel John Armstrong, who at the time was using his logistical expertise to secure arms, ammunition, and provisions for the undersupplied and undermanned forts in Cumberland County. On 30 July, Fort Granville was garrisoned by just 24 militiamen under Lieutenant Armstrong while Ward was leading a patrol to hunt down Indian raiders. That morning, a combined French, Canadian, and Ohio Indian raiding party attacked the fort, while the two sides traded shots.²¹⁶ A group of attackers managed to set the wooden wall on fire.²¹⁷ An Indian shot and killed Armstrong as he attempted to put the fire out at the breach and repair it. The death of Armstrong led to the immediate end of the resistance. Villiers saw Armstrong's fall and quickly called for the garrison's surrender, promising that no harm would come to them when they were escorted west into captivity. Before the militiamen could decide what to do, Corporal John Turner took advantage of the confusion and unbarred the gate for Villiers and Tewa. Tewa finished the destruction of Fort Granville as his warriors led 23 surviving men, three women, and an unknown number of children into captivity. Tewa triumphantly announced that he could take any fort on the frontier that would catch fire.²¹⁸ One of the captives, Nicolas Barnhold, eventually escaped and his account of the disaster had changed the frontier.²¹⁹ In addition to the

²¹⁶ Crytzer, *War*, 139.

²¹⁷ John Armstrong to Robert Hunter Morris, August 20, 1756, *Colonial Records* 7, 230–233.

²¹⁸ Montgomery, *Report*, 1:607-609,2:451-452. Crytzer, *War*, 139-142, John Armstrong to Robert Hunter Morris, August 20, 1756, *Colonial Records* 7, 230–233.

²¹⁹ Escapees later reported that Turner was tortured, scalped, roasted alive, tortured again by the women of Kittanning with fiery lances, and finally given to the children of Kittanning as a plaything to torture to death in a great public spectacle. Turner finally succumbed to a tomahawk to the head from a toddler held aloft by his proud father. Crytzer, *War*, 140-145.

failures of the previous spring, the back-to-back French and Indian victories at Forts Granville and Oswego suggested the futility of static defense without offensive action, at least to Morris and Armstrong.

The sack of Fort Granville made headlines across Pennsylvania.²²⁰ Lieutenant Governor Morris had just concluded a promising council at Easton with the Haudenosaunee, the Friendly Society, and the Wyoming Valley (Eastern) Delaware under Teedyuscung. At the conference Teedyuscung promised to renew the traditional Delaware role as mediators, and to convince his western brethren to cease the violence in exchange for an investigation of the Walking Purchase. The fall of Fort Granville combined with news that French General Louis-Joseph de Montcalm had taken 1700 prisoners when he captured Fort Oswego in Iroquoia changed the political dynamics in the colony.

The Kittanning Raid

Before leaving office, Morris decided to go on the offensive and destroy the source of the raids, the Indian leadership and villages, instead of passively waiting for the Indians to attack the frontier. For several months in the spring and summer of 1756 Armstrong considered attacking over the mountains into the Ohio Country. Morris and Armstrong entertained the idea of attacking Fort Duquesne, but they concluded that this was impractical. Logstown was also a targetable option by late summer, but Armstrong increasingly focused on Kittanning. The death of his brother-in-law no doubt influenced Armstrong to seek vengeance. Shingas and Teweia lived in Kittanning and according to Delaware Joe most captives seemed to pass through there on their way west. In January, a militiaman named John Baker was captured by the Ohio Indians outside Fort Shirley. In March, he escaped from Kittanning. Baker provided the intelligence and

²²⁰ Betts, *Rank and Gravity*, 70-71, 75.

firsthand knowledge of Kittanning's layout needed for a targeted surprise raid.²²¹ Armstrong wanted to run a secret raid, infiltrating from Fort Shirley or Fort Lyttleton along the Raystown or Frankstown Paths.²²² Armstrong's objectives were to destroy the village, capture or kill Shingas and Teweia, scatter the warriors and their families, and free the hundred or so captives Baker said were there at any one time. The destruction of Fort Granville convinced Morris to approve the plan, which he did as one of his last acts as lieutenant governor.

Only an operational offensive, the raid on the Delaware village of Kittanning, led by Colonel John Armstrong, brought some measure of relief to the beleaguered colonists on the frontier. The planning and preparations for the raid were complicated since they had to be carried out with the existing resources, specifically the £60,000 approved in the Supply Act which by August was running dangerously low. Fortunately, organizational changes from the early summer shifted provincial militia west from relatively safer duty further east, increasing the number of troops and the sum of supplies available to Armstrong. Companies were taken from Weiser's and Franklin's old battalions and were used to reinforce Armstrong, whose sector of the frontier bore the brunt of raiding. . In theory, this shift concentrated just enough troops in Armstrong's battalion to furnish a 350-man raiding force and still garrison the forts at a greatly reduced capacity. By July it was obvious the forts were not effective at stopping or even slowing the Indian raids, so reducing their garrisons was not seen adding much greater risk. For the British and colonists, the frontier could not get much worse in any case. Moreover, secrecy was paramount, and Morris did not even inform his replacement, William Denny, of the raid until its final stages of preparation. If Villiers, Shingas, or Teweia got any hint of the raid, they would at

²²¹ Crytzer, *War*, 147.

²²² Wallace, *Paths*, 49-52, 142-147.

best be absent from the village when the raid took place, at worst, they would be lying in wait to ambush the raid before it reached its objective.²²³

Since there had been little special recruiting for the raid, Armstrong's company commanders had to provide the men, while still garrisoning their forts. All of the company commanders accepted the risk and joined in the raiding party, while delegating command of the skeleton garrisons to trusted subordinates. Armstrong's company commanders were all seasoned frontiersmen who had spent the last ten months in a futile attempt to defend the frontier: Armstrong's brother George brought his company from Pomfret Castle. Edward Ward came from Fort George after the destruction of Fort Granville. Hans Hamilton came from Fort Lyttleton and Hugh Mercer came from Fort Shirley. The only prominent company commander under Armstrong who did not participate in the raid was James Burd, who was entrusted with the critical Fort Augusta at Shamokin, the loss of which would set back Pennsylvania's plans to coopt the Haudenosaunee's Great Road west. The other commanders under Armstrong in this raiding force had not been company commanders in his battalion beforehand, but they proved to be among those most beneficial to the raid. The fiery "Fighting Parson" John Steel and the equally indefatigable Cumberland County Sheriff James Potter rounded out Armstrong's commanders.

Colonel John Armstrong's raid on Kittanning was only possible with the assistance and advice of dedicated specialists who were intimately knowledgeable in their areas of expertise. The last addition to Armstrong's command was not an officer at all, or even a militiaman anymore. It was James Baker, the former captive. He knew that if he was captured again he would almost certainly be gruesomely tortured to death by his former captors, who were no

²²³ Crytzer, *War*, 170.

doubt still furious at his escape. But Baker volunteered for raid. His intimate knowledge of Kittanning and his expertise in Indian patterns of life were invaluable to Armstrong.

Like Baker's, Armstrong's entire force were volunteers, as stated in the terms of the Militia Act. However, with the impending harvest, militia volunteers were in short supply. Even keeping the militiamen on hand posed a serious challenge to Armstrong's ability as a leader – the Militia Act had no provision for the punishment of desertion. Though they were subject to military discipline while on duty, they signed no contract. Every militiaman was a volunteer and could go as he wished. At the end of August, Armstrong had only about 300 of his promised 350 militia and rangers, but he could wait no longer for more.²²⁴

On 30 August 1756, then, Pennsylvania militia Lieutenant Colonel John Armstrong and 300 men departed Fort Shirley to raid the Delaware village at Kittanning on the Allegheny River. Upon consultation with his officers as well as with Baker, Armstrong took the Frankstown Path. Though longer, the route past Frankstown was more secure and less traveled.²²⁵ Any contact with any Indian would all but ensure loss of surprise.²²⁶ The choice proved to be beneficial. Scouts reported only four Indians on the path, and they were only encountered when the raid was a few hours from Kittanning. Nonetheless, Armstrong avoided the four Indians on the final approach march to Kittanning and left Lieutenant James Hogg with ten men to ambush them when the raid on the village commenced. Unfortunately for the militiamen, the scouts were incorrect about the number of Indians, and Hogg would pay with his life for their inaccuracy. Armstrong did not hide the fact that he was unhappy with his scouts who returned early from

²²⁴ John Armstrong to Robert Hunter Morris, August 20, 1756, *Colonial Records* 7, 230–233.

²²⁵ Wallace, *Paths*, 49-53.

²²⁶ John Armstrong to Robert Hunter Morris, August 20, 1756, *Colonial Records* 7, 230–233.

their reconnaissance of the village. They gave him no information on the current state of the village. Moreover, during the final night movement into the raid's blocking and assault positions, the scouts still gave no acceptable assistance.²²⁷ Adapting to the unexpected situation Armstrong and his officers not only led their men; they also guided the raid until they reached the Allegheny River. At first the noise from the war dances in the village alarmed Armstrong, but Baker assured him that Kittanning's warriors were just preparing for the expected raid on Fort Shirley of which they had been informed of just before they departed. The singing conveniently oriented Armstrong and his men as they moved into position.²²⁸ They had completed a forced march of over twenty miles, and now Armstrong had most of the men resting in the cornfield outside the village so they would be prepared for a pre-dawn assault. Mercer's reinforced company seized a hill east of the village hoping this would prevent escape by the inhabitants and, later, enable a delayed attack into the village from an unexpected direction.²²⁹

On 8 September 1756, Armstrong launched the pre-dawn surprise attack on Kittanning. Although his men were on-line to begin the assault, Armstrong made clear he did not expect them to maintain formation; instead each man should "do for himself" in the assault.²³⁰ Surprise was complete, but it was quickly obvious that the men on the hill could not prevent the Indian families from escaping, among whom were the white captives. Furthermore, most of the captives whom Armstrong was charged with freeing were on the other side of the river and could not be freed. Shingas was also on the other side of the river, so he could not be killed or captured unless he chose to join the fray, which he did not do. Initially, the Kittanning Raid was little different

²²⁷ William A Hunter, "Victory at Kittanning," *Pennsylvania History*. 23 (July 1956), 12-13.

²²⁸ Hunter, "Victory", 13.

²²⁹ John Armstrong to William Denny, September 14, 1756, *Colonial Records* 7, 257-263.

²³⁰ Robert Robison's Account, as printed in Loudon, *Interesting Tales*, 162-163. Add quotes

from any other raid on the Pennsylvania frontier over the last months, except the roles were reversed. In this case, the colonials were the ones fighting from the trees and cover while the Indians fought back from windows and loopholes in their houses. Fighting from his home, Tewa taunted the attackers. Armstrong responded by setting fire to the village's single longhouse and to their bark-covered homes. Defiant to the end, Tewa was killed along with his family while fleeing his burning home. Unexpectedly, the burning homes exploded, and the explosion from the longhouse was so large that it was heard at Fort Duquesne forty miles away. The French had recently delivered a large supply of powder and shot, and the longhouse served as a magazine. There was so much stored powder in Kittanning that each home had its own cache. The fire and exploding gunpowder leveled the main village of Kittanning on the eastern bank of the river. However, it had little effect on the buildings on the western bank, where Shingas, the captives and a 60-man-strong French force led by Joseph Godefroy de Normandie resided. Normandie was wounded in the leg in the exchange of gunfire with the far bank.²³¹ With the random explosions, fires raging out of control, and the death of Tewa, Armstrong thought it prudent to withdraw, before Indian and French reinforcements arrived. Fortunately for Armstrong, Shingas and the French did not pursue for lack of powder.²³²

Although the raid started in an organized manner, it ended with a disorganized flight back across the mountains. For some of Armstrong's command, the Indians in the village were not the only hostile warriors near Kittanning on the eastern bank of the Allegheny River. The "four Indians" left for Hogg to attack turned out to be a significantly larger number, and he and his ten

²³¹ Preston, *Braddock's Defeat: The Battle of the Monongahela and the Road to Revolution*, 210, 345.

