

Exploring multiple language learning from an existential perspective: An applied  
philosophical inquiry of self-cultivation and aspiration in language learning

by

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B.S., Grace University, 2001

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AN ABSTRACT OF A DISSERTATION

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## Abstract

The field of language learner (LLer) motivation and identity has been dominated by methodologies that rely on infrequent data collection measures, whether they be quantitative (e.g., surveys) or qualitative (e.g., interviews). Also, data from LLer studies tend to be experiences of researchers interacting with LLers rather than the data being the experiences of the LLers themselves. Therefore, we do not get direct data of identity, motivation, and learning experiences, but rather data of researchers' experiences of others' experiences. My study includes a two-month span of writing a beginning-of-study strong evaluation, followed by 368 days of multiple-times-daily data of language learning experiences that were then further analyzed to perceive the higher-order value affirmations revealed by the motivation, learning, and identity forming journeys of the a LLer of multiple languages over the course of 15.5 months throughout times of existential uncertainty.

Relatedly, advances in the field have been made through psychometric approaches that tend to aggregate LLers into categories, while few whole-person philosophical approaches have been used. Furthermore, studies are sparse which concern learners learning multiple additional languages far from any community of speakers. This study attends to all of these research lacunae through providing an existential philosophical perspective and, concomitantly, providing and carrying out a rigorous research design. Through its explication of concepts, such as *existential motivation*, *existential identities*, *strong evaluation*, *self-cultivation*, *aspiration*, *proleptic reasons*, and a *hybrid account of valuing*, it provides hitherto lacking philosophical distinctions *and* philosophical applications to the fields of applied linguistics and philosophy of education, bringing *conceptual*, *methodological*, and *empirical* contributions to these fields.

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## Abstract

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# Table of Contents

List of Figures .....	x
List of Tables .....	xi
Acknowledgements .....	xii
Dedication .....	xiii
Chapter 1 - Introduction .....	1
Introduction and Overview of the Issues .....	1
Statement of the Research Problem .....	4
Purpose of the Study .....	6
Research Question .....	7
Methodology .....	8
Limitations .....	10
Significance of the Study .....	11
Researcher Perspective .....	20
Organization of the Study .....	25
Chapter 2 - Literature Review .....	27
Existential Identity versus Other Concepts of Identity in SLA .....	28
Introducing Existential Identity & Comparing it with Other Leading Conceptualizations ..	29
Identity and Learning .....	38
Identity and Authenticity .....	41
Existential Motivation Compared with Other Motivational Frameworks in SLA .....	46
Existential Motivation .....	46

Contrastive Pre-Summary .....	57
The Existential Perspective vs. Self-Determination Theory .....	61
The Existential Perspective vs. Integrativeness .....	69
The Existential Perspective vs. Dornyei's L2MSS .....	70
The Existential Perspective vs. Discursive Social Psychology .....	73
The Existential Perspective vs. Harvey's and Hennig's Philosophical Perspectives .....	76
The Need for More Philosophy .....	80
The Need for More Multiple Additional Language Learning Studies.....	83
Multiple Additional Language Learning Gaps in the Literature .....	83
SLA Theoretical Stance of This Study .....	87
The Need for More Auto-methodological Studies .....	90
Reasons Related to Research Quality .....	90
Reasons Related to Research Ethics .....	104
Putting It All Together .....	106
Chapter 3 - Theoretical Framework: The Philosophical Solution .....	111
Ontological Stance .....	111
Existential Identities, What are They? .....	113
Existential Values, What are They?.....	129
Valuing versus Finding Valuable.....	135
Ethicality of Values.....	137
Language Learning Ethics?.....	148
Affectual, Cognitive, Actional, and Evaluative Aspects of Values .....	153
Existential Authenticity in Lling in Six Steps .....	159

Existentialism.....	159
(Step 1) Recognizing Existence as Valuable .....	166
(Step 2) Recognizing One’s Facticity .....	168
(Step 3) Choice and Endorsement: Choosing to Choose .....	171
(Step 4) Acknowledging Responsibility .....	173
(Step 5) Conducting Strong Evaluation .....	180
Articulating One’s Identities & Values.....	180
Simple Weighers vs. Strong Evaluators.....	188
(Step 6) Resolve: Actionality, Will, and Good Faith.....	199
Summing Up Identity and Motivation in the Existential Framework .....	207
Ontological Stance Revisited.....	208
Chapter 4 - Methodology .....	210
Suitability of the Research Design.....	210
Purpose of the Research.....	217
Research Question .....	218
The Specific Methodology Employed .....	220
The Basics of the Auto-Phenomenography .....	220
Auto-Hermeneutics: Self-Interpreting .....	221
Data Collection Procedures with-and-as Data Analysis.....	225
Beginning-of-Study Strong Evaluation.....	225
Daily Movements.....	228
Daily Logs of Narravive Instantiations.....	228
Data to Help Assist in Perceiving Commitments .....	237

End-of-Study Stronger Evaluation .....	243
Quality Criteria .....	245
Trustworthiness.....	245
Transferability and the Epistemological Stance of This Study.....	246
Credibility-Validity.....	247
Confirmability-Dependability.....	252
Summary .....	253
Chapter 5 - Results and Discussion .....	254
Reviewing the Research Question .....	254
Results from the Beginning-of-Study Strong Evaluation.....	256
Results from the Multiple-Times-Daily Documentation over 368 Days.....	264
Results from the End-of-Study Stronger Evaluation .....	281
Future Research and Broader Applications .....	287
Future Research .....	287
Broader Applications .....	291
References.....	302
Appendix A - Acronyms and Definitions .....	351
Appendix B - Daily Documentation Examples .....	362

## List of Figures

Figure 2.1 Existential Identity Formation Model: Chart Version.....	107
Figure 2.2 Existential Identity Formation Model: Venn Diagram Version .....	108
Figure 2.3 Existential Identity Formation Model: Pyramid, Iceberg, and Arrowhead Version .	109
Figure 4.1 Interaction between Existential Motivation & Authentic Narrative Instantiations ..	231
Figure 4.2 Timeline of the Study .....	252

## List of Tables

Table 5.1 Time-under-Tension Totals in Terms of Hours .....	278
Table 5.2 Multiple-Times-Daily Journal Entry Totals .....	280

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## **Dedication**

This dissertation is dedicated to every person who continues to attempt to progress in multiple languages no matter what life throws at them: to the language learners who self-cultivate or aspire by actively following their existential motivation in additional language learning. You are my phenomenological family. I also dedicate this to my actual biological family, immediate and extended, who have always played and will always play a reverberating role in my existential and phenomenological journeys.

# Chapter 1 - Introduction

## Introduction and Overview of the Issues

This study addresses the following three interconnected lacunae in the applied linguistics / second language acquisition (SLA) literature concerning motivation and identity: a lack of philosophical perspectives, a lack of thoroughly holistic studies, and a lack of studies concerning the learning of multiple additional languages (de Beaufort, 2019; Harvey, 2014; Hennig, 2010a; Hennig & Clarke, 2013; Kalaja & Leppanen, 1998; Lanvers, 2017; Rampton, Charalambous, Jones, Levon, Mangual Figueroa, and Zakharia, 2020; Ushioda, 2009, 2019; Wlosowicz, 2013). This study begins by creating and justifying a rigorous theoretical framework for SLA: the existential framework, which includes conceptualizing a new type of motivation for SLA research, existential motivation, which is inexorably tied with the concept of identity in existentialism (Davenport, 2012; Kreber, 2013; Noddings, 2003; Webster, 2004, 2005). Then the study thoroughly conducts and enacts this framework over the course of two strong evaluations (taking two months and one month to write out, respectively) and 368 days worth of in-the-moment multiple-times-per day documentation of multiple language learning by the language learner (LLer). This led to the discernment that the identity formation journeys were aspirational and self-cultivational in nature more than they were drifting or ambitious. In this way, this study also incorporates the newly-developed philosophical concept of aspiration into the field of applied linguistics/SLA (Callard, 2017, 2018, 2021a, 2021b).

While this study falls squarely within the field of SLA, the focus is not on *second* language learning, but on motivation and identity in the learning of *third or more* languages, i.e., “multiple languages” (Ushioda, 2019, p. 2). Thus, this dissertation preferences the term “applied linguistics” and when it does refer to SLA, it means *multiple* additional language learning

(ALLing). SLA is used only because that is the common term for the research field; however, an over-centering on *second* language learning with the concomitant lack of studies on *multiple* language learning has created a gap in terms of multilingual studies *and* is a major cause for the gap of holistic studies since learning multiple languages affects more areas of the learner's life than mere second language learning since it requires more time, energy, and resource usage (see Ushioda, 2017, pp. 474-475).

Within the domain of multiple language learning, this study centers on multiple languages in which the language learner's (LLer's) motivation and identity occurs in contexts where the LLer is surrounded by his dominant native language, which constantly interacts and interferes with the learning of the additional languages (ALs) (Ushioda, 2019, p. 2). That is, there are little-to-no non-virtual face-to-face interactions available with which the LLer is able to engage with the languages (de Beaufort, 2019; Macedo, 2019; Ushioda, 2017; Wlosowicz, 2013). Rather, everywhere the LLer goes, if there are other people present, he is mandated to hear and use his native language.

Since only the LLer can know what he is attending to, finds as more or less important, his intentions for what he does, and why (Heidegger, 1996; Hinchliffe, 2011; Nietzsche, 1983; Polanyi, 1995; Taylor, 1985a & 1985b), an auto-methodology is the most obvious choice of method to use in studying LLing motivation and identity. However, auto-methodological studies concerning motivation or identity (or otherwise) in SLA are sparsely published in journals and are nearly non-existent in dissertations (e.g., Cardinal, 2010, 2011; Marx, 2002). Needing a research design that could most permit the perception and description of the LLer's experiences and that could promote the attainment of a thoroughly holistic level of data throughout the existential undulations of life, I conducted a deep dive into various methodologies and found that

auto-methodologies could provide a much fuller and more rigorous holistic study than non-methodologies (Polanyi, 1995; Schmidt & Frota, 1986). Specifically, I found that auto-phenomenography (AuPh) to be the best fit due to its flexibility and rigor (Allen-Collinson, 2011, 2012, 2018; Allen-Collinson & Hockey, 2001).

AuPh is flexible such that one may create a research design that is most befitting of the LLe involved while being simultaneously rigorous such that it requires an entwining of some form of strong evaluation with some sort of daily journaling of in-the-moment practices (Allen-Collinson, 2011, 2018; Allen-Collinson, Vaittinen, Jennings, & Owton, 2018; Davenport, 2012; Gorichanaz & Latham, 2016; Polkinghorne, 1995). Thus, it is a methodology that is both flexible enough to be used throughout undulating contexts and circumstances while still providing rigorously thorough and holistic data.

Concomitant with perceiving that an auto-methodological study best attends to the lacunae of holistic studies on motivation and identity in language learning, I perceived that there would likely be various vicissitudes to such a study that takes place (mostly or entirely) far removed from the target languages, especially one that takes place during a global pandemic. This presented me with the following guiding question for the rest of my literature review: *What type of philosophical perspective best describes additional language learning identity and motivation that persists even in and through times of opportunity deprivation and uncertainty?* I use the term opportunity deprivation for those who are learning far away languages because, besides the limitations of COVID, simply being in a place where there is little-to-no face-to-face interaction with the language deprives one severely of opportunity, as a recent study of 2/3s of a million participants found: “native and non-native learners both require around 30 years to reach asymptotic performance, at least in immersion settings” (Hartshorne, J. K., Tenenbaum, J., &

Pinker, 2018, p. 272). Notice, that is *30 years*, and not by studying in faraway settings, but *in immersion settings*.

The literature review guiding question was found to be more and more apt as contexts of existential crises continued to occur as people in my circle of relations became sick and the various openings, laws, rules of conduct, and continued-availability of study-areas (e.g., coffee shops, libraries) were continually changing (closed, open with mask requirement and limited hours, expanded hours, open without mask requirement, mask requirement once more put into effect, closed due to a worker being diagnosed with COVID, etc.). It became a study of additional language learning through such existential desperation that people would be accosting each other over rolls of toilet paper or charging Capitol Hill due to perceived voter fraud.

Taking a deep dive into the literature, I found existentialism to be the best answer to the guiding question since existentialism profoundly and extensively discusses existential resolve through long undulating stretches of absurdities, horrors, uncertainties, ease, lushness, boredom, irony, loneliness, frustration, angst, satisfaction, hope, guilt, and so on (Bogost, 2016; Camus, 1955; Davenport, 2007, 2012; Kierkegaard, 1987c; Nagel, 2002; Noddings, 2003; Sartre, 1943, 1965). Existentialism readily admits to the vicissitudes of life and the necessity of steadfast caring and continuous movements of faith in the face of them (Camus, 1955; Davenport, 2007, 2012; Nagel, 2002; Noddings, 2003; Sartre, 1943, 1965).

### **Statement of the Research Problem**

*The research problems are a lack of philosophical holistic studies in motivation and identity in multiple additional language learning and a lack of studies whose data is the experiences of the Ller's motivators, identities, values, and practices which include strong evaluations and longitudinal processes of what the Ller actively attends to and is learning, documented*

*throughout each day over the course of hundreds of days.* The lack of holistic studies in SLA on additional language learning motivation and identity is reflected in the lack of studies that take into account *and* track one's multiple-times-daily and long-term motivational, identity forming, and language learning experiences as actual data of the study itself, rather than as secondary or tertiary details within the thrice-or-more removed experiences of an interviewer or survey not being the experiencer nor having been at the place that the experiences occurred nor being there at the time of the experiences or any other outside-of-initial experiences methodologies (Allen-Collinson, 2011; Bogost, 2012; Busse, 2010; Gousah, 2018; Noddings, 2003; Pennycook, 2018a; Rule, 2015; Stebbins, 2007; Ushida, 2009; Yu, Chen, Li, Liu, Jacques-Tiura, & Yan, 2014).

Moreover, this is not merely a need for philosophically-*based* studies, as biology, psychology, and other sciences (perhaps all) can claim to be philosophically-based in the sense that they *originated* from philosophy; rather, this is about philosophical *inquiries* which are lacking in the research literature. That is to say, inquiries concerned with an area that falls squarely within the philosophical domain, such as axiology (the good, true, or beautiful), teleology, metaphysics, or phenomenology, and/or inquiries concerned with ontologically conceptualizing and epistemologically describing an as-yet not clearly conceptualized and/or described phenomenon or phenomena (Burbules & Warnick, 2006; Chalmers, 2002; Callard, 2018; Hennig, 2010). Since this study is of the existential persuasion, it is also an *applied* philosophical inquiry, so it is interested in exploring the *living-out* of the phenomenon that it conceptualizes and describes (Little, Edenberg, Luken, Healey, 2020).

The research problems are addressed creating and using an existential framework (EFr), which appropriates and incorporates philosophical concepts that have yet to make inroads into applied linguistics' research, such as aspiration, narrative, and proleptic reasons (Callard, 2018;

Davenport, 2012). The EFr grounding of this study and its AuPh research design add to the newly emergent holistic-philosophical research choice in SLA which offers a “theoretical and philosophical expansion of what can be an excessively self-referential field” (Harvey, 2017, p. 69-70), a field dominated by psychometric and post-structural research perspectives (Aronin, & Singleton, 2012; Hennig, 2010a; Hennig & Clarke, 2013; Lanvers, 2017; Larsen-Freeman, 2007; Taylor, 1985a, 1985b).

### **Purpose of the Study**

*The research purpose of this study is to develop, explain, enact, and analyze a philosophically-conceptualized and methodologically-holistic study of motivation, identity, values, and practices in relation to multiple additional language learning within an ecology of existential threat and opportunity deprivation. This purpose is accomplished by basing the study in existentialism (referred to as the existential perspective, EPr) and by a developed-and-enacted version of the holistic methodology of existential auto-phenomenography (AuPh) which permits a holistic philosophical analysis of the identity forming journey. This holistic philosophical framework (EFr) is developed and explained in the first four chapters of this dissertation (Callard, 2018; Davenport, 2012; Gorichanaz, 2017; Khawaja, 2016; Mitchell, Tracy-Ventura, & McManus, 2017). The part of the abovementioned purpose concerned with enacting (i.e., holistically applying) and analyzing such a philosophy and research design in a real-life additional language learning (ALLing) journey is fulfilled over the course of 15.5 months, during the COVID-19 pandemic, and is summarized in Chapter 5 (Allen-Collinson, 2011, 2012; Burbules & Warnick, 2006; Davenport, 2012; Rampton, Charalambous, Jones, Levon, Mangual Figueroa, and Zakharia, 2020).*

In order to accomplish all of the parts of the purpose, the objects of the study could be put into four groups with each group itself containing several objects: (1) an adult language learner of additional languages who is situated in environments of existential opportunity deprivation; (2) his ALLing existential motivators, existential identity formators, including self-cultivational values and aspirational value creations as existential identity-conferring pursuits; (3) his practices and the objects, contexts, and others he interacts with on the ALLing journey; and (4) the methodological object of an existential research design that explicates, perceives, discerns, describes, and is part of (1) to (3) via a beginning-of-study strong evaluation, daily in-the-moment logging, and an end-of-study stronger evaluation (Allen-Collinson, 2011, 2012, 2018; Bakhtin, 1981, 1986; Callard, 2017, 2018; Davenport, 2007, 2012; Nietzsche, 1911; Polkinghorne, 1995).

### **Research Question**

Following the tradition of phenomenological studies, I had one research question to guide my inquiry (De Felice, 2012; Creswell, 2007; Jones, 1994). Furthermore, since my research was philosophical, exploratory, and descriptive, it is an open-ended research question, which is also “standard fare—even requisite—in phenomenological research” (Gorichanaz, 2018, p. 48; Smith, Flowers, & Larkin, 2009; van Manen, 1990, 2014):

Research Question: *From an existential perspective, in what ways does the language learner perceive and describe his 15.5 month identity-forming multiple additional language learning journeys?* This could be worded in many ways, and I provide multi-question rewording here. As with this originally-worded RQ, a clear meaning to the concepts in the following reworded paraphrase is provided in chapters two and three: “What values did I aspire towards? What

values did I self-cultivate? What identity journeys did I cut short? Was I an existentialist or a philistine?”

### **Methodology**

A claim of this paper is that any non-auto-methodological study cannot be as thoroughly holistic as any auto-methodological counterpart when it comes to motivation, identity, or learning (Gorichanaz, 2017). This is because non-auto-methodological means cannot encompass the identity forming process as it plays out over the long-term as thoroughly as auto-methodological means can. Only auto-methodological means can be thoroughly holistic *both* via in-the-moment multiple-times-per day documentation over the long-term *and* via deep self-exploratory, self-interpretive strong evaluations that cover months and that include pondering deeply over the entire past and potential future lifespan of the individual LLer.

In an existential auto-phenomenographical (AuPh) study, “the phenomenological researcher is both researcher and participant in his study of a particular phenomenon or phenomena” (Allen-Collinson, 2011, p. 11). This is especially important when it comes to researching a particular phenomenon/a that is only available to the participant, such as what he is attending to, what he is learning, what he identifies more or less with, what he values, what moves/motivates him, his moment-by-moment practices, and so on. In this existential AuPh study, the language learner (LLer) documents his strong evaluation, the various ways in which he goes about language learning (LLing), the content of the LLing, the contexts of the LLing, his motives, his intentionality, the impact that LLing is having on his life and his perspective on the world, and the impact his life and perspective of the world is having on his LLing (Allen-Collinson, 2011; Allen-Collinson & Hockey, 2001; Riccioni & Zuczkowski, 2012). This allows for research on motivation, identity, language, learning, values, practices, context, and their various interplays.

The *auto-* prefix of AuPh means it is the LLeL himself who is doing the study; the -*phenomeno-* root means it concerns the LLeL's own experiences, such as what the LLeL attends to, finds as important, and why; and the -*graphy* suffix signifies that the LLeL writes this out in an auto-hermeneutical, self-interpreting, thorough manner. This study's philosophical framework combined with its AuPh research design addresses the calls to action for more studies and approaches to identity and motivation in SLA that are concerned *both* with multiple additional language learning *and* with the LLeL as a whole person which includes the unique undulating ecology in himself and in which he finds himself (de Beaufort, 2019; Clarke & Hennig, 2013; Harvey, 2014; Hennig, 2010a; Lanvers, 2017; Macedo, 2019; Thompson, 2017; Ushioda, 2009, 2012, 2017; Ushioda & Dornyei, 2017).

In my existential AuPh research design, through phenomenological reflection, the LLeL initially deciphers, via articulation, what his initial existential commitment motivators are or what he determines to create as being existentially motivated towards via a written beginning-of-language-study self-interpretation strong evaluation. Then, the LLeL discerns if such beginning-of-study reflective motivations are lived out by, over the course of the following 368 days, documenting his day-to-day *lived* practices as he lives them (i.e., one's "narrative") and as (and how) it evolves (Davenport, 2012, pp. 8-9, 40, 52-56; Allen-Collinson, 2011; Hart, 2020a).

Specifically, the research question of this study was answered through the following existential auto-phenomenographic steps: (1) articulating via writing a beginning-of-study auto-hermeneutical strong evaluation (i.e., BoS strong evaluation) in order to discern one's potential identity-defining commitments (June 29, 2020-September 7, 2020); (2) multiple-times-per-day daily documentation over the course of 368 days (September 11, 2020- September 13, 2021); and, (3) an end-of-study (EoS) stronger evaluation of "(1)" through "(3)" (September 13, 2021-

October 13, 2021) to perceive the identity formation journeys that occurred over that timeframe (June 29, 2020-October 13, 2021).

Thus, this AuPh is an articulating, perceiving-describing, re-articulating exploratory process in order to provide the most transparent, thorough, and developed articulation of the LLer's identity forming journeys, befitting of the philosophical stances of the study. This design offers a rigorous way to perceive and describe "language, learning and motivation, by connecting these to our being-in-the-world" (Harvey, 2017, p. 77) and permits one to both *enact* a holistic study of motivation and identity in LLing and to *analyze* such a study.

### **Limitations**

Since aspirational and self-cultivating journeys can last years, as is the case with multiple LLing, the *longer* the auto-methodological research, *the better* (de Beaufort, 2019; Callard, 2021a, 2021b; Josselson, 1996; Manarin, Adams, Fendler, Marsh, Pohl, Porath, & Thomas, 2021; Marx, 2002). Due to certain constraints, my study was limited to 15.5 months rather than an initially hoped for two year study. Also, while the lion's share of this study was always intended to be LLing in contexts of opportunity deprivation, it had initially planned to also have a portion of it be study abroad LLing research. However, the COVID 19 pandemic made this impossible wherein all study abroad opportunities were cancelled for the duration of the study. This placed the entirety of the study within situations of opportunity deprivation and contexts of additional language learning. That is, the entirety of this study consisted of LLing in situations where one's native language is constantly bombarding, interacting, and interfering with one's target languages (de Beaufort, 2019; Ushioda, 2019). This produced a study that more strongly answers to the literature's call to action for more discussions on identity in SLA that focus on

conditions of experience that work to constrain individuals' attempts at using or learning a language (Block, 2013; Mitchell, Tracy-Ventura, & McManus, 2017, p. 30; Xi, 2014, p. 8).

Another limitation is that the study is of one individual, the researcher-participant, and therefore conclusions drawn may be, "limited in their transferability . . . Still, single-case research offers an accessible way to research new contexts, as well as the opportunity for thorough documentation" (Gorichanaz, 2017, p. 4). Also, the transferability is not as limited as may be normally thought of a single-person study since this study is centered on the individual articulating *his identity* forming journeys in *LLing*, which is something that *each* LLe could and (in my opinion) should do; hence, the greater potential transferability of the philosophical framework and research design of this study given it can be transferred to *any* LLe. Moreover, this limitation to a single individual was important in order to be able to attend to the research field's lack of thoroughly holistic studies on LLe identity formation and the concomitant problems and sub-gaps that accompany such a lacuna.

### **Significance of the Study**

This study is significant to applied linguistics/SLA in that it attends to three major holistic-related lacunae in the literature, the significance of which is evidenced by the many calls to action for studies to address the gaps (de Beaufort, 2019; Harvey, 2014; Hennig, 2010a; Hennig & Clarke, 2013; Kalaja & Leppanen, 1998; Lanvers, 2017; Rampton, Charalambous, Jones, Levon, Mangual Figueroa, and Zakharia, 2020; Ushioda, 2009, 2017, 2019; Wlosowicz, 2013). The three holistic-related lacunae are the following, followed by some smaller gaps and calls to action addressed in this study:

(1) *The lacuna of LLing studies that connect motivation, identity, learning, and language with the entire person and his contexts.* Researchers have recognized "that second language

learning necessarily impinges on the learner's identity" (Benson, Barkhuizen, Bodycott, & Brown, 2012, p. 174). This is shown in that language learning affects (develops and/or changes) one's identities, and it is shown in that one's identities are displayed through one's ALs. This makes studies on identity formation in applied linguistics particularly important.

With identity, motivation, and learning the *experiences* of the LLer *are* the identity-formers, movers, and learnings where experience includes both the actions undertaken and the phenomenological engagement with such actions (such as attention toward, reasons for, intentions, etc.). Therefore, in such a study, we want the data of these experiences. That is, a study concerning identity, motivation, and/or learning naturally must be comprised of data of the *experiences* of identity, motivation, and/or learning, as preferable to data of *second-hand* information of experiences by outside observers.

For example, in Harvey's philosophically-centered study of LLing motivation, the data are "a) what was said in interviews, and b) the conceptual themes I constructed after interviews for participants to respond to" (2014, p. 116). Therefore, Harvey's is a study of experiences of interviews and the experiences of the construction of conceptual themes after those interviews. These are methods done in removed-time and removed-space from the experiences. Moreover, the data are not experiences of one's own motives, identities, and learnings. Instead of non-auto-methodological studies, a study on motivation, identity, and/or learning should be one which is authored, or, at minimum, co-authored, by the one having the motivation, possessing the identity formation, and doing the learning, and much of the data should be acquired in-the-experiences themselves at the time of the experiences. That is, the data should be the experiences of the LLer, rather than the experiences of an outside observer concerning the LLer-other.

Also, the field has been dominated by quantitative methodologies which rely on infrequent data collection measures that cannot take into account complex particularities of daily individual-contextual-other interactions that reveal consistent movements in or changes in motivation. Therefore, the less frequent measures cannot perceive the evolution of identity formation as well as auto-methodological measures (Divan, Ludwig, Matthews, Motley, and Tomljenovic-Berube, 2017; Matthews, Divan, John-Thomas, Lopes, Ludwig, Martini, Motley, and Tomljenovic-Berube, 2013; Ushioda, 2019). Even qualitative methods (e.g., interviews, requesting the learner write her autobiography) lack the rigorous multiple-times daily-contextual *and* dynamic long-term data that is required to best understand the complex motivational experiences and identity formation that the language learner actually lives out (Boo, Dörnyei, & Ryan, 2015; Harvey, 2017; MacIntyre, Baker, & Sparling, 2017). This study provides “a more holistic view of learning,” supplementing a field that is replete with “indirect measures of learning” by providing “more nuanced accounts of how and why learning happens” (Manarin, Adams, Fendler, Marsh, Pohl, Porath, & Thomas, 2021, p. 359).

(2) *The lack of studies that maintain a philosophically-dominant perspective.* Attending to “(2)” is integral for attending to “(1)” since philosophical frameworks by their nature are meant to be broadly-encompassing, concerning the entire person and his contexts (Dewey, 1929; Harman, 2015; Taylor, 1985a). “(2)” is also integral for attending to “(1)” because to have an experience is to be in the philosophical realm of phenomenology because experience *is* phenomenology. Any “essential phenomenological feature of an experience is equivalent to an essential feature of [the experience] tout court” (Taylor, 1985a, p. 48), i.e., experience is phenomenology. Therefore, when one enacts an AuPh one is directly perceiving, documenting, and discussing one’s own experiences of ALing, whereas any non-existential and non-auto-

phenomenological study, no matter how rigorous, is a study concerning the experiences and thus the philosophy of an external-researcher talking or writing about another's experiences.

Many advances in the field of motivation in SLA have been made through psychological conceptual frameworks, while very few (only two) philosophical frameworks have been used (Clarke & Hennig, 2013; Harvey, 2014; Hennig, 2010a). The two philosophical frameworks that have been developed have proven beneficial in offering holistic perspectives on language, learning, motivation, and identity, and in shedding light on “ways in which language learning motivation is part of broader motivation for learning and identity forming in multiple life domains” (Harvey, 2014, p. 13; Clarke & Hennig, 2013, p. 87; Hennig, 2010a). Furthermore, a philosophical framework is particularly apt when studying L2 in situations of existential uncertainty, such as during COVID-19, and/or situations of opportunity deprivation, such as those learning a faraway additional language (de Beaufort, 2019; Lindemann Nelson, 2001; Rampton, Charalambous, Jones, Levon, Mangual Figueroa, and Zakharia, 2020).

This study is significant to the field in that through its philosophical existential framework various as-yet incorporated-into-SLA concepts, such as the philosophical concept of aspiration, is implemented into this study's framework and shown to play a key role in multiple language learning (Callard, 2017, 2018, 2021a, 2021b). Through its *existential* AuPh research design, it provides a rigorous, holistic, auto-methodological study on motivation, identity, value, practices, language, and learning. The methodology includes continual, daily in-the-moment documentation, thus taking into account the in-the-now individual-contextual-other interactions, *and* it includes over-the-long-term evolving identity forming documentation, taking account the motivational experiences and identity formation over time. This is perceived and described phenomenologically by the language learner and through the language learner's own voice.

Moreover, the philosophical methodology was proven to be a good fit even throughout the unique contexts of existential uncertainty in which this research took place: the COVID-19 pandemic and the volatile American political climate. Therefore, this study is significant in that it offers conceptual *and* methodological contributions to the fields of applied linguistics/SLA and philosophy of education.

(3) *The lack of studies concerning learning multiple additional languages.* This “(3)” in certain situations may be considered a separate gap where one sees LLing as simply another school subject, such as learning algebra or genetics. However, with serious Llers, one must be able to learn those school subjects (e.g., algebra, genetics) and most everything else (e.g., how to express one’s emotions) through the languages one is learning. That is, Llers are attempting to continuously progress at learning everything and expressing everything they think, have learned, and want to learn through the languages they are learning. Therefore, “(1)” and “(2)” are inseparable, and “(3),” since it concerns serious LLing and thus the entire person, requires a holistic study.

The learning of any second language is a broadly-encompassing holistic endeavor, and the learning of multiple *additional* languages is even more encompassing in terms of overall time and energy that is needed to put into them (Wlosowicz, 2013). However, there are a lack of studies on motivation for learning *multiple* languages (Ushoida, 2019). Since the learning of multiple languages has been identified as requiring *more* and *different kinds of* motivation than second language learning, research on *motivation* should be keen on attending to it (Aronin, 2006; Aronin & O Laoire, 2005; Aronin & Singleton, 2012; Hennig, 2010a; Ushioda & Dornyei, 2017). Still, a comprehensive study of research from 2005 to 2014 found that the focus on studies of motivation concerned the learning of a second, not multiple, language *and* that one

second language was primarily English, the language for which there is the least mystery as to why people might be motivated to learn it: “over 70% of the motivation studies . . . were set in contexts where the focus was on learning English as the target language” providing “incontrovertible evidence of a strong language bias in current theorizing and research in the L2 motivation field” (Ushioda & Dornyei, 2017, p. 451). Due to this, this study has broader potential significance by way of providing an existential-aspirational approach to multilingual education concerning languages beyond English (especially since it concerns multiple languages) and in contexts which multilingual face-to-face education may be (nearly) nonexistent.

Since learning English is perhaps the least mysterious when it comes to motivation since it has for sometime been the global “hyper-central” language (de Swaan, 2001, pp. 185, 192; Kelly-Holmes, 2007, p. 507; Kramsch, 2019, p. 62) that demands “unconditional allegiance” (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 342; Harvey, 2017, pp. 73, 185, 192), the subfield of *motivation* in language learning *research* would benefit from expanding its focus to involving more languages, even if including English as one of the multiple languages. L2 *motivation* studies that have the highest potential for bringing forth new findings in the field of applied linguistics/SLA are studies that concern a learner of multiple ALs rather than studies concerning the learning of a second language which is either a language mandated by the curriculum the learner is brought up in or is the imposed language by the global culture that exposes it to the learner in a ubiquitous fashion (de Beaufort, 2019; Macedo, 2019). An American living in Kansas may not encounter any other language than English, whereas a Portuguese person living in Portugal is likely to have been brought up hearing not only her mother tongue, but also English and other languages frequently. For a speaker in the dominant environment of the hyper-centrally dominant language trying to learn multiple additional languages in contexts of opportunity deprivation (OD),

especially given COVID-19, an existential commitment of aspiration *at least* is needed—wherein one is *committed* to learning the values of learning the ALs across numerous constraints and actual opportunity deprivation.

Furthermore, the field of language learning motivation is replete with studies of learners in or *near* a community of speakers of their target language—though *holistic* studies of even these types are few—while studies are sparse which concern learners of *additional* languages (ALs) for whom there are few or no non-virtual opportunities for use (de Beaufort, 2019; Hennig, 2010a; Ushioda & Dornyei, 2017). This creates contexts of opportunity deprivation for learning the ALs, not only because there are no or few opportunities for face-to-face social proxemic interpersonal communication-interaction (de Beaufort, 2019, p. 32), but also because one’s native language acts as a constant barrage of bombardments interfering-with-thinking in the ALs since in all face-to-face social proxemic contexts one must interact with others in one’s native language. Each enacting of a normal task, such as paying for groceries, doing one’s taxes, calling hospitals, talking with mechanics, talking with gym members, talking with coffee shop workers, talking with family members, talking with peers, and so on, is in the native language and thus the LLer must attempt to become a regular thinker in and identity former through his ALs even within a milieu of endless and constant native language interference (Ushioda, 2019).

This has been the situation for many Midwestern American LLers for some time, where there simply are no or very few foreign language classes offered (Hamilton and Berdan, 2019) with cuts continually being made (see Johnson, 2019, p. A26, “universities and colleges have shut down a stunning 651 language programs over the past three years”) and where the trend to cut programs further is almost certain to continue (Flaherty, 2020). What makes this study particularly apt in this period of time is the COVID-19 pandemic. With COVID-19, the normal

situation for language learners in Middle America has become the situation for many more Llers around the globe, making clearer than perhaps ever before the importance of attending to this research gap. My study attends to this gap of studies on additional (i.e., faraway) languages by taking place entirely in Kansas, in the middle of America, during the COVID-19 pandemic.

This study researches the impact of studying-one's-ALs-whenever-one-can, holistically, given the dominance of the Ller's native language, given COVID-19 where travel abroad was not permitted and where it is hard to understand an interlocutor in one's own native language due to wearing a mask, let alone the lucky times the Ller is able to dialogue in an AL. This study thus addresses Benson, Barkhuizen, Bodycott, & Brown's observation of "a clear need for more research to investigate . . . second language identities in a wider variety of settings" (2012, pp. 190-191).

(4) *Some smaller gaps and calls to action addressed by this study.* Significance of the study is enhanced by answering the call "for a new subfield [in SLA] that seriously includes religion . . . approached holistically through scholarship" (Bigelow, 2018, p. 432). This subfield should be able to exist in the subfield of identity formation insofar as religion is part of one's identity formation. Hence, I have attempted to be explicit and honest about the religious aspects of this study.

This study is also significant by balancing the overly-centered and propagated focus on transformation as being that which is *different from* whom one was or one's background or norms, and *instead* focuses on a perspective of transformation in which learners are encouraged to be who they value they are (i.e., self-cultivating) *and* who they could value to be (i.e., self-creating, aspiring) (Callard, 2018; Kemp, 2020). This could be a strengthening and growing in the ways they have been brought up in—in their family's or original community's values and

activities, and/or it could be creating a new self. What sets this apart from other perspectives is it does not see growth, development, or transformation as equating with being that which is different-from or opposed-to the norms in one's environment(s). This contrasts to the other two philosophical SLA studies (Harvey, 2019, 2017, 2014; Clarke & Hennig, 2013; Hennig, 2010). The existential approach sees transformation as choosing one's valued commitments—choosing one's value-developmental directionalities, whether they be norm-adhering or norm-violating or a(n) (ever-developing) personalized combination of both (Noddings, 2003).

To conclude, the main significances of this study are the interrelated ways by which it attends to important gaps in the SLA literature and “expands the boundaries of the field and the scope . . . of SLA research” (Pavlenko, 2016, p. 582). These include (1) bringing to the fore *multiple additional language learning*; (2) *being holistic*, including rigorous strong evaluations and multiple-times-daily documentation of interactants in ALing engagements with longitudinal, deep analyses; (3) its unique coverage of ALLing during *contexts of unique existential uncertainty*; (4) its *philosophy-based framework* of an existential perspective to motivation and identity formation in language learning (Allen-Collinson, 2011, 2012; Bakhtin, 1981, 1986; Davenport, 2007, 2012; Webster, 2004, 2005; Webster, & Whelen, 2019; Webster & Wolfe, 2013); (5) its incorporation of a concept of value that includes aspects of a deontological-virtue existential ethics of care philosophy to Lling motivation and identity (Noddings, 1993, 1995, 2002, 2003; Whelen, 2019); and (6) its auto-methodological aspect, bringing existential *auto-phenomenography* (AuPh) to SLA for the first time, further permitting a more rigorous and holistic study (Allen-Collinson, 2001, 2011, 2012, 2018; Allen-Collinson & Hockey, 2001).

## Researcher Perspective

One subjectivity clarification which concerns a writing convention of this paper is that I identify as male and, as such, masculine pronouns are used throughout this study when referring myself or when giving examples that include myself so that the reader knows it is directly relevant to the participant of this study. However, due to recent existential literature's convention of preferencing mixing their use of masculine, feminine, indefinite (“one”), and third person (“they”) pronouns when referring to a person or people in general (such as referring to any “language learner”), feminine, indefinite, and third person pronouns are also used in this paper when the context is not confused by its use (e.g., Aumann, 2020; Chow, 2018; Gordon, 2020; Kemp, 2020; Khawaja, 2016; Noddings, 2013).

Concerning any study, “Theories, concepts and interpretations are always inevitably there right from the very inception of our research . . . which can never be ‘neutral’ or value-free” (Allen-Collinson, 2011, p. 17; Lantoff, Thorne, & Poehner, 2015, p. 218; Pavlenko, 2007; Vygotsky, 1978). Furthermore,

“Any theoretical view is a view adopted by a person (in the first person), and the validity of any view of existence that I adopt cannot be inoculated against the existential conditions—my thrownness, my concern, my being-in-the-world—to which all my perceptions and cognitions are in each case subject” (Khawaja, 2016, p. 127).

This research comes from the phenomenological vantage point of an adult American living in the American Midwest who could not attempt to master an additional language (AL) until adulthood and who is attempting toward a multilingualism in a global-and-research milieu that centers on a single hyper-central (English) language's use, learning, learners, and publication. That being said, this study's holistic research design and existential framework could (and

should) be applied in various forms or wholly to other kinds of language learner studies, including those concerned with students learning only the hyper-central language without a concomitant concern for learning other languages and even those learning a language they are inundated with on a daily basis since they, like all language learners, are still the only ones in the privileged position to observe their language learning practices, motives, identities, interests, and values.

As an AuPh study, the researcher perspective is given thoroughly throughout; still, it is important that in this section I reveal other specific aspects of my background which played key roles in developing the particular kind of existential-phenomenological perspective in which I conducted the research:

I am a monolingually-raised-and-educated adult learner of additional languages who was not exposed to native speakers of other languages speaking the other languages around me in normal contexts until adulthood (aged 22). Due to such limited exposure, once I was exposed to it, I was entranced by the possibility of the experience of what it could be like to think in a language that was not English. It was not until living in Los Angeles while pursuing my master's in philosophy of religion and ethics that I heard native Spanish speakers speaking to each other in regular, quotidian settings. Because my brain had no experience with thinking in a non-English language, while I knew they were actually speaking and understanding Spanish, a very vivid part of me thought they had to be making up sounds and pretending to understand each other. I could not imagine the possibility of having non-English thoughts since I never had had non-English thoughts. Looking back on this experience helped me see the accuracy of Thomas Nagel's observation that it is impossible for someone to be able to understand any actual phenomenological experience of another without actually experiencing what that other has

experienced, no matter how vivid one's imagination is of what it might be like to have that experience (Nagel, 1974).

I desired to mentally metamorphosize such that I could *experientially know* what it was *actually like* to think in a non-English language. However, since that life-changing realization in Los Angeles, I came to value learning as many languages as possible, thinking if I understood how languages typologically, universally worked, that would be good enough to be able to know what it is like to think in those languages. I studied Korean in Korea, Spanish in Mexico and Panama, Portuguese in Brazil and Portugal, Greek in Greece, Hungarian in Hungary, Romanian in Romania, Russian in Russia, one-on-one tutoring of Arabic in Kansas, three semester of German, and several other languages of which I took only one-semester courses, such as Farsi and Slovak. Only Spanish and Portuguese did I get to the point of being able to somewhat think in the languages, but even with that, due to constantly being imbued by English even during study abroad (Kinginger, 2004; Librande, 1998; McGregor, 2016), my thoughts were in a constant battle to prevent itself from reverting to English and I only thought in the languages for small portions of time. Also, never could I think in both languages during the same timeframe, but rather after Brazil and Portugal, during a semester of Portuguese tutoring I gained and used the ability to think in Portuguese; and at a completely different time in my life, I gained and used the ability to think in Spanish. Still, anytime my value for a non-English language would grow, after I would study it abroad my value for it flatlined due to hearing English being played everywhere (gyms, coffee shops, theaters, etc.) and perceiving that even native speakers of the languages did not value their own language to the level that they valued English. More on this in Chapter 5's section, "Results from the Beginning-of-Study Strong Evaluation."

Due to full-time work in the middle of America, pursuing advanced degrees where the homework and research were all in English, and nearly all of my interlocutors being people who could not or would not speak any language other than English with me, my Spanish and Portuguese almost immediately deteriorated below the thinking-in-the-language level. I could only ever think in one non-English language and it only lasted at most one semester. Therefore, one personal goal for this study was to be able to think in more than one language such that I could, for example, choose to think in Portuguese throughout the days of Monday and Thursday and in Spanish throughout the days of Tuesday and Friday every single week, and that I could maintain this *long-term*, which would hopefully translate to a *life-long* value of these languages.

The reflection on this helped me to realize that the qualification of *thinking in the ALs* in a deep real sense, was never a value I fully accepted (due to my study abroad experiences and to my own ever-changing inquisitive nature), but rather only the value of learning the various grammatical and phonological concepts in as many languages as possible. Therefore, deciding on and committing to gaining a deep level in a few, delimited number of ALs was a hoped-for (and hoped-to-be maintained) goal for the ALs of this study. In other words, this study was aspirational in nature (Callard, 2018).

The languages I studied for the entirety of this research, with my proficiency at the start of the study in terms of ACTFL (ACTFL, 2016) and CEFR (Council of Europe, 2018) proficiencies were the following: Spanish: Intermediate Mid (B1, can listen to talk about one's weekend, describing a movie, but not yet about deeper issues such as global warming), Portuguese: Intermediate Low (A2, can understand mini-conversations about daily life with interactants who speak somewhat slower than normal), French: Novice Low (pre-A1, unable to even ask or understand "What do you do for a living" in the language, or understand a simple request such as

a request for a croissant at a bakery), and Italian: Novice Low (pre-A1) (Baztán, 2008). My performance goal by the end of at least 365 days was to be at Intermediate High (i.e., B2) level for all of my ALs. However, much more important than this was my goal to genuinely, deeply appreciate these six languages, in the six-fold manner one has of a genuinely-held value: reflective, affective, cognitive, motivating, actional, and ethical appreciation of the ALs (Callard, 2018).

In the course of writing the BoS strong evaluation, that is, in the beginning parts of my aspirational journey of desiring to more deeply value (and thus more deeply desire and to actually discover) what it is like to think in a select few non-native languages, my evaluation converged with a query about ethical responsibilities of a teacher of languages for academic purposes. I came to the conclusion that an ethical responsibility of the language teacher is to share and maintain the phenomenological experiences with his Lling students as much as he can by going through *and* continuing in the processes of becoming academically proficient in several non-native languages himself—ever trying to learn concepts that he desires to learn but through the non-native languages as part of his identity formation aspirational journeys (Bakhtin, 1986; Callard, 2017, 2018). As Thomas Nagel explains,

“There is a sense in which phenomenological facts are perfectly objective: one person can know or say of another what the quality of the other’s experience is. They are subjective, however, in the sense that even this objective ascription of experience is possible only for someone sufficiently similar to the object of ascription to be able to adopt his point of view—to understand the ascription in the first person as well as in the third” (1974, p. 442).

The sentiment of this quote was an evaluator-reason for valuing becoming academically proficient in a few languages, rather than simply learning about the workings of as many

languages as possible or becoming proficient in one language but then language-hopping to another. It became stronger over the course of the study, as I explain in the “Results” section. Hence, as an educator, this research ended up responding to an admonition “that educators be held to aspirational rather than performance-based standards: they should be evaluated on their ability to model the values to which their students should aspire” (Yacek, Rödel, & Karcher, 2020, p. 535; Gordon, 2020). In this way, my research actually allowed and helped me to reflect and discover if indeed I am in any way, and how well or not, modelling what I have been and will be encouraging my students to be enacting—that is, self-articulating, evaluating, and aspiring-and-living towards higher-order values.

### **Organization of the Study**

Chapter 1 provides an introduction, an overview, the research problem, the purpose of the study, the research question, a summary of the methodology, research limitations, the significance of the study, and the researcher perspective. Chapter 2 provides a review of the literature concerning identity, motivation, and the three interrelated gaps in applied linguistics/SLA: philosophically perspectival studies, multiple additional language learning studies, and holistic auto-methodological studies. Within these overarching gaps, Chapter 2 also expounds on multiple sub-gaps in the literature that this study addresses. Chapter 3 then presents a solution to these issues in terms of this study’s philosophical framework. Chapter 3 fully fleshes out that philosophical framework—the existential perspective (EPr) on motivation and identity in language learning. In this way, it answers the question: *“What philosophical approach accurately and holistically describes the kinds of motivation that maintains engagement with multiple languages even in and through times of existential uncertainties and opportunity deprivation **and** permits the most clearly perceived and holistically described*

*identity formations that occur throughout such journeys?”* Chapter 4 goes into depth as to this existential framework’s auto-phenomenographical methodology and research design. Chapter 5 discusses the results, discerning exactly what kind of existential commitments were lived out in this study and if any were cut short. Finally, Chapter 5 ends by delivering calls to action for future research, researchers, curricula, and language educators.

## Chapter 2 - Literature Review

This chapter provides a literature review concerning identity, motivation, and the three interrelated gaps in applied linguistics/SLA: philosophically perspectival studies, multiple additional language learning studies, and holistic studies. In perceiving the gaps and answering a further developed literature review question which was the outcome of perceiving the gaps, I reviewed the literature through iterative cycles of holistic reading, selective reading, and detailed reading (Gorichanaz, 2018; van Manen, 2014). Throughout these cycles, the existential framework (EFr) of Lling motivation and identity eventuated. The main authors whose work most influenced this framework are Agnes Callard (2017, 2018, 2021a, 2021b), John J. Davenport (2007, 2012), Nell Noddings (2003, 2013, 1993, 1995), Noreen Khawaja (2016), Søren Kierkegaard (1987c, 1987a, 1987d, 1951, 1980, 1988), Viktor Frankl (1973, 1974, 1985, 1987, 2000), and Charles Taylor, (1985a, 1985b, 1992); and secondarily, by the works of Mikhail Bakhtin (1981, 1984, 1986; Coates, 1999; Holquist & Clark, 1984), Tim Gorichanaz (2015, 2016, 2017, 2018), Scott Webster (2004, 2005; Webster & Whelen, 2019), and Jean-Paul Sartre (1943, 1946a, 1946b, 1965).

Like the other two philosophical frameworks created and put to use for SLA, this existential framework “offers a holistic perspective on language, learning, motivation, and identity” (Harvey, 2017, p. 76; Dovchin, Pennycook, Sultana, 2018; Floridi, 2015). Moreover, this study’s existentialist AuPh research design provided a means for describing and analyzing a Ller’s aspirational and cultivational identity forming journeys (Allen-Collinson, 2011; Bakhtin, 1981; Bakhtin, 1986; Busse, 2010; Callard, 2018, 2021b; Clark & Holquist, 1984; Clarke & Hennig, 2013; Coates, 1999; Davenport, 2007, 2012; Dornyei & Ushioda, 2009; Foucault, 1997; Gorichanaz, 2017; Gorichanaz, 2019; Goulah, 2009; Harvey, 2017; Noddings, 2003; Pavlenko,

2011a; Rampton, Charalambous, Jones, Levon, Mangual Figueroa, and Zakharia, 2020; Ryan, Huta, & Deci, 2008; Stebbins, 2003, 2007; Waterman, 1981). While this chapter compares and contrasts this study's framework with other frameworks and, in this way, presents a thorough description of the framework, Chapter 3 even more thoroughly describes the framework.

### **Existential Identity versus Other Concepts of Identity in SLA**

Before diving into the concepts of existential identity and the concepts of identity which are dominant in the literature, a brief terminological clarification should be made. As aforementioned, additional language (AL) refers to, “a language that has few or no ‘natural’ communicative functions in a particular context, and for which there are few opportunities for use” (de Beaufort, 2019, p. 32). For the rest of this paper, AL also is meant to mean a language that is *one of several* languages that an adult is *actively* learning. Therefore, ALs are *multiple* additional languages (Aronin & Singleton, 2012; Thompson, 2017; Wlosowicz, 2013). I use the expression additional language *learning* (ALLing) to refer to the *longitudinal* aspect of this study and language learning in general as a long-term journey (Landau, Oysereman, Keefer, & Smith, 2014). I use the variant expression additional *languaging* (ALing) when I am referring to *in-the-moment engagements* with an additional language. For example, *Portuguese language learning* concerns my continuously interacting in and with Portuguese over the course of a journey lasting at least several months such that improvements in it and in my learning of other cares through it likely occur; whereas, *Portuguesing* concerns my in-the-moment actively engaging with the Portuguese language, e.g., attentively reading the book *Neurofisiologia Sem Lágrimas* right now (Mackay, 2006). Using *languaging* in this way (Becker, 1988, 1991a, 1991b) agrees with the use of translanguaging in the translanguaging literature (García & Kleyn, 2016; Wei, 2011; MacSwan, 2017; Mirzaei & Eslami, 2015; Suzuki, 2012; Tribble, 2009) and the use of

linguaging in SLA's sociocultural theory (Lantolf, Thorne, & Poehner, 2015; Swain, 2006; Swain, Lapkin, Knouzi, Suzuki, & Brooks, 2009). Simply put, linguaging and thus ALing *means* engaging with the language in some way.

### **Introducing Existential Identity & Comparing it with Other Leading Conceptualizations**

I will go into the existential concept of identity in depth in Chapter 3, but in a nutshell, existential identities are those identities that one chooses to relate-to as centrally valued to the self and is concordantly committed-to living-out long-term (Callard, 2018; Davenport, 2012; Khawaja, 2016; Noddings, 2003; Sartre, 1943, 1999). One must be able to think as relating-as X identity (e.g., "Spanish speaker") in order to exist as X identity, but one also must exist as X identity in having genuine X-ness thought-actions (e.g., thoughts in Spanish, speaking Spanish) in order to relate-as X identity (see Kierkegaard, 2009a, p. 276).

This view of identity is couched in certain values held by the existential philosophical framework (EFr). It is couched in the value of existence (Frankl, 1984; Mate, 2003). It also nested in the value of choosing to choose rather than letting choice occur (Khawaja, 2016; Kierkegaard, 2009a). There is the value of self-ownership or responsibility in the sense of making oneself explicitly aware of (accepting of) one's responsibility to choose ethically, which is necessarily couched in the fact that one continues to exist and that one is ever choosing, which are parts of one's facticity, and which together comprise part of one's debt that one did not choose but was and is born into—that is, one did not choose to exist or to have freewill, yet one is given the responsibility for one's existence and freewill choices (Davenport, 2012; Khawaja, 2016; Noddings, 2013; Sartre, 1943). Followed by the value of responsibility is the value of explicitly committing-to some delimited subset of higher-order values and therefore authoring one's self—one's own life via and with the ALs—through self-cultivation or aspiration, and

doing so in each moment to the utmost so that potentialities within oneself are unlocked. This choosing is choosing authentically, and throughout one keeps in mind one's unconditional values (of existence, choice, responsibility, and commitment) whether or not one is "successful" moment by moment in unlocking potentialities (Khawaja, 2016, pp. 61-64). A study concerned with such a life-as-philosophy and trajectory-of-life perspective can only be done by the self—only the self can articulate and name one's values, motivations, identities, and practices in one's active relating-towards-ness (Kierkegaard, 1987c, 1987a, 2009a).

Through this definition of existential identities, we can also see when and how the following *facets* of identity referred to in SLA literature (as well as any other facets) are or are not a part of one's *existential* identities, and to what degrees:

"second language literature refers to at least five distinct facets of identity, including (1) people's inner sense of who they are, (2) the identities they project to others, (3) the identities that are recognized or ascribed to them by others, (4) imagined identities, and (5) socially-validated identity categories" (Benson, Barkhuizen, Bodycott, & Brown, 2012, p. 176).

In the existential perspective, (1) and (4) are clearly part of one's relating-as of existential identities. This could also include one's sense of how they perceive others, objects, religion, how to spend their time, how they perceive others perceive them and their work, etc. in terms of self-held value of all of these. Feature (2) is a feature of existential identities in that there must be real acts in accord with one's identities. Finally, features (3) and (5) are relevant to the existential view of identity insofar as any of those features are perceived by the Ller herself as consistent with what she holds as valued as to who she relates to as being and what she consistently enacts, or insofar as they affect that Ller perspective of how-and-who she relates to as being (Davenport, 2012; Webster, 2004, 2005).

Aside from facets of identity, the common SLA “view . . . of identity is that of a social process whereby individuals ‘manage and negotiate their selves in social circumstances’” (de Beaufort, 2019, p. 78; De Fina & Georgakopoulou 2012; Bauman R. 2000; Norton, 2000, 1995). However, this could refer philistine drifter identities who do not explicitly relate-towards any specific solid values, and it could refer to the ambitious identities who explicitly relate-towards things that are not values (e.g., status). At the same time, there are existential identities that would not fall under this definition’s purview. Therefore, in the existential perspective (EPr), it is both too broad by covering identity types that the EPr would eschew, and too limited by not covering all the identity types of value—those that could fall under being the most relevant identities to a person. Specifically, this particular social-constructivist view, while potentially valuable, excludes those who stick with LIng due to self-valued identities whether or not (and even when) relatedness is lost due to LIng. In many identity forming situations, there is no negotiation because one has committed to their directionality whatever the social pressures around them may be. Perhaps the salient difference here is authenticity. In existentialism, being authentic means taking ownership of determining “how things are to count towards one’s situation and how one is to act in relation to them” (Webster, 2005, p. 11). Also, the above social-constructivist explication does not apply very well with ALLing, and with this compounded with COVID-19 when the social circumstances are limited-to-nonexistent.

An expanded social-constructivist definition that perceives watching YouTubes in Italian as negotiating a self in a social situation (with cultural artifacts and the like) could work, but then we would need to replace “negotiate” with something like “explicitly choosing to develop the self through others’ created cultural artifacts” or something akin to that. Sociocultural Theory in SLA does a decent job in describing situations of interacting with ALs alone as being in this

sense socially-constructed because it still uses social artifacts and includes socializing with the self (Lantolf, Thorne, & Poehner, 2015). I adopt some of its method Sociocultural Theory's methods (from Pavlenko & Lantolf, 2000). The main issue I have with the abovementioned definition is the "negotiation" part. I think it is good to negotiate; however, the definition needs to be expanded to include self-negotiation when one mainly learns by talking to oneself in the AL, writing to the self, or through listening and reading to self-selected materials.

Returning to the point of existential authenticity, if any negotiation is a violation of one's *authenticity*, one remains authentic to their chosen valued related-towards identities in non-negotiable ways. Moreover, there are identities that can only be named by the self living them out and identifying them as being a part of who the self is because without this auto-methodologically naming, these identities would not have a name because they are not socially valued or sufficiently ubiquitous in the culture. We need a framework that can permit the description of all of these kinds of identities as well. Existentialism gives us that.

Identities in the EPr are any valued whats of the person that she herself identifies her identities as and has explicitly chosen to commit to. The first part of this, therefore, agrees with part of the extended poststructuralist definition by Norton (2000) that defines identity as "how a person understands his or her relationship to the world, how that relationship is constructed across time and space, and how the person understands possibilities for the future" (p. 5), but the EPr centers on those relationships that the LLer has committed to that are understood as being of higher-order values for the LLer.

This study also does not take the approach that has been taken by "the LL research field at large . . . framing identity as decentred and fragmented, dynamic, unstable, contested" (Harvey, 2014, p. 40). This is *not* how many people *themselves* describe their identities. In the EFr, it is

what each person *himself* identifies as higher-order identities that are of value. Just because something is there about me and is a reality (and maybe is fragmented, unstable, contested, etc.), it does not make it part of my existential identity. It could be a way others identify me, but it is only a part of my who-ness, a part of my identity, insofar as how I relate to it. Identity is not in any identifier X, but only *how* the person himself identifies as X (Kierkegaard, 2009a; Webster, 2004, 2005).

Thus, I agree with Harvey (2014) when she says, “learners’ own voices and perspectives should be foregrounded in order to understand how LL motivation develops” (p. 54). But unlike Harvey, I take on the certain *auto*-methodological implications of this—that a study concerning the LLer’s own voice and perspective should be given by the LLer, rather than the perspective and voice of an outside researcher re-voicing or discussing the voices of the participants dubbed-over with the researcher’s voice (Davenport, 2012; Khawaja, 2016).

The other philosophical perspective, that of Barbara Hennig, defines “identity” in accord with her motivational model: “a Foucauldian ethical perspective . . . defines individuals’ identities as de-centralised and ever-changing” (Hennig, 2010a, pp. 43-44). Conversely, in the EPr, one explicitly chooses in a committed manner one’s identities that one will relate as in a self-cultivating or aspirational caliber (i.e., concerned with commitments to values) and made in-the-moment continuously (Sartre, 1943; Webster, 2005). Identities as Hennig’s Foucauldian ethical perspective defines them as drifting identity journeys, rather than value-based committed ones (Callard, 2018; Davenport, 2012, pp. 44, 95-97). That is, unlike Foucauld’s perspective, in the EPr an individual may and should have identities that are central long-term authentically chosen commitments willed forth in good faith.

Identities are ever-changing in that everything and everyone is in some way ever-changing, but an existential identity of an authentic person who is living in good faith is not as a whole decentralized, but rather centralized and directionalized where the person knows at least some of what he consistently personally values and attempts to live out, such as an ethic of care (Noddings, 2003). To not have this, or to deny it, is to live in bad faith (Sartre, 1943). To have it strongly, usually one has conducted some form of strong evaluation (reflection) on one's own interests and based on this reflection, she purposefully selected a subset of centrally-focused-on values to commit to consistently live out (Davenport, 2012, p. 117; Taylor, 1985a). This is done auto-phenomenographically because one's central values can only be known and experienced by the language learner himself—only the person himself can know what values he cares most about.

Thus, examples of existential *multilingual* identities would be ones in which one's reflected-on valued multiple languages are connected to other lived-out higher-order values in order to create or develop such valued identities. This study itself is an example of an existential aspirational multilingual journey interlaced with existential self-cultivating journeys wherein the AL's that I hoped to acquire were interwoven with higher-order values I had already acquired (Benson, et al., 2012, p. 174; Callard, 2018; Davenport, 2012; Simpson, 2001, p. 91; Simpson, 2014; Marx, 2002). This is in line with Benson, Barkhuizen, Bodycott, & Brown's definition of second language identity with a few essential additions: "second language identity [is] defined here as any aspect of a person's identity that is connected to their knowledge or use of a second language" (Benson, Barkhuizen, Bodycott, & Brown, 2012, p. 174); the additions being that it is an aspect that the person himself *explicitly* holds to be as important in some *valued* way.

Ema Ushioda's perspective identifies three types of language learner identities: situated, discourse, and transportable (Ushioda, 2009, p. 222). Situated identities depend on the particular situation, e.g., language teacher and language student identities in a classroom. These could be existential identities or part of one's existential identities. Discourse identities are the discourse roles in the verbal interaction, e.g., language teacher as initiator and student as responder—these are a type of what I call narravival identity instantiations (Davenport, 2012). Transportable identities are those that are with a person over multiple contexts and in other identity instantiations. These could also be existential identities. An example would be someone who deeply, consciously, volitionally, and continuously identifies as an ultramarathoner, thus, having this identity throughout various kinds of discourse identities and situated identities. For example, even if they are a teacher or student in a language classroom, they will bring some ultramarathon-related examples or concepts into their essays or in their verbal responses. They may also have some kind of ultramarathon clothes on, emblems on their book/bag/computer, etc. Often, transportable identities are more covert. The most accurate way to deciphering them is simply by asking the person. For example, someone who takes her mother identity everywhere, but does not explicitly talk about it, will, if asked, gladly tell you she is a proud mother and that it affects how she is everywhere she goes and how she treats everyone (Hewitt, 1991, p. 159).

Ushioda advises one to leverage the power of one's transportable identities in Lling classroom contexts (2009, p. 222). I extend this advice to apply to *every* possible environment, e.g., talking to oneself in the language in one's home, while one drives, while one walks around. Ushioda observes this "powerful motivational impact" of bringing one's transportable identities into one's Lling as stimulating "a much higher level of personal involvement and effort in the interaction" (p. 223). This is because self-cultivating *values in and through* the languages one is

learning highly engages the Ller's "own motivation, personal interests and identities" (Ushioda, 2009, p. 223) in order to promote the development of one's *values for* the languages. That is, by invoking their autonomous transportable identities, "language learners (are enabled to) engage their current [self-cultivating] selves in their L2 [aspirational] interactions" (p. 224).

Related to the concept of identity is identity work. Identity work is any act that contributes to the formation of one's identities (Allen-Collinson & Hockey, 2007; Snow & Anderson, 1995; Stebbins, 2003, 2014a, 2014b). The language of identity work is continuous with the language of identity formation such that a declaration of one is a declaration of the other. Identity work can be extended over diachronic time such as writing one's strong evaluation over the course of weeks, or it can be in-the-moment work such as identity instantiations.

