

**IN SEARCH OF NEW IDENTITIES: THE DOD AND CIA FROM THE END OF  
THE COLD WAR THROUGH THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR**

**By**

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**AN ABSTRACT OF A DISSERTATION**

**Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree**

**DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY**

**Department of Security Studies  
College of Arts and Sciences**

**KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY  
Manhattan, Kansas**

**2016**

## ABSTRACT

Since September 11, 2001, the CIA and DoD have operated together in Afghanistan, Iraq, and during counterterrorism operations. Although the Global War on Terrorism gave the CIA and DoD a common purpose, it was actions taken in the late eighties and early nineties that set the foundation for their current relationship. Driven by the post-Cold War environment and lessons learned during military operations, policymakers made intelligence support to the military the Intelligence Community's top priority. In response to this demand, the CIA/DoD instituted policy and organizational changes that altered the CIA/DoD relationship. While debates over the future of the Intelligence Community were occurring on Capitol Hill, the CIA and DoD were expanding their relationship in peacekeeping and nation-building operations in Somalia and the Balkans.

By the late 1990's, some policymakers and national security professionals became concerned that intelligence support to military operations had gone too far, weakening the long-term analysis required for strategy and policy development. Despite these concerns, no major changes to either national intelligence organizations or its priorities were implemented. These concerns were forgotten after 9/11, as the United States fought two wars and policymakers increasingly focused on tactical and operational actions. As policymakers became fixated with terrorism and the United States fought in Iraq and Afghanistan, the CIA focused a significant amount of its resources towards global counterterrorism efforts and in support of military operations.

The CIA/DoD operational relationship has led to successes such as the raid that killed Osama Bin Laden, but CIA's counterterrorism and military support requirements

have placed a significant burden on the organization. As the United States' only independent intelligence organization, the CIA was conceived to separate the collection of intelligence from the institutions that develop and execute policy. The CIA's increased focus on support to military and counterterrorism operations weakens this separation, reduces its focus on strategic issues, and risks subordination to the DoD. The CIA and DoD are the ones immediately affected by this evolving relationship, but it is policymaker preference for military force and the militarization of foreign policy that has led both organizations down this path.

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## **Acknowledgments**

I want to thank my wife Kristen and our children (Taylor, Tanner, Tatum, and Tyler). I could not have completed my dissertation without their love and encouragement over the last eight years. I cannot thank them enough for their continued support and patience. Thanks to my parents (Don and Pat) and brother (Chris) for years of support, love, and encouragement. I also want to thank Chris for reviewing my work and providing feedback.

The research for my dissertation involved numerous individuals, who without their support I would not have been able to complete it. Thanks to Dr. David Stone who served as my advisor through eight years in the KSU Security Studies program. His mentorship, friendship and patience is greatly appreciated. Thanks to Dr. Michael Krysko, who served as a committee member throughout my time in the program and then my co-major advisor during my dissertation year, for his mentorship, friendship and advice. Thanks to my other committee members, Dr. Dale Herspring and Mr. David Edger for their mentorship, friendship and advice throughout my time in the program. Thanks to Dr. Cassou for serving as the outside chairperson on my committee. Thanks to Dr. Long, Dr. Polson, Shelly Reves-Klinker, Angie Pfizenmaier and others at KSU who helped me during the last year. Thanks to all the KSU students and professors who challenged and taught me throughout my time in the program. Thanks to the United States Army and Functional Area 59 (Strategist) career field for funding my education and giving me a year off to research and write my dissertation. I particularly want to thank COL David McHenry, Andrew Ajamian, Andrew D'Amico, Jon Parvin, Amy Elsey, and Robert MacMullen for all their efforts.

Thanks to all the leaders and experts that provided their insight into the CIA/DoD relationship (a complete listing of these individuals is included in the bibliography). I appreciate them generously giving of their time for me to better understand this important and interesting topic. Thanks for all the archivists who supported my research, particularly Dr. Gerth and others at the University of Oklahoma's Carl Albert Center's Congressional Archives that funded my travel to Norman, Oklahoma. Thanks to those who supported my earlier research at the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), where I started this research back in 2012. These include Beth Bochtler, Dr. Butler-Smith, Col. David Aitchison, Dr. William Knarr, Robert Nalepa, MG (R) Barrett, and Elizabeth Hill.

## Preface

The research for this project began in 2012 when I was a student at the U.S. Army's School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS). One of the requirements for SAMS is to write a monograph focused on an operational issue. As a military officer and former CIA officer, I decided to use the opportunity to explore the CIA/DoD's shared history since the 1947 National Security Act. This motivation stemmed from an affinity for both organizations, a curiosity regarding CIA/DoD interactions, and wonderment about how each developed their distinct cultures despite shared lineage.

My research efforts began with the 1947 National Security Act, but the post-Desert Storm/Cold War period quickly surfaced as a key turning point in the relationship. The CIA and DoD were both established at the beginning of the Cold War and the cultures of each were shaped by the nearly fifty-year struggle. The collapse of the Soviet Union brought elation but also uncertainty to the CIA and DoD. The two organizations were no longer chasing or preparing to fight Soviets, but trying to understand a new world while undergoing significant budget and personnel reductions. The CIA/DoD coordinated sporadically throughout the Cold War, but it was in the uncertain 1990s that support to military operations became the priority mission for the CIA and national intelligence. Although subsequent conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and worldwide counterterrorism operations provided a common purpose and helped develop the DoD/CIA partnership, it was policy actions and organizational changes in the 1990s that set the foundation.

My first paper, *Partners or Competitors?: The Evolution of the DoD/CIA Relationship since Desert Storm and its Prospects for the Future*, focused on how increased interaction in education, training and operations resulted in tactical and operational successes. This paper builds upon the earlier research, while delving deeper into how choices made during the late 1980s, 1990s and into the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century shaped the current CIA/DoD relationship. Although I still believe the evolution of the CIA/DoD relationship provides positive benefits, the further I explore the relationship the more I recognize trade-offs. The CIA was created in 1947 to serve as an independent intelligence organization to inform policy and strategy without being unduly influenced by organizations responsible for policy implementation. Beginning in the 1990s and hastened after 9/11, the demand for CIA support to military operations and its own counterterrorism operations started to erode this separation.

After 9/11, the United States became hyper-focused on ridding the world of a terrorist threat, while issues such as a rising China or a reemerging Russia dropped in priority. The focus on identifying and targeting terrorist threats took priority over trying to understand the intentions of world leaders or informing policy and strategy development. As retired Admiral William Studeman remarked during an interview, the United States dropped fundamental intelligence coverage while it focused on "Lucy and the football." While this shift towards counterterrorism and support to military

operations resulted in operational successes such as the killing of Bin Laden and Abu Musab al Zarqawi, it has also resulted in the neglect of longer-term strategic issues.

The more I considered the evolution of the CIA/DoD relationship following Desert Storm, the more I saw linkages and parallels to the broader militarization of U.S. foreign policy that various authors and national security professionals have identified. The military started to emerge as the United States' preferred policy tool in the 1990s and then solidified that position following 9/11. The embrace of military power to transform Iraq and Afghanistan, coupled with the empowerment of regional combatant commanders to "shape" their environment has made the military the dominant player in foreign policy. And although Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, and Libya have shown the limits and unpredictability of using military force, there are still loud voices arguing that military power is the solution. This imbalance has created an environment where the DoD leads and all others support. In this regard, the evolution of the CIA/DoD relationship is both a cause and a symptom of the militarization of foreign policy. While policymakers can recognize the counterterrorism benefits this partnership provides, they should also appreciate the cost the nation assumes by operationalizing its only independent intelligence organization. I hope this paper helps further that understanding.

The views in this paper are entirely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy or position of the United States Government, the Department of Defense, or the Central Intelligence Agency.

## **Chapter One: Introduction**

### **Overview**

During an interview on May 3, 2011, then Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (DCIA) Leon Panetta told interviewer Jim Lehrer that he was the overall commander for the Abbottabad Raid that killed Osama Bin Laden.<sup>1</sup> While some uniformed military officers disagreed with DCIA Panetta's assertion, Admiral William McRaven, the Joint Special Operations Commander (JSOC) who was the commander on the ground had no issue with DCIA Panetta's role description.<sup>2</sup> In Admiral McRaven's opinion, arguments over who was within the chain of command were pedantic and not worthy of debate. Admiral McRaven credited the Department of Defense (DoD)/Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) collaboration for the success of Operation Neptune Spear and did not believe it useful to dwell on debates about command authority. CIA/DoD collaboration and not some outdated parochial attitude was what brought about the demise of bin Laden. This CIA/DoD "interagency unified command" approach to kill the United States' most wanted man signified the transformation of a CIA/DoD partnership from one of sporadic cooperation to regular integrated collaboration.

The CIA/DoD relationship expands well beyond special missions and has come to include integration during training, exercise, and operations. In the early nineties there

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<sup>1</sup> CIA Director Leon Panetta Interview Jim Lehrer, PBS News hour, 3 May 2011 located at [http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/terrorism/jan-june11/panetta\\_05-03.html](http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/terrorism/jan-june11/panetta_05-03.html) (accessed on 18 September 2013).

<sup>2</sup> McRaven, William, Admiral (R). Former Commander Special Operations Command and former Commander Joint Special Operations Command. Telephone Interview by author 5 June 2015.

were only a handful of military liaison officers working with the CIA; today there are hundreds of uniformed personnel (active, guard, and reserve) serving in the building. In addition, the agency has representatives at dozens of military commands and professional military schools.<sup>3</sup> There is ongoing interaction between the CIA and DoD at multiple levels. CIA's Special Activities deals directly with the theater special operations commands and CIA's CTC deals directly with SOCOM. In addition, CIA's geographic division chiefs interact with SOF personnel in their region and coordination occurs between SOF and other CIA centers such as the Counternarotics Center. The Numerous interactions between the CIA and DoD build redundancy in the relationship, which protects against organizational stove piping and enables unity of effort.<sup>4</sup>

While some of these relationships developed out of necessity during operations, the increased interaction during training has cultivated and institutionalized the partnership. Beyond serving as a gateway into the CIA, the CIA's Associate Director of Military Affairs (ADMA), whose origin dates back to the mid-1990s, has instituted various programs focused on increasing "support, information, and deconflicting issues between DoD/CIA", by cultivating non-parochial leaders who are familiar with both organizations and aware of the value each brings.<sup>5</sup> For example, ADMA hosts numerous

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<sup>3</sup> Wise, Doug. Deputy Director Defense Intelligence Agency. Interview by author, Washington D.C. area, 28 August 2012 and 3 September 2105; Cichowski, Kurt A, Lieutenant General. Associate Director for Military Affairs, interview by author, Langley, VA, 29 August 2012.

<sup>4</sup> Reid, Garry. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict, telephone interview by author, 19 September 2012; Oakley, David. "Partners or Competitors: The Evolution of the Department of Defense/Central Intelligence Agency Relationship Since Desert Storm and its Prospects for the Future." [http://jsou.socom.mil/JSOU%20Publications/JSOU14-2\\_Oakley\\_PartnersorCompetitors\\_27Feb.pdf](http://jsou.socom.mil/JSOU%20Publications/JSOU14-2_Oakley_PartnersorCompetitors_27Feb.pdf) (accessed 14 July 2016).

<sup>5</sup> <https://www.cia.gov/offices-of-cia/military-affairs/history.html> for description of the ADMA mission.

military professionals during visits to CIA headquarters to build a greater familiarization of the CIA's mission. Recognizing the increased interaction between SOF and the CIA in Iraq and Afghanistan, ADMA started bringing every newly minted Special Forces detachment (18A) captain to CIA headquarters to brief them on the CIA's mission and introduce them to CIA personnel.<sup>6</sup> ADMA also works to educate the CIA workforce on the military mission and culture, providing pre-deployment briefs to CIA officers and serving as an accessible resource to learn about the military or obtain contact information for military units.

Cross-pollination during training has also strengthened the relationship. In 2012, military students made up more than twenty-five percent of the class at the CIA's renowned case officer training location, known colloquially as "The Farm." Beyond the networking opportunities joint training creates, the bond forged through shared experiences shapes the mind-set of younger officers and results in organizational integration becoming a way of life. A senior CIA officer previously responsible for overseeing training throughout the organization stated in an interview that the showcasing of military during training, presence of military colleagues, and operational experiences in war zones are contributing to a more "enlightened" institution and CIA officer when it comes to working with the military.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Alyssa G. Military liaisons to CIA's Office of the Associate Director of Military Affairs, interview by author, Langley, VA, 28 August 2012.

<sup>7</sup> Wise, Doug. Deputy Director Defense Intelligence Agency. Interview by author, Washington D.C. area, 28 August 2012 and 3 September 2015; Oakley, David. "Partners or Competitors.;" Historians within the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence stated that interviews with CIA personnel highlight significant improvement in CIA's relationship with other government organizations since 9/11. These improved partnerships have resulted in less parochialism and increased mission success. Most important, the officers recognize the value of these partnerships and are now more receptive to engaging their interagency colleagues instead of operating alone.

Although the CIA and the DoD both originated with the 1947 National Security Act, an act that was meant to streamline national security affairs, the two organizations spent most of the first fifty years working separately towards the United States' national security objectives. During the Cold War, these two organizations did work alongside each other in places such as Vietnam and Latin America, and had established mutual support agreements; but these previous interactions were not as consistent or integrated as the post-9/11 operations. When the broader CIA and DoD did interact, it was usually contingent and in response to a significant need.<sup>8</sup> Although the post-9/11 collaboration involved niche and temporary elements, this paper argues the reoccurring integration of the CIA and DoD across all facets of the organizations, particularly, the CIA's increased focus on providing intelligence support to military operations and for force protection is what sets it apart from these previous collaborative efforts.

Various contemporary accounts to include Mike Morrell's, *The Great War of our Time*, Jeremy Scahill's, *Dirty Wars*, Hank Crumpton's, *The Art of Intelligence*, Eric Blehm's, *The Only Thing Worth Dying For*, and Douglas Laux's, *Left of Boom*, describe the operational relationship, often depicting a post-9/11 CIA focused on supporting the military's operational efforts and force protection requirements. Some national security professionals argue this increased collaboration is a direct result of the counterterrorism

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<sup>8</sup> Ahearn Jr., Thomas. L, *Vietnam Declassified: The CIA and Counterinsurgency* (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2010). During Vietnam, elements of the military and the CIA did work together. For example, Air Force Colonel Edward Lansdale ran one the CIA's "Saigon Military Mission" in Vietnam, but the CIA-military interaction was not common and usually limited to military officers that were working for the CIA on specific programs. These paramilitary type programs were much different from the CIA support to military operations that occurred after Desert Storm.

fight and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.<sup>9</sup> Their view is the CIA and DoD developed a collaborative partnership in the aftermath of 9/11 in order to wage the Global War on Terrorism. Although this viewpoint is accurate, it is incomplete because it overlooks or underestimates previous actions that set conditions for the partnership to grow.

The Global War on Terrorism gave the CIA and DoD a common purpose, while providing an arena for iterative interaction that allowed the partnership to blossom, but the seed from which the partnership grew, was laid in the late eighties and early nineties as the United States transitioned from the Cold War into an uncertain global environment. Beginning in the 1980s and continuing into the 1990s, policymakers and national security leaders, motivated by previous operational failures, started to focus on transforming the defense and intelligence communities for the post-Cold War world. Influenced by lessons learned during operations such as Urgent Fury, Just Cause and Desert Storm, a major component of the transformation discussion focused on improving intelligence support to military operations. The call to improve intelligence support to military operations resulted in policy and organizational changes that altered the CIA/DoD relationship. These changes, coupled with internal changes within the DoD and CIA that were motivated by the same operational failures, set the foundation for the post 9/11 partnership growth.

These organizational and policy changes were enabled by a shifting global order

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<sup>9</sup> Kojm, Chris. Former Chairman of the National Intelligence Council. Telephone interview by author, 14 October 2015; Petraeus, David General (R). Former Director of Central Intelligence Agency and former Commander of United States Central Command. Interview by author, Washington D.C., 23 October 2015.



and technological developments that made national intelligence support to military operations both possible and necessary. The pending collapse of the communist bloc meant the United States Intelligence Community could decrease its focus on the Soviet Union and shift its gaze elsewhere. The precision-strike capability and speed of the battlefield displayed during Desert Storm increased the intelligence required for understanding, targeting, and information operations, while new computing and information technologies made it possible for soldiers on the front line to receive and disseminate national intelligence products. The “New World Order” and an accompanying regionally aligned national security strategy that was concerned with localized conflicts and military operations other than war (MOOTW) also encouraged a shift towards increased intelligence support to military operations.<sup>10</sup>

Although the CIA/DoD relationship started to improve during this period, it was not without its costs. The increased focus on intelligence support to military operations, while undergoing significant budget reductions, forced the CIA and the rest of the Intelligence Community to assume risk by shifting resources away from global coverage and long-term analysis. By the late 1990s, congressional committees and independent task forces became concerned that too much focus was being placed on intelligence support to military operations and not enough on intelligence support to strategy and policy development. As this concern started to gain momentum, the 9/11 attacks occurred, forcing the CIA to focus even more attention on immediate operations and

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<sup>10</sup> Bush, George Herbert Walker. *National Security Strategy of the United States.*” Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, August 1991.

away from global coverage and long-term analysis.<sup>11</sup>

Following 9/11, and with Bush's declaration of a Global War on Terrorism, DoD found itself not only at war in Iraq and Afghanistan, but taking a more proactive role throughout the globe. Empowered combatant commanders, embracing the concepts "shaping the environment" and "engagement" that originated in the 1990s, started devising security cooperation plans focused on influencing their areas of operation (AOR).<sup>12</sup> Organized by geographic areas, enjoying large staffs and budgets, and access to military forces and intelligence capabilities, the geographic combatant commanders' influence over foreign policy steadily increased. Along with this increased role in foreign policy came an ongoing need for greater intelligence support to the military outside traditional operations. This coupled with the intelligence requirements needed to support wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, found the Intelligence Community focused largely on supporting tactical operations and away from long-term analysis.

Three presidents, George H.W. Bush, William J. Clinton, and George W. Bush, led the transition from the post-Cold War period to the Post-9/11 period, each putting their imprint on how the CIA/DoD relationship evolved during this time. The George H.W. Bush administration was at the helm when the coalition won the Gulf War and the Soviet Union dissolved. Embracing a "peace dividend," the administration reduced national security spending and sought transformation of the United States' national

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<sup>11</sup> Burgess, Ronald L, Lieutenant General (R). Former Director Defense Intelligence Agency. Telephone interview by author, 17 September 2015.

<sup>12</sup> *JP 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* defines Area of Operations (AOR) as "An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and maritime forces that should be large enough to accomplish their missions and protect their forces.

security structures.<sup>13</sup> Influenced by criticism of intelligence support to military operations during Desert Storm and the changing global landscape, the administration ordered “policy departments and agencies” to identify intelligence needs for the next thirteen years.<sup>14</sup> Armed with this knowledge, Bush issued National Security Directive (NSD)-67; the “most dramatic reconfiguration of the Intelligence Community in decades,” a major component of which was improving CIA support to military operations.<sup>15</sup> Despite victory in Desert Storm and the Cold War, the George H.W. Bush administration could not secure a second term when a stagnant economy made international relations a secondary concern to domestic and economic issues.

Bill Clinton, the former Arkansas governor who campaigned on strengthening the economy, replaced George H.W. Bush in 1993. Two months into his administration, President Clinton directed a National Performance Review (NPR) “to bring about greater efficiency and lower cost of government.”<sup>16</sup> The NPR committee told the Intelligence Community it had to “improve support to ground troops during combat operations,” while undergoing significant budget reductions. In 1995, Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-35, making support to military operations the Intelligence

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<sup>13</sup> Nelson, Michael and Barbara A. Perry, *41: Inside the Presidency of George H.W. Bush*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), 20. Nelson and Perry’s book cites the first mention of a “peace dividend” was in a June 8, 1989 article by William Safire in the New York Times titled, “Is Peace Bullish?”.

<sup>14</sup> Bush, George H.W.. *National Security Review 29: National Security Review of Intelligence*. Washington, D.C: The White House, 15 November 1991.

<sup>15</sup> Bush, George H.W. *National Security Directive 67: Intelligence Capabilities: 1992-2005*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 30 March 1992.

<sup>16</sup> Clinton William J. "Remarks Announcing the National Performance Review," March 3, 1993. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46291> (accessed 29 January 2016).

Community's top priority.<sup>17</sup> This priority was tested in Somalia and the Balkans, where an air campaign and small-scale humanitarian and peacekeeping operations provided a venue for the evolving CIA/DoD relationship.

The improve intelligence support to military operations theme continued into 1996 when the Aspin-Brown Commission and the Intelligence Community in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century (IC21) study reviewed intelligence requirements in the post-Cold War world.<sup>18</sup> Although many civilian and military leaders testified that support to military operations deserved primacy, private organizations conducting their own reviews raised concerns with the dominance of military requirements over strategic intelligence needs.<sup>19</sup> Despite these concerns, support to military operations remained the Intelligence Community's top priority into the George W. Bush administration. The lack of intelligence support to strategic planning led former Congressman Lee Hamilton to argue, "a lot of things are going to be neglected while you're providing military intelligence. Military Intelligence is important, but it is not the whole world."<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Clinton, William Jefferson. *Presidential Decision Directive 35, "Intelligence Requirements."* Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2 March 1995.

<sup>18</sup> Johnson, Loch, *The Threat on the Horizon: An Inside Account of America's Search for Security after the Cold War*, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011), 65, 125 and 237. Johnson states that Anthony Lake, Bill Studeman, and John Deutch all discussed the importance of intelligence support to military operations. Lake discussed how PDD-35 "made support to military operations" the top priority "wherever U.S. forces are deployed." Studeman called "support to military operations" the "defining mission" for the Intelligence Community. Deutch was the most assertive, saying there was "not enough" support to military operations, despite acknowledging that support to military operations had "about 90% of the intelligence budget."

<sup>19</sup> Council on Foreign Relations. "Making Intelligence Smarter." <http://www.cfr.org/intelligence/making-intelligence-smarter/p127> (accessed 24 February 2016).; Hedley, John Hollister. *Checklist for the Future of Intelligence*. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University's Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 1995.

<sup>20</sup> Hamilton, Lee. "Testimony of the Honorable Before the Senate Select Committee, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Joint Inquiry into events surrounding September 11." 3

Eight years after George H.W. Bush lost his bid for a second term, his son, George W. Bush, won a controversial election against Al Gore, Clinton's vice-president. Shortly after entering the White House, George W. Bush issued National Security Decision Directive (NSDD)-5, becoming the third president seeking to transform the Intelligence Community for the post-Cold War world. Part of Bush's campaign platform criticized the Clinton administration's use of military forces for operations other than war (OOTW) and promised to focus military capabilities on strategic issues such as an emerging China. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the administration abandoned its promises and undertook a global campaign against Al Qaeda and the tactic it employed. The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), evolved into the United States waging counterinsurgency campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq that greatly surpassed any Clinton administration OOTW effort. These wars and global counterterrorism operations provided CIA and DoD the common purpose that was lacking during small scale OOTW in the 1990s. Although President George W. Bush's post-9/11 counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations provided the venue for CIA/DoD partnership growth, it was actions taken during all three administrations that set the foundation.

This research is important for its historical perspective and for an appreciation of future policy implications of this partnership. From a historical perspective, there is a lack of research that highlights how the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War affected the Intelligence Community broadly and the CIA/DoD partnership particularly. The CIA and the DoD were both established at the beginning of the Cold

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October 2002. [http://fas.org/irp/congress/2002\\_hr/100302hamilton.html](http://fas.org/irp/congress/2002_hr/100302hamilton.html) (accessed 7 July 2016); Johnson, 237-238.

War and their institutional identities were shaped by the nearly half-century struggle with the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War and the corresponding “peace dividend” raised questions about the future of these two institutions, while operational experiences during this same period highlighted tension in the partnership. This paper asks why and how did these two organizations mutually evolve from the end of the Cold War to the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), how did this evolution shape their cultural identities and purpose, and what are the benefits and consequences of these changes for operations and national security?

In his famous book, “What is History?,” the British historian E.H. Carr said that a historian “provides general guides for future action, which though not specific predictions, are both valid and useful.”<sup>21</sup> The economic and strategic conditions of the post-Gulf War/end of the Cold War period that helped shape the current CIA/DoD partnership offers valuable guidelines for today’s leaders. Similar to the early 1990s, the United States national security organizations are facing significant reductions while undergoing a transitional period in national security affairs. After a decade and a half of fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States is suffering from operational weariness and budgetary constraints.<sup>22</sup> These realities are forcing the United States to reassess its strategic focus and the manner in which it prioritizes its national interests and employs its assets. Understanding how choices made under similar fiscal and national security conditions affected the CIA/DoD relationship can provide a better appreciation

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<sup>21</sup> Carr, Edward Hallett, *What is History* (New York, NY: Random House Books, 1961), 85.

<sup>22</sup> Scarborough, Rowan. “Panetta Says 2013 Defense Budget to Cut Land Forces,” *Washington Post*, 26 January 2012.

for how contemporary policy decisions might affect future CIA/DoD relations and, in return, United States' national security interests.

Exploring the evolution of the DoD/CIA relationship highlights various contemporary implications that affect not only the two organizations, but how the United States conducts foreign policy. Undoubtedly, the close partnership between the CIA and DoD since 9/11 has resulted in successes such as Neptune Spear, the operation that finally got Osama Bin Laden; while these successes should be lauded, they come with costs. The operationalization of CIA in support of military operations and as part of the United States' counterterrorism approach, limits the resources CIA can focus on other issues. A current intelligence leader argues the 2011 Arab Spring was largely unforeseen because nearly half of the CIA's resources were focused on warzones and counterterrorism operations and not on tension in the Arab Street or other strategic issues.<sup>23</sup> Although some leaders argue the CIA's focus on operations is fulfilling immediate national needs and there will always be resource allocation issues, others are concerned that if the CIA continues down its current path, it risks becoming a 21<sup>st</sup> Century Office of Strategic Services (OSS); an organization excellent at counterterrorism operations, but lacking the ability to focus its foreign intelligence collection capability on the world more broadly.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Wise, Doug. Deputy Director Defense Intelligence Agency. Interview by author, Washington D.C. area, 28 August 2012 and 3 September 2015; Los Angeles Times. "U.S. Intelligence Official Acknowledges Missed Arab Spring Signs." *Los Angeles Times*, 19 July 2012. [http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world\\_now/2012/07/us-intelligence-official-acknowledges-missed-signs-ahead-of-arab-spring-.html](http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2012/07/us-intelligence-official-acknowledges-missed-signs-ahead-of-arab-spring-.html) (accessed 5 July 2016).

<sup>24</sup> Petraeus, David, General (R). Former Director of Central Intelligence Agency and Commander of United States Central Command. Interview by author, Washington D.C., 23 October 2015. Petraeus somewhat disagreed with my argument, saying that Desert Storm might have had a "catalytic effect," but it was 9/11 that was the catalyst; Hayden, Michael V, General (R). Former Director Central Intelligence

Some academics, policymakers, and pundits argue that CIA's focus on counterterrorism and intelligence support to military operations has resulted in the "militarization" of the CIA in the post-Cold War environment. These individuals argue that too many resources focused on supporting military operations and the counterterrorism fight results in a myopic view that neglects existential issues such as a rising China or an aggressive Russia. Of equal concern, they describe the predominance of intelligence support to military operations, as a symptom of what many believe is the militarization of foreign policy.<sup>25</sup> From this perspective, it is the entire national security system that has been militarized, and the CIA is only a symptom of this militarization. Others argue, the greatest value of intelligence is in supporting military actions by "identifying the (enemy) guy behind the door" or providing information to inform a commander's decision-making. While these individuals appreciate policy-makers' information needs, they believe academics and think tanks can provide the understanding necessary to formulate policy and strategy, but only intelligence organizations can provide the information necessary to enable operations.

These differing opinions highlight an important reality that goes beyond the CIA/DoD partnership and influences how leaders perceive intelligence. Even though the

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Agency and former Director National Security Agency. Interview by author, Washington, D.C., 18 September 2015. General Hayden advised the incoming DCIA David Petraeus to not let the CIA become the OSS.

<sup>25</sup> Kibbe, Jennifer. (2014). The Military, the CIA, and America's Shadow Wars. In G. Adams and S. Murray (Eds.), *Mission Creep: The Militarization of US Foreign Policy* (pp. 210-234). Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press; Goodman, Melvin. *Failure of Intelligence: The Decline and Fall of the CIA* (New York, NY.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2008), 312 and 331-336. Kibbe describes the two organizations taking on the same type of missions. Goodman describes the dominance of DoD within the Intelligence Community.



United States has an “Intelligence Community,” there is not a consensus on the purpose of intelligence. Although some shrug this off and argue the general purpose of intelligence is to inform decision-making, this broad, simple definition does not capture the trade-offs incurred when determining whether to focus intelligence support towards policymakers or commanders.<sup>26</sup> The information required by a commander to enable decisionmaking in war is different than information required by a policymaker to decide whether to go to war in the first place. While a commander requires information to support tactical or operational action in pursuit of policy objectives, the policymaker requires information to decide whether or not the use of force is an appropriate policy tool in the first place. A policymaker needs to understand the benefits and limitations of the use of force in a particular situation, but he does not need to understand the tactical intelligence required to enable military operations. Finally, while the commander’s understanding of the strategic situation is important for him to advise policymakers on the efficacy of the use of force and to adjust operations accordingly, he does not decide when to employ force, but rather how to use force to achieve policy-goals.

The “purpose of intelligence” is a discussion that extends beyond the CIA/DoD, but the evolution of its partnership over the last three decades reflects broader shifts in the role of intelligence in America’s national security affairs. As the United States’ most significant non-DoD intelligence organization, the CIA was conceived to separate the collection of intelligence from the institutions that develop and execute policy.<sup>27</sup> The

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<sup>26</sup> Kojm, Chris. Former Chairman of the National Intelligence Council. Telephone interview by author, 14 October 2015. While interviewing Kojm, he described intelligence as information required to enable decision-making.

<sup>27</sup> <https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2008-featured-story->

CIA's increased focus on support to military operations and counterterrorism operations weakens this separation, reduces its focus on strategic issues, and risks subordination to the DoD.

### **Historiography**

The purpose of this research is to understand how the end of the Cold War affected the CIA-DoD relationship, why the relationship evolved in the post-Desert Storm/post-Cold War period, and appreciate the influence of this partnership on contemporary public policy. Despite a significant amount of literature on both the CIA and DoD, to include primary and secondary accounts of organizational interaction during military operations, there is a dearth of literature covering the evolution of the CIA/DoD relationship since the 1947 National Security Act and the contextual and institutional forces that shaped the relationship. The existing relevant academic literature focuses on the 1947 National Security Act and the creation of both organizations, post-Cold War and post-9/11 Intelligence Community transformation, and implications of the CIA/DoD relationship on US foreign policy. Although the literature provides some context to the current CIA/DoD relationship and identifies potential implications associated with the DoD/CIA relationship, the literature does not consider how the changing post-Desert Storm/post-Cold War domestic and international environment affected the two organizations and shaped their relationship. This research looks to fill that gap.

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archive/national-security-act-of-1947.html (accessed 7 January 2016). During an interview, Rich Haver discussed the influence of the Roberts Commission's review of Pearl Harbor on establishing an independent intelligence agency. Haver conducted research on the Robert's Commission for Secretary Rumsfeld when they were considering intelligence reform.; NGA and elements of NSA are considered DoD Combat Support Agencies. See <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300006p.pdf> (accessed 17 March 2016).

Amy Zegart's book *Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the JCS, NCS, and CIA* and Douglas Stuart's book *Creating the National Security State: A History of the Law that Transformed America* provide valuable insight into the establishment of the CIA and DoD. Amy Zegart uses New Institutionalism to explain the establishment and development of the JCS, NCS, and CIA structures from 1947-1999. Zegart argues that domestic politics and parochial interests influenced the establishment and subsequent development of these three national security institutions, resulting in sub-optimal national security organizations. One of Zegart's findings is that national security organizations seldom adapt to "exogenous events," and therefore remain ill organized to accomplish their mission. Zegart's research provides value in understanding the influence of domestic politics on foreign policy and further acknowledges how the American system of competing interests does not result in optimal bureaucratic organizational design.

While Zegart's research provides value, she considers the evolution of the three organizations as separate case studies and does not fully consider how the adaptation of one affected the other. In addition, Zegart's research focuses mainly on domestic political interests in the development of separate national security institutions and not how the combined international and domestic environment helped shaped the relationship between institutions. Interestingly, Zegart argues the creation of the CIA, JCS, and NSC were in response to the "emerging Soviet threat" and only mentions in passing the influence of Pearl Harbor on post-World War II national security design.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Zegart, Amy, *Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 6-14. Zegart states that New Institutionalism "assumes that individuals are self-interested rational maximizers. It also assumes that collective outcomes-including organizational design-have roots in individual behavior. From these traditional assumptions new institutionalism makes a very untraditional claim: institutions matter. New institutionalism treats institutions as both dependent and

Stuart provides context into what was the ongoing political debate when Congress created both organizations. He argues that Pearl Harbor traumatized the American psyche, resulting in a reconceptualization of how America defined international relations, thus influencing the national security structure the United States built to execute foreign policy. Stuart's research highlights the importance of "historical context" and a nation's experience in shaping national security structures and how these structures in return influence future policy choices and actions. In this regard, Stuart's research and this research share a similar argument even though the historical period of focus differs.

Although Stuart's research focuses on the early post-World War II period and the focus of this research is the post-Cold War period, understanding why the United States created the DoD and central intelligence is necessary to understand what the CIA and DoD evolved "from" following the Cold War. By crediting Pearl Harbor for the 1947 National Security Act, Stuart appears to fall into the historical camp that believes central intelligence was built largely to protect against another surprise attack.<sup>29</sup>

Books such as Dr. Loch Johnson's *Threat on the Horizon: An Inside Account of America's Search for Security after the Cold War* and Craig Eisendrath's *National Insecurity: U.S. Intelligence After the Cold War*, provide interesting accounts on the post-Cold War political climate that motivated Intelligence Community change and the results of various executive and congressional committees. Johnson's book also describes the

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independent pendent variables. Its central research questions ask where institutions come from and how, in turn, institutions shape the world around them."

<sup>29</sup> Stuart, Douglas, *Creating the National Security State: A History of the Law that Transformed America* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008). Although it can be argued that a greater "awareness" of Japanese interests might have helped the United States appreciate potential Japanese actions, most of the discussion on "attack warning" is not focused on broad understanding, but on putting together disparate pieces of information to identify potential actions.

tension between national security leaders pushing for more intelligence support to military operations and national security leaders concerned with the military's dominance of the Intelligence Community. These books focus on the actions and decisions of the investigative bodies and highlight the broad implications of their actions. They do not focus on how the post-Cold War environment affected the CIA/DoD partnership.

General William Odom's book, *Fixing Intelligence: For a More Secure America*, was published pre-IRTPA and argues for a major transformation of the Intelligence Community. Odom recounts intelligence failures and friction, previous proposals on intelligence reform, and Intelligence Community transitions to build his case of why the community needs to reform to serve its customers and the American people. Although Odom's vast experience as an Intelligence Community leader makes for an interesting and informative read, his objective is to advise policy changes and not to gain an appreciation of why the CIA/DoD relationship evolved over time. Although Odom uses history, it is to support his argument for reforming the Intelligence Community and is not a comprehensive account. In addition, since he published his book in 2003, it does not consider subsequent changes to the Intelligence Community or the CIA/DoD relationship.<sup>30</sup>

Dr. Gregory Treverton's book, *Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Terror*, considers the increasing role of national intelligence in support of military operations. Treverton argues that since the end of the Cold War, the Intelligence Community has not only increased its support to military operations, but shifted its focus

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<sup>30</sup> Odom, William E, *Fixing Intelligence for a More Secure America* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003).

from strategic to tactical. He posits that this change was partially due to new weapon system technology that allows pinpoint targeting accuracy, but requires greater technical intelligence requirements to enable operations. Treverton believes this shift from strategic to tactical, “represents a movement forward from the past,” returning intelligence to “primarily tactical after the long Cold War interlude when intelligence was preoccupied with the strategic imperative.” Treverton argues strategic to tactical raises fundamental questions, such as, “what should intelligence do? And for whom? How should the obvious need to support military operations be squared with intelligence’s mission to make sense of the world for all parts of the government?”

Treverton raises concern with the push towards centralizing intelligence, a push that he advises against, believing the varied intelligence needs require a “loose confederation” of intelligence organizations. Notably, he acknowledges that “military planners and operators will be prominent consumers,” but argues, “the task, though, is to ensure the national purposes—those of the secretary of state or trade representative—are not lost in intelligence’s reversion to support for the military.”<sup>31</sup> A valuable read on the shifting of intelligence from a strategic to a tactical focus that raises the often-neglected question on the purpose of intelligence, Treverton’s discussion on support to military operations considers mainly the technical reasons driving this evolution. Like Odom, Treverton’s book is focused on reforming the Intelligence Community in the post-Cold War/pre-9/11 period and is not a detailed account of the CIA/DoD relationship.

*Blinking Red: Crisis and Compromise in American Intelligence after 9/11*, by

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<sup>31</sup> Treverton, Gregory, *Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2001), Kindle Location 334-337, 915-916, 921-935, and 1607-607.

Michael Allen, focuses on the post-9/11 changes to the Intelligence Community. A former House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) staffer, Allen takes a “case study” approach to layout the politics and interests behind intelligence reform following 9/11 and Iraq. Allen argues the 9/11 Commission was one of the most influential committees in American history and, despite necessary political compromise, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) “created a structure that has the potential to positively benefit national security.”<sup>32</sup> Allen’s experience and his access to individuals involved in the 9/11 Commission and the IRTPA, makes his book an informative account of post-9/11 intelligence reform. Although useful in furthering understanding, Allen’s research focuses on post-9/11 reform and the pre-9/11 period is tangential to his argument.

John Diamond’s book, *The CIA and the Culture of Failure*, is a critical account of the CIA from the end of the Cold War to the attacks on 9/11. Diamond’s conclusion is the “culture of failure” in the Intelligence Community resulted from the collapse of the Soviet Union and with it, the mission of the CIA. Diamond argues this loss of purpose, coupled with significant budget cuts and “a series of intelligence lapses”, damaged the Intelligence Community, resulting in a loss of confidence and leading to a weakened CIA.<sup>33</sup> Diamond’s account considers some of the historical events and highlights various points considered in this research, such as the effect of the collapse of the Soviet Union

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<sup>32</sup> Allen, Michael, *Blinking Red: Crisis and Compromise in Intelligence after 9/11* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2013), 169.

<sup>33</sup> Diamond, John, *The CIA and the Culture of Failure: U.S. Intelligence from the End of the Cold War to the Invasion of Iraq* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008).

on the CIA. Although this research and Diamond's account share a common timeframe and some similar points, there are important differences in the conclusions drawn.

Whereas Diamond suggests the 1990s were a lost decade for the Intelligence Community, this account argues that key policy and organizational changes occurred during that decade that provided a foundation for the growth of the CIA/DoD partnership following 9/11. Although there is little doubt that significant budget cuts and certain policy decisions in the 1990s affected the CIA or that 9/11 provided a newfound purpose, it is important to appreciate the influence of policy and organizational changes that did occur during the 1990s.

In addition to the literature covering policy and organizational changes throughout the Intelligence Community are individual organizational accounts sponsored by the government agencies. These official histories provide a chronological account of organizational transition and transformation, while identifying the primary sources from their organization's archives. Although valuable in recounting organizational history, they are written on behalf of individual organizations and do not capture the entire relationship.

*Directors of Central Intelligence as Leaders of the Intelligence Community 1946-2005*, is a CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence book by Douglas Garthoff in commemoration of the end of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) serving as both the leader of the CIA and the head of the Intelligence Community. Garthoff reviews the tenure of the nineteen DCIs and provides a good synopsis of each DCI's contributions. Valuable to understanding key issues during each of the DCIs time in office, the book focuses broadly on the DCIs' contributions and is "based primarily on CIA files."



Although the book highlights issues regarding the CIA/DoD partnership, such as the creation of the Office of Military Affairs (OMA) and the increased importance of support to military operations, it does not focus on the DoD/CIA partnership and only mentions the relationship as part of the broader DCI history.

DoD agencies and departments also have various organizational histories that provide significant background information on the evolution of their individual organizations. Similar to the CIA's Studies in Intelligence products focused on organizational history, the DoD literature mentions the DoD/CIA partnership, but is not the focus of the research. For example, Janet McDonnell, a DIA historian, wrote a classified account of the first ten years of the office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD-I). *Defense Intelligence Coming of Age: The Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence 2002-2012*, explores the issues and personalities that led to the formation of the USD-I under the Bush administration and the evolution of the organization under the first three USD-I(s). Although the book highlights specific issues within the DoD/CIA relationship, its information is limited in scope due to the broader focus of the research and the timeframe considered. A valuable account to understand the increasing importance of intelligence within DoD, its classified status limits access to the book.

From a policy standpoint, various academics, policymakers, and pundits have questioned aspects of CIA/DoD operations, to include a perceived "militarization" of the CIA in the post-Cold War environment and too much of a focus on tactical intelligence support to military operations instead of strategic intelligence support to policymakers.

JP Brodeur, a professor at the University of Montreal, highlights how the

“militarization” of intelligence affects not just the CIA/DoD relationship, but also the way the United States conducts foreign policy. Gordon Adams, a former White House budget official during the Clinton administration, and Jennifer Sims, a former Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence Coordination, argues the lack of intelligence support to diplomats has weakened United States diplomacy. Brodeur, Adams, and Sims research on the consequences of where intelligence capabilities are focused and how intelligence is used is important in determining the costs and benefits of the CIA/DoD relationship. Although the authors do a good job explaining the consequences of where intelligence focuses, the intelligence role in the “militarization of foreign policy” and the implications of this “militarization,” they do not explain what has driven these realities.<sup>34</sup>

*The Hidden Hand: A Brief History of the CIA*, a recent book by Dr. Richard Immerman, a former senior intelligence official and historian at Temple University, has a section that highlights the “militarization” of the CIA and its implications. Immerman argues the CIA’s focus on tactical action robs policymakers of the strategic analysis necessary to inform policy decisions. Similarly, Mark Mazzetti’s 2013 book *The Way of the Knife: The CIA, a Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth*, considers how the CIA mission has evolved from intelligence collection to a more tactical action focus. Although informative reads, the books focus on CIA operations and do not consider many of the external conditions that drove the CIA/DoD relationship after the Cold War.

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<sup>34</sup> Brodeur, J.P., “The Militarization of Intelligence,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology <https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-policing-web-9780199740598?cc=us&lang=en&> (accessed 8 February 2015).; Jennifer E. Simms and Gordon Adams, “Demilitarize the CIA,” <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/12/03/a-new-director-or-a-new-direction-for-the-cia/demilitarize-the-cia> (accessed 8 February 2015).

In a 2002 article titled “Tug of War: The CIA’s Uneasy Relationship with the Military,” Dr. Richard Russell, a former CIA analyst and current university professor, argues that overwhelming the CIA with support to military operations could have severe consequences for CIA support to policymakers.<sup>35</sup> Dr. Russell covers the CIA/DoD history to include Desert Storm and the establishment of CIA’s Office of Military Affairs and poses some valid concerns regarding analytical support. A valuable account of the relationship, particularly from an analytical support standpoint, the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) published the paper a year after September 11, 2001 therefore it does not capture the evolution of the relationship until President Obama declared an end to the Global War on Terror in 2009.

Another informative paper that captures some of the issues involved with the CIA/DoD relationship is Kathryn Stone’s 2003 paper, “All Necessary Means-Employing CIA Operatives in a Warfighting Role Along-side Special Operations Forces.”<sup>36</sup> Stone’s paper tackles the Title 10 vs. Title 50 debate and explores the confusing topic of legal authorities.<sup>37</sup> Jennifer Kibbe’s 2007 paper, “Covert Action and the Pentagon” and Frederick Hitz’s 2012 paper, “U.S. Intelligence in the Wake of September 11: The Rise of the Spy Commando and Reorganized Operational Capabilities,” update this discussion

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<sup>35</sup> Russell, Richard L. "Tug of War: The CIA's Uneasy Relationship with the Military," *SAIS Review; a Journal of International Affairs* 22, no. 2 (2002): 1.

<sup>36</sup> Stone, Kathryn. “All Necessary Means: Employing CIA Operatives in a Warfighting Role,” <http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/stone.pdf> (accessed 14 November 2012).

<sup>37</sup> United States Code (USC) Title 10 covers the “Armed Forces of the United States” and Title 50 covers “National Security and War.” Although USC is merely meant as an “efficient” way to organize legal statutes, national security officials often associate “Title 10” with military and “Title 50” with non-military intelligence. While this is understandable, it is not completely accurate since Title 50 gives the Secretary of Defense some of his authorities. See Mary Whisner’s, “The United States Code, Prima Facie Evidence, and Positive Law,” *Law Library Journal* 101, no 4 (2009): 545-549 for more information.

and add to the body of academic literature for this very important topic.<sup>38</sup> In addition to the issue-focused literature, papers by James Lose, Garret Jones, and Daniel Moore consider the value of CIA/DoD interaction and/or provide recommendations on how they can improve the relationship.<sup>39</sup>

Although all these books and papers provide valuable information on the CIA/DoD relationship, there is not a comprehensive account that covers the evolution of the relationship from the early 1990s until today and the policy decision and global context that drove those decisions. Understanding how the CIA/DoD relationship has evolved and appreciating the environment that shaped it is important to any projection of how the relationship might develop in the future and the policy implications of that development.

### **Methodology**

To understand the historical and contemporary context of the CIA/DoD relationship, this research draws on both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include over forty interviews with current and former leaders within the defense and intelligence communities. These leaders served during critical periods in the CIA/DoD relationship, with many of them serving throughout both the post-Desert

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<sup>38</sup> Hitz, Frederick P. "U.S. Intelligence in the Wake of September 11: The Rise of the Spy Commando and Reorganized Operational Capabilities," *Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy* 35, no. 1 (2012): 245-258; Kibbe, Jennifer D, "Covert Action and the Pentagon," *Intelligence & National Security* 22, no. 1 (2007): 57-74.

<sup>39</sup> Lose, James. "Fulfilling a Crucial Role: National Intelligence Support Teams," <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol43no3/pdf/v43i3a08p.pdf> (accessed 14 November 2012); Jones, Garrett, "Working with the CIA," *Parameters* 31, no. 4 (2001), 28-39; J. Daniel Moore, "CIA Support to Operation Enduring Freedom," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* 28, no. 3 (2002): 46; Oakley, David. "Partners or Competitors."

Storm/Cold War and post-9/11 eras. Those interviewed served in both the executive and legislative branches of government and include two former Chairmen of the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), a former Secretary of Defense, a former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), a former Director of National Intelligence (DNI), two former Directors of the Central Intelligence Agency, three former Deputy Directors of the Central Intelligence Agency, two former Directors of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Deputy Director of the DIA, four former directors of the National Security Agency (NSA), two former Directors of the National Clandestine Service, a CIA Associate Deputy Director of Operations, a CIA Deputy Director of Community Human Intelligence (HUMINT), a former CIA Associate Deputy Director for Operations/Military Affairs and an Associate Director of Military Affairs (ADMA) within the CIA.

Archival research included trips to the William J. Clinton and George H.W. Bush Presidential Libraries, the National Defense University Library, the Office of Secretary of Defense Historical Office, the Central Intelligence Agency's Studies in Intelligence, and Congressman David McCurdy's papers at the University of Oklahoma's Carl Albert Center. In addition to these trips, primary research was conducted through various online archives such as the National Security Archives at George Washington University and the United States National Archives. The secondary sources include academic journal articles, historical and current affairs accounts, and various media reports.

This paper is broken down into two sections and nine chapters, with each section containing chapters focused on a specific period. Section I covers the period from 1982-2001, with a particular focus on the post-Cold War/post-Desert Storm period. Section II

looks at the post-9/11 period, with a focus on the changes to the CIA and DoD partnership spurred by the Global War on Terrorism and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Section I, Chapter two begins in the mid-1980s, towards the end of the Cold War when the United States Department of Defense (DoD) went through its most significant overhaul since its formation through the 1947 National Security Act. By taking the necessary first steps to weaken the powerful services and establishing a unified Department, Goldwater-Nichols increased the DoD's influence in US foreign policy, while also creating policy and structure that enabled and required future CIA/DoD collaboration.

The operational failures that motivated defense reform were the same failures that initiated discussions on greater intelligence support to military operations. Congressional and agency reviews of Operation Urgent Fury and the Beirut barracks bombing that were cited as justification for defense reform also criticized the lack of intelligence support to operational commanders. In this regard, the defense reform enacted by Congress through Goldwater-Nichols can be viewed as the initial phase of broader national security reforms that were intended to improve how the United States conducted operations. Although intelligence reform was not embraced to the same degree as defense reform initially, policymakers motivated by perceived "intelligence failures," the ensuing fiscal constraints and sensing the changing global order, started to look at ways to restructure intelligence in order to save money and respond in a post-Cold War environment.

Chapter two concludes with Operation Just Cause, the 1990 invasion of Panama to oust General Manuel Noriega from power. Operation Just Cause served as a waypoint for the United States to measure its progress along its journey towards achieving jointness. While the military displayed significant improvement in service interoperability during Just Cause, the operation highlighted that intelligence support to military operations had not attained the standard sought by the military, Congress, or the administration.

Section I, chapters three and four look at the influence of Desert Storm on the evolution of the CIA/DoD relationship. The attention given Schwarzkopf's comments on intelligence shortfalls and the concepts developed to support military operations during Desert Storm resulted in the operation being a primary catalyst for changes in the CIA/DoD relationship in the 1990s. Although similar critiques of intelligence were heard following Urgent Fury and Just Cause, the Desert Storm critiques received more attention and resulted in significant policy and organizational changes.

