

THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER CONTROVERSY

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to review the historical background of the growing conflict and to examine the relations between the two giant countries of Asia, that is, China and India. After five full years of arguments on the Sino-Indian frontier territory, China and India entered into an undeclared war on October 20, 1962.¹ The regions concerned in the present dispute involve more than 2000 miles of boundary, starting at the Karakoram Pass in the extreme north of Kashmir and extending to the middle of the Assam Himalayas. This territory is mountainous, very sparsely inhabited, and of no importance to either party except for military reasons. It is a romantic region famed in the history of the Buddhist religion. So remote and uninhabited was this frontier territory that the records show only a few cases in centuries in which there is any mention of it. These contain no definite proof as to where the frontier was at the time.

This disputed area can hardly be said to be either decisively Chinese or Indian. With a pile of maps and abundant documents presented by both Peking and New Delhi,

¹ The Republic Of India, India's Fight For Territorial Integrity, (New Dehli, Publications Division, The Government of India Press, 1963), p. 15.

no definite conclusion regarding the claims of either side can be reached by studying them. Each side can produce documents establishing administrative and tax control over these remote regions. Each side can produce maps allocating the area in question to the one claiming it. The Peking Government's display of Indian maps in 1954 claimed the territory in dispute to be that of China.² The New Delhi Government produced documents to the effect that the Chinese maps claiming these areas were in error at the time they were produced by the Peking Government.

The question of where the boundary line was has been complicated during the present century because of various events. The Indian Government claimed the territory which had been claimed by the British Government of India, but the Chinese maintained that parts of this territory did not really form a part of India and had been claimed only by British Imperialists. All these different factors complicated the dispute. Where there is such conflict between the statements of the two sides, it is almost impossible for a private person to reach a conclusion about the territorial questions involved.

² The People's Republic Of China, A Collection Of Documents of Foreign Relations Of The People's Republic Of China, (Peking, World Knowledge, 1958), III, p. 12. (in Chinese).

On the other hand, it is worthwhile to examine the significance of the hostilities which occurred in the fall of 1962 at the eastern and western sectors of the Sino-Indian border. This conflict created a potential threat to world peace. Moreover, it could ultimately involve the vital interests of both Western and Communist blocs. The latter has been seriously affected by these developments, and certain areas of opposition between Chinese and Russian interests have resulted in sharp competition. The gap between Peking and Moscow became an open conflict in 1960. From then on, the two leading Communist countries became widely separated. This became more evident in October, 1961. This was the year that the 22nd Congress of the Soviet Communist Party was held.³ The differences between Peking and Moscow were made more serious by the de-Stalinization campaign which the then Premier Khrushchev inaugurated at that Congress. The 1962 Sino-Indian crisis worsened the Sino-Russian relationship. It seemed clear that the Moscow Government was on India's side on the Sino-Indian border issue. In 1960, facing Russia's policy of friendship with India, China intensified her efforts to isolate India by making agreements with and concessions to Burma.⁴ China and Russia then seemed to be on the verge of a complete break.

³ R. G. Boyd, Communist China's Foreign Policy, (New York, F. A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 78-83.

⁴ Daphne E. Whittam, "The Sino-Burmese Treaty", Pacific Affairs, XXXIV, No. 2, (Summer 1961), p. 174.

A few words regarding the two giant nations of Asia, that is, China and India, are necessary before considering the border dispute. In the first place, it is important to make a survey in India. The fact is that India, before the border dispute with China began, was unaligned. Its government appeared secure, and the country was a show-place for those who considered democracy possible in Asia. Its economic policy was mildly socialistic, but it carefully abstained from favouring either bloc. Internationally, the Government of India stood, in general, for peace and conciliation, for which it did useful work, especially in Korea during the Korean War in the 1950's. It was the Sino-Indian border conflict of 1962 which was a lesson to the Indian people. It caused the Indian people to reevaluate their foreign policy, especially with the Chinese Communists. They reluctantly admitted that their "policy had indicated their lack of understanding of the world situation".⁵ At least, they found that China "is arrogant, expansionist and barbarous".⁶ Thus they gave a clear picture that showed that lacking "the understanding of the world situation," the Indian people did not find China "an arrogant, expansionist and barbarous people" until the border dispute began. But this was a little late for the Indian people to comprehend such an important fact.

⁵ Satyavrata R. Patel, Foreign Policy Of India; An Inquiry And Criticism, (Bombay, N.M. Tripathi Private Ltd, 1960), p.xv.

⁶ Ibid., p. 278.

In the second place, China had been affected by the border dispute. The Peking regime was the first strong government in China for a hundred years. Apart from the Communist issue, China seemed to be repeating a pattern which had governed its history since the third century B.C. The rule had been that, after a period of internal unrest, a strong government emerges which gradually loses its strength, giving place to a new cycle from anarchy to order. The present Government of China, because it is Communist, is hated in the West. And therefore, the Chinese Communists believe that there must, sooner or later, be a world war between Communists and anti-Communists. Thus, only ignorant people may believe in the Peking regime propaganda that "a socialist China is, and will be, a peace-loving country."⁷

The dispute between China and India has not only been on geographical questions but also on ideological grounds. China respected Marxism-Leninism as its special orientation to its nation-building. Finally, Marxism-Leninism in effect provides a new way of extending China's power in Asia. The Chinese have advanced their revolution as a model for the under-developed countries. Moreover, the Chinese people wanted to show their strongly national force to protect China's national interest. Undoubtedly, that national

⁷ The People's Republic of China (PROC), The Sino-Indian Boundary Question, (Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1962), p. 105.

interest would include the places which Chinese claimed as theirs in the Himalayan disputed area.

The problem of the Sino-Indian border has been complicated during the last fifty years by various events. After the Chinese Revolution of 1911, although there were some disputes about the frontier between China and India, no military conflict occurred until late in 1962.

The disputed area stretches from Ladakh to Assam. It is necessary to explore not only the historical background of the disputed area, but also a general review of the geography and the people in this area. These have had important bearings on the conflict between India and China. Furthermore, attention should extend to the neighboring area such as Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim. In the above places, the controversy between China and India was created and thus became a part of the reasons which finally caused the border dispute to become a military conflict in 1962.

CHAPTER II

GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL FACTORS AS BACKGROUND OF THE BOUNDARY CONTROVERSY

The Three Sectors

In all the discussions between China and India regarding their frontier, it is agreed that this frontier can be divided into three parts; western, middle, and eastern. The whole length of the border stretches from Ladakh in the north, near Sinkiang, to the North East Frontier Agency, near Burma, on the southernmost point.¹

This disputed area has a 2500 mile border and forms a great divide between China and the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. On her side, Red China enjoys an unbroken control over the entire length of the border, which is a distinct military advantage. This disputed region contains Mount Everest (29,028 feet) and more than three dozen peaks, each over 24,000 feet in height.² The upper areas are capped with ice and glaciers, often visited by snow and rain, and swept by cold, biting winds. It also contains some of the world's thickest jungles. This Himalayan border has long

¹ George N. Patterson, Peking vs. Delhi, (New York, F. A. Praeger, 1964), p. 167.

² Maharaj K. Chopra, "The Himalayan Border War; An Indian Military View," Military Review, XLIII, No. 5, (May, 1963), p. 8.

been considered by Indians as a standing natural guardian of the north.

The Western Sector. The western sector is the boundary between Kashmir and Sinkiang and Tibet. It starts at the Karakoram Pass in the extreme north of Kashmir, and extends to the Spiti-Tibet border just north of where the Sutlej River cuts its way through the Himalayan range. In this portion of the boundary, the main dispute is as to Ladakh, which is called Aksai Chi.³ Chou En-lai, Prime Minister of Chinese Communists, in a letter to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India dated November 4, 1962, stated "the Aksai Chi area has always been under Chinese jurisdiction."⁴ Possession of Aksai Chi was proclaimed by the Chinese as self-evident, through language and names. Most of these place names are identified either as Chinese or Tibetan. For instance, Mar-yul, literally "lower land" is the common name in Tibet.⁵ But the Government of India gives a quite different account of the matter and maintains that this area has always been under Indian administration.

Ladakh, a part of Jammu and Kashmir State of India, has been considered as the center of aggravation during the

³ See map A, Appendix 1.

⁴ People's Daily, Peking, November 6, 1962. (in Chinese).

⁵ Margaret W. Fisher, Leo E. Rose, and Robert A. Huttenback, Himalayan Battleground; Sino-Indian Rivalry in Ladakh, (New York, F. A. Praeger, 1963), p. 19.

Sino-Indian dispute. It is not a secret that Chinese have recently constructed a road in this area. Ladakh is an area that stretches from the Karakoram Pass to the end of the western sector and through Chinese eyes, it was a place used by Englishmen as a springboard for exploring Tibet.⁶ Though there is now no thought of Ladakh as a part of Tibet, it is true that the peoples of these two places are similar.⁷

The border between Tibet and Ladakh runs along the western most pastoral areas of the Tibet plateau. As Nehru stated; "This is an area of mountainous territory of an altitude varying from 14,000 to 20,000 feet above sea level, with the mountain peaks going up much higher". Therefore, this land is not thickly inhabited.⁸ The eastern part of Ladakh has been called "changtang" (high Plain), where the amount of level ground diminishes gradually westward. The western part of Ladakh has been called "rong" (deep valley). The area of Ladakh has about 45,762 square miles and its population in 1961 was 195,431.⁹ Most of the people are

⁶ Tsung L. Shen and Shen C. Liu, Tibet And The Tibetans, (Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1953), p. 8.

⁷ Owen Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontier of China, (New York, American Geographical Society, 1940), p. 214.

⁸ The People's Republic of China, Documents On the Sino-Indian Boundary Question, "Prime Minister Nehru's Letter to Prime Minister Chou (November 16, 1959)", (Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1960), p. 133.

⁹ Encyclopedia Britannica, (Chicago, E.B. Inc., 1964), XIII, p. 582.

Buddhists. Leh, an important trade center, is the capitol of Ladakh.

Ladakh received only infrequent mention in the world press before the Sino-Indian border dispute began. Today, China, India, and Russia confront one another in Central Asia under greatly changed circumstances. And the fact is that Ladakh is the center of Central Asia. According to historical records, this remote territory did not attract even the Mongols' attention when the Mongols (the Yuan Dynasty of China; 1260-1368) occupied Tibet. From then on, Ladakh kept a sort of independent status.¹⁰ With its military power, Britain then stretched her influence into this remote land in the seventeenth century. In 1842, a treaty was signed between Ladakh and Tibet defining the borderline of the two as following their "established frontier".¹¹ When India won her independence, Ladakh then became a part of the Kashmir State.

During the Sino-Indian border dispute, both sides claimed to have been administering the area over a long period during which they claimed to have sent regular military patrols into the area. It is somewhat difficult to draw boundaries on the ground in areas which are difficult to approach or settle. But the Indian Government insisted "an international boundary

¹⁰ Pedro Carrasco, Land And Polity In Tibet, (Seattle, University Washington Press, 1959), p. 19.

¹¹ Sir Olaf Caroe, "The Geography And Ethnics Of India's Northern Frontier", The Geographical Journal. CXXVI, No. 3, (September, 1960), p. 303.

had been shown for nearly a century on official Indian maps as it is today. In fact, detailed surveys of the area were undertaken in 1867-1868, and the boundary as shown on those maps is not only in accordance with tradition and custom but is also based on the results of the later surveys.¹² But the fact is that India did not give any other strongly approved evidence to support her claims. Precisely, only showing its own map is not sufficient evidence in this case. Therefore, in his letter to Chou En-lai dated November 16, 1959, Prime Minister Nehru even admitted "it is obvious that there is complete disagreement between the two governments".¹³ The disputes about the Ladakh area finally led to a military conflict three years later.

The Middle Sector. The middle sector, much shorter in length, covers the lesser Himalayas at an altitude of about 15,000 feet and involves the boundary between Himachal Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh (both are states of India) and Tibet. It runs along the crest of the Himalayas from the Sutlej River to the Nepalese border.¹⁴ This portion of the Sino-Indian frontier has caused less difficulty than the eastern and western portions.

12 Documents On The Sino-Indian Boundary Question, op cit.
p. 119.

13 Ibid., p. 135.

14 See map A. Appendix 1.

The main states (in India) in this sector are; Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh. Uttar Pradesh is an area about 113,423 square miles with 73,746,401 population (1961).¹⁵ The capitol of this state is Lucknow. This sector is sometimes referred to as "the Ari Sector", Ari being a corruption of Ngari Khor-sam, a Sanskrit name for southwest Tibet.¹⁶ This area has two special geographical features; the first, that the main axis of the Himalayas is divided here by the Sutlej River. The second feature is that in many parts of it there is a double range of snow peaks, the higher peaks mostly in the nearer Indian-ward range, but the lower range towards Tibet being the watershed. The first feature is notable in the Himalayas for the main axis is divided by the Indus River and Brahmaputra River at either end.

Although this is a high level ground, ancient trade routes exist. Merchandise from the Punjab finds its way over a height of 18,000 feet into Tibet. The mountains run down the entire length from the Himalayas to the sea. Toward the south the valleys are narrow. To the northward, the mountains are more open and tend to form an elevated tableland which merges into the great Tibet plateau.

¹⁵ Encyclopedia Americana, (international edition), Vol. 27. (New York, Americana Corporation, 1966), p. 843.

¹⁶ Encyclopedia Britannica. op cit., XXII, p. 917.

During the period of British rule the state was known as the Northwestern Province. The title Uttar Pradesh was introduced at the time of the declaration of the Republic of India in 1950. It is bounded on the north and northeast by Tibet and Nepal and comprises the whole of the upper part of the Gangetic basin, from the Himalayas and the Punjab border to the Vindhyan plateau. At one end this state rises into the Himalayas and includes some of the grandest of the peaks which look out upon upper Asia. In this area, the Himalayas rise through the foothill ranges, at around 2000 feet. The Himalayan region has two rainy seasons. The population density of this Himalayan region is 130 per square mile.¹⁷

The second state in this area is Himachal Pradesh, land of Indian union territory lying north and north-northeast of the state of Punjab. It is an area about 10,879 square miles with 1,351,144 population (1961).¹⁸ Most of its inhabitants are farmers. This state was constituted in April 1948 by a consolidation of 21 former princely Punjab hill states. At the present time, Himachal Pradesh is the direct responsibility of the central government which controls it through an administration.