Benson, Barkhuizen, Boycott, & Brown partition SLA identity work into three categories: "identity-related proficiency development" (2012, p. 182), "language-mediated personal development" (p. 185), and "linguistic self-concept" (p. 184). Identity-related proficiency development refers to indirect impact to identity due to a greater proficiency in the language. Some of these may count as proleptic reasons along an aspirational journey where one has discovered new reasons for holding the AL as important to and for the self by way of greater proficiency in the AL (Callard, 2018). The "language-mediated personal development" identity dimension (Benson et al, p. 185) relates to personal development through one's ALs, for example, my personal development of virtue ethics through reading *Ética a Nicómaco de Aristóteles* in Spanish (Fernández Aguado, 2009). This then has an impact on my identity as a philosophy enthusiast as well as my identity as an academic Ller of Spanish.

Linguistic self-concept refers to "the participants' sense of who they are as language learners and users" (Benson, Barkhuizen, Bodycott, & Brown, 2012, p. 184). This overlaps with the other

two conceptually, but puts them (and any other identity work) into strong evaluative form, thus, making explicit to the self through articulation of the self's values what they connect with the ALs or desire to connect with the ALs and who they see themselves as or could see themselves as being and becoming in regard to being an ALLer and user of those ALs. This includes articulating things such as “beliefs about language learning and self-assessments of proficiency” (Mitchell, Tracy-Ventura, & McManus, 2017, p. 35) as well as transportable Lling “self-beliefs that a learner holds and takes with them into any encounter” (Mitchell, Tracy-Ventura, & McManus, 2017, p. 35). All three of these types of SLA identity work are present in my study by way of my BoS strong evaluation, 368 days of multiple-times-daily identity instantiations, and EoS stronger evaluation.

Prominent SLA scholar Claire Kramsch words the ways the self is formed through language usage as “subjectivity” rather than “identity” (Kramsch, 2009, p. 25). This study sides with the existentialist view that subjectivity is the in-the-moment relating-to-X self (i.e., an identity instantiation) but that identities themselves are identity formations seen as over-the-longer-term composite and development of such instantiations (Block, 2009; Callard, 2018, 2021a, 2021b; Gee, 1996; Hall, 2004; Weedon, 2004). This is a conceptualization of in-the-moment subjectivities as narravive instantiations and over-the-longer-term composite of the flow of relations of such instantiations as one's identities (Gorichanaz, 2017 and 2018). Therefore, while, “[s]ubjectivity is . . . the process of how identity is constructed in moment-to-moment activity . . . Identities . . . are more durable than the ever-changing modes of subjectivity which create them” (de Beaufort, 2019, pp. 53-54).

The higher-valued subjectivities do create the higher-valued identities; therefore, there is no identity without concomitant identity instantiations i.e., willed-forth movement attempts that

instantiate such an identity (Khawaja, 2016). Thus, my work on my beginning-of-study (BoS) strong evaluation is an articulation of my identity formation up to that point and of the committed-to identity forming journeys for at least the duration of this study. The in-the-moment daily logs are identity instantiations. My end-of-study (EoS) stronger evaluation is the ontological explications of the entire identity formation journeys that the BoS strong evaluation, the daily logs, language assessments, and so on, reveal (Block, 2009; Gorichanaz, 2017, 2018; Hall, 2004; Weedon, 2004). Thus, for this study, *data* is an umbrella term referring both to the identity narrative instantiations and to the flow of identity formation that encompasses the entire 15.5 month identity forming journey from starting the BoS strong evaluation to finishing the EoS stronger evaluation (Allen-Collinson, 2011, 2018; Allen-Collinson & Hockey, 2001; Davenport, 2012; Gorichanaz, 2017, 2018; Harvey, 2014, p. 116).

### **Identity and Learning**

To *learn something* could simply mean having gained an addition of knowledge (in terms of understanding something new or once-forgotten) (Callard, 2018). However, since this is a study on identity and motivation in multiple language *learning*, the focus and meaning of *learning* here also concerns one's identity. One's identity formation is evidence of one's learning and is shown by chosen attempts at-or-with learning. That is, a person's self-chosen learning-directions show what is important to the person *and* creates things of importance by the person. *Learning* for this study is taken to mean *the having of meaningful experiences by way of engagements which over the course of time produces a cultivating and/or creating of the self* (Dewey, 1958, 1985, 1991; Webster, 2005, p. 9; Barr & Tagg, 1995; Manarin, Adams, Fendler, Marsh, Pohl, Porath, & Thomas, 2021, p. 350). In other words, for active learning to happen, one does not simply have experiences, but experiences gain meaning in terms of explicitly, actively learning, "from

persons engaging . . . making choices as to how the elements of the experience are to be meaningful” (Webster, 2005, p. 9).

One may be able to discover very specific items that another has learned by way of having the other answer specific questions on a test, but knowing what someone is actively learning can only be discovered by an open ended question such as “What are you learning?” and trusting that the LLer is being honest in his answer. Therefore, this study takes the definition of *learner* to be *someone who seeks to know something in an explicit, active way*: “For Freire [1994], the process of knowing is central to what it means to be a learner . . . Freire emphasizes that learning is intentional: it is actively directed towards an object to be known” (Rule, 2015, p. 145).

Of those things the LLer is learning throughout the journey, this study is centered on *those things the LLer is learning that the LLer values*. Agnes Callard would say that there cannot be learning without valuing the learning and there cannot be value that one possesses without the person actively trying to learn more in the domain of the value (Callard, 2018). Hence, all the more it is the case that to determine what a LLer is learning, one must rely on the LLer to tell us what valued objects he is actively directed toward at any point in time. A rigorous study would have the LLer document his close attention to multiple-times-daily learning over the course of a long period of time in the learning. The lack of this is a methodological gap in the research.

There are also gaps concerning the population researched.

Manarin, Adams, Fendler, Marsh, Pohl, Porath, & Thomas’s scholarship of teaching and learning (SoTL) meta-analysis shows a gap in studies concerning graduate students. Of 299 studies coded,

“the most common data source was . . . undergraduate students (included in 73.9% of articles), whilst the second most common was faculty (19.4%). Graduates of programs were

rarely considered in SoTL studies; they were data sources in only two of the articles” (2021, pp. 353-354).

Studying graduate students (and beyond) in research concerning learning could provide further data of *enduring* change brought about by the learning. This is important because, “we know that significant learning takes time as it involves not only knowledge acquisition, but also developing new ways of thinking and changing attitudes” (Manarin et al., 2021, p. 358). Furthermore, when investigating student learning in a one-semester class, “No matter how good the study, it cannot demonstrate enduring change within that limited context and time-frame” (2021, p. 358).

The authors also conclude that more empirical studies are needed that focus less on “‘what works’ in terms of teacher activity” and more on “‘what is’ happening in terms of student learning” (Manarin et al., p. 360). On all of these points, what are needed are more longitudinal and multi-contextual studies in the life of and from the perspective of the LLeL herself. A study that contains months of strong evaluation and multiple-times-daily journaling over 368 days by the LLeL for a total of 15.5 months gives evidence of *lasting* change and of what is happening in terms of student learning. That is, it attends to these gaps.

Lastly, learning values cannot be lies. They are ordered towards the truth: “Consider an analogy: in order to count as learning mathematics, there must really be mathematical knowledge, and your possession of it must increase over time” (Callard, 2021b, p. 489); so too of LLeLing: there must really be Spanish knowledge, and my possession of it must increase over time. Now, I may, “make such cognitive sacrifices in order to achieve this end that [I] end up with less overall knowledge,” such as perhaps forgetting all the algebra and physics I once knew (p. 489). Still, I will count as having learned Spanish. “Whereas you cannot learn some alchemy: there is

simply nothing there to learn. If you call someone an ‘aspirant,’ you are committed to thinking that the value she aspires to learn is not a sham” (p. 489).

*The number one interest and focal point of this dissertation is the motivation involved in and self-cultivational and aspirational identity formations created by the active learning of multiple languages.* It is in service to this goal that makes existential motivation and identity inextricably important to the research. They serve the goal of discovering and promoting authentic ethical-and-effectual directions for active multiple language *valuing, learning, and researching.* *Learning* itself, as explained above, means reflected-upon and explicitly-made movements of being-as-becoming, existentially speaking (Kierkegaard, 2009; Manarin, Adams, Fendler, Marsh, Pohl, Porath, & Thomas, 2021, p. 350) with a goal of ever attempting for *development* in the languages in some way (listening, speaking, vocabulary, grammar, singing, pragmatics, content-via-the-AL, etc.), otherwise one is not *becoming* multilingual but rather *becoming* monolingual or self-silenced. Thus, *learning*, including multiple language learning (including of one’s native language), is the kind of practice that cannot be completed once-and-for-all. Rather, the activity requires ceaseless renewal and unending striving to (continue to) be “learning” and thus it *means* that multiple language learning *is* an existential practice (see Khawaja, 2016, pp. 58-68) because it requires commitment, that is, existentially enforced motivation. Multiple language learning such as it exists at all in one’s life (and did not simply at one point exist in the past, or exists only in a hoped-for future existence) *is* a continually enforced-and-enforcing existential choice attempts in enacting existential identity forming journeys.

### **Identity and Authenticity**

While authenticity in teaching has been a thoroughly researched phenomenon (Kreber, Klampfleitner, McCune, Bayne, & Knottenbelt, 2007, p. 22), authenticity in learning has not.

This study is one of making sense of authenticity in learning in light of the conceptions of authenticity underlying the texts that are reviewed and discussed throughout this dissertation (e.g., Davenport, 2012, 2015; Khawaja, 2016; Kreber, 2010, 2013, 2015, 2016; Taylor, 1992; Sartre, 1943). However, since authenticity in general parlance means something along the lines of that which comes most naturally to a person, I often prefer to use the term resolve or existential resolve or existential identity forming commitments or journeys.

Aside common meanings of authentic, such as correspond to the facts, not fictitious, trustworthy, and reliable (Authentic, 2021a, 2021b; Αὐθέντης, 2021; Kreber, 2013, p. 27), another dominant way that authenticity is viewed today flows from a Rousseauian philosophical tradition in which it means something along the lines of doing what most naturally comes to you (Laceulle, 2018; Rousseau, 1984, 1996, 2003; Taylor, 1992). Jean-Jacques Rousseau never used the term authenticity, but the concept is attributed to him due to the ideas put forth in his works (Ferrara & Evans, 1993; Rousseau, 1984, 1996, 2003; Taylor, 1992).

In the Rousseauian tradition, the inauthentic person is the social person whose identities are society's and thus are artificial and misdirected by unethical social values such as competition, possession, and power: "social man lives always outside himself; he knows how to live only in the opinion of others" (Rousseau, 1984, p. 136). Existentialists agree that one should not be a drifter who lives only in the opinion of others or an ambitious person seeking only possession or domination, but existentialists add that even when one lives authentically by reflection and choosing, one is going along with aspects of certain crowds since we are mimetic creatures as part of our facticity (Girard, 1978). The key is choosing what to have mimetic desire with and towards (Aristotle, 2002; Bakhtin, 1981, 1984; Callaghan, Moll, Rakoczy, Warneken, Liszkowski, Behne, & Tomasello, 2011; Girard, 1978; Girard, Rocha, & Antonello, 2007;

Hepach, Vaish, & Tomasello, 2012; Joaquin, Schumann, Mates, Mikesell, & Lee, 2009; Noddings, 2003).

“Far from referring to a ‘true’ or ‘real’ self underlying false, social, or superficial performances, existential authenticity describes a way of working on the self” (Khawaja, 2016, p. 25). To explicitly choose to choose is to work at creating and/or cultivating yourself as a sort of work of art (Khawaja, 2016). This is to “become personally responsible for what meanings are to count as significant” as opposed to being “lost in the crowd” (Webster, 2004, p. 14).

A logic that holds that one is authentic when one does what comes most naturally would mean I, and most people raised in and surrounded by their native language, would not progress very far in a non-native language. When I first studied, Spanish I thought my teachers were lying to me when they told me every noun has a gender. It seemed like the most absurd and unnatural thing to my English mind, while the native speakers considered the usage natural. It was only natural to them because they were speaking words others taught them from infancy. It *became* natural to me as I continued to hear and repeat such words and phrases—but it took work and long stretches of feeling fake. It only became natural over choosing to choose consistently over a very long-term time frame. The options with language are you either choose to choose to create what becomes natural for you *or* you choose (inexplicitly) to be a slave to whatever others have put into you by way of what you were raised around, happen to be most around, or have been forced to learn by others (e.g., school mandates). Doing so feels much more natural to the person than the one who steps back, reflects, and explicitly chooses to learn who they are and what that means, such as one who pursues academic learning of an additional faraway language (Bakhtin, 1981, 1984, 1986; de Beaufort, 2019; Hennig, 2010a; Lee, 1998).

What existentialists are encouraging, and how they define authenticity, is that people reflect on their choices and then choose to choose their daily and long-term choices. One is *not* free to be oneself in the Rousseauian sense of authenticity because he is instead choosing in bad faith to let their facticity choose for them. One is being moved by impulse and/or other people. Instead of this, one is existentially free when one uses their rationality to explicitly choose to choose and to act on those committed-to choices (Lee, 1998, p. 41). In this type of freedom, one can choose even against their biochemical imperatives, for example, by fasting or by becoming a martyr (Sartre, 1999). This freedom is the way in which a person can have the kind of moral fortitude to not go along with the majority when put into Milgram-experiment type situations because she has reflected, evaluated, articulated, and chosen to choose with a firm commitment based on that strong evaluation (Blass, 1991, 1999; Davenport, 2007; Duns Scotus, 1997, 2008; Lee, 1998; Milgram, 1974; Sartre, 1963, 1965; Zimbardo, 2007).

Out of the superabundant amount of thoughts, ideas, objects, people, will, attitudes, and mimetic potentialities of one's facticity, one can choose a limited number of options for what to believe and how to act by reflecting on one's superabundance, evaluating it, and articulating one's higher-order values from it (Duns Scotus, 1997, 2008). In this, she develops a resolved direction for herself. This is living in authentic resolve, rather than merely going along with one's most presently-powerful factual internal and external contextualities or being more readily manipulatable by such at any given time.

While the common parlance of authenticity *and* the parlance of existentialism may default into thinking they are both self-focused, the actual existential tradition this paper follows (of Kierkegaard, Davenport, Kemp, Khawaja, and Noddings) and the tradition in philosophy of education (especially scholarship of teaching and learning) of "authentic motivation"

(Sergiovanni, 1992, p. 27) hold that authentic motivation is moved by *morality, virtue, and values* (Callard, 2018; Davenport, 2007, 2012, 2015; Grummer & Neufeld, 1994, pp. 4-5; Kemp, 2020; Khawaja, 2016; Kierkegaard, 2009a; Kreber, 2015, pp. 109-111; Noddings, 2003). That is, because one with existential authenticity recognizes existence is valuable, recognizes one's facticity which means recognizing one is created by and in horizons of significance (Taylor, 1992, p. 66) and that choice is part of her facticity, morality is central in her every choice since she is responsible for how she chooses and in the direction she explicitly commits to choose. Due to this realization of responsibility, she steps back and gazes on her values and choice-possibilities by articulating and evaluating them to more clearly, explicitly choose those value-oriented identities to relate towards the most (Bakhtin, 1981; Taylor, 1985a).

Thus, an authentic existence is “an existence most truly ‘one’s own,’ not what is natural or ‘given’ but with transformative labor, merit, and conscious, active reflection . . . working on the self” (Khawaja, 2016, p. 24). Connecting this with the next section, existential authenticity in commitment *is* existential motivation not simply because they are motivators “that others prefer that you want (and perhaps try to persuade you to want)” (Hampton, 1993, p. 155), but rather because they are motivators that the person has reflected on and decided is of value such that they decide to dedicate a portion of their limited lives to pursuing it (Davenport, 2015). This is why existential motivation (as existential authenticity) cannot simply be labelled as intrinsic, although it is (often) also that, but it may equally be extrinsic. It may be because one has chosen an extrinsic value for that value in and of itself, e.g., making a decision because I value my (extrinsic) parents’ opinion (cf. Ryan & Deci, 2000).

## Existential Motivation Compared with Other Motivational Frameworks in SLA

### Existential Motivation

Before I begin comparing existential motivation to other motivational constructs in the SLA literature, for clarity, I present a simple introductory description of existential motivation. Simply put, existential motivation (EM) is reflected-on maintained *and* enforced motivation throughout an explicit committed-to long-term timeframe. Since it is a *committed* timeframe, the timeframe is to some degree demarcated ahead of time. It must be at least approximately the length it takes to acquire most skills, i.e., six or more months long (Hunt & Weintraub, 2002). This will be comprised of many commitment-instantiations, whether it be all day (“I am going to study French and be only in French all day today”) or lifelong (“I will attempt to engage with French at least 2 hours a week for the rest of my life”). Simply put, EM is meant “to include an awareness of and commitment to what we are doing, what we are living . . . living with heightened awareness” (Noddings, 2003, p. 35).

Existential motivation as resolve “moves a person to make certain choices, to engage in action, to persist in action” (Ushioda, 2019, p.1). As existential resolve, one’s mover (existential motivator) is one’s commitment to one’s chosen values-as-callings. Existential motivation is an *awareness of* and a *commitment to*, where the commitment entails trying-enacting, i.e., *willing*. Thus, EM is both the motivator when care is felt and the motivator even through the times when the interest, desire, want, or care is not felt, when they are altogether waning, dormant, or insufficient (Noddings, 2003, pp. 4, 69-70). EM is commitment to a subset of one’s higher-order *values*. While these values may be developed from interests, commitment is not equivalent to an *interest*. One’s interest at any given time may fade or simply not be there (such as right when one

awakens from a night's sleep). However, one's committed-to identities remain, and it is to these that one is still existentially committed through such times (Holton, 2004).

The EFr of identity formation is a model particularly important for the language learner in situations of native language dominance, existential uncertainty, and opportunity deprivation since “even in study abroad settings a ‘transcendent’ experience of language learning is often a matter of choice” (Kinginger, 2009, p. 114). That is, it is a matter of deep and abiding commitment (Davenport, 2012; Mitchell, Tracy-Ventura, & McManus, 2017; Noddings, 2003), and all the more so when confined to the middle of America in the middle of a pandemic.

Since no extensive SLA study on motivation and identity that is philosophically centered has been concerned on Llers attempting to learn other languages in such situations of existential opportunity deprivation (Dreyer, 2009; Harvey, 2014; Hennig, 2010a), I expanded my reading of the literature beyond SLA proper to discover a philosophical type of motivation that fit such a Ller. In this expansive reading, I developed the EPr of identity formation. As I delved into the existential literature, I kept encountering vague notions that seemed to get at the motivation type I was looking for but in a nebulous way, such as Nietzsche's organizing idea (Nietzsche, 1911, p. 50) and Kierkegaard's life passion (Kierkegaard, 1988, p. 162-163). But it wasn't until Noddings' definition of existence as, “an awareness of and commitment to” (Noddings, 2003, p. 35), Davenport's concept of willing (2007) and narravives (Davenport, 2012, pp. 91-115), and Callard's concepts of value, self-cultivation, and aspiration, that I finally discovered a clear and thorough explication of the existential motivational model of identity formation. *Existential motivation* (EM) is a commitment-to an explicitly chosen “I must” value in Noddings' terms (2003, pp. 35 & 40) and this commitment-to is “a kind of willing that . . . sustains effort over time” (Davenport, 2012, p. 7). Thus, existential motivation is a kind of commitment that has the

components of *willing* (“effort”) and *long-term* commitment (“sustains,” “over time”).

Presumably, one who is motivated long-term, will over the long-term engage with the ALs in such a way that they will be learning the ALs (Wlosowicz, 2013 p. 78, p. 80).

Existential motivation is therefore opposed to any motivations that are enacted in bad faith. This can be seen by the protagonist in Sartre’s play, *No Exit* (Sartre, 1973). While in hell, he desires to believe that in life he had existential motivation for his acts, but he constantly questions if he really did because his actions were not lived sufficiently consistently in accord with his claimed motivation. Even in the one room where the entire play takes place, he never commits to any consistent course of action. This is why *willing* is a key component of existential motivation—one only knows what one is willing to do or to have done by seeing what one actually attempts at doing (Davenport, 2007). The willing component is not the action itself, but that which necessarily produces attempts-at action. Without *consistent external trying* (even if not able to complete the attempt), one does not have an *existential* motivation for something, instead, any act done possesses the kind of motivation that ex-Navy Seal, ex-Army Ranger, ultramarathoner David Goggins’ describes: “motivation is crap. Even the best . . . is nothing but a temporary fix. It won’t rewire your brain. It won’t amplify your voice or uplift your life. Motivation changes exactly nobody” (Goggins, 2018, p. 28). It takes long-term willing forth movements of faith to reveal one as having EM as opposed to types of motivation which give way during times of testing. For example, in Farr, 2016, the Llers of English ranked high on one of SLA’s most popular motivational models, L2MSS (Dornyei, 2009), but they also ranked low on *willing* and therefore did not actually commit to advancing in English.

The first appearance of existential motivation (EM) in the SLA literature was in a publication in 2009 by Serge Dreyer. Unfortunately, the only other appearances of EM in SLA (de Beaufort,

2019, 2021) perceived Dreyer's concept of existential motivation to mean something separate from identity, "a study of French learners by Dreyer (2009) explored the concept of 'existential motivation' rather than identity" (de Beaufort, 2019, p. 38). However, Dreyer himself made it clear that this was not the case. In summarizing his findings, he states, "leur motivation . . . est étroitement associée à une démarche identitaire . . . C'est la raison pour laquelle nous appellerons ce type de motivation existentielle [*their motivation . . . is closely associated with an identity process . . . This is why we will call this type existential motivation*]" (2009, p. 31).

Akin to my construal of EM, Dreyer construes EM as incorporating sub-motivation types such as instrumental and integrative in its service. However, he leaves out commitment entirely, instead, he limits the motivation to aspirational-esque reasons which may or may not be committal in nature. In his view, existential motivation for Lling moves one to learn the language out of a desire to differentiate oneself from their culture, to provide "l'introduction d'un mode de vie plus romantique dans le quotidien de la société taiwanaise, jugé trop pragmatique par l'apprenant [the introduction of a more romantic way of life in the daily life of Taiwanese society, considered too pragmatic by the learner]" (p. 40). His construal of EM as being a desire to differentiate from one's culture is one of the same features of Hennig's Foucaultian construal of motivation for ethical self-formation (Hennig, 2010a, 2010b) where one is motivated by a drive to be different in some way from one's surrounding culture. I describe how my conceptualization of existential motivation is set apart from these views in the section, "The Existential Perspective vs. Harvey's and Hennig's Philosophical Perspectives."

However, the biggest difference between Dreyer's conceptualization of EM and my own is the lack of explicitly made commitment-to and responsibility-for Lling even through the vicissitudes of life. Therefore, my conceptualization of existential motivation incorporates more

existential aspects into it than Dreyer's does, e.g., mine incorporates Kierkegaardian (1987c, 1987a, 1987b, 2009a, 2009b) and Sartrean (1943, 1973) aspects left out of Dreyer's, who somehow never cites either the father of existentialism (Kierkegaard) or its greatest popularizer (Sartre) even once. In fact, he does *not* develop his concept of *existential* motivation from conversations-with or appropriations-from *any* leading *existentialists* (e.g., Martin Buber, Albert Camus, Viktor Frankl, Martin Heidegger, Karl Jaspers, Gabriel Marcel, Paul Tillich, etc.). Therefore, for the rest of this dissertation, whenever I use the abbreviation "EM," I am referring only to my conceptualization of existential motivation, which was developed out of conversation with many existentialists. This is a necessary and defining feature of existentialism itself—being a conversation with a tradition even if one disagrees with everyone one converses with from that tradition (see Chapter 3 which expounds on this universal feature of existentialism).

Commitment must be an overt defining feature of EM because in the existential concept of choice, choice acquires a normative dimension wherein in order to be existentially authentic one reflects on one's choice-ability, and one then experiences the things that one does as participating in a movement of avowal such that one can say about that choices one chooses in some deep way (conative, cognitive, in good conscience, in good faith) that she herself affirms it as part of what she views as being valuable to her and what she has explicitly committed to (Kierkegaard, 1951, 2009a; Khawaja, 2018), i.e., she self-endorses it (Callard, 2018). EM is an awareness of the value-based commitment and the reason for the choice of saying yes to that commitment.

For example, someone is learning an AL due to her parents' expectations. She is aware of this, has reflected on it, perceived it to be of true value, and for that reason has consented to being committed to learning the AL. Thus, this reason (motivation) also ties with her *identities*

because it is her *self* that is saying yes to this reason and to its motivated-towards relevant choice. It is saying yes in some deep way, i.e., in a way that is congruent with one's self such that one affirms it conatively, cognitively, in good conscience, and in good faith (Callard, 2018; Curren, 2020). In this, she has become the owner of this commitment and is responsible for it. It does not matter if a psychometric measurement would label such motives as extrinsic, intrinsic, integrative, instrumental, or otherwise, the reasons are existentially authentic because they are in an aware-of congruence with one of the self's own higher-order values.

Also, unlike de Beaufort's (2019, 2021) view of Dreyer's concept of existential motivation, the fact *is* that EM *must include* a study on identity because the two cannot be separated in real, existing life. Since one's existential identities are those identities one relates-to as being valuable and important to the self and one's EM is the enforced commitment to that, a study on EM is inseparable from a study of existential identity. In a holistic study of the self, motivation and identity are not separable entities.

While existential motivation has only been mentioned by two authors in the SLA literature (de Beaufort, 2019, 2021; Dreyer, 2009), authentic motivation has been mentioned several times in the philosophy of education literature (Grummer & Neufeld, 1994, pp. 4-5; Kreber, 2015, pp. 109-111; Sergiovanni, 1992, p. 27). However, it has only been defined by Grummer and Neufeld (1994) and only in relation to teachers, contrasting it to intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. They explain that teachers who are oriented to doing what is rewarded possess extrinsic motivation which "can lead to a sense of being bound by the agenda of others" (p. 4). They call this "traditional motivation" because it is what they perceive teaching to have traditionally been (p. 4). Teachers who are oriented to doing what is rewarding to them possess intrinsic motivation which "can be bound by self-oriented agendas" and "could foster feelings of narcissism,

hedonism, and irresponsibility” (p. 4). They call this “alternative motivation” because it is an alternative to the traditional (p. 4). Finally, teachers who are oriented to doing what is moral possess authentic motivation and, therefore, are “caught up in a struggle to do what is . . . of value, not just for the organization nor just for oneself, but ultimately in the important interests of learners” (p. 5). They conclude that this type of motivation produces, “a moral quest requiring teachers to transcend traditional and alternative forms of motivation to engage in the pursuit of moral aims, questions, and interpretations of teaching” (Grummer & Neufeld, 1994, p. 5).

How they define authentic motivation agrees with this study’s EM in which values are the central component (and values, by definition, must be moral, see Chapter 3). However, this study incorporates rather than denies the reality that intrinsic and extrinsic can be felt and used throughout one’s EM in service to the EM (perhaps Grummer & Neufeld were implying this by their use of “transcend” (1994, p. 5) rather than meaning “pass over entirely”). EM is committed-to-enforced motivation. It is comprised of one or any number of sub-motivational types—any and all types that serve one’s commitments (and hence are also bound by ethics and so on). EM is the superordinate motivator that other motivational types subserve (Kemp, 2020).

Finally, EM is more than Grummer & Neufeld’s definition for authentic motivation in that EM contains an explicit long-term (at least six months) *resolve* aspect. Authentic resolve is part of authentic motivation; therefore, existential motivation is the preferred term, although I use them interchangeably. Also, EM refers not only to teachers but also to any learner as concerns their learning of and teaching about (to self or others) anything.

Furthermore, it is reasoned that if ALLers *combine* their commitments to their ALs with other existentially committed-to centrally valued pursuits, they will more likely stay committed to engaging with, and thus learning, those ALs. In fact, this is important for any AL or L2 learner

because, “as opposed to the narrowly defined perspective of the L2 motivation theorist, the processes of motivation associated with L2 learning are experienced alongside and in interaction with . . . other learning activities and pursuits” (Ushioda, 2012, p. 17).

Mainly, in the existential perspective, identity and motivation are inextricable since, ontologically, motivation is taken as the mover (Ushioda, 2019), i.e., the identity *former*, while the movements that motivation produces are the external acts of the identities *forming* (Bakhtin, 1981, 1986), which themselves also provide proleptic reasons that feed back into EM (Callard, 2018, 2021b). Both the mover and the movements are aspects of the thing moved and moving, i.e., of the language learner, and of their identity formational journeys.

To look at it epistemologically, motivation is identified by its motivators; that is, those things that “moves a person to make certain choices, to engage in action, to persist in action” (Ushioda, 2019, p.1). Thus, the beginning-of-study (BoS) strong evaluation is a movement *while* it is being written—moved by EM. The writing of it makes the mover explicit—it is informing the LLer (the moved and moving one) what his identity formation has been up until that point while also being an act of formation itself. Once it is written, the BoS strong evaluation may also act as a *mover*—as part of the EM, such as when reading it or remembering it induces action (e.g., to watch a video in Portuguese). So too, any present identity formation instantiation may itself become part of the motivation when remembered (thought on, read, etc., even immediately after doing the movement when the movement acts as a sort of warming-up-to or getting-into deeper, further study). Using the mainstay of phenomenological investigation of etymological analyses (Gorichanaz, 2018, p. 59; Introna & Ilharco, 2004; van Manen, 1990, p. 50) we see this interplay is there in the etymology of motive in that *motive* derives from the Old French *motif* meaning *that which incites movement* (Motif, 2021).

Furthermore, an existential aim is to have aware-of value-commitment. Whether that requires the person to write hundreds of pages of articulate awareness of exactly what his higher-order values and desires are and endless reasons he has them, or whether one simply has mentally articulated to himself an explicit awareness of the commitment such that he is willing to suffer much (maybe even die) for it and lives consistently, both fall under the descriptor of strong evaluation from which one makes oneself aware-of one's existential motivation-as-commitment. On the other hand, one with extremely articulated reasons and naming of higher-order values and desires but who never lives by them, perhaps because they spend all of their time writing about their reasons to be committed to X and planning how they will live it out, rather than spending time actually doing X, this person does *not* have EM. Whereas, one with an awareness of one's values and reasons while constantly acting on the commitments has commitment even though he may very rarely be articulating it, e.g., perhaps once a year in random conversation when someone directly asks due to it somewhat being a topic. That person *is* committed and *is* actually living by EM and with existential identities unlike the endlessly-articulate person.

Committed motivation is shown by the doing, by the movements, just as my typing and completing this sentence is a testament to my commitment to have typed and completed the sentence. There must be some level of minimal awareness of value for *why* it was committed to such that some kind of real answer could be given if asked, e.g., I value explaining my theoretical framework to any potential reader of these sentences. However, without actually typing out sentences, there is no commitment to typing out sentences. The motivation is the committed-to value (or values) intentionally, and the living it out over the long-term is its expression—it is what the motive moves (what it motivates). This EM with its willed-forth

movements together comprise existential identity formation (see Figures 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 at the end of this chapter).

It is one's choice commitment to X that motivates oneself to do Y. This commitment could be comprised of a number of motivational types that change depending on the time, situation, one's own feelings, etc. However, one uses whatever motivational types one can in order to maintain the committing forth of committed action that is moved by the superordinate commitment. Therefore, EM could be comprised of a "subjective motivational set" (Kemp, 2015, p. 392) where one's motivated commitment is comprised of motivating values such as doing it for one's Maker *and* for the phenomenological new experiences it may bring *and* the possibility of helping others through the language knowledge *and* for the love of challenge, but it could also be a subjective motivational singularity where it is simply the knowledge of one's commitment to do the higher-order value Y because it is good, true, or beautiful that makes one do Y.

Noddings explains that when this is naturally felt and done, it is an engrossment with the object of care, but when that engrossment is no longer there, the "I must" continues one onward via motivational displacement "without needing any further endorsement by separate psychic states or processes" (Davenport, 2012, p. 104; Noddings, 2003, p. 50). This "caring . . . commits me to struggle . . . through clouds of doubt, aversion, and apathy" until the engrossment returns or until the end of the commitment even if the engrossment never returns (Nodding, 2003, p. 50). In fact, it could be claimed that the majority of the time I am not interested in doing any X at the beginning of Xing until I get warmed up by way of simply making myself do it (Goggins, 2018). Existential motivation is holistic in that it is a commitment concerning one's life (e.g., to continue X value) through, to, and by life (because I am still alive, I owe it to existence) and throughout the long-term (commitment) (Frankl, 1972; Kierkegaard, 2009a). I am committed to

the identity of being someone who can read academic Spanish and therefore I enact some Spanishing right now whether or not I happen to have an interest in Spanishing at this exact moment.

EM grows in power through time as one consistently enacts instantiations of one's committed-to values, building up an ever-growing repertoire of habits, memories, and proleptic justifications (Callard, 2018, 2021b; Noddings, 2003, p. 124). EM as enforced motivation is seen in Noddings's "I must" (above) and in Khawaja's (2016, p. 225) and Sartre's (Sartre, 1943, p. 180) ontology of existence wherein one chooses to be who one identifies as rather than one simply letting oneself be whatever one's self happens to be or is ambitiously claimed to be in bad faith. That is, one chooses an existential identity, which "is not the being that is itself but rather the being that has to . . . sustain its self actively through the constant assumption of responsibility for its past and future" (Khawaja, 2016, pp. 224-225).

This "I must" is redolent of Kierkegaard's explanation of his search for getting clear about what he must commit to, and then after that the important thing becomes (which is more important for it is the purpose for getting clear about what one must commit to) actually doing it (Kierkegaard, 1987d, 1849). That is why this study is comprised both of EM, which is the getting clear of what one must do—what one centrally commits-to and wills-forward—and what I actually do, i.e., the daily languaging acts (Bakhtin, 1981; Davenport, 2012; Noddings, 2003; Ushioda, 2019). It is profoundly important to gain an understanding of one's higher-order values via becoming aware of one's self-cultivating and aspirational commitments, but it is more important to actually *do* the higher-order values—the day-to-day enactments.

When one is existentially motivated to engage with X language, one is explicitly aware that they have committed themselves to engage with X language; therefore, one is also aware of

existential threats to their L2 value journey of enacting such engagements and is, therefore, as much as can, comfortable with that fact *as well as* determined to find creative ways to continue the journey throughout it all (Sullivan, Landau, and Kay, 2012). Continuing to enact one's commitments despite existential threats requires an existential perspective and directionality that directs one in movements of faith (which could be movements of dialogue, typing, thinking to self with a mantra in the AL even if imprisoned, or any other number of creative means) around or through all the innumerable possibilities of existential obstacles (Sartre, 1965), distractors (Sartre, 1943), bad faith (Sartre, 1942), absurdities (Camus, 1955; Kierkegaard, 2009a), guilt (Noddings, 2003, pp. 38-40), and "awareness of one's own potential (and imminent) nonbeing" (Tillich, 2000, p. 35) which is distinctly salient during a pandemic. Since the existentially motivated person is aware of her commitments and aware of the imminent threats to her commitments, the enacting of her commitments is an enacting and a displaying of good faith (Noddings, 2003; Sartre, 1943), which is also all of the following:

"an intellectual and experiential state characterized by conviction about the ultimate worth of being despite the ubiquitous threat . . . faith . . . reaffirms meaning and life over and against meaninglessness, guilt, and mortality . . . faith acknowledges nonbeing and the self's unacceptability, but . . . affirms the priority of being and the self's final acceptance" (Sullivan, 2012, p. 461-462).

### **Contrastive Pre-Summary**

Seeing this as "an invitation to dialogue and not a challenge to enter battle" (Noddings, 2003, p. 6), the following sections compare this study's *existential perspective* (EPr) and its motivation type, *existential motivation* (EM), with prevalent motivational models in SLA in order to both further clarify the EPr for the reader and to further show how this study makes novel "inroads

into our ways of conceptualizing (and thereby promoting) motivation for learning languages” (Ushioda, 2017, p. 474). This research readily admits to the psychometric validity of the various psychologically-centered approaches to motivation in language learning (MiLL) (e.g., external vs. intrinsic, instrumental vs. integrative, the L2MSS) (Gardner, 1985; Dornyei, 2009; Dornyei and Ushioda, 2009; Sheldon and Kasser, 2001; Deci & Ryan, 1991, 2000, 2006; and/or Ryan & Connell, 1989). I am not interested in debunking rigorous and legitimate research findings, rather I am interested in bringing the view of the LLer as a philosophical and individual person a little bit from the periphery and more towards the center of SLA dialogue on motivation and identity.

As a broadly-encompassing philosophy, existentialism includes the psychological in the Deweyan definition of “Psychological: consciousness as a process taking place in time” (Dewey, 1925, p. 1), but it is not a “psychological approach” in that existentialism considers the individual as unique,

“Sartre would say that I, like everyone else, am a universe/singulier . . . a unique universal . . . In our lived experience we feel ourselves to be selecting among the available ingredients out of which we make ourselves as well as choosing how to combine them” (Barnes, xii, 1997).

There are three key features to note in that quote: we are created out of the many-voiced “ingredients” available to us (of other people, objects, etc.), but out of these each person makes herself by *selecting* how she relates and does not relate to those individual ingredients *and* choosing *how to combine* those ingredients that have been selected (Barnes, xii, 1997; also, see Bakhtin 1981, 1986). We are all at our own unique self-selected intersectionality of values. A study that takes an EPr on identity is a study concerned with what values the LLer selects in her LLing and how the LLer combines her selections in her LLing. Thus, there is a centering on

LLer self-description and interpretation (i.e., strong evaluation) and a journaling of what the LLer selects at the time she selects it (i.e., narravival documentation).

This view “contrasts sharply with the . . . L2 learner conceptualized as a theoretical bundle of variables representing . . . e.g. the integratively motivated L2 learner or the extrinsically motivated L2 learner” (Ushioda, 2012, p. 17). From an EPr, “every action is situated and every situation is singular” (Khawaja, 2016, p. 181). Unlike all of the categories provided by the models on motivation below, while these are helpful in many ways, the EPr holds that such categorization is not sufficiently descriptive for a *holistic* study of a person endeavoring on a long-term project such as multiple language learning wherein various motivation types come into play and out of play and interplay in various ways.

In a similar sense, the psychometric categories are somewhat artificial dichotomies that may be inter-meshed portions of the same entity. For example, any motivation type could in some way be seen to be integrative motivation. For example, reading a philosophy book for pleasure also means I am desiring to integrate with that philosophical tradition (that philosophical culture) sufficiently at least to understand it. It is also extrinsic in that I want to understand this presently-external-to-me philosophy to be able to better engage with it, and it is intrinsic in that I want to do it out of interest for it (Hart, 2020a, pp. 29 & 175).

With EM, one can switch one’s motivational-impetus for being-now-in-the-AL from various perspectives to others. For example, ALing could be done for integrative-and-external reasons when the LLer uses his desire to communicate with his friend’s neighbors in Portuguese in order to get to know them better (integrative) and in order to impress the friend (extrinsic); both motives are done due to the authentic motivation (the EM) of continuing to explicitly choose to choose Portuguese. If that starts to deter the person due to a dislike of caring what people think,

he may jump to the intrinsic-portion via the pleasure of knowledge or simply because he has told himself he is going to do it (which itself could be intrinsic, introjected, or identified motivation), and if that starts to wane he can jump to the intrinsic feel of pleasure of watching a good TV show in Portuguese. Or the motivational impetus could be remembering how it would be cool to teach English in a Portuguese-speaking country, which itself is based on intrinsic-integrative-extrinsic-and-others mixed motivational complex of a love of teaching (due to a love of students, etc.) and love of other cultures and love of appropriate translanguaging, and etc., etc. (García & Kleyn, 2016; Wei, 2011, 2017, 2018). The layers of motivation continue endlessly.

Furthermore, more important than all of the above categories (extrinsic, integrative, etc.), existentially speaking, is if the motivation is existentially authentic, i.e., is an explicit commitment made by reflection and choice. Thus, the most important dichotomy is if someone's motivation is existential (i.e., authentic) or if it is philistine (i.e., inauthentic) in that it has not been reflected on nor explicitly committed to by way of a deeply personally-made choice. The descriptors of intrinsic and extrinsic and so on can fit into both of these categories, so the EPr holds that *such models miss the mark. They miss an ethically central point of motivation* (Callard, 2018, 2021a; Khawaja, 2016; Kierkegaard, 2009a; Webster, 2004), for it is through the value-directed choices made due to the self-recognizing of the value and one's self-assent commitment to it that is important (Kierkegaard, 1987b, p. 163). Since one is always ever choosing, with all the different motivation-types "all we are talking about are various modalities" through and by which one is maintaining their strongly-evaluated, good faith momentum (continued existence and thus acts/movements) by choosing to choose, or, conversely, they are maintaining their momentum in bad faith by not reflecting-and-choosing or by choosing ambitiously (Hart, 2020a, p. 29).

Hence, the EPr is a holistic view of motivation, recognizing that any motivation in Lling (a long-term endeavor) may be many multi-layered-intermeshed motivation-types. It centers on the entire person's identities that are existentially motivated as self-cultivating or aspirational identities, while being honest of drifting and ambitious inauthentic (i.e., philistine) identities. The goal in existentialism is for one to actively be being a self by actively living in their authentic resolve (i.e., existential motivation) in and towards their higher-order identities (i.e., existential identities). In these ways, the EPr offers "a more holistic perspective on real 'persons' who are engaged in learning a language" (Ushioda, 2012, p. 17).

In sum, the EPr differs from all the dominant SLA motivational perspectives in the following ways: one who is existentially motivated is aware of one's ever-present freewill choices and thus *continues to choose to will oneself forth* in action towards one's *committed-to* higher-order *values* by way of *good faith* even in and through (knowledge of) potential existential threats. These concepts of reflective awareness of and commitment to a certain subset of one's higher-order values, continuous ever-present affirmation of one's commitments, willing-forth movements in or towards those values, and doing so in good faith set the EPr apart from the other motivational perspectives.

### **The Existential Perspective vs. Self-Determination Theory**

"Self-determination theory [SDT] is perhaps the most widely applied in LL motivation research" (Harvey, 2014, p. 30; also, see Noels, Clément and Pelletier 1999; Noels, Pelletier, Clément and Vallerand 2000; Noels 2001, 2009). SDT is a theory created by psychologists Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan (Deci & Ryan 1980, 1985, 1995; Ryan & Deci 2000). "Deci and Ryan (1985; Ryan & Deci, 2002) differentiate two broad categories of motivation, which they term 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic' motivation" (Noels, 2009, p. 297).

If we run the paradigmatic why-test of motivation where we can define a motivation type using the formula “I am doing X because [of] Y” (Sheldon, Ryan, Deci, & Kasser, 2004, p. 1108), Existential motivation (EM) would be something along the lines of, “I am doing X because it is discerned and chosen to be committed-to by me as being importantly valued by me,” or in short form: “because I am committed to valuing it” (see, Callard, 2018; Davenport, 2012, p. 172; Taylor, 1992, p. 16; Webster 2004). This value answer will have all sorts of sub-motivators that make it something valued since by definition:

“the valuer sees reasons to believe that what she values is good (or valuable or worthy), as well as reasons to do things in relation to it, and to have certain feelings at the prospect of engaging with the value, losing the value, etc.” (Callard, 2018, p. 34).

One can, therefore, keep asking the why question, such as “Why do you value doing it?” in which sufficient answers may be known to the valuer (in self-cultivation) or in which some of the answers are known but others are more nebulous or uncertain (in aspiration). Still, even if we can supply answers that we feel are sufficient for why we value something, we “express our values through the activities we intentionally commit ourselves to” (Wietzke, 2019, p. 388). Therefore, when one *intentionally* commits to learning a language (explicitly choosing to choose to) and, therefore to willing-forth activities from that intentionality, even if one feels she needs to develop her reasons for valuing it more, she is still displaying EM and value for that activity. This contrasts in at least the following ways from SDT’s distinctions:

The answer to the why-test for extrinsic motivation is “I am doing it because the situation demands it” (Sheldon & Schuler, 2011, p. 1109). In contrast, intrinsic motivation answers, “I am doing it because the experience is inherently interesting or rewarding” or “enjoyable” (Sheldon & Schuler, 2011, p. 1109). Since one can both enjoy doing something *and* be doing it because

the situation demands it, these motivation types are not either-or binaries but are often both-and occurrences when considering the actual LLer. However, in the EPr, one cannot be *both* authentic (existential) *and* inauthentic (philistine). It is impossible. Thus, the EPr provides a clearer line of demarcation than SDT does.

As explained above, EM is maintained and enforced motivation throughout a committed timeframe, and commitment entails trying-enacting, i.e., *willing*. Thus, EM is both the motivator when care or enjoyment or a sense of reward is felt and the motivator even through the times when the interest, enjoyment, reward, desire, want, or care is not felt, when they are altogether waning, dormant, or insufficient (Noddings, 2003, pp. 4, 69-70). Sometimes even the lack-of-interest is what internally motivates the person—such as one who holds that boring monotonous rigor is a valued superpower (see Bogost, 2016; and, Lawrence, 2016). EM is focused on the individual's value, i.e., importance of the thing to the person, and not on if it is or is not rewarding at any given time.

Again, since EM is inseparable from will—that is from attempting-at actions—while I *may* often find it to be the case that my ALLing is interesting, rewarding, and/or enjoyable, when it is not, I still do it because I am committed to doing it—it is a central care, even when it is not presently interesting, rewarding, or enjoyable. I made the choice to receive and respond to this value (Laengle, 2012; Noddings, 2003; Sartre, 1965). This “enables me to surpass my actual uncaring self in the direction of caring . . . the vision . . . enables the ‘I must’ to arise with respect to the ethical self” (Nodding, 2003, p. 50).

This relates to how, unlike SDT, EM (1) admits to the constant undulation and conflicts of interests in each person for each interest, but due to higher-order volition (based on one or several higher-order values), one still attempts-forth acts of ALing (Davenport, 2012; Frankfurt,

1971; Lewis, 1942; Taylor, 1985a); and EM (2) admits to there being some motivators that are not “self-determined” (which is the “SD” part of SDT) but instead may be “something that happens to an agent, not something that is done by her” (Kemp, 2015, p. 389), such as in an irresistible calling or a self-sustaining value, such as Noddings’ “I must” and so on (2003, p. 50). It is self-chosen and explicitly taken up as a personal responsibility, but it is self-chosen out of a superabundant *non*-self-determined subset of one’s facticity (Khawaja, 2016).

So as to avoid misunderstanding, existential concepts like Noddings’ “I must” is not referring to extrinsic motivation as if imposed upon the self by an outside peer or parent. This “I must” is there whether or not “the situation demands it” (Sheldon & Schuler, 2011, p. 1109). The situation only demands it as my choice-response to such a calling, via my higher-order emotions, cognition, conscience, and self-monitoring “demand” it (Callard, 2018).

Again, in this paper’s EPr, there is only authentic (i.e., existential: self-cultivating or aspirational) motivation or inauthentic (i.e., ambitious or drifting) motivation. If I am learning a language only because my parents are pressuring me to, that amounts to a coerced state and is therefore inauthentic (Callard, 2018; Davenport, 2012). However, if I am learning a language because I value my parents and place a high value on the value of honoring one’s parents and my parents desire me to learn the language, and, therefore, reflectively with strong evaluators such as these, I explicitly choose to commit to learning the language, then I am motivated authentically (with EM). It does not, like SDT, claim that both of these are cases of extrinsic motivation. It does not perceive it in those terms nor find them appropriate.

Taking SDT’s other side of the motivational dichotomy, intrinsic motivation, if I do something because it is rewarding and enjoyable but have not reflected on it, I am merely drifting and/or could actually be being manipulated by distracting TV shows and the like that

work on my pleasure system (Callard, 2018). If I do that something because I have reflected on it and approved of the rewarding and enjoyable feelings it induces as being of value; and I, therefore, explicitly continue to engage with it, then I am acting on authentic (i.e., existential) motivation. It does not, like SDT, claim that both of these are cases of intrinsic motivation. It does not perceive it in those terms nor find them appropriate because in such a system, “ethics has been elbowed out of the system” (Kierkegaard, 2009, p. 290).

These reasons also speak to SDT’s answers for the “what” question for defining motivation, asking “What motivates me?” (Sheldon & Schuler, 2011, p. 1108). Again, SDT answers this question “via the concept of extrinsic (money, fame, image [is *what* motivates]) versus intrinsic (intimacy, growth, community [is *what* motivates])” (p. 1108). And, again, for EM, what constitutes the “what” is more properly understood as a directionalized *journey* towards my calling, the commitment, or in Noddings’ terms, “the ‘I must’ is what motivates me” (Noddings, 2003, p. 17). In other words, the “what” is my identity-defining commitments to-and-in my higher-order identifiers of my identity, and, thus, the “growth” example of an intrinsic motivator could be seen in the growth-towards any of the EM’s claimed higher-order values, which could be e.g., a care for growing one’s corn production which may be perceived as an extrinsic motivator but when driven to do so by EM it is because that is a calling one is aware that she has chosen to respond in commitment to out of the many potential callings she could have responded to (Khawaja, 2016). Here is how Laengle explains the extrinsic/intrinsic motivation distinction versus the assent-to-a-calling by way of commitment to it of EM:

“Being touched and provoked, as well as understanding the situation, is like being called on by something or someone . . . By our understanding of the context and by our inner

agreement, the motivation gets its shape and receives its content . . . This happens by a perceptive encounter with some form of otherness or with oneself” (2012, p. 34).

The “our understanding” and “our inner agreement” and the “perceptive encounter” is phenomenological, perceived by the self, and when received it results in self-authoring acts (Coates, 1999; Noddings, 2003). This also speaks to the deeply dialogical aspect of EM whereby one can discern one’s calling by way of a strong evaluative self-dialogue (Bakhtin, 1981) since “the need and the ability for dialogue are . . . a prerequisite for building up a motivation” (Laengle, 2012, pp. 34-35; Noddings, 2003, p. 3).

Even on the face of it, some SDT subcategories under extrinsic are clearly more intrinsic in how they are described by SDT itself, which makes the philosopher wonder why the term extrinsic is its overarching category. SDT distinguishes four types of extrinsic motivation. They range from externally regulated where the motivation is centered on an external demand or reward that is out of the person’s control and that pressure her to behave in certain ways (existentialists would call this coercion, see Davenport, 2012, p. 116; Christman, 2005, p. 333). Next is integrated motivation which is quite autonomous and intrinsic-sounding where the externalities coincide with one’s self-evaluations and beliefs (Deci & Ryan, 1985, 1995; Ryan & Deci, 2000; Ryan, Stiller, & Lynch, 1994; Vallerand, 1997). In between these two poles are introjected where one has not taken it as one’s own what one is doing but one does it because they find self-worth in others valuing their ability and/or because of identification which consists of others’ demands or beliefs that have become internalized and therefore actually are a part of one’s intrinsic self (Deci & Ryan, 1985, 1995; Ryan & Deci, 2000; Ryan, Stiller, & Lynch, 1994; Vallerand, 1997).

Excepting for extreme cases of coercion, manipulation, or brainwashing where clearly an external force has become internalized, in the Bakhtinian existential perspective, such normal internalization is merely an observation of how from birth we are involved in assimilation processes (Bakhtin, 1981, 1984, 1986; Clark & Holquist, 1984; Joaquin, Schumann, Mates, Mikesell, & Lee, 2009). One could well-argue that no demand or principle is initially one's own. A baby has not thought out "personal demands and principles" (Hennig, 2010a, p. 18), but it steadily gets shaped through experiences with the world and the person's ever-more autonomous choosing of how to react to and what to react to out of them.

Existentially speaking, while one must discern one's callings, choosing what values to more or less relate-towards-as, one can rarely-to-never know just how much various others played various roles in revealing these callings since they are all ontologically and dialogically both external and internal to the person (Bakhtin, 1981). Due to their inter-dialogical complexity, they are inextricable (Bakhtin, 1986; Laengle, 2012; Noddings, 2003). The inextricability of being unable to parse out our motivation between such categories of levels of interiorization and exteriorization as given in SDT is due to being "embedded in an infinite that I cannot entirely grasp" (Noddings, 2003, p. 39; Bakhtin, 1986; Coates, 1999; Kierkegaard, 1987c). However, we can still choose to commit to move ourselves in certain ways based on certain values we have fully or partly grasped and assented to.

The philosophical problem with claiming that SDT's subcategories are extrinsic (if non-coercive), is explained by the philosophies of Bernard Williams (Williams, 1981), Stephen Finlay (Finlay, 2007), and Mark Schroeder. Their reasoning also supports an existentially authentic versus a philistine inauthentic view of motivation:

“no motivationally ‘external’ considerations could genuinely be practical reasons for an agent . . . a consideration *R* could motivate an agent once he believed that it was a reason to act, but it could not make it the case that *R* itself was a genuine explanation of his acting . . . motivated behavior is not merely caused by her reasons; it is a voluntary response to them” (Finlay & Schroeder, pp., 2017, pp. 22-23).

David Bentley Hart would word this as intrinsic and extrinsic motivations being “merely the two inverse expressions of the continuum of a single reality” (Hart, 2020a, p. 171). The question is whether that single reality is inauthentically motivated due to the motives being implicit and un-aware-of or due to the motives being self-denied (claiming one has to do it because of X outside-entity) or due to the motives being explicitly chosen but directed unethically (e.g., greed-directed), *or* whether that reality is existentially authentically motivated in that one explicitly internally relates-to the value-based choice.

Before there is authentic EM, a person’s “self is, so to speak, outside him, and it has to be acquired, and repentance is his love for it, because he chooses it absolutely from the hand of an eternal God” (Kierkegaard, 1987b, p. 216). This is the realization of what one is given (a body, genetic potentialities, etc.) that one has yet fully ethically chosen. To attempt to potentiate it to its fullness is repentance for not having done so yet (Khawaja, 2016).

To be an inauthentic philistine means one chooses in bad faith to not use their awareness or their explicitly-choosing intentionality or to use it toward evil. It is to act in bad faith by not taking into account that one is constantly choosing *or* by fooling oneself that one has no choice but X choice *or* by forgetting oneself in forgetting of one’s constant human *moral* agency (Sartre, 1943). However, to act as an authentic existentialist, one has made explicit value-based

choice-commitments and is explicitly approving them and living in them by choosing to live towards them (Callard, 2018; Khawaja, 2016).

We can still see SDT's categories as partitioned sub-types of motivation that make up (parts of) one's overarching EM. They could be part of one's existential motivational complex (i.e., subjective motivational set, see Kemp, 2015; Williams, 1981). What makes any one of them EM, is that one is aware-of them and aware-of one's higher-order values and thus *uses* any of these sub-motivators in order to force oneself forward in their commitment(s) due to the delimited set of values they have chosen to be responsible-for pursuing (Callard, 2018). It does not matter the sub-motivation types that come and go or that are induced or comprised as part-or-whole of one's EM. What matters is EM's enforced motivation to what one has articulated as one's committed-to higher-order values.

### **The Existential Perspective vs. Integrativeness**

Second to SDT's motivational concepts, the motivational concept that has been given most prominence in SLA is integrative motivation (Gardner and Lambert, 1972; Jones, 1994). This is defined as "reflecting a sincere and personal interest in the people and culture represented by the other group" (Hennig, 2010a, p. 3). As with SDT's motivational types, the EPr sees this as a validly authentic EM insofar as the LLer does personally value such that they commit to this value even through times when they are not so much interested but instead are heavily annoyed by the people and culture. However, the main limitation to integrative motivation is that "concepts of integrativeness and integrative motivation are ambiguous and in foreign language contexts without any direct contact with the target language community they do not even make sense" (Wlosowicz, 2013, pp. 78-79). This point is particularly relevant for a study that centers on learners in situations of opportunity deprivation (Lindemann Nelson, 2001).

Furthermore, “the notion of integrative motivation (or the desire to ‘integrate’ in a culture) seems outdated in an age where online activity is capable of establishing connections with any culture in the world” (de Beaufort, 2019, p. 39). Even before COVID-19, a compilation of research on study abroad participants found that even though all were physically located in a country where the target language was the dominant language, “high gainers become increasingly active as consumers of L2 resources online” (Mitchell, Tracy-Ventura, & McManus, 2017, p. 250). Finally, as concerns multilingualism, “if integrative motivation is quite possible in L2, it is difficult to imagine somebody [fully] integrate into several different cultures, except in rather unusual situations” (Wlosowicz, 2013, p. 81).

In fact, in studies “by Busse and Williams (2010) and by Stolte (2015) . . . students in neither study showed classic integrative motivation (despite pleasant impressions of Germany gained through short visits)” (Mitchell, Tracy-Ventura, & McManus, 2017, p. 3). They instead found that, “enjoyment of the language-learning opportunity available while at school . . . play a key role in British students’ pursuit of languages” (Mitchell, Tracy-Ventura, & McManus, 2017, p. 3). In sum, integrative motivation leaves much to be desired, especially if we want a holistic view of the LLer.

### **The Existential Perspective vs. Dornyei’s L2MSS**

In transitioning to another popular SLA motivational model, Dornyei’s L2 motivational self-system (L2MSS) (Dornyei, 2009), it should be pointed out that L2MSS is developed from and centered around aggregates of participants, whereas EM is focused on the individual (Ushioda, 2009). Space does not permit a thorough description of L2MSS, but its key components are the possible self, ought-to self, and ideal self. As is the case with native English speakers in general, researchers have found “little evidence for an ought-to self among British students,

unsurprisingly (i.e., societal expectations and pressures for language learning success are weak)” (Mitchell, Tracy-Ventura, & McManus, 2017, p. 4). Yet they did find “their participants as possessing a distinctive ideal L2 self which values multilingual proficiency in general” (p. 4). However, often L2Lers’ (such as self-cultivators’) motivation falls outside the reach of the conceptual apparatus of possible and ideal selves of L2MSS:

“Dörnyei’s . . . possible and ideal self seems to be strongly linked to the outcome . . . rather than treating learners’ selves as the source from which their . . . commitment to language learning derives. The findings of this study, however, indicate that the learners’ selves served as the very source which their learning activities were grounded in and emanated from” (Hennig, 2010a, p. 206).

Furthermore, the L2MSS has been found to be insufficient L2Ling motivation for continually attempting at engagement with the target language even when the target language is the globally motivated language to learn of English (de Swaan, 2001). In a study on Swedish soldiers learning English, “Dörnyei’s (2009) . . . Ideal L2 self and L2 learning experience were found to be particularly important motivators” (Farr, 2016, p. 391); however, the L2Lers still did not actively, committedly engage with attempting-at learning English, “despite the officers’ high levels of motivation, their willingness to exert effort on learning is relatively low” (p. 391). Even with the motivation of an L2MSS in place, one may not actually *will* forth effort to learn the AL, which seems counterintuitive to the meaning of *motivation*.

The key component of *will(ing(ness))* is not a part of Dörnyei’s L2MSS motivational model, so one can rank high in L2MSS and still be low in actual effort towards learning (which reveals a lack of *existential* motivation). However, in the EPr, “will plays a motivational role, striving to carry out . . . specific actions . . . in the most uncompromising way” (p. 6). In other words, there

is a deeply important qualitative distinction between L2MSS's conception of motivation and the EPr's conception where, "willing . . . points toward the idea of self-motivation as . . . committing oneself . . . by an 'effort of will' . . . the agent . . . experiences the motivation as actively formed" (Davenport, 2007, p. 8).

Whether there are external, introjected, possible, ought-to, or ideal selves as sub-motives, it is the committed willing-forth pursuit that is central to EM. It is "that in us through which we, rather than the forces which surround us on every side, play an active role . . . beyond the satisfactions that they promise to bring us when reached" (Davenport, 2007, p. 3). EM still strives to have a joyful attitude, but in points where this is nigh impossible, it wills itself on in action anyway (Noddings, 2003, pp. 38-40; Lewis, 1942, pp. 37-38). Hence, motivation and identity cannot be partitioned from willing-forth, defined as "committed striving" (Davenport, 2007, p. 3) and "self-positing activity" (p. 7). Unfortunately, "this most crucial sense of the 'will' as the source of . . . identity-forming motivation . . . has for the most part been systematically excluded or truncated within theories of motivation" (Davenport, 2007, p. 6).

This paper prefers the concepts of exemplaric or aspirational self rather than ideal self because "such a vision is not just an 'ideal' because being idealistic it would exist in a realm other than that in which we ourselves have our practical existence" (Webster, 2009, p. 48). A self-cultivational and an aspirational self are realizable selves in the here-and-now by acting in how the exemplaric self would act in the here-and-now. One might not yet feel they truly are the exemplaric self as an aspirant; she may not yet appreciate the AL, but she can act as if she does and be learning how to. She can know she is acting as the aspirational self, believing the actual self will more and more become her exemplaric self the more and more she wills it forth in-the-now (Aristotle, 2002; Callard, 2018). Even when she does not know or feel this, she still wills-

forth attempted acts due to her commitment. Ideal selves are only relevant in connection to in-the-now movements prompted by existential motivation because “every choice we make is an act of valuation and a positing of an ideal” (Gravil, 2007, p. 22). Any ideal vision of the self is secondary and subservient to the present-enacting of the commitment, “primary allegiance is to the objects of core commitments, not to some ideal of self that operates independently of them” (Davenport, 2012, p. 105 quoting Blustein, 1991, pp. 86-87). There is an ethical ideal self in one’s higher-order value pursuits, but it is an ideal in-the-now self, which centers the self on enacting the pursuits concretely in the now due to one’s committed assent to do so (Coates, 1999, pp. 71-73; Noddings, 2003, pp. 91, 109, 172).

Existential motivation itself may have various feelings, visualizations, and/or self-guides accompanying it at any given time, but when none accompany it, one with EM still enacts the committed, willed-forth action, displaying his EM and exemplifying his identity. L2MSS, like other dominant traditions in MiLL, “favors the idea that all motivation has this magnetic form” (Davenport, 2007, p. 7) whether it be magnetic intrinsic or extrinsic motivation, integrative motivation, or ideal selves or ought-to selves, “By contrast, existential commitment . . . in which we . . . take up projects and concerns . . . carries us creatively beyond any prior or present lack of or difference in desires and inclinations” (p. 8).

### **The Existential Perspective vs. Discursive Social Psychology**

Concerning discursive social psychology, Kalaja & Leppanen are on a similar path as the EPr’s auto-methodological epistemology when they point out that “as motivation is a learner-internal entity, it is not readily available for direct observation” (1998, pp. 167-168). They also make good points when they claim that it is problematic having pre-study motivational metrics because such metrics create artificial boundaries (Kalaja & Leppanen, 1998, pp. 167-168). The

authors explain, instead, it is important that the LLer writes an auto-narrative since, “stories illustrate aspects of the learning process not easily encapsulated in most studies of SLA” (Kinginger, 2009, p. 155). This is because studies focused on “the array of personality and affective factors presented in the literature on individual differences” prove to be irrelevant to any specific, particular, unique individual since even the “most obvious among biological variables, such as age or gender, are only relevant if they are invoked in telling the tale” (Kinginger, 2009, p. 156).

