

The pen for the sword: how the end of the Second Boer War unified Afrikaner culture and led to Afrikaner political dominance in South Africa.

by

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Abstract

The end of the Second Boer War in 1902 gave rise to cultural and political action of Afrikaners within the colonial governments and among the South African people. These actions caused a rise in Afrikaner cultural and political nationalism. Though the British emerged victorious from the war, resentment for the British Empire was widespread in the South African colonies due to brutalities suffered by the Afrikaners during the war. This resentment would later be channeled by Afrikaner leaders and used as a political weapon. The British wished for appeasement with the Afrikaners and established terms at the end of the war that Afrikaner leaders were able to use to further Afrikaner culture through politics. The military victory for the British influenced many Afrikaners to trade violence for political and cultural means of resistance. Throughout the years 1902-1924 the Afrikaner people established strategies through politics, literary publications, and new political groups, developed in the years 1904-1908, to advocate for Afrikaner nationalism and cultural equality amongst the British in areas of law, commerce, and education. The war showed the futility of military resistance against the British, but inspired many to push for political and cultural resistance, unification, and eventual dominance. Afrikaner nationalist dominance in South Africa began with the efforts of the Afrikaner leaders and people in 1902 after the Second Boer War.

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Dedication

To my parents, my brother, my entire family, and my Major Professor, who got me this far through their support and guidance.

Preface

In Pretoria on May 31, 1902, twelve men signed the Treaty of Vereeniging, ending the Second Boer War. With the twelve signatures, three years of warfare, destruction, and suffering were brought to an end. The British military had succeeded in occupying or destroying every major town or city in the Afrikaner Republics of Transvaal or the Orange Free State. The treaty promised responsible government in the ambiguous time of the future, and in the meantime, the Afrikaner people were to remain under the British military and colonial administration. Somehow, in spite of this crushing defeat, the Afrikaner people would someday unite under a single government, and become the dominant political power in South Africa. How could this happen? Afrikaner political and cultural dominance was something that had to be fought for in the political spectrum for years after the last major war with Afrikaners and the British. How did such a culture come to be the dominant political power in South Africa? The purpose of this thesis is to answer that question.

After the Second Boer War, the Afrikaner people had to find a different way to fight for their culture's survival. With the war's end the Treaty of Vereeniging was put in place establish a political framework for British rule in the conquered Afrikaner territories. The treaty established British rule, but was agreed upon by both the British and the Afrikaners. After the war, the Afrikaner leaders succeeded in using Afrikaans, the terms of the Treaty of Vereeniging, and Afrikaner culture as rallying points around which they forged an Afrikaner national identity. Many who participated in the war would step forward to lead the Afrikaner people in this drive. The Treaty of Vereeniging and the Second Boer War paved the way for Afrikaners to become the dominant political and cultural power in South Africa by inspiring anti-British resentment, establishing an Afrikaner cultural identity through Afrikaans and Afrikaner-influenced

education, and facilitating the formation of political groups and movements that led to Afrikaner nationalism.

This thesis draws on articles from American and British newspapers, written by people who visited South Africa and analyzed Afrikaner culture. There are also official documents that described Afrikaner legal matters and societal topics such as the education systems, and the *Smuts Papers*¹, a collection of the writings of Jan Smuts, edited by W. K. Hancock and Jean van der Poel. It also uses books and articles written by post-Apartheid Afrikaner historians, British Historians of Afrikaner culture, and Afrikaner historians who wrote of their culture's ascension during the 1960s-80s.

The *Selections from the Smuts Papers* have been crucial to this thesis due to its large supply of personal letters between Smuts and other Afrikaner cultural and political advocates, and between Smuts and British officials and political leaders. The volume also contains the progression in Jan Smuts' beliefs for the future of Afrikaner culture, and how he altered his strategies to push for recognition of their culture. There are also drafts of constitutions for South African provinces, speeches, and essays describing how and why the Afrikaner people were uniting. Some of them were provided in their original language but many were also translated from either Dutch or Afrikaans.

Afrikaner history began with the Dutch settlement in The Cape of Good Hope in 1652. The Dutch settlers were mostly contractors from the Dutch East India Company, and settled in the Cape to create a re-supply outpost for their company. After the outpost had been built, many of those employed by the Dutch East India Company stayed and settled with their families in

¹ W. K. Hancock, *Selection from the Smuts Papers: I, II, and III: June 1886-Nov. 1918*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966)

South Africa, after they were given leave of their contracts.² By the late seventeenth century, a thriving agricultural-based community of deeply religious “Boers” (derived from the Dutch word for farmer) developed around the Cape of Good Hope in what is now South Africa.

By 1795 much of the Dutch European homeland was under the control of the French, who were in fervent competition with the British Empire. To prevent French influence from extending throughout Africa, the British took control of the Cape, sparking a mass migration of Dutch throughout the region of southern Africa. The migration, later known as the “Great Trek” resulted in the Dutch-descended Boers moving inland and seeking a life away from the British Empire.³

After the trek, the Afrikaners formed two Republics and in 1852, the British issued the Sand River Convention, which recognized the legitimacy of the South African Republic, also called Transvaal Republic.⁴ In 1854, the Bloemfontein Convention recognized the Afrikaner territory of the Orange Free State as a republic.⁵ The Afrikaners then had control of their own lands and affairs of state. The conventions marked a great step towards Afrikaner independence from Britain, but the British eventually breached the terms of these conventions and renewed their imperialist expansion. The discovery of gold and diamonds brought thousands of British colonists into Afrikaner lands. With these discoveries, the Afrikaner people found their way of life threatened as more English-speaking British citizens came into their lands. With this British migration, territories originally held by Afrikaners were under threat of annexation.⁶ Afrikaner

² Louis Creswicke, *South Africa and the Transvaal War: I*, (Edinburgh: T. C. & E. C. Jack, 1900), 1

³ Creswicke, *South Africa and the Transvaal War: I*, 1

⁴ Montagu White “The Uprising of a Great People” *The Independent*, (New York) Feb. 8, 1900, 373

⁵ Joseph S. Dunn “The Restoration of the Free State,” *The Independent*. (New York) May 10, 1900

⁶ Louis Creswicke, *South Africa and the Transvaal War: 8*, (Manchester: Kenneth Maclennan, 1900), 78

desires and efforts to circumvent British economic expansion increased a desire to form united Afrikaner cultural and political groups.

On August 15, 1875 a small group of Afrikaners launched the organization *Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners* or “The Fellowship of True Afrikaners” led by an Afrikaner reverend named Stephanus Jacobus du Toit. The True Afrikaners lived by the code “*om te staan ins Taal, ons Nasie en ons Land* (To stand for our Language, our Nation, and our Country.”⁷ As the British hold on territories in southern Africa increased, so did the resolve of many Afrikaners to unify their people. The *Genootskap van Regte* distinguished themselves from the other unifying Afrikaner organizations due to their attempts to forge a united Afrikaner culture instead of just achieving political unity. The *Genootskap van Regte* was also unique to other Afrikaner union groups at the time because it promoted Afrikaans as a national language for Afrikaners. This was unusual because at the time Afrikaans was considered a bastardized form of Dutch, and not widely accepted as an independent language by the educated community.⁸

The *Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners* held a position of influence in Afrikaner society for several years. Its goals were more culturally based than political. In the early 1880s, a new political movement emerged that would survive past the first and Second Boer Wars and last until the beginning of the much more effective post-war Afrikaner cultural and political movements. In 1879 S. J. du Toit had entered Cape Colony Parliament as a member for Stellenbosch and launched a proposal for an “Afrikaner Bond.” Du Toit sought to use the Bond

⁷ T. R. H. Davenport, *Afrikaner Bond: The history of South African Political, 1880-1911*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), 28

⁸ John Fisher, *The Afrikaners*, (London: Cassel, 1969), 124

to unite the Afrikaner people as one political and cultural body, regardless of what republic or colony they lived in.⁹

In 1880-81, the Transvaal Republic fought a small war, later dubbed by historians as the “First Boer War,” to resist the British annexation of Afrikaner lands and to reestablish the waning power of the Afrikaner Republics.¹⁰ Through surprise and a lack of preparedness by the British, the war ended with Afrikaner victory and a new recognition of the independence of the Afrikaner Republics.¹¹ The peace that followed was not a stable one, and only a few short years later, the British once again attempted to undermine the power of the Afrikaner Republics.

The competition for gold and diamond franchise culminated into the Jameson Raid (1895), where hundreds of private soldiers, led by Commander Leander Starr Jameson but financed and organized by British officials, such as Cecil Rhodes attempted to organize an uprising of the British who were living in the Transvaal Republic to overthrow the government.¹² The attempt was a fiasco, ending in the defeat of Jameson’s forces, and fierce resentment towards the British for their involvement in the affair. This inciting incident led to failed negotiations of peace between the British and the Afrikaner Republics, resulting in the Second Boer War.

In general, before the Second Boer War, the Afrikaner people did not have a cultural identity that unified all Afrikaners together. By the late nineteenth century, British, French, and Dutch descended people within South Africa labeled themselves as Afrikaner, or the Anglicized version, Afriander. Afrikaner identity had to compete with other identities, including as Boer,

⁹ Davenport, *Afrikaner Bond*, 35

¹⁰ Fisher, *Afrikaners* 116

¹¹ Fisher, *Afrikaners*, 118

¹² Edward Porritt, “Jameson’s Raid,” *The Independent*, (New York), Jan, 16, 1896, 48

Burgher, and Cape Dutch.¹³ Today the word Afrikaner of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries identified mainly those who fought the British during the Second Boer War and spoke either Dutch or Afrikaans. For the sake of this thesis, and to avoid essentializing Afrikaner identity, anyone who self-identified as an Afrikaner will be considered an Afrikaner.

Historian's views of the origins of Afrikaner domination of South Africa have changed over the decades and have been influenced by the changing political situations in South Africa. During the 1960s and 1970s, Afrikaner historians were interested in preserving the memory of the rise of Afrikaner nationalism. Most of the works tended to focus on a single aspect of Afrikaner culture or nationalism, such as Cape Town Professor T. R. H. Davenport, who wrote *The Afrikaner Bond: 1880-1911* to present the progression and evolution of the Afrikaner cultural and political coalition through South Africa's history.¹⁴ South Africa historian and reverend J. Alton Templin focused on religious faith within Afrikaner culture and how it contributed to Afrikaner nationalism and dominance in South Africa in his book *Ideology on a Frontier*.¹⁵ Afrikaner Historian John Fisher studied the progress of Afrikaner culture in his book *The Afrikaners*.¹⁶ Cape Town Professor of Sociology T. Dunbar Moodie also focused on how faith influenced Afrikaner culture and nationalism in his book *The Rise of Afrikanerdom*.¹⁷

During the eighties and nineties, while Apartheid was collapsing and immediately after its end, scholars of Afrikaner nationalism mainly focused on the beginnings of Apartheid and

¹³ Davenport, *Afrikaner Bond*, 326

¹⁴ Davenport, *Afrikaner Bond*

¹⁵ J. Alton Templin, *Ideology on a Frontier: The Theological Foundation of Afrikaner Nationalism 1652-1910*, (London: Greenwood Press, 1984),

¹⁶ Fisher, *Afrikaners*

¹⁷ T. Dunbar Moodie, "The Rise of Afrikanerdom: Power, Apartheid, and the Afrikaner Civil Religion"(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975)

how those ideas developed within Afrikaner society. After the year 2000, many South African professors and historians began to do *post-mortem* studies of the Afrikaner nationalism of the twentieth century. Many of these studies began to go further in depth towards Afrikaner culture and nationalism, its development in the nineteenth century, and its rise to power in the twentieth century. These studies, such as an article written by Mariana Kriel who described the working-class founders of the Afrikaner Broederbond and what their lives were like when they were young, describe aspects of Afrikaner nationalism that may have gone unnoticed before.¹⁸

Most of these works discussed the Treaty of Vereeniging as a British advantaged end to the war that continued to restrict Afrikaner culture once the war was ended. This thesis revises the view by arguing that postwar Afrikaner political and cultural leaders were able to exploit the terms of the treaty to begin encouraging the growth of Afrikaner culture and eventually political nationalism. Many authors have described the major events and people who moved Afrikaner culture and politics forward, including the post-war education and language movements. I hope to add to these descriptions of Afrikaner cultural and political progression, by adding an analysis of the progression of Afrikaner culture by analyzing a substantial number of Jan Smuts' and other Afrikaner leaders' own writings that can mark specific moments of Afrikaner political and cultural development. I also hope to show how both the British and Afrikaner leaders used the specific wording of the treaty of Vereeniging to their advantage. The credit for bringing a unified Afrikaner culture and political presence out of a crushing military defeat belonged to more than one cultural factor or political group. Men and women, both British and Afrikaner, contributed to

¹⁸ Mariana. Kriel "Culture and Power: The rise of Afrikaner Nationalism revisited," *Nations and Nationalism*, 16:3 (2010): 48

the ideologies of the twentieth-century Afrikaner, and the rise of Afrikaner culture to a dominant political power in South Africa.

Chapter 1 - The Consequences of War

“In 1895 the political clouds gathered thickly and grew threatening. They were unmistakable in their portent. War was meant, and we heard the martial thunder rumbling over our heads.”¹⁹

--General Benjamin Viljoen

The above quote by Afrikaner General Benjamin Johannes Viljoen was written in his account of the Second Boer War, titled *My Reminiscences of the Anglo-Boer War*. Though written in a dramatic fashion, his words accurately described what the people of the Afrikaner Republics felt before the Second Boer War. Conflicts over mining franchises and annexation of land had put the Afrikaner republics at odds with the British for decades by the beginning of the war. What followed incited a drive for Afrikaner unity that had not yet come to fruition before the war. With the end of the war, the memory of British attacks against civilians remained with the Afrikaner people and began the first steps toward Afrikaner political and cultural unity after the war. The Second Boer War resulted in resentment for the war's harsh occurrences, a treaty that laid a baseline for the future, and men who contended for either British or Afrikaner culture in post-war South Africa.

Viljoen was a close ally of Transvaal President Paul Kruger, and was loyal to him throughout the war. When describing the causes of the war, Viljoen made sure to mention “it remains an irrefutable fact that the Jameson Raid was primarily responsible for the hostilities which eventually took place...Mr. Rhodes (Cecil Rhodes, Prime Minister of the Cape Colony) could not agree with Mr. Paul Kruger and had failed in his efforts to establish friendly relations to him.”²⁰ After failed negotiations in the years 1896 and 1897, the Second Boer War began in

¹⁹ Benjamin Viljoen, *My Reminiscences of the Anglo-Boer*, (London: Hood, Douglas, & Howard, 1902), 17

²⁰ Viljoen, *My Reminiscences*, 18

earnest in 1899. The Afrikaners forces had the archetypal hardships of an outgunned, outnumbered, and outmatched force against the British. The Afrikaner forces were split between the Transvaal, the Orange Free State, Foreign Legionnaires, and “rebel” Afrikaners who came to fight for the republics from the Cape.²¹ The British were able to field near seven times that number, many of them professional soldiers while many in the Afrikaner commandoes were volunteers armed with what they had brought with them to fight.²² The advantages of the Afrikaner forces were mobility; they were better mounted than the British, and knowledge of the terrain since many of the Afrikaners fought on land they had known for years.²³ As a result, the war soon turned into a guerilla conflict for the Afrikaner commandoes, and for the British it was a war of scorched-earth attrition.

In an article written by James Barnes, a British special commissioner and war correspondent who witnessed the fighting first hand and described the Afrikaner tactics as “They melt in among the friendly rocks like marmots in a burrow hill; and thence they take pot shots at advancing lines of dusty gray men who carry horses’ loads on their backs and wear heavy helmets that pain their sweaty brows and fall over their eyes—alas!”²⁴ Barnes’ words were dramatic and heavily biased towards the British but they accurately depicted how the Afrikaners fought. With smaller numbers and knowledge of the terrain, Afrikaner generals saw sporadic hidden attacks as their most effective means of fighting.