Desert Storm is also important for the introduction of technologies and concepts that became prominent following 9/11. Concepts such as "fusion center" and "operationalization of intelligence" that were embraced during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom surfaced during Desert Storm. These concepts matured following 9/11, when the length and type of operations made them necessary and the increased technology made them more feasible. Desert Storm era professionals deserve credit for strengthening the link between intelligence and operations, while also weakening service and interagency parochialism. Even though intelligence support to military operations during Desert Storm was not error free, the intelligence professionals

deserve credit for their effort, ingenuity, teamwork and level of support to military operations.

Chapter four looks at the support for defense intelligence reform that Desert Storm generated. This momentum was partially due to the timing of the war and the celebrity status General Schwarzkopf enjoyed following the victory. With the end of the Cold War on the horizon and domestic pressure building to embrace the “peace dividend,” the conditions were set for policymakers and national security organizations to be more receptive to change. The popularity of General Schwarzkopf ensured that any critiques he made were taken seriously and their legitimacy little questioned. Despite General Schwarzkopf’s complaints being somewhat misplaced and later partially recanted, his words were embraced by policymakers and were influential in building the momentum for change. In this regard, Schwarzkopf can be both criticized for his uninformed criticism of the Intelligence Community and credited for the change his comments helped generate.

Although Chapters three and four focus significantly on Desert Storm military operations and the actions of DoD intelligence, these chapters are important to gain an appreciation of the catalysts that drove Intelligence Community reform debate and were proximate causes of CIA organizational reform to better support military operations. Despite a limited CIA role once military operations started, the push for improved interoperability between civilian agencies and the military, the calls for increased Intelligence Community support to military operations, and the friction between Schwarzkopf and the CIA over battle damage assessments, ensured the CIA would be significantly affected in Desert Storm’s aftermath.



Chapter five looks at how the momentum for intelligence reform within the DoD quickly expanded into the broader Intelligence Community and Congress. The chapter considers how the executive and legislative branches worked to improve intelligence support to military operations. Although all of these reform measures were not initially instituted, the actions of a handful of individuals kept the intelligence reform and support to military operations discussion alive. Over time, many of the issues that were not initially instituted found increased support as national security conditions changed and support to military operations became immediate.

Chapter Six, the final chapter within Section I, focuses on the Clinton years and how the international and domestic conditions after the Cold War drove changes within the CIA and DoD that affected its partnership. The CIA and DoD had only existed during the Cold War and a significant amount of their energy was focused towards the Soviet Union. After the Soviet fall, both organizations wrestled with their roles in a multi-polar world while policymakers slashed budgets and looked for ways to reorient both organizations. This chapter considers the various national and institutional issues that influenced the CIA/DoD partnership and provides the reader context in how seemingly separate issues merged to shape the organizations and therefore influence how the CIA/DoD relationship evolved during the 1990s. As part of this exploration, the chapter considers how a change in administrations and the personalities of individual leaders influenced how the CIA/DoD partnership evolved.

Section II begins with chapter seven, which focuses on the arrival of the George W. Bush administration to the White House, and with it, the return of many old hands from previous Republican administrations. These individuals were involved in previous

Intelligence Community reform efforts and returned to power with the intent of furthering these efforts. Believing the previous administration reduced intelligence funding too far, the Bush team looked for ways to increase spending and rebuild the Intelligence Community after years of reductions. Within months of taking office, the administration initiated reviews to identify where to rebuild the Intelligence Community, but their reviews were soon influenced by the necessities of war.

Section II, chapter eight considers the changes to defense intelligence that occurred following September 11, 2001 to build self-sufficiency within the Department of Defense in order to severe perceived reliance on national intelligence support to operations. These changes were partly motivated by previous reviews of intelligence and partly driven by Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's desire to consolidate power and capability within the DoD. The enacted changes resulted in a significant transformation of defense intelligence and influenced the manner in which the DoD interacted with the CIA and the broader Intelligence Community. Particularly interesting, this chapter shows how individual leaders shaped the CIA/DoD relationship, for better or worse, in the first five years following 9/11. The influence of individual leaders, highlights how parochial and non-parochial personalities affected the CIA/DoD relationship during the GWOT, and how the greater influence of non-parochial leaders seems to have shaped the relationship in a more positive direction.

This chapter considers how the exigencies of war solidified the actions taken in the late 1980s and 1990s to improve the CIA/DoD partnership, resulting in unprecedented collaboration between the two organizations. Chapter eight also looks at the increased importance of intelligence within operations. The “operationalization of

intelligence” within the military is an important change in how the Department of Defense conducts operations and explains the increased importance of national intelligence to military operations. As with the CIA/DoD partnership, “operationalization of intelligence” origins can be traced back to the 1980s and 1990s.

The final chapter summarizes the evolution of the CIA/DoD partnership and considers the contemporary implications of the CIA and DoD partnership on policy, strategy, and operations. This chapter is important for both policymakers and intelligence leaders to understand the costs and benefits incurred by the increased focus of intelligence support to military operations. Chapter nine also considers how the operationalization of national intelligence since 9/11 affects the purpose of intelligence and therefore influences the manner in which the United States conducts foreign policy.

## **Chapter Two: Change on the Horizon-1980s**

**“It is not sufficient to have just resources, dollars, and weapon systems”<sup>40</sup>**

The growth of the CIA and DoD relationship post-9/11 has much to do with internal changes that occurred within both organizations decades earlier. Many of the

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<sup>40</sup> Locher, James, *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), 34.

changes were inwardly focused and not expressively intended to improve interagency coordination and operations. Despite this fact, some of the internal organizational changes established the necessary conditions for future CIA/DoD relationship growth.

As this chapter will cover, the interoperability failures during Operations Eagle Claw, the failed mission to rescue U.S. citizens in Iran, and Urgent Fury, the 1983 invasion of Grenada, highlighted the inability of the United States military to conduct joint operations. In response to these failures, Congress looked for ways to increase inter-service understanding and cooperation to enable successful joint operations. The passage of the Goldwater Nichols-Act did not completely eradicate parochial mind-sets, but it did help weaken the military service centric attitudes. The eroding of service separation over time, accustomed the services to embrace non-parochialism beyond their cloistered environments, a small yet significant step in shaping how DoD developed relationships with non-military government agencies.<sup>41</sup> Over time, the unification of the services through a jointness mantra empowered the DoD in relation to other national security/foreign policy institutions. By unifying as a department and thus weakening interservice rivalry, the DoD was able to unify its efforts and increase its relative power over other departments and agencies.

Interestingly, the after action and congressional reviews of military operations that encouraged passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act also emphasized the breakdown of intelligence support to military operations. Although internal DoD reform was the proximate outcome of the operational failures or shortcomings, the inclusion of

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<sup>41</sup> Cichowski, Kurt A, Lieutenant General. CIA Associate Director for Military Affairs, interview by author, Langley, VA, 29 August 2002. Lieutenant General Cichowski compared the evolutionary path of the CIA/DoD partnership to the path the military service relationships took following Goldwater-Nichols.

intelligence shortfalls in these reviews highlighted the increasing need for intelligence support to low-intensity conflicts and joint operations. The call for greater intelligence support to military operations continued after the passage of Goldwater-Nichols and, just like service jointness, was viewed as a necessary component to achieve operational success. The military and congressional reviews characterized intelligence support to military operations as such an integral part of improving operations that it could be considered a quasi-phase II of Goldwater-Nichols. Now that DoD was internally organized to conduct operations more effectively, greater external intelligence support was required to enable these operations.

It was an unseasonably warm February day in 1983 when General David C. Jones, an Air Force aviator and the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff briefed the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) for one of his last times. As General Jones sat listening to Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger outline “three fundamental requirements” for the United States defense effort, even he probably did not fathom the coming defense transformation his mea culpa that day eventually resulted in. An intelligent, no-nonsense North Dakotan who enlisted into the Army Air Corps as a young college student during World War II, General Jones was present for the creation of the DoD and experienced the highs and lows of its first four decades. After eight years on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, four as Chief of Staff of the Air Force and four as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Jones decided it was time to tell Congress the DoD structure was broken.

That warm February day, Jones told the HASC the DoD structure, which had changed little since its establishment with the 1947 National Security Act, was ill-

designed to meet the future challenges facing the military and more importantly, the nation. Jones argued that a committee system driven by consensus was no way to run a large organization focused on action and results. In Jones' opinion, the United States required a DoD that could operate as a unified force, the only problem was the current system encouraged and rewarded institutional parochialism.<sup>42</sup> To unify the department and resolve its issues, General Jones gave HASC four recommendations: 1) "Strengthen the role of the Chairman; 2) Limit the role of Service Components in producing joint papers to "input" and not "debate"; 3) Joint Chiefs should receive advice from their own staff and not the service chief staffs; and 4) Increase the role of the Combatant Commanders. Jones' campaign to remold the DoD into a better organized and unified department did not end with his testimony that day, but was followed up with various articles and a continued push for change.<sup>43</sup> Not initially accepted by other DoD leaders, General Jones' recommendations gained momentum eight months later when Operation Urgent Fury, the invasion of Grenada, highlighted DoD's operational shortcomings.

### **Grenada: Joint Operations and Intelligence Support Issues**

In the spring of 1983, President Reagan alerted the American public to a Soviet and Cuban build-up on the Caribbean island nation of Grenada. Although individuals closely linked to Grenada's government claimed the airport enlargement project was part

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<sup>42</sup> House, Committee on the Armed Services. *Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 5968 Department of Defense Appropriations for 1983*. 97<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2nd sess., February-March 1983.; Locher, James, *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2002). Locher's Chapter 2, "Jones Breaks Ranks," goes into detail on General Jones actions to initiate reform.

<sup>43</sup> Jones, David C. "Why of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Must Change." *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 12, No.2 (Spring 1982): 138-149.

of an effort to increase tourism, Reagan argued the project was further proof of Soviet expansionism in the Western Hemisphere.<sup>44</sup> During the 1980 Presidential campaign, then candidate Reagan warned against Soviet inroads into the Western Hemisphere, identifying the 1979 socialist coup in Grenada as evidence of Soviet intention.<sup>45</sup> Once in office, President Reagan proposed the Caribbean Basin Initiative, an economic development plan focused on improving the quality of life within select Caribbean countries and intertwining their interests with the United States to counter Soviet and Cuban influence in the region.<sup>46</sup> Although Grenada was listed as an “eligible country,” its “communist” status at the time made it ineligible to receive benefits under the legislation.<sup>47</sup>

On October 12, 1983, six months after Reagan’s first public mention of the airfield in a speech, turmoil within Grenada’s Marxist regime resulted in Prime Minister Maurice Bishop’s overthrow, arrest, and eventual death. Bishop’s Marxist New Jewel Movement (NJM) regime rose to power four-years earlier when collective discontent with Prime Minister Eric Gairy’s first post-Colonial government lead to its overthrow.

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<sup>44</sup> Reagan, Ronald. "Remarks on Central America and El Salvador. "Annual Meeting of the National Association of Manufacturers." Speech, Washington Hilton Hotel, Washington, D.C., March 10, 1983. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=41034> (accessed 5 July 2016); Beede, Benjamin. *The Small Wars of the United States 1899-2009*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2010, 327.

<sup>45</sup> Reagan, Ronald. "Peace: Restoring the Margin of Safety." Speech, Veterans of Foreign Affairs Convention, Chicago, IL, August 18, 1980. <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/reference/8.18.80.html>

<sup>46</sup> Reagan, Ronald. "Remarks on Central America and El Salvador. "Annual Meeting of the National Association of Manufacturers." Speech, Washington Hilton Hotel, Washington, D.C., March 10, 1983. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=41034> (accessed 5 July 2016).

<sup>47</sup> Public Law 98-67. *Caribbean Economic Initiative*. 98<sup>th</sup> Cong., 5 August 1983; House. Committee on Ways and Means. *Hearing on HR 2769: Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act*. 98<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1st sess., 9 June 1983.

Despite Bishop's communist leanings, he followed a more pragmatic governance approach to bring economic reform to Grenada. This pragmatism eventually resulted in his removal and the assumption of power by General Hudson Austin, the Commander in Chief of Grenada's Armed Forces.<sup>48</sup>

On October 19<sup>th</sup>, administration officials became concerned with the safety and security of U.S. citizens in Grenada. In response to this concern, the United States Atlantic Command under Admiral Wesley McDonald began planning for a Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) of United States Citizens in the country.<sup>49</sup> Admiral McDonald, a seasoned Naval aviator who enjoyed a fascinating career that included service on Admiral Byrd's South Pole expedition and command of the first air strikes on North Vietnam following the 1964 Tonkin Gulf incident, focused initial planning on both "opposed" and unopposed courses of action.<sup>50</sup> Although the NEO planning efforts considered a range of options, McDonald's staff finally settled on an "opposed" option of a provisional joint US force led by Vice Admiral (VADM) Joseph Metcalf III, Commander of US Navy's 2<sup>nd</sup> Fleet and comprised of elements drawn from all four services.<sup>51</sup>

On October 25, 1983, a joint contingent of 6,500 invaded the small Caribbean nation resulting in the evacuation of 599 American citizens, the removal of the military

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<sup>48</sup> Crandall, Russell, *Gunboat Diplomacy: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Panama* (Oxford, UK: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2006), 111-112, 126.

<sup>49</sup> Cole, Robert, *Operation Urgent Fury: Grenada* (Washington, D.C.: Joint History Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997), 9-10.

<sup>50</sup> [http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/23/us/23mcdonald.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/23/us/23mcdonald.html?_r=0) (accessed 05 January 2016).

<sup>51</sup> Clarke, Jeffrey J, *Operation Urgent Fury: The Invasion of Grenada, October 1983*. (Washington, D.C.: US Army Center for Military History), 11.



junta from power, and the force departure of Cuban workers from the island.<sup>52</sup>

Considering the multiple moving pieces involved in assembling, training, rehearsing, and executing a joint operation with an ad hoc force in less than 48 hours, VADM Metcalf and his subordinate commanders performed rather well.<sup>53</sup> Credit should also be given to other organizations, as the invasion force was not only joint, but also interagency.

Notably, VADM Metcalf's staff included representatives from the CIA that worked with DIA and military forces on the ground to help conduct sensitive site exploitation of the Grenadian documents recovered during the invasion.<sup>54</sup>

Although the operation was considered a success, various questions arose on both the quality of intelligence and perceived operational shortfalls related to communication and service interoperability. During a House Appropriations Committee hearing two weeks after the invasion, Secretary of Defense Weinberger was asked if Grenada was an intelligence failure. Although Weinberger said, he did not view Grenada as an intelligence failure and downplayed any intelligence issues, the legislators questioned whether the operational commanders took full advantage of available intelligence and challenged the accuracy of intelligence on Cuban strength and the location of American citizens.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> House Committee on the Armed Services. *Lessons Learned as a Result of the U.S. Military Operations in Grenada*. 98<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> sess., 24 January 1984, 11; Cole, 6.

<sup>53</sup> Clarke, 11. The CMH paper lays out a roughly 48-hour time lapse between when the announcement that VADM Metcalf was the commander until the actual invasion.

<sup>54</sup> Ward, Samuel D. "The Operational Leadership of Vice Admiral Joseph P. Metcalf, III," 2012. <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a564017.pdf>, 6; Cole, 52 and 56.

<sup>55</sup> U.S. Congress, House. Defense Appropriations Sub-Committee of the Committee on Appropriations. *Situation in Lebanon and Grenada*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 8 November 1983, 38-40.

In January 1984, the HASC conducted a “Lessons Learned” review focused on Operation Urgent Fury during which various congressional leaders once again questioned the lack of intelligence support to military operations. During an exchange with Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (USD-P) Harold Ikle, Maryland Republican Congresswoman Marjorie Holt argued that intelligence issues in Grenada were the result of previous actions that “diminished our intelligence gathering capability.” Although Holt did not specify, one could safely assume the previous actions she alluded to were the CIA HUMINT reductions of over 800 CIA case officers carried out by Stansfield Turner during the Carter administration that came to be known as the “Halloween Massacre.”<sup>56</sup>

Holt specifically focused on the CIA, arguing there was a contingent within the country that were “opposed to strengthening the CIA and opposed to letting them play their proper function as our intelligence agents.” In Holt’s opinion, it was this anti-CIA contingent that resulted in poor intelligence support to military operations during Urgent Fury. Seconding his fellow Marylander, Democrat Roy Dyson voiced his concern that the lack of quality intelligence resulted in American service members invading a country “near-blind.” Citing the lack of intelligence in Lebanon preceding the bombing of the Marine Barracks in Beirut that occurred a few days before the Grenada invasion, Dyson questioned why the military commander did not have a better understanding of Grenada to inform his understanding and military planning. In response to Holt and Dyson, Ikle

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<sup>56</sup> Shackley, Ted and Richard A. Finney, *Spymaster: My Life in the CIA* (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2005), 91 and 292.

agreed with the shortage in intelligence, but also stated that resource limitations forced the Intelligence Community to assume risk in some areas.<sup>57</sup>

The congressional concern over service interoperability and intelligence support to operations was reinforced in the Joint Staff review of Urgent Fury. Although the military believed that intelligence support required for initial planning was adequate, they identified a shortfall in intelligence support to processing captured material, a need for better “intelligence management arrangements,” and castigated intelligence organizations for “inadequate” intelligence on the locations of American citizens requiring evacuation. Regarding service interoperability, the joint staff report noted the various gains made by the services in conducting joint operations, but highlighted the continual shortfalls in communications, fire support, and planning.<sup>58</sup> While the Joint Staff report was more forgiving than congressional reviews regarding intelligence support to operations and more appreciative of the strides DoD made to improve joint operations; Congress and the military both highlighted the need for greater service interoperability and the intelligence to support it.

The HUMINT intelligence required to improve the combatant commander’s understanding and support contingency planning efforts that Representative Holt described would largely come from the CIA. Although the military services had some capacity for tactical HUMINT interrogation and sensitive site exploitation (SSE) (the CIA also supported SSE during Urgent Fury), they did not have enough clandestine

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<sup>57</sup> U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Armed Services. *Lessons Learned as a Result of the U.S. Military Operations in Grenada*. 98<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> sess., 24 January 1984, 27-28 and 33-34.

<sup>58</sup> Department of Defense. *Joint Overview of Operation Urgent Fury*. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1 May 1985, 48, 55 and 78.

capability or the long-term HUMINT collection structures in place to develop assets with the local knowledge and access necessary to achieve what Holt was describing. If military contingency planning required more in-depth knowledge of locations, and if much of this information, particularly in potential conflict areas, could not be acquired overtly, the DoD would have to depend on CIA's clandestine collection because DoD lacked sufficient capability.<sup>59</sup> What Dyson described was not a CIA surge during operations, but an ongoing supporting relationship to DoD's planning efforts.

### **Beirut: Intelligence to Blame?**

On October 23, 1983, two days before the invasion of Grenada, a tragedy struck US Marine forces in Beirut, Lebanon where they had been deployed as part of a multinational peacekeeping mission since August 1982. The Lebanese Government had requested an international peacekeeping force in June 1982 when they became concerned that fighting between the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), Israel, and Syria was putting Lebanese citizens at risk. The following month, July 1982, the United Nation's Security Council passed Resolution 508, which called for the departure of Israeli forces from Lebanon. Shortly after passage of the resolution, the United States became part of a multinational peacekeeping force (MNF) responsible for overseeing departure of foreign forces from Lebanon. The MNF eventually included contingents

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<sup>59</sup> Defense Attaches provide valuable overt information through their foreign engagements and contacts, but, while valuable, overt collection cannot cover all the information requirements and DoD's clandestine capability is not sufficient (as the 2012 request to build-up the DCS highlighted).

from France, Italy, Great Britain and the United States.<sup>60</sup>

President Reagan's August 24, 1982 notification of the deployment of US forces into Lebanon stated the purpose of deployment was to ensure the implementation of the departure plan. The letter further stated that US forces would not become involved in "hostilities" and that multinational forces would be withdrawn if a breakdown in implementing the departure plan occurred.<sup>61</sup> Despite Reagan's initial limitations, the United States Multinational Force (USMNF) element within the MNF eventually expanded its mission to three objectives: 1) Withdrawal of foreign forces (Israeli and Syrian) from Lebanon; 2) Ensure Security of Israel's Northern Border; and 3) Provide the Government of Lebanon an opportunity to assert its sovereignty.<sup>62</sup> The MNF presence in Beirut was largely accepted for the first nine months, but this changed in the spring of 1983 when a suicide attack destroyed the United States Embassy, killing seventeen Americans and thirty-three locals.

The April 1983 attack on the United States Embassy destroyed the CIA station, killing seven officers to include Robert Ames, the CIA's National Intelligence Officer for the Middle East, who was on temporary duty in Beirut at the time.<sup>63</sup> The bombing also severely disrupted the intelligence operations that were providing information on militias

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<sup>60</sup> Huchthausen, Peter, *America's Splendid Little Wars: A Short History of U.S. Engagement from the Fall of Saigon to Baghdad* (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2003), 49-50.

<sup>61</sup> Reagan, Ronald. *Communication from the President of the United States*, "Use of United States Armed Forces in Lebanon." Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 8 September 1982, 2.

<sup>62</sup> U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Armed Services. *The Use of Military Personnel in Lebanon and Consideration of Report from September 24-25 Committee Delegation to Lebanon*. 98<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1st sess., 27 and 28 September 1983, 5.

<sup>63</sup> Geraghty, Timothy J, *Peacekeepers at War: Beirut 1983- The Marine Commander Tells His Story* (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2009), 19-20.

and foreign forces operating in the area.<sup>64</sup> In late summer 1983, as the intelligence network remained disrupted, a United States congressional delegation arrived in Beirut. The HASC delegation was part of a broader congressional review looking at the role of US forces in Beirut and how these forces nested within the broader US strategy regarding Lebanon. Although these hearings did not result in a recommendation to remove US forces from Beirut, they did raise concerns regarding the safety of US forces in the area. More broadly, the hearings were critical of a US “involvement that some perceived to be controlled more by events than by deliberate planning and coherent policymaking on the part of US Government Officials.” Despite the disconnect between the use of force and policy objectives, the congressional delegation believed the presence of US forces in Beirut served America’s long-term interests.

While Congress was concerned with the safety of United States’ ground forces in Beirut and naval forces offshore, the congressional delegation did not raise concerns with either the quality or quantity of intelligence support to US forces in the area. In fact, the only substantive commentary on intelligence support during the hearing came from Rear Admiral William T. Howe, then Director of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs at the Department of State. Although RADM Howe acknowledged concerns with the evolving mission and threats to US forces in the area, he also recognized the level of force protection awareness commanders in the area possessed due to the significant level of intelligence support.<sup>65</sup> The absence of a concern over intelligence support to ground

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<sup>64</sup> Hastedt, Glen. “Intelligence Failure and Terrorism: The Attack on the Marines in Beirut.” *The Journal of Conflict Studies* Vol. 8, no. 2 (1988), 17-18; Geraghty, 143.

<sup>65</sup> U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Armed Services. *The Use of Military Personnel in Lebanon and Consideration of Report from September 24-25 Committee Delegation to Lebanon*. 98<sup>th</sup>

forces following the delegation's September visit is a significant oversight by the commanders and the delegates, considering the critiques intelligence support to commanders received from both Congress and the Long Commission less than two months later, following the Marine Barracks bombing.

Two days after the bombing, the Senate Arms Services Committee (SASC) initiated hearings to review US policy on Lebanon. The SASC hearings were conducted over two days on 25 October and 31 October and involved testimony by Secretary of Defense Weinberger, Lt. Gen Bernard Trainor (Marine Corps Deputy Chief of staff for Plans, Policy and Operations), RADM Almon Wilson (Navy Deputy Surgeon), General PX Kelley (Marine Corps Commandant), and General Bernard Rogers (Supreme Allied Commander Europe and Commander in Chief European Command [CINC]). Although the discussion touched on Lebanon policy issues, the crux of the discussion focused on the pre-attack preparedness actions and the post attack response. Senators questioned the measures taken by commanders on the ground to ensure force protection and whether or not commanders responded adequately to intelligence reports highlighting the threat of terrorist attacks.

The back and forth between Senators and DoD leaders regarding pre-attack preparedness actions became very heated. During one exchange, Senators Nunn and Cohen excoriated General Kelly for failing to foresee the threat suicide bombers posed against Marines even after the April 1983 embassy bombing.<sup>66</sup> Even though Marine Commandant General Kelley's assertion that he was not in the Lebanon mission chain of

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Cong., 1st sess., 27 and 28 September 1983, 1, 20-21.

<sup>66</sup> Locher, 129-131.

command was accurate, it was not well received by the committee. Testifying along-side Kelly was General Rogers, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), who told the committee, that as the regional commander, he was ultimately responsible for the Beirut bombing failures.

Rogers and Kelly both argued that intelligence reporting did not point to the threat of a suicide attack on the Marines.<sup>67</sup> Although the senators did not accept the generals' argument and criticized them for a lack of imagination, no congressional alarms sounded about the terrorist threat prior to the barracks bombing either. While force protection was an issue during the September 1983 HASC delegation visit to Lebanon, the threat of a suicide bomber was not mentioned in the delegation's report. The delegation mentioned the poor tactical low-ground of the Marine position and the threat posed by indirect fire, but there was no discussion regarding measures required to protect against a suicide attack.<sup>68</sup> It is interesting, and a little unnerving, that congressmen believed themselves expert enough to comment on tactical positioning of military forces, but then critique the military for failing to assess broader terrorist threats in Lebanon. If an amateur military terrain analysis is appropriate for a congressional delegation, a terrorist threat assessment is just as appropriate, if not more so. Instead, Congress criticized the commanders for failing to identify a threat to US forces their own delegation overlooked or did not

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<sup>67</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services. Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services. *The Situation in Lebanon*. 98<sup>th</sup> Cong., 25 and 31 October 1983, 51, 92-93, 107.

<sup>68</sup> Senator Warner did ask General Rogers whether any of the flag officers that visited Beirut following the April 1983 Embassy bombing were terrorist experts that reported to him and if any of them "express concern with the adequacy or inadequacy of the preventative measures." See Senate, Committee on Armed Services. Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services. *The Situation in Lebanon*. 98<sup>th</sup> Cong., 25 and 31 October 1983, 97. For Warner's full statement.



consider.<sup>69</sup>

Even before the late October testimony, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, based on a recommendation by General Kelly, assigned an independent investigatory body to review the circumstances surrounding the Marine Barracks bombing.<sup>70</sup> The *DoD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act of 23 October 1983* was chaired by Admiral (R) Robert Long, a veteran of World War II and the Vietnam War, and the recently departed Commander in Chief of the United States Pacific Command. The “Long Commission,” “examined the mission of the U.S. Marines assigned to the MNF, the rules of engagement governing their conduct, the responsiveness of the chain of command, the intelligence support, the security measures in place before and after the attack, the attack itself, and the adequacy of casualty handling procedures.” Echoing General Rogers' testimony, the Long Report identified the chain of command as those ultimately responsible for any operational failures. In addition to various issues regarding a lack of a common interpretation of the mission, convoluted chain of command, unclear rules of engagement, medical evacuation procedures and care, the commission report identified intelligence as a key issue that led to the attack.

Although previous military leaders had praised the intelligence support to commanders in Lebanon, the Long Commission found that while there was a large quantity of threat reporting, it was of little value to the military commanders in Lebanon. Specifically, the committee report stated the 100 intelligence reports warning of car

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<sup>69</sup> U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Armed Services. *The Use of Military Personnel in Lebanon and Consideration of Report from September 24-25 Committee Delegation to Lebanon*. 98<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1st sess., 27 and 28 September 1983, 31.

<sup>70</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services. Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services. *The Situation in Lebanon*. 98<sup>th</sup> Cong., 25 and 31 October 1983, 56.

bombs were too general and did not provide actionable information for the commanders to prevent the barracks bombing. Reaching beyond the causes of failed terrorist prevention in Beirut, the Long Commission argued that reduction in “HUMINT collection worldwide” contributed to Beirut and previous operational failures. The commission argued that “better HUMINT to support military planning and operations” was critical to ensure success and protect against failure. The committee provided two important recommendations regarding intelligence that dealt directly with the CIA/DoD relationship; 1) “establish an all-source fusion center” to support US commanders during military operations; and 2) CIA/DoD work together and take necessary actions to improve HUMINT support to operations in Lebanon and other military operations. These recommendations resembled future structural decisions made during subsequent operations.<sup>71</sup>

In agreement with congressional criticism made during the Operation Urgent Fury joint hearing that occurred a month later, the Long Commission argued “the paucity of U.S. controlled HUMINT is partly due to U.S. policy decisions to reduce HUMINT collection worldwide.” Although not explicit, this statement alluded to Admiral Turner’s October 31, 1977 “Halloween Massacre” of the CIA’s HUMINT capability. The Long Commission argued the HUMINT shortage had led to a “critical repetition of a long line of similar lessons during crisis situation in many other parts of the world.” The Long

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<sup>71</sup> Department of Defense. *Report of the DoD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act*. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 10 December 1983, 8. General Rogers, a former Army Chief of Staff and highly regarded officer, was a native Kansan who attended Kansas State University for one year before attending West Point. Rogers was never officially reprimanded even though he held the command ultimately responsible. The Long Commission also found “that there was a series of circumstances beyond the control of these commands that influenced their judgment and their actions relating to the security of the USMNF.”; Geraghty, 143.

Commission was arguing that CIA HUMINT reductions had been partially responsible for military operational failures, an interesting assessment for a national intelligence capability, and one that was embraced by future reviews.

In response to the Beirut bombings, the United States Secretary of State, George Schultz, established the Advisory Panel on Overseas Security, to review threats and security at U.S. facilities abroad. As chairman of this panel, Schultz selected recently retired navy Admiral Bobby Ray Inman. Admiral Inman, a former NSA Director and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, was the first Navy Intelligence Officer to earn four-stars. Inman, from Rhonesboro, a speck of a town in east Texas, joined the Navy out of the University of Texas. The man once referred to as, “one of the smartest people to come out of Washington or anywhere,” never planned to make the Navy a career. Although initially lacking admiral aspirations, Inman’s superiors realized his talent and placed him in challenging, yet rewarding, positions.<sup>72</sup> Inman remained a mentor to many rising intelligence professionals even after his retirement to the University of Texas.

The recommendation of the Inman Panel led to the establishment of the State Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security, which includes a Diplomatic Security Service that consolidated separate State Department security organizations. In addition to recommending the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and calling for “improving intelligence gathering and analysis,” the panel also created the Inman Standards that established

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<sup>72</sup> <http://fas.org/irp/news/1993/931216i.htm> (accessed 29 February 2016).; Inman, Bobby Ray, Admiral (R). Former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Agency. Interview by author, Austin, TX, 27 August 2014.

minimum specifications for new overseas US diplomatic facilities.<sup>73</sup>

The congressional and DoD reviews of Operation Urgent Fury and the Beirut bombing highlighted issues with intelligence support to military operations. During congressional discussion of Operation Urgent Fury, elected officials from both parties argued that a reduction in HUMINT capability affected operational performance. Similarly, the Long Commission Report linked the lack of HUMINT support to military operations to the Beirut tragedy and other operational failures worldwide. Although historians highlight the influence of Operation Urgent Fury and the Beirut Bombing on congressional action to reform the DoD, these two events also highlight the early stages of the call for increased intelligence support to military operations.<sup>74</sup> The identification of issues related to service interoperability and intelligence support to military operations appearing together regularly in after action reviews is evidence of the acknowledged link between joint operations and the intelligence support to enable those operations.

More importantly, the recommendation that HUMINT (i.e. CIA) tailor its collection efforts in support of military operations was an expectation that would significantly affect CIA's operational focus. Even though the CIA provided threat reporting to military commanders, this reporting was incidental to its broader collection efforts and the suitability of an asset was not primarily based on whether that individual could report on items of interest to military commanders. Whether congressman or the reports' authors realized it, increasing CIA HUMINT support to military operations,

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<sup>73</sup> United States Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security, *History of the Bureau of Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State* (Washington, D.C.: Global Publishing Solutions, 2011), 285-289.; Tiersky, Alex and Susan B. Epstein. "Securing U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad: Background and Policy Issues," 30 July 2014. <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42834.pdf> (accessed 18 March 2016).

<sup>74</sup> Locher, 305-314 and 424-425.

without building up CIA HUMINT capabilities, would detract from support to policymakers. This was a realization that became apparent to many Intelligence Community leaders years later.

Inspired by General David Jones' honesty and motivated by lessons learned during operations, the Armed Services committees tackled the controversial issue of defense reform, an issue that met resistance not only within the individual services, but also among many DoD leaders. Congress did not use the Goldwater-Nichols legislation to tackle the relationship between the CIA and DoD regarding intelligence support to military operations, but comments made during the debate highlighted the importance of intelligence support to operations. These comments signaled that change within the DoD was only the first step in reforming how the United States conducted military operations.<sup>75</sup>

### **Goldwater-Nichols: Unifying Defense First**

The call for defense reform that General Jones stoked in 1982 resulted in congressional bills and an intensifying chorus calling for change. The operational issues that arose during Urgent Fury and the perceived intelligence and organizational failures that were faulted for not preventing the Beirut barracks bombing provided further evidence why defense reform was needed. Despite evidence that reform was required, the introduction of a proposal sponsored by the HASC on JCS reorganization, and an

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<sup>75</sup> During congressional hearings on defense reform, Senator Goldwater spoke of the importance of identifying the different roles and responsibilities of American national security organizations during war. See U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services. *Hearings on the Reorganization of the Department of Defense*. 98th Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> Sess., October-December 1985, 31.

increasing call for action, the SASC was slow to respond.

Following the death of Senator Scoop Jackson, the leading Democrat on the SASC, and the announcement of Senator John Tower's retirement in 1983; pro-reform leaders gained influence in the Senate.<sup>76</sup> Beginning in late 1985, the SASC held a series of defense reform hearings focused on previous operational issues, particularly the Urgent Fury failures, the Marine Corps barracks bombing in Beirut, and the failed hostage rescue in Iran. The senators honed in on the command and control and service interoperability issues that were highlighted in commission reports and pursued during previous congressional inquiries.

The hearings highlighted the friction between congressional leaders intent on defense reform and the defense leaders wanting to protect the institution and pursue additional resources. During questioning by Senator Exon, a Democrat from Nebraska, regarding whether the failures in Iran, Beirut, and Grenada were due to command and control issues; Secretary of Defense Weinberger said his impression were that failures like the Iran hostage rescue had to do with a "complete lack of resources," something the Reagan administration was trying to remedy, not command and control. Admiral James Watkins, the Chief of Naval Operations, reinforced Weinberger's argument saying, "we can communicate and we have demonstrated this time and time again in the last three years between Washington, D.C. and people on the ground in foreign lands. For example, while we could talk to downtown Beirut anytime we wanted to, we do not have the resources available for everybody to do that everywhere in the world at one time." Following, and in accord with Watkins, General Charles Gabriel, the Air Force Chief of

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<sup>76</sup> Locher, 124-125.

Staff, testified that inter-service communication was strong and improving. Echoing his counterparts, the Army Chief of Staff, General John Wickham, argued the DoD was improving interoperability by rectifying issues previously identified. While the current crop of DoD leaders were on message, General (R) Edward “Shy” Meyer, the previous Army Chief of Staff, was supporting DoD reform. General Meyer told the committee the failure to “link our strategy and forces together” was “even more insidious” than the “hollowness” of the Army he warned against in 1979.<sup>77</sup>

General Meyer’s decision to back General Jones’ call for reform is not surprising when you consider his own history as a reformer. As Army Chief of Staff, General Meyers strove to rebuild the “hollowed out” post-Vietnam Army. Part of this rebuild included an Army image rebranding, which resulted in the Army’s memorable “Be All that You Can Be” Campaign.<sup>78</sup> Most notably regarding the CIA/DoD partnership, General Meyers was the first service leader to consolidate Special Forces capability within its own command when he established the 1<sup>st</sup> United States Army Special Operations Command in 1982. Meyer’s vision and his appreciation of the importance of special operations in future conflicts resulted in the creation of an Army component that would serve as a “point of interaction with SOCOM.”<sup>79</sup> After its creation in 1986, SOCOM in return served as a “point of interaction” with the CIA.

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<sup>77</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services. *Hearings on the Reorganization of the Department of Defense*. 98th Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> Sess., October-December 1985; 118, 149, 495, 559.

<sup>78</sup> Lock-Pullan, Richard, *US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation: From Vietnam to Iraq* (New York, NY: Routledge Press, 2006), 61.

<sup>79</sup> Paul, Christopher, Isaac R. Porche III, and Elliott Axelband, *The Other Quiet Professionals: Lessons for Future Cyber Professionals from the Evolution of Special Forces* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2014), 9.

Although the SASC hearings focused on defense transformation, Senator Nunn highlighted the importance of intelligence support to military operations in his opening statement. Senator Nunn, a Georgia Democrat and member of the SSCI, was a significant proponent of special operations forces and co-sponsored the 1985 bill that established SOCOM.<sup>80</sup> Nunn noted the indispensable link between operations and intelligence when he complemented the DoD officials on capturing the terrorists responsible for seizing the Achille Lauro Ocean Liner stating, “key and timely intelligence were the secrets of success, and the connectivity between the military and our intelligence community last week was superb.”<sup>81</sup> Senator Nunn followed up this praise by saying Senator Goldwater’s and his goal was to take the “all-star” service teams and turn them into a “joint service all-star team” to ensure the military can meet the needs of the nation. By highlighting the importance of intelligence to military operations and using it as a segue into his comments on the importance of teamwork in operations, Nunn linked defense transformation and intelligence support to operations.

Although Defense transformation was initially driven by congressional motivation and found little support within the DoD, the executive branch entered the fray in July 1985 when President Reagan issued *Executive Order 12526: President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management*. The order established a commission to “study issues surrounding defense management and organization” and identified ten specific areas the President wanted the commission to tackle. These ten areas included questions

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<sup>80</sup> United States Special Operations Command History. <http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/socom/2007history.pdf> (accessed 29 December 2015).

<sup>81</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services. *Hearings on the Reorganization of the Department of Defense*. 98th Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> Sess., October-December 1985, 5.; <http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/achille-lauro-hijacking-ends> for further details (accessed 18 March 2016).



surrounding the command and control issues and the interoperability issues that Congress was also looking to resolve.<sup>82</sup> President Reagan appointed David Packard, one of the co-founders of Hewlett Packard, to lead the commission composed of fifteen members drawn from the public and private sectors. A prominent Republican donor and former Assistant Secretary of Defense during the Nixon administration, it was hoped that Packard would bring a businessman's acumen to the helm of the commission chartered with improving efficiency.<sup>83</sup>

The commission's investigation discovered a convoluted and inefficient system that provided great sound bites for the President to push for government fiscal reform. Nearly three decades following publication of the commission's report, most people only remember the "\$600 toilet seat" and "\$475 hammer," but the Packard Commission symbolizes the executive branch coming on board with the legislative branch to reform the military.<sup>84</sup> Among the commission's final recommendations was strengthening the

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<sup>82</sup> Reagan, Ronald. *Executive Order 12526*, "President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management." Washington, DC.: Government Printing Office, 15 July 1985. Four questions touched on these issues: 1) Review the adequacy of the current authority and control of the Secretary of Defense in the oversight of the Military Departments, and the efficiency of the decision-making apparatus of the Office of the Secretary of Defense; 2) Review the responsibilities of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in providing for joint military advice and force development within a resource-constrained environment; 3) Review the adequacy of the Unified and Specified Command system in providing for the effective planning for and use of military forces; 4) Consider the value and continued role of intervening layers of command on the direction and control of military forces in peace and in war

<sup>83</sup> Hunt, Richard A. *Melvin Laird and the Foundation of the Post-Vietnam Military, 1969-1973*. [http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/secretaryofdefense/OSDSeries\\_Vol7.pdf](http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/secretaryofdefense/OSDSeries_Vol7.pdf) (accessed 26 January 2016); Locher, 294. Locher states in his book that "Packard believed the two (Reagan and Weinberger) 'wanted the commission to come in, look things over, and tell everybody that everything was fine and not to worry.'" According to Locher, Packard had a different view of his role and did not want to be a rubber stamp.

<sup>84</sup> Pincus, Walter. "Defense Procurement Problems Won't Go Away." *The Washington Post*, 2 May 2012. President Reagan implemented some of the recommendations after the release of the Commission's initial report and just prior to the release of its final report by issuing NSDD 219. Its implementation guidance included the requirement of DoD to report back to the President various policy changes that would empower the Chairman of the JCS and the combatant commanders.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff role by making him the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Advisor, and the Secretary of Defense and the recommendation to give unified and specified commanders flexibility in structuring their commands.<sup>85</sup> These two changes, which were also implemented as part of Goldwater-Nichols, contributed to the reduction in service parochialism and empowered the joint combatant commanders. The empowerment of the combatant commanders was the beginning of a significant rise in their influence, an influence that eventually had great effect on the role of intelligence support to military operations.<sup>86</sup>

On October 1, 1986, President Reagan signed the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act into law. After four long years of debate and negotiation, action to improve DoD planning and operations was finally initiated. Although the legislation focused on the DoD, the influence of Goldwater-Nichols was felt well beyond the Pentagon corridors. The structural and policy changes that came about through Goldwater-Nichols strengthened the DoD's influence and role in foreign policy.

Structurally, by weakening the services and empowering the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the legislation centralized power under a joint construct. This centralization of power increased the relative power of the DoD vis-à-vis other departments and agencies. Although service parochialism remained, it was weakened to the point where service scrabbles did not affect the overall strength and influence of the

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<sup>85</sup> U.S. Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management. *A Quest for Excellence*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, June 1986, 38.

<sup>86</sup> Priest, Dana, *The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America's Military* (New York, NY: W.W. Norton and Company, 2003), 94-96. Dana Priest's book explains the rise of the combatant commanders and how Goldwater-Nichols helped lead to their rise in power; Wise, Doug. Deputy Director Defense Intelligence Agency. Interview by author, Arlington, VA, 3 September 2105.

DoD. No longer was DoD a loose configuration of four services with limited power to reign in those organizations. Although the services retained influence and the power to man, train, and equip, military operations were now planned and executed jointly.

Structural reforms were not the only changes that increased DoD's influence. The "increased attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning" also significantly increased the influence of the DoD.<sup>87</sup> By linking national security strategy, defense strategy, and contingency planning, Goldwater-Nichols organized the DoD efforts and ensured there was a nesting/centralization of plans to go with the nesting/centralization of structure. The centralization of structure and plans enhanced the power of the DoD, creating a system the United States could utilize not only to fight wars, but to "shape the environment" in an arguably less physically intrusive, but more iterative fashion.

Part of increasing jointness and weakening the services, was the authority and responsibility Goldwater-Nichols gave the combatant commanders to plan and execute operations within their areas of responsibility (AOR). The legislation made clear the combatant commanders were now the DoD point person within their respected regions and the service component commanders were subordinate to them. While the 1947 National Security Act created the Unified Combatant Command System and the 1958 DoD Reorganization Act "delegated full operational control over forces assigned to them," prior to 1986, the power and influence of the services stifled any ability to plan

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<sup>87</sup> Public Law 99-53. *Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986*. 99<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1 October 1986.

and organize for joint operations.<sup>88</sup> Goldwater-Nichols changed this reality, empowering the joint combatant commands, thus initiating the rise of the combatant commanders' influence. Over time, the combatant commanders gained influence beyond the employment of forces and other military issues within their region. Eventually, the combatant commands' planning efforts evolved beyond contingency and warfighting to embrace a role in "shaping" their regions in pursuit of perceived American interests. This shaping went beyond the battlefield and involved all elements of national power.<sup>89</sup> As the combatant commanders' authority increased, so did their influence and sway in gaining resources outside the DoD.<sup>90</sup>

Goldwater-Nichols did not tackle the CIA/DoD partnership directly, but it introduced policy changes that made increased CIA/DoD collaboration necessary and structural changes that made it easier. The push to link military operations to strategy and policy that Goldwater-Nichols mandated increased the requirement for better intelligence support.<sup>91</sup> Although the concept of policy driving operations that Goldwater-

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<sup>88</sup> Feickert, Andrew. "The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands: Background and Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service, U.S. Library of Congress. <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42077.pdf> (accessed 12 December 2015).

<sup>89</sup> In 2006, US military joint doctrine introduced a six phase "phasing model." JP 3-0 states that Phase 0-Shape is "executed continuously with the intent to enhance international legitimacy and gain both adversaries and allies, developing allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations, improving information exchange and intelligence sharing, and providing US forces with peacetime and contingency access."

<sup>90</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. *Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1992 for the Intelligence Activities of the U.S. Government, the Intelligence Community Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other Purposes*. 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., 8 July 1991, 7.

<sup>91</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services. *Hearings on the Reorganization of the Department of Defense*. 98th Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> Sess., October-December 1985, 5; U.S. Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management. *A Quest for Excellence*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, June 1986, 20. The Packard Commission recommended that the DCI work with DoD leadership to "prepare a net assessment" that would inform "strategy."

Nichols sought to establish was not novel, the legislation renewed focus on its importance. The connection between policy and operations became of particular importance as the United States increased its participation in low-intensity conflicts that were not of an existential nature, but required iterative dialogue between commanders and policymakers to determine if they continued to be in America's interest. These low-intensity conflicts for limited policy objectives required a constant coordination between policymakers, military commanders, and the Intelligence Community. As Beirut showed, when the US deployed force for limited objectives, there had to be a constant dialogue to determine if the approach was leading to the desired condition or if the cost of action outweighed the potential benefits of action. Over time, as operations other than war (OOTW) became more prominent and the combatant commanders' role and influence in foreign policy expanded beyond waging wars to shaping the environment, they required constant intelligence support to increase understanding and enable operations.

Structural DoD changes created organizations that made CIA collaboration easier to conduct. As part of defense reorganization, Congress, supported by former and current defense officials, looked for ways to both strengthen and raise the "clout" of Special Operations Forces (SOF). In pursuit of these goals, Goldwater-Nichols established SOCOM as a functional combatant command responsible for SOF within all services. The rise of low-intensity conflicts (LIC) and the failures of Desert One, Beirut, and Grenada convinced policymakers of the need for a joint structure to command unconventional forces likely to fight in these environments. The centralization of SOF capabilities under a single command increased the efficiency of resource management

and improved interoperability.<sup>92</sup> Although not an articulated justification for SOCOM's establishment, a joint SOF command gave the CIA a point of contact for its paramilitary operations, something that became important for CIA/DoD collaboration following 9/11. SOCOM now meant CIA had a direct plug-in to all DoD SOF elements, making collaboration less complex.

Around this same period of time and resulting from some of the same events that motivated Congress to establish SOCOM, the CIA also instituted organizational changes that affected the evolution of the CIA/DoD partnership. In the aftermath of terrorist attacks, such as the 1983 Beirut Embassy and Marine Barracks bombings and the 1984 kidnapping and murder of the CIA's Beirut Chief of Station, the CIA increased its focus on terrorism.<sup>93</sup> The CIA established the Counterterrorism Center (CTC) in response to the Reagan administration's desire to have a single entity within the US Government focused on the international terrorist threat.<sup>94</sup> Although it is doubtful the Reagan administration could have predicted the future importance of United States' counterterrorism efforts, the creation of CTC provided a venue for future CIA/DoD collaboration- a venue that became valuable during joint CIA/DoD counterterrorism

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<sup>92</sup> USSOCOM, "United States Special Operations Command History," 16 April 1987, <http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/DOD/USSOCOM/2007history.pdf> (accessed 7 January 2013), 6-7.

<sup>93</sup> <https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2015-featured-story-archive/william-buckley.html> (accessed on 10 February 2017); "Body Believed to be CIA Agent and Hostage is Found in Lebanon," New York Times, 27 December 1991, <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/27/world/bodybelieved-to-be-cia-agent-and-hostage-is-found-in-lebanon.html> (accessed 21 February 2013) for information on the abduction and murder of William Buckley; Baer, Robert. *See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA's War on Terrorism*. New York, NY: Crown Publishers, 2002. Chapter 7 of Baer's book discusses the early days of CTC.

<sup>94</sup> Crumpton, Henry A, *The Art of Intelligence: Lessons from a Life in the CIA's Clandestine Service* (New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2012), 122.

operations following 9/11.

The need for greater intelligence support was identified during the reviews of Beirut and Grenada; the same reviews that identified the need for improved service interoperability. Through Goldwater-Nichols, the government had taken its first significant step towards service interoperability and improving the link between policy, strategy, and military operations. Even if successful, Goldwater-Nichols only fixed part of the problems identified during the reviews. The need for more intelligence support to military operations not only remained unresolved following Goldwater-Nichols, but the legislation instituted structural and policy changes that increased the intelligence support requirement.<sup>95</sup> Almost three years after passage of Goldwater-Nichols, events in Panama presented the United States an opportunity to test if the legislation fixed the interoperability issues that plagued the military. Panama confirmed the path initiated by Goldwater-Nichols, while at the same time reaffirming the need for greater intelligence support.

### **Operation Just Cause: Validating Defense Reform**

*“we achieved our objective (Defense reform), and now we go to the Civilian side of the coin.”*

**- Congressman Ike Skelton speaking to the House of Representatives about the military’s performance in Operation Just Cause, 5 February 1990**

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<sup>95</sup> Powell, Colin. Memo for the Secretary of Defense. *Report on the Role and Functions of the Armed Forces* (w/attachment), 2 November 1989.

Three years after the Goldwater-Nichols legislation was passed, Operation Just Cause provided an opportunity to validate its changes. Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega's support from Washington, D.C. had been eroding since 1986 when Senator Jesse Helms first held hearings on the "Situation in Panama."<sup>96</sup> A North Carolina Republican Senator who had fought against the planned US turnover of the Panama Canal since 1978, Helms' hearings were viewed skeptically by some as an attempt to use tragic events, such as the murder of Panamanian politician Dr. Hugh Spadafora, to stop the transfer of the canal.<sup>97</sup> For his part, Helms argued that turning over the canal to a country that was led by criminals, influenced by communists, and lacking freedom was not in the US interest. The hearings put at odds the Republican Senator and the Reagan administration, which acknowledged Panama's weakness, but argued that Panama was trying to improve governance and halt criminal activity.