All of those statements are congruent with the EPr that motivation requires auto-methodological methods to study it (Noddings, 2003, p. 10; Pavlenko, 2011a). Unfortunately, Kalaja & Leppanen disconnect this from having the LLers actually conduct auto-methodological studies. Instead, LLers are “asked to write, on the basis of a set orientative questions, their histories as learners of English” which are then analyzed and authored by the external researcher-other, that is, it is *other-interpreted* by the outside researcher-others’ practices of talking / writing about the motivation of the LLer (Kalaja & Leppanen, 1998, pp. 172-175).

Furthermore, they define “L2 motivation as . . . the variety of people’s practices of talking / writing about motivation in particular settings and for particular interactional and social purposes” (Kalaja & Leppanen, 1998, p. 171). In EPr, motivation is what ALs the LLer has chosen to commit to engaging (ALing) with. This commitment should be articulated, but the commitment itself need not be for particular interactional and social purposes but could instead be for e.g., self-improvement, growth of knowledge, or any number of values. Furthermore, motivation is the articulated mover, but it is not the actual written documents themselves excepting to the degree that such writing itself is part of the motivated commitment that creates movements. Mainly, the writing is a *description or articulation* of that particular LLer’s

motivation, it is not itself the entirety of the motivation, rather the motivation is the committed (en)forcing-movers that are discerned by the LLe. Hence, while the discursive framework focuses on identity *as* discourse (Kalaja & Leppanen, 1998, p. 166), the EPr sees identity as both mover and as lived actions-as-movements which could include written discourse but also could include a lot of listening, interactions with objects, walking and talking aloud in one's place, and so on (Allen-Collinson, 2011; Hockey, 2019).

This also falls into the trap of having students take on “a ‘confessional’ obligation, as students are exhorted to reveal and share their personal narratives and their innermost selves and desires that many may find obtrusive” (Motha & Lin, 2014, p. 349). Instead, researchers should attempt to do away with “the power of the researcher in even apparently close and less formal researcher-participant interactions . . . to elicit stories of participants’ lives without having to reciprocate” (Harvey, 2014, p. 107). Unlike the discursive social psychological approach (and the others above), auto-methodological researchers “become ‘vulnerable observers’ . . . dive into the stream of action . . . rather than watch it from the bank . . . dive and swim along with method and purpose” (Wacquant, 2015, pp. 3-4; and see Pavlenko, 2016, p. 597).

The EPr agrees that “Instead of questionnaires and test batteries . . . scholars [should] rely on written autobiographies” or written auto-descriptions of whatever type, be it autobiography or rigorous descriptive journals of their commitments (Kalaja & Leppanen, 1998, p. 171). However, it is a writing that is both written by the LLe *and* interpreted by the LLe who wrote it, rather than one or more steps removed by the interpretation of some other researcher(s) interpreting it which occurs in all of Kalaja & Leppanen’s examples of discursive social psychological studies (1998, pp. 172-173). Published studies of EM would in some way be auto-methodological; it could be co-auto-methodological wherein it includes another researcher-leader, but the other

LLers are co-authors and self-interpreters of the research, sharing both the power and the vulnerability.

Also, the 12-month portion of this research answers the call to action by Kalaja & Leppanen that “analysis needs to address . . . what functions and effects their text and talk about their motivation actualizes” (1998, p. 179). As explained in the methods, one of the purposes of journaling in-the-moment multiple-times-daily is to discern how aligned or not those experiences are to what the LLer claimed his identity-defining commitments were as written in the beginning-of-study strong evaluation.

### **The Existential Perspective vs. Harvey’s and Hennig’s Philosophical Perspectives**

Having compared EM with the main *psychological* perspectives to MiLL, I will now discuss how it compares with *philosophical* perspectives to MiLL. The first of the two philosophical perspectives which I will discuss is Harvey’s perspective (2014) of language learning motivation as ideological becoming. This perspective presents “an account of language learning motivation . . . as a holistic process . . . inextricably bound to learners’ wider life-learning” (Harvey, 2017, p. 69). Similarly, existential motivation (EM) is a motivation for learning and living as committed holistic processes (Davenport, 2012). It is a motivation for developing in one’s values connected with the additional languages (ALs) and as attempting to better value the ALs—it is a commitment to those developments, and an awareness of that commitment as willed-forth attempted-at movements.

In Harvey’s study, her adult participants are said to lack the freedom to *not* identify with English. For Harvey’s LLer participants, their English target language demanded, “their ‘unconditional allegiance’ (343) and . . . they were unable to not choose English” (Harvey, 2014, p. 241). In the EPr, however, past a certain age (at least by adulthood) one always has the ability

to not choose or choose. In fact, in the EPr, the claim “unable to not choose” is actually itself a choice—a choice to attempt to deny choice, to live in bad faith (Sartre, 1943). Most things about the self the self did not choose such as what languages were dominant in one’s *upbringing*, but in adulthood one should step back and reflect and then explicitly *choose* the things he pursues, such as what languages to learn *no matter how dominant or not* the languages have been in his life up to that point.

However, Harvey is correct that her participants were in a very real way in this situation before they became adults. All six of Harvey’s participants had started learning English before the age of 12 (ages 7, 7, 4, 6, 7, and 11) and had been learning English for at least 12 to 21 years (see Harvey, 2014, p. 106). However, her study took place when all of them were adults; therefore, at this point the participants could and should have chosen to step back, reflect, and existentially choose in authenticity for their own owned reasons to learn English or to not continue learning it.

Agency is at the center of EPr which means that each can choose what one relates with, i.e., what one is in allegiance to, what is important to the person, and what is and will become the person’s language learning identity (Kierkegaard, 2009a; Webster, 2004, 2005). This will be even more difficult for Llers who are already native speakers of the dominant surrounding English language. These Llers choose to give other languages authority by purposefully focusing on advancing in some of their higher-order values with/through those ALs, as a holistic commitment. Wlosowicz points to this existential freewill agentic choice in creating an interrelated commitment of the ALs by explaining, “English being the world language, learners may have difficulty finding motivation to learn other languages . . . they might relate such

motivation to extracurricular interests . . . fans of Latin music might learn Spanish in order to understand the lyrics” (Wlosowicz, 2013, p. 81).

Clearly, the participants of Harvey’s study are far different from someone who did not have the opportunity to learn an additional language until adulthood and has only had a few years or less learning it. In this regard, Hennig’s study is more in-line with mine where some of the learners in Hennig’s study started learning German as an adult and had only done so for a few years living far removed from any German language communities. Hennig’s study took the other of the two philosophical perspectives to MiLL: a Foucaultian perspective of motivation as ethical self-formation (Clarke & Hennig, 2013; Hennig, 2010a, 2010b). Hennig does not fall into the power-resistance binary since she is not centered on English language learners living in an English-dominant country (Hennig, 2010a). Rather, her research centers on *additional* Llers with far fewer opportunities to engage with their ALs with face-to-face native speakers.

However, the EPr differs from Hennig’s perspective since her “Foucauldian ethical perspective . . . defines individuals’ identities as de-centralised and ever-changing” (Hennig, 2010a, pp. 43-44). Furthermore, Hennig takes Foucault’s definition of the ethical as that which differs from one’s culture’s norms (Hennig, 2010a, pp. 25-26, 33): “The ethical substance . . . represents the desire of individuals to no longer comply with given norms” (Hennig, 2010a, p. 33), such that the “degree of divergence from pre-given norms and rules demonstrates one’s ethical values . . . which determines how the individual is supposed to constitute himself as a moral subject” (Hennig, 2010a, pp. 25-26). Psychopath David Wood talks about how he bashed his father’s head in with a ballpoint hammer to show his explicit freewill ability to choose something that was diametrically different from the cultural norms (Wood, 2014). His act squarely falls under Hennig’s and Foucault’s definition of the ethical in that it is that which

differs from one's culture's norms (Hennig, 2010a, pp. 25-26, 33), but this is a clear violation of ethical responsibility. Therefore, the Foucaultian philosophical model of motivation and identity in LIng is too susceptible to calling the unethical, ethical.

In the EPr, rather than ethicality being that which differs from the norm, the ethical is seen as explicitly choosing one's value-based identities and identity-defining commitments which may be in line with certain norms that are already in one's environment and may differ from others (Davenport, 2012; Noddings, 2003, pp. 48-51, pp. 104-124, pp. 187-197). This coincides with philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre's argument of defining authentic agency not in terms of negation, such as the refusal to abide by conventional roles and relations, but rather in terms of virtues, i.e., in terms of nobly intentioned actions toward a noble end through a noble journey throughout various types of situations, going with some norms in some circumstances and diverging from some norms in other circumstances in order to maintain and develop one's values (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 205). It is not a duty that anyone has pressured the person to have, feel, or do. If the person's conscience agreed with it, one actions align with it not because the other commanded or advised it, but because the person's self-chosen value was in alignment with it, "The autonomous man . . . may do what another tells him, but not because he has been told to do it" (Wolff, 2002, p. 448).

From the EPr, one's ethical substance is not determined by whether it converges or diverges from norms but rather that one acts ethically throughout the pursuit of the specific delimited valuable things that the Ller himself chooses to relate to as being of himself (Davenport, 2007 & 2012; Noddings, 2003; Taylor, 1985a, 1985b). "In sustaining and enhancing caring, an ethic of caring conserves many traditional values" (Noddings, 2003, p. 107) where,

“conservation of traditional values . . . is not a life-denying ethic . . . not a dour, dutiful, or cowardly ethic . . . many options are easily rejected as beneath its vision and demands. But it returns to humility in its recognition of dependence” (Noddings, 2003, p. 108).

Thus, unlike “Foucault’s analysis of ethical self-formation” (Hennig, 2010a, p. 5), this study draws on an existential analysis which does not see ethics as defined by how one diverges from norms, but rather by how one virtuously values. That is, it is concerned with ethically enacting one’s commitments to one’s cared-for and cared-about values, which may or may not mean diverging from pre-given norms, conventional roles, or whatever norms of the crowd in one’s situation-at-hand may happen to have (Noddings, 2003, pp. 47-52, 81-100).

### **The Need for More Philosophy**

Learning another language is a broadly-encompassing endeavor. When one attempts to learn another language to an advanced degree, that person attempts to learn how to articulate nearly *everything* that they deal with in life through and with that language, be it emotions, science, family, health, history, current events, the language itself, motivation, identity, learning, or etc. (Bakhtin, 1981, 1986; Coates, 1999; Clark & Holquist, 1984; Holquist, 1990). In other words, language and thus language learning covers all aspects of one’s life, quotidian and otherwise. Since language learning is such a broadly-encompassing endeavor, a lack of *holistic* studies in the area of identity and/or motivation in language learning (MiLL) is extremely problematic (Ushioda, 2017, 2019). A philosophical perspective is integral for attending to the lack of holistic studies since philosophical schools of thought are broadly-encompassing: “Philosophy aims for an account of what is, and of the conditions of its being, at the maximum level of generality” (Khawaja, 2016, p. 11; Dewey, 1929; Harman, 2015; Taylor, 1985a).

Also, presenting and applying a philosophical approach to MiLL answers the call to “challenge the psychological and post-structural paradigms by presenting a . . . much-needed theoretical and philosophical expansion of what can be an excessively self-referential field” (Harvey, 2017, p. 69-70). Rather than overly-revoicing poststructural paradigms and that center on power and resistance (Norton, 1997, 2000, 2013) or psychological dichotomies such as “learning versus use; psychological versus social; acquisition versus participation” (Larsen-Freeman, 2007, p. 784) and imposing such on language learners who are being studied, the holistic-philosophical paradigm of existentialism addresses the dynamic, unique, and situated complexity of language-learning motivation and identity that the Ller experiences throughout her language learning journey (Kramersch, 2019; Macedo, 2006, 2019; Syed, 2001; Ushioda, 2019; Ushioda & Dornyei, 2017). An enlightening example of how excessively self-referential approaches leave key aspects of MiLL unseen that philosophical perspectives bring to light is from a Ller in Hennig’s 2010a study who was *not* learning a language to increase his utilizable skillset for himself or others as per psychological theories, *nor* to bolster recognition in the target language society as per investment theories. Rather, he saw LLing as a practice by which he might live in accordance with ethical and aesthetic values that he perceived to be in contrast to his culture (Clarke & Hennig, 2013, p. 88). Notice, this contrast was not done as a negotiation.

Capturing findings of this type necessitates a philosophical perspective to motivation and identity in language learning that acknowledges that MiLL is part of broader motivation for learning and identity formation in multiple life domains (Harvey, 2014, p. 13; Clarke & Hennig, 2013, p. 87; Hennig, 2010a). The two philosophical frameworks that have been used have proven beneficial in offering holistic perspectives on MiLL (Harvey, 2014, p. 13; Clarke & Hennig, 2013, p. 87; Hennig, 2010). Aside from the problems with their perspectives listed in the

previous section, an additional problem is that both frameworks were carried out by outsider-researchers. Therefore, neither framework applied documentation of multiple-times-daily Lling engagements experienced by the language learner during-the-moment in real time. Hence, direct data of identity, motivation, and learning experiences themselves were not produced, but rather data of researchers' perceptions of others' experiences. Therefore, philosophical frameworks have been put to their full potential.

Another reason there is a need for more philosophical frameworks in Lling education is that philosophy provides meaning to the use of terms such as “transformative.” Rather than a transformative method or educational experience merely signifying something akin to “I like this” or a means of getting into a good college and finding a lucrative profession, it instead refers to something actually transformative by way of “encouraging students to inquire into their own frameworks of value to see whether they are coherent, empowering, and socially responsible” (Yacek, Rödel, & Karcher, 2020, p. 532).

But then the question becomes the following: How do you gauge if integrity, courage, foresight, or compassion is being fostered—that they actually are part of one's educational journey? Only by answering this can we gauge if indeed there was something called transformative education occurring. This paper provides one such answer and, thus, means for this in its existential perspective (EPr), particularly in its implementation of the concepts of self-cultivation and aspiration. Thus, this paper's EPr study provides further philosophical grounding for the concept of transformative education, answering Yacek, Rödel, and Karcher's call for such a grounding (2020). In this way, this research could be seen as part of the “ontological turn” of higher education literature (Barnet, 2012, p. 65) wherein the concern is “no longer merely with

whether higher education affects what and how students know, and what they can do with this acquired knowledge, but also . . . who they are becoming” (Kreber, 2013, p. 45).

Finally, while morality and ethics have made strong headways into philosophy of education broadly and its applications in the classroom via Noddings’ ethics of care and other critical approaches (Kostogriz, 2019; Noddings, 2003; Webster & Whelen, 2019), it has made little headway into motivation or identity in language learning (de Beaufort, 2019; Harvey, 2014; Hennig, 2010). Therefore, with regards to motivation and identity in Lling we need a way of “writing and thinking about academic practice—that reinstates the moral dimension. A clearer articulation of the virtuous dispositions implicit in academic practice” (Nixon, 2008, p. 95), virtuous dispositions such as to *commitment to Lling* with other *higher-order values* and dispositions to *ethical responsibility* to explicitly to choose to engage with ALs in ethical ways (e.g., edifying language usage, attempting at unconditional love with all one’s interactants, forgiving oneself in one’s ALing mishaps). This paper’s EPr provides this articulation.

### **The Need for More Multiple Additional Language Learning Studies**

#### **Multiple Additional Language Learning Gaps in the Literature**

Motivation in language learning (MiLL) research that takes a framework based on motivation in third-or-more language learning is hard to find, even though it requires more complex and more overall motivation than second language learning (Aronin & Singleton, 2012; Hennig, 2010a, p. 14; Wlosowicz, 2013, p. 77; de Swaan, 2001; Kelly-Holmes, 2007, 2019). Therefore, “it is vital . . . to lay greater stress on motivation in third or additional language acquisition as well as in multilingualism research” (Wlosowicz, 2013, p. 80). Before Hennig’s Foucauldian ethical perspective (2010), no philosophical perspectives had been developed that explored the

motivation of learning three or more languages (Hennig, 2010a, p. 14), and her approach remains the only one until this dissertation's existentialist perspective.

Even on the national level, an existential study on multiple language learning is important. While many may hope for multilingualism to be enacted through a mandated curriculum, the historic lack of funding and the trend of budget cuts even before (but made worse by) the pandemic make this exceedingly unlikely in America (Belkin & Brody, 2017; Flaherty, 2020; Hamilton and Berdan, 2019; Johnson, 2019). As Reagan and Osborn put it, "Foreign language education, in fact, is destined to fail . . . even the most competent foreign language teacher is faced with an almost insurmountable challenge in the U.S. context . . . what is needed is a real 'paradigm shift'" (2019, p. 91).

This need for a paradigm shift is clearly seen in that even before the pandemic, "only 1% of Americans . . . succeed in learning an additional language in school" (Macedo, 2019, p. 34). Some form of *existential* motivation (commitment-through-obstacles) is required for American native-English speakers raised in monolingual environments to actually learn multiple additional languages to an academic level. In other words, they need to choose *for themselves* to commit to engaging with additional languages over the *long term* despite the lack of resources they have at their disposal or will for the foreseeable future have access to. This autonomous choosing and living out entails auto-methodological practices due to the multiple language learner being in a society in which foreign language classes are not, or are very rarely, offered (Allen-Collinson, 2011; Gorichanaz, 2017; Davenport, 2012; Ushioda, 2017). This choosing to choose is also the case for those who want to be multilingual in other countries but the only foreign language offered to them is one dominant language.

Therefore, there is a need for more research on students far-removed from other language communities who are *learning* multiple languages and aspiring to learn them to academic levels. This is also reflected in the education field of the scholarship of teaching and learning where a 2021 analysis of 299 empirical studies showed that there was a focus “primarily on teacher activity rather than student learning, despite efforts to broaden its scope” (Manarin, Adams, Fendler, Marsh, Pohl, Porath, & Thomas, 2021, p. 349). In other words, there is a glut of studies in which, “the primary focus is on the teacher and their pedagogy” and there is a dearth of studies, “on students and their learning experience” (Manarin et al., 2021, p. 351). Given that only 1% of American students attain a proficient level in an additional language in school (Macedo, 2019, p. 34), “We need to think of the . . . important role for the scholarship of teaching and learning to move beyond the scholarship of teaching to explore more fully the wondrous, messy world of student learning” (Manarin et al., 2021, p. 361). This study does that.

This messy world can at any moment be made even more messy given ever-present possibilities of sudden disruptions due to crises. Hence, there are lacunae and need for more studies centered on learning, particularly as regards the multiple ALLer who may be forced to take auto-methodological ALLing journeys due to lack of available language learning courses in America or globally due to a pandemic. That is, there is a need for more studies on motivation and identity in SLA that include LLing through conditions that work to constrain individuals’ attempts at using or learning a language (Block, 2013; Mitchell, Tracy-Ventura, & McManus, 2017, p. 30; Xi, 2014, p. 8). Documenting such enriches our understanding of who the LLer is and how he comes to have the value-acquired identity of academic language learner (Hennig, 2010a, p. 26-27; May, 2006, pp. 12-15; Polkinghorne, 1995, p. 16).

In Bakhtin's terms, such environments limit opportunities to grow one's internally persuasive discourse through the exposure to and appropriation of the other language's authoritative discourse (Bakhtin, 1981, pp. 345-346; Harvey, 2014, p. 92). When there is only *one* authoritative discourse, there are fewer-to-no opportunities to learn a non-native language since one is *not* surrounded by such a variety of others' words (Bakhtin, 1981; Harvey, 2017). For these learners, to actually learn additional languages such that they can think in those languages and communicate with native speakers (i.e., at an approximate Intermediate High level or greater), it will take a form of *existential* motivation, i.e., they will need to autonomously continuously choose for themselves to *commit to* engaging with additional languages over the *long term* despite the lack of resources that are available to them. This autonomous choosing and living-out entails auto-methodological practices (Allen-Collinson, 2011; Gorichanaz, 2017; Davenport, 2012; Ushioda, 2017).

Furthermore, advanced multilingualism is incredibly difficult for *adult* ALLers due to internal resistance such as the vulnerability of being put in the language *learner* position and thus no longer being the expert in the language one uses *and* due to external resistance such as (in)securitization or having fewer opportunities for embodied situations in the target languaculture due to the dominance of English in valued settings in places one is allowed to frequent (Agar, 1994; Bergen, 2012; Keysar, Hayakawa, & An, 2012; Pavlenko, 2012; and Pavlenko, 2016). Therefore, it is crucial for ALLers to have discovered and developed a stable multilingual self-concept comprised of higher-order values; that is, to have articulated and discerned their existential motivation (Davenport, 2012; Ushioda, 2009; Noddings, 2003; Benson, Barkhuizen, Bodycott, & Brown, 2012; Gorichanaz, 2017).

The actualizing of a pandemic cancelling all possibilities for study abroad occurred throughout the course of this dissertation. For every university I could find in nation-states whose main spoken language is one of my six ALs, their study abroad language programs from Summer 2020 through the Spring 2021 were either cancelled or denied access for American students as concerns in-class teaching. An existential type of motivation that is uniquely personalized and deeply committed to is of particular importance during such times. For further discussion on gaps in the literature concerning multiple additional language learning, see Chapter 1's section, "Significance of the Study."

### **SLA Theoretical Stance of This Study**

In this section I will give an overview of my theoretical stance of how one advances in the learning of a language. I am presently convinced by the research that shows that so long as the methods of language learning are as highly engaging-with-the-language as possible (which is a necessary component of *learning*, as explained in the section "Identity and Learning"), it does not matter what method is used, we all (with *slight* differences) go through the same stages of mastery of a new language, sometimes referred to as the same "developmental trajectory" (Pienemann & Lenzing, 2015, p. 160). Likely, it takes us all approximately the same amount of actively engaging-with-the-language time to get to various proficiency levels (Di Biase & Kawaguchi, 2002; Garrett, 1980; Pienemann, 1998). Indeed, it takes native English speaking Americans more time on average to learn Farsi than it does to learn German, but if you add the hours it took the person to learn, in their L1, as a child, the English words that are similar to German words, the phonology that is similar, the nearly-exact orthography, and so on, into the hours it takes to learn German as an adult, the total hours for learning Farsi and German would be nearly the same. The stated time it takes for a L1 English speaker to learn X language as

calculated by the United States Foreign Service Institute leaves out this calculation of time the English speaker has already spent learning the shared aspects of German (Ulrich, 2020). In other words, overall time to learn the aspects of a language is nearly the same for any language, simply some languages will have already been given more time to learning their aspects from childhood than others (Bachman & Palmer, 1981; Clark & Clifford, 1988).

Added to this, the growth of one stage of understanding and then mastering a concept in an AL to the next stage is “emergent: They develop over time in complex, sometimes surprising, dynamic, and adaptive ways” (Ellis & Wulff, 2015, p. 81) while still “adhering to the overall developmental schedule” (Pienemann & Lenzing, 2015, p. 160). This is important because it supports the claim that it is not a specific language learning method that matters but rather the general guideline that *that method is best which gets the L2er most often actively engaging with the language*. Wlosowicz’s quote is apropos: “A strongly motivated student will learn a language by any method, whereas an unmotivated one may fail despite the best method . . . Moreover, lack of motivation may lead to fossilization in spite of appropriate input” because the input will not be attended to (Wlosowicz, 2013 p. 78; and see, Ellis & Wulff, 2015, p. 88; Herdina & Jessner, 2002; Signan, 1983). If I sleep with the Spanish channel playing on my TV for 8 hours every night but never actually attend to Spanish, I will have incrementally picked up on some things (prosody, etc.) but I will never move past a somewhat subliminal stage unless I am motivated enough to actually attend to the language in explicit ways. In fact,

“Some aspects of an L2 are unlearnable—or at best are acquired very slowly—from implicit processes alone. In cases where linguistic form lacks perceptual salience and so goes unnoticed by learners, or where the L2 semantic/pragmatic concepts to be mapped onto the

L2 forms are unfamiliar, additional attention is necessary in order for the relevant associations to be learned” (Ellis & Wulff, 2015, p. 89).

This was the case for me in learning Spanish. I would have never imagined a language could put a gender onto all their nouns and would have never even thought to notice such (as mentioned in Chapter 1, I thought I was being lied to when I was first told about this feature of the language). Therefore, I favor combining the insights of the existential perspective (EPr) with those of Processability Theory, Functional Approaches, Complexity Theory, and Sociocultural Theory (SCT) wherein the Lling stages one moves through can be accelerated or at least continued (rather than remaining discouragingly stagnant in any of Processability Theory’s Lling stages) through combining the Ller’s values and personalities with zone-of-proximal-developmental Lling situations which empowers the Ller “toward greater self-regulation through the new language” (Lantolf, Thorne, & Poehner, 2015, p. 214). Adding Functional Approach strategies allows, “learners to develop their own assessment of their success by asking themselves ‘Do I understand, am I understood? and [so on]” (Bardovi-Harlig, 2015, pp. 66-67). This is the encouragement of self-discovery through self-inquiries. This, in turn, relates to Complexity Theory in SLA and its shared views with the EPr, where, “An affordance affords action (but does not trigger or cause it). What becomes an affordance depends on what the organism does, what it wants’ (van Lier, 2000, p. 252)” (Larsen-Freeman, 2015, p. 231).

This is in essence saying what SCT says about Ller’s mediated processes that are organized by cultural artifacts, activities, and concepts where humans utilize existing “cultural artifacts that allow them to regulate, or more fully monitor and control, their behavior” (Lantolf, Thorne, & Poehner, 2015, p. 207). The sociocultural and functional approaches explained above are also preferred because allowing values, personalities, discovery questions, zone of proximal

development via use of cultural artifacts encourages one to more actively engage with the language and appreciates the Ller's human agency to "actively engage in constructing the terms and conditions of their own learning" (Lantolf & Pavlenko, 2001, p. 145). This centers on the ethically important perspective that Llers are distinct persons with distinct interests and personalities, rather than perceiving Llers as mere computational input-output processors with one trademarked language acquisition device (Lantolf, Thorne, & Poehner, 2015, p. 214). Therefore, there are shared aspects of the EPr with these SLA theories, and certain specific aspects of SCT are directly implemented in the methodology of the multiple-times-daily logs of this study (Lantolf & Pavlenko, 2001).

### **The Need for More Auto-methodological Studies**

#### **Reasons Related to Research Quality**

In order to produce and analyze data derived from a holistic perspective and concretize the philosophical framework, I needed a coinciding holistic and philosophical methodological research design (Ushioda, 2017, p. 474). The first step was realizing that an auto-methodological research design is the best fit for a holistic study on Lling identity formation since it is only the learner who knows what he attends to at any given moment, what he most relates towards during the journey, and what he has and is valuing given "the obvious consideration that a subject's introspective data are available only to him" (Taylor, 1985a, p. 119). To put it another way, "every language learner is alone with a unique experience, an experience tailored to, by and for that individual" (Polanyi, 1995, p. 287; Nietzsche, 1983). Also, since the Lling agent is always situated within boundaries of specific contexts that are lived-and-witnessed only by the person who crosses them all, Lling journeys are "best explained by the person involved" (Marx, 2002, p. 269; Rivers, 1983).

Since single case studies are seen to be “especially powerful” given the depth of analysis that they allow (Smith, Flowers, and Larkin, 2009, p. 51), the single-case study method has been shown to be a particularly useful method of inquiry within the discipline of SLA for quite some time, whether or not it was done auto-methodologically (de Beaufort, 2021; Bromley, 1986; Jones, 1994; Rivers, 1979; Schmidt & Frota, 1986; Schumann, 1976). Those auto-methodological studies that have been done include diary studies and autobiographies and have worked to overcome the immense limitations that are inherent in non-auto-methodological studies (e.g. Everett, 2008; Carson & Longhini, 2002; Marx, 2002; McGregor & Fernandez, 2019; Moore, 2009; Jones, 1994; Schmidt & Frota, 1986; Simon-Maeda, 2011). However, few extensive auto-methodological single case studies have been done in SLA concerning motivation (Harvey, 2014, p. 97).

As for phenomenological studies in applied linguistics, there have been a decent supply of them, but these have not been auto-methodological (De Felice, 2012; Noels, 2009; Xu, 2018). Even if we see as being partially-phenomenological the methods of interviews, co-analyses of participant diaries, and narrative writing by participants to be read and interpreted by researchers, such as the only philosophical inquiry MiLL studies to date have done (Harvey, 2014; Hennig, 2010a), these methods still do not “actually participate in the processes under study” (Allen-Collinson, 2011, p. 11)—that of identity formation in the learning of multiple additional languages. Therefore, “phenomenological researchers have been criticised . . . because, unlike auto/ethnographers, they rarely actually participate in the processes under study” (Allen-Collinson, 2011, p. 11), an especially apt criticism since phenomenology concerns experiencing the phenomena of study. However, “auto-phenomenography does provide a means of addressing such criticism” (Allen-Collinson, 2011, p. 12).

While any study that claims to include learner autonomy, authenticity, desires, cares, or interests *is* partaking in phenomenology in some way (Noels, 2009, p. 302; Harvey, 2014, p. 36), auto-phenomenography (AuPh) acknowledges that a “truly phenomenological (and hermeneutic) study would entail thick description . . . taking into account the actions and thoughts of those involved,” and since this kind of research is extensive, it allows “research questions to be investigated more deeply” and, thus, more holistically (Gorichanaz, 2017, p. 3). Non-auto-methodologies, such as “interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA), a methodology based on semi-structured interviews with a handful of participants” (Gorichanaz, 2017, p. 3), which takes seriously that the “participants are the ones who experience the phenomenon and therefore should be considered to have expertise in that phenomenon” (Zeivots, 2018, p. 281), can fit the requirement for somewhat thick description when done thoroughly (see Wei, 2011 for an example in SLA). However, since IPA methods are not auto-methodological, “the meaning documented by the researcher will have invariably been interpreted and the interviewee’s perception of reality” and therefore “deformed” (Zeivots, 2018, p. 282). Again, this is due to “the researcher’s inability to have direct experience of the participants’ experiences” which “can be overcome through the study of the self in auto-hermeneutics” (Gorichanaz, 2017, p. 3).

This is also a problem in that not only is L<sup>L</sup>ing research one step removed when *told to* an outside-other not experiencing the phenomena, it is a further step removed when *told later in time to* a researcher-other by way of a semi-structured interview, and it is yet a further step removed when *told in a different location by or with* that researcher-other. That is, non-auto-methodological research that also lacks multiple-times-daily in-the-moment documentation is at least three steps removed from the phenomena of study. Therefore, non-auto-methodological methods are less precise *and* no longer provide a discussion of *experiences of ALing* but rather a

discussion of *experiences of another discussing experiences with different others of third-party experiences of ALing* (Busse, 2010; Allen-Collinson, 2011; Gorichanaz, 2017, 2018, 2019).

A holistic study of LLeR motivation, “which attempt to account for fully motivated behaviour must take account of the fact that the human animal is a self-interpreting subject” (Taylor, 1985a, p. 43). Therefore, a holistically study of MiLL should have self-interpretation, i.e., auto-hermeneutics, as part of the methodology. Hence, my study includes a BoS strong evaluation component, which consists in articulating the strong evaluators for self-cultivating and the nebulous evaluators for aspiring; as well as an EoS stronger evaluation component, which consists of perceiving if indeed I did self-cultivate what I set out to self-cultivate and to articulate the strong evaluators (i.e., proleptic reasons) of the aspiration. This concept of “auto-hermeneutics” (Gorichanaz, 2017, p. 3) is a methodology wherein one interprets one’s own experiences. This is part of the overarching AuPh as seen in the *-graphy* of AuPh, because to write about an experience is to interpret a phenomenon. I consent to the common view that the, “phenomenological approach is a form of qualitative enquiry that emphasizes experiential, lived aspects of a particular construct – that is, how the phenomenon is experienced at the time that it occurs” (Nelson, 2011, p. 299).

Therefore, I enacted 368-days of multiple-times-daily in-the-moment documentation of ALLing experiences as the *phenomenological* proper part of the study. However, strong evaluations of one’s experiences (such as my BoS and EoS strong evaluations) are simultaneously a compiling of the key moments that I noticed as-they-occurred and a further interpretation thereof. For this reason, philosophers such as Charles Taylor use the terms “self-interpretations” and “self-descriptions” interchangeably (e.g., Taylor, 1985a, pp. 35-38). Hence, the *auto-* of AuPh means these are self-interpretations, self-descriptions, and self-experiences

and the *-graphy* is because these experiences are produced by a BoS strong evaluation, then written-documented daily, and further interpreted in an EoS stronger evaluation.

This AuPh research design was due in large part to the following: (1) Only the person himself can describe why he did and does what he did and does. (2) Only the person himself knows what he finds and holds to be of higher-order value throughout his journey, even though he discovers this through many others—others within the self and others outside the self which are still phenomenologically within the self since they must register in one's intentional phenomenological consciousness for them to have influence (e.g., books, physical-verbal interaction with humans, with the Superaddressee) (Bakhtin, 1981, 1984, 1986). The LLer is the only one in the privileged position of knowing why he did and does what he did and does and what is of value to him that he is actively pursuing. Only the LLer knows what he most identifies towards, what he cares more or less about, and what he holds as more or less important, and only he can articulate why (Passeron & Revel, 2005).

On a more basic level, (3) only the person himself knows what he is attending to. Only he knows what he notices. Other people can see what his eyes seem to be directed at or hear what he appears to be listening to, etc., but they do not know what he is actually paying attention to. His mind might be thinking in his native language about a TV football game that will occur later while he appears to outsiders to be listening to a lecture in his AL. Others-who-are-not-the-LLer can make educated guesses, but only the LLer himself knows this data/information and thus only he can provide it. This also points to the importance of the LLer being honest about what he is attending to at any given time (see Chapter 4). Even in small aspects, only the person himself can know what he attends to, what he finds valued, and what his motivations are. We can only know by his testimony.

A study concerning motivation, identity, values, and learning is about the *experiences* the Ller has himself (of his motivation, identifying-withs, values, and practices—the learnings-of/about). Only the Ller has access to what he is attending to, what he is relating to, how he is relating to it, and why. Even with externally observable actions, only the Ller knows what he is actually *doing*—whether my looking at a page in Spanish means I am *reading* Spanish phrases trying to understand new turns of phrase or if I am instead daydreaming about an English movie I want to see later or appreciating how beautiful the typography of the letters. “What makes his action one of these rather than another is the description under which he intends his action” (MacIntyre, 2009, p. 161).

This inability to properly define or describe an action without knowing its auto-phenomenological intent is why “purpose is not ontologically separable from the action” (Taylor, 1985a, p. 79). There is an anti-dualist Aristotelian inseparability of form (action) and function (the desire, beliefs, and/or intentions) (Aristotle, 2002; Taylor, 1985a, p. 78). The meaning of each object or situation cannot be known by external objective descriptions of objects or situations, rather meaning is only known by the person telling us what the meaning of the object or situation is (Taylor, 1985b, pp. 22-24).

The importance of this for SLA cannot be overstated, even with studies completely different from this one, such as outcome-based, quantifiable studies. If we want to know, for example, what a survey or test we have a participant of a study take tells us about the participants actual cares or abilities, we need to know what the student was actually doing when she took the survey or test. Was she seeing this as something she needed to simply get an X score on, or perhaps merely as something she was doing for a study that she agreed to do out of kindness or camaraderie or pressure, or was she doing it as an attempt to show her fullest range of language

abilities? Did she take the test as quickly as possible being quite confident she would be over the threshold score? Did she take it in a slightly lackluster way due to seeing it as completing a task a researcher had requested? Or was her intention to do her very best in order to see just how much she knows in regards to the language skill of the test? Or are there some other intentions she had? Intentions tell us how relevant or not the results of any SLA study are (MacIntyre, 2009).

Since epistemology is concerned with how one knows what is, it is concerned with what kinds of methods of investigation reveal the knowledge of what is. In this study, this concerns what methods best reveal the motivation, identities, values, and learning of the Ller (Nagel, 1995, p. 201). Epistemologically, only the person himself has access to this. Therefore, the best methods are auto-methodological methods. One may document and know one's existential motives, identities, values, and identity formation through attempted self-transparency and ever more accurately articulated self-interpretations throughout the journey (Davenport, 2012; Taylor, 1985a). Auto-phenomenologically perceived and interpreted thoughts and actions provide the epistemic knowledge of the identity-forming values and viewpoint directionalities throughout the journey—where one is going however straight, sinusoidal, or asymptotic it may be and in what ways it was or was not self-cultivating or aspirational (Callard, 2018, 2021b; Frankl, 1984; Kierkegaard, 1941, 1951; Taylor, 1985; Webster, 2005).

Quantitative approaches or qualitative approaches that do not have an auto-methodological component run “up against an obvious objection . . . which is that the phenomena of this domain, that is, [human] acts . . . are . . . in terms of the thoughts, images, intentions, and ways of seeing of the people concerned” (Taylor, 1985a, p. 120). Knowing why a person is conducting any action can only be explained by the person himself, even in “relatively unproblematic cases we

can be led to change our mind if the agent tells us credibly that he had some quite different intention” (Taylor, 1985a, p. 120); therefore, the auto-description is crucial.

“The same point can be made about feeling” (Taylor, 1985a, p. 120). An example of this can be seen in the popular Schachter-Singer experiment where a certain amount of epinephrine was injected into patients, but the emotion felt depended on the patients’ phenomenological interpretation of the situation, with emotions ranging from euphoria and happiness to anger and rage, with those who had no articulated explanation for their feelings being more susceptible to the emotional influences of the confederates in the study (Schachter & Singer, 1962). “The emotion is defined by the thoughts and perceptions of the subject individual, by the meanings things have for him” (Taylor, 1985a, p. 120). Therefore, only the person can describe the significance of her feelings and the person may, in fact, via articulation, choose to change what feelings she feels via her self-interpretations. This means not only with one’s actions but also with one’s emotions, self-interpretation “plays no secondary, optional role, but is essential to human existence” (p. 76).

The same holds for identities and values. My lineage is part of my existential identity in so far as I interpret it as such, but if I do not, it remains as facticity but not something I *identify* with. *Values* which I relate the most to and in what ways may be simple, but they always combine with some identity or another. For example, I may value honesty and I consider myself (identity) an honest person and want to cultivate this value, or I may be a liar who has not yet really understood the value of honesty but aspires to desire or acquire the value of it and thus I take myself (identity) to be an aspirant of honesty. These and other value-identities may incorporate within a higher-complex of other values, e.g., I am a proud Kansan because I hold that Kansans have a reputation for honesty as well as for being hard working; also, I value the

Kansas ecosystem and other people I take to be Kansans, etc. Thus, an individual's unique particularities regarding his ALLing purposes, reasons, emotions, feelings, values, beliefs, identities, appropriations, appreciations, understandings, commitments, situations, and actions can only be known by the LLer-actor himself (de Beaufort, 2019; De Fina & Georgakopoulou, 2012; Dewey, 1925, pp. 8-9; Duff, 2010; Taylor, 1985b, p. 26). It is impossible to know the motives, identities, and learnings of an ALLing study without at least some kind of strong auto-methodological phenomenological component (James, 1890; Taylor, 1985a).

Furthermore, only the LLer can document each time he is actively attending to something in the ALs. As Schmidt & Frota note, "only language learners themselves can be in a position to observe their experiences" (1986, p. 238). In-the-moment documentation concerning language engagements is best done by the person who is doing the attending to in-that-moment. This speaks to issues of feasibility wherein it is simply not feasible to follow a person everywhere or to constantly ask him if he is actively attending to the AL and about what and in what ways and why (Benson and Gao, 2008; Polanyi, 1995). However, such documentation is not infeasible for someone living the study himself, to "follow" oneself as it were through his multiple-times-daily AL engagements (Ellis, 2013, p. 377; Ortega and Iberri-Shea, 2005; Collins and Ellis, 2009). Therefore, at minimum, an auto-methodological holistic approach solves the need for SLA researchers "to pay more attention to . . . the varied ways in which [LLers] go about language learning in their homes, workplaces, and lives" (Benson and Gao, 2008, p. 38).

Enacted commitments with an attitude of value are best documented auto-methodologically since, "when we consider the action component of caring in depth, we shall have to look . . . to acts of commitment, those acts that are seen only by the individual subject performing them" (Noddings, 2003, p. 10). That is, only the subjects knows if he performs his acts of commitment

when he is alone, with no other human witnesses to hold him accountable, verify, or falsify. This alone shows true commitment—when one engages with the AL central value even when there is no one to see him engaging with it (Noddings, 2003; *King James Bible*, 1611, Matthew 6:5-6).

Furthermore, only the ALLer knows if he is enacting such acts with an attitude of value (e.g., love for the language, love for learning) or is instead doing it for some ulterior non-existential motive (e.g., pride, spite): “To go on sacrificing bitterly, grudgingly, is not to be one-caring” (Noddings, 2003, p. 105). Since we are aware of our thoughts about our other thoughts, only we can ask in any present moment if our present thought-act is violating our commitments by being distracted or unethically motivated or in some other way violating our values or if it is an affirming and continuing in them. Therefore, only the person herself can know if indeed she is thinking and acting authentically (Kierkegaard, 2009a, p. 371).

Moreover, the expansive and holistic tying together of ALLing with its contexts and contents in situations of existential opportunity deprivation is most effectively done auto-methodologically because contexts in which social gathering is not permitted may actually prevent there from being genuine and sufficient researcher-participant interaction when not auto-methodologically done (Rampton, & Charalambous, 2020; Rampton, Charalambous, Jones, Levon, Mangual Figueroa, & Zakharia, 2020). That is, doing this auto-methodologically made the study possible even through the many contexts of (in)securitization that came with the COVID-19 pandemic (e.g., viral infection, loss of a job) and with many rules that came in and out of existence (e.g., closed university campus, six feet of distance, ever differing lockdown regulations) (Floridi, 2013; Morrison, 2018).

Also, since serious Lling is broadly-encompassing in that one wants to learn how to express in the AL every thought one has or that one is attempting to say or might hear, the only way to

get at that broadly-encompassing research object of Lling is from the inside, from within. From the outside, a researcher can get at it partially—those partial ways and times when the researcher is around to observe it in the participant *and* to hear from the participant what the participant is actually attending to in order for the researcher to be sure that what she is observing is fairly accurate. However, such research will be far from holistic or broadly-encompassing.

Again, this is why an existential study *must be* (at least in large part) auto-methodological. One (somewhat extreme) counterargument to all of this runs along the following lines: If the Ller is delusional, then auto-methodology cannot be the best option. The response to this is that even if the Ller is delusional, e.g., he is learning an AL because he thinks he is a secret agent for a country whereas he really is not a secret agent and the country he believes he works for does not in actuality exist, because *he* thinks so—*he* is still being accurate as to what *his* motivation is for learning the AL. He is also still being accurate in what he describes as being of valued importance, even if he is confused as to what he is actually doing, the concept of the value is still the thing that is important to him and the thing that motivates him. That is, we still are getting a more accurate view of his actual motivation and existential identity than we would from external observational analysis of why he advances in his proficiency of X language and what identities he ties with that.

While this clearly reveals his motivation (as well as his beliefs: he believes he is a spy, his desires: he desires to be a better spy, etc., see Horgan & Tienson, 2002), his identity is confused in the sense that in existentialism there still must be a real-world *what* (“satisfier”; Horgan & Tienson, 2002, p. 528) that he is identifying-towards. It tells us what he finds as valued and what he is doing, but when taking both aspects of identity into account (subjectivity and reality), his identifying-towards *being* a spy is in actuality a identifying-toward *acting like* a spy or acting as

if he were a spy of X country. Hence, “because an articulation can be wrong, and yet it shapes what it is wrong about . . . We do not just speak of error but . . . of illusion or delusion” (Taylor, 1985a, p. 38). Therefore, an auto-methodology on motivation, beliefs, and desires with an existential view of identity should have a base-level assurance that the auto-methodologist is not delusional. Assurances can be had, for example, by taking legitimate language tests, logging real places one has gone to, having a dissertation committee review one’s work to assure its coherence, transparency, and, in a base-level way, make sure the researcher is not delusional such as by claiming to study Martian languages on Mars or to have mastered 1,000 languages in 10 days or some other clear delusion.

Even those of us completely non-delusional may not know or be able to articulate as we would like, our actual foundational values (Kemp, 2020). Also, we are not all-knowing of all the things that effects us and in all the ways they do so. Hence, the research attitude is of the sort where one might say, “this is what I know to be why for now of my chosen higher-order values in my articulations, that is acceptable; it will continue to be sharpened as my knowledge of the why’s changes or develops.”

Also, even though often we sharpen our knowledge of what we hold as important by dialoging with others outside of ourself, and I provide an example and explanation below for how this can be useful as part of an auto-methodological study, it is still the LLer himself who is discovering what is important to his self, and therefore for anyone but the LLer to put into form what that other LLer finds important, i.e., what the LLer’s identity formation is, i.e. what he found as valued throughout, *is to audio dub over the LLer’s voice (i.e., to voiceover) with one’s own voiced translation* rather than letting the voice of LLer itself be the one heard. This is the tautological Bakhtin implication that self-authoring can only be authored by the self and, hence,

a study on authentic identity can only be done auto-methodologically. To not do so is to provide a secondhand description:

“a human being cannot be turned into the voiceless object of some secondhand, finalizing cognitive process. In a human being there is always something that only he himself can reveal, in a free act of self-consciousness and discourse, something that does not submit to an externalizing secondhand definition” (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 58).

Thus, if there is any other helper to the research it would be one who serves “in the role of helpful editor or provisional amanuensis” (Bruner, 1990, p. 113). In this vein, the auto-methodologist may discover better what one holds as important by dialoging with others outside of himself: with books, friends, mentors, colleagues, even with people who have no education or training about the topic one is talking about. Others may also provide us with their own articulations of who they see us to be that we can take/revise (or re-/inter-textualize) in order to better our own self-interpreted articulations, but, of course, ultimately they must always be *our* articulations (appropriated or not). Even if the attention-of-direction was in some way co-initiated by the other, the oneself still has chosen to attend to it rather than to something else (Dryden, 2020; Hinchman, 1996).

Philosopher and dramatist, Heinrich von Kleist explains the importance of self-transparent dialoging (be it dialoging with self and/or others of whatever sort, e.g., one’s cat, friend, books, etc.) and its connection with thought-interaction in his philosophical essay, “On the Gradual Production of Thoughts Whilst Speaking” (1951). Here, he also provides evidence for how the ability of the LLer, any LLer, to be his own researcher—to conduct his own auto-methodological study on his motivation and identity in his ALs and LLing journey—requires no superabundant skills. It only requires the skill of Heinrich—of being able to write out or talk out one’s thoughts:

“If there is something you want to know and cannot discover by meditation . . . I advise you to discuss it with the first acquaintance whom you happen to meet. He need not have a sharp intellect, nor do I mean that you should question him on the subject. No! Rather you yourself should begin by telling it all to him . . . to speak with the reasonable purpose of enlightening yourself” (p. 42).

Finally, the auto-methodological single-case study is deeply existential and likely a requirement of an existential LLer study. This can be seen throughout existentialists’ own works, which are almost always in some way (usually quite overtly) auto-methodological (e.g., Barnes, 1997; Beauvoir, 1958; Frankl, 1972; Kierkegaard, 1980, 2009a; Sartre, 1964; Wietzke, 2013). Existentialists are continually pointing out the tautological truth that the single individual is the single individual and, hence, each situation and process that occurs within and as existence is “in each case mine” (Khawaja, 2016, p. 203). That is, in the EPr, to conduct a study on any phenomenon concerning one’s LLing motivators, identities, values, or practices is by definition to conduct a unique and belonging-to-the-LLer auto-methodological study.

In existentialism, “philosophy ought to take a cue from its subject matter. A phenomenology of human existence . . . should be an extension of and elaboration of . . . self-understanding” and, therefore, “self-explication . . . to everyday experience is precisely what philosophy ought to develop” (Khawaja, 2016, p. 210). In existentialism the who of the self, the identity, is how one relates-to what one is and does. Therefore, a methodology that articulates this, articulates a self-cultivational and/or aspirational journey where one is guided by one’s intentionality to act in accord with one’s delimited selection of valued cares. This is, then, to *enact* existential philosophy, providing a “relation among experience, implicit self-knowledge, and explicit reflection” (p. 211). This study’s EFr has done this by way of developing a strong evaluation by

which the LLer explicitly reflects on his once-implicit self-knowledge, on his experience, on any values he wants to develop or hopes to acquire in order to delimit his value-pursuits; and, following from that, documenting quotidian in-the-moment acts as he attempts to live out those values as “relation among experience” (p. 211), explicitly *relating as* a LLer of his ALs with content concerning his higher-order values (e.g., studying Italian via the content of Catholic philosophy and triathlon-related talks). Then, following all of that, this study’s EFr conducts a stronger evaluation.

In sum, due to the existential-phenomenological-hermeneutical reasons given above, philosophically and methodologically, a study on motivation and identity in LIng needs to be auto-methodological through-and-through; both on the micro level, such as through multiple-times-daily logs (thought-interaction logs), and on the macro level, such as through beginning-of-study and end-of-study strong evaluations. *Phenomenologically* speaking, only I am in the position to observe and know what I am attending to and what motivates me and what I experience as valuable in my experience. *Existentially* speaking, I am living unique experiences and sets of experiences (individual points of time and processes) of which only I can become aware of and select a delimited amount of values to pursue and identify-as. *Hermeneutically* speaking, only I can articulate and interpret my values, beliefs, desires, actions, and commitments. *Value-developmentally* speaking, which is to say, identity-formation-wise—only I can self-monitor to perceive those things in which I have chosen to say yes to cognitively, conatively, affectually, motivationally, and actionally (Callard, 2018; Scheffler, 2010).

### **Reasons Related to Research Ethics**

One ethical problem with non-auto-methodological research is that of the observer effect (Hyde, 2007). That is, an outside-researcher by virtue of the fact of being an observer changes

the actual data and experiences the LLer has had and/or is having. While the LLer himself does this when observing and articulating his own experiences, it is still *his* interpretations of his interpretations. It remains in the realm of articulating what a person's own motives, identities, etc. actually are. Hence, researchers need to "move from participant observation to participation . . . 'making explicit' of what we do anyway: we change situations we observe . . . researchers co-create the historical processes they document" (Van Der Aa & Blommaert, 2015, pp. 12-13). Therefore, it is more ethically honest if either researchers of motivation and identity in Lling themselves are the participants or if, at least, include their participants as co-authors.

Also, conducting "autoethnographies of L2 learning . . . seen in the few existing autoethnographies . . . is a threat to our [i.e., researchers'] face, authority, and legitimacy" (Pavlenko, 2016, p. 597) because it puts the authority and voice into the hands of the LLer *and* because the researcher-participant himself is in the vulnerable position of potentially losing face. It is ethically important that the researcher himself is the one in the most vulnerable position in the research by being the (or a main) participant of the research. This does away with or at least diminishes acts of dominance of "power of the researcher in even apparently close and less formal researcher-participant interactions, and in particular the power of the researcher to elicit stories of participants' lives without having to reciprocate" (Harvey, 2014, p. 107).

Unlike the auto-methodologist, the qualitative *non*-auto-methodological researcher acts as an external power holder. Even with all ethical precautions in place, there remains an element of peer or mentor pressure when it comes to eliciting information from a non-researcher participant, especially with research concerned with identities since such research "tends to promote a 'confessional' obligation, as students are exhorted to reveal and share their personal narratives and their innermost selves and desires that many may find obtrusive" (Motha & Lin, 2014, p.

349). Opposed to this, auto-methodologies put the vulnerability on the researcher-participant and provide a completely uncoerced Ller study (Gorichanaz, 2017, p. 6; Macedo & Bartolomé, 2014). Vulnerability is also tied with research rigor in that researchers “become vulnerable . . . dive into the stream of action to the greatest possible depth, rather than watch it from the bank” (Wacquant, 2015, pp. 3-4).

What makes our goals, purposes, and projects existentially authentic is that it is our own explicitly made goals, purposes, and self-chosen projects and not ones put upon us by another (Davenport, 2007; Mate, 2003). A study that takes an EPr cannot be (otherwise it is not *existentially*) done by an outside observer of a Ller who is not the Ller himself. It can only be done by the one who is experiencing-doing the thinking-acting and experience-having of the Lling instantiations (Khawaja, 2016; Kierkegaard, 2009a, p. 370). In sum, when it comes to a study on Lling motivation and/or identity formation, auto-methodologies permit us to be more rigorous, holistic, and ethical:

“Researchers have ongoing access to themselves. Auto-methodologies allow for longitudinal, demanding, and speculative—perhaps even invasive—research . . . Researchers also have more access to their own thoughts . . . Thus researching the self may potentiate deeper and more precise and accurate data collection” (Gorichanaz, 2017, p. 2).

### **Putting It All Together**

Existential identity formation can be seen analogically as the action and interaction of two hemispheres, with its intimately intertwined interaction seen most clearly in an analogical corpus collosum of willing-forth from EM to the existential movements in good faith and the proleptically feeding-back to the EM more reasons re-enforcing it derived from the existential movements (Callard, 2018; Davenport, 2012; Sacks, 1998). Below are figures that show this,


ranging from a two-column chart (Figure 2.1) to a Venn Diagram (Figure 2.2) to a Pyramid Chart (Figure 2.3). These figures clarify-by-simplifying what is meant by existential identity formation. The figures all represent the same model of existential identity formation, but with differing amounts of detail. They all represent committed-to, continuously-lived-out, ever-present choices towards one's explicitly chosen higher-order values and value-development *seen in* higher-order volition and the voluntary movements they produce. One's creation of and correspondence between existential motivation and existential movements is one's living out authenticity with good faith (Khawaja, 2016; Sartre, 1943). For this study, all of these relate to the self-chosen additional languages, the explicitly chosen values of philosophy-theology and fitness-health, and the content and means by which I engage with all of them.

**Figure 2.1 Existential Identity Formation Model: Chart Version**

Existential Motivation	Existential Movements
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• aware-of</li> <li>• one's commitments-to</li> <li>• one's higher-order values or value-development, built up out of:</li> <li>• one's endorsed strong evaluation of self-discerned past, present, and proleptic interests, capabilities, potentialities, and appreciations.</li> <li>• which will-forth continual attempts at</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• corresponding intentional movements as:</li> <li>• higher-order pursuits built on:</li> <li>• one's higher-order values.</li> <li>• these movement-actions are more or less successfully executed, and in an aspirational journey they also work to:</li> <li>• <i>develop</i> value-reasons, proleptically,</li> <li>• and with both self-cultivating and aspirational pursuits they:</li> <li>• unlock corresponding potentialities</li> </ul>


Inauthentic identity formation would be the converse of the above. This could be to choose to live in an ambitious manner or to choose to live in a drifting manner (Callard, 2018; Davenport, 2012). Violations of any of the bullet points above could occur in an overall authentic identity formation when one becomes distracted or enacts acts of akrasia (Callard, 2018; Davenport, 2012). Figure 2.2, below, probably best exemplifies how the motivation (movers) and movements can be seen as the two brain hemispheres of existential identity formation with the overlapping bubble as the corpus collosum combining the hemispheres.

**Figure 2.2 Existential Identity Formation Model: Venn Diagram Version**



## Figure 2.3 Existential Identity Formation Model: Pyramid, Iceberg, and Arrowhead

### Version



While the pyramid figure (Figure 2.3) does not show the overlap as well as Figure 2.2. or feedback-feedforward-ness of Figure 2.1, it does show how they are altogether part of one and the same entity. It also shows how the existential identity formation works in ways that the other two figures do not reveal as well: The base of the pyramid is the committed-to values not only because the other parts of the pyramid are built on it, but also because it is the strongest support (firm foundation) of the three due to its well thought-out strong evaluation. The movements are placed on top in the sense that it is built upon committed-to higher-order volition which itself is built out of committed-to higher-order values. Also, the movements are at the top in the sense of

being the most visible since and are thus like the part of the iceberg above water (Frankl, 1984; Kierkegaard, 1941, 1951; Webster, 2005). Similarly, the movements are the tip of the arrowhead that pushes through the vicissitudes of life, propelled by the weight of the other two elements in the arrowhead. In a word, the model of ALLing existential identity formation that this study is concerned with studying views the participant-LLer as mover+attempter+movement.

## **Chapter 3 - Theoretical Framework: The Philosophical Solution**

This study's existential perspective (EPr) was derived primarily by the works of Agnes Callard (2017, 2018, 2021a, 2021b), Nell Noddings (1991, 1993, 1995, 2002, 2003), John J. Davenport (2007, 2012), Søren Kierkegaard (1987c, 1987a, 1987d, 1951, 1980, 1988), Noreen Khawaja (2016), Viktor Frankl (1973, 1974, 1985, 1987, 2000), Charles Taylor (1985a, 1985b, 1992), Scott Webster (2004, 2005; Webster & Whelen, 2019), and Jacquelyn Allen-Collinson (2011, 2012, 2018; Allen-Collinson & Hockey 2001); and secondarily, by the works of Mikhail Bakhtin (1981, 1984, 1986; Coates, 1999; Holquist & Clark, 1984), Tim Gorichanaz (2015, 2016, 2017, 2018), and Jean-Paul Sartre (1943, 1946a, 1946b, 1965).

To summarize very briefly, the philosophical solution, and thus philosophical framework (EPr), that this study puts forth is a kind of existentialism that is sharpened by aspirational theory wherein the existential conceptualization of language learner identities and motivations are value-based and explicitly-committedly directionalized (Callard, 2018; Davenport, 2012; Kierkegaard, 2009a; Noddings, 2003).

### **Ontological Stance**

With philosophical inquiry, it is standard fare to clarify the ontological and epistemological stances that the research question is based on (Burbules, & Warnick, 2006; Harvey, 2014). These are described throughout these first four chapters, but I will sum up the ontological stance here and the epistemological stance in Chapter 4 since epistemology is most directly tied with methodology. The ontological questions most pertinent to this study, which lead to other ontological questions (such as “What is a narrative?”), are the following: (1) What *is* motivation? (2) What *is* identity? And, (3) What *is* existential identity formation, especially in and through multiple additional language learning? All three questions revolve around and are

described and explained by a fourth question: (4) What are personal values in the sense of values one personally possesses rather than in the sense of all things which are valuable?

As concerns (1), motivation is usually a cluster concept wherein one has “a motivational set” (Kemp, 2020, p. 605) of many various motivators. The existential type of motivations are derived from (or are themselves) values or potential values that one is committed to developing and this commitment-as-motivation moves someone to dwell on something and to do something. As for (2), these can be classified as ambitious, drifting, aspirational, or self-cultivating identities. Existential identities encompass the latter two and concern those values that the Ller engages with that the Ller takes to *be* or to *be related to* as valued aspects of himself; thus, this includes practices, phenomenological relating-towards, and motivation.

Since the existential versions of (1) and (2) concern what is importantly valued by the Ller, to perceive such they require reflection on what he finds most (or more) interesting, curious, offensive, bothersome, and what his other attitudinal-values are, such as his belief system and life philosophy. Donald Davidson calls all of these “pro-attitudes” (1980, p. 4). I, instead, follow Agnes Callard’s terminological preference. Callard explains that we usually use terms like “desire,” “attraction,” or “urge” with the qualifiers like “mere” to describe something on a shallower stratum (2018, p. 3). On the other hand, we use qualifiers like “valued,” “identified-with,” or “endorsed” to describe the deeper, more important stratum of our cares and interests (2018, p. 4). I concur with Callard as to these terms, and I attach “higher-order” before “values” and their underlying features, such as desires, wants, etc. that matter to the person to a greater degree than other potentially conflicting desires, wants, etc. In other words, pro-attitudes that correspond with a higher-order value also get the “higher-order” qualifier (Frankfurt, 1971, pp. 7-8; Callard, 2018, pp. 85-86). To follow any non-higher-order value (or any non-value) is to be

a “philistine,” i.e., to act ambitiously or driftingly (Callard, 2018, pp. 93-109; Kierkegaard, 1951, 1989).

Concerning (3), *existential identity formation* is how the LLer advances (takes actions) in those things he finds to be importantly valued (higher-order valued). Figures 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 exemplify what is meant by existential identity formation. There are different kinds of identity formation, and existentialism is interested in those kinds that one commits in and towards, while the ethical component adds that these be value-based commitments. That is, commitments directed toward something that is good, done in a good way, as opposed to simply any commitment no matter how evil or good. The former kinds of identity formation are aspirational and self-cultivational (Callard, 2018, 2021a). The non-value based kinds of identity formation we call “ambition” (Gordon, 2020, p. 632) and the unaware-of higher-order value or non-higher-order (non-)value identity forming pursuits we call “drifting” (Callard, 2018, pp. 42-44 & 56; Kierkegaard, 1987a, 1987b; Ullmann-Margalit & Morgenbesser, 1977, p. 783).

The ambitious identity formation may be based on a reflected-on explicitly chosen choice to commit to X, but X is not a value in the sense that we mean it. That is, it is not ethical, rather it is connected to some non-value quality like status, power, lust, or greed (Callard, 2018, 2021a). The drifting identity formation is a not-reflected-upon, non-explicitly choosing-to-choose identity formation (Gordon, 2020, p. 621; Ullmann-Margalit, 2006, p. 170). On the other hand, the two types of existential identity formation of self-cultivation and aspiration concern explicit commitments to values (Callard, 2018; Davenport, 2007, 2015; Sartre, 1943; Scheffler, 2010).

### **Existential Identities, What are They?**

The etymological implications of the word “existence” concur with existentialism’s view of identity. The *ex-* of *existence* is a Latin prefix meaning *out*, and *-stence* is derived from the Latin

verb *sistere* which means *to take a stand* or *to cause to stand* (Existence, 2021). One's existential identities are those that one has chosen to relate-to as the whos of herself *after* (and as) one has reflectively stood outside of the whats of her existence to discern those whats that most tie with her values and thus with who she is (Callard, 2018). It is not all the whats of a person. Thus, one can choose to relate to the goods of one's existence rather than evils, while still be real about and aware of and, as can, fighting against the evils. To give an example from Viktor Frankl, one can explicitly choose to relate to a good "what" of their facticity, such as being a father or a brother or a multilingual, even while in a prison camp, rather than relating to an evil "what" of their facticity, such as being a prisoner (Frankl, 1972). Even in an example where one is given the option of either joining their country's war or refusing to and being shunned by all or even executed for that refusal, one can still choose to not identify with that and instead identify with their values and, thus, potentially become a martyr (Sartre, 1999, p. 128).

Existential Identities (EIs) are those value-based identities that one chooses to relate-to as centrally important to her and is concordantly committed-to enacting long-term. With the criteria of relating-to and committed-to, existential identity agrees with a version of philosopher Hilde Lindemann Nelson's definition of identity as "a meaning-system that . . . represents, from one's own perspective . . . the things that contribute importantly to one's life over time" (Lindemann Nelson, 2001, p. 103). Or as she defines later, "identities are . . . constructions consisting of a fluid and continual interaction of the many stories that are created around the things that seem most important" (p. 106).