²³² John Armstrong to William Denny, September 14, 1756, *Colonial Records* 7, 257–263. Robert Robison's Account, as printed in Loudon, *Interesting Tales*, 162–163.

men were either killed or presumed missing as a result.²³³ The same or another group of Indians ambushed a wounded Mercer and the remains of his company on the hill after they withdrew.²³⁴ Mercer was left for dead and only after an epic fourteen-day trek alone through the wilderness did he return to Fort Shirley. On the last day his ordeal, Mercer was at the end of his tether and sat against a tree resigned to his death. Ironically, he was then found by a band of Cherokee warriors hired by Virginia's Governor Robert Dinwiddie and was carried to Fort Shirley.²³⁵

Armstrong was received as a great hero in Philadelphia when he brought Tewa's head in for the £300 bounty. Armstrong, however, did not believe the raid as great a success as most in Philadelphia believed it to be. His men took almost as many casualties as they inflicted. And although Tewa was killed, Shingas was alive and would certainly seek bloody retribution for the raid. The destruction of the village and the loss of powder and supplies would curtail some of the raiding, but this change was only temporary, since the French could replace the lost powder from Fort Duquesne, albeit with some difficulty. Most distressing for Armstrong was having freed few captives. He had expected to free at least a hundred but recovered just eleven, two of whom were recaptured and tortured to death.

The Kittanning Raid was the sole British victory in 1756, their "Year of Defeat" in the Seven Years War.²³⁶ The Kittanning Expedition provided a much needed boost to the morale of the settlers on the Pennsylvania frontier, and even more to the confidence of the political factions in Philadelphia.²³⁷ Raids by Shingas and the Western Delaware dropped off significantly for the

²³³ Robert Robison's Account, as printed in Loudon, *Interesting Tales*, 162–163.

²³⁴ Hunter, "Victory", 14.

²³⁵ Robert Robison's Account, as printed in Loudon, *Interesting Tales*, 162–163.

²³⁶ Crytzer, *War*, 196-197.

²³⁷ Pencak, Keller, and Gannon, *Pennsylvania*, 30-33.

rest of 1756 and into the summer of 1757, while Kittanning's former inhabitants relocated to Kuskusky, Logstown, and Fort Duquesne.²³⁸

The leaders and men who participated in the raid later provided valuable experience to future attempts to secure the frontier. When John Forbes and Henry Bouquet arrived in the Middle Colonies with the object of taking Fort Duquesne in 1758, they found competent and independent senior and junior officers and diplomats capable of applying their own extensive frontier experience to the realities of the Pennsylvania frontier and its inhabitants. Forbes and Bouquet found diplomatic and political expertise in Weiser, Croghan, Franklin, and Pemberton. Flexible and agile leaders with a bias for action, responsibility and initiative, such as St. Clair, Armstrong, and Washington were willing to give their local expertise and intuitive knowledge to their new commanders to great effect, providing that their commanders were willing to take it. In 1758, Forbes and Bouquet brought the final elements of the emerging American command culture, focus and direction, and the unspoken contract between commander and subordinate based competence and mutual trust to eventual victory on the Pennsylvania frontier.

In the wake of the Kittanning Raid the Pennsylvania Assembly and the Lieutenant Governor Denny decided to change strategy. The "chain of forts" idea was abandoned, and only the forts which supported offensive raiding were maintained. With little population left west of the Blue Ridge, it made no sense to garrison forts that were just targets. An offensive on the scale of Kittanning's Raid would not happen again until 1758, but the Quaker and Proprietary compromise, along with the more offensive minded reorganization of the frontier posts allowed a slightly more effective defense against the raiding. Though the French tactical successes in 1756 were devastating and caused much consternation, they achieved no decisive results. They did

²³⁸ Newland, *Militia*, 93-94.

however inspire the colonials to much needed training and equipping for the militia. Fortifying and supplying the militia and regulars rose to primacy among their skill sets. Moreover, unimaginative and indecisive leaders, from the highest metropolitan general to the lowest frontier patrol leader, made way for a crop of flexible, agile, and battle-proven leaders who were much wiser having survived the last few disastrous years. The new colonial leaders rose to the occasion and the passivity of William Penn's "peaceable kingdom" was gone. The new offensive mindset of the British and colonials was complemented by a parallel "peace offensive" by the resigned Quakers of the Friendly Society. The result of these dual offensives was the Forbes expedition in 1758.

Chapter 4 - Lessons in Practice, 1758-1763

“They had People to cope with that understood Bush Fighting as well as themselves” – The Pennsylvania Gazette, 1 September 1763, on the Battle of Bushy Run.²³⁹

When John Forbes and Henry Bouquet arrived in the Middle Colonies with the object of taking Fort Duquesne in 1758, they found competent and independent senior and junior officers and diplomats capable of translating their own extensive frontier experience to the realities of combat on the Pennsylvania frontier and its inhabitants. Forbes and Bouquet relied on the diplomatic and political expertise of Weiser, Croghan, Franklin, and Pemberton. Flexible and agile leaders with a bias for action, responsibility and initiative such as St. Clair, Armstrong, and Washington were willing to give their local expertise and intuitive knowledge to their new commanders to great effect. In 1758, Forbes and Bouquet brought the final elements of a new command culture – focus and direction and the social contract between commander and subordinate based competence and mutual trust – leading to eventual victory on the Pennsylvania frontier.

Forbes and Bouquet benefited from Pennsylvania’s decision to abandon defensive forts and shift to an offensive raiding strategy after the success of the Kittanning Raid. Although Pennsylvania could not launch an operationally decisive offensive on its own, the more offensive minded reorganization of the frontier posts allowed the Pennsylvania Regiment and the militias to be more effective in defending the frontier.

The expected Quaker demise in Pennsylvania’s 1756 elections failed to materialize, which led to several organizational changes and developments on the frontier. First, William Denny accepted the need to cooperate with the Quaker Party and forged a working relationship

²³⁹ *The Pennsylvania Gazette*, 1 September 1763.

with Benjamin Franklin.²⁴⁰ The arrangement between Franklin and Denny was both political and military. Denny accepted that Franklin was commander of the City Regiment, and Franklin and the Quaker Party accepted that Denny would command of the Provincial Regiment.

Quakers inside and outside of the Assembly used trade and diplomacy to try to reduce the threat of raids.²⁴¹ Israel Pemberton, the Quakers' leader in the Pennsylvania Assembly, formed the "Friendly Association for Preserving and Regaining Peace with the Indians by Pacific Measures."²⁴² The Friendly Association took advantage of the absence of French and British traders in some Delaware lands to begin negotiations with Indians desperate for trade goods that were not forthcoming because the war parties massacred any traders they encountered. Pemberton brought food and goods in exchange for temporary ceasefires among the isolated tribes, especially in the east. Pemberton's efforts were rewarded when in 1758 the Ohio Indians, the Haudenosaunee, and peace delegates led by Conrad Weiser met again in Easton.²⁴³ The negotiations with the Indians were complicated. The Haudenosaunee forbade the Eastern Delaware, as the polyglot collective of River, Christian, and Delaware Indian remnants and various Indian refugees living east of the Alleghenies were known, from negotiating with anyone. Johnson forbade Pennsylvania from negotiating with any Indians. Pennsylvania forbade the Friendly Association from negotiating with the Indians. They all essentially ignored each other's restrictions.²⁴⁴

²⁴⁰ Issacson, *Benjamin Franklin*, 194-195. Jennings, *Empire*, 276-280.

²⁴¹ Patrick Sperro, *Frontier Country: The Politics of War in Early Pennsylvania* (Philadelphia: The University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 122, 123.

²⁴² Dixon, *Peace*, 36.

²⁴³ Sperro, *Frontier*, 123-125.

²⁴⁴ Anderson, *Crucible*, 205-207, 268-276. Jennings, *Empire*, 272-280, 396-403.

The Quaker Party of the Pennsylvania Assembly, managed to coopt the process. Much to Penn's and Johnson's chagrin, the Quaker Party led by Franklin was quickly becoming the most powerful political faction on the frontier. In 1757/8, Franklin was the Pennsylvania Assembly's representative in London, where he was winning the fight against the Penn proprietors in London's halls and newspapers.²⁴⁵ In December 1757, England's Secretary of State for the Southern Department William Pitt ordered Forbes to seize Fort Duquesne. Forbes chose the auxiliary supply road started by the Pennsylvania militia in 1755 to advance on the French fort, instead of the Virginia road cut by Braddock. To support this endeavor, the Commander-in-Chief of British forces in North America and Governor General of Virginia, the Earl of Loudon, essentially ordered William Denny to sign a £100,000 Supply Act passed by the Pennsylvania Assembly. William Pitt, now the Prime Minister assured the colonies that the Crown would repay them for their defense expenses in a change of policy from the previous administration. Nonetheless, it took a year of negotiating to make the act palatable to the proprietors, since it required taxation of Penn family estates. The new Supply Act was finally signed in April 1758 and, despite Denny's best efforts, it broke the hold on the taxation of Penn family estates, and thus the power of the Proprietary Party, further reducing the differences between the political factions in Pennsylvania.²⁴⁶

At Easton, most of the negotiators were working, at least indirectly, on behalf of Pennsylvania instead of working for William Johnson. The Pennsylvania Assembly avoided the restrictions set by Johnson and the Haudenosaunee against direct negotiations by inserting

²⁴⁵See Robert Daiutolo, "The Role of Quakers in Indian Affairs During the French and Indian War," in *Quaker History* journal 1988.

²⁴⁶ Jennings, *Empire*, 255.

George Croghan, a Pennsylvania stalwart, as Johnson's deputy and go-between with the various Indian nations. Moreover, Teedyusung and Kanukusy, the son of pro-British Seneca Queen Aliquippa, were named Pennsylvania Indian agents. Furthermore, Forbes was frustrated by the lack of information on the Ohio Indians from Johnson and the Haudenosaunee, so he turned to Pemberton for information, which marginalized Johnson and the Haudenosaunee. For a man as practical as Forbes, military necessity trumped the authority of Johnson and by extension the Haudenosaunee. The Friendly Association, led by Israel Pemberton, ignored everyone and negotiated and traded with the Indians in coordination with Colonel John Stanwix, Forbes' predecessor at Carlisle and battalion commander in the newly raised 60th "Royal American" Regiment. Using donations from the large Quaker and diverse German populations, Pemberton provided direct access to the Indian nations for the British Army outside of Johnson's official crown authority.²⁴⁷ John Forbes and his officers, including those from the Pennsylvania Provincial Regiment which made up a sizeable part of his army, needed the Ohio Indians at least neutral in the upcoming campaign against Fort Duquesne, since the army would pass over the Allegheny Mountains from Carlisle. Major General James Abercrombie, who replaced Lord Loudon in December 1757 as the commander in chief in North America, ordered Johnson to cooperate with Forbes in July 1758, but by then events had moved past the ability of Johnson and the Haudenosaunee to influence events.²⁴⁸

The Haudenosaunee were ostensibly neutral in the French and Indian War and felt that peace was needed on the Pennsylvania frontier to resume the subjugation of Teedyuscung, Shingas, and the other Ohio Indians, whose autonomy had grown beyond their control. The

²⁴⁷ Anderson, *Crucible*, 205-207, 268-276. Jennings, *Empire*, 272-280, 396-403.

²⁴⁸ Jennings, *Empire*, 323-348

raiding became costlier for the Indians who participated in late 1757 and 1758 due to the Pennsylvania militia's new strategy. More importantly, the reward was almost not worth the risk, since most of the frontier inhabitants were even further dispersed, in well protected and vigilant communities, or located much further east. But the raids did not stop. Furthermore, the Indians who were not raiding the colonists received gifts and trade goods from negotiating with the Friendly Society, while the French were not as forth-coming. The sieges of Louisburg at the mouth of the St. Lawrence River and Fort Frontenac further up the river prevented trade goods from reaching Fort Detroit and Fort Duquesne. Trade goods that did arrive went to the Great Lakes Indians. Many of the Ohio Indians warmed to the British peace initiatives because Great Lakes Indians were no better overlords than the Haudenosaunee and the French seemed to be unwilling to depart their land either.²⁴⁹ The Ohio Indians were also concerned about Brigadier General John Forbes' expedition which in June 1758 was just ascending the east slopes of the Allegheny Mountains, building a road and constructing forts along the way. Shingas held no animosity toward the British and was willing to stop under only a single condition – which Christian settlers stay east of the Allegheny Mountains.²⁵⁰


By the summer of 1758, the foundation was set for ending hostilities between the British and colonials and the Ohio Indians, if not with the French and the Great Lakes Indians. Like his newfound political ally Israel Pemberton, Denny also rode the coattails of the most politically powerful man in the Pennsylvania, John Forbes.²⁵¹ Just as Forbes disregarded the protests of Johnson, Denny met with Teedyusung and Ohio Indian chiefs Pisquetomen and Keekyuscung in

²⁴⁹ Jennings, *Empire*, 191.