The British reactions to the Afrikaner guerilla tactics embittered many Afrikaners. Among the harshest of these reactions were the scorched earth policies and the concentration

²¹ Fisher, *Afrikaners*, 157

²² Fisher, *Afrikaners*, 157

²³ Fisher, *Afrikaners*, 163

²⁴ James Barnes, “With the Highlanders at Koodoesberg!,” *Outlook*, (New York), May 19, 1900

camps for the Afrikaner families that lived in British-occupied territory where British commandoes operated the scorched earth policies were known to have “almost entirely denuded the veldt of evident food sources.”²⁵ When describing how the British tactics ravaged the South African countryside, Afrikaner historian Albert Grundlingh wrote, “The British scorched-earth policy in the latter part of the conflict reduced the country almost to a wasteland.”²⁶ In a speech in Pretoria made right after the signing of the Treaty of Vereeniging (which effectively ended the war), Afrikaner General Jan Smuts lamented “We have given thousands of lives, we have sacrificed all our earthly goods; our cherished country is one continuous desert... The manner in which the enemy has carried on this war and still carries it on has reduced us to a condition of exhaustion.”²⁷ Afrikaners referenced the destruction from the war as a great injustice immediately after the war and for years onward.

Even worse than the controversy of Britain’s scorched-earth policy, was the British use of concentration camps. British troops herded Afrikaner civilians suspected of aiding the republics’ forces into makeshift internment camps operated and guarded by British troops to prevent them from supporting Afrikaner commandoes. Smuts referenced these camps in the same speech, declaring, “More than 20,000 women and children have already died in the concentration camps of the enemy.”²⁸ Little was known of these camps during first part of the war. It was difficult for the Afrikaners to get word out of the camps. The details of the British concentration camps did

²⁵ James Kirschke, “Say Who Made Her So: *Breaker Morant* and the British Empire,” *Film and History*, 38:2 (2008): 54

²⁶ Albert Grundlingh, “The Bitter Legacy of the Boer War,” *History Today*, Nov. 1999, 21

²⁷ Jan Smuts, Speech at Vereeniging, May 20, 1902 in *Selection from the Smuts Papers*: I, ed. W. K. Hancock and James Van Der Pole, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 531

²⁸ Smuts, *Smuts Papers*: I, 530

not become public until a liberal British writer and philanthropist, Emily Hobhouse visited the camps and wrote of what she saw, and published accounts of what she saw.

In one of her published accounts Hobhouse described her first impressions of the camps as, “the sun blazed through the single canvas, and the flies lay thick and black on everything, no chair, no table, nor any room for such, only a deal box standing on end, served as a wee pantry.”²⁹ Her published first-hand account gave both the British and Afrikaners people access to details about the existence of the British-controlled camps and what life was like for the civilians inside of them. Hobhouse also described the threat of diseases such as typhoid that were a major concern and had already claimed numerous Afrikaner lives within the camps. A severe lack of food and water also plagued the camps, causing further sickness and death. Hobhouse condemned the British Government for creating the camps, declaring, “this camp system a wholesale cruelty. It can never be wiped out of the memories of the people. It presses hardest on the children...Thousands of physically unfit are placed in conditions of life which they have not the strength to endure.”³⁰ Hobhouse’s words were the first widely published accounts of the concentrations camps. After their publication more attention and investigation was brought to the camps, bringing accounts of further depravity during the war. By the end of the war, the count of dead within the camps was 1,676 men, 4,177 women, and over 20,000 children.³¹

The Second Boer War ended with the defeat of the Afrikaners, foreclosing any direct retribution against the British for the wartime atrocities held little possibility. Smuts referenced the Afrikaner’s inevitable defeat in his Pretoria speech, saying, “As soon as we are convinced

²⁹ Emily Hobhouse, *Report of a Visit to the Camps of Women and Children in the Cape and Orange River Colonies*, (London: Friars Printing Association Ltd., 1899), 4

³⁰ Hobhouse, *Report of camps*, 4

³¹ Fisher, *Afrikaners*, 197

that, humanly speaking, there is no reasonable chance to retain our independence as Republics, it clearly becomes our duty to stop the struggle in order that we may not perhaps sacrifice our people and our future for a mere idea, which cannot be realized.”³² It is important to recognize that these were the words an Afrikaner general. Jan Christian Smuts had been born in Cape Colony, trained in law both at the Cape and later in Cambridge. After the Jameson Raid (1896) he migrated to the Transvaal and became a close associate and confidant of President Paul Kruger.³³ After witnessing the destruction of the Afrikaner republics and the exploitation and suffering of the Afrikaner people, Smuts publically called for the Afrikaners to cease guerrilla efforts and to focus on surviving. Though Smuts saw the Afrikaner republics as a “mere idea” after the war, he later proved himself to still be very devoted to the Afrikaner cause.

When the war ended, many Afrikaners followed Smuts’ lead and shifted from guerilla warfare to cultural and political resistance. This allowed men and women like Smuts, who had fought for or supported the Afrikaner cause during the Second Boer War to continue to do so legally after the war. Some of the leaders like Louis Botha, Jan Smuts, and J. B. M. Hertzog were already seen as heroes by the Afrikaners because of their wartime exploits. Others had fought for the Afrikaners within the British colonial system, like J. X. Merriman. The Afrikaner soldiers were defeated in the battlefield against the British, but these men continued the fight in the cultural and political world of South Africa.

General Louis Botha was a Natal-born Afrikaner who after briefly serving in Parliament of the Transvaal, rose through the ranks and was eventually appointed Commander-in-Chief of Transvaal forces during the Second Boer War.³⁴ Botha won renown as a redoubtable commander

³² Smuts, *Smuts Papers*: I, 531

³³ Templin, *Ideology of a Frontier*,

³⁴ “Botha Nearly Captured,” *New York Times*, (New York), Jan. 15, 1902

and had a wartime reputation, mentioned in an American newspaper after his death in 1919, for “sterling honesty, a judgment that seldom erred, and an infinite capacity for taking pains...Botha captured men’s hearts as well as their understandings.”³⁵ After the war Botha was a hero to thousands of Afrikaners in the colonies, and later became the figurehead of postwar Afrikaner political movements.³⁶ Jan Smuts aligned himself with Botha after the war. Together the two of them brought about some of the first post war Afrikaner political movements, with Botha as the heart and figurehead of their operations, and Smuts as the strategist and writer for their political exploits.³⁷

J. X. Merriman, unlike Botha and Smuts, was never a soldier. Since 1869 he had been a career politician, participating in the parliament of the Cape, and eventually became Prime Minister of the Cape after the war, at the head of an Afrikaner political party called the South African Party.³⁸ He supported the Afrikaner republics during the war, and after the war continued to use his parliamentary position to aid the Afrikaner cause in the Cape and kept in close correspondence with his friend Jan Smuts.³⁹ These three men represented a great portion of the Afrikaner political cause after the end of the Second Boer War, though their ideas and methods were moderate compared to other Afrikaners in post-war South Africa.

Although J. B. M. Hertzog, did not have the same level of prestige as Botha during the Second Boer War, he won recognition as a fighter, ascended to the rank of general, and invaded

³⁵ “Louis Botha,” *New York Times*, Aug. 29, 1919, 10

³⁶ W. K. Hancock and James Van Der Pole, *Selections from the Smuts Papers: II June 1910-November 1918*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1966), 3

³⁷ Hancock and Pole, *Smuts Papers: II*, 3

³⁸ Fisher, *Afrikaners*, 142

³⁹ Hancock and Pole, *Smuts Papers: II*, 4

Cape Colony with forces from the Orange Free State.⁴⁰ He was born the fifth son of German-descended farmers in Cape Colony. His mother was a devout Afrikaner who never learned English, though he learned English later in school. He studied law at Stellenbosch and was awarded a seat on the bench of the Orange Free State Supreme Court. When war broke out, he resigned from his seat to fight.⁴¹ When the war was drawing to a close with an impending British victory, Hertzog and many others from the Orange Free State were considered “Bittereinders” who wanted to continue the fight in spite of sure defeat. In spite of this desire, Hertzog and the acting President of the Orange Free State, Christaan de Wet, were signatories of the Treaty of Vereeniging.⁴²

Supporters of British rule and culture were also active in post-war South Africa. Within the Conservative wartime and post-war British government, High Commissioner of the Colonies Lord Alfred Milner worked to make British culture dominant within South Africa. He is dramatically referenced in Afrikaner history as the “most hated of all the British ogres described in the Afrikaner history books” mainly for his postwar support of Anglicization of the colonies.⁴³ During the war, Alfred Milner was Governor of Cape Colony as well as High Commissioner of South Africa, where his policies against the Afrikaner republics and people earned him the reputation of “King Ahab to the Boers.”⁴⁴ After the war, Milner was given governorship over the two defeated Afrikaner republics and remained in South Africa after the war as the primary champion for British interests. In a speech made to the people of Cape Town in 1900, Milner commissioned those “who believe in the victory of the cause of Queen and Empire to show the

⁴⁰ Fisher, *Afrikaners*, 175

⁴¹ Fisher, *Afrikaners*, 216

⁴² Richard Cavendish, “The peace of Vereeniging: May 31st 1902,” *History Today*, 52:5, 2002, 65

⁴³ Fisher, *Afrikaners*, 149

⁴⁴ Moodie, *The rise of Afrikanerdom*, 9

temperateness of strength, the temperateness of profound conviction, the spirit which should animate all the men and women who mean to persevere to the end in the struggle for an absolutely good cause.”⁴⁵ The cause was the consolidation of British culture throughout all of South Africa, and Milner’s conviction and words gave him the semblance of the British answer to the Afrikaner “Bittereinders.” Milner and other imperialists in the British government wished for the fighting to only end if the Afrikaners considered themselves British citizens and were given little to no representation in the colonial governments.⁴⁶

After the war, alongside Milner’s superior was Secretary of State for the Colonies Joseph Chamberlain. Though he was a liberal, Chamberlain was part of a breakaway faction of pro-empire Liberals who formed the Liberal Unionist Party and allied with the Conservatives to block Irish Home Rule and support the expansion of the British Empire.⁴⁷ Chamberlain’s views were similar to Milner regarding how to deal with Afrikaner resistance to British consolidation of power. In 1899, Chamberlain was recorded saying, “It must be clearly borne in mind that what we have to deal with...is the general situation which has been created by the policy pursued by the South African Republic...directed against any assertion of supremacy on the part of Her Majesty’s Government.”⁴⁸ Many Afrikaners saw Chamberlain and Milner as their enemies whose attempts to politically and culturally subordinate the Afrikaners had to be resisted. Together the British and Afrikaners contended with each other and in the years immediately after the war, and worked within the social and political confines established by the Treaty of Vereeniging.

⁴⁵ Alfred Milner, *The Nation and the Empire*, (London: Constable and Company Ltd., 1913), 27

⁴⁶ Cavendish, “The peace,” 65

⁴⁷ Peter Davis, “The Liberal Unionist Party and the Irish Policy of Lord Salisbury’s Government,” *The Historical Journal*, 1 (1975): 85

⁴⁸ Templin, *Ideology of a Frontier*, 252

The Treaty of Vereeniging was signed in Pretoria on May 31st 1902. There were twelve signatories, most of them were commanders and generals from the Afrikaner Commandoes. Among the signatories were, from the Transvaal Republic: Commander General Louis Botha, Assistant Afrikaner Commander General Koos de la Rey, and Acting President of the Transvaal Republic Schalk Willem Burger. Among the signatories from the Orange Free State were the Acting president Christaan de Wet and General J. M. B. Hertzog. The only two signatories representing the British Empire were General Lord Kitchener of Khartoum, and High Commissioner Alfred Milner.⁴⁹

There were ten terms agreed upon by the representatives of the two sides. These terms were worded in ways that could potentially have favored both the British, or the Afrikaners, depending on which side was able to exploit the terms towards their favor. Both sides attempted to do so. It was up to either the British or the Afrikaners to discern what each term meant, in a long-term context, for postwar South Africa.

The first four terms involved: the removal of armed fighters from the battlefield, the disarmament of all Afrikaner fighters, a ban on the execution of fighters, all Afrikaner combatants would swear allegiance to the crown, no soldiers were to be deprived of their personal liberty or property, and a general amnesty applied for all combatants who had not been dubbed as war criminals. The sixth term of the treaty also allowed the private ownership of firearms within the colonies so long as they were registered with the government.⁵⁰ The last terms established much of the political and cultural climate of post-war South Africa.

⁴⁹ "Treaty of Vereeniging," *Second Anglo Boer War 1899-1902, A History of the South African Constitution 1910-1996*, Official or Original Documents, 1902, 4

⁵⁰ "Treaty of Vereeniging" *Second Anglo-Boer*, 1-3

In the fifth term, it was agreed upon that the Dutch language was to be taught in the public schools of Transvaal and Orange River Colony “where the parents of the Children desire it, and will be allowed in COURTS of LAW when necessary for the better and more effectual administration.”⁵¹ The term marked the partial legitimization of the “Dutch” language, though by this time, the language of Afrikaans had infiltrated the Dutch-speaking community, and was even referenced as “Cape Dutch” at times.⁵² The words “where the parents desire it” and “when necessary for the better and more effectual administration” restricted the language to being applied only when the colonial administration authorized it. With the end of the war, it was the responsibility of British colonial officials to decide whether or not Dutch was necessary in the courts of law or in schools. At the time, British officials controlled many of the courts of law, parliamentary buildings, and public schools. Though in some ways the clause gave the British an advantage, it also gave advantage to the Afrikaners. In later years, Afrikaner political advocates and officials used the fifth term of the treaty to encourage the increase in the allowance of “Dutch” and later Afrikaans. Jan Smuts also spent years explaining to the British colonial administration how Afrikaner control of public schools could promote and encourage a better and more effectual administration.⁵³

Transvaal and the Orange River Colony were, at the time of the signing of the treaty, under British military and colonial administrations. The seventh term of the treaty was that these administrations were to allow responsible self-government for the colonies “as soon as circumstances would permit” which gave the British military authority for as long as the British

⁵¹ “Treaty of Vereeniging” *Second Anglo-Boer*, 3

⁵² S. J. du Toit, *Comparative Grammar of English and Cape Dutch*, (Paarl: D. F. du Toit & co. Limited, 1962)

⁵³ W. K. Hancock, *Selection from the Smuts Papers*: II, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 105

colonial officials deemed necessary.⁵⁴ In the following years after the war, the British colonial administration attempted to further Anglicize the Afrikaner people. The term did however give the Afrikaner people a vague timeline where they could expect to have their own elected officials within Afrikaner influenced colonial governments. Although, these advantages later needed to be vigorously fought for by men like General Louis Botha and General Jan Smuts in the first years after the war.

The question of granting mining franchise and rights for land for the black populations of South Africa was also left to the future responsibilities of the self-governed former Afrikaner Republics in the eighth term of the treaty.⁵⁵ The treaty vested the future self-governing colonial governments with the power to decide whether or not to allow black populations to vote. At the time, there were very few accurate censuses or records taken of the black populations within South Africa. Many of the early censuses taken by the British colonial administration omitted the black population from their records. A full census of the both the white and black populations of South Africa would not be included until 1911.⁵⁶ During the discussion of a possible Union of South Africa in 1908, Jan Smuts argued against including the black populations, believing that the question of “Native franchise” or any inclusion of the black population impeded Afrikaner political progress.⁵⁷ The term outlining Afrikaner responsibility over black franchise gave the Afrikaners the ability to control much of the political progress of the black South Africans.

⁵⁴ “Treaty of Vereeniging” *Second Anglo-Boer*, 3

⁵⁵ “Treaty of Vereeniging” *Second Anglo-Boer*, 3

⁵⁶ Anthony J. Christopher, “A South African Doomsday Book: The First Union Census of 1911,” *South African Geographical Journal*, 92:1 (2010) 22

⁵⁷ Jan Smuts, Letter to J. H. Hobson, July 13, 1908 in *Selections from the Smuts Papers: II*, ed. W. K. Hancock and James Van Der Pole, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 442

The last two terms of the treaty concerned the economic repercussions of the Second Boer War. In order to encourage economic reconstruction, the ninth term banned the British from imposing any land or property tax was imposed in the Transvaal or the Orange River Colony. The final term instituted the colonial government's responsibility to dole out three million pounds in sterling silver for the reconstruction of the Afrikaner territories. A commission of British officials was to be appointed and the commission's job was to hear the cases of the thousands of Afrikaners who needed money for the restoration or reconstruction of their lands.⁵⁸ The last part of the term specified who benefited from the reconstruction clause. It was established in the treaty that no "foreigner or rebel" benefited from the financial reconstruction clause. The term "foreigner" meant those who were non-citizens of the British Empire, and the term "rebel" referred to the Afrikaners in British territory, who rose up against the colonial governments, were to be put under the charge and justice of the colonial governments of the Cape and Natal, where they received little to no financial and reconstruction aid and were susceptible to criminal charges. The postwar treatment of the Natal and Cape Colony Afrikaners later fueled resentment against the British within Afrikaner society in the two colonies.⁵⁹

At the end of the war the situation seemed bleak for the Afrikaners. The Treaty of Vereeniging would be remembered in Afrikaner history as "written on British terms" and "aimed to break the power of Afrikanerdom once and for all."⁶⁰ However, the men who took up the cause of furthering Afrikanerdom both politically and culturally worked within the constraints of the treaty to use it against the British colonial officials whose goal it was to consolidate and extend British culture throughout South Africa. The day before the Treaty of Vereeniging was

⁵⁸ "Treaty of Vereeniging" *Second Anglo-Boer*, 4

⁵⁹ Davenport, *Afrikaner Bond*, 251

⁶⁰ Templin, *Ideology on a Frontier*, 268

presented to the public, General Jan Smuts, who had participated in negotiations and been made privy to the terms of the treaty, expressed in a speech that there was opportunity in the defeat of the Afrikaner people. In his speech he implored to his fellow Afrikaners that “These are great moments for us...Let us rise to the magnitude of the opportunity and arrive at a decision for which future Afrikaner generations will bless and not curse us...we should continue the struggle till the last means of resistance was exhausted.”⁶¹ Even though he saw the Afrikaner republics as a mere idea that had been lost during the war, Smuts continued to advocate for the Afrikaner cause. In the coming chapters, the efforts of Smuts and his Afrikaner counterparts could be seen in their correspondence between each other and the British officials who spent the first few years after the war circumventing Afrikaner cultural and political efforts to further British culture.