The "important" part is *only* decided and thus known by the self. This view of existential identity also seems to be the most healthy view since it has been shown that to let others dictate what is important for the self results in lower quality of life and possibly a shorter lifespan,

whereas those who decide for themselves which subset of values are most important are more likely to survive a larger swath of situations, such as concentration camps (Frankl, 1972; Khawaja, 2016; Whitbourne, 2010). Lindemann Nelson seems to disagree, though, and gives a fictional example of Shakespeare's more talented sister, Judith, for whom nothing was more important than writing plays. She was married off at 16 years of age and was not taken seriously as a playwright by her brother or husband or children so she killed herself. However, if this were an existential identity then she would have never given up (Frankl, 1970, 1972, 1973, 1984, 1985, 1987, 2000). She would have continued to write plays even if in secret knowing that simply writing them was adding beauty into the world, but also with the hopes that someday someone who would value them might find them and they would be performed. She would have continued to try to tell other people about her plays and get others to read them. In other words, she would have chosen to live existentially: As long as existence let her continue to be alive, she would not end her life but would rather see that there was something existence desired of her, which would be those things that she held as most valued rather than only what others held as important for her, and thus playwriting would be one of them. This would continue to, thus, play a role in her meaning-system of "the things that contribute importantly to one's life over time" (Lindemann Nelson, 2001, p. 103). Existence is granted in order that one continues in one's existential identities (Khawaja, 2016; Lee, 1998). This is to be living in hope towards what oneself has chosen as one's important values.

In the existential tradition, identities relate to the who of the person and is *not* determined by the what (Khawaja, 2016; Kierkegaard, 2009a; Sartre, 1943; Webster, 2004). The existential view of identity are those *whats* of a person that a person *chooses to identify as* (Khawaja, 2016; Kierkegaard, 1983, 1989; Webster, 2004). A what has to be there for one to identify as it, but a

*what* is only an existential *who* of the person, i.e., only an existential identity, when the person herself identifies it as being one of her identities. Therefore, existential identities are who one explicitly identifies relating oneself as *being* (e.g., I am someone who is a brother—a brother being), as *being into* (e.g., I am someone (a being) who is into philosophy, aspirationally or cultivationally), and/or as *consistently becoming* (e.g., I am someone (a being) who is ever attempting to unlock my physical potentials in order to ever be the best animal I can be; and, I am a being (I am someone) who is becoming multilingual) (Davenport, 2007, 2012). In the EPr, all of these are actually becomings—the being of a global citizen also means one is in an ontological state of continuing to become a global citizen (Kierkegaard, 1983). And these could be worded in many ways. My identity of *becoming* multilingual is often worded as my identity of *being* a multiple language learner.

Again, this shows how existential identity is inexorably tied to existential motivation—to those committed-to values-as-movers. I value philosophy which is *why* I am a being who is into philosophy when I am languaging (e.g., Italianing). The value I hold (or desire to hold) moves me to take movements of being-in-philosophy *through* being-in-the-AL (e.g., watching presentations by philosopher Luciano Floridi, reading philosopher Ilaria Ramelli). I am committed to a multiple language learning identity, and I see myself as consistently becoming a more frequent multilingual thinking *being* who is ever able to better think out deeper concepts and topics of interest in the ALs.

Take someone who has a somewhat greater than average amount of freckles on his face. This is a true *what* of the person. It is part of his facticity (Khawaja, 2016). However, even if everyone around him identified him as “that guy with the freckles,” if he in no way related to having freckles, then it would *not* be part of *his existential* identity. He may almost never think of his

freckles except when others mention it or in passing on occasion when he shaves his face and is closely observing his facial features. If, on the other hand, he related to having freckles in valued-to-him ways; for example, he believed in a prophecy that claims that those with freckles are known to be pure of heart and/or that it made the rest of his facial features more striking etc., then freckle-faced (a person with freckles) would be one of his existential identities and he would act in a way that lived out that identity (e.g., wearing COVID masks that still allow the outline of his freckles to show).

While an innumerable amount of *whats* are out of one's control (what happens to us, what our genetics are, how much we were fed as a child, and so on), "through agency, the individual has some freedom to choose the significance of the relations to his or her own meaning of existence" (Webster, 2004, p. 11; Kierkegaard, 1991). I am born into a world where I am only exposed to English, but once I discover there are other languages in the world, I can choose to try to be exposed to more of those other languages or I can choose to remain in English, but to claim I cannot choose but must remain in English since it is so ubiquitous in my environment is to live in bad faith (Sartre, 1943). Maybe as a child I was brought to a local library where, when serendipitously perusing the books, within the factual situation of being brought there and having no say as to what books were put out (I was not in control of what material the library had on display), I came across some foreign language material which I could then choose to hone in on or to pass up for some other subject. And so it goes, at each stage and in each environment of facticity, I was constantly making choices within them. The *who* I was and came to be and am presently living out is not entirely dependent on all the factual *whats* of what I was, came to be, or am presently living with; rather, my existential identities correspond to *how* I relate with certain specific *whats* and develop them (Sartre, 1943; Webster, 2005). Explicitly choosing to

become more and more exposed to other languages, I give myself a means to a new beginning. This is a process and takes time, but it is possible. This may occur by way of self-cultivation where I begin to take on some value I had already but explicitly choose it and choose to develop it, or it may be by way of aspiration where I see the potential value in something I do not yet fully grasp and thus I aspire to become a valuer of that value by way of choosing acts that develop me towards it (Callard, 2018).

Victor Frankl shows us that even in the most extreme of factual situations, someone can choose his existential identities. Someone in a concentration camp is actually a prisoner in a prison, but being a prisoner is a part of one's existential identity, one's *who*, only to the degree that that person relates towards that (Frankl, 1972). It does not matter if others identify him as that, it only matters if he himself identifies himself as that. Existentialism acknowledges the *whats*—that I was born in X place, am Y centimeters tall, etc., but those correspond to *who* only to the degree that I relate to them *as* parts of myself—that I identify with them. Frankl argued that even in his experiences of being in Nazi concentration camps, the category of prisoner could not define or determine the identity of any individual there (Frankl, 1984). One could choose to relate towards being a brother more than towards being a prisoner even though both are *whats* of his facticity. Both are identifiers, but identifiers and identities are not always synonymous. There are identifiers that are identities (taken by that person as that person's identities), and then there are identifiers that are simply descriptors of a *what* of a situation of a person but that the person does not relate-towards as being *who* he is.

In this way, we see that *how* a person relates with what is or what may be *is* what makes a person *who* that person is—it gives that person his existential identities. These identities are

nested in and built on values. By definition, nobody knows a person's existential identities more than the person herself. When we take up this existential perspective,

“we have a sense not only of active agency but of a kind of identity that we are expressing . . . a sense of commitment to various roles . . . this kind of identity is not an issue of scientific fact, but rather a description under which you value . . . which you find . . . actions to be worth undertaking” (Davenport, 2012, p. 14).

Existential identities first need *reflection* in order for one to *discern* one's higher-order values and then *choosing to commit to acts of faith* of concrete instantiations living out those higher-order values. For example, through my BoS strong evaluation, I discerned that I highly value health both physically and mentally, which itself is based on other values such as value for my Maker and what He has presently entrusted me with. Based on these values, I desire to learn more about health via my ALs (thus exercising my mind, ears, and verbal articulatory muscles). Accordingly, I will forth the act today of listening to a Portuguese podcast of first responders talking about how best to care for someone who may have spinal trauma. Therefore, I am living in and living out this commitment, but the enacted relevant choices must continuously be done long-term for it to really be a commitment.

Notice that in this definition of existential identities, one really is related to the entities in an externally-observable objective way, but one's identities are *how* oneself relates to those. Using religion as his case study, Kierkegaard makes clear that only the person herself can know whether or not being a Christian is an existential identity to her, whatever the “what”s of a national survey, fellow church-goer's words, or one's antagonists may identify her as (Kierkegaard, 1992, 2009). Only the person herself discerns whether such holds a central place for her. It is only through one's self-interpreted reasons and self-perceived relation-to and -as

that one can identify as a Christian or anything else, as a *who* and not only as an externally-seen *what* (Kierkegaard, 1992, 2009).

A person may be assisted in her articulation of her existential identities by way of discussion with knowledgeable others who may “be able by seeing the good that we are, and naming it, to bring us closer to this good” (Taylor, 1985a, p. 290), but it is only the person herself who can discern, decide, and thereby believe if this is indeed one of things she identifies as and thus actually *is* as *being*, i.e., as *who*. Furthermore, “commitment is required to establish the ethical ideal” and not only establish it, but, also with every step, renew it (Noddings, 2003, p. 104). Commitments and willed-forth renewed steps are mutually-benefiting, for acts reinforce one’s commitments on the one hand and “effort required to summon ethical caring is greatly reduced by renewed commitment” on the other (p. 104).

In the EPr, each act is either reinforcing one’s committed-to identities, and thus living with integrity, or is betraying (or violating) one’s committed-to identities and thus lacking the consistency which defines integrity (Blustein, 1991; Davenport, 2012; Sartre, 1943). Integrity is the committed, integral, consistent being of a being.

Even those who live in bad faith by claiming to not have choice are simply choosing what is imposed upon them or are continually changing their choice so as to appear to never actually settle upon choosing anything. This fickle ever-fluctuation is a choice (Sartre, 1943, 1946). As Frankl explained, “Man does not simply exist but always decides what his existence will be, what he will become in the next moment” (1984, p. 154). Furthermore, “freedom can be used to choose one’s attitude and purpose – and therefore one’s identity – in the face of any circumstance” (Webster, 2005, p. 8).

Using Sartre's terminology, the EPr considers the following as acts of *bad faith*: For a person to have *any* identities based *only* on what others claim is the person's identities is to live in bad faith. If a person does not try to understand or discern what of value she identifies as, she is living in bad faith and is betraying herself by betraying her own potential existential identities (Sartre, 1943, pp. 47-72). If one does not attempt to reflect on her identities, values, and desires, and discern and articulate those that she values more than others, as higher-order (Step 5, strong evaluation), she is living in bad faith. She is making a *choice* to live in bad faith—a choice to not be sufficiently reflective. If she is reflective, but then claims that she cannot decide between her values, she acts in bad faith: “Bad faith apprehends evidence” of one's values “but it is resigned in advance to not being fulfilled by this evidence, to not being persuaded and transformed into good faith” (Sartre, 1943, p. 68). If she does not choose to commit diachronically to act on and toward her higher-order identities and values (Step 6), she is living in bad faith. Finally, whenever one does not act on one's commitments, but instead acts on some lesser important thing, one again is acting in bad faith.

There is the flip side to all of this: good faith (Kierkegaard, 1989). Existentialists take the “ideal of identity, of ‘becoming oneself’ by virtue of an ongoing movement of self-conscious appropriation . . . as the spring of good faith” (Khawaja, p. 94). To attempt to discern one's higher-order values, to be self-persuaded to (by faith) choose a delimited specific set of them, to then make commitments to live according to them, and to actually act and live according them are all enactments of and in good faith (Sartre, 1943). If one chooses to be in a drifting-type of journey without having articulated and explicitly chosen to choose in good faith, she does not yet have existential identities, even though she is still choosing (and perhaps consistently choosing)

(Davenport, 2012). Existential identity comes in when one uses strong evaluative agency to explicitly choose.

Thus, one has existential identity only insofar as one explicitly chooses one's higher-order values. The goal of this study on identity formation is to identify ALs existential identities and related-to or shared-with-ALs existential identities through strong evaluations and multiple-times daily logs. Named identities are articulated by values. I aspire to be multilingual which is based on my aspirational value of the learning of several other languages which itself is based on a host of values such as the value of being able to dialogue with a greater range of people, being able to see the world in different ways by being able to think of it in terms of another language, and so on (de Swaan, 2001; Kierkegaard, 2009a; Stebbins, 2003, 2007, 2017).

Identities as well as the values on which they are based and in which they are nested have four features, features which are auto-methodologically discerned. I did not come across these features as an explicitly delimited list in my literature review, but various explications of them or their sentiment can be found throughout the main material of this paper's framework (especially, Davenport, 2012, 2015; Callard, 2018, 2021b). I developed the list from introspective analysis after reading such works, reflecting on my own human experience. This is a common philosophical strategy, and like Horgan and Tienson of their introspective-based philosophical work, I optimistically "think you will come to appreciate their truth" (2002, p. 521):

(Identity Feature 1) Identities and values are comparatively more or less *important* than other identities and values the person has or could have. Identities that rank high in this feature that could combine with my ALs are the only one's of interest to this study. Throughout her book, Callard provides various examples of what could be important identities such that one must "pass them down to her children," but another who has the same object of value but does not in fact see

it as so important and “rarely gives the matter a second thought” (Callard, 2018, p. 31). A short list of examples she gives of such values range from one’s citizenship, to fashion sense, to gender, to hobbies, to heritage, to knowledge of multiple languages, to religion, to profession, to physical appearance, to how her home is decorated, to sexual orientation, and even to who one’s neighbor is (Callard, 2018, pp. 32-40).

Charles Taylor agrees: “‘What is my identity?’ . . . physical description, provenance, background, capacities, and so on . . . can figure in my identity, but only as assumed in a certain way” (Taylor, 1985a, p. 34; Assume, 2021), assumed as being of more or less central importance to the person. Taylor provides the example of someone who holds that people’s “moral qualities are to a great extent nourished by their background” and “that to turn against one’s background is to reject oneself in an important way” and that therefore that person’s heritage is an important value-based identity to that person (Taylor, 1985a, p. 34).

This brings us to a concept of value given by Ryan Kemp known as a foundational value. A foundational value is “the value that most thoroughly grounds [one]’s sense of self. There is nothing he cares about more and, as a result, he cannot imagine losing the value while remaining the same person” (2020, p. 606). We can imagine other foundational values helping to hold this foundational value up, such as goodness and love, and therefore it still is not one singular monolithic value. Also, a foundational value does not need to reach this level of often-unknowable abstraction *but* it can. Goodness *can* be one of a person’s foundational values, but it need not (and perhaps in the abstract, cannot) be a sole foundational value.

In a footnote, Kemp hedges the meaning of foundational value by stating that “he might lose” the value “and still recognize himself. This, however, is very different from being able to imagine continuity of identity before losing the value” (p. 606). Given this subjective hedge with

the focus on “imagine,” I can work to agree with Kemp because it admits to the possibility that maybe we do not and cannot imagine all of our co-foundational values clearly all the time since no one ever fully knows with divine omniscient certainty all of their values and all of the ways they value them (Horgan & Tienson, 2002, p. 526).

Kemp further hedges the meaning of foundational value implicitly when he states that, for example, someone’s deep care for his family “appears to be more fundamental” than his care for “cultivating a particular strawberry patch” (pp. 605-606). Apparently, in Kemp’s view, values can appear more or less fundamentally foundational. This means it is not necessarily justificatory of *all* the other values, but rather more or less so. One can always articulate and stronger-evaluate one’s foundational values and discover more values connected with it. Perhaps one discerns a foundational value because it is that which “there is nothing he cares about more” (Kemp, 2020, p. 606), but he cannot know if there are not further waiting-be-uncovered-by-future-articulations of sub-values more foundational values than it or co-values equal to it or co-existent with it.

Foundational values are used to justify many other values and concomitant practices. So, if goodness is one of one’s foundational values, one is living in strong evaluation when she says she is doing X because it is good (assuming she really believes it is good) (Callard, 2018; Kemp, 2020). I suspect that often (or always) foundational values are actually co-supportive rather than (merely) self-sustaining. For example, whatever is good is true and whatever I do solely for goodness I actually also am doing it because I value the truth or beauty of it. Moreover, some values feed-back and feed-forward into themselves as a sort of virtuous circle, while in other value-arenas, there may not so much be a feed-forward/back loop as there are linked-sets of values that together equally comprise a value-matrix. The important thing to the existentialist is

that even one's foundational values should be authentically lived out: one is aware of being explicitly committed to them and one is aware of personally approving of them.

The following list of further examples of foundational values given in the philosophical literature shows how there is an extremely broad range of values that can be considered foundationally (co-)sustaining and (co-)justificatory: truth, beauty, having the potential of being a mother, being of a certain religion, having a certain hobby, being a professional classical pianist, collecting blue-green river rocks, having a beard (Callard, 2018; Kemp, 2020; Lewis, 1947; Hart, 2003, 2019; Taylor, 1985a).

(Identity Feature 2) One's identities can fall on various points of a stable-to-fluctuating scale. That is, some identities change more readily than others. Some may never change. They are more or less *permanent* in regards to the individual's lifespan (decades to days-long). You could have a transportable (i.e., highly integrated) identity that is also highly important but that is comparatively impermanent e.g., I am the person who needs a blood transfusion within the next 10 days. This is a transportable, highly-important, but comparatively impermanent identity.

(Identity Feature 3) Identities and values may be more or less harmonious with other identities and values. If conflict occurs, it may be experienced as identity threat or threat of one's value (in terms of time or emotion or cognition). They are still two values, but they work together or conflict within the person. Nor is one necessarily embedded in the other, but rather they work in concert. Examples of harmonizing identities might be being a father being harmonious with being a husband or my Spanish-learner identity being harmonious with my Catholic-philosophy learner identity. One is not nested in the other, but they often are lived and/or developed in concert with each other.

(Identity Feature 4) Identities and values have a certain amount of embeddedness (or co-integration) or lack thereof. That is, some identities and values are embedded in one or more other identities and values, some have other identities embedded in them, some are both embedded and have identities embedded in them, and possibly some are stand alone. For example, my acquiring (or knowing, once acquired) Italian is nested in my identity of becoming (or, once there, my being) multilingual. There can be a continuum from more overlapping to more distinct values and identities. This can affect Feature 3 in that there may be conflict due in part to two identities or values being overlapping (familiarity breeds contempt) or due to being too distinct and thus one taking too much time or energy away from another.

Embedded and overlapping identities as well as less-permanent identities have been conceptualized and termed in many ways in the literature. Some examples are “sub-identities” (Mishler, 1999, p. 8), “multiple selves” (Josselson, 1996, pp. 243-244), “shifting social identities” (Lykes & Mallona, 1996, p. 313), and “nonunitary subjectivity” (Bloom & Munro, 1995, pp. 99-100).

More concrete values and identities are often embedded in more abstract ones. For example, the concrete commitment to be a being able to communicate in emergency situations with Spanish speakers and English speakers alike may be embedded in the more abstract values of learning, of phenomenological knowledge (knowing what it is like to think in multiple non-native languages), of sharing ontological space with language learners, of love, and so on.

Embeddedness includes overlapping or co-integrated identities. This includes interconnectivity-ubiquity, such as transportable identities or values, which integrate with and are more ubiquitous than others. There is a spectrum here from ubiquitous identities (and values) on one end of the spectrum to separated-from-rest-of-life on the other end. Being more or less

integrated is in and of itself neither good or bad (or healthy or unhealthy); rather, it depends on how they are integrated or separated and how one lets that effect oneself. There have been studies that have shown it can be good to have separate identities so that if one identity gets destroyed, the other identity is not also destroyed. For example, one may be a spouse and it is transportable in certain senses, but one can still have the “excellent researcher” identity as a (near) completely separate identity and strive to excel in that. Therefore, if their spouse leaves them or dies and they feel they no longer have the “spouse” identity, they are still left with other strong and valued identities (Rojas-Marcos, 2019).

*Any identities on which one’s entire identity complex relies, such as foundational identities, should be identities that can never be taken from you even with the threat of death. There can even be maintained value-identity even when everything concerning the identity seems to have been taken away. If I value loving my family, and see it as part of my identity, and my entire family dies, I can still love my family and enact acts of love (visiting their gravesite, thinking about them, talking to them, etc.). In the same vein, we can understand why Geronimo’s last words were, “I should have fought until I was the last man left alive” (Junger, 2021, p. 41). I do not take it that a person needs such hyper-centrally valued identities to be attached to (or as) their ALs in order for those ALs to be authentically committed to as identities and values, but if the person can attach such values to her ALs, great.*

In a sense, values might be held by the person wherever she is. That is, even if one is enacting one value, while she might not be thinking about the other values at all, if asked or thought of, the person would say she still considers her other values as being worthy or valuable and important to her as a part of her. What is meant by transportable or overlapping values is that

they are values that are in some way *actively* enacted (and their identities instantiated) across contexts.

An example that clarifies the distinction between Feature 4 and Feature 3 is that of a drummer and a guitarist in one punk band. In one aspect they both have Feature 4 in that they are both embedded identities inside the punk-band-member identity. However, in another aspect they both have Feature 3 but not Feature 4 wherein neither the guitarist nor drummer are embedded or subserving the other, rather they are both working in concert, and, thus, harmonious.

In shortened form, these features are referred to as (1) comparative importance, (2) temporal permanence, (3) harmony-conflict, and (4) embeddedness-separateness. The identities are articulated by the persons themselves perceiving the comparative importance of their identities, the comparative temporality of their identities, if they are in conflict, and if they are or can be embedded with other value-based identities.

The most foundational identities may be integrated with all the rest of one's identities over the long-term—these are transportable identities in the strongest sense, that is, they are always in some sense *there* in the person as the person. An example of this would be a person who identifies as a lifelong Spanish learner whereby one of their many focuses of this is on dreaming in the language as much as possible. That is, Spanish imbues all of their life, even their sleeping life. Another example might be one's fitness identity which is there even when purely studying Spanish by interacting with a reading by a philosopher that has nothing to do with physical fitness, but the Ller is still, while doing it, aware of his posture and so on—in innumerable ways is still living as a person who wants to be the best animal he can be. Or when purely working out in a CrossFit group with the instructor and others only speaking in English, he is translating all

into Spanish in his head. This person could be worded as having a hyper-central or foundational identity-complex comprised of Spanish and fitness.

In sum, an identity may be more or less important, temporary, harmonious, or ubiquitous and multi-layered. Identities may be lived out in a drifting manner, ambitious manner, self-cultivating manner, or aspiring manner. All of the whats of us only become existential identity whos of us when and if we relate towards them as our committed-to valued identities and live it out in a thought-action identity formation. Only self-cultivating and aspirational identity formations do this. Otherwise, identity formation journeys are either unethical journeys (ambitious) or are no longer defined in any meaningful way by the person herself (drifting) (Callard, 2018; Frankl, 1984). *Existential identity formation journeys* are the central foci of this research, and to have/be it, one needs to have made oneself aware of one's *strong evaluators* of one's *articulated* existential motivation as commitment which then coincide with one's resolved willed-forth *movements*, together creating one's existential identity formation (Taylor, 1985a, pp. 30-38).

### **Existential Values, What are They?**

The concept of values gets its own overarching section here because in providing the answer to my research question I am providing information related to *values*. This concerns the three principal phenomena this study is centered on: One phenomenon is perceived in the BoS strong evaluation, and that is *what values was the LLeR intending to cultivate over the course of the study, and/or what values was he intending to create (i.e., to aspire to have, aspire to acquire) over the course of the study?* The next phenomenon is perceived over the 368-day in-the-moment documentation portion of the study, and that is the *discerning of what was of value to the LLeR in regards to LLeR throughout the course of the study*. The last phenomenon this study is centered

on is discerning *what values indeed were of value to the LLer (were in some sense “his”) in the sense that the LLer actively cultivated them or created (acquired) them (aspirationally)*. In providing answers to this, I will have answered this study’s research question of the 15.5 month-long existential identity formation journeys.

This paper’s EPr appropriates the view that valuing is a cluster-concept (Simpson, 2014) comprised of “interrelated dispositions and attitudes, including (at least) . . . types of belief . . . reasons for action, and susceptibility to a wide range of emotions” (Scheffler, 2010, p. 4). Values can be goals, persons, ideas, things, or activities (Davenport, 2012, p. 111). What makes all of these tie together as being a value is that out of the innumerable amount of objectively valuable things, this subset are valuable to the LLer. Ethical identities that are important to the LLer *are* values. There are six interacting ways that make or reveal something as valuable to a LLer: it is *important* to him in an axiological (related to the good, true, and/or beautiful), affective (emotional or conative, such as desire), cognitive (such as belief or judgment), motivational, actional, and evaluative (also called self-monitoring or reflective) relationship (Callard, 2018; Kolodny, 2003; Scheffler, 2010). This is basically synonymous with what Webster calls “existential spirituality”:

“Existential spirituality is to be understood as involving the whole person, the values, beliefs, understandings, emotions, motivations and actions . . . All of these aspects impinge upon how one understands one’s personal identity and makes sense of everything one thinks, feels and does” (Webster, 2005, p. 13).

This paper is not concerned with all types of values nor is it concerned with all types of identities, instead, it is concerned with one’s identities and their formation *that are tied to one’s own value-pursuit (pursuing an already held value) or pursuit-of-value (developing a value)*

(Callard, 2019; Davenport, 2012). In other words, it is concerned with one's existential identities. One's explicitly chosen values *are* one's higher-order identities because "when we know a person's values, we know what objects out in the world she is, as we say, 'all about'" (Callard, 2018, p. 35). To put this "all" more specifically, when we identify someone's values, we identify valued objects that elicit a response from the agent which is, "the product of the cooperation of the various cognitive, motivational and affective elements of her agency" (Callard, 2018, p. 35).

Again, the two types of value-identities are the aspirant identity type and the self-cultivator identity type. The aspirant is creating a value for herself, whereas the self-cultivator is further cultivating a value one has already attained. Thus, aspiration is also called self-creation, whereas self-cultivation is cultivation rather than creation because it is a cultivating of a value that has already been created within the self.

LLer aspirants are like athlete aspirants, "They . . . select a sport and persevere at learning it . . . As they get more proficient, they come to identify with it" (Stebbins, 2003, p. 882). Simply put, "when the agent arrives at her aspirational endpoint, she has become the sort of person who appreciates something" that she did not previously appreciate, whereas the self-cultivator is cultivating something she already appreciates (Callard, 2021b, p. 491). The end point of an aspirational journey is when it turns into a self-cultivating journey. Until then, the aspirational journey is still good because the "aspirant already has in her possession, (some) actual grasp of the value in question. This amounts to: some joy and insight" (Callard, 2021b, 491).

The self-cultivating person is trying to get better at something *because* he highly values it. The aspirational person is trying to get better at something *in order to* more highly value it (Callard, 2018, 2021a, 2021b). "Most of the profoundly important activities, relationships, and forms of knowledge that human beings pursue are ones a person can fully appreciate . . . only

once she is well-acquainted with them” and aspiration “concerns the process of becoming acquainted” (Callard, 2018, p. 107). This is why an existential identity formation journey must be at least six-months long.

In aspiration, reason “for doing that work is provided by the value in question, but the defect in your grasp of that value” means that you will likely have to use other motivational techniques to continue in its pursuit until you more fully have a grasp of that value (Callard, 2018, p. 68). One enforces one’s commitment by whatever sub-motivational means are required. These “reasons are how she moves herself forwards . . . which is to say, as placeholders for the ‘real’ reason” (Callard, 2018, p. 69), and more of the real reasons in an aspirational journey become known proleptically, as one lives out the journey. Agnes gives an example of the strong evaluation of a music appreciation student. This student,

“is listening to the symphony assigned for her class because music is intrinsically valuable, and because she wants a good grade. If she merely cited the first as her reason, she would be pretending to a greater love of music than she currently has; if she merely cited the second, she would be incorrectly assimilating herself to the bad student,” these two reasons, “somehow combine into one reason that motivates her to listen” (Callard, 2018, p. 70).

An example from my study would be that I am learning my ALs because I know they are intrinsically valuable in various ways and have a grasp on this in limited ways, such as seeing aspects of the beauty of the languages and because I would like to not be a hypocrite when I encourage students to stick with a target language and intertwine it with some other things they value, but I am also learning the ALs for the valued but yet a bit too utilitarian (or ulterior, and thus borderline ambitious) reason to complete my Ph.D. and finally have my doctorate. I then

discover more directly value-based proleptic reasons along the way. But to simply state one or two of these and not all of the reasons would not be as fully an honest picture.

Following Callard's description wherein tying self-cultivating values with aspirational values provides reasons to move oneself forwards, "which is to say, as placeholders for the 'real' reason" (Callard, 2018, p. 69), I purposefully integrated already-acquired values with my language engagements in order to assist in more deeply developing my value for learning that language. This study is, therefore, an entwined self-cultivating endeavor with an aspirational endeavor. As an aspirant, aspiring to more deeply value a select few target languages (rather than dozens or hundreds or hopping from one to the next), I chose those ALs that I perceived would most allow me further access to things I already deeply valued. Then throughout the aspiring journey I actually did actively combine those target languages with things that I already deeply valued *in practice* in order to put me into each language for hours each day. I also tied the select few ALs with things that have always been higher-values of mine so that I might always, or at least in a longer committed-way, aspire to value these ALs, and maybe even actually fully value them. This also meant I began to willingly and with purpose to neglect the endless number of languages that interest me and pull me in, including the many I have already put time into.

On a broader level, incorporating the philosophy of aspirational value formation and proleptic reasons into curriculum development answers all four of the following questions about any curriculum: "Does it work? Is it right? For whom? Why?" Kreber (2013, p. 159). The concept of value this paper takes *and* the enacting of strong evaluation answer these questions for each individual Ller for their own unique lives. Encouragingly, this is a solution that teachers can use to encourage LLers to implement in their own ways, rather than any avoidance of in-the-now multiple language learning action (Barr & Tagg, 1995, p. 15; Manarin, Adams,

Fendler, Marsh, Pohl, Porath, & Thomas, 2021; Reagan & Osborn, 2019, p. 91). I provide explicit examples of this in Chapter 5.

The SLA literature seems to back this up, but without having the conceptual architecture that terms like self-cultivation, aspiration, and proleptic reasons provide. It has been shown that Llers who use strong evaluation hone in on ALs that combine well with their other values and that, with this knowledge, they create their own ALing contexts which in turn makes the Llers more likely to advance in valuing the ALs and, therefore, actually learning the ALs (Dubin, 1979, 1992; Ushioda, 2009). For example, in a study of American students studying French in France, students who combined their ALLing with other values, such as “philosophy student, Eric, who wanted to add a reading knowledge of French to his existing repertoire of relevant languages” and “Elise, who planned a career in the foreign service, and saw herself using French to assist American tourists in difficulties,” are compared with students who wanted to learn French “as a means of enhancing their professional credentials in general terms” (Mitchell, Tracy-Ventura, & McManus, 2017, pp. 35-36). Comparing these two groups, it was found that, “enhanced language learning motivation and persistence’ emerged primarily for sojourners such as Eric and Elise, but not for those with less clear motivations” (Mitchell, et al., 2017, p. 36).

Enhanced LLing motivation and persistence did not emerge as much for those who did not purposefully *articulate* specific values that they already held that could combine with the French LLing as motivation and persistence did for those who did articulate specific values for themselves that they could combine with French (Callard, 2017, 2018; Taylor, 1985a, 1985b). For me, taking on this task as a responsibility was especially important because *multiple* language learning takes much more time and requires more LLing engagements than second

language learning alone, and because I was in a long-term isolated context given the COVID-19 pandemic.

### **Valuing versus Finding Valuable**

There is a strict distinction between something being *valuable* and something being *one's value* (Callard, 2018; Kolodny, 2003; Scheffler, 2010). Because we are quite limited in our time, energy, and attentional abilities, only a certain extremely delimited subset of all things valuable can comprise one's personally held and pursued values. That is, "our capacity to believe that things are valuable far outstrips our capacity for personally investing ourselves in those objects we can truly be said to value" (Callard, 2018, p. 117). An example relevant to this study is that many people find multiple L2s for an adult as valuable, but very few of these people actively value it in their own lives. There are many reasons why this may be. They may be a professional basketball player and married with kids and not have the time. They may be a construction worker with others who only speak English to them so also cannot expose themselves sufficiently to other languages. Whatever the reason, "nobody can occupy all the relevant positions in order to value all valuable things" (Scheffler, 2010, p. 37).

We are finite creatures and must pick a finite amount of good things to pursue. This includes languages. One cannot master all 7,000 languages. Kierkegaard claims that, "the principle of limitation" is "the sole saving principle in the world. The more a person limits himself, the more resourceful he becomes . . . not through extensity but through intensity" (Kierkegaard, 1987a, p. 292). This was my aspirational goal—to limit my ALs such that I could pursue them with *intensity* and in a consistent long-term committed way in order to actually deeply develop a value for those specific ALs, as opposed to my up-until-this-study's pursuing of languages through

shallow *extensity* (many languages) or short-term commitment to only one AL and then switching to another and dropping the previous one.

The *explicitly* discerning and *choosing* of a delimited amount of higher-order values to pursue is of utmost importance because many humans jump from one desire to the next, not realizing that, “A human being is a ‘synthesis’ of precisely the two conditions . . . inexhaustible desire and limited resources (or, in Kierkegaard’s hyperbolic shorthand, ‘the infinite and the finite’)” (Khawaja, 2016, p. 86; Kierkegaard, 1983, p. 13). We can see the unending things that are valuable, but we can only choose a delimited few to value personally, actionally, committedly, and to do so takes *explicit reflection*. Therefore, I needed to conduct strong evaluation (Step 5) in order to delimit those languages I would come to value as my own. While I considered all languages to be of equal value, I had to *evaluate* which ones would be more *worthy* of my time and energy than others. “Aspirants aim to direct their own ethical attention in such a way as to more fully appreciate one value or set of values, and to become immune or insensitive to [other] values” (Callard, 2018, p. 143).

The further along one is on one’s valuational journey, the more reasons they can give for why they value that value, for why they are doing what they are doing. And the more one acts and goes along, the more one can learn to better distinguish which signals to respond to and which signals are distracting and thus should be ignored. Aspirants learn better to pick out the better types of reinforcements that will reinforce them in the right sorts of ways.

Also, while only one knows one’s values, those phenomenologically known-values must coincide with things that are of real value (Allen-Collinson, 2011, p. 51). “When we ‘attach’ value to something” which is only something the self can do for the self (be the one that attaches

one's value to something), we do not “choose to make the thing valuable when previously it wasn't, for . . . if it is not, then our valuing it does not make it so” (Scheffler, 2010, p. 39).

Just as the definition of identity in existentialism is that real thing that one phenomenological orients towards as being who one is or is becoming (Webster, 2004; Kierkegaard, 2009a), so too with motivations and identity formation concerning valuing—there must be an objective thing that one is forming-in and identifying-toward. Returning to the spy example, if I identify as aspiring towards being a telepathic spy for a country that does not exist, this is not an aspiration. Rather, I *think* I am aspiring towards it, but in reality, I am living in and developing certain delusions, because, “aspiration is value-learning, and you cannot learn what is not the case. We could speak of ‘seeming to oneself to aspire’ . . . just as we could speak of ‘seeming to oneself to’ see or remember or know or learn” (Callard, 2021b, 488-489). If the object does not exist, one is not actually seeing it or learning about it or aspiring to acquire it. Callard calls terms such as identity, self-cultivation, and aspiration as “success terms” in the sense that they must successfully be oriented toward something real (Callard, 2021b, 488).

### **Ethicality of Values**

To value something is to take an actional, motivational, affective, cognitive, evaluative, and ethical orientation towards it (Davenport, 2012, pp. 17-18). In fact, “a person's values are the ethically deepest and most important facts about her” (Callard, 2018, p. 33). Callard claims this is also the case vice versa. That is, anytime anyone speaks “of a person's ethical self,” they are “really talking about her values” (p. 33). Callard is claiming (1) that a person's values are the deepest and most important facts about her and (2) that these values must be ethical. Backing up these claims, she states that it is common sense given that when we feel self-disappointment it is because we see ourselves to be in some condition that “amounts to a failure to live up to our

values,” whereas contrariwise, “when we feel pride it is because we recognize the fact that we have lived up to our values” (Callard, 2018, p. 34). Thus, the ethical self is a *relation* of the actual self living in congruence with its ethical framework (Callard, 2018; Davenport, 2012; Noddings, 2003).

Callard further states that any unethically construed values are not actually values but are a defective view of a value or values. Callard gives the example of Martin Luther King, Jr. instructing us not to judge people by the color of their skin but by the content of their character, she claims that to judge oneself unduly in esteeming “his own skin color . . . as grounds for treating those with skin of a different color as his moral inferiors . . . is a fact about a person’s (defective) values, and those are the things that comprise a person’s character” (Callard, 2018, p. 34). Therefore, while Callard defines people’s values as “what is really important to them, what drives them, what their life is organized around” (Callard, 2019, 36:15), she also holds that if these values are not ethically sound, they are defective values, and, thus, not really values at all. If someone values something that is not ethically *good*, they really do not value something that is actually *valuable*, and therefore they are neither in possession of or in pursuit of a value. Hence, ethical goodness is a necessary feature of a value. Kierkegaard agrees and goes so far as to say,

“When a person . . . says . . . I have a keen wit and a keen mind—this I regard as essential that cannot be taken away from me without my becoming somebody else. To that I would answer: The whole distinction is an illusion, for if you do not take on this keen wit and keen mind ethically, as a task, as something for which you are responsible, then it does not belong to you essentially” (Kierkegaard, 1987b, p. 260).

The use of multiple languages only belongs to me essentially, as one of my values, if I take it as an ethical task, as something I am responsible for, and, thus, as something I act on and with,

ethically. Only when I take learning French as a task, as something which I am responsible for and committed to, as something which I ethically care for and live out, does it belong *to me* as one of *my* values. When I am doing so, I am living existentially.

Again, if one's purported "values" are unethical, that person does not really have values in the proper sense (Callard, 2018, p. 34). We may still use the term "value" in such cases ("a bad / defective value") but a better signifier, in Callard's opinion, is *ambition* (Callard, 2018, pp. 32-34). Callard suggests a system of clear categories of identity formation based on if and how they are explicitly connected to values. She describes the cultivation of an already-attained value as *self-cultivation* and pursuit of the attainment of a good value as *aspiration*. She describes the development of bad values as *ambition*. Finally, she describes identity formation which is not explicitly-chosen-to-be tied to some values (even if incidentally or otherwise it ends up ethical) as *drifting* (Callard, 2018, pp. 32-118).

The pursuit of bad values is not actually a pursuit of values but a cultivation of ambitions, such as for power, wealth, or fame. Ambition may be a confused pursuit of self-cultivation or aspiration, but it cannot be self-cultivation or aspiration, "because there is nothing 'there' to aspire to" since there is no actual value to acquire since by definition a value must be virtuous (Callard, 2018, p. 240). Each aspiration towards value-creation is "an aspiration to virtue" (p. 237). To give a relevant example of this research, pursuing Lling in order to impress people would be an ambitious and immoral project, while pursuing Lling in order to learn what it is like to know the languages would be an aspirational project. There are many bad ways and reasons for pursuing Lling and many good, virtuous, and valuable ways and reasons.

There likely were some Nazis who held that their Nazi-values were ethical (Khawaja, 2016). The person holding the value may believe it to be an ethical good. However, in order to cultivate

a value or aspire to acquire a value, one must be cultivating or aspiring towards something that is actually *is* ethically good or at least not towards something unethical. If they think they are pursuing a value but in actuality are developing something unethical, what they are doing is not cultivating or aspiring, but rather deceiving themselves in some way (Callard, 2018; Kierkegaard, 2009a).

Hence, the “authentic Nazi” (Khawaja, 2016, p. 128) who holds that he values the values of Naziism is not valuing a value and thus not holding a value but rather is holding something in high regard that should not be held in high regard and is, therefore, holding an ambition (Callard, 2019; Khawaja, 2016, p. 168). This also reveals a distinction between the use of the term value and the use of the term care. One can care for (or about) the Nazi party, but since it is not good and worthy, one cannot be said to value it. So long as you exist, you care-toward-something whether you are aware of it or not. However, authentic, existential acts are explicitly willed-forth acts in and towards one’s aware-of values.

Due to this (and other reasons), the existentialism of this paper is far more Kierkegaardian and far less Heideggerian because, “the evaluations involved in Heidegger’s thinking about authenticity do not at any point concern ‘the good,’ either explicitly or implicitly” (Khawaja, 2016, p. 129) possibly because Heidegger himself was an authentic Nazi (Di Cesare & Baca, 2018; Ferry, 2019). Kierkegaard’s manner of ethics which synthesizes deontological ethics (there is objective good and evil) and virtue ethics (attempting to inwardly align one’s virtues with the outward objectively virtuous acts, and learning what is virtuous in a given context), “is in broad agreement with Kant that morality is ‘universal’ and never justified by mere preferences or commands: moral character depends entirely on an inward motivation by recognition of good

ends and right actions themselves” (Davenport, 1995, p. 76; see also, Kierkegaard, 1941, 2009a; and, Khawaja, 2016, p. 29).

Scheffler agrees with Callard and Davenport in distinguishing value from care: “valuing, unlike caring, involves a view of the object of one’s attitude as being good and worthy or valuable” (Scheffler, 2010, pp. 25-26). That is, I can care for one of my own bad habits while also knowing the thing I care for is (at least presently) not good or worthy. One’s care for a homicidal maniac may be worthy and thus valuable (she sees him as a being made in the image of God with potential for good), or it might not be. It could be for selfish reasons or because for some twisted reason she wants there to be more homicidal maniacs in the world, but *care* is there in both cases. Therefore, we can care for or about something bad (e.g., an alcoholic who cares for their alcohol, a gangster who cares about being someone of power and domination), but we cannot value it, by definition.

My claim is that in an ethic of care (Noddings, 2003), we should *only* care in valuable, ethical ways for or about things that are valuable. However, this only works if there are objectively bad things. This seems to be explicit in the title *ethic* of care itself, but unfortunately it is not, as I will discuss shortly. First, I want to point out that the solution I give is also given elsewhere in Davenport, where he makes his definition of *care* based on *values* in the same sense that Callard defines *values*—as necessarily being objectively good:

“caring and higher-order willing are naturally based on perceptions or beliefs about objective values . . . caring (like identification) requires the agent’s conviction that (i) the people or goals to which he is committed are inherently worth caring about, or that (ii) the process of caring about these ends and pursuing projects related to them is inherently valuable (or both),

where (iii) such inherent value is independent of her prior desires or preferences”

(Davenport, 2012, p. 105).

In other words of (iii), the care is based on a value and therefore valuable whether or not she or others happen to have desired or preferred it. It is objectively value-worthy. Recognizing for oneself that it is a value and choosing to take it on as one of one’s delimited value pursuits makes it a higher-order volition. In regard to all the other attributes of a person, values act as the king and any desires I have either subserve it (hence, these would be called higher-order desires) or if it conflicts with it, I temporarily ignore the desire until it is replaced by another, continuing all the while in higher-order volitional willed-forth attempts (Davenport, 2007, pp. 330-390; Dworkin, 1976; Frankfurt, 1971; Kemp, 2020, p. 605; Taylor, 1984a).

While, I agree with Callard and Scheffler’s distinction of care versus value, I think Davenport (above) and Kemp (here) help to clarify this. Kemp states that, “I consider the language of care to be continuous with the language of value such that a declaration of one is a declaration of the other” (p. 615). As seen in Davenport’s quote, caring, identification, value, beliefs, and higher-order willing are continuous with each other, and clearly motives are embedded in these: “Higher-order will in this sense is not merely decision but a kind of self-motivation” (Davenport, 2012, p. 101). Hence, this existential perspective explicates a holistic conception of existential motives, values, identities, and cares.

Returning to the need to temper an ethic of care (EoC) with this Callard-Davenport-Kemp-Kierkegaard conception of objective deontological-virtuous values, the problem can be brought into focus with the real-life examples of the EoC perspective being used to justify what should be clearly seen as abuse. These examples reveal why there must be some minimally acknowledged objective evils if we want, as educators, to actually be living and enforcing an

EoC that is not evil. It is important that I spell this out because many have assumed that those with an EoC mindset “will be internally motivated ‘towards the good’” (Whelen, 2019, p. 89; Forster, 2012, p. 14) or what Nodding’s calls “a longing for goodness” (2013, p. 26), but this is simply not the case.

One example can be seen in Germany where they deemed pedophile abusers to be good carers for foster children, which, although it appeared to the authorities the children were receiving good care, in actuality caused long-term harm to the children (Aviv, 2021). Other examples are teachers who groom their students as being viewed as enacting care for their students (Whelen, 2019). Hence, “the very notion of care, far from being self-evidently good, is tragically and dangerously ambiguous in light of the actions of those whose intentions . . . are at the very least criminal, if not evil” (Whelen, 2019, p. 84). Since we live in an ethically ambiguous age where morality is relativized, there is a need to argue for such objective ethics. That is, to evade such ambiguity, certain moral non-negotiables must be rigorously and clearly described. As with all ethical imperatives, these are ethical imperatives not only in schools, but *any* place humans exist. The responsibility is upon each person’s shoulders.

For starters, “However else it may be conceived, ethics treats ‘the good’ as its fundamental issue” (Khawaja, 2016, p. 129). However, EoC theorist, Nel Noddings, whose philosophy by-and-large has strongly influenced this study’s EPr, steers away from the use of the good. While being rich in ethical advice, Noddings’ preferences pursuing care as superior to pursuing the good (Noddings, 1995, 2013). Noddings nods towards objective moral principles, but in a way that downplays them. Her common advice is to not focus on them (Noddings, 1995, 2003). For example, in, “A Morally Defensible Mission for Schools in the 21st Century,” she states “Instead of juggling principles as we might when we say . . . ‘Murder is more important than friendship,’

we begin by asking ourselves whether our friends have committed caring acts” (1995, p. 367). Her most popular text, *Caring: A relational approach to ethics and moral education* (1984, 2003, 2013), much of which I find deeply useful in explaining existential motivation and so have appropriated many of its concepts throughout this dissertation (as seen by the frequent Noddings citations throughout), displays her dislike and downplaying of objective morality. She states that “it is not clear to me that . . . objective morality is possible” and therefore she believes we should center on the personal “moral impulse as it arises in response to particular needs,” this, she says, “provides . . . what it means to be moral” (p. 26). Her hope is that in this way “we may move farther away from a notion of objective morality” (p. 26). However, as Whelen and the German case study point out, this moral impulse does not appropriately arise in everyone (Aviv, 2021; Whelen, 2019, p. 89; Webster & Whelen, 2019).

Moral life so defined allows for horrors such as examples discussed in the works listed above of Aviv (2021) and Whelen (2019). We need objective moral principles as the framework and then caring is placed within that, but always bound by that (Davenport, 2012, p. 105). Moral life needs to be defined as including those things that are objectively morally good (valuable) and guarded from those things that are objectively morally evil. The moral work has not even begun if caring in any way is seen as superseding objective moral principles rather than necessarily relying on and based within them.

Objective moral evils are ones that the average person knows is wrong. A long list could be made, but the following concrete examples serve to get the point across: genocide, pedophilia, grooming, slavery, acidification of our oceans, torturing any living being for fun, touching someone who does not want to be touched unless to save their lives from some immediate physical threat (e.g., pull them out of the way of a moving car, see Chomsky, 2004; Chomsky &

Otero, 2003). In a deontological ethic, these things are always wrong. However, people have justified it using (twisting) the same philosophical reasonings as used by Noddings, above. An example that uses the exact language as her EoC (Noddings, 2003, 2013) were slave-holders claiming to be the one-caring for the slave as if he were one of his own children, or having the ability to better care and be responsible for the slave than the slave would for himself, or there being a supposed mutual one-caring and cared-for relationship. This terminology of “one-caring” and “cared-for” and its logic as spelled out by the slave owner is propagated in Noddings’ works, such as the classic, *Caring* book (2013, see especially, pp. 55-73). Davenport suggests that “this problem is addressed by basing cares on putatively objective values, which requires that they be . . . well-grounded” in an articulated strong evaluation (Davenport, 2012, p. 146). Thus, we need stronger moral evaluators than EoC has provided, not only for why we do things, but also for why certain things are not permitted (Callard, 2018; Taylor, 1985a).

A more rigorous EoC must appropriate other philosophical explanans for the explanandum outside of the EoC field-proper. Many sources provide this justification of specific deontological virtue ethics for an existential EoC framework where cares are by definition reliant on well-grounded values (Davenport, 2012). Take philosopher Gregory of Nyssa in his *Homilies on Ecclesiastes*, written in the fourth century AD. This work is the first and only complete repudiation of the institution and concept of slavery in the ancient world and the first call for the complete manumission of all slaves (Gregory of Nyssa, 1993; Hart, 2001; Ramelli, 2016). Gregory of Nyssa’s philosophical reasoning is strong, and while space does not permit me to explicate it here, it is based on the notion that all humans are made in the likeness of God and are, moreover, “recalled to freedom” by the work of God (Gregory of Nyssa, 1993, p. 74).

This logic has further-reaching effects. Since we have been freed by the Divine, we should not enslave ourselves once more. Since we are made in the image of God and are thus equal in value, we should love ourselves and each other in such a way that we protect ourselves and others from harm, abuse, and exploitation and in so doing that we dispense fear and spread truth, calm, security, and goodness. This philosophy is deep-set in the Kierkegaardian existential tradition, and thus a part of the EPr:

“Kierkegaard’s contrast between ‘preferential’ loves and agapic love, which still responds to something objectively valuable and essential (not a varying basis of merit) in each person: namely, the image of God that Kierkegaard calls the ‘watermark’. This . . . includes each person’s potential for freely willed love, no matter how fallen they are” (Davenport, 2016, p. 75; Kierkegaard, 1995, pp. 89 & 217).

The main point is, each objective value has strong evaluating explanans. With these in place, co-dialoguers can ethically dialogue and continuously grow while agreeing on certain non-negotiables as shared-givens. Moral agency, “requires some kind of reflexive awareness of the standards one is living by (or failing to live by)” (Taylor, 1985a, p. 103), but we may know this without knowing many of the premises (such as those given by Gregory of Nyssa) that underlie it and often go unmentioned due to being lived out as givens. With the ethical standards made abundantly clear, we can develop in continuous-growth via dialogue—getting better and better—within the bounds of safety, as Noddings herself encourages (1993).

By integrating deontological and virtue ethics into the EoC, we receive “an ethic of care aimed at protecting . . . from abuse and providing an educational context within which student well-being is actively promoted so that schools may be supportive, protective and safe” (Whelen, 2019, p. 89). Aside from being more ethical, it promotes learning since it is only within a

protected, safe environment that students can feel freest to take the risks-to-fail that are necessary for optimal learning. Deontological and virtue ethics as part of the definition of value guard against the dangers of an EoC that does not believe in ethical absolutes because,

“we must be willing to see that some cares of ours are not ethically good; or that they are pursued in a wrong way; or that there is something or someone else that we should care about instead or care about more than we have . . . these . . . are actually improved responses to the grounds for all caring—to the regulative highest good . . . cares are regulated by a hyper-care for the good” (Davenport, 2012, pp. 146-147).

And while being “regulated” by the highest good sounds like it is limiting (regulating) us, it actually is freeing us to learn most fully, love most fully, and pursue the true and beautiful most fully. Whereas, on the contrary, “a wicked man, though a king, is a slave. For he serves, not one man alone, but, what is worse, as many masters as he has vices” (Augustine, 1934, p. 87).

EoC educators should center on having this virtue-value perspective because, unlike merely a care perspective, a value perspective will assure that the care that is there for the self and the student is of the good kind as well as encouraging and facilitating the students’ own values and value-formation (self-cultivations and aspirations). With such a value perspective, we can more ethically “do what is required to maintain and enhance caring” (Noddings, 2003, p. 95). When it comes to one’s personal delimited values that one can pursue, it can always be pursued ethically, and given they are *values*, they must be pursued ethically, or they turn into ambitions or driftings.

The explanans of this study’s existential EoC framework, which includes the explananda of certain non-negotiables, strengthens the Noddingsian EoC *with* the philosophies of Agnes Callard, Gregory of Nyssa, Saint Augustine, Saint Macrina, Ilaria Ramelli, John D. Whelen,

Charles Taylor, Ian Bogost, John J. Davenport, Søren Kierkegaard, and David Bentley Hart (Augustine, 1984; Bogost, 2012, 2016; Callard, 2017, 2018; Davenport, 2012; Gregory of Nyssa, 1993; Hart, 2019, 2020a; Kierkegaard, 1995, 2009a; Ramelli, 2013, 2019; Taylor, 1985a, 1985b; Whelen, 2019). When it comes to curriculum and instruction, true learning is learning how to use a right means in a right way—which does transform a person, even something as simple as learning addition for the first time and using it to help keep track of the number of first-aid bandages one’s family has (Augustine, 1993; Callard, 2018, p. 241, 2021b, p. 489; Jung, 2014; Raz, 1986). In sum, “valuing, unlike caring, involves a view of the object of one’s attitude as being good and worthy or valuable” (Scheffler, 2010, pp. 25-26); therefore, cares must be based on and nested in values.

### **Language Learning Ethics?**

Since even one’s native language is never fully known, Lling is (as is learning in general) *good* because it is always aimed toward the good-as-such, towards the never-quite-arrived-at ultimate knowledge of the AL (or whatever it is one is learning). That is, learning is “the dynamic tension resulting from ‘endeavour’ (ἐπέκτασις), of the creature in authentic but paradoxical experience of the perpetual knowledge of the Unknowable” (Petcu, 2017, p. 772). Learning is the continuing in a directionality in an asymptotic path toward truth.

Various philosophers have termed this “ethical intellectualism” wherein the more we learn and live a truth with right intentions, the more we are actually able to do it *and* the more we want to do it aspirationally (Ramelli, 2019, p. 246). The learning-and-acting *and* freedom go hand-in-hand. The more one (clearly) knows what one is (most) aspiring to do and be in X particular moment or in the rest of their flesh-and-blood life, the more one can be free to choose in the direction of that value, rather than constantly indecisively wondering (Davenport, 2012; Taylor,

1985a). Also, the more we learn and dialogue about what we have learned, with whomever, as well as dialoging in order to better learn the truths about anything, such as speaking an AL with another learner or a native speaker by which iron sharpens iron, the more positive effects we have on our communities even though we will never fully know in what ways and how much (Ramelli, 2019, p. 289).

In this asymptotic learning-growth, there is still a danger of obscurantism or endless filibustering in order to kill time and/or avoid action. This too is a form of distraction. Existential philosophers like Søren Kierkegaard (1995, p. 96) and Viktor Frankl insist instead that, “the answer must consist . . . in right action and in right conduct. Life ultimately means taking the responsibility to find the right answer to its problems and to fulfill the tasks which it constantly sets for each individual” (Frankl, 1984, p. 122), even though the “tasks . . . differ from man to man, and from moment to moment” (Frankl, 1984, p. 122).

*Strongly* evaluated ethics says not only do we attempt to conduct the abovementioned lifestyle, we must also be ethically *intentioned* in our acts, “internally motivated towards the good” (Whelen, 2019, p. 89), or at least not unethically intentioned. A Lling value based on a strong evaluation will be aimed towards the true, e.g., learning more about a certain grammar feature of an AL, and/or the beautiful, e.g., able to better appreciate French poetry, and/or the good, e.g., able to communicate in an emergency first-aid situation with a French person. ALLing will not be pursued in an unethical manner, e.g., able to better appreciate French poetry by kidnapping a French poet and forcing him to enlighten us.

That is, whatever learning-act is enacted, in a self-cultivating or aspirational journey, a person explicitly reflects and intentionally recognizes her obligation in regards to being a moral agent with the abovementioned ethical imperative-as-responsibility. It is clear to see why this

intentionality is important when one considers that if someone acted in a perfectly ethical way, he would not be a moral agent, “unless there were some recognition on his part that in acting this way he was following a higher standard” because agentic “[m]orality requires some recognition that there are higher demands on one” (Taylor, 1985a, p. 103).

Kierkegaard makes this point with the example of Christ, who lived ethically in poverty, but this was only ethical because of his non-greedy lifestyle *and* his ethical intentions (Kierkegaard, 1991). In Kierkegaard’s words, “Christ was not someone who coveted earthly things but had to be satisfied with poverty—no, he chose poverty” *and* chose to not covet earthly things (1991, p. 67). My aspirational multilingual journey needed to be done with ethical actions *and* ethical intentionalities in order for it actually to be aspirational in nature.

There is a valuational continuum as to what are better and what are worse reasons for learning another language and for the actions one does during that Lling. That is, this valuational continuum goes from optimum-value relations to opposition-to-value relations. Examples of reasons on the worse side of the continuum would be learning another language to terrorize people such as by integrating oneself into a community of practice to be able to then attempt to destroy it from within or to destroy something beautiful within it. In the middle-ish of this valuational continuum would be reasons like “to impress people” which itself could be more towards the negative end of the spectrum because you want to show a sense of superiority to others or more towards the positive end because you care what they think in a positive way of valuing them and you want to be a good exemplar to others and yourself (Callard, 2021a). The far end of the good side of the spectrum would be to learn the ALs to better serve in a community by knowing the main languages of the community one is to serve in. Basically, in

this continuum, the more virtuous, the better the intention (reason) or action, the more the opposite of virtue it is, the worse the intention or action.

An example on the positive end but more specific to my contexts would be to grow my ability to appropriately translanguage with potential students for most effective involvement of the students. Translanguaging has been shown to benefit students greatly when the teacher can and does explain confusing language concepts (e.g., a usage of the past perfect) or aspects of in-class instructions (e.g., certain aspects of how to play a game or do an assignment that initially could be confusing) in the native language of the students so that they may more readily interact in their target language in the game or grammar activity (Davidson, 2020; García & Kleyn, 2016; MacSwan, 2017; Pennycook, 2019; Wei, 2011, 2017, 2018; Wei & Ho, 2018). I have personally found this to be the case with knowing Spanish sufficiently to be able to explain complicated aspects to my Spanish speaking students so that they can quickly become involved in the English activity. Students seem to naturally understand this. For example, my Chinese students would help each other in this way so that their classmates could most fully participate in English with them in in-class activities and for general student success.

Other virtuous and thus value-related reasons would be Lling to be able to better discuss important concerns (curricular, assessment, research, administrative, advising, or etc.) with students or co-workers (if teaching in another country where the AL is the dominant language), to better share in the ontological space that my Lling students occupy by better knowing what it is like to go through the work of becoming academically proficient in other languages as an adult, to care for myself by forgiving myself when I realize how bad I am at the languages even with all this studying, caring for myself by attempting to keep my brain keen through language study, and so on. Those are personal reasons that would fall on the good-side of the valuational

continuum. Taking ownership of one's potentialities in this way has a view of ownership in which, "ownership . . . means both to profit from the possibilities a thing opens up and to be answerable to other human beings for what develops from those possibilities" (Khawaja, 2016, pp. 182). Many other concrete examples could be given, such as to better serve in a Spanish speaking Catholic parish, to better serve in group-fitness activities in a Portuguese-speaking community of practice, etc. (for other examples, see Davidson, 2020).

Not only *acts* and *intentions*, the ethical of value also concerns *cognition* (what I choose to think about), *motivation* (virtuous motives or not), and *emotions* (Callard, 2018; Hart, 2020a; Aumann, 2020). That is, I can engage with ALs in such a way where I get angry and blame others if I do not understand something immediately or if I let the slightest noise distract me. However, I can also, instead, choose to practice the virtues of patient-persistence in attempting-to-understand and detachment as concerns any incidental noises that others make around me. It is my ethical choice which *emotions* I nourish.

At times in this study, I even reached a height of choice-commitment to enact Lling activities (ALing) even if it killed me, for example, studying Italian in a coffee shop to be more stimulatingly attentive to the Italian even though it was the beginning of the COVID pandemic when the coffee shops had just re-opened and people were still very unwilling to go out due to its potential danger of killing us (and long before having a vaccine created). I saw this as important not so much because it might be a foundational value (Kemp, 2020), but merely because, in actuality, anything may kill me when I am doing anything, and since this is the case, I must justify all I do as being worth dying in the doing of it (Korsgaard, 1996). The other side of that coin is: "If the choice of refraining from a course of action is worse than death, then the justification for that action must appeal to that which we could not continue living without"

(Weitzke, 2013, p. 898). I think the latter statement is a bit overblown for a study on ALLing; however, the former consideration keeps in mind that “to value something, we must engage with it in a way that takes time, effort, and practice” (Callard, 2018, p. 63). Seconds spent on X at any moment means it should be something one is willing to die doing since one may die at any time and one only has so many seconds of life on this planet (see Davenport, 2012, pp. 14; Korsgaard, 1996, p. 102).

### **Affectual, Cognitive, Actional, and Evaluative Aspects of Values**

At first glance, what EM and existential identities are seem quite simple: those importantly valued identities that one has explicitly chosen to commit to. However, this description has many embedded complex and intertwining features: cognitive, emotional, evaluative, ethical, actional, and, of course, motivational. This section will focus on explaining how committed-to values *by definition* have these important affective (e.g., emotions, feelings, desires), cognitive (e.g., beliefs and judgments), actional, and evaluative (e.g., self-monitoring and strong evaluation) dimensions (Horgan & Tienson, 2002; Kolodny, 2003; Sheffler, 2010; Taylor, 1985a).

By definition, the one who values is “subject to a range of characteristic emotional reactions, depending on how things are going with the object of concern” (Wallace, 2013, p. 23). When one feels one’s commitments are threatened, one may feel “existential threat”; that is, one may experience an obstacle as an “attack on one’s own symbolic structures of meaning and value” (Sullivan, Landau, and Kay, 2012, p. 738). This is the case not only for self-cultivating values one already has acquired, but also for aspirational values one is attempting to acquire, i.e., a value one is “coming to value” because “Coming to value something entails opening yourself up to being hurt in relation to that thing: you become vulnerable to forces that threaten the valued object, or threaten to separate you from it” (Callard, 2018, p. 118).

This affectual vulnerability is also tied with one's cognitive "believing that one has reasons both for this vulnerability to X and for actions regarding X" (Kolodny, 2003, p. 150). One is using one's cognition to judge one's emotions and actions. This has sometimes been termed critical feeling as an analogy of, and perhaps a part of, critical thinking (Callard & Weinstein, 2020). One's values also guide one's emotions "in terms of a movement from appropriate and/or effective to inappropriate and/or ineffective" (Noddings, 2003, p. 34). For example, one may feel "emotionally vulnerable to something one thinks badly of, and wishes one did not care about" (Callard, 2018, p. 118); however, when one values something, she approves of her own affective entanglement with it. That is, in valuing, one is emotionally vested in the value in some way *and* cognitively approves of such an investment in it. In the case where the emotion is judged to be more appropriate and/or effective, the emotion is "facilitative . . . and . . . useful in restoring the organism to a stable and less stressful state. But neither of these effects lifts emotion to an exalted state" (Noddings, 2003, p. 143). The emotion is still always subservient to the value. The most important states are the in-the-now willed thoughts and actions in and towards one's valued identities (Davenport, 2007, 2012; Noddings, 2003). Hence, to value something does *not mean* one *always* feels certain emotions, but that one is *disposed* to feel the appropriate emotions concerning one's values in the appropriate circumstances, "valuing is a matter of being disposed to have certain emotional responses, rather than actually having emotional responses" (Kolodny, 2003, p. 186).