²⁵⁰ Jennings, *Empire*, 393-394.

²⁵¹ Jennings, *Empire*, 372-384.

June 1758 to announce the peace conference at Easton. As a result, Christian Frederick Post, a Moravian missionary who was married to a Delaware woman and was known to most of the Ohioan tribes, travelled the Ohio country with Kanukusy and Pisquetomen spreading the news of the conference at Easton.²⁵² They dispatched Loups, who were young Indian messengers not tied to any particular nation, to cover a wider area. Post and the Loups told the Ohio Indians that as long as the French were in the Upper Ohio Valley, Forbes and the British would stay.²⁵³ At the Treaty of Easton that October, Pennsylvania and the other colonies promised to look into recent claims on Indian land, particularly the Walking Purchase. Furthermore, they reached an agreement that no colonial would settle the lands beyond the crests of the highest mountains, as was only implied in the original Lancaster Treaty, but was specified in the Easton Treaty. The treaty soon ended most Indian raids against the Pennsylvania frontier.



Map 5. General Forbes' Route on the March against Fort Du Quesne, 1758. (Library of Congress).²⁵⁴

Brigadier General John Forbes was a regular British officer sent to the colonies to attempt again what had eluded General Braddock – seize Fort Duquesne and the French forts below the

²⁵² Dixon, *Peace*, 38.

²⁵³ Dixon, *Peace*, 48. Hunter, *Forts*, 132.

²⁵⁴ John Forbes, John Potts, Wm. D McGowan, and Historical Society Of Pennsylvania. *General Forbes' route on the march against Fort Du Quesne,; this map is a copy of the original map, "General Forbes' marching jurnal sic to the Ohio J. Potts" in the collection of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania.* [?, 1758] Map.

<https://www.loc.gov/item/2008620550/>

southern shore of Lake Erie. Fort Duquesne was the primary staging ground for the Great Lakes Indians' raids on the Pennsylvania frontier and served as the Great Lakes Indians' "village." Forbes did not repeat Braddock's mistakes and was keenly aware of the developments on the Pennsylvania frontier regarding the use of forts to enable offensive maneuver against the French and Indians in the Ohio Country. Forbes' chain of forts would not be defensive but used to offensive maneuver. Scouts and rangers from the Pennsylvania Regiment and the 60th Royal American Regiment under Lieutenant Colonel Henry Bouquet found that the best route to Fort Duquesne was not through Fort Cumberland and Virginia in the southeast, but from Fort Lyttleton and Pennsylvania in the east.²⁵⁵ This eastern route followed the Raystown Indian path to the west.²⁵⁶ The Pennsylvania Assembly agreed wholeheartedly, using this route gave them better claim to the Ohio Country than the Virginians. The Virginians, led by Lieutenant Colonel George Washington, protested vehemently and even suggested a separate thrust through Cumberland.²⁵⁷ Trusting Bouquet's assessment, Forbes ordered the expedition to assemble at Carlisle and Fort Lyttleton, and later at Fort Bedford, at Raystown, after it was completed.²⁵⁸

Forbes also understood the vital role light infantry played on the Pennsylvania frontier. Forbes agreed with Bouquet who advised that, "In this Country, we must comply and learn the Art of Warr, from Enemy Indians, or anything else who have seen the Country and Warr carried on in it."²⁵⁹ Two events that summer made the case obvious. First, James Abercrombie met

²⁵⁵ Sipe, *War*, 439.

²⁵⁶ Alfred Proctor James, ed. *Writings of General John Forbes Relating to His Service in North America*, (Menasha, WI: The Collegiate Press, 1938), 32. Wallace, *Paths*, 142-146.

²⁵⁷ Cort, *Bouquet*, 11. Stevens, *Bouquet Papers*, 2: 179.

²⁵⁸ Sipe, *War*, 440.

²⁵⁹ Stevens, *Bouquet Papers*, 2:135-137.

defeat at the Battle of Carillon in early July 1758. Abercrombie used his regulars in the battle and did not commit the allied Mohawk warriors and many of his provincials. The provincials he did commit were used not as light infantry but as regulars to poor results.²⁶⁰ A week later, Lieutenant Colonel Bradstreet used the provincials to capture Fort Frontenac. Bradstreet's audacious 250-mile approach down the Mohawk River and up the southern coast of Lake Ontario was accomplished without even Mohawk assistance, much less the greater Haudenosaunee Confederation, all of whom refused to take part in the expedition.²⁶¹

Forbes could not replicate the boldness of Bradstreet's advance on Fort Frontenac due to the lack of river transport that had sped Bradstreet to his objective. He had to deal too, with the chaos caused by the haphazard arrival of the various elements of his army to Carlisle.²⁶² Also Forbes would have to contend with Ohio Indian attacks on his columns unlike Bradstreet who traveled among the benign inhabitants of Iroquoia. Moreover, the Haudenosaunee offered no help. At first Forbes relied on Cherokee and Catawba warriors, who were the Haudenosaunee's traditional enemies. Forbes' army was scattered across North America and the various elements were slow to assemble at Carlisle in the winter and spring of 1757/8.²⁶³ The southern Indians were some of the first elements of his new army to assemble, and the ailing Forbes commented that if he had to become Cherokee to capture Fort Duquesne, he would do so.²⁶⁴ Slowly over the spring and summer of 1758, his army, varying in quality, assembled from lands of the Cherokee

²⁶⁰ Anderson, *Crucible*, 240-249.

²⁶¹ Anderson, *Crucible*, 258-266.

²⁶² McConnell, *Risk*, 90.

²⁶³ McConnell, *Risk*, 34-41, 60-61, 90-91.

²⁶⁴ Calloway, *Indian World*, 140-141.

and Catawba, as well as the colonies of Maryland, Virginia, the Carolinas, Pennsylvania, and its lower counties on Delaware Bay.

As colonial militia and Indian war parties became available, Forbes assigned them to specific parts of his campaign plan to seize Fort Duquesne. Along the Raystown Path axis of advance, Forbes' scheme of maneuver was layered, methodical, and decentralized. The first layer was the series of diplomatic overtures to isolate the Ohio Indians from the French. Next was the unending task of defending the frontier. Forbes inherited Armstrong's, Denny's, and Franklin's combined and updated plan for the defense of Pennsylvania. The raiding had not abated in intensity, and a sizable percentage of Forbes' men were still vainly attempting to ambush or chase down French and Indian raiding parties.²⁶⁵ Nonetheless, Forbes' prioritized counter-raiding of French posts and Ohio Indian villages, first by war parties of friendly Indians, then finally by colonial rangers as they formed or arrived.

Indians and rangers also performed vital reconnaissance of Fort Duquesne and the Ohio Country. However, Forbes' reconnaissance was not as successful as he wished. Like Armstrong at Kittanning in 1756, Forbes continually complained of the state of his intelligence on the Ohio Country and on Fort Duquesne in particular. Nevertheless, Forbes had 400 rangers and Indians dedicated to reconnaissance at any one time, whether infiltrating into, operating in, or exfiltrating from the Ohio Country.²⁶⁶ Behind the raiders and scouting parties was the next layer, the companies of provincial militia who went ahead to build the forts in anticipation of the main body. Forbes' expected the forts to be complete, or near completion, by the time the main body

²⁶⁵ McConnell, *Risk*, 211-212.

²⁶⁶ McConnell, *Risk*, 99-106, 129-140.

arrived.²⁶⁷ The main body was the next layer, which would necessarily move at the pace of road construction while Raystown Path was widened into a proper road capable of supporting wagons. The logistics trains were the final element. Escorted by the Pennsylvania militia, the wagons ensured that the forts and magazines were provisioned, as the main body moved slowly, but inexorably, forward.²⁶⁸ Because they needed so much fodder, the cattle were free to roam and find their own sustenance in the woods, then to be driven forward. The cattle also had to be guarded. The level of organization and planning Forbes required to successfully capture Fort Duquesne had not been seen on the frontier before. Though it was Forbes' plan, his failing health and increased involvement in the political and diplomatic problems meant that the operational details and actual execution were entrusted to his second in command, the commander of the 1st Battalion of the 60th Royal American Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Henry Bouquet.

In a letter to the headstrong St. Clair, Forbes said of Bouquet, "You know very well...²⁶⁹ [Bouquet] commands in my absence." Born in Rolle, Switzerland in 1719, Bouquet was a colorful Swiss mercenary who first enlisted as a cadet in a Dutch "professional" regiment in 1743, and fought in the War of Austrian Succession with the Kingdom of Sardinia. Bouquet later served with the Swiss Guards at The Hague, where he busied himself with more formal university education, while simultaneously touring the battlefields of Europe and socializing with the local intellectuals.²⁷⁰ He accepted a commission in the 60th "Royal American" Regiment, a regular British regiment recruited specifically to fight in America in the wake of Braddock's

²⁶⁷ McConnell, *Risk*, 185-194.

²⁶⁸ McConnell, *Risk*, 224-235.

²⁶⁹ Forbes to St. Clair, May 25, 1758, James, *Writings*, 98.

²⁷⁰ Stuart, *Defenders*, 6. Wulff, *Destiny*, 6-7.

defeat.²⁷¹ Bouquet epitomized the frontier commander in Pennsylvania.²⁷² The regiment was supposed to be recruited from German settlers in North America, but the generally pacifist religious beliefs of the German settlers in Pennsylvania led to few recruits. The remaining billets were filled by recruits who were not qualified for enlistment in the Irish regiments. The Royal American were recruited from all over the North American colonies and in Europe as well. Swiss mercenaries, German *jäger*, Scots-Irish and German frontiersmen, British volunteers, and converted Indians were commanded by European Protestant officers.²⁷³ Half of the regiment were led by British officers, and the rest had German, Dutch, and Swiss officers, including Bouquet.²⁷⁴

As Forbes, Denny, Post, and Pemberton hammered out a peace treaty with Teedyuscung and the Ohio Indians, the main body of Forbes Expedition under Bouquet slowly cut a road over the mountains. To the west, Forbes' and Bouquet's trusted subordinates built forts hacked out of the wilderness while under constant harassment from the French, Canadians and Indians.²⁷⁵ Although he kept in constant contact with Bouquet, Forbes was increasingly invalidated by an unknown ailment.²⁷⁶ Trusting Bouquet to execute his plan, Forbes' threw his substantial political weight behind Pennsylvania's "peace offensive" at Easton. Furthermore, should Bouquet take Fort Duquesne, which was the stick behind Pennsylvania's carrot at Easton, the Ohio Indians

²⁷¹ Alexander V. Campbell, *The Royal American Regiment, An Atlantic Microcosm, 1755-1772*, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2010), 11.

²⁷² Dixon, *Peace*, 45. Ian McCulloch and Timothy Todish. *Through So Many Dangers: The Memoirs and Adventures of Robert Kirk, Late of the Royal Highland Regiment*, (Fleischmanns, NY: Purple Mountain Press, 2004), 133.

²⁷³ Campbell *Royal American*, 49-79.

²⁷⁴ Campbell, *Royal American*, 21-24, 25.

²⁷⁵ Dixon, *Peace*, 33.

²⁷⁶ Stevens, *Bouquet Papers*, 2: 305.

were under no illusions about what would happen to their villages. They had a recent example in the Kittanning Raid two years previously, and there was no Allegheny Mountain barrier between the Forks of the Ohio and their villages.

In November 1758, a former French prisoner reported that the Great Lakes Indians had departed Fort Duquesne and that the Ohio Indians had deserted the French upon learning of the Treaty of Easton.²⁷⁷ The intelligence was confirmed when Christian Frederick Post arrived at Fort Ligonier with the news of the successful completion of his diplomatic mission. Post and Pisquetomen had personally visited Shingas and other Shawnee and Delaware war chiefs at Kuskusky with the news of the Treaty of Easton. In front of a delegation of French officers, Post presented the wampum peace belts to Shingas. After a brief discussion among the chiefs, during which the French attempted to pass the war belt to confirm their alliance against the British, Shingas and his confederates accepted peace with the British, dismissed the French officers, and flung the war belt out the door behind them.²⁷⁸ Until the French lost their Ohio Indian allies, Forbes had planned on his army wintering at Forts Ligonier and Bedford until the spring. Post's confirmation spurred an immediate advance on Fort Duquesne.²⁷⁹ With few remaining Indian allies, the French defense of Fort Duquesne was futile.