⁶¹ Smuts, *Smuts Papers*: I, 530

Chapter 2 - Education After the War

Education was something that was a constant struggle for the Afrikaner people in the years leading up to, and immediately after the Second Boer War. Poverty, a lack of financial support and the suspicion of British Anglicizing efforts combined to slow the efforts of the education system. After the war however, there was a new political and cultural climate within the Afrikaner territories. Resentment of the British was at an all time high, and the colonial administration needed to find a way to appease the Afrikaner people and avoid future conflicts. Though efforts to Anglicize the Afrikaner people continued, Afrikaners such as Louis Botha and Jan Smuts took advantage of the British desire to appease the Afrikaners by coming up with proposals on how to rebuild an education system within South Africa that placed Afrikaans and Afrikaner culture at its core. Botha, Smuts, and other Afrikaner leaders wanted to use the education system to teach, preserve, and pass down Afrikaner identity, culture, and history. Through continued proposals from Louis Botha and Jan Smuts, along with the exploitation of the British wish to appease the post-war Afrikaner people, the Afrikaner leaders succeeded in vesting control over education within local Afrikaner communities.

Before the war, the public education system in the Afrikaner Republics and the British colonies were underdeveloped and little of it was under Afrikaner control. During the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century, many of the schools relied on private funding and found outside support, leading to a heavy reliance on the charity of British missionary groups.⁶² The age of students in the rural public schools ranged from six to sixty. Mothers were known to bring their infant children and hold them in their laps all day during the lessons.⁶³

⁶² “Interesting School in South Africa” *Christian Observer* (1840-1910), (Louisville), Jan. 19, 1844, pg. 12

⁶³ “Interesting School in South Africa”

Wealthier families had the means to send their children to Europe to study in schools such as Oxford and Cambridge; many however relied on the smaller rural schools that were available to them.⁶⁴ The void of public education was filled by organizations such as the London Missionary Society that began in the late eighteenth century as an organization devoted to international mission work and schooling and evangelization of the British colonies. These works represented the beginnings of what the British considered, the Anglicization of South Africa.⁶⁵ The missionaries mainly came over from Great Britain and America to teach in these impoverished Afrikaner schools.⁶⁶

Since their society was primarily based on agriculture, much of the Afrikaner population was dispersed throughout the farmland of their territories. Farm work was placed ahead of schooling, teachers were difficult to find and few stayed for long.⁶⁷ The schools' curriculum was heavily influenced by religion.

Anglicization continued to spread through South Africa partly due to the fact that the British controlled many of the towns and urban areas in South Africa during the early nineteenth century, and thus appointed British officials who could control many educational decisions. This led to many informal and impoverished schools being set up in rural Afrikaner homes or churches. During the development of these British and Afrikaner schools, attendance was poor for the Afrikaner Schools and the British schools had great difficulty cooperating with the highly

⁶⁴ "Wesleyan Foreign Missions" *Cheshire Observer*, (Chester, England) Saturday, February 04, 1888

⁶⁵ London Missionary Society, *Report of the Directors, (Andover) Flagg and Gould, 1813*, (Cape Town: Cape Times Ltd), 19

⁶⁶ "Interesting School in South Africa"

⁶⁷ "Interesting School in South Africa"

religious Dutch and Afrikaans speaking Afrikaners.⁶⁸ The British colonial governments were finding it hard to offer equal support for the Afrikaner and British schools within their colonies. Due to the differing ideas about the role of religion within the schools and which form of Christianity should be taught, government administrations were brought under scrutiny for only supporting schools with non-Dutch religious affiliations.⁶⁹

After the Second Boer War, with the governments of the former Afrikaner Republics dissolved and replaced by British colonial administrations, the question of education within Afrikaner society was paramount. Afrikaners who planned to support Afrikaner culture and political aspirations called for the public educational systems to be locally influenced by the communities with high populations of Afrikaners. However, British-appointed colonial administrations worked to take advantage of the unstable education system in the damaged Afrikaner communities to ensure that the rebuilt school system would serve British interests and Anglicize the population.

High Commissioner Alfred Milner used the power vacuum in the former republics after the war to promote his own ideas of education for the Afrikaners. He hoped to use education to undermine Afrikaner culture and establish a future generation of South Africans influenced by the British way of life.⁷⁰ In a speech that he gave in the Transvaal city of Johannesburg, in January of 1902, (four months before the end of the Second Boer War) Milner described his plans for post-war South Africa. By Milner's description, in order for there to be a "great Johannesburg...means a British Transvaal. A British Transvaal will turn the scale in favor of a

⁶⁸ Cape of Good Hope, *Report of Select Committee on Education Bill*, (Cape Town: W. A. Richards & Sons, Govt. Printers 1883), 18

⁶⁹ Cape, *Report of Select Committee*, 18

⁷⁰ Christina Van Heyningen, "Christian National Education," *Potchefstroom: Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education*, (1990): 52

British South Africa...and a British South Africa may go a long way to consolidate...your schools, in your attaining for yourselves the full equipment of the highest standard of civilized life.”⁷¹ Before the war had finished, and with the Afrikaner Republics still legally in existence, though they were almost entirely occupied by the British military, Milner planned to consolidate British culture throughout the Afrikaner territories. His perception of the future of the Afrikaner territories held no room for Afrikaner culture, especially through the avenues of education.

Milner’s strategies involved inviting dozens of teachers and librarians from Britain to come to South Africa and to set up or support local organizations that filled the schools of the Afrikaner territories with books and teachers who taught ideologies aligned with the British Empire. One of the organizations influenced by Milner was the Guild of Loyal Women of South Africa who were South African-born British loyalist women, interested in maintaining British culture and education in South Africa.⁷² Guilds and educational organizations such as these worked to spread an idea of pride to be a part of the British Empire. The schools and educational programs that they set up in the former Afrikaner Republics targeted the younger generation of Afrikaners, attempting to omit Afrikaner history and memory of the Second Boer war and to replace those teachings with British history and “patriotic” lessons.⁷³ In the minds of those who supported the Guild however, they were saving South Africa from a tyrannical pro Dutch-speaking Afrikaner regime. J. W. Wessels, a strong advocate for the Guild of Loyal Women, explained, in a speech to rally people to the Guild’s cause in 1900, that, “It is high time, therefore, that English Africanders stand together and oppose in solid phalanx the onslaught of

⁷¹ Alfred Milner, *The nation and the empire, being a collection of speeches and addresses*, (London, Constable and Company Ltd, 1913), 55

⁷² Archie Dick, “”To make the people of South Africa proud of their membership of the great British Empire”:
Home reading Unions in south Africa 1900-1914” *Libraries and Culture*, 40:1 (2005): 5

⁷³ Dick, “To make the people of South Africa,” 7

those of our countrymen who long to establish over us a red rule of terror.”⁷⁴ These groups saw their services as the protection of their people through the survival of their culture. Other organizations such as the Cape Colony-based Central Literature Committee also supported Milner’s efforts to Anglicize South Africa by sending lists of specific pro-British books and lesson plans to the schools spread throughout the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony.⁷⁵

Jan Smuts described the Afrikaner reaction to Milner’s Anglicizing efforts in a letter to Abraham Fischer, the head of a joint deputation between the Afrikaner territories and Europe. Smuts declared, “it is our duty to guard against this (Anglicization), and that is why I am so strongly in favor of ourselves, if necessary, providing for the education of our children.”⁷⁶ Afrikaner leaders’ efforts to get control of how future generations of Afrikaners would be taught can be seen through the efforts of the *Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk* (Dutch Reformed Church), also known as the N. G.. A number of churches in the former Afrikaner republics founded the Christian National Education and were financially supported by the N. G. According to Afrikaner historian Dunbar Moodie, through these efforts, Afrikaner Christian charity soon became something more like “Christian nationalist charity,” as the schools within the former republics were only financed and supported if they taught only Afrikaner specific culture, history, and language.⁷⁷

Churches from all over the former republics banded together to raise money and provide teachers for schools who spoke Dutch or Afrikaans and taught a detailed history of Afrikaner

⁷⁴ J. W. Wessels, *An Afrikaner on the Situation*, (Cape Town: The South African Vigilance Committee, 1900), 4

⁷⁵ Dick, “To make the people of South Africa,” 7

⁷⁶ Jan Smuts, Letter to A. Fisher, October 11, 1902 in *Selections from the Smuts Papers: II*, ed. W. K. Hancock and James Van Der Pole, (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1966), 38

⁷⁷ Moodie, *The Rise of Afrikanerdom*, 70

culture and society.⁷⁸ The British colonial governments did not have any authority regarding what was learned or how the lessons were taught within the church schools. While the Afrikaner churches worked among the public to further education of Afrikaner culture and history, Transvaal Afrikaners Jan Smuts and Louis Botha began their work on establishing Afrikaner control of public education in the political arena.

In 1903 Secretary of State for the Colonies Joseph Chamberlain ventured to South Africa for a conciliatory tour. Many times, he had publically declared that his “objects are the reconciliation of the races, the progress of South Africa, and the removal of discontent.”⁷⁹ It was the hope of both the Afrikaner people that during this visit, Chamberlain would listen to the Afrikaner cause and the British hoped that his visit would decide what needed to be done in order to prevent Afrikaner resentment from breaking out in violence again. In preparation for Chamberlain’s tour, Jan Smuts and Louis Botha began writing up their proposals that outlined their ideas about how to reconcile the Afrikaners to British rule.

During Chamberlain’s visit to the Transvaal, Smuts gave an address to Chamberlain that discussed the inadequacy of Afrikaner representation within schools. He also informed Chamberlain that what the Afrikaner “people desire very strongly is that there shall be, together with the Government control, local management in the Government schools so that both in regard to the teaching of the Dutch language and other matters of grave importance effect can be given to the wishes of the parents in the education of their children.”⁸⁰ If government schools were locally controlled by their respective communities, the areas with a high percentage of

⁷⁸ “Christian National Education” 2

⁷⁹ Jan Smuts, Smuts speech in Pretoria, Jan 6, 1903 in *Selections from the Smuts Papers: II*, ed. W. K. Hancock and James Van Der Pole, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 62

⁸⁰ Jan Smuts, Smuts address to Chamberlain, Jan. 8, 1903 in *Selections from the Smuts Papers: II*, ed. W. K. Hancock and James Van Der Pole, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 207

Afrikaners within their population would be able to influence the curriculum to insure the schools focused on Afrikaner history, culture, and language. Chamberlain's visit resulted in little political change in educational policies for the Afrikaner people. The address and speeches given during that time did however communicate to Milner that Jan Smuts and Louis Botha had enough popularity and influence among the Transvaal people to be dangerous to his administration.

Milner's reaction to Smuts' popularity and appeals to Chamberlain can be seen in letters between the High Commissioner and Smuts, Botha, and De la Rey. In 1903, shortly after Smuts' appeal to Chamberlain, Alfred Milner offered the men seats on the Transvaal Colony Legislative Council that Milner was organizing supposedly for the benefit of the Afrikaners, calling it a first step towards "complete popular government."⁸¹ The council was in need of credible leaders to represent the Afrikaner people during the transition to responsible government though Milner was clear to specify, "The power and responsibility will still rest with the representatives of His Majesty's Government."⁸² Milner was sure to specify that the British-controlled council sought "not agents of its own policy, but representative men who would acquaint it with views and wishes of the population."⁸³ Milner's offer was, in a sense, a position of voice with no direct power. Giving them a powerless position on the Transvaal Legislative Council gave Smuts and Botha a voice that Milner hoped would, for a short period at least, assuage the Afrikaner people without allowing them to achieve much.

⁸¹ Alfred Milner, Letter to Smuts January 30, 1903 in Smuts Papers Vol. II, ed. W. K. Hancock and James Van Der Pole, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 80

⁸² Milner, Smuts Papers Vol. II, 80

⁸³ Milner, Smuts Papers Vol. II, 80

Smuts, and Botha firmly declined Milner's allegedly generous offer and sent word that they thought Milner's Legislative Council was a sham. They believed the council would only legitimize Britain's political monopoly in Afrikaner-majority districts. Smuts wrote his response in a letter to Milner, declaring, "If it were possible to constitute a Legislative Council without politics or politicians, this evil (voiceless politics) might be averted; but that possibility is not worth discussion." Smuts denounced the legislative councils throughout the four colonies, believing them to be entirely ineffective in promoting Afrikaner interest. Faced with a conflict between Smuts and Milner, Chamberlain eventually backed Milner and would not listen to Smuts' vision. As a result, Smuts and Botha's struggle for equal political representation and Afrikaner control over education continued.

In the few years immediately after these first efforts, the colonies remained under governments appointed by the conservative-led government of Great Britain. Little changed in the political spectrum during this time, given that the efforts of the N. G. continued among Afrikaner society, Smuts and Botha continued to advocate for Afrikaner control of schools, and Alfred Milner remained unshakable in his attempts to Anglicize the Afrikaner people.

Smuts worked on getting the message out of the Afrikaner plight under the British Colonial Administration. In a 1903 letter to the British journalist, L. T. Hobhouse, who was a Liberal political advocate, and Emily Hobhouse's brother, Smuts declared "the Boers find their whole existence torn up by the roots...their children educated by strange people...who do not know their languages or modes of thought...who teach them history which every child knows to be a travesty of the facts."⁸⁴ In the same letter, Smuts went so far as to allude to the possibility

⁸⁴ Jan Smuts, Smuts in letter to L. T. Hobhouse, June 13, 1903 in *Selections from the Smuts Papers: II*, ed. W. K. Hancock and James Van Der Pole, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 104

of another war between the British and the Afrikaners by posing the question, “Do you think the Boers will love and admire their conquerors for openly trying to Anglicize their children...It sometimes seems to me that the Government has forgotten every lesson of Transvaal history.”⁸⁵ Smuts was aware of the desire of the British colonial administrations to, above all, assuage the Afrikaner people’s anger enough to prevent further violence. By writing this letter to a well-connected British journalist, Smuts was trying to convince British leaders that unless they made concessions, another costly bloody conflict was likely.

In 1904, Smuts updated L. T. Hobhouse’s sister, Emily (whom after the war Smuts had become good friends with) on his efforts with Milner’s administration. He described an interview that he and Botha had with Milner and how “you know we want elective school committees (elected by the local community), but he wants to appoint two fifths of the committees as Government nominees. We pointed out to him that such a hybrid committee will repeat the farce of” other attempts of Milner to include Afrikaner voice in politics without giving them power or influence, such as the Legislative Council he had proposed the year before.⁸⁶ The repeated failure of his efforts to influence Milner’s education policy and advance Afrikaner education and cultural interests demoralized Smuts. Later in the letter he wrote “Naturally one despairs of making any headway with him (Milner)... If a vital reversal of British policy in South Africa does not take place soon, she may expect anything from the despair of its population.”⁸⁷ The vital reversal that Smuts and his associates so desired occurred a few short years later.