Thus, valuing something means one has a certain kind of emotional perspective (vulnerability, one desires to protect it), belief perspective (including approval and reasons), correlative actions, and ethical perspective as "a view of the thing that one values as being good or worthy or valuable" (Scheffler, 2010, p. 26). Furthermore, along with the interacting and

overlapping affective, cognitive, ethical, motivational, and actional components to value, “valuing includes an element of self-monitoring” (Callard, 2018, p. 120). Strong evaluation through self-monitoring provides the grounding that guards from distortion of (what may be) a value. In self-monitoring, we experience our own affective, cognitive, motivational, ethical, and actional responses to the valued object “as merited or appropriate” (Callard, 2018, p. 119; Scheffler, 2010). Based on Callard’s work, I offer three examples that show how the various categories come into play in developing one’s values:

(Example 1) A person finds herself developing a passion for learning multiple languages in multiple countries at a period in her life when she “cannot afford the investment of time or money such an activity demands” (Callard, 2018, p. 119). She has young children, and, therefore, finds it irresponsible to leave them at home while studying abroad or to risk their safety by bringing them with her. She genuinely believes that studying multiple languages in study abroad contexts is a valuable activity. Moreover, she does not think she is wrong to be thrilled by the prospect of doing so, but she experiences her motivational disposition to engage in the activity as inappropriate at this time. In this type of situation, the agent is using self-monitoring to disapprove of the motivational aspect of her value for learning multiple languages by studying abroad—weighing it out and due to that seeing her “own motivational disposition to engage in the activity as inappropriate” (p. 119). She also sees it as ethically inappropriate, even though studying abroad itself can be ethically quite good, but it would be ethically irresponsible *for her to do so at this time* in her life.

(Example 2) An older brother finds himself with a growing passion for learning Spanish guitar just as his younger brother is displaying talent in that skill. The older brother might judge learning Spanish guitar to be valuable, “be motivated to do it, feel excited at the prospect of

pursuing it and saddened at the thought of giving it up. Nonetheless, he might judge that these reactions are not warranted” (Callard, 2018, pp. 119-120). He recognizes that while learning Spanish guitar really is valuable, his “passion for it is suspect, a manifestation of his reluctance to allow his brother an arena in which to shine” (p. 120). Callard states the agent disapproves only “of the motivational and affective responses” (p. 120). However, there is also an ethical disapprobation connected to the value being ethically suspect given the possible intentions in the person’s particular context. One makes sure her *intentions* are ethical as concerns her *value* pursuits.

(Example 3) A French language learner, watching a movie in French with a gruesome scene with clever yet vicious dialogue, is struck by it as being a thing of beautiful creativity. She takes pleasure in it and is initially inclined to memorize the French dialogue when she checks herself. In this self-reflection she sees that something is wrong with her appreciating it. She realizes she ought not re-watch and memorize this scene. She “ought not take pleasure in it,” which is an evaluation of an affective condition, and she “ought not even judge it to be beautiful,” which is an evaluation of her cognitive condition of judgment (Callard, 2018, p. 120). These evaluations lead her to perceive the misappropriation of the axiologically beauty of it. She then also disapproves of her actions in relation to it—of watching the scene time and again. In a sense, self-monitoring is simply higher-order cognition and/or emotion and/or ethical discernment. When she disapproves of her valuation, she is judging her judgment, feelings, and ethics; she is feeling her feelings and judgment and ethics are wrong; and she is discerning via conscience that her ethics and feelings were off. She is judging, feeling, and discerning what earlier seemed to be rationally thought out, pleurably felt, and axiologically beautiful.

These examples show how all of these aspects of value (emotive, cognitive, ethical, actional) are separate conditions within the process of valuing *and* are co-dependent, co-interacting, and intertwined. One uses one's emotions and intellect and conscience (sense-of-ethics) to value something and to conduct an evaluation of that something. The evaluation can be said to be the higher-order use of one or several of the other elements (cognition, including ethical cognition, i.e., discernment, and/or emotion).

However, even if one has cognitive, affective, motivational, ethical, and evaluative concord with a value, but lacks actions, one does not value that object. One's committed-to value is only actually committed to (and thus one's value) via continuous actions. There is an inseparable link between *practice* and *value*. Hence, to value something is to take an actional stance towards it:

“If I believe philosophy . . . to be valuable but am not inclined to engage in philosophy . . . then I do not really value [it] . . . this is true even if I have an emotional vulnerability that manifests in, e.g., feeling guilty about the fact that I never do any philosophy” (Callard, 2018, p. 64).

In other words, for something to really be one's own value, that person cannot *only* have an emotional, cognitive, etc. attachment to it, but *also must* have actions correlative of it. Hence, this study documents ALLing engagements multiple times daily.

*Thus, valuing consists of affect, cognition, motivation, action, ethicality, and evaluation.* Evaluation applies to all five of the other conditions in at least the sense that it does not actively, explicitly disapprove of them. That is, if the valuer concludes that her emotion or judgment or motivation or action or the ethics of the potential-value is actually wrong or unjustified or in any other way inappropriate, then it is not (or no longer) a valued object for that person. When agents disapprove along the lines of any of those six, they are no longer “(paradigmatic) valuers of the

domain in question” (Callard, 2018, p. 120). Paradigmatic valuers of the domain make sure that their holding of the value is appropriate: “The valuer thus experiences her own motivation to pursue, protect, and engage with [and enjoy] it as fitting” (p. 120).

Taking these six aspects into account, the valuer may (A) realize that her motivation to pursue the value has been or is a long-term-committed value and she then explicitly chooses to continue to self-cultivate it. Or, she may (B) realize that this is a value she wants to acquire by *becoming* entangled with it, and due to that, have a committed type of motivation to aspire towards it knowing that, “the process of coming to value something happens quite gradually” (Scheffler, 2010, p. 39). Whether cultivating a value or aspiring to create it, being/becoming entangled with a value and being/becoming alienated from others is committal and long-term in nature (Hauerwas, 1984). Therefore, a study interested in such must be longitudinal in nature. Committing via use of a significant portion of one’s time and energy is a necessary component of valuing. That is, if I did not actually spend consistent time and energy engaging with French over the course of my 368 days of documentation, I cannot say I truly valued it and my end-of-study stronger evaluation would need to articulate this.

When one has determined which delimited set of values one will be committedly motivated to pursue, it is seen as being superordinate to other values, “it has become quite a different kind of motivation” (Scheffler, 2010, p. 36). It has become existential motivation (EM) with existential resolve. It has become a motivation that now is of the nature of an explicitly specified commitment.

Existential motivation as endorsement of cultivation (past and present endorsements) or aspiration (past, present, and proleptic endorsements) sustains diachronic commitment to higher-order values from which a “volitional continuity” emerges and through which our identities

govern “more short-term plans, courses of action, and emotional responses to circumstances . . . thereby giving these stronger teleological connections” (Davenport, 2012, p. 110). This also satisfies Korsgaard’s existential claim and mandate in which the responsibility of constituting ourselves as agents “involves finding some roles and fulfilling them with dedication and integrity” (Korsgaard, 2009, p. 25); that is, it involves existential identities.

Also, due to one’s evaluation of the other five features of one’s (potential) value, the valuer “will not . . . feel alienated from her own assessment of the object as valuable” (Callard, 2018, p. 120). Thus, valuing helps to overcome the existential problem of alienation wherein one feels thrown into the world without being “asked about it” or “informed of the rules and regulations but just thrown into the ranks as if I had been bought from a seller of souls” (Kierkegaard, 1983, p. 200).

### **Existential Authenticity in LLing in Six Steps**

#### **Existentialism**

Since LLing is broadly-encompassing, conceptualizing motivation and identity in LLing needs to be conceptualized by a broadly-encompassing philosophy. This is especially the case with multiple language learning. To become decently proficient in multiple languages as an adult takes serious commitment. While many philosophies indeed attempt to be broadly-encompassing (Burnham & Papandreopoulos, 2020; Clark & Holquist, 1984; Harman, 2015; Taylor, 1985), existentialism in particular holds that reflected *committed* choice is key to actually and deeply authentically existing (Khawaja, 2016). That is, one reflects on her facticity to discern which choice-option is more importantly valued to her, and then she accepts the responsibility in trying to enact the more-valued-to-her commitment. This includes choices of thoughts to dwell on,

attitudes to take up, and external movements, such as words said or picking up a book someone has dropped, and all of these as part of broader commitments.

In focusing on reflected committed choice (committing to making choices that hold value to the person), the philosophy of existentialism can be richly integrated with and throughout life (Burnham & Papandreopoulos, 2020). Existentialism states that one's thoughts and acts *are* one's philosophy, and, therefore, one's philosophy of life should ever be, in each choice-made, a philosophy as a *way* of life (Khawaja, 2016). The thoughts or lack thereof express the philosophical why's that one acts, and the acts themselves express one's lived-out philosophy (one's *applied* philosophy) (Britton, 1969; Pugh, Kriescher, Cropp, & Younis, 2020; Webster, 2004). This is important ethically and even pragmatically because, "When you have a philosophy of life, decision making is relatively straightforward . . . In [its] absence . . . even relatively simple choices can degenerate into meaning-of-life crises" (Irvine, 2008, p. 203). One's philosophy of life is an incorporation of all of one's life in an attempt to have a harmonious inner life amongst the various elements of life, and to be an exemplar to, at minimum, one's own future selves (Davenport, 2007, 2012; Noddings, 2003).

Existentialism, with the assistance it always takes from other philosophies in its appropriative tradition, provides the conceptual architecture to describe such a mental-and-physical mandate (Davenport, 2012). Furthermore, the hermeneutical component of existentialism in its part alone, while knowing it can never fully understand everything, seeks continually to understand (via ever better self-interpreting) more of everything of the self's values (Xie, 2014).

This dissertation narrows down the conversation in order to center on its relevance to motivation and identity in additional language learning (ALLing). The terms existential perspective (EPr) and existential framework (EFr) are used nearly interchangeably, with EPr

generally focused on the point of view of the framework. Both the EPr and EFr of this study might most accurately and clumsily be worded as *an existential perspective-framework-theory-method of and for motivation and identity in adult language learning*, but usually I simply use EPr or EFr with the possible addition “of the LLe” or “for the LLe” or “of ALLing” to make it clear I am referring to this study’s particular EPr/EFr.

Existentialism, “is a tradition in the most literal sense of the word: a pattern of intergenerational influence, in which later figures read and appropriated the work of earlier figures” (Khawaja, 2016, p. 4), which often differs greatly from those other figures. My existential framework is not a wholehearted agreement with or fleshing out of any one existentialist’s views, but through a dialogue with various works of existentialists and others I have leaned far more into the Kierkegaardian tradition and farthest away from the Heideggerian tradition. In particular, this study’s EPr has its deepest dialogues with Agnes Callard, John J. Davenport, Viktor Frankl, Noreen Khawaja, Søren Kierkegaard, Nel Noddings, Jean-Paul Sartre, Charles Taylor, Mikhail Bakhtin, and R. S. Webster (Bakhtin, 1981, 1984, 1986; Callard, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2021a, 2021b; Davenport, 2007, 2012; Frankl, 1973, 1985, 1987, 2000; Khawaja, 2016; Kierkegaard, 1987c, 1987a, 1987d, 1951, 1980, 1988; Noddings, 1993, 1995, 2003; Sartre, 1943, 1946a, 1946b, 1965; Taylor, 1985a, 1985b; Webster, 2004, 2005; Webster & Whelen, 2019).

Existentialists also share a religious terminology: “Whenever existentialists give answers, they do so in terms of religious or quasi-religious traditions” (Tillich, 1975, pp. 25-26). In other words, “the human condition is described in apparently theological terms” (Khawaja, 2016, p. 15), even for existentialists who adamantly do not believe in God (Sartre, 1943). While this is an SLA study on ALLing, things like evil, care, freewill, goodness, and responsibility are a part of

its scope. In fact, Nel Noddings states that, “existential questions should form the organizing backbone of the curriculum” when it comes to the curriculum of *any* subject (1993, p. 8). She explains that this existential type of strong evaluation via questioning-exploration is important for educative development of all subjects for all persons because without such “we tear education from the existential roots of life—discussing evil only in *Moby Dick*, God only in a survey of world religion, creation only in brief mention of a Big Bang,” and so on, thereby becoming, “part of a death orientation” which places little value on the values that are central to all aspects of life (Noddings, 1993, p. 13).

The *Oxford Online* definition of existentialism is “a philosophical theory or approach which emphasizes the existence of the individual person as a free and responsible agent determining their own development through acts of the will” (Existentialism, 2021). The first part of this definition calls existentialism a theory or approach. In this study’s EPr, existentialism is a philosophical theory *and* approach. This is because, as aforementioned, existentialism is an intentional, action-oriented, engaged philosophy, and applying it to LLing means actually *applying* it (Khawaja, 2016; Monier, 1936). Without a clearly explained philosophy that can be, thereby, clearly lived and in which one can clearly say if they are living it at any given time, “the wretched outcome is a confusion” (Kierkegaard, 2009a, p. 370) or “extreme obscurity” (Kaufmann, 1980, p. 189). Therefore, “one thing can, and should, be demanded of the [philosopher], that his address be such that it can be acted upon . . . for preacher-talk is dust in your eyes” (Kierkegaard, 2009a, p. 371). Therefore, as an applied philosophy and philosophical inquiry, the EPr of the LLer heeds the points in the following description:

“Applied philosophy involves . . . taking epistemic and moral responsibility for the implications that acceptance of those claims would carry for that world . . . such work has to

proceed . . . from a granular and empirically robust appreciation of fact and context . . . not only as a corrective to test the intuitive adequacy of received concepts and frameworks, but as an engine for developing novel ones” (Little, Edenberg, Luken, Healey, 2020, p. 70).

Existentialism is concerned with one’s sense of *values* that movements have for *oneself* in order for the self to know what it would mean for the self *to develop* or not—what kinds of movements and in what direction would actually be considered meaningful developments for the LLe rather than stagnation or digression. In the EPr, identity formation *is* the perceived thoughts and actions, i.e., *activities*, that are phenomenologically experienced as being of valued import to the person herself as part of herself and her value-development (Allen-Collinson, 2011; Taylor, 1985a).

“Unless a philosophy is to remain symbolic or verbal or a sentimental indulgence for a few, or else mere arbitrary dogma, . . . its program of values must take effect in conduct” (Dewey, 1985, pp. 250-251). Thus, this study’s EPr has clearly laid out its description of existential motivation, existential identities, and existential values and has included examples of it in real life conduct. This EPr has explicated existential identity formation as being either self-cultivating in which identified values one has is explicitly committed to being continuously developed in some way, e.g., one already values French songs but desires to develop a greater repertoire of knowledge of French songs; or existential identity formation as being self-creating aspirational values that one does not fully have but is committed to acquiring in some way, e.g., one does not yet appreciate any French songs, but sees such appreciation as being valuable and thus desires to acquire that value as one of *their* values.

The following six conceptual steps of existential authenticity express much of this study’s EPr. These steps are overlapping and co-supportive. The first three steps are congruent with the

thought of all leading existentialist philosophers, while steps four to six separate this study's existentialism from the likes of Heidegger (1969; 1988; 1996) and instead follows more in the lines of thought of Sartre (1943) (Step 4) and especially of Kierkegaard (2009a) and those who have followed his footsteps most closely, such as Davenport (2012), Khawaja (2016), and Noddings (2003) (all six steps).

Each step is a movement of existential authenticity, but in order to have identities or a self in the Kierkegaardian sense one must be living in the sixth step, known as *authentic resolve*, during which one is simultaneously following and living-out the other five. Also, steps four to six are important in that they answer questions begged in the preceding steps. When the steps are understood for the first time, they may generally follow the order of the steps. However, once all six steps have been made, they may then be made over the course of one's life simultaneously. The steps have feed-back and feed-forward effects into the other steps. The steps are as follows: (1) recognizing that our *existence matters*, (2) recognizing our *facticity*, (3) explicitly *choosing to choose*, (4) acknowledging *responsibility* in and for the choosing, (5) conducting *strong evaluation*, and (6) willing forth directionalized actions in a good faith committed fashion which is known as *authentic resolve* or ethical identity-forming *pursuits*.

Once these steps have been understood conceptually, they can be lived in and lived out simultaneously and continuously where rather than "recognize" for Step 1 and Step 2, one has an awareness-of because one has already recognized it at some point in the past and now is simply living in his awareness of those valued-commitments (to continue to choose-to-choose those values one has chosen to pursue), and is continuing to live out Step 6 and therefore continuing to do Step 3 and Step 4 *and* to develop and live in accord with one's strong evaluation (Step 5). The point is, *once one gets to Step 6, his then continued goal is to stay there (committing acts*

*towards that directionality) even if and while re-reflecting and re-evaluating (i.e., re-enacting a strong evaluation, Step 5).*

Without “(Step 1) Recognizing Existence as Valuable,” none of the other steps are possible or they become negated, e.g., if I have fully understood my facticity but choose that existence does not matter, then understanding my facticity also does not matter. Or going further, without Step 1, there is no reason to take on the responsibility of one’s existence as one’s own, and so on. In other words, without Step 1, all other steps are rendered void.

The second most basic step to existential authenticity is to *recognize one’s facticity*. That is, to recognize the fullness of the thrownness of the conditions of one’s existence. This means recognizing not only that we did not create our bodies, but also that we are dialogical creatures who did not create our language or the many other ways in which we mimic others. It also means, and this is very important in existentialism for each individual to recognize, recognizing that we are always choosing and we have no choice but to always be choosing (Kierkegaard, 1950, 2009a; Sartre, 1943). When this step has been taken, one can then *choose* to undertake an *explicit* relationship with one’s *existence* (Khawaja, 2016).

Going from Step 2 to Step 3, is where existential authenticity in-action comes into play: “authenticity serves as a criterion linking the a priori conditions of existence with the freedom—also an a priori condition—to undertake an explicit relationship to those conditions” (Khawaja, 2016, p. 123). Once one chooses to undertake an explicit relationship with the a priori and factual conditions of existence, authenticity becomes “a way of choosing oneself—not, as is often thought in abstraction from one’s peers and surroundings but as already engaged in a concrete world of possibilities and others” (Khawaja, 2016, p. 39).

But in what way is one choosing oneself when one chooses oneself authentically, especially since we are condemned to choose anyway? Also, how does one undertake an explicit relationship with one's conditions of existence? The answer to the first question is by taking a step back from one's drifting choosing, and instead explicitly, with awareness and evaluation, choosing to choose, i.e., Step 5. A more developed answer to both questions is by living in responsibility, with strong evaluation, and with resolve. That is, the answers *are* Steps 4 to 6.

Concerning the existential triptych of identity-values-practices, these are developed by way of steps three to six (Davenport, 2020; Callard, 2018; Kemp, 2020). Again, since authenticity in the general parlance means something different from existential authenticity, I often preference using the phrase *existential* authenticity or (existential) identity-forming *commitments*. In the following sections, I provide more in-depth justification and explication of these steps.

### **(Step 1) Recognizing Existence as Valuable**

Existentialism “emphasizes the existence of the individual person” (Existentialism, 2021; Khawaja, 2016, p. 225). Since existence is front and center in existentialism, existentialists must first confront, “whether life is or is not worth living, [which] amounts to answering the fundamental question of philosophy. All the rest . . . comes afterwards” (Camus, 1955, p. 4). When it comes to this question, this paper's EPr agrees with the philosophies of Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, David Bentley Hart, Søren Kierkegaard, and Viktor Frankl (the latter two also admitting much of existence is absurd) that hold that existence matters because it actually is an active ethical *good* (Augustine, 1990, 1994; Aquinas, 2006; Frankl, 1984; Hart, 2020a; Kierkegaard, 1987c & 2009a). By adopting this view, this study also adopts a certain view of ethics and of LIng in that *to value LIng as a positive good, let alone to care about and care for its motivations and its identity relations, one must actually value existence*. This includes the

existence of the additional language (AL), the millions of people throughout history who brought the AL about, the people who are presently playing with it, the existence of one's mind, one's tongue, one's voice, one's typing-fingers, one's computer, etc., etc. The justificatory role of the value of existence comes into play in a very real way in its support of the value of choosing to engage with an AL.

Since existence matters because it is good, we should ever strive for the good (Augustine, 1990, 1994; Aquinas, 2006; Frankl, 1984; Hart, 2020a; Kierkegaard, 1987c & 2009a). In this view, whatever one chooses to commit to, it should in some way be good and oriented toward the good. Since many other values are either based on or in some way related to the value of existence, it is a value of the highest-order, a foundational value (Kemp, 2015, 2020) and an existential point of departure (Frankl, 2000). The belief that existence matters justifies other beliefs-values, feelings, desires, thoughts, acts, and, thus, identities. It is *self-sustaining* in that “it cannot be justified in terms of any other members of an agent's motivational structure” (Kemp, 2015, p. 393; Kemp, 2020, p. 606), and the value is *justificatory* in terms of providing reasons for other values (Kemp, 2015, p. 393).

Therefore, I take learning, specifically for this study and this participant, additional language learning (ALLing), to be a value in that it is a form of responding to the goodness of existence and pursuing more truth and creating more goodness, beauty, dialogue, communication, communion, and so on. Existence matters at least enough to hold oneself responsible to be responding to that existence as long as that existence has us existing (Frankl, 1972). Because existence is valued, so long as we exist, we have a debt to it (Khawaja, 2016, p. 101; Kierkegaard, 1951, pp. 38-41).

However horrendous the *experiences* during one's existence are, one must love existence as an unearned gift, "turning those circumstances into the raw materials of a spiritual labor" (Khawaja, 2016, p. 101; and, see Hart, 2020a, pp. 77-97; Kierkegaard, 2009a; Lippitt, 2013). Throughout the horrors and the good times, "existential thought is based in a radical affirmation of finite temporality and embodied concern" (Khawaja, 2016, p. 22). Thus, we should ever try to overcome evil with good since evil is parasitic on existence (Augustine, 1990, p. 102; Hart, 2020a); and, thus, existence is "a debt that 'invites' the individual to fight" continually (Khawaja, 2016, p. 102; Kierkegaard, 2009b). This fight could be seen as simply resolving to learn French throughout the vicissitudes of a pandemic.

### **(Step 2) Recognizing One's Facticity**

Confusingly, existentialists use the terms *immediacy*, *givenness*, *facticity*, *historicity*, and *thrownness* interchangeably (Khawaja, 2016, p. 123; Heidegger, 1996, p. 297; Kierkegaard, 1983). Each of these words represent those things about oneself and around oneself that the self did not author; those ways one finds oneself written into the story of actuality unauthored by the self even when from the self (e.g., a sudden sensation, one's potentialities, one's genetics) or whatever ways one finds oneself enmeshed in others' stories (e.g., suddenly finding oneself in a dangerous situation due to two people arguing nearby in a crowded shared bus). To simplify the redundancy of terms, I have selected to use "facticity" most of the time (Khawaja, 2016, p. 123; Sartre, 1943; Webster, 2004).

One can purposefully choose her attitude in the midst of the facticity and choose certain aspects to activate and strengthen and others to ignore and let die. Furthermore, one can confront one's alienation and give oneself meaning, and in this sense get unlost by choosing to *value* one's givenness of existence as a *responsibility* and choose how to act out that responsibility in a

directionality towards a specified subset of values (Feeney, Howard and Howard, 2002; Hennig, 2010a, p. 14; Hufeisen, 2000).

This has particularly clear implications when it comes to one's facticity of living in Kansas, hundreds of miles from nearest country, in the midst of a global pandemic, and still choosing within that to attempt at engagements with multiple additional languages and doing so in ways that most relate to one's identities, i.e., to one's values or value-developments. Thus, while "debt is an a priori condition of existence," a voluntary resolution such as to aspire towards valuing specific ALs provides "a form through which the original debt . . . can be made into the thread of an intentional existence" (Khawaja, 2016, p. 101). This, then, attends to the debt of existence by continuously attempting to unlock in specific ways (e.g., ALing) specific potentialities, the full potential of which is unknown and uncreated by me, *but* is unlockable by me (Frankl, 1972). "The resolution turns the original debt of existence into the condition of one's future conduct . . . in so doing, it exposes the vertiginous alienation of life as something capable of receiving form" (Khawaja, 2018, p. 102).

Facticity is quite relevant to language usage. All words we say are words we have heard—others' words, so we have many others' voices in us, but it is still up to us to choose which voices will be our own (Bakhtin, 1981). Authoritative discourse is a part of our facticity (Clark & Holquist, 1984; Holquist, 1990). The utterances by which we learn a language are authoritative; but as we choose which utterances to re-and inter-contextualize and explicitly relate-to in our own unique ways, we existentially create and cultivate our personally internally-persuasive language (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 282, pp. 346-347, p. 401; Bakhtin 1984, 1986).

When learning a language, one has no choice but to choose, and the main point in the EPr is that the person be aware of this continual choosing and thus to *explicitly* choose, directionalize

their choosing, and not be a philistine that lets a teacher, friend, actor, happenstance, or spontaneous emotion determine their language choices (Kierkegaard, 2009a). The Ller herself explicitly chooses what to dwell more on in the ALs and what to be ALing more with and what to replicate in his own words, mentally and physically. In this, the Ller enacts existentially authentic ALing (Khawaja, 2016). Existentialists like Mikhail Bakhtin expand this to include how we choose to re- and inter-contextualize and relate-toward anything: “In this dialogue a person participates wholly and throughout his whole life: with his eyes, lips, hands, soul, spirit, with his whole body and deeds” (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 293).

An important claim in existentialism is that making a choice is itself part of our facticity, not the specific choice X but the fact that some specific choice must be chosen in each instance of life (Khawaja, 2016; Kierkegaard, 1987b; Sartre, 1943). Realizing that we are “thrown” in the sense that we did not and cannot choose to *not* be free, brings about another realization: our responsibility. One is condemned to be at free each moment in choosing one’s direction of attention, direction of thoughts, movement, lack of movement, and so on, and thus one is *responsible* for all of it (Sartre, 1946). We can choose which choices we potentiate. Explicitly choosing to choose a choice with reflection, awareness, and responsibility is to choose authentically (Bakhtin, 1981; Khawaja, 2016; Sartre, 1943, 1977a; Webster, 2004). Furthermore,

“Existential authenticity is . . . opposed to the idea that one ought to be ‘true’ to oneself. Such fidelity is not authenticity but merely an illusion . . . Authenticity is not . . . the ideal of ‘being oneself’ but of ‘appropriating’ oneself through an act of decision that is possible in each instant” (Khawaja, 2016, p. 39).

Appropriating oneself is the self-chosen choice of which of one’s potential values one chooses to decide to commit to and keep deciding to do so. The goal was to have had existential

authenticity throughout this study by *articulating* my commitments in the BoS strong evaluation, by my articulated devotions *throughout* at least a year following that by way of multiple-times-daily documentation, by a broader-viewed EoS stronger evaluation, and by throughout (by the BoS, the daily logging, and the EoS) having expressed openly the values that these identities and their formations are based (Davenport, 2015).

### **(Step 3) Choice and Endorsement: Choosing to Choose**

This paper takes the existentialist tradition that sides with Spinoza that choosing in and of itself is a good (Hart, 2020a; Kierkegaard, 2009a, Spinoza, 1910). It is not so much that we are “condemned” to choose, as Sartre saw it (1946, p. 2), but that we are *blessed* with choice as Camus perceived it (Camus, 1955). However, one should existentially choose by explicitly choosing a choice to choose (Step 3) (Taylor, 1985a). Kierkegaard clarifies this with an example of a helmsman of a ship at sea (1987b). This helmsman may claim to not be able to choose which direction to direct the ship at any given point along the journey, but still the ship is going ahead. By claiming to not be able to choose, he in actuality has chosen to allow the ship to do what the winds, waves, or other sailors decide it to do. In this way the helmsman’s “personality or the obscure forces within it unconsciously chooses” (Kierkegaard, 1987b, p. 164). Given this Kierkegaardian analogy, this type of person is called a drifter and their identity formational journeys are drifting ones (Callard, 2018).

If the helmsman, instead, explicitly chooses to choose, “not only to travel in the northeastern direction but also to accept his ability to choose, he has ‘chosen himself in freedom’” (Khawaja, 2016, p. 97; Kierkegaard, 1987b, p. 154). Therefore, given our facticity, choice “is not freedom from conditions, but freedom to take a stand toward the conditions” (Frankl, 1972, p. 205). This is the way that it can be said that one is choosing oneself when one chooses oneself existentially

(i.e., authentically) because one recognizes one is ever choosing and therefore reflects on one's values and explicitly chooses to choose based on that reflection (Khawaja, 2018).

One's facticity can be changed by making use of other portions of one's facticity, e.g., not being taught Italian or raised around Italian speakers but going out of one's way to study Italian in the library or study abroad in a Italian speaking country. Other aspects of facticity might not be able to be changed, e.g., not being able to study abroad during the COVID pandemic.

Furthermore, one can reflect and choose one's attitude and, with that, how the facticity affects oneself (Frankl, 1984). Within and towards one's thrownness our care, continued existence, value-preferencing, and actions are of our choosing (Frankl, 1984). In this way, subjectivity is "situated in and drawn out of itself by the possibilities of its world" (Khawaja, 2016, p. 39). A person looks at all her possibilities and chooses her identity formation as a responsible and "creative response to our capacities and circumstances" (Appiah, 2006, p. 19). Existential choice is the choice made when one reflects on such capacities, circumstances, and possibilities, and explicitly, purposefully selects certain values to concretely pursue from those (Khawaja, 2016).

What is meant by *explicit* in saying an existential (or authentic) act is one a person is *explicitly* choosing to choose is that there is an *awareness* of the valued-to-the-self option and an *intention* to choose to enact that option. It does not mean the choice always comes about as the person intended it nor does it imply a knowledge of all of the infinite amount of unpredictable things that may occur due to the choice. The explicitly choosing to choose simply means choosing with an awareness and an intention of the value-directionalized choice even if this is simply the aware-of and intentional choice to lay down in bed right now to clear my mind to be able to study an AL better, or to ski on a black diamond while listening to French music in order

to connect a flow experience with LLing, even if some obstacle on my way to skiing prevents me from fulfilling the attempted-at choice (Kotler, 2010).

The existential mindset is one that not merely recognizes one is making choices, but one recognizes as well that those choices in some way determines something about her identities, “she understands the choice in terms of her own existence, as a productive act, in which something of her ‘self’ is determined” (Khawaja, 2016, p. 87). The (would-be) LLer no longer simply chooses a language based on convenience because his university has a requirement to take a certain number of foreign language credits, rather, he understands his choice in terms of his own existence, in terms of his identities and values being instantiated in that choice.

*Explicitly* choosing to choose is choosing with an awareness that one must choose to identify with a certain limited, finite set of values within the infinite number of values one could identify with *and* that that choice plays a role in determining and emphasizing one or some of one’s identities and values (e.g., a learner of Spanish) and at the same time weakening others (e.g., a learner of Russian).

#### **(Step 4) Acknowledging Responsibility**

Morality is inherent in the concept of responsibility (Step 4). However, ethics is not limited to responsibility or in explicitly choosing to choose (Step 3), but is there throughout. The claim existence is good (Step 1) is a moral claim. If morality is *not* incorporated into Step 5, which concerns reflection and articulating a strong evaluation (Davenport, 2012; Taylor, 1985a), the step could actually encourage evil, as seen in Hitler’s reflected on and exhaustively articulations over the course of 720 pages (Hitler, 1939). Without a specifically demarcated ethic, philosophy can help people realize themselves as their own unique work of art, transform, self-forge, and/or

self-create into determined people with a resolve bent toward evil (Callard, 2018; Davenport, 2007; Khawaja, 2016).

Taking all of this into consideration, in the EPr of the LLe, explicitly choosing to choose (Step 3) should also bring with it the responsibility (Step 4) of always trying to choose to choose that which is objectively ethically good, true, or beautiful. Also, strong evaluation (Step 5) includes a strong evaluation *of one's values* wherein something is only valuable (and therefore can only be a value) if it is ethically good (Callard, 2018). Consequently, the living out of one's LLe commitments (Step 6), which is to constantly choose in a directionality based on strong evaluation, is an axiological endeavor that is done because of and/or aimed at the good, true, and/or beautiful. While the section, "Ethicality of Values," explains why and in what ways axiology is inherent in the concept of value, this section explains why axiology is tied with the concept of responsibility and that, thus, by definition responsibility is always *ethical* responsibility.

One has a responsibility to cultivate or aspire toward some good; one never has a responsibility to cultivate or aspire toward some evil. It is, in fact, impossible to do such even if one claims to be doing such. The dictator who justifies gulags by claiming to have a responsibility to his value of the virtue of order is simply wrong about his supposed responsibility. Order is a good virtue to be responsible for when done in a good way and with good intentions; however, when done in such a way that it violates justice or love or some other virtue, it is a vice and hence cannot be a responsibility (Aristotle, 2002; Callard, 2018).

To assume responsibility for one's given reality *includes* assuming the responsibility for choosing those portions of one's givenness that one will develop and cultivate, relate-to as being one's own, and those that one will (more or less) ignore (Khawaja, 2016, p. 40; Sartre, 1992, p.

515). The point concerning Lling is that one has a responsibility to commit in some way and to engage with the language and to do so in ethical ways by ethical means (see the section “Language Learning Ethics?”).

Existentialists see responsibility is coexisting with sin-consciousness (Camus, 1947; Khawaja, 2016; Kierkegaard, 1987c, 1987a, 1987b). Sin-consciousness is the consciousness one develops by realizing one is choosing at every moment, and that one can choose how she chooses at each moment and therefore one is both freed from the bondage of one’s facticity because they have the freedom to choose what to choose (e.g., what to attend to, etc.) *and* is responsible for what one chooses. Once one realizes one *must* choose as part of one’s facticity *and* can choose *how* to choose and therefore realizes one is *responsible* for how one chooses, she *then* has developed a sin-consciousness. In other words, sin-consciousness turns the trauma of our thrownness “into the positive condition of spiritual labor” (Khawaja, 2016, p. 207) of self-cultivation and/or aspiration. In this way, existentialism “puts every man in possession of himself as he is, and places the entire responsibility for his existence squarely upon his own shoulders” (Sartre, 1977b, p. 27).

This is Kierkegaard’s insight of the helmsman discussed above (Kierkegaard, 1987b). Kierkegaard held that once the helmsman accepted responsibility for the ship’s course, his then choosing to choose the course is an act of repentance for his past inauthentic choosing in bad faith by either not caring sufficiently or by believing he had not choice (Kierkegaard, 1987b). Existentialists see the explicitly choosing to choose as always being penitential because “in asserting one’s freedom, one acknowledges that choice is at every moment possible, which means that before the choice, one was responsible” (Khawaja, 2016, p. 97). In choosing to

choose towards a value, “the helmsman accepts history as his own personal responsibility” (Khawaja, 2016, p. 97; Kierkegaard, 1987b, p. 154)

The person becomes responsible both for creating something good out of one’s history (one’s historic facticity) *and* responsible for creating one’s own future history out of one’s consistent, explicit choosing. Concerning the former, even the past is not immune to redescription because how I act *now* determines how my *past* lives through me (Khawaja, 2016, p. 127). The past and the future reside in now’s explicitly chosen way-of-being (Khawaja, 2016; Kierkegaard, 2009a; Noddings, 2003).

On the one hand, “Without the notion of sin, Kierkegaard’s text points out, the individual is charged with nothing; he has nothing—no matter, no surface area, no domain—over which to be responsible” (Khawaja, 2016, p. 203; Kierkegaard, 2009a). With the notion of sin, on the other hand, one accepts one’s given existence “as the materialization of a debt for which she is responsible” (Khawaja, 2016, p. 203; and see Noddings, 2003, pp. 47-52 & 81-90). In this sense, “Moral acts are not in some special subset of free actions. Rather, all free actions have moral character” (Lee, 1998, p. 54). The same holds true for acts of faith—they are not a special subset of free actions, but rather all free actions are acts of faith: good faith or bad faith. One is responsible for living in good faith. An act of faith is anything believed or act-attempted without 100% omniscient-level of certainty that the belief is true or that the act will come about (Davenport, 2012). In this, “faith . . . make[s] all men again equal” because any movement is a movement of faith, any enacting of an act or supposed non-act is done by faith (Kierkegaard, 1983, p. 77).

Every act of choice is either a virtuous act in good faith or a peccable act in bad faith, in its intentionality and/or its actionality. For example, carelessness is not simply a neutral way of

being, but is actually vice-directed because it is a lack-of-care for something valuable in one's environment. The ever-hoped for goal is the virtue of an intellect oriented towards (attempting towards / to figure out) what is true (e.g., toward learning more of an AL or of X content via an AL) and a will oriented towards (attempting towards / to figure out) what is good (e.g., towards learning, towards edification, toward respecting others, toward helping others when in need such as lifting a barbell off of their face, toward an appreciation of the beautiful) (Aristotle, 2002; Callard, 2018). Vice is there when one of these is lacking, for to orient towards what is true in order to enact evil is clearly a vice, *and* to orient towards what is good without attempting to figure out what is true is a vice in that it often is an enacting of what is evil out of ignorance. In other words, good intentions without knowledge leads to actual harm in the real world as does knowledge without good intentions. This is why pursuit towards the true *and* the good cannot be separated, and these need to become "character dispositions that equip us to reliably execute the core practices that undergird our foundational values. The virtues are tools of self-maintenance" of either self-cultivating or self-creating (aspirational) work (Kemp, 2020, p. 612). Each act either is an instantiation that feeds something to become a character trait towards one's values and valued practices (acts in or toward such values) or detracts from them.

This definition of virtue (the disposition to having one's intellect directed towards truth and one's will towards the good, in good faith and concomitant actions) applies directly to this study (apart from it applying to every choice) in at least the following ways: (1) I am trying to learn *truths of* the languages, e.g., vocabularic, grammatical, and phonetic truths of how the language works. (2) I am trying to learn *truths through* the languages, e.g., philosophy of Thomas Aquinas by Abbe Raffray in French, or how best to do first-aid in X situation. (3) I am ready to enact goodness in that, e.g., first aid to be ready to actually help people in times of emergency and to

be able to communicate better with them if they do speak one of the languages I am learning, or to continue to occupy the same ontological grid as my students as being co-LLers, to build up each other in the ALs such as with my friend who is also studying Spanish. (4) I am trying to learn truths of my (hopefully) virtue-directed identity forming journeys.

In these ways, the virtues provide further intentionality to the practices. I already have an interest in X, but with value and virtue in mind, I can explicitly choose-to-choose *with* stronger evaluation, the stronger evaluation being “because X is leading me to more truths” (intellect) and “because doing it in Y-way is good-directed” (will). Explicitly self-chosen responsibilities gives oneself an ever more fine-grained aim and therefore an ever more fine-grained awareness of when they are amiss of that aim. It is not that one will ever be perfectly good, as Kierkegaard claims one of Socrates’ greatest ethical insights shows us, that even in realizing that we have,

“a disposition to all evil . . . the ethical path becomes exceedingly long, since it begins with first making this discovery. The more profoundly it is made, the more one will have to do; the more profoundly one makes it, the more ethical one becomes” (Kierkegaard, 2009a, p. 135).

*The chain of reasoning here goes as follows:* A person has been given these genetic-potentials, these events, these situations, these happenstances, these sicknesses, this health, this time, and so on. Therefore, all of these have become that person’s responsibility. Therefore, the person must act in a caring manner with regard to all of them. Therefore, the person is responsible for developing what she can (the finite among the infinite amount of options) of her potentialities and for acting with care towards herself and her values because without that she can do no good towards others. As Kierkegaard puts it “any religion of love we might conceive would presuppose, just as epigrammatically as truly, one condition only and assume it as given:

to love oneself in order to command loving the neighbour as oneself” (Kierkegaard, 1985, p. 39). Thus, one also is responsible for acting with dignity towards others (see Davenport, 2012; Kierkegaard, 2009a; Noddings, 2003). In so doing, one becomes free to choose to choose rather than live in bad faith’s illusion of lack of choice; and one becomes free to choose to choose the good.

Once one becomes aware of her responsibility and, because of that, becomes more aware that in some way(s) they can improve how well and with what attitude they possess and live out her values, she then also becomes ever more aware in an ever more nuanced manner of her aims. One’s awareness of goodness increases and so her sin-consciousness increases (Khawaja, 2016, p. 205). The more one is aware of one’s aims the more free one is to advance in the directionality of those aims while at the same time the more aware she is of when she gets off track of those directionalities due to allowing distractions to occupy her direction of attention and thus she becomes once more a quasi-slave to that distraction—until she freely chooses to return once more to her higher-order directionalities (Dean, 2013).

“A man who becomes conscious of the responsibility he bears toward . . . an unfinished work, will never be able to throw away his life. He knows the ‘why’ . . . and will be able to bear almost any ‘how’” (Frankl, 1984, pp. 126-127). This is a responsibility to continuing doing whatever valued pursuit he has chosen to be doing because he is the only one who can do what he does in the manners and ways he does it, and if he does not do it, it will go undone. Even when one feels he has “nothing more to expect from life,” so long as the person is alive, life is “still expecting something from them” (Frankl, 1984, p. 126). The existentialist claim is it is the person’s duty to respond to this calling, to this expectation, however absurd at times it may seem to do so (Camus, 1955; Nagel, 1974). Or as Kierkegaard confidently put it, “for you to be

finished with life before life is finished with you is precisely not to have finished the task. That is how it is” (2009a, p. 138).

Self-cultivating Llers develop their identities by explicitly choosing AL contexts and content that have to do with their values and by taking responsibility for this choosing even in contexts of opportunity deprivation. Aspiring Llers develop their values by explicitly choosing AL contexts and content that have to do with those attempting-toward values and by taking responsibility for this choosing even in contexts of opportunity deprivation. This responsibility implies a level of importance in the choosing, and therefore the choices made should have strong evaluation upholding them.

### **(Step 5) Conducting Strong Evaluation**

#### **Articulating One’s Identities & Values**

Strong evaluation is particularly important in a SLA study since the literature has left “a gap in terms of approaches to motivation that capture the ways in which learning is perceived as meaningful for learners’ lives” (Clarke & Hennig, 2013, p. 79). On a deeper level, the axiological importance of strong evaluation in Ller research can be clearly understood via the conception of a person wherein,

“a person is an agent who has a sense of self, of his/her own life, who can evaluate it, and make choices about it . . . Even those . . . deprived of the ability . . . are still understood as belonging to the species defined by this potentiality” (Taylor, 1985a, p. 103).

Furthermore, if writing is both “a tool we use to express a self we already have” self-cultivationally, and “a means by which we form a self to express” aspirationally (Lensmire, 2000, p. 62), then importance of creating a beginning-of-study (BoS) and an end-of-study (EoS) strong evaluation for a study centered on *identity* formation cannot be overstated. Enacting

strong evaluations answers to the Socratic injunction to know thyself (via reflection and evaluation) (Plato, 1979) and the LIng identity forming injunction to cultivate and/or create oneself (via aspiring will) (Augustine, 1489; Bakhtin, 1981; Callard, 2018; Newman, 2019, pp. 117-127; Shusterman, 2013, pp. 45-55; Teo, 2005).

For there to be existential identity in a human, the human must have reflection, evaluation, and will. One's reflection, evaluation, and will leads one to one's more central identities and values (Girard, 1978; Girard, Rocha, & Antonello, 2007; Taylor, 1985a, p. 23, 88). While this is Step 5, it actually occurs throughout all of the steps and the entirety of the actual study (and perhaps one's existentially-lived life). Steps 1 to 4 is part of (the beginnings of) this articulation. Then the articulation becomes stronger through a purposeful self-cultivational and/or aspirational journey; it continues to be proleptically strengthened throughout the lived-enacted journey (Callard, 2018; Davenport, 2015, p. 154; Khawaja, 2016, p. 147).

Self-interpretation and self-articulation have been shown to be beneficial for self-care and "as a healing modality" (Gorichanaz, 2018, p. 142; and see Davidson, 2013; Pennebaker, 1997, 2013). This can be beneficially done with others (von Kleist, 1950), but often it is most beneficially done alone. It has been found that personal diaries tend to be more honest and transparent than things written or spoken about the self for another (Pennebaker, 2004). Also, verbalized self-articulated soliloquies have been found to be "grammatically more complex, more extended in utterance length, and less 'here-and-now' than conversational speech" (Bruner, 1990, p. 88) due to not having the judging eye of an interlocutor or interruptions from the interlocutor or worrying about occupying too much of the interlocutor's time. That is, one can more freely and openly articulate herself to herself (Bruner, 1990; Bruner & Lucariello, 1989; Nelson, 1989). Self-interpretation (including identity articulations) via writing about it is,

therefore, perhaps our best way for sorting out our thoughts about the world and ourselves in it (Brunner, 1990, p. 88; Dewey, 1958; Pennebaker, 2004). Through a strong evaluation, the Ller can articulate and self-interpret her higher-order identities and values and, thus, understand how those identities tie, or could tie, with her ALs and the wider world (Khawaja, 2016, p. 86; Kierkegaard, 1983, p. 13; Kreber, 2013; Taylor, 1985a, 1992).

Furthermore, when we realize that because we may die at any time, whatever we are doing we should, in some sense, be something we are willing to die doing (Korsgaard, 1996), we then become “the types of beings who need reasons in order to go on” doing what we do (Weitzke, 2013, p. 899). Therefore, “we must also value that ability to give ourselves these reasons as a special part of our being” (p. 899). Hence, the ability to conduct a strong evaluation should be a higher-order value that everyone holds.

The problem with being beings who are addressed and who can reply is that every single thing in our environments are calling out to us—including everything going on in our heads. This is the infinite. Thus, one must pick out from those things in our environment, our delimited set of pursuable higher values. Also, “a person might value something without being explicitly aware that she values it” (Kemp, 2020, p. 605) or there might be a value that she would like to acquire but she has not begun to articulate yet (Finlay & Schroeder, 2017). The point of writing one’s self-interpretation is to discern by writing out, or to write out if already discerned, one’s higher-order values.

Articulation concerning identity formation not only *describes* our identity formation, our values, but in and of itself *affects* and therefore *is* part of our formation—it is a part of the identity/value formation itself (Taylor, 1985a). Taylor calls this “strong evaluation” (1985a, pp. 24-25, 66, etc.). Callard calls it “self-endorsement” (Callard, 2018, p. 183). Specifically, a strong

evaluation or reflection or self-endorsement is, “an activity in which an agent, or some part of her, steps back from, appraises, and attaches a positive or negative evaluation to the aspect of herself she evaluates” (p. 184).

Therefore, strong evaluation includes discovering one’s values that one already holds and has been practicing, values that one desires to hold, anything one wants to spend less time as being (e.g., ambitious, drifting), and so on. The part of that that concerns evaluating one’s values and potential values themselves, once identified, Callard calls “self-monitoring activity” (2018, p. 131) or the “self-monitoring component to the activity of valuing” (p. 120). I prefer the term strong evaluation, and therefore use it more frequently than the other terms when referring to my BoS and EoS articulations.

Part of a strong evaluation is an articulation of “what one stands for, and why one values one’s position. This articulation is one important aspect of becoming authentic” (Webster, 2005, p. 10). Thus, “authentic identity clearly involves reflection . . . it requires agents . . . to ‘stand back from her or his desires and evaluate them’” (Davenport, 2012, p. 100; MacIntyre, 1984, p. 88). One first perceives her interests and potential interests and why, discerns which ones (perhaps all) are also values and why (such as by deciding if they align with her most admirable self (as perceived by her) and why), and she makes an authentic commitment to a delimited set of those values that she can consistently live out as defining her existential identity pursuits (James, 1890, p. 402; Lee and Ewert, 2018; Murphy, 2011; Noddings, 2003, p. 9; Pink, 2009; Stebbins, 2002, 2005, 2007, & 2014a).

“Strong evaluation is . . . about . . . the kind of beings we are” in the case of self-cultivation “or want to be” in the case of aspiration (Taylor, 1985a, p. 26). The strong evaluator who discerns what values she has that she most values, leads to self-cultivation. However, the strong

evaluator may also notice that there are areas where she is not sure of the reasons for wanting to want something, such as appreciating classical music or being advanced in specific multiple languages. The results of this type of strong evaluation lead to aspiration (Callard, 2018, 2021a). Such articulations which form a strong evaluation can sufficiently occur at the beginning of a LLing study. I conducted this kind of strong evaluation during the first two months of my study.

The beginning-of-study (BoS) strong evaluation provides the initial normative grounding of the study. The aspirant further develops (articulates) proleptic reasons as normative grounding as he goes along his journey and, most clearly articulates this at the end when he has acquired or come closer to acquiring the value (Callard, 2018, 2021b). This is a self-authoring of a journey of identity formation where he (the author) is creating a value for himself that he does not yet fully possess (does not yet fully value) (Hampton, 1993). This kind of strong evaluation occurred throughout the study, during which I discerned and explicated my further proleptic reasons for advancing in my acquisition of French, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish, and Catholic philosophy. The articulation and aspirational journey continued even up until the final draft of this, as I continued to learn how to more deeply appreciate acquiring these specific languages and this specific philosophy through those languages.

The level and degree to which we dialogue with things of value or potential value is our choice. Recognizing this choice and taking responsibility for it creates reflective evaluation in order to decide which values we allow to call us forth and which we hear less and thus become less provoked by. We can also interpret and pursue identities in ways that are more or less in line with a potential value, that is, in more or less *ethically* accurate ways. For example, if big trucks constantly grab my attention, I can interpret this as a calling to steal them, drive them as an occupation, learn the mechanics of them, design them, or some combination thereof. Within the

valuational framework, one ignores the interpretation to steal or the like; unless, for example, it is the only option to save someone's life (Gilligan, 2003; Noddings, 2003). That is, in strong evaluation, genuine care for choosing *values* is paramount.

As concerns interpreting the most meaningful ALs and most meaningful content and contexts in which to engage the ALs, I kept all of the above in mind and applied it methodologically: I have had experiences and these mean something to me. I interpret the meanings of these experiences by writing them down and expressing how I relate to them in terms of my values and identities or potential values and identities. I also used the following revised techniques suggested by existentialist Alfried Laengle (2012) as a way to conduct strong evaluation. First, using a vocabulary of worth, simply observe those top few things which we *most* perceive as legitimately fascinating, interesting, or even bothersome in the sense of seeing a need to address it in some way. Identify the corresponding value(s). Then, examine the consistency of the value(s), "with the rest of our values, with attitudes, abilities and capabilities and with our conscience" (Laengle, 2012, p. 33). Then, cut these down to a manageable set of values. Then, take action, responding to the values by "consent to one's own active involvement" (p. 33; also, see Bakhtin, 1986; Davenport, 2007; Frankl, 1972; Noddings, 2003; Taylor, 1985a; Pressfield, 2002, 2015).

Webster suggests that conducting a strong evaluation "is . . . valuably facilitated through an engagement with existential questioning" (Webster, 2005, p. 13). However, Webster gives no examples of such existential questioning but only references Noddings (1993, p. 8). Noddings herself does not give explicit examples but says they should be about the values of life: love, death, meaning, goodness, evil, birth and creation, etc. In order to make existential questioning more concrete for an individual study such as this one, I expound some of the existential

questions I posed to myself during my study; however, any type of self-questioning that points to identities-nested-in-values to any Ller could be used in an auto-methodological existential study:

A part of discerning my value-based identities was in asking myself, “What do you find as beautiful / good and/or what do truth do you want to gain / learn more of?” For example, I find the thought processes in Italian of Floridi Luciano as both beautiful and good. Hence, I value them because they hold valued qualities. Other existential questions stemmed from my perception that comparative importance, temporal permanence, harmony-conflict, and embeddedness-separateness are features of (potential) values and identities. With this awareness, I could better articulate my (potential) identities by asking questions such as, “What is most important to me?” “What is next most important?” “What could I see myself (and what have I seen myself) doing or being for years on end or for only a few days?” With harmony-conflict, I decided which of my values are more valued so as not to lose it to a less-valued identity in terms of energy expenditure and time.

I attempted to evaluate the above questions and their answers by way of my affective, cognitive, and axiological responses to them (Callard, 2018). I asked myself, “Based on the answers I have given myself so far, what values of the potential language(s) and/or what values that can be connect to learning the language(s), can I deeply give avowal to, i.e., strongly endorse?” (Khawaja, 2018). This not only gave my choices and values weight, but also made it less likely that I would self-betray in regards to those identities so long as the importance I had placed upon them (i.e., the values undergirding them) were kept in mind.

Beyond asking the above questions about the four features of identity and the six features of value, another helpful self-interpreting technique comes from critical intercultural hermeneutics.

It is known as “informed endorsement” and consists of asking the question of what you might value or identify as (or separate yourself from) if you “were not constrained by your fears” (Simpson, 2014, p. 267). Notice, the goal of the question is ever more “truthful self-representation,” i.e., self-transparent articulation, whatever feared consequences there may or may not be (p. 268; Kierkegaard, 2009a; Webster, 2004, 2005).

Having the same passion(s) in one’s L2, L3, and L4 as in one’s L1 (e.g., fitness and philosophy) act as a solution to the identity dilemmas one may encounter as one advances in those ALs, keeping each identity anchored to other identities to ensure the identity formation journeys continue in the ALs throughout various external uncertainties (COVID) and throughout any identity uncertainties that may occur due to the newly-developing ALLing-selves (Agar, 1994; Allen-Collinson, 2012, p. 205; Larsen-Freeman, 2015; Marx, 2002; Pavlenko, 2007, 2011, 2016; Stebbins, 2003).

This bears upon the points of how even with a limited set of values there is potential for endless variation and how one must discover his own ways to pursue *all* of them wholeheartedly: “Person A might have the same three main cares . . . as person B; yet how they combine in A’s caring actions and feelings might be quite different than . . . in B’s” (Davenport, 2012, p. 114). Without this consideration of how one’s cared for values combine, one’s values may become disharmonious or co-canceling. However, this does not mean that one will strike the balance perfectly (Davenport, 2007, 2012; Kierkegaard, 1987c; Nietzsche, 1911). One may find, as I did in my study, over time that some commitments were indeed less long-term than had been hoped, and that I needed to stop pursuing some of them if I wanted to continue my aspirational journey in the other aspirational values.

Choosing what to relate-as as one's higher-order identities and what to not relate-as as being of sufficiently high enough caliber to commit to, "is something you must do . . . as the existentialists quite correctly point out, without any sure proof that what you are doing is correct" (Ellin, 1995, p. 325). Once we've articulated a value of ours, it is a value of ours *at that time*. We can (and should) ever articulate it better (via ever more self-transparency) and may find that it no longer is (or never really truly was) a value of ours due to realizing its conflict with other more highly-committed-to values of ours or etc. One must have some level of strong evaluation in value-commitment choices, and then confidently live it out as one's present-tense acts in the direction of those commitments while still understanding that one's understanding is ever limited and comfortable in that knowledge and in the continuous journey of attempting to understand more (Khawaja, 2016, p. 182). Thus, while in an AuPh, the LLer spells out her identity formation through a BoS strong evaluation up to the point of beginning the multiple-times-per-day logging, but the LLer still attempts to discover more of her value-identifying-towards self through that daily documentation.

### **Simple Weighers vs. Strong Evaluators**

*One purpose of this study having beginning-of-study strong evaluation is to be(come) a strong evaluator in relation to ALLing rather than a simple weigher.* The goal and point was to step back from the choices of my life and really explicitly choose to choose those ALs that connect with or could connect with values I already had that I was already most committed to or should be most committed to in order to both self-cultivate those values and to aspire to more deeply value the ALs I chose to choose.

A simple weigher is "reflective in a minimal sense, in that he evaluates courses of action, and sometimes is capable of action out of that evaluation as against under the impress of immediate

desire” (Taylor, 1985a, p. 23). However, only the strong evaluator articulates his courses of action by viewing his *values* and committing to a subset of them in a course of action, “where it is not calculation of consequences . . . Rather . . . a vocabulary of worth” (Taylor, 1985a, pp. 23-24). That is, the strong evaluator has a vocabulary of value through which he can articulate his motives, identities, values, and goals. The vocabulary of worth/values is “the language of higher and lower, noble and base, courageous and cowardly, integrated and fragmented, and so on” (Taylor, 1985a, p. 24). Other examples include playfulness, joy, gratitude, strength, wonderment, levity, seriousness, moderation, wisdom, goodness, beauty, truth, and so on (and see Aristotle, 2002; Callard, 2021b; Bogost, 2012, 2016). For example, valuing one’s employment because of “joy in personal work” or “congenial companionship” would be to be a strong evaluator (rather than to make money to just get by or than to outperform or crush a co-worker or some other weak or unethical reasons) (Noddings, 2003, p. 105).

Simpler weighers may have pursuits in areas of which they are talented, but without existential commitment they are agents with “identities featuring planned and . . . intentional action who still show little . . . integrity in the sense of loyalty to principles when stronger appetites can be satisfied by their betrayal” (Davenport, 2012, p. 95). Unlike those agents, self-cultivators and aspirants continue in their identity-conferring pursuits despite the various appetitive changes or obstacles.

Drifting identities can appear to be life-long commitments by chance, more accidental than purposive. For one may find he has “inadvertently, by remaining on board ship too long, traveled around the world” (Kierkegaard, 1987b, p. 163). To live in any drifting manner, is to live by, what Davenport calls, “accidental desires” (2012, p. 106) or “accidental motives” (p. 104) as opposed to explicitly chosen and committed-to existential motives. When accidental motives are

enacted in movements somewhat consistently over time they display “accidental traits” (p. 124). Such a character “plans and acts, but she has not ethically chosen and found herself or taken the formation of her identity as her objective” (Davenport, 2012, pp. 103-104; Kierkegaard, 1987b). Again, only the Ller himself can distinguish this—whether he is drifting or explicitly committing. Only the Ller himself can, therefore, provide us with the relevant data concerning this.

There are two kinds of simple weighers: the ambitious person and the drifter, both of which Kierkegaard also refers to as the philistine (Callard, 2018; Kierkegaard, 1951), and there are two kinds of strong evaluators: the self-cultivator and the aspirant. To not have chosen one’s value-based identities, i.e., how one relates to things as being valued by the self and in what ways and with what other values and so on, is to be living as a philistine—a product of what one’s ambitions or one’s surroundings make of one’s talents and dispositions (Kierkegaard, 1849, 1951, 1989). A strong evaluator, however, develops herself by explicitly deciding on, via articulating, one’s higher (and less high) values and then acting on them, or by perceiving something worthy of becoming one of one’s values and aspiring towards acquiring that value (Callard, 2018).

In self-cultivation, present and earlier selves (called  $S_1$ ) have given the present self a deeply held value and provides reasons for the present and later selves ( $S_2$ ) to continue in those values. With aspiration, “while an earlier self,  $S_1$ , might cause a later self,  $S_2$ , to come into existence, a self’s later reasons,  $R_2$ , might make an earlier self’s reasons,  $R_1$ s, good,” thus strengthening one’s prior evaluation of the value through a stronger evaluation (Gordon, 2020, p. 628). Thus, the BoS strong evaluation leads to self-cultivation and to aspiration, but the EoS stronger evaluation

completes (or more fully completes) the strong evaluation for the aspiration. Thus, my study was (in part) seeing if I self-cultivated what I self-endorsed in my BoS strong evaluation *and* in seeing what my aspirations ended up becoming throughout the 368 days and further analyzed via the EoS *stronger* evaluation.

Even when one's vocabulary of worth is limited, one can still be a strong evaluator by using that limited vocabulary whilst ever trying to expand it. Taylor gives the example of not being able to talk "very volubly why Bach is greater than Liszt," but still he "can speak of the 'depth' of Bach, for instance, a word one only understands against a corresponding use of 'shallow', which, unfortunately, applies to Liszt" (1985a, p. 25). His point being that even with quite a delimited strong evaluative articulation, he is still far ahead of the weak evaluator who never uses any of the vocabulary of worth to talk about musical preferences. The level of richness of a vocabulary of worth one has about any value pursuit makes such a pursuit "a very different experience" than from before when one did not have that vocabulary (p. 25).

The realm of limited strong evaluation is where the aspirant is before she has reached her self-cultivating paragon self. She can say something of the worth of the value she is pursuing, but cannot yet appreciate it as she would like to. She feels her vocabulary of worth of that value-identity is lacking and she would like to be able to articulate it more richly (Callard, 2021b). The self-cultivator, on the other hand, feels a deeper appreciation, understanding, and thus articulation of the value in question. However, the simple weigher does not use a vocabulary of worth at all: "a reflection about what we feel like more, which is all a simple weigher can do in assessing motivations, keeps us as it were at the periphery," whereas a value-based reflection, "takes us to the centre of our existence as agents" (Taylor, 1985a, p. 26).

Thus, the aspirant “is able to offer us some articulation, however vague or incomplete, of the value” (Callard, 2021b, p. 488). However, “in order for the student to count as an aspirant she must herself find” that her strong evaluation of it is “insufficient” (p. 488). This articulation of the insufficiency of one’s articulation is itself a strong evaluator of one’s identity formation and value pursuit, a strong evaluator that keeps one on the look out for discovering other strong evaluators along the journey. Thus, Taylor is an aspirant of Bach only if *he* is not satisfied with that reason (evaluation) of Bach as having more depth than Liszt *and* he desires to discover more reasons for listening to Bach (Ferrara, 2002; Ferrara & Evans, 1993; Taylor, 1985a).

Just as “depth” can be a sufficient reason to commit (a strong evaluation worthy of a commitment) to aspire to valuing Bach more, so too “that which is so inexplicable . . . that it must be attributed to a deity must also come about by virtue of deliberation, and such exhaustive deliberation,” e.g., strong evaluation, “that from it a resolution results” (Kierkegaard, 1988, p. 102). That is, the strong evaluation may simply be because I see it as my calling from some divine source. If, on the other hand, “deliberation has not exhausted thought, then I make no resolution,” i.e., I re-enter the drifting state (p. 102). Hence, there can be a fine line between a strong evaluator that produces existential resolve and a simple weigher that does not, “I act either on inspiration” e.g., something attributed to a deity as a personal calling given to me, “or on the basis of a whim” (Kierkegaard, 1988, p. 102).

Once the resolution is made, the thought is exhausted in the sense that it is done as concerns making the decision and one should solely focus on the acts in the direction of the decision (Kierkegaard, 1988). One has moved into the realm of resolve. While it has all the backing of the strong evaluation, the reason given to any questioner may be, “because I said I would” or

“because I have chosen the responsibility for it” without remembering at hand every possible reply for “why” to every possible retort against it or questioning of it.

