The nature of thinking, shallow and deep

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dc.contributor.author Brase, Gary L.
dc.date.accessioned 2014-08-08T21:44:43Z
dc.date.available 2014-08-08T21:44:43Z
dc.date.issued 2014-08-08
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/2097/18197
dc.description Citation: Brase GL (2014) The nature of thinking, shallow and deep. Front. Psychol. 5:435. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00435 en_US
dc.description.abstract Because the criteria for success differ across various domains of life, no single normative standard will ever work for all types of thinking. One method for dealing with this apparent dilemma is to propose that the mind is made up of a large number of specialized modules. This review describes how this multi-modular framework for the mind overcomes several critical conceptual and theoretical challenges to our understanding of human thinking, and hopefully clarifies what are (and are not) some of the implications based on this framework. In particular, an evolutionarily informed “deep rationality” conception of human thinking can guide psychological research out of clusters of ad hoc models which currently occupy some fields. First, the idea of deep rationality helps theoretical frameworks in terms of orienting themselves with regard to time scale references, which can alter the nature of rationality assessments. Second, the functional domains of deep rationality can be hypothesized (non-exhaustively) to include the areas of self-protection, status, affiliation, mate acquisition, mate retention, kin care, and disease avoidance. Thus, although there is no single normative standard of rationality across all of human cognition, there are sensible and objective standards by which we can evaluate multiple, fundamental, domain-specific motives underlying human cognition and behavior. This review concludes with two examples to illustrate the implications of this framework. The first example, decisions about having a child, illustrates how competing models can be understood by realizing that different fundamental motives guiding people’s thinking can sometimes be in conflict. The second example is that of personifications within modern financial markets (e.g., in the form of corporations), which are entities specifically constructed to have just one fundamental motive. This single focus is the source of both the strengths and flaws in how such entities behave. en_US
dc.language.iso en_US en_US
dc.relation.uri http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00435 en_US
dc.rights Attribution 3.0 Unported (CC BY 3.0) en_US
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/ en_US
dc.subject Normative models en_US
dc.subject Cognitive modularity en_US
dc.subject Deep rationality en_US
dc.subject Evolutionary psychology en_US
dc.subject Human reasoning en_US
dc.subject Time scales in rational decision making en_US
dc.title The nature of thinking, shallow and deep en_US
dc.type Article (publisher version) en_US
dc.date.published 2014 en_US
dc.citation.doi 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00435 en_US
dc.citation.epage 7 en_US
dc.citation.issue Article 435 en_US
dc.citation.jtitle Frontiers in Psychology en_US
dc.citation.spage 1 en_US
dc.citation.volume 5 en_US
dc.contributor.authoreid gbrase en_US


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