MILITARY CHANGES
AFFECTED BY
ACQUIRING THE PHILIPPINES.

C. D. MONTGOMERY.
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INTRODUCTION.

Possibly there is no other question now confronting our statesmen, that assumes such an unsolvable indetermined aspect, as that of "Expansion" and its effect on our military organization.

The United States is unskilled in provincial rule. She has ever shunned aggressive warfare, while conquest is certainly beyond her well tried spheres of action. Her military force has ever been held to the minimum necessary for home defense. She now has adopted provincialism, without special preparation for the defense of the Province. She has planted the "Stars and Stripes" some ten thousand miles from home, without strengthening our defensive force for its protection. Where our flag goes, be the ethics what it may, our armies must go to protect.

That our martial strength must be increased, is an obvious fact; but the manner of its increase and disposal of its newly organized forces are problems as yet unsolved.

In treating this subject, the theories of the best tacticians, who have published articles within recent date, will be used as a back-ground. To these men the writer acknowledges his indebtedness.

The reader is asked to accept only what seems logically deducted from the correlation of these theories, bearing in mind the fact that tacticians are at this date slow to publish their ideas or make conjectures on a subject that is affected by so many external forces as that of "Expansion" or extending territory.

C. D. M.
Tacticians, prior to the Hispano-American war, advanced the statement "that our present standing is insufficient for our defense." The statement was set forth by men who ranked first among the tacticians of the age. And we must certainly recognize the probability that they were in the best position to judge. The conjecture that we could successfully fight any of the larger nations, which was made by the same men, is hard for us to believe, since we have, so recently limited one of the recognized powers of Europe. But these successes are apt to, erroneously applied to prove a doubtful position. We cannot conclude, from our successes from Manila and Santiago de Cuba, that we have a predominant navy or that we can defend our nation against attacks from stronger nations. It has been pointed out, by men of recognized tactical ability, that our flight is insignificant when compared with the navies of England, France, Germany or Russia; that we have no powerful coast defenses, and that our army is barely sufficient to garrison our few weak fortresses. These conditions are only the more easily recognized since our "brush" with Spain.

Let us review our condition. We have a regular army of about eighty-five thousand men. We might expect some help from the "National Guards", but cannot list them with any given strength. The value of "National Guards" is apt, too, to be overdrawn as has been shown by our recent war. The officers of our army were, prior to the Spanish War, unskilled in handling troops.

A few of the minor officers had commanded troops in "brushes" with the Indians. The "National Guards" were even less ready for war and could be counted on for but little more than to suppress strikes and riots in their own states.

As for our navy, while we floated seven modern first-class battle-
ships, it is recognized by all naval officers to be insignificant in comparison with the navy of any of the five great Eastern powers.

As for coast defenses we are unguarded. On the Atlantic seaboard alone, as have been painted out by General Howard, we have fifteen important cities must fall prey to an attack by sea.

We have, however, a few natural and one social strength of which no other nation can boast. J. S. Pettit tells us "we have little fear from invasion, owing to our isolated position and extensive domains." He goes on to show that Canada, our only possible enemy at land, is of a social condition that reassures our safety. Our extensive sea coast obliterates the idea of bombardment. The rough topographical condition affords natural fortresses, behind which we can defend against all Europe, were she able to land.

But better still, we have existing among our people a social condition that enables us to muster in, by call for volunteers, an army of any desired strength, a condition which makes it absolutely impossible for other nations to determine our strength. With all of these advantages, however, we must suffer materially at the hands of a strong nation even though we could probably defend most of our territory.

Our present conjecture, as a slight deduction from the above is, that, in the estimation of our best tacticians, our present strength is even too small to defend with certainty our home possessions. How many more fold too small and inadequate must it be, then, to defend the Hawaiian and Phillipine islands the latter being ten thousand miles away.

**Effects of Isolation.**

The effects that must follow from attempting to defend isolated possessions are very marked. In the first place the islands in questions are four hundred in number, scattered over an area eighty degrees long and twenty degrees wide, with only one of them large enough to
outreach the long range of Marine guns in extension.

The climate is poorly adapted for American soldiers, as has been shown by recent campaigns in Luzon. So were all other conditions favorable it would be impracticable to garrison the islands with sufficient army strength to defend them. The general lay of the islands, themselves, make internal defense impracticable, if possible. The coast line bears such a broad ratio to the area that the thrusts we might receive from sea cannot be parried off by land forces.

The expense of supporting an army ten thousand miles from supplies, as an army station in the islands will be until civilization has had time to grow, would be so enormous as to render this means of defense a very costly one if desirable otherwise. The fact that we are so widely separated makes it tactically a poor practice to depend on landing an army in Luzon after hostilities were really begun. It would take a strong naval force to escort a transport through a stretch of waters frequented by an enemy's war ships.