Through diplomacy and operational maneuver, Forbes and Bouquet defeated the French garrison without firing a shot. Lignery's garrison burned the fort to the ground, and then departed for Forts Machault and Venango farther north. After Forbes' army arrived at the ruined fort, he ordered a new fort to be built at the Forks of the Ohio upon the ruins of Fort Duquesne.

²⁷⁷ McConnell, *Risk*, 268.

²⁷⁸ McConnell, *Risk*, 252-259.

²⁷⁹ Stevens, *Bouquet Papers*, 2: 344.

Christened “Fort Pitt” in honor of the British minister whose policies brought about a turn in the war in America, Forbes’ again entrusted a junior officer to carry out his plan in his absence. With just 600 men, Hugh Mercer was tasked with building Fort Pitt and maintaining relations with the Ohio Indians, while Bouquet and the dying Forbes returned east with the bulk of the army. Brigadier General John Forbes died of his ailment in Philadelphia just three months later on 11 March 1759.

Forbes’ campaign of 1758 was a master class in mission command. His priority was peace with the Ohio Indians, if only to reduce the effectiveness of the French defense of Fort Duquesne. One of his last letters before he died was to Jeffery Amherst. Forbes stressed the need to maintain good relations with the Ohio Indians and not take their friendliness for granted.²⁸⁰ While Forbes focused his considerable efforts on the talks at Easton, his trusted subordinates embraced the various tasks for which they were best suited. They cut the road, drove the convoys, built the forts, scouted and raided the frontier, and led the men and women who, under constant threat of assault by the French and Indians, captured Fort Duquesne. Many of the men who embraced their responsibility were critical to the success of his expedition. They included Washington, Armstrong, Burd, Mercer, and others. But there was none more so than Forbes’ second in command Lieutenant Colonel Henry Bouquet.

Forbes’ expedition was too large for any one man to micromanage, and Bouquet empowered his subordinates to act within his intent according to their expertise. Bouquet himself exemplified competent, flexible and agile military leadership on the Pennsylvania frontier. He was the de facto commander for Forbes’ advance on Fort Duquesne in 1758 and the commander of the column sent to relieve Fort Pitt at the height of Pontiac’s War in 1763, shortly after the end

²⁸⁰ James, *Writings*, 289-290. McConnell, *Risk*, 289-290.

of the French and Indian War. While John Forbes focused on diplomacy and imperial, colonial and Indian politics necessary to allow the capture of Fort Duquesne, Bouquet was entrusted with the military operations against the French and Indians. Bouquet in turn trained and empowered his eclectic mix of subordinate leaders to accomplish their missions. Bouquet embraced acting independently, delegated authority, and took responsibility for his subordinates' actions. Bouquet was a flexible and adaptive leader, who defied normal British military conventions. During Pontiac's War he imposed new training and fighting techniques on his troops to counter his adversaries' expertise in irregular warfare. Bouquet's focus was always on his missions' objectives, whether that was transporting an army through the wilderness of the Allegheny Mountains or defeating an irregular army in a battle on the way to relieve Fort Pitt. Bouquet encouraged and adapted his troops' and subordinates' strengths to the realities of fighting on the frontier.²⁸¹ Bouquet's innovative and adaptive practices were on full display at the Battle of Bushy Run. Bouquet's mental agility, offensive mindset, and willingness to make hard and painful decisions were instrumental in defeating a worthy and dangerous adversary in Mingo Chief Guyasuta.

Bouquet already had extensive experience fighting in the Europe and America by the time of Forbes' campaign against Fort Duquesne. By 1758, Like Bouquet, many of his subordinate officers were familiar with fighting in the American backcountry and frontier.²⁸² He shared the typical British officer's disdain for colonial militia, yet he recognized that militia understood frontier fighting and were better suited to a variety of roles that would cause regulars to be underutilized, such as vanguard, flank and rear guard, trains escort, and manning

²⁸¹ Sipe, *War*, 442.

²⁸² Campbell, *Royal American*, 158.

fortifications.²⁸³ Moreover, he was quick to see that the militia included some seasoned frontiersmen.²⁸⁴ He used them as scouts and raiders modeled after Major Robert Rogers' Rangers in New York.²⁸⁵ Bouquet sent several provincials, dressed as Indians, with Cherokee and Catawba scouts.²⁸⁶ Though frustrating and unreliable at times, the colonial rangers and scouts provided vital information regarding French and Indian forces and politics of the Indian nations that could influence operations along the route.²⁸⁷

Bouquet adapted his troops to the realities of the frontier. He modified the training and equipment of his regulars, provincials, and militia on the expedition. Rogers' "Rules of Ranging" were incorporated into training of the 60th Regiment. Bouquet ensured that his provincials, especially Washington's Virginians. Burd's Pennsylvanians were issued hatchet, which were much more useful in the wilderness than their bayonets.²⁸⁸ Bouquet encouraged his regulars to modify their uniforms and equipment to facilitate fighting as light infantry. His men often replaced their bright red jackets with shorter coats of browns and greens, and those who did not shed their heavy jackets cut them down to make them more manageable in the undergrowth. He had each man cut down his tricorne hat, which regularly got caught on the thick Appalachian underbrush, to resemble as simple and practical short-brimmed hat, or even modify them to function like modern-day pile caps. He replaced their heavy leggings with gaiters made from

²⁸³ Dixon, *Peace*, 45-46. Stevens, *Bouquet Papers*, 2: 136. For disdain see Ourry's letters to Bouquet in Stevens, *Bouquet Papers*, 2: 317, 359. Ourry wrote these parts in French so they wouldn't be read by anyone except Bouquet.

²⁸⁴ Sipe, *War*, 441-445

²⁸⁵ Dixon, *Peace*, 43.

²⁸⁶ Stevens, *Bouquet Papers*, 124, 136.

²⁸⁷ Stevens, *Bouquet Papers*, 2: 143, James, *Writings*, 168, 191.

²⁸⁸ Stevens, *Bouquet Papers*, 2: 22, 72.

traders' furs, common among the colonials and Indians of the frontier.²⁸⁹ He also had them "brown their musket barrels" to make them harder to spot.²⁹⁰ Bouquet was not opposed to having his men dress as Indians, if the situation required.²⁹¹

A perfect example of the new breed of adaptable British frontier officers was Captain Abraham Bosomworth. That any Indians participated at all with Forbes' expedition was almost solely due to Bosomworth.²⁹² Bosomworth was the brother-in-law of a powerful Creek matriarch, Mary Musgrove, and a familiar sight around the council fires of the southern Indians. After initially mustering at Winchester, the Cherokee and Catawba warriors were dissatisfied with the small amount of presents that they received from the British. Bosomworth deliberated with the bands for two days. He convinced them to stay on, and even to scout Fort Duquesne, while they waited on shipments from Philadelphia.²⁹³ Indian diplomacy was not the only skill among his subordinates upon which Forbes relied upon. Engineering was also in high demand for Forbes' offensive maneuver against Fort Duquesne.

While Bouquet's main body of Forbes' expedition was slowly advancing over the mountains, he routinely required his subordinates to operate independently while surveying the routes and cutting the road.²⁹⁴ Reconnaissance of the potential routes was entrusted to competent subordinates, whose recommendations ultimately decided the course of Forbes' road.²⁹⁵ To maintain the momentum of the expedition, Bouquet ultimately switched from wagons to

²⁸⁹ Smith, *Historical*, 47.

²⁹⁰ Dixon, *Peace*, 44.

²⁹¹ Stevens. *Bouquet Papers*, 2: 124, 136, 159, 203, 402, 595.

²⁹² Stevens. *Bouquet Papers*, 2: 96. Campbell, *Royal American*, 158.

²⁹³ Campbell, *Royal American*, 158.

²⁹⁴ Stevens, *Bouquet Papers*, 2: 121.

²⁹⁵ Stevens, *Bouquet Papers*, 2: 123

packhorses to keep the forward elements that were working on the road and building the forts supplied appropriately. He set up a small staff of packhorse experts who redistributed the loads at the farthest point to which wagons could handle the road.²⁹⁶

Bouquet and his officers simultaneously managed the comings and goings of the scouts, raiders and diplomats, the building and stocking of the forts and magazines, the cutting of the road, the convoys to and from Carlisle and Fort Lyttleton, all the while attempting to defend the frontier from French and Indian raids.²⁹⁷ The forts and outposts provided a secure place to which to withdraw in the event of difficulties, permitted the trains to safely rest and water the horses, and allowed the expedition to stockpile provisions.²⁹⁸ They also provided spots to which scouts could return in a timely manner with information about Indian war parties going east or returning west. Fort Loudon and Fort Lyttleton were Pennsylvania provincial forts absorbed into Forbes' scheme along with their garrisons.²⁹⁹ The small outpost at Stoney Creek protected a vital ford.³⁰⁰ Fort Juniata protected the vulnerable ferry and ford located where the Raystown Path crossed the Juniata River.³⁰¹ Whether the crossing was a ferry or ford depended on the height of the river, but in either case, crossing was slow and time consuming. St. Clair deemed building a bridge impractical since it would have blocked the only possible crossing site as it was being built. The Juniata Crossing outpost was built by Captain Harry Gordon and was a frequent target of French and Indian raids while troops and wagons gathered to wait their turn to cross.³⁰² Fort Bedford

²⁹⁶ Stevens, *Bouquet Papers*, 2: 120-123

²⁹⁷ Stevens, *Bouquet Papers*, 2: 552, 33.

²⁹⁸ Pencak, Keller, and Gannon, *Pennsylvania*, 34.

²⁹⁹ Stotz, *Outposts*, 113.

³⁰⁰ Stotz, *Outposts*, 110.

³⁰¹ Stotz, *Outposts*, 110.

³⁰² Stotz, *Outposts*, 110.

was built on the ruins of Raystown and was about 100 miles directly east of Fort Duquesne. Bouquet selected Fort Bedford for the assembly of Forbes' army, because several Indian paths – the Warrior's Paths – stretched from there to Fort Cumberland in Maryland.³⁰³ This newly cut path gave the men from Maryland, Virginia, and the Carolinas easier access to Pennsylvania, cutting weeks off their travel time. However, a "Waggon Road" had to be cut to widen the paths. This road was "blazed" by "Nichols the Pilot," who stayed with Washington a few days before returning to Fort Bedford.³⁰⁴ The last post in the offensive chain of forts that stretched west across the Pennsylvania frontier was Fort Ligonier. Sited just beyond Laurel Ridge at Loyalhanna Creek, Fort Ligonier was entrusted to the engineering expertise of Sir John St. Clair under the command of Lieutenant Colonel James Burd, who was given the liberty to "make any alterations that your judgement and circumstances may direct."³⁰⁵ Fort Ligonier was the final depot before Fort Duquesne, and it was sure to be the target of a major attack by the French and Indians at Fort Duquesne.

Bouquet's leadership style and the slow pace of communication demanded that he trust his subordinates to carry out his intent without micromanagement. However, difficulties sometimes arose when his subordinates did not coordinate with each other, which diluted the operation's overall focus. The focus was ultimately his responsibility, and Bouquet actively resolved problems as he became aware of them. One such problem was at Fort Ligonier. Bouquet respected Burd and St. Clair's judgments, and he had a high opinion of other subordinates including Ensign Charles Rhor, an officer of Major James Grant's accompanying

³⁰³ Wallace, *Paths*, 184.

³⁰⁴ Stevens, *Bouquet Papers*, 2: 134.

³⁰⁵ Stevens, *Bouquet Papers*, 2: 380, 408.