17 Ibid., XVIII. p.772.

18 Loc. cit.

Though there was no open military conflict in this area in the Sino-Indian undeclared war in 1962, the dispute about the middle sector still existed. In the note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China to the Indian Embassy in China dated December 26, 1919, the Peking Government firmly claimed its sovereignty over this sector. The Government of Peking declared "that this sector of the boundary has not been delimited."¹⁹ Therefore, the Chinese Communists denounced the "principle of watershed" which the Government of India proposed and claimed "the local authorities of the Tibet Region have all along been collecting taxes in these places." Furthermore, China pointed out that "nearly all of those who have lived for a long time in these places are of the Tibetan nationality of China."²⁰ The fact that they argued over this sector in 1962 does not mean the two countries will compromise. On the contrary, both Peking and New Delhi will keep their eyes on this sector. Whether to China or India, this portion of land is just as important as are the other two sectors.

The Eastern Sector. The eastern sector is that stretch of boundary in the Assam Himalayas between Bhutan and Burma. In this portion of territory, India's claim is based upon the

¹⁹ Documents On The Sino-Indian Boundary Question, op cit.,
p. 35.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 48.

McMahon Line. The Chinese, since the frontier disputes began, always spoke of this as "the illegal so-called McMahon Line".²¹ The Line was negotiated in 1914 between Tibet and the British Government of India. The Chinese maintain that Tibet was not an independent power and did not possess treaty-making rights. The territory between the McMahon Line and the line China claimed (running along the foot of the Himalayan range) is in India and is known as the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA). The area covers "32,000 square miles".²²

It is in this sector that the most serious disputes lie. The disputed area is about 400 miles long and 75 to 100 miles wide.²³ In this area, Indian claims extend to the main Himalayan axis, while China claims a frontier along the skirts of the foothills where these merge into the plains of Assam only a few miles north of the Brahmaputra River. China's claim is in effect based on the border line of the British Province of Assam which showed the districts under regular administration. India's claim is based on the fact

21 The People's Republic Of China, "Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China to the Indian Embassy in China, December 26, 1959", The Sino-Indian Boundary Question, (Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1962), p. 59.

22 V. Elwin, "The North East Frontier Agency of India", Geographical Magazine, XXIX, (1956), p. 405.

23 Sir Olaf Caroe, op cit., p. 305.

that the primitive tribes beyond the administered border were for many years under British political control from a date early in the nineteenth century.

There are two states in this disputed area, Assam and North East Frontier Agency. Assam, a northeastern state of the Republic of India, is almost cut off from the rest of the country on the west by East Pakistan and borders, Bhutan, Tibet, and Burma. The population of this 47,098 square miles of land is 11,860,059 (1961).²⁴ Among those, the majority (65 percent) are Hindus, the minority (22 percent) are Muslims, while the most remaining are Buddhists.

The most famous state in this disputed area is the North East Frontier Agency. There are 336,558 (1964) settlers who live in this remote land of 31,438 square miles.²⁵ This is a tangle of sparsely populated mountainous country in the extreme northeast of India. It stretches broadly from the Brahmaputra River plain in Assam northward to the main crestline of the Assam Himalayas and eastward to an irregular line passing through a series of lofty peaks. Geographically and constitutionally, the agency is a part of Assam. The Agency comprises five frontier divisions: Kameng, Subansiri, Siang, Lohit, and Tirap. It is inhabited by tribes most of

²⁴ Encyclopedia Britannica, op cit., XII, p. 619.

²⁵ Ibid., XVI, p. 332.

which are of Mongoloid stock such as the Monaba and Mishni. The capitol of NEFA is Shillong.

The northern boundary of NEFA, about 550 miles long, in dispute between China and India, is known as the McMahon Line. Sir Henry McMahon, the then secretary on the Indian foreign department and a representative of Great Britain, at the conference held in Simla (1913-1914) settled frontier and other matters relating to Tibet. Although the Chinese Government refused to sign the convention, the Indian Government, in 1913, constituted the NEFA as a state of Indian territory.

The Indian Government claimed that it has always exercised jurisdiction over this area. But Chou En-lai stressed that the Sino-Indian boundary was correctly delineated in all "traditional Chinese maps" and in the map of Tibet and adjacent countries published by the Indian survey in 1917 and the map attached to the 1929 edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica.²⁶ Furthermore, China denounced the McMahon Line. Therefore, the validity of the McMahon Line has been the source of most of the controversial issues. Since both China and India have different accounts on this matter, it is assumed that the border problem of this sector

²⁶ Documents On the Sino-Indian Boundary Question, op cit., pp. 49-53.

will never be solved without a priority of solving the problem of the McMahon Line.

Tibet: The Land And The People

The question of Tibet was first put before the United Nations in November 1950 - at the time of the forcible entry of Chinese Communist troops into Tibet. This attracted world-wide attention. Unfortunately, it was immediately overshadowed by the Korean War.²⁷ The Tibet case was, therefore, shelved at the United Nations. It was not until 1959, when the Dalai Lama escaped from Tibet, that the question of Tibet was again brought up and formally placed on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly.²⁸ Although the question was discussed, no solution satisfactory to all sides has yet been formed.

Tibet lies roughly between the 28th and the 36th parallels of north latitude and 79th and 99th of east longitude. Its area in 1950 was estimated to be about 500,000 square miles. Chinese Communists have recently published the population of Tibet as 1,274,969.²⁹ According to the

²⁷ Dalai Lama, My Land and My People, (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1962), p. 86.

²⁸ Ibid., pp. 220-221.

²⁹ J. P. Mitter, Betrayal of Tibet, (Bombay, Allied Publishers, 1964), p. 1.

Theory of Harmony among the five races (Han, Manchu, Mongol, Hui, and Tibetan) advocated by Sun Yat-sen,³⁰ Tibet was regarded as a component part of the Chinese nation. Most of the Tibetans live in Tibet itself, while the rest live in southwestern Kansu, northeastern Szechwan, and the mountainous areas of Yunnan, Tsinghai. Most Tibetans are believers of Lamaism, which tremendously influences Tibetan society.

Early Contact With China and Britain. In comparison with India and China, Tibet entered the historical phase at a late period. The first unification was in the sixth century. Years after the introduction of Buddhism, the monks began to be appointed "ministers".³¹ The Mongols occupied Tibet in 1247.³² At the time the Yuan Dynasty collapsed, the Tibetans then could organize their own government. From the fourteenth century to the seventeenth, China was under the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644).³³ Tibet maintained a general cordial relation with China in those years. The history of the Ming Dynasty records many peaceful missions

30 Sun Yat-sen, San Min Chu I - The Three Principles of People (a selected speeches), trans. into English by Frank W. Price. (Chungking, Ministry of Information of the Republic of China, 1943), p. 12.

31 Carrasco, op cit., p. 19.

32 Loc. cit.

33 Emily Hahn, China Only Yesterday, (New York, Doubleday & Co., 1963), p. 15.

to and from Tibet. Though the routes can easily be traced, the place names are sometimes confusing.

After Manchu set up the Ching Dynasty in Peking in 1644, the Dalai Lama visited Peking in 1651 and was warmly received.³⁴ The friendly relations between the Emperor of the Ching Dynasty and the Dalai Lama gave powerful aid to the Chinese Government by his great name. At the same time, the recognition of the Dalai Lama as the head of the Buddhist world naturally added enormously to the strength of his position and enhanced his prestige.

The earliest attempt to map the whole of Tibet scientifically was made by order of the far-seeing Chinese Emperor Kang Hsi.³⁵ Between 1708 and 1716 data were slowly collected. The first map of Tibet was completed in 1717.³⁶ In the same year, the Sixth Dalai Lama asked help from Peking to push out the rebels. This brought about the direction of China in Tibet affairs. Several years later, the Chinese introduced a number of reforms in the Tibetan administration that stabilized the organization of Tibet during the remaining years of the Ching Dynasty.

³⁴ S. S. Tso (ed), A Collection Of Documents Of Modern History; 1800-1900, (Taipei, Chung Hwa Co., 1958), p. 609. (in Chinese).

³⁵ O-Yang Wu Wei, "Sino-Indian Border & McMahon Line", Issues and Studies, (Taipei, September 1963), I. no. 9 p. 571., (in Chinese).

³⁶ Tso. op cit., p. 612.

After the fall of the Ching Dynasty the Lhasa Government asserted its independence from China and came under British influence. Since it was both Tibetan and British policy to keep Tibet closed to all outside influence, most of the native rulers of the small state of Eastern Tibet were suppressed during this period, although in large part the Tibetan forms of local government persisted.³⁷ In general terms, it was due to the folly and arrogance of the Manchus in later times, the weakness of their military force, and the influence of foreign powers that Tibet drifted gradually away from its traditional position in China.

The impact of the west, so far as Tibet is concerned, was not felt until 1768. The Court of Directors of the East India Company recommended the obtaining of information regarding the promising market in 1768.³⁸ From then to late in the nineteenth century, the Englishmen kept step in Tibet with a kind of cool reception. Panchen Lama once considered that the English were "fond of war, and after insinuating themselves into a country, raised disturbances and made themselves masters of it".³⁹

37 Carrasco, op cit., p. 19.

38 Tieh T. Li, The Historical Status of Tibet, (New York, King's Crown Press, 1956), p. 71.

39 Ibid., pp. 75-76.

By its powerful army forces, Britain forced the government of the Ching Dynasty to sign a series of treaties on Tibet late in the nineteenth century. From those treaties of 1890 and 1893,⁴⁰ the British received various privileges in Tibet which were not to be enjoyed by the Chinese in any British Colony. The British, having decided to eliminate the Chinese factors in the controversy, made various attempts to open direct negotiations with the Tibetans. After the failure to make direct negotiations with the Tibetan authorities, Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of British Government in India, sent a letter to the Thirteenth Dalai Lama on August 11, 1900.⁴¹ The letter was unexpectedly sent back after six months. Curzon then sent his second letter to the Dalai Lama. It had the same fate as the first one. The information which at this period reached India from Tibet was rare, "unreliable and difficult to evaluate".⁴²

The Agreement Of 1904. After years of fruitless talk with the Chinese Government, on June 3, 1903, Curzon dispatched Colonel Younghusband to Lhasa with an armed escort of 200 men.⁴³ The aim of the mission was to talk with the Chinese and Tibetans directly. From the moment that the

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 80.

⁴¹ Peter Fleming, Bayonets To Lhasa; The First Full Account Of The British Invasion Of Tibet In 1904, (New York, Harper and Brother, 1961), p. 31.

⁴² Ibid., p. 36.

⁴³ Li, op cit., p. 87.

armed mission began to approach the frontier, both Tibetan and Chinese representatives continued their protest against the mission. Ignoring the protest, the mission kept going and reached Lhasa on August 3, 1904.⁴⁴ Under the British military pressure, the Chinese Commissioner to Tibet, Yu-tai, signed the Lhasa Agreement of 1904.⁴⁵ The Court of the Ching Dynasty refused to ratify the Treaty and fired Yu-tai because the treaty would draw Tibet into the sphere of British influence.

The significance of the Lhasa Agreement of 1904 lies in the competition for Tibet which was created between China and Britain. Let us see then what encouragement China could have from the treaty. Whether the British Government would still regard Tibet as China's province or only recognize China as the supervisor of Tibet was in doubt. The fact that Britain sent a military expedition to Lhasa without consulting China had already imperiled her position. This was the main reason why the Government of China never could claim any sovereign rights to Tibet from then on to the end of the Dzing Dynasty.

Tibet And The Republic Of China. When China was proclaimed a republic (1911), efforts were soon made to regain control of Tibet. Seats were allotted to Tibet in the

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 92.

⁴⁵ Tso, op cit., p. 618.

National Assembly and the five-colored national flag had the black bar to stand for Tibet. On April 12, 1912, President Yuan Shih-kai issued a proclamation declaring that Tibet, Mongolia and Sinkiang would be regarded as on equal footing with the provinces of China proper and as "integral parts" of the Republic.⁴⁶ Yuan could not carry out his proclamation, however, by China's weak national force. From 1916 on, China hardly had a single year without civil conflict. Foreign menace, other than that of Japan, was temporarily lightened because of World War I, but internal dissension went on with ever greater destruction.

Chiang Kai-shek unified the nation in 1928.⁴⁷ Unlike the Communists, Chiang did not use his powerful army to settle the outstanding Tibet issue. The reason of Chiang's peaceful settlement was affected by the following factors: Firstly, from a theoretical point of view it would be self-defeating if the National Government, which stood for equality of all states within the Republic and for harmony and peace, should use force to subdue the Tibetan people. Secondly, the National Government in carrying out its Northern Expedition, had encountered repeated menaces from the foreign powers. It,

⁴⁶ Ta-shou Huang, The History of China, (Taipei, Great China, 1959), p. 332. (in Chinese).

⁴⁷ Hahn, op cit., p. 356.

therefore, was not in a position to force the Tibetan issue, which would give offense to Great Britain. And it was always the British who had to be taken into account if any solution of the Tibetan issue was to be effective. Thirdly, the international situation would not allow the National Government to adopt such a risky measure as a military campaign in Tibet. The Nationalist forces succeeded in knocking out the leading warlords, but there soon developed dissension among its own ranks. Fourthly, the National Government, since its removal from Canton to Nanking, had become more compromising than revolutionary in character. The complexity of the situation on the spot would make any government hesitate to start a military campaign against Tibet.