To bolster his case against Panama and the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF), Helms invited the family of Dr. Spadafora to the hearings and allowed a family representative to read Spadafora's sister's statement. Dr. Spadafora, a former Panamanian government official and guerrilla fighter, was found headless after accusing Noriega of being "the drug kingpin of the region." During the hearing, Helms and others testified that Spadafora's death at the hands of the PDF showed the viciousness of the military regime, while the removal of President Barletta after he promised an independent

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<sup>96</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations. S Hrg. 99-832 *Situation in Panama*. 99th Congress, 2nd sess., 10 March and 21 April 1986.

<sup>97</sup> Kempe, Frederick, *Divorcing the Dictator: America's Bungled Affair with Noriega* (London, UK: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1990), 94 and 176.



inquiry into Spadafora's death showed their control. Elliott Abrams, then Assistant of Inter-American Affairs at the US Department of State, disputed Helms implication that Barletta was a popular president who was removed without cause following Spadafora's death. Abrams argued that Barletta was "vehemently opposed" "by the opposition party" and viewed as an ineffectual president by many within the population.<sup>98</sup>

Momentum against Noriega started to build in response to articles written about Noriega's involvement in the drug trade, his non-responsiveness to American demands, and his increased partnership with Cuba and other communist sympathizers.<sup>99</sup> In February 1988, Federal prosecutors indicted Noriega on drug trafficking charges, accusing him of receiving millions in bribes from Colombian cartels and allowing Panama to serve as a major drug transit point.<sup>100</sup> Following the indictment, the United States increased economic sanctions intended to drain Noriega's support in the region and within Panama to force his departure.<sup>101</sup> As the United States tightened its grip on Noriega, the Panamanian dictator started lashing out against US interests and holdings in Panama. Fed up with Noriega's behavior, President George Bush issued NSD 17, *US Actions in Panama*, on 22 July 1989, which "ordered military actions designed to assert U.S. treaty rights in Panama and to keep Noriega and his supporters off guard."

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<sup>98</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations. S Hrg. 99-832 *Situation in Panama*. 99th Congress, 2nd sess., 10 March and 21 April 1986, 4-5 and 48.

<sup>99</sup> Rosenberg, Scott. "Panama and Noriega: Our SOB," <http://history.emory.edu/home/documents/endeavors/volume1/Scotts.pdf> (accessed 29 December 2015).

<sup>100</sup> Shenon, Phillip. "Noriega Indicted by U.S. for Link to Illegal Drugs," 6 February 1988. [http://www.nytimes.com/1988/02/06/world/noriega-indicted-by-us-for-links-to-illegal-drugs.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/1988/02/06/world/noriega-indicted-by-us-for-links-to-illegal-drugs.html?_r=0) (accessed 16 December 2015).

<sup>101</sup> Rosenberg, Scott. "Panama and Noriega: Our SOB," <http://history.emory.edu/home/documents/endeavors/volume1/Scotts.pdf> (accessed 29 December 2015).

The sanctions and other pressure tactics directed towards Noriega did not compel Noriega to cede to the United States' demands. As the US relationship with Noriega further unraveled, his reliance on the United States' enemies such as Libya, Nicaragua and Cuba increased. Discouraged by the ineffectiveness of sanctions to bring down Noriega, the Bush administration tepidly supported an October 1989 PDF coup attempt by Panamanian Army Major Fernando Quezada. When the coup attempt failed, the United States started to lose hope that internal pressure would bring Noriega's downfall.<sup>102</sup>

Panama's legislature, encouraged by Noriega's outlandish rhetoric, declared that a "state of war existed with the United States" and stepped up the PDF's aggressive behavior towards US forces in Panama.<sup>103</sup> On Saturday, December 16, 1989, the tension between Panama and the United States hit a boiling point when two separate PDF checkpoints fired at a group of United States military officers out for dinner. The hail of bullets ended up killing 1<sup>st</sup> Lieutenant Robert Paz, a young Marine who was born in Colombia to an American mother and Colombian father. The death of Lieutenant Paz was a catalyst that pushed the United States towards an invasion.<sup>104</sup>

The military planning for possible operations in Panama had been occurring since February 1988 and considered different options and force packages, ranging from a

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<sup>102</sup> <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/09/13/world/us-expands-its-sanctions-against-panama.html> (accessed 18 March 2016).; <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/10/08/world/failed-coup-bush-team-noriega-special-report-panama-crisis-disarray-hindered.html?pagewanted=all> (accessed 18 March 2016).: Kempe, 273, 281 283, and 293.

<sup>103</sup> <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1981-1988/central-america> (accessed 18 March 2016).

<sup>104</sup> Wallace, Linda and Mark Fazlollah. "The Man Whose Death Led to Warfare," 22 December 1989. [http://articles.philly.com/1989-12-22/news/26158426\\_1\\_jaime-paz-animal-science-panamanians](http://articles.philly.com/1989-12-22/news/26158426_1_jaime-paz-animal-science-panamanians) (accessed 16 December 2015).

minimal military footprint using forces already present in Panama to protect American citizens to a large-scale corps size invasion of Panama. When President Bush became frustrated with General Frederick Woerner's behavior and criticism of policymakers in Washington, Bush decided to replace General Woerner as the Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) commander with General Maxwell Thurman.<sup>105</sup> General Thurman, a life-long bachelor who was married to his work, was a hyper-committed officer the Army Chief of Staff General Meyers selected in the early 1980s to repair the Army Brand. The leader behind the "Be all you can be" campaign, Thurman was a well-known officer who was serving as the Army Training and Doctrine Commander (TRADOC) when he was tapped for the SOUTHCOM post.

The year and a half of planning and preparation for the Panama operation culminated on December 20, 1989 when 24,500 American troops initiated combat operations leading to the capture, extradition, trial and conviction of Noriega. In Congress, the success of Operation Just Cause was celebrated and viewed as validation of the defense transformation actions initiated through Goldwater-Nichols legislation. Congressman Ike Skelton, a Missouri Democrat recognized for his pro-defense stances applauded the military for avoiding repeats of the command, control, and communication issues that plagued the Grenada Operation. Congressman Skelton, whose own physical ailments kept him out of the military, had two sons who served as career military officers, including one who previously served in Panama.

Although the tenor of the post-Panama invasion discussion was positive, there were some stray notes regarding the operation that Congress wanted corrected. At the

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<sup>105</sup> Kempe, 363 and 374.

forefront of these concerns was the issue of intelligence support to military operations that Goldwater-Nichols had not resolved. During his February 5<sup>th</sup> appraisal of the “Armed Forces” performance in Panama, Congressman Skelton criticized the “civilian side of the equation.” Regarding political efforts, Skelton denounced the ill preparedness for the post-invasion conditions and the Department of State for not preparing enough for the potential of an invasion. Skelton reserved his harshest criticism for intelligence, which he argued, “failed us on a number of accounts.” Skelton believed that better intelligence would have resulted in the earlier capture of Noriega and awareness of the threat posed by Noriega’s “Dignity Battalions” that continued to fight after the PDF surrendered.<sup>106</sup> Although the service interoperability issues identified in the Urgent Fury and the Barracks Bombing reviews significantly improved after Goldwater-Nichols, the intelligence issues identified during the same reviews remained unresolved.

In late January 1990, barely a month after the invasion, the HPSCI contacted DoD, CIA, and the Department of State (DoS) requesting their participation in a hearing on “intelligence planning and support to Operation Just Cause.” The HPSCI letter to Secretary of Defense Cheney requested the participation of General Thurman and top intelligence officers to gain their perspective on intelligence support during the planning and execution of Operation Just Cause. The HPSCI was “particularly” interested in “coordination among human intelligence entities and lessons learned with respect to the adequacy of organic tactical intelligence collection, processing, and dissemination

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<sup>106</sup> U.S. Congress, House Congressional Record Daily Edition. *Operation Just Cause: Preliminary Session*. 101st Cong., 2nd sess., 5 February 1990.; Langer, Emily. “Ike Skelton, Congressman, who led House Armed Services Committee, dies at 81.” *The Washington Post* (29 October 2013). [https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ike-skelton-congressman-who-led-house-armed-services-committee-dies-at-81/2013/10/29/ba8ae458-40ad-11e3-9c8b-e8deeb3c755b\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ike-skelton-congressman-who-led-house-armed-services-committee-dies-at-81/2013/10/29/ba8ae458-40ad-11e3-9c8b-e8deeb3c755b_story.html) (accessed 16 December 2015).

systems for special operations forces in a low-intensity conflict environment.”<sup>107</sup> It might seem odd that a HPSCI review of intelligence support was being pursued immediately following the operation, but documents reveal that concerns regarding intelligence support to operations in Panama surfaced before the invasion even occurred.

A memo dated November 21, 1989 (a month prior to the invasion) from the chairs and vice-chairs of the SASC and SSCI to Mr. James Locher, then Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflicts (ASD-SOLIC), requested information on intelligence support to low intensity conflicts.<sup>108</sup> Mr. Locher, a seasoned national security expert who had been one of the principal staffers working on the Goldwater-Nichols legislation, was asked about his view on the importance of intelligence support the previous month during his Senate confirmation hearing. During questioning, Senator Cohen, a Republican Senator from Maine and future Secretary of Defense who had co-sponsored the legislation creating SOCOM and the ASD-SOLIC position, asked Locher his view on the “importance of intelligence in dealing with terrorism, insurgency, and related problems.” Locher responded to Cohen that “intelligence is one of our most important resources” and that he would “begin working to change some of the priorities of the intelligence community.”

Opinions on the importance of intelligence within the burgeoning international environment were a common theme throughout the Senate confirmation hearings of

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<sup>107</sup> Department of Defense. Secretary, Joint Staff Directive. *Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Hearing to Address Intelligence Planning and Support to Operation Just Cause*, 31 January 1990.

<sup>108</sup> Department of Defense. Secretary, Joint Staff Directive. *Intelligence Support to Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict Activities-Congressional Report*. (This document included two attachments, an ASD-SOLIC memo and the actual request from the senators).

President Bush's nominees. Some of the nominees, such as Locher and Donald Atwood seemed to link changes in intelligence to defense transformation efforts enacted three years prior. During his confirmation testimony to become Assistant Secretary of Defense, Atwood argued that the interests of the nation "will require closer coordination among those responsible for diplomatic, military, and intelligence matters."<sup>109</sup> In June 1990, President Bush furthered the pursuit to unify the national security organizations in the new environment when he issued National Security Review (NSR) 27 *National Security Review of Low Intensity Conflict*.<sup>110</sup> The document, which directed a government wide review on how the United States "assists in the prevention and resolution of low-intensity conflicts," focused on interagency integration and how the United States government should be structured to wage low-intensity conflicts.<sup>111</sup> The issuance of this document acknowledged a deficiency in how the United States' conducts interagency operations. Although the CIA/DoD relationship was not specifically mentioned, the increased focus on low-intensity conflicts significantly affected both organizations in the future.

NSR 27 and the congressional testimony was a continuation of the nesting of policy, strategy and plans the Goldwater-Nichols legislation started to tackle three years earlier. The Goldwater-Nichols legislation was a necessary, but not sufficient step

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<sup>109</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services. *Nominations Before the Armed Services Committee*. 101st Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> Sess., March-November 1989, 689 and 99.

<sup>110</sup> This followed *NSR-12: Review of National Defense Strategy* that was published in March 1989 and looked at how DoD had to adapt to the changing global environment in consideration of the reduced budgets.

<sup>111</sup> Bush, George HW. *National Security Review 27: National Security Review of Low Intensity Conflict*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 11 June 1990.

towards improving coordination and collaboration among the United States' national security organizations. Congressman Skelton's remarks following Operation Just Cause highlights the mood amongst many executive and legislative branch officials, "we achieved our objective (Defense reform), and now we go to the Civilian side of the coin."<sup>112</sup>

The decade of the 1980s began shortly after the tragic failure of Operation Eagle Claw, the Iranian hostage rescue mission that served as a catalyst for defense reform efforts in the mid-1980s. Although parochialism initially dominated the DoD, with services and their congressional overseers pushing against any proposals that weakened institutional powers, visionaries like Generals Jones and Meyer, and Senators Goldwater and Nichols, eventually won support for defense reform. Although the passage of Goldwater-Nichols instituted important changes within the DoD, the issues identified during reviews of Grenada and Beirut were not purely defense related. In order to fix all the operational issues, the executive and legislative branches needed to increase their aperture beyond DoD to include the Intelligence Community. Newly appointed leaders throughout the Bush administration agreed that changes were required to posture the United States' national security institutions for the changing global environment and

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<sup>112</sup> U.S. Congress, House Congressional Record Daily Edition. *Operation Just Cause: Preliminary Session*. 101st Cong., 2nd sess., 5 February 1990. The full quote was, "Militarily, I think we earned a good A-minus for our forces. As I said, the shortcoming was in the intelligence area. And we did learn, as the gentleman from Mississippi knows, we did learn from the mistakes made in Grenada. The communication mistakes were horrendous, but we did well despite that; but none of those Grenada mistakes reoccurred. As long as our military, with its capable leadership-and particular I want to give applause to General Max Thurman down in Panama-as long as our military learns from the past, they will do better in the days ahead. This is a prime example of learning from the mistakes of the past and doing a good job. We achieved our objective, and now we go on to the civilian side of the coin."

initiated efforts to incorporate those changes.<sup>113</sup> Although these efforts began shortly after the Bush Team occupied their desks, actions by another dictator nearly 8,000 miles away distracted focus from these proposed changes, while simultaneously providing evidence to bolster the case for further reform.

Less than a year after Panama, Desert Storm offered a second opportunity, on a much grander stage, to validate the effectiveness of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. The overwhelming victory reaffirmed the increased service jointness, but highlighted continued shortfalls in intelligence support to military operations. Congressional reviews of Desert Storm specifically highlighted the shortfalls in CIA support to military operations and these reviews eventually resulted in changes to CIA structure. Although CIA HUMINT support to military operations had been an ongoing issue for the last decade, Desert Storm served as a catalyst for change in the 1990s.

### **Chapter Three: The Gulf War**

If one considered CIA's traditional role prior to the Gulf War as the basis for managing expectations of its support level during Desert Storm, there should not have

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<sup>113</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services. *Nominations Before the Armed Services Committee*. 101st Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> Sess., March-November 1989.



been much expectation for the CIA to have a significant role supporting military operations. The CIA's focus during the Cold War was on conducting covert action, recruiting long-term assets with access to foreign intelligence, and providing strategic analysis. Although some of the intelligence CIA collected was useful to military commanders, without assets already in place when operations began, the asset recruitment process was not something that could be quickly initiated to fill military commanders' immediate information needs.

Despite this reality and understanding by some military intelligence leaders that the CIA had a limited role, congressional overseers singled out the CIA for failure to support military operations.<sup>114</sup> In addition to acknowledging the need to enhance HUMINT intelligence to understand “the morale and intentions of Iraqi forces and leaders,” the SSCI took previous criticism of CIA's failure to support planning efforts a step further by arguing the CIA had a role in supporting military commanders during peacetime and needed to be more responsive to DoD's requirements.<sup>115</sup> Expanding the CIA's role in supporting military operations to peacetime and giving regional combatant commander's peacetime control of national systems was a significant step towards subordinating national intelligence to the combatant commander.

The Bush administration had been trying to normalize America's relationship with Iraq following the end of the eight-year Iraq-Iran War in 1988. Realizing that

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<sup>114</sup> McConnell, Michael, Vice Admiral (R). Former Director of National Intelligence, former Director National Security Agency, and former J2 Joint Chiefs of Staff. Interview by author, Leesburg, VA, 8 August 2015.

<sup>115</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. *Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1992 for the Intelligence Activities of the U.S. Government, the Intelligence Community Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other Purposes*. 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., 8 July 1991, 5- 6.

Saddam was a tyrant, but understanding the importance of maintaining influence in the Middle East, the Bush administration hoped diplomatic engagement, military exchanges and economic incentives could temper his behavior. On October 2, 1989, the administration published National Security Directive 26, *U.S. Policy Towards the Persian Gulf*, which stated, “normal relations between the United States and Iraq would serve our longer-term interests and promote stability in both the Gulf and the Middle East.”<sup>116</sup> Although the administration acknowledged Saddam’s brutality, they believed Iraq’s economic deprivation, coupled with America’s engagement, could moderate the regimes behavior and allow it to serve as a counter-weight to its Iranian neighbor. The administration’s actions paid dividends initially, with Congress relenting from economic sanctions and Saddam agreeing to compensate American families who lost loved ones when an Iraqi missile struck the USS Stark in 1987 during the Iran-Iraq War.<sup>117</sup>

Despite the efforts to normalize the United States-Iraq relationship, Saddam’s behavior became increasingly belligerent towards his fellow Arab League members, particularly Kuwait, who refused to forgive Iraq’s debt and who Iraq accused of

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<sup>116</sup> Bush, George HW. *National Security Directive 26: U.S. Policy Towards the Persian Gulf*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 02 October 1989.

<sup>117</sup> Bush, George HW and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed* (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1999), Kindle Location, 6283.; Swain, Richard M, *Lucky War: Third Army in Desert Storm* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1991), 4-6.; Bacevich, Andrew, *America’s War for the Greater Middle East* (New York, NY: Random House, 2016), Kindle Location 971-995; <sup>117</sup> Gordon, Michael R. and Bernard E. Trainor, *The General’s War* (New York, NY: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), 12. Some dispute that the US was looking to improve the relationship with Iraq. For example, Richard Swain describes how Schwarzkopf focused more on the Iraqi threat beginning in 1989 and cites Schwarzkopf changing their Operations Plan (OPLAN) to focus on “Iraqi threat to Saudi Arabia...be made the priority for Central Command planning.” Andrew Bacevich book adds to Swain’s perspective by arguing that CENTCOM embraced Iraq as a threat to remain relevant and justify budgets. Gordon and Trainor make similar argument to Bush and Scowcroft, arguing the Bush administration tried to improve the relationship with Iraq after the Iraq-Iran War, citing Schwarzkopf’s 1989 proposal to do military officer exchanges with Iraq as evidence.

exceeding oil quotas. On July 16, 1990, Tariq Aziz, the Iraqi Foreign Minister sent the Arab League a letter threatening military action if Kuwait continued to ignore Iraqi concern over oil quotas, demands for debt forgiveness, and a resolution of border disputes. A week later, Iraq was moving “war materiel” to its border with Kuwait, and unbeknownst to the US at the time, ordering commercial imagery of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in preparation for an invasion. During this period, the United States was planning for and debating flexible deterrent options (FDO), including moving additional naval and airpower into the region, to convince Saddam to back down. Confidant the Arab League would resolve the situation, and not wanting to escalate too far, the U.S. settled for deploying two KC-135 refueling aircraft and a C-131 in support of the United Arab Emirates’ attempt to extend their Mirage Fighter aircraft range.

On July 25, 1990, with Iraq concerned about possible deployment of U.S. forces in the region and with tension increasing in the Middle East, Saddam “summoned” April Glaspie, the U.S. Ambassador in Iraq, to his palace.<sup>118</sup> Ambassador Glaspie was later criticized for not firmly warning Saddam to halt his aggressive actions towards Kuwait, but confidence in diplomatic efforts led by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Saddam’s own words of restraint provided hope the Iraq-Kuwait squabble could be resolved peacefully. Despite an increase in oil prices and reassurances from Arab allies that tension was easing, Iraq continued to increase its troop strength along the Kuwait border, reaching more than 100,000 on July 31, 1990.<sup>119</sup> The next day, citing disagreements over territorial and financial claims, the Iraq delegation walked out of

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<sup>118</sup> Gordon and Trainor, 14-16.

<sup>119</sup> Bush and Scowcroft, Kindle Location 6405.

negotiations with Kuwait.<sup>120</sup> Brent Scowcroft notified President Bush late on the evening of August 1, 1990 that Saddam Hussein's forces had just invaded Kuwait.<sup>121</sup>

The United Nations Security Council immediately condemned Saddam's actions and the United States started redirecting Naval and Air Force capability towards the region in hopes of persuading Saddam to rethink his decisions and to prepare for the possibility of military action. Over the next three days, President Bush discussed response options with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and nations in the region.<sup>122</sup> Hoping that economic pressure would compel Saddam Hussein to depart from Kuwait without resorting to military action, the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 661 on August 6, 1990, cutting off exports to and imports from Iraq.<sup>123</sup>

Feeling the pressure building from the coalition of odd bedfellows, Saddam's actions became even more desperate when on August 8<sup>th</sup> he started to "round up" foreign nationals in Kuwait, detaining them locally or moving them to Baghdad to serve as human-shields against an attack.<sup>124</sup> Saddam's late August press conference with western children taken from their homes in Kuwait angered the world. Although Saddam intended the kidnappings to buy him time, the image of him asking a visibly shaken British five year old named Stuart Lockwood about his breakfast dietary preferences only

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<sup>120</sup> Gordon and Trainor, 14-16 and 27.

<sup>121</sup> Bush and Scowcroft, Kindle Location 6361 and 6195.

<sup>122</sup> Bush, George HW. "Remarks and an Exchange with Reporters on the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait," 5 August 1990. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolsey, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=18741> (accessed 29 December 2015).

<sup>123</sup> <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/575/11/IMG/NR057511.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed 25 March 2016).

<sup>124</sup> Department of Defense. *Final Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War*. Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, April 1992, 70.

hardened the UN's resolve.<sup>125</sup> By the end of December, the hostages were released and Saddam's stay in Kuwait was running short.<sup>126</sup>

With Saddam ignoring warnings, Kuwait under Iraqi control, the region disrupted and many nations fearing an attack into Saudi Arabia that would give Saddam control of forty-percent of the world's oil production, the United States and its coalition partners prepared to build combat power in the region. During Desert Shield, the United States and its coalition partners amassed over 500,000 troops in the region between August 1990 and January 1991 to compel Saddam's retreat from Kuwait and to deter an invasion of Saudi Arabia. On January 16, 1991, when the threat of force failed to compel Saddam's withdrawal, the coalition transitioned to Desert Storm by initiating an air campaign focused on Iraqi leadership and military capabilities.<sup>127</sup>

Twenty-five years later, it is easy to forget how controversial the decision to go to war with Iraq was. Closer to Vietnam than to today, a powerful collection of voices warned against being drawn into a quagmire that would sap the United States of its blood and treasure. On January 12, 1991, Senator Sam Nunn, the SASC Chairman whose legislation created SOCOM in 1986, and Maine Senator George Mitchell offered up a resolution to give economic sanctions "more time."<sup>128</sup> Arguing the United States was

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<sup>125</sup> <https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2015/jun/05/that's-me-picture-stuart-lockwood-saddam-hussein-iraq> (accessed 29 December 2015); See news conference at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7q5KMe7LPRI> (accessed 29 December 2015).

<sup>126</sup> Department of Defense. *Final Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War*. Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, April 1992, 693.

<sup>127</sup> Gordon and Trainor, ix and 205.

<sup>128</sup> <http://www.c-span.org/video/?15665-1/senate-session&start=11899> (accessed 04 January 2016).

“playing a winning hand” because economic sanctions and the Desert Shield defense were working, Nunn and Mitchell urged the Senate to restrain the dogs of war. Senator Frank Lautenberg, the second term New Jersey Senator and World War II veteran had earlier warned of the terrible American casualties that could result from a ground war with Iraq. Citing a recent Pentagon order of 16,099 body bags as evidence, Lautenberg questioned whether Iraq was worth the potential cost in blood.<sup>129</sup> The House of Representatives was also arguing for restraint. On October 30, 1990, House Speaker Thomas Foley sent a letter to President Bush, arguing that war with Iraq would not be a “low-intensity conflict,” but could result in a “massive loss of lives” (“including 10,000 to 50,000 Americans”).<sup>130</sup>

Those arguing for restraint and to allow more time for sanctions to work were not just Democratic congressmen, but included two former Secretaries of Defense, two former Chairmen of the Joints Chiefs of Staff and a former NSA director. Casper Weinberger, the author of an eponymous doctrine, which articulated the use of force as a last resort, argued for more patience. James Schlesinger, a former DCI and Secretary of Defense, warned that the United States’ increasingly aggressive posture and rhetoric towards Saddam risked splintering the coalition. General David Jones and Admiral William Howe praised President Bush for his actions to date, but advised that sanctions required more time. LTG (R) William Odom compared the “scale” of a tank war

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<sup>129</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate. *Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution*. 102<sup>nd</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., 11 Jan 1991, 8.

<sup>130</sup> Congressman Thomas Foley to President George H.W. Bush, 30 October 1990, President George H.W. Bush Library Archives, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX; Diamond, 149. Diamond discusses the casualty debate in his book and said Nunn had mentioned the estimate figure of 10-20,000 casualties.

between the US and Iraq to the World War II Battle of Kursk between Germany and Russia; cautioning Congress not to underestimate the potential costs in blood and treasure that war with Iraq might incur.<sup>131</sup> Despite these voices of caution, the United States Senate passed a resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq on January 13, 1991.

The campaign plan for Iraq was a four-phased operation that began with air and naval strikes focused on disabling Iraq's political and military communication systems, knocking out their air defense capability and destroying Iraqi ground forces to soften their defense and limit the number of coalition casualties during the ground phase. On January 17, 1991, Iraq's black sky lit up as Air Force cruise and Navy Tomahawk missiles rained down, smashing Iraq's communication, air defense and NBC capabilities.<sup>132</sup> Leading the war effort were two infantrymen, who were very different, despite both being Army generals.

General Colin Powell was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff whose experience in Vietnam as a young officer framed how he viewed war's subordination to policy.<sup>133</sup> A native New Yorker and graduate of the City University of New York Reserve Officer Training Corps, Powell had spent the majority of his general officer years advising President Reagan and senior civilian defense officials. A man universally

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<sup>131</sup> Bush and Scowcroft, Kindle Location 8476. Scowcroft and Bush discuss the hearings and how Bush believed the "witness list had been stacked in favor of individuals who favored sanctions as the only option."; Senate. Committee on Armed Services. *Crisis in the Persian Gulf Region: U.S. Policy Options and Implications*. 101st Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> sess., Sep-Dec 1991, 464.

<sup>132</sup> Department of Defense. *Final Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War*. Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, April 1992.

<sup>133</sup> Hew Strachan's book *On War* discusses Carl von Clausewitz's influence on General Powell and how Powell's reading of Howard and Paret's version, coupled with Powell's Vietnam experience, helped him frame the Policy-War link.

revered for his intelligence, strategic thought, and political astuteness, he was also respected for his humility and professionalism. Powell's effect on the military and his fellow service member's fondness for him lingered long after his 1993 retirement.

With General Powell ensuring the nesting of policy and military operations from his Joint Chiefs of staff position, General Norman Schwarzkopf, Admiral Metcalf's deputy during Urgent Fury, led the fight as the Central Command (CENTCOM) commander. Schwarzkopf a bear of a man, whose father led the New Jersey State Police during the Lindbergh kidnapping investigation and later served as the US military advisor to the Shah of Iran, had a mixed reputation in the military. Some viewed Schwarzkopf as a soldier's soldier whose Pattonesque mannerisms, high standards, and hard-charging personality was what made many great warriors. Other officers who worked for him or served near him viewed Schwarzkopf's motives more suspiciously, even contemptuously. To these individuals, Schwarzkopf was a self-promoting, egotistical officer who berated juniors for failing to attain standards he himself did not achieve.<sup>134</sup> Despite the ire of many younger officers, Schwarzkopf continued to rise and, following Desert Storm, his public reputation as one of America's greatest generals resulted in congressional legislation recommending him for a fifth star. Although the legislation never passed, merely recommending his placement in the pantheon of Generals of the Army, underscores his reputation following Desert Storm.

On January 30<sup>th</sup>, two weeks into the air war, General Schwarzkopf swaggered up to the podium to exhibit for the world the awesome destruction and effectiveness of the

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<sup>134</sup> One retired military officer recalled to the author, then LTG Schwarzkopf addressing an auditorium full of junior officers at Fort Lewis Washington during an I-Corp Officer Professional Development (OPD) session. As Schwarzkopf, who was not known for his slender build, berated the audience of officers about height and weight, this young officer sat amazed and disgusted at the hypocrisy.



coalition's air strikes. During the press conference, the CENTCOM commander, with assistance from his lead air planner, Brigadier General (Brig Gen) Buster Glosson, displayed aerial footage of Iraqi SCUDS being destroyed during air strikes.<sup>135</sup> This footage was intended to highlight the effectiveness of the air strikes and the precision of America's new weaponry. Although the footage was impressive, it did not depict the destruction of mobile Iraqi SCUDS. After the press conference, intelligence analysts discovered that imagery showed the supposed SCUD sites were actually Jordanian fuel trucks.<sup>136</sup> RADM Mike McConnell, the Joint Chiefs J2, took the information and went to speak with General Colin Powell about the mistaken SCUDS. After receiving the information, General Powell picked up the phone to inform General Schwarzkopf that the SCUD destruction he so proudly displayed were actually fuel trucks.<sup>137</sup> The mistaken SCUDS reflected a significant ongoing debate between the CIA and CENTCOM on how to assess battlefield damage.

After weeks of bombing Saddam's government facilities and military capabilities, CENTCOM was ready to initiate the ground phase of the operation. Believing that Iraq's defense was weakened to an acceptable level, Schwarzkopf argued to unleash the

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<sup>135</sup> <http://www.nytimes.com/1992/06/24/opinion/operation-desert-sham.html> (accessed 29 December 2015); see video of press conference at <http://www.c-span.org/video/?16102-1/us-centcom-military-news-briefing> (accessed 29 December 2015).

<sup>136</sup> Atkinson, Rick, *Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War* (New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing, 1993), 232; McConnell, Michael. Vice Admiral (R). Former Director of National Intelligence, former Director National Security Agency, and former J2 Joint Chiefs of Staff. Interview by author, Leesburg, VA, 8 August 2015. Atkins book described a CIA analyst discovering that they were actually Jordanian fuel trucks and a DIA analyst saying they might have been milk trucks. During a 2015 interview, McConnell remembered one of his analysts giving him the news that the reported SCUDS were Jordanian fuel trucks.

<sup>137</sup> McConnell, Michael, Vice Admiral (R). Former Director of National Intelligence, former Director National Security Agency, and former J2 Joint Chiefs of Staff. Interview by author, Leesburg, VA, 8 August 2015.

coalition's ground forces to push the remainder of Saddam's forces from Kuwait. The debate over whether or not to use ground forces had been building in Washington for weeks, with Generals Powell and Schwarzkopf believing ground forces were required to remove Saddam's forces from Kuwait and Air Force leadership confident that, if given enough time, air power alone could bring Iraq's departure.<sup>138</sup>

At the time of Desert Storm, there was no standard procedure for calculating battle damage assessments (BDA). Since the coalition's ground forces would be the ones facing off against Iraq's Army, General Schwarzkopf deferred to Army Central Command (ARCENT) to determine the criteria for calculating BDA. Uncertain the best approach to assess damage, the Army went through numerous iterations of establishing and then adjusting the assessment criteria based on intelligence derived from various sources. Initially using imagery, the Army found it difficult to assess damage to Iraqi capability based on the destruction done to a few pieces of equipment captured in high-resolution photos. When this approach proved unsuitable, the Army started to use pilot reporting to calculate BDA.<sup>139</sup> One of the criteria ARCENT elected to use was to count seventy-five percent of the "kills" A-10 pilots reported.<sup>140</sup> A number of intelligence agencies back in Washington, D.C., particularly the CIA, criticized ARCENT's process, arguing it greatly inflated the percentage of Iraq's military capability that was either disabled or destroyed. Based on the criticism, ARCENT reduced its percentage of

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<sup>138</sup> Gordon and Trainor, 178-179.

<sup>139</sup> Atkinson, 234-235.

<sup>140</sup> U.S. Congress, House Oversight and Investigations Sub-Committee of the Committee on the Armed Services. *Intelligence Successes and Failures in Operations Desert Storm/Shield*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 16 August 1993, 18-19.

declared “kills” to around thirty-three percent, but the Intelligence Community still claimed inflation.<sup>141</sup> The debate over BDA was more than an office water cooler discussion, it had political ramifications. The administration was concerned about casualties and wanted to reduce Iraqi combat power by fifty percent before initiating the ground invasion

The disagreement between the CIA and CENTCOM came to President Bush’s attention on February 21, 1991, when DCI Webster briefed him on the issue.<sup>142</sup> The CIA and DoD tried to work through the disagreement, but their BDA calculations were so far off that they were unable to settle the dispute. Since the ground invasion was contingent on the weakening of Iraq’s military capability, the BDA controversy had to be resolved before a decision to invade was made. Brent Scowcroft, Bush’s national security advisor, was the individual responsible for mediating the CIA/DoD BDA disagreement and recommending to Bush if it was time for a ground invasion.<sup>143</sup>

RADM McConnell’s phone rang on February 21, 1991; on the other line was his boss, General Powell telling him to “get your stuff, we are going to the White House.” After he hung up the phone, RADM McConnell collected his briefing “kit,” which he had created for his various White House briefings on the Iraq campaign and hurried off to a waiting car.<sup>144</sup> After crossing the Potomac and pulling through the White House gates,

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<sup>141</sup> Department of Defense. *Final Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War*. Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, April 1992, 192.

<sup>142</sup> Vickers, Robert. “Desert Storm and the BDA Controversy.” [http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/DOC\\_0006122350.pdf](http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/DOC_0006122350.pdf) (accessed 5 April 2016).

<sup>143</sup> Atkinson, 346.

<sup>144</sup> McConnell, Michael, Vice Admiral (R). Former Director of National Intelligence, former Director National Security Agency, and former J2 Joint Chiefs of Staff. Interview by author, Leesburg,

Powell and McConnell walked to Brent Scowcroft's West Wing office for a meeting with Cheney, Scowcroft, DCI Webster, and David Armstrong, a senior intelligence officer. On Scowcroft's meeting agenda that day was a discussion over the CIA and DoD's divergent BDA(s) and whether it was time to initiate the ground phase.<sup>145</sup>

Lieutenant General (Lt. Gen) (R) Brent Scowcroft graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1947, the same year the DoD, United States Air Force (USAF) and CIA were established through the National Security Act. An intellectual heavyweight with a PhD from Columbia University, he rose to the senior ranks of the military via a non-traditional path that included professor stints at both West Point and the Air Force Academy, along with numerous prestigious staff officer positions within the Pentagon.<sup>146</sup> General Scowcroft retired from the Air Force in 1975, but his career as a trusted advisor continued into numerous administrations. That day in February 1991, Scowcroft, the retired general had to balance his military expertise with his political judgment. The anxiety over the prospect of thousands of dead American troops concerned policymakers whose memory of the Vietnam stalemate lingered fresh in their mind. With this fear in the forefront, Scowcroft's job was to determine if Iraqi forces were weakened enough to limit an American body count.

General Scowcroft looked at the representatives from the DoD and CIA and told them they had to come to some resolution on the BDA dispute. David Armstrong, one of the CIA representatives, admitted that Iraq's Army was "highly degraded," but raised

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VA, 8 August 2015.

<sup>145</sup> Atkinson, 346-347.

<sup>146</sup> <http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/Biographies/Display/tabid/225/Article/104997/lieutenant-general-brent-scowcroft.aspx>.

concern with the reliability of CENTCOM's evolving BDA methodology that reported Iraqi combat units between 42-72% strength, while the CIA's estimates placed them at 75-85% strength.<sup>147</sup> McConnell told the group that even though the Intelligence Community had "amassed back here the best talent in the US government" to support the commander and was willing to send the "experts forward", there was a limit on how much analysts back in Washington D.C. could know about conditions on the ground in Iraq. He then pointed out that "our capability to know was imagery based and the opportunity for imagery was only twice a day."<sup>148</sup> Supporting, Cheney's and Powell's position, McConnell stated that CENTCOM had access to aircraft photography, pilot reporting, radio intercepts and other intelligence resources that analysts back in Washington could not access.<sup>149</sup> After listening to the two arguments, Scowcroft ended the meeting and a few days later the ground phase began.

Whether or not the BDA assessments were accurate, the ineffectiveness, pliability, and lack of fight within most of the Iraqi units became apparent once the ground war kicked-off on February 24, 1991.<sup>150</sup> In roughly 100 hours, coalition forces swept into Kuwait and Iraq, easily defeating Iraqi forces and forcing Saddam's surrender. The fear of fighting the world's fourth largest military quickly evaporated and the

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<sup>147</sup> Atkinson, 346-347.

<sup>148</sup> McConnell, Michael, Vice Admiral (R). Former Director of National Intelligence, former Director National Security Agency, and former J2 Joint Chiefs of Staff. Interview by author, Leesburg, VA, 8 August 2015.

<sup>149</sup> Atkinson, 346-347.

<sup>150</sup> Stewart, John F. Jr., "Operation Desert Storm The Military Intelligence Story: A View from the G-2 3D U.S. Army," April 1991. <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB39/document5.pdf> (accessed 31 December 2015). The ARCENT G2 report argued that the ease of the invasion proved that ARCENT assessments were accurate. The final Congressional report argues they were greatly exaggerated/inaccurate.

jubilation of a decisive coalition victory quickly ensued. For the United States, the victory reaffirmed changes brought about through the Goldwater-Nichols legislation and helped exorcise some of the ghosts of Vietnam.<sup>151</sup>

### **Building a JIC on the Fly**

As General Schwarzkopf and his staff prepared for operations to oust Saddam from Kuwait, RADM Mike McConnell was at the Pentagon building a coalition of his own to support the war effort. A future Director of the National Security Agency and Director of National Intelligence (DNI), McConnell was at the time a recently frocked RADM who had spent his career in Naval Intelligence. As a Navy intelligence officer, McConnell had served a significant portion of his career aboard fleets and viewed pushing intelligence to the combatant commander's corps and divisions as no different than a fleet's intelligence component "broadcasting" intelligence to its ships; the purpose for both was to enable operations by establishing a common operating picture.<sup>152</sup>

Understanding the importance Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) would play in the war, McConnell's fellow Navy Admiral and NSA Director, William O. Studeman worked with McConnell to help get the Department of Defense Joint Intelligence Center (DoDJIC) up and running and then provide DoDJIC round-the-clock SIGINT support.<sup>153</sup> Navy intelligence is a small, close-knit community that has produced many influential

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<sup>151</sup> Department of Defense. *Final Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War*. Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, April 1992, 276.

<sup>152</sup> McConnell, Michael, Vice Admiral (R). Former Director of National Intelligence, former Director National Security Agency, and former J2 Joint Chiefs of Staff. Interview by author, Leesburg, VA, 8 August 2015.

<sup>153</sup> Studeman, William O, Admiral (R). Former Deputy Director CIA and former Director NSA. Interview by author, Severna Park, MD, 24 November 2015.

leaders within the Intelligence Community. Studeman and McConnell's own relationship went back years, to include a stint together on "Team Charlie", the group of top Navy analysts tasked by Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Thomas Hayward to investigate the Soviet submarine strategy.<sup>154</sup> Both officers also shared a common mentor in Admiral Bobby Ray Inman, the former NSA Director and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, who served as Chairman of the Secretary of State's Advisory Panel on Overseas Security following the Beirut bombings.

Talented officers in their own right, Studeman and McConnell rose through the ranks of the Navy and national intelligence. Following the Gulf War, Admiral Studeman, like his mentor, earned his fourth star and became the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. Upon departing NSA, Studeman was influential in choosing his

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<sup>154</sup> Vistica, Gregory, *Fall From Glory: The Men Who Sank the U.S Navy* (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1997), 47. Team Charlie was a group of Navy personnel who were tasked to research Soviet submarine doctrine. The team was led by Rich Haver and included future admirals Studeman and McConnell; Haver, Richard. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and former Intelligence Advisor to Secretary of Defense (Cheney and Rumsfeld). Interview by author, Great Falls, VA, 01 December 2015 and email exchange with author, 04 January 2016. According to Rich Haver Team Charlie "origin" --"CNO, Tom Hayward held a meeting in the special Navy spaces in the Pentagon in February 1981. He wanted a broad look at the rationale for a strong Navy. He complained Intel was giving great details on how long, how wide, how well armed and laid out the new Soviet Nuclear cruiser was. However, we provided nothing about why it was being built what was intended to do for them or more important why he should care. ---I was the briefer and I provided a view quite different from the prevailing wisdom. He was engaged and at the end asked me what I needed. I told him I needed a customer. Line Naval Officers who had the clearances needed to see all the special material I had access to. Adm Ken McKee was there, OP-95, he said he would create such a group of middle grade officers headed for flag rank to create such a group. The VCNO Jim Watkins was also there and said he knew who those officers were. Team Charlie was born that morning.---I was the briefer because 3 months earlier Adm Hayward held a conference in Newport RI with all the living former CNOS. I was the Intel briefer at the meeting along with my boss Adm. Tom Brooks. Brooks had raised the strategy issue and was not treated well. At the end of the day Hayward surprised me by asking the others how he was doing. Arleigh Burke spoke up gave him big grades for cleaning up drugs and other problems then hit him with a comment that he had failed to justify the role of the Navy in National Security.---The next week I was removed as Technical Director of the Navy Field Operational Intelligence Office, placed on the staff of the DNI in the Pentagon and designated the Chief of the Soviet Strategy Branch, OP-009J. Hence the briefing 2 months later. The SSG at the Naval War College came about 6 months later."

replacement, Mike McConnell.<sup>155</sup>

According to McConnell, each of the services reacted differently to his request for support. The Navy was supportive from the beginning and provided two of their best officers. The Army was a little hesitant at first, but eventually came on board and provided their best in support of the DoDJIC. The Air Force was the most resistant towards McConnell's "fusion center" project.<sup>156</sup> The reluctance of the Air Force Intelligence Directorate, led by then Major General (Maj Gen) Jim Clapper, a future DIA Director, Undersecretary of Defense-Intelligence (USD-I), and DNI, was understandable. The Air Force would lead the air campaign and the intelligence directorate had the important job of identifying Iraq's military and civilian targets. Clapper, who was consistently praised by his fellow intelligence professionals for his non-parochial leadership of the Intelligence Community as the DNI, had to have worried that Air Force support to the DoDJIC decreased his directorate's focus on the air campaign. With the joint effort not building at the rate envisioned, DIA Director LTG Harry Soyster called a Military Intelligence Board (MIB) to ensure all the services were supportive of RADM

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<sup>155</sup> Studeman, William O. Government Memorandum. "Farewell," 8 April 1992. <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB23/docs/doc10.pdf> (accessed 21 December 2015); Studeman, William O. Admiral (R). Former Deputy Director CIA and former Director NSA. Interview by author, Severna Park, MD, 24 November 2015. Some influential Congressmen wanted Inman DCI when Reagan selected Casey. Although they did not get their nominee, they got him nominated for the deputy position. A position Inman was not thrilled about after being the NSA chief and having to assume a deputy position.

<sup>156</sup> McConnell, Michael, Vice Admiral (R). Former Director of National Intelligence, former Director National Security Agency, and former J2 Joint Chiefs of Staff. Interview by author, Leesburg, VA, 8 August 2015; See "The Evolution and Relevance of Joint Intelligence Centers" at [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol49no1/html\\_files/the\\_evolution\\_6.html](https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol49no1/html_files/the_evolution_6.html) for a history of the JIC. Admiral McConnell was credited with using the term "fusion center" in this article.



McConnell's efforts.<sup>157</sup>

With the DoDJIC functioning, the MIB decided in the Fall of 1990 to establish a CENTCOM Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) in Riyadh to ensure Schwarzkopf's tactical and operational intelligence needs were met.<sup>158</sup> In November 1990, the MIB sent a team to Riyadh to expand the twenty-three member intelligence section to more than one-hundred individuals two months later in January 1991. The CENTCOM JIC served as the "single focal point for analysis as well as for collection management, production, dissemination, and tailored intelligence" within the theater and included analysts from the CIA who participated in a "Tiger Team" that helped with the targeting process once Desert Storm kicked off in February 1991.<sup>159</sup> Early on, RADM McConnell reached out to the CENTCOM J2, BG Jack Leide to ensure he had the support necessary from Washington to build his intelligence apparatus.<sup>160</sup>

John "Jack" Leide had a rare background for an Army general. A Mandarin Chinese speaker with a Syracuse University law degree, BG Leide had spent over a third of his then twenty-seven year military career in the Far East, first serving in the Vietnam

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<sup>157</sup> Department of Defense. *Joint Publication 2-01: Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations* defines the as "...the senior board of governors for the military IC and works to develop cooperation and consensus on cross- agency, Service, and command issues. The MIB is chaired by the Director of DIA."; Defense Intelligence Agency. "A Brief History: Committed to Excellence in Defense of the Nation." [http://fas.org/irp/dia/dia\\_history.pdf](http://fas.org/irp/dia/dia_history.pdf) (accessed 5 April 2016). The MIB was originally established as the Defense Intelligence Board in 1975 when the Assistant Secretary of Defense was established as the Director of Military Intelligence. The ASD-I position was later consolidated during the Carter administration into the ASD-Command, Control, and Communication (ASD-C3I).

<sup>158</sup> Shellum, Brian G. "Defense Intelligence Crisis Response Procedures and the Gulf War." <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB39/document14.pdf> (accessed 26 January 2016).

<sup>159</sup> [http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/DOC\\_0006122143.pdf](http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/DOC_0006122143.pdf) (accessed 5 April 2016).

<sup>160</sup> McConnell, Michael, Vice Admiral (R). Former Director of National Intelligence, former Director National Security Agency, and former J2 Joint Chiefs of Staff. Interview by author, Leesburg, VA, 8 August 2015

War and then as a foreign area or intelligence officer in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Japan, and China.<sup>161</sup> Following his assignment at CENTCOM, Major General (MG) Leide served out the rest of his military career at the DIA; first as the Director for Attaches and Operations and then as the Director of the Defense Human Intelligence Service. During his last three years at DIA, he oversaw HUMINT consolidation within the DoD.

During their first conversation, Leide and McConnell joked about how their experiences, one as a fleet intelligence officer and the other as a Chinese FAO, prepared them for a land war in Iraq. The two flag officers hit it off, agreeing they would “have to move mountains” and conduct a “full court press” to provide General Schwarzkopf and his subordinate commanders the intelligence necessary to wage war. Embracing the spirit of Goldwater-Nichols, McConnell and Leide were intent on building an apparatus that could exploit all of the United States’ intelligence capability to provide Schwarzkopf the best intelligence support available.

One of the first operators RADM McConnell contacted was the lead planner for the air campaign. Brig Gen Buster Glosson, an Air Force aviator, known equally for his talent and drive, was an air power enthusiast that wanted to prove its decisive nature.<sup>162</sup> A graduate of North Carolina State University, Glosson was a fighter pilot with over a quarter century service in the Air Force.<sup>163</sup> “A mover and a shaker,” Glosson arrived at

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<sup>161</sup> MG Leide also had significant experience with the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division and Special Operations. See Atkinson’s book *Crusade* for more detail on Leide’s background. Atkinson, 234.

<sup>162</sup> Atkinson, 64; McConnell, Michael. Vice Admiral (R). Former Director of National Intelligence, former Director National Security Agency, and former J2 Joint Chiefs of Staff. Interview by author, Leesburg, VA, 8 August 2015.

<sup>163</sup> <http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/Biographies/Display/tabid/225/Article/106980/lieutenant-general-buster-c-glosson.aspx> (accessed 10 April 2016).

CENTCOM after a stint as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs and was well connected within the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill.<sup>164</sup> Glosson was promoted to Major General five months after Desert Storm, shortly after returning to Washington as the Air Force Legislative Liaison. Within a year, Glosson received his third star and assignment as the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, a prestigious position that is along a path to a fourth star. Despite Glosson's reputation and connections, he retired in July 1994 after receiving a letter of admonishment from Air Force Secretary Shelia Widnall for trying to influence a general officer promotion board. Even though the Pentagon and Air Force Inspector General(s) (IG) concluded that Glosson lied during testimony regarding his involvement, then Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch came to Glosson's defense.<sup>165</sup>

During one of Glosson's Washington, D.C. trips, RADM McConnell reached out to him to discuss intelligence support requirements for the air campaign. After a short conversation, Glosson and McConnell agreed to work together to ensure General Horner, the Air Force Central Command (AFCENT) Commander, had the intelligence necessary to wage the air campaign. Over the next two months, the JCS J2 and the lead planner for the air campaign became close, on the phone 3-4 hours a day discussing intelligence

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<sup>164</sup> McConnell, Michael, Vice Admiral (R). Former Director of National Intelligence, former Director National Security Agency, and former J2 Joint Chiefs of Staff. Interview by author, Leesburg, VA, 8 August 2015; Andres, John Olsen. *Strategic Air Power in Desert Storm*. Oxford, UK: Routledge, 2003, 128.

<sup>165</sup> <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/12/04/us/general-is-scolded-in-ethics-inquiry.html> (accessed 29 December 2015); <http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1994/Desert-Storm-General-Volunteers-for-Lower-Rank-Retirement/id-633995e095fc5db2694d3e47711c8b03> (accessed 14 March 2016).

requirements.<sup>166</sup> The personal relationship gave Glosson direct access to intelligence required for targeting when the transmission through normal intelligence channels was not quick enough.<sup>167</sup>

Two to three weeks after the effort to build an intelligence fusion center began, RADM McConnell, VADM Studeman, and others brought together 200-300 people into the Pentagon to establish the DoDJIC.<sup>168</sup> The motivation to build the DoDJIC was a belief that operational requirements should drive intelligence. If the DoDJIC was going to be relevant, the intelligence professionals had to understand the military's intelligence requirements and focus their collection efforts accordingly. This meant setting up a "fusion center" was useless, unless the Intelligence Community understood the commander's information requirements, was able to collect the intelligence to answer those requirements, and had the means to distribute their products to the troops on the ground.

