Omissions, conflations, and false dichotomies: Conceptual and empirical problems with the Barbey & Sloman account.

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dc.contributor.author Brase, Gary L.
dc.date.accessioned 2009-03-10T20:53:45Z
dc.date.available 2009-03-10T20:53:45Z
dc.date.issued 2009-03-10T20:53:45Z
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/2097/1290
dc.description.abstract Both the theoretical frameworks that organize the first part of Barbey & Sloman's (B&S's) target article and the empirical evidence marshaled in the second part are marked by distinctions that should not exist (i.e., false dichotomies), conflations where distinctions should be made, and selective omissions of empirical results - within the very studies discussed - that create illusions of theoretical and empirical favor. en
dc.relation.uri http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=BBS en
dc.rights Copyright Cambridge University Press en
dc.subject Bayesian reasoning en
dc.subject Frequencies en
dc.title Omissions, conflations, and false dichotomies: Conceptual and empirical problems with the Barbey & Sloman account. en
dc.type Article (publisher version) en
dc.date.published 2007 en
dc.citation.doi DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X07001690
dc.citation.epage 259 en
dc.citation.issue 3 en
dc.citation.jtitle Behavioral and Brain Sciences en
dc.citation.spage 258 en
dc.citation.volume 30 en
dc.contributor.authoreid gbrase en


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