77th Regiment of Foot (Montgomery's Highlanders).³⁰⁶ Bouquet's problem was the need to ensure unity and focus among his subordinates. The headstrong St. Clair wrote directly to Bouquet about the site at Loyalhanna and began construction of the major depot, ostensibly with Bouquet's approval.³⁰⁷ Bouquet presumed that St. Clair had Burd's approval.³⁰⁸ However, Burd, Grant, and Rhor all disapproved of the Loyalhanna site, which they claimed was "commanded," or compromised, by being sited below ground so that it would be indefensible against a properly equipped French Army.³⁰⁹ Bouquet was forced to travel to Loyalhanna on the "infernal road" from Bedford to settle the difference.³¹⁰ The irritated Bouquet ordered St. Clair to stop construction and concentrate on the site at Nine Mile Run just over the Chestnut Ridge that Burd, Grant, and Rhor recommended.³¹¹ Forbes directed that the forts be two days' travel from each other with spacing recommended at 40 miles apart, but he gave Bouquet the leeway to site them as he saw fit.³¹² The site at Loyalhanna was already 47 miles from Fort Bedford, the new site was 55 from it.³¹³ However, Bouquet trusted Burd and Rhor, and in any case he needed the final depot as close to Fort Duquesne as practical. Rhor, Bouquet said, "although a young man—has a great deal of judgement, and I know from experience that he sees things clearly, without prejudice, and I can depend on his report."³¹⁴ With Rhor, Burd took his men to cut the nine-mile

³⁰⁶ Stevens, *Bouquet Papers*, 2: 423-424. Stotz, *Outposts*, 119.

³⁰⁷ McConnell, *Risk*, 205.

³⁰⁸ Stevens, *Bouquet Papers*, 2: 290-91, 336.

³⁰⁹ Stevens, *Bouquet Papers*, 2: 290-91, 336.

³¹⁰ Stevens, *Bouquet Papers*, 2: 482.

³¹¹ Stevens, *Bouquet Papers*, 2: 290-91, 336, 408.

³¹² Stevens, *Bouquet Papers*, 2: 380, 408

³¹³ Stotz, *Outposts*, 113, 118

³¹⁴ Stevens, *Bouquet Papers*, 2: 423-424.

road to the new site, which left Grant's Highlanders and several companies of provincials idle at the Loyalhanna site.³¹⁵

Bouquet satisfactorily resolved the conflict over the depot, but not every mistake by subordinates could be so easily reversed. In September 1758, Grant lobbied Bouquet to allow him to move against Fort Duquesne with his idle Highlander regulars and some provincial militia although the move would violate Forbes' intentions. To his later regret, Bouquet authorized Grant to conduct a reconnaissance in force of the fort.³¹⁶ Though Grant was not one of Bouquet's trusted officers in the vanguard like Armstrong, Burd, and Rhor, Grant was the senior British regular officer there. Bouquet presumed that Grant was best aware of the local situation. Grant received intelligence recently that the garrison of French, Canadians, and Indians was significantly reduced – by about 1200 – due to the loss of Louisburg and Fort Frontenac in July.³¹⁷ By agreeing to Grant's proposal, Bouquet accepted that Grant would be out of communication with him and would have to act autonomously.³¹⁸ He thus had to trust Grant to carry out his mission and to act prudently.³¹⁹

The French commander of the Ohio Country, Marine Colonel François-Marie Le Marchand de Lignery, could no longer get arms, provisions, and gunpowder to most of the men in his command in 1758. Nonetheless, what supplies he did receive went to his Great Lakes Indian allies in anticipation of Forbes' attack. Forbes was moving slowly across the mountains, but Lignery had to be prepared for a faster-moving "flying column" akin to Braddock's advance

³¹⁵ Stotz, *Outpost*, 119.

³¹⁶ Stevens, *Bouquet Papers*, 2: 517

³¹⁷ Stevens, *Bouquet Papers*, 2: 492-493

³¹⁸ Stevens, *Bouquet Papers*, 2: 499-504

³¹⁹ Stevens, *Bouquet Papers*, 2: 493, 2:501

in 1755. Much to the surprising of the French and Indians around Fort Duquesne, one appeared outside the gates on 14 September 1758.

Bouquet instructed Grant to withdraw if he encountered any Indians and to ambush those who would engage in the inevitable pursuit.³²⁰ However, Grant took possession of a hill outside of the fort without alerting the French or Indians six hundred meters away. Grant then dispatched part of his force to burn the fort's outbuildings. They advanced in formation with drums pounding and pipes playing, which was the first Lignery's men heard of the British so close to the fort. The French and Indians, pent up with frustration after waiting for months for Forbes to do battle, rushed out from Fort Duquesne and attacked. Seizing the moment, they surrounded and annihilated the raiders, whom Grant could not support. Grant attempted to retrieve the situation by dividing his force again. He placed elements on both of his flanks along the rivers to ambush the inevitable attempt to surround him. The tactic failed; both elements were simultaneously defeated in detail. The Highlanders sought refuge in close order formations, but they were swarmed by the French and Indians light infantry, operating in open order and using cover and concealment to maneuver against Grant's men. Grant attempted to withdraw to the river crossing which he had left another element to guard. But the young officer in charge of the crossing, Major Lewis of the Pennsylvania Provincials, marched to the sound of the fighting, passing by Grant in the confusion in the woods.³²¹ Grant found no one at the crossing and his attempt to find refuge in the strong defensive position at the river crossing failed.³²² All Grant's disparate elements were isolated and destroyed, and casualties ran to nearly half of Grant's command.³²³

³²⁰ McConnell, *Risk*, 214-215.

³²¹ McConnell, *Risk*, 215-219.

³²² Stevens, *Bouquet Papers*, 2: 499-504

³²³ Pencak, Keller, and Gannon, *Pennsylvania*, 34-36. Stevens, *Bouquet Papers*, 2: 520

Lignery's command suffered just eight killed and eight wounded, even though his command was just as divided as Grant's in the confused fighting.³²⁴

Unfortunately for Lignery, the Great Lakes Indians felt that they had honored their obligation to the French. They had defeated a British army sent to seize Fort Duquesne, and so they triumphantly returned home with their captives and booty. With his staunchest allies departed, Lignery's only hope to save Fort Duquesne was to stall Forbes' advance until the spring, when the Great Lakes' Indians could be persuaded to return. Over the next month, Lignery launched two attacks with his Canadian militia and remaining Ohio Indian warriors against Bouquet at the encampment at Loyalhanna.

Bouquet took advantage of the autonomy Forbes had given him and reacted immediately to Grant's defeat. He recalled Burd to the depot at Loyalhanna to complete the partial fort begun by St Clair, eventually named Fort Ligonier.³²⁵ Forbes use of forts, to slowly maneuver on Fort Duquesne, maintained a steady tempo, leaving Lignery without an easy way to stop him.³²⁶ However, until Forbes' army was massed for the final push on Fort Duquesne, the tactical tip of his operational maneuver required a fort. These forts provided a place to rally defeated troops and gather supplies for the advancing forward elements. The encampment at Loyalhanna served this purpose after Grant's defeat.³²⁷ Unlike Braddock's defeat three years earlier, the defeat of the advanced flying column did not end the campaign.³²⁸ Bouquet's army at Loyalhanna absorbed the losses and prepared for the inevitable counterattack. It is a testament to Forbes'

³²⁴ Stevens, *Bouquet Papers*, 2: 499-504.

³²⁵ Stevens, *Bouquet Papers*, 2: 543-544.

³²⁶ Slow is smooth, and smooth is fast.

³²⁷ Stevens, *Bouquet Papers*, 2: 520.

³²⁸ *The Pennsylvania Gazette*, 28 September 1758.

trust and confidence in Bouquet that Bouquet was not relieved for the debacle, even though removal from command was a common occurrence of other officers after they suffered defeats in the French and Indian War.³²⁹ As Burd constructed Fort Ligonier, Lignery's Canadians and Indians attacked shortly thereafter.

Aggressive offensive action was recognized by the British and colonials as tactically necessary by this point in the war, but the French and Indians were still the masters of open order and light infantry warfare. In October 1758 Burd, then in command of Fort Ligonier, attempted to intercept the Canadians and Indians as they attacked the men guarding the fort's grazing animals. The skirmish between the cattle guards and the Indians escalated into a battle. Each force that Burd sent into the battle was forced to retreat to Fort Ligonier. The French and Indians only withdrew after receiving cannon and mortar fire from the fort.³³⁰ When Bouquet learned of the setbacks he was disappointed in the performance of his men.³³¹ However, the Indians later commented about the battle saying that the British were beginning "to learn the art of war," and this was especially true of the riflemen, and of the troops from Virginia led by George Washington.³³² Despite their initial victories outside the fort, the French and Indian attackers were checked by the fort's artillery that afternoon, and they were checked again that evening in a failed night attack. Without the element of surprise, there was no chance that the French could capture Fort Ligonier. The Canadians and Indians withdrew to Fort Duquesne.

Nonetheless, Lignery tried to surprise Fort Ligonier again in early November. The attempt was discovered by colonial scouts. Bouquet sent two companies of Virginians to

³²⁹ Stevens, *Bouquet Papers*, 2: 522-524.

³³⁰ *The Pennsylvania Gazette*, 26 October 1758. Stevens, *Bouquet Papers*, 2: 552, 555, 558.

³³¹ Stevens, *Bouquet Papers*, 2: 560

³³² Wulff, *Destiny*, 69.

intercept. Unfortunately, both companies, one led directly by Washington and the other by Mercer, engaged each other in the dark and foggy night. Both sides took casualties. Only through the personal bravery of George Washington did the firing cease, when he jumped in front of his men and swatted at their barrels, calling for them to cease fire. Miraculously, Washington was unharmed; and while he was President, he said the experience was the most terrifying of his life.³³³

The French had few remaining Indian allies, so their defense of Fort Duquesne was futile. Lignery's garrison burned the fort to the ground, and then departed for Forts Machault and Venango farther north.³³⁴ As Bouquet, Post, Armstrong, Burd, Washington and the rest of Forbes' victorious army approached the ruined fort, they were greeted with scalps, bloody kilts and mutilated bodies of the Grant's flying column. At this point, Forbes was so invalidated that he had to be carried on a litter, and Bouquet was the de facto expedition commander.

Bouquet had to return to Philadelphia with the incapacitated Forbes and the vast majority of the 6,000-man army which they had so laboriously transported over the mountains. Bouquet had trusted subordinates secure the operationally significant areas, garrisoning the former French forts and building new forts such as James Burd's Redstone Fort at the Monongahela transfer at the terminus of the Nemaquin Trail. Most importantly, Bouquet left 200 men under Captain Hugh Mercer to hold the Forks of the Ohio that winter, maintain relations with Ohio Indians, and keep track of French movements.³³⁵ Mercer's mission was a difficult one for such a junior officer, and its effects would have strategic effects in the coming years.

³³³ Anderson, *Washington Remembers*, 23.

³³⁴ Stevens, *Bouquet Papers*, 2: 592, 608. Anderson, *Crucible*, 281-283.

³³⁵ Pencak, Keller, and Gannon, *Pennsylvania*, 36. Stevens, *Bouquet Papers*, 2: 642-643, 635, 640. Stevens, *Bouquet Papers*, 3: 10, 59-60. Stotz, *Outposts*, 121-125.

Like most militiamen, Hugh Mercer was a recent immigrant, specifically from Scotland, where he was educated as a doctor.³³⁶ He joined the Jacobite army and tended the wounded of the Bonnie Prince Charlie's defeated army after the Battle of Culloden.³³⁷ Escaping to Pennsylvania, Mercer carved out a practice on the frontier. He reprised his role as army surgeon for Braddock's expedition, but after witnessing the butchery in the aftermath of Braddock's defeat, Mercer joined the militia as an officer, a role at which he excelled. In the confusion during John Armstrong's withdrawal from Kittanning, the wounded Mercer became separated from Armstrong's raiders, and it took the tough Scotsman fourteen days of living on berries, hiding during the day, and traveling at night to reach the safety of one Pennsylvania's new forts.³³⁸ Mercer was one of Bouquet's most trusted subordinates during the construction of Forbes' Road to the Forks.

Mercer's first priority after being entrusted with the security of the Forks of the Ohio was constructing a small fort to shelter his men from the winter weather and from French attack. Furthermore he was entrusted with maintaining the neutrality of the Ohio Indians.³³⁹ He could do this only by continually assuring the Ohio Indian half-kings and chiefs, who were instrumental in Post's peace deal, such as Shingas and Tamacua, that the British would depart when the French were gone.³⁴⁰ Mercer called a great council fire with the Ohio Indian chiefs at which he stressed that the treaty of Easton would be honored.³⁴¹ To back his message, he recruited Haudenosaunee,

³³⁶ Crytzer, *Fort Pitt*, 18.