RADM McConnell understood that when the ground war kicked off, the divisions, brigades and below had to have access to the latest intelligence on Iraq's military disposition and status. Although the Pentagon's DoDJIC and CENTCOM's JIC were built to bring together the resources of the Intelligence Community, dissemination

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<sup>166</sup> Gordon and Trainor, 234; McConnell, Michael. Vice Admiral (R). Former Director of National Intelligence, former Director National Security Agency, and former J2 Joint Chiefs of Staff. Interview by author, Leesburg, VA, 8 August 2015.

<sup>167</sup> <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj94/win94/man1.html> (accessed 5 April 201). In an article discussing the air campaign it was mentioned that Brig Gen Glosson reached out and grabbed imagery from RADM McConnell and the same imagery came down later via normal dissemination channels.

<sup>168</sup> Studeman, William O, Admiral (R). Former Deputy Director CIA and former Director NSA. Interview by author, Severna Park, MD, 24 November 2015.

of intelligence was constrained due to the limited communication architecture possessed by forces on the ground. Since there was neither the time nor resources to build a new system for dissemination, the DoDJIC and CENTCOM JIC had to exploit the organic capabilities within the units. Although not a perfect solution, the Multi-media Information Network System (MINX) provided a means to broadcast the intelligence.<sup>169</sup>

In 1972, Datapoint Corporation introduced the Multi-media Information Network Exchange (MINX) System, the first “desktop videoconferencing system.”<sup>170</sup> The MINX system resembled a personal computer, but provided “point-to-point and multipoint,” imagery and data transmission capability.<sup>171</sup> The system was compact enough that it was deployable and its encryption capability enabled it to disseminate classified intelligence to the troops on the ground. RADM McConnell’s plan was to “broadcast” intelligence reports using the MINX system so the commanders on the ground could have the most up to date intelligence the JIC(s) possessed.<sup>172</sup>

McConnell’s “broadcasting” approach was based on his experience as a Navy

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<sup>169</sup> McConnell, Michael, Vice Admiral (R). Former Director of National Intelligence, former Director National Security Agency, and former J2 Joint Chiefs of Staff. Interview by author, Leesburg, VA, 8 August 2015.

<sup>170</sup> Wood, Lamont, *Datapoint: The Lost Story of the Texans Who Invented the Personal Computer Revolution* (Englewood, CO: Hugo House Publishers, Ltd, 2010), Kindle Location 3564. The inventors of the personal computer (PC) founded Datapoint (originally Computer Terminal Corporation) in the late 1960’s.

<sup>171</sup> Allen, Gregory J. “The Feasibility of Implementing Videoconferencing Systems Aboard Afloat Naval Units,” March 1990. [http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/30671/90Mar\\_Allen.pdf?sequence=1](http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/30671/90Mar_Allen.pdf?sequence=1), 48 (accessed 15 March 2016).

<sup>172</sup> MINX was not the only system utilized for intelligence dissemination during Desert Storm. The Army built the Department of Defense Intelligence Information System (DoDIIS) to help with the transmission of intelligence reports down to forces on the ground. See John F. Stewart’s “Operation Desert Storm The Military Intelligence Story: A View from the G2 3D U.S. Army,” for more information on the technology that came out of Desert Storm.

intelligence officer where it was standard practice to push intelligence out to all the fleet's ships. Not appreciating the difference in how services operated, McConnell assumed that if he made the intelligence available, the units' intelligence officers would know how to gain access. After the war, McConnell found out some of the ground forces did not receive much of the tactical intelligence on the disposition of Iraqi forces.

Although the broadcasts were not heard by all, at least one resourceful division intelligence officer was tuning-in. LTC Keith Alexander, a highly intelligent officer with graduate degrees in physics, electronic warfare, and business, was the 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division's Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (G2). According to McConnell, some divisions complained about the level of intelligence support and their commanders were unaware the DoDJIC was pushing intelligence down to the troops on the ground, but Alexander found the broadcasts and utilized them to his commander's advantage.<sup>173</sup>

Following Desert Storm, Alexander rose through the ranks, eventually attaining a fourth star and becoming the longest serving Director of the National Security Agency (NSA) and the first commander of United States Cyber Command (CYBERCOM); to include a period under DNI Mike McConnell.

### **CIA's Contribution to the War Effort**

Admiral McConnell did not see much of a role for the CIA once the war kicked off, but wanted to ensure complete Intelligence Community support to the combatant commander. Early on in his effort to build the DoDJIC, McConnell reached out to DCI

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<sup>173</sup> McConnell, Michael, Vice Admiral (R). Former Director of National Intelligence, former Director National Security Agency, and former J2 Joint Chiefs of Staff. Interview by author, Leesburg, VA, 8 August 2015; Tom Carhart's book *Iron Soldiers* highlights Alexander's close adversarial role to his division commander.

William Webster's office. President Reagan tapped DCI Webster, a former judge and FBI Director, following Bill Casey's death, the Iran Contra scandal, and withdrawal of Robert Gates' nomination. Not an intelligence professional, Judge Webster was selected more for his unimpeachable character and righteous reputation than his intelligence expertise. McConnell's first call was answered by one of Webster's assistants who promised to discuss CIA participation in the DoDJIC with Judge Webster. Despite the assistant's promise, his "don't call us, we will call you" belied his guarantee.<sup>174</sup> When McConnell did not hear back from the DCI's Office, he reached out to Air Force Lt. Gen Michael Carns, the Director of the Joint Staff for assistance. Lt. Gen Carns informed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, GEN Colin Powell of the issue and Powell contacted DCI Webster. Following Powell and Webster's conversation, the CIA assigned a senior intelligence officer to serve as McConnell's liaison back to the agency.<sup>175</sup>

Despite the DCI office's slow response and later criticism that CIA did not support the military, because it failed to "fully incorporate" its Iraq analysts into the DoDJIC, the CIA committed significant resources towards supporting the military in Iraq.<sup>176</sup> A week prior to Iraq's invasion and up until it crossed Kuwait's border, it was

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<sup>174</sup> McConnell, Michael, Vice Admiral (R). Former Director of National Intelligence, former Director National Security Agency, and former J2 Joint Chiefs of Staff. Interview by author, Leesburg, VA, 8 August 2015; <https://fas.org/irp/news/1995/950311carns.htm> (accessed 5 April 2016). In 1995, President Clinton would nominate Carns for DCI, but a controversy involving his family's relationship with a Filipino national convinced Carns to withdrawal from consideration.

<sup>175</sup> McConnell, Michael, Vice Admiral (R). Former Director of National Intelligence, former Director National Security Agency, and former J2 Joint Chiefs of Staff. Interview by author, Leesburg, VA, 8 August 2015. McConnell's recollection was that the individual was a former senior officer within the CIA's Directorate of Operation's Near East Division.

<sup>176</sup> U.S. Congress, House Oversight and Investigations Sub-Committee of the Committee on the Armed Services. *Intelligence Successes and Failures in Operations Desert Storm/Shield*. Washington,

Charlie Allen, a CIA analyst and National Intelligence Officer for Warning who had warned that Iraq was going to invade.<sup>177</sup> Following the invasion, the CIA established Task Forces within both the Directorate of Intelligence (DI) and the Directorate of Operations (DO), while it surged the number of CIA officers worldwide focused on the Iraq mission.

The DI sent analysts to work in the DoDJIC and CENTCOM's JIC as part of the national intelligence surge to provide reach back into the CIA, while a senior analyst travelled to Saudi Arabia to prepare Schwarzkopf for his August meeting with Saudi government officials. The DI not only sent personnel to the intelligence centers and to brief senior defense and military leaders, but provided Iraq centric briefs to deploying units and at military professional schools to assist those service members preparing to deploy. CIA analysts serving in CENTCOM's JIC participated in the targeting process and CIA analysts at headquarters and in the field supported the military planning efforts for the ground invasion by providing information on Iraq WMD locations, Iraq ground force "order of battle" and unit position, minefield locations, and information on Iraqi infrastructure to include road networks.

The most significant commitment the CIA made was providing a number of liaison officers to the Pentagon and CENTCOM. Compared to the Pentagon, the CIA is a small organization with little surge capacity. Realigning officers to support Gulf War

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D.C.: Government Printing Office, 16 August 1993; CIA Gulf War Task Force. "CIA Support to the US Military During the Persian Gulf War," 16 June 1997, 1.

<sup>177</sup> Gordon and Trainor, 4-6; Diamond, 237. Kenneth Pollack, a CIA Analyst at the time, actually "attempted to warn senior administration and military decision-makers about potential Iraqi aggression" the same day Saddam met with Glaspie. The *Gulf War Air Power Survey* mentioned Pollack's actions, but, "U.S. security censors who reviewed the *Survey* before its release in 1993 deleted any further discussion of this analysts' minority view, identifying neither the analyst nor his agency."



operations, coupled with the number of Reservists within CIA called to active duty, affected the CIA's ability to collect on other intelligence requirements. The CIA also deployed Joint Intelligence Liaison Elements (JILE) to CENTCOM headquarters forward in Saudi Arabia. These teams of "operations officers, analysts, and communication specialists" served as conduits into the CIA's resources and expertise to support CENTCOM's operational requirements.<sup>178</sup> Despite these efforts to support the military, controversies rose regarding intelligence support to the operation. These controversies and the subsequent congressional reaction increased CIA's focus on supporting military operations, thus risking subordination to DoD.

Through the support of the services and national intelligence agencies, the JCS J-2 and CENTCOM J-2 built a novel intelligence apparatus whose primary focus was supporting the CENTCOM commander. The DoDJIC that was built to support the operational commander served as a blueprint for the establishment of the National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) in March 1992. The NMJIC included representatives from NSA and the CIA, while at the same time consolidating the DoD's intelligence and indications and warning production "into a single, jointly manned center."<sup>179</sup>

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<sup>178</sup> CIA Gulf War Task Force. "CIA Support to the US Military During the Persian Gulf War," 16 June 1997.

<sup>179</sup> McDonnell, Janet A, *Adopting to a Changing Environment: The Defense Intelligence Agency in the 1990s* (Washington, D.C.: DIA Historical Office, 2013), 14; Department of Defense. Secretary, Joint Staff Directive. *Intelligence Support to Military Operations*. (NDU Holdings).

## **Chapter Four: The Gulf War's Aftermath-From Victory to Vitriol**

*"No combat commander has ever had as full and complete a view of his adversary as did our field commander. Intelligence support to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm was a success story."<sup>180</sup>-General Colin Powell*

### **Preparing for Blowback**

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<sup>180</sup> CIA Gulf War Task Force. "CIA Support to the US Military During the Persian Gulf War," 16 June 1997.

On the afternoon of March 3, 1991, the same day General Schwarzkopf and the victorious coalition military leaders stood with their conquered Iraqi foes, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney was already thinking about the intelligence lessons learned from the conflict. That day he gave Rich Haver, his special assistant for intelligence, a month to research and write an analysis on the performance of intelligence leading up to and during the war. As Haver stood wondering what drove the rush to review following such a lopsided victory, Cheney explained the celebration would soon end and questions would arise regarding why elected officials and former military professionals had overestimated casualties. According to Haver, Cheney believed there was a significant pushback against war based on casualty estimates and, “when people are that wrong in Washington, it had to be intel.”<sup>181</sup> That March day, Haver departed Cheney’s office with his marching orders to limit each issue to one page, but to investigate everything that went well and wrong throughout the lead up and execution of the war.<sup>182</sup>

Cheney’s concern over congressional reaction was justified. The vote to go to war was the closest since 1812 and many congressmen claimed they were influenced by the Intelligence Community’s briefs on Iraqi capability.<sup>183</sup> According to L. Brit Snider, a

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<sup>181</sup> Haver, Richard. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and former Intelligence Advisor to Secretary of Defense (Cheney and Rumsfeld). Interview by author, Great Falls, VA, 01 December 2015 and email exchange with author, 04 January 2016.

<sup>182</sup> Although this intelligence review was directed by Cheney, he was looking beyond DoD and was particularly concerned with CIA’s HUMINT support to military operations. His statement in the *Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict* report, that “the morale and intentions of Iraqi forces and leaders were obscure to us,” highlights this point. The only way to truly understand intentions is through HUMINT means. Imagery can capture actions and SIGINT can capture communication, but to appreciate intentions you need someone who can provide context to the recordings and photographs.

<sup>183</sup> Fritz, Sara and William J. Eaton. “Congress Authorizes Gulf War: Historic act: The vote in both houses, supporting Bush and freeing troops to attack Iraq, is decisive and bipartisan. It is the strongest move since Tonkin Gulf. [http://articles.latimes.com/1991-01-13/news/mn-374\\_1\\_persian-gulf](http://articles.latimes.com/1991-01-13/news/mn-374_1_persian-gulf) (accessed 7 April 2016).

former SSCI staff member and CIA Inspector General, SSCI staffers recalled Intelligence Community testimony that “the Iraqi military was the most advanced in that part of the world, battle-tested by eight years of war with Iran...The Iraqis would use chemical and biological weapons against the coalition forces...In all likelihood, the United States was in for a prolonged conflict of at least six months’ duration involving many casualties.” Based on these “dire predictions”, many congressmen voted against the authorization for the use of force.<sup>184</sup> Senator Boren, the SSCI Chairman, was angry, believing the Intelligence Community “sandbagged” him with their intelligence assessment, while Senator Nunn believed his vote had “impaired his credibility as chairman of the SASC.”<sup>185</sup> According to Bruce Reidel, a senior CIA middle east analyst at the time, the CIA analysts were just trying to explain the quality and effectiveness of the Iraqi military in relation to their Arab neighbors and left it up to the United States military and others to put the Iraqi capability in context with the coalition forces’ capability.<sup>186</sup>

Rich Haver is somewhat of a legend in the Intelligence Community, known for effectiveness, but sometimes ruffling feathers in the process. Haver has a deep intellect and a remarkable recall, that he credits his undergraduate history professor Stephen Ambrose for helping him develop.<sup>187</sup> Haver served in the uniformed Navy during the

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<sup>184</sup> George, Roger Z. and Robert D. Kline, eds. *Intelligence and the National Security Strategist*. New York, NY: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006, 98.

<sup>185</sup> Snider, L Britt, *The Agency and the Hill: CIA’s Relationship with Congress, 1946-2004* (Washington, D.C.: CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2008), 209.

<sup>186</sup> Diamond, 143-144.

<sup>187</sup> Studeman, William O, Admiral (R). Former Deputy Director CIA and former Director NSA. Interview by author, Severna Park, MD, 24 November 2015. Studeman called Haver one of the best community managers there has been; Haver, Richard. Former Intelligence Advisor to Secretary of Defense

Vietnam War, but gained his reputation largely as a civilian analyst and leader within Navy intelligence.<sup>188</sup> A mentee of Admiral Bobby Ray Inman, who selected him and future Admiral Bill Studeman in 1976 to determine what was driving Russian “activity towards the US Navy.” Haver and Studeman’s investigation pointed to Russia “reading the Navy’s mail” and the compromise of its crypto machines. Supporting the findings, Inman sent Haver around the world to speak with Navy forces about the compromise. Evidence the Soviets were reading the Navy’s mail was “paper thin” and most of the Navy was reluctant to accept Studeman and Haver’s findings until the John Walker case surfaced.

John Walker, who retired from the Navy in 1976, had been spying for the Soviets since October 1967 when he walked into the Soviet Embassy offering his services and information on the KL-47 crypto machines. Over the next 18 years, Walker expanded his spy ring and compromised the crypto machines the Navy used to secure communications. Walker evaded FBI scrutiny until 1984 when his wife came forward and recounted Walker’s treachery.<sup>189</sup> The Navy then finally accepted Studeman and Haver’s conclusions.

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(Cheney and Rumsfeld). Interview by author, Great Falls, VA, 01 December 2015. During the interview, Haver told the story of how Ambrose told him to memorize some details to exercise the brain for memory recall.

<sup>188</sup> Haver, Richard. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and former Intelligence Advisor to Secretary of Defense (Cheney and Rumsfeld). Interview by author, Great Falls, VA, 01 December 2015 and email exchange with author, 04 January 2016; Vistica, 47. Vistica’s book mentions Admiral Inman identifying Haver’s talent and recruiting him to stay in the Navy as a civilian intelligence analyst.

<sup>189</sup> <http://www.usni.org/magazines/navalhistory/2010-06/navys-biggest-betrayal> (accessed 5 January 2015).; Earley, Pete, *Family of Spies* (New York, NY: Bantam Books, 1988), Kindle Location 6225.

Knowing that Navy leaders would not warmly receive news of the compromise and valuing officers willing to go against the grain, Inman promised to take care of Studeman and Haver. A decade later, Studeman sat in Inman's old chair as Director of Naval Intelligence and Haver resided down the hall as his deputy. As Studeman's deputy, he conducted the damage assessment on the Walker spy case and then following his stint as Cheney's special assistant, served as DCI Gate's and then Woolsey's Director of Community Affairs where he handled the Ames spy case damage assessment. Temporarily leaving government after his CIA stint, Haver returned to defense intelligence during the early years of the George W. Bush administration.

Haver's investigation into intelligence support during the Persian Gulf War had him journeying throughout the Intelligence Community, to the various military commands and into policymaker offices, to include the Oval office. Haver's report not only considered the performance of intelligence during the war, but why the Intelligence Community had failed to accurately predict Saddam's behavior. Haver's highly classified report for Secretary Cheney identified twenty-three issues for Intelligence support leading up to and during the Gulf War. Among the issues was the need to further exploit and expand technology to ensure persistent collection and to "get information the last mile" to the troops on the ground. To accomplish persistence, the report highlighted the value of the burgeoning UAV technology. The CIA and the military pursued this technology in the years to come, an investment that paid dividends in the Balkans, before becoming one of the Intelligence Community's and United States' most visible, and controversial, assets after 9/11.

Regarding national intelligence collection, the report gave SIGINT positive

reviews, stating that it was “centrally ran and responsive.” The report said imagery was unresponsive because there was no central “NSA” like organization ensuring commanders’ imagery needs were met. Finally, the report said that HUMINT was “a mess” and “a day late and dollar short;” failing to take advantage of the numerous defector debriefings leading to the ground invasion. According to Haver, the issue with HUMINT reflected a lack of attention given towards it by the services. He argued the Navy and Air Force had shuttered their HUMINT capabilities years earlier, and although the Army and Marines retained theirs, they never “exercised” the capability. In Haver’s opinion, the “entire HUMINT enterprise was unprepared” and efforts had to be taken to ensure preparedness in the future. Since the HUMINT capability required for war could not be grown overnight, the DoD had to find a way to build and exercise its HUMINT capability during peacetime. Since DoD did not possess the expertise, they needed the DCI and CIA’s assistance.<sup>190</sup>

Both the CIA and DoD have HUMINT collectors, but the DoD’s HUMINT capability has not traditionally held a position of prominence within the department.<sup>191</sup> According to MajGen Michael Ennis USMC (R), a former Deputy Director of DIA for

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<sup>190</sup> Haver, Richard. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and former Intelligence Advisor to Secretary of Defense (Cheney and Rumsfeld). Interview by author, Great Falls, VA, 01 December 2015 and email exchange with author, 04 January 2016. According to Haver, the failure to recognize Saddam’s intentions was not just an intelligence issue, because there were multiple people, to include leaders from other countries, discussing the issue with President Bush and trying to determine Iraq’s motivations and future actions. Haver said that “everybody has an opinion, and in the absence of exquisite knowledge, that is all it is, an opinion.”

<sup>191</sup> HUMINT is a broad and contentious term that can describe both clandestinely acquired and overtly acquired information. Some classify the information collected by diplomats and military Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) as HUMINT. Many in the CIA would question whether these activities are HUMINT because they view HUMINT collection as a clandestine activity. Although overt collection is important, there are characteristics that distinguish intelligence from information and in many CIA Directorate of Operations (DO) Officer view, clandestine acquisition is one of those factors.

HUMINT, and a former Deputy Director of the National Clandestine Service for Community HUMINT, there is a “real negative bias towards HUMINT” within DoD, where it is the “least understood, least supported, and least trusted” of the intelligence collection disciplines. According to Ennis, “this lack of understanding, trust and support for HUMINT within all of DoD, resulted in service HUMINT, with the exception of the Army’s Great Skills Program being a poorly managed career field with little upward mobility, and in Defense HUMINT (which relies heavily on augmentation from the services) an organization who’s capabilities are hampered by insufficient logistic support, a risk adverse leadership, and an excessively bureaucratic approval process;” a reality recognized by both DCI Tenet and Congress.<sup>192</sup>

The DIA does possess clandestine HUMINT collectors and the military services have tactical HUMINT collectors, such as interrogators and Counterintelligence (CI) HUMINT professionals, but DoD’s clandestine capability has always been controversial and its interrogators and CI HUMINT capability have often been the first casualties when the budget axe was swung.<sup>193</sup> Ennis described how, “in the mid-1990s, the Army made significant cuts to its tactical HUMINT force (which had been largely unused since the

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<sup>192</sup> Ennis, Michael, Major General (R). Former CIA Deputy Director of HUMINT. Interview by author, Leesburg, VA 17 November 2015; Rumsfeld, Donald. Memo to Steve Cambone. “Defense HUMINT Service.” 27 January 2004; Miller, “Senate Moves Blocks to Block Pentagon Plans to Increase Number of Spies Overseas.” For more information on the Great Skills Program, see [http://asamra.hqda.pentagon.mil/nco/DA%20Pam%20600-25%20\(Approved\)%20CMF%2035-09L.pdf](http://asamra.hqda.pentagon.mil/nco/DA%20Pam%20600-25%20(Approved)%20CMF%2035-09L.pdf) (accessed 10 April 2016).

<sup>193</sup> <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB520-the-Pentagons-Spies/> (accessed 31 March 2016). Jeffrey T. Richelson, a prolific writer on intelligence issues, has a page on the National Security Website that describes some of the DoD’s HUMINT history. One of the sections, with supporting sources, describes the closing of Navy HUMINT TF-157 in the mid-1970s and another covers Rumsfeld’s “snowflake” on fixing DoD’s HUMINT management issues; Ennis, Michael. Major General (R). Former CIA Deputy Director of HUMINT. Interview by author, Leesburg, VA 17 November 2015. Ennis described the Army cutting HUMINT billets in the 1990s to provide space for field artillery capability and how this hurt them following 9/11.



end of the Vietnam War), to provide structure for a new weapons initiative.”<sup>194</sup>

Cheney’s prediction that policymaker attention would soon shift towards perceived intelligence shortcomings was perceptive. In April 1991, the Congressional Research Service published “Desert Shield and Desert Storm Implications for Future U.S. Force Requirements.” With the looming budget reductions, the shift away from the Cold War, and the transition to a more regionally focused strategy, the United States Congress was looking at Desert Storm to inform future force reductions.<sup>195</sup> Regarding intelligence, CRS highlighted the need to “fuse” all source intelligence at the tactical and strategic intelligence levels. The report highlighted the benefits new technical collection systems provided commanders during Desert Storm, but argued these systems had severe limitations on providing commanders battlefield awareness. CRS argued the “strategic and tactical intelligence failures” that plagued Desert Storm could not be remedied with more technology, but required greater HUMINT. According to the report, HUMINT shortfalls were not new and had been the root of past intelligence failures.<sup>196</sup> The report specifically noted the “lack of HUMINT professionals able to furnish otherwise unavailable information from high-priority areas has been obvious for many years” and that “indigenous networks” needed to be developed during peacetime; a responsibility

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<sup>194</sup> Ennis, Michael, Major General (R). Former CIA Deputy Director of HUMINT. Interview by author, Leesburg, VA 17 November 2015.

<sup>195</sup> President George HW Bush’s 1990 National Security Strategy was one of the first documents that signaled the shift to a regional focus that the United States would take following the collapse of the Soviet Union; Godson, Roy, Ernest R. May, and Gary Schmit, *U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads* (Washington D.C.: Brassey’s, 1995), 284. James R. FitzSimonds has an article in this book that discusses RMA’s influence on intelligence requirements. He specifically mentions HUMINT (although focused on military) important role in enabling RMA.

<sup>196</sup> Collins, John M. “Desert Shield and Desert Storm: Implications for Future Force Requirements.” Congressional Research Service, U.S. Library of Congress. <http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=712698> (accessed 15 November 2012), 13 and 14.

that would certainly fall upon the CIA.<sup>197</sup>

The CRS critiques regarding HUMINT shortfalls were not only in-line with elements of Haver's report and concerns raised by the chairmen of the HPSCI and SSCI, but echoed comments made following the Beirut Bombing and Operation Urgent Fury. In the aftermath of these events, representatives from both parties argued that slashing HUMINT in previous years and the lack of investment in HUMINT to rebuild the capability was largely to blame for intelligence shortfalls during military operations.<sup>198</sup> Although some of the issues, such as shortage of interrogators, were service related, the larger issues with HUMINT were directed towards the CIA. While the military units could expand the language skills necessary for debriefings and interrogations, they did not have the ability or resources to generate and sustain the type of clandestine networks described in the CRS report and during SSCI hearings. If HUMINT was required to enable planning before operations and to ensure force protection during operations, the networks had to be established and developed during peacetime, long before any combat boots hit the ground. Establishing networks in peacetime to support possible future military operations would place a significant burden on the CIA, while also risking its subordination to geographic combatant commanders.

Despite HUMINT support to military commanders being a reoccurring issue, not enough had been done during the decade between Beirut and Desert Storm to remedy the

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<sup>197</sup> An example of using HUMINT to establish networks/relationships in peace time was the establishment of liaison elements that ran HUMINT networks throughout Iraq in the early to mid-1990s. See Tyler, Patrick, *A World of Trouble: The White House and the Middle East – from the Cold War to the War on Terror* (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009), 428-466.

<sup>198</sup> U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Armed Services. *Lessons Learned as a Result of the U.S. Military Operations in Grenada*. 98<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> sess., 24 January 1984, 27-28 and 33-34; Department of Defense. *Report of the DoD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act*. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 10 December 1983, 8.

problem; there simply was no urgency to introduce the changes required to increase intelligence support to military operations. Part of the issue was more pressing Cold War requirements had taken precedence over the analysis necessary to reform the Intelligence Community. This was understandable because there were (and are) legitimate questions regarding if prioritizing support to the military was an appropriate role for the nation's only independent intelligence agency. It was difficult to reallocate resources toward intelligence with the Soviet Union still around, but with the Soviet Union weakened, it became easier.

Desert Storm not only confirmed ongoing issues with intelligence support to military operations in the minds of many legislatures, but also proved a boon to the military's public image. From a publicity standpoint, the overwhelming victory in the Gulf War transformed Schwarzkopf into a celebrity with a bully pulpit and a receptive audience.

### **Schwarzkopf 's Triumph and Stoking the Intelligence Debate**

General Schwarzkopf and other Desert Storm veterans enjoyed a hero's welcome when they returned to the United States. Ticker-Tape parades in New York, Washington D.C., and Hollywood drew millions of revelers celebrating the victory and praising the troops. A relatively unknown civil servant to the majority of Americans before the Gulf War, Schwarzkopf enjoyed celebrity status upon his return. Salivating Madison Avenue advertising firms wanted to cash in on Schwarzkopf's hero status and brands were reaching out to Schwarzkopf doppelgangers to market their goods. Schwarzkopf's image and story was so lucrative that Bantam Books paid him five million dollars for his story

in June 1991, less than six months after his return.<sup>199</sup> General Schwarzkopf 's hero reputation accompanied him when he took his seat before the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 12, 1991.<sup>200</sup>

General Schwarzkopf had been critical of CIA support during the planning and execution phases of the Gulf War. When Saddam took western hostages in August 1990 to deter a military response to his invasion of Kuwait, Schwarzkopf claimed the lack of HUMINT sources limited US options.<sup>201</sup> During congressional testimony, Schwarzkopf criticized the CIA and other national intelligence agencies for providing contradicting analysis and not distilling intelligence to enable Schwarzkopf's decision-making.<sup>202</sup> Schwarzkopf's frustration with what he viewed as CIA's unwillingness to assume a supporting role lingered even after congressional testimony, noting in his biography that, "the CIA was the only agency to dissent: on the eve of the ground war, it was still telling the President that we were grossly exaggerating the damage inflicted on the Iraqis. If we'd waited to convince the CIA, we'd still be in Saudi Arabia."<sup>203</sup> Despite Schwarzkopf's frustration with the CIA over BDA, in 1993 the Gulf Air Power Survey and a HASC subcommittee found that Schwarzkopf's BDA estimates were greatly

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<sup>199</sup> Heard, Alex. "The Schwarzkopf File," 11 August 1991. <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/08/11/magazine/the-schwarzkopf-file.html> (accessed 3 January 2016).

<sup>200</sup> Lajoie, Roland, Major General (R). Former/First CIA Associate Deputy Director for Operations/Military Affairs. Telephone interview by author, 10 November 2015-During an interview with MG Lajoie, he mentioned Schwarzkopf's "war hero" status as a reason for the reform initiated at the CIA to increase support to the military.

<sup>201</sup> Snider, Kindle Location 4490; Schwarzkopf, Norman. H, *It Doesn't Take a Hero* (New York, NY: Bantam Books, 1992), Kindle Location 6269.

<sup>202</sup> Diamond, 113.

<sup>203</sup> Schwarzkopf, Kindle Location 8199-8202.

inflated.<sup>204</sup>

His criticism received publicity and was noticed by Senator John Warner, a member of both the SASC and SSCI. According to Admiral McConnell, Senator Warner's office reached out to General Schwarzkopf to get his insight on intelligence support to the military during the Gulf War. Senator Warner's office was informed the general's schedule was currently too hectic and he could not make himself available. Dissatisfied with Schwarzkopf's office's response, the Senator contacted Cheney who reached out to Schwarzkopf and told him white space had just opened on his calendar.

While Schwarzkopf had made his concerns with intelligence known, there was less certainty regarding his awareness of what support intelligence had actually provided him. To overcome this shortfall, BG Leide, Schwarzkopf's intelligence chief spent a week reviewing with Schwarzkopf the support intelligence provided during Desert Storm. According to McConnell, this education had changed Schwarzkopf's perspective on intelligence support and he partially recanted his previous critiques during an interchange with Senator Warner. When Warner asked why his earlier comments regarding intelligence were more critical, Schwarzkopf supposedly said he had time to reconsider the support intelligence provided. Warner asked Schwarzkopf to let the press know that he had reconsidered intelligence performance and had changed his opinion about the support he received during Desert Storm; Schwarzkopf agreed to Warner's request. McConnell spent the next few weeks eyeing press reports for Schwarzkopf's

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<sup>204</sup> Betts, Richard K, *Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2007), 358-362.

recant. It never came.<sup>205</sup>

Despite what Schwarzkopf said prior to June 12<sup>th</sup>, his testimony that day regarding intelligence support was pretty balanced. Schwarzkopf testified that “intelligence support” was excellent, but in addition to the BDA issues, he identified the need for the Intelligence Community to develop a capability that provides commanders “near real time” information. As later critiques by Congress depicted, this support could not merely be left up to technical systems that could fail during war, but had to include HUMINT elements to meet the commander’s expectations. Since HUMINT systems had to be developed over time, the CIA had to work during peacetime to develop the HUMINT networks necessary to support the wartime commanders.<sup>206</sup>

Even though Schwarzkopf complemented intelligence support, the Washington Post and New York Time’s headlines the next day focused on his critiques. Both newspapers highlighted the CENTCOM Commander’s frustration with “caveated, disagreed with, footnoted and watered down” intelligence reports that did not enable his battlefield decision-making ability.<sup>207</sup> Congressional criticism of the “duplicative and

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<sup>205</sup> McConnell, Michael, Vice Admiral (R). Former Director of National Intelligence, former Director National Security Agency, and former J2 Joint Chiefs of Staff. Interview by author, Leesburg, VA, 8 August 2015.; Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. S. HRG. 102-91 *Review of Intelligence Organization*. 102nd Congress, 1st sess., 12 March 1991, 9. During a SSCI meeting in early March (a few weeks after Desert Storm), Senator Warner said “now, to the extent, that reference has been made to the Gulf, I would like to add my perspective. If that is a news hook, I hope it is a positive news hook, because the record will show what we employed our intelligence assets very skillfully throughout that operation. Just a week ago today—or tomorrow to be exact—I was in General Schwarzkopf’s office when that question was put directly to him about intelligence, and he said unequivocally that intelligence played a great role, it was well—professionally –and certainly we have some lessons learned. But I think that in any situation, you have some lessons learned.”

<sup>206</sup> U.S. Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Hearings. *IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. 104th Cong., 1st sess., 22 May-19 December 1995., 43.

<sup>207</sup> Moore, Molly. “Schwarzkopf: War Intelligence Flawed; General Reports to Congress on Desert Storm.” *Washington Post*, 13 June 1991.

contradictory” intelligence provided to the military commander during Desert Storm echoed Schwarzkopf’s complaints.<sup>208</sup> While understandable, this critique highlights a tension between a military commander that wants certainty to make decisions and an Intelligence Community that appreciates the uncertainty they are analyzing.

Twelve years later, another report on the failure of the Intelligence Community in Iraq cited “group think” as an issue in the analysis of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs.<sup>209</sup> These two reports, separated by more than a decade, seem to be at odds with each other, with the Gulf War era report striving for greater analytical consensus to enable commander decision-making and the WMD report embracing analytical friction to protect against groupthink. Although both policymakers and commanders appreciate agreement on intelligence analysis to support decision-making, the pursuit of consensus raises the prospect of groupthink within the Intelligence Community. Contradictory analysis might make it difficult to decide courses of action, but there is goodness in analytical friction for better understanding the possibilities present within any operational environment.<sup>210</sup>

In response to Schwarzkopf’s criticism and subsequent concerns surfacing from Gulf War Illness, numerous reviews of intelligence performance during Desert Storm were held. These reviews, conducted by elements within the executive and legislative branches, considered the performance of both tactical and strategic intelligence. The

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<sup>208</sup> Department of Defense. *Final Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, April 1992), 388.

<sup>209</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. *Report on the U.S. Intelligence Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq*, 108th Cong., 7 July 2004, 18.

<sup>210</sup> Oakley, David. “Partners or Competitors.”

reviews were typically balanced, but over time the critiques of intelligence were embraced and significant changes implemented in response.

The military services' after action reviews on intelligence support were mixed regarding CIA support. The then classified, Department of the Army (DA) Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence's Annual Historical Review for FY 1991 highlighted the interaction of the CIA, Army, and other DoD intelligence agencies collaboration in support of CENTCOM operations and the use of overt HUMINT in the targeting process to "nominate, target, and destroy" Iraq's capabilities. Although the DA report praised overt HUMINT (i.e. military), the 3rd Army/Army Central's (ARCENT) G2's after action review criticized clandestine HUMINT (i.e. CIA) for being "critically short" and contributing little to the operation."<sup>211</sup> This criticism echoed the CRS report that argued "strategic and tactical intelligence failures can be traced directly to the shortage of well-qualified, area-oriented HUMINT specialists."<sup>212</sup>

The Air Force's, "Gulf War Air Power Survey" mentioned the CIA liaisons sent to work with military planners focused on the air war and described how informal relationships between Air Force planners and CIA and DIA officers furthered planning efforts and concealed some of the Air Force's internal failures. The report also described how Schwarzkopf viewed the CIA as a "supporting agency," explaining that "as the

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<sup>211</sup> Stewart, John F. Jr. "Operation Desert Storm: The Military Intelligence Story: A View from the G-2 3D U.S. Army," April 1991. <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB39/document5.pdf> (accessed 31 December 2015).

<sup>212</sup> Department of the Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, *Annual Historical Review 1 October 1990-30 September 1991* (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1991), 4-10; Collins, John M. "Desert Shield and Desert Storm: Implications for Future Force Requirements." Congressional Research Service, U.S. Library of Congress. <http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=712698> (accessed 15 November 2012).



supported commander,” Schwarzkopf “was given the authority to designate targets or objectives, set the timing and duration of supporting actions, and establish other instructions necessary for coordination and efficiency of operations.” Although many CIA officers and leaders agreed they were supporting military operations during Desert Storm, their definition of “support” probably more closely resembled Webster’s Dictionary and not the command relationship “supporting” that Schwarzkopf had in mind.<sup>213</sup>

The CIA also conducted internal reviews to determine how to improve their support to military operations. Richard Kerr, the Deputy Director for Central Intelligence and a career CIA analyst, selected Dan Childs and Charlie Allen to conduct CIA’s own review of their support to military operations during Desert Storm. Dan Childs had served in the Intelligence Community since 1957, moving back and forth between the SSCI and CIA.<sup>214</sup> Charlie Allen, a legend within the Intelligence Community and the analysts that had predicted the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, joined the CIA in 1958, eventually serving as the first Chief of Intelligence for the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center (CTC) and the first Assistant Secretary for Intelligence, then Under Secretary for Intelligence, within the Department of Homeland Security. Child’s and Allen’s report highlighted differing views between the CIA and DIA regarding intelligence support. The CIA perspective was the entire national security apparatus came together for “a national war effort,” while the DIA viewpoint was the Intelligence Community should “integrate

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<sup>213</sup> Keaney, Thomas and Eliot A. Cohen, *Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 1993), 182, 288 and 392.

<sup>214</sup> Smist, Frank J, *Congress Oversees the United States Intelligence Community 1947-1989* (Knoxville, TN.: The University of Tennessee Press, 1990), 104.

into DoD systems when war loomed.” This was an important distinction; the CIA viewed wartime operations as a partnership, while DoD viewed the CIA/DoD relationship as subordination, differing viewpoints that became even more relevant during the GWOT, when the United States embraced perpetual and preemptive war.<sup>215</sup>

The DoD’s April 1992 *Final Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War* captured the significant effort and resources the Intelligence Community contributed to the war effort. The report argued that intelligence support to General Schwarzkopf was “one of the larger efforts in the history of the U.S. Intelligence Community” that “reflected the investment of billions of dollars in technology and training and the contribution of thousands of intelligence professionals, both military and civilian, from a variety of agencies and staff.”<sup>216</sup> Despite providing the combatant commander a previously unsurpassed level of intelligence support, the increasing appetite could not be satiated. The jointness introduced by Goldwater-Nichols and the burgeoning battlefield technology increased the intelligence “calories” necessary for operational success.

SSCI discussions in the spring and summer of 1991 were particularly critical of CIA’s support, arguing that Desert Shield/Desert Storm “highlighted enduring problems in ensuring CIA understanding of and responsiveness to military requests.” To alleviate these issues, the SSCI told the CIA to establish an Assistant Deputy Director for Operations (ADDO), who would “ensure that military requirements are fairly represented

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<sup>215</sup> Garthoff, Douglas F, *Directors of Central Intelligence as Leaders of the U.S. Intelligence Community 1946-2005* (Washington D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005), 188.

<sup>216</sup> Department of Defense. *Final Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War*. Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, April 1992, 387.

within CIA and to advocate an earlier and more effective interaction by CIA with DoD operational planners.” The SSCI specifically noted that the ADDO would be responsible for “receipt of tasking to satisfy military requirements,” a significant subordination of CIA capabilities to operational commanders. Coordination of intelligence capabilities in support of military commanders through a “unity of effort” was one thing, but the mention of “taskings” created the perception of military commander’s possessing command authority over national intelligence capabilities.<sup>217</sup>

Removing any doubt regarding the empowerment SSCI wanted to give military commanders during operations, the SSCI 1992 authorizing appropriations report stated, “shortcomings in intelligence support relate not only to gaps in collection, but also to the ability of military commanders to task available assets to collect the right information at the right time as well as the capability subsequently to transmit collected information- from both national and tactical sources- in sufficient quality and with adequate speed.” To ensure the CIA was responsive to these taskings, the SSCI “mandated” that both the CIA Directorate of Intelligence and Directorate of Operations not only participate and integrate into combatant commanders’ JIC(s), but report to the J2.<sup>218</sup>

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<sup>217</sup> Department of Defense. *JP 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*. Washington, D.C.; Department of Defense, 25 March 2013. “Taskings” is a principle of combatant command authority which states: Nontransferable command authority, which cannot be delegated, of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces; assigning tasks; designating objectives; and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command.”; *JP 1* defines “unity of effort” as “coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization, which is the product of successful unified action.” The ability to task is directly related to authority over, whereas unity of effort takes into consideration the absence of any authority over an organization.

<sup>218</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. *Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1992 for the Intelligence Activities of the U.S. Government, the Intelligence Community Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other Purposes*. 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., 8 July 1991, 6-7.

The SSCI's and SASC's spring and summer 1991 review of Desert Storm operations were not the end of congressional criticism of intelligence support. Over the next decade, policymakers pointed to intelligence shortfalls during Desert Storm as evidence for prioritizing intelligence support to the military. In August 1993, the HASC's Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations published *The Intelligence Successes and Failures During Desert Storm*. The report credited the Intelligence Community for its creativity and proactivity in trying to provide General Schwarzkopf the information he needed to make decisions. The report also highlighted the performance and intelligence value of burgeoning technologies such as the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar Systems, Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar System, and the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). According to the DoD report, while "information and intelligence provided the decisive edge," and new technologies allowed them to "pierce the fog of war," the technologies also "exponentially increased demand for information."<sup>219</sup> It seemed that the better intelligence performed and the increased coverage technologies provided, the more intelligence was required. Instead of satisfying the commander, intelligence improvements and technology developments were only increasing expectations.

The combatant commanders, empowered by Goldwater-Nichols, were encouraged by legislatures who criticized the Intelligence Community for failing to support military operations. The HASC report criticized the absence of a unified intelligence structure in support of the combatant commander. The report was particularly harsh of the CIA,

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<sup>219</sup> Department of Defense. Memo (w/attachments). *Lessons Learned from the Persian Gulf*, 29 March 1993, Slide 2.

arguing the CIA took a “hands off attitude toward the concept of joining in the organized support given the combat commander” and stating the CIA should not remain outside the JIC during future operations. This critique clearly articulated the subcommittee’s view that all national intelligence capabilities, including the independent CIA, should be subordinated to the military commander during wartime. A perspective that arguably runs counter to the very reason an independent central intelligence organization was created. Even more burdensome, the HASC seemed to believe the CIA should be developing HUMINT networks in peacetime that could be used by military commanders during war.<sup>220</sup> Relying on the CIA to develop networks throughout the world in anticipation of future military operations would be a significant burden and necessarily detract from its strategic intelligence mission.

Appreciating the potential value integrated intelligence provided combatant commanders; the HASC report identified the importance of building a unity of effort in support of the combatant commander during wartime. Since understanding the capabilities, needs, and requirements of the partner organization could not occur overnight, construction of the DoD/Intelligence Community relationship needed to begin in peacetime. It is not surprising that some commanders viewed the Intelligence Community as an extension of their staff as the military conducted more humanitarian and peacekeeping operations and the distinction between war and peace became blurred.

The HASC Chairman who approved, *The Intelligence Successes and Failures During Desert Storm*, report was California Congressman Ronald Dellums, an

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<sup>220</sup> U.S. Congress, House Oversight and Investigations Sub-Committee of the Committee on the Armed Services. *Intelligence Successes and Failures in Operations Desert Storm/Shield*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 16 August 1993, 6 and 24.

experienced legislature with stints on both the HASC and the HPSCI. Despite his service on these two committees, Dellums was not viewed as a protector of either defense or intelligence. In fact, Dellum's history with the CIA was rather contentious. In the mid-1970s, in the aftermath of Watergate and following DCI William Colby's release of the "Family Jewels," Dellums served on the Pike Committee that "investigated whether intelligence activities threatened the rights of American citizens."<sup>221</sup> During the Pike hearings, Congressman Dellums skewered DCI Colby about CIA operations and its abuse of citizen's rights. During one particularly heated exchange when Colby refused to discuss classified information in open session, an angry Dellums asked Colby "what makes you believe that you can play God?"<sup>222</sup> Although Congressman Dellums argument regarding the congressional role in "checks in balances" was fair, his forcefulness displayed a distrust, if not seething dislike, of a clandestine intelligence organization within a democracy.

The investigation of intelligence shortfalls in support of Desert Storm military operations continued into 1997-1998 with the Gulf War Illness Investigations. Concern over Saddam Hussein's use of chemical and biological weapons had been around since the invasion, but when Desert Storm veterans started displaying unexplained symptoms, concerns increased. In 1997, the Senate Committee on Veteran's Affairs established the Special Investigation Unit to identify failures preceding, during, and following the war that contributed or exaggerated the Gulf War illness problem. In support of the Gulf War

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<sup>221</sup> Oakley, David. "Taming the Rogue Elephant?" *American Intelligence Journal* 26, no. 2 (2008-2009): 61.

<sup>222</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Hearings Before the Select Committee on Intelligence. *U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities: Intelligence Cost and Fiscal Procedures*. 94th Cong., 1st sess., July-August 1975, 173.

Illness reviews, the CIA established the DCI Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force in March 1997 to ensure the investigations had access to the appropriate intelligence and to assist investigators in analyzing the information. Although the purpose of the Gulf War Illness investigations was to understand the government's response when Gulf War veterans started displaying symptoms, the investigators also considered intelligence on WMD locations in relation to force protection and support to military operations during the war.

The investigation unit argued the CIA did not provide adequate support to military operations. The report stated that intelligence operations were not integrated and the CIA's unwillingness to be part of the intelligence team was one of the main issues. Despite establishing a JILE, the investigation unit believed the CIA remained outside the team effort. The report recommended establishing "a single focal point in unified commands to gather, analyze, and report all intelligence information in support of any military operations in order to avoid the information sharing and communication failures that occurred during the Gulf War," and stated the Director of Central Intelligence, "must fully coordinate and cooperate in ensuring this unified effort."<sup>223</sup> Echoing the HASC report from five years earlier, the Gulf War Illness Investigation Unit recommended increasing CIA support to military commanders during wartime. The report's questioning of CIA reporting in relation to service member WMD exposure was reminiscent of the critiques of CIA support during the 1983 Beirut Bombing, both reports

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<sup>223</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Veterans Affairs. *Report of the Special Investigation Unit on Gulf War Illnesses*. 105th Cong, 1998, 9, 20, 29 and 30.

placed a degree of responsibility on CIA for collecting tactical intelligence related to force protection.<sup>224</sup>

### **DoD Initiates Reform Efforts**

Two months prior to Schwarzkopf's SASC testimony, the Department of Defense published the *Plan for Restructuring Defense Intelligence*. Although the plan was focused on DoD reform, the changes it implemented also affected the CIA. With the defense budget being slashed and intelligence support to the military an increasing priority, there was concern about the Intelligence Community's relationship with the military. Bud Shuster, the nine-term Congressman and HPSCI Co-Chair, reflected this concern when he announced during a joint session of the HPSCI and SSCI that the "committees are going to watch very carefully...Secretary Cheney's conduct of his reorganization particularly because of the cost-free support the Intelligence Community receives from the military." Shuster's statement reflected the tone within the HPSCI hearings, a tone that was focused largely on increasing intelligence support to the military.<sup>225</sup> This focus on supporting military operations, coupled with the cuts in defense spending, should have made the HPSCI co-chair concerned with the "cost-free support" the CIA would provide the military, not vice-versa.

The development of this plan started in December 1989 when Secretary Cheney requested a review of defense intelligence to ensure it was adapting to the changing

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<sup>224</sup> Department of Defense. *Report of the DoD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act*. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 10 December 1983, 66 and 136.

<sup>225</sup> U.S. Congress, Joint Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. *S. 2198 and S.421 to Reorganize the United States Intelligence Community*. 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., 1 April 1992, 2 and 8.



international environment and domestic fiscal conditions, while still providing the capabilities combatant commanders required. The history of this effort went back to the Reagan era Packard Commission that focused on restructuring defense management and procurement processes and was supposed to be in line with the principles/objectives identified in the July 1989 *Defense Management Review*. Accepting the significant budget cuts on the horizon, the plan sought ways to increase “jointness” while cutting expenditures and reducing duplication.

In cooperation with the executive branch, Congress was also trying to “bring defense intelligence in line with the organizational structure established by Goldwater-Nichols.”<sup>226</sup> In the 1991 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Congress mandated the Secretary of Defense and DCI conduct a review of all intelligence, revise priorities, reorganize efforts and reduce personnel. The NDAA’s objective was to eliminate redundancy, streamline intelligence efforts, and cut personnel costs. Most notably, the NDAA told the Secretary of Defense and the DCI to “strengthen joint intelligence functions, operations, and organizations” and to “improve the responsiveness and utility of national intelligence systems and organizations to the needs of the combatant commanders.” A tall order was being requested of the DCI and Secretary of Defense. They were being asked to consolidate intelligence resources and increase support directed towards combatant commanders while undergoing a 25% reduction in personnel between FY(s) 1992-1996.<sup>227</sup>

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<sup>226</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. S. HRG. 102-91 *Review of Intelligence Organization*. 102nd Congress, 1st sess., 12 March 1991, 8.

<sup>227</sup> U.S. Congress, House. *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991*, 101<sup>st</sup> Cong., 5 November 1990, 284.

Informed by the Defense Management Review and the 1991 NDAA, the twenty-eight-page restructuring plan gave precise implementation guidance to the NSA, DIA, and military services on how to reduce and consolidate intelligence capabilities to achieve the goals of increased service interoperability, decreased expenditures, and the empowerment of the combatant commander. The restructuring plan required each service to consolidate its intelligence capabilities into one headquarters. This reduction in “management overhead” was intended to streamline operations and reduce costs. The plan also called for the combatant commands’ regional components to “eliminate” their intelligence production capabilities and consolidate it at the combatant commander level JIC(s). Although the Desert Storm experience highlighted the value of JIC(s), the push towards JIC(s) was as much about reduced costs as it was about focusing intelligence support towards the combatant commander and away from the services. Under the restructuring plan, service components retained only minimal intelligence capability required for current operations and planning.<sup>228</sup>

United States Pacific Command was one of the first organizations to consolidate its analysis capabilities. In the early 1990s, CAPT Lowell “Jake” Jacoby took over as the United States Pacific Fleet (PACFLEET) Intelligence chief (N2). Jacoby soon realized the “peace dividend” meant PACFLEET could not afford to retain the command’s Fleet Intelligence Center and reached out to his boss Admiral Chuck Larson, the PACFLEET commander, to propose a solution. Jacoby argued money could be saved by

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<sup>228</sup> LeVitre, Rosanne M, Rear Admiral (R). National Intelligence Manager for Military Issues DDNI for Intelligence Integration. Interview by author, Washington D.C., 4 November 2015.

consolidating the three analysis centers at PACOM, PACFLEET, and Pacific Air Force (PACAF) into one centralized analysis center. Admiral Larson supported Jacoby's proposal and unbeknownst to Jacoby at the time, would become the PACOM commander in 1991.