Though there was sporadic light fighting between the Tibetans and Liu Wen-hui, a Szechwan warlord,⁴⁸ the relations between the National Government and Lhasa can be considered as friendly. The National Government indeed did not re-establish China's original position in Tibet. The reason for refusing to have a close relation with China was that the Tibetans could not depend on a weak Chinese Government. Indeed, only a united and peaceful China could give Tibet needed assistance and protection. If Tibet had entirely

⁴⁸ Huang, op cit., p. 337.

turned away from powerful Great Britain and leaned toward a divided China fully engaged in international war or civil war, it would have stood the risk of endangering its own existence. Unfortunately, China, since the establishment of the Republic, had hardly enjoyed any peace.

Tibet And China After World War II. After World War II, the Tibet issue became more complex than before. The fact that China was victorious did not help to solve the issue. The independence of Outer Mongolia deeply hurt Chinese prestige and inspired the Tibetans to follow the example of their kindred Mongolians. Therefore, the declaration made in the Constitution adopted by the Chinese National Government to guarantee Tibet's autonomy failed to receive support of the Tibetans.⁴⁹

While the Civil War between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists made the Tibetans hesitate to come to terms with the Government of Nanking (the then Capitol of National Government) even if they had the intention of doing so, the same international development alienated them and encouraged them to assert immediate independence.

In 1947 Great Britain recognized the independence of India.⁵⁰ This development must have greatly affected the

⁴⁹ T. L. Shen and S. C. Liu, Tibet And The People, (Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1953), p. 52.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 52.

status of Tibet. The Indian assumption of the role previously played by the British can also be seen from the Indian measures adopted in connection with Tibet. Proclaiming an independent state, Tibetan delegates attended the Asiatic Conference of March 1947 in New Delhi.⁵¹

Facing A Red Dragon. After Chiang's administration evacuated from the Mainland to Taiwan in 1949, the Tibetan authority cut relations with the National Government and expelled the Chinese officials.⁵² The fourteenth Dalai Lama claimed Tibet as a "de facto" independent nation ever since 1912.⁵³

However, the Chinese Communist Government has not accepted the Dalai Lama's proclamation. In 1950, the Red Army reached Tibet. By proclaiming Tibet as an "integral part" of China, the Peking regime mobilized its forces and defeated a limited number of Tibetan warriors in October 1950.⁵⁴ Simultaneously with the Chinese military expedition into Tibet, various messages were exchanged between the Chinese Communist and the Indian Government. The Indian Government expressed its "deep regret" and asked Peking to

51 Dalai Lama, op cit., p. 77.

52 Ibid., p. 78.

53 Loc. cit.

54 The People's Republic Of China, Concerning The Question Of Tibet, (Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1959), p. 186.

ease the war with peaceful means.⁵⁵ Peking replied, "Tibet is an integral part of China and the Tibet issue is an entirely domestic problem", and declared that its army must enter Tibet to "liberate the Tibetan people and to defend the national frontier".⁵⁶ When the diplomatic duel between Peking and New Delhi could not make for any good but instead made the situation worse, the Lhasa Government turned to the United Nations for help. As there was not a single vote in the United Nations to support Tibet's request, the Tibetan appeal was set aside. In September 1951, Red Forces entered Lhasa and set up the Tibet area as a military district.

Escape And Asylum. In February 1959, people from all parts of Tibet gathered together in Lhasa for a solemn religious festival. According to the account given by the Chinese Communists some two months later, the Tibet Local Government carried out a series of provocative, anti-Chinese acts, thereby creating a tense situation. In March, it was rumored that the Chinese intended to arrest the Dalai Lama as a hostage to discourage a Tibetan rebellion.⁵⁷ The hatreds between the Chinese and the Tibet Local Government rapidly grew, and the Dalai Lama had no other choice than to

55 N. M. Ling (ed), Tibetan Sourcebook, (Hong Kong, Union Printing Co., 1964), p. 12.

56 Ibid., p. 16.

57 Dalai Lama, op cit., p. 164.

flee. He left his palace on the night of March 17, 1959, and entered India on March 31.⁵⁸

After their failure to prevent the flight of the Dalai Lama, the Peking regime made the Panchen Lama the acting chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region.⁵⁹ At the same time, the Red Chinese were notably silent on the true nature of the explosive situation, especially the continuing flight abroad of Tibetans. This fact, of course, has played a prominent role in the deterioration of Sino-Indian relations, breaking out in late 1962 in open conflict. The increasing controversial Tibetan issue has raised more disputes between China and India, for the Chinese viewpoint is that Tibet is an "Integral part" of China. But through Indian eyes, the view is that "Tibet serves as a spring board southward to India".⁶⁰ Therefore, the Chinese Communist suppression of Tibet has "Agitated Indian public opinion".⁶¹

58 Ibid., p. 216.

59 People's Daily, July 3, 1959, (in Chinese).

60 Geraldine Fitch, "Tibet Revolts Against Chinese Rule", The New Leader, XL No. 10, (March 1959), p. 17.

61 Sharokh Sabavala, "Tibet Agitates India", The New Leader, XL No. 13, (July 1959), p. 8.

Sinkaing And The Himalayan States

Sinkiang. Sinkiang (Chinese Turkestan), like Tibet, is a part of the encircling land frontier of China. Its history and modern problems are inseparable from those of China. This, the biggest province of China, has more than 600,000 square miles and thirty five million population.⁶²

Sinkiang is situated north of the Tibet highland and borders on three central Asian republics of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia and Tadzhikistan. Aside from the highland margins that penetrate into Sinkiang from the south, the region can be divided into three major subregions, the rugged Tien Shan (Mt. Heaven) mountain system in the center, separating the Dzungaria basin in the north from the larger Tarim basin in the south. As to its people, the Sinkiang region are 75 percent Uigur.⁶³

The Chinese Emperor ruled this remote area, but the power often remained in the hands of local people. The province which is really a group of native protectorates has been closely linked with China from the Han Dynasty (206 B.C. - 220 A.D.).⁶⁴ In the following years, however, Chinese authority over what is now Sinkiang has only been in effect for some 425 years, which was divided into several

62 Lattimore, op cit., p. 40.

63 Ted Shabad, China's Changing Map, (NY. Praeger 1965), p.257.

64 Owen Lattimore, Studies In Frontier History, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 184.

periods, of which the present Chinese overlordship is the fifth important period.⁶⁵ The present geographic boundaries of Sinkiang, and its tribal and administrative organization, follow the lines laid down under the Ching Dynasty (1644-1911).⁶⁶ The Emperors of the Ching Dynasty accomplished their aim of political authority only in a very small measure by direct conquest. The Government of China relied chiefly on setting one tribal element against another and then coming forward to act as arbitrators, when the different rivals were exhausted by local warfare. China also then arranged settlement on the basis of the tribal spheres of interest.

Between 1865 and 1877, the whole tribe of Kashgaria, bordering on British India, claimed its freedom from China. To crack down on the uprising, the Manchu House dispatched General Tso Tsung-tang and his powerful semi-modern equipped army to this remote area. Moving on into Sinkiang, Tso and his men were victorious over those local tribes. Tso Tsung-tang then reestablished the state and local governments.⁶⁷ The high ranking officials of both organizations were all Chinese. The Chinese governing minority in Sinkiang is comparable to the British element in India. But the difference was that there was no solid connection between

⁶⁵ Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontier Of China, op cit., p. 171.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 187.

⁶⁷ Huang Ta-shou, op cit., p. 404.

Sinkiang and Peking. This was partly due to a poor transportation system and to a series of uprisings which occurred constantly in Kansu, the province in the middle of the Sinkiang-Peking route. Since Sinkiang is divided from China by great distances and formidable deserts, there is only one main cart-road approach, through Kansu. Consequently, the relations between Sinkiang-Peking have always been somewhat distant.

At the time of the Chinese Revolution in 1911, the position held by the Manchus passed to the Chinese. The fall of the Empire immediately caused a series of outbreaks in Sinkiang. A Chinese named Yang Tseng-hsin took over the state and the local governments under a system of dictatorial control. This former appointee of the Ching Dynasty maintained general authority on the local issues.⁶⁸ In the following twenty years, Yang and his government lived almost completely at peace. After Chiang Kai-shek completed the well known Northern Expedition in 1928, the Nanking Government then decided to discontinue the native state administration. It is probable that the year of 1929 marks the peak of Chinese expansion in Sinkiang, Tibet, Manchuria, and Mongolia.⁶⁹ From then on, the government of the Republic of China claimed Sinkiang as one of its provinces. The effective government over Sinkiang lasted until 1949, the year

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 410.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 412.

that Red China took over the mainland. It was from the year of 1949, the Peking regime deliberately sent a large number of Hans to Sinkiang and set up a series of industrial firms. Along with these actions, the Government of Chinese Communists has always kept close watch on the border question.

Sikkim. Sikkim is a tiny state situated between Nepal and Bhutan, bordering Tibet on the north and India on the south. There are only 162,189 people (1961) in this land of 19,500 square miles.⁷⁰ Most of them are farmers. The capitol of this tiny kingdom is Gantok. This smallest country of Asia was found by a group of immigrants from Tibet in the sixteenth century.⁷¹ Not much attention was paid to this remote land, and the Lhasa Government maintained only a loose relationship with Sikkim. On the other hand, under the initiative of its agents, the aggressive British Government in India infiltrated into this tiny kingdom and put it under British influence in 1861.⁷²

After years of military pressure, Sikkim yielded to Britain and signed the Agreement of 1861. By the Agreement, Sikkim agreed to refer any disputes or questions between its people and those of neighboring states to the arbitration of the British Government and to abide by its decision.

70 The New International Year Book, (New York, Funk & Wagnalls, 1964), p. 435.

71 Carrasco, op cit., p. 27

72 Loc. cit.,

According to Article 19 of the treaty, Sikkim agreed not to lease or cede any part of its territory to the third nation without the permission of Britain.⁷³ From then on, the great success of British colonial expansion placed this mountainous kingdom's foreign relations under British control.

In 1886, a group of Tibetan troops invaded Sikkim and caused a tense situation between China and Britain.⁷⁴ Once again, the Government of the Ching Dynasty yielded to powerful Great Britain. A convention was held in 1890 by the delegates of China and Britain in Calcutta. In the same year, the Sikkim Treaty was signed by China and Great Britain. From this treaty, China recognized British supremacy in Sikkim. By Article I of the treaty, the boundary of Sikkim and Tibet "shall be the crest of the mountain range separating the waters flowing into the Sikkim Teesta".⁷⁵ This Treaty, indeed, marked a real beginning of international complications on the Tibet issue.

After the independence of India, Sikkim then fell under India's sphere of influence. In June, 1949, Indian troops invaded Sikkim and appointed a commissioner to take

⁷³ Li, op cit. p. 78.

⁷⁴ Alastair Lamb, The China-India Border, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 38.

⁷⁵ William F. Mayers (ed), Treaties Between The Empire Of China And Foreign Powers, (Shanghai, North China Herald, 1902), p. 211.

over the administration.⁷⁶ Naturally, this former British protectorate thus came under the influence of India. Furthermore, the Government of India maintained three roads to Sikkim.

Bhutan. Bhutan has assumed importance in the Sino-Indian border dispute, with China seeking to extend the borders of Tibet, which it dominates. This tiny kingdom occupies, with Sikkim, the southern slopes of the Himalayas. The capitol is Punakha. This remote land ranges from the high valleys into the foothills and the jungle in the immediate plain. There is as much as 300 inches of rain fall each year.

This tiny kingdom is situated on the east of Sikkim, north of India. The rest of the border faces Tibet. In Bhutan, as in Sikkim, the population consisted of different groups. The people of the mountain area are Tibetans, while those of the plains are Hindus. The people of former part are Buddhists of the Red Hat Sect. Their language is Tibet. After its subjection to British influence, Bhutan received a large number of Nepalese settlers.⁷⁷ Within its 2745 square miles of land are 726,853 people (1964).⁷⁸

Bhutan was a dependency of Tibet in the late eighteenth century. Like Ladakh, Bhutan has, on occasion,

⁷⁶ Li, op cit., p. 196.

⁷⁷ Carrasco, op cit., p. 27.

⁷⁸ The New International Year Book, op cit., p. 96.

appealed to Lhasa for the settlement of their ruler's problem. During this period, Bhutan had a strong bureaucratic organization entirely under the control of the Church. In 1826, the Government of Britain took over Assam and put Bhutan under its sphere of influence.⁷⁹ Forty years later, the Treaty of Sinchula was made by Bhutan and Britain. By this treaty, Bhutan accepted the status of a British protectorate and became the recipient of a British subsidy.⁸⁰ Under its terms, Bhutan ceded Athara Duras to Great Britain. Furthermore, the Government of Bhutan also agreed to arbitration by the British Government in all disputes between Bhutan and Sikkim.

The second treaty was made between Bhutan and Britain in 1910. By this treaty, the Government of Britain completely controlled Bhutan's affairs. British influence in Bhutan, as in Nepal, depends on maintaining British prestige and eliminating Chinese temptation. The various British proposals concerning Tibetan boundaries during the Simla Conference (1913-1914) were to a great extent influenced by this fact. In 1947, an agreement was renewed between Bhutan and India after the Independence of India.⁸¹ Although the

79 Li, op cit., p. 76.

80 Lamb, op cit., p. 39.

81 Caroe, op cit., p. 305.

Chinese Government, has disclaimed on paper any claim over Bhutan, the Government of Bhutan, fearing Chinese Communist aggression, has built roads and strengthened its defense beginning in the 1950's.