³³⁷ Crytzer, *Fort Pitt*, 19.

³³⁸ Dixon, *Peace*, 50.

³³⁹ Crytzer, *Kittanning*. 24.

³⁴⁰ Crytzer *Kittanning* 27-28.

³⁴¹ Crytzer *Kittanning* 27-28.

who were happy in any attempt to reassert their control over the Ohio Indians.³⁴² However, the Ohio Indians suspected that the British and their Haudenosaunee allies had no intention of departing the Ohio Country despite the Easton Treaty (or the later Proclamation of 1763.)³⁴³ In the spring of 1759, the Delaware, Shawnee, and Mingo looked on with suspicion when Captain Henry Gordon, a Royal Engineer who had helped build many of the forts along Forbes' road, arrived with 200 artificers at the growing village of Pittsburgh, outside Mercer's small fort.³⁴⁴ Gordon had orders to build what became the second largest fort in colonial America, Fort Pitt.³⁴⁵

Although the French and Indian War continued for three more years, violence on the Pennsylvania frontier declined dramatically after Bouquet seized the remains of Fort Duquesne. With the aid of Indian guides and Ohio Indian allies, Bouquet followed up his victory by taking the other French forts in the Ohio Country.³⁴⁶ The Ohio Indians believed that as soon as the French were gone, the British would go back across the Allegheny Mountains, and they were ready to hasten that day. Bouquet and his officers, especially those of the Royal American Regiment, his battalion commanders, and the commandants of the newly captured French forts, became diplomats and ambassadors on the frontier.³⁴⁷ The lives of the garrisons and the Ohio Indians were irrevocably intertwined. The British and colonial leaders met with the local Indian chiefs and matrons frequently, sometimes daily. They discussed and decided on a wide range of policy issues, including justice, prisoners, trade, treaty implementation, warfare, and many other

³⁴² Dixon, *Peace*, 51.

³⁴³ Pencak, Keller, and Gannon, 34, Crytzer *Kittanning* 7-28.

³⁴⁴ Dixon, *Peace*, 52.

³⁴⁵ Crytzer, *Kittanning* 1.

³⁴⁶ Dixon, *Peace*, 56.

³⁴⁷ Campbell, *Royal American*, 185. Calloway, *Indian World*, 160-161. Crytzer, *Fort Pitt*, 27-29.

topics of mutual concern and interest.³⁴⁸ These decisions usually had immediate importance, and they had to be agreed upon before permission could be sought from higher headquarters, governors, or the crown, especially those regarding supplies for the garrison, and peace and trade with the many nations of Indians of the Ohio Country.³⁴⁹ In the letters they sent back east and across the Atlantic the officers of the garrisons noted that they had become unofficial spokesmen for the Ohio Indians and that their garrisons had become integral parts of the local Indian community.³⁵⁰

Meanwhile, British forts were not dismantled and the garrisons did not depart, as the Ohio Indians had been promised. Instead, new forts were constructed, and more traders and settlers arrived. From then until the end of the war, Bouquet's men spent most of their time in a vain attempt to enforce the Treaty of Easton, not on the Ohio Indians, but on the mainly Scots-Irish squatters.³⁵¹ Work on the massive Fort Pitt continued, and the village of Pittsburgh grew substantially. In fact, rather than dealing mostly with the French, Mercer's troops had a present problem with the residents of Pittsburgh, whom they had to keep from falling into violence with the local Indians.³⁵² Bouquet called Pittsburgh a "colony sprung from Hell."³⁵³ In addition to the settlers disrupting the Ohio Indian hunting grounds, Bouquet and his officers had to deal with traders who continued to sell liquor to the Indians despite its prohibition.³⁵⁴ But Fort Pitt was not the only fort constructed along the frontier, much to the Ohio Indians' dismay. James Burd

³⁴⁸ Mulkearn, *Mercer Papers*, 481, 560.

³⁴⁹ Campbell, *Royal American*, 185. Barr, *Colony*, 98-131.

³⁵⁰ Campbell, *Royal American*, 185-186

³⁵¹ Pencak, Keller, and Gannon, *Pennsylvania*, 36. Dixon, *Peace*, 69.

³⁵² Crytzer, *Kittanning* 24-25. Waddell, *Bouquet Papers*, 6: 43, 78.

³⁵³ Barr, *Colony*, 1.

³⁵⁴ Waddell, *Bouquet Papers*, 6: 53.

constructed Redstone Fort in 1759 at the terminus of Nemacolin's Trail on the Monongahela River, where travelers heading west could embark on the river for the journey to Pittsburgh. Settlers flooded west along this and the other trails protected by British and Pennsylvania provincial troops. All along the Pennsylvania frontier, the British resorted to using Ohio Indian allies in a vain attempt to enforce the Easton Treaty and after the end of the French and Indian War, the Proclamation of 1763, whose wording was nearly identical to that of the Treaty of Easton.³⁵⁵ Both treaties offered only a temporary reprieve in hostilities between the colonists and the Indians of the Ohio Country, and did little to stem the wave of colonial settlers.

Bouquet's service on the Pennsylvania frontier did not end after Great Britain's victory in the Seven Years War. Britain took control of much of France's North American territory. The British army even kept regular regiments in America to enforce the Proclamation of 1763. Confrontations between settlers and the regulars were common that spring, much more common than encounters between soldiers and the Indians. This led to a general feeling on the frontier that the British favored the Indians at the expense of their own colonial subjects.

Despite the British Army's presence on the frontier, settlers continued staking claims west of the Appalachians. In 1763, the Ohio Indians, various factions of the Seneca, and many of the nations that had been allied with the French formed a loose confederation led by Ottawa chief Pontiac to drive the British off the continent.³⁵⁶ The Haudenosaunee Confederation stayed neutral, except the Genesee Seneca, as they nominally had for the last two wars on the frontier. The resulting conflict between Pontiac's confederation and the British and colonials is variously

³⁵⁵ Pencak, Keller, and Gannon, *Pennsylvania*, 50, Dixon, *Peace*, 69.

³⁵⁶ Dowd, *War Under Heaven*, 55-113.

known as Pontiac's War, Pontiac's Rebellion, or Pontiac's Uprising.³⁵⁷ Pontiac's Uprising was at first extremely successful as his warriors ranged up and down the hills and slopes of the Appalachian Mountains killing or enslaving any settlers they found and burning all settlements to the ground, just as they had seven years before. By June 1763, thousands had been driven from their homes, hundreds had been killed or captured, and there were few, if any, colonial settlements left west of the mountains. Eight British forts fell to Pontiac, Guyasuta, and their allies, most through surprise and deception. Only four were left – Fort Detroit, Fort Bedford, Fort Ligonier, and Fort Pitt, at the strategic confluence of the Allegheny and Monongahela Rivers that formed the Ohio River. Fort Pitt was newly built over the ruins of the French Fort Duquesne, and the strong blockhouse built by Hugh Mercer's and John Stanwix' men had been completed just that spring. The British garrison's commander, Captain Simeon Ecuyer, dispatched three letters to Bouquet, and he prepared the settlers and the fort for a siege.³⁵⁸ Mingo chief Guyasuta and a large gathering of Ohio Indians settled in for a siege when they judged that efforts to storm Fort Pitt would be futile. The garrison's silence from Fort Pitt announced the beginning of the siege.³⁵⁹

The loss of Fort Pitt might have ended British power west of the mountains. Even worse, Amherst feared that the loss of Fort Pitt would convince the Haudenosaunee to join the war. The Seneca alone could put more warriors into the field than all the tribes of Pontiac's coalition combined. Moreover, the easternmost Haudenosaunee, the Mohawk, sat astride the vulnerable New York, Massachusetts, and Connecticut frontier. The other Haudenosaunee tribes, including

³⁵⁷ All are accurate, though "uprising" or "rebellion" may be more so due to Haudenosaunee continual clinging to the fiction of suzerainty over the Ohio Indians, who provided most of the warriors against the British.

³⁵⁸ Waddell, *Bouquet Papers*, 6: 195-196, 202-203, 231-232.

³⁵⁹ Waddell, *Bouquet Papers*, 6: 4-6

the vehemently anti-British Tuscarora had open to them a clear avenue into Pennsylvania through the refugee-choked Susquehanna Valley. If those threats materialized, Amherst would need to request reinforcements, something that would inevitably lead to his replacement. Therefore, Amherst was determined to defend Fort Pitt.

Amherst had few troops to send. Hundreds of convalescents from the Caribbean were the only troops readily available. Amherst formed them into a relief column under Colonel Henry Bouquet to relieve Forts Pitt and Detroit and break the power of the Ohio and Great Lakes Indians.³⁶⁰ It was a daunting mission for men who were just recovering from yellow fever. Nonetheless, the convalescents were from some of the most experienced regiments in the British army. They included the 42nd Regiment known as “the Black Watch,” the 77th Regiment called “Montgomery’s Highlanders” (formerly 62nd Highland Regiment), which had seen extensive action during the French and Indian War, and the “Royal Americans” of the 60th Regiment.³⁶¹ There was no officer in America better suited to relieve Fort Pitt in 1763 than Bouquet.³⁶²

Bouquet intended to lure the Indians into attacking him and draw them away from the settlements and Fort Pitt.³⁶³ He hoped then to destroy their villages and their ability to wage war. Unlike in the early days of the French and Indian War, there was no talk of purely defensive measures.³⁶⁴ Even without orders, Bouquet decided he needed to act.³⁶⁵ He asked Croghan to scout Fort Pitt and the other western forts immediately, while he gathered troops.³⁶⁶ Amherst

³⁶⁰ Waddell, *Bouquet Papers*, 6: 6

³⁶¹ Waddell, *Bouquet Papers*, 6: 227, 240, 256.

³⁶² Sipe, *Indian Wars*, 439.

³⁶³ Waddell, *Bouquet Papers*, 6: 297, 308, 328, 368.

³⁶⁴ Waddell, *Bouquet Papers*, 6: 322.

³⁶⁵ Wulff, *Destiny*, 123.

³⁶⁶ Waddell, *Bouquet Papers*, 6: 223-224.

wrote to Bouquet, “they [colonists] may [k]now that without Acting offensively the Indians will Carry their Ravages into the Heart of the Country.”³⁶⁷ Even Bouquet’s junior officers understood the need for decisive offensive action, in the spirit of the Kittanning Raid in 1756. Captain James Robertson wrote “...that the Indians could not by a defensive plan be prevented from ravaging the frontiers.”³⁶⁸ Bouquet had few provincials for the expedition, a result of the Pennsylvania’s appropriation policy.³⁶⁹ The inability of the settlers to defend themselves and the lack of arms and ammunition among the Pennsylvania settlers infuriated Bouquet, especially since their defenselessness was a result of the same provincial political maneuvering that had left the frontier defenseless in 1755 and early 1756.³⁷⁰ Commanders at Forts Pitt, Ligonier, and Bedford were forced to provide arms, ammunition, and powder to settlers who had little more than they needed for hunting.³⁷¹ Provided with arms, many would-be militiamen agreed to stay and help defend the fort to which they had fled.³⁷² Colonial administrators forbade the provincial militia to accompany Bouquet westward.³⁷³ Bouquet’s use of provincials to garrison the forts freed the regulars for the expedition to relieve Fort Pitt.³⁷⁴ However, Bouquet also requested experienced woodsmen for service as flankers and scouts. “I have commissioned a Person here to procure me about Woodsmen to march with us; Their Services obvious...”³⁷⁵ These rangers were given extra

³⁶⁷ Waddell, *Bouquet Papers*, 6: 314.

³⁶⁸ Waddell, *Bouquet Papers*, 6: 322.

³⁶⁹ Dixon, *Peace*, 158. Stevens, *Bouquet Papers*, 6: 280.

³⁷⁰ Waddell, *Bouquet Papers*, 6: 256, 308, 322, 326. Dixon, *Peace*, 45-46.

³⁷¹ Stevens, *Bouquet Papers*, 6: 246.

³⁷² Waddell, *Bouquet Papers*, 6: 247.

³⁷³ Waddell, *Bouquet Papers*, 6: 280, 306, 312.