⁸⁵ Smuts, Smuts in letter to L. T. Hobhouse, *Smuts Papers*: II, 105

⁸⁶ Smuts, Smuts in letter to E. Hobhouse, March 13, 1904 in *Selections from the Smuts Papers*: II, ed. W. K. Hancock and James Van Der Pole, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 154

⁸⁷ Smuts, Smuts in letter to E. Hobhouse, *Smuts Papers*: II, 154

In December 1905, the Conservative government of Great Britain was taken out of power and replaced by the Liberal Party.⁸⁸ The Conservative Prime Minister, Arthur Balfour, was replaced by the new Liberal Prime Minister of Great Britain, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman. His ideas regarding the Afrikaners and the governing of South Africa differed greatly from his Conservative predecessors. For instance, during the Second Boer War, Campbell-Bannerman opposed the harsh treatment of the Boer people and Anglicization, posing the question “What is the effect upon brave men (the Afrikaners)? Of course, it can only be one to harden his heart and drive him to desperation.”⁸⁹ The new prime minister of Great Britain held views very similar to those of Smuts or Botha, regarding the result of the continued suppression of Afrikaner culture. Right before the ascension of the Liberal Party in Great Britain, the Conservative government appointed a Liberal-Unionist, Lord Selborne, as the new High Commissioner of the South African colonies.⁹⁰ He remained as High Commissioner after the Liberal party took power. With the changing of the old conservative guard for the liberal government in Britain, a new invitation to discuss the previous issues of education was made to the Afrikaner political advocates several months after the liberal government took power.

The effects of having a Liberal at the head of the South African colonial administration can be seen in a letter about public education that Colonial Secretary Sir Patrick Duncan wrote to Transvaal Afrikaner representative D. P. Graaff. He encouraged the Afrikaner people to “write to the government expressing their desire for such an arrangement and indicating the lines which they desire such an arrangement to follow...any proposal...will be considered by the

⁸⁸ Davenport, *The Afrikaner Bond*, 260

⁸⁹ Henry Campbell-Bannerman, *Speeches by the Rt. Hon. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, from his election as leader of the Liberal party to his resignation of office as prime minister, 1899-1908*, (London: The Times, 1909), 79

⁹⁰ “Current Events Programs and News Summary,” *The Chautauquan*, May 1905, 273

Government with an earnest desire to meet all reasonable requirements on the part of those...outside the Government education system.”⁹¹ Given that Smuts and Botha had been pushing for changes like these for the past three years, Duncan’s request was a clear signal that local control of education would be much easier to obtain than when Milner and Balfour had been in power.

Botha and Smuts took the opportunity to draft a proposal for an education program that represented what they had been determinably advocating for years. Botha sent their reply to Duncan with the drafted proposal a few weeks later. Within the letter and drafted proposal, Botha described a system of public education where a School Board, whose members would be elected by various elected school committees from the schools within the district. The school committee members were to be elected by parents from the local communities who had children enrolled in the respective schools.⁹² The school committees would have control over which teachers were hired or fired from each school, as well as dictate what the teachers at each school were permitted to include in the curriculum.⁹³ At the same time Duncan and Selborne were opening the path for Afrikaner control of education in Transvaal, they were also in the process of fulfilling the Treaty of Vereeniging’s promises by granting Transvaal responsible government.

In an article from the New York newspaper, *The Independent*, covering the process of election and self-government, Lord Selborne was quoted as expressing “the hope that the institution of self-government in the Transvaal would remove the causes of misunderstanding

⁹¹ P. Duncan, P. Duncan in letter to D. P. Graaff, August 10, 1905 in Smuts Papers: Vol. II, ed. W. K. Hancock and James Van Der Pole, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 192

⁹² Jan Smuts, Smuts in letter to P. Duncan, August 29, 1905 in *Selections from the Smuts Papers*: II, ed. W.K. Hancock and James Van Der Pole, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 194

⁹³ Smuts, Smuts in letter to P. Duncan, *Smuts Papers*: II, 194

and disunion and result in permanent peace and progress.”⁹⁴ Unlike High Commissioner Milner and the Conservative government, the Liberal government in Great Britain saw that acceding to the furthering of Afrikaner politics and culture would bring peace to South Africa quicker and more effectively than attempting to bring peace through the eliminating of Afrikaner culture. The *New York Observer and Chronicle* noted the change in government of Transvaal saying that the Liberal government decided to “give the people of the Transvaal a constitution worthy of the name, and the privilege of suffrage distributed on a generous scale among all classes, with regard alike to the rights of Britons and Boers.”⁹⁵ Selborne also described the 1907 election of Transvaal’s parliament as having “been characterized by a remarkable absence of racial bitterness (between the British and the Afrikaners) and this was a happy augury for the union of the two white races.”⁹⁶ These policies and views of the new Liberal government and High Commissioner greatly helped in the furthering of Afrikaner education. During the election; Louis Botha was elected Prime Minister and Jan Smuts was elected to Minister of Education, where he worked to use the systems drawn out in his and Botha’s previous proposals to undue what he called the “one-sided educational system” of Alfred Milner.⁹⁷ These efforts came to fruition in Smuts’ Education Act that he passed in 1907.

During the years 1907 and 1908, Jan Smuts and J. B. M. Hertzog, who worked as Botha and Smuts’ political counterpart in the Orange River Colony, drafted and worked for a similar Education Act, though Hertzog’s system would contain stricter criteria on the curriculum of public schools. Hertzog became Minister of Education in 1907 when the Orange River Colony

⁹⁴ “The Transvaal Parliament,” *The Independent*, American Periodicals Vol. 62, New York, 1907, 697

⁹⁵ “The Future of the Transvaal,” *New York Observer and Chronicle*, (New York), Nov. 1, 1906, 551

⁹⁶ “The Transvaal Parliament” 1907

⁹⁷ Jan Smuts, Smuts in letter to J. X. Merriman, March 4, 1907 in *Selections from the Smuts Papers*: II, ed. W. K. Hancock and James Van Der Pole, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 326

was also granted self-government.⁹⁸ Smuts' Act maintained his original plan of school boards and committees from 1905, but added the role of Director of Education, who mandated the region-wide educational regulations over the School Boards and district committees, but was held accountable by an appointed Education Council (the council part was added after concerns were raised by J. X. Merriman about the director having too much power).⁹⁹ Smuts Act allowed local communities to control individual schools but also, with an Afrikaner government in power, his and Botha's administration influenced education as a whole. One unfortunate effort of Jan Smuts to maintain Afrikaner influence over education was that his system prevented Black indigenous, Chinese, or Indian families (many who worked for the mining corporations) from admitting their children from attending Afrikaner-controlled schools within the Transvaal.¹⁰⁰ With the cruel exclusion of that portion of the population, aside from the continued private British missionary school, the Afrikaner people held the majority of influence of the school systems. After years of church efforts for private schools, appealing to British Colonial officials, spreading awareness of the potential loss of Afrikaner culture and threats of Afrikaner discontent, Jan Smuts, Louis Botha, and the Afrikaner communities had successfully taken control over their schools. Smuts and Botha were then also able to amicably communicate and work alongside Selborne's colonial administration.

Hertzog's Education Act, in the eyes of Botha and Smuts, alarmingly changed the balance of influence within the Orange River Colony, between the British and Colonial schools.

⁹⁸ Jan Smuts, Smuts to A. Fisher June 16, 1907 in *Selections from the Smuts Papers: II*, ed. W. K. Hancock and James Van Der Pole, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 346

⁹⁹ Jan Smuts, Smuts in letter to J. X. Merriman, July 8, 1907 in *Selections from the Smuts Papers: II*, ed. W. K. Hancock and James Van Der Pole, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 349

¹⁰⁰ Michael Cross, "The Foundations of a Segregated Schooling System in the Transvaal 1900-24", *History of Education*, 16:4 (2001): 259

The act that he passed required the teachers within every district in the Orange River Colony to speak the “mother tongue” (at this point many of the Afrikaner families in the Orange River Colony spoke Afrikaans) for at least the first four grades, after which the students would be taught in English and Dutch.¹⁰¹ The act infuriated many of the British teachers, who had originally come over as part of Milner’s Anglicization tactics, because many did not speak Afrikaans. Ninety out of the 240 British teachers resigned shortly after the act was passed.¹⁰² Though this took a considerable amount of British influence away from the schools systems of the Orange Free State, the act alarmed Botha and Smuts due to the dangers of the act fraying their hard-earned friendly relations with the British colonial administration.

Transvaal Afrikaners did not have too long to worry about the effects of Hertzog’s act on their relations with Selborne’s administration due the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910, which was made possible by the Union of South Africa Act of 1909. The Union had long been advocated for by the Transvaal Afrikaners, led for the most part by Botha and Smuts. Smuts drafted a constitution in 1908 that, for the most part, kept their original Transvaal plan for public education but allowed for the Union government to change the system if it was deemed necessary (this same provision was included in the official Union of South Africa act of 1909).¹⁰³ Within the new government, Francois Stephanus Malan, a member of the Afrikaner bond and a friend of both Smuts and Botha, was elected as the Minister of Education.

F. S. Malan had been a long time supporter of Botha and the ideas that he and his followers had for the future of South Africa. In a letter to Jan Smuts during the formation of the government, and Afrikaner politician from Natal, T. Hyslop, referenced F. S. Malan as being

¹⁰¹ Fisher, *The Afrikaners*, 218

¹⁰² Fisher, *The Afrikaners*, 218

¹⁰³ “The South Africa Act,” *The American Journal of International Law*, (Cambridge University), Jan. 1910

“still animated by the convention spirit” (Hyslop was referencing the 1908 National Convention where the constitution of the Union of South Africa was first drafted).¹⁰⁴ Malan discussed his intentions in a letter to Jan Smuts describing his “hope from my heart that, while preserving our principles, it may be our good fortune to get the English-speaking Afrikaners to join us.”¹⁰⁵ Malan’s intention was to use his position to carry out Botha and Smuts’ goal of defending and expanding Afrikaner culture and identity through education without alienating, either Anglophone Afrikaners or the British population within the Union.

At the establishment of the Union of South Africa, the Afrikaner leaders effectively controlled the majority of the educational system within all areas that held a high population of Afrikaners. They used education to defend and spread Afrikaner culture, history, and language throughout the Union. At the unveiling of a monument to the Second Boer War in 1913, Jan Smuts referenced his hope of what this control of education would bring. Smuts expressed his belief that soon “a strong self-conscious South African nation embodies the highest and noblest ideals of our ancestors, it will no longer be asked of what use that suffering and sacrifice was. The heroic tradition will be written on the heart of the nation and will remain the inspiration to noble deeds from one generation to another.”¹⁰⁶

After Afrikaner leaders’ long struggle against Anglicization and debates over education policy, the Liberal British government’s acceleration of granting self-government, as promised to the Afrikaner people in the Treaty of Vereeniging, allowed Smuts and Botha to implement their

¹⁰⁴ T. Hyslop, T. Hyslop in message to Jan Smuts, March 15, 1910 in *Selections from the Smuts Papers: II*, ed. W. K. Hancock and James Van Der Pole, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 630

¹⁰⁵ F. S. Malan, F. S. Malan in Letter to Jan Smuts, Feb. 28, 1910 in *Selections from the Smuts Papers: II*, ed. W. K. Hancock and James Van Der Pole, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 624

¹⁰⁶ Smuts, Speech made by Smuts at Bloemfontein, December 16, 1913 in *Selections from the Smuts Papers: III*, ed. W. K. Hancock and James Van Der Pole, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 146

reorganization of public education within Transvaal and later the Union of South Africa. In less than a decade after the war, the Afrikaner people had changed a sporadically supported church-based and British Influenced private school system into an official state-funded education system that was firmly under the control of elected Afrikaners.

The effects of these changes could be seen in the progress of the language movement in post-war South Africa, as well as the rise in power of Afrikaner nationalist ideals in the years following the formation of the Union of South Africa. Afrikaner cultural dominance was beginning to become a reality less than a decade after the Second Boer War. The way for the cultivation of nationalist ideals and the Afrikaner language was paved by the development of the Afrikaner influenced education system of the Union of South Africa.

Chapter 3 - Afrikaans and Afrikaner Culture

Afrikaans was, by comparison to the other languages spoken in South Africa, a young language. It had begun to develop with the continual mixing of languages from the diverse groups of Europeans and indigenous Africans in the late seventeenth century. Though the first Dutch settlers continued to speak Dutch for years, a need for trade and commerce among many groups in southern Africa encouraged new slang and phonetic pronunciation with their language. By the eighteenth century, the Dutch spoken by the working class in South Africa was near unrecognizable to the language spoken in the Netherlands. As an Afrikaner-specific identity began to emerge out of Dutch identity, the Afrikaans language began to gain more attention from people who thought of themselves as Afrikaners. In the years following the Second Boer War, Afrikaner writers and officials spread and established Afrikaans through the four colonies, making it harder for the British to avoid using Afrikaans as a language of administration. These efforts united the Afrikaner people behind a language that was specific to their culture. The progression of Afrikaner cultural and political unity can be marked in the progression of Afrikaans as a language.

Today Afrikaner historians such as professor John Boje and Fransjohan Pretorius see Afrikaans as “crucial to the production of popular historiography by means of which this (Afrikaner) national identity was constituted.”¹⁰⁷ There had been efforts to make Afrikaans an official language of the Afrikaner people before the Boer Wars but they faced adversity because of the fragmentation of Afrikaner society. Groups such as *Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners* (Fellowship of True Afrikaners) which campaigned to make Afrikaans a socially accepted

¹⁰⁷ John Boje and Fransjohan Pretorius “Kent gij dat volk: The Anglo-Boer War and Afrikaner identity in postmodern perspective” *Historia*, (South Africa), November 2, 2011, 3

Afrikaner language garnered working class support, but gained little support among elites within the Colonial and Afrikaner governments.¹⁰⁸ Official support for the acceptance of the language was overall very limited. Afrikaner historian Dunbar Moodie described Afrikaans before the war as “regarded as inappropriate for educated discourse, which meant that in writing and public speaking the cultured Afrikaner had to choose between...English and Dutch.”¹⁰⁹

The progression of Afrikaner support of Afrikaans can be found through accounts of both the British and Afrikaners in the nineteenth century. The first major movements to transform “Cape Dutch” into the official language of Afrikaans, emerged in the nineteenth century. Before then, Afrikaans had mainly been a conglomeration of several languages that were used to facilitate commerce and trade between speakers of different languages. Through the process of British “Anglicization” many of the schools in the British colonies and Afrikaner Republics either taught English or Dutch as the primary language.