One of Jacoby's "politically astute" subordinates recommended contacting Marty Hurwitz, the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) manager at DIA about his proposal. Jacoby told Hurwitz that if he "endorsed the concept" and provided a few million in "startup money" he could "consolidate" the analysis centers and save DoD "30% annually." Hurwitz liked the idea and after Jacoby won support from the initially reluctant PACOM J2 and AFPAC G2, the decision to consolidate the analysis centers moved forward. The 1991 plan to reorganize defense intelligence highlighted PACOM's efforts to establish a JIC and tasked other combatant commands to follow suit. While in Hawaii, CAPT Jacoby was promoted to RADM and served as both the JIC commander and the PACOM J2 before departing to become the Joint Staff J2. Jacoby rose up the Navy ranks to VADM, serving as the Director of Navy Intelligence and then the DIA Director during the early phases of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.<sup>229</sup>

In 1992, Duane Andrews, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (ASD-C3I), led an "ad hoc" group composed of DoD and service leadership to review the "role and missions of service intelligence organizations at each echelon that support the combatant commander." This group was a continuation of earlier efforts focused on streamlining the service capabilities to ensure

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<sup>229</sup> Jacoby, Lowell E, Vice Admiral (R). Former Director Defense Intelligence Agency and former J2 Joint Staff. Interview by author, Ashburn, VA, 18 November 2015.

the combatant commander had an integrated intelligence capability that could meet his requirements economically. Part of the discussion on intelligence consolidation was the centralization of DoD HUMINT.

In June 1991, LTG Harry Soyster, the soon to be retiring DIA Director, submitted a plan to ASD Andrews that proposed, “centralizing” defense HUMINT to streamline operations and taskings and to gain efficiencies. Andrews accepted the recommendation in August 1991 and tasked Soyster for an implementation plan on HUMINT consolidation.<sup>230</sup> Although portions of Andrews’ memo to Soyster are redacted, Andrews guidance to Soyster included giving the DoD HUMINT Manger (i.e. DIA) “HUMINT operational tasking authority over all elements of the DoD HUMINT system” and told him to consider an organization where the HUMINT Manager controlled all DoD “HUMINT resources and operations.” DoD HUMINT consolidation began during the last months of the Bush administration and carried over into the Clinton administration.<sup>231</sup>

During Desert Storm, the Intelligence Community worked assiduously to develop a joint/interagency infrastructure responsive to the combatant commander’s requirements. Leaders like RADM McConnell reached out to units preparing to fight the war to identify their needs. Unfortunately, no amount of hard work in that short period could completely make up for the shortfalls that existed in the system when the conflict began. As both Congress and DoD’s post mortem reviews acknowledged, the Intelligence Community was built to focus on a Soviet threat, not on a regional threat from Iraq. Based on the

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<sup>230</sup> Department of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence. Memo. *Strengthening Defense Intelligence-DIA HUMINT Plan*, 6 August 1991.

<sup>231</sup> Department of Defense. Directive. *Centralized Management of Department of Defense Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Operations*, 18 December 1992.

nation's priorities, the Intelligence Community focused their resources on the Soviet Union and took risk in these smaller regions. Considering this, coupled with the lack of an interagency intelligence structure to support the military, it is not surprising that intelligence failed to meet the combatant commander's expectations.

The US military was on the cusp of a "revolution in military affairs" that introduced technology that gave the commander the ability to access intelligence not previously possible. At the same time, new weapon systems were introduced that required more intelligence to employ. As a 1991 CRS report argued, the technological intelligence collection systems had "severe limitations," and as Desert Storm highlighted, the United States needed HUMINT in place to make up for these shortfalls in supporting the new weapon technologies.<sup>232</sup> These technological capabilities and intelligence requirements enabled operationalization of intelligence, but required greater synchronization and collaboration between national intelligence and military operations. The intelligence requirements, coupled with the feasibility of intelligence provision, raised the combatant commanders' expectations regarding intelligence. With Goldwater-Nichols empowering the combatant commander, they were now in a position to demand greater intelligence support.

As Michael Warner points out in his 2014 book, *The Rise and Fall of Intelligence*, the increasing support and dedication of national resources towards military operations during Desert Storm became "the minimum expected of it in future conflicts – and the military leaders did not shrink from demanding the resources of the CIA and other

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<sup>232</sup> Collins, John M. "Desert Shield and Desert Storm: Implications for Future Force Requirements." Congressional Research Service, U.S. Library of Congress. <http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=712698> (accessed 15 November 2012), 13 and 14.

agencies to sustain it.” As Warner goes on to explain, the prioritization of support to the military, coupled with the cuts in defense intelligence capabilities driven by budget reductions, resulted in a significant focus of national intelligence resources on military operations.<sup>233</sup>

The burgeoning DoD intelligence consolidation and reform efforts were influenced by the lessons learned during Desert Storm and the ongoing domestic and international political changes. The reduction and streamlining efforts were not merely internal DoD maneuvers, but an interagency effort that affected the Intelligence Community’s structure, increased its focus on military operations and altered the purpose of national intelligence. The perceived intelligence failures and shortfalls during Desert Storm, coupled with the changing strategic and domestic landscape, resulted in numerous intelligence reviews in the 1990s.

## **Chapter Five: End of the Cold War, Continuation of Reform**

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<sup>233</sup> Warner, Michael, *The Rise and Fall of Intelligence: An International Security History* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 261.

The year following Desert Storm was a busy year for intelligence reviews. From February 1991 to April 1992, both the executive and legislative branches of government conducted reviews of the Intelligence Community and either took executive action or proposed legislation. The year began with Cheney's review of the DoD in February and March 1991 and ended in April 1992 with Dr. Gates testifying before the first joint SSCI/HPSCI conference on the Gates Task Force findings and proposed reform measures. During this period, the SSCI initiated a review of the Intelligence Community (March 1991-April 1992), Dr. Gates nomination and confirmation hearings occurred (September-November 1991), President Bush issued NSR-29 focused on intelligence reform (November 1991), the Gates Task Force review of the Intelligence Community occurred (November 1991-April 1992), the introduction of the Senate and House bills (February 1992), and the National Security Directive (NSD)-67 was issued (March 1992).

### **National Security Review 29-Call for Intelligence Reform from the Top**

Sensing the final collapse of the Soviet Union and realizing its significance on the “changing international landscape,” President George H.W. Bush ordered the executive agencies to identify what those changes meant for the U.S. national security apparatus.<sup>234</sup> Domestic fiscal concerns regarding an ongoing recession threatening America's economic health partially drove President Bush's review. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, President Bush called for national security spending cuts amounting to approximately

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<sup>234</sup> Bush, President George HW. “National Security Review 29: The Intelligence Community.” <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsr/nsr29.pdf> (accessed 17 November 2012).

25%. The President and other national leaders believed the global standing of the U.S. was not only contingent on a strong defense, but also on its economic health. The reunification of Germany and the weakening of the Soviet Union provided the U.S. an opportunity to embrace the “peace dividend” and put America’s fiscal house in order.<sup>235</sup>

If there was ever a modern President who entered office understanding the Intelligence Community, it was George H.W. Bush.<sup>236</sup> President Bush served as President Ford’s DCI during a contentious period following Watergate and the Church and Pike Committees. Although only serving in the position for a short-period, Bush carried the CIA through a tumultuous time and became beloved by most of the CIA’s workforce.<sup>237</sup> In 1999, CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia, was renamed the George Bush Center for Intelligence in Bush’s honor.<sup>238</sup> Understanding Bush’s tenure as DCI and his relationship with the Secretary of Defense is important and informative to understanding subsequent developments in the CIA/DoD relationship over the next 30 years.

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<sup>235</sup> Garfinkel, Michelle R. “The Economic Consequences of Reducing Military Spending.” *Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review*, Vol. 72, No. 6, November/December 1990, p.49.

<sup>236</sup> Andrew, Christopher, *For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush* (New York, NY: Harper Perennial, 1996), 5 and 532-533.

<sup>237</sup> Gates, Robert M, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War* (New York, NY.: Simon and Schuster, 2006), 137. The CIA held a reception to celebrate the DCI as the leader of the Intelligence Community not long after the IRTPA created the DNI. The living former DCI(s) and the widows of others participated in the ceremony. Each former DCI was given the opportunity to speak to the CIA workforce. It was interesting to see how warmly (or not) the CIA workforce received the DCI(s). Bush and Tenet were warmly received, while Turner and Tenet reception was a little colder.

<sup>238</sup> <https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2014-featured-story-archive/flashback-cia-headquarters-named-george-bush-center-for-intelligence.html> (accessed 7 April 2016).



In 1976, DCI Bush was not particularly close with Ford's Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld who assumed his Pentagon position two months prior to Bush becoming DCI. Rumsfeld and DCI Bush previously served together in Congress and during the Nixon administration. Both had presidential political aspirations and the type of pedigree necessary to propel them into that position. Although never close, the Bush-Rumsfeld feud gained momentum during the Ford Administration when some officials told Bush that Rumsfeld recommended him for the DCI to ruin his potential 1976 vice-presidential nomination. Although the exact origin of the tension is unknown, Bush confirmed his low opinion of Rumsfeld telling his biographer John Meacham, "I don't like what he did (reference to serving his son), and I think it hurt the President, having his iron-ass view of everything. I've never been that close to him anyway. There's a lack of humility, a lack of seeing what the other guy thinks. He's more kick ass and take names, take number. I think he paid a price for that."<sup>239</sup> These are sentiments many who worked for Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld in 2001 would agree with.

DCI Bush looked to salvage Americans' trust in their intelligence organizations and bring the Intelligence Community closer together in the aftermath of the Church and Pike Committee hearings. One of the initiatives during Bush's DCI tenure was the creation of the Committee on Foreign Intelligence to bring a "policy-level focus to intelligence problems" and work through "DoD and DCI" equities. Although Bush believed the DCI should focus on strategic intelligence and leave tactical intelligence to DoD, Bush and Rumsfeld, bumped heads over the DCI's objectives. As Ford's

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<sup>239</sup> Meacham, Jon, *Destiny and Power: The American Odyssey of George Herbert Walker Bush* (New York, NY.: Random House Books, 2015), Kindle Location 12367-12370.

Secretary of Defense, Rumsfeld was concerned that Bush was trying to gain control over DoD intelligence resources. To centralize his authority and improve intelligence support to military operations, Rumsfeld undertook his own efforts to restructure defense intelligence.<sup>240</sup> This effort included the creation of a Director of Defense Intelligence with authority “over assigned DoD intelligence programs and activities” and the establishment of a Defense Intelligence Board to “improve the interaction between intelligence users and producers, to improve the coordination between various elements of the Department of Defense, and to improve intelligence-related planning and decision-making.”<sup>241</sup>

Similar to his perspective during the George W. Bush administration nearly three decades later, Rumsfeld was determined to build a strong defense intelligence apparatus focused internally on support to operations. This focus caused friction at times with the broader Intelligence Community, and its leader, DCI Bush. Rumsfeld argued the majority of the intelligence budget was focused towards supporting military operations and was unwilling to cede control to the DCI. The precient Richard Lehman, a career CIA analyst and advisor to DCI Bush, encouraged him to stand against Rumsfeld’s campaign to gain greater control over systems that were increasingly being used for both tactical and strategic collection.<sup>242</sup> The collapsing of strategic and tactical intelligence intensified over the next forty years, with many losing sight of any differences between them.

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<sup>240</sup> Garthoff, 122 and 114.

<sup>241</sup> Department of Defense. Memo. *Defense Intelligence Board*, 16 Dec 1976.

<sup>242</sup> Garthoff, 114.

Bush's and Rumsfeld's reorganization efforts occurred following a congressional push to reform how the United States conducted foreign policy. In 1972, Congress established the *Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy*, informally referred to as the Murphy Commission. The Murphy Commission grew from concern by members of Congress that the United States conducted foreign policy in a disjointed manner driven more by organizational interests than common purpose. The report highlighted the importance of subordinating defense and intelligence to policy, arguing that, as foreign policy tools, defense and intelligence should be focused on achieving policy objectives and not on institutional interests.<sup>243</sup> Although Rumsfeld and Bush might have disagreed about control and influence over intelligence, DCI Bush's reform objective on improving intelligence support to policy was in-line with the congressional push to streamline the United States' national security processes. Despite the Murphy Commission's warnings, defense gained a greater influence over foreign policy in the coming decades, as national intelligence increased its support to military operations.

In November 1991, as President Bush issued *National Security Review 29: Intelligence Capabilities 1992-2005*, he probably reflected on DCI Bush's reform efforts in 1976. Although markedly different periods for the United States, with the Fall of 1991 being a time of jubilation following the Gulf War and the coming Cold War victory, and 1976 in the midst of the post-Vietnam and post-Watergate doldrums; both periods marked the beginning of uncertainty for the Intelligence Community. In 1976, the

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<sup>243</sup> Congressional Research Service. "Report by the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy: Background and Principal Recommendations." [research.policyarchive.org/20213.pdf](https://research.policyarchive.org/20213.pdf) (accessed 12 January 2016), CRS-9-11.

Intelligence Community was trying to recover and reclaim America's confidence in the aftermath of the Church and Pike Committee Hearings. In 1991, the Intelligence Community was celebrating its contribution to the victory over Iraq and the Soviet Union, while also coping with the Gulf War intelligence critiques and trying to understand what came after Cold War victory. NSR-29 was Bush's second opportunity to help the Intelligence Community cope with uncertainty and adapt to a changing environment.

Echoing aspects of the Murphy Commission, NSR-29 stated that policy requirements should drive intelligence resources and required a "comprehensive identification by policy departments and agencies of their anticipated intelligence information and support need to the year 2005," before the Intelligence Community developed their resource wishlist. NSR-29 stated that policymakers had in the past shirked their responsibility "in setting intelligence priorities and requirements" and NSR-29 was published to fix this flaw in a post-Cold War world. NSR-29 told policymakers to focus beyond typical foreign policy issues and consider how "global problems" such as "health," "natural resource scarcity," and the "environment" should influence intelligence capabilities.<sup>244</sup> Among the issues President Bush wanted the policymakers to focus on was intelligence support to the military.

In line with his perspective as DCI, President Bush viewed intelligence as a community effort and understood resource allocation issues had to be based on policy requirements, not organizational interests. This perspective was shared by others in his

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<sup>244</sup> Bush, President George HW. "National Security Review 29: The Intelligence Community." <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsr/nsr29.pdf> (accessed 17 November 2012).

administration and their actions equally focused on building a unified intelligence organization, not one dominated by any policy department or agency. One of these individuals was the new DCI Robert Gates, who authored NSR-29, been a driving force behind its publication, and was largely responsible for implementing its findings.

### **Gates Task Force and Intelligence Reform**

*I believe, even if we weren't in the troubled world that we are going to be in, that he is the best candidate for the job and that he is now ready to provide the leadership and the management, not only of the CIA, but for the Intelligence Community that the country needs and that CIA needs.*<sup>245</sup> –Admiral (R) Bobby Ray Inman commenting on Robert Gates readiness to serve as DCI during Gates' confirmation hearings

President bush swore in Dr. Robert Gates as the fifteenth DCI on November 12, 1991. As Bush, the eleventh DCI, reminisced about his year at the helm of the CIA and the Intelligence Community, he described the enoumous challenges facing Gates. Signalling the guidance he gave three days later with the issuance of NSR-29, Bush spoke of the need for intelligence reform to posture for the post-Cold War world. Gates was a close advisor to President Bush, serving as his Deputy National Security Advisor under Brent Scowcroft since 1989. In this position he had been the driving force behind Bush's intelligence reform, essentially developing the idea he later implemented. Gates' experience as an intelligence professional, coupled with his knowledge of policy and political maneuvering, made him an ideal candidate to implement the NSR-29 objectives.<sup>246</sup>

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<sup>245</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. S Hrg. 102-799 *Nomination of Robert M. Gates to Be Director of Central Intelligence*. 102nd Cong., 1st sess., 16, 17, 19, 20 September 1991, 938.

<sup>246</sup> <http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/rewiring-the-cia-for-a-post-cold-war-world->

Robert Gates, a Kansan who possesses a PhD in Russian History and a tremendous intellect, had served in the Intelligence Community for twenty-three years when he was selected as DCI. He had been a key advisor to five administrations, and beginning with Richard Nixon, had worked on the National Security Council for four of them.<sup>247</sup> Gates' intellect and talent were recognized by influential officials throughout his career, resulting in his meteoric rise within the national security establishment. One of the individuals who recognized Gates' talent was Admiral (R) Bobby Ray Inman, who as Deputy Director for Central Intelligence (DDCI) in 1981 recommended the thirty-eight year old Gates to Bill Casey as someone who should be groomed as a future DCI. Despite Gates' young age, Casey promoted him to Deputy Director of Intelligence (DDI) after then DDI John McMahon moved into the Executive Director position.<sup>248</sup> Gates eventually replaced McMahon, who previously replaced Inman, as the DDCI. Following Casey's death, Reagan nominated Bob Gates as his DCI, but controversy surrounding the Iran Contra-Scandal derailed Gates' initial nomination.<sup>249</sup> When Gates withdrew his name from consideration, Reagan nominated then FBI Director Judge William Webster.

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19910627 (accessed 3 March 2016).

<sup>247</sup> <http://www.biography.com/people/robert-gates-40993#early-career>

<sup>248</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. S Hrg. 102-799 *Nomination of Robert M. Gates to Be Director of Central Intelligence*. 102nd Cong., 1st sess., 16, 17, 19, 20 September 1991; Gates, *From the Shadows*, 221 and 224-225. Admiral Inman stood up for Gates' during his unsuccessful nomination, telling a New York times reporter "there is no set of circumstances under which I would accept the job....Gates was exactly right." When asked about his status as a potential nominee. See <http://www.nytimes.com/1987/03/03/world/reagan-retracts-gates-nomination-to-head-the-cia.html>. Inman was so angry about how Gates was treated that he told reporters. "I will never come back to government. I have zero Potomac fever. I don't have the patience anymore. Watching this process has absolutely locked that in concrete." See <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/12/17/us/change-pentagon-man-bobby-ray-inman-operator-for-pentagon.html?pagewanted=all>.

<sup>249</sup> Garthoff, 168.

The Iran-Contra Scandal did not slow Gates' rise for long, following Webster's DCI tenure, Bush renominated Gates to be DCI.

The SSCI hearing on Bob Gates' nomination occurred over multiple days in late September and early October 1991. Nearly twenty-five years after the nomination hearings and with his image as a sage senior statesman established, it is easy to forget how contentious Gates' confirmation hearings were. During the hearings, the SSCI heard testimonials regarding Gates' intellect and leadership, from former colleagues such as Bobby Ray Inman and John McMahon. Gates also heard his reputation excoriated over issues ranging from allegations that he was involved in "slanting" analysis to scurrilous media reports alleging a role in the "October Surprise." As expected, the crux of the testimony and questioning centered around the Iran-Contra scandal; particularly what Gates knew and when he knew it. While the Iran-Contra discussion was significant and a mixture of pro and con testimonials were heard, Gate's second nomination as DCI passed the SSCI by an 11-4 vote and the full Senate by a 61-31 vote.<sup>250</sup>

During his testimony, Gates described his vision for the Intelligence Community and indentified issues he would tackle during his tenure. Among these issues, were improving the responsiveness of intelligence collection to policymakers' requirements and increasing the investment in both HUMINT and technology. Regarding intelligence

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<sup>250</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate Executive Reports. *Nomination of Robert M. Gates to be Director of Central Intelligence*. 102nd Cong., 1st sess., 3 January 1991, 2, 4-5. The "October Surprise" was the allegation that members of the Reagan campaign team (including Casey and Bush) and others conducted backdoor negotiations with Iran to hold the hostages until after the 1980 campaign to weaken Carter's chances of reelection. These allegations, driven largely by Gary Sick, a Carter National Security advisor, led to a congressional task force. The task force chair, Lee Hamilton, found that "there was virtually no credible evidence to support the allegations." See Hamilton, Lee. "Dialogue: Last Word on the October Surprise?; Case Closed." *New York Times*, 24 January 1993. Compare this vote to his 2006 vote to be Secretary of Defense, which was a 95-2 vote.

support to the military, Gates testimony highlighted two issues. First, he argued “the relationship between our national and tactical intelligence programs must be dramatically improved.” This issue had to do with strengthening individual organizational relationships to solidfy the Intelligence Community. Since tactical intelligence programs resided in the military, strengthening the relationship between tactical and national was a euphemism for strengthening the relationship between the military and non-military intelligence. Gates did not stop with a broad generalization of tactical and national programs, but specifically argued that “CIA’s relationship to and support for the U.S. military must be improved.” This nod toward improving intelligence support to military operations was in-line with comments made by the SSCI Chariman, Senator David Boren. Although both Gates and Boren argued for increased intelligence support to military operations, the consistency of their words through the years show that neither wanted a subordination of national intelligence to DoD, but rather an equal partnership with organizational responsibilities clearly defined.<sup>251</sup>

On November 9, 1991, three days before his swearing-in ceremony at CIA, Bob Gates reached out to Rich Haver requesting a meeting with Secretary of Defense Cheney for the afternoon of his ceremony. Uncertain about the agenda for the meeting, Cheney asked Haver for a point paper to prepare him for the discussion. Knowing Bobby Ray Inman was involved in the Gates’ confirmation, Haver reached out to the retired

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<sup>251</sup> During the Gates’ confirmation hearings, both Senator Boren and Dr. Gates argued for improving support to the military and the link for tactical and national intelligence. Senator Boren also cautioned that DoD should not control the intelligence community, a concern he would raise twenty-one years later when responding to questions. In 2008, when he was departing as Secretary of Defense, Gates discussed his concern with the power/influence of DoD in foreign policy. A concern he said he had during his career as an intelligence officer.



admiral.<sup>252</sup> Admiral Inman, who helped further both Haver's and Gates' career, provided a "terse rundown of what Gates' big ideas were with the Intelligence Community." Haver used Inman's input "as the framework" and rounded the point paper out with insight he derived from Gates' testimony and previous conversations between the two. On the morning of November 12<sup>th</sup>, Haver dropped by Cheney's office to give him the paper; after a quick look-over, Cheney said "thanks, about what I figured." Haver departed from Cheney's office and went about his day. That afternoon, following the Cheney/Gates meeting, the Secretary of Defense summoned Haver back to his office to pick up the point paper. When Haver arrived, Cheney handed him the point paper which was now covered in scribbled notes. Cheney was not a note taker, at least in public, and receiving a paper back from him was not normal. Cheney told Haver the paper was "very helpful" in informing his discussion with DCI Gates and that Haver's job description just changed.

When Haver first started working as Cheney's intelligence advisor, the Secretary of Defense told him to "be a thorn in Judge Webster's ass for DoD." Cheney said Judge Webster and the rest of the CIA, "were fine guys," but to ensure DoD interests were protected, they were going to have to "push him." Now that Bob Gates, an experienced intelligence official and confidant of President Bush, was DCI, Cheney's guidance flipped. Cheney rescinded Haver's earlier marching orders, telling him, "now your job is

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<sup>252</sup> Haver, Richard. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and former Intelligence Advisor to Secretary of Defense (Cheney and Rumsfeld). Interview by author, Great Falls, VA, 01 December 2015 and email exchange with author, 04 January 2016; U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. S Hrg. 102-799 *Nomination of Robert M. Gates to Be Director of Central Intelligence*. 102nd Cong., 1st sess., 16, 17, 19, 20 September 1991, 443-444.-Inman conducted a review of intelligence capabilities in the early eighties to determine intelligence requirements that Gates highlighted as informing his push for the review outlined in NSR-29.

to make sure Bob Gates succeeds, because DoD does everything it can to make him succeed.” Cheney understood the services would not be happy with some of the reforms and wanted Haver to keep him apprised on whom within DoD was not supporting the new DCI. According to Haver, Cheney understood the Intelligence Community’s flaws and wanted to improve intelligence support.

While Cheney’s attitude toward the CIA mellowed after Gates became DCI, his desire to protect DoD’s interests probably drove this change. It is hard to believe that Cheney suddenly embraced a more benevolent approach to bureaucratic interaction. It is more likely he saw an opportunity to use resources outside DoD to alleviate some of the budgetary strain. The days of plentiful defense spending were coming to an end and the services could no longer afford an autarkic approach. The DoD’s own intelligence reform efforts, initiated six months earlier, were driven by an economic environment that assailed duplication. As the DoD’s leader, Cheney was concerned with intelligence support to the warfighter and rectifying the issues that plagued past operations. Although autarchy makes operations easier, there was no way to remain autonomous during these anemic times.

DCI Gates also appreciated the coming fiscal constraints and understood he had to fix the flaws of the Intelligence Community, while navigating through an uncertain and tumultuous time; fighting change and budget reductions would be futile. As the first post-Cold War DCI, Gates had to bring the Intelligence Community together, identify responsibilities, and reduce duplication. This approach was the only way the Intelligence Community could survive reductions, while continuing to support its diverse customers. Gates also heard rumblings about the need to improve CIA support to military operations

since Operations Urgent Fury and was motivated to resolve these issues when he took over as the DCI.

One of the most important and “hardest” actions Gates’ took to improve the DoD/CIA partnership was asking his close friend Dick Kerr to resign as the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence to replace him with VADM Studeman. Gates and Kerr had a close relationship and there was mutual respect and admiration between the two career CIA officers, but Gates thought it was important to give the military a significant voice in the CIA leadership to improve intelligence support to military operations.<sup>253</sup>

The same month Gates became DCI, he established fourteen task forces to determine how the Intelligence Community needed to transform to ensure relevance in a post-Cold war world. These reviews were in support of Bush’s NSR-29 and were consistent with Cheney’s post-Desert Storm intelligence review.<sup>254</sup> The focus of the fourteen task forces were equally split between internal CIA and broader Intelligence Community issues. The seven CIA task forces focused on intelligence support to policymakers, the issue of politicization of intelligence, future methods of communicating with policymakers, improving HUMINT collection, handling information pertaining to law violations, internal CIA communications, and CIA openness. Gate’s intent with the internal CIA task forces was to “revolutionize both the culture and the

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<sup>253</sup> Gates, Robert, Dr. Former Secretary of Defense and former Director of Central Intelligence. Telephone interview by author, 29 March 2016.

<sup>254</sup> Haver, Richard. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and former Intelligence Advisor to Secretary of Defense (Cheney and Rumsfeld). Interview by author, Great Falls, VA, 01 December 2015 and email exchange with author, 04 January 2016; Haver noted that Cheney advocated for imagery and drones during close door congressional testimony. He stated that capacity for war had to be developed during peace, this included the equipment and the “gray matter.” Haver mentioned language shortfalls during Desert Storm and the inability to interrogate POW(s) as an example of the cost of unpreparedness.

intelligence processes at the CIA.”<sup>255</sup> Gates identified many of these issues during his confirmation testimony, and improving CIA HUMINT collection had been an issue of concern for Congress, during both Gate’s Senate confirmation and following previous military operations. Of particular concern, was CIA clandestine HUMINT support to the military, which, following Desert Storm and other operations, was identified as a significant shortfall.

During his testimony, Gates described the CIA role evolving from one that was historically separate from the military to one that was becoming more intertwined because of the rise of low-intensity conflicts and the growing difficulty in distinguishing between war and peace. Gates told Congress, “CIA has basically been considered a fundamentally peacetime organisation...But war...was defined as something like global thermonuclear war...What the Gulf War showed, unlike Vietnam...was that in this intense, very large conventional war, we had something in between...peace and full-scale war. We really didn’t have, I think, very good procedures particularly for CIA support for military operations of that scale. I think that is one of the areas we need to look at...We discovered some real problems there during the course of the war...in terms of the transmission of our information to local commanders, to the commanders on the ground.” Gates understood the end of the Cold War changed the CIA and DoD partnership and that he as DCI had to ensure this evolved in the right direction. Part of this evolution

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<sup>255</sup> U.S. Congress, Joint Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. *S. 2198 and S.421 to Reorganize the United States Intelligence Community*. 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., 1 April 1992, 14.

involved increased CIA support to military operations, while still maintaining the CIA's role in supporting the policymaker.<sup>256</sup>

The final seven task forces focused on changes to the Intelligence Community. Gates told the SSCI his intent was to improve coordination within the Intelligence Community, while maintaining its decentralization to ensure the consumers' "diverse needs" were met, an important acknowledgment by Gate.<sup>257</sup> Although the various intelligence organizations could assist each other through collaboration, they all existed for different purposes and had to retain that individual identity and mission focus. To strengthen how the community functioned, Gates made various changes to its management and collective analysis processes. According to Rich Haver, who served on three of the tasks forces, Dr. Gates knew what he wanted the task forces to produce ahead of time and selected individuals who were aware of his desires and would recommend those changes. He also gave them only three weeks to produce the task force reports. With only a year left in Bush's first term, time was of the essence for any meaningful intelligence reform to occur.<sup>258</sup>

On April 1, 1992, Bob Gates sat before a joint session of the intelligence oversight committees to brief them on the findings of the task forces and his initiatives

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<sup>256</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. S Hrg. 102-799 *Nomination of Robert M. Gates to Be Director of Central Intelligence*. 102nd Cong., 1st sess., 16, 17, 19, 20 September 1991, 640.

<sup>257</sup> U.S. Congress, Joint Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. *S. 2198 and S.421 to Reorganize the United States Intelligence Community*. 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., 1 April 1992, 14.

<sup>258</sup> Haver, Richard. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and former Intelligence Advisor to Secretary of Defense (Cheney and Rumsfeld). Interview by author, Great Falls, VA, 01 December 2015 and email exchange with author, 04 January 2016.

for the Intelligence Community. According to Gates, Intelligence Community reform efforts focused on four areas; community management, community analysis, integrating the collection disciplines, and strengthening support to the military.

The post-Cold War environment, defined by certain budget reductions and uncertain requirements, mandated a community approach to intelligence. Gates and other leaders understood the “diverse” requirements of the consumers necessitated a decentralized intelligence approach. The only problem, is fiscal constraints made duplication unsustainable, and the Intelligence Community had to streamline to ensure all customers needs were met. The streamlined community approach did not mean subordination or blurring mission lines, it meant defining the requirements, identifying responsibilities, and then reducing duplication. Gates realized the dynamic environment meant initial allocation decisions were probably wrong and community leadership needed the flexibility to realign resources. To achieve this flexibility, Gates replaced the Intelligence Community Staff with the DCI Community Staff and made Rich Haver the first Director of Community Affairs. Haver and his staff focused on streamlining the Intelligence Community to reduce costs, while maintaining its capabilities to support a varied customer base.<sup>259</sup>

Part of streamlining community efforts involved strengthening “an independent community analytical and estimative capability”, while reducing overall intelligence costs. To achieve this, Gates increased the size of the National Intelligence Council and moved it and the National Intelligence Officers (NIO) out of the CIA to highlight their

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<sup>259</sup> U.S. Congress, Joint Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. *S. 2198 and S.421 to Reorganize the United States Intelligence Community*. 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., 1 April 1992, 14.

independence from any one intelligence organization. He then empowered the NIC chair and the NIO(s) within the community to make it clear they were the leads for community estimates. Regarding alternative analysis, he increased emphasis on “red teams” and “Team A vs. Team B” approaches, while also looking toward non-governmental organizations to support analytical efforts.<sup>260</sup> The Intelligence Community could benefit from the alternative views and expertise provided by university and think-tank scholars, without having to maintain this resource in house. Although budget reductions might have influenced Gates, he truly valued the potential capability within non-government organizations to tackle difficult problems. When Gates became Secretary of Defense in 2006, he once again turned to universities and other non-governmental organizations to “engage their expertise.”<sup>261</sup>

The third part of Gates’ reform efforts was improving the “management, direction, and coordination” of collection efforts. The idea was to designate a lead for each collection discipline who would establish standards and oversee the development of each individual discipline, while ensuring it was providing the collection required to feed comprehensive analysis. Gates still appreciated the differing intelligence requirements of various agencies, but understood the value in having a lead for each discipline that could maintain standards and develop the discipline. For example, Gates established the National Human Intelligence Tasking Center (NHITC) and placed it

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<sup>260</sup> U.S. Congress, Joint Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. *S. 2198 and S.421 to Reorganize the United States Intelligence Community*. 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., 1 April 1992, 15-16. Red Teams and Team A/B provide alternative analysis and often serve as a kind of “devil’s advocate” to help ensure all angles are considered.

<sup>261</sup> Gates, Robert M. “Secretary Gates Speech at National Defense University,” September 2008. <http://www.cfr.org/defense-strategy/secretary-gates-speech-national-defense-university-september-2008/p17411> (accessed 8 July 2016).

under the responsibility of the CIA's Deputy Director of Operations. As the lead for HUMINT, the Center was responsible for establishing and enforcing HUMINT standards, "managing and tasking" requirements, and charting the future of the discipline.<sup>262</sup> As Christopher Andrew points out in his book, *For the President's Eyes Only*, the creation of NHITC was directly related to the failure of the United States to understand Saddam's "political and military aims." This increased HUMINT was required to penetrate the inner-circles of other "third world leaders anxious to acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons" in a post-Cold War world where proliferation was a growing concern.<sup>263</sup>

Gates also worked to remedy organizational issues linked to the BDA controversies that surfaced during the Gulf War. Since Desert Storm, there had been a push to consolidate imagery within a single organization like NSA did for signals intelligence. Although this was recommended by various reviews and DCI Gates was willing to place this new organization within DoD, General Powell's concern over consolidation negatively affecting DoD's mapping capability postponed the consolidation for about four years. Although Powell agreed imagery was "broken," he did not believe defense mapping was and could not support an action that subsumed the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) into a centralized imagery organization.<sup>264</sup> Not able to establish a truly centralized imagery organization, Gates settled for a loose confederation

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<sup>262</sup> U.S. Congress, Joint Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. *S. 2198 and S.421 to Reorganize the United States Intelligence Community*. 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., 1 April 1992, 16.

<sup>263</sup> Andrew, Christopher, 533.

<sup>264</sup> CIA Public Website. "Creating the National Imagery and Mapping Agency." [http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/DOC\\_0000619983.pdf](http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/DOC_0000619983.pdf) (accessed 9 February 2016).



known as the Central Imagery Office (CIO).<sup>265</sup> Although the establishment of CIO was the initial step towards consolidating imagery, the CIO director lacked any real authority or ability to compel cooperation from the DMA, the National Photographic Imagery Center (NPIC), CIA imagery or DIA imagery.<sup>266</sup> This was rectified following the second round of intelligence reform in the mid-1990s.

Not publicly debated, but associated with the Desert Storm BDA controversy and the increased requirement for military support was consolidation of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). During the war, Schwarzkopf complained about the conflicting BDA that was determined largely through satellite imagery. After the war, he complained of not receiving timely and adequate imagery intelligence to enable his decision-making and argued the Intelligence Community had to remedy this shortfall because the future of warfare required it.<sup>267</sup> On March 5, 1992, DCI Gates established a Task Force to determine how the NRO should evolve in the post-Cold War world.<sup>268</sup> Gates asked Robert Fuhman, the former President of Lockheed Martin to chair the Task Force whose members had a diverse background within both the Intelligence Community and commercial sector.

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<sup>265</sup> Gates, Robert, Dr. Former Secretary of Defense and former Director of Central Intelligence. Telephone interview by author, 29 March 2016. Gates referred to this as a “half-step” during the interview.

<sup>266</sup> Miles, Anne Daugherty, *The Creation of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency: Congress’s Role as Overseer* (Washington, D.C.; Joint Military Intelligence College, 2002), 5.

<sup>267</sup> Berkowitz, Bruce, *The National Reconnaissance Office at 50 Years: A Brief History* (Chantilly, VA: Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance, 2011), 18.

<sup>268</sup> DCI Task Force on the National Reconnaissance Office. “Report to the Director of Central Intelligence,” <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB35/docs/doc14.pdf> (accessed 8 February 2016).

The NRO was established through a joint agreement between the CIA and DoD in September 1961, one year before Kennedy's space race speech, but its existence remained classified until 1992. The NRO was formerly established in 1961, but reconnaissance programs had been developing in the CIA and the services since the Eisenhower administration initiated the U2 Spy program in 1954. Although the services had been using reconnaissance aircraft for years, the technology and secrecy involved in the U2 program significantly raised the bar and brought the CIA into the mission. Over time, both the DoD and the CIA assumed leadership roles within the NRO, but the programs remained largely separated and focused on their individual organizational needs. From 1974 to 1992, the NRO consisted of three separate programs: 1) Air Force Satellite Reconnaissance Program (Program A), 2) CIA Satellite Reconnaissance Program (Program B), and 3) Navy Program (Program C).<sup>269</sup>

The Fuhrman Task Force concluded a centralized NRO was still required, but the separate "alphabet programs," lead to parochialism and made it "difficult to foster loyalty and maintain focus on the NRO mission." The Task Force recommended combining the individual programs into "intelligence discipline lines" to increase efficiency, eliminate duplication, and to instill a common NRO culture.<sup>270</sup> The Fuhrman Commission's recommendations were implemented through NSD-67, establishing three functional directorates: 1) SIGINT Directorate, 2) IMINT Directorate, and 3) Communications

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<sup>269</sup> Berkowitz, *The National Reconnaissance Office at 50 Years: A Brief History* (Chantilly, VA: Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance, 2011), iii and 13. There was a fourth program- "Program D, the Air Force and CIA aerial reconnaissance program, comprising all national assets, including the U-2 and A-12/SR- 71 programs. (This program was dissolved and its assets were transferred to the Air Force when the CIA's A-12s were deactivated on 1 October 1974)."

<sup>270</sup> DCI Task Force on the National Reconnaissance Office. "Report to the Director of Central Intelligence," <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB35/docs/doc14.pdf> (accessed 8 February 2016).

Directorate. These directorates eventually co-located within a new NRO Headquarters in the Washington D.C. suburbs.<sup>271</sup> The funding of which became a major controversy within the oversight committees.<sup>272</sup>

Gates' fourth area for intelligence reform focused specifically on improving the CIA-DoD relationship by establishing the Associate Deputy Director for Operations for Military Affairs (ADDO/MA) and the CIA Office of Military Affairs (OMA). Gates explained this new position and organization were "responsible for improving CIA's support to military planning, exercises, and operations. More specifically, this office would be responsible for coordinating military and CIA planning, strengthening the role of DCI representatives at major commands and at the Pentagon, developing procedures so that CIA is regularly informed of military needs for intelligence support, developing plans for CIA support in nation, theater and deployed Joint Intelligence Centers during crises, and the availability of CIA officers for participation with the military on selected exercises."<sup>273</sup> Gates believed the CIA support to the military was important enough that he made the position the number three position in the Directorate of Operations.

DCI Gates wanted the ADDO/MA to be "a real snake eater" and asked Gen Powell to send him a guy that fit that description. The first name Gen Powell sent DCI Gates did not fit the "snake eater" criteria so Gates asked for another name. When the

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<sup>271</sup> Berkowitz, 20.

<sup>272</sup> [http://articles.latimes.com/1995-09-24/news/mn-49643\\_1\\_national-reconnaissance-office](http://articles.latimes.com/1995-09-24/news/mn-49643_1_national-reconnaissance-office). The controversy had to do with the NRO using "unspent funds" they had set aside to build a new headquarters without properly notifying Congress. (accessed 15 March 2016).

<sup>273</sup> U.S. Congress, Joint Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. *S. 2198 and S.421 to Reorganize the United States Intelligence Community*. 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., 1 April 1992, 18-19.

second name did not fit the criteria either, Gates contacted Powell to request a third name. Powell asked Gates if he thought an operator or a guy that had the “credibility” and “could walk right into his office” was more important. Gates then accepted the second nominee, MG Ronald Lajoie, a guy with credibility who could walk into Powell’s office.<sup>274</sup>

MG Lajoie came to the CIA from the Joint Staff, where he served in the J5 (Plans) as the Deputy Director for International Negotiations. Lajoie spent his early career as a transportation officer and then an intelligence officer, during which time he served in Vietnam with the 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division. After Vietnam, MG Lajoie spent the rest of his career as a Russian Foreign Area Officer (FAO), to include a three year stint as the Chief of the United States Military Liaison Mission (USMLM) and two tours at the US Embassy in Moscow.

The USMLM is a little known, but fascinating piece of Soviet-U.S. relations during the Cold War. Established in 1947 to serve as a liaison between the SACEUR and the Chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, the USMLM was a fourteen man organization stationed in Potsdam, East Germany. USMLM’s mission was to serve as liaison between Soviet military units and U.S. military units in Germany, but its “classified primary responsibility” was to collect intelligence on Soviet capability it observed in East Germany.<sup>275</sup> According to MG Lajoie, the Soviet-US agreement

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<sup>274</sup> Gates, Robert, Dr. Former Secretary of Defense and former Director of Central Intelligence. Telephone interview by author, 29 March 2016.

<sup>275</sup> Office of the Chief of Military History. “Unit History 1964-United States Military Liaison Mission to Commander in Chief, Group of Soviet Force in Germany.” <http://www.coldwarspies.com/resources/uh1964cpr.pdf>, 1; Lajoie, Roland, Major General (R). Former/First CIA Associate Deputy Director for Operations/Military Affairs. Telephone interview by author, 10 November 2015.

allowed them free movement throughout East Germany, but it never envisioned them snooping around at Soviet “deployment sites.” The USMLM’s ability to observe Soviet equipment that had previously only been observed via satellite, provided valuable information to American forces that might have to face off against Soviet Divisions.<sup>276</sup> MG Lajoie (then COL Lajoie) was chief of USMLM in 1985 when a Soviet sentry killed an unarmed American officer while he was “conducting reconnaissance on a Soviet training installation in an area not officially restricted.” The death of Major Arthur Nicholson angered Washington D.C. and increased tension between the Soviets and the Americans. Three months after the incident, Lajoie’s vehicle was followed and rammed by a Soviet vehicle during a nighttime deployment. Fearing increased tension on the heels of the Nicholson killing, the Soviets quickly apologized for the Lajoie incident.<sup>277</sup> After his stint in charge of USMLM, Lajoie was promoted and sent to Paris as the Defense Attaché, before moving back moved back to Washington D.C. to establish the On Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) as part of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty implementation measures; a position where he was responsible for inspecting the East German missile installations where armed guards once chased him and his men away. Following OSIA, Lajoie served on the Joint Staff, where in 1992, Lt. Gen Jim Clapper, the DIA Director, reached out and asked him to serve as the first ADDO/MA.<sup>278</sup>

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<sup>276</sup> Lajoie, Roland, Major General (R). Former/First CIA Associate Deputy Director for Operations/Military Affairs. Telephone interview by author, 10 November 2015.

<sup>277</sup> <https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1144&dat=19850717&id=1NQbAAAAIBAJ&sjid=CWMEAAAAIBAJ&pg=4947,203827&hl=en> (accessed 13 January 2016).

<sup>278</sup> Lajoie, Roland, Major General (R). Former/First CIA Associate Deputy Director for Operations/Military Affairs. Telephone interview by author, 10 November 2015;

The creation of the ADDO/MA and OMA was a direct result of Schwarzkopf's post-Gulf War DC tour when he complained about intelligence support and not having control of all operations within his theater. The CIA did not like Schwarzkopf's quest to acquire power over entities outside DoD, but their desire to get Schwarzkopf "off their back" trumped their concern over his power grab. Although the CIA did not accept Schwarzkopf's argument that they should have been his subordinates, they were receptive to improving the CIA/DoD partnership. Since the purpose of Lajoie's new organization was to support military operations, it was placed within the Directorate of Operations (DO), the CIA's HUMINT collection arm. The DO was led by Tom Tweeten, who had been the Deputy Director for Operations for about a year when Lajoie arrived. A former Army intelligence officer and Iowa State graduate, Tweeten was a career Middle East case officer who had served as the Near East-South Asian Division Chief. Like Gates, Tweeten's assignment as the DDO was mired in political controversy due to his service on the NSC staff with Lt. Col Oliver North during the Iran-Contra scandal.<sup>279</sup>

Lajoie started pulling in military officers and Tweeten provided him CIA DO and DI personnel to build an OMA organization of around forty officers. After building the OMA structure, Lajoie focused on three initial goals: 1) Increase CIA's focus and military access to collection efforts that supported military planning; 2) "Demystify the CIA" so military leaders could have a better understanding of the CIA's role, capabilities,

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[http://articles.latimes.com/1985-03-25/news/mn-21307\\_1\\_soviet-union](http://articles.latimes.com/1985-03-25/news/mn-21307_1_soviet-union) (accessed 13 January 2016); White House. "Statement by Principal Deputy Press Secretary Speakes on the Death of Major Arthur D. Nicholson, Jr., in the German Democratic Republic," 23 April 1985 accessed at <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1985/42385d.htm> (accessed 13 January 2016).

<sup>279</sup> Wines, Michael. *The New York Times*. "Washington at Work; After 30 Years in Shadows, a Spymaster Emerges." 20 November 1990.

and limitations; and 3) Help professionalize DoD HUMINT so the military clandestine effort could better collect on their own requirements and not depend on the CIA.

Lajoie “came to appreciate” that CIA representatives at the combatant commands were an important tool in providing quality support and managing expectations. At the time, CIA employees did not consider an assignment as a CIA representative to the military “career enhancing.” To move past this stigma and to ensure the best candidates were selected to represent the CIA, MG Lajoie started chairing a selection committee. Lajoie also understood there was a need to educate both the CIA and the military to demystify the CIA and overcome the mutual ignorance that often resulted in friction. In pursuit of this, the OMA started hosting future flag officers, War College classes, and combatant command J2(s) at CIA headquarters, to increase military understanding of CIA operations. Lajoie also worked with Twetten to increase the level of CIA support to exercises, a move intended to educate both military and CIA officers.

MG Lajoie found the CIA, particularly the DO, always willing to support the military. Fondly remembering his experience twenty-years later, Lajoie said in 2015, “I always had a good feeling about the CIA, especially the DO which has a gung ho attitude and is always willing to rush to the sound of the guns...they have the money, cover and forward deployed resources which allows them to react quickly and get people on the ground to support whatever military operation ensues.”<sup>280</sup> Lajoie’s efforts and the efforts of others’ strengthened the CIA-DoD partnership, but the concern remained over whether DoD support requests would consume CIA resources.

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<sup>280</sup> Lajoie, Roland, Major General (R). Former/First CIA Associate Deputy Director for Operations/Military Affairs. Telephone interview by author, 10 November 2015.

The push for intelligence reform spurred by Desert Storm and the Cold War was not limited to the executive branch. At the same time, DoD and Dick Cheney were restructuring defense intelligence and Bob Gates' task forces were looking for ways to transform the entire community, the HPSCI and the SSCI were debating intelligence reform legislation. There was a significant issue overlap in the debate occurring within the executive and legislative branches, particularly management and intelligence support to military operations. Although the legislation never made it into law, the congressional input helped inform discussion and encourage reform. Leading the legislative debate, were two Congressmen from Oklahoma, Senator David Boren and Representative David McCurdy.

### **Sooner Born/Sooner Bred: Boren, McCurdy and Congressional Reform**

***“We can no longer afford to maintain separate civilian and military intelligence empires. There needs to be better coordination and integration of these activities, both to reduce waste and duplication, and to ensure that our military commanders in the field get the best support possible from both national and tactical systems.”<sup>281</sup>- SSCI Chairman Senator David Boren***

The initial congressional push for broader Intelligence Community reform began with the 1991 Intelligence Authorization Act (IAA).<sup>282</sup> The IAA noted that both the HASC and SSCI intended to conduct studies, hold hearings, “and, if necessary, to draft legislation to achieve these objectives.”<sup>283</sup> Regarding intelligence support to military

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<sup>281</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. S. HRG. 894. *S. 2198 and S. 421 to Reorganize the United States Intelligence Community*. 102nd Cong. 2nd sess., 20 February; 4, 12, 19 March 1992, 252.

<sup>282</sup> U.S. Congress. House. *Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991, Report 102-166*. 102nd Cong., 1st sess., 03 August 1990, 16.

<sup>283</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. S. HRG. 102-91 *Review of*



operations, the IAA raised concern over separation of “tactical and national intelligence communities” and described the growth of defense intelligence as an understandable response by commanders who questioned national intelligence support to operations. An interesting perspective that appeared to insinuate the CIA’s mission always included support to military operations and concluding they had been neglecting this role.

Although redundancy had been okay, the lean times increased concern over intelligence expenditures. In conjunction with SASC efforts, the IAA also directed the Secretary of Defense and the DCI to review DoD intelligence “with the objective of consolidating redundant functions, programs, and entities, and strengthening joint intelligence organizations and operations.” Interestingly, the 1991 IAA was introduced on August 3, 1990, one day after Saddam invaded Kuwait and before Schwarzkopf’s Gulf War intelligence critiques caught the attention of the HASC and the SSCI.

The SSCI Intelligence Community hearings began on March 21, 1991, nearly a month after Desert Storm and while Haver’s review of intelligence during the war was wrapping up. Although intelligence performance during Desert Storm shaped the discussion, Pennsylvania Senator Arlen Specter introduced legislation the previous month that informed it. Senate Bill 421 (S.Bill-421), *The National Intelligence Reorganization Act*, proposed creating an independent Director of National Intelligence (DNI) who would oversee and have budgetary authority over the entire Intelligence Community.<sup>284</sup> Although most senators agreed some form of intelligence reform was

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*Intelligence Organization*. 102nd Congress, 1st sess., 12 March 1991, 3.