Nepal. Nepal, the largest among three Himalayan states, lies on the west of Sikkim. In 1964, the population of this 54,362 square miles of land was 9.8 million. Most of the people depend on farming.⁸² Preoccupied by cultural influence and settlers from Tibet, Nepal, like its sister countries - Sikkim and Bhutan, had a close relationship with Tibet before eighteenth century. Then the aggressive Gurkhas (a tribe from India) invaded Nepal in 1760.⁸³ With its great expansion, the Gurkhas threatened the rest of the slope of Himalayan range. The outcome was intervention from China. Failing against the powerful intruding Chinese army, Nepal then became a Chinese tributary state with the obligation to send a tribute mission to Peking once every five years. This mission was continued until the fall of the Ching Dynasty in 1911. In the early nineteenth century, the British took over China's place and put Nepal under British influence. On the other hand, Nepal maintained a rather friendly relationship with the Ching Dynasty. And it was true that China always considered Nepal as its dependent. When the Manchus fell, the Nepalese Government,

82 The New International Year Book, op cit., p. 352.

83 Li, op cit., p. 1.

like that of the Dalai Lama in Tibet, regarded itself as in no way bound to the Republic of China.

Aware of the border question, the Government of Britain then never ignored the geographical importance of Nepal. Up to the present, the Government of India as its predecessor, has paid a close attention to this remote land.

CHAPTER III

THE McMAHON LINE

On October 22, 1962, while President John F. Kennedy of the United States spoke to the American people on radio and television about the Cuban crisis, half way around the world Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India spoke to his countrymen over the radio about the Himalayan border crisis. In his broadcast-to-the-nation speech, Mr. Nehru said that he considered "China's aggression" on the Ladakh frontier and on the North East Frontier Agency a "menace to freedom".¹ He condemned Chinese military action and stated:

Our border with China in North East Frontier Agency region is well known and well established from ages past. It is sometimes called the McMahon Line. ... This has been acknowledged as the border by history, tradition and treaties long before it was called the McMahon Line. The Chinese have in many ways acknowledged it as the border, even though they have called the McMahon Line illegal.²

Since then, the Sino-Indian border dispute has resulted in military conflict. And this has focused attention on the McMahon Line.

¹ The Republic of India, Prime Minister On Chinese Aggression; A Collection Of Nehru's Addresses on the Border Issue. (New Delhi, Ministry of External Affairs, the Government of India, 1963), p. 1.

² Ibid., p. 2.

It is true that both the land and the names of areas in the regions concerned in the Sino-Indian dispute are unfamiliar to most of us. But it is also correct to say that many people have read or heard the term "McMahon Line". The term "McMahon Line" has been closely connected with the issue of the Sino-Indian border dispute. Therefore, consideration of the McMahon Line should take precedence in the study of the Sino-Indian border dispute. Precisely, the McMahon Line is the most controversial issue in the border dispute. Although, through Indian eyes, the McMahon Line is a "traditional boundary" between the two nations,³ Chou En-lai, the Prime Minister of Chinese Communists firmly announced:

The so-called McMahon Line was a product of the British policy of aggression against the Tibet region of China. ... (the McMahon Line) has never been recognized by any Chinese Central Government.⁴

The term McMahon Line has been in the news in connection with the Sino-Indian border issue for a long time. It owes its name to Sir Henry McMahon, the then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the British-Indian Government.

³ The People's Republic Of China (PROC), "Note From The Indian Ministry of External Affairs Dated February 26, 1962 to The Chinese Embassy in India", Selected Documents On Sino-Indian Relations, December 1961 - May 1962, (Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1962), p. 24.

⁴ PROC, "A Letter From Chou to Nehru Dated September 8, 1959", Documents On The Sino-Indian Boundary Question, (Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1960), p. 6.

He negotiated with the representatives from both China and Tibet in 1913-1914 at Simla, India.⁵ The outcome of this meeting was a treaty co-signed by the representatives from both Tibet and Britain. The main part of the treaty is the demarcation of the border between India and China. This is the line which has created many disputes between China and India.

Because of the importance of the McMahon Line which forms the eastern China-India boundary and a portion of the northern China-Burma Boundary, it seems best to review its historical background as the starting point for this paper. Furthermore, it is important to note that primary emphasis has been placed on the Indian portion of the line, because of the settlement of the China-Burma boundary problem in 1960.⁶

Historical Background

After the fall of the Ching Dynasty of China in 1911, the Lhasa Government asserted its independence from China. Noticing this, Yuan Shih-kai, the then President of the

⁵ George N. Patterson, Peking vs. Delhi, (New York, F. A. Praeger, 1964), p. 173.

⁶ Daphne E. Whittam, "The Sino-Burmese Boundary Treaty", Pacific Affairs, XXXIV, No. 2, (Summer, 1961), p. 174.

young Republic of China, declared on April 12, 1912, that Tibet, Mongolia as well as Sinkiang would be regarded as a part of China.⁷ In the following years, a series of conflicts occurred between Tibetans and Chinese for control of this state. Since then it has been the Chinese policy to introduce direct Chinese Government in this area and to consider this area a part of China.

The first impact between Lhasa and Peking was in 1912 when the Thirteenth Dalai Lama issued a declaration of independence. He listed as his chief grievance, China's inability to protect Tibet from aggression.⁸ In this announcement, he did not define clearly what he meant by "aggression". But one thing for certain was that "aggression" was not from China. In other words, it meant that the "aggression" was from the South and the source was the British. A review of the historical records gave support to the idea that the above hypotheses might be right. However, Tibet being a small weak country and the realization that Tibet would have to fight her own battles. Tibet felt compelled to yield to the British and adopt an unfriendly attitude toward China that is Tibet had to stay with the

⁷ Ta-shou Huang, The History Of China, (Taipei, Great China Co., 1959), p. 332. (in Chinese).

⁸ Tsung-lien Shen and Shen-chi Liu, Tibet And Tibetans, (Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1953), p. 50.

British and find a way to maintain peaceful relationships with the British.

It is true that the British Government did play an important role behind the scene. And it is quite clear that the British Government was not prepared to admit the right of China to intervene in the internal administration of Tibet. They would not tolerate the maintenance of an unlimited number of Chinese troops in Tibet. This meant that the Government of Britain did not respect the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906.⁹ By this treaty, Chinese influence in Tibet was confirmed. Furthermore, the treaty recognized that China had the right not to permit any foreign state to interfere with the territory or internal administration of Tibet. Since China was not included in "foreign states", it was completely legal to adopt the policies which subordinated Tibet to her.

The Chinese Government, however, had to yield to the pressure of the British in face of internal difficulties as well as international developments. The central administration in Peking could hardly command the respect of many southern provinces.¹⁰ The international prospect was even

⁹ Alastair Lamb, The China-India Boundary. (New York, Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 134.

¹⁰ While Yuan Shih-kai headed the Central Government in Peking, the Kuomintang (KMT) under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen put the southern states under its influence. Therefore, the South was always unwilling to obey the Peking Government.

worse since Russia, the only power that could be expected to counteract any British action in Tibet, was engaged in carrying out her own design in Mongolia. Besides, there were strong indications that similar action might be taken by other powers in their respective spheres of influence, especially the Germans in Shangtung and the Japanese in Manchuria.¹¹

In such a bad situation, Yuan Shih-kai reluctantly pulled his army out of Tibet late in 1912 and restored the title of Dalai Lama to the Thirteenth early in the following year.¹²

As to Great Britain, she was enjoying her successful colonial expansion into Tibet. Moreover, the British Government demanded a tripartite conference which would include Britain, China, and Tibet. As expected, the Chinese Government turned down the request. China argued that the existing treaties, signed by Britain and China, had clearly defined Tibetan status. The Government of China considered that the two signers should respect the "Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906".¹³ Therefore, China believed that there was no need to negotiate a new treaty.

¹¹ Kenneth S. Latourette, China, (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall Inc., 1964), p. 123.

¹² Shen and Liu, op cit., p. 51.

¹³ Lamb., op cit., p. 134.

Along with its mighty military power, the British Government continued its previous demand. It is not hard to find out that there were at least two factors from which the British demand originated. In the first place, the British Government found that it was necessary to consolidate its own position in Tibet by having a new treaty. Secondly, the British Government wanted a new treaty to reaffirm its influence in Tibet and to resolve the worrying on the outcome of the Tibet-Mongolia Pact.

It is not difficult to understand the concern of the Government of Britain about the Tibet-Mongolia Pact. From the British viewpoint, the Pact simply would weaken London's influence in Tibet. In January 1913, the representatives of Tibet and Mongolia secretly signed the Tibet-Mongolia Pact at Urga (Ulan Bator, the capitol of Outer Mongolia).¹⁴ In this treaty, both sides declared themselves free from Manchu domination. Moreover, the two signers asserted their position as independent states. Britain was concerned that the treaty might give the Russians the advantage of extending their influence through the medium of Mongolia to Tibet. British concern was not only limited to Russia's ambitions but also encompassed the Japanese expansion. From 1906 to 1916, a series of secret conventions between Japan and

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 143.

Russia was made.¹⁵ Acting as a host of Mongolia, Russia then invited the Japanese to this remote land. Facing this serious situation, the British Government could not wait any longer but threatened China that:

... if China should again refuse to take part in a meeting with a view to conclude a new treaty, the Government of Britain would directly negotiate one with Tibet alone.¹⁶

It was under such pressure that the Chinese Government notified the British Minister of its readiness to discuss the Tibetan problem. Therefore, the British Government had accomplished its first demand and was ready to carry out its ambition in the future to hold a tripartite conference. Because there was no other choice, both Peking and Lhasa accepted the British invitation to attend the meeting.¹⁷

The Simla Conference

The Simla Conference, a meeting initiated by the British Government and reluctantly agreed to by the Chinese

¹⁵ Owen Lattimore, Studies In Frontier History, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 261.

¹⁶ Tieh-tseng Li, The Historical Status of Tibet, (New York King's Crown Press, 1956), p. 134.

¹⁷ The meeting was held at Simla, a small town in the northern part of Uttar Pradesh near Sutlej River.

lasted from October 13, 1913 to July 24, 1914.¹⁸

The participants in their agreeing to have this meeting showed that the British Government had won the first round of this diplomatic battle. In the first place, having Simla as the meeting place was a deliberate choice to emphasize the importance of the border question. In the second place, ignoring the strong protest of the Peking Government, the London administration invited Lhasa to participate in the conference. It would show clearly that China was already yielding to Britain on the matter of conflict over Tibet. By those deliberate actions, Britain showed not only its great power but also its attitude toward Tibet. Therefore, that this fateful conference brought a temporary settlement but a permanent dispute should not surprise anyone.

The attendants of this conference were Chen I-fan (Ivan Chen), Special Commissioner for Foreign Affairs in Shanghai, Sir Henry McMahon, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the British-Indian Government, and Lonchen Shatra, chief Tibetan delegate.¹⁹ It was clear that the Tibetan delegates were on an equal footing with their former

18 Esson M. Gale, "International Relations: The Twentieth Century", China, Harley F. McNair, (ed), Chapter XII, (Berkeley, Calif., University of California, 1947), p. 206.

19 Lamb, op cit., p. 144.

master, the Chinese delegate, in this meeting. This significant point became a sound argument in the very beginning of the conference.

The first meeting of the Simla Conference was held on October 13, 1913. As expected, the Chinese representative objected to the Tibetan delegate having equal status with the Chinese delegate, but later agreed to continue the meeting.²⁰

In this tripartite meeting, Lonchen Shatra insisted on the return to Tibet of all the land as far as Tachienlu (now in Hsikang Province of China) and the extension of the Tibetan territory to include Kokonor (name of a lake in Chinghai Province).²¹ To this unreasonable demand, even Sir John Jordan, the then British Minister to Peking, stated:

The Tibetans, in my opinion, have always been very unreasonable about the boundary and have claimed a frontier right away to Tachienlu. No one could make me believe that Tachienlu and Batang are not Chinese.²²

However, Sir Charles Bell also conceded that some of the districts claimed by the Tibetan delegate had been brought

²⁰ Patterson, op cit., p. 172.

²¹ O-Yang Wu-wei, "Sino-Indian Border dispute", Issues and Studies, I, No. 9. (September 1964), p. 577.

²² Li, op cit., p. 136.

under Chinese control during the last two hundred years.²³

Then came the Chinese objection. The Chinese counter-proposal consisted of the following items: (1) Tibet should be regarded as an integral part of China; (2) China would not convert Tibet into a province; (3) Britain should not annex Tibet or any portion of its territory; (4) A Chinese Resident should be stationed in Lhasa; (5) The foreign and military affairs of Tibet should be under Chinese direction; (6) Tibet should not enter into negotiation or agreements with any foreign country except through the Chinese Government; and (7) The Tibetan boundary should not extend into the province of China.²⁴

Since the proposals presented by Tibet and China for the solution of their border troubles were so far apart, no progress was made at this early part of the meeting. As a middle man, the British delegate then suggested dividing Tibet in two divisions, Inner and Outer Tibet.²⁵

To this proposal several questions could be raised: What was the real intent of this proposal? Was this proposal a fair solution to both China and Tibet? And was

²³ Sir Charles Bell, Tibet, Past and Present, (London, Oxford University Press, 1924), p. 152.

²⁴ O-Yang, op cit., p. 578.

²⁵ Lamb, op cit., p. 143.

this proposal made by British in "good faith"? For the first question, the answer was that the proposal was designed to benefit Great Britain. To the second and the third questions, the answers, as will be shown, were both negative.

To Sir Henry McMahon, the Russia's achievement in Mongolia was a successful accomplishment. Russia forced China to redefine the border between Outer and Inner Mongolia. The outcome was that the Outer Mongolia fell under Russian control. On the other hand, the Chinese Government still controlled Inner Mongolia. For this reason McMahon thought the best thing for Britain was to divide Tibet into two parts as Russia had done to Mongolia. From this fact, it is not hard to find out that Britain was the very one who wanted to put Tibet under its control. But most of the westerners believed that the McMahon's proposal was not an example of aggressive self-interest. In his book, The China-India Border, Alastair Lamb (Professor, University of Malaya) considered the motive of McMahon's proposal was just a plan to have an autonomous Tibet, a "buffer between China and the British Indian frontier".²⁶ But Mr. Lamb did not explain why the British Government did not plan to have Punjab of Uttar Pradesh as "buffer" between Tibetan and British Indian frontier. Perhaps the

²⁶ Ibid., p. 144.

right answer to this question is that China was a poor and weak country during the early part of the century. Therefore, those western colonial powers always won victories over China both at the battleground and at the conference table.