The Islands, themselves, being hostile now, cannot be depended on to remain friendly or even neutral should they ever become so, which, in Col. Boyle's mind, will not be for ten years hence.

After all this, it would be difficult to raise an army of sufficient strength to garrison the islands, were it deemed strategy to do so. Captain Mahan tells us "that the islands are of no value to us unless they are all owned or controlled. "If we own a few islands we must own them all in order to protect that few." To control four hundred islands scattered over so broad an area, would require an army one hundred thousand strong could we furnish it.

David Starr Jordan asserts that a majority of the United States soldiers, who have fought in the Philippines, are themselves opposed to annexing those islands to the United States. Other men of less prominence, but probably acquainted with the facts sufficiently to
make a valuable guess. Say that it will be impossible to raise an army sufficiently strong to garrison the islands. Men that respond to the call for volunteers to fight over wars are not men who are willing to do garrison duty or become regular soldiers. This was well proven in the war with Spain. When the orders were issued to muster out ninety five regiments, and retain the rest to garrison Cuba and Porto-Rico, the volunteers were as wild to be among those to be mustered out as they had been to be sent to Santiago, when there was fighting to be done. Petition after petition followed each other to Washington protesting against the disposal of troops for garrison duty that had been mustered into fight the war with Spain.

When we remember that it is novelty and love of adventure that sweeps our bright youths into the ranks, while there is warfare in progress, we must conclude that, when the fighting has subsided and there is no promise of adventure, we cannot expect the same men to enter the army to garrison islands ten thousand miles from home, friends and native land, and in a land where the climate is oppressive and civilization lacking.

In conclusion, then, the scattered condition of the islands, the enormous expense of maintaining an army so far from its source of supplies, the unfriendly attitude of the natives, together with the difficulty of raising a sufficient force to garrison the islands, make it impracticable to depend on a standing army as a means of defending the islands. Since it is necessary to be able to defend a transport against any navy that might attack it, it is necessary, from a scientific strategical standpoint to leave a navy that is predominant to the navy of any country likely to become our enemy.

The United States troops must be of sufficient strength on the Islands, however, to insure internal peace and dispel thoughts of invading, Luzon, the largest island. They can better be centralized
at Manilla from which all moves on till other islands must proceed, (as a base.)

How must the Army change?

The army must be reorganized to become adapted to the islands and their methods of fighting, and to best resist the oppressive heat of that hot climate and the infectious diseases peculiar to the tropics.

Cavalry cannot do very much in so rough a country, neither can we rely on heavy field artillery, the defense must come through the infantry supported by rapid fire guns and other models of artillery easily transported from place to place.

As I have pointed out, volunteers cannot be depended on as we must have forces ready to station on the islands as the first indications of a war. The standing army should be increased to a strength sufficient to provide this. With the exception of an army strong enough to preserve peace among the islanders, they should be kept in the southern part of the United States, where they will become acclimated to a tropical climate.

The officers should be given opportunity to handle troops in the formation and maneuvers of battle.

Effect on Our Navy.

The problem then reduces itself to that of a naval proposition, the standing army, as we have been being insufficient to maintain our standing among nations.

I believe it is conceded by all military engineers, who have given the subject a careful investigation, that a predominant navy is our only safe means of defense.

The idea of defending by coast fortifications is, owing to the enormous extent of coast as compared with the area included, too foolish to be entertained by any tacticians. Although it is still ad-
vanced by a limited few who are apt to overrate the value of new contrivances, such as "Submarine mines", torpedoes, Dynamite guns, etc., which are, as yet, in the experimental stage.

We must therefore make the changes in our navy, that will insure safety against attack from any other nation. In doing this, we should bear in mind the fact that our success with Spain, a fourth rat nation, must not be over-estimated. It has been said, by good authority, that we won, not by our strategy but by Spanish inferiority in seamanship.

I epitomize below the views of Admiral Columbi and Captain Mahan on the subject. The same opinion, I find upheld by nearly every tactician who has published his views regarding the matter.

If the islands are to be a source of strength to us, we must first make them ours to defend. Admiral Columbi says, "We can do this only by a predominant navy. If this predominant navy is not maintained, the islands can only be sources of strategical weakness putting a check on aspiration to influence international councils, which we must certainly expect to see increased, and make the United States more hesitating because of the ease with which her islands can be rent from her and her consciousness of the fact. Had Spain possessed a predominant navy, the United States could never have attempted, much less succeeded, in her attack on Cuba, Porto-Rico and the Phillipine Islands. In like manner, it will be hopeless for the United States to dream of her retaining her new possessions in war with a country which has a navy superior to her own. There is no plainer document than that of a predominant navy. There is a natural hesitation in pushing things to their extreme point, yet I fear they must be so pushed or let alone. People often say that such an island will control such a harbor. It is an utter, deplorable, ruinous mistake." Other conditions are implied. The islands across the Pacific
control nothing till we control them.