As early as 1804, visiting Europeans began commenting on Afrikaans. This was many years before there had been any official language agreed upon by the Afrikaner people. In the early 1800s, Europeans had referenced the language of the Afrikaners as simply the “Dutch” or the “Cape Dutch.”¹¹⁰ Europeans saw the language simply as a different form of Dutch.¹¹¹ In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the British and others began to see Afrikaans as separate from Dutch. They began to understand that the language had too many differences to simply be

¹⁰⁸ Davenport, *The Afrikaner Bond*, 28

¹⁰⁹ Moodie, “The Rise of Afrikanerdom,” 40

¹¹⁰ “Admiral Sir Roger Curtis,” *Hampshire Telegraph and Sussex Chronicle* (Portsmouth, England), February 20, 1804

¹¹¹ “Cape Dutch Boors” *The Morning Post* (London, England), July 21, 1827

considered another form of Dutch, although many newspapers referred to the language and the people who spoke it as “Cape Dutch” up until the early twentieth century.¹¹²

The *Main Farmer*, an American newspaper mentioned the differences between Afrikaans and Dutch, considering it to be completely different from Dutch. The “Afrikaans Taal” as it was classified by some in South Africa at the time, held its roots in the old Dutch, spoken by the first Dutch settlers, then was later molded by contact from other languages, especially, French and English, as people from those nations settled in South Africa as well. Their “taal” was a language that was impossible for a typical Dutch speaker to understand.¹¹³ A British citizen concerned with the British dismissing the Afrikaner language as barbaric wrote to *Reynolds’s Newspaper*, London, going so far as to say that the “Boer Language” held far more similarities to English than it did with Dutch. The “Boer Language” held many phonetic similarities between basic words such as “wil,” “en,” and “wat” saying that the Afrikaans version of these words were the English words but simply had the “superfluous letters omitted.”¹¹⁴ Not all British observers were as favorable as the writer in *Reynolds’s Newspaper*. During the visit of the Transvaal Republic President, Paul Kruger, to England, other newspapers gave sidelong comments to the way he spoke, denouncing the Afrikaner language as complex and “as hard to learn as Chinese.”¹¹⁵ Much of the discussion of Afrikaans outside of South Africa focused on its merits as a stand-alone language and whether or not it belonged in respectable places of law, education, and

¹¹² “Transvaal War” *Western Mail*, (Cardiff, Wales), Jan. 1, 1900

¹¹³ “The Boer Language: It Differs Materially from That of Holland” *Main Farmer*, (Augusta, Maine) Sep. 27, 1894, 2

¹¹⁴ “What our readers say,” *Boer language*, *Reynolds’s Newspaper* (London, England), December 23, 1900

¹¹⁵ “Chamberlain and Kruger,” *Hampshire Telegraph and Sussex Chronicle etc* (Portsmouth, England), September 30, 1899

commerce. Many saw the language as nothing more than a base dialect of “debased Dutch, corrupted English, and Kitchen Kaffir.”¹¹⁶

With the discovery of diamonds in the 1860s and gold in the 1880s in the Afrikaner republics, the threat of British culture and annexation of Afrikaner land, Afrikaners stepped forward to attempt to cultivate and protect Afrikaner culture.¹¹⁷ During the years leading up to the Second Boer War, Stephanus Jacobus du Toit (S. J. du Toit) became one of the forerunners of the postwar Afrikaner cultural and literary movements. Du Toit was the thirteenth child of a French Huguenot descended farmer. He studied at the Stellenbosch Seminary, where he met Arnoldus Pannevis, a linguist who had already publically proposed an idea for a unified Afrikaans language.¹¹⁸ One of the first ways that du Toit moved Afrikaans forward in society was by finishing the work of Arnoldus Pannevis. Though little can be found mentioning Pannevis before many years after the Second Language Movement of Afrikaans it was clear that he saw the importance of Afrikaans within the religious beliefs of the Afrikaner people. He became one of the first men to attempt to translate the Dutch bible into Afrikaans.¹¹⁹ Pannevis’ bible was not taken up by Afrikaner society when he wrote it. Scholars have debated the reason for this, such as historian and writer for the University of the Free State, Marina Kriel, who believed that “the time was not ripe for bible translation...the speakers of Afrikaans...did not recognize the language as theirs and had far too little respect for it to embrace it as a language of

¹¹⁶ George Lacy, “Some Boer Characteristics,” (Boston, MA), Jan. 1900

¹¹⁷ Fisher, *The Afrikaners*, 124

¹¹⁸ Davenport, *The Afrikaner Bond*, 29

¹¹⁹ Anne-Marie Beukes, “Our language heroes and the modernizing movement of Afrikaner Nationalism,” *Department of Linguistics and Literary Theory, University of Johannesburg*, (Johannesburg, South Africa), Sep. 1, 2007, 250

religion.”¹²⁰ Men such as S. J. du Toit later attempted to bridge this gap that so many Afrikaners saw between Afrikaans and a legitimate language.

Du Toit, like many Afrikaners, had been trained in Dutch and English, but through his travels and daily life had also learned the language of Afrikaans. After accepting a position with the Christian National Education, Du Toit rose through the government of the Transvaal to be appointed as Superintendent General of Education in 1882.¹²¹ Soon after, he was commissioned to finish what Arnoldus Pannevis began and translate the Dutch Bible into Afrikaans. The “Boer Bible” as British journalists and officials called it, was different in structure than the typical Dutch or English bibles found in South Africa. Instead of beginning with Genesis, their book begins with Psalms and each Psalm was set to music.¹²² The trouble with the publishing of bibles in Afrikaans during the 1880s was that the language movements for Afrikaans were still in the early stages of development and much of the Afrikaner population had not yet committed to establishing it as a separate language. In the Afrikaner Republics and the British colonies, English and Dutch were already well ingrained into everyday life. Jan Smuts wrote in an essay in 1892 that “English and Afrikaans may continue to coexist for a good while yet...Natural causes and the laws which regulate linguistic phenomena must ultimately decide the struggle for supremacy.”¹²³ There was a palpable struggle between the two languages, but it was later, towards the end and after the Second Boer War, when Afrikaans began to be accepted as a separate language from Dutch, and Afrikaners began look towards it for identity. Some writers encouraged this shift by writing in Afrikaans, while others tried to advance the language through

¹²⁰ Kriel, “Afrikaner Nationalism,” 403

¹²¹ Davenport, *Afrikaner Bond*, 30

¹²² “What the Boer Bible is Like” *Boer Bible The Courier and Argus Dundee*, (Scotland), November 08, 1900

¹²³ Jan Smuts, Smuts wrote essay at Cambridge, July 1892 in *Selections from the Smuts Papers: I*, ed. W. K. Hancock and James Van Der Pole, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 44

politics. Jan Smuts and Louis Botha made their ideas for Afrikaner future known to the British colonial administration. Besides education, these men, among others, worked to increase the use of Dutch within the postwar British colonies. This proved to be helpful to further the use of Afrikaans in South Africa as well.

The Treaty of Vereeniging restricted the use of Dutch after the Second Boer War, but within the careful wording of the treaty, the Afrikaners would find a foothold to further their culture and languages (both Dutch and Afrikaans). The fifth term of the treaty allowed for the Dutch language to be used within schools “where the parents of the children desire it,” and would be allowed within courts of law “when necessary for a better and more effectual Administration of Justice.”¹²⁴ Within the Transvaal, Louis Botha and Jan Smuts worked to extend the circumstances where of when Dutch could be used for a better and more effective government and society.

As with education, Smuts’ and Botha’s appeals began with the contentions of Alfred Milner and Joseph Chamberlain. Their argument for the Dutch language aligned very closely with their argument for Afrikaner control of education. With the war over and the Afrikaner republics gone, Smuts and Botha feared for the survival of Afrikaner culture under colonial rule. One month after the end of the war, Smuts wrote a letter to Cape Colony’s Acting-Prime Minister T. Lynedoch Graham lamenting that “South Africa is dying...of crushed ideals and an ineradicable hatred and social disruption...if things continue much longer as they have been going on for some considerable time...warfare against constitutional liberties and equality...will become synonymous with that Nemesis which is riding South Africa to death.”¹²⁵ Smuts early on

¹²⁴ Treaty of Vereeniging,” *Second Anglo Boer War*, 3

¹²⁵ Jan Smuts, Smuts in letter to T. Lynedoch Graham, July 26, 1902 in *Selections from the Smuts Papers*: II, ed. W. K. Hancock and James Van Der Pole, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 16

in the years after the end of the war, established to the post-war British colonial government that their policies remained a great source of discontent among the Afrikaners. In later letter to the Graham, Smuts discussed his efforts for the Afrikaner people by explaining:

I was not fighting for ‘Dutch’ supremacy or predominance over the English Afrianders...what makes me pessimistic is the fact that so many are still aiming at the old policy of trying to crush the spirit or dominion of Afrianderdom (whatever that may mean). The political vote, national sentiments, and language of the Dutch colonists must be eliminated and they themselves transformed into full-blown ‘Englishmen’...That I say is a fatal policy.¹²⁶

Though the letter to the Acting-Prime Minister for the Cape produced few immediate results for the furthering of Afrikaans or Afrikaner culture. Smuts tied the language question, by referencing the “language of the Dutch colonists” rather than the “Dutch language,” into the survival of British and Afrikaner interests within South Africa. Smuts made very few references to Afrikaans in his correspondence with British colonial officials but it is important to note that at this time, most of the educated British and Afrikaners did not recognize Afrikaans as a sophisticated language. By avoiding referencing Afrikaans and using ‘Dutch’ to cover any potential form of Dutch, including Afrikaans, Smuts was able to work for Afrikaner culture through pushing for Dutch to be protected according to the Treaty of Vereeniging. However, some of Smuts’ original letters, such as a letter to former President Paul Kruger’s private secretary H. C. Bredell (written in 1903), were originally drafted, by Smuts, in Afrikaans.¹²⁷

¹²⁶ Jan Smuts, Jan Smuts in other letter to T. Lynedoch Graham, August 2, 1902 in *Selections from the Smuts Papers: II*, ed. W. K. Hancock and James Van Der Pole, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 25

¹²⁷ Jan Smuts, Smuts in a letter to H. C. Bredell, June 28, 1903 in *Selections from the Smuts Papers: II*, ed. W. K. Hancock and James Van Der Pole, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 107

Despite not directly advocating Afrikaans to the British colonial administration, Afrikaner historians such as J. Alton Templin consider Smuts' policies as one of the reasons that Afrikaans was preserved in the years following the Second Boer War.¹²⁸

During Chamberlain's visit, Smuts gave a speech to Chamberlain in front of other Afrikaner delegates in Transvaal. In the speech he compared their situation with Chamberlain's culture by saying "Mr. Chamberlain has, like us, been educated in a school of freedom and he will therefore understand why we desire so strongly that our language shall be acknowledged."¹²⁹ Throughout the entire speech and the appeal for their culture, Smuts never used the word Dutch. He referenced only the Afrikaner people, and "our language" for describing what they spoke. Smuts' unwillingness to reference the term Afrikaans in his letters to the British colonial administration may have been because of the British prejudice for the language. Afrikaans still needed the respect of the elite educated Afrikaners before it could be pushed for in politics. Smuts would not openly show support for Afrikaans until the passing of his Transvaal Education Act in 1907, when he declared that Dutch, English, and the "Mother-Tongue" would be used to teach children in public schools.¹³⁰ In the time between Smuts' first efforts to give Dutch an equal standing in education in law, and his establishment of Afrikaans in public schools, Afrikaners with a desire to legitimize Afrikaans would work to bring the language into the folds of society.

Cultural acceptance of Afrikaans was primarily rooted, not in the political spectrum, but in the efforts of writers, poets, and veterans of the Second Boer War. They were the fighters for

¹²⁸ Templin, *Ideology on a Frontier*, 272

¹²⁹ Jan Smuts, Smuts in speech to Afrikaner Delegates and Chamberlain, January 8, 1903 in *Selections from the Smuts Papers*: II, ed. W. K. Hancock and James Van Der Pole, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 71

¹³⁰ Jan Smuts, Smuts in a letter to A. Fisher, June 16, 1907 in *Sections from the Smuts Papers*: II, ed. W. K. Hancock and James Van Der Pole, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 346

Afrikaans, their words inspired a desire among the Afrikaner people to pursue a collective Afrikaner-specific language. S. J. du Toit, one of the writers who wrote in Afrikaans before the Second Boer War, published a book in 1902, before the end of the war, which was written to bridge the gap between Afrikaans and the British of South Africa.

Du Toit had already made failed attempts to legitimize Afrikaans through organization *Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners* in the Western Cape.¹³¹ The war did not dilute his desire for a unified Afrikaner identity. Instead, the impending Afrikaner military defeat inspired du Toit to change his strategy towards promoting Afrikaans. In 1902, S. J. du Toit published the *Comparative Grammer of English and Cape Dutch* in Paarl. He presented the content using a side-by-side structure. On one side of the page was the Afrikaans version of what was being said, and the other side of the page held the English version.¹³² While it was important to Afrikaans' advocates to reach out to Dutch speakers, there were still many English speakers who identified themselves as Afrikaners. In the book, Du Toit explained the numerous similarities that Afrikaans had with English, such as both use the Latin alphabet, the similarities in spelling, as well as the similar phonetic pronunciation of Afrikaans vowels and consonants as with English words. The book contained numerous facts on subjects such as "When 2 vowels follow on each other, which are pronounced as 2 syllables, this is indicated in Cape Dutch by placing a comma between the two, thus *Isra'el, Indi'e*."¹³³ The book also contained exercises for the reader to practice what they had previously read. Du Toit's book aided the Afrikaner cause in more ways than simply spreading knowledge regarding Afrikaans. By centering the primary focus of the

¹³¹ Sandra Swart, Lize-Marié van der Watt, "Taaltriomf of Taalverdriet?" *Historia*, 53:2 (2008): 135

¹³² du Toit, *Comparative Grammer*, 5

¹³³ du Toit, *Comparative Grammer*, 5

book on explaining the similarities and differences that Afrikaans had with English, Du Toit opened the possibilities of the language to English speakers. For so long, English newspapers and writers simply saw Afrikaans as a lower form of Dutch. Few considered it worthy of being used in places of law or commerce. Even on the title page, Du Toit placed the word “Afrikaans” next to the words “Cape Dutch” which were the words English speakers used to describe Afrikaans for decades. Through his book, Du Toit aided to bridge the gap between the English speakers and speakers of Afrikaans. All of this was accomplished during the largest war between the English and the Afrikaners.

In 1906, shortly after the Second Boer War ended, Afrikaner journalist A. L. Snell published the *Handbook of Boer Dutch Part 1: Vocabularies Phrases, Short Sentences*. Snell’s book held a less extensive explanation of Afrikaans, and mainly focused on filling his book with a massive amount of English words and the translated words in Afrikaans. He divided up the sections of vocabulary through topics such as “Parts of the Body,” “Days Months Seasons,” and “The Pronouns.”¹³⁴ He also included a short introduction explaining the phonetic sound of the Afrikaans words, though his explanation was not nearly as detailed as Du Toit’s, regarding phonetic similarities.¹³⁵ Snell did however use a different strategy to endear Afrikaans to English speakers as well. Towards the end of the handbook, Snell translated famous English historical and poetic writings into Afrikaans to give the reader insight into how they sounded in Afrikaans. In one section, Snell began an excerpt with “Die lich, wat nou door daarje venster breek,” which many in England and elsewhere knew as “But soft, what light through yonder window breaks,”

¹³⁴ A. L. Snell, *Handbook of Boer Dutch Part 1: Vocabularies, Phrases, Short Sentences*, (Johannesburg: Central News Agency LTD, 1906), 12

¹³⁵ Snell, *Handbook of Boer Dutch*, 2

or rather the balcony scene from *Romeo and Juliet*.¹³⁶ The latter sections of Snell's books contained words and phrases that had been familiar to English speaking culture for centuries. English speakers from around the world were able to hear words and phrases they had listened to for much of their lives in Afrikaans. In this way, Snell worked to endear Afrikaans to the rest of the English-speaking world. Though it acted as more of a translating thesaurus than a lesson book like Du Toit's book, Snell's efforts worked to further the English understanding of Afrikaans. These works also aided the Dutch speaking Afrikaners as well, as many had learned English in their schools before the war.

Besides the education publications, there were other Afrikaners who used the impassioned voice of poetry to further Afrikaans. One such man was Jacob Daniel du Toit, was the son of Stephanus Jacobus du Toit. During the war, he had been a chaplain for Boer commandos. He later took the pen name of "Totius" for his writing of poetry in Afrikaans.¹³⁷ One poem that was published after the Second Boer War, titled "Forgive and Forget," held a message of rebirth and possibility for success despite defeat. The poem read: "His beauty was broken / his basses were torn / In one place was the tribe so close to the middle / But still that tree slowly recovered / because about his wounds drop the ointment of its own sap."¹³⁸ Throughout these stanzas and the rest of the poem, Afrikaans, British imperialism, or Afrikanerdom are not directly mentioned, but the original translation of the poem was in Afrikaans. "Forgive and Forget" as well as many other pieces of Totius' work contained hints of rebirth, resistance, and perseverance through adversity. All of it was written in Afrikaans.

¹³⁶ Snell, *Handbook of Boer Dutch*, 48

¹³⁷ Dr. EC Pienaar, *Poets From South Africa*, (Pretoria: J. H. de Bussy Limited, 1922), 1

¹³⁸ Dr. J. D. du Toit, Poem forgive and Forget in *Poets From South Africa*, ed. Dr. EC Pienaar, (Pretoria: J. H. de Bussy Limited, 1922), 30

Among the efforts of Totius were the works of other poets who wished to establish the language of Afrikaans through expanding its literature. Former soldier among the Boer commandos, Jan F. E. Celliers published a poem after the war called “Afrikaner Comfort.” His poem was somewhat more direct in his message to Afrikaners than du Toit’s. The poem described an aunt speaking to her nephew, saying: “I see his look so pale and to/ so I ask quickly, ‘What’s the matter’ / She said ‘The last day is here / and soon the world will perish / come join us now / oh nephew how can you sleep? / Our time is short.”¹³⁹ Celliers’ poem presented a much more direct call of unity and action among the Afrikaner people. He wrote of an Afrikaner aunt speaking to a young boy in Afrikaans, telling him that for their survival he must awake and get up. The symbolism of Afrikaners stepping forward to protect their culture and unify their people is shown through many poems that emerged from the years immediately after the Second Boer War.