As expected, China again yielded to McMahon's proposal and agreed to negotiate about the division of Tibet. From then on, the argument, shifted to the delimitation of the boundary between Inner and Outer Tibet.

The McMahon Line

Late in the conference, Sir Henry McMahon proposed a draft convention which consisted of eleven articles and seven exchanges of notes. The main parts of the draft convention included the following items. China's suzerainty over the whole of Tibet was to be recognized together with the autonomy of Outer Tibet. Both Great Britain and China were to respect the territorial integrity of the country, and to keep hands off the internal affairs of Tibet. China would be forbidden to send troops, civil, or military officers.²⁷ China might maintain a Resident in Lhasa, and 300 escorts could stay with this Resident. As in Inner Tibet, China could maintain her administrative system. Tibet would not

²⁷ P. C. Chakravarti, India's China Policy, (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1961), p. 21.

be represented in the Chinese Parliament or any other similar body. China would pledge not to convert Tibet into province, while Britain would not annex any Tibetan territory or station troops, civil, or military officers, or establish colonies in Tibet. The special interest of Great Britain in the existence of an effective government, and in the maintenance of peace and order in the neighborhood of the frontier of India was to be recognized. The British Trade Agent could visit Lhasa with escort. Britain would enjoy Tibet's most favored nation treatment. Britain would be a mediator between the disputes of China and Tibet.²⁸

The most important part in this draft convention was the delimitation of the border line. From the British suggestion, the border between Outer and Inner Tibet would roughly follow along the Upper Yangtze River.²⁹ The border between China and India, as well as between China and Burma, was also regulated by the draft convention. The line between Inner and Outer Tibet, McMahon marked out with blue color, while the other international border line was marked in red. This red line extended along the crest of the

28. O-Yang, op cit., p. 579.

29 See map A, appendix 1.

Himalayas from Bhutan on the west to a point called Isu Razi on the Mekong Salween watershed in the east. It began in the west at approximately $91^{\circ} 40''$ E., $27^{\circ} 45''$ N., on the eastern border of Bhutan and proceeds in a northeasterly direction for 250 miles through a region with mountains ranging from 15,000 to 23,500 feet in height. The line ended on the present Burma-China border at a point approximately $98^{\circ} 27''$ E., and $27^{\circ} 40''$ N.³⁰

Under much pressure from the British, Ivan Chen, the head delegate of China reluctantly signed the draft convention, but the reaction from Peking was such that the Chinese Government promptly repudiated the agreement. Since the Government of China refused to ratify the treaty, therefore, according to international law, the treaty was illegal. In his book, International Law, Dr. D. P. O'Connell considered, "the necessity for the ratification is the primarily constitutional".³¹ This gave Chinese a good reason to refuse recognition of the Simla Convention as a legal international treaty. And from then on, Chinese always claimed that the agreement was a defective one. In other words, it meant that the McMahon Line should not

³⁰ United States Air Force Operational Navigation Chart, sheet H-10, The Sino-Indian Boundary Question, (Naga Hill, September, 1961).

³¹ D. P. O'Connell, International Law, Vol. 1, (New York, Dobbs Ferry, 1965), p. 245.

CHAPTER IV

THE CHINA-INDIA CONTROVERSY

A friendly Sino-Indian relationship was rooted in their history for over three thousand years. There was almost never an armed conflict between the two countries. The only invader of India, Genghis Khan,¹ a Mongol soldier, came from the north. Since it was hard to travel over the Himalayan mountains, the people of the two countries had but rare chances to associate with each other. Only monks traveled to the other side of the Himalayas. Therefore, Buddhism had been and still has strong influence on the Chinese mainland.

But everything is different at the present time. Modern transportation facilities have complicated the relationship between China and India. It is not because there are no Buddhists in India, but rather due to a series of complicated events which just have happened between these two giant Asian nations. The controversy between Peking and New Delhi has caused the gap between them to

¹ Genghis Khan, (1162-1227), founder of Yuan Dynasty, conquerer of the Asian mainland, Near East, Eastern Europe. European considered his western expedition as "yellow peril".

enter into discussions of the boundary. At this time, World War I started. From then on, Britain (later its successor, India) and China did not pay much attention to this matter.³² The reasons given by the then Chinese Government for refusing to ratify the Simla Convention were as follows: (1) All the places west of the Salween³³ shall be placed within the limits of the autonomy of Tibet.³⁴ (2) Tibet should be recognized as a region of China. (3) China could not agree with the prospective blue line.³⁵ In the face of the Chinese repudiation, Britain then signed a bi-lateral treaty with Tibet. The demarcation of the boundary line was the most important part in the convention. From then on people called this line the McMahon Line.

Since the treaty did not well define the Sino-Indian border, and the refusal to ratify the treaty by the

32 Shen and Liu, op cit., p. 51.

33 A river originated in Hsinkang, China via pass Burma into Indian Ocean.

34 Patterson, op cit., p. 172.

35 Sir Olaf Caroe, "The Geography and Ethnics of India's Northern Frontier", United Asia, XII, No. 4, (August, 1960), p. 231.

Peking Government, the McMahon Line was not a final settle-
ment for the border issue but a source of future trouble.

The McMahon Line was a result of the 1914 Simla Convention between the British and the Chinese. It was a temporary arrangement and was never accepted by the Chinese government. The Chinese government has always maintained that the McMahon Line is an illegal line and that the border between China and India should be determined by the two countries through negotiations. The McMahon Line has caused a lot of trouble between China and India, especially in the area of the Arunachal Pradesh and Nagaland. The Chinese government has always been very active in the area of the McMahon Line, and it has been a source of tension between China and India.

The McMahon Line is a line of latitude and longitude that runs from the north to the south. It is a line that was drawn by the British in 1914. It is a line that was never accepted by the Chinese government. The Chinese government has always maintained that the McMahon Line is an illegal line and that the border between China and India should be determined by the two countries through negotiations. The McMahon Line has caused a lot of trouble between China and India, especially in the area of the Arunachal Pradesh and Nagaland. The Chinese government has always been very active in the area of the McMahon Line, and it has been a source of tension between China and India.

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¹ Genghis Khan, (1162-1227), founder of Yuan Dynasty, conquerer of the Asian mainland, Near East, Eastern Europe. European considered his western expedition as "yellow peril".

grow wider and wider. And eventually it led to a military conflict in 1962. Therefore, it is essential to examine the controversial factors involved before discussing the Sino-Indian Conflict.

Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai²

The relationship between China and India was a very friendly one even as recently as 1949, the year the Chinese Communists took over the entire Chinese mainland. After centuries of aloofness between the two nations, they drew together during the early twentieth century, for India herself was fighting against British imperialism. As to China, this old but weak country was striving hard to maintain her political entity against a whole series of imperialist powers, Western and Eastern. Out of this common struggle against imperialism emerged new ties of friendship, new sympathies, a new desire to help each other and to learn of each other. China watched with great interest Mahatma Gandhi's non-cooperation and civil disobedience movement of 1920-1921. Sun Yat-sen, the then leader of the Chinese revolutionary movement, in his lecture on the methods of

² Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai; Indian and Chinese are brothers. P.H.M. Jones, "Passes and Impasses: A Study of the Sino-Indian Border Dispute:", Far Eastern Economic Review, XXXIX, No. 9. (February, 196e), p. 444.

nationalism, which was later incorporated in his "Three People's Principles", pointed to the Indian movement as an object lesson for the Chinese Nationalist.³ On the other side, the Indian people also paid their high respect to China's revolutionary movement.

Moreover, the Chinese and Indian delegates, in 1927, issued a joint statement at the Congress of the League against imperialism and refused "the use of Indian troops in China to protect the imperialist interests of Great Britain".⁴ In 1937 and 1938 the Indian National Congress passed resolutions expressing its sympathy with the Chinese in their struggle against the western powers. After the Sino-Japanese War broke out on July 7, 1936, the Indian people organized a boycott of Japanese goods in India. Furthermore, Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru went on a good-will mission to China in August 1939. Nehru spoke at Chungking over the radio.⁵ In his speech, Nehru stressed the importance of Sino-Indian cooperation "for the sake of the freedom of our dearly-loved countries, for Asia and for the world"⁶

³ P.M.A. Lineburger, The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen, (Baltimore, The John Hopkins Press, 1937), p. 180.

⁴ Satyavrata R. Patel, Foreign Policy of India: An Inquiry And Criticism, (Bombay, N.M. Tripathi Ltd., 1960), p. 161.

⁵ China's National Capitol during World War II, in Szechween Province.

⁶ P.C. Chakravarti, India's China Policy, (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1962), p. 6.

In return, Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek paid a state-visit to India and exchanged good-will wishes each for the other's country in 1942. In fact, Chiang urged Franklin D. Roosevelt, the then President of the United States, to bring pressure upon Churchill to free India. Those were the days of the first Sino-Indian honeymoon.⁷ These two great nations of Asia established their relationship on the basis of freedom and true understanding.

The dreams, however, did not last very long. With the end of World War II, a new situation emerged in Asia. The victory of the Allies meant a victory for China. She had already been accepted as a major power at the Cairo Conference of 1943.⁸ Furthermore, as one of the Five Major Powers, China attended a series of important international meetings. China was a charter member of the United Nations, and had been seated as a permanent member in the Security Council. For India, too, victory was in sight in her struggle for independence. In 1946, India became an independent nation. Other Asian nations were also on the march and some of them, such as Burma and Ceylon, had many cultural ties with India. Under these new conditions, relations between India and China could not stay unchangeable.

⁷ The second Sino-Indian honeymoon would be the days in the early 1950's.

⁸ Kenneth S. Latourette, The Chinese, Their History and Culture, (New York, McMillan Co., 1961), p. 452.

In his broadcast speech from New Delhi dated September 7, 1946, Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru stated:

... realize that we were yet on the march and the goal had still to be reached. There were many difficulties and obstacles on the way and our journey's end might not be so near as people thought. Any weakness now, any complacency would be fatal to our cause.⁹

Mr. Nehru was right when he pointed out, "any weakness ... would be fatal to our cause". And it is clear to see that a great "weakness" in India's foreign policy is having a giant neighbor on the north side.

In analyzing the gigantic changes that were taking place in China in the year of the Chinese Civil War, a distinguished Indian author observed:

A mighty convulsion is shaking the land of Confucius. For four thousand years the Chinese people have been kowtowing before their ancestral tombs,¹⁰ seeking an answer to life in the past. But now, almost for the first time ... the common people of Cathay are beginning to stand erect and seek an answer to their problems in the future. For better or for worse, the Chinese Communists have succeeded in awakening, in millions of people, a sense of personality.¹¹

⁹ Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, (New Delhi, The Publication Division, Gov't of India, 1961), p. 99.

¹⁰ A reverence made by prostrating and knocking the heads on the ground.

¹¹ Dinkar Sakrikar, "Sino-Indian Border Dispute", United Asia, XII, No. 2, (April 1960), p. 109.

In reviewing the developments of Sino-Indian border dispute, it is not hard to find out that Chinese now "stand erect and seek an answer to their problems. ...".

The year of 1949 was a very unusual one for the Chinese. In this year, Red China took over the mainland from the hands of the National Government. The National Government evacuated to Taiwan. Since then, the Indian people have had to face an extremist progressive Communist regime from the north. Therefore, a more complicated situation was created by these new international relations.

The relationship between China and India was very friendly during the first decade after the Chinese Communists took over the mainland in 1949. India was the first country after Burma in the Free World to recognize the Red Chinese Government. In a parliamentary speech, Nehru said that "it was not a question of approving or disapproving the changes that have taken place. It was a question of recognizing a major event in history and appreciating and dealing with it."¹² Nehru soon found that there were many obstacles ahead in the business of "dealing with" China.

The relationship between these two countries was once shadowed by the Korean War and the Tibetan incident in 1950.

¹² Patel, op cit., p. 161.

As the time passed, China and India drew together once again. They walked hand in hand on the international stage. Unable to refuse the strong demand from China, India did not attend the San Francisco Conference of September 1951, for signing the Japanese Peace Treaty.¹³ From then on, there was much progress in creating good relationships between China and India. This result came about partly as a result of Nehru's efforts to please China. But Chou En-lai, the Prime Minister of the Peking regime, also contributed his work to strengthening this friendship. In a letter to Nehru dated April 29, 1954, Chou stressed the importance of "peaceful co-existence" shortly before the Geneva Conference began.¹⁴ The two prime ministers then announced the five principles of international relations known as PanchShila. The principles were incorporated in the final communique of the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, Indonesia. The five principles are the following items:"

- (1) Mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty.
- (2) Non-aggression.
- (3) Non-interference in internal affairs.
- (4) Equality and mutual benefit.

¹³ Ibid., p. 168.

¹⁴ A Collection of Documents of Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China: 1954-1955, Vol. III, (Peking, World Knowledge, 1958), p. 10 (in Chinese).

(5) Peaceful co-existence.¹⁵

This new Chinese diplomacy was intended to demonstrate China's peaceful intentions towards neighboring states and in particular to discourage the South and South-East Asian nations from alignment with the West. But to Jawaharlal Nehru, China's "peaceful co-existence" proposal seemed the only way to solve the world problems. Thus, in the speech in Lok Sabha¹⁶ dated September 17, 1955, Nehru stated:

... that war does not solve any major issues and that, therefore, all problems, however different¹⁷ and intricate, should be approached peacefully.

Unaware of the Chinese Communist aggressive character, Nehru and his people greatly enjoyed the peaceful atmosphere between these two giant Asian nations. This brought India and China together in the next three years after the Panch-Shila announcement in 1954. Therefore, it is correct to say that the two nations enjoyed this second honeymoon. It was the time of "Hindi Chini bhai bhai".

