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dc.contributor.authorBoone, Gerald Alan
dc.date.accessioned2026-11-13T14:32:29Z
dc.date.graduationmonthDecember
dc.date.issued2026
dc.description.abstractThis dissertation examines the strategic context of War Plan Red, a military conception developed jointly by the Army and the Navy during the 1920s that envisioned a future conflict between the United States and the British Empire. Formally developed in the decade after World War I, it was a response to American military concerns that the British government sought to maintain its prewar dominance of the system of global trade, preventing the United States from expanding into emerging commercial markets. Articulating a belief that commercial expansion was the lifeblood of national prosperity, early twentieth-century U.S. military officers saw intense trade rivalry as a likely cause of modern interstate conflict. The early interwar years were characterized by considerable friction between Washington and London, precipitated by significant policy disagreements, attempts to control resources and international telecommunications, and naval rivalry. Military attitudes about the latter’s strategic objectives during the early interwar years were influenced by a persistent Anglophobia present in American society; uniformed officers drew on deep-seated suspicions about Whitehall’s intentions to keep the United States subordinated to British interests that went back to the nineteenth century. For most of the period following the Treaty of Versailles, these sentiments intruded on the way uniformed thinkers interpreted Britain’s supposed aspirations. Filtered through an existing Anglophobic temperament, they rarely failed to paint British actions in the worst light. Following the First World War, U.S. military planners genuinely believed that conditions were sufficiently developed to make an Anglo-American war a distinct possibility at some point in the near future. Although their suppositions barely resonated with their civilian superiors or their fellow citizens, the latter distracted by postwar disarmament initiatives, uniformed intellectuals were not dissuaded from continuing their planning exertions. Animated by long- standing fears about national vulnerability to external aggression and a resilient popular resistance to military preparedness, American military officers nevertheless took seriously their statutory responsibilities to prepare the country for a war against its most dangerous commercial competitor.
dc.description.advisorMichael Krysko
dc.description.degreeDoctor of Philosophy
dc.description.departmentDepartment of History
dc.description.levelDoctoral
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2097/47505
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.subjectWar Plan Red
dc.subjectGreat Britain
dc.subjectAnglophobia
dc.subjectWar planning
dc.subjectCommercial rivalry
dc.subjectMilitary
dc.titleOur Most Probable Enemy: The American Military, Great Britain, and the Making of War Plan Red
dc.typeDissertation
local.embargo.terms2027-12-31

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