The explanatory relevance of Nash equilibrium: one-dimensional chaos in boundedly rational learning
dc.citation.doi | doi:10.1086/673731 | en_US |
dc.citation.epage | 795 | en_US |
dc.citation.issue | 5 | en_US |
dc.citation.jtitle | Philosophy of Science | en_US |
dc.citation.spage | 783 | en_US |
dc.citation.volume | 80 | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Wagner, Elliott O. | |
dc.contributor.authoreid | eowagner | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-03-19T19:42:52Z | |
dc.date.available | 2014-03-19T19:42:52Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2014-03-19 | |
dc.date.published | 2013 | en_US |
dc.description.abstract | Game theory is often used to explain behavior. Such explanations often proceed by demonstrating that the behavior in question is a Nash equilibrium. Agents are in Nash equilibrium if each agent’s strategy maximizes her payoff given her opponents’ strategies. Nash equilibriums are fundamentally static, but it is usually assumed that equilibriums will be the outcome of a dynamic process of learning or evolution. This article demonstrates that, even in the most simple setting, this need not be true. In two-strategy games with just a single equilibrium, a family of imitative learning dynamics does not lead to equilibrium. | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2097/17237 | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
dc.relation.uri | http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/673731 | en_US |
dc.rights | Copyright 2013 by the Philosophy of Science Association. | en_US |
dc.subject | Game theory | en_US |
dc.subject | Nash equilibrium | en_US |
dc.subject | Two-strategy games | en_US |
dc.title | The explanatory relevance of Nash equilibrium: one-dimensional chaos in boundedly rational learning | en_US |
dc.type | Article (publisher version) | en_US |