

UNITED STATES MILITARY INTERVENTION
THE CASE OF THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION

by

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this report is threefold: The first purpose of the report is to present an historical overview of the intervention problem, various definitions, and United States policy. The second purpose is to examine military intervention during the Eisenhower Administration in support of foreign policy designed to maintain the status quo. The third purpose is to look at the evidence to infer a future direction for United States intervention.

Recognition of the all encompassing nature of intervention and the interrelated effect on international stability has been the driving force behind the research reported in this paper. The inquiry was conducted by means of library research in order to develop the basis leading to a qualitative conclusion. Research was accomplished primarily in the United States Army, Command and General Staff College Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, with planned reinforcement from primary sources from the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas. However, review of available sources from the Eisenhower Administration listed in the bibliography and assistance from the library staff revealed limitations to this approach. Records of the Eisenhower Administration that deal with military intervention compiled by the intelligence agency, and the departments

of state and defense are still closed to research. In addition, meaningful discussion on military intervention has been deleted from the Eisenhower office file, and from the diary written by James C. Hagerty during his years as press secretary to the President. In addition, permission was requested and received from Mrs. C. D. Jackson to review her husband's papers. C. D. Jackson served as special assistant to the President for international affairs 1953-54, and his papers are open to research with permission. Based on his position in the Eisenhower Administration it is logical to assume that his papers would contain some information on Guatemala and Indochina, however, nothing was found that would contribute to this report.

In conclusion this paper will move from a broad discussion of the intervention problem to an analysis of military intervention during the Eisenhower Administration in order to arrive at an inferred direction for United States intervention.

Chapter 2

THE PROBLEM OF INTERVENTION

An Historical Overview

With the turn of the century, the United States saw itself in a new position as a world power. The country had just annexed the Hawaiian Islands, Guam, Wake Island, Puerto Rico, and the Phillipines. By 1900 with the election of William McKinley over the anti-imperialist William Jennings Bryan, the new imperialism was firmly established. Public approval of an aggressive foreign policy was evident with the election favoring the Republican Party in 1900. The party platform had called for an ambitious expansionist program. When Theodore Roosevelt became President in 1901 following the assassination of McKinley, an aggressive foreign policy was certain. Roosevelt was aggressive by nature. This, combined with his belief in the writings of a friend and confidant, Alfred Thayer Mahan, was bound to have a great influence on American foreign policy. In the Twentieth Century intervention can be considered as a combination of four basic problems: territorial expansion, stopping or forestalling European intervention in Latin America, preserving the balance of power in the Far East and Europe, and influencing the internal policies of other countries. The four basic problems were not new, but the