Wingman in Bombing: State Support to Nonstate Actors and Drone Strikes to Erode the Power Base

Abstract

What explains the variation in weaponized drone strikes among nonstate actors? Specifically, why are some groups capable of launching audacious and relentless power-base-erosion strikes deep inside the metropole of a target state, while others remain confined to skirmishes along the battlefronts? This paper argues that external support from a state actor is likely to be a determining factor. A nuanced examination of air power theory, proliferation of drones, and state support to rebels literature demonstrates that sponsor states - particularly those engaged in a balance-of-power rivalry or possessing a conflict history with the target state - have strong incentives to empower a nonstate actor to conduct power-base-erosion attacks. The analysis also finds that a group’s longevity and the regime type of the target state influence the strategic calculus behind such strikes. These statistically significant findings introduce new explanatory factors, contributing to the emerging empirical literature on drone warfare.