15 Sharokh Sabavala, "Reaction In India". The New Leader. XLIII, No. 16, (April 1959), p. 3.

16 Lok Sabha; Indian Parliament.

17 Nehru, op cit., p. 99.

As expected, the second honeymoon did not last very long. The major reason was that India's attitude toward China was only determined by her unrealistic assessment of Chinese leadership. In Nehru's eyes, the need of the moment was peace, particularly in Asia. The only power that might disturb Asian peace was China with her ambitions. Nehru strongly believed that once those ambitions were satisfied, China would settle down to peaceful internal development. Nehru believed that friendly policies would solve the problems and maintain the peace. Nehru was so naive that he even considered that China and India were "meeting one another in South-East Asia once again and, as in the past, there was no hostility between them."¹⁸ The fact is that there was and still is hostility between China and India. The trouble was that Mr. Nehru was not aware of all the real controversial situations between his country and China.

¹⁸ Asian Recorder. New Delhi. (December 1956), pp. 1182-1185.

The Korean War

The first impact between China and India happened during the Korean War. The Chinese Communist Government gave moral support to the North Korean attack against South Korea, in June 1950 and reacted sharply to the intervention by the United Nations forces in Korea. In his letter to the Security Council of the United Nations dated August 20, 1950, Chou En-lai maintained that the United States was the number one war criminal and, thus, the United Nations mission to Korea had seriously endangered world peace.¹⁹ But the United Nations did not pay much attention to this paper protest. Moreover, this world body dispatched the United Nations police forces to maintain the integrity of the Republic of South Korea.

The role which India played in the Korean War gave a clear picture that Nehru was trying to avoid annoying China. When the war broke out in June 1950, India supported the United Nations' resolution condemning North Korea as an aggressor and calling for a cease-fire and withdrawal of the northern forces from South Korea. But when Communist China began to show resentment against the steady advance of the

19

A Collection of Documents of Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China: 1949-1950, op cit., Vol. I, p. 133.

United Nations forces, the Indian attitude was surprisingly changed. In fact, India almost identified herself with the Chinese view that the crossing of the 38th parallel amounted to a direct threat to the security of China, and if Peking had sent its forces into North Korea, it had done so in self-defense. Therefore, India seemed to refuse to accept the United Nations' responsibilities under the United Nations Charter. As in his book, Peking vs. Delhi, George Patterson considered that the India policy "could not both support the United Nations' position and at the same time contribute troops as she should have done."²⁰

When the United States presented a draft resolution to the Political Committee of the United Nations General Assembly stating that Red China had engaged in aggression in Korea, the Indian delegation opposed the resolution on the ground that India was "not convinced that the participation of the Chinese forces in the fighting in Korea was due to any aggressive intention."²¹ On the whole, India had played her part well in pleasing China in the United Nations on the Korean issue. However, India remained

²⁰ George Patterson, Peking vs. Delhi. (New York, F. A. Praeger, 1963), p. 110.

²¹ Ibid., p. 110.

chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission until the end of the Korean War. India found that the role of chairman was not a very pleasant job. Both Syngman Rhee, the then President of South Korea, and Mao Tse-tung complained about the way India managed Chinese war prisoners. Nehru then realized that to maintain friendship with the Chinese Communists was a difficult task.

The Communist Party Of India

Before Indian independence, the Communist Party of India (CPI) never made much progress in its efforts to infiltrate the nationalist movement or appeal to the mass of people. But a great change occurred in the 1950's. Since the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was so strong and successful, the CPI, therefore, inevitably followed the so called Neo-Maoism in the early 1950's.²² According to Maoism, the CPI emphasized the policy of a collaboration government. Which meant that the CPI and the other parties should work together. Mao also advocated that using ballot boxes was the easiest way to gain political strength. Indian Communists now sit in all or nearly all of the State Legislative Assemblies, and they are particularly strong in

²² Norman D. Palmer, The Indian Political System. (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1961), p. 203.

West Bengal, Andhra, and Kerala.²³ Therefore, the development of the CPI has attracted much attention among Indian people. Since the CPI had close relations with Peking, the majority of the Indian people consider the CPI as Peking's vanguard.

It is true that Peking's ambition is to be a leader in Asia. The existence of the Communist Party in most of her neighboring countries made it easier for Peking. But the worst thing for the Indian people is that in India China has the greatest fifth-column because the CPI is the largest minority group. This focuses attention on the possibility of a link-up between the Chinese Communists inside the Himalayas.

The Tibetan incident of 1950 drew the CPI and the CCP together. In the early part of this year, Mao Tse-tung, in a letter to the CPI, stated:

relying on the brave CPI and the unity and a struggle of all Indian patriots, India certainly will not remain long under the yoke of imperialism and emerge in the Socialist and People's Democratic family. That day will end the imperialist reactionary era in the history of mankind.²⁴

In return, the CPI responded in its "notes of the week" in

²³ Ibid., p. 204.

²⁴ People's Daily. Peking. January 21, 1956. (in Chinese).

the New Age Weekly.²⁵

It is common knowledge that the People's Government of China respects Tibetan customs and autonomy to such an extent that it is not even introducing the reforms and social changes that are being implemented in the rest of China.²⁶

Furthermore, Mr. B. T. Ranadive, the General Secretary of the CPI, criticized the Indian's China-Policy. He challenged Nehru's view that China had been primarily responsible for the deterioration in Sino-Indian relations. He expressed the view that "if Indians feel hurt at the change of expansionism levelled at a few among them, should not the Chinese feel hurt when their government is attacked as an aggressor and charged by the Prime Minister of India with deception?"²⁷

Contrary to this pro-China policy, Mr. Nehru's firm stand during the late 1950's to Chinese Communist both on the border issue and other developments created further differences between Nehru's Government and the CPI. Thus, the Sino-Indian "friendly" relationship deteriorated. Therefore, the Chinese Communist leaders

²⁵ The New Age Weekly, an official organ of the CPI, published in Bombay.

²⁶ Girilal Jain, PanchSheela and After; A Re-Appraisal of Sino-Indian Relations in the context of the Tibetan Insurrection. (New York, Asian Publishing House, 1960), p. 184.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 188.

left the CPI leaders no doubt that their sympathies and support were with the left. The Chinese influence has continued to be the left-wing group. Moreover, the Chinese have been behind those leaders of the militant group who show signs of emerging as a force on the Indian national scene. Thus, in his book Panch-Sheela and After, Mr. Girilal Jain considered that "the reactionaries in India were working to ruin relations with China".²⁸

Tibet Revolt

The first major test of Indian foreign policy, and the first major clash between Peking and New Delhi, occurred over Tibet. Therefore, the Tibetan issue worsened the Sino-Indian relationship and eventually led to an open military conflict in 1962. A review of Red China's foreign policy will show it is related to the Sino-Indian controversy over Tibet.

On October 1, 1949, the Chinese Communist Government announced the following intentions in foreign affairs:

- (1) To protect China's independence, freedom and integrity.
- (2) To work for lasting international peace and friendly cooperation between all countries.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 198.

- (3) To establish cordial relations with foreign governments whose attitudes were friendly.
- (4) To unite with the Soviet Union and other Communist states and movements in the struggle against the imperialists and in particular the United States.
- (5) To protect the rights and interests of the overseas Chinese.²⁹

By the pledge of "protect China's ... integrity", Peking regime shows its will to extend into those parts of Chinese territory still under Nationalist Chinese control.³⁰ The Chinese Communist leaders also apparently had in mind the recovery of authority over areas which had become detached from China in the past.

It became clear later that the Chinese Communists were thinking in particular of Tibet, of certain border territories controlled by India and Burma. They hoped to develop strong influence in these regions by encouraging and supporting the local Communist movements. It meant that the march to Tibet from Peking was a step to "protect China's ... integrity". Facing such a situation, it was impossible to expect a friendly relationship would exist between China and India. Lacking mutual understanding, the "Hindi Chini bhai bhai" era was merely a political drama.

²⁹ A Collection of Documents of Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China, Vol. 1, op cit., p. 1.

³⁰ Taiwan, the Pescadores, Kinmen, Matsu.

In October 1950, after announcing its intention to "liberate Tibet by peaceful or other means,"³¹ the Peking regime ordered the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to advance toward Tibet. About forty thousand Chinese troops crossed the eastern border of Tibet. On October 21, a memorandum was delivered by the Indian Ambassador to Peking, stating:

a military action at the present time against Tibet will give those countries in the world which are unfriendly to China a handle for anti-Chinese propoganda at a crucial and delicate juncture in international affairs.³²

Another note was dispatched from New Delhi to Peking on October 28, reiterating that "the decision to order the advance of China's troops into Tibet appears to us most surprising and regrettable."³³ The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied on October 30, that "Tibet is an integral part of Chinese territory and the problem of Tibet is entirely a domestic problem of China." Therefore, the Peking Government considered that "the regional (Tibet) autonomy granted by the Chinese Government to the national

31 A Collection of Documents of Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China. Vol. I, op cit., p. 165.

32 Ling Nai-min, Tibetan Sourcebook. (Hong Kong, Union Research, 1964), p. 10.

33 Ibid., p. 11.

minority inside the country is an autonomy within the confines of Chinese sovereignty."³⁴

When Peking and Delhi once got acquainted with each other, they soon were concerned about Tibet. However, with the signing of the Sino-Tibetan agreements on May 23, 1951, the situation regarding Tibet eased -- at least temporarily. The major provisions of this agreement include the following:

- (1) The Tibetan people shall return to the big family of the motherland - China.
- (2) The Tibetan people have the right to exercise regional autonomy under the unified leadership of Chinese Government.
- (3) The central authority will not alter the existing political system in Tibet.
- (4) The policy of freedom of religious belief laid down in the common programme shall be carried out.
- (5) Tibetan troops shall be reorganized step by step into the PLA and become a part of the national defense forces.
- (6) The Central People's Government shall have the centralized handling of all external affairs of the area of Tibet.³⁵

There were two significant points mentioned in the above agreement. First, China regarded her measures concerning Tibet since 1950 as an exercise of sovereign rights

³⁴ Ibid., p. 13.

³⁵ Frank Moraes, The Revolt In Tibet. (New York, McMillan Co., 1960), pp. 65-66.

within Chinese territory while India emphasized the autonomous nature of Tibet. The second point is that the Agreement of 1951 gave Lhasa substantial autonomous rights and until the Tibetan local government took up armed insurrection in March 1959, China had adopted a soft policy in making changes in Tibet.

After 1951, there were frequent and close contacts between China and India. In 1954, both Nehru and Chou played very important roles in the Bandung Conference, and a Sino-Indian Agreement was signed by Peking and New Delhi in the same year. It is true that during those years, the relationship between China and India was enjoyed in the atmosphere of "Hindi Chini bhai bhai".

Some controversial cases occurred during that period, but were not made known to the public. Late in 1955, the Indian Government announced that Chinese troops had occupied some disputed territory at a place called Bara Hoti.³⁶ During the following August, the Indian Government announced that a few Chinese soldiers had entered Indian territory but left when requested.³⁷ Therefore, both sides did their best to maintain friendship.

³⁶ Bara Hoti; in Chinese called Wu-je, a place west of Nepal. This two square mile place lying at over 16,000 feet had no strategic or other importance for either country.

³⁷ Jones, op cit., p. 443.

A turning point came when open revolt broke out in Lhasa in March, 1959. As expected, the Tibetan people reorganized themselves and attacked the Han people after Red China's nine years of control. The main reason for the revolt was that the Tibetans wanted to keep their own way of life. The conflict between China and Tibet is just like what Nehru described: "A dynamic, rapidly moving society on one hand and a static, unchanging society, fearful of what might be done to it in the name of reform on the other."³⁸

The Tibetan people's revolt against China started on March 9, 1959, when demonstrations broke out in Lhasa.³⁹ The Tibetans believed that the Dalai Lama would be kidnapped on March 10. On March 17, the Dalai Lama and his followers left his palace secretly for India. Three days later, the Chinese army started to counterattack.⁴⁰ The revolt then became a whole scale conflict between the Tibetan people and the Han people.

³⁸ Nehru, op cit. Speech at the Parliament dated April 27, 1959. p. 319.

³⁹ Jones, op cit., p. 444.

⁴⁰ Dalai Lama, My Land and My People. (New York, McGraw-Hill Co. 1962), pp. 164-200.

To India, the Tibetan revolt was sudden and unexpected. It was true that the actions of the Chinese Communists in Tibet in 1959 hit India like an icy blast from the high Himalayas. Thus, the revolt did provoke a marked change in Indian public moods and attitudes, as well as in official policy. The widespread expression of sympathy for Tibet was given from both the Parliament and Indian people. Then a Chinese accusation through the HsinHua Agency (Chinese official news agency) to India worsened the already thin Sino-India friendship. The HsinHua Agency accused that the rebellion in Tibet was "engineered by the Imperialists, ... the commanding centre of the rebellion was in Kalimpong."⁴¹ This announcement led to an immediate storm of protest. Mr. Nehru spoke in the Lok Sabha on March 30. He announced that "it is wrong to say that the Kalimpong was the centre from which anti-Chinese activities were directed." He then continued that although "it is important for us to have friendly relations with the great nation - China, our sympathies are with the Tibetans. We want them to progress in freedom."⁴² No doubt, this word agitated the Peking Government. Chinese then fired back with a Resolution on

⁴¹ Jones, op cit., p. 445.

⁴² Nehru, op cit., p. 133.

the Question of Tibet which adopted, on April 28, by the first Session of the Second National People's Congress of the Chinese Communists. In this resolution, Chinese condemned Indian Imperialists for "scheming the Tibetan rebellion and interfering in China's internal affairs with the intention to split Tibet from China."⁴³

Warnings and threats to India were also on their way. On April 30, 1959, the People's Daily held out the threat; "we give solemn warning to imperialists and Indian expansionists. You must stop at once, otherwise you will be crushed to pieces under the iron fist of 650 million Chinese people."⁴⁴

From then on, tons of letters, editorials, and exchange of notes blasted each other. Apparently the "Hindi Chini bhai bhai" era was over. But the worst thing did not happen until August 28, 1959. On that day, Nehru told the Lok Sabha that "a detachment of Chinese troops, 200 to 300 strong, crossed into the Subansini Frontier Division in the North East Frontier Agency and fired on the Indian Picket Post of Longjn on August 25."⁴⁵

⁴³ Tibetan Sourcebook. opcit., p. 388.