³⁷⁴ Waddell, *Bouquet Papers*, 6: 300, 313, 315-316.

³⁷⁵ Waddell, *Bouquet Papers*, 6: *Bouquet Papers*, 6: 279, 326.

pay and rations.³⁷⁶ As the expedition slowly moved westward, many Pennsylvania frontiersmen joined the expedition voluntarily. Nonetheless the commanders of Forts Bedford and Ligonier needed to keep as many militiamen as they thought could be spared. This was not specifically to deal with the Indian attacks, although harassment occurred with frightening regularity; it was more to manage the irascible and impatient settlers gathered there for protection.³⁷⁷ The militiamen routinely deserted to go back to their plantations, where they put themselves at risk of being attacked.³⁷⁸ These individual attacks drained the garrisons significantly. To reinforce Fort Ligonier, Captain Robertson first had to infiltrate his way to the fort through the woods at night using local guides.³⁷⁹ The rangers were some of the only irregulars who accompanied the expedition. Many were former Pennsylvania Provincials and Royal Americans.³⁸⁰ They were, according to Bouquet, “Excellent Woods Men, disguised like Indians & well versed in method of traveling & acquainted with their haunts.”³⁸¹ Lemuel Barrett’s Rangers, the best men from Fort Cumberland, were stripped from its garrison to provide their expertise to Bouquet’s relief force.³⁸² Nonetheless, the unreliable militia and lack of provincials made Bouquet’s regulars more essential, and Bouquet’s subordinate commanders, like Captain Lewis Ourry at Fort Bedford, loathed to see them depart.³⁸³

³⁷⁶ Waddell, *Bouquet Papers*, 6: *Bouquet Papers*, 6: 248.

³⁷⁷ Waddell, *Bouquet Papers*, 6: 146.

³⁷⁸ Waddell, *Bouquet Papers*, 6: 286.

³⁷⁹ Waddell, *Bouquet Papers*, 6: 286, 297.

³⁸⁰ Waddell, *Bouquet Papers*, 6: 24.

³⁸¹ Waddell, *Bouquet Papers*, 6: 204-205.

³⁸² Waddell, *Bouquet Papers*, 6: 328.

³⁸³ Waddell, *Bouquet Papers*, 6: 309.

Although his command was composed almost exclusively of regulars, Bouquet trained them in the ways of fighting on the Pennsylvania frontier.³⁸⁴ Most companies under his command had already been turned into light infantry companies, a reorganization made in the final years of the French and Indian War. Furthermore, the 60th and 77th were already familiar with the Indian ways of war and with Bouquet's light infantry, trained by him and his officers on Forbes' expedition. Every afternoon, Bouquet drilled some portion of his men in the open order tactics necessary to defeat Guyasuta. And every evening on the trail, he patiently explained and demonstrated the tactics to the men around their campfires.³⁸⁵ Joseph Shippen noted that Bouquet, "exercises his men in the woods and bushes in a particular manner of his own invention, [which] will be of great service in an engagement with the Indians."³⁸⁶ Furthermore, Bouquet made organizational changes at Fort Ligonier. He incorporated the Royal American garrison into the expedition and broke up the large and relatively healthy light company of the 42nd into two separate companies. Combined with Royal Americans and 77th Highlanders, the light companies were expanded and their strength evened. The organizational changes facilitated his tactical changes, and the companies were trained in battle drills specifically created for the Pennsylvania frontier.³⁸⁷ To take advantage of the tactics, Bouquet appropriated quick-firing fine-ground hunting powder for his troops on the march, while the coarse gunpowder normally issued to the regulars stayed in the barrels on the wagons.³⁸⁸ The fine hunting powder greatly improved accuracy since there was little delay from the strike of the flint until the discharge from

³⁸⁴ Waddell, *Bouquet Papers*, 6: 209, 220-221, 270.

³⁸⁵ McCulloch and Todish, *Dangers*, 90-91.

³⁸⁶ Dixon, *Peace*, 45.

³⁸⁷ McCulloch and Todish, *Dangers*, 92.

³⁸⁸ Waddell, *Bouquet Papers*, 2: 112.


the barrel.³⁸⁹ Bouquet layered his march, with scouts and rangers ahead, followed by small silent parties of men in the van and to the flanks of the main body, while further flank parties of rangers screened the movement.³⁹⁰

³⁸⁹ Waddell, *Bouquet Papers*, 6: 255.

³⁹⁰ Waddell, *Bouquet Papers*, 6: 289.

Map 6. Bouquet's Route to Fort Pitt, 1763. (Library of Congress)³⁹¹

Bouquet's force, encumbered with wagons full of provisions for Fort Pitt, left Carlisle Barracks in June and began hacking its way across the mountains. The road so laboriously constructed in 1758 had not been maintained, which was an attempt by Pennsylvania and the British to enforce the Treaty of Easton and prevent settlers from easily crossing the Allegheny Mountains. Bouquet quickly became frustrated with the sluggish pace. After a short halt at Ft. Ligonier, he abandoned his wagons and baggage, and loaded up his horses and mules with flour bags for the Fort Pitt garrison who were slowly being starved out by Gwaysuta.³⁹² Gwaysuta knew of the relief column from his scouts and so he took most of the warriors from the siege to intercept and destroy Bouquet's relief column, just as they had done eight years before with Braddock's expedition.



³⁹¹ *Map of a route through south west Pennsylvania from Fort Loudon, Franklin Co. to Fort Pitt, Pittsburgh.* [?, 1763] Map. <https://www.loc.gov/item/gm71000599/>.

³⁹² Waddell, *Bouquet Papers*, 6: 338.

Guyasuta was originally a Seneca war chief, but soon began to identify with the subjugated Ohio Indians.³⁹³ The Iroquoian-speaking people of the Ohio Country, distinct from the Shawnee and Delaware majority, formed their own nation separate from the Haudenosaunee, the Mingo, of who, Guyasuta was one of their foremost chiefs. The Mingo grew apart from their Haudenosaunee suzerains, and began to sympathize with their Ohio Indian charges' desire for independence. When the Haudenosaunee stayed neutral in the French and Indian War, the Mingo led the Ohio Indians in defiance of the Haudenosaunee to fight for the French. Guyasuta was the most influential Mingo chief, and many earlier historians refer to Pontiac's War as The Pontiac-Guyasuta War.³⁹⁴ Guyasuta missed a confrontation with Bouquet in 1758, when he and the Ohio Indians departed Fort Duquesne ahead of Forbes expedition in compliance with the quickly defunct Treaty of Easton. Guyasuta openly sought war with the British after the failure of the Treaty of Easton, and he had the support of Pontiac and western coalition of former French allied Indian tribes of the Great Lakes.³⁹⁵

When Bouquet's expedition was about a mile from the ford over Bushy Run Creek on the morning of 5 August 1763, Guyasuta and his 450 Ohio Indian warriors attacked.³⁹⁶ Unlike the terrain affecting Braddock's Expedition, the terrain around Bushy Run Creek was not managed. It was covered in dense and thorny underbrush at the edges of areas where the sunlight could penetrate the thick canopy of an old growth forest, e.g. at the edges of clearings, along cleared

³⁹³ Crytzer, *Guyasuta*, 2-3.

³⁹⁴ Sipe, *Chiefs*, 375.

³⁹⁵ Sipe, *Chiefs*, 371-382

³⁹⁶ "1000", "450", and "150" are the cited numbers from various sources.

roads, and on the banks of streams.³⁹⁷ The resulting close quarters combat made bayonet charges temporarily effective. A quick bayonet charge was usually enough to break up a gathering of Indian warriors, but Guyasuta's warriors just withdrew, reorganized, and attacked elsewhere. The initial bayonet charge was uphill to Bouquet's front and succeeded in seizing the high ground. However, in the dense brush, the maneuver resulted in just spreading his men out. A result that Guyasuta had planned for.³⁹⁸

Guyasuta knew if he spread Bouquet's men out, his warriors would overwhelm them individually. The typical European response to this was maintaining closed order formation. However, if Bouquet maintained his formation, his warriors could wither it away with musket fire at such an inviting massed target while his men hid behind the abundant tree cover. After the initial bayonet charge failed to break up the Indian force, Guyasuta held all the advantages, just as the French and Indians did at Braddock's defeat.³⁹⁹

Unfortunately for Guyasuta, Bouquet had trained his men in tactics that combined the discipline and efficacy of the bayonet-armed soldier with the realities of frontier warfare.⁴⁰⁰ First, the outlying security elements, Captain Lemuel Barrett's rangers, withdrew to the main

³⁹⁷ Darlington, *Gist*, 36. Known locally today as "Laurel Thickets" or "Jaggerbush", Western PA underbrush is notoriously thick and tall (up to nine feet) and a combination of several plant and tree species. You can walk off a small cliff hacking your way through. This underbrush would not have been as thick in 1763 as it is today due to the old growth forest. However, it had to be thicker than the area on which the Battle of the Monongahela was fought since that area was a hunting ground and managed by the Ohio Indians which had its underbrush cleared. The area around Edge Hill was not cleared in order to make hunting game easier. The underbrush would have made swinging a club or tomahawk difficult, but would be little obstacle to a bayonet thrust. Bushy Run is named for the underbrush.

³⁹⁸ Waddell, *Bouquet Papers*, 6: 326

³⁹⁹ Smith, *Historical*, 57.

⁴⁰⁰ Dixon, *Peace*, 181. McCullough and Todish, *Dangers*, 92.

body, which prevented their being defeated in detail, as had happened to Braddock's expedition. Next, Bouquet's men defaulted to the training and instruction he and his experienced officers had given them on the trail.⁴⁰¹ Bouquet's training specifically avoided overmatch against an individual Indian warrior who was considered far superior in close hand-to-hand combat than a typical British soldier. The new tactics maintained the advantages of the bayonet-equipped musket without being in an exposed close order formation.⁴⁰² Bouquet's men did this by breaking into mutually supporting pairs, while still maintaining a cohesive platoon defense.⁴⁰³ One man with loaded musket and bayonet guarded another who reloaded. When both were reloaded, one would pick a target and fire, then the process would repeat. It took great discipline to maintain that posture. Bouquet had a great many officers and noncommissioned officers in proportion to soldiers.⁴⁰⁴ Only under extreme circumstances would both men fire and be empty at the same time. In an old-growth deciduous forest demanded at least four, and preferably five, individual Indian warriors attacking the pair simultaneously to break this tactic. This small attack

⁴⁰¹ Waddell, *Bouquet Papers*, 6: 209, 220-221, 270

⁴⁰² Dixon, *Peace*, 45. Stevens, *Bouquet Papers*, 6: 321. A properly trained soldier with a bayonet was the more than a match for any indigenous warrior with a one handed melee weapon. A musket with a bayonet is just a two handed spear, and spears have been used since time immemorial to provide their wielder a first strike and standoff capability against their non-spear wielding opponent. First strikes were almost always decisive, and surviving and overcoming a first strike is the stuff of epics. To survive a spearman or bayonet-wielding soldier, requires a missile weapon, or two warriors: one to distract or fix and one to kill i.e. as demonstrated by the Zulu. If both sides have a missile weapon such as a musket with bayonet or musket and tomahawk, the wielder with bayonet has the advantage, as the time to switch between weapons systems is lessened, in addition to the standoff and first strike melee capability of the bayonet. The problem in individual frontier warfare was avoiding the individual over match, something at which the Ohio Indians excelled.

⁴⁰³ Smith, *Historical*, 57-58.

⁴⁰⁴ Scarff, *Skulking*, 151.

was then exposed to fire from the defenders' platoon nearby.⁴⁰⁵ This level of coordination was uncommon among Indian warriors on the 18th century frontier.⁴⁰⁶

Bouquet's tactic was effective but temporary. Guyasuta's warriors hunted and fought for a living, and Bouquet knew they would eventually find and exploit a weakness in the broken forested terrain. He knew his men stood no chance fighting it out with Guyasuta's warriors if they got among them. As Guyasuta's attacks extended down the column, they threatened its rear and the horses carrying the flour on the nearby Edge Hill. Bouquet ordered a withdrawal to the small hill overlooking the Bushy Run ford. In the clearing at the top of Edge Hill, he collected his wounded and formed an ad hoc fort out of flour sacks and dead horses.⁴⁰⁷ Most of Bouquet's men were outside the stacks of flour in their pairs or in formation. They then fought off all Guyasuta's attempts to storm the impromptu fort.⁴⁰⁸ That Guyasuta convinced his warriors to storm it at all is a testament to his leadership. By the afternoon, the battle was at an impasse. However, a new siege had begun, a siege that Bouquet had no hope of winning by staying put.