In the self-cultivating aspects of strong evaluation, “an agent is attempting to ask whether she should value something she already values” (Gordon, 2020, p. 622), and in the aspirational aspects she is asking whether she should grow her valuation of something she feels she does not yet value sufficiently. In the former, she discerns which of her values are higher-order and if other values conflict with them. An example of the former would be one who sees her appreciation of Spanish as more important to her than her appreciation of well-developed video games. They are both values, but she has stepped back and viewed them both and perceived that her appreciation of Spanish is a higher-order value to her. In the latter, where one is evaluating potential values, the agent sees potential value in wanting (to want) a value she does not yet have. For example, she sees appreciating French as potentially being valuable in some ways, but she does not yet know what those ways are as she has yet to actually appreciate French. That is, she legitimately does not fully value French sufficiently and would prefer to simply listen to things in English each time she has the choice to listen to French or English. However, she perceives the value of appreciation for French and sets out to make it one of her higher-order values and identities.

Aspiration only works if, even during times you do not want to continue pursuing that value, one “does it anyway” i.e., via forced-motivation, i.e., via *existential* motivation (Callard, 2021a, p. 463). Callard gives an example of committed, forced motivation to choose exercise over a long-term timespan. As her aspirational identity-forming journey proceeded, “Most of the work was a matter . . . of doing” (p. 463). That is, she could not rely on any of her fleeting motivators, but had to rely on her forced EM. She also expresses that “I often felt silly, awkward, like I was

faking something” (p. 461), which is exactly how Llers often describe themselves—like they are being fake when they are forcing themselves onward and attempting to think or write or talk in the language (Marx, 2002). “Also relevant . . . were long stretches in which I did no exercise, but I didn’t feel ok about that. I felt I was missing something” (Callard, 2021a, p. 461). She drifted, but reflected on it, and then explicitly chose to return to aspiring. This is another reason why a continual daily journaling of an aspirational journey is important for the validity of such a study, for seeing how much of an aspirational or drifting (or otherwise) identity forming journey the journey actually was.

Callard’s endpoint, where she became a self-cultivator of exercise, also expresses the existential notion of an *authentic* journey “Now . . . I don’t feel at all as though I’m pretending. I am all in . . . But I worked hard for that ‘natural’ feeling . . . decades!” (2021b, p. 461). Still, even those who have arrived at appreciating some skill often have times of not feeling comfortable or natural or all-in, in which they must re-force themselves until they feel natural doing so again (Goggins, 2018; Lewis, 1942; Noddings, 2003). Even in those times, the self-cultivator can articulate better, i.e., with stronger strong evaluation, why she exercises. For example, now Callard explains the reasons she exercises with a much richer and broader vocabulary of worth, “a beauty in synchronized movement . . . and in pushing your body to its limits . . . deep camaraderie in the experience of shared pain . . . Even the element of competition, serves . . . to humanize” (Callard, 2021a, p. 461).

One can lapse from being a self-cultivator to being a drifter and then back to being an aspirant and then self-cultivator again of the same value. For example, “recollecting what one has forgotten” would be like someone who had the value (a self-cultivator) but has lost it and is attempting through aspiration to re-attain / re-acquire / re-grasp it (Callard, 2021b, p. 495).

Furthermore, the aspirational journey may be interrupted by one's own distractions or weaknesses in a more serious way as to make it "discontinuous, incoherent, and ultimately fruitless" (Callard, 2018, p. 21). Moments of akrasia or breaking-with or truly distracted-from one's committed-to value-pursuits are moments of self-betrayal to one's future self, present self, and/or past self. Thus, with existential authenticity "everything is always anew. Hero today, coward tomorrow if he doesn't take care" (Sartre, 1992, p. 574). However, even when one backslides, once he reflects upon *and* explicitly re-chooses his existential identities, he converts back into a partaker of that self-cultivating and/or aspirational identity forming journey.

The existential claim is that to actually forge and (trans)form into anything, one must keep willing forth attempted acts towards it for some time, e.g. learning an instrument, losing weight, gaining muscle, becoming good at X sport, and learning an additional language. Therefore, while in Hennig's philosophical perspective, LIng is seen as "individualistic as opposed to . . . dependent on others" (Hennig, 2010b, p. 319), EM centers on a definition of autonomy wherein one is dependent on others when and where such is in line with one's chosen values, and may dissent and remain independent when and where a context detracts from one's chosen values (Little, 2011, 2012; Webster, 2005).

A counter argument to strong evaluation and then committing to a delimited set of valued interests is that it is overly self-limiting, blinding "us to potential new experiences and possibilities, or prevent us from appreciating a sufficient diversity of ends" (Davenport, 2012, p. 98; Kemp 2020). There are several responses to this. On the one hand, one cannot have the freedom to do anything unless one has the freedom to ignore most other things in order to do that thing (Kierkegaard, 1988). On the other hand, EM "is compatible both with attention to a suitably wide array of values," such as ALs, philosophy, and physical exertion, "and with the

existential importance of openness to novelty,” of new ways one might engage with those values or new values that may suddenly surprise us (Davenport, 2012, p. 98). This is also well-defended by Ian Bogost, who points out that, “Everything has greater potential than we initially suspect—or than we can ever fully know” (Bogost, 2016, p. 73).

Everyone’s values have infinite richness that can never be fully plumbed (Davenport, 2012; Noddings, 2003), “the potential meaning and value of things—anything: relationships, the natural world . . . is in them”; therefore, “we can fashion novelty from anything” (Bogost, 2016, p. 223). I can learn ever more new things from even a video presentation I have seen 100 times of a philosopher speaking on X topic in Y language. In this regard, existential commitment, “completely depends on continuous renewal that it can most properly be described as an ‘eternal youth’” (Khawaja, 2016, p. 103). This is the renewal of the person, in each instance or day or week, in deciding to continue to enact acts in their chosen committed-to values. When choosing one’s finite (e.g., six ALs to learn out of the 7,000 to choose from), there is still an infinity within the finite boundary (Bogost, 2016). In this, a central care complex can be both stable and anti-fragile (Larsen-Freeman, 2015; Valiant, 2013). It can be durable, adaptable, and maintainable throughout vicissitudes (Davenport, 2012).

While there is an infinite potential for variety of commitment-enactments within any (even extremely) delimited commitment (Blustein, 1991; Bogost, 2012, 2016; Davenport, 2012; Robinson & Zarate, 2003); still, one must choose a finite infinity such that it is a commitment to X rather than an ever floundering about (Sartre, 1943). One is ever able to achieve goals, create new goals, adjust how one lives out this value identity complex while still ever living it out, *and* one is able to glean and grow and identity-form from within its finite boundaries, infinitely (Green, 2012). Bakhtinianly speaking as concerns ALLing, the more authoritative discourses in

an AL that one consumes, learns, and selectively assimilates, the more one is provided with “free movement within a more rigid structure” (Tekinbas & Zimmerman, 2003, p. 304; Bakhtin, 1981, 1984). This learning is endless. Kierkegaard refers to this as earnestness which is the virtue that makes one “capable of returning regularly . . . with the same originality to the same thing” (Kierkegaard, 1968, p. 104), with indefatigable repetition *and*, as need or want, originality within repetitions. *Ethical* earnestness may require creative revisions of our cares, but *not* of our values, for it is an explicitly committed earnestness to a value or values that makes a pursuit an existential identity formation. That is,

“earnestness sometimes requires radical changes in our cares . . . consider the inspector in the film *V for Vendetta* . . . his ground project is to excel in law enforcement. But pursuit of this project leads him . . . to see the injustice and corruption of the government he serves . . . But there is still narrative continuity in this: he remains loyal to the value of justice” (Davenport, 2012, p. 147).

Existential identities include an awareness of one’s values-as-motivators (i.e., movers) *and* what one actually selectively lives out. The awareness portion of this is thus a better knowing of oneself, and in articulating *and* enacting it in other ways is a forging or creating of oneself with and in and via the ALs with other aspects of one’s strongly-evaluated identity, e.g., love of narrative combined with French by watching *Balthazar*, a good narrative in French; or a love of philosophy combined with French by reading René Girard in French.

When you identify yourself with certain values by the articulation of that value, there may be a realization of practices that conflict with it. In the film *Liar Liar* when the father is articulating why he missed one of his son’s events, much to his surprise he articulates it as, “because I’m a bad father” (Shadyac, 1997). Able to finally articulate this identity to himself, he then is able to

stop committing actions that conflict with it and begin enacting actions (that can then turn into practices) that align with it. By the end of the film, he has attained the identity of being a decent father or at least of one who is becoming a better father. In this simple example, we see the necessary interactions and co-dependency of the triptych, *identity-value-practice* (Kemp, 2020). To be a multilingual I must work towards acquiring my value of it, the both of which require practices (i.e., Step 6).

Having done a strong evaluation to select a delimited set of values to pursue, one has given deep assent (endorsement) to it, taking it up as a spiritual labor, as one of one's own callings. However much intrinsic or extrinsic or otherwise motivational reasons went into it, the important thing is the personal, deep assent to the commitment. Again, perhaps initially someone is learning a language due to a school requirement or a parent's expectation, but once that someone takes a step back and questions why he is learning the language and then affirms value-oriented reasons as being valid for learning it, if the reason is e.g., that he thinks it is honorable to do what is required by the school, or if the reason changes to being some other value they find in learning the language, he has "*transformed*" (to use Khawaja's word here) his Lling into a spiritual labor (Khawaja, 2016, p. 26).

Once an explicit assent, endorsed commitment to a value is made, one is *unflappably* committed to it and resting in the determination of that in the sense that the mind can rest from most of its wondering of if this or that should be one's commitment. The main focus is now on doing. This is what (I take) Kierkegaard to mean when he says "once deliberation has been exhausted" one can thus rest from deliberation and *do* (Kierkegaard, 1988, p. 102).

Still, one might ask whether one "should not dig beneath the commitment. Why should I be committed . . . I cannot answer this better than we already have" beyond the already-made strong

evaluation (Noddings, 2003, p. 94). “When the ‘Why?’ refers to motivation, we have seen that the one-caring receives [the value-commitment] and acts” (p. 94). There is no “Why” layer deeper than the strong evaluation and the existential commitment to it. At this point, “we are obligated—to do what is required to maintain and enhance” the value pursuit, and the burden of justification is no longer on why we are pursuing the value but rather on anyone claiming we should stop pursuing it (Noddings, 2003, p. 95). We must only justify when we are not engaging with our higher-order values why we are not. Otherwise, we must be wholeheartedly engaging with these explicitly chosen strongly evaluated delimited set of higher-order values in some fashion, in some instantiated way (Bogost, 2016; Camus, 1955, pp. 4-24; Davenport, 2012, p. 148; Kierkegaard, 1987c; Nagel, 2002; Noddings, 2003; Sartre, 1943).

#### **(Step 6) Resolve: Actionality, Will, and Good Faith**

Once the resolution of identity-defining commitments is arrived at by way of reflection, that resolution wills-forth actions “far beyond any reflection” throughout all times of undulation, for at the low points, “he himself is bowed down under the imperative of duty and raised again in the optative of the resolution” (Kierkegaard, 1988, p. 163). Once the commitment is made, the commitment has become the prime mover (Noddings, 2003, pp. 16-17, 43, 84, 134). In this, “resolution is the true beginning of freedom” (Kierkegaard, 1988, p. 161).

My BoS strong evaluation was used in order to find such specified resolution. My daily documentation over the course of 368 days showed if I actually lived out the resolution, for without this “integrity to stick by one’s devotions in the face of difficulty” one never actual becomes that being because one never actually develops the relevant traits or appreciation (Davenport, 2015, p. 154). The existential self-cultivating or aspirational journeys are those journeys one has committed to as explicitly chosen *resolve* to long-term continual willed-forth

attempts at action (Davenport, 2007; Khawaja, 2016). *Willing-forth* is “a kind of striving . . . that involves committing the agent . . . to the task. Although it is really an ongoing activity, we sometimes also call this . . . firm resolve” (Davenport, 2007, p. 4). Will is resolve to enact *attempts* at X activity in-and-towards one’s commitments.

“Man is created by the intermediary of his action on the world” (Sartre, 1992, p. 122). In this, change of oneself occurs—but it is *directed* change—changes that occur through one’s committed pursuits, e.g., ever attempting at Portuguesing and thus I change by being able to speak more vastly in Portuguese, but just how much better, if even noticeable, is never assured. This is the resolved stage, and no matter how a person’s sub-motivations fluctuate, one enacts one’s commitments because he has decided to do so. It is not about introjected vs. intrinsic vs. integrated vs. etc. motivation types, because those types can be interrelated and because a person can go minutes, hours, days, weeks, or months moved primarily by one type of motivation and then the next minutes, hours, days, weeks, or months be moved by another type of motivation. The existential motivation (EM) is what keeps one going in the self-cultivating and aspirational journeys, using whatever subtypes of motivation occur throughout that time frame, while not constantly re-analyzing “but what specific way or reason am I motivated right now in reading this exact thing in Spanish?”

“There are situations in which more thought makes an agent less rational, situations in which the rational course is to think less” (Holton, 2004, p. 507). Once strong evaluation has been made, then “judgement shift” occurs and the activity remains regardless of remembrance of the strong evaluators (p. 507). It is an existential commitment that one maintains “even if interests . . . change and evolve, as circumstances and experiences change and evolve” (Ushioda, 2012, p. 17). Continually reconsidering one’s chosen, committed-to value often ends up being a form of

self-betrayal by detracting one from actually living out that commitment (Kemp, 2020). Self-reflection without action can easily become an ad infinitum process wherein, “Every self-conscious gesture that attempts to take stock of existence is itself a new act of consciousness of which to take stock” (Khawaja, 2016, p. 91). Instead of this, the higher-order value-choosing necessitates higher-order volition and “nothing counts as a second-order [i.e., higher-order] volition unless it results in action or attempted action” (Taylor, 1985c, p. 118; and see Figure 2.2. in this dissertation).

One’s philosophy as *a way of life* is the *pursuing*, i.e., *acting out* of one’s explicitly committed-to values (Irvine, 2008). This philosophy is broadly-encompassing in that every moment can be lived with that (en)forcing-of-action motivation: “Man does not simply exist, but always decides what his existence will be, what he will become in the next moment” (Frankl, 1972, p. 206). *Choosing* to consistently attempt to live out higher-order values is to live authentically as a cultivator or aspirant. When living in this way, one is *living in* one’s higher-order identities and (therefore) *living out* a higher-order identity formation. “Every spiritual battle—appropriation, self-choice, faith, salvation—takes place, insofar as it takes place at all, ‘at each instant’” (Khawaja, 2016, p. 105). On the other hand, “every instant thou standest still after hearing the invitation, thou wilt in the next instant hear its call fainter and fainter, and thus be withdrawing to a distance though thou be standing at the same spot” (Kiekegaard, 1944, p. 22). Once the commitment has been made, one makes movements in its directionality. One cannot wait until one has complete clarity because, “No such situation exists. The decisive either/or . . . is aimed at acting decisively” (Kiekegaard, 1944, p. 67).

Because existential commitment towards cultivation and aspiration, “is a decision about some concrete course of action . . . that one’s future self must continually confront either by

assuming it or by neglecting it” (Khawaja, 2016, p. 101), there are many acts which are not related to one’s existential identities that amount “to abandonment of the good, treachery, akrasia, or sheer distraction” (Davenport, 2012, p. 147). In theory, one should have a simultaneous-with-action-reflective-focus on one’s already self-chosen commitment-enactments in order to protect from unintentional, distracted actions. This is a “resoluteness to reflect on the conditions of existence while getting up, brushing your teeth, heading out into the world, and doing the ordinary things you do” (Khawaja, 2016, p. 147).

Since the possibility to abandon one’s commitments “is there at every moment, it can only be overcome by my overcoming it at every moment” (Kierkegaard, 2009a, p. 139). In each moment of choice, I must re-choose to exercise or study X language or ready Y philosophy in Z language. Each instance is an instance of either authenticity (living directionalized toward the commitment) or distraction and thus inauthenticity, even if by something good, but not of higher-order in the direction of one’s higher-order commitments (Davenport, 2012; Heidegger, 1996; Khawaja, 2016; Kierkegaard, 2009a; Sartre, 1943).

In each step, “bad faith is . . . an immediate, permanent threat to every project of the human being” (Sartre, 1943, p. 70). Even from the BoS strong evaluation: “any beginning, when made, does not occur on the strength of immanent thinking but is made on the strength of a decision, essentially on the strength of faith” (Kierkegaard, 2009a, p. 159). The agent cannot ensure that she will be successful even with the simplest action, such as picking up a novel in Italian, for she may pass out or suddenly lose function in her hand, etc. Hence, in successfully enacting “even such small goods . . . a tiny miracle is involved” (Davenport, 2012, p. 148). With the knowledge of this gap between willing-forth and the result, one moves by faith in order to conduct any ALLing action (Kierkegaard, 1980).

Just as leading existentialists appropriated the concept of faith from Christianity, so too leading Christians have in turn appropriated the concept of the “existential” from existentialism. As Pope Benedict XVI, Joseph Ratzinger, puts it, “What . . . is ‘faith’? . . . it is . . . an existential decision—it is life in terms of the future that God grants us . . . This is the attitude and orientation that gives life . . . its very freedom” (Ratzinger, 2009, pp. 59-60). Faith itself is existential because it is reflective, personally-made, *and, mainly*, actionally-lived-out. The individual who walks by faith has eradicated despair from his being and become more realized and free, more able to freely live in the journey of his identity formation both rationally and supra-rationally (Kierkegaard, 1987c). As Noddings explains,

“If I care enough, I may do something . . . that has only the tiniest probability of success, and that only in my own subjective view . . . my rational powers are not diminished but they are enrolled in the service . . . subordinate to my commitment to do something” (Noddings, 2003, pp. 35-36).

Walking by faith includes the rational but it does not live in obeisance to it; the rational serves it. One cannot rationally guarantee how one will perform, but that fact submits to one’s commitment to continue to will-forth *attempts* at doing something, movements-of-faith in the full knowledge of the absurd, because “the power of good is shown not by triumphantly conquering evil, but by continuing to resist evil (with all they can) while facing certain defeat” (Hamilton & Savage, 1989, p. 443).

However, the one who has forgotten himself in bad faith, “fails here: she has to have the victory; she does not accept the jest that is recognized in infinite resignation” (Davenport, 2012, p. 149). Good faith, in contrast, “recognizes with a ‘smile’ that despite our utmost effort, ‘a human being is nothing at all and that one who works with all one’s might gains only the proper

opportunity to wonder at God” (Davenport, 2012, p. 149; Kierkegaard, 2009b, pp. 80 & 83).

This is seen in a tale I was told about the death of Ambrose Bierce: he died laughing when being shot, realizing the killers’ trickery and false assumption of him. Even though he was, therefore, unable to complete the investigative journalistic story he was pursuing, because he was a person of good faith he saw the situation for what it was and died laughing at it. If he died in horror or despair, he would have died in bad faith, or at least not in good faith. As Kierkegaard words it, “one can die from a trifle so ridiculous that even the most serious-minded person cannot help laughing at death” (Kierkegaard, 2009a, pp. 138-139).

This “irony and humor are also self-reflective and thus belong to the sphere of infinite resignation” (Kierkegaard, 1987c, p. 51). Realizing the (potential) ironic, humorous, absurd aspects of our existence, one can confidently live in faith knowing that the movements one makes in one’s commitments through such absurd aspects *are* movements of, in, and through faith (Kierkegaard, 1849). EM moves one in a progression in one’s commitments with knowledge of the absurd close at hand, continuing through faith and thankful in each continued instance of existence (Kierkegaard, 2009a, pp. 368-397; Noddings, 2003). “Embracing this is equivalent to ‘infinite resignation’ in its widest sense” (Davenport, 2012, p. 148).

On the one hand, “bad faith . . . has taken precautions by deciding that . . . non-persuasion is the structure of all convictions” (Sartre, 1943, p. 68). On the other hand, good faith resides in a persuasion in and thus acting on one’s reflected-on and explicitly chosen delimited values, “I believe it; that is, I allow myself . . . to trust it; I decide to believe in it, and to maintain myself in this decision; I conduct myself, finally, as if I were certain of it” (Sartre, 1943, p. 69). Bad faith seeks to be a constant flux and change of subjectivity-types such that there is no actual long-term identity, and therefore, existentially, there is no *becoming* because there is no directionality.

Rather than acting on commitments, bad faith is “an inner disintegration in the heart of being, and it is this disintegration which bad faith wishes to be” (Sartre, 1943, p. 69).

Good faith, however, creates a directionalized, not distracted, journey. I am trying to learn, trying to grow, but it may not always be asymptotic. Even if I study Spanish all week and constantly am learning new words, I may go to the Catholic Spanish service and feel I cannot understand any more than I did last week. This does not matter as concerns my EM—the motivation remains. There still must be correspondence with reality where I am not claiming to be learning Russian when I am learning Spanish, but with that correspondence of actual directionalized action, it does not have to be asymptotic, though it is ever hoped to be, but even when it seems not to be, the directionalized action continues.

Taking the classic existential concept of *infinite* resignation, this study appropriates a slightly more tepid version of it which I call *finite* resignation. It is finite in the sense that I have, for at least some long-term period of commitment (mine being 12+ months) resigned myself to that commitment for the duration even through any potential judgment shifts (Holton, 2004; Hunt & Weintraub, 2002). That is, the 12-month portion after the BoS strong evaluation is meant to focus on the action. It “resigns” itself to action, as it were (Kierkegaard, 1987c, p. 142). Finite resignation is utter confidence in living by good faith—in taking those steps of faith towards my commitments during that time frame I have committed to doing so.

Once a certain amount of one’s higher-order values are known, one must commit and continue in one’s chosen ALs even through the many times when one wants to do something else (Noddings, 2013). This is especially important with ALLing since if you do not use it, you lose it quickly, especially if there are multiple languages (Doidge, 2007). You have to be continuously in those other languages since one can even lose one’s first language for lack of use yet alone

(and much quicker) one's second, third, fourth, and so on languages (Marx, 2002). Even if it feels fake, e.g., I feel it is not me at time X, I have discerned it and committed to it and thus am authentic by enacting it. My enacting it *is* my actually believing it since it is in accord with a higher-order value (Frankfurt, 1971; Taylor, 1985a). In certain cases, this could be worded as fake identity becoming real identity (Goggins, 2018). One acts the identity out throughout all times of not feeling authentic until one does feel authentic in enacting it, or until the end even if the feeling never arrives or revives. The "motivational shift must span the interval whether that be, properly, a few moments or a lifetime . . . in this consists what cannot consist in any feeling" (Noddings, 2003, p. 40). Authenticity in the EPr is not reliant on feeling although it rejoices when the right feeling accompanies it (Goggins, 2018; Noddings, 2003).

"We aspire by doing things, and the things we do change us so that we are able to do the same things, or things of that kind, better and better. In the beginning, we sometimes feel as though we are pretending, play-acting, or otherwise alienated from our own activity" (Callard, 2018, p. 5).

Willing exists throughout various feelings or lacks thereof (Noddings, 2003). It can include extrinsic factors, intrinsic factors, but the one unifying theme is the awareness-of willing the commitment-forth throughout all the other sub-motivators or sub-factors, such as times of felt-meaning and times of being overtaken by the absurd or feelings of fakeness or numbness. Authentic willing is consistent attempts-at movements of faith in the commitment, living out one's deep consent (Callard, 2018; Davenport, 2007, 2012; Khawaja, 2016; Kierkegaard, 1849, 1988; Sartre, 1943, 1965).

Continuous action throughout undulation "transforms estrangement from a phase to be overcome into a kind of perpetual dance partner, through which life receives its value and

absurdity its form” (Khawaja, 2016, p. 44; and, see Kuhn, 1949, p. 39). In fact, this dance is often a sort of play that can only be acquired by way of continuous committed actions because “fun requires a greater commitment to everyday life not a lesser one” (Bogost, 2016, p. 78). When really committed, we “pay close, foolish, even absurd attention to” our delimited values, e.g., French, and “allow their structure, form, and nature to set the limits for the experiences . . . allowing what is present to guide us . . . a circumscribed, imaginary playground in which the limitations . . . produce meaningful experiences” (Bogost, 2016, pp. 11-12).

### **Summing Up Identity and Motivation in the Existential Framework**

This study takes existential identity formation as being encapsulated by the meaning of “existential authenticity” (Davenport, 2015, pp. 153-154) which is (1) the articulation of one’s values via strong evaluation, conatively, cognitively, with good conscience endorsing a subset of values to pursue; and, (2) as the study progresses, endorsing one’s values proleptically, i.e., further justifying the values one is creating in a proleptic manner; and, living out the integrity to stick by one’s devotions in good faith in the face of difficulty (i.e., willed-forth commitment in action). Then, (3) reflecting on the journey with stronger evaluation and renewing commitments with self-transparency.

Unlike the common definition of transformation being a change or differing from the norms (Clarke & Hennig, 2013; Foucault, 1997; Harvey, 2014; Hennig, 2010a), as Kierkegaard makes clear, the EPr is about repetition, which could include a commitment to transformation that differs from how one was raised or from one’s surroundings or being a further formation in a committed-to direction one has already been in or a combination of the two (Kemp, 2020; Kierkegaard, 1987b, 1951, 2009a, 2009b). Hence, rather than defining a transformational journey as one in which “some core personal preferences change, or . . . desires, defining

intrinsic properties, or values change” (Paul & Quiggin, 2020, p. 561), this paper agrees with the definition that sees transformation as a commitment to a development of one’s already strongly held values (self-cultivation) and/or of values one feels they only partially grasp but want to strongly hold (aspiration) with the existential claim in focus that to actually (trans)form into anything, one must stay committed to it for some time, e.g., learning a language, learning multiple languages, learning to appreciate classical music, learning an instrument, becoming good at X sport, etc.

### **Ontological Stance Revisited**

This research falls in the arena of values—those (ethical) things we hold as important and those things by which we justify other things (Callard, 2018; Kolodny, 2003; Scheffler, 2010). For example, I value existence, so a higher-order desire is to treat myself and others with care. And I identify with that part of myself that does so (has done such, is doing such, will do such)—that part that makes relevant movements in and towards such values. This is the identification with higher-order values that produce higher-order volitions which then can be seen in higher-order movements. It is the identifying with that portion of myself that chooses to choose acts of such higher-order values and alienating from other portions of myself (Davenport, 1995; Frankfurt, 1971). This, therefore, means I have given myself a responsibility to enact such higher-order volitions and thus I am guilty when I commit acts that violate such (Khawaja, 2016).

Ontologically, these first chapters have answered what identity *is*, what motivation *is*, and how they *form* in and through multiple ALLing, and how they may *be formed* by multiple ALLing. Epistemologically, these chapters have answered how one can *know* one has EM, how one can *know* what one’s existential self-cultivating and aspirational identities / values are, and

how one can *know* how his identity forms (what his identity forming journeys are) in and through multiple ALLing. The following chapter more exhaustively delineates my epistemological stance.

## **Chapter 4 - Methodology**

### **Suitability of the Research Design**

This study brings to light identity formation through its existential perspective (EPr) and by way of an existential auto-phenomenographical research design (AuPh) (Allen-Collinson, 2012; Allen-Collinson & Hockey, 2001, 2007; Bakhtin, 1981; Bakhtin, 1986; Clark & Holquist, 1984; Davenport, 2007, 2012; Goulah, 2009; Greer, 2013; Noddings, 2003; Webster, 2004, 2005). Specifically, it does so by way of exhaustively strong(er) evaluations written over the course of months of reflection at both the beginning and end of the study and multiple-times-daily in-the-moment identity instantiations documented over the course of 368 days. Its data are the identity and motivational experiences of the Ller himself rather than experiences of an outside other interviewing the Ller and/or combing through his journals. The methodology is flexible enough to be effectively executed in a broader range of situations than non-auto-methodological means allow for, such as documenting each engagement with an additional language (AL) in every environment one engages with it and even throughout contexts of extreme existential opportunity deprivation brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic (Allen-Collinson, 2011; Busse, 2010; Clarke & Hennig, 2013; Dornyei & Ushioda, 2009; Ryan, Huta, & Deci, 2008; Foucault, 1997; Gorichanaz, 2017; Gorichanaz, 2019; Harvey, 2014, 2017; Hennig, 2010a; Pavlenko, 2011b; Rampton, Charalambous, Jones, Levon, Mangual Figueroa, and Zakharia, 2020; Stebbins, 2003, 2007; Bakhtin, 1981; Bakhtin, 1986; Coates, 1999; Waterman, 1981).

The methodological choice for this qualitative study was, “between applying to oneself someone else’s phenomenological analysis of existence on the one hand,”—or, similarly, applying someone else to my phenomenological analysis of their existence,—“and grasping

authentic resolve as the task of life on the basis of a personal, critical engagement with the conditions proper to one's own existence" on the other hand (Khawaja, 2016, p. 134). Since I am convinced that having existentially committed motivation is the most important kind of motivation for an adult Ller of ALs to have, I chose the latter. Also, as a "first-person philosophy" (p. 25), an existential study of Lling, if it is to be pursued with existential authenticity, is one where the Ller herself takes explicit responsibility for documenting her Lling as committed self-cultivational and aspirational practices. Again, this study does this through two strong evaluations and the rigorous multi-times-daily documentation.

As a reminder, motivation is what moves someone to dwell on something or to do something, existential motivation is that mover that is created-commitment from reflective strong evaluation, existential identity is what the Ller takes to be importantly valued and thus includes motivation but also includes the movements, and identity formation is how the Ller advances in those things he values *and* the fluctuations of what he finds more or less importantly valued throughout the journey and why (Callard, 2018; Frankl, 1984; Kierkegaard, 1941, 1951; Webster, 2005). Epistemologically, one can know and document this through phenomenological experiencing, interpreting, and documenting strong evaluations and in-the-moment multiple-times-daily experiences (Allen-Collinson, 2011; Taylor, 1985a).

For my study, a methodology was needed that would make feasible the addressing of the lacuna of extensively holistic studies in identity and MiLL from a philosophical perspective. Also, a design was required through which I could most fully trace and track a Ller's experiences of learning ALs in contexts of native language dominance and opportunity deprivation in times of existential uncertainty. I needed a methodology that could represent the language-learning life lived in various domains, e.g., whether there would be a study abroad

component or not (Busse, 2010; Davenport, 2012; Lanvers, 2017; Ushioda, 2009, 2017, 2019). Finally, I needed a methodology that was consistent with the ontological stance of this study (Allen-Collinson, 2011; Davenport, 2012; Gorichanaz, 2017; Harvey, 2014; Noddings, 2003).

This led me to situate the study in an existential philosophical auto-methodological qualitative language learning motivation-and-identity research paradigm centered on one's values in and with LLing (Callard, 2017, 2019, 2021a; Davenport, 2007, 2012; Noddings, 2003). Since such an auto-methodological field is not-yet-existent, I derived my methods from auto-phenomenography (AuPh) developed by sociologist Allen-Collinson (2011, 2012, 2016; Allen-Collinson & Hockey, 2001) and appropriated into it the concepts of narrative instantiations from existentialist philosopher John J. Davenport (Davenport, 2012, 2015) and auto-hermeneutics from information science researcher Timothy Gorichanaz (Gorichanaz 2015, 2017; Latham, Narayan, Gorichanaz, 2019). This AuPh research design permitted me to write a holistic beginning-of-study (BoS) strong evaluation, to track and trace my ALLing identity formations throughout various types of contexts, and to be able to reflect on all of that in the creation of my end-of-study (EoS) stronger evaluation. As Harvey puts it, since qualitative “studies are still less visible in the LL motivation research field than quantitative studies . . . this study makes a contribution to this burgeoning tradition” (Harvey, 2014, p. 97).

Auto-phenomenography (AuPh) agrees that the “embodiment of values [are] in the action of individuals” (Coates, 1999, p. 78) and discerns the LLe's values through his embodied actions of strong evaluations and identity instantiations of ALs, content, objects (wideware), places, and characters (Allen-Collinson, 2012; Lantolf, Thorne, & Poehner, 2015). Hence, my study conducts strong evaluations and documents identity instantiating ALing interactions in daily

logs. Taken together, these reveal my authentic enactments of my EM which create self-cultivating and aspirational identity forming journeys.

Both in-the-moment documentation and over the longer-term strong evaluations are of utmost import in the EPr because “existentialists . . . are the ones who insist on interpreting every philosophical proposition in the context of a particular historically-situated-subject-who-proposes” (Khawaja, 2016, p. 231); hence, strong evaluations of some kind done by the LLe himself are a must in an existential study. Also, “existentialists are the ones pushing the view that theory is a kind of practice and that all practices are implicit ontologies” (p. 231); i.e., the *acts* matter and are inextricably interconnected with one’s philosophy and reveals it and in fact actually *is* it and *is* the person’s becomings (ontologies). Thus, a methodology needs to include at least some kind of in-the-moment documentation occurring over the long-term.

Perceiving and describing experiences *by* the LLe who is explicitly attending to them are the only ways to know what aspects of the experiences relate to him, how those aspects of the experiences relate to him, what he identifies towards, and what he values and in what ways (Webster, 2005). That is, in this framework, identity is discovered or discerned via articulating one’s values, but the actuality of these values (these identities) exists within an actual existing world (much of which one has been thrown into) of things that the LLe *engages with* that are valued by him (Allison-Collinson, 2011). The auto-methodological subject takes center stage because it is the articulated self-interpretation of the person who discovers and determines his relations to those physically observable acts (e.g., studying X language for 2 hours right now) and who discovers and determines his value-viewpoints of the various ways he does or could relate to certain higher-order values (e.g., via reflective evaluation) that determines and discerns his identities (Khawaja, 2016, p. 25).

A Ller/LLing study that takes an existential perspective aims to discover and describe what and how the individual Ller relates to his (attempted at) LLing experiences. The validity of such written data, as well as the individual who writes it, is “in truth” if his “how of this relation is in truth” (Kierkegaard, 1992, vol.1, p. 199). Therefore, Ller self-transparency, self-honesty, and thoroughness of articulation of his more meaningfully valued relations are the quality criteria of a study that takes this perspective.

In attempting to keep with all of this, I first wrote out my BoS strong evaluation in order to become maximally aware of my higher values or higher-hoped-for values and how they harmonize, and making plans as I did. This guided me to six ALs that I would commit to aspire to more deeply value and the other values that I already deeply valued that I would cultivate through and with that aspirational journey as a way to answer to the debt of my existence (Khawaja, 2016; Kierkegaard, 2009a; Sartre, 1943). *Then*, since the commitments must be confronted and renewed in every step along the way, for the next 12 months I actively, daily, responded—I practiced caring about and carrying out my central values: actually engaging with the languages with other values rather than merely talking about them and reviewing the literature on them. Multiple times per day, I in-the-moment documented such steps to see if indeed I was living in good faith by renewing the commitments or to see if I abandoned any of the commitments. The EoS *stronger* evaluation then was made to see to what degree I had and had not reached my paragon selves in my aspirational journeys, including by way of articulating proleptic strong evaluators realized along the way.

In these ways, this study is a conceptual and empirical philosophical case study inquiry (see Duff, 2010, p. 22; Polkinghorne, 1995, p. 15). The case study approach is befitting a philosophical inquiry because the case study approach is exploratory (Duff, 2010, p. 44),

provides “intensive, holistic description and analysis” (Merriam, 1998, p. 6) that “yields rich data and thick descriptions” (de Beaufort, 2019, p. 76), may “modify researchers’ way of thinking” (de Beaufort, 2019, p. 77; Passeron & Revel, 2005, p. 20), and “respectfully examine[s], rather than conveniently ignore[s], the cases that don’t fit our categorizations and dichotomies” (Clandinin & Rosiek, 2007, p. 26).

Beyond the BoS and EoS strong evaluations and the in-the-moment multiple-time-daily narrative documentation, there is a level of “epistemological anarchism” in that there are no set rules for how exactly to articulate one’s identities, what one may identify as being or becoming, what one finds most salient as concerns one’s identity formation, what one finds and has found as important, and how that changes or not throughout the journey (Feyerabend, 1988, p 9; Dewey, 2005, p. 235; Piroșcă, 2013). This produces more accurate data as concerns the unique individual’s identity forming journeys as seen in Jerome Bruner research that discovered over the course of years of collecting accurate and rigorous autobiographies that they “were far more varied than we had ever expected” but still quite accurate and each providing new, interesting findings (Bruner, 1990). This epistemological anarchism also provides greater transportability of the methodology (see Bruner, 1990, p. 124).

This is particularly important in an ALLing study because people who choose and control their own methodology find content that they care about in fields that are most important to them, mining their infinite depths in their ALs (Bandura & Schunk, 1981; Bogost, 2016; Lecerle, 1990; MacIntyre, Mackinnon, & Clement, 2009; Manderlink & Harackiewicz, 1984; Reeve, 2005; Spitulnik, 1993). They may even create their own contexts where “context itself ‘can be understood as emergent from students’ motives, goals and resultant actions’ (Allen, 2010, p. 46)” (Mitchell, Tracy-Ventura, & McManus, 2017, p. 36), such as by intentionally

combining one's own methods, values, and language engagements. The important part is that in some consistent and cogent manner one documents one's LIng experiences, which could be done in many ways since a study on phenomenological "experience denotes whatever is experienced, whatever is undergone and tried" (Dewey, 1925, p. 8).

My particular auto-phenomenological daily documentation method fit Dewey's explication of experience, above—that is, it includes the thing experienced: the AL (Italian), the what (Luciano YouTube on digital philosophy), the place (in the Hale library), and the process of experience as regards to the relating-to, that is, how comparatively important the experience was for me, the Ller. Dewey further claims that "The value . . . of experience for philosophy is that it asserts the finality and comprehensiveness of the method of pointing, finding, showing, and the necessity of seeing what is pointed to and accepting what is found in good faith" (Dewey, 1925, p. 12). That is, a philosophical perspective should trust in good faith the Ller's own auto-phenomenological interpretation of lived experience as having last word finality of, to, and for the study's inquiries.

A study using experience as method wherein the participant (Ller) himself names his experience is of utmost ethical importance as well: "Respect for the things of experience alone brings with it such a respect for others, the centres of experience, as is free from patronage, domination and the will to impose" (Dewey, 1925, p. 39). That is, respecting the Ller enough to empower him to be the one to have experiences and to relate to those experiences in the ways he chooses. Still, a study must be feasible. It must select out of the potentially infinite amount of relations one has, a certain subset to study and give results for. Hence, this study marks off its sphere by way of its timeline (~15.5 months) and by way of its strongly evaluative result discernments of, specifically, self-cultivational and aspirational identity forming journeys

(Davenport, 2012, pp. 112-114; Frankfort, 1999, pp. 95-107; Kierkegaard, 1980, pp. 113–131, 2009a, pp. xvi-24).

### **Purpose of the Research**

*The purpose of this research is to present a solution for and to produce research that addresses the dearth of holistic, philosophical, and multilingual language studies in fields of applied linguistics and second language acquisition (SLA) concerned with motivation and/or identity. It does this with a rigorous and philosophical theory of and holistic approach to language learning motivation and identity formation.* The purpose of specifying a philosophically-centered concept of motivation and identity was accomplished with the creation of the first three chapters of this dissertation, while the purpose of applying that philosophy was enacted with a holistic study concerning motivation, learning, identity, and central values specified and described in a BoS strong evaluation, traced through the course of a 368 days of holistic in-the-moment documentation, all of which were further reflecting on to create a EoS stronger evaluation of the entire 15.5-month self-cultivational and aspirational identity forming journeys (Callard, 2018; Davenport, 2012; Gorichanaz, 2017; Mitchell, Tracy-Ventura, & McManus, 2017; Rampton, Charalambous, Jones, Levon, Mangual Figueroa, and Zakharia, 2020).

The objects of this research are the descriptions, enactments, and investigations of a philosophical-holistic identity and motivation for-and-as multiple language learning with other value pursuits in the linguistic ecology of a learner situated in contexts of opportunity deprivation by way of an applied philosophical inquiry of the multiple language learning journeys. Broken up into parts, the objects of the study are (1) an adult language learner of multiple additional languages who is situated in native-dominated language environments of

opportunity deprivation; (2) his developed existential motivation as value-based identity-defining commitments; (3) his actualized additional language learning identity formation journeys with other value pursuits. All of (1), (2), and (3) were explicated, perceived, discerned, and described via the objects of (4) an existential perspective and an existential auto-phenomenographical methodology (Allen-Collinson, 2011, 2018; Davenport, 2007, 2012; Bakhtin, 1981, 1986; Nietzsche, 1911).

### **Research Question**

The research question of Chapter 1, “From an existential perspective, in what ways does the language learner perceive and describe his 15.5-month identity-forming multiple additional language learning journeys?”, was answered in the following steps: (1) *the writing of* the beginning-of-study (BoS) reflective strong evaluation (June 29, 2020-September 7, 2020). This was a strong evaluation of my historical becoming, values, belief system, present ideals, and future teloi by which I identified my existential motivation as wholehearted identity-defining commitments (EM). In this, I perceived my valued interests and my language exposure and learning journey up until the daily logs began (Davenport, 2012; Simpson, 2001; Schumsterman, 2012; Taylor, 1985a). This also laid out my claimed aspirational existential motivation-as-commitment which was found to be comprised of six ALs and Catholic philosophy, and my claimed self-cultivating existential motivation-as-commitments which was found to be general philosophy-theology, physical exertion, and being in the language education-and-learning world.

Then, I (2) *discovered* my identity formation *by way of* (2.1) *tracking* the evolution of 368 days of daily documentations, and (2.2) *perceiving* my identity-conferring pursuits (my journey) by way of an end-of-study (EoS) stronger evaluation. The (2.1) daily documentation over the course of 12-months (September 11, 2020-September 13, 2021) was considered suitable for the

ontological and epistemological stances of this study because, “hermeneutic phenomenology pierces the essence of phenomena (ontologically, offering an account of being) by . . . considering its outward manifestation (ontically, offering an account of beings)” (Gorichanaz, 2017, p. 3). Therefore, the 12-month research component revealed the enacted EM and identity-conferring pursuits; that is, it provided data of what I committed to *in action*. This occurred in a rich, detailed, and coherent way that included the relations within each additional language (AL) with the other central values and the contexts in which the ALing took place (e.g., Italian with philosopher Floridi, Google Translate, in my apartment in Kansas in America on X day for Y hours).

In (2.2), the results-producing end-of-study (EoS) stronger evaluation (September 13, 2021-October 13, 2021) looked back over the BoS evaluation and the 12-months of multiple-times-daily journaling to identify those identity-defining commitments and key points of proleptic reasons discovered along the way, interpreting and describing how those self-cultivating and aspirational identities developed over the entire 15.5-month journey (June 29, 2020-October 13, 2021). In other words, the EoS stronger evaluation perceived the authentic value identity complex, completing the answer to the research question: *From an existential perspective, in what ways does the language learner perceive and describe his 15.5 month identity-forming multiple additional language learning journeys?* The 15.5-month analyses were suitable in revealing the essences of the phenomena because, in agreement with auto-hermeneutics, “a researcher can know when they have uncovered the essence of a phenomenon because their account will, first, demonstrate the relationships among the elements involved and, second, be rich, detailed, and coherent” (Gorichanaz, 2017, p. 3). For example, the claimed identity of Greek language learner with theology, philosophy, and individual fitness identities of my BoS

strong evaluation was compared to how those and other pursuits developed as perceived and described in my 12-month documentations. With this analysis, this was found to be a long-term but temporary identity complex (lasting ~2.5 years, ending six months into the 12-month portion of my study). Stopping the deep-study continuance of it was prompted by various discoveries in the study, such as discovering that being a multilingual thinking being through fascinating-to-me modern listening material consisting of various living people discussing theology-philosophy is more valued to me than merely having access to reading Koine Greek.

### **The Specific Methodology Employed**

#### **The Basics of the Auto-Phenomenography**

Auto-phenomenography (AuPh) has similarities to autoethnography, but AuPh “provides a distinctive research form . . . Its focus is upon the researcher’s own lived experience of a phenomenon or phenomena . . . first person accounts of perception and experience” (Allen-Collinson, 2011, p. 2). That is, while it includes the ethnographic milieu, which is particularly important given that the Lling occurred in an ethnographic milieu of opportunity deprivation, but AuPh is still more centered on studying the researcher’s experiences of the phenomena than it is of the culture (ethnos) at large. Hence, AuPh is not centered solely or predominantly on “-ethnos-” as is in the *autoethnography*, but it does include it in certain ways since we are comprised of the many cultures we have been exposed to which are, if authentic, those aspects we have chosen-to-choose as our own as well or as one’s we aspire towards (Callard, 2018; Khawaja, 2016). That is, this study is particularly auto-phenomenological because it concerns existentialism, and existentialism concerns subjective rationality, intentional experiences, personally choosing to choose, personally identifying one’s identities and values to value, and so on.

The AuPh describes the -ethnos- holistic environment and “keeps firmly in mind existential phenomenology’s exhortation that lived experiences are firmly embedded within the world” (Allen-Collinson, 2011, p. 21). But since a phenomenologist is “above all, one who thinks in the first person . . . in terms of its identity and so forth” (Angus, 2019, 25:27; Angus, 2014), the inquiry centers on the researcher’s “personal, subjective, idiographic experience whilst also acknowledging its situatedness” (Allen-Collinson, 2011, p. 22).

Furthermore, AuPh includes the “‘intentional’, that is, it constantly takes account of the meaning of things, environment and self, for the agent” (Taylor, 1985a, p. 165). It then writes out these, and perceives those values which are more or less important for oneself and how these importances change or remain. Existential AuPh has the following two main aims: (1) The aim to describe “subjective human experience as it reflects people’s values, purposes, ideals, intentions” (Jun, 2008, p. 94), recognizing that the only person who is able to sense and apperceive one’s central values and to choose to commit to them is the person himself. (2) The aim “to provide rich, textured, detailed descriptions of phenomena as they are lived and experienced by participants in actual concrete situations” (Allen-Collinson, p. 7, 2011). The tracking of the described instantiations (aim number (2)) is used to trace and thus discern the ALLing identity formation journeys (aim number (1)). This is further discerned comparing the evolving values that one actually self-cultivated and aspired towards to what the LLe apperceived them to be from the earliest points of the study.

### **Auto-Hermeneutics: Self-Interpreting**

Existential AuPh is not only phenomenological, it is also hermeneutical, more specifically, it is auto-hermeneutical (Fall, Roaten, & Eberts, 2012; Gorichanaz, 2018; Sartre, 1963). Auto-hermeneutics (AuH) is the interpreting (hermeneutics) of one’s own lived experience

(phenomenology) (Sloan & Bowe, 2014). This interpretation should be ever more accurate, thorough, and advanced as one continues one's self-interpretations (Taylor, 1985a) in order to be ever stronger evaluators of one's values. AuH is reflected in the *-graphy* of the term *auto-phenomenography* and is why it is not *autophenomenology*. The *-graphy* represents the hermeneutically written representational and interpretational products of the phenomenological processes (Allen-Collinson, 2011, pp. 12-13). When I enact hermeneutics (interpretation), I do it through a phenomenological lens (the lens the one interpreting). When I use the term phenomenology, I include hermeneutics as part of it since, "phenomenology is both descriptive and interpretative" (Gorichanaz & Latham, 2016, p. 1117). This makes sense since phenomena are "apprehended hermeneutically from phenomenological . . . experiences" (p. 1121), and "the interpretative nature of hermeneutics is . . . holistic, contextualized, and iterative" (Gorichanaz, 2017, p. 3). Hence, "there can be no fixed, hard and impenetrable boundary between description and interpretation . . . indeed any such dichotomy would be antithetical to the very openness and non-dualistic thinking of phenomenology itself" (Allen-Collinson, 2011, p. 8).

The term *auto-hermeneutics* was coined by Daniel Dennet (1992), touched on by John Caputo (2000), and fleshed out by Timothy Gorichanaz (2017, 2019) wherein "auto-hermeneutics generally seeks to characterize . . . phenomenon through one person's experience" (Gorichanaz, 2017, p. 4; and see Wei, 2011; Dovchin, Pennycook, & Sultana, 2018). To auto-hermeneutically paint a fuller picture of my interpretation of amalgamated experiences of moments, I absorb suggestions for auto-hermeneutics given by Gorichanaz (2017) into the AuPh perspective of Allen-Collinson (Allen-Collinson, 2009; 2011; 2012).

Having *auto-hermeneutics* as part of an overall quasi-anarchic existential auto-phenomenographic methodology (AuPh) is in keeping with auto-hermeneutics' suggestion that

“auto-hermeneutics may best be thought of as a research approach rather than a strict methodology” (Gorichanaz, 2017, p. 6). Through such an approach within an AuPh, I was able to create a methodology that revealed my self-cultivating and aspirational higher-order value pursuits, my existential motivators, and my identity formation journeys due to the flexibility of both the auto-hermeneutic approach and of its superordinate AuPh method: “Any tight prescription of method(s) would certainly run counter to the very openness of the phenomenological spirit . . . phenomenology is highly complex and never dogmatic” (Allen-Colinson, 2011, p. 9). This is because for phenomenological methods, “the aim is to explore, flexibly and in detail, an area of concern” (Smith, 2008, p. 55; and see Bogost, 2016, pp. 223-224).

Auto-hermeneutics is a “way to explore and describe the ontological nature of one’s own personally lived experience” (Gorichanaz, 2017, p. 1). For SLA, auto-hermeneutics in AuPh allows for exploration of prior undocumented contexts and occurrences regarding multiple additional language learning, motivation, and identity formation, which can set new precedents for further work in these areas and potentially deepen the understanding of the phenomena. One specific criterion taken from auto-hermeneutics is that researchers “focus on the experience of an individual rather than a group” (Gorichanaz, 2017, p. 5). Another criterion is the practice of some kind of in-the-moment documentation through systematic self-observation:

“Systematic self-observation (Rodriguez & Ryave, 2002) stems from the insight that many experiential phenomena can only be observed by the person having the experience. However, many aspects . . . go unnoticed, unremembered and unrecounted. This explains some of the difficulty that researchers have had with using interviews and surveys in attempting to collect

data after an experience . . . it highlights an opportunity for an auto-methodological approach to studying personal experience” (Gorichanaz, 2017, pp. 3-4).

My method includes documenting the instantiations of the ALings with other values and interactants at the time of the experiences. This method reduces “the distance between occurrence and data collection, leading to data that is more accurate, vivid, and free from the transformations of faulty memory” (Gorichanaz, 2017, p. 4). This is also known as a phenomenology of practice. A phenomenology of practice is “done using experientially descriptive accounts—that is, ones that present things as they happened and in detail” (Gorichanaz, 2018, p. 82). In this way, phenomenology of practice helps the researcher-participant perceive his identity formation through the daily documentation of his acts—i.e., his holistic descriptions of lived experiences as they occur.

More broadly, my study’s methods achieve the following goals for a phenomenology of practice: “Descriptive Richness: Does the text contain rich and recognizable experiential material?” (Gorichanaz, 2018, p. 229). This descriptive richness is done via the *detailed* daily documentations. “Interpretive Depth: Does the text offer reflective insights that go beyond the taken-for-granted understandings of everyday life?” (p. 229). Interpretive depth is achieved in both the BoS strong evaluation and the EoS stronger evaluation. And, “Inceptual Epiphany: Does the study offer us the possibility of deeper and original insight . . . of the ethics and ethos of life commitments and practices?” (p. 229). The last one is clearly achieved in this dissertation’s explication of its existential philosophical theory and its implementation via this methodology, seeing if and how my practices reflect my existential commitments and concomitant existential identities, both self-cultivating and aspirational.

## Data Collection Procedures with-and-as Data Analysis

### Beginning-of-Study Strong Evaluation

As mentioned in Chapter 3, *the purpose of this study having a beginning-of-study strong evaluation is to be(come) a strong evaluator in relation to ALLing rather than a simple weigher.* The point was to step back from the choices of my life and make sure I was really explicitly choosing to choose those ALs that connect with or could connect with values that I was most committed to or should be most committed to. Furthermore, Since “our self-interpretations are partly constitutive of our experience” (Taylor, 1985a, p. 37), writing out my BoS and EoS strong evaluations *were themselves* part of my identity formation. It *created* portions of my identity formation that would otherwise have been impossible to create. That is, the *act* of conducting BoS and EoS strong evaluations *is* part of the answers to my research question.

In the quasi-anarchic existential methodology, a person can enact a BoS in any way they see fit so long as they are using a vocabulary of worth to decide why something is of higher-order value to them and which values to convert into long-term commitments. I enacted the BoS strong evaluation in the manner described in the section “(Step 5) Conducting Strong Evaluation” and in the following ways:

Owen Flanagan suggests that when making identity articulations, one who desires existential authenticity considers what one can recall “of past and present identifications, desires, commitments, aspirations, beliefs, dispositions, temperament, roles, acts, and actional patterns, as well as by whatever self-understandings (even incorrect ones) each person brings to his or her life” (Flanagan, 1991, pp. 134–135). I attempted this, but what helped me the most was really getting down what I took to be the main features of existential identities, and then questioning myself based on these. That is, questioning what values are most important to me, what ones I

could stick with most permanently, what ones I could harmonize with each other or at least would not be conflicting, and what ones I might best be able to overlap with each other wherein I could pursue one while simultaneously pursuing the other.

What is important in promoting articulation, for the self and for any students one may have, are simple discovery questions. The questioning should be simple because the focus is in the answers—on the strong evaluators—and not in getting bogged down by complicatedly-worded question. If the questions are complicated that takes away from the answers—from the actual articulation, which is the whole point. Also, one wants to be able to live by it soon (or immediately). Therefore, I centered on discovering my higher-order values by asking myself what I most valued and why, and what I most wanted to want and why, and I continued this questioning until I discovered a delimited subset they I could live out readily. That is, “What do I value? What is important to me? What is interesting to me? Why?” Articulating the answers then creates a list of values and things of import and interest. Then asking of this list: “What is it about these things that I value?” “Why do I value this?” The list of answers received the same questions until I had a list of higher-order values while asking “Can I be willing to choose to choose this above the other (presumably) lower-order things?” and “If not, why not, what should I choose instead and why or when?” Based on this I re-ordered the values as needed and arrived at more fine-grained ordering of values. This tenets of simplicity in the methodology of this EPr is what make it *tenable* to actually be lived forth and not just be sitting in my head constantly analyzing or imagining myself in seven billion situations. The answers to these questions for this study are given in Chapter 5.

The BoS strong evaluation explains where I, as a Ller, was at that point and why I was there, while the daily logs and the analyzing of them further in an EoS stronger evaluation revealed if

and in what ways that identity formation played out (Barkhuizen 2011, pp. 401-402; de Beaufort, 2019, pp. 80-81). Hence, this study discerned the extent of the contexts and breadth of my Lling-related values throughout the 15.5-month study with a key telos of attaining and maintaining my selected combination of languages and other values. At the same time, this does not imply that such a study “is better the more details it includes, for the purpose . . . is not to chronicle as many points as possible in the weave of significance” (Davenport, 2012, p. 59), rather the purpose is to discern those values that were most important. The simpler description “can sometimes be ‘truer’ to life for picking out what is most salient” (p. 120). The goal was to articulate the weave of those things of *greater significance as accurately as possible*, i.e. as honestly, thoroughly, and most self-transparently as I could.

The BoS strong evaluation led me to commit to certain specific ALs and other central value(s), but it could never with complete certainty and fully exhaustively articulate an evaluation for why I ended up choosing X rather than Y. The *strong evaluation is never omnipotently strong* and the self-articulation must necessarily be limited in order for there to actually be eventual enacted commitments. As Noreen Khawaja points out for why she became an existentialist scholar, “none of the explanatory factors that present themselves to my questioning mind . . . why I went into my chosen line of work—is sufficient” and then she presents a strong evaluation supporting her decision while still remaining uncertain exactly how much these or others she cannot yet articulate came and come into play (Khawaja, 2016, p. 169).

Teloi are part of a commitment framework. One has a telos Goal X (be able to speak in French for an hour at the conversation group; learn to read Italian to B2+ level in one year) *because of one’s commitment to Xing in the long-term* (Italianing now and next week and the week after that, etc.). The telos serves to strengthen the directionality. One knows and is

reminded of what one is committed to becoming so that the term *progress* actually means something—one knows in which direction one is progressing toward (Kierkegaard, 1988). This is especially important in an existential ethic of care framework because, “caring in every domain implies competence. When we care, we accept the responsibility to work continuously on our competence so that the recipient of our care—person, animal, object, or idea—is enhanced” (Noddings, 1995, p. 368).

Having clarified to oneself one’s related-to-as higher-order values and corresponding teloi, one may find in the course of their journey they have misrelated to one or some of those values or their corresponding goals. This is part of the multiple-times-daily tracking of meaning-making and EoS strong evaluation. For example, this documentation showed me that, unlike what I had set forth in my BoS strong evaluation, I was not in actuality someone who sufficiently valued being a consistent Latin-learner towards a mastery-level telos.

## **Daily Movements**

### **Daily Logs of Narravive Instantiations**

In Chapter 2 I talked about identity instantiations. The operationalization of identity instantiations in my study was done by appropriating the concept of “narravive” from existentialist John J. Davenport (Davenport, 2012, pp. 70-82, 153-156). Specifically, the concept of narravive is adopted as a way to talk about instantiated LIng acts, which concern the multiple-times-per day journaling of this study. I prefer to call them narravive instantiations because I could not be certain whether or not they would all instantiate existential identities (i.e., those narravive instantiations that connect with my higher-order values).

The term narravive was created in order to *distinguish* what people normally think when they think of a *narrative* as something we read in a book or see in a movie theater *from* something

actually *lived-out*, which is what the term *narravive* is used to describe (Davenport, 2012, pp. 70-82, 153-156). Davenport created this by combining the Latin words *narro* and *narrare* which mean “to make known” or “to be(come) conscious of” (Narro, 2021; Narrare, 2021) and the Latin word *vivere* which means “to live” (Vivere, 2021).

A narravive instantiation requires, “unity of apperception and minimally well-functioning semantic and episode memory” (Davenport, 2012, p. 94). Memory allows us to have enough of a mental narravival flow to direct and commit ourselves to doing relatively simple narravival tasks such as ordering a coffee or finding a bathroom. Even in ordering a coffee there is a clear flow of narravive in the committed task: a beginning, a betweenness, and an end with potential dramatic flourishes between as well as potential multiple simultaneous narravives occurring (e.g., texting one’s friend who also wants you to order him a coffee). At even this basic level, there is human agency, and therefore, even in these, not only does the person have the ability to choose, but they *cannot not* choose *something* (Sartre, 1946, p. 2). Even in completing a sentence, there are many choices going on, e.g., words to use, tone, etc., because in “each literary-verbal performance, consciousness must actively orient itself amid heteroglossia . . . it chooses, in other words, a ‘language’” (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 295). One chooses each sentence spoken or written, including choosing how to respond when sentence errors are made (to apologizing or simply continue talking in order to clarify). Authenticity comes into play when one admits this to oneself and takes on the responsibility for each of his choices, even though malapropisms and slip ups commonly occur. One with existential authenticity takes responsibility for trying to say what they are trying to say.

Each narravive instantiation reveals a potential existential identity manifestation. It is an actual existential identity instantiation when someone identifies with it in a self-cultivational

and/or aspirational way and it is not ambitious. Aspirational and self-cultivational narravive instantiations are explicitly made “volitional identifications” (Davenport, 2012, p. 105)—one freely chooses these acts as part of one’s identities. Thus, we can *know* how one’s identity forms in and through ALLing by what one *intentionally* reads, listens to, writes, says, movements made with her body, and so on as valued to the person. While this can, to a great extent, be perceived by an outside observer, it can only be known phenomenologically by the language learner himself because only the person himself knows what he is attending to at *any* given moment and only the person himself can know what he does when alone (Gorichanaz, 2017; Pavlenko, 2016).

However, narravive instantiations may merely be drifting *whats* but not also *hows* of a person (Frankl, 1984; Webster, 2004, 2005). Thus, each narravive instantiation is a less or more important act towards a drifting, ambitious, aspirational, or cultivating identity. For example, the narravive instantiation of listening to a lecture in Italian by Luciano Floridi reveals my aspirational identity (formation) to be a multilingual who possesses Italian as one of his acquired languages. The time spent in my self-cultivating and aspirational narravive instantiations were logged as time-under-tension. Reflecting on the narravive instantiations during the EoS strong evaluation provides further interpretations of my identity formations.


Existential motivation (EM) is the best explanatory motivation-type for such a study done long-term because even the “feeling that I must act may or may not be sustained. I must make a commitment to act . . . the continual renewal of commitment over this span of time” (Noddings, 2003, p. 16). Again, by long-term, I mean the length of time it (generally) takes to acquire a skill, productive (speaking a language; playing tennis) or receptive (listening to a language; a genuine appreciation for classical music or watching a tennis match). In other words, six months or

longer (Hunt & Weintraub, 2002). By definition, aspirational journeys and self-cultivational journeys are long-term.

The tracking of my ALing over time revealed if I lived authentically in congruence with my claimed EM (Davenport, 2012; Stebbins, 2007, 2013; Wlosowicz, 2013); if my volitional state was “ongoing, repeatedly renewed, rather than consisting in a single moment of decision” of the BoS strong evaluation (Davenport, 2012, p. 116). The aspirational hope was that the narrative instantiations themselves would not only reveal the EM but also work to increase that momentum as proleptic reasons were found and the ALs more deeply appreciated as values. The EM producing the authentic narrative instantiations and the authentic narrative instantiations revealing the EM is represented simply in the visual aid of Figure 4.1.

**Figure 4.1 Interaction between Existential Motivation & Authentic Narrative**

**Instantiations**



In AuPh, unlike studies that “rely largely upon the recollection of events long after their occurrence . . . our approach is based upon the daily collection of data during the actual process”

(Allen-Collinson & Hockey, 2001, p. 99). Daily documentation is interested in “actual use” and “under what conditions” of ALing (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 401), in those things that are actually enacted and interacted with during language engagement and in what contexts. Thus, as much as can, each experience log “situates itself not above or on the side of action but at its point of production . . . to eschew the spectatorial viewpoint and to grasp action-in-the-making” (Wacquant, 2015, p. 4). That is, it is documented by the Ller at the moment of his language-engagement.

These dailies can be readily understood as “engagement logs,” akin to “training logs” used in Allen-Collinson, Vaittinen, Jennings, & Owton’s auto-phenomenographic study (2018, p. 8). These were done during or right after the engagement. I made copies of it on my Dropbox and Google Drive so I could readily add to it through my laptop or cellphone, one of which I always had close at hand. This provided a methodological “strategy of inquiry that examines motivation ‘as it is constructed and expressed in and through interaction’” (Ushoida, 2009, p. 225; McGroarty, 1998, p. 600), such as in-the-moment interactions with characters, books, videos, writing, oneself, etc. The daily logs permitted me to produce a thorough, accurate, and cohesive study which “captures the qualitative richness of the phenomenon” (Nowell, Norris, White, & Moules, 2017, p. 6).

