On the Effectiveness of k-Anonymity Against Traffic Analysis and Surveillance
dc.citation.doi | 10.1145/1179601.1179604 | en_US |
dc.citation.epage | 18 | en_US |
dc.citation.isbn | 1-59593-556-8 | en_US |
dc.citation.spage | 9 | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Hopper, Nicholas | |
dc.contributor.author | Vasserman, Eugene Y. | |
dc.contributor.authoreid | eyv | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2015-08-05T21:06:30Z | |
dc.date.available | 2015-08-05T21:06:30Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2006-10-30 | |
dc.date.published | 2006 | en_US |
dc.description.abstract | The goal of most research on anonymity, including all currently used systems for anonymity, is to achieve anonymity through unlinkability: an adversary should not be able to determine the correspondence between the input and output messages of the system. An alternative anonymity goal is unobservability: an adversary should not be able to determine who sends and who receives messages. We study the effect of k-anonymity, a weak form of unobservability, on two types of attacks against systems that provide only unlinkability. | en_US |
dc.description.conference | Fifth ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society, held in association with the 13th ACM Computer and Communications Security Conference, October 30, 2006, in Alexandria, VA CCS 2006 | en_US |
dc.description.version | Article (publisher version) | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2097/20138 | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
dc.relation.uri | http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1179601.1179604 | en_US |
dc.rights | This Item is protected by copyright and/or related rights. You are free to use this Item in any way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-holder(s). | en_US |
dc.rights.uri | https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/?language=en | |
dc.subject | Statistical disclosure | en_US |
dc.subject | Mass surveillance | en_US |
dc.subject | k-anonymity | en_US |
dc.title | On the Effectiveness of k-Anonymity Against Traffic Analysis and Surveillance | en_US |
dc.type | Text | en_US |