Former Afrikaner war correspondent during the Second Boer War, Dr. C. Louis Leipoldt, wrote a number of poems with a forlorn theme involving the suffering of the Afrikaners. In a poem that he wrote in 1901 simply titled “In the Concentration Camp” Leipoldt wrote “Here the child stumbles, he was born prematurely / Here the old men die, too weak for battle...for every second of sorrow leaves its tracks / Printed on your heart, sacrifice by sacrifice.”¹⁴⁰ Poems such as these referenced the torment and anguish of the Afrikaner people residing in the British military camps during the war. In another work called “The Provider’s Will,” Leipoldt wrote “We are entering a new world / to win a new paradise / to get a new country / Where we can live

¹³⁹ Jan F. E. Celliers, Poem Afrikaner Comfort, in *Poets From South Africa*, ed. Dr. EC Pienaar, (Pretoria: J. H. de Bussy Limited, 1922), 13

¹⁴⁰ Dr. C. Louis Leipoldt, Poem In the Concentration Camp, in *Poets From South Africa*, ed. Dr. EC Pienaar, (Pretoria: J. H. de Bussy Limited, 1922), 58

free.”¹⁴¹ Leipoldt referenced both suffering and rebirth in his works, like many of his poet counterparts.

Cape Colony born Afrikaner writer Daniel Malherbe wrote another lamentation for the Afrikaner people titled “The Sea is Full of Eternity.” Malherbe wrote “The sea is full of lamentation / of voices that can not get rest, of souls that are centuries in and centuries out / in eternal repetition they lie hopelessly.”¹⁴² Few of these poems referenced the Afrikaner people directly. But these works all referenced a lost, unheard, suffering yet steadfast people, all of it written in Afrikaans. Many of them were written fewer than twenty years after the Second Boer War.

Another Afrikaner Attorney and journalist, Eugene Marais wrote in his poem titled “Winter” that “Lay in the fields in starlight and destruction / And high in the edges / spread in the fires / in the grass seed on the move / like desperate hands.”¹⁴³ This poem is another example of Afrikaner writings discussing growth and life amidst destruction. Many of the post-war works of these poets seemed to have a phoenix-like rebirth from ashes as a general theme.

One such poem with similar themes as the other poets was a poem written by attorney, politician, and journalist Cornelius Jacobus Langenhoven in 1918 called “Die Stem van Suid-Afrika” or “The Call of South Africa.”¹⁴⁴ Langenhoven’s writing tilted towards being more symbolic than other writers of his day. One of the stanzas read: “In our body and our spirit / in

¹⁴¹ Dr. C. Louis Leipoldt, Poem The Provider’s Will, in *Poets From South Africa*, ed. Dr. EC Peinaar, (Pretoria: J. H. de Bussy Limited, 1922), 66

¹⁴² Daniel Malherbe, Poem the Sea is Full of Eternity, in *Poets From south Africa*, ed. Dr. EC Pienaar, (Pretoria: J. H. de Bussy Limited, 1922), 82

¹⁴³ Eugene Marais, Poem Winter, in *Poets From South Africa*, ed. Dr. EC Pienaar, (Pretoria: J. H. de Bussy Limited, 1922), 102

¹⁴⁴ Cornelius Langenhoven, Poem Di Stem van Suid-Afrika, in *Poets From South Africa*, ed. Dr. EC Pienaar, (Pretoria: J. H. de Bussy Limited, 1922), 98

our inmost heart held fast / In the promise of our future / And the glory of our past / In our will, our work, our striving / From the cradle to the grave.”¹⁴⁵ Though it was difficult to measure the impact that the poems, or each individual writer, had on the Afrikaner public, the impact of “The Call of South Africa” was more apparent. In the early 1920s music was added to the words of Langenhoven’s poem and was later made the national anthem of The Union of South Africa.

Most of the more famous Afrikaner men who wrote poetry in Afrikaans were in their twenties or thirties when the Second Boer War began. Some were soldiers during the war, like Totuis and Celliers. Others witnessed the war through other perspectives, like C. Louis Leipoldt, who worked as a war correspondent. These men were a young generation of Afrikaners who had witnessed first hand what their people had gone through. Many of their works included the forlorn sentiments of a suffering people.

The poems and other writings in Afrikaans further legitimized the language by bringing the colonies of South Africa considerably more Afrikaans literature than there had been before the war. The war brought forward writers who published works only in Afrikaans and years later the poems were published throughout South Africa. Through the works of writers such as Celliers, du Toit, and Langenhoven, Celliers, Leipoldt, Malherbe, and Marais, the Afrikaans language became more accepted in a broader range of Afrikaner society. With the language’s growing presence and social acceptance, it became harder for the British to exclude it from places of business and law.

There are few reviews available from the time period of these individual poems. There are however references made by later Afrikaner historians who argued that these poets and their work were influential in postwar Afrikaner society. In his book *The Rise of Afrikanerdom*,

¹⁴⁵ Langenhoven, *Poets From South Africa*, 98

Moodie wrote of how “Boer suffering and heroism was sung by a new breed of poets: Eugene Marais, Jan Celliers, Totius, and Louis Leipoldt.”¹⁴⁶ When describing what these men did, Moodie referenced the words of Afrikaner poet, N. P. van Wyk Louw, who was born in 1906 and grew up around the time that the poet’s words took effect in society. He believed “The task of these writers was the spiritual transfiguration of the war...so that it would become meaningful and not remain a brute material happening for us...so that [we] could again become men with human values and evaluations”¹⁴⁷ The poets of post-war South Africa channeled the painful memories of the Afrikaner people during the war, and turned them into rallying ideas and moments of pride for the Afrikaners who survived and carried on after the war. *The New York Times* published an article about post-war South Africa, written by Afrikaner journalist G. H. Archambault, where he referenced, “The strength of Afrikaans literature lies in the fact that their writers do not use language merely as a medium of expression but as a manifestation of pride in a cultural renewal entirely on their own.”¹⁴⁸ Historians have looked back at the years after the Second Boer War and saw what effects the works of these poets, journalists, and former soldiers had on Afrikaner society.

Even Jan Smuts, though not a public supporter of Afrikaans, acknowledged the importance of harnessing the pain of the past in a way that strengthened Afrikaners and became a part of their identity. In the same speech given at the Bloemfontein monument referenced in the previous chapter, Smuts declared “when a strong, self-conscious South African nation one day embodies the highest and noblest ideals of our ancestors, it will no longer be asked of what use that suffering and sacrifice was. The heroic tradition will be written on the heart of the nation and

¹⁴⁶ Moodie, *The Rise of Afrikanerdom*, 41

¹⁴⁷ Moodie, *The Rise of Afrikanerdom*, 41

¹⁴⁸ G. H. Archambault, “Letter From South Africa,” *New York Times* (New York), April 1, 1951

will remain the inspiration to noble deeds from one generation to another.”¹⁴⁹ Afrikaners of differing motivations, such as which language to support in post-war South Africa, united behind an idea of survival and strength through their people’s suffering.

The works of the poets, and their increasing use within South African society could be seen in the school systems of postwar South Africa. In a yearly record of policy change for the University of South Africa, published in 1913, it was recorded that “With regard to words and expressions peculiar to the Dutch of South Africa and used in a sense different from that which they now have in Holland, it will be left to the judgment of each examiner to decide to what extent the use of such words and expressions may be admitted.”¹⁵⁰ Though this is only a representation of a single university, it is a direct reference to the fact that the Dutch language of South Africa had become ambiguous enough, as to merit a qualification for the school to allow the Afrikaner people their own version of their language, depending on the wishes of the examiner.

British writers also helped boost Afrikaans’s profile. British Professor C. M. Drennan published a book called *Cockney English and Kitchen Dutch* in 1920, in which he analyzed the divide between Dutch and Afrikaans, and its similarities to the differences between modern English and Old English. Drennan referenced the fact that many skeptics referred to Afrikaans as “Kitchen Dutch” or a lesser form of an older language. Drennan believed “on historical grounds there is no reason that Afrikaans may not one day possess a glorious worldwide literature of its own...In the year 1200 English was what one might fairly call ‘Kitchen English.’”¹⁵¹ Controversy surrounded the growing Afrikaans language and its relative merits

¹⁴⁹ Smuts, *Smuts Papers*: III, 146

¹⁵⁰ University of the Cape of Good Hope, *The Calendar 1913-1914*, (Cape Town: University, J. C. Juta, 1913), 47

¹⁵¹ C. M. Drennan, *Cockney English and Kitchen Dutch*, (Johannesburg: Argus, Johannesburg, 1920), 6

compared to Dutch. For the Afrikaner, “it might be argued that in order to promote the future unity of South African peoples, a unity of language would be a desideratum, and that we should begin by knocking down the linguistic walls which separate us.”¹⁵² The British professor saw the divisions between Afrikaners wishing to remain close to European Dutch, and speakers of Afrikaans, as well as the English speakers in South Africa. Drennan’s book showed the efforts being made by scholars who saw the benefits of linguistic unity in South Africa. Drennan even declared “If Afrikaans is to blossom into a great literature, the Afrikaner poet, must turn his back on the polder and look to the veld.”¹⁵³ Drennan believed, given his study of languages and their progression, that for Afrikaans to move forward the writers and poets must be the ones to move the language forward.

With the amount of Afrikaner literature and analysis becoming more extensive within the South African public, Afrikaners who supported Afrikaans acted on their support in small but effective ways. Afrikaners throughout the Cape and other provinces of South Africa spoke only Afrikaans in public as well as demanded to do business solely in Afrikaans. Teachers also began speaking Afrikaans during their lessons in public schools.¹⁵⁴ Though it is difficult to find references of specific instances of these small forms of support for Afrikaans, their results could be seen in the following years.

The progression of Afrikaans moved forward hastily in the second decade in the twentieth century. By 1914, Cornelius Jacobus Langenhoven, the man who would later write “Die Stem,” was a member of Cape Colony’s parliament, and successfully advocated for “the use of Afrikaans as a written medium in our primary schools, up to and including the fourth

¹⁵² Drennan, *Cockney English*, 13

¹⁵³ Drennan, *Cockney English*,

¹⁵⁴ Moodie, *Rise of Afrikanerdom*, 51

standard.”¹⁵⁵ The Cape Province, formerly Cape Colony, which had originally been under the control of Milner’s anti-Afrikaner cultural administration, now aligned Afrikaans as an equal language among Dutch and English. The Transvaal and the Orange Free State provinces soon followed similar educational rulings.¹⁵⁶ By 1917 an Afrikaans dictionary had officially been drafted, and by 1919, work on continuing the Afrikaans Bible began again.¹⁵⁷

It was at this stage that Afrikaans began to be made into a political, rather than simply cultural, tool for the Afrikaners. By 1919 the *Afrikaner-Broederbond*, a nationalist organization founded that year that was popular among the working class Afrikaners, declared that they would only accept Afrikaans speaking members, and that one of their central goals was to “inspire love of the Afrikaans language, religion, traditions, country, and People.”¹⁵⁸ J. B. M. Hertzog, who had advocated strongly in favor of Afrikaans in his Education Act of 1907, was also growing in political popularity and by 1919 was at the head of the nationalist movement in the Union of South Africa.

By in the year 1925, the Official Languages of the Union Act established Afrikaans as an official language in South Africa. The act amended that “the word ‘Dutch’ in section one hundred and thirty-seven of the South Africa Act, 1909, and wheresoever else that word occurs in the act, is hereby declared to include Afrikaans.”¹⁵⁹ This act officially lifted Afrikaans to an

¹⁵⁵ Cape of Good Hope, *Minutes and Ordinances of the First Session of the Second Provincial Council*, (Cape Town: Cape Times Limited, 1914), 46

¹⁵⁶ Fisher, *Afrikaners*, 266

¹⁵⁷ Fisher, *Afrikaners*, 266

¹⁵⁸ Moodie, *Rise of Afrikanerdom*, 50

¹⁵⁹ “Official Languages of the Union Act,” Act No. 8 of 1925. First published on 27 May 1925 in *Government Gazette Extraordinary* No. 1477, 1925,

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Official_Languages_of_the_Union_Act,_1925

equal legal status with English and Dutch. The language had become commonly used enough for an amendment of the original document that had established the Union of South Africa.

In less than a quarter of a century, Afrikaans had grown from a socially stigmatized, slang-based dialect of a higher language, to a language that was legally accepted alongside the centuries old languages of English and Dutch. With the rise of nationalism in 1910s, Afrikaans proved useful to the organizations that wished to further use Afrikaner identity as a political weapon, and eventually make Afrikanerdom dominant in South African politics.

Chapter 4 - Afrikaner Nationalism

The growth of Afrikaner nationalism and its eventual political dominance in South Africa have roots in the efforts of the Afrikaner champions of the Second Boer War. After the war the former Generals Jan Smuts, Louis Botha, and J. B. M. Hertzog all achieved significant influence in Afrikaner society and colonial politics. Though they were not the only Afrikaners working to further Afrikaner political interests in the aftermath of the Second Boer War, these men formed the political parties that eventually steered Afrikaners towards a dominant political position in South Africa. The memory of the British scorched-earth tactics and the concentration camps of the Second Boer War were still fresh in the minds of the Afrikaner public in the years following the war. It was these memories, coupled with a British desire to appease the resentful Afrikaner people, that men like Hertzog, Botha, and Smuts exploited to further Afrikaner political interest. After what was suffered by Afrikaners during the Second Boer War, political and societal support and eventual dominance of Afrikaner nationalism grew through the channeling of anti-British ideologies and the political movements after the Second Boer War.

Afrikaner nationalism had already started developing throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century. In the decades leading up to the Boer Wars, groups such as the *Boeren Vereeniging*, the Afrikaner Bond, and the *Genootskap van Regte* were unable to garner enough support to gain much political influence, especially within Cape Colony and the Natal. There were too many complications between Afrikaners who were unwilling to commit to Afrikaans as a legitimate language and those with a strong desire to maintain a cultural connection to Afrikaner-Dutch roots.¹⁶⁰ However, through the publications and societal awareness raised by these organizations, such as what was published in the Afrikaans newspaper of the *Die*

¹⁶⁰ Davenport, *Afrikaner Bond*, 264

Afrikaanse Patriot, a nationalist spirit was cultivated among Afrikaners in the pre-war Afrikaner Republics and the South African British colonies.¹⁶¹ Though they lacked in political success before the war, these Afrikaner parties formed an effective “protective shield behind which the broken institutions of Afrikanerdom could be rebuilt” after the Second Boer War.¹⁶²

After the war, collective Afrikaner resentment of other non-Afrikaner cultures occurred in the form of the petitions and documents presented by Louis both and Jan Smuts, who wasted no time in establishing themselves as Afrikaner political players in the British-controlled Transvaal. One of the ways that Smuts did this was by opposing the British administration’s plans to encourage Chinese immigration. The British wanted to encourage Chinese immigration because of a shortage of mining labor in postwar Transvaal. The experience of the war had led a large percentage of the black population of South Africans to shun dangerous mining work and to move to rural areas to rebuild their lives after the destructive war, thus prompting the British Labor Commission to send for thousands of Chinese workers to immigrate to South Africa to work in the mines.¹⁶³ A memorandum of evidence submitted by Jan Smuts to the British Labor Commission in 1903, showed the anti-Chinese and anti-black sentiments shared by many Afrikaners at the time. While the Labor Commission rejected the memorandum, the document showed the early stages of Afrikaner nationalists building an Afrikaner identity in opposition to other cultures within South Africa after the Second Boer War. Since Afrikaners owned much of the rural territory of the Transvaal, their resentment of the Black population increased as a result of their migration from the cities to rural areas. In the memorandum, Smuts wrote against the British Native Commissioner, who he believed did not understand the rural Afrikaner “official

¹⁶¹ Templin, *Ideology on a Frontier*, 201

¹⁶² Davenport, *Afrikaner Bond*, 264

¹⁶³ Davenport, *Afrikaner Bond*, 255

routine, and consequently prefers to leave the insolent Native on his farm alone rather than embark on an expensive and cumbersome litigation in order to have them ejected by process of law.”¹⁶⁴ These harsh disagreements between the Afrikaners and the British would later be cruelly remembered by historians as the “Black” and “Yellow Perils.” They helped radicalize many Afrikaner’s racial views and infused Afrikaner identity with a strong racist streak, while uniting the Afrikaner parties against British interests.¹⁶⁵ The Afrikaner people continued to exclude the black population from official records. Except for the census of 1911, which showed how large the black population of South Africa was in comparison to the minority white population, the Union of South Africa excluded the areas with a black- dominant population percentage from their yearly census, once the census was established in 1918.¹⁶⁶

The mining industry had long been a major part of Transvaal’s economy. After the Second Boer War, the British controlled much of Transvaal’s industry.¹⁶⁷ With the influx of Chinese miners, Afrikaners feared the black population’s migration out into the areas of rural Afrikaner-populated territory, thus threatening Afrikaner agricultural development through what Smuts called “their old life of lazy barbarism.”¹⁶⁸ Smuts’ racist attacks against the black population of Transvaal show the emerging power of racism within postwar political Afrikaner nationalism. Political disputes such as the fight over Chinese immigration continued in Transvaal

¹⁶⁴ Jan Smuts, Jan Smuts in Memorandum to Labour Commission, Sep. 15, 1903 in *Selections from the Smuts Papers*: II, ed. W. K. Hancock and James Van Der Pole, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 128

¹⁶⁵ Jil Campell-Miller, “‘Ex Unitate Vires’ Elite Consolidation and the Union of South Africa, 1902-10,” *Canadian Journal and History*, 45:1, (2010): 89

¹⁶⁶ Christopher, “A South African Doomsday book,” 31

¹⁶⁷ Fisher, *The Afrikaners*, 242

¹⁶⁸ Smuts, Memorandum in *Smuts Papers*: II, 129

and helped Botha and Smuts establish a new political party that would advocate for Afrikaner resentments such as the resentment of Chinese and black population's relocations.

