On the efficiency of codeshare contracts between airlines: is double marginalization eliminated?

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dc.contributor.author Gayle, Philip G.
dc.date.accessioned 2014-04-18T21:16:27Z
dc.date.available 2014-04-18T21:16:27Z
dc.date.issued 2014-04-18
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/2097/17336
dc.description.abstract Previous research has suggested that codeshare agreements eliminate double marginalization that exists when unaffiliated airlines independently determine the price for different segments of an interline trip. Using a structural econometric model, this paper investigates whether codeshare contracts do eliminate double marginalization. The results suggest that both upstream and downstream margins persist when the operating carrier of a codeshare product also offers competing single-carrier product(s) in the concerned market. Furthermore, counterfactual simulations from the model suggest that efficient pricing of these codeshare products would lower their price, and yield nontrivial increases in consumer welfare. en_US
dc.language.iso en_US en_US
dc.relation.uri http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mic.5.4.244 en_US
dc.subject Double marginalization en_US
dc.subject Airlines en_US
dc.subject Codeshare contracts en_US
dc.title On the efficiency of codeshare contracts between airlines: is double marginalization eliminated? en_US
dc.type Article (publisher version) en_US
dc.date.published 2013 en_US
dc.citation.doi doi:10.1257/mic.5.4.244 en_US
dc.citation.epage 273 en_US
dc.citation.issue 4 en_US
dc.citation.jtitle American Economic Journal: Microeconomics en_US
dc.citation.spage 244 en_US
dc.citation.volume 5 en_US
dc.contributor.authoreid gaylep en_US

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