⁴⁴ People's Daily, Peking. April 30, 1959. (in Chinese)

⁴⁵ Nehru, op cit., p. 335.

Since then, the relationship between the two nations deteriorated steadily and finally an open military conflict broke out in 1962.

CHAPTER V

BORDER DISPUTE

The tragedy of Tibet cast a deep shadow upon Sino-Indian relations. It undermined India's faith in Chinese intentions. On the other hand, it agitated the Chinese Government against the Government of India. Facing such a situation, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru still considered Sino-Indian relations one of the important factors in maintaining world peace. In his speech at Rajya Sabha dated September 10, 1959, the Prime Minister admitted that he had been "surprised at the recent developments."¹ But in his speech in Lok Sabha just five days earlier, Nehru said that "it is important, even essential, that these two countries of Asia, China and India, should have a friendly and cooperative relationship."² His efforts to maintain and promote such relationship made him partially blind to the full implications of Chinese policies and actions. On the other hand, in all the communications which Chou En-lai, Prime Minister of Communist China, addressed to Nehru about violations, there were references to PanchShila and

¹ Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy; Selected Speeches. The Publications Division, The Government of India, 1961. p. 352.

² Ibid., p. 344.

"age old friendship", but the emphasis was unmistakably on China's pretended right based on her national interest.

Therefore, it is safe to say that India's China policy lends itself to a comparison with the policy pursued by western statesmen toward Adolf Hitler in pre-Munich years. In both cases, the primary weaknesses were misjudgments on the rival's real long-term intentions. As time passed, Nehru realized to some degree the real danger of the situation. He spoke to the Lok Sabha on November 27, 1959, stating that the issue between China and India was of the "biggest magnitude - a matter of the utmost significance to the present and future of India and Asia".³

The Himalayan States

Meanwhile, on the other side of the Himalayas, the Chinese had worked hard to strengthen their defense line. In Sinkiang, the Chinese had been building up basic industrial complexes and pushing through a program improving transportation. Apart from the Sinkiang-Tibet highway (730 miles) through Aksai Chin, China constructed six new roads in Ladakh.⁴ Other roads were built along the McMahon Line

³ Ibid., p. 368.

⁴ Anna L. Strong, "The China-India Border", New World Review, XXVII, No. 10, (November 1959), p. 50.

and the Nepalese frontier. It was clear to see that new roads in Tibet "could not be for the purpose of trade, although the Chinese said that trade was their main reason for building them. The roads had to be for military purpose."⁵ On a conservative estimate, the Chinese troops in Tibet, "in combat readiness were more than six divisions, a Chinese division usually consists of 15,000 men".⁶

Both China and India competed hard over the three tiny Himalayan Kingdoms. After the signing of the Sino-Nepalese Treaty on August 1, 1955, the relations between China and Nepal was provided for on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence.⁷ Then a Chinese consulate-general was established in Katmandu, the capitol of Nepal, in the following years. And in 1960, the governments of Chinese Communists and Nepal signed the Sino-Nepalese Agreement on the Boundary Question.⁸ Therefore, China and Nepal became

⁵ G. S. Bharhava, The Battle of NEFA: The Undeclared War, (New York, Allied Publishers, 1964), p. 7.

⁶ Ibid., p. 10.

⁷ A Collection of Documents of Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China: 1954-1955, Vol. 1, (Peking, World Knowledge, 1958), p. 10

⁸ "Nepal: Sino-Nepalese Treaty", United Asia, XII, No. 4, (April, 1960), pp. 391-392.

close friends. And, thus, anti-Indian feelings in Nepal grew steadily. To India, she has repeatedly stated that Nepal's geographical position dictated a special Nepalese-Indian relationship. This position was recognized in the international community. But now India had to face a competitor from the north who seemed to have won the first round.

China also challenged India's influence both in Sikkim and Bhutan. According to the Indo-Sikkimese Treaty of 1950, Sikkim remained as to a protectorate of India in respect to foreign relations and defense.⁹ The situation in Sikkim became more complicated during the 1950's. Kazi Lhendup Dorji, the Chairman of Sikkim National Congress Party, pointed out that "China had advanced to Sikkim through many ways."¹⁰

As for Bhutan, the Maharaja of this tiny kingdom disclosed in January, 1961 that Peking unofficially had approached the Bhutanese Government with a request to open direct border talks, and had made an offer of economic aid for the development of Bhutan. Facing such a situation,

⁹ Chandra Das Rai, "Sikkim; Gateway to India". United Asia. XII, No. 4, (April, 1960), p. 360.

¹⁰ George N. Patterson, "Recent Chinese Policies in Tibet and towards the Himalayan Border States". The China Quarterly. XII, (October-December, 1962), p. 198.

India offered to Bhutan a major program of aid.¹¹ However, China did her best to woo Bhutan away from its policy of friendship with India. And it seemed to work.

Furthermore, China's policy toward Burma in 1960 left no doubt of the worsening of Sino-Indian relationships. That was the situation of the Himalayas before 1962.

Sino-Burmese Treaty

On January 25th to the 28th of 1960, in Peking, Communist China concluded a Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression with Burma.¹² Under its terms, the Chinese accepted the British defined boundary except for the three village tracts and the area in the Wa State which was to be exchanged for the Nanwan Tract.¹³ It also provided for setting up a Joint Committee to survey and define the boundary. On October 1, in the same year, Prime Minister U Nu of Burma and Chou En-lai signed the Sino-Burmese Boundary Treaty in Peking.¹⁴

¹¹ Ibid., p. 199.

¹² Daphere E. Whittam, "The Sino-Burmese Boundary Treaty", Pacific Affairs. XXXIV, No. 2, (Summer, 1961), p. 180.

¹³ Map D. Appendix 4.

¹⁴ Maung Maung, "The Burma-China Boundary Settlement", Asian Survey. I, No. 1, (March, 1961), p. 38.

Under its terms, the following items were listed:

- (1) Burma ceded 59 square miles in the Hpimaw, Gawlum Kangfang area.
- (2) Burma ceded 73 square miles in the Wa State.
- (3) Burma gained 85 square miles comprising the Namwan Assigned Tract.
- (4) Burma gained four villages and ceded two villages.
- (5) Burma gained about 5 square miles in the far north and ceded about 2 square miles in the eastern section.¹⁵

Thus, it is clear to see that, for the loss of a small portion of territory, the Burmese obtained what they had long wanted. And even more important, British-defined boundary was recognized by the Peking Government.¹⁶

China's willingness for signing the treaty was based on two facts. The first place, China wanted to show its righteousness in the eyes of the world. Secondly, China taught the Burmese that though China was a powerful nation, it would follow a "right" path to deal with its small neighbors. As to Burma, the signing of the agreement set a high mark for its foreign relations with China. Therefore, Burma, in urgent need of consolation after the civil strife

¹⁵ Whittam, op cit., p. 181.

¹⁶ The National Government in Taipei has never recognized the McMahon Line and condemned the Sino-Burmese Treaty as illegal.

On a wider view of the frontier question, India was trying to maintain a frontier along the crest of the Himalayas. The reason for this was that a great strategic disadvantage would be created for India if the Chinese were in possession of all the high passes and their southward exits into the Indian lowlands. The frontier could be left undefined in the old days because communications were so difficult and international contacts so few throughout the Himalayan region. But modern conditions of international life need definite frontiers. Therefore, in his letter to Chou En-lai, dated September 26, 1959, Jawaharlal Nehru considered that the Government of India

recognize that the India-China frontier which extends over more than 2500 kilometres has not been demarcated on the ground and disputes may therefore arise at some places along the traditional frontier as to whether these places lie on the Indian or Tibetan side of this traditional frontier.¹⁷

From this statement, it is clear to see that Nehru did not overlook the McMahon Line. What he was concerned about was the "traditional frontier". To him the "traditional frontier" simply meant the McMahon Line. He spoke to the

¹⁷ Documents on the Boundary Question. (Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1960). p. 80.

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¹⁷ Documents on the Boundary Question. (Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1960). p. 80.

Rajya Sabha on September 10, 1959, that "the McMahon Line, by which I simply mean the defined frontier, was our frontier."¹⁸

As to the Chinese, they have never recognized the McMahon Line. Even during the heavy fighting of the Chinese Civil War, the National Government sent a note to the Indian Government through its embassy at New Delhi on November 18, 1949. In this statement, the National Government repudiated the McMahon Line and denounced the validity of the Simla Conference.¹⁹ The Chinese Communist took the same stand on this matter. Chou En-lai, in his letter to Nehru dated September 8, 1959, stated:

the McMahon Line ... was determined by the British representative and the Tibetan representative behind the back of the representative of the Chinese Central Government through an exchange of secret notes ... The so-called McMahon Line was a product of the British policy of aggression against the Tibet region of China and has never been recognized by any Chinese Central Government and is, therefore, decidedly illegal.²⁰

Since China considered the McMahon Line illegal, the claims of the two countries were far apart.

¹⁸ Nehru, op cit., p. 358.

¹⁹ Lo Chia-lun, "Raise Up The Curtain on the Tibetan Issue In Sino-Indian Relations", Free China. III, No. 7, (July, 1950), p. 229. (in Chinese).

²⁰ Documents on the Boundary Question. op cit., p. 6.

For the convenience of discussion, the disputed area may be divided into three sectors: (1) The Northern Sector, consisting of the boundary between Ladakh and Tibet, (2) The Central Sector, covering the boundary between Panjab, Himachal Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Tibet, and (3) Eastern Sector, extending from the northeastern border of Bhutan to the Isu Raji pass on the northwest of Burma.

In the Northwestern Sector, the Chinese claimed territory of about 33,000 square kilometers. In fact, China already had seized about 12000 square kilometers. Here the Indian case rested largely on a peace treaty concluded in September 1842, between Tibet and the Raja of Jammu. By this treaty, the Lhasa Government acknowledged "no other authority in Ladakh".²¹ Peking maintained that the Chinese Central Government of the day neither participated in the conclusion of the treaty nor ratified it. In his letter to Nehru dated December 17, 1959, Chou En-lai stated that "this area has long been under Chinese jurisdiction and is of great importance to China. Since the Ching Dynasty, this area has been the traffic artery linking up the vast regions of Sinkiang

²¹ Alastair Lamb, The China-India Border, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1964). p. 69.

and western Tibet".²² The fact was that since 1950 the Chinese have made regular and busy use of the Sinkiang-Tibet highway. Therefore, China claimed that Aksai Chi was already under China's sovereignty.

As in the Central Sector, the Chinese's claim involved a comparatively much smaller area. It is the area over which lesser disputes occurred. The area to which the Chinese laid claims were in the Spiti region: Nilang-Jadhang, Bara Hoti (Wu-je), Sangcha Malla, and Lapthal. In his letter to Nehru dated September 8, 1959, Chou stated that this area "had always belonged to China, and was gradually invaded and occupied by the British thirty to forty years earlier."²³ Nehru replied on September 26, 1959, that "the Government of India has always been in control of this area".²⁴ In fact, China laid its claims on the ground that the people living in this area were mostly of Tibetan origin, but the difficult thing was to draw an ethnic frontier in this place. To India, she had to maintain the ownership over this area for keeping her "watershed" policy. The fact was that in the early nineteenth century the British began to extend their administrations into this area.

²² Documents on the Boundary Question, op cit., p. 22.

²³ Ibid., p. 5.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 85.

In the Eastern Sector, the Chinese claimed some parts of the North East Frontier Agency and a small portion of Assam. The Chinese's claim was based on the following two points: (1) The McMahon Line was an "illegal line", and (2) Until recently the area down to the plains of Assam was under Chinese jurisdiction. In regard to the first point, Chou insisted that the "McMahon Line was never intended to mark the Sino-Indian border. Consequently, China's failure in 1914 and later to object to it proved only that the Chinese Government was completely unaware of the existence of the so-called McMahon Line".²⁵ Nehru replied on September 10, 1959 in a speech in Rajya Sabha that since China and Burma had "agreed to recognize the McMahon Line in so far as the Burmese frontier was concerned and the China-India frontier was concerned. That would take care of the whole of the McMahon Line."²⁶

As to the second point, it was true that from about the middle of the last century, some of the tribes living in the NEFA area began to enter into contact with India. Therefore, Nehru pointed out that the McMahon Line only "formalized the neutral, traditional, ethnic and administrative boundary in the area."²⁷ He continued to defend

²⁵ Ibid., p. 6.

²⁶ Nehru, op cit., p. 351.

²⁷ Documents on the Boundary Question. op cit., p. 91.

the McMahon Line as "correctly represents the customary boundary in this area. The water-parting formed by the crest of the Himalayas is the natural frontier which was accepted for centuries as the boundary by the peoples on both sides."²⁸

Military Conflict

On the eve of the undeclared border war, China and India scolded each other with documented sources. On August 17, 1959, Peking asserted that twenty-two new Indian military strong points had been set up since that spring.²⁹ On September 15, the Government of India claimed that there were about 200 Chinese intruders who had infiltrated into NEFA.³⁰ On the night of September 20, 1962, a serious military clash took place in Chedong, a place at the north-western corner of NEFA. China claimed that a Chinese officer was killed and another Chinese frontier guard wounded. India blamed China for provoking this clash and reported that three Indian soldiers were wounded.³¹ A new "attack" at the Cheo Jao Bridge was claimed by Peking on September 29.³²

28 Ibid., p. 89.

29 Peking Review, No. 33. August 17, 1962. p. 5.

30 Bhargava, op cit., p. 88.

31 Ibid., p. 90.

32 People's Daily. Peking, September 30, 1959. (in Chinese).

From then on, there was a series of light fighting along the NEFA frontier. Ultimately on October 19, China started a "counter-attack" in Chedong area. In his book, The Battle of NEFA, Mr. G. S. Bhargava (Indian) claimed that during that first massive attack, "the enemy was two battalions strong - 2000 men - whereas the defenders were only 600."³³ According to the New China News Agency reports, a "Large scale attack was waged by Indian troops into Sinkiang on the same day."³⁴ So a full-scale military conflict was engaged in both West and East Sectors.