In 1904, within the former Transvaal Republic, former Afrikaner political rivals congregated at a "Peoples Congress" in Pretoria to meet and establish a firmly united Afrikaner-specific political party.¹⁶⁹ Through this congress, Louis Botha and his deputy Jan Smuts were able to lead and help form the political party, *Het Volk*. Since their party was newly made, and the conservative British government that had been in power during the war was still in power, *Het Volk* did not begin with a demand for Afrikaner self-government. Smuts explained his strategy in a letter to his friend and wartime ally Emily Hobhouse. He confided that, "We refused to say anything about responsible or representative government, as we are not certain of what we are going to get while Lord Milner has to settle the terms of the grant."¹⁷⁰ At the time Alfred Milner was still High Commissioner for Southern Africa, and the newly formed *Het Volk* would have to deal with him as part of any negotiation for self-government.

Louis Botha was acclaimed as a hero by many after the war, and was the central figurehead of *Het Volk*, but it was Jan Smuts who devised and presented the Afrikaners' case to Milner's administration. He wrote almost every major political document that *Het Volk* presented for the Afrikaner case in the colonial governments, and was the overall strategic mind behind the party.¹⁷¹ Botha gained popular support from the people and Smuts fought for political support within the British colonial government of Transvaal.

¹⁶⁹ W. K. Hancock and James Van Der Pole, *Smuts Papers: Vol. II*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 164

¹⁷⁰ Jan Smuts, Smuts in letter to E. Hobhouse, May 29, 1904 in *Selections from the Smuts Papers: II*, ed. W. K. Hancock and James Van Der Pole, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 165

¹⁷¹ W. K. Hancock and James Van Der Pole, *Smuts Papers: Vol. II*, (Cambridge University Press, 1966), 3

Though Smuts argued against the petitioning for Afrikaner self-government at the beginning of his work with *Het Volk*, Afrikaner self-government was one of his primary goals. As early as 1904, in a letter to his friend and political associate J. X. Merriman, Smuts described his belief that the days of Milner's administration would not last long in post-war South Africa. He fervently believed that "sooner than we think we shall find that Imperialism has spent its force and has come down never to rise again in South Africa."¹⁷² His efforts to make this dream a reality were shown later documents.

Het Volk had been a Transvaal-based political party. In Cape Colony, there had been a group called the "South African Party" since the 1898 when William Schreiner, Cape Colony politician and Afrikaner Bond supporter was elected prime minister of Cape Colony.¹⁷³ Jan Smuts referenced the loss of the South African Party in the Cape Colony parliamentary elections of 1904 in a letter to J. X. Merriman, who was also a high ranking official in the South African Party and became prime minister of Cape Colony in 1908.¹⁷⁴ A new South African Party later formed on a union-wide basis after the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910 and involved a combination of *Het Volk*, the former South African Party, and other Afrikaner specific political parties within the Union of South Africa.

After the War, each colony had an Afrikaner political party that was pushing for self-government, as was promised in the Treaty of Vereeniging. J. X. Merriman worked at the head of the South African Party in Cape Colony, J. B. M. Hertzog worked his political party in the Orange River Colony and Smuts and Botha worked within the Transvaal with *Het Volk*. J. B. M.

¹⁷² Jan Smuts, Smuts in letter to J. X. Merriman, May 30, 1904 in *Selections from the Smuts Papers: II*, ed. W. K. Hancock and James Van Der Pole, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 170

¹⁷³ Davenport, *Afrikaner Bond*, 189

¹⁷⁴ Smuts, *Smuts Papers: II*, 170

Hertzog, who had worked within the colonial government of the Orange River Colony after the war, helped form the Orange River Colony's counterpart to *Het Volk*, called the *Orangie Unie* (Orange Union).¹⁷⁵ Among the ranks of their party were the former Orange Free State president M. T. Steyn, and hero of the Second Boer War Christiaan de Wet.¹⁷⁶ The *Orangie Unie* had similar values as *Het Volk* and the South African Party, and passed an Education Act similar to Smuts in 1907, but their values proved to be more radical than either party suspected in the later years of Afrikaner politics.¹⁷⁷

The Transvaal-based *Het Volk*'s main rival was the British Progressives Party, which was led by Jameson Raid leader Leander Starr Jameson and drew most of its support from the British in south Africa. Its victory in Cape Colony's 1904 parliamentary election represented what Taylor Davenport called the "nadir" of Afrikaner political fortunes.¹⁷⁸ The Cape Colony was the most stable British colonial government in the years immediately following the Second Boer War. After the Treaty of Vereeniging and the enactment of new British colonial policies, the Cape government held influence in the still developing colonial governments of the former Afrikaner Republics.¹⁷⁹ Alfred Milner's administration had a strong influence in the Cape, but was losing influence to the steadily growing Afrikaner political strength in the Transvaal.

In 1905 the Liberal-Unionist Lord Selborne replaced Lord Milner as High Commissioner and in December of 1906, the Liberal Party gained control of the government of Great Britain. With the change of power in favor of the Liberals, Jan Smuts took advantage of the new British government by petitioning for federation and self-government for the Afrikaner people

¹⁷⁵ Templin, *Ideology on a Frontier*, 271

¹⁷⁶ Fisher, *The Afrikaners*, 207

¹⁷⁷ Templin, *Ideology on a Frontier*, 273

¹⁷⁸ Davenport, *Afrikaner Bond*, 251

¹⁷⁹ Beirmart, *Twentieth Century Africa*, 60

throughout all of South Africa. During the days of Milner's administration, calls to form a federation had little hope of success. British scholar of Afrikaner history John Fisher believed that "when Alfred Milner departed, he took with him the odour of Imperialism, which had previously hung around the notion of federalism. The colonies at last began to feel that Union benefited them all equally."¹⁸⁰ In a proposed constitution memorandum for Transvaal that Smuts later hoped would transfer to the other colonies, Smuts described how "The people, and I may perhaps add, the statesmen, of South Africa are in favor of federation and with a truly popular Constitution in the Transvaal we may see federation or union in south Africa perhaps within the next five years."¹⁸¹ Smuts' memorandum proved to be somewhat prophetic given the governmental changes in the following years. With a new Liberal government in place the key for Afrikaner dominance within the colonies of South Africa was the unification of the colonies.

Besides the union of the colonies, many Afrikaner political leaders wanted other forms of integration as well. In a letter from Jan Smuts to his longtime friend J. X. Merriman, Smuts wrote of the importance of a unified Afrikaner political force within a unified South African government that could achieve economic integration. Smuts believed that "unless we have political union commercial union will become impossible...I say let us follow a better way and through mutual self-sacrifice proceed to lay the foundation of a united South African people."¹⁸² The self-sacrifice that Smuts spoke of was the setting aside of ideas that usually separated the Afrikaners and the British in South Africa, such as the racial disputes about the status of the Chinese and black populations. Merriman later referenced the possibilities in aligning moderate

¹⁸⁰ Fisher, *The Afrikaners*, 209

¹⁸¹ Jan Smuts, Memorandum on Transvaal Constitution, Jan 1906 in *Selections from the Smuts Papers: II*, ed. W. K. Hancock and James Van Der Pole, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 224

¹⁸² Jan Smuts, Smuts in a letter to J. X. Merriman, December 30, 1906 in *Selections from the Smuts Papers: II*, ed. W. K. Hancock James Van Der Pole, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 311

Afrikaners with the moderate British in South Africa. Given the previous objections raised by Smuts regarding the black and Chinese population, Smuts' main concern was for a unified white Afrikaner people within South Africa. Once self-government was achieved and the Union of South Africa was formed, Smuts and Merriman continued with this idea and Merriman took the idea even farther.

In 1910, after the formation of the Union of South Africa, J. X. Merriman wrote a letter to Louis Botha, who had recently been elected as the first prime minister of the Union. The letter described a strategy of Merriman's to combine the outlying Afrikaner political parties of all the colonies, to unite as one "South African Party."¹⁸³ In the letter he described how many of the parties, such as the Afrikaner Bond, which already supported Merriman's South African Party in the Cape, had very similar ideas. Merriman believed that a "better name than South African Party you could not have. It really embrace all we stand for...It would embrace 'Het Volk' and 'De Unie' (*Orangie Unie*) as it has embraces the Bond, and it would, I think, attract many others who might not see their way to joining those organizations."¹⁸⁴ Merriman later referenced the moderation of ideas for the new united Afrikaner party, describing the importance of moderation regarding hard issues such as race in South Africa "which would enable English people to join the party without fear."¹⁸⁵

Smuts wrote back to Merriman, agreeing that if "we finally adopted all over South Africa some such name as 'South African Party' we would consolidate under a good name and prevent

¹⁸³ J. X. Merriman, Merriman in letter to Louis Botha, Jan. 5, 1910 in Smuts Papers: Vol. II, ed. W. K. Hancock and James Van Der Pole, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 603

¹⁸⁴ Merriman, Smuts Papers: Vol. II, 604

¹⁸⁵ Merriman, Smuts Papers: Vol. II, 603

provincial sectionalism inside the party.”¹⁸⁶ The men discussing the benefits of a unified Afrikaner political party were already powerful and influential members of their parties. They also represented two of the three largest Afrikaner parties in the Union of South Africa. T. Hyslop, one of the representatives of Afrikaner interests in the Natal, wrote a letter to Smuts stating his support for a party that would bridge the Afrikaner-British divide, promising Smuts that although “the Natal people are saying nothing, the leading politicians, both in town and country, are all with you and Botha in the work which we understand you are engage, viz., the building up of a party of moderate men of both races.”¹⁸⁷

From the year 1906-1910, the four colonies of South Africa each saw change in their governments. Both the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony achieved self-government, as promised in the Treaty of Vereeniging, in 1907. Cape Colony elected an Afrikaner controlled government, led by J. X. Merriman, in the parliamentary election of 1908.¹⁸⁸ Later, the Union of South Africa was formed with the Act of 1909, combining the Transvaal, the Orange River Colony, Cape Colony, and the Natal into one government. Their respective Afrikaner political parties were brought into the folds of the South African Party.¹⁸⁹ In 1910 Louis Botha was elected prime minister, Jan Smuts was appointed minister of the Interior, Defence, and Mines, and J. B. M. Hertzog was given the role of Minister of Justice.¹⁹⁰ In the years following the formation of the Union, J. M. B. Hertzog and other former members of the *Orangie Unie*

¹⁸⁶ Jan Smuts, Smuts in response to Merriman, Feb. 15, 1910 in *Selections from the Smuts Papers*: II, ed. W. K. Hancock and James Van Der Pole, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 610

¹⁸⁷ T. Hyslope, Hyslop in letter to Jan Smuts, Feb. 24, 1910 in *Selections from the Smuts Papers*: II, ed. W. K. Hancock and James Van Der Pole, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 617

¹⁸⁸ Templin, *Ideology on a Frontier*, 271

¹⁸⁹ “South Africa Act 1909,” 1

¹⁹⁰ Fisher, *The Afrikaners*, 214

weakened the unified coalition of British and Afrikaner moderates, their crossing of political and cultural lines that led to a wave of political nationalism in the Union of South Africa.

J. B. M. Hertzog, and many political actors in the former *Orangie Unie* were against many of the new policies surrounding the formation of the South Africa Party. In a letter to Jan Smuts, before the formation of the Union and written after Smuts had submitted a proposed constitution for the Union of South Africa, Hertzog demanded changes to Smuts' draft regarding how the judges of the Court of Appeal should be appointed, paid, and where they are appointed from.¹⁹¹ This is the only letter provided in the *Smuts Papers* that showed Hertzog directly disagreeing with the provision of the Union of South Africa, but the letter does show that early on, Hertzog made known his qualms with the constitution known to the party. From what can be seen of the final draft of the Union of South Africa Act of 1909, Hertzog's objections went unheeded, and the Act was passed.

Despite his party's disputes with the other groups that were forming the South African party, Hertzog's party did join the new South Africa Party when the Union of South Africa was formed.¹⁹² For the first year and a half after Botha's election and the formation of the South African Party, its leaders focused on the economic integration of the four colonies and the modernization of the Union's economy (this included modernizing the agriculture system, increasing the Union's exportation of fruits and other goods).¹⁹³ In all, Botha's government and

¹⁹¹ J. B. M. Hertzog, Hertzog in letter to Jan Smuts, Feb. 12, 1909 in *Selections from the Smuts Papers: II*, ed. W. K. Hancock and James Van Der Pole, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 544

¹⁹² Templin, *Ideology on a Frontier*, 272

¹⁹³ Fisher, *The Afrikaners*, 214

the South Africa Party were able to function well in the year after their formation.¹⁹⁴ Hertzog eventually became the primary threat to the Party's progress.

Hertzog's greatest reservation with the formation of the South African Party was the closeness with many of its representatives with the British. He resented Botha's desire, expressed in a speech made at the inauguration of the South African Party, to "take advantage of this golden opportunity...to make of South Africa a happy and prosperous country where we could all (Afrikaner and British) live mutually in peace, happy, and in harmony."¹⁹⁵ Hertzog had been a longtime advocate for separating all Afrikaner interests away from the British. He was a "Bittereinder" and had wanted to fight until the end against the British during the Second Boer War. He also greatly resented that the Transvaal took lead at the negotiations at the Treaty of Vereeniging. Despite the potential danger of bringing such a man into their administration, Smuts and Botha knew that the amount of support that Hertzog brought from the Orange Free State was indispensable.¹⁹⁶ Hertzog was also very popular among working-class of Afrikaners, many who still resented the British for what occurred during the Second Boer War. Hertzog's appointment to the position of Minister of justice did not subside his views of Botha or Smuts. He proved to be determined to use his position and popularity to make South Africa an Afrikaner South Africa.¹⁹⁷

Though the South African Party had been formed under a banner of compromise and friendship with the British in South Africa, the old resentments of the Second Boer War, and longtime submission of the Afrikaner people to British authority proved to still be fresh in the

¹⁹⁴ W. K. Hancock and James Van Der Pole, *Smuts Papers: III*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 3

¹⁹⁵ Fisher, *The Afrikaners*, 215

¹⁹⁶ Fisher, *The Afrikaners*, 220

¹⁹⁷ Templin, *Ideology on a Frontier*, 273

minds of the public. Hertzog exploited this fact in 1912. The Parliament of the Union of South Africa was in a state of disunity, mainly due to the questions of cooperation and influence among the Afrikaners and the British in the Union. Hertzog, while unable to overrule Prime Minister Botha's policy of compromise, went to the streets to gain favor and support for anti-British sentiments among the Afrikaner people. He gave public speeches, calling out the British as "bastard sheep" and "foreign adventurers" who only wished to reassert British domination over Afrikaners.¹⁹⁸

These speeches, and Hertzog's growing influence in parliament, proved to be a great danger to Botha's administration. During a conciliatory trip to the Natal, and the other provinces of the Union, Botha sent a letter to Smuts explaining what he saw happening in the streets, due to Hertzog and his supporters. Botha wrote that many saw Hertzog's words as "a party declaration of war on the English-speaking section."¹⁹⁹ Hertzog was not alone in his views within the South African Party. In the same letter, Botha wrote of having met with other representatives of their party in the Natal, saying that "Whatever I say and do I only get one answer: they (the British) are regarded as foreigners...I have no idea why Hertzog goes so far."²⁰⁰ Botha's drive of peace and compromise with the British was crumbling in front of him and Smuts.