"Local protection such as strong forts and great preparations of harbors will avail but little, why?

First, the expense put into such works is only an incentive to the enemy leading them on to destroy them. Second, it will not be attacked by an inferior force, hence a subduing of the works in the end.

If there could be a resting place short of a predominant navy, which I do not believe there is for a country with outlying dependencies, I think it would be found in the localization of a defensive navy." By this the Admiral means, that instead of a strong navy of battle-ships, we might have a fleet of gun boats, which though sluggish, float a strong battery and can creep from place to place.

The same author thinks that there is much promised by the torpedo boat, but more recent writers seem to think that this Marine device, is, as yet, unproven in its value.

Mr. Hallis makes the following statement as to the torpedo boat and other martial devices for sea combat, that have not as yet, emerged from the experimental stage. "Cruisers, like the 'Columbia' and 'Minneapolis' had no real test: as scouts, they are too large; as fighters they are of no real value against an armored fleet. As for the Torpedo its value has not been determined, the principal danger being their proclivities to explode on our own hands, injuring friend instead of foe." In one case a Spanish torpedo boat was defeated by an American yacht. "Our search lights had but little trouble in locating torpedo boats, and our former fear for these vessels has quite subsided." We cannot therefore draw conclusions as to the place of these new untried devices in future warfare.

The conclusions would be that the United States must increase her naval fleet of modern battle-ships to equal or excel that of any
possible enemy. What does this mean? Let us sum up the standing as
to naval strength of the great European powers, and compare them with
that of the United States. According to Henry W. Raymond, "We have,
a total of sixty-one modern ships in actual service of which thirteen
are fighting ships, with nineteen more to be added within eighteen
months of which five are "fighters"—thirty-five more to be added pos-
sibly, within three years, of which seven belong to the class of ar-
mored vessels. The United States has then a navy in Esse and in Posse
of one hundred and fifteen ships, of which fifty will be torpedo boats
and torpedo catchers."

Fred T. Jone makes a comparative resume of the navies of England,
Germany and Russia, the recognized leading powers of the world. Ac-
cording to his classification a first rate battle-ship must conform
to most of the following conditions:

"(a) The vitals so protected that no projectile stands a chance
of reaching them, even at close range.
(b) The main ornament must consist of most powerful armor-piercing
guns, these must have central loading positions and be generally not
liable to be easily put out of action by small shell.
(c) The secondary ornament must be well protected and powerful.
(d) The ship must generally be able to beat down the fire of a
ship of lower class."

The following table gives the totals of the ships of the four
great powers according to his classification. (Ebd) = building.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rate</th>
<th>England Bldg</th>
<th>France Bldg</th>
<th>Germany Bldg</th>
<th>Russia Bldg</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st.</td>
<td>13 + 14</td>
<td>5 + 2</td>
<td>0 + 0</td>
<td>4 + 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd.</td>
<td>12 + 10</td>
<td>4 + 0</td>
<td>7 + 7</td>
<td>8 + 6</td>
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<tr>
<td>3rd.</td>
<td>10 + 4</td>
<td>14 + 10</td>
<td>0 + 1</td>
<td>2 + 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th.</td>
<td>42 + 0</td>
<td>15 + 4</td>
<td>13 + 0</td>
<td>10 + 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th.</td>
<td>25 + 0</td>
<td>14 + 1</td>
<td>9 + 0</td>
<td>6 + 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th.</td>
<td>55 + 0</td>
<td>7 + 0</td>
<td>2 + 0</td>
<td>3 + 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th.</td>
<td>29 + 2</td>
<td>11 + 0</td>
<td>13 + 2</td>
<td>4 + 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggregate</td>
<td>184 + 30</td>
<td>80 + 17</td>
<td>44 + 10</td>
<td>57 + 21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above table shows how insignificant the American fleet is, when compared with other great powers. There is one thing, however, that we must not forget in summing up our strength, that is the superiority of our American seamen, which our past wars from the engagements of Paul Jones to the battle of Manilla show to unexcelled by any other nation.

Admitting this but being careful not to overrate it, we must conclude that safety to our new possessions can be insured only by increasing our navy to the equal of that of either Germany or Russia, twisting in the neutrality of England and not forgetting, the while, that those nations are much nearer the Phillipine islands than are we.

CHARLES D. MONTGOMERY.