The military victories helped the Chinese soldiers advance. Just a month after the undeclared war began, the Chinese army was down toward the Assamese towns of Tezpur and Sadiya. Thus, it was safe to say that the Indian soldiers were completely defeated in NEFA. As to Ladakh, the situation was the same. The Chinese troops had moved all the way to the limits of the Chinese boundary claims. This meant that China occupied nearly 14,000 square miles of territory in Ladakh.

Besides military campaigns, China then launched a peaceful offensive campaign. On November 21, 1962, Peking offered India a cease-fire.³⁵ The offer was based on the

³³ Bhargava, op. cit., p. 96.

³⁴ People's Daily. October 22, 1962.

³⁵ P.H.M. Jones, "Passes and Impasses; A Study of Sino-Indian Border disputes." Far Eastern Economic Review. XXXIX, No. 9. (February, 1963), p. 456.

grounds of Chinese Communist strategy of "fight-talk-fight", largely of a political nature with only little military consideration. While Nehru's prestige had been severely shaken, his illusion of peaceful co-existence with China shattered, China boasted her military power. The "cease-fire" offer once again showed that China was "reasonable". China had now proved that she could take the areas to which she laid claim by force if she chose to do so. Furthermore, the Chinese military victory would help China to extend her influence in the Himalayas. Then the Chinese troops slowly withdrew from NEFA and Ladakh. But this did not mean that the Sino-Indian border dispute was settled. It was clear that the trouble would recur some day. Only no one could tell when there would be another military conflict.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

At the end of 1962, six nonaligned nations (Burma, Ceylon, Cambodia, Ghana, Indonesia, and the United Arab Republic) presented the Colombo Proposal for ending the Sino-Indian boundary military conflict. In this proposal, the six nations suggested that: (1) In Ladakh, China should, as she offered, withdraw her forces 20 kilometers behind what she alleged to be the line of November 1959, while Indian forces might move right up to this line, (2) In the NEFA area, both sides might move troops right up to the McMahon Line, except in the Chedong and Longju areas, where there was a difference of opinion about the border line, (3) As for the central sector, the proposal suggested that its problems would "be solved by peaceful means without resorting to force".¹

In January 1963, both China and India accepted the Colombo Proposal in principle, but it soon became apparent that each country had interpreted the proposal differently. Therefore, the bitterness still remained in the Sino-Indian

¹ "China's Rebuff to Colombo Powers," India's Fight for Territorial Integrity. Publication Division, The Government of India, New Delhi. 1963. p. 27.

boundary problem. From then on, there was no progress in solving the border dispute. After all, the Sino-Indian boundary question has existed for nearly half a century, and there are no urgent reasons for settling all pending issues overnight.

The McMahon Line and the Three Sectors

Though it is nearly impossible for a private person to judge the disputed areas, the author believes that it is his duty to extend this survey to a definite conclusion. In working toward this goal, it was necessary to briefly reconsider the disputed areas.

Since the Simla Conference of 1914 proposed the McMahon Line, the Sino-Indian border question has become a tenacious knot between the two countries. The documents from both the National Government of China and the Chinese Communist regime proved that China had never recognized the McMahon Line. China laid its claim on the grounds that she had never ratified the Simla Convention of 1914. By this, China stressed that the Simla Convention, which was signed by the delegates of Tibet and Britain, was merely a draft. Furthermore, the McMahon Line never was marked on the ground or definitely defined. In his book, The China-India Border, Mr. Alastair Lamb stated that "the McMahon Line is, on the whole, quite a fair and reasonable boundary

between China and India along the Assam Himalaya."²

But the fact was, no matter whether the McMahon Line was fair or not, it was still illegal. The debate should focus on the McMahon Line's legal case. Anything beyond this should not be brought out. Furthermore, according to the law of nations, the ratification was an essential element to legalize an international treaty. Therefore, it was correct to say that the McMahon Line should neither have existed nor be the draft for future Sino-Indian boundary settlement.

In considering those disputed areas, it was thought best to have a brief review for each sector. The most controversial area was the Eastern Sector. Though the Government of Britain established the NEFA, however, the people living here were in far closer contact with Tibet than India. And the region was of some interest to the Tibetan authorities. On the other hand, India considered this area as its utmost frontier. India could not maintain its "watershed" policy without having NEFA. It left no doubt that India would try to keep and occupy this area. Thus, it became clear that NEFA would become a place sought by both China and India in the future boundary conference.

² Alastair Lamb, China-India Border. (New York, Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 169.

The best solution to this problem would be a compromise. After a future joint survey and careful study, China and India should demarcate a boundary between them. It would mean that India would cede a portion of NEFA to China.

The Central Sector did not bring very much trouble in the 1960's. But one thing similar to the East Sector was the debate over the "watershed". The disputes of this area were basically concerned with a conflict between the "watershed" alignment and the fact of history and occupation. Though the debate had existed between China and India, this sector remained quiet during the military conflict of 1962. The major disputed places of this area were Spiti, Nilang-Jadhang, Bara Hoti, and Sancha Malla. It might be fair to both sides if China took over those Tibetan inhabited areas and the rest of the area was left to India.

In the Northwestern Sector, though China has claimed nearly 33,000 square kilometers, only about half the size of what she had claimed should adhere to China. It was true that the Chinese sovereignty already was over a large part called Aksai Chi. The place has been proved as a part of China by the construction of the Tibet-Sinkiang highway. Furthermore, the names of some areas which the Chinese claimed such as Aksai Chi and Karakash are of Uighur origin.³ China laid her claims on the grounds that the Government of China already effectively controlled Aksai Chi during the

³ Uighur; native born of Sinkiang people.

last two centuries.

In September 1958, Chinese border guards encountered fifteen Indian soldiers in this area but when those admitted that they were trespassing to do reconnaissance work, they were escorted back over what the Chinese considered the border.⁴ There was no serious debate follow-up by India and nobody in China seemed to know just where India got the border line shown today on Indian maps. Therefore, it might be correct to say that China would keep Aksai Chi. In other words, the future settlement should be based on the status quo boundary line.

Prospect

With no settlement in sight, China and India seem to stay on the stage of dispute which might lead to unforeseen and unpredictable consequences. This rapid deterioration of Sino-Indian relations, in sharp contrast to the previous romantic phase, has been a puzzle to most people of the free world. Why did China abandon her former policy of apparent friendship with India and adopt one of open hostility?

⁴ Anna L. Strong, "The China-India Border", New World Review. XXVII, No. 10, (November, 1959), p. 49.

Of the many answers, as the author mentioned in the previous chapters, one possibility is the competition between China and India over Tibet. Another is the situation in China in the 1960's. The aggressive policy toward India might be prompted by the need to divert the attention of the Chinese people from the failure of the Communists on the home front. During these years the Government of Chinese Communists was facing the failure of the "Great Leap Forward Movement". A series of national disasters which occurred brought the country almost to the edge of famine. Mao Tse-tung then had no other choice but to divert the attention of the people by pursuing a policy of adventure abroad.

But perhaps the most plausible explanation of Chinese behavior was that Peking was pursuing the policy of restoring China's old glory. To attain this goal, in the first place, China has to extend Peking hegemony over all those regions and peoples which once belonged to the Chinese empire. Secondly, China was trying to erase from memory all humiliations and defeats of the past. The third method was to give the people a new sense of pride. Above all, the Peking regime was tempted to reshape the map of the world in the Communist pattern. Militant nationalism and the revolutionary movement of Communists were the two essential elements of the foundation of Mao's philosophy.

Apart from the above survey, it was necessary to cast attention on the prospect of the Sino-Indian border dispute. The author believes that though the McMahon Line was illegal, Chinese Communists should not have waged the military action in 1962. These were two distinct and separate things. And it was wrong to say that anyone who criticized the Chinese military action must be considered a believer of the McMahon Line.

The fact is that the bitterness between China and India has not diminished and still exists. Therefore, no one can predict the future of Sino-Indian relations. But it might be right to say that it remains possible that the Chinese would attack again in the future. Although China proclaimed herself the leader of Afro-Asian bloc, the military action of 1962 was not too well received by the nations of this bloc. This left no doubt that the so-called nonalignment nations could not work together solidly as they did before the year of 1962. And it is wrong to say that the Sino-Indian military conflict was the only cause for weakening this bloc. However, the truth is that China and India, the two essential pillars of the bloc, have gotten into a hostile relationship since then.

The military conflict of 1962 not only affected the nonalignment nations but also endangered world peace. The fact was that the Himalayan disputes have made very clear

that a local war may become general. India has appealed to Britain and the United States for arms.⁵ It is impossible to guess whether Britain and the United States would actually fight against China, but it is certainly possible that this might occur. If it did, it is probable that China would compose its disagreements with Russia. In this case, the war would become a world-scale one.

Another result from the military conflict of 1962 was that the concerned governments were tempted to whip up warlike feelings among their people. This specially happened in India over the border issue. The New Delhi Government misled the people by covering the fact that the Chinese had a legal case which was as strong as the Indian case. And, thus, made clear that to examine China's legal case was what was needed for negotiation or arbitration.

To conclude this paper, the author, therefore, believes that a peaceful settlement could solve the Sino-Indian boundary question. With this, it would not only ease the tension between China and India but also give a good pattern for solving the India-Pakistan Kashmir boundary issue.

⁵ "Text of Broadcast by Nehru on November 14", Prime Minister on Chinese Aggression. (New Delhi, Publication Division, the Government of India, 1963). p. 93.

To fulfill the suggested peaceful settlement, it is believed that the best solution is to appoint a field survey party preferably made up of neutral representatives, under a neutral chairman, acceptable to both the parties, and allow them to conduct a thorough survey of the entire border of the disputed areas. This neutral body should analyse the historical background and study the ancient treaties. They should be allowed to make whatever inquiries they consider necessary, including personnel interrogation of elderly inhabitants. Such a commission should bear in mind the recent political happenings in both the countries. Then only a workable formula could be evolved, and a peaceful settlement of the burning question worked out. However, both the countries have agreed to stop sending further patrols in this disputed area, in order to avoid further clashes. Both the countries have also agreed to reach a peaceful settlement of the problem, with the help of negotiations and conferences.

The measures outlined above are, in part, difficult of acceptance and are sure to meet with strong opposition. Perhaps further experience of crisis may make them acceptable, but perhaps not. A choice is before the concerned peoples and their governments. No matter what way will be adopted, it is true that the people of the world have learned

a lesson from the crisis of the Himalayas in the last decade. This should be borne in mind and never forgotten.

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APPENDICES


THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES COLLECTS AND PRESERVES
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
AND OF THE STATES AND OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

APPENDIX A

APPENDIX B


APPENDIX C

MAP SHOWING INDIA'S MILITARY STRONG-POINTS IT SET UP ON THE NORTH OF TRADITIONAL BOUNDARY IN THE PERIOD BETWEEN NOV.7, 1959 AND OCT. 20, 1962




SOURCE: The Sino-Indian Boundary Question, Peking Foreign Language Press, 1962


MAP SHOWING THE AREAS CLAIMED BY INDIA



MAP SHOWING THE TRADITIONAL CUSTOMARY
BOUNDARY LINE BETWEEN CHINA AND INDIA



SINO-BURMESE BOUNDARY SETTLEMENT



C—D: McMahon Line

D—E: Irrawaddy-Salween Watershed

F—G: 1941 Line

Shaded areas indicate territory transferred under terms of Boundary Treaty

Cross-hatched areas shown as Chinese territory in maps used by both Nationalist and Communist governments

1960

SOURCE: Pacific Affairs, XIII, NO. 2, 1961

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THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER CONTROVERSY

by

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AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S THESIS

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The areas which are involved in the Sino-Indian border dispute stretch from the Karakoram Pass in the extreme north part of Kashmir to the middle of the Assam Himalayas. This high level ground territory is mountainous, very sparsely inhabited, and of no importance to either party except for military reasons. The major counterparts in this boundary problem are China and India. However, Tibet also has played an important role in this border issue. Certain of the neighboring states such as Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim are also involved in the China-India border dispute.

This problem has become increasingly complicated during the last fifty years for various reasons. Therefore, it is necessary to explore not only the review of the geography and the peoples in this area, but also to examine the historical background of this area.

The materials the author found in the Kansas State University and the University of Kansas libraries have shown that both China and India have issued a pile of maps and abundant documents allocating the areas in question to the one claiming them. Where there is such a conflict between the statements of the two sides, the author believes that these maps and documents should not serve as a blueprint to settle the dispute. These are some of the factors making it almost impossible for a private person to reach a definite conclusion about the territorial questions involved.

However, in this paper, the author bases his opinions on the following facts. In the first place, since China never ratified the treaty formulated by the Simla Convention of 1914, the McMahon Line should not be uncritically accepted for the settlement of the border issue.

Secondly, Communist China was the invader of India in the military boundary conflict late in 1962. From the materials at hand about the Indian and Chinese dispute, the author believes that the reason that the Chinese Red armies were sent to Ladakh and NEFA was a combination of both geographic and political facts. This complicated the already confusing situation.

Thirdly, the evidence left little doubt that a regional war could lead to a full scale nuclear war. Therefore, the best way to settle the frontier problem is by using peaceful means. The counterparts should send their most able people to a conference table to examine every phase of this situation. The author strongly believes that modern nationalism, especially in developing nations, is the chief source of friction among nations.

To conclude this paper, the author believes that a conference composed of the most able people from each of the interested countries should be held to determine just where the line of demarcation should be. Only with a reasonable permanent settlement of this boundary problem among the interested nations can peace be maintained in this disputed area.