Just as with the identities and values of which they are a part, narravive instantiations (e.g., I am a man typing on a laptop right now) may be nested in higher narravive identity-levels (e.g., I am a Ph.D. student right now working on his dissertation) (Davenport, 2012). For example, I am finishing a comment in Italian about one topic in a podcast which is nested in my interactively listening to the entire 45-minute Italian podcast. Thus, lower-level narravives structure higher-level narravives (Davenport, 2012, p. 94).

Narrative instantiations are journaled and articulated in a descriptive-interpretive fashion that follows several methodological traditions: “narrative thought” (Yussen & Orzcan, 1996, p. 2), the six dimensions of mental-or-physical L2 behavior in SLA’s Sociocultural Theory (Lantolf & Pavlenko, 2001, p. 144), and the Burkean pentad (Burke, 1969). Narrative thought is summarized as possessing three elements: a person, a setting, and an implied purpose (Taylor, 1985a, p. 80; Yussen & Orzcan, 1996, p. 2). Even if I write something as simple as “my house’s address is X,” I have engaged in narrative thought because I have a character (myself), a setting (house), an implied purpose (house implies a thing made for living in), and even a sort of implied action (possessing or living in a place). Since I journal my narrative instantiations as or right after they happen, I call this narrative instantiation, rather than narrative thought. Keeping the term *narrative* gives a clear reminder that we are talking of actual lived experiences *as they are lived* rather than lived experiences with added narrative literary flair or flourishes or as documented removed-from-the context in time and/or place (Lindemann-Nelson, 2001).

The three dimensions of narrative thought are supplemented with three dimensions missing from it of the total six dimensions of mental-or-physical L2 behavior in SLA’s Sociocultural Theory (Lantolf & Pavlenko, 2001). These six dimensions are the *individual*, *what* the individual is doing, *how* the individual is acting (in consort with other individuals and/or artifacts), *where* the individual is acting, *why* the individual is acting, and *when* the activity occurs (Lantolf & Pavlenko, 2001, p. 144). The three of those that are missing from narrative thought are what the individual is doing, how the individual is doing it, and when the activity occurs.

Lantolf and Pavlenko justify incorporating these six by way of certain “fundamental principles” (2001, p. 144). Those fundamental principles are as follows: “The human mind is formed and functions as a consequence of human interaction with the culturally constructed

environment” (p. 144) and this environment “is as objective as other physical, chemical, and biological properties” (p. 145); hence, we want to objectively know in which cultural artifacts the ALing took place, i.e., the *where* (e.g., Hale Library). Activities are also “impelled by motives . . . directed at specific goals” (p. 145); hence, actions are ontologically inseparable from purpose (see Taylor, 1985a). Therefore, documenting the action by the person doing the action *is* a documentation of the motivation/purpose of the action because it is documented in such a way that describes the intentionality of the action which is what the action actually is (MacIntyre, 2009, pp. 161ff).

Finally, “Mental processes are derived from external actions through the course of appropriation of the artifacts made available . . . both physical” e.g., computers, books “and semiotic” e.g., words and phrases heard or read (Lantolf & Pavlenko, 2001, p. 145). Hence, unlike the cultural place the action occurred in, we also want to know what cultural artifacts were being directly acted with (the *what* the LLer was interacting with, e.g., a cell phone, an Italian operatic video, a bilingual dictionary, a pencil), especially since “Activities are oriented to objects (concrete or ideal)” (p. 145). This is *the medium or interactants* (YouTube, paperback, face-to-face human, etc.) by which I interacted with the ALs (Bakhtin, 1981, 1984; Bogost, 2012; Harman, 2015). Dewey understood this when he said, “The urge to express . . . the perceived qualities of a landscape is continuous with demand for pencil or brush. Without external embodiment, an experience remains incomplete” (2005, p. 53). Thus, one’s experience of one’s identity formation is more complete as one is able to articulate it with objects—such as writing about it or recording oneself talking about it, hence, the -graphy in auto-phenomenography (Allen-Collinson, 2011; Bogost, 2012; Goulah 2017; Harman, 2015; Pennycook, 2018a; Pennycook, 2018b).

Including physical cultural artifacts in the daily logs also is in keeping with being a broadly-encompassing methodology (Lantolf, Thorne, & Poehner, 2015). Objects affect language learners in nearly all contexts in their identity formation, motivation, and language exposure (Pennycook, 2018b). When one is studying “a language that has few or no ‘natural’ communicative functions . . . and for which there are few opportunities for use” (de Beaufort, 2019, p. 32; De Felice, 2012), especially when one is studying it in times of existential uncertainty, objects become even more salient in combating the existential opportunity deprivation (Bogost, 2012).

Returning to the last methodological tradition that this study’s daily logs follow, the “Burkean pentad” is especially important in a study on motivation (Bruner, 1990, p. 85). As researcher Kenneth Burke observed, “any complete statement about motives will offer some kind of answers to these five questions: what was done (act), when or where it was done (scene), who did it (agent), how he did it (agency), and why (purpose)” (Burke, 1969, p. xv). This is the case because “all statements that assign motives can be shown to arise out of them [the pentad] and to terminate in them” (p. xvi). It is important to credit the pentad since it is described long before the six dimensions of mental-or-physical Lling behavior given by Lantolf and Pavlenko (2001), but I do add to his pentad their explicit dimension of “when it was done” (what day) *and* where (whereas the Pentad states “when *or* where”). I also add three other documented dimensions to all of these models by including how much time was spent engaging with the language (not only the day that it occurred on), which language was interacted with (French or Latin or etc.), *and* the general content that was engaged with in the AL (philosophy, theology, etc.). The latter two are spelled out here so there is no confusion as exactly what was included in my daily journaling, but

they could (also) be considered as falling under Burke’s dimensions of “what was done (act)” and “how he did it (agency),” respectively (1969, p. xv).

Hence, I documented each multi-times-daily in-the-moment narravive instantiation with at minimum the following eight dimensions of information: day, location, language, the content, the cultural artifact medium by which I interact with the content, how much time I spent *attentively* doing such, any in-person agents with myself, and the purpose if not already implied by the other information given (Allen-Collinson, 2011; Bogost, 2012; Engel, 2008; Gorichanaz, 2017; Hockey, 2018; Hulstijn, Young, Ortega, Bigelow, DeKeyser, Ellis, Lantolf, Mackey, & Talmy, 2014; Larsen-Freeman, 2015; Wacquant, 2015; Whiten, 2012). I also often logged my own commentary of what I was watching and thinking and realizing in the ALs and particular vocabulary I wanted to hone in on. Furthermore, salient, impactful times and places on a broader level (e.g., study abroad opportunities continuing to be cancelled) was also documented in the daily logs as they occurred and impacted my ALing lifestyle, as well as any shifts in my personal philosophies (Agar, 1994; Polkinghorne, 1995; Wacquant, 2015).

Two examples of minimal narravival articulation are the following: “July, 23, 2021: watching a video in Hale Library about the coffee bean market in order to understand the topic better (the coffee market) and to engage with Spanish more: 0.5 hours.” And, “October, 14, 2020: learning more about philosophy *and* French by reading René Girard’s *Des choses cachées depuis la fondation du monde* (Girard, 1978) in my apartment in order to more deeply understand Catholic philosophy and to attempt to value French slightly more: 2 hours.”

The main point here is that *the narravive is the descriptive-interpretive apparatus by which the identity instantiations are initially named/articulated*. Therefore, I could assure that indeed *aspirational and self-cultivating higher-order identities and the narravival articulations that*

*comprise them are the phenomena studied in this inquiry.* At the end of study, I more deeply interpret these and their longer-term identity formations in my end-of-study (EoS) stronger evaluation. The EoS is a further articulating of these engagements to perceive, at minimum, if indeed the EM, self-cultivation identity formations, and aspirational formations were what the beginning-of-study strong evaluation articulated them to be and if there were proleptic reasons discovered by which I was able to better advance in my aspirational journeys.

To be clear, this study is not a narrative inquiry as much as it is a *philosophical* inquiry, specifically an existential philosophical inquiry focused on *articulating* the self-cultivating identity formation journeys and the aspirational identity formation journeys (Burbules & Warnick, 2006, pp. 489-502; Callard, 2018). The point is truly to see what those valued-to-me self-cultivating and aspirational commitments and important happenings ended up being. *Therefore* it is not centered on turning everything into a written narrative but rather to perceive what I found as most valued and what I committed to as such *via the actually lived-while-lived* daily moments *and* via looking back over my BoS strong evaluation comparatively with the 12 months of movements when I created the EoS stronger evaluation.

Importantly, the existential concept of authentic resolve as self-cultivation or aspiration (self-creation) occurs via explicit choices lived out committedly, long-term, through acts of good faith. Therefore, I could methodologically track this via the ALing narravive instantiations of ALLing existential identities and identity formation journeys, i.e., the aware-of, related-to, and acted-out long-term value commitments. With the strong evaluations, this is the living out of Steps 1 to 6 of existential authenticity explicated in Chapter 3.

### **Data to Help Assist in Perceiving Commitments**

Each narrative instantiation that is a self-cultivating or aspirational identity instantiation is an instance of explicitly engaging with a value-oriented AL. In this section I spell out exactly what I mean by “engage with” through the concept of time-under-tension. To make this minimally measurable and still open to engaging with the ALs through different mediums and means concerning potentially different topics, the ALings (i.e., language engagements) were measured numerically throughout the study *only* via the metric of time.

Since the times that were measured are *reflected on, explicitly made, actively attended-to, ALing-and-value pursuit* times, their measurements are referred to as *time-under-tension* (TUT) (Burd, Andrews, West, Little, Cochran, Hector, Cashaback, Gibala, Potvin, Baker, & Phillips, 2012; Dyjack, 2018). While my main data were the strong evaluations, journal entries themselves, and my phenomenological perception of the most valued to me objects and events, TUT helped to provide some amount of triangulation to perceive that these language pursuits were indeed consistently committed-to Lling pursuits.

TUT is the purposeful time spent attending to a value-based AL by explicitly choosing to explicitly engage with it. The term TUT was chosen due to being, “commonly employed in strength and conditioning training and is a reference to how long a muscle is under strain during exercise” (Dyjack, 2018, p. 62). This has been proven to be effective in increasing strength compared to other methods (Burd, Andrews, West, Little, Cochran, Hector, Cashaback, Gibala, Potvin, Baker, & Phillips, 2012). For my study, this meant time spent actively engaging with an AL in the sense of paying purposive, value-based, active attention to the language in terms of what I am listening to (understanding what is being said), what I am writing in the language, what I am hearing, and what I am speaking (each of these includes explicit thinking). Therefore, simply staring at a page of Portuguese while I daydreamed in English did not count as TUT,

neither did listening to Portuguese in my truck while I was mainly paying attention to not hitting anyone playing in the street, and so on.

In TUT I was not engaging with the AL in a way where “some detail or arrangement of details serves as cue for bare identification” (Dewey, 2005, p. 54). Rather, TUT consisted of the kind of thought that Dewey calls *perception*, “to study and to ‘take in.’ Perception replaces bare recognition” (p. 54). In other words, in perception we are actively attending to something with an openness to learning something (Bakhtin, 1981). We are aware of those things we are bringing to our minds for the first time or renewed or a combination of a first-and-renewed something e.g., seeing something new or anew. “Perception is an act of the going-out of energy in order to receive . . . We must summon energy . . . in order to take in” (Dewey, 2005, p. 55). Thus, in TUT I am perceiving something new or re-learned in or through the AL. In this way, in TUT, I am *creating* (in the case of newing) or *sharpening* (in the case of renewing or anewing) something in my mind through engaging with an additional language.

TUT as engagement-interaction (i.e., as languaging) is receptivity not passivity, “a process consisting of a series of responsive acts that accumulate toward objective fulfillment. Otherwise, there is not perception but recognition” (Dewey, 2005, p. 54). And, therefore, we see that TUT is only auto-phenomenologically known. Only the person himself knows if he is engaging with something in this way. Kierkegaard explains how listening and reading to something when alone are just as interactive as talking and writing, but it is more dependent on the subjective self to be actively doing the interacting because the thing read or heard,

“does not even know who you are. But if you think . . . vividly, it will seem to you, whoever you are, as if it were speaking directly to you. This is not the merit of the discourse; it is the

action of your self-activity that you . . . on your own initiative will to be the one intimately addressed” (Kierkegaard, 1993, p. 123).

Dewey presents the same sentiment when he says, “to perceive, a beholder must create his own experience” (Dewey, 2005, p. 56). For example, if I’m listening to Spanish music where I enjoy the beat but do not learn and thus do not really *listen to* (although I *hear*) the vocabulary such that I understand the song, that is *recognition*, not *perception*. However, perception-  
interaction is occurring when I am listening to the song in one of the following types of ways: with the lyrics pulled up consciously learning new turns of phrase, trying to feel how I imagine the singer-songwriter was feeling when he wrote it, how he might be wanting his audience to feel, critiquing it or actively agreeing with it, using dictionaries, forums, and/or corpuses to get at the precise connotation of the words and collocations he is using that I before did not as fully understand—looking for that explanation that most explains how the singer may have been feeling when writing that word/phrase, etc.

Perception is all about what the Ller himself attends to that he values (not what others think he is attending to or should attend to)—beyond that actual definition, there are no added rules or limits as to what perception is. For if there are any rules or classifications beyond this, then the “classification sets limits to perception . . . it restricts creative work” (Dewey, 2005, p. 235).

One identity-forms with each act of intentionally listening to or reading in an AL, because such stimulates dialogues “within one’s self, between the self and the author . . . through exemplars provided in stories . . . and . . . contents of text” (Landay, 2004, p. 112; Davies & Harre 1999; Block, 2009; Weedon, 2004; Hall, 2004; Gee, 1996; de Beaufort, 2019). Furthermore, literacy and listening activities “promote dialogism, both internal—within one individual consciousness, and external—between two or more speaking subjects” (Landay, 2004,

p. 112). In these Kierkegaardian, Deweyian, and Landayan ways the narrative instantiations are a going beyond the self-as-solitary. It is a more broadly dialogizing of the self by seeing the many others within each utterance one consumes or produces, each object one uses, each place one learns in, and each living being one languages with (Bakhtin, 1981, 1986; Coatey, 1999; Dovchin, Pennycook, Sultana, 2018; Gorichanaz, 2018; Hadot, 1995, esp. p. 211; Hulstijn, Young, Ortega, Bigelow, DeKeyser, Ellis, Lantolf, Mackey, & Talmy, 2014; Stariou, 2014)

TUT was logged multiple times daily, as they occurred, but added up weekly, and then perused, totaled, and averaged trimonthly with attempts to increase each trimonthly season's average in each subsequent season. At 12-months, TUT over the course of each season of the entire study was analyzed to see if there were consistent increased dedications over time. This provided one more key way to perceive my identity-conferring pursuits in my EoS stronger evaluation.

A general EM-as-commitment was to engage with the six ALs in some way every week with other higher-order values for at least the duration of a year, but also there was a commitment to an identity formation of attempting continually to transcend in some small way the previous AL self which could be a way to know if I was growing in my aspiring or not (Bakhtin, 1986; Callard, 2021b; Harvey, 2017; Vygotsky, 1986). That is, my past AL selves acted as controls for my present AL selves. I measured this by way of seeing if I *engaged* with the AL this season *more* than I did last trimonthly's season and if I increased the present season's average TUT per-week more than the last season's. In these ways, each present season was the experimental self comparing itself to its past season's self; and my present and past AL selves acted together as controls for my future AL selves—giving an “at-least-minimal amount of time” that that future experimental self would strive to achieve and supersede.

I chose this form of measurement rather than directly comparing only one week's TUT to the immediately preceding week's TUT because *individual* weekly TUT were too subject to chance (e.g., if I travelled during my French day with family one week but not the next). However, averaging the weeks over the course of three-months gave an appropriate indicator of actual growth in, maintenance of, or lack of commitments in actions.

TUT tracking was a way to see if I spent more ALing (e.g., Italianing) this trimonthly season more than I did the prior seasons. It was a way of showing my 12-month commitment via willed-forth resolve in the form of in-the-now actions (i.e., movements of faith) with an emphasis “on how to be better—just some, realistically better” (Noddings, 2003, p. 121).

Another way to triangulate my data concerning my aspirational commitments to academic *comprehension* of the ALs was to take tests created by the American Council of the Teaching of Foreign Languages (ACTFL) in Listening or Reading skills in the languages they offered: Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, and French; they do not offer them in Latin or Greek. ACTFL tests are used for placement in appropriate levels for modern language students in American universities (ACTFL, 2016; Clark & Clifford, 1988). As of the year 2020, “The ACTFL scale and descriptors are still one of the most widely used foreign language proficiency assessment frameworks in public schools, colleges, and universities nationwide” (Ulrich, 2020, p. 115). Their tests are always proctored, and the proctor requires you to show them your surroundings and that you are in a room behind a locked door. The proctor continues observing you throughout the test and closes the test for you when you are done. One must pay to take their tests, with a range from \$51 to \$165 and they last from 50 minutes to 120 minutes.

Taking the ACTFL tests was also useful in assisting me in being as self-transparent as possible by seeing a bit more clearly whether I truly did have the multilingual identities by the

end of the study that I had been aspiring to have because, “someone who is to learn must really be learning and not only appearing to learn . . . a certain kind of actual progress toward grasping the way things are” (Callard, 2018, p. 242). The results section discuss if I attained at least an Intermediate High (B2) level of proficiency in each AL, with this level chosen simply as one more bit of data that might point towards long-term commitment, rather than for the purpose of giving a definitive quantifiable endpoint (Baztán, 2008; Ushioda, 2017).

### **End-of-Study Stronger Evaluation**

The EoS stronger evaluation is a type of articulation where I write out my interpretations of the entire study and name the most important formators while keeping in mind that, “an account of a real life that omits many details may be more insightful for highlighting the experiences and choices that were most important” (Davenport, 2012, p. 59). Thus, this study is *not* concerned with corpus frequency data in order to relate importance, but rather with the phenomenological perception of the Ller as to his sense-significance of what is of value-based importance.

Furthermore, naming one’s own lived out identities is important because there are identities that can only be named by the self living as such and identifying as such, otherwise the identities would not have a name because they are not sufficiently socially valued or ubiquitous in one’s society to have already been named by that society (Lippett, 2013). An example is the valued identity of being someone who is an expert at understanding Luciano Floridi’s Italian accent and his philosophical explications.

The BoS strong evaluation’s main point was to reflect and then name my potential higher-order identities journeys. The multiple-times-daily journaling was the naming of my ALing narravive instantiations as they were lived (e.g., “Reading Rene Girard in French in the fourth floor of Hale library on February, 20, 2021, for 1 hour”) (also known as movements of faith).

The final portion of the study was the reflecting on the BoS strong evaluation and the 12 months of multiple-day-journaling in order to discern my higher-order value-based identities (e.g., “a reader of philosophy in French”) and those that were not, such as realizing I needed to drop a language in order to focus on French due to my finding out a relative was studying French deeply and my poor attempt at talking it with the relative.

Going over my dailies at 12-months to discover my value preferences gives further justification for calling them actual higher-order values beyond my own initial reflective judgements in my BoS strong evaluation, because the EoS evaluation provides a further depth to “triple subjectivity: researcher—observer—introspecting subject” (Jones, 1994, p. 444), and, hence, it is the stronger evaluation of the two strong evaluations. In the EoS phase, I read through the entire 12-months of daily logging in order to both get “impressionistic readings of the descriptions in order to gain a feel for the whole” as well as “in-depth re-reading of these descriptions” (Allen-Collinson, 2011, p. 16). This was done in order to attempt to see the value-pursuits as a whole as well as see the important proleptic reasons discovered and other happenings and realizations along the way that had particular value-import to the journey. This reading “through the entire data set at least once” provided “ideas and identification of possible patterns” as I became even more “familiar with all aspects” of my data (Nowell, Norris, White, & Moules, 2017, p. 5; Braun and Clarke, 2006).

My mentality to see what my actual higher-order values were as compared to my proclaimed ones in my BoS strong evaluation meant I kept my mind open to any accounts that departed from what my BoS strong evaluation had set out to do (Nowell, Norris, White, & Moules, 2017, p. 6). Furthermore, as I went through all of my journal entries, I kept in mind the four features of identity: importance, permanence, harmony-conflict, and embeddedness-separateness, discerning

and deciphering what was more or less important to me, what was more permanently at the forefront of my mind throughout the study, what seemed to be integrated with or separated from each other and in what ways, and how any of it was embedded in any of the others.

As I poured over the journal entries, I kept these thoughts in mind in order to better discern the value-identity formation (becoming) journey *and* this discerning itself was part of the process of valuational-becoming: What did and does what I noticed and notice mean to me? What did and does it connect with other things I noticed (within or across ALs)? *How* did and does it connect with other things I noticed? How does this development / switchback / segue seem to flow / contour the identity forming journeys and, therefore, reveal what is more or less valued by me long-term?

### **Quality Criteria**

“Qualitative research must be assessed according to some standard” (Gorichanaz, 2017, p. 4). Therefore, this portion of the chapter will outline the standards that my study was judged by. In the end, I did indeed adhere to these throughout the study. These are broken down into the quality criteria of trustworthiness, transferability, credibility-validity, and confirmability-dependability (Gorichanaz, 2017; Nowell, Norris, White, & Moules, 2017).

### **Trustworthiness**

Because the LLe<sub>r</sub> himself (which is myself) is the only one who has access to perceiving what his higher-valued identity formations were throughout the study (which necessarily includes motivation), in order for such a study to be trustworthy, the following criteria needed to be adhered to and, therefore, were adhered to:

(1) *Honest* articulations: By this I mean honest articulations by the LLe<sub>r</sub> (myself) as far as what he actually does and did attend to, rather than any false statements e.g., false claims /

testimony of things attended to when they were not, or how much he attended to them, or how important they were, etc. To avoid accidentally doing so, it was important that I logged what I did and thought *during* the time of doing it and thinking it or *immediately* after. Then, when time removed, during the EoS stronger evaluation, I honestly articulated how those times interacted with each other, and how I saw which ones as having been most impactful by it still being important to me at the removed time from the logs.

(2) *Thorough* articulations of the *entire* research-study: By this I mean that the LLer tells as much of the relevant-to-the-journey portions as possible—that he does not leave out anything of *importance* that he actually did and does notice. In this way, any reader of the data is not, as it were, only getting partial truths. While the literal “whole story” is never fully plumbed, this quality criterion states that we get as much of the importantly-valued portions of the story as possible. Therefore, it is important that the LLer logs as many times as he can (e.g., multiple-times-daily) whenever he is attending to the ALs and what it is he is attending to in those ALs.

(3) *Advanced/Developed* articulations: By this I mean there are articulations that have been sharpened and developed to be even more self-transparent *and* more accurately discerned and described. Thus, there are articulations that are more authentically showing of what the LLer holds as more-or-less important and why and the evolutions of such throughout the journey (Taylor, 1985a). This primarily relates to the EoS stronger evaluation.

### **Transferability and the Epistemological Stance of This Study**

This study’s epistemological stance maintains the type of research question that this study asked can be asked of any LLer, and it can be known (perceived) as concerns each unique LLer through the existential auto-phenomenographical (AuPh) methods of strong evaluations and in-the-moment logging of language engagements (Allen-Collinson, 2011, 2012, 2018; Allen-

Collinson & Hockey, 2001; de Beaufort, 2019, p. 71; Bruner, 1987, 1991; Davenport, 2012; Gorichanaz, 2017, 2018; Hockey & Allen-Collinson, 2007; Kierkegaard, 1988; Taylor, 1985a, 1985b; Noddings, 2003; Watson, 2007, p. 371). This quasi-anarchic method whereby each LLer can discover her own valued strong evaluation and can enact her own engagements in her own ways makes this methodologically particularly transferable (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000). Also, in this way, it attends to the call to action to “consider how individuals ‘live’ and ‘imagine’ languages at their own pace, and on their own terms by engaging in their agency . . . and tracing their own trajectories” (de Beaufort, 2019, p. 37; Ros i Sole, 2013, p. 336).

Transferability is also supplied by way of writing this chapter, Chapter 4, itself: “In describing . . . data collection techniques, and analysis in detail, I maximized the transferability” (Gorichanaz, 2017, p. 6). That is, I provided “thick descriptions, so that those who seek to transfer the findings to their own site can judge transferability” (Nowell, Norris, White, & Moules, 2017, p. 3). I spell out more ways in which this is transferable in my “Future Research and Broader Applications” section of Chapter 5.

### **Credibility-Validity**

A strong evaluation for any existential study on identity and motivation in LIng should fulfill *both* Taylor’s three criteria for self-interpretation as base-level criteria *and* the higher-level criteria of Hilde Lindemann’s three credibility criteria. First, I will discuss Taylor’s three criteria for self-interpretation:

“first . . . its sense or coherence; and second, that this sense can be expressed in another form, so that we can speak of the interpretation as giving clearer expression to what is only implicit in the explicandum. The third condition, that this sense be for a subject” (Taylor, 1985b, p. 27).

Taylor's first criterion is achieved especially in the way the EoS stronger evaluation brings the entire sense and coherence of the study together. His second criterion is fulfilled by conducting self-interpretation through my, at minimum, eight dimensions of in-the-moment logging and then expressing that in another form by way of my EoS stronger evaluation. His last criterion is fulfilled by way of the study being done auto-methodologically. That is, it makes sense to the LLeR subject himself.

Philosopher Hilde Lindemann Nelson lists three credibility constraints (or credibility criteria) for self-interpretative self-descriptions where one's descriptions of one's identity formation is credible insofar as it provides strong explanatory force, correlation to action, and heft (2001, p. 93). (1) Strong explanatory force means that what is included in my EoS stronger evaluation are explanations that are most consistent with the data and coherent. Lindemann Nelson supports this with concepts of credibility given by Ronald Dworkin of verifiability, simplicity, and elegance (Dworkin, 1986, p. 53). Verifiability means one can see if the self-interpretations are at least consistent with the data. For example, one can check the data (such as daily logs) to see if the EoS stronger evaluation sufficiently lines up with it. Simplicity and elegance coincide with coherence of the self-description as well as it being sufficiently broad in scope without it being unmanageable. For example, this study focuses on higher-order valued identities rather than every single identity that may be temporarily instantiated over the course of 15.5 months.

(2) Lindemann Nelson's second credibility constraint is "correlation to action" (p. 95). This constraint states that "since acts express a person's identity, we have reason to believe a story is identity-constituting only if there is a strong correlation between it and the person's actions" (p. 95). This coincides with the "consistent with the data" part of the first credibility constraint (strong explanatory force) insofar as the data track one's actions. The *accuracy* of the self-

interpretation of one's existential identities can be verified by what actually happened. This is most clearly fulfilled by my in-the-moment journaling of my languaging as it is lived.

Lindemann Nelson (2001) claims that writing about such is more important than writing style:

The beauty of the writing is “irrelevant here . . . What we are after . . . is not art but accuracy . . . it must depict the proportions faithfully” (Lindemann Nelson, 2001, pp. 98-99). This makes it different than many other types of auto-methodologies where the aesthetic outcome of the methodology is important, such as poetical or emotive auto-methodologies. It speaks further to why this is more of a philosophical inquiry than it is a narrative inquiry.

Furthermore, when this is in strong(er) evaluative format, it is bidirectional. A credible self-description of one's identity formation that correlates with how one has lived is backward-looking in that it explains the person's past actions, but it should also be forward-looking in structuring the field of the person's actions such “that she can continue to act in accordance with who she understands herself to be” (p. 95). For example, I can see myself continuing in all four of my ALs even after this Ph.D. when, presumably, I will have a full-time job and so on.

(3) Lindemann Nelson's last credibility constraint is *heft*. Heft assures that the self-description is about *valued* identity formations where the description is “woven around the features of people's lives that they . . . care about most . . . values she cares about most and with which, accordingly, she is most closely identified” (2001, p. 96). This is discerned only auto-phenomenographically because only the person knows what instances on the journey reflected what she valued more and what proleptic reasons reinforced a growing value. Something that seems to others “quite trivial could credibly be considered identity-constituting if, for the particular person, the thing weren't trivial at all” (p. 96).

Furthermore, credibility *and* confirmability can be strengthened by the data I collected in a “consistent, and exhaustive manner . . . and disclosing the methods of analysis with enough detail to enable the reader to determine whether the process is credible” and confirmable-dependable (Nowell, Norris, White, & Moules, 2017, p. 1). Therefore, in order to establish a strong level of credibility for this study, this dissertation has included strong “reasons for theoretical, methodological, and analytical choices throughout the entire study, so that others can understand how and why decisions were made” (p. 3). This study has fulfilled the general concerns of validity / credibility of clearly given aims, the means of attending to those aims and the strong justification for those means (the methods), and the ways this study actually did (described, documented, analyzed, and interpreted) what it aimed to do.

AuPh permitted me to studying a case in its real-world, holistic, fuller contexts and its in-the-moment documentation, rather than via surveys or three-or-more steps removed interviews (Bromley, 1986; Pavlenko, 2011a). This provided descriptive richness. Also, AuPh “offers a distinct advantage regarding validity: It eliminates the possibility for misinterpretation of the participant’s account” since it is *auto*-hermeneutically interpreted (Gorichanaz, 2017, p. 5), “which is one validity threat to phenomenological research in general” (p. 5). Specifically, this provides ecological validity since autophenomenographies,

“bring to the fore many issues that may not be visible in . . . qualitative methods such as participant observation or learner interviews . . . the disadvantage of requiring a second person—the researcher—as an interpreter. First-person accounts . . . allow for ecological validity in a way that more traditional research paradigms cannot” (Marx, 2002, p. 269).

Given the additional language component, issues of COVID 19 existential insecurity, and difficulty communicating face-to-face during such times, “Regarding validity, my single-case

design was warranted as this was a revelatory case of a novel context” (Gorichanaz, 2017, p. 6). Similarly, this study is warranted due to being an “‘unusual case’, in which an opportunity arises to study a rare phenomenon [e.g., the LLeR in a global pandemic] . . . offering an initial contribution to the literature” (Gorichanaz, 2017, p. 3).

The daily enacted experiences documented in the daily logs were a means for credibility by a avoiding a major pitfall “in conducting autoethnography” where there is “excessive reliance on memory as a data source” (Gorichanaz, 2017, p. 5). Therefore, I enacted in-the-moment systematic self-observation via my daily documentation (Rodriguez & Ryave, 2002), collecting data in the moment.

Also, complementary types of data were used to increase the probability that the research findings and interpretations were credible, such as my strong evaluations, daily logs, my TUT times, my ACTFL scores, and it being a “‘longitudinal case’, which allows a view of change over time” (Gorichanaz, 2017, p. 3; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). These are taken as each connected to ALLing identity formation from a different vantage point (daily, yearly; historic, presently-lived, apartment to university; the vantage point of a well-validated language proficiency test, etc.) (García, 2019).


In sum, this study has established credibility and validity by giving accounts (1) with beginning-of-study strong evaluative in-depth reflection, (2) documenting multiple-times-daily languaging instantiations as they occurred, (3) in detail, (4) with an end-of-study strong evaluation with reflective interpretive depth of the daily documentation and the BoS strong evaluation, providing (5) a deep perception into the life of the LLeR’s commitments and practices over the course of the study (Gorichanaz, 2018) and (6) providing “an audit trail and a

benchmark against which later data analysis and interpretations can be tested for adequacy” (Nowell, Norris, White, & Moules, 2017, p. 3).

### Confirmability-Dependability

Aside from the overlap with the above criteria, the quality criterion of dependability is further provided by way of having spelling out the timeline of the study at the beginning of the study, in detail, the dependability and confirmability of which are measured by how well I consistently kept to the timeline.

**Figure 4.2 Timeline of the Study**



The planned timeline enhanced dependability by ensuring that “the research process is logical, traceable, and clearly documented” (Nowell, Norris, White, & Moules, 2017, p. 3). Furthermore, the timeline helped to make the unfinalizability of identity formation able to be studied by providing a demarcated timeframe (Bakhtin, 1984, pp. 59-60). While the research is

unfinalizable, the timeline has *completeness* in a Deweyan perspective (Dewey, 1934).

Completeness includes “continuity . . . ; deepening complexity as time progresses; meaning that persists . . . ; challenges encountered; and anticipation of culmination” (Gorichanaz, 2018, p. 61).

### **Summary**

This is an existential auto-phenomenographic approach (AuPh) to existential motivation and identity formation in and through additional language learning with other central values. This AuPh study was used to best perceive and describe my identity formation journeys and if indeed they were existentially motivated journeys as self-cultivational and aspirational identity-defining commitments. The beginning-of-study (BoS) strong evaluation provided solid strong evaluators of the higher-order values of and with the delimited subset of ALs to pursue learning. This made clear to the LLe the whys of his LLing, and thus also what he would be selectively centering on throughout his LLing (in thought, readings, listenings, etc.). The LLe then documented his language engagements daily and in-the-moment and added up his TUT. This data collection during actual language engagements is, “an approach largely under-represented in the literature, which is often based on interviewing or recounting of experiences retrospectively” (Allen-Collinson & Hockey, 2006, p. 382). Then, after 12 months of this multi-times-per day documentation, the end-of-study (EoS) strong evaluation was a holistic-tying-together description of the self-cultivating and aspirational identity formations or lacks thereof (Allen-Collinson, 2011, 2012, 2018; Allen-Collinson & Hockey, 2001; de Beaufort, 2019; Block, 2009; Callard, 2018; Davenport, 2012; Gee, 1996; Gorichanaz, 2017, 2018; Hall, 2004; Harvey, 2014; Khawaja, 2016; Weedon, 2004).

## Chapter 5 - Results and Discussion

### Reviewing the Research Question

Because this study takes existential identity formation as possessing “existential authenticity” (Davenport, 2015, pp. 153-154), I explicitly articulated my existential commitments as self-explicit consent to the higher-order values of the study via strong evaluation, endorsing a certain delimited set of values to aspire to and self-cultivate, going on to more strongly endorse certain ones of the aspirational values proleptically (Callard, 2018; Khawaja, 2018). By articulating my ends in the BoS identity articulations, perceiving if I stuck by my articulated devotions throughout the study with the multiple-times-daily documentation thereof, and having throughout (from the BoS, the daily logging, and the EoS) expressed openly the values that these identities and their formations are based, I accomplished the goal of having existential authenticity throughout the study.

By detailing what LLeR identities I was most committed-towards and what values I was most loyal to and those I ended up discontinuing, the following answers the research question *From an existential perspective, in what ways does the language learner perceive and describe his 15.5 month identity-forming multiple additional language learning journeys?* This will show how my existential motivation played out by way of valued movements committed to over the long-term and the realizations of when and where I needed to put an end to my existential motivation towards identity pursuits. This is the transparent self-interpretation of which value-based identities I self-cultivated throughout the study, which ones I aspired towards throughout the study, and which ones I laid aside.

This was not an identity formation of drifting because I explicitly spelled out my directionality in my BoS strong evaluation. Also, this was not an identity formation of ambition

because ambition is the pursuit of something that is not a value (power, status, etc.). This identity formation was one of self-cultivational and aspirational identity formations. Self-cultivation is a diachronic living-out of a higher-order value (e.g., of an appreciation of philosophy and theology), while aspiration is a diachronic development of a value that one does not yet fully have but desires to acquire (e.g., of an appreciation of academic French).

To do this properly and clearly, proleptic reasons in particular are outlined, because, “if a skeptic takes a case of aspiration and tweaks the details slightly” he will find himself faced with a case of self-cultivation wherein it is a value one has already fully acquired or a case of ambition where one no longer attempts to acquire the value for virtuous reasons (Callard, 2021a, p. 460). Also, one may tweak the details of a case of aspiration “in which the person fails to count as the agent of her own transformation,” such as the drifter due to not reflecting and explicitly choosing (p. 460). In the self-cultivating, ambitious, and drifting phenomena, none of them “require us to invoke proleptic reasons” (p. 460).

Hence, to make the claim that my study was concerned with aspirational identity formations and not only self-cultivating ones, the concept of *proleptic reasons* needed to be kept front-and-center throughout. Methodologically, proleptic reasons can only be known throughout and at the end of a study on aspiration, not at the beginning. Thus, I will be referring to and giving examples of proleptic reasons discovered along the course of this identity formation primarily in the below sections concerned with the 12-month portion of the study and the end-of-study (EoS) stronger evaluation. That is, the 12-months and EoS provide the proleptic reasons that helped to further develop the aspirational identity formation journeys of this study, while the BoS provides the reasons that motivated forth the self-cultivation identity formation journeys as well as providing a grasp of reasons for the aspiration identity formation.

## **Results from the Beginning-of-Study Strong Evaluation**

Any university student who is aspiring to value academic-level use of other languages, such that one uses those other languages to learn new things concerning their academic interests, but is surrounded by their native language, has to make this journey auto-methodologically. That is, only he is in the position to value learning other languages and only he is in the position to make movements towards that value and to discern, as he goes, what movements bring him closer to valuing it and which ones alienate him from that value. Callard explains why a study concerned with being an aspiring academic multilingual must be auto-methodological, “not because the agent in question is self- as opposed to world- directed, but because . . . one’s value-directed activity is simply identical with a self-directed activity” (Callard, 2018, p. 36).

The aspirant is learning to value engaging with the additional languages (ALs) more and more even though there are no interlocutors in her geographical space. The aspirant’s goal is not simply to engage with ALs, but to engage with ALs in such a way as to come to appreciating the value of engaging with them more (Callard, 2021b, p. 492). This was the case for my goals of my specific six ALs. I already desired to continuously learn more about how languages in general globally, typologically work, but I had yet to be in a place where I desired to engage with a select few specific ALs, more and more, without switching to some other ALs.

The BoS strong evaluation helped me focus on committing to values I already held (to self-cultivate them) *and* to identify values that I as yet had only had a vague grasp of but saw as being important to develop. In my BoS, when I asked the self-cultivation-related question, “What do I most value based on my values from the past until now?” The answers were all-around fitness, a deeper philosophical-theological understanding, and to be in the language education-and-learning world.

When I asked the aspiration-related question, “What do I feel I lack valuing and have for some time lacked really placing a value on?” The answers were to deeply know and remain committed to a delimited set of languages, rather than a delimited amount about as many languages as possible, and to really value that delimited set of languages to a level that even experiences of hearing English everywhere would not work to devalue the languages or the pursuit of them in my mind. That is, I realized I had only valued learning the inner-workings of as many languages as possible and not in sticking to a certain specific set of multiple languages. I had grasped that value, but due to my study abroad experiences consisting of being bombarded by English in the other country, I would then choose a different language and country for the next study abroad flatlining my value aspiration for the prior language. I was dumbfounded because unlike in my Kansan homeland where the dominant native language was the language of choice in gyms, coffee shops, supermarkets, to have on their TV or flat screens, and so on, these other countries chose music and shows that were not in their dominant native language but in English. This made it hard for me to develop a value for their language when it seemed they did not value it since I had assumed other countries valued their languages in similar ways as where I was raised does, and, therefore, I wrongly attributed their preference for English as a lack of value for their own language. I was aware of this wrong attribution and did not feel right about it, but it was hard to force myself to feel otherwise with the ubiquity of English in countries I visited. Due to these experiences, it was hard for me to develop a value for learning a non-English language past a certain point to an academic level.

In other words, I was an aspirant who had “not quite succeeded in acquiring a new value system,” the new value system being to learn and value a few ALs really well, “or in losing her old one,” the old value system being to learn a portion of as many ALs as possible (Callard,

2021a, p. 463). This adds further reasons for why auto-methodological means are important to this study because one, “who aspires . . . changes herself. The engine of this change is her own sense that her grasp of the value in question is insufficient: her awareness of her own (valuational) ignorance drives her to learn” (Callard, 2021b, p. 495). So, a guiding question was, “How could I grow to value a specific set of languages to such a degree that even with English all around interfering with these languages, I would not be *deterred* from continuing to learn them; *and* even if I attain a PhD, I’d still likely remain committed to them?”

My solution was to aspire to value a specific subset of languages through self-cultivating values. Therefore, six languages were chosen because I saw them as having the most potential for providing me materials for cultivating my already-held values of fitness and philosophy, especially concerning an aspiration embedded in my value of philosophy to learn more Catholic philosophy because I had never been exposed to that even in my Master of Arts in Philosophy of Religion and Ethics. I also hoped to discover better *value*-based reasons *proleptically* that would help me value the languages to such a degree that my valuing of them would last long-term, even beyond this study.

At the start of this study, I knew I wanted to cut my fascination with 7,000 languages down to a very delimited amount, and that that delimited amount was an amount I could realistically aspire to value to an academic level. Finally realizing, as Callard (2021b, p. 495) and Kinginger (2009, p. 114) claim, that submitting myself to be changed by outside forces (for example, via study abroad) could not create the aspirational change that I sought, I selected my languages based on already-held higher-order values—on which languages gave me most access to these other values. Therefore, this was an aspirational study based on an already living-out self-cultivating journey. Also, I attempted to create my own atmosphere where I would hear the ALs

as much if not more than English. COVID provided me with the opportunity to do this for myself better than I ever could before.

This was further enforced when I realized the feature of harmony-conflict among one's identities, especially multilingual identities, and that since one "may affiliate himself with more than one . . . language . . . these dynamic identities must in some way be reconciled within one unified self in order to maintain this self across boundaries" (Marx, 2002, p. 266; also, see Davenport, 2012, p. 95; Korsgaard, 2009, p. 21). I saw that to preemptively harmonize the multiple voices of multiple languages I would (hopefully) acquire of those additional languages (ALs) I would choose, that I should choose ALs to aspire to appreciate that I could best connect with commitments I had already strongly cultivated. Marx herself hints at this in her paper, stating that, "when a language learner succeeds in connecting the L1/C1 with the L2/C2, he is able to participate in both" (Marx, 2002, p. 277), such as by connecting the languages with shared values of fitness (e.g., CrossFit) and philosophy (e.g., Thomism). This also ensured a higher likelihood of transportability (Identity Feature 4) among the identity-conferring pursuits.

I made further articulations and endorsements in my BoS strong evaluation that connected to the above endorsements, such as needing to select languages that had a good amount of online material due to the possibility of COVID preventing travel. However, I assumed, with all the promises in the news by specialists, that I would be allowed to travel after some short time, so I did think travel to Greece was likely when I made the BoS strong evaluation. I also knew I would only be able to travel abroad to one location, so that I definitely needed to select *other* ALs that did have a good online presence in my other self-cultivators (fitness-health and philosophy-theology) and aspiration (Catholic philosophy).

Another reason I realized I had for my goal of high proficiency in the delimited ALs was in order to acquire the value of *critical* autonomy in multiple languages (Little, 2011, 2012; White, 2008). I would know I reached my aspirational goal when in-and-through my ALs I could “form judgements about subject content” of value to me, in a critical-thinking way and in such a way that I could be “developing expertise in it and awareness of subject knowledge in a wider context” (White, 2008, p. 16). I never had experienced being able to do this before in an AL, so I had yet to experience or fully apprehend the value, but I had a grasp of its value both based on my own thinking and based on other Ller narratives (Benson, Barkhuizen, Bodycott, & Brown 2012, p. 182). My daily engagements with the ALs would be attempts at acquiring this value.

Since these goals for my value-aspirations concerned values that were not clearly in view yet (since I was aspiring to bringing them better into view), I was not sure how many languages I could successfully accomplish these goals with. However, combining my self-cultivating values with the Catholic philosophy sub-value aspiration, I selected languages that had the most Catholic philosophical content, general philosophical and theological content, and health and fitness content (especially CrossFit-related) for free online and at my university library (Kelly, 1983; Stebbins, 2003, 2007, & 2015). Through this strong evaluation, I narrowed down the hundreds of options of languages that fascinated me to committing to engaging with and aspiring to deeply value six: Latin, Greek, French, Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese.

As I conducted my BoS strong evaluation, I kept in mind that my study had the potential of being one of four types of identity forming journeys that combine aspirations and self-cultivations. It could be (Type-1) an aspiration to develop a value that harmonizes with one’s self-cultivating values by means that develop the aspirational value; (Type-2) an aspiration to develop a value that harmonizes with one’s self-cultivating values by means that do not develop

the aspirational value; (Type-3) an aspiration to develop a value that undermines one's self-cultivating values by means that develop the aspirational value; or (Type-4) an aspiration to develop a value that undermines one's self-cultivating values by means that do not develop the aspirational value (Kemp, 2020). Ryan Kemp rightly points out that "the move from (1) to (4) is, in one sense or another, one of steady decline"; therefore, it is up to the person "to actively cultivate aspirations of the first sort and to intentionally alienate aspirations of the final sort" (Kemp, 2020, p. 609). Therefore, I picked additional languages (ALs) to aspire to acquire that were most likely to form a journey of the first kind (Type-1) and least likely to be that of the fourth kind (Type-4).

This commitment was for made to last for at least a year-long duration, but my hope is it would bring me along far enough in my aspirational journey that these year-long committed-to values would be fully, or at least sufficiently, appreciated by me so that I would continue to aspire towards them (or self-cultivate them if I reached that level—what Callard calls a "paragon" self in 2021b, p. 490) beyond the timeframe of my dissertation and maybe even become life-long values. The narrowing down was a big part of the BoS strong evaluation, especially since other languages seemed to nearly fit the bill just as well, if not better.

For example, as I enacted the BoS strong evaluation, I saw in my situation I could choose to spend time going from A1 to C1 (Novice to Advanced High) in Italian *or* German in order to develop a value for one of those because both seemed to have high volumes of material related to values I have, listed above. Relatedly, through this self-evaluation, I realized that I had always partly (to strongly) agreed with Aristotle's claim that contemplation is happiness (Aristotle, 2002). And many of the times that I best get into this highly valued contemplative mode is by listening to the Italian philosophers Ilaria Ramelli and Luciano Floridi discuss their thoughts in

English. This led me to notice they had thousands of pages of various published works in Italian as well as many YouTubes and other online material where they discuss their thoughts in Italian. However, there are no living German philosophers who interested me to that level. Some ideas among various German philosophers who have died did interest me when reading them in English, but not nearly to the degree as Ramelli or Floridi did. Plus, I was deeply interested in philosophers and theologians I could listen to giving lectures, podcasts, and in other ways verbally discussing their thoughts.

Reasons I had been given by others for learning German were often pragmatic, such as there being more total native German speakers than Italian speakers, or utilitarian, such as German being favored when it came to potential financial endeavors. However, I saw pursuing something due to a love of money as part of the vocabulary of ambition, not of value. Therefore, I saw that for me, personally, there were weak-weight reasons that supported learning German, but stronger-evaluative reasons for learning Italian and aspiring to develop a deeper appreciation of that language. Therefore, my most authentic choice when stepping back and reflecting was to pursue Italian over German (while still, of course, encouraging those whose personal strong evaluators would indeed lead them to German, to pursue German).

To sum up so far, the goal and existential commitment discerned and formed in this BoS strong evaluation was that I engage with (i.e., pursue) *all* six of my value-based ALs *wholeheartedly* in order to develop a deep appreciation and value for them (aspirationally) and that I do so with content concerning religion-philosophy (and its aspirational sub-value of Catholic philosophy), fitness-health (self-cultivating such knowledge and practices) as together potentially comprising *10* total value-based *identity-defining commitments* along the lines of eight aspirational identity journeys: becoming a learner of academic Spanish, Portuguese, Latin,

Greek, Italian, and French; becoming an academic multilingual, which would be the composite of at least three of the academic Ller identities; and becoming a learner of Catholic philosophy; and along the lines of two self-cultivating identity journeys: fitness enthusiast and theology-philosophy enthusiast.

I knew I wanted to fill in the gaps in SLA motivation and identity research by way of conducting an AuPh study—actually providing data of the actual motivation and identity in LLing phenomena in a holistic manner. In that regard, I knew full well why I was doing what I was doing. Also, after the BoS strong evaluation, throughout my 368-day portion of the study, I was able to see more and more which of the six ALs attached to values I already held, and to discover other values that I held in high regard proleptically (e.g., the value in well-written movies and shows with virtuous characters). Therefore, this was an aspirational study (becoming a learner of academic ALs) based initially on self-cultivating journeys which I had discerned that I was already in (fitness and philosophy), all of which took place within an overarching self-cultivating study (conducting research to fill in the gaps in the literature in the field I already highly valued—philosophy of education within applied linguistics/SLA) (Lee and Ewert, 2018; McGregor, 2014; Mitchell, Tracy-Ventura, & McManus, 2017; Stebbins, 2007, 2013, 2014).

My BoS strong evaluation revealed that I am learning my ALs because I know they are valuable in various ways and have a grasp on this in limited ways (simply my love for science of how languages work), but I am also learning my ALs because I would like to not be a hypocrite when I encourage students to stick with a target language to attain academic-level proficiency and intertwine it with other things they value or aspire to value *and* because I would like to complete my Ph.D. and finally have my doctorate. I then have discovered proleptic reasons along the way. But to simply state one or two of these and not all of them would not be as fully honest

of a picture of my reasons for this study and in such a way would be in danger of being misleading.

Once completed, my BoS strong evaluation was 35,885 words long. As the results below will explain, over the course of the study, six of the eight aspirations did indeed cultivate the self-cultivating values delineated in my BoS. That is to say, six of the eight aspirational journeys to becoming a learner of an academic AL *assisted* in my self-cultivational value formation of health-fitness and philosophy-theology and vice-versa. The self-cultivating values also deeply helped in more deeply appreciating those six AL aspirational values, and, thus, also the academic multilingual aspirational value.

### **Results from the Multiple-Times-Daily Documentation over 368 Days**

As an aspirant, a central focus of my journey was discovering proleptic strong evaluators for learning these six languages. This revealed values I have when it comes to Lling that I had not explicitly realized about myself before this study (e.g., being able to talk with another person in the language; having a relative, even if distant, learning one of the languages; etc., reasons that seemed contrary to my introverted nature). As this section and the next will explain, it ended up that I was a stronger aspirant with stronger proleptic reason-evaluators for three of the ALs, a fairly stronger aspirant with more proleptic reasons for one of those languages, and only a six-month committed aspirant for two of them.

With six ALs, I was still too polygamous in my language pursuits to achieve an academic level in *all* of the languages, but I didn't realize it at the BoS. However, over the course of the study proleptic reasons were discovered along the way which provided me with strong evaluations for narrowing the amount of languages down further which could only be discovered and known *through* the journey. In this way, aspiration afforded "a diachronic path to unity"

(Callard, 2021a, p. 463). This is why, in comparison to my BoS articulations, I have called my EoS articulations the stronger evaluation of the two.

While I had strongly evaluated reasons for dedicating myself to the six ALs, I knew based on past experience that the reasons may not be enough in terms of providing strength to continue me on to a higher level of value for the ALs. Therefore, it was “important that I understood myself to be actively engaged in reaching for a better answer” (Callard, 2021a, p. 462). Not even at the outset did I feel that to develop my self-cultivating values (which I could do through English) or to attain a Ph.D. and fill in gaps in the applied linguistics field were strong enough reasons for engaging with the ALs I had committed myself to adhere to *throughout* the study. Therefore, my strong evaluation included “a kind of placeholder spot for the understanding I would later acquire” and hopefully be able to articulate at points along my multiple-times-daily documenting journey and in my EoS stronger evaluation (p. 462). That is, during the 12-months portion, I was aware of my BoS strong evaluation proximal or “inward face” which is what I could grasp about the value of the languages, *and* my distal or “outward face” which is the evaluative perspective I would hopefully have of the languages once my aspiration was more developed by the end of the study (p. 462). This would, then, be the stronger evaluative perspective.

All of this speaks to my being on the lookout for proleptic reasons during the 12-month portion of the study. Agnes Callard’s philosophy provided “proleptic” as the term to describe “the kind of reason someone acts on . . . of her rationale . . . as yet ungrasped” because “Her action outstrips her current valuational understanding and points towards her future one” (Callard, 2021a, p. 462). I felt like the reasons for choosing all six of the languages might not be strong enough to justify the hundreds of hours I would need to put into learning them. As I went, I found stronger and stronger reasons for a smaller sub-set of valued languages.

For example, while in my BoS I articulated that the rich philosophies of Ilaria Ramelli and Luciano Floridi were a reason for studying Italian, as were inspirational athletes, such as Roberto Zanda. However, I did not yet appreciate Italian as I wanted since I did not understand what it was to know or appreciate Italian because I was only at a Novice Low (pre-A1) level. Thus, I was ever looking for proleptic reasons for why I was spending so much time learning Italian in order to make my strong evaluation even stronger. These reasons came later, over the course of the 12-months, some of which was the discovery of good Italian drama such as *Il commissario Montalbano* and *Sei personaggi in cerca d'autore* and the discovery of high-quality physical therapy and running YouTube channels in Italian.

Based on my BoS strong evaluation, I tried to increase the value I had for my six ALs by way of interweaving them with my fitness value and philosophical-religious value. Of course, some values could not so readily combine as others. For example, if I really wanted to have a good workout, I could not pay attention to the French playing through my earbuds, but I could at least drown out the endless English music played on the gym's speakers. Values that are not readily combinable may still be lived with in harmony (Rudd, 2009). I did this by attempting to give each value its due time, e.g., focusing on an intense group yoga session where the leader spoke in English the whole time (the only types of yoga sessions in my area in Kansas), but making sure it is delimited to one hour, and afterwards returning as soon as possible to ALing with other values (including possibly watching a yoga video in an AL). In this way, wholeheartedness could obtain “across the lines of our cares, even if the ‘plots’ of intentional action involved in pursuing each do not causally connect in direct ways” (Davenport, 2012, p. 114).

The total word count of all of my 368 days of logging is 118,951. It was a total of 54 weeks long, although Week 1 and Week 54 were only comprised of two days each. The 12 months

were broken down into four seasons, each about three months long. Specifically, Season 1 and Season 4 were each 14 weeks long (although literally, 13 weeks and 2 days) and Season 2 and Season 3 were each 13 weeks long. Two examples of my daily logs can be found in Appendix B. At the beginning of my aspirational identity forming journey, I began with six ALs and had split them up into 8 hour units of time throughout the week so as not to go too long between studying them that I forgot what I had learned and at the same time have enough time dedicated within any single session to go deep into that AL.

Like Callard's aspirant, "I didn't take myself to be in a position to know which habits to inculcate: I was exploring, experimenting, learning as I went along" (Callard, 2021a, p. 461). As the study progressed, I changed the 8 hours to 12 hour segments and then down to 4 hours because I would feel like I was forgetting the language knowledge by the time I returned to it. Then I finally realized that with all the past time break downs, I would miss certain ALs completely for a couple of weeks due to other things occurring during their timeframes, so I settled on 24 hours-per-AL by the end of Season 1. Also, in this way, I could really develop the habit of thinking in them throughout the day and better partitioning them from each other in my mind. However, I also experimented with attempting to simultaneously be in two ALs: using one to translate and interpret for the other. This usually did not last long as I did not trust the translations and my English vocabulary was still quite vaster than any of my AL vocabulary repertoires.

Throughout the 12 months, since I have had bad experiences of online language learning where it was constantly interrupted by children in the background or other family members or constantly freezing or the sound missing out due to someone's connection and who knows what, I predominantly centered on reading, listening, typing, and overtly thinking aloud to myself in

order to get to an academic level. However, I did take some Zoom courses that were made available to people who lived in my city, and therefore the teacher and all of use LLers were in the same vicinity and could (and sometimes did) meet face-to-face if need/want. These Zoom classes were comprised of small-group classes in Spanish and French. They were two hours per week for eight weeks each. They proved to be useful.

I also took every opportunity I had for face-to-face interactions. The total Zoom and face-to-face interactions amounted to zero with Greek, Latin, and Italian, though. The introductory group French Zoom showed I truly was at the Novice Low level of French up until at least the end of my second trimonthly-season. Nine-months into this portion of the study, I discovered a relative who was studying French, which was a proleptic eye-opener for me (discussed below). At the end of my last trimonthly season, there was a face-to-face French conversation group and a Spanish conversation group that began re-meeting due to vaccines having been distributed and the COVID pandemic somewhat dying down. I was able to join these groups twice each before the end of the daily journaling portion of my study. With Spanish, there was a Catholic Spanish community, but they would revert to English when speaking to me, but it was still good to be able to attend Spanish Mass in person. The Spanish Zoom was advanced conversational where I was able to interact richly with others in Spanish for two months. Also, I made a friend halfway through the study who was a Spanish major. We would hang out primarily for talking in Spanish, although these often turned fairly quickly into English conversations.

On January, 18, 2021 (in Season 2), my goals for Greek *changed* from being able to think in it, interact with it academically, and interact with it well during a study abroad in Greece that I had planned at the beginning of the study *to* being able to simply maintain a level of my Greek knowledge for understanding the Greek Bible passages and to connect Greek etymology to

words in my other languages (English included). This change from a centralizing on Greek was an unexpected but ultimately wise choice because my planned study abroad ended up not only being cancelled for the fall of 2020 and winter of 2020-2021, at which point I had decided to stop aspiring towards Greek, to also being cancelled for the spring, summer, and fall of 2021 after I had made that decision. Before I ended my aspiration to be a learner of academic Greek, during my Greek languaging times, I grew to realize that the resources most connected to my other values were few to none in Greek. Even the values I did not realize I had, but grew to proleptically learn about due to the study, such as the value I place on good stories in movies and shows, I could not find a sufficient amount of in Greek (even through international streaming services I had access to, like Hoopla or Netflix).

Also, as I studied Latin, I found great songs and prayers in Latin, but very few videos or channels of people discussing in Latin. Even most of those, such as videos of Latin professors presenting at Classics' conferences, did not have a fluid speaking grasp of the language, which made it hard for me to enjoy listening to them (due to constant pauses, "umms," and other English-based filler sounds). The few who did sound fluent used Classical Latin rather than Ecclesiastical Latin, the latter form was the form I wanted to learn (and, honestly, I did not much like the sound of the classical version). As I continued to progress, I realized there was not enough material to keep growing my value for Latin.

This also showed that I do indeed value listening material and living people who actively and regularly speak the language. As an introvert, I thought perhaps simply reading Latin with some listening would be enough, but it turns out I value new and present-era social media communication more. I wanted to hear the language in my head, and without many various types of dialogue that I could listen to, I could only develop this through self talk, which I loved doing,

but it was not enough in and of itself to grow my value for Latin. I found throughout the course of the study that indeed the multiple-times-daily listening in the ALs built “a reservoir of sustenance from activity” (Noddings, 2003, p. 124), a reservoir that increased the value I held for the ALs that had plenty of listening material (Spanish, Portuguese, French, and Italian) and, thereby, maintained a sustenance in and for the ALs even through contexts of native language saturation and opportunity deprivation.

By February 9<sup>th</sup>, 2021, I realized without a doubt that another central value that I hold, along with philosophy-theology, fitness, and being in the language education-and-learning world is good stories in the form of YouTube, DVDs, or Hoopla or some other streaming service, and this more than my love of reading. Reading was still quite valued by me, for example, throughout the study I loved reading and re-reading the hilarious *La Biblia al pie de la letra* in Spanish. However, I realized I love seeing the characters, perceiving their values, in what ways they had strong virtues, in what ways they worked on their vices, and in what ways their dialogue could verbally echo in my head throughout the day and as I fell asleep and dreamed. I realized, for example, that without having access to good Italian shows, such as *Il commissario Montalbano*, I could never really properly master the language with all the verbal intonations and non-verbal-movements that often accompany it. Again, such resources were sorely lacking when it came to Greek and Latin.

Also, the critical autonomy reason for my aspiring in these ALs made in my BoS strong evaluation became ever stronger as the study progressed. This is from part of my journal entry on March 6, 2021: “Main personal goal: Get advanced-high in all 4 ALs & thus have the ability to better understand and explain-to (translanguagingly) students who speak those languages of any such concepts as concerns their academic (potential) interests in their native language with

academic English academically—to a level of critical *thinking*, which includes critical reading, listening, writing, speaking, & feeling.” Some specific ways my critical autonomy grew is given in the next section.

Finally, there came a time when I realized I was simply forgetting too much of my languages due to rotating six languages. That is, six languages were too many to legitimately consider myself a committed aspirant language learner in all of them. Due to this reasons, along with the one’s given above (study abroad to Greece cancelled, no access to good shows in Latin or Greek, etc.), at the six-month point of this 12-month portion of the study, Week 28: March 14-20, 2021, I decided to end my commitments to Latin and Greek and focus on aspiring towards Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, and French.

Through the course of the 12-months, concerning French, my valuing of it grew in these ways, and until these ways, I was still not very sure that I did or should value it: There was an episode on the YouTube channel *Meaning of Catholic* where a man of Louisiana-French ancestry who was a reporter talked honestly of how the French are the worst and best of in terms of promoting love and Catholicism and demolishing it. This warmed me up to French a bit more. Then, I started discovering cool French punk bands and friars and priests who shared my passions for fitness and philosophy and made endless videos discussing and debating aspects of these passions. Another two huge proleptic points (phase shifts) that got me into French were finding out my relatives were studying it and, later, realizing I had reached a level of being able to converse in it for an hour during the face-to-face French conversation group that started to meet at the very end of my study. I discuss these two phase shifts next.

During Weeks 38-39 of the 12-month portion of the study (May 23-June 5, 2021), I drove with my parents from Kansas to Wisconsin to see my brother’s family and to have a family

reunion with my extended family. The family reunion fell on May 30. What happened that day had reverberating effects that I pondered over until the 9-month point of the study during Week 41, and on June 13 of that week, I decided I needed to stop studying Italian for the last three months and focus solely on French, Spanish, and Portuguese, with a particularly heavy emphasis on French.

I did not entirely drop Italian, but I would no longer be explicitly committing time-under-tension (TUT) to it. I would only listen to it occasionally when it happened to be the next recording on my Olympus recorder. My two Olympus recording devices had hundreds of recordings from these languages that I would listen to as I drove places, walked around, and so on. I deleted approximately 250 Italian recordings and replaced them with French ones, but I kept about 30 Italian recordings that I could serendipitously come across. For the last three months I did not really know if I still considered myself an aspirant of Italian or not. I doubted I was, but I had a re-conversion experience at the last moment that placed Italian back on my aspirational journey's map. I explain this in the last portion of this section.

Returning to my family reunion French phase shift, my heightened value-aspiration for French came about when I found out one of my relatives had been studying French for four years and was going to take a study abroad the next year in which she would be living with a French family. Due to finding this out, I tried to talk with her in French. After all, I had six months of TUT under my belt. Shortly after saying "Parlez vous francais!?" to her (itself a bit of an odd thing to say because it uses an unnecessarily formal form and I was presumably speaking informally with a relative), I realized I could not even remember how to say simple words and phrases such as "French people" or "please" in French. So I said the only other phrase I could think of: "Je ne se pas." I was able to somewhat smoothly (in my mind at least) switch my

attempts at talking *in* French with her to talking *about* French with her, such as interesting aspects of French grammar, funny false-cognates, the weirdness of French stories, and finding out she would be living with a French family in France.