<sup>284</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate. Bill-421. *National Intelligence Reorganization Act*. 102nd Cong., 19 February 1991.

required, they were not all convinced that reform had to be congressionally mandated. This was the third time Specter introduced DNI legislation, but this time he hoped to ride the post-Desert Storm euphoria to convince his colleagues that intelligence reform, like defense reform, required legislative action.<sup>285</sup>

In his opening statement, SSCI Chairman Senator David Boren explained the Intelligence Community, which was established nearly forty-four years earlier, had to evolve beyond its Cold War focus. He explained the transition would occur during a period of fiscal austerity and required a streamlining of intelligence capabilities and a slashing of redundancy throughout the community. One of the areas Boren focused on during his statement was the relationship between intelligence and defense. Boren explained the SSCI was concerned, that “despite a sizeable growth in development in intelligence,” intelligence was not meeting the commanders’ intelligence requirements. In addition, there was a growing concern that “two separate empires,” “one on the military side and one on the civilian side,” were becoming unmanageable and actions had to be taken to ensure tactical and national intelligence were integrated to reduce cost. Boren mentioned specifically the need to increase investment in human intelligence to “rebuild some of the strength” previously cut from HUMINT.<sup>286</sup> The opening comments on

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<sup>285</sup> Senator Specter had previously introduced S.Bill 1820-National Intelligence Reorganization Act of 1987 and S.Bill 175-National Intelligence Reorganization Act of 1989.

<sup>286</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. S. HRG. 102-91 *Review of Intelligence Organization*. 102nd Congress, 1st sess., 12 March 1991, 5; Tenet, George J. Memo for National Security Advisor Samuel R. Berger. *Meeting with the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board*, 16 April 1993. During Inman’s tenure, the PFIAB would publish a report titled *Intelligence Support to the Persian Gulf Crisis*. This report argued “the failure of U.S. intelligence to provide strategic warning of Saddam Hussein’s intentions to invade Kuwait, the paucity of human intelligence we had collected on Iraq, and the real problems between military and civilian intelligence in providing unified support, in the initial stages of the Desert Shield deployment, to our commanders on the ground.”

increasing HUMINT and improving support to the military revealed SSCI's objective of strengthening the CIA/DoD partnership as an element of reform.

The SSCI had been focusing specifically on enhancing HUMINT since 1989 and the Desert Storm critiques only increased their drive for HUMINT reform. The committee acknowledged that access to enemy intentions might require additional HUMINT capabilities, but they were also focused on increasing CIA support to the operational commander. Although failure to support the military during Desert Storm is what roused the 1991 debate, the SSCI was looking beyond wartime and also wanted to improve CIA's HUMINT support to DoD during peacetime. The concern was that the HUMINT sources necessary to support the wartime commander had to be developed during peacetime and identifying the sources with access required CIA involvement in DoD planning efforts. If pursued, CIA support to DoD planning efforts could put a significant strain on CIA resources and shift it from an organization focused mainly on supporting the policymaker to one focused largely on supporting the military. This was a fundamental change for the CIA.<sup>287</sup>

The witnesses that March day reflected the influence of the Gulf War critiques and the importance SSCI placed on intelligence support to military operations. ADM (R) Bobby Ray Inman, LTG (R) William Odom, and Donald Latham were all former defense intelligence officials with tremendous knowledge of both operations and intelligence. The discussion focused on two issues: 1) what are the United States' intelligence needs in a

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<sup>287</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. S Rpt. 102-117 *Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1992 for the Intelligence Activities of the U.S. Government, the Intelligence Community Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Disability System, and for Other Purposes*. 102nd Cong., 1st sess., 8 July 1991, 6.

post-Cold War world; and 2) considering the intelligence needs and the fiscal environment, how should the Intelligence Community be structured.

The first witness to testify was Bobby Ray Inman, the retired admiral and mentor to Bob Gates, Rich Haver, Mike McConnell, and Bill Studeman. The Chairman of President Bush's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), Inman argued for a bottom up assessment of national security requirements before pursuing any structural reform of the Intelligence Community.<sup>288</sup> Cautioning against salami slicing capability, Inman argued the future course of the Intelligence Community could not be identified without knowing the "needs" of the NSC and departments. According to Inman, this knowledge had to be generated without the involvement of the Intelligence Community, whose agencies had their own parochial interests.

After arguing that intelligence needs should drive focus and structure, Inman turned to the question of organizational reform. Admiral Inman had long been a supporter of competitive analysis to encourage rigor in review, challenge assumptions and reduce group-think. Despite the value Inman placed in competitive analysis, he understood the budget environment required trade-offs and recommended dividing up analytical responsibility between the separate agencies to ensure broader coverage. Regarding community management and leadership, Inman argued an independent DNI would be the best solution if resources were not an issue, but this was not feasible in the current fiscal environment. Instead, he argued for strengthening community management by establishing an Executive Director in the CIA to manage the community staff. Nine

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<sup>288</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. S. HRG. 102-91 *Review of Intelligence Organization*. 102nd Congress, 1st sess., 12 March 1991, 18. Morton Abramowitz also argued for a bottom up review on intelligence needs during his testimony to the SSCI in March 1992.

months later, Inman's recommendation to conduct a bottom-up review without the Intelligence Community's initial involvement was implemented when President Bush issued NSR-29. A year later, Gates established a new director of the community staff position at the CIA.

Like Admiral Inman, LTG (R) Odom served as the Director of NSA and was a respected national security professional. Odom had a long illustrious military career, moving between military and scholarly assignments. During his career LTG (R) Odom served on the USMLM in Potsdam and as an Army attache in Moscow, as a professor at West Point and Columbia University, with the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development (CORDS) program in Vietnam, as Zbigniew Brzezinski's military advisor, and as the head of Army Intelligence. A man of deep intellect, Odom was the rare Army officer who pursued a non-traditional path to the pinnacle of his profession. A prolific author, Odom blended his military experience with his academic training, publishing books on topics such as American foreign policy, counterinsurgency, and the Soviet military. Influenced by his Vietnam experience and his willingness to speak out against what he perceived as poor policy decisions, Odom became a notable critic of the Bush administration's decision to invade Iraq in 2003 and its subsequent surge.<sup>289</sup> Distancing himself from the counterinsurgency hype that swelled within the US Army ranks during the Iraq surge, Odom argued the approach was nothing new and a similar approach had failed before in Vietnam. Referring to the surge in Iraq as merely a "new tactic" with "no serious prospect for success," he continuously pushed against policymakers and argued

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<sup>289</sup> <http://rs5.loc.gov/service/mss/eadxmss/eadpdfmss/2009/ms009006.pdf> (accessed 3 March 2016).

for American troops to leave Iraq up until he passed away in May 2008.<sup>290</sup> Although policymakers largely ignored his sage advice in 2008, one could argue the conditions in Iraq eight years later underscore his accuracy.

Demonstrating the same independence of thought he did regarding Iraq a decade later, Odom told SSCI the Intelligence Community required a DNI. The DNI would serve in a commander-like position, prioritizing requirements and managing resources. Underneath the DNI should reside separate collection “disciplines,” which, similar to Admiral Inman’s recommendation, would be centrally managed. Regarding analysis, Odom argued that policymakers and commanders each required tailored analysis focused on their individual requirements. While collection could be consolidated and centrally managed, each commander and policymaker had to retain their own analytical capability.

Donald Latham, a former ASD-C3I under President Reagan, was the final witness. Like Inman and Odom, Latham believed the DNI provided value in centrally managing resources. Latham did not agree with Odom that centrally managing each collection discipline with separate analytical capabilities was the right approach. He believed separating by collection discipline created unnecessary stove-pipes that would further divide the community and weaken support to the consumer. He believed new technologies offered the ability to fuse collection disciplines to enable the user to view the intelligence picture in real-time.

It is clear from Latham’s testimony, that he primarily viewed intelligence from a support to the military perspective. Although his argument to centralize all collection

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<sup>290</sup> <http://www.c-span.org/video/?204669-1/security-situation-iraq&start=1887>;  
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/31/AR2008053102193.html> (accessed 26 February 2016).

under one agency and create a DNI with budgetary power might weaken the Secretary of Defense's authority on paper, Latham's approach largely focused intelligence on the needs of the military. From his argument that DoD had to have some control over national intelligence to his description of a "single console" displaying all source intelligence, Latham believed intelligence was primarily a commander's tool. This highlighted an issue LTG (R) Odom mentioned at the beginning of his testimony, "we shall only talk nonsense about organization and structure unless we have a commonly accepted paradigm of what intelligence is supposed to do, for whom, and how it is supposed to do it."<sup>291</sup> SSCI testimony that day and subsequent days over the next year highlighted the lack of an "intelligence paradigm" among elected officials and national security professionals.

In 1991, when Representative Dave McCurdy assumed the chairmanship of the HPSCI, it was the first time two congressmen from the same state simultaneously chaired their respective intelligence committees. The hometowns of Senator Boren and Congressman McCurdy, both graduates of the University of Oklahoma School of Law, are separated by only seventy-six miles. Senator Boren, whose father Congressman Lyle Boren, once represented the same 4<sup>th</sup> district as McCurdy, spent his childhood between Oklahoma and the Washington D.C. area. Boren returned to Oklahoma after graduating from Yale and Oxford universities; following law school, Boren began a professional career that included stints as a professor, lawyer, state representative, and governor. In 1978 he returned to Washington D.C. to represent his state in the U.S. Senate. Boren served in the Senate for sixteen years and as the chairman of the SSCI for roughly six of

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<sup>291</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. S. HRG. 102-91 *Review of Intelligence Organization*. 102nd Congress, 1st sess., 12 March 1991, 37.

those years. A leading member of the Democratic Party in the 1990s, he was influential in the rise of his former SSCI aide, George Tenet, to the position of DCI under presidents Clinton and George W. Bush.

When Boren was Oklahoma's governor, Dave McCurdy was a young assistant states attorney in Oklahoma. A graduate of the University of Oklahoma, McCurdy was elected to Congress when he was only thirty years old and served six terms in the House of Representatives. A one-time ally of Bill Clinton, McCurdy gave the seconding speech nominating him as the Democratic nominee for President during the party's 1992 convention.<sup>292</sup> The Clinton/McCurdy alliance publicly splintered less than two years later when McCurdy questioned Clinton's policies, referring to him as an "old Democrat."<sup>293</sup> Representative McCurdy left Congress in 1995 after he lost the race for the Senate seat vacated by Boren when he retired from Congress to become President of the University of Oklahoma.<sup>294</sup> These two Oklahomans, with help from others like Senator Arlen Specter, took the congressional lead on intelligence reform in the early 1990s. By 1995, Boren and McCurdy were retired from Congress and others were picking up the legislative lead for intelligence reform.

On February 5, 1992, Senator Boren and Congressman McCurdy introduced intelligence reform bills in their respective chambers. On introducing the bills, both

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<sup>292</sup> <http://www.c-span.org/video/?27124-1/democratic-convention-seconding-speech> (26 February 2016).

<sup>293</sup> [http://articles.latimes.com/1994-12-07/news/mn-5990\\_1\\_leadership-council](http://articles.latimes.com/1994-12-07/news/mn-5990_1_leadership-council) (accessed 26 February 2016).

<sup>294</sup> Apple Jr., R.W. "The 1994 Campaign; In Oklahoma's Senate Race, Both Candidates are Running Against Clinton." 5 October 1994. <http://www.nytimes.com/1994/10/05/us/1994-campaign-oklahoma-s-senate-race-both-candidates-are-running-against-clinton.html?pagewanted=all> (accessed 3 March 2016).



legislators cited their desire to spur discussion on how the Intelligence Community needed to transform in the post Cold War world. Acknowledging the Bush administration's actions, both Boren and McCurdy perceived their legislation as contributing to the ongoing debate and did not expect their legislation to be wholly adopted.

The *Intelligence Reorganization Act of 1992* could be considered part of a proposed second phase of reform to ensure the United States' national security structures were better organized to achieve the United States' foreign policy objectives. Goldwater-Nichols had achieved two important goals; 1) it unified the services and centralized power under a joint construct; and 2) established a system/process where the National Security Strategy would drive military strategy development and planning efforts. The *Intelligence Reorganization Act*, sought to establish a unified intelligence structure that supported DoD and the efforts of other departments, while also assisting strategy development and planning efforts in pursuit of policy objectives.

To unify the Intelligence Community, the legislation recommended a DNI who would serve as the President's principle advisor and head of the Intelligence Community. As head of the Intelligence Community, the DNI's responsibilities would include; "developing" the National Foreign intelligence Program Budget, "managing collection capabilities," and "eliminating waste and unnecessary duplication." To improve the Intelligence Community's responsiveness to consumers' needs, the legislation established a Committee on Foreign Intelligence within the National Security Council. Similar to the committee proposed during the Ford Administration, the President's National Security Advisor would chair this committee and its members would include the DNI, the

Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, their deputies, and other members the “President designates.” The committee would be responsible for ensuring that intelligence priorities were nested with the President’s “policy and objectives.”<sup>295</sup>

Since improving intelligence support to military operations was one of the driving forces behind intelligence reform, there were numerous elements that focused on improving the intelligence/defense partnership, particularly in regards to the CIA/DoD relationship. First, the legislation mandated that either the DNI or his deputy be a commissioned military officer to ensure DoD equities were understood and considered by the Intelligence Community leadership. The Intelligence Community had been led by active duty military officers in the past, but never before had it been mandated that one of the top two Intelligence Community leaders be a current serving military officer.<sup>296</sup>

To replace the DCI as manager of the CIA, the legislation established a Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (DCIA) who would not only be responsible for the CIA, but also oversee HUMINT collection for the entire Intelligence Community. This would place the responsibility on the CIA for remedying all shortfalls in HUMINT support to military operations that every congressional review of military operations had identified since Grenada. To ensure that CIA responded to DoD HUMINT needs, the legislation established an Assistant Deputy Director for Operations-Military Support (ADDOMS).

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<sup>295</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate Bill-2198. *Intelligence Reorganization Act of 1992*. 102nd Cong., 5 February 1992.

<sup>296</sup> This was not the first time a proposal mandating that either the head of the Intelligence or his deputy was a military officer. Gen (R) Gorman mentioned previous legislation during his testimony on March 12, 1992. U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. S. HRG. 894. *S. 2198 and S. 421 to Reorganize the United States Intelligence Community*. 102nd Cong. 2nd sess., 20 February; 4, 12, 19 March 1992, 286.

The ADDOMS would be a two-star flag officer and serve as DoD's "principal liaison" to the CIA, responsible for facilitating the CIA/DoD partnership.

To unify the Intelligence Community in support of military operations, the sponsors of the legislation believed they needed to strengthen the management of defense intelligence. To help accomplish this, the bill created an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (ASD-I) whose responsibilities included the integration of tactical and national intelligence and ensuring the Intelligence Community supported DoD operations. In the ASD-I you would have one person responsible for the "development of policy, resource allocation, and oversight" of DoD intelligence while also ensuring the remainder of the Intelligence Community was providing adequate support to military operations. Finally, the legislation looked to rectify the Gulf War BDA controversy and consolidate imagery under a National Imagery Agency that would fall underneath the DoD.

Congressman McCurdy's *National Security Act of 1992* shared numerous similarities with Boren's legislation. Both bills established a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) that would have enhanced budgetary and management authorities over the current DCI. Unlike Boren's bill, McCurdy's legislation did not allow the DNI to be an active duty military officer. This did not mean McCurdy was not focused on improving intelligence support to the military. His Act made intelligence support to military operations one of the DNI's primary responsibilities and ensured military

equities were considered by mandating that the Deputy DNI was an active duty flag officer.<sup>297</sup>

With the recommended establishment of the DNI, both bills did away with the DCI and created the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (DCIA). The DCIA would be in charge of an organization that was significantly reduced from the current CIA. Like the Senate bill, the House bill focused the CIA on HUMINT collection and had the CIA assuming responsibility for directing the Intelligence Community's HUMINT activities, while a new Office of Intelligence Analysis integrated analysts from throughout the community. Unlike the Senate bill, McCurdy's legislation did not focus on strengthening the CIA/DoD partnership specifically by establishing an ADDOMS within CIA or creating an ASD-I.<sup>298</sup>

The introduction of the intelligence reform bills in early February was followed by numerous hearings with expert testimony throughout February and March 1992. Over the course of a month, the SSCI pulled together a group of national security experts to testify on the proposed intelligence reform. ADM (R) Inman and LTG (R) Odom testified for a second time since the committee started to pursue intelligence reform the previous year. In addition to Inman and Odom, James R. Schlesinger (former Secretary of Defense and DCI), Ambassador Frank Carlucci (former DDCI and Deputy Secretary of Defense), GEN (R) Paul Gorman (former Southern Command CINC), Gen (R) Alfred

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<sup>297</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate Bill-2198. *Intelligence Reorganization Act of 1992*. 102nd Cong., 5 February 1992; Steele, Robert David. "The National Security Act of 1992." *American Intelligence Journal*, Winter/Spring 1992, 33.

<sup>298</sup> Steele, Robert David. "The National Security Act of 1992." *American Intelligence Journal*, Winter/Spring 1992, 35; House. H.R.-165. *National Security Act of 1992*. 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., 5 February 1992.

Gray (former Commandant of the Marine Corps), Dr. Richard Betts (professor and former SSCI and NSC staff member), Harold P. Ford (former senior CIA analyst and NIC deputy), Ambassador Morton Abromowitz (former ambassador to Turkey and Thailand), and Senator Arlen Specter testified before the Committee.

Boren made it clear early on during the hearings that the United States could not sustain “separate civilian and military intelligence empires” and that a significant focus of intelligence reform was going to be consolidating these two kingdoms into one.<sup>299</sup> Boren understood intelligence was a vitale element of military operations and argued there was “no more important consumer” than the “military commander.” Since budget reductions were certain, Boren believed that DoD required an intelligence czar to streamline defense intelligence and to ensure adequate intelligence support from the broader community was forthcoming during operations. Since large-scale military operations were infrequent, the United States could accept risk by shifting support away from policymakers towards the military during these periods. Of course, this was before the rise of low intensity conflicts and the introduction of continuous war after 9/11.

The first hearing on February 20<sup>th</sup> brought LTG (R) Odom back to testify on his thoughts regarding the reform bills. Odom’s background in the Intelligence Community during the Cold War, coupled with his academic reasearch interests, made him an ideal witness to testify on intelligence reform in the new operational environment. In November 1991, LTG (R) Odom’s book *On Internal War: American and Soviet Approaches to Third World Clients and Insurgents* was published. The book considered

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<sup>299</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. S. HRG. 894. *S. 2198 and S. 421 to Reorganize the United States Intelligence Community*. 102nd Cong. 2nd sess., 20 February; 4, 12, 19 March 1992, 252.

the difference between Soviet and American approaches to third-world conflicts during the Cold War. Odom's ultimate recommendation was for the United States to "eschew involvement in internal war entirely," but he believed America's push for "global involvement" in the 1990's meant this suggestion would fall on deaf ears. Accepting this reality, he offered some suggestions for a new strategy in waging low-intensity conflicts.

In his book, Odom described the significant intelligence resources required to wage the low-intensity conflicts he saw America pursuing in the future. Odom argued that waging low-intensity conflicts required information on the social, economic, and military factors, not just the opposing forces' orders of battle.<sup>300</sup> During his testimony, Odom described how the end of the Cold War, the rise of low-intensity conflicts, and the increasing technology were going to increase "intelligence tasks" in the future. He believed many were underestimating how taxing these new military operations were going to be and that the United States needed to focus analytical resources on supporting these military efforts. Odom was not the only witness testifying about how low-intensity conflicts increased the requirement for intelligence support to operations.<sup>301</sup>

GEN (R) Paul Gorman was a former SOUTHCOM CINC who had served as the National Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces. Gorman assumed the helm of SOUTHCOM chief five months after the Grenada invasion and during a period of

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<sup>300</sup> Odom, William, *On Internal War: American and Soviet Approaches to Third World Clients and Insurgents* (Raleigh, NC: Duke University Press, 1991), 215.

<sup>301</sup> Odom argued that analytical support to policymakers often did not provide them any valuable insight or help determining policy actions. On the other hand, analytic support to the military at all levels provided the commander more clarity and understanding. Although Odom's analytical argument focused on the importance of decentralization of analysis, his opinion on the value of tactical analysis compared to strategic analysis highlighted where he thought intelligence provided the most value, and that was at the policy implementation level (i.e. military operations).

increased focus on insurgencies and drug wars in Latin America. Gorman's experiences shaped his view that the United States had to rethink "the traditional dichotomy of war vs peace, with which this Republic was formed and which it has lived for so many years, may have to be set aside in order to deal adequately with the problems of the present."<sup>302</sup> Gorman described a United States constantly engaged in some form of low-intensity conflict. Whether assisting in a counterinsurgency, waging a drug war, or combatting terrorism, it was irrelevant if the United States viewed their actions as war if those it was countering viewed themselves at war with the United States. In articles Gorman wrote after retirement he described the increased role combatant commanders must play in this new "strategically amorphous" environment and the importance of intelligence in supporting their new responsibilities.

Gorman's testimony to the SSCI reflected his writings about the increasing number of low-intensity conflicts, the role of the CINCs, and the importance of intelligence in this new environment. Gorman did not support the intelligence reform legislation because he "feared that the changes would strengthen the "Beltway Barrier" between the U.S. Combatant Commands and the intelligence centers in the Washington D.C. region." Gorman believed that the "intelligence apparatus in Washington ought to be focused outward, to those who must collect the information and act on the intelligence rather than upward to hierarchy." In a dynamic world, where the United States was always engaged in some degree of conflict, Gorman believed it best to decentralize

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<sup>302</sup> Gorman, Paul F. "Preparing for Low-Intensity Conflict: Four Fundamentals," *Essays on Strategy*. National Defense University, 1988.  
[http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/docs/Gorman/06\\_Retired/01\\_Retired\\_1985\\_90/30\\_88\\_NDUPreparing\\_LowIntensityConflict\\_Four%20Fundamentals\\_Aug.pdf](http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/docs/Gorman/06_Retired/01_Retired_1985_90/30_88_NDUPreparing_LowIntensityConflict_Four%20Fundamentals_Aug.pdf) (accessed 26 February 2016).

intelligence so it could support those on the ground. To accomplish this decentralization, Gorman argued for an increased influence of the military over intelligence, going as far as to recommend a military operator and not an intelligence professional as the deputy of national intelligence. If adopted, Gorman's recommendation would significantly increase the CINCs' influence in foreign policy. Placing the intelligence apparatus in direct support of the CINCs would not only increase their intelligence capability, but largely enable them to shape US foreign policy towards their region. If the CINCs controlled where intelligence focused in their regions, they could largely determine the important issues to focus on, thus shaping how policymakers viewed those issues.

The other military officer testifying that day, Gen (R) Alfred Gray the former Marine Corps Commandant, recommended less evasive changes to increase intelligence support to military operations. Gray, who in 2008 the NSA inducted into their Hall of Fame for his work operationalizing SIGINT in support of military operations, opined that the Intelligence Community had served the United States well throughout its history. Although he applauded SSCI's efforts in encouraging this important debate, Gray favored allowing the Secretary of Defense and DCI to move forward with their plans before legislating change. Notably, Gray did signal out the CIA/DoD relationship as requiring improvement and recommended that DoD increase the number of exchange officers it sent to the CIA. These exchange officers would not be intelligence professionals, but "young combined arms warriors," who could use their knowledge of CIA operations when they commanded battalions and above in the future.<sup>303</sup>

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<sup>303</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. S. HRG. 894. *S. 2198 and S. 421 to Reorganize the United States Intelligence Community*. 102nd Cong. 2nd sess., 20 February; 4, 12, 19 March 1992, 289.



Congress wanted to improve the support tactical and strategic intelligence provided each other, but the discussions focused mainly on national intelligence support to military operations. This is understandable, the Gulf War intelligence debate had been going on for more than a year and intelligence support to military operations had been an issue for more than a decade. Without the Soviet Union as a main adversary, and with the increased focus on low-intensity conflicts becoming the “normal form of conflict in the 1990s,” it was an easy decisions to focus so much attention on improving intelligence support to the military.<sup>304</sup> Congressional reformers understood the Intelligence Community had to support the military, but cautioned against its subordination to the commander. Boren, McCurdy, and the other supporters were trying to find an optimal structure to ensure all consumers’ needs were met, while also eliminating duplication. Although improving intelligence and decreasing expenditures is an admirable pursuit, it is difficult to achieve in an environment where eliminating duplication results in winners and losers.

The intelligence reform discussions in February-March 1992, not only displayed broad support for increasing intelligence support to the military, but reflected a difference of opinion on the purpose of intelligence; the spectrum of witness testimony highlights the varying opinion. James Schlesinger the former DCI, Secretary of Defense, and the first Energy Secretary who served in the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations argued for decentralized intelligence. Schlensinger believed the varied consumers from the battalion commander on the battlefield to the President in the White House required

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<sup>304</sup> Cassidy, Robert M, *Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 121.

different intelligence to perform their jobs. Although centralization sounded attractive, Schlesinger argued the Intelligence Community evolved to its current decentralized structure because that is what the different consumers required. Overly centralizing the Intelligence Community might save money, but it could create a structure that provided less value to its customers. Schlesinger stated “only if intelligence assets are widely distributed, and marbled throughout the user communities, will the ultimate task of policy best be achieved.”<sup>305</sup> In Schlesinger’s view, the definition and purpose of intelligence were defined by the organization it served.

Gen (R) Gorman also argued for decentralization, but with a different view towards why it was important. Where Schlesinger argued for decentralization because he believed all organizations have unique intelligence requirements, Gorman argued for decentralization because he believed the CINCs needed more capability to support their role in the new environment. Gorman viewed intelligence from an operator’s perspective, believing it should be “pushed out” from Washington to commanders in the field. This stance reflected a certain view of the purpose of intelligence, one biased towards enabling operations and less towards informing strategy or policy. This view was shared by Gen (R) Odom, who argued that analytical support to policymakers often did not provide any valuable insight or help determining policy actions, while analytic support to the military at all levels provided the commander more clarity and understanding. Although Odom’s main analytical argument focused on the importance of

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<sup>305</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. S. HRG. 894. *S. 2198 and S. 421 to Reorganize the United States Intelligence Community*. 102nd Cong. 2nd sess., 20 February; 4, 12, 19 March 1992, 183. Schlesinger further argued that most of the “prospective savings” should come from cuts in DoD’s collection capabilities and manpower as part of the drive towards jointness initiated with Goldwater-Nichols.

decentralization of analysis, his opinion on the value of tactical analysis compared to strategic analysis highlighted where he thought intelligence provided the most value, and this was at the policy implementation level (i.e. military operations).<sup>306</sup>

On March 17, two days before the final SSCI hearing on the intelligence reform bills, the DoD formally addressed their non-support of the legislation. In a six-page letter signed by Secretary of Defense Cheney and the department's general counsel, the DoD argued the "bills are unnecessary and so severely flawed that selective amendments would not make either of them acceptable." Reiterating witness statements made during testimony over the previous month, the letter argued the Intelligence Community had evolved over the years in response to the needs of the individual departments and agencies and through lessons learned. Individual organizations had specific intelligence requirements geared toward their mission and consolidating them would negatively affect those organizations.

The creation of a DNI who "would manage all collection activities" was the greatest concern to DoD because they believed it would weaken intelligence support to the military. Similar to Gorman's testimony, the letter described the necessity of keeping intelligence linked to operations and argued centralization significantly inhibited the Secretary of Defense's ability to ensure that link was not severed.<sup>307</sup> The letter tried to reassure Congress that DoD understood the need for reform and highlighted their

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<sup>306</sup> VADM (R) Mike McConnell offered a similar opinion during a 2015 interview when he stated that the value in intelligence was identifying the "guy behind the door."

<sup>307</sup> Cheney, Richard, letter to Rep. Les Aspin (w/attachments), 17 March 1992.

cooperative efforts with the DCI to incorporate change based on lessons learned during operations.

The letter belied a recommendation made by Gen (R) Schwarzkopf during his June 1991 SASC testimony regarding standardizing analysis. Frustrated with conflicting analysis, Schwarzkopf suggested developing “standardized methodology within the Intelligence Community” so the “guy in the field” would not receive “caveated” reports that disagreed with each other.<sup>308</sup> The DoD’s stance was that a “centralized analytic structure to produce government-wide intelligence would inhibit competitive analysis and, then, threaten the integrity of the intelligence product and prevent competing analytical views from coming to the attention of senior decision makers.”<sup>309</sup> This contradiction represents a disconnect between the reverent status Schwarzkopf enjoyed with the public and the more balanced perspective of those in his own institution. Where Congress showed deference to the war hero and took his critiques at face value, DoD leadership, who had observed the Intelligence Community’s performance during the war and knew Schwarzkopf personally, questioned his accuracy. The disagreement between Schwarzkopf and DoD leadership was not widely known, but the letter hints at the disharmony regarding the intelligence reform debate, of which Schwarzkopf’s critique was a proximate cause.<sup>310</sup>

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<sup>308</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services. *Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm*. 102nd Cong., 1st sess., April-June 1991, 341.

<sup>309</sup> Cheney, Richard. Letter to Rep. Les Aspin (w/attachments), 17 March 1992.

<sup>310</sup> McConnell, Michael, Vice Admiral (R). Former Director of National Intelligence, former Director National Security Agency, and former J2 Joint Chiefs of Staff. Interview by author, Leesburg, VA, 8 August 2015. McConnell mentioned that Secretary of Defense Cheney knew that intelligence provided great support to the military during Desert Storm.

Like many myths, the claim of poor intelligence support during Desert Storm started to develop the semblance of reality. Three years after victory in Desert Storm, Admiral Studeman participated in a symposium on the war involving former commanders, many whom complained about the intelligence support they received. Unwilling to accept this perspective, Admiral Studeman, who was NSA Director during Desert Storm, went “through a list of 25-30 things” that identified all the support intelligence provided military operations. Later on during the reception, fellow panelists acknowledged to Studeman, that after further consideration, they might have exaggerated the lack of intelligence support.<sup>311</sup> Despite evidence to the contrary and a partial recant, Schwarzkopf’s initial intelligence critique became an accepted reality.

On March 30, 1992, President George H.W. Bush issued NSD- 67, *Intelligence Capabilities 1992-2005*.<sup>312</sup> NSD-67 was a follow-up to NSR-29’s assessment of the intelligence capabilities required by consumers in the post-Cold War environment. It approved both NSR-29’s findings and DCI Gates’ recommended realignment of resources to posture the Intelligence Community to serve the consumers.<sup>313</sup> Two days after Bush issued his directive, DCI Gates briefed the Joint SSCI/HPSCI session on the

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<sup>311</sup> Studeman, William O, Admiral (R). Former Deputy Director CIA and former Director NSA. Interview by author, Severna Park, MD, 24 November 2015.; VADM (R) McConnell spoke about a meeting he later had with General Paul Funk who had been the 3<sup>rd</sup> Armored Division Commander during Desert Storm. When Admiral McConnell mentioned the “great” intelligence support provided to commanders on the ground in Desert Storm, Funk disagreed and told Admiral McConnell that his division was not receiving tactical intelligence from higher. McConnell concluded that not all the unit G2s used the intelligence being pushed down and many commanders remained unaware of the products available.

<sup>312</sup> Bush, George HW. *National Security Directive 67: Intelligence Capabilities: 1992-2005*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 30 March 1992.

<sup>313</sup> Bush, George HW. "Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on Organizational Changes in the Intelligence Community," April 1, 1992. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project.<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=20786>.

Intelligence Community reform measures he was implementing. Following the joint hearing, the HPSCI and SSCI intelligence reform bills did not progress any further and congressional discussion on intelligence reform quieted down for a while. Boren and McCurdy were not successful in establishing a DNI, but their congressional actions helped encourage change driven by executive fiat. In a city not known for responsiveness, the speed at which reform was proposed and initiated is remarkable. In less than three months after NSR-29 was published, the Gates Task Forces formed and reported their findings and the ADDO/MA was established at CIA.

### **Implementing Partial Reform and Preparing for a Loss**

Gates' strategy for implementing the task force recommendations had three phases. The first phase focused on implementing changes that were widely accepted throughout the Intelligence Community. These were changes with "no entrenched efforts" that could be easily implemented. Once the first phase was complete and sufficient "momentum" for change was generated, transition to the second phase could occur. The second phase required realignment of resources, where there would be winners and losers. Phase two involved a "base capability study" that considered the minimal resources necessary to support consumer requirements. The third phase was the most difficult, this phase looked to rectify the IC's "fundamental flaws." These changes were going to be contentious because they affected groups of people with entrenched interests and "political clout." According to Haver, phases two and three reform objectives were never fully achieved.<sup>314</sup>

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<sup>314</sup> Haver, Richard. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and former Intelligence

In the summer of 1992, Bob Gates mentioned to Dick Cheney and Rich Haver that he thought Bush was going to lose the election. At that time, some polls showed Ross Perot (39%) leading Bush (31%) and Bill Clinton (25%), but Cheney scoffed at the notion of predicting election results this far out.<sup>315</sup> While Cheney brushed Gates' comments off, Gates' prediction proved accurate five months later. With intelligence reform phases two and three not yet implemented, Gates told Haver to get rid of the remaining intelligence reform recommendations. According to Haver, phase two and three could only occur in the second term of an administration because it involved reallocating resources. With a second term not looking promising, Gates feared only the budget cuts would make it to a new administration and not the understanding of why resource realignment decisions were made. Although Gates understood budget cuts were necessary, he intended to do all he could to strengthen the community while reducing duplication. Dr. Gates, informed by his three decades in the Intelligence Community, considered the "winners and losers" during resource allocation. When the new administration assumed the helm, he feared the thoughtful analysis would be lost and only reductions would remain.

President Bush's four years in office saw significant turmoil at home and abroad. In just two years, the Berlin Wall had collapsed and the Soviet Union had disintegrated. From 1990-1991, the United States suffered through a recession, but the poor economic conditions lingered even longer. Initially standing fast to his campaign promise of "no

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Advisor to Secretary of Defense (Cheney and Rumsfeld). Interview by author, Great Falls, VA, 01 December 2015 and email exchange with author, 04 January 2016.

<sup>315</sup> <http://www.nytimes.com/1992/06/11/us/the-1992-campaign-on-the-trail-poll-gives-perot-a-clear-lead.html> (accessed 12 April 2016). Haver, Richard. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and former Intelligence Advisor to Secretary of Defense (Cheney and Rumsfeld). Interview by author, Great Falls, VA, 01 December 2015 and email exchange with author, 04 January 2016.

new taxes,” the significant budget deficit and congressional pressure led Bush to support tax increases along with budget reductions, all in an attempt to course correct America’s economic vessel. Budget cuts were significant, with roughly a fifteen percent reduction in Defense between 1990-1993.<sup>316</sup> The intelligence budget, which had grown by 125% between 1980-1989, was reduced by roughly 12% by 1993 and was continuing on a downward trend.<sup>317</sup>

The changing world required a reassessment of US strategic interests, which provided the administration an opportunity to reduce national security expenditures and benefit from the “peace dividend.” The shift to a regionally focused strategy provided the DoD an opportunity to reduce structure and realign forces for the “New World Order.” Always a visionary, General Colin Powell, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, initiated the Base Force Concept to determine the appropriate mixture of forces to respond to a new military strategy focused on regional threats. Along with the new force structure came a new Defense Strategy focused on regional engagements through “forward presence” and “crisis” response. Now that the threat of Soviet tanks rolling through the Fulda Gap was gone, the United States military had to posture and prepare for low-intensity conflicts that could arise in various regions throughout the world. Most importantly, the DoD had to do its part to ensure the United States retained its dominance in the world and was able to lead the former communist nations into the democratic fold.

The nearly 90% approval ratings Bush enjoyed following the Gulf War soon

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<sup>316</sup> [http://voices.washingtonpost.com/fact-checker/2011/01/cutting\\_the\\_defense\\_budget.html](http://voices.washingtonpost.com/fact-checker/2011/01/cutting_the_defense_budget.html) (accessed on 28 January 2016).

<sup>317</sup> Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community. *Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence*. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996, 131.



dissipated with the staggering economy and broken promise not to raise taxes sinking his approval rating below 40% by the time voters went to the polls in November 1992.<sup>318</sup> Bush's defeat brought to power the charismatic Arkansas governor, whose campaign platform focused largely on domestic issues and recovering America's economic health. The desire to reduce national security expenditures to strengthen the sickly American economy did not end with the George H.W. Bush presidency. Running on the memorable quip, "it's the economy stupid," Bill Clinton entered the White House with an electoral mandate to strengthen the economy. Part of the Clinton administration's strategy to revitalize the economy was a determined focus to make federal government more effective and efficient. Sharing the Bush administration's belief that a new unipolar world presented an opportunity to cut national security significantly, the Clinton administration continued the trend of reduced defense spending initiated by their predecessor. Part of this reduction meant looking for opportunities to use existing capabilities to cover requirements, and the intelligence needs of the post-Desert Storm military was one of those identified requirements.

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<sup>318</sup> <http://www.gallup.com/poll/116677/presidential-approval-ratings-gallup-historical-statistics-trends.aspx> (accessed 28 January 2016).

## **Chapter Six: It's the Economy Stupid-Intelligence Reform during the Clinton Years**

Clinton's campaign focus on domestic policy, the economy, and the 7.8% unemployment rate brought him to the White House with just over 43% of the popular vote.<sup>319</sup> During the 1992 presidential campaign, Clinton advisor James Carville hung a sign at Clinton's campaign headquarters reminding the volunteers what issue was most important to the electorate. Carville's, "it's the economy stupid," became the mantra for the Clinton campaign, reminding them the sagging economy meant people were more concerned with their pocketbook than national security issues.

Although Clinton honed in on the economy and is often associated with initiating the national security drawdown in the 1990s, the "peace dividend" reductions started before his inauguration on January 23, 1993 and enjoyed bipartisan support. On August 1, 1990, the same day Iraq invaded Kuwait, President George HW Bush stood before an Aspen Institute audience proposing a 25% reduction in active duty military forces, reaffirming a figure that Secretary of Defense Cheney proposed to Congress in June 1990.<sup>320</sup> Between 1990 and 1993, the defense budget was reduced roughly 8% a year, with an average yearly reduction of 5.7% during this period. The Bush administration's final budget proposal in January 1993 recommended active duty force reductions through 1999 when the number of active duty personnel would be 1.568 million, a reduction of

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<sup>319</sup> <http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe1992/federalelections92.pdf> (accessed 15 March 2016).

<sup>320</sup> Bush, George HW. "Remarks at the Aspen Institute Symposium in Aspen Colorado (August 2, 1990)." <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=18731> (accessed 26 June 2016); Gordon, Michael R. "Cheney Gives Plan to Reduce Forces By 25% in 5 Years," <http://www.nytimes.com/1990/06/20/us/cheney-gives-plan-to-reduce-forces-by-25-in-5-years.html?pagewanted=all> (accessed 26 June 2016).

28% from FY 1987.<sup>321</sup> From 1989 to 1996, the military slashed its officer ranks by a staggering 23%, while the Intelligence Community reduced its ranks by 17.5% between 1993 and 1997.<sup>322</sup> The CIA was particularly hard hit with the Directorate of Operations personnel reductions hitting 20% and budget reductions 30% in the 1990s.<sup>323</sup>

The end of the Cold War and the United States' poor economic health necessitated national security reductions, but these reductions came at a time of transition that brought confusion and change to both the DoD and CIA. It was in the midst of this fluid environment that the United States took its second attempt at intelligence reform in less than five years. Similar to 1992, little intelligence reform legislation resulted from these efforts, but actions were taken that improved the CIA/DoD partnership, while increasing CIA's focus on supporting military operations. Although an improved CIA/DoD relationship was a positive result, the pressure to increase CIA support to military operations not only affected CIA's support to policymakers, but risked CIA subordination to DoD.

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<sup>321</sup> United States General Accounting Office. "Military Downsizing: Balancing Accessions and Losses is Key to Shaping the Future Force," September 1993. <http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/153782.pdf> (accessed 26 June 2016).

<sup>322</sup> Congressional Budget Office. *The Drawdown of the Military Officer Corps*. Washington, D.C.; Government Printing Office, November 1999; [http://fas.org/irp/congress/1993\\_cr/index.html](http://fas.org/irp/congress/1993_cr/index.html) (accessed 9 February 2016).

<sup>323</sup> Sims, Jennifer E. and Burton Gerber, eds. *Transforming U.S. Intelligence*. Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2005, 180; General Accounting Office. *Military Personnel: High Aggregate Personnel Levels Maintained Throughout Drawdown*. Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, June 1995, 10.

## **DoD Intelligence Reform Continues**

As Congress was complaining about HUMINT support to military operations and telling the CIA to increase its support to the military during both peacetime and operations, the DIA was undergoing significant cuts, forcing it to consolidate DoD's HUMINT capability. If DoD lacked the HUMINT capability to inform contingency planning during Desert Storm, further reductions made it more necessary to turn to CIA for support. With CIA experiencing reductions, increased military support requirements forced the CIA to reprioritize and shift resources away from long-term analysis, thus affecting its ability to provide intelligence support to policymakers.

Lt. Gen James Clapper, who served as the Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence during Desert Storm, became the DIA Director in November 1991. Clapper, a 1963 graduate of the University of Maryland's Air Force Reserve Officer Training Program, spent his early career as a signals intelligence officer and his general officer time within geographic combatant commands and at Air Force Headquarters. Clapper retired in 1995 after serving as DIA Director, but returned to government service in 2001 as the director of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). Clapper served as the NIMA director until 2006, when his willingness to work for the DNI as the head of a national intelligence organization earned him Rumsfeld's ire and he was forced to resign.<sup>324</sup> In 2007, Secretary of Defense Gates made Clapper the second USD-I and in 2010 President Obama made him the fourth DNI.<sup>325</sup>

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<sup>324</sup> Gates, Robert, Dr. Former Secretary of Defense and former Director of Central Intelligence. Telephone interview by author, 29 March 2016.

<sup>325</sup> Gates, Robert M, *Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War* (New York, NY.: Penguin Random House, 2014), 23.

When Clapper took over DIA, he had to focus his efforts on reducing the DIA workforce by 20%, while ensuring this reduced capability could support the new operational environment. To accomplish this, Clapper reduced the number of DIA directorates from nine to four and then consolidated the five former directorates and other various offices into three centers; the National Military Intelligence Collection Center (NMICC) to manage DoD's HUMINT and Measurement and Signals Intelligence (MASINT) collection capabilities, the National Military Intelligence Production Center (NMIPC) to focus on the development and dissemination of finished analysis, and the National Military Intelligence Systems Center (NMISC) to better organize DoD's imagery efforts.<sup>326</sup> Closely linked to the NMICC and most significant in regards to the CIA/DoD relationship, Clapper continued the DIA HUMINT consolidation that was initiated under General Soyster's tenure.

The HUMINT restructuring plan that LTG Soyster submitted to ASD-C3I Duane Andrews in June 1991 was eventually codified in Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5200-37, *Centralized Management of DoD HUMINT Operations*. DODD 5200-37 identified the DIA Director as the DoD HUMINT Manager and "centralized the decisionmaking process under" him. The directive authorized operating bases around the world where the DIA, individual services, and the combatant commands would work together. With decreasing budgets, the military could not afford the cost of redundant HUMINT collection efforts and the multiple support systems within the services. To streamline HUMINT efforts, the DoD established joint operating bases where the services and DIA maintained separate HUMINT capabilities, but worked together by

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<sup>326</sup> McDonnell, Janet A, *Adopting to a Changing Environment*, 19.

portioning the collection requirements and sharing a common “HUMINT support service.”<sup>327</sup>

There was initial confusion over what centralization meant. The Department of the Army G2 argued the operating base concept allowed the services to retain “responsibility for the conduct of intelligence operations,” while the DIA managed the collection requirements. As the Army G2 History Office’s Annual Historical Review stated at the time, “DIA would tell us what to collect—we’d figure out how to do it and be responsible for the results.”<sup>328</sup> According to the Army G2, the DIA looked at the operating base concept differently and believed it gave DIA day to day control over HUMINT operations.

By 1993, the ongoing reductions were continuing to take a toll on DoD and the focus on centralizing DIA’s and the military services’ HUMINT resources and personnel evolved into the consolidation of DoD’s HUMINT capabilities. That year, DoD established the Defense HUMINT Service (DHS), placing the military services’ HUMINT personnel directly under DIA and consolidating DIA HUMINT, Army HUMINT, Navy HUMINT, and Air Force HUMINT programs into a “single DoD HUMINT budget.” The transfer of personnel and money from the military departments to the DHS was intended to reduce expenditures and carry forward the jointness mantra introduced with Goldwater-Nichols.<sup>329</sup> The need for the plan was driven by guidance

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<sup>327</sup> Department of Defense. Directive. *Centralized Management of Department of Defense Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Operations*, 18 December 1992; <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB46/document18.pdf> (accessed 9 February 2016).

<sup>328</sup> Department of the Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence. *Annual Historical Review 1 October 1990-30 September 1991*. Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1991, 4-19.

<sup>329</sup> <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB46/document18.pdf> (accessed 9 February 2016).

provided by both the Secretary of Defense and the DCI that mandated cuts between FY 1995-1999. Development of the DHS plan was an interagency effort, with groups from the “military departments, the Joint Staff, the DIA and the CIA” working together to establish a way forward for defense HUMINT consolidation.

On November 3, 1993, Deputy Secretary of Defense William Perry, who three months later became Secretary of Defense, signed the memorandum directing consolidation of defense HUMINT. The memorandum established DHS and created a consolidated defense HUMINT budget within the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP). Establishing the new DHS as a “Joint Field Operating Activity” and creating joint duty positions, ensured DIA control beyond merely apportioning collection requirements to the different services. Perry did allow the services to maintain “a small, carefully focused HUMINT capability, designed to meet specific overt non-sensitive needs which cannot efficiently be met by the DHS, ” but the consolidation memorandum made it clear DIA was responsible for the bulk of DoD HUMINT operations.<sup>330</sup>

MG Jack Leide, Schwarzkopf’s J2 during the Gulf War who worked closely with RADM McConnell’s DoDJIC, was assigned as the first Director of DHS and the NMICC in June 1993. The previous summer, a year after his CENTCOM boss’ complaints regarding intelligence revitalized the decade long effort to improve intelligence support to operations, Leide arrived at DIA as the Director for Attaches and Operations (an element that fell under the DHS/NMICC when established). In his role as the new DHS boss, Leide was responsible for ensuring that DoD HUMINT reduced by 350 personnel

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<sup>330</sup> Department of Defense. Deputy Secretary of Defense. Memo. *Consolidation of Defense HUMINT*, 2 November 1993.

while simultaneously trying to build an organization that could meet the Pentagon's, services', and combatant commands' HUMINT intelligence needs.<sup>331</sup> This was a hefty task, but MG Leide was not alone in trying to focus an organization in a new environment while undergoing significant cuts.

### **Reforming Government and Prioritizing Support to Military Operations**

The establishment of DHS and the resulting streamlining of DoD HUMINT operations was in-line with the Clinton administration's efforts to reduce the size of the federal government. On March 3, 1993, six weeks after Clinton was inaugurated as the 42<sup>nd</sup> President of the United States, he stood before a crowd at the Old Executive Office Building adjacent to the White House announcing a new effort to "bring about greater efficiency and lower cost of government."<sup>332</sup> President Clinton charged Vice-President Al Gore with leading the National Performance Review (NPR) and gave him six months to assemble a team, review government organizations, and present a report. Gore not only contributed his name and power of position to the review, but also embraced an integral role in the Review's operations. Although the initial review lasted only six months, the NPR operated throughout Clinton's term in office.<sup>333</sup>

The NPR had similar objectives to Reagan's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (Packard Commission), with both the NPR and the Packard

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<sup>331</sup> <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAE/NSAE46/document18.pdf> (accessed 9 February 2016).

<sup>332</sup> Clinton William J. "Remarks Announcing the National Performance Review," March 3, 1993. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46291> (accessed 29 January 2016).

<sup>333</sup> <http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/whoware/historyofnpr.html> (accessed 26 June 2016).



Commission seeking to bring greater efficiency and transparency to how the Federal Government operated.<sup>334</sup> Although similar in objectives, the NPR's aspirations were much larger and looked to "make the entire federal government less expensive and more efficient, and to change the culture of our national bureaucracy away from complacency and entitlement toward initiative and empowerment."<sup>335</sup>

During its existence, the NPR reviewed the operations of the Intelligence Community and, like congressional and executive reviews since the late 1980s, focused significant attention on improving intelligence support to military operations. Of the seven Intelligence Community recommendations, three focused specifically on integrating the thirteen separate intelligence organizations into a community and three focused on improving support to the Intelligence Community's customers.<sup>336</sup> Although the recommendations acknowledged the Intelligence Community's diverse customer base, the military was the only customer that received a recommendation focused purely on improving the support it received.

The NPR's seventh recommendation, "Improve Support to Ground Troops During Combat Operations", argued it was the Intelligence Community's responsibility to

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<sup>334</sup> <https://www.reagan.utexas.edu/Archives/speeches/1985/71585c.htm> (accessed 28 January 2016).

<sup>335</sup> <http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/5043> (accessed 28 January 2016).

<sup>336</sup> National Performance Review, "1993 Report: From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government that Works Better and Costs Less." <http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/nprprt/annrpt/redtpe93/259e.html> (accessed 26 June 2016). The seven objectives were; Intel 01: Enhance Intelligence Community Integration, Intel 02: Enhance Community Responsiveness to Customers, Intel 03: Reassess Information Collection to meet new Analytical Challenges, Intel 04: Integrate Intelligence Community Information Management Systems, Intel 05: Develop Integrated Personnel and Training Systems, Intel 06: Merge the President's Intelligence Oversight Board with the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Intel 07: Improve Support to Ground Troops During Combat Operations.

support the individual “shooter” on the ground with a tailored product that was relevant and useable. Although improving intelligence support to troops on the ground is an admirable goal, placing responsibility for this support on the entire Intelligence Community and not just on DoD risked burdening an Intelligence Community that was already undergoing significant budget cuts. Although collaboration is a good thing, the integrated approach NPR recommended paid scant attention to the fact that each intelligence organization evolved over time to provide intelligence support to a distinct customer base, something former DCI Schlesinger identified as an issue in 1992.<sup>337</sup> This neglect, coupled with the NPR signaling to the Intelligence Community that the military enjoyed primacy among the various customers, risked subordinating national intelligence to the military consumer.