There was no possible relief force. And even if there had been, the siege of Bouquet's flour fort would not last long enough to see help arrive. The day was hot and humid and Bouquet's men were out of water and thirsty. Any attempt to secure water from nearby Bushy Run failed. Survivors of failed attempts to gather water were taken prisoner and then gruesomely

⁴⁰⁵ Charles E. Brodine, Jr. "Henry Bouquet and British Infantry Tactics on the Ohio Frontier, 1758-1764." *The Sixty Years' War for the Great Lakes, 1754-1814* (East Lansing, MI: MI State, 2001), 43-61.

⁴⁰⁶ Smith, *Historical*, 57-58.

⁴⁰⁷ Waddell, *Bouquet Papers*, 6: 338-340, 342-345.

⁴⁰⁸ Waddell, *Bouquet Papers*, 6: 327

tortured in full view of their comrades on the hill. Guyasuta cunningly planned to wait Bouquet out.⁴⁰⁹

Bouquet devised a desperate course of action that could be merciless – not just for the Indians, but also for his own wounded. He planned to feign a retreat that would leave his wounded and baggage exposed. He knew Guyasuta did not have as strong a hold on his warriors as he had on his soldiers. An Indian war band formed around the leadership and strength of will of its leader, honor gained from the kill, and immediate material gain. Any warrior was free to come and go as he pleased. Guyasuta's army was no different. Bouquet callously planned to exploit this. At 6:00 pm Bouquet feigned his retreat. He pulled two light companies from the front, the resulting gap being filled by the companies to their right and left, leaving the perimeter dangerously thin. Guyasuta's warriors threw themselves at the perceived rear guard for a chance to loot and torture the wounded in the makeshift fort. The feigned retreat thus concentrated the Indian warriors in front of the rear guard and the makeshift fort.

Unknown to the Indians, Bouquet did not withdraw. He used the west side of the hill and a small ridge off to the south to mask the movements of his rangers and three light infantry companies, as well as the 42nd's grenadier company. As the thin line of the rear guard desperately tried to protect the wounded in the fort, Bouquet attempted to trap Guyasuta just as he himself had been trapped hours before. At 7:00 p.m., two light infantry companies attacked from the north into the flank of Guyasuta's warriors fighting the rear guard. The main effort however was from the south when two other light infantry companies under Major Allan Campbell and the grenadiers attacked from behind the small ridge which masked their movements. The Indian concentration made a short-ranged massed volley by the light companies

⁴⁰⁹ *The Pennsylvania Gazette*, 1 September 1763. Waddell, *Bouquet Papers*, 6: 338-340, 342-345.

and subsequent bayonet charge extremely effective.⁴¹⁰ No quarter was given, and, despite their bravery, Guyasuta's shocked warriors immediately broke. Bouquet did not manage to close the trap completely and Guyasuta and a small force of Indians extricated themselves. However, most Indians who escaped the trap continued home to their lodges and did not return to Pontiac or the siege of Fort Pitt.⁴¹¹

The Siege of Fort Pitt was lifted the next day. However, Bouquet took several days to reach Fort Pitt due to the number of wounded and the number of horses killed by the Indians. Two more years were needed to completely subdue all the Indians involved in Pontiac's War. More raids were launched in 1764 and the winter of 1764/65 by John Armstrong and Henry Bouquet to destroy the Indian villages of the Ohio Country, which became the standard tactic to defeat the Indian enemy on the Pennsylvania frontier.⁴¹² The Pennsylvania Assembly passed another "Scalp Act" in 1764 one which significantly sped up the process of subduing the Indians.⁴¹³

However the bloodshed did not end. In December 1763, a small militia from Paxtang, known as the "Paxton Boys" massacred Christian Conestoga Indians, who they felt were aiding Pontiac and Guyasuta with covert support and information.⁴¹⁴ Later, 250 Paxton Boys marched on Philadelphia because they thought the colonial government was not doing enough to protect the frontier. Franklin organized nine companies of the city's militia to oppose them. The Paxton Boys only dispersed after Franklin promised to air their grievances to the Pennsylvania

⁴¹⁰ Dixon, *Peace*, 188.

⁴¹¹ *The Pennsylvania Gazette*, 1 September 1763. Waddell, *Bouquet Papers*, 6: 338-340, 342-345.

⁴¹² Smith, *Historical*, 4-28.

⁴¹³ Pencak, Keller, and Gannon, *Pennsylvania*, 48.

⁴¹⁴ Dixon, *Peace*, 247-248.

Assembly.⁴¹⁵ In the words Delaware chief Keekyuscung, “They (the Indians and colonials) will never come to peace again.”⁴¹⁶ Bouquet’s rebuilt his army, partially by enlisting Virginians on his own initiative whom the Virginia House of Burgesses refused to pay, after the colonial governments failed to recruit the numbers of requested by the British commander-in-chief.⁴¹⁷ With no prospect for French intervention, Pontiac made peace in 1765. Sadly, the horrors of Pontiac’s War show the depths to which Indian and colonial relations had fallen by that time. The perception that lines had been crossed that could not be uncrossed hardened in the minds of colonials and Indians alike. The savage nature of the fighting, and the remorseless decisions of both Guyasuta and Bouquet showed the lengths to which both sides would go for victory. The British and colonial victory at Bushy Run meant that the Appalachian frontier was permanently open for colonial settlement and expansion, regardless of what the British and the Indians wished on the matter, including the Crown and the Haudenosaunee. The new command culture forged from the fire of conflict on the Pennsylvania frontier could not only be used to win battles, but also to bring terror to bear against perceived enemies.

⁴¹⁵ Dixon, *Peace*, 248-249.

⁴¹⁶ Dixon, *Peace*, 41. Thwaites, *Early Western Travels*, 278.

⁴¹⁷ Anderson, *Crucible*, 619.

Chapter 5 - Conclusion

The new command culture forged on Pennsylvania frontier had significant consequences for its French, Indian, British, and colonial inhabitants. The Appalachian frontier was opened for colonial settlement and unofficial expansion. The new decentralized leadership style that developed out of necessity just before and during the French and Indian War influenced American leadership culture of the future.

One hundred and fifty years of political, diplomatic, economic, and military machinations shaped the essential social and cultural character of the Pennsylvania backcountry and frontier. From the Ohio Country in the west to Susquehanna River Valley and its tributaries in the east, the Pennsylvania frontier was inhabited by an eclectic mix of political, social, and cultural groups with often conflicting agendas. The varied political entities encompassed dozens of ethnicities who mingled and quarreled, fought and married, and celebrated and did business together inside a complex competition and cooperation zone that encompassed the Pennsylvania frontier. The complexity of the Pennsylvania frontier forced individuals to focus on kinship and community, which were required not just for prosperity, nor for implementing the wishes of a far-off authority figure, but for survival against a nearby competitor. The frontier's harsh learning environment forged a generation of highly competent and distinctly American leaders who were forced to adapt or else see their way of life perish.

Military commanders, civic leaders, adventurous traders, and frontier diplomats, with many individuals combining all four roles, adapted to the realities of fighting on the Pennsylvania frontier. With only rivers and Indian paths crisscrossing the frontier, colonial and Indian leaders were forced by the limited means of communication to trust their subordinates in

wartime to accomplish a mission as they saw fit. A surveyor or trader one day and militia officer or ranger the next, the commanders and leaders on the frontier influenced the foundations of decentralized mission command. Even regular and professional commanders on the frontier had to be experts in diplomacy, politics, trade, and military operations – or else surround themselves with trusted subordinates who were. Failure to do so was not just painful, but deadly.

On the Pennsylvania frontier between 1750 and 1765, the American colonial leaders and British leaders developed a successful decentralized leadership culture. Several indicators of decentralized military leadership appeared at this time on the Pennsylvania frontier. These indicators were: the use of light infantry, disciplined initiative among aggressive offensive minded commanders and subordinates, operational diplomacy, secure offensive bases of operation, and the use of situational expertise to better inform decision making.

In the early battles of the French and Indian War, the French and their Indian allies excelled at light infantry warfare and inflicted several defeats, and much frustration and consternation, on the British and colonial authorities on the frontier. Learning from the experiences, the colonials eventually used the French and Indian tactics against them.

The French and their Indian allies were unable to decisively exploit their victories early in the French and Indian War, and British and colonial commanders were permitted to learn from their experiences. Despite the tactical advantages that the French and Indian enjoyed, New York, Philadelphia and Williamsburg were not seriously threatened. The British and colonials capitalized on this operational weakness and used the newfound knowledge to directly threaten Fort Duquesne and the Ohio Indian villages which formed the French and Indian bases of operation. From these limited successes and widespread defeats came the hallmarks of mission command in the eighteenth century – trusted aggressive subordinates, disciplined light infantry,

operational and tactical diplomatic and military operations, and specialist staffs under flexible, agile, intuitive, generalist commanders willing to accept responsibility for their subordinates' actions as well as their own. The surviving commanders, and several new commanders appointed to operate on the Pennsylvania frontier, internalized these lessons and used them to great effect in the second half of the French and Indian War and then later during Pontiac's War. It took time and many setbacks for American colonials to develop their system of decentralized military leadership. For the British and colonists, the warfighting lessons pertinent to the frontier had to be learned in combat and at the expense of the people they were charged to serve. Simultaneously, previous ways of fighting that worked well in other areas during King George's War, had to be slowly reformed at great expense to meet the challenges of the French and Indian War and Pontiac's War.

When John Forbes and Henry Bouquet arrived in the Middle Colonies with the object of taking Fort Duquesne in 1758, they found competent and independent senior and junior officers and diplomats capable of applying their own extensive frontier experience to the realities of combat on the Pennsylvania frontier and its inhabitants. Forbes and Bouquet brought the final elements of a new command culture – focus and direction and the implied contract between commander and subordinate based competence and mutual trust, to eventual victory on the Pennsylvania frontier.

While Forbes focused his considerable efforts on the talks at Easton, his trusted subordinates embraced the various tasks from which they were best suited. They cut the road, drove the convoys, built the forts, scouted and raided the frontier, and led the men and women who, under constant threat of assault by the French and Indians, captured Fort Duquesne. Many

of the men who embraced their leadership responsibilities were critical to the success of his expedition.

By the summer of 1758, the diplomatic foundation was set for the cessation of hostilities between the British and colonials and the Ohio Indians, if not with the French and the Great Lakes Indians. Forbes' expedition was too large for any one man to micromanage, and Bouquet empowered his subordinates to act within his intent according to their expertise. They exemplified competent, flexible and agile military leadership on the Pennsylvania frontier. Trusting Bouquet to execute his plan, Forbes' threw his substantial political weight behind Pennsylvania's "peace offensive" at Easton, whose treaty resulted in the departure of the Ohio Indians from Fort Duquesne rendering it untenable by the French.

While John Forbes focused on diplomacy and imperial, colonial and Indian politics necessary to allow the capture of Fort Duquesne, Bouquet was entrusted with the military operations against the French and Indians and trained and empowered his eclectic mix of subordinate leaders to accomplish their missions. Bouquet embraced acting independently, delegated authority, and took responsibility for his subordinates' actions. He was a flexible and adaptive leader, who defied normal British military conventions. During Pontiac's War he imposed new training and fighting techniques on his troops to counter his adversaries' expertise in irregular warfare. Bouquet's focus was always on his missions' objectives, whether that was transporting an army through the wilderness of the Allegheny Mountains or defeating an irregular army in a battle on the way to relieve Fort Pitt. Bouquet encouraged and adapted his troops' and subordinates' strengths to the realities of fighting on the frontier. His innovative and adaptive practices were on full display at the Battle of Bushy Run during Pontiac's War in 1763. Bouquet's mental agility, offensive mindset, and willingness to make hard and painful decisions

were instrumental in defeating a worthy and dangerous adversary in Mingo Chief Guyasuta. The British and colonial victory at Bushy Run meant that the Appalachian frontier was permanently open for colonial settlement and expansion, regardless of the British and Indian wishes on the matter, including the Crown and the Haudenosaunee.

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