Then, hours later while mingling with other relatives, I found out another relative of mine had taken two years of French and planned to continue her studies. As an introvert, I did not really think knowing other people who are studying the same language would have *that* big of an effect on me, but the knowledge of these two relatives studying French motivated me to dive into French like never before and in a different way than anything I could read in Latin or Greek had motivated me to study those languages. Also, it motivated me to dive into French quite a lot even though I will see my relatives at most once a year and our French talk will be minimal. The important thing was, I had some kind of social connections with French.

I also found out during that trip of Weeks 38-39 of the 12 month portion of my study that my brother and nephew had been watching a French Netflix show, *Lupin*, even though they had no desire to study French. This led me to begin watching that show, and through that, to find other quality French shows. I had already found French shows I loved, but finding even more made me appreciate French even more. In fact, my present favorite series of all my languages, including English, has become the French show, *L'Art du Crime*.

All of this that occurred from Weeks 38 to 41 led me to reflect, and I realized that what is highly-valued by me along with philosophy-theology, being in the language education-and-learning world, and fitness is appreciating well-written shows and being able to communicate about normal things in a normal settings with people whom I find to be fascinating in the AL. It was a very, very hard lesson to learn the truth of how the “social” aspect does indeed need to be included in “the essential relation between identity, value, and social practice” (Kemp, 2020, p.

609), rather than primarily (as I had at the start of this study) seeing it as an identity-value-practice triptych without the inclusion of the “social.”

As I narrowed down my languages from six to three and back to four, I surprisingly remained most consistent to Spanish, French, and Portuguese in large part to them being the only ALs that I had some kind of social practice with, even given the COVID 19 pandemic: Spanish with a Zoom Basic Language Teaching advanced conversation class, the Spanish Catholic Mass and Rosary gatherings, and an acquaintance turned into good friend I made from speaking with her in Spanish in the gym and us starting to meet to practice our Spanish in January of 2021. For French, I had a two-month Zoom Basic Language Teaching French beginners’ class led by a friend from Zaire that I had not seen for two years, I found out two of my relatives know it well, and I discovered the French Table began meeting again where people met face-to-face at a donut-coffee shop to actually socialize in French (August 19, 2021). When I went to the first French Table on September 2, 2021, I was quite delighted to find out I could speak for an hour in French with someone else—an overall great dialogic-in-action. This was quite a huge change from when I had attempted to speak it with my relative three months prior. The second to last proleptic reason (relatives) occurred right before my last trimonthly season and the last proleptic reason (French Table) occurred in the last trimonthly season, both of which go a long way in explaining why I dedicated so much more time to French in that last season (see Table 5.1) than any of the other seasons. Nothing of the sort of any of these Spanish and French proleptic reasons was the case for Latin, Greek, or Italian. I did have two encounters with a few Portuguese words exchanged with Brazilians and some with my Spanish-majoring friend who began to learn Portuguese, which although quite minimal, still made the face-to-face social time in Portuguese infinitely more than in Latin, Greek, or even Italian.

Thinking more deeply on this, I realized that, what I attempted to do but could not do when I found out my relative knew French, I wanted to be able to do in all of my ALs. That is, I wanted my ALs to be such that I could quickly access them in whatever situations, including emergency and non-urgent but-still-important situations. It reminded me how years ago I volunteered to work in a jungle hospital in Panama in order to learn Spanish better, which I did, but I did not know it enough to understand what was going on in the hospital without someone translating everything into English for me. Also, I renewed my desire to legitimately be able to help potential students by appropriately translanguaging with them in their native language in order to help them optimally develop their academic English skills. This was all articulated at the end of my third trimonthly season. After this nine-month point, I let Italian fall by the wayside except when I happened to come across a recording on my Olympus recordings or as an option only to my Sunday-after-church do-whatever-I-want-to-do time.

As for Spanish, I first, begrudgingly early on, listened to Spanish YouTubes, thinking they were quasi interesting. Then, as I appreciated the quality and could understand more of what they said, I felt they were of less in depth than English YouTubes on the same subject and simply talked about talking about the subject, rather than talking about fascinating concepts and revelatory points of the theology or philosophy. However, as I continued forcing myself to listen to videos, I slowly came to realize (and appreciate) that they were just as deep and with certain videos of certain philosophers discussing Catholic philosophy and philosophy generally, much more deep and revelatory of concepts than I had grasped in English. That is, these were deeper intellectual experiences than I had ever experienced from watching English philosophical videos.

With Portuguese, I had a decent repertoire of online content and books built up from my past studies. However, I still did not value it as I knew I should since I had nearly forgotten all that I

learned from these sources and I lacked a deep motivation to engage with it. One thing that helped was meeting the Brazilian neighbor of a friend and realizing I would like to better be able to communicate with him in Portuguese, again, a surprise to my hermit-like introverted existence. Also, at first much of my online engagements with Portuguese consisted of Buddhist and Hindu philosophers that I had listened to in the past, but no Catholic philosophers. Slowly, over time, I began to find more and more fascinating Catholic philosophy material online. Also, I discovered more and more health and fitness sites in Portuguese, such as well-detailed first-aid channels and many CrossFit Instagram Portuguese accounts, which came with videos and accompanying Portuguese commentaries. Finally, much to my delight, I began finding channels not only in Brazilian Portuguese, but also Portugal Portuguese. When I studied abroad in Portugal in 2017, none of this material existed so that even though I tested into the B1 level, when I went to class I could not understand a word my professor said due to the difference in accent between Brazil's and Portugal's Portuguese dialects. Being able to master comprehension of this accent as well due to there being an increase of free online YouTubes developed over the course of the COVID pandemic also worked to increase my overall valuing of Portuguese.

This brings me to the final portions of the 12-month part of my study, which culminated in taking ACTFL tests. I planned on assessing my receptive (comprehension) skills in the ACTFL tests for several reasons. Firstly, I wanted another means to triangulate data revealing commitment to academic comprehension. Also, I wanted to see how good I was in academic reading and listening since those were the kinds of activities I most participated in throughout the study and that most interested me as an aspiring learner of academic ALs.

I knew I wanted to see how the ACTFL created and proctored both its listening and reading tests. So, I first took the Spanish test in listening on September 10 and attained an Advanced Mid

(i.e., C1 or B2.2) certification. Then, I took the French test in reading on September 12 and attained an Intermediate Mid (i.e., B1) certification. I felt this level also accurately aligned with my speaking skills since I was at a level where I could speak for an hour in French as I had in the French table face-to-face meetings. However, even though ACTFL advertises both tests as being 50 minute tests, the listening test is comprised of less-academically-dense, short conversations and took a total of 80 minutes to complete. The reading test, on the other hand, is comprised decently-long readings covering a wide girth of academic topics (news, literature, geography, religion, politics, culture, etc.) with just as long and just as academically-worded multiple choice questions and answer-options. Therefore, it took me a total of 120 minutes to complete this test, i.e., 50% longer than the listening test.

Since the reading test was *much* more academic than the listening test, and since my academic-level language proficiency is what I was most interested in assessing myself in, I chose to take the reading test for the other languages. I ended up attaining an Advanced Mid (B2.2/C1) level in reading in Portuguese and Italian.

This brings me to the re-conversion moment of re-asserting my aspirational journey in Italian. I had no intention of taking Italian since I had not attended to it for three months and did not like the prospect of spending \$51 plus tax on a test to tell me I ranked as Novice Low. The official last day of multiple-times-daily in-the-moment documentation was September 13, making it a total of 368 days. However, the night of September 15, one of my few Italian recordings happen to be the next to play on my recorder. I stopped and paid attention to see if I could understand most of it. I *thought* I was able to, so I took the Italian test when the next proctor was available. To my surprise I attained the Advanced Mid level. This played a role in reviving my aspiration to continue being a learner of academic Italian because it was evidence to

me that I could continue to aspire towards being a learner of academic Italian *with* the other three languages—that I could still continue in that directionality without it being too many languages.

As for the TUT research goal of fairly consistently transcending my past self by in some explicit way attending to the AL for more during each proceeding three-months’ season than I did the previous three-months’ season(s), the following table reveals this. Keep in mind that these are TUT times, they do not include the hours spent listening to the language while mentally occupied with doing something else. My overall TUT in terms of absolute numbers and in terms of average numbers increased from Season 1 to Season 2, decreased in Season 3, and then increased beyond all prior season times in Season 4. I attribute the increase in hours in the last season due mainly to having found more proleptic reasons for the ALs.

**Table 5.1 Time-under-Tension Totals in Terms of Hours**

Spanish	Portuguese	French	Italian	Latin	Greek	Overall:
<b>First Trimonthly Season’s Totals:</b>						
28.25 hrs	29.25 hrs	24.75 hrs	22.75 hrs	16.25 hrs	16.25 hrs	137.50 hrs
<b>First Trimonthly Season’s Averages per Week:</b>						
2.02 hrs	2.09 hrs	1.77 hrs	1.63 hrs	1.16 hrs	1.16 hrs	9.83 hrs
<b>Second Trimonthly Season’s Totals:</b>						
58.00 hrs	30.25 hrs	53.00 hrs	40.50 hrs	3.25 hrs	0.05 hrs	185.50 hrs
<b>Second Trimonthly Season’s Averages per Week:</b>						
4.46 hrs	2.33 hrs	4.08 hrs	3.12 hrs	0.36 hrs	0.06 hrs	14.42 hrs
<b>Third Trimonthly Season’s Totals:</b>						
40.75 hrs	29.25 hrs	42 hrs	25.50 hrs			137.15 hrs

<b>Third Trimonthly Season's Averages per Week:</b>						
3.14 hrs	2.25 hrs	3.23 hrs	1.96 hrs			14.00 hrs
<b>Fourth Trimonthly Season's Totals:</b>						
70 hrs	50.25 hrs	137 hrs				257.25 hrs
<b>Fourth Trimonthly Season's Averages per Week:</b>						
4.46 hrs	2.33 hrs	10.54 hrs				17.33 hrs
<b>Year-Long (368 Days) Totals:</b>						
197 hrs	139 hrs	256.75 hrs	88.75 hrs	19.50 hrs	16.75 hrs	717.75 hrs
<b>Year-Long (368 Days) Averages per Week (54 Weeks for Spanish, Portuguese &amp; French; 40 Weeks for Italian; and, 23 Weeks for Latin &amp; Greek):</b>						
3.65 hrs	2.57 hrs	4.76 hrs	2.22 hrs	0.85 hrs	0.73 hrs	14.78 hrs

As concerns the statistic of the total number of journal entries (JEs), I do not think their data are as helpful as the TUT totals since a singular journal entry ranged from engaging with an AL for a couple of minutes (e.g., two minutes in French watching part of an interview about the Charlie Hebdo murders) to being over several hours long (e.g., 5.15 hours in French watching *L'Art du Crime* attentively—learning turns of phrase and pronunciation features as I do). Thus, the total number of JEs do not reveal as accurately the time spent engaging with the ALs as TUT totals. Plus, JEs could be counted in different ways. Was interacting with one video in the AL and then a book in the AL with all the other dimensions of the JE being the same (the same place, and during same timeframe, but just going back and forth between the book and the video) be considered one JE or should that be considered two separate JEs? The same could be said

with a change to any one (or two or etc.) of the dimensions. Also, if I took a walk for an hour and then returned to the exact same place studying the exact same material, was that really two separate entries? I tended to think these should be seen as different sometimes, like how one's identities can be different even though identities (and JEs) may be embedded or overlapping. However, if the JEs were strongly connected with one another, I tended to group it as being one JE, for example, my writing-philosophizing in an AL being influenced by my recent listening/reading material in the language even if it went way off into another territories and I ended up writing a lot of unrelated material, I considered it the same JE. So counting it this way, my JE totals were the following:

**Table 5.2 Multiple-Times-Daily Journal Entry Totals**

<b>Timeframe</b>	<b>Total JEs</b>	<b>Average # of JEs per Day</b>	<b>Average time per JE in terms of hours</b>
1 <sup>st</sup> season:	136	1.46	1.01
2 <sup>nd</sup> season:	234	2.58	0.79
3 <sup>rd</sup> season:	208	2.29	0.66
4 <sup>th</sup> season:	244	2.62	1.05
Total Seasons:	822	2.23	0.87

Thus, overall, I averaged 0.87 hours per journal entry (given my overall TUT at 717.75 hours). I also averaged more than two per day over the 368 days (average 2.23 journal entries per day), although some days there were no JEs (Thanksgiving break, family trip to Wisconsin to visit other family members, etc.) so the real per-day average is somewhat higher. Again, I think

the most accurate view can be seen by the TUT totals since how I divided what was considered separate or the same JEs is somewhat ambiguous in comparison.

### **Results from the End-of-Study Stronger Evaluation**

My end-of-study (EoS) stronger evaluation is 21,355 words long. Many of the main points articulated in it I have already given throughout this paper, especially in the last section, but the main articulatory discernments can be seen through its fleshing out of answers to BoS directionalities by seeing if indeed the 12-month portion lived-out those directionalities or not. There were certain specific value-based *teloi* (i.e., goals, with *telos* being the singular—one goal) that my BoS strong evaluation fleshed out that only my EoS stronger evaluation could discern if they actually were lived out. I had five *teloi* written up in the BoS strong evaluation that in the EoS stronger evaluation I perceived if they were accomplished by looking over my 12 months of journaling. They all related with what I had discerned to be my higher-order values. I list them here with what my EoS revealed:

My first *telos* (i.e., goal) was the *telos* of conversing only in the AL in its linguacultural environment (Agar, 1994), e.g., in Greek in Greece if study abroad; in Spanish before, during, and after Catholic Spanish Masses; etc. Since the study abroad option was taken off the table for each of the summer, fall, winter, and spring semesters of this study, I was not able to fulfill this in Greece. I only partly fulfilled this in the Spanish Masses, but not very much. There were only Spanish niceties of greeting and leaving and a sharing in praying the Rosary in Spanish, but nothing I would really call as conversing.

My second *telos* was to be thinking (talking, writing, etc.) to myself mainly in each AL during its allotments of time when I did not have to engage in English. I often would forget to do this, but I did develop this more throughout the study. When one of the Italian language

YouTube teachers I followed revealed the auto-descriptor option in Netflix Italian shows (March 5, 2021), I realized that *that* was exactly how I needed to live my life—to say everything out loud that I was doing in that day’s AL, e.g., “Sto aprendo la porta proprio ora girando la maniglia” (“I’m opening the door right now by turning the handle”). I would say that I accomplished this goal more than I did my previous telos, but it still needs work.

The next telos was my telos of having attained an academic multilingual identity. I would give a definitive yes to having fulfilled this telos. Even though the French level is not quite academic yet, I can and do read and listen to and learn from academic content in Spanish, Portuguese, and Italian now.

The fourth telos I articulated in my BoS strong evaluation was to have a more developed belief system (a philosophy-theology central value) in and through the ALs. I kept a folder of all the belief system related developments I made through the various AL engagements. This folder now has dozens of topical documents and PDFs in the ALs. To give an example of one very small belief system development out of the thousands I compiled, the following is a quote from an Ileria Ramelli book in Italian where her exposition of what Catholic philosophy calls *epektasis* (ἐπέκτασις) was made clearer to me. For example, in discussing the philosophical theology of Saint Clemente, she states that, “per Clemente il mondo intero è una scuola: ‘siamo stati rivestiti della forma corporea in vista della nostra venuta al mondo, per essere in grado di entrare in questa scuola universale’ [*For Clemente the whole world is a school: ‘we have been clothed with the corporeal form in view of our coming into the world, to be able to enter this universal school’*]” (Ramelli, 2007, p. 15). More fuller understandings would take too much space, but the point is that throughout this study my belief system actually did evolve *through* the ALs I was studying—by engaging with them.

The final main telos that I articulated in my BoS was the telos of an increase of Time-Under-Tension (TUT) for each of my six ALs. I accomplished this with only three of them: French, Spanish, and Portuguese. The other three only increased up until the end of the second trimonthly season, in which I dropped Latin and Greek TUTs entirely and in which I kept at Italian strongly, but did not actually increase the TUT from the second to the third season, and the fourth of which I no longer maintained TUT for Italian. The TUT *average* for Portuguese and Spanish for the fourth season actually reads as being equivalent to the average in the second season, but this is deceptive because the last week of the fourth season was only two days, whereas every week in the second season was a fully seven days. Therefore my total and average TUT increased somewhat for Portuguese and Spanish, and quite a lot for French.

Throughout the study, I maintained the timeline that I created at the beginning of the study in order to make the confirmability-dependability quality criterion of my study to be strong and to show, existentially speaking, that I lived it out in good faith (see Figure 4.2). For example, I consistently maintained my daily logs, creating at least one per day for an average of at least six days a week. The same holds for the rest of the details in Figure 4.2.

In my BoS strong evaluation, I also spelled out the importance to me of keeping a thankfulness journal in order to enhance my “commitment to caring” about the ALs and other value-commitments (Noddings, 2003, p. 134). Looking back during my EoS stronger evaluation, I saw that this was not actually a value I enacted and therefore I did not actually value. However, I did not *need* it to enhance my commitments, although I do think it would have helped to enhance my caring attitude in the carrying out of the commitments. I hope to develop this value someday, but I did not develop it over the course of this study.

The self-cultivating identity commitments of fitness and philosophy were maintained over the course of the study and often *in-and-through* engagements with the four ALs of Spanish, Portuguese, French, and Italian. With all four ALs, I continued to find more quality health and fitness sites and philosophical material. For example, seven months into the study, I discovered the channel *Teología Filosófica*, which, among other things, explained divine simplicity in Spanish in a way I had never before understood in English. Each piece of material like this that I found—where I advanced in some way in a self-cultivating value *through* a target language—provided me with yet another proleptic reason for more deeply appreciating *that* language

One of the evaluator-reasons for becoming academically proficient in a few languages (rather than simply learning about the workings of as many languages as possible or not being fully committed to those I that studied abroad) was that it is impossible for someone to be able to understand any actual phenomenological experience of another without actually experiencing what the other has experienced, no matter how vivid one’s imagination is of what it might be like to have that experience (Nagel, 1974) (a strong evaluator that I also articulated in the “Researcher Perspective” of Chapter 1). I valued being able to better share the ontological space of my past and future students (Lewis, 1988, p. 29; Noddings, 2003, p.189; Paul, 2014, p. 11). This value did grow over the course of the study, as I continuously re-realized just how expansively complex a language is and how hard it is to change one’s mental paradigm in order to think in another language to an academic level (Byrnes, 2008). In this and other ways, through ALing, my self-understanding *and* other-understand grew, as did my ethic of care for language learners (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 7), rendering me “more sensitive to the needs of others and more capable of responding to them with effectively willed action” (Shustermann, 2000, p. 546). In other words, this study made me better at connecting with the potential sufferings of my past and

future students as they struggle through learning things and doing things in their target language that they can easily do in their native language. As philosopher of education, Jon Nixon, puts it, “Can I, as a teacher, connect with that suffering?” (Nixon, 2008, p. 91). I can now answer this question more strongly in the affirmative than I could before enacting this study.

As my proximate face caught up with my distal one (Callard, 2018, 2021b), I also realized that along with bonding with relatives, learning through theologians and philosophers and CrossFitters, being exposed to quality shows, desiring to share the same ontological grid as my students, translanguaging-ability, and other reasons, that my journey *felt* most-justified when explaining the whys of my dissertation to new acquaintances by telling them simply that, “My goal is to teach English at a university in Spain.” This was a value that only grew in the last six months of the study through conversations with my best friend and through remembering past conversations with Europeans from various countries talk about Spain. I am not sure how deeply true this answer of mine is, but I do feel it is the best answer when someone outside my field initially asks of my dissertation topic for why I chose the languages I choose. That is, it is a reason that the majority of people can understand in the quickest way (Spain being bordered by France and Portugal, with Italy nearby). Will I be able to actualize this value of teaching English at a university in Spain? Will I be able to advance as far as I want in developing this value? Will this value change? Only time will tell.

For me, the paragon at the end that I hoped to become was someone who has become a deep appreciator of several languages, an appreciation that can only be had by a certain level of acquisition of those languages (just as a person cannot deeply appreciate classical music without a deep acquisition of classical musical pieces). I am closer to this paragon self than I have ever been, but I am not there yet. This study made me, for the first time in my life, demarcate my

languages to a select few and dedicate myself to those select few in order to become academically proficient in multiple languages and develop my value for that, rather than my previous value of either learning one language deeply (when in study abroad) and then switching it out for another or learning the science of how many different languages work without committing to any language or languages.

Callard gives the following sentiment concerning the aspirant who does not quite arrive at her paragon self: “Does it follow that she is bereft of ‘joy and insight?’ No, that simply means she did not acquire all the joy and insight she had been aspiring for . . . The interrupted aspirant can say, ‘this is some of what I was after all along’” (Callard, 2021b, 491). This definitely describes me of my continued AL value pursuits. Of the four ALs I continued to aspire towards, their value-to-me has surpassed that value I had of learning about as many different languages as possible or that I had when learning any singular language in depth. I think the value for these languages is strong enough to overcome any future study abroad disappointments from hearing English everywhere since it is now strong enough to hearing English everywhere while living in Kansas. I am not yet my paragon self in these four ALs, but I am much more my paragon self than I ever have been and enough of my paragon self to continue (as long as life permits) in developing my appreciation of them.

Possibly the clearest sign by which I recognized that I reached a version of my paragon self (Callard, 2018, pp. 206-208) came on September 3, 2021 while I was working out. I realized when imagining the reasons I would now give to someone who might ask why I spend so much time in four ALs that I feel like I am doing the right thing in the right place at the right time when I am imbued in them. This is a sensation I have when I am exercising—a value I have held long before this study. So too was the concomitant, opposite wherein I feel a void in me when I

do not make sufficient time for these pursuits. Thus, these are clear signposts that I have indeed attained the ALLing value to an almost self-cultivating degree.

## **Future Research and Broader Applications**

### **Future Research**

In a sense, this Ph.D. research is a proof of concept. It is creating a conceptual framework from various existential philosophers and creating a research methodology based upon that framework *and* enacting the methodology, i.e., applying it, in order to see if such a claimed applied philosophy (as existentialism claims to be) does indeed work in the real world with multiple ALLing. This work's existential perspective (EPr) does not pretend to be a complete account of all the various existential perspectives that could be ethically and effectively applied to multiple LLing. On the contrary, part of this EPr's success is contingent on the fate of its invitation to others to take it up (as well as my own continued living of it out) by taking up an existential approach to doing and/or studying language learning, teaching, and/or research. In this section and the next, I offer some possible ways that this could eventuate.

I will likely return to teaching academic English in the future, but I do not want my English students to *only* choose English to specialize in since it is a hyper-dominant in the world. My invitation to them will be to also pick *another* language (or languages) to aspire to deeply appreciate—but to think about it, conduct a strong evaluation, try several languages if they like, and be very purposeful in their choice by then committing at least a year to it, even while pursuing English as their specialization. In other words, English-centered majors could benefit themselves and others (globally) by taking up my invitation to aspire towards academic multilingualism via existential means.

It would also be interesting to see both the different and similar the findings in other individuals who might take up a similar auto-methodological perspective, especially to find out what proleptic reasons *they* discover for themselves along the way and compare the similarities and differences of different people's proleptic-discoveries while they enact a long-term aspirational journey in multiple language learning. Relatedly, auto-methodological studies with this EPr applied to learning endangered languages would be fascinating and beneficial to the SLA research community and beyond. Here the factors of opportunity deprivation are even greater so presumably their existential motivation (EM) would also need to be strong. It would be interesting to see if this is the case. As De Felice puts it, "One factor fueling the language loss occurring within these speech communities is the attitudes of majority language speakers . . . seen in the policies and limited opportunities offered to students looking to study endangered languages" (2012, p. 7). Thus, an EPr could be beneficial in working to promote revitalizations and continuations of less-learned languages.

The auto-methodology was initially partially chosen because American public and private schooling, even though entrusted with the responsibility to educate our population, has done little and will continue for the foreseeable future to do little to remedy the lack of foreign language education. The only way for this knowledge gap to be filled is through autonomy along the lines of aspiration wherein people search / forage curiously around various languages within their other interests until their curiosity is heightened, and then they follow it along those paths which most heighten it to commit to certain ALs. It is hoped that more people in contexts in which their native language constantly interferes with their LLing will analyze their own paths toward academic tri+lingualism via performing their own auto-methodology / idiography (Smith, Flowers, & Larkin, 2009). If others do so from this paper's EPr or a similar one, it could add a

sort of qualitative reliability to the theory. While it is impossible to study the same object, since humans differ from each other and from themselves at different points in time, still, it could be “productive to ask whether similar results would emerge from a repeat study of a similar object” by another LLer enacting their own strong evaluation and daily analyses within an EPr (Gorichanaz, 2017, p. 4).

Furthermore, of the types of identity formation this study dealt with, Callard claims that aspiration has the most reproducibility and transportability potential for university students since they are usually learning how to appreciate a value or certain values more (Callard, 2017). However, along with Ryan Kemp, I think self-cultivational formation has equal potential for reproducibility among university students as aspiration has (Kemp, 2020). However, I think when it comes to *multiple* language learning, aspirational identity forming journeys will be the most likely candidate of the two since it is with multiple LLing (especially multiple additional, i.e., faraway, LLing) that is hardest to grasp the value of before actually getting there, and it is harder to get there (unlike, e.g., learning the hyper-central language of English or learning the language of one’s neighbors).

Also, the theory and/or methodology of this study could be used to inspire future collaborative co-auto-methodological action research, such as collaborative auto-hermeneutics (Gorichanaz, 2017), where the LLer, wherever she is in life (e.g., a construction worker, a freshman at a university, a professor, an elementary student, a restaurant worker, someone who is homeless, a pastor) is a co-writer of the research and listed as such in any published material. This could attend to the gap found in the meta-analysis of hundreds of studies concerning the scholarship of teaching and learning where “one illustration of the limitations of our sample was the surprisingly limited evidence . . . of the growing field of work involving ‘students-as-

partners,' where learning from and with each other in a mutually supportive environment is investigated" (Manarin, Adams, Fendler, Marsh, Pohl, Porath, & Thomas, 2021, p. 360). This could be especially fruitful research wherein researchers actually put the students as co-publishers of their articles due to being co-participants. Journals such as the *International Journal for Students as Partners* would be a good fit for this. Of course, I encourage researchers (and everyone) to conduct their own auto-methodological research, but when they come to know other Lling participants of-and-with whom they would like to research, they could / should attempt to do it co-auto-methodologically (e.g., McGregor & Fernández, 2019).

Without having made this overt, this study has shown that the serious leisure perspective offers much that can be applied to adult language learning, and adult language learning offers much that could be applied to serious leisure studies, such as potential studies on adult language learning as serious leisure (Allen-Collinson & Hockey, 2007; Snow & Anderson, 1995; Stebbins, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2014a, 2014b). My research could be used as a springboard for this. For example, aspirational Lling research could work to fill in gaps in serious leisure studies' literature by way of aspirational Lling research that concerns all stages, including the fourth stage, of Prus's (1984) classification of serious leisure: "initial involvements . . . continuity . . . disinvolvement . . . reinvolvement . . . The fourth stage has so far inspired little research. Indeed, most analysts fail to mention the reinvolvement stage" (Stebbins, 2003, p. 879). Aspirational research could concern LLers in any of those stages, several of the stages, or passing through all of the stages. My Italian journey seems to have done exactly this, beginning with involvement, continuing for nine months, then a three month period of disinvolvement, and then a reinvolvement stage that has been maintained for a couple of months now and is likely to continue to be maintained.

To conclude, this study attended to the lack of philosophical perspectives and lack of studies concerned with multiple faraway LLing. It also addressed the need for more holistic studies due to being carried out continuously throughout each day and over the long-term *as well as* having complete access to the LLer's experiential data, *rather than* being at least three steps removed from the phenomena of study when one is an external researcher not experiencing the motivation or identity formation and getting data at time removed and place removed from the experiences. Hence, this study addressed all the conceptual and empirical gaps that it set out to address. This research also addressed a call for more researchers to “become vulnerable by diving into the *stream* of action, rather than watching it from the bank” (Wacquant, 2015, p. 4). Furthermore, as an educator, I can *now* with *less* hypocrisy encourage future students' to pursue their values as part of their aspirational LLing-journeys, which is also responding to an admonition by philosophers (Gordon, 2020; Nixon, 2008; Yacek, Rödel, & Karcher, 2020) that language educators should evaluate themselves *both* based on their ability to connect with the sufferings of students going through learning an additional academic language *and* based on if they continue to attempt to live those values that they hope their students aspire towards.

### **Broader Applications**

If one is focused on learning another language and they work full time, have a family, etc., they likely will not be able to (and do not need to) do a large amount of peer-reviewed research reading, personal journaling, or typing-up of hundreds of pages of data. They can center on engaging with the language in the ways they can. To re-emphasize, each person's situation is unique and often changing and therefore not just unique from other people but unique from their own past and future selves. Therefore, articulation and reflection remain important parts of living

out one's existential authenticity as one discerns best ways in one's present situations to engage with one's valued target language(s)—via content that relates to her important interests.

The auto-phenomenographical techniques used in this research need not be limited to only a research situation, but could be also implemented in various forms throughout our courses because existential education encourages a continual strong evaluation of oneself and of the truths of one's subject matter. Existential education is a teacher-with-students co-finding of what is the most accurate e.g., topic of this reading, verb-usage here, way to get math answer Z. That is, in the EPr, students, “do not need to be given freedom but should, through education, become aware of the freedom that they already have” (Webster, 2005, p. 15).

While agreeing that “there is no . . . best way to know things, to feel things, to see things, to remember things . . . to make such a claim is to trivialize learning, to reduce it to a mechanical skill” (Postman, 1995, p. 3), this paper will make some humble existentially-based suggestions for what might help to promote language learning with-and-as students' values (Augustine, 1993; Callard, 2018). The EPr suggests that in the Lling classroom there should be occasions for LLers to dialogue (in the target language if possible) about the things they find of interest to them and of value to them, especially in regard to learning the target language. What of learning this language is of most/greater value to them? If nothing, why are they learning the language? Why might that reason be(come) important to them? In this way we might help them discover the value they hold that is underlying their learning, even if it initially appears externalized. This is a form of encouraging students to find in what ways, for now at least, they can give their personal assent to studying that language.

In this paradigm, the LLer learner is encouraged to go on a journey to perceive her cares, then choose to commit to pursuing those cares through-and-with her ALs and to therein live

authentically. This includes the individual LLe's need-for-articulation *and* the language teacher's. Webster (2009) laments that the metaphysical challenge for schooling is either neglected or avoided altogether. This particular challenge offers LLe's an opportunity to articulate and justify a *why* for their LLe beyond the completion of a course, *in terms of long-term purpose*, and for offering educators an opportunity to articulate and justify a *why* for the *how* of their pedagogy (interactive manner that permits student to be co-teachers, etc.) as more important than the *what* of their pedagogy (as concerns books and other materials, order of presenting the materials, and so forth).

Another goal of such existential questions is to encourage the student's ability to explicitly choose to choose in the classroom, such as explicitly choosing what their opinion really is and why (while open to changing it) when dialoguing face-to-face and when explicitly choosing what topics to center on in their assignments. "What is necessary is for the individual teacher to be able to pursue a notion of the good for each and every one of her students" (Webster, 2009, p. 48). This is an encouraging of our students to participate in *good faith*, choosing to choose to dialogue in good faith, where we are each trying to seek the truth rather than attempting to manipulate or trick or outdo or outsmart. It is a hope to progress lovingly (which includes humorously, playful, and so on) towards the truth, towards the language learnings.

Existential authenticity within facticity in education can also be seen when teachers and students find themselves thrown into an outcome-based curricula where certain skill-based student learning outcomes are mandated to be taught and tested at certain times throughout the semester dictated by some supervisory or governmental force from above. In the EPr, the focus is on the attempt-toward—the directionalities. The students will (very likely) improve in those language skills, but that is secondary. The focus is on the shared commitments of students and

teachers to attempt-toward the ethical learning during that semester by virtue of the fact that they chose (even if they deny this choice-ability) to be there. The commitment is seen as made to a directionality of purposively engaging with the skills in virtuous, valued ways.

Virtuous purposive engagements are directed toward learning for the goodness and beauty and truth of learning, and the learning outcomes can thereby be seen as a great excuse to do so via learning of and within (and in the many various ways other things interconnect with) the skills / outcomes. That is, even within facticity one can choose one's manner of directing oneself. Since high test scores are a specific aim of many students, the teacher very much should prepare them for the tests as much as they are responsible for doing so given the expectations of the class and student, but in an EPr she does so with care and intentionality-towards values, rather than utilitarian attainment of a certain number-score on a test. Students are almost guaranteed to do well on the tests if they authentically continuously choose-to-choose to engage with the skills of that language via their own values through the classroom and homework engagements. They will advance in the skills, but the purposive focus is on each narrative act being one of explicit intentionality by the students and the teachers by value-based directing, attending to, and co-learning. The focus is on each purposive directionalized value-based act. In other words, the skills are engaged with for ethical learning, but conversely,

“when the will measures its motives by outcomes, it becomes greedy for reward, and even if it accomplishes something great, it does not do so ethically . . . acting ethically means . . . being motivated by nothing outside the ethical rightness of the acts, or the goodness of their ends” (Davenport, 1995, p. 76).

Still, this does not mean one gets bogged down in seriousness, which hinders learning. As Kierkegaard puts it, “the true ethical enthusiasm consists in willing to the utmost limits of one's

powers, but at the same time being so uplifted in divine jest as never to think about the accomplishment” (Kierkegaard, 1941, p. 121). Even in their facticity, students and teachers can choose to explicitly choose their attitude *and* their means of going about attaining bureaucratic outcomes. They can still pursue those outcomes while living in accord with their higher-order values, such as the value of care for each other and for student-voiced learning, or the value for existential discussions in activities that sharpen the skills the student learning outcomes are meant to address, e.g., better mastering the phoneme [θ] or conditional clauses by talking about beliefs concerning death or love or being given existence (Noddings, 1993, p. 8-13).

In the subfield of philosophy of adult education, the most philosophically basic question is, “What is the purpose of adult education?” Extrapolating the answers from my EPr of the LLer, I submit the answer is along the lines of the philosophies of Agnes Callard (2017), Ryan Kemp (2020), and Nel Noddings (1995), which is to promote learning as equivalent to saying to (all of us—teachers and students and everyone involved) become better people by pursuing the good. But this needs to be answered more specifically: To promote one’s students’ self-cultivational and aspirational journeys, which gives a more concrete direction to what it could mean “to become better people” since by definition valuable things must also be good things (Scheffler, 2010). Self-cultivational journeys are ones where one selects to grow in a more delimited or expanded set of things one already fully appreciates, while aspirational journeys are ones where one grows in valuing a new valuable thing. LLing education in particular can apply this in multifaceted and ever-flexible ways since a student can use any interest she has to assist in learning the language and vice versa, as the examples throughout this dissertation testify to.

However, caution must be made that turning ambition or apathy/drift into aspiration or self-transformation is not something that is coerced, but rather is assisted, “If we do not do

enough, they may never get there; and if we do too much, we get in their way” (Callard, 2018, p. 267). Certain aspirational theorists have gone so far as to warn that “we do the phenomenon of transformation an injustice when we try to develop a pedagogical program to intentionally bring it about” (Yacek, Rödel, & Karcher, 2020, p. 537). It is instead something that is encouraged, allowed, given space for, which can occur from certain assignments given, certain dynamics in class encouraged, fostering students’ interests, and so on, but it is up to each learner to choose to directionalize herself in her transformation. No teacher can make this happen; only the student can choose to ethically self-author rather than ambitiously centering on getting a certain grade at any cost or rather than merely drifting and doing the least amount to get by without personal reflection and explicit choice.

“The aspirant herself, and not (only) her parents, teachers, mentors, culture etc., is morally responsible for developing into the kind of person she ends up becoming. The reason Socrates didn’t ‘make’ Alcibiades virtuous is because that is not something one person can do to another. The work of appreciating the value of, say, wisdom, is not work that someone can do for or to you” (Callard, 2018, p. 31).

One can teach what the virtues are by word and deed, and encourage others to follow her by her words and as a living example, but only the student herself can develop the virtue in herself by living toward the virtue. It is treating ourselves and our students a free agents who make voluntary choices about how reality is going to come into being that has the most potential for empowering ourselves and themselves to do so explicitly and ethically.

Take an example given by Lantolf and Pavlenko (2001) of two students in a French class with a bad curriculum design and implementation. Student J performs badly due to a dislike of having to take French for his Arts and Science degree while R performs well even though she

does not like the curriculum nor how her teacher implements it. R performs well because she connects part of her identity with it. She explicitly identifies herself as a language learner. If J's French class allowed a certain number (as many as possible) of the assignments to include the student's own interests, such as writing, reading, hearing, or talking about basketball in French (one of J's identities is basketball enthusiast), then it could have pulled one of J's identities into the classroom as well and thus also increased his performance due to an increase in French engagements. In this way, "we foster learning by 'creat[ing] environments and experiences that bring students to discover and construct knowledge for themselves'" (Manarin, Adams, Fendler, Marsh, Pohl, Porath, & Thomas, 2021, p. 350; Barr & Tagg, 1995, p. 15).

By encouraging students' freedoms, such as the ability to articulate their own interests with L2, we may foster more transformative learning in the Kemp-ian sense (Kemp, 2020) where students can choose to foster aspects of their hobbies, of the (sub)culture(s) they were raised in or with; or in the Callard-ian sense of choosing to foster aspects that are different from one's past hobbies or (sub)culture(s) (Callard, 2017); and/or any combination thereof. It would not be hard for language curriculum to make use of the philosophical concepts of this study, such as strong evaluation, because it likely is true that, "We all want . . . to bear witness, that is, to carve out our being in the world by giving durable, visible form to what we have done, felt, and believed" (Barnes, 1997, p. xiv). When students are given the opportunity, they may realize that they *want* "to write because everyone feels the need to be signifying, to signify what he experiences" (p. xi).

Carolyn Kreber in her discussion of authenticity, which should be seen as concerning aspiration or self-cultivation, goes so far as to propose that "students' authenticity should be recognised as a universal (although not the only) aim of higher education on the grounds of it

being a . . . fundamental interest for each and every person” (Kreber, 2013, p. 130). Support for this can be found in the observation that, “All human beings, whatever their culture, find themselves confronted by questions about the nature and significance of their lives” (MacIntyre, 2009, p. 9). This could be encouraged by having *each student* articulate and evaluate and re-articulate and re-evaluate what matters most to them in and through and with the subject they are studying. This is because even if, as Kreber and MacIntyre point out, this aim of higher education to foster students’ authenticity is *universal*, still, “how to serve the important interests . . . will always be a matter of finding out what becoming more authentic implies for this particular student, in the context of this particular class, course, programme, or university” (Kreber, 2013, p. 130). This is the case whether those important interests / higher-order values become transformations from their traditions by being exposed to other frameworks and traditions at the university and from other students, by growing stronger in their own traditions and enjoying sharing it with others and listening to the others share theirs, or any combination thereof as they practice their values by way of their AL articulations (written and spoken) (Kemp, 2020).

Furthermore, “how students experience their learning and the learning environments . . . is evidently a question only the students can answer” and hence auto-methodological means are needed (Kreber, 2013, p. 130). That is, each student can enact self-articulating, strongly evaluating, self-observing, and documenting. In these ways, we “encourage students to reflect on their . . . personal ways of meaning-making” (p. 130). This instills students with responsibility and encourages strong evaluation, e.g., in deciding topics or their opinion of topics in homework; or fostering the dialogic in open, honest in-class dialogue; etc.

My study included creating and enacting my own quasi-anarchic curriculum of the ALs upon myself. In discussing it throughout this dissertation, including the suggestions put forth in this chapter thus far, I have touched on ways the EPr can be implemented in curriculum and instruction. However, since this dissertation is achieved within KSU's Department of Curriculum and Instruction, it behooves me to go beyond and explicitly lay out how this EPr of the LLe might be implemented throughout a language learning curriculum in very concrete terms. Again, the student is still the auto-phenomenographer and auto-hermeneutician, since only the student can make herself existentially authentic, but we, educators, still aim at allowing, encouraging, and supporting it.

Let us take the example of an academic writing course in English for Academic Purposes. The curriculum will still be following the department's requirements of aiming to help the students attain specific student learning outcomes by certain points throughout the course by way of three coordinated tests and by the course's end with a coordinated final achievement exam. However, the curriculum can be aware of the narratives that students may be living as they go through the course and therefore can foster students' attainment (or maintenance) of self-cultivating or aspirational identity forming journeys by integrating their interests and piquing their curiosities while they learn the student learning outcomes' skills.

This could occur by having an early writing assignment concerning students' important interests wherein students reflect on those things that are most important to them and why and then ask why for each of the answers for why such things are important to them until they discern a set of higher-order values underlying their higher-order interests. After this, throughout (a portion of) the semester, students could be graded on simply if they kept a journal where once every other day or two days a week they journal on (reflect on) what content they read, listened

to, wrote, or spoke about in English the most that day (that they interacted with in English or tried to interact with and/or wanted to interact more with) or that most stuck out to them—that they most noticed or remembered, which thus tells them something that may be potentially important to them or in some way related to something important to them.

At the end of the week, they would ask themselves and journal on, “What did I most notably learn through English as seen in my reflecting over the week and on my daily journals?” Then, at the end of the first month they could look over their weekly journals and ask themselves if they stayed with the same basic content-themes that they engaged with in English or if they switched it up and, if so, how so. They then do the same thing for the end of the second month, and after writing that, they compare it to the phenomenological description they wrote at the end of the first month. They do the same at the end of month three. Then, they look over their monthly phenomenological articulations and ask themselves what this means to them: Do they think they will try to continue to develop these important interests and/or be looking to revise them and in what potential ways? Are there interests they hope to engage with more deeply in the future that they feel they wish they had engaged with more or because they feel their interest in them has grown? To be clear, a grade for such assignments is merely given by seeing that the students wrote something down. The teacher cannot judge how genuine it is, if it really is the interests the students have or should have, because true transformation cannot be forced from the outside (Callard, 2018; Pugh, Kriescher, Cropp, & Younis, 2020; Yacek, Rödel, & Karcher, 2020).

As Callard points out, “aspiration is self-creation, and selves are quite particular and idiosyncratic” (2021a, p. 463). By fostering our students’ interests in and via Lling, e.g., writing about a hobby, leading the class in an interactive way about an academic-level reading of the student’s choice, listening to a lecture of interest to the student and outlining the main ideas,

talking to a classmate for one minute straight about an interest or curiosity, we let students discover and/or develop their own interests through experimentation, open-ended dialogue, and homework that is flexible as to the content. In a similar vein, future applied linguistics/SLA research on motivation and/or identity could work to be more (co-)auto-methodological in such a way that the LLer conducts her own strong evaluations and traces out her own reflected-on-and-chosen valued interests with the target language as their own personalized self-cultivational and/or aspirational journeys, for,

“if the task of becoming subjective is the highest set for a human being, everything turns out beautifully . . . there is no waste, for even if the individuals are as countless as the sands of the sea, the task of becoming subjective is given to each” (Kierkegaard, 2009a, p. 133)

To repeat the sentiment I made in Chapter 2, the ability of the LLer, any LLer, to be his own researcher—to conduct his own auto-methodological study on his own motivation and identity in his ALs and bringing about and observing his own Lling self-cultivational or aspirational journeys requires no superabundant skills. It only requires the ability expressed by Heinrich von Kliest, a skill any *homo loquens* can potentiate, which is our ability to write out or talk out our thoughts (von Kliest, 1951). Existentialism requires the added step of committed-to action. In these ways, existentialism makes philosophy “a practical, lifelong activity that can help all of us to create ‘whys’ for living in order to be prepared for the ‘hows’ that so often challenge and disrupt our lives” (Nash & Jang, 2014, p. 96).

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## Appendix A - Acronyms and Definitions

AL = additional language, any non-native language that is one of several that an adult is actively learning (proactively engaging with) long-term and is not offered in a non-virtual nearby class and otherwise “has few or no ‘natural’ communicative functions in a particular context, and for which there are few opportunities for use” (de Beaufort, 2019, p. 32; also, see Macedo, 2019), *and one of several languages that an adult is actively learning*. Therefore, the ALs are *multiple additional languages* (Aronin & Singleton, 2012; Thompson, 2017; Wlosowicz, 2013).

ALing = additional languaging (in the moment engagement with the AL).

ALLer = additional language learner.

ALLing = additional language learning (over the course of longer periods of time of many instances of ALing).

Appropriation = “the resolute gesture by which finite and temporal possessions are converted into spiritual property—that is, that which can be accessed at any moment by an individual and which no one can take away” (Khawaja, 2016, p. 92).

Authenticity = Authenticity “involves rationality or critical reflection but it goes beyond this. We act authentically, rather than only autonomously, when the choices we make are bound up with *our own inner*”—commitments—“Authenticity involves not just being able to make *rational choices*; it also implies *owning* them, being personally invested in them, or feeling *a deep inner commitment* to them” (Kreber, 2013, p. 10). I take “existential authenticity” from John J.

Davenport to mean ““the articulation of one’s ends [endorsingly initially, and as the study goes along, proleptically], the integrity to stick by one’s devotions in the face of difficulty [i.e., commitment], and the sincerity to express openly the values on which they are based [a

necessary feature to meet the transparency and reliability criteria, among others]” (Davenport, 2015, pp. 153-154), and to do so because oneself chooses it for itself (Hampton, 2003, p. 155).

Autonomy = “the ability to govern one’s core priorities and the overall direction of one’s life (the control-condition of responsibility for one’s practical identity)” (Davenport, 2012, p. 97).

Axiology = having to do with the good, beautiful, and/or true

Description = “an explanation that details an account, narrative or documentation of an experience” (De Felice, 2012, p. 20; Creswell, 2007; Moustakas, 1994; Patton, 2002).

Directionality = Ever going towards something

Ethics = “However else it may be conceived, ethics treats ‘the good’ as its fundamental issue” (Khawaja, 2016, p. 129).

Evaluation = the self-awareness making / becoming self-aware of one’s higher-order values. By higher-order I mean it is of stronger approval and has a stronger sense of ownership (or responsibility for) compared to other values. This approval is sensed by the person’s cognitive, affective, conscience, motivational, and evaluative faculties. To take just the affective faculty, “We have certain de facto, first-order desires. These are given, as it were. But then we form evaluations, or second-order desires. But these are not just given, they are also endorsed, and in this sense they engage our responsibility” (Taylor, 1985a, pp. 28-29). These second-order (higher-order) desires point towards higher-order values.

Existential Attitude = The state of knowledge that I am responsible for everything I do which includes every thought I have, not every thought that happens to flutter through my head, but for every thought I choose to hold onto—to possess to at all think on. I am choosing these and thus I am responsible for it. For example, not being a morning person, I am sometimes spontaneously bombarded with negative thoughts in the morning, but to choose to switch to dwelling on

thoughts of thanksgiving rather than at all entertaining the fluttering negative thoughts or feelings is my choice and responsibility. Each person can always choose their mindset (state of mind as a modal choice) at any given time (Khawaja, 2016). The manner of choosing how to relate to the situation—however much you created the situation or you found yourself (thrown) in(to) the situation – whichever end of that continuum the situation one is in presently fits. That is, the actions taken with the attitude had (i.e., with love and joyfully + (e.g., joyfully + curiosity; joyfully + concern-care, etc.).

Existential Identities = Those identities that are reflected upon and chosen that are also values and values that are also identities. Existential identities are defined as the values that one relates towards as being or becoming (Kemp, 2020; Webster, 2004, 2005).

Existential Motivation = Explicitly made commitments-to will-forth a value-based directionality.

Existentialism = a philosophical theory and approach-method which emphasizes the existence of the individual person as a free and responsible agent determining their own development through acts of the will.

Experience = What X is like. Encountering what-it-is-likeness. Identity includes both one's experience, that is, auto-phenomena, "the showing up of something to an existing individual (literally, *phainómenon*)" (Khawaja, 2016, p. 127, emphasis in original) or "the what-it-is-like" to being or doing something (Horgan & Tienson, 2002, p. 530), "the feeling, knowledge, or understanding of one's personal involvement in a situation, event, moment, or phenomenon" (De Felice, 2012, p. 19; Creswell, 2007; Moustakas, 1994; Patton, 2002).

Explicit, as in explicitly choosing to choose = What is meant by *explicit* in saying an existential (or authentic) act is one a person is *explicitly* choosing to choose is that there is an *awareness* of the more-important-to-the-self option and an *intention* to choose to enact that option. It does not

mean the choice always comes about as the person intended it or any of the infinite amount of unpredictable things that may occur due to the choice. In this paper's XPr, explicitly choosing to choose also always means trying to choose to choose that which is more important to the chooser given the time and place while also always being an ethically permissible choice. For example, the (would-be) LLer no longer simply chooses a language based on convenience because his university has a requirement to take a certain number of foreign language credits, rather, he understands his choice in terms of his own existence, in terms of which something of his identities and values is determined in that choice. Therefore, the student would make the choice with that in mind. This is explicitly choosing to choose (see Khawaja, 2016, p. 87).

Faith = anything believed or act-attempted without 100% omniscient-level of certainty that the belief is true or that the act will come about. (*See Good Faith*, and *see Bad Faith*).

Feeling = Emotion = "feeling is an affective awareness of situation" (Taylor, 1985a, p. 61); "a sense of our *situation*. They [Emotions] are affective modes of *awareness of situation* . . . describing properly what these emotions are like involves making explicit the sense of the situation they essentially incorporate, making explicit some judgement about the situation which gives the emotion its character . . . experiencing a given emotion involves experiencing our situation as being of a certain kind or having a certain property. But this property cannot be neutral . . . or else we would not be moved. Rather, experiencing an emotion is to be aware of our situation as . . . outrageous, or dismaying, or exhilarating, or wonderful; and so on. Each of these adjectives defines what I would like to call an import . . . By 'import' I mean a way in which something can be relevant or of *importance* to the desires or purposes or aspirations or feelings of a subject; or otherwise put, a property of something whereby it is *a matter of non-indifference* to a subject" and thus may be noticed and made aware of by the subject (Taylor,

1985a, p. 48, emphasis mine). “In identifying the import of a given situation we are picking out what in the situation gives the grounds or basis of our feelings, or what could give such grounds, or perhaps should give such grounds if we feel nothing or have inappropriate feelings” (Taylor, 1985a, p. 49). “Saying what an emotion is like therefore involves making explicit the import-ascription, a judgement which is not thereby affirmed, it is true, but experienced as holding the sense of the situation which it incorporates” (Taylor, 1985a, p. 50). Therefore, emotions and judgements about emotions can only be made, perceived, and described by the Ller having them.

Good Faith = being reflexive in order to discern and choose what one holds as important, and living in accord with what up to this point in your life you’ve articulated that you hold as important (i.e., relate towards as important, i.e., your presently understood more centralized-valued-by-the-self (related towards) identity/ies).

Foundational Value = A value that is self-sustaining *and* justificatory for other values (Kemp, 2015, 2020). As an example, take the value of existence. That value is, for the agent who possesses it, *self-sustaining* in that “it cannot be justified in terms of any other members of an agent’s motivational structure” (Kemp, 2015, p. 393; Kemp, 2020, p. 606). And the value is *justificatory* in terms of providing a reason or reasons for other values: “If an agent’s desire (say, to misreport her taxable income) is in conflict with her foundational value (to live ethically), then that desire isn’t—all-things-considered—a rational desire for the agent” (Kemp, 2015, p. 393).

Hermeneutics = The interpretation/ing of the meaning/significance of an act, event, statement, subject matter, etc. Thus, auto-hermeneutics as self-interpretation is the interpretation of the meanings things have for the person herself, such as what she holds as comparatively more or less important (Caputo, 1987, p. 417; Hart, 2003, p. 417).

Inauthenticity = If you are going on first order desires or values that are contrary to higher ones, then you are acting inauthentically. If you're not willing forth movements you are acting inauthentically even if you have the proper desires and values, if you're not actually willing forth relevant movements then you are acting inauthentically. Also, whenever the existing person present in situation letting himself be determined in his being by others, letting others name him, and thus existing primarily in forgetfulness of his own self-convinced genuine self (Heidegger, 1988, p. 170; Kierkegaard, 1987, p. 259; Webster, 2005, p. 11)

Joy = not a momentary affective response to a pleasant situation, "but an attitude toward God and his world which is profoundly appreciative of all the good that is and will be" (Stoeffler, 1973, p. 20).

Languaging = Simply put, for this paper languaging and thus ALing is and means engaging with the language in some way. Using *languaging* in this way stems mainly from Li Wei's "idea of translanguaging [which] comes from a . . . notion of languaging, which refers to the process of using language to gain knowledge, to make sense, to articulate one's thought and to communicate about using language (e.g., Lado, 1979; Hall, 1996; Smagorinsky, 1998; Swain, 2006; Maschler, 2009). In this process, 'language serves as a vehicle through which thinking is articulated and transformed into an artifactual form' (Swain, 2006: 97). It is also connected to A.L. Becker's attempt to move away from language as a noun or something that has been accomplished to language as a verb and an ongoing process, or languaging (1988: 25; see also Becker, 1991a,b)" (Wei, 2011, p. 1223).

Learner = someone who seeks to know something for himself or herself (Freire, 1994; Rule, 2015, p. 145).

Learning = the having of meaningful experiences by way of engagement that over the course of time of many of these engagements produces a cultivating and/or creating of the self (Dewey, 1958, p. 422; 1985, pp. 150–151; 1991, p. 124; Webster, 2005, p. 9; Barr & Tagg, 1995; Manarin et al., 2021, p. 350), whereas to learn something could simply mean having gained an addition of knowledge (in terms of understanding something new or once-forgotten) (Callard, 2018),

Movement = physical movements that are *volitionally* brought about (so not e.g., a sneeze); therefore, it is brought forth by will—by willing forth. Not all willing-forth brings about movement, but all movement is brought about by a willing-forth whether it is the 100% intended-movement or some movement approximating it (and thus still volitionally brought about). (*See Willing-Forth.*) Volitional movements are by definition *valued* (they *reflect* or *are* a value in some way, e.g. of “are a value” would be “doing exercise” e.g. of “reflects/shows/points towards a value” would be “eating vegetables” when one does not like eating vegetables but only does it for the value they place on health)) by the one making them else he would not make them or they are not truly volitional but are rather coerced or forced.

MiLL = motivation in language learning / motivation in the language learner. This is in reference to the subfield in applied linguistics concerned with motivation and language learning (Harvey, 2017, 2014; Hennig, 2010a).

Narrative = One’s life which is lived out (Davenport, 2012, pp. 8-12).

OD = opportunity deprivation = problems wherein students have few-to-no opportunities to practice the language face-to-face in their contexts/situation (Yu, Chen, Li, Liu, Jacques-Tiura, & Yan, 2014).

Perception = “the way an individual sees, understands, or refers to a phenomenon” in an explicit attended-to way (De Felice, 2012, p. 20; Dewey, 2005; Creswell, 2007; Moustakas, 1994; Patton, 2002).

Phenomena / Phenomenon = “the showing up of something to an existing individual (literally, *phainómenon*)” (Khawaja, 2016, p. 127, emphasis in original). “things as they appear in our consciousness” (Allen-Collinson, 2011, p. 3); “what I agree to attend to” (James, 1890, p. 402). “This enables . . . analysis to go back and forth constantly between descriptions of particular engagements with the world (actions, thoughts, fears, moods, etc.) and descriptions of ways of being in the world. Hammering is not just an action ‘I’ undertake; hammering can also be described as my ‘being-toward’ the possibility of making this table, or of banging my finger, or whatever the case may be. In conversing with my friend, I am not only talking with her but exercising the fundamental aspect of my being as a ‘being-with’ . . . When I feel a pang of conscience about this or that decision, what I am feeling is an echo of my own ‘being-guilty’—that is, my own radical responsibility for all that happens, which [all] issues from the fact that existence *is* care. Even the past is not immune to this sort of redescription: existentially understood, the past is not the sum total of that which has gone before but is my own present ‘having-been.’ There is nothing that I do or experience that cannot be characterized in terms of a ‘way of being’ fundamental to existence” i.e., care which includes being toward possibility, being with in engagement, and being responsible (Khawaja, p. 127 citing Heidegger, 1996, pp. 286, 291-299). – Truly broadly-encompassing, and/but (assumed) in a certain way, a certain philosophical perspective, the EPr.

Practice(s) = “any operation that provides or improves the actor’s qualification for the next performance of the same operation, whether it is designated as practice or not” (Sloterdijk, 2013, p. 4).

Resolve = explicitly chosen long-term commitments with consistently willed-forth attempts at acting them out.

SCT = Sociocultural Theory (of second language acquisition).

Strong Evaluation = Self-Endorsement = “an activity in which an agent, or some part of her, steps back from, appraises, and attaches a positive or negative evaluation to the aspect of herself she evaluates” (Callard, 2018, p. 184).

Simultaneous pursuit = any pursuit which engages two or more of one’s central values.

Spiritual Act = anytime a freewill decision is made in regards to choosing what values to relate towards and how to relate towards them, or anytime a freewill decision is made in regards to choosing to attempt willed-forth acts in relation to what values one is choosing to relate to (Webster, 2004, 2005).

Study abroad = “a temporary sojourn of pre-defined duration, undertaken for educational purposes” (Celeste, 2009, p. 11).

Subjectivity = the in-the-moment relating-to-X self (i.e., an identity instantiation) and identity as the over-the-longer-term composite of such selves (Block, 2009; Gee, 1996; Hall, 2004; Weedon, 2004).

Values = A cluster-concept (Simpson, 2014) comprised of “interrelated dispositions and attitudes, including (at least) certain characteristic types of belief, dispositions to treat certain kinds of considerations as reasons for action, and susceptibility to a wide range of emotions”

(Scheffler, 2010, p. 4). It is what is really *important* to someone, “what drives them, what their life is organized around” (Callard, 2019, 36:15).

Virtue = When your intellect is oriented towards (attempting towards / to figure out) what is true (e.g., toward learning more of an AL or of X content via an AL) and your will is oriented towards (attempting towards / to figure out) what is good (e.g., towards learning, towards edification, toward respecting others, toward helping others when in need such as lifting a barbell off of their face, toward an appreciation of the beautiful) and your acts coincide. Vice is there when one of these is lacking, for to orient towards what is true only to use that for evil means is a vice while to orient towards what is good without attempting to figure out what is true is how the road to hell gets paved with good intentions. In other words, good intentions without knowledge leads to actual harm in the real world as does knowledge without good intentions. This is why pursuit towards the true *and* the good cannot be separated, and these need to become dispositions because the virtues are also “character dispositions that equip us to reliably execute the core practices that undergird our foundational values. The virtues are tools of self-maintenance” of either self-forging or self-creating work (Kemp, 2020, p. 612; and, see Aristotle, 2002; Callard, 2018).

Voice = “This is the speaking personality, the speaking consciousness. A voice always has a will or desire behind it, its own timbre and overtones” (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 434, translator Michael Holquist’s notes).

Will = Volition = “our will is our capacity to face adversity and struggle . . . even when there is little real hope of success . . . notions of determination or sustained effort remain the primary sense of ‘willing’ . . . The Battle of Maldon . . . as the English lost the battle to the Vikings, the

English commander . . . utters . . . ‘Will shall be sterner, heart the bolder, spirit the greater, as our strength lessens’” (Davenport, 2007, p. 5)

Willing-forth = the portion of the motive/mover that attempts at movements. It is not the movement, but it is the attempting-at movement. Every (volitional) movement is caused by a willing forth, but not every willing forth brings about its intended movement(s).

## Appendix B - Daily Documentation Examples

Here are two examples of multiple-times-per-day in-the-moment journaling:

### **Jun 14, 2021:**

Apt. Portuguese: Paulo Pablo sobre participação con Deus para obtener os virtuded teologicos. – 30min.

First Aid videos finishing this one first for if happens when triathlon training or in the triathlon:

<https://youtu.be/pPr6prD2WOs> . Grammar video on the conjugated infinitive = personal

infinitive: <https://youtu.be/3wF5kWfImwE> — 2hr

Biking around Manhattan: Port. attentive listening to the 4 stages of cardio-pulmonary (sp?) adult emergency situations in Portuguese that I recorded from the YouTube channel *Instituto Brasileiro de APH - IBRAPH*: 1.5hr.

\*\*\*DE LOIN mon principal phil.ical-theo. intérêts sont ceux qui relèvent du sous-domaine de Teología Filosófica— ME ENCANTA eso, esp. ya que la Biblia y demás, la comprensión de Dios no debería ser un tipo solo leyendo la Biblia, sino más bien toda la tradición Y porque es lo más fascinante a través de un no inglés. Ig. donde estoy aprendiendo (o re / aprendiendo mejor) las materias y aprendiendo vocabulario nuevo / combinaciones de palabras, partes, estilos, etc. Y para la salud y el estado físico, bueno, todo se trata de rendimiento sin importar qué (sin importar si no duerme, si alguien se lesiona, etc.), por lo tanto, primeros auxilios, nutrición, etc., todo tipo de aplicación, y principalmente (como incluso el Dr. lo que debo hacer hoy en día) buscarlo ya que veo la necesidad en ese momento (por ejemplo, si una X lesionada, busco videos (de ejercicio) sobre eso, etc .; si me estoy preparando para un triatlón, busco videos sobre eso).

**Septembre 5, 2021:**

Apt. Fr. Easy French – What do French students pack for school, et. Reflexive verbs – 30min.

- Apt. Interview of Agnes Callard with Eric Weinstein w/ French subs – 1hr.

- Apt. *L'art du crime* « Le peintre du diablo : Partie 1 et Partie 2 » ; un peu du vocabulaire : m'assoupir, s'endormir, pourrir, verser, un verset, un témoin, la charité de réadaptation, un dessin inconnu, c'est une bonne piste que nous devons suivre, Est-ce qu'il m'emballe ? Est-ce qu'il se moque de moi? nous nous sommes battus à ce sujet, combattre, débauche, Tu me manques, cette salope, assele-vous (s'asseoir), vous aimez tirer les ficelles de la marionnette, Tu me dégoûtes, Elle devrait être celle qui te dégoûte, il m'a déchiré le coeur, je ne lui ferais jamais de mal, de façon inattendue, le navire, le bateau, des imbéciles, pas de demi-mesures ici, hein ? ils ne savent-même, ce sang a été sec, sécher, la lame du couteau, le boiteux, Mettez des céréales étranges du réfrigérateur dans un sac poubelle et jetez-les dehors, à l'intérieur, Est ce que cela te dit quelque chose? nous nous sommes quittés. — 2hr45min.

- Apt. Español video de *Miklos Lukacs* se llama “Fe, razón e ideologías - Dante Urbina y Miklos Lukacs” – 1hr