In March 1995, six months after the NPR Commission published the seven Intelligence Community objectives, President Clinton confirmed the primacy of the intelligence consumer when he issued Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-35 and identified intelligence support to military operations as the top Intelligence Community priority.<sup>338</sup> Removing any doubt from CIA employees on where their efforts should be focused, President Clinton told them during a headquarters visit a few months after

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<sup>337</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. S. HRG. 894. *S. 2198 and S. 421 to Reorganize the United States Intelligence Community*. 102nd Cong. 2nd sess., 20 February; 4, 12, 19 March 1992, 183

<sup>338</sup> PDD-35 also established a tiered intelligence collection/support system that prioritized efforts for the Intelligence Community. (see <http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd35.htm> for more information). PDD-35 would be replaced in 2003 with the National Intelligence Priorities Framework that would require a review of intelligence priorities every six months to identify changing requirements and ensure proper resource allocation based on collection requirements. Around 2006, LTG Michael Maples, the DIA Director, and LTG Ronald Burgess, the JCS J-2, established a Defense Intelligence Priorities Framework (DIPF) to ensure DoD’s collection priorities were in-line with the national collection priorities (Burgess, Ronald L. Lieutenant General (R). Former Director Defense Intelligence Agency. Telephone interview by author, 17 September 2015).

issuing PDD-35 that providing “prompt, thorough intelligence to fully inform their (commanders’) decisions and maximize security of our troops,” during operations is the first priority for the Intelligence Community. As Michael Warner argues in *Intelligence and the National Security Strategist*, PDD-35 resulted in a “diversion of shrinking national, strategic intelligence resources to growing, tactical missions.”<sup>339</sup> This diversion only hastened following September 11, 2001 when the Intelligence Community became even more focused on tactical problems.

As Al Gore’s committee pursued ways to “reinvent” government, the Secretary of Defense Les Aspin was leading DoD through its own review. The Bottom-up Review (BUR) focused on how to restructure and reduce the military to save money while maintaining its ability to wage two regional wars. For the Intelligence Community, the NPR and BUR were inextricably linked. The NPR was trying to organize the Intelligence Community to support the military during planning and operations and whatever force structure and defense strategy came out of the BUR, the Intelligence Community had to be organized to support.

Les Aspin rolled out the BUR in October 1993, the same month of the tragic *Black Hawk Down* incident in Somalia and two months before Clinton accepted Aspin’s resignation as Secretary of Defense. Aspin, the intellectual former Congressman, who served as one of Secretary of Defense McNamara’s whiz kids, looked forward to remaking the post-Cold War DoD, but early controversy over Don’t Ask-Don’t Tell, Bosnia, and Haiti, made his first eight months in office bumpy. The tragedy in Somalia, especially controversy over his denial of the mission commander’s request for armored

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<sup>339</sup> George and Kline, 50.

vehicles, sealed his fate, ensuring he did not remain Clinton's Secretary of Defense.<sup>340</sup>

Aspin's forced resignation was a blemish on an impressive record as a policymaker and national security leader. As a consolation prize, Clinton made Les Aspin the chair of his President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) and gave him a new mission, reviewing the Intelligence Community and reorganizing it for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.<sup>341</sup>

The Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community (Aspin-Brown Commission) was mandated in the 1995 Intelligence Authorization Act (IAA).<sup>342</sup> Dissatisfied with previous reform efforts, the commission was another post-Cold War attempt to institute intelligence reform. Although Congress had deferred to the executive branch two years earlier to implement change, events such as the Somalia tragedy, the Ames spy case, and controversy over the funding for the National Reconnaissance Office Building, caused some congressmen to call for reform through legislation. The commission was a joint executive and legislative endeavor focused on how the Intelligence Community should transition in the post-Cold War environment. On one side of the reform debate were congressmen like Senator Warner, who was a supporter of the Intelligence Community and had come to its defense when

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<sup>340</sup> Bowden, Mark, *Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War* (New York, NY: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999), 335; Bacevich, Kindle Location 3032. Bacevich describes Aspin as a fall guy. [http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1993-12-16/news/1993350006\\_1\\_les-aspin-clinton-oval](http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1993-12-16/news/1993350006_1_les-aspin-clinton-oval) (accessed 28 January 2016); <http://www.nytimes.com/1995/05/22/obituaries/les-aspin-56-dies-member-of-congress-and-defense-chief.html?pagewanted=all> (accessed 28 January 2016); <http://www.newsweek.com/collapse-les-aspin-190744> (accessed 28 January 2016).

<sup>341</sup> Dr. Loch Johnson, a leading intelligence scholar, who served on both the Church Committee and the Aspin and Brown Commission, has written extensively about the Aspin-Brown Commission and the events leading up to its establishment. According to Johnson, it was the confluence of various events in the early 1990s that brought about the push for an intelligence review.

<sup>342</sup> U.S. Congress, House. *Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1995, H.R. 4299*. 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., 30 September 1994.

Schwarzkopf was complaining after Desert Storm. Warner was suspicious of congressmen “advocating slash and burn of the intelligence budget” and some, like Senator Moynihan, even proposing legislation to disband the Agency.<sup>343</sup> The Clinton administration putting Aspin, who was not known as being pro-CIA, in charge of a review did not “sit well” with some members of Congress and added to the tension.

Les Aspin had been a member of the House Select Committee on Intelligence led by Representative Otis Pike in the mid-1970s. The “Pike Committee” was the House version of the Church Committee that investigated the Intelligence Community after Watergate and the release of the Family Jewels.<sup>344</sup> The hearings of the Pike Committee were particularly contentious as Republicans and Democrats continuously butted heads over the simplest of issues, with leaks to media and other outsiders constantly occurring.<sup>345</sup> Aspin followed-up service on the Pike Committee with service on early forms of the HPSCI.<sup>346</sup> Les Aspin passed away before the Aspin-Brown Commission completed its work and was replaced by Dr. Harold Brown, a former Secretary of Defense during the Carter administration.

Similar to the 1992 intelligence reform legislation, the commission sought to consolidate intelligence capabilities by streamlining the community and eliminating

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<sup>343</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate. Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community. *Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence*. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996, 149; Diamond, 21.

<sup>344</sup> The Family Jewels were a collection of internal CIA documents that listed past misdeeds and/or actions that might not be looked upon favorably by Congress. It was put together at DCI Schlesinger’s request who wanted to get a better handle on what had occurred in the past. DCI Colby turned them over to Congress.

<sup>345</sup> Olmstead, Kathryn S, *Challenging the Secret Government: The Post-Watergate Investigations of the CIA and FBI* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 170; Smist, 160.

<sup>346</sup> Smist, 228.

redundancy. The commission recommended the DCI retain responsibility for serving as the President's main intelligence advisor and leader of both the Intelligence Community and the CIA. To alleviate some of the DCI's management responsibility, the commission recommended breaking the current Deputy DCI position into two presidentially appointed and Senate confirmed deputy positions, a Deputy Director for the Intelligence Community (DDIC) and a Deputy Director for the Central Intelligence Agency (DDCIA). Although the DCI would still be responsible for leading both the Intelligence Community and the CIA, the DDIC would have no direct CIA management role and the DDCIA would lack a community management role. The Commission argued two presidentially appointed deputies would give the DCI two "senior managers of stature" that could speak "authoritatively" on their respective organizations, thus providing the DCI "greater freedom to choose where to devote his energy." By identifying the DDIC as the acting DCI whenever the DCI was absent, the Commission essentially made him the primary deputy and placed community interests over CIA interests.<sup>347</sup>

The commission also pursued budget reductions by increasing the coordination between the Secretary of Defense and the DCI and restructuring the budget by intelligence disciplines. The Commission hoped this would help eliminate redundancy within the community. To improve the dialogue between policymakers and the Intelligence Community, the commission once again recommended the National Security Council establish a Committee on Foreign Intelligence chaired by the National Security Advisor and composed of the NSA Director, DCI, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and

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<sup>347</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community. *Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence*. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996, 54-57.

Deputy Secretary of State. This new committee would be responsible for providing iterative guidance on where the Intelligence Community should focus their collection and analysis efforts based on national priorities.<sup>348</sup>

Although the Aspin-Brown Commission's recommendations on the Intelligence Community's leadership, structure, and budget authorities were not novel, the commission had one recommendation that, if enacted, would fundamentally alter the CIA-DoD partnership. Citing the "costs and difficulties involved in maintaining a separate infrastructure within DoD for the conduct of clandestine HUMINT operations," the commission recommended folding DHS clandestine operations into the CIA and making one clandestine service that would handle both military intelligence and national intelligence HUMINT collection requirements. The idea was to establish one organization that understood how to manage, develop, and direct clandestine HUMINT operations to ensure effective employment, while also consolidating resources and deconflicting operations. The military would still retain certain HUMINT capabilities such as interrogators and CI HUMINT, but their clandestine capabilities would be consolidated under CIA. This proposal was not supported by Chairman Brown who believed consolidation would "make the DIA's assets too civilian from the CINC point of view," or by Lt. Gen Clapper who believed this would result in the loss of HUMINT support to the military.

The HPSCI did not rest on its laurels while waiting for the Aspin-Brown Commission to report back. As the commission was conducting its investigation, the

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<sup>348</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community. *Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence*. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996, 33.

HPSCI was holding its own hearings to discuss the future of the Intelligence Community. Senator Warner and Aspin had worked together to ensure there was not two competing hearings debating the Intelligence Community's future, thus making a political spectacle of intelligence reform. Larry Combest, the HPSCI Chairman from West Texas, had a different perspective on the intelligence reform discussion and believed there was value in "proposing radical intelligence reform" to force a suitable compromise between the different reform perspectives.<sup>349</sup> Between May and December 1995, HPSCI held six separate hearings involving a diverse number of national security leaders discussing a wide range of intelligence topics from technology's effect on intelligence to the role of intelligence in policymaking as part of their *Intelligence Community in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* (IC21) effort. In Congressman Combest's view, the only discussion topic that was off the table was whether the United States required an Intelligence Community, "beyond that, everything else is on the table for examination and debate."

***"I believe that over time the CINCs are going to become the key to the demand side of the intelligence future. I think it is starting now."-DCI John Deutch<sup>350</sup>***

A major point of discussion during the house hearings was the role of intelligence, particularly the increased importance of intelligence support to military operations. The witnesses argued technology was providing military commanders more capability to wage war, but requiring more intelligence to enable the capability. Technological developments were also increasing the intelligence consumer base, as the mantra "from

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<sup>349</sup> Johnson, 324 and 320-321.

<sup>350</sup> U.S. Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Hearings. *IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. 104th Cong., 1st sess., 22 May-19 December 1995., 373.



the sensor to the shooter” was highlighting the push to get intelligence into the hands of the individual soldier on the ground.

DCI Deutch testified that integration of intelligence and military operations will only increase the intelligence support DoD requires. Richard Kerr, the former DDCI, alluded to the trade-offs that increasing military support incurs, pointing out that although intelligence support to military operations is important, the CIA had other support requirements. Regarding the CIA/DoD partnership, Kerr and John McMahon, his predecessor as DDCI, acknowledged that CIA was not meeting the military’s HUMINT support requirements, but Kerr cautioned that the military’s “insatiable appetite” for intelligence made this nearly impossible. Paul Kaminski, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, articulated this cost when he argued that national intelligence was no longer primarily focused on Washington, but also on the “day-to-day real time operations.” Kaminski’s enthusiasm noting this evolution highlighted the disconnect that existed between many CIA and DoD leaders regarding the purpose of the CIA.

The witnesses were not the only ones acknowledging the military’s primacy for intelligence support and its flourishing hunger for information. Larry Combest, the Republican Texas Congressman and HPSCI Chair, stated the “primary objective of intelligence is to provide for the military user” and argued “intelligence is becoming an even more integral part of the modern battlefield. We talk about support to military operations as an important mission of U.S. intelligence, but we may not fully grasp the ramifications of how new technology will ensure a seamless web of intelligence, command, control, and communications to the warfighter.” Combest also acknowledged

the United States did not have “unlimited resources” to direct towards intelligence and that decisions had to be made on how to apportion the limited resources.<sup>351</sup>

Congressman Combest sent the IC21 Staff Study to Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich on April 6, 1995. The 379 page report covered a wide range of topics from restructuring HPSCI and the Intelligence Community to reassessing collection requirements. Similar to discussions that occurred during the eight months of hearings, the IC21 Staff Study considered the tradeoffs of increasing support to military operations. Echoing some of the Intelligence Community and DoD leaders, the report described how increasing technology and the push to have intelligence flow to the individual soldier were placing a significant burden on the Intelligence Community. This burden was only going to increase as DoD pursued new operational concepts such as “Dominant Battlefield Awareness” that provided the false hope of “piercing the fog of war,” but required significant multi-discipline intelligence resources to attempt to achieve.<sup>352</sup>

The report argued these military demands made it difficult for the “Intelligence Community to meet the broader national security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century” and that military requirements were already sapping resources away from “maintaining the necessary intelligence base” that was “critical in addressing future national security

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<sup>351</sup> U.S. Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Hearings. *IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. 104th Cong., 1st sess., 22 May-19 December 1995., 2, 96, 120, 215, 310, 369-370 and 373.

<sup>352</sup> Cooper, Jeffrey. “Dominant Battlespace Awareness and Future Warfare.” In *Dominant Battlespace Knowledge*, edited by Martin C. Libicki and Stuart E. Johnson, 39-46. Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 1995; Kagan, Frederick W, *Finding the Target: The Transformation of American Military Policy* (New York: Encounter Books, 1997), 212-218. Kagan’s book discusses the history of Dominant Battlefield Awareness and critiques the promises/expectations of those that developed it. Cooper’s article describes as the ability to know more about the battlefield because technology allows the collections, organization, and understanding of larger amounts of data than was before possible.

needs.” Although the report argued that support to military operations and “maintaining the necessary intelligence base” had to both be considered, the report described an Intelligence Community already subordinated to the DoD.<sup>353</sup>

The IC21 Staff Study supported the Aspin-Brown Commission’s recommendations to reestablish the Committee on Foreign Intelligence and create a separate clandestine service composed of both national and military resources. It also pursued a similar path to establishing “corporateness” within the Intelligence Community by establishing two DDCI positions, one responsible for the day to day operations of the CIA and the other for managing the Intelligence Community. The IC21 report departed from the Aspin-Brown Commission recommendations in a few areas. Two areas of particular note were its calls to give the DIA Director a new responsibility as the Director of Military Intelligence (DMI) and the establishment of a new Technical Collection Agency (TCA) to consolidate all technical collection capabilities.

Regarding consolidating clandestine HUMINT, the IC21 report acknowledged that clandestine operations must develop over time, forcing a reassessment of the CIA’s earlier decision to reduce its number of stations globally. The IC21 report called for a “global presence” of CIA clandestine capability throughout the world that could assist the US military in its planning efforts. Since clandestine HUMINT operations could not be established overnight, and arguing that clandestine operations had provided commanders some of the best intelligence during operations due to the ,“limitations of technical collection capabilities in environments largely devoid of signals,” CIA clandestine

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<sup>353</sup> U.S. Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Hearings. *IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. 104th Cong., 1st sess., 22 May-19 December 1995, 43.

operations would have to be in place and conducting operations in support of the military during peace time. Although the IC21 report acknowledged the importance of CIA HUMINT support to policymakers and warned about spreading the Intelligence Community thin, its assessment that the clandestine service, “must accept its responsibility to support the requirements of the military not only for strategic intelligence—something in which it can excel—but also for appropriate tactical intelligence support in times and places of military engagement—a responsibility that often falls to it only by default,” reflected its true preference. The IC21 might have been paying lip-service to the importance of CIA HUMINT support to policymakers, but its recommendation to reestablish a global presence and build, during peace time, the networks necessary to support military operations, showed CIA support to military operations was the priority.<sup>354</sup>

In 1993, then DIA Director, Lt. Gen Clapper assumed the title of DMI to help solidify his leadership role within the DoD’s Intelligence Community. Although DoD intelligence was dispersed, the DIA Director’s leadership role increased as the Military Intelligence Board (MIB) gained more influence in managing support to military operations. Dual-hatted as chair of the MIB and DIA Director, Clapper wanted to differentiate between his two roles. Clapper also believed the title DMI gave him more clout dealing with the diverse defense intelligence community even though he lacked any “command authorities.”<sup>355</sup> Jim Woolsey, the DCI at the time, did not support the DMI

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<sup>354</sup> U.S. Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Hearings. *IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. 104th Cong., 1st sess., 22 May-19 December 1995, 15-18.

<sup>355</sup> McDonnell, Janet A, *Adopting to a Changing Environment*, 29-31 and 226.

title, believing it weakened his authorities as the DCI and resulted in more, not less, confusion. The decision was made not to alienate DCI Woolsey by “formalizing” the title and the issue was temporarily dropped. The recommendation to establish a DMI who was a uniformed military intelligence professional was not adopted, but an Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD-I) was established during the George W. Bush administration. Although the concepts were slightly different, the USD-I helped centralize intelligence within DoD and many of the concerns Woolsey voiced in 1993 resurfaced.<sup>356</sup>

Although Congressman Combest agreed the military was the most important intelligence consumer, he also understood that others required intelligence support and wanted to ensure an independent Intelligence Community not under DoD control. This push for independence is why the IC21 recommended a “corporate approach” that would not only allow the IC to realign resources and reprioritize when required, but build an independent culture that would separate it from the agencies it supported. The TCA recommendation was part of this “corporate approach,” consolidating technical collection and maintaining a separate identity from the organizations it supported.<sup>357</sup>

According to Loch Johnson, the Aspin-Brown Commission and the IC21 recommendations were stifled by DoD and their “congressional allies” who feared the proposals would weaken DoD. The leadership of the oversight committees, Senator Specter and Congressman Combest, sought a revolution in intelligence by establishing a

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<sup>356</sup> Garthoff, 226-227; Hayden, Michael V. General (R). Former Director Central Intelligence Agency and former Director National Security Agency. Interview by author, Washington, D.C., 18 September 2015. General Hayden discussed how the existence of the USD-I could take away power from the DNI.

<sup>357</sup> Johnson, 357.

truly independent Intelligence Community. The revolution did not occur, but evolutionary change did take place. The 1997 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) established the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), consolidating the DoD's Defense Mapping Agency, Central Imagery Office, and other DoD imagery elements with the CIA's NPIC and other CIA imagery elements. When President Clinton signed the 1997 NDAA on September 23, 1996, the five year debate on how to consolidate imagery finally concluded. The United States now had a centralized imagery intelligence organization and DoD had a more effective combat support agency for enabling military operations, once again highlighting that support to military operations was the Intelligence Community's first priority.<sup>358</sup>

### **CIA Under Attack and the Arrival of Deutch**

The IC21 HPSCI hearings witness list was an impressive array of individuals drawn from government and the private sector, to include seven of the last ten DCI(s) stretching back to 1966. The tenures of the testifying former DCIs had been tumultuous, with many serving in the 1970s when the existence of the Intelligence Community, particularly the CIA, was questioned. Helms, Schlesinger, and Colby had been DCI during the Nixon years and were all affected by the "Family Jewels" disclosure. Schlesinger ordered the investigation of the "Family Jewels," Colby released the "Family Jewels" to Congress, and Helms pled guilty to misleading Congress based on evidence that surfaced within the "Family Jewels." Stansfield Turner became DCI shortly after the

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<sup>358</sup> U.S. Congress, House. *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997*. 104th Cong., 10 September 1996.

release of the Church Committee Report and the leaking of the Pike Committee Report. Turner's teetotaler and moralizing personality alienated many in the clandestine service and his direct assault on their colleagues did not win him any allies. Judge William Webster took over the CIA following the death of Bill Casey and the Iran Contra Scandal when some top CIA leaders were being prosecuted. Webster came to the job as DCI after Bob Gates, Reagan's first choice, became a casualty to Iran Contra and Webster's appointment was intended to signify a cleanup of the Agency. These DCIs served at the helm of the CIA during some of its darkest days.

The testimonies of the former DCIs depicted an Intelligence Community that was in defilade against outside attack in the 1990s. Victory in the Cold War should have brought ticker-tape parades and speeches, but instead brought questioning of existence, reduced budgets, and second-guessing. As is often the case with the passage of time, the end of the Cold War erased much of the memory of the existential threat the Soviet Union once posed. The fear that brought about the Domino Theory and the Red Scare was replaced with a belief that the world was moving inextricably towards democracy.

Bill Colby, the quintessential Cold Warrior whose death near his southern Maryland home less than a year later was as mysterious as his career, warned against erring like their Post-World War I and World War II predecessors.<sup>359</sup> As Colby pointed out, the confluence of the end of the Cold War, the uncovering of Aldrich Ames, and questions over the character of American assets had resulted in a cacophony of voices encouraging changes ranging for budget reductions to closing the CIA. Although the

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<sup>359</sup> Woods, Randall B, *Shadow Warrior: William Egan Colby and the CIA* (New York, NY: Basic Books), 2013, 397 and 1.

Intelligence Community had already been reduced between 15-17% since 1990, individuals like Senator Pat Moynihan argued the end of the Cold War should result in the end of the Agency. A writer, professor, and former ambassador to the United Nations, Moynihan proposed legislation dissolving the CIA in 1991 and again in 1995.<sup>360</sup>

Introducing his legislation, Moynihan argued the CIA contributed little towards victory in the Cold War and claimed that CIA's analysis on the fall of the Soviet Union was inaccurate. Although Moynihan's position was on the extreme edge of the spectrum, the recent capture of Soviet Spy Aldrich Ames threw additional fuel on the fire and provided CIA detractors more ammunition. The Ames case received criticism from the chairman of both the HPSCI and the SSCI and put the Agency on the defensive. As Michael Sulick, former Director of the National Clandestine Service, details in his book, *American Spies: Espionage Against the United States from the Cold War to the Present*, SSCI Chairman Senator DeConcini actually conducted a jailhouse interview of Aldrich Ames.<sup>361</sup> Although it is understandable the SSCI Chair wanted to learn from an espionage case, DeConcini asking Soviet Spy Ames his opinion of Moynihan's legislation and CIA's management practices went a little too far.<sup>362</sup> The Ames case, coupled with controversy over the funding for the NRO building and a less than ideal

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<sup>360</sup> <http://carnegieendowment.org/2005/12/20/case-for-abolishing-cia> (accessed 5 February 2016).

<sup>361</sup> Sulick, Michael J, *American Spies: Espionage Against the United States From the Cold War to the Present* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 201.

<sup>362</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Report. *An Assessment of the Aldrich H. Ames Espionage Case and Its Implication for U.S. Intelligence*. 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1 November 1994, 126.



relationship with President Clinton, resulted in DCI Woolsey's departure from the CIA in January 1995, the same month Moynihan introduced his legislation.<sup>363</sup>

John Deutch, the man Clinton picked to replace Woolsey, did not instill confidence or reassure the CIA workforce about their future. Before he even arrived at the CIA, Woolsey was telling Congress that he was going to "redesign" the Directorate of Operations "from the ground up" to prepare it for "operations in the current times." Deutch's call to "change the culture" of the Directorate of Operations before he was even confirmed to sit behind the DCI's seventh floor desk alienated many in the CIA that had served in intelligence for years.<sup>364</sup>

Deutch came to the CIA from the DoD where he had served as the Deputy Secretary of Defense and developed a preference for the uniformed services. Deutch believed the CIA's most important mission was supporting military operations and argued the roughly 90% of the intelligence budget DoD already received was not enough. Deutch told Loch Johnson, the noted intelligence expert, that, "the community's effort is really to support military operations, to be ready to tell a commander: 'We know where the Iraqi position is' ...submarines...a lot of very valuable stuff....What a huge difference that can make. In Bosnia, providing technical and human intelligence has worked great....It prevents casualties." Although Deutch's sentiments echoed other calls for increased intelligence support to military operations, as the head of the CIA, Deutch had a responsibility to balance its military and policymaker support requirements, and

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<sup>363</sup> Garthoff, 231-232.

<sup>364</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. S Hrg. 104-160 *Nomination of John Deutch*. 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 April and 3 May 1995, 67, 14.

most importantly, maintain CIA independence. It appeared, that if it was up to Deutch, the CIA would become another Combat Support Agency, similar to the NSA or NGA, thus depriving the nation of its only independent intelligence organization.

During his first all-hands inside the CIA's auditorium known as the "Bubble," Deutch tried to convince CIA leaders that he had "harbored a secret desire to be the Director of Central Intelligence," but they knew he did not plan to be at the CIA for long and hoped to depart to lead his beloved DoD.<sup>365</sup> It was bad enough that CIA employees knew that Deutch considered the CIA a rest stop on his journey to Secretary of Defense, but the new CIA Executive Director Nora Slatkin's stated doubt that CIA officers were as good as military officers was even worse.<sup>366</sup> Slatkin, who had served as an Assistant Secretary of the Navy, was not the only one who made the move from the Pentagon. Deutch also brought over former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence Keith Hall to replace Haver as the Executive Director for Community Affairs and future Marine Corp Commandant, then Brig Gen, Michael Hagee as his personal assistant.<sup>367</sup>

The attention Deutch placed on the military went beyond installing DoD colleagues in positions of power. Understanding the increasing importance of operational support to the military, Deutch moved the Associate Deputy Director of Operations for Military Affairs (ADDO/MA) out of the Directorate of Operations (DO) and created the

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<sup>365</sup> Johnson, 163 and 237; Edger, David. Former CIA Associate Deputy Director of Operations. Telephone interview by author, 7 December 2015. Edger explained that Deutch made it clear that he preferred DoD over CIA when he first arrived.

<sup>366</sup> Edger, David. Former CIA Associate Deputy Director of Operations. Telephone interview by author, 7 December 2015.

<sup>367</sup> Garthoff, 237-238.

Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support (ADCI/MS).<sup>368</sup> This meant a flag officer responsible for ensuring CIA/DoD partnership reported directly to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and not through the Deputy Director for Operations.<sup>369</sup> It also meant an increase in rank from a two-star billet to a three-star billet. After 9/11, the CIA consolidated the ADCI/MS and OMA into the office of the Associate Director of Military Affairs (ADMA).<sup>370</sup>

To fill the ADCI/MS position, Deutch brought over RADM Dennis Blair. Blair, who retired from the military as the PACOM CINC, was a Navy Surface Warfare officer and Rhodes Scholar. In 2009, President Barack Obama selected Blair to replace VADM(R) Mike McConnell as DNI. Blair's tenure as DNI lasted less than two years, but long enough for him to bump heads with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (DCIA) Leon Panetta over who should select the senior intelligence officer in each country.<sup>371</sup>

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<sup>368</sup> CIA Public Website. "Military Affairs/History" <https://www.cia.gov/offices-of-cia/military-affairs/history.html> (accessed 18 November 2012).

<sup>369</sup> The *2005 Intelligence Reform Terrorism Prevention Act* replaced the DCI with the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). Prior to 2005, the DCI was both the head of the CIA and the intelligence community. Now the head of the CIA is referred to as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (DCIA).

<sup>370</sup> CIA Public Website. "Military Affairs/History" <https://www.cia.gov/offices-of-cia/military-affairs/historm.html> (accessed 04 March 2013).

<sup>371</sup> Blair argued that he, as the DNI, should be the one who assigned the senior intelligence officer. Panetta argued the CIA Chief of Station should be the senior intelligence officer in each country. The issue was eventually taken to President Obama who sided with Panetta. Numerous interviewees commented on this debate with some arguing that it was a non-issue because in the majority of the cases the CoS would be the senior intelligence officer and it would only be in unique circumstances (e.g. warzones). Some believed Panetta fought the issue because senior CIA officers got to him early on and convinced him of the need for the CIA to retain the position. Some believed the President siding with Panetta over Blair further weakened the DNI since the DCIA is supposed to be a subordinate to the DNI. Panetta describes his perspective in his book. Panetta, Leon and Jim Newton, *Worthy Fights: A Memoir of Leadership in War and Peace* (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2015), 229-231.

On March 22, 1995, about a month before Deutch arrived at Langley, New Jersey Representative Robert Torricelli sent President Clinton and the New York Times a letter accusing the CIA of involvement in the murders of Michael Devine, an American citizen, and Efrain Bamaca Velasquez, a Guatemalan leftist guerrilla and husband of Jennifer Hardbury, an American citizen. In the letter, Torricelli, then a member of the HPSCI, identified Guatemalan Army colonel Julio Roberto Alpirez as a CIA asset and accused him of murdering the two men. Making public this information violated Torricelli's responsibility as a member of the HPSCI and was later investigated by a House Ethics Committee. Although Torricelli was not punished because the committee said the rules governing classified material were not clear and subsequently clarified them, they said Torricelli would have been "guilty" under the clarified rules.<sup>372</sup>

Devine and his wife, who was also an American citizen, lived in Guatemala for nearly three decades running a restaurant in Poptun and a hotel nearby.<sup>373</sup> In June 1990, a group of Guatemalan officers detained Devine for questioning and his decapitated body was later found next to his vehicle along a rural highway not too far from his home. Bamaca, also known by the nom de guerre Commander Everardo, was a leader of a leftist guerrilla group battling the Guatemalan government when he disappeared following a firefight in March 1992. Initial reports claiming he committed suicide on the battlefield to avoid capture were later found to be false. Bamaca had been captured by Guatemalan forces, held in captivity, tortured for a period, and then killed.

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<sup>372</sup> McCarty, Gregory C. (2009). *Congressional Oversight of Intelligence* (Doctoral Dissertation). Catholic University of America, 171; Lowenthal, Mark M. *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*. Los Angeles, CA: Sage, 2012, 323.

<sup>373</sup> Central Intelligence Agency. *Report of Investigation*, "Guatemala Volume IV: Michael Devine." Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 15 July 1995.

Admiral Bill Studeman, the highly respected Navy intelligence officer, had been serving as the acting DCI for about three months when he walked into an ambush on April 5, 1995.<sup>374</sup> The open SSCI hearing that spring day on the CIA's "alleged improprieties" in Guatemala included testimony from the widows of Bamaca and Devine and brought the debate over the character of CIA assets into the forefront. Subsequent investigations by the CIA's Inspector General and Clinton's Presidential Intelligence Advisory Board determined that evidence against Alpirez was "unreliable" and there was "no indication that U.S. government officials were involved in or had prior knowledge of the death, torture or disappearance of U.S. or Guatemalan citizens." The PIAB report did find that "credible allegations" of CIA assets committing human rights abuses required the CIA to reconsider their relationship with these individuals and determine if the benefit of these relationships outweigh the potential costs.<sup>375</sup> Ignorant of HUMINT, but wanting to send a message, Deutch alienated himself even more from the CIA workforce, when on September 27, 1995 he fired two DO officers, demoted a third, and gave twenty-three others letters of reprimand for the handling of the Col Alpirez case.<sup>376</sup>

Deutch, who lacked intelligence experience, assumed leadership of the CIA between the SSCI Guatemala hearing and the release of the CIA IG and PIAB reports.

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<sup>374</sup> Studeman, William O, Admiral (R). Former Deputy Director CIA and former Director NSA. Interview by author, Severna Park, MD, 24 November 2015. Before Studeman walked into the SSCI hearing on 5 April, he was unaware that Jennifer Hardbury was going to be present at the public hearing; Johnson, 118. Johnson mention's Studeman testifying and was also critical of Torricelli's actions, stating that "Torricelli had no right to reveal Alpirez's name or the identity of another CIA asset."

<sup>375</sup> Central Intelligence Agency. *Report of Investigation*, "Guatemala Volume IV: Michael Devine." Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 15 July 1995; Mahle, Melissa Boyle, *Denial and Deception: An Insider's View of the CIA from Iran Contra to 9/11* (New York, NY: Nations Books, 2004), 175.

<sup>376</sup> Johnson, 317-318.

Deutch's ignorance of HUMINT operations became apparent shortly after his arrival when he started asking questions about safe houses and asset pay. These simple questions lead to in-depth discussions regarding the character of CIA assets and what type of agents the CIA recruited.<sup>377</sup> Deutch eventually implemented the "Torricelli Rule" which restricted the CIA's recruitment of suspected human rights violators and criminals.<sup>378</sup> He also ordered a review of current CIA asset files and required justification for retaining any assets of questionable character. With Deutch already ordering the termination of one of the CIA's best assets based on human rights accusations, many believed arguing for retaining others was futile. The wisdom of Deutch's policy was later questioned, especially after the September 11, 2001 attacks highlighted a shortfall in HUMINT assets within terrorist organizations.<sup>379</sup>

Controversy surrounding the CIA did not stop with the Ames spy case or the Guatemala allegations. On November 15, 1996, Deutch found himself being skewered during a town hall meeting in Los Angeles while responding to allegations the CIA had ignored their Contra allies' involvement in introducing crack cocaine to Los Angeles. The accusations that originated in a *San Jose Mercury* article described a South Los Angeles drug dealer who purchased cocaine from Nicaraguan drug dealers. The Nicaraguans then used the proceeds to help fund the Contras. Although congressional

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<sup>377</sup> Edger, David. Former CIA Associate Deputy Director of Operations. Telephone interview by author, 7 December 2015. Senior CIA Director of Operations (DO) officers eventually briefed Deutch on a still classified case that had produced significant results for the CIA and the United States.

<sup>378</sup> <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/17/nyregion/challenger-to-torricelli-attacks-curbs-on-the-cia.html> (accessed 5 February 2016).

<sup>379</sup> Edger, David. Former CIA Associate Deputy Director of Operations. Telephone interview by author, 7 December 2015.

and CIA IG investigations found the allegations false, many did not stop believing the CIA played a role in fueling the crack cocaine epidemic. Fortunately for the CIA, Deutch's tenure was short-lived; a month after he spoke in Los Angeles, Deutch resigned as DCI.<sup>380</sup> As the CIA was being raked over the coals regarding their assets' human rights records, crack cocaine allegations, and spy cases, and as funding reductions were forcing them to close overseas stations, ongoing military operations were testing the partnership.

### **Building a Partnership During Operations**

During his February 1993 Senate confirmation hearing, then DCI nominee James Woolsey quipped, "Our two surrounding oceans don't isolate us anymore. Yes, we have slain a large dragon, but we live now in a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes. And in many ways, the dragon was easier to keep track of."<sup>381</sup> The CIA and military were no longer chasing the Soviets or preparing to meet them on the plains of Europe, they were now trying to understand a confusing world while undergoing significant institutional downsizing and turmoil.<sup>382</sup> Compounding this confusion were cuts in both personnel and budgets introduced during the George H.W. Bush administration and incorporated during President Clinton's tenure.<sup>383</sup> Despite

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<sup>380</sup> [http://articles.latimes.com/1996-11-16/news/mn-65300\\_1\\_cia-crack-cocaine](http://articles.latimes.com/1996-11-16/news/mn-65300_1_cia-crack-cocaine) (accessed 8 April 2016); Snider, Kindle Location 4539 and 5976.

<sup>381</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, S Hrg. 103-206, *Nomination of James Woolsey*, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., 2-3 February 1993, 76.

<sup>382</sup> Oakley, David. "Partners or Competitors."

<sup>383</sup> Government Printing Office, "The Cost of Intelligence," <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-INTELLIGENCE/html/int017.html> (accessed 7 January 2013).

declining budgets from 1990-1996 and mainly “flat budgets” from 1996-2000, the Intelligence Community had to satiate an increasing intelligence appetite of a multiplying consumer trying to come to terms with a post-Soviet environment and America’s role in this world.<sup>384</sup>

Many pundits and experts thought the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe signaled irrepressible progress towards a liberal democratic world, instead, the splintering of existing orders highlighted a tumultuous and unpredictable environment. In response to this splintering, the United States conducted various peacekeeping and humanitarian operations in the Balkans and Africa.<sup>385</sup> Whereas the Desert Storm critiques centered on analytical support to the combatant commander and BDA discrepancies, the post-Desert Storm expectations to provide Intelligence Community support down to the individual troop on the ground required more operational integration between CIA and DoD elements at the tactical level. It was one thing for the CIA to increase its analytical support to the military during infrequent major combat operations, but supporting numerous reoccurring military operations other than war (MOOTW) and establishing the necessary intelligence networks to generate the local knowledge many peacekeeping and humanitarian conflicts required, levied a significant tax on CIA resources during a period when they were already being reduced. It is one thing to provide a commander order of battle or intelligence on a country’s infrastructure to inform major combat operations, it is quite another to establish the asset networks necessary to provide atmospheric

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<sup>384</sup> The National Commission on Terrorism Attacks, “The Performance of the Intelligence Community: Staff Statement No. 11,” [http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff\\_statements/staff\\_statement\\_11.pdf](http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/staff_statement_11.pdf) (accessed 27 November 2012).

<sup>385</sup> Oakley, David. “Partners or Competitors.”



intelligence on the varied communities and competing interests that are often present within peacekeeping operations.

The number of MOOTW, coupled with reduced budgets, forced the CIA to “surge” personnel to support military operations.<sup>386</sup> Although “surging” is often necessary, it becomes problematic for an organization dependent on engaging in long-term relationships to spot and develop individuals with access to information. Beyond the policymaker vs. military support tradeoff, the CIA required access and time to meet policymakers increasing expectations to provide the intelligence needed to support the military at the operational and tactical levels, a commitment many military commanders and policymakers did not appreciate.<sup>387</sup> Despite these complaints, the CIA and DoD worked together during a period of austere budgets and personnel drawdowns to improve their relationship during operations.

In the late 1970s, Somalia became part of the Cold War surrogate conflict when the Soviet Union shifted support away from Somalian President Siad Barre and towards his Ethiopian enemy. In response, Barre sought assistance from the Carter administration who was concerned with Soviet influence in North Africa and the Middle East.<sup>388</sup> The United States signed an agreement with Barre in 1980 to gain access to military

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<sup>386</sup> Loeb, Vernon. “After Action Report.” *Washington Post*, 27 February 2000. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/magazine/2000/02/27/after-action-report/3c474a43-ea21-4bf5-afc5-02820b8579e5/> (accessed 13 February 2016).

<sup>387</sup> Edger, David. Former CIA Associate Deputy Director of Operations. Telephone interview by author, 7 December 2015.; Loeb, Vernon. “After Action Report.” *Washington Post*, 27 February 2000. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/magazine/2000/02/27/after-action-report/3c474a43-ea21-4bf5-afc5-02820b8579e5/> (accessed 13 February 2016).

<sup>388</sup> Jackson, Donna, *Jimmy Carter and the Horn of Africa: Cold War Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company Inc, 2007), 7.

installations in Somalia. The US-Somalian relationship deteriorated over time as the Cold War moved towards its conclusion and Barre became more despotic. In early 1991, the ten-year multi-tribal insurgency finally resulted in Barre's overthrow and a civil war ensued.<sup>389</sup> By 1992, multiple clans were fighting for power and a functioning government did not exist when the UN stepped in to ensure aid made it to Somalia's population. The United States initially did not have a large role in the mission, but this soon changed after President George H.W Bush, with pressure from Congress, decided the United States was indispensable.<sup>390</sup>

On December 4, 1992, President Bush announced to the American People his decision to deploy roughly 25,000 US Forces into Somalia in support of United Nation's operations. Within a week, the initial wave of US troops started arriving in Somalia as part of Operation Restore Hope. Commanding American forces in Somalia was Lieutenant General (LtGen) Robert Johnston, commander of the First Marine Expeditionary Forces at Camp Pendleton, California. The Scottish Born Johnston came to the United States at eighteen, joining the Marines after graduating from San Diego State University. An experienced officer, Johnston was one of the first Marines sent into Lebanon by SACEUR GEN Rogers to serve as part of a liaison team to Ambassador Habib in August 1982. He subsequently commanded a battalion landing team as part of

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<sup>389</sup> Schraeder, Peter J. "From Ally to Orphan: Understanding U.S. Policy Toward Somalia After the Cold War," in *After the End: Making U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World*, ed. Paul James M. Scott (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), Kindle Location 6407.

<sup>390</sup> Huchthausen, 161.

the American contingent to the MNF mission in Lebanon.<sup>391</sup> During Desert Storm, then MajGen Johnston served as General Schwarzkopf's Chief of Staff at CENTCOM.<sup>392</sup>

From the beginning, CIA officers worked side-by-side with their DoD colleagues in support of military operations in Somalia. In addition to deploying as part of the National Intelligence Support Team (NIST) that was providing LtGen Johnston "national level, all-source intelligence support from throughout the Intelligence Community," the CIA Directorate of Operations deployed a group of officers to conduct Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) in support of follow-on forces.<sup>393</sup> On December 23, 1992, one of the CIA officers paid the ultimate sacrifice while conducting intelligence support to military operations.

Larry Freedman, a retired Army sergeant major, Green Beret and Delta Force member, had served in Vietnam and been part of the 1980 mission to rescue hostages from the US Embassy in Tehran. Freedman, who enlisted in the Army after a stint at Kansas State University, was part of a four-man team "conducting work for a humanitarian aid mission" around Bardera, Somalia, a town about 284 miles east of Mogadishu. During the mission, the vehicle Freedman and his three colleagues were

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<sup>391</sup> Frank, Benis, *U.S. Marines in Lebanon: 1982-1984* (Washington, D.C.: History and Museum Division Headquarters USMC, 1987), 10.

<sup>392</sup> Schmitt, Eric. "War in the Gulf: Commanders; Top Brass in Gulf: Profiles in Uniformed Authority." <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/02/12/world/war-in-the-gulf-commanders-top-brass-in-gulf-profiles-in-uniformed-authority.html?pagewanted=all> (accessed 15 February 2016).

<sup>393</sup> Department of Defense. *Joint Publication 2-01: Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations*. Washington, D.C.; Department of Defense, 5 January 2012, II-22; Loeb, Vernon. "After Action Report." *Washington Post*, 27 February 2000. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/magazine/2000/02/27/after-action-report/3c474a43-ea21-4bf5-afc5-02820b8579e5/> (accessed 13 February 2016); Lajoie, Roland. Major General (R). Former/First CIA Associate Deputy Director for Operations/Military Affairs. Telephone interview by author, 10 November 2015. MG Lajoie mentioned the deployment of CIA operators in support of CIA.

riding in struck a land mine, killing Freedman and injuring the other officers.<sup>394</sup> The world was not initially told that the first U.S. casualty in Somalia was a CIA officer and Freedman's true affiliation was not known until Ted Gup wrote about it in *The Book of Honor: The Secret Lives and Deaths of CIA Officers*. Although the world did not yet know about Freedman's sacrifice or his true affiliation, LtGen Johnston knew and wrote Freedman's family a condolence letter that acknowledged the sacrifices Feedman made in support of the Somalia mission.<sup>395</sup>

In March 1993, the United Nations decided to transition the mission in Somalia from a peacekeeping operation to a nation building operation. To build Somalia's institutions, advisors within the Clinton administration believed it was necessary to remove impediments to development such as clan leader Mohammed Aideed. Tasked with apprehending General Aideed was a special operations element known as Joint Task Force Ranger led by Major General (MG) William Garrison.<sup>396</sup> On October 3, 1993, Joint Task Force Ranger's attempt to capture Aideed resulted in some of the bloodiest one-day fighting American troops experienced since Vietnam. That day, eighteen American troops died during the fighting and the disturbing image of American troops

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<sup>394</sup> <https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/2012-press-releases-statements/2012-memorial-ceremony.html> (accessed 10 February 2017).

<sup>395</sup> Gup, Ted, *The Book of Honor: The Secret Lives and Deaths of CIA Operatives* (New York, NY: First Anchor Books, 2001), Kindle Location 6110-6115.

<sup>396</sup> Loeb, Vernon. "Warlords, Peacekeepers, and Spies," *Washington Post*, 27 February 2000, <http://www.somaliawatch.org/archivejuly/000927601.htm>. (accessed 27 December 2012); U.S. Army, Center of Military History, *United States Forces, Somalia After Action Report and Historical Overview: The United States Army in Somalia 1992-1994* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History), 8.

being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu became seared in the United States' collective conscious.

The tragedy of Somalia is well known, but the collaboration between the DoD and the CIA is less known. Despite a lack of HUMINT sources, the CIA integrated their operations as best they could with Garrison's command. A SASC after-action review concluded, "intelligence support to Joint Task Force Ranger was a major effort and demonstrated a high degree of cooperation and pooling of efforts by the several agencies involved. HUMINT was expected to be and proved the most difficult aspect of this effort. It did not succeed in locating Aideed but did locate his lieutenants."<sup>397</sup>

COL Jerry Boykin, the commander for Combat Applications Group (Airborne), was one of the military officers that voiced concern with HUMINT support in Somalia.<sup>398</sup> A career special forces officer, Boykin was in the Iranian Desert preparing to rescue American hostages when aircraft collided, causing the mission to be aborted. Boykin, who served in Grenada and Panama, rose through the ranks before serving as the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (DUSD-I) and then retiring as a LTG.<sup>399</sup> During the Senate review of Task Force Ranger, Boykin stated, "we don't have a good HUMINT program, certainly not for crisis or unanticipated situations," a telling

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<sup>397</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services. Memorandum for Chairman Strom Thurmond from Senator Warner and Senator Levin, "Review of the Circumstances Surrounding the Ranger Raid on October 3-4, 1993 in Mogadishu Somalia," 29 September 1995, 42. MG Garrison stated that he "was totally satisfied with the intelligence effort-never saw anything better from the intelligence community or architecture. It was totally fused-we got everything we asked for. It was a superb intelligence effort and architecture.

<sup>398</sup> Position identified on LTG Boykin's official Army resume

<sup>399</sup> Boykin, Jerry, *Never Surrender: A Soldier's Journey to the Crossroads of Faith and Freedom* (New York, NY: Hachette Book Group, 2008). Boykins book covers his career in the military.

comment, for someone, who, as DUSD-I was involved in a controversial pentagon program to build a separate DoD clandestine HUMINT capability under Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld.<sup>400</sup> Although Boykin's opinion might somewhat reflect reality, it ignored the long-term investment that is required to establish HUMINT assets and the significant resource constraints in developing networks that would be available if a crisis arose anywhere in the world. Boykin might not have enjoyed all the HUMINT resources he desired, but it was financially infeasible for the CIA or DoD to establish HUMINT networks throughout the world in anticipation that a mission might occur in some distant location that was not previously a priority.<sup>401</sup> In March 1994, five months after that tragic day recounted by author Mark Bowden in *Blackhawk Down*, the American military mission in Somalia ended; at least temporarily.

During the same period that Somalia was spiraling out of control, Yugoslavia was fracturing into ethnic pieces.<sup>402</sup> The multiple ethnic identities that Tito was able to hold together finally fell apart in 1991, a decade after his death. Against the wishes of the international community who preferred stability in Yugoslavia, Slovenia and Croatia, these nations declared their independence and conflict quickly ensued. Slovenia was able to secure its independence after a relatively short war; Croatia was not as fortunate. Possessing a significant Serbian population, Yugoslavia's Serbian President, Slobodan

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<sup>400</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services. *Review of the Circumstances Surrounding the Ranger Raid on October 3-4, 1993 in Mogadishu, Somalia*. 29 September 1995, 42.

<sup>401</sup> Mahle, 148. Boyle discusses how the "CIA abandoned its position as a 'world-wide' intelligence organization" during the 1990's, pointing out that the CIA reduced or "closed large numbers of stations and bases." She also points out "Africa Division was the hardest hit."

<sup>402</sup> Oakley, David. "Partners or Competitors."

Milosevic, was not willing to depart with Croatia so easily.<sup>403</sup> In March 1992, Slobodan and Serbia's attention shifted towards Bosnia as the Bosnians declared independence from Yugoslavia.

Two months after Bosnia declared independence and before US troops hit the ground, DCI Gates and DDCI Studeman established the Interagency Balkans Task Force to “centralize and coordinate collection and sanctions monitoring,” while also “coordinating general military intelligence support to US policy and contingency planning and tactical intelligence support.” The organization was led by a senior CIA analyst with a senior DIA official as his deputy, and consisted of members from CIA, DIA, and NSA. The Balkan Task Force eventually became the “longest running” Central Intelligence Agency Task Force at the time and evolved to include two deputies, one “a senior member of the JCS military intelligence” and the other a “CIA officer.”<sup>404</sup>

In December 1995, the UN authorized the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to conduct military operations to ensure enforcement of the Dayton Peace Accords, which established a “cease-fire” between Bosnia, Croatia, and Yugoslavia (Serbia). As in Somalia, Operation Joint Endeavor highlighted the evolving DoD/CIA relationship following Desert Storm.<sup>405</sup> The Intelligence Community once again committed to support military operations, a standard practice since Desert Storm. The

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<sup>403</sup> Huchthausen, 197.

<sup>404</sup> William J. Clinton Presidential Library. “Bosnia, Intelligence, and the Clinton Presidency: The Role of Intelligence and Political Leadership in Ending the Bosnian War,” 01 October 2013. [https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/international-relations/bosnia-intelligence-and-the-clinton-presidency/Clinton\\_Bosnia\\_Booklet.pdf](https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/international-relations/bosnia-intelligence-and-the-clinton-presidency/Clinton_Bosnia_Booklet.pdf), 25 (accessed 15 February 2016).

<sup>405</sup> Larry Wentz, ed., *Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1997), 25 and 54.

CIA/DoD partnership went well beyond the standard practice and included a “unified integrated HUMINT Service” involving elements from the CIA DO and the DIA DHS whose purpose was to synchronize HUMINT collection to meet the commanders’ operational and force protection needs. This unified CIA/DIA element operated together out of an office in Tuzla, coordinating HUMINT collection efforts on force protection requirements and atmospheric information such as identity and backgrounds on various leaders and the plans and intentions of the different groups. This type of unified organization was abnormal in the DoD/CIA partnership, but PDD-35 dictated that CIA push their capability to the tactical level in support of military commanders. Twelve years earlier in Beirut, the CIA was blamed for failing to provide adequate force protection intelligence following the Marine Barracks bombing. Only a month after Joint Endeavor began, a CIA officer was being credited with collecting information on minefield emplacement procedures, likely saving lives of American and Coalition forces.<sup>406</sup> Although CIA’s support of the operational commander appeared a tactical success, there is little doubt that increased tactical support resulted in reduced strategic intelligence collection.