Botha chose to take the fight to Hertzog when, during the Parliamentary Crisis of December 1912 (which had been caused by the divisions in the party that Hertzog had orchestrated) Botha resigned and then reformed his government, excluding Hertzog from the

¹⁹⁸ Hancock and Pole, *Smuts Papers: Vol. III*, 112

¹⁹⁹ Louis Botha, Botha in letter to Smuts, October 10, 1912 in *Selections from the Smuts Papers: III*, ed. W. K. Hancock and James Van Der Pole, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 112

²⁰⁰ Botha, *Smuts Papers: Vol. III*, 113

ministry.²⁰¹ The crisis of 1912 and the reformation of the government without Hertzog hit the South African Party, in the words of party member P. R. Viljoen “like a shattering bombshell.”²⁰² Hertzog’s exclusion did far more damage to Botha’s administration than he, Smuts, or any of their supporters had anticipated. Wasting little time, Hertzog took with him his support from the Orange River Colony, his popularity among the people, and several key South African Party members. One of the greatest blows to Botha’s administration and the party’s morale was the breaking away of Christiaan de Wet, former general and military hero during the Second Boer War. He left the party to help Hertzog form own. In a demonstration in Pretoria in support of Hertzog, de Wet was seen standing on top of a literal pile of dung, calling out to the Afrikaner people that “I would rather be on a dung heap with my people than in the palaces of the Empire.”²⁰³ The exclusion of the British from Afrikaner politics was the key goal of Hertzog and his followers. This ideology resonated among the still resentful Afrikaner people and politicians.

Former-president of the Transvaal Republic, and supporter of Botha’s administration, Schalk Burger wrote to Smuts describing Hertzog’s party’s progress. Burger wrote, “Where the Hertzog party is drifting I cannot understand. Any Tom, Dick and Harry belongs to their army.”²⁰⁴ As support continued to flock to Hertzog, his following began to form into a new political party. In Bloemfontein, capital of the Orange River Colony, in January of 1914, the

²⁰¹ P. R. Viljoen, P. R. Viljoen in letter to Smuts, Dec. 19, 1912 in *Selections from the Smuts Papers*: III, ed. W. K. Hancock and James Van Der Pole, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 123

²⁰² Viljoen, *Smuts Papers*: Vol. III, 123

²⁰³ W. K. Hancock and James Van Der Pole, *Smuts Papers*: III, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 124

²⁰⁴ S. W. Burger, Burger in letter to Jan Smuts, Feb. 8, 1913 in *Selections from the Smuts Papers*: III, ed. W. K. Hancock and James Van Der Pole, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 126

National Party, led by Hertzog, Steyn, and de Wet was officially established.²⁰⁵ The National Party vowed to fight for “freedom of language, of historical interpretation, of religion, and of customs of morals.”²⁰⁶ All of these concepts had been previously threatened by the British administrations, and though the government of the Union was still held by Afrikaners, the memory and resentment for the British having denied the Afrikaner people what Hertzog was advocating for was still fresh in the minds of the Afrikaner people.

In the unveiling of a monument to the deaths of the Afrikaner women and children during the Second Boer War, Jan Smuts gave a speech where he mentioned hoping that someday a “historian will be able to ask and answer questions with which we today cannot deal without danger of rousing passions that must rest of doing great harm.”²⁰⁷ Hertzog and his followers played on the old resentments and memories of the British. These resentments and popular anti-British views began to eat away at the power of the South African Party. South African Party member F. E. T. Krause updated Jan Smuts on the party’s influence in the Natal and how he was “convinced that it would be self-evident to you that, as far as our people are concerned, this split (between support for the National and South Africa Party) is largely responsible for our loss in prestige and influence. . .the sooner pressure is brought to bear upon Hertzog, or rather upon those who support him, to abandon their position the better it will be for us.”²⁰⁸ The amount of influence that the South African Party had enjoyed at the onset of the Union of South Africa continued to wane, despite any desires of their party members to suppress Hertzog’s popularity.

²⁰⁵ Fisher, *The Afrikaners*, 226

²⁰⁶ Fisher, *The Afrikaners*, 226

²⁰⁷ Smuts, *Smuts Papers*: III, 146

²⁰⁸ F. E. T. Krause, Krause in letter to Jan Smuts, March 23, 1914 in *Selections from the Smuts Papers*: III, ed. W. K. Hancock and James Van Der Pole, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 171

The fervor of stirred up anti-British and anti-Botha resentments came to a head at the onset of an Afrikaner uprising. This was during the onset of the First World War, and the British charged Botha with leading Afrikaner and British-allied forces, against German positions around South African territory.²⁰⁹ This was a difficult charge presented to Botha, since if he did not act on behalf of the British the British may have decided to send their own soldiers into South Africa to defend against Germany forces in Africa. Also, many Afrikaners in the territories near southwest Germany-controlled Africa had deep familial ties with the Germans.²¹⁰ This included Hertzog. German familial ties and nostalgia for the bygone days of republic and freedom from any British-influenced or British-compliant policies inspired men to take up arms against Botha.²¹¹ Within the southwestern Transvaal and the northern territory of the Orange River Colony eleven thousand farmers and sharecroppers rose up with the set desire to undermine Botha's government and reestablish the Transvaal as a republic.²¹² One of the generals of the Afrikaner uprising was Christiaan de Wet, who had supported Hertzog and the National Party since before its official formation.

Another major leader of the Afrikaner uprising in 1914 was Manie Maritz, a veteran of the Second Boer War, and a fierce advocate to make Transvaal into a republic again. In the Judicial Commission charged with examining the causes of the uprising, after its conclusion, one of Maritz's men said that at the beginning of the war "Maritz said that they wanted territory...to declare South Africa a Republic...they could either join him, or allow themselves to be made

²⁰⁹ Fisher, *The Afrikaners*, 227

²¹⁰ Fisher, *The Afrikaners*, 228

²¹¹ Sandra Swart, "'Men of Influence' - the Ontology of Leadership in the 1914 Boer Rebellion," *Journal of Historical Sociology*, 17 (2004): 1

²¹² Swart, "'Men of Influence'", 1

prisoners and sent to German West.”²¹³ In the minds of de Wet, and Maritz who had both previously fought an imperial power for republic, their uprising had very similar justifications, and it was those similarities in the cause that generated such support from the farmer classes of Afrikaner.²¹⁴ The uprising was unsuccessful and many of the leaders were captured by Botha’s better-equipped forces, and later put on trial.²¹⁵

Sociologist and Afrikaner historian Sandra Swart described the leadership and following of the Afrikaner uprising as “Leadership was still linked to the *man*, even if it was just in the imagination...as in the semi-feudal relationship poor white groups maintained with de Wet” as well as other Afrikaner military leaders.²¹⁶ J. X. Merriman also endorsed this theory. He believed, after the rebellion was defeated, that the administration should “Punish the ringleaders who have misled the mass—who were, by the way, uncommonly ready to be misled.”²¹⁷ Men such as de Wet and Hertzog, though Hertzog publically condemned the rebellion, had channeled Afrikaner resentment of the British and those, such as Botha, who aligned themselves with the British in such a way that thousands were willing to take up arms against Botha’s government in the hope of returning to the days of Afrikaner republics in South Africa.

Hertzog’s suspected involvement in the rebellion became a point of great controversy between the members of Botha’s administration and in later years with historians. He had close

²¹³ Sir Johannes Lange, *Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the causes of and circumstances relating to the recent rebellion in South Africa [and Minutes of evidence] December, 1916 / Rebellion Inquiry Commission*, (Cape Town: Cape Times Limited, Government Printers, 1916), 5

²¹⁴ Swart, “*Men of Influence*,” 7

²¹⁵ Fisher, *The Afrikaners*, 234

²¹⁶ Swart, “‘Men of Influence’,” 7

²¹⁷ J. X. Merriman, Merriman in letter to Jan Smuts, Dec. 23, 1914 in *Selections from the Smuts Papers*: III, ed. W. K. Hancock and James Van Der Pole, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 226

personal ties with de Wet and there was proof of communication between him and Maritz at the onset of the conflict, but none could provide any solid proof that Hertzog was involved in the uprising in any way. Fischer described how “this did not save him from being named in Parliament as a German advocate. He was cold-shouldered at the Bar and at his club.”²¹⁸ In the end, though the uprising was unsuccessful, the uprising gained ground in public sympathy towards the motivations of those who fought. J. X. Merriman later described how many in the Union “persist in talking of the uprising as if it was a sort of political demonstration...Nothing touches up the ordinary man on the veld, who used to consider himself law-abiding soul, so much as to find that he has been guilty of some vulgar offence that brings him within the meshes of ordinary law.”²¹⁹ In the field, military support for the uprising failed, but the sympathy for the struggling Afrikaner and the resentment of pro-British policy remained stronger than ever.

The end of the uprising did not show any slowing in the cause of Hertzog or his followers. Smuts wrote in a letter to Merriman, warning him “Magistrates in the Free State warn me that the Hertzogites boast openly of what they are going to do when they win at the next elections.”²²⁰ The National Party gained in strength and influence within the Union. Hertzog’s followers were gaining in confidence that the future showed their success in the government of the Union of South Africa.

In the years after the uprising, the language and education movements helped with channeling the Afrikaner desire for a unified Afrikaner culture and a dominant Afrikaner political force. One of the ways that Afrikaner political nationalism combined with Afrikaner

²¹⁸ Fisher, *The Afrikaners*, 235

²¹⁹ Merriman, Letter to Smuts, Smuts Papers: Vol. III, 226

²²⁰ Jan Smuts, Smuts in letter to D. P. de V. Graaff, June 14, 1915 in *Selections from the Smuts Papers*: III, ed. W. K. Hancock and James Van Der Pole, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 298

culture was the working-class based *Afrikaner-Broederbond* in 1919. Afrikaner historian T. Dunbar Moodie wrote that the *Afrikaner-Broederbond* “came into being at this time to further nationalist aims awakened by the Afrikaans language movement...to accomplish a healthy and progressive unity amongst all Afrikaners who actively seek the welfare of the Afrikaner...to arouse Afrikaner national self-consciousness and inspire the love of Afrikaans language...country and People.”²²¹ Much of their constituency involved the gold mineworkers and other working-class Afrikaners, representing a large amount of the population throughout the Union.²²² Another important addition to the nationalist *Afrikaner-Broederbond* was a large number of Afrikaner teachers. Given the growth in popularity of uniting behind Afrikaner history and culture, “the acquisition of teachers...meant not only that the Bond (Afrikaner Broederbond) was itself was strengthened by enthusiastic new members, but also that these teachers was highly influential in forming the minds of the succeeding generation.”²²³ The *Afrikaner-Broederbond*, while not entirely a political organization, was able to combine Afrikaner culture with Afrikaner political nationalist aspirations, and garner more societal support for the National Party in the years after its formation.

By 1920 Louis Botha was dead, Jan Smuts was Prime Minister and head of the South African Party, and the nationalists held a third of the national legislature and won support from the Labour Party’s supporters, giving them an understood majority.²²⁴ With the shared ideals between the labor classes and the National Party, Smuts and his supporters had feared a combined effort of the Labor Party and the National party for years. In 1915, Smuts wrote to D.

²²¹ Moodie, *Rise of Afrikanerdom*, 51

²²² Kriel, “Afrikaner Nationalism,” 410

²²³ Moodie, *The Rise of Afrikanerdom*, 51

²²⁴ “A Week of the World,” *The Living Age, American Periodicals*, (Boston, MA), Mar, 12 1921

P. Graff explaining his plan to adhere “to the practice of general elections but only avoid giving seats away to Labour or Hertzog.”²²⁵ Due to the combined efforts of the *Afrikaner-Broederbond* and the National Party however, an alliance between the Labour and National party occurred all the same.²²⁶ The alliance continued on to the next general election. The election of 1924 concluded with J. M. B. Hertzog, who was still the leader of the National Party in 1924, winning the majority and was elected as prime minister. The Nationalists received support from the Labor Party and won in a near landslide victory against Smuts’ party.²²⁷

The 1924 election marked the first time that the National Party took control of the government in South Africa. Through years of political splitting and garnering public support, the National Party had been created by disgruntled former South African Party members, survived attacks from their former party, and flourished into the dominant political force in 1924. In the years following National Party’s first victory, the progress of the National Party was uneven, with the splitting, merging, remerging, and eventual reformation of the National Party. Throughout the twentieth century, the *Afrikaner-Broederbond* continued to garner support among the Afrikaner public, helping to maintain a nationalist force in Afrikaner politics until the reformed National Party once again gained control of the government in 1948.²²⁸ The resentment of other races and the memory the Second Boer War and a free Afrikaner Republic kept the nationalist ideas alive within Afrikaner society from the first efforts to unite the colonies and Afrikaner political parties of Smuts, Botha, and Merriman, to the political split and cultivation of anti-British sentiment made popular by Hertzog.

²²⁵ Smuts, *Smuts Papers*: III, 298

²²⁶ “A Week of the World” 1920

²²⁷ “South African Elections,” *The Register*, (Adelaide, Australia), June 21, 1924

²²⁸ Moodie, *Rise of Afrikanerdom*, 51

Conclusion

Despite the defeat of their army, the destruction and the dissolution of their republics, and the imposition of British rule, the Afrikaner people became the dominant culture and political presence in South Africa within two decades of the end of the war. Jan Smuts, Louis Botha, J. X. Merriman, J. M. B. Hertzog and others adapted Afrikaner resentment, and the British desire to appease the Afrikaners, into political weapons. They used the formation of political parties (that eventually united under a similar purpose), their positions within the colonial parliaments, and the wording of the Treaty of Vereeniging to push for Afrikaner control of education, the recognition Afrikaans as an official language, and the establishment of Afrikaner-controlled governments. The continued resentment of what the British inflicted on the Afrikaner people during the war created a new public desire for a unified Afrikaner culture, and helped postwar leaders forge the Afrikaners into a coherent political force.

The National Party's dominance in the Apartheid Era was built on the same foundation as Smuts' moderate nationalism. This thesis presents the progression of Afrikaner culture and politics from the Treaty of Vereeniging to the National Party's victory in 1924. It shows how both forms of Afrikaner nationalism gained power through the exploitation of the Treaty of Vereeniging and the efforts of Afrikaners who worked in the cultural and the political worlds to further establish a unified Afrikaner people.

The British scorched-earth strategies and concentration camps brought about deep lasting resentments for the Afrikaners against the British. The towns and cities throughout the former Afrikaner Republics were destroyed, and the memory of the suffering the British inflicted remained fresh in everyone's minds, especially with the published accounts of Emily Hobhouse. The Treaty of Vereeniging ended the war, dissolved the Afrikaner republics, and left the British

colonial administration in power immediately after. Its terms did however present the first postwar opportunities for Afrikaners to consolidate their culture and establish their own political power.

Immediately after the war, the British colonial administration attempted to consolidate British culture by monopolizing the education system of South Africa. While the Dutch Reformed Church worked to establish private Afrikaner schools, Jan Smuts and Louis Botha worked with their group *Het Volk* to appeal to the colonial administration, showing them how the local control schools could be a more effective education system. Their efforts and the change from the British Conservative government to the Liberal government ended Afrikaner reliance on the British schools, and brought the public school system under the control of the Afrikaners.

The Afrikaans language, and the literature that followed, were central to nationalists' successful efforts to forge an Afrikaner specific culture and political force in South Africa. Through the letters and official documents written by these men, this thesis directly followed the progress of Jan Smuts, J. X. Merriman and Louis Botha among British colonial officials and Afrikaner political advocates in their efforts to further Afrikaner culture and political power. S. J. du Toit enabled political leaders to use Afrikaans as a political device by establishing a set grammar and vocabulary, and Afrikaner poets such as Totius and Cornelius Langenhoven brought the Afrikaner spirit and history to the Afrikaner people through the use of Afrikaans. Jan Smuts and Louis Botha were also crucial for the development of Afrikaner education.

Afrikaner resentment against the British, Chinese, and black South Africans was then channeled by followers of J. M. B. Hertzog to form a hardline nationalist political movement that challenged the political parties of Smuts, Botha, and Merriman and eventually gained the majority within the government of the Union of South Africa, making Afrikaner nationalist

ideals the dominant political force in South Africa. Although Hertzog was not able to consolidate power following the 1924 elections, and his National Party went through a further period of internal crisis and opposition, the National Party reformed and regained control in the general election of 1948, implemented Apartheid, and remained in power until the end of Apartheid in 1994

This thesis showed that Afrikaner cultural and political dominance in South Africa was the result of any one specific individual or political group. The nationalist Afrikaner culture of the middle to late twentieth century, was borne from a military defeat which ended with a treaty and collective resentment that cultural and linguistic nationalists adapted to and exploited in order to create a cohesive cultural and political identity for Afrikaners.

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