The Clinton administration has been blamed for the Dayton Peace Accords narrowly focusing on Bosnia, while neglecting other issues within the region. Most notably, the accord neglected Kosovo, which some believed was Milosevic’s biggest prize.<sup>407</sup> Richard Holbrooke, the lead negotiator for the Dayton Peace Accord, and Carl

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<sup>406</sup> [http://fas.org/irp/news/1996/x011996\\_x0118oje.html](http://fas.org/irp/news/1996/x011996_x0118oje.html).

<sup>407</sup> Nation, Craig R, *A History of the War in the Balkans* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2015), 223.



Bildt, the Swedish Prime Minister and EU's top envoy at Dayton, argued that a peace accord was unachievable if Kosovo was part of the discussion. Believing that some degree of peace in the Balkans was a better option than chasing an unachievable, yet preferable peace throughout the region, the negotiators temporarily set aside the Kosovo issue.<sup>408</sup>

Although American diplomats promised to deal with the Kosovo issue, some ethnic Albanians became impatient with the peaceful approach of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), the leading voice for ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. In response to this frustration and determined they had to take action into their own hands, Albanian elements in Kosovo started initiating attacks on Serbian targets in early 1996. These attacks were followed by a little known organization called the Kosovo Liberation Army declaring a "guerrilla war" against "Serbian oppression." Hoping for a peaceful resolution to the conflict, the United States continued to encourage dialogue between Ibrahim Rugova, the LDK leader, and Slobodan Milosevic, but increased repressiveness by Milosevic made constructive dialogue difficult.<sup>409</sup> After numerous failed attempts to halt Serb actions in Kosovo, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) undertook a 78-day bombing campaign, unleashing more than "14,000 strike missions" on "targets in Kosovo and Serbia".<sup>410</sup> This action, coupled with the threat of a ground invasion,

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<sup>408</sup> Chollet, Derek, *The Road to the Dayton Accords: A Study of American Statecraft* (New York, NY: Palgrave, 2005), 191.

<sup>409</sup> Phillips, David L, *Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012), 68.

<sup>410</sup> Nation, Craig R, *A History of the War in the Balkans* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2015), 251; Phillips, David L, *Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012), 107.

resulted in the withdrawal of Serbian forces and the arrival of NATO's Kosovo Forces (KFOR) as part of Operation Joint Guardian.<sup>411</sup>

CIA support to military operations in Kosovo began with Operation Allied Force, the 78-day bombing campaign and went well beyond its support for previous bombing campaigns. Previous CIA support to bombing campaigns focused on the "strategic and planning level, such as analytical judgments on the kinds of targets that are the most important." During Operation Allied Force, the CIA's support went clear down to the tactical level, issuing targeting packages on "specific installations or buildings."<sup>412</sup> Instead of focusing at the national level, elements within the CIA were acting like an air intelligence unit, feeding information to drive bombing operations. CIA's support continued into Operation Joint Guardian, where it was part of the National Intelligence Support Team that deployed in support of military operations.

Although CIA's involvement in the tactical target nomination process was in-line with PDD-35 guidance, CIA's increased involvement did not come without incident. On May 7, 1999, NATO forces accidentally bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade when CIA misidentified the building as the Yugoslav Federal Directorate for Supply and Procurement. While Thomas Pickering, the Undersecretary of State, proclaimed the incident as "an error compounded by errors," some of these errors were directly related to the CIA becoming involved in a typically military target nominating process without the requisite knowledge on how to accurately determine bombing locations and absent

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<sup>411</sup> Clark, Wesley K, *Waging Modern War* (New York, NY: Public Affairs Books, 2002), 425.

<sup>412</sup> CIA Public Website. "DCI Statement on the Belgrade Chinese Embassy Bombing." [https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/1999/dci\\_speech\\_072299.html](https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/1999/dci_speech_072299.html) (accessed 24 February 2016).

established targeting procedures and proper databases. Six weeks after the incident, DCI Tenet explained to the HPSCI that although CIA was taking measures to ensure a similar incident does not occur in the future, he pointed out that the “episode is unusual because the CIA does not normally assemble, on its own, target nomination packages containing the coordinates of specific installations or buildings.” With both the executive and legislative branches pushing for increased CIA support to the military, CIA’s involvement in targeting and other tactical support to the military increased.<sup>413</sup>

The use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) also started to gain more prominence during operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. Although both the CIA and military had been testing drone technology for years, during Bosnia and Kosovo they worked together to train and deploy pilots to use the UAV’s to collect intelligence. The use of drones, especially by the CIA, was controversial with some fearing this new technology would pull money away from traditional collection methods, particularly HUMINT.<sup>414</sup> Nevertheless, the Balkans marked the beginning of an operational use for UAVs that expanded exponentially after 9/11. It also brought the CIA further into tactical operations. Less than a decade later, a PFIAB member visiting the CIA for an organized tour, stood in amazement as UAVs took center stage in the presentation. He

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<sup>413</sup> Myers, Steven Lee. “Chinese Embassy Bombing: A Wide Net of Blame.” <http://www.nytimes.com/2000/04/17/world/chinese-embassy-bombing-a-wide-net-of-blame.html?pagewanted=all> (accessed 27 June 2016); CIA Public Website. “DCI Statement on the Belgrade Chinese Embassy Bombing.” [https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/1999/dci\\_speech\\_072299.html](https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/1999/dci_speech_072299.html) (accessed 27 June 2016).

<sup>414</sup> Coll, Steven, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (New York, NY: Penguin Group, 2004), 529.

left wondering if the CIA had been pushed too far to the tactical level at the cost of its national mission and support to policymakers.<sup>415</sup>

The integration of military operations with national intelligence at the tactical, operational and strategic levels was even more remarkable when one considers this occurred within multinational operations in the Balkans. Understanding that support to the military in multinational operations involved providing intelligence support to allies, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) had a task force develop procedures that ensured U.S. and allied militaries received the necessary intelligence, while protecting CIA sources and methods.<sup>416</sup> The interaction between the CIA and special operations also increased in the Balkans with SOF ground teams working closely with CIA officers.<sup>417</sup>

In 1991, the congressional committees reviewing intelligence support to military operations during Desert Storm probably had conventional war in mind; by 1995, the concept of “military operations” had significantly expanded to include “Military Operations Other Than War.”<sup>418</sup> Although “Phase Zero-Shaping” did not enter the military lexicon for another decade, the MOOTW definition included military operations during peacetime to keep “tensions between nations below the threshold of armed

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<sup>415</sup> Inman, Bobby Ray, Admiral (R). Former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Agency. Interview by author, Austin, TX, 27 August 2014.

<sup>416</sup> Wentz, 228-229. An article written by David D. Perkins discusses how HUMINT and CI experiences during other operations informed operations in Bosnia; Tenet, George, *At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA* (New York, NY: Harper Collins E-Book, 2007), Kindle location 7810.

<sup>417</sup> Reid, Garry. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict, telephone interview by author, 19 September 2012.

<sup>418</sup> Davidson, Janine. *Lifting the Fog of Peace: How Americans Learned to Fight Modern War* (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2010), 134. Davidson’s book discusses the absence of MOOTW in most military doctrine in the early 1990s and the introduction in 1993.

conflict and maintain US influence in foreign lands.”<sup>419</sup> The expanded definition of military operations, captured in the 1995 National Military Strategy that articulated a “peacetime engagement,” and the expectation of intelligence support to the military, placed a considerable burden on the CIA.<sup>420</sup> The CIA could no longer temporarily surge officers from one area to focus on supporting military operations during war, the military was now conducting peacetime operations and depended on intelligence support. Despite reduced defense and intelligence budgets, the DoD and CIA worked together to develop new partnerships and procedures to meet these operational needs.

In 1998, President Clinton and Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich worked together to bring about another commission focused on how the United States’ national security institutions should transform in the post-Cold War world.<sup>421</sup> The United States Commission on National Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century (Hart-Rudman Commission) began its work in October 1998. The commission, co-chaired by former Senators Warren Rudman and Gary Hart, was composed of fourteen former government officials, business leaders, and media professionals, all with impressive national security credentials. Whereas the Aspin-Brown Commission focused on how the Intelligence Community had

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<sup>419</sup> Department of Defense. *Joint Publication 3-0: Doctrine for Joint Operations*. Washington, D.C.; Department of Defense, 1 February 1995, I-3 Bacevich, Kindle Location 6718. Bacevich credits Wolfowitz with introducing the concept of “shaping” when he put in the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance. Bacevich writes, “shaping now became the military’s primary job. Back in 1992, the Defense Planning Guidance drafted under the aegis of Paul Wolfowitz had spelled out this argument in detail. Pointing proudly to the ‘new international environment’ that had already ‘been shaped by the victory’ over Saddam Hussein the year before, that document provided a blueprint explaining how American power could ‘shape the future.’ The sledgehammer was to become a sculptor’s chisel.”

<sup>420</sup> [http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nms/nms\\_feb95.htm#CS](http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nms/nms_feb95.htm#CS) (accessed 2 February 2016).

<sup>421</sup> Find transcript at <http://www.cfr.org/homeland-security/national-security-21st-century-findings-hart-rudman-commission/p4049> (accessed 16 March 2016).

to transform to meet the post-Cold War requirements, the Hart-Rudman Commission sought to “redefine national security” in a post-Cold War environment.

The Hart-Rudman Commission pursued a bottom-up approach broken down into three phases; “understanding” the world, developing a strategy to respond to the that world, and then adapting the national security structure to execute the strategy. During its two and a half years of existence, the commission produced three reports, each focused on one of the three phases. In its phase one report, the Hart-Rudman Commission described a world that was becoming increasingly linked through rapid technology and whose economies were growing dependent on each other. The economic interconnectedness forced the United States and other “advanced countries” to become involved in the struggles of smaller, weaker states for fear that internal state failure would result in security threats to their interests. This involvement tested the notion of state sovereignty that had served as the foundation for the nation-state construct since the Treaty of Westphalia. This new world environment not only shaped the United States’ global role, but also challenge the Intelligence Community with non-traditional threats. The Commission further argued that many of these challenges, such as terrorism, would soon threaten the United States’ homeland.<sup>422</sup>

Armed with a better appreciation of the world, the Hart-Rudman Commission transitioned to phase II. In April 2000, the Commission published their phase II report, “Seeking a National Strategy: A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom.” The report introduced six objectives the United States should pursue to

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<sup>422</sup> U.S. Commission on National Security/21<sup>st</sup> Century. *New World Coming: American Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century; The Phase I Report on the Emerging Global Security Environment*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 15 September 1999.

protect and advanced U.S. interests: 1) Defend the U.S. and ensure that it is safe from the dangers of a new era; 2) Maintain America's social cohesion, economic competitiveness, technological ingenuity, and military strength; 3) Assist the integration of key major powers, especially China, Russia and India, into the mainstream of the emerging international system; 4) Promote, with others, the dynamism of the new global economy and improve the effectiveness of international institutions and international law; 5) Adapt U.S. alliances and other regional mechanisms to a new era in which America's partners seek greater autonomy and responsibility; and 6) Help the international community tame the disintegrative forces spawned by an era of change.<sup>423</sup>

When the Commission identified the United States strategic interests and objectives, they transitioned to Phase III, which focused on building the “structure and processes” needed to pursue Phase II objectives. While Phase I was descriptive, and phase II spoke in broad strategic terms, Phase III was critical of the United States' national security structure and prescribed specific changes necessary to prepare the United States for the dynamic world. The Commission argued the DoD was too large, inefficient, and recommended a 20-25% infrastructure reduction to streamline operations and make it more agile.

Unlike other post-Cold War commissions, the Hart-Rudman Commission did not mention a lack of intelligence support to military operations. In fact, the commission argued that a more dynamic world, coupled with reduced resources and concerns over terrorism, proliferation, “ethnic conflicts and humanitarian emergencies,” has “led to a

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<sup>423</sup> U.S. Commission on National Security/21<sup>st</sup> Century. *New World Coming: American Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century; The Phase II Seeking a National Strategy: A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 15 April 2000.

focus on providing warning and crisis management, rather than on long-term analysis.” The commission argued, “the results of these three developments is an intelligence community that is more demand-driven than it was two decades ago. That demand is also more driven by military consumers and therefore, what the Intelligence Community is doing is narrow and more short-term than it was two decades ago.” The commission further argued that long-term analysis of “important regions” had been ignored because of this short-term focus. An interesting perspective since it was legislative and executive decisions over the previous decade that deliberately pushed the Intelligence Community towards supporting the military consumer at the cost of neglecting the policymaker. To remedy this problem and to strengthen the link between strategy and intelligence, the commission recommended having the NSC set the national intelligence priorities.<sup>424</sup>

The commission also challenged the legacy of DCI Deutch and Senator Torricelli regarding HUMINT assets accused of human rights abuses. Arguing the importance of HUMINT collection for counterterrorism efforts and acknowledging that those with access to terrorist plans and intentions, “are not liable to be model citizens of spotless virtue,” they recommended reconsidering the restrictive guidelines enacted by Deutch. The commission valued human rights, but understood that Deutch and Torricelli’s actions significantly restricted the CIA’s Directorate of Operations, potentially setting back the United States’ counterterrorism efforts.<sup>425</sup> The Hart-Rudman Commission members were

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<sup>424</sup> U.S. Commission on National Security/21<sup>st</sup> Century. *New World Coming: American Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century; The Phase III Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 15 February 2001, 82-83.

<sup>425</sup> The Hart-Rudman Commission also recommended establishing a “National Homeland Security Agency with responsibility for planning, coordinating, and integrating various U.S. government activities involved in homeland security.”



not the only ones voicing concern over Deutch's and Torricelli's actions. Around the same period, the congressionally mandated National Commission on Terrorism argued the human rights standards have "delayed vigorous efforts to recruit potentially useful informants" and recommended a Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) stating the "1995 guidelines will no longer apply to recruiting terrorist informants."<sup>426</sup> Unfortunately, the "Torricelli Rule" had already done damage to the United States counterterrorism efforts, and although it might be difficult to link the rules to counterterrorism intelligence shortfalls leading to 9/11, it certainly did not help.

The Hart-Rudman Commission's final report was released less than two weeks after President George W. Bush's inauguration, when the new administration was trying to find its footing. This timing, coupled with the absence of an event to compel policymaker actions, resulted in the Hart-Rudman Commission, like the Aspin-Brown before it, not leading to significant legislation.

As congressional committees were acknowledging improvements in intelligence support to military operations, the Aspin-Brown Commission and the Hart-Rudman Commission were raising concerns about military support consuming CIA resources and attention; a concern not limited to government commissions, but also cited by influential former national security professionals, academics, and business leaders. A 1996 Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Task Force report raised "concern about the influence over intelligence policy exerted by the Defense Department and defense-related concerns. There is a danger that spending on intelligence to support military operations will take priority over other important or even vital national security ends which intelligence is

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<sup>426</sup> National Commission on Terrorism. *Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 02 August 2000, 8.

needed.” A Georgetown University *Checklist for the Future of Intelligence* report that was intended to inform the Aspin-Brown Commission’s work argued the commission should not “make recommendations that would excessively skew the focus of U.S. intelligence gathering toward purely military needs.”<sup>427</sup> A discussion that would have been useful over the previous five years when congressional reviews and executive action were continually pushing national intelligence, particularly the CIA, to focus their efforts towards supporting the military.

While debates over the future of national security institutions were occurring on Capitol Hill, within commissions, and at policy and academic institutions, the CIA and DoD were operating together in peacekeeping and nation building operations. Although policymaker pronouncements highlighted the need for integrated CIA/DoD operations and structural changes displayed CIA/DoD willingness to adapt, operations were required to solidify the relationship. During the 1990’s peacekeeping and humanitarian operations provided a small-scale venue for CIA/DoD relationship building. The decade looming on the horizon brought a “Global War” and two large-scale operations that consumed the focus of the national security establishment, while providing a shared mission focus that was absent since the end of the Cold War. This experience further solidified the CIA/DoD relationship, but also increased concern the CIA and other elements within the Intelligence Community were becoming subordinated to DoD.

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<sup>427</sup> Council on Foreign Relations. “Making Intelligence Smarter.” <http://www.cfr.org/intelligence/making-intelligence-smarter/p127> (accessed 24 February 2016).; Hedley, John Hollister, *Checklist for the Future of Intelligence* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University’s Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 1995).

## Chapter Seven: A New Administration

Towards the end of Clinton's second term, concern started to build that the United States cut too much bone from its defense and intelligence capabilities, while at the same time deploying military forces more often than expected following victory in the Cold War. Uniformed military leadership argued this increased operational tempo (OPTEMPO) affected the military's ability to wage two mid-size wars simultaneously, a standard introduced by Colin Powell and Dick Cheney in the last years of the George H.W. Bush administration.<sup>428</sup> With the budget balanced and the economy stronger than it had been in the last three decades, some argued it was time to reinvest the peace dividend in the United States' national security organizations.

Although national security spending drastically increased after 9/11, the Clinton administration made modest increases in national security spending prior to leaving office, altering a reduction course that had begun in the late 1980s. Clinton's final budget, included a roughly 3.8% increase in defense spending, the first "real" defense increase since Desert Storm, but less than some in Congress desired.<sup>429</sup> Around this same period, the CIA started to enlarge a workforce that had not experienced growth in over a decade. The number of CIA employment offers rose by more than 50% between 1998-1999, an important increase for an organization that had reduced the number of case officers worldwide in 1995 to the same number of officers cut by Stansfield Turner in the

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<sup>428</sup> Troxell, John F. "Sizing the Force for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century," in *Revising the Two MTW Force Shaping Paradigm*, ed. Steven Metz (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001), 10-12.

<sup>429</sup> U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Armed Services. *Military Service, Posture, Readiness, and Budget Issues*. 106th Cong., 1st Sess., 21 October 1999.

late 1970s.<sup>430</sup> Although this increased CIA capability was welcomed, it takes time to train and deploy case officers and years before their efforts at recruiting assets and developing networks bare fruit. This increased spending would continue, albeit at different levels and towards different programs, no matter who won the 2000 election.

### **2000 Campaign**

Al Gore entered the 2000 campaign with high expectations the Democratic Party could secure a third consecutive term. With President Clinton's second term approval rating over 60% and strong confidence in the economy, Gore entered the final days of the campaign slightly ahead of Texas Governor George Bush, scion of the 41<sup>st</sup> President.<sup>431</sup> On election night, the contest was closer than anyone expected and the selection of the 43<sup>rd</sup> president did not occur for over a month. On January 6, 2000, Congress certified President Bush the winner after one of the most contentious and drawn out elections in American history.

During the 2000 campaign, George W. Bush and Al Gore's platforms both called for increased national security spending, but how they proposed allocating resources and employing the military was quite different. The Bush campaign argued for increased spending on missile defense, quality of life, military readiness, and research and

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<sup>430</sup> Raum, Tom. "CIA Recruiting Drive Paying Off." <http://fas.org/sgp/news/2000/01/ap011700.html> (accessed 26 February 2016).; Coll, Steven. *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*. New York, NY: Penguin Group, 2004, 317.

<sup>431</sup> Fiorina, Morris, Samuel Abrams, and Jeremy Pope. "The 2000 Presidential Election: Can Retrospective Voting be Saved." <http://www.uvm.edu/~dguber/POLS234/articles/fiorina.pdf> (accessed 15 March 2016); Campbell, James E. "The Curious and Close Presidential Campaign of 2000." <http://www.acsu.buffalo.edu/~jcampbel/documents/CampbellCrottyChapter4.pdf> (accessed 16 March 2016).

development (R&D). Gore argued for increasing military pay, while continuing to build a military that was flexible enough to execute his “forward engagement” doctrine.

Embracing elements of the Powell Doctrine, Bush argued that U.S. forces should deploy only when “strategic” interests were at stake. These “strategic” interests did not include most of the humanitarian and peacekeeping missions that occurred during the Clinton administration. Absent definable and achievable military objectives and an “exit plan” if things went awry, candidate Bush claimed he would not deploy US forces.<sup>432</sup>

Gore criticized Bush for adopting a narrow perspective, focused largely on China and Russia, while ignoring America’s responsibility to enforce peace and shepard the world towards greater democracy, peace and prosperity. Gore’s campaign articulated a concept of “forward engagement,” which included “trying to disrupt terrorist networks, even before they are ready to attack.” Embracing a less conventional approach with a limited missile defense capability, Gore argued for developing a military force that could face unconventional threats “that do not respect national borders.” His stance also called for “efforts to expand the rule of law, fight corruption, and improve democratic governance.”<sup>433</sup>

In stark contrast to many of the arguments put forward for maintaining Iraq deployments circa 2006, Ari Fleischer, Bush’s campaign spokesman and future White House press secretary, argued in 2000 that, “the role of the United States military is not to

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<sup>432</sup> <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25849> (accessed 16 March 2016). Bush’s vision for the role of US military power during his presidency did include a focus on the Middle East, but this focus was directed towards nation-states, particularly Iraq which was one of his administration’s top priorities when he entered office. Candidate Bush’s more traditional approach focused on protecting the homeland through missile defense and deploying the US military in conventional wars.

<sup>433</sup> <http://www.4president.us/issues/gore2000/gore2000foreignpolicy.htm> (accessed 26 February 2016).

be all things to all people. Governor Bush does not support an open-ended commitment to keep our troops as peacekeepers in the Balkans.” Condolezza Rice, the future National Security Advisor and Secretary of State criticized Gore’s “vision of an indefinite U.S. military deployment,” arguing “that if he is elected, America’s military will continue to be overdeployed, harming morale and re-enlistment rates, weakening our military’s core mission.”<sup>434</sup> The Bush administration fulfilled their promise to increase military pay and improve quality of life on installations, but they also surpassed the deployment rates of the Clinton years.

A mere six years later, the 9/11 attacks and failures of conventional force to introduce democracy in Iraq, led President Bush to embrace a use of force consisting of elements more akin to Gore’s 2000 platform than his own. The president, who as a candidate argued the United States could not be the world’s policeman, issued a 2006 *National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism*, that called for the “advancement of democracies” and “eliminating physical safehavens.”

### **The Boys are Back in Town....and considering Intelligence Reform**

Many of the top officials within the new Bush administration in the winter of 2001 had served with each other previously. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld had been a mentor to Vice-President Cheney, bringing him into the Office of Economic Opportunity during the Nixon administration when Cheney was a twenty-eight year old PhD student

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<sup>434</sup> Holmes, Steven A. “The 2000 Campaign: Foreign Policy; Gore Assails Bush on Plan to Recall U.S. Balkan Force.” *New York Times*, 22 October 2000.; <http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/22/world/2000-campaign-foreign-policy-gore-assails-bush-plan-recall-us-balkan-force.html> (accessed 26 February 2016).

at the University of Wisconsin. A few years later, Rumsfeld, then Ford's chief of staff, brought Cheney into the inner-circle as his deputy Chief of Staff. Subsequently, Cheney became Ford's Chief of Staff when Rumsfeld replaced Schlesinger as Secretary of Defense. This musical chairs made Rumsfeld the youngest Secretary of Defense and Cheney the youngest Chief of Staff in American history.

The Rumsfeld-Cheney connection was not the only relationship that extended back to previous administrations. Colin Powell, the new Secretary of State, served as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs when Cheney was Secretary of Defense. Paul Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld's deputy in DoD, served with Secretary of State Powell and his deputy, Richard Armitage, in DoD during the Reagan administration. As James Mann points out in his book, *The Rise of the Vulcans*, these relationships went beyond the top tier of the new administration, and included many of their influential deputies and advisors.<sup>435</sup>

As Secretary of Defense in 1989, Cheney plucked Rich Haver, a career Navy intelligence professional, from his job as Deputy of Naval Intelligence to serve as his intelligence advisor. After Desert Storm, Secretary of Defense Cheney made Rich Haver the point-man in reviewing intelligence performance during the war and the lead for intelligence reform efforts. A few days after the 2000 election, while the debate over the Florida ballots raged on, Dick Cheney once again turned to Rich Haver; this time asking him to lead the intelligence transition for the Bush Team.

Haver had left government in 1999, when he departed the National Intelligence Council for a senior position within the defense industry. Soon after his conversation

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<sup>435</sup> Mann, James, *Rise of the Vulcans: History of the Bush's War Cabinet* (New York, NY.: Penguin Group, 2004), Kindle Location 84.

with the vice-president elect in late 2000, Haver took a short trip from his Northern Virginia home to Tysons Corner, a defense industry mecca at the junction of Route 123 and Leesburg Pike, less than fifteen miles from the White House. Over the years, Tysons Corner had transformed from a sleepy pastoral area into an important national security corridor into Washington, D.C.. On his first day working for his second Bush administration, Haver arrived at a non-descript three story office building to meet with Dick Cheney and receive his marching orders.<sup>436</sup>

According to Haver, Cheney was interested in gaining an appreciation of how intelligence had evolved since he left as Secretary of Defense in 1991 and told Haver to query the DCI and the oversight committees' leadership about their interaction with Secretary of Defense Cohen and President Clinton. He also asked Haver to find out what happened to the 1994-1999 intelligence budget that was left behind by the previous Bush administration. In Haver's view, there was a limited relationship between many of the individuals responsible for guiding, directing, and overseeing intelligence during the Clinton administration. Haver said he confirmed the intelligence budget left behind by the first Bush administration had been reduced significantly and told Cheney the Clinton administration "had under funded national intelligence by tens of billions of dollars."<sup>437</sup>

Vice-President Cheney's experience in the executive and legislative branches convinced him of the importance of intelligence. He had served as Ford's Deputy Chief

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<sup>436</sup> Haver, Richard. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and former Intelligence Advisor to Secretary of Defense (Cheney and Rumsfeld). Interview by author, Great Falls, VA, 01 December 2015 and email exchange with author, 04 January 2016; Barbara Olson, who would tragically die on September 11, 2001 aboard American Airlines Flight 77 and Scooter Libby, the loyal Cheney aide who would be found guilty of leaking a CIA officer's identity in 2007, were also present at the meeting.

<sup>437</sup> McDonnell, Janet A, *Defense Intelligence Coming of Age: The Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence 2002-2012* (Washington, D.C.: DIA Historical Office, 2014), 22.



of Staff and then Chief of Staff during the Church and Pike Committee Hearings in the 1970s. Although he saw value in some of their findings, he also believed they were “sensational” and marked the unfortunate beginning of congressional usurpation of Presidential power in foreign policy. As a Congressman, Cheney served on the HPSCI, personally observing CIA support to the Afghanistan mujahedeen during the Soviet occupation and gaining intimate knowledge of the Intelligence Community. When Cheney became George H.W. Bush’s Secretary of Defense, he “wanted to spend significant time on intelligence,” and took a lead role in intelligence reform efforts following Desert Storm.<sup>438</sup> Now as Vice President, Cheney once again prioritized intelligence and his efforts were partially responsible for a second President Bush tackling intelligence reform early in his administration.

Shortly after Bush named Rumsfeld his nominee for Secretary of Defense, Haver received an invite from Rumsfeld to dine at the Four Seasons in Georgetown, his favorite haunt whenever he was in Washington, D.C.. Arriving late to dinner that evening, Rumsfeld apologized, explaining he was meeting with Armitage, the administration’s lead for DoD transition. When asked if the meeting went well, Rumsfeld told Haver that he and Armitage had agreed the Pentagon was not big enough for both of them-- Armitage ended up working for Powell at State.<sup>439</sup>

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<sup>438</sup> Cheney, Dick, *In My Time* (New York, NY.: Simon and Schuster, 2011), 141-142, 160.

<sup>439</sup> Haver, Richard. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and former Intelligence Advisor to Secretary of Defense (Cheney and Rumsfeld). Interview by author, Great Falls, VA, 01 December 2015 and email exchange with author, 04 January 2016; Rumsfeld, Donald, *Known and Unknown, A Memoir* (New York, NY: Sentinel, 2011), 292. Rumsfeld described Armitage as “Brusque” in his first meeting with him.

As Rumsfeld and Haver sat alone in a dim-lit room near the back of the restaurant (“a scene out of a movie”), Rumsfeld informed Haver that he was going to be his intelligence advisor. Away from government merely a year, Haver responded “I already did that job for Cheney, why do I want to do the same job again?” Rumsfeld retorted, “look who you are talking to, why do I want to do the same job again?” After a little more back-and-forth, Rumsfeld told Haver he was determined to reinvest in intelligence after years of neglect and highlighted three priorities: 1) “pump money back into the intelligence activity...but into the right places”; 2) fix the requirements process; and 3) establish an assistant secretary for intelligence in DoD.<sup>440</sup> That evening, Rumsfeld made it clear to Haver that he had big plans for the Pentagon and wanted to give Haver the opportunity to finish the intelligence reform he had started ten years earlier. Haver’s temporary job as the Cheney-Bush lead for intelligence had just evolved into a more permanent position within the administration.

Similar to Deutch’s arrival at CIA, Rumsfeld stormed into the Pentagon criticizing its culture, alienating its leaders, and promising significant change. Rumsfeld argued the DoD was a “bloated bureaucracy” and a “relic of the Cold War” that needed to transition to meet the demands of the changing world.<sup>441</sup> He looked to streamline the department’s notoriously burdensome acquisition processes and to reduce what he viewed as bloated military staffs. Most importantly, he wanted to regain civilian control over the DoD, control he argued had been relinquished during the Clinton administration.

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<sup>440</sup> Haver, Richard. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and former Intelligence Advisor to Secretary of Defense (Cheney and Rumsfeld). Interview by author, Great Falls, VA, 01 December 2015 and email exchange with author, 04 January 2016; Loeb, Vernon. “Rumsfeld’s Man on the Intelligence Front.” *Washington Post*, 10 Feb 2003;

<sup>441</sup> <http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=44916> (accessed 26 February 2016).

Although Rumsfeld's pursuit of building a nimble organization capable of responding to unforeseen challenges was admirable, many of the reform changes he pursued were not as novel as he portrayed.

His pursuit of streamlining the DoD's bureaucracy had been sought for years and was part of Gore's NPR reinventing government program. His description of a stagnant DoD that failed to evolve after the Cold War was not completely accurate, as Eric Shinseki's reform efforts underway in the Army demonstrated.<sup>442</sup> Nor was his capabilities based approach as revolutionary as the 2001 Defense Planning Guidance led one to believe, with the decade long revolution in military affairs already focusing in that direction. Despite all these issues, Rumsfeld's reform effort was contested as much for his approach as for its content. Instead of building a team, he created division.

Rumsfeld is truly a paradox. A man who gave his subordinates a copy of Thomas Schelling's forward to Roberta Wohlstetter's *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision*, encouraging them to challenge their thinking, then created an environment that discouraged dissent. A man who circumvents the traditional military chain of command, but will not tolerate himself being circumvented.<sup>443</sup> Many in the uniformed military did not appreciate these contradictions. Nor did these leaders, who experienced significant turmoil in the 1990s, appreciate Rumsfeld's bluntness or arrogance. The military leadership agreed with the new Secretary of Defense that funding had to increase and some reform was needed, but did not appreciate Rumsfeld ignoring their views and

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<sup>442</sup> Herspring, Dale R, *Rumsfeld's Wars: The Arrogance of Powers* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2008), 31.

<sup>443</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services. *Nominations Before the Armed Services Committee*. 107th Cong., 1st Sess., January-December 2001.

depending largely on his civilian leadership for advice. Although traditionally loyal to the chain of command, the military leaders had given decades of their lives to the institution and expected reciprocity. Leaders like the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Hugh Shelton, served in Vietnam and survived the post-Vietnam military. Now Rumsfeld, returning to the Pentagon more than two decades after he left an institution then suffering in the aftermath of Vietnam, was criticizing their leadership and neglecting their counsel.<sup>444</sup> Even though Rumsfeld's government background, coupled with his business acumen, brought some good ideas to the Pentagon, his confrontational approach sullied relationships he needed to realize transformative change.

During Senate Confirmation questioning, Rumsfeld told the Armed Services Committee that intelligence was his biggest concern, describing it as one issue that keeps him up at night, and identifying improving intelligence as one of his top five goals. He argued the United States needed better intelligence to “know more about what people think and how they behave and how their behavior can be altered and what the capabilities are in this world.” During his testimony, Rumsfeld focused on improving not just DoD intelligence capabilities, but declared his commitment to work with the DCI to establish “a strong spirit of cooperations between the DoD and the rest of the Intelligence Community.”<sup>445</sup>

Rumsfeld did not waste anytime tackling intelligence, initiating reform efforts a month after assuming office, when, on February 23, 2001, Rumsfeld sent Haver a paper

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<sup>444</sup> Herspring, 21.

<sup>445</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services. *Nominations Before the Armed Services Committee*. 107th Cong., 1st Sess., January-December 2001.

titled, “Visualizing the Intelligence System of 2025.” The target of the document was wider than just DoD intelligence, focusing on developing “a new vision of intelligence, gathering, and utilization” for the United States. The document described characteristics of the post-Cold war environment, arguing the United States’ current intelligence system was “less than optimal in the face of new conditions and new requirements.” The paper concluded by arguing for “a broad based working group or commission to review the collective needs of the National Command Authority and examine the potential and long-term requirements of both American security and American leadership and then propose a system that could meet those needs.”<sup>446</sup> Rumsfeld’s call to review the United States’ intelligence capabilities in a post-Cold War world was at least the fifth review in the last decade. Although Rumsfeld’s call for a review of national intelligence in June 2001 appears innocuous, his actions to gain greater control of national intelligence capabilities following September 11, 2001 raises questions regarding whether his review was an initial attempt to expand DoD influence over national intelligence.

One of Rumsfeld’s early intelligence initiatives was gaining greater control of DoD’s intelligence bureaucracy. Despite responsibility for roughly 80% of the United States’ intelligence capabilities, the DoD did not have a point person dedicated to intelligence issues within the Pentagon. As Ford’s Secretary of Defense from 1975-1977, Rumsfeld had an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (ASD-I), a position established by Melvin Laird, Nixon’s first Secretary of Defense, in 1971 upon the recommendation of a Blue Ribbon Defense Panel. In 1976, Rumsfeld dual-hatted the

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<sup>446</sup> Rumsfeld, Donald. *Snowflake*, “Intelligence.” (w/attachment “Visualizing the Intelligence System of 2025), 23 February 2001.

ASD-I as the Director of Military Intelligence (DMI), giving the ASD-I “line authority” over the majority of defense intelligence resources.<sup>447</sup> This essentially created an intelligence czar within DoD that Rumsfeld could count on to lead DoD intelligence, manage resources across entities, and serve as a point of contact for intelligence issues.

Despite the importance Rumsfeld placed in this position, its existence was short-lived. Harold Brown, Carter’s Secretary of Defense, consolidated the ASD-I position and the Director of Telecommunications and Command and Control Systems into a new Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, and Communications (ASD-C3I).<sup>448</sup> By the time Rumsfeld returned to the Pentagon, intelligence shared an assistant secretary’s attention with two other important areas; command and communication. Rumsfeld’s previous experience told him this had to change.

On May 9, 2001, President Bush issued NSPD #5, *Intelligence*, to determine how the Intelligence Community had to evolve in the post-Cold War world; making Bush the third President to focus government efforts towards reforming the Intelligence Community for the post-Cold War world. The directive ordered the DCI to establish “two separate panels,” one panel was comprised of Intelligence Community professionals and the other of outside government leaders. These two panels would assess the intelligence needs of the United States and then recommend the structure and resources necessary to meet those needs.<sup>449</sup> The responsibility for chairing the internal committee

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<sup>447</sup> <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v02/d211> (accessed 19 February 2016); Ellsworth, Robert. Memo for Secretary of Defense. *DoD Intelligence Restructuring*, 7 May 1976.

<sup>448</sup> [http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Document/key\\_officials/KEYOFFICIALS\\_june22-2015.pdf](http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Document/key_officials/KEYOFFICIALS_june22-2015.pdf) (accessed 19 February 2016).

<sup>449</sup> Bush, George W. *National Security Presidential Directive-5 “Intelligence.”* Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 9 May 2001.

was given to Joan Dempsey, a career intelligence professional who served as the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management under George Tenet. DCI Tenet selected Brent Scowcroft, the retired Lt. Gen and George H.W. Bush's National Security Advisor, to chair the external committee. Unfortunately, tragedy struck, delaying the external committee's report and ending the internal committee's review.<sup>450</sup>

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<sup>450</sup> Zelikow, Philip. "The Evolution of Intelligence Reform, 2002-2004." *Studies in Intelligence*, Vol. 56, No. 3 (September 2012), 6.

## **Chapter Eight: 9/11 and GWOT**

By September 2001, Rumsfeld's popularity with the military was rapidly diminishing. A conservative institution whose officer corps self-identifies Republican at a rate higher than the rest of the population, military officers overwhelmingly supported Bush during the 2000 election and had high expectations for his administration.<sup>451</sup> Following a strained relationship with President Clinton, the military was looking forward to a change in the White House, particularly with candidate Bush promising pay increases and quality of life improvements for the military; campaign promises he initiated action on with NSPD-2, *Improving Military Quality of Life*, on February 15, 2001. The military's honeymoon with the new administration ended a few months later when Rumsfeld's alienation of the uniformed military leadership had some officers almost reminiscing about the good ole' days of the Clinton administration.<sup>452</sup>

Rumsfeld's approach not only frustrated his underlings, but upset many within Congress. When some of Rumsfeld's civilian deputies were circulating a proposal to cut the Army by two divisions, bringing them down from ten to eight, a bi-partisan group of ninety-two members of Congress sent him a letter warning against this action.<sup>453</sup>

Rumsfeld's actions and disregard for military leadership also caught the ire of retired flag

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<sup>451</sup> Urban, Heidi. "Civil-Military Relations in a Time of War." (14 April 2010), 11.; Holsti, Ole R. "Of Chasms and Convergences: Attitudes and Beliefs of Civilians and Military Elites at the Start of a New Millennium," in *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil Military-Gap and American National Security*, ed Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn (Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs-JFK School, Harvard University, 2001), 31.

<sup>452</sup> <http://articles.latimes.com/2001/feb/10/news/mn-23691> (accessed 16 March 2016).

<sup>453</sup> Pellegrini, Frank. "Defense: Rumsfeld's Lonely, Losing Battle." <http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,170605,00.html> (accessed 26 February 2016).



officers, a powerful force in the defense community. Retired Army General Gordon Sullivan, who served as Secretary of the Army during the George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations, publicly excoriated Rumsfeld for coming to “the easy, but erroneous conclusion that by spending hundreds of billions of dollars weaponizing space, developing a national missile defense, and buying long-range precision weapons, we can avoid the ugly realities of conflict,” a statement that became all too relevant in the coming years.<sup>454</sup>

The frustration with Rumsfeld culminated on September 10, 2001 when he castigated the Pentagon’s bureaucracy and articulated his mission to liberate it from itself. Although he tried to distance the Pentagon’s bureaucratic culture from the employees that labored within it, his messianic tone only reinforced his image as a patronizing curmudgeon. The next day tragedy struck, providing the Secretary of Defense an opportunity to transform from a cankerous influence in a peacetime Pentagon to a brave leader of a military at war. As Dr. Dale Herspring discusses in his book *Rumsfeld’s Wars*, Donald Rumsfeld’s unpopularity and the likelihood of him becoming the first cabinet member fired ended with the September 11, 2001 attacks.<sup>455</sup> The photo of Rumsfeld carrying the wounded out of the burning Pentagon and stories of him ignoring personal risk to assist with immediate response efforts, seared within America’s collective mind the image of a fearless leader unwilling to backdown. In the coming days, weeks and months, his mannerism during press conferences that were considered

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<sup>454</sup> Kitfield, James, *War and Destiny: How the Bush Revolution in Foreign and Military Affairs Redefined American Power* (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2007) Kindle Location 724,

<sup>455</sup> Herspring, 41.

bombastic and irreverent before 9/11, were looked upon as decisive and assertive; qualities many sought after the terrorist attacks. Rumsfeld's image of a man in charge was in stark contrast to the feelings he was having regarding DoD's initial role in Afghanistan.

On September 20, 2001, with fires smoldering at the Pentagon and twin towers, President Bush announced his vision for a "war on terror" that would "not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated."<sup>456</sup> Days before Bush's speech, CIA, SOCOM, and CENTCOM personnel were conducting initial planning for a U.S. response. On September 13, 2001, CIA officers briefed the National Security Council on a plan to insert CIA teams with the Northern Alliance to pave the way for follow-on forces.<sup>457</sup> A week after Bush's speech, the first CIA teams entered Afghanistan.<sup>458</sup>

Rumsfeld was not happy that CIA officers were the first boots on the ground in Afghanistan and did not hide this frustration from his subordinates. On September 19<sup>th</sup>, Rumsfeld called all the service intelligence chiefs and the directors from DIA, the National Security Agency (NSA) and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) to badger them for what he perceived as an intelligence failure; not 9/11, but the

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<sup>456</sup> [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushaddress\\_092001.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushaddress_092001.html) (accessed 26 February 2016).

<sup>457</sup> Shelton, Hugh, *Without Hesitation: The Odyssey of an American Warrior* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2010), 443.

<sup>458</sup> Schroen, Gary, *First In: An Insider's Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan* (New York, NY: Ballantine Books, 2005), 87.

CIA beating DoD into Afghanistan. That day he charged the leaders of defense intelligence with finding new ways to advance DoD operations.<sup>459</sup>

Rumsfeld viewed the DoD and himself as the first among unequals and did not want to depend on another organization to enable his department's operations. Although CIA had connections in Afghanistan and it was a logical plan to have them use these relationships to open the door for follow-on forces, Rumsfeld wanted DoD to be in control of operations and self-sufficient. Rumsfeld constantly lectured his subordinates about ridding the DoD of its CIA dependence, comparing the CIA/DoD relationship to a baby bird hungrily resting in a nest waiting to be fed by its mother.<sup>460</sup> To make DoD independent, Rumsfeld had to go back to what gave him insomnia, intelligence.

Rumsfeld's description of his initial intelligence reform efforts embraced a community approach, focused on not just providing the military the necessary intelligence to develop plans and inform operations, but on creating an intelligence system that provided the United States a better understanding of adversaries "attitudes, behaviors, and motivations."<sup>461</sup> Rumsfeld's stated goal of ensuring the Intelligence Community was designed to respond to the nation's needs was admirable, but it is unclear whether he was being non-parochial or if he was motivated by a desire to expand DoD influence. If Rumsfeld's motivations were initially non-parochial, they shifted after

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<sup>459</sup> Ennis, Michael, Major General (R). Former CIA Deputy Director of HUMINT. Interview by author, Leesburg, VA 17 November 2015.

<sup>460</sup> Jacoby, Lowell E, Vice Admiral (R). Former Director Defense Intelligence Agency and former J2 Joint Staff. Interview by author, Ashburn, VA, 18 November 2015; Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown*, 391. Rumsfeld describes a conversation he had with General Tommy Franks when he said, "my goodness, Tommy, I repeatedly said to Franks. The Department of Defense is many times bigger than the CIA, and yet we are sitting here like little birds in a nest, waiting for someone to drop food in our mouths."

<sup>461</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services. *Nominations Before the Armed Services Committee*. 107th Cong., 1st Sess., January-December 2001.

he became frustrated with DoD's dependence on the CIA. At that point, his determination to build the Intelligence Community shifted towards building the DoD's intelligence capability and achieving self-sufficiency. Rumsfeld was no longer as concerned with the broader Intelligence Community, he was now concerned that DoD had the intelligence capability necessary to wage war and lead America's efforts in the GWOT.

### **DoD Counterterrorism Reform and Finalizing USD-I**

On September 26, 2001, the same day CIA teams arrived in Afghanistan, Rumsfeld sent Tenet a new organizational concept that if implemented, could help DoD reduce reliance on CIA. The Joint Intelligence Task Force-Counterterrorism (JITF-CT) was proposed by VADM Thomas Wilson, the DIA Director who previously served as the Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support and before that the J2 for the Joint Chiefs. The organization described in Wilson's proposal as "supporting a unified national campaign," would have given DoD a lead role in counterterrorism efforts. The envisioned DoD organization would be the centerpiece of the United States' counterterrorism efforts, with access to "all information" and the capability to "generate actionable intelligence to drive planning and operations," while also providing threat warning and assisting in diplomacy and policy development. Although led by DoD, the proposed organization would have elements from CIA, FBI, DoS, Treasury, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), law enforcement agencies, allies (Canada, Great Britain, Israel), and other members of the undefined "coalition," that would operate out of DIA Headquarters at Bolling Air Force Base in Washington, D.C and other deployed

locations. The envisioned JITF-CT would have placed DoD at the center of the United State's counter-terrorism efforts, possibly usurping authority and responsibility from the CIA and FBI. Although a new concept that would have significantly expanded DoD's role, the proposed JITF-CT built upon an already established organization.<sup>462</sup>

After the October 2000 Cole Bombing, CENTCOM Commander General Tommy Franks and his J2, MG Keith Alexander, met with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Hugh Shelton and his J2, RADM Lowell Jacoby, at the Army's Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) HQs near Washington, D.C.. Franks and Alexander proposed placing CENTCOM in charge of the global counterterrorism mission for DoD. Concerned with a regional combatant commander trying to gain a world-wide mission, but aware that DoD had to improve its counterterrorism efforts, Shelton asked Jacoby to devise a "counterproposal." Jacoby's counterproposal recommended keeping regional commanders responsible for counterterrorism within their areas of responsibility (AOR), but establish a "central repository" of terrorist threats and warnings to support these commanders.<sup>463</sup> Jacoby's argument was that DoD required a "tailored warning down to the unit level" to identify potential attacks on US forces and this requirement exceeded what CIA's Counterterrorism Center could provide. A central repository would also ensure the dissemination of intelligence regarding potential attacks where the planning occurred in one combatant command AOR, but targeted another combatant command's AOR.

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<sup>462</sup> Rumsfeld, Donald. *Snowflake*, "JITF-CT." (w/attachment "JITF-CT: Supporting a Unified National CT Campaign"), 26 September 2001.

<sup>463</sup> Jacoby, Lowell E, Vice Admiral (R). Former Director Defense Intelligence Agency and former J2 Joint Staff. Interview by author, Ashburn, VA, 18 November 2015.

Supporting the proposal, but not wanting to conflict with CIA operations, Shelton ran the recommendation past DCI Tenet and Cofer Black, the Chief of CIA's Counterterrorism Center. Tenet and Black confirmed the CIA were unable to provide force protection intelligence, but were willing to support DoD efforts. CIA sent DoD "additional resources" and DoD sent officers to work with CIA. Prior to 9/11, this organization was not called JITF-CT and was structured to provide terrorist warning, not finished analysis. In 2002, DoD established the JITF-CT using Jacoby's earlier organization as a foundation, but it did not possess the responsibilities laid out in the proposal Rumsfeld sent Tenet. As of 2016, JITF-CT conducted analysis and assessments on threats to "DoD personnel, facilities, and interests," while also providing some analytical support to operations.<sup>464</sup> Important functions, but not the center of the United States' counterterrorism effort.

In the early days of the administration, prior to 9/11 and the JITF-CT proposal, Rumsfeld was looking to resurrect the ASD-I that existed during his time in the Ford administration. To confirm the need for this position, Rumsfeld told Haver to "birddog" ASD-C3I John Stenbit to assess how much attention he focused towards intelligence in relation to his other responsibilities of command, control and communication. Rumsfeld personally liked Stenbit, but did not see how, with such a demanding portfolio, Stenbit could dedicate enough time towards intelligence. Rumsfeld wanted a senior leader dedicated to intelligence who could ensure the defense intelligence needs of the President, military services, CIA, and other departments were met. With Haver

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<sup>464</sup> [https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/archived-reports-1/Ann\\_Rpt\\_2001/smo.html](https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/archived-reports-1/Ann_Rpt_2001/smo.html) (accessed 16 March 2016).

confirming Rumsfeld's concerns that Stenbit was spending most of his time on command and control (C2), the Secretary of Defense moved forward with the ASD-I proposal.<sup>465</sup>

Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld was not the best at motivating subordinates or building organizational cohesion, but he was intelligent, politically astute and understood DoD budget constraints were not an issue immediately after 9/11. In mid-September 2001, Haver received a phone call from Larry De Rita, Rumsfeld's Special Assistant. De Rita told Haver that Rumsfeld wanted him to "bring down all that stuff on the ASD-I, we are going to send it to the Hill as part of legislative initiatives." When Haver warned De Rita that "prep work" to inform Congress had not been done, De Rita responded that Rumsfeld "did not care," he just wanted to get the concept before Congress for discussion. Over the next week, Haver and De Rita used the documents Haver compiled to "develop a legislative proposal." Congress discussed the ASD-I proposal during the hectic days immediately following 9/11, but more pressing concerns captured their attention and the proposal was set aside. That December, as Congress was preparing for the Holiday Season, Rumsfeld told Haver to prepare the ASD-I packet for the next session. It was finally time to initiate reform.

Haver and Rumsfeld had just returned to the Pentagon from an ASD-I discussion with the INSCOM Commander, LTG Keith Alexander, when Rumsfeld sensed Haver's reservations about the proposal. On the escalator back to the Secretary of Defense's office, Haver explained to Rumsfeld that he did not believe an assistant secretary possessed the authority or influence to oversee the vast defense intelligence structure. In

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<sup>465</sup> Haver, Richard. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and former Intelligence Advisor to Secretary of Defense (Cheney and Rumsfeld). Interview by author, Great Falls, VA, 01 December 2015 and email exchange with author, 04 January 2016.

the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) there are seventeen assistant secretaries and only five under secretaries. Haver explained to Rumsfeld that he “may or may not answer” a phone call from an assistant secretary, but he would return a phone call from an under secretary “right away.” Without hesitating, Rumsfeld told Haver to make the position an under secretary.<sup>466</sup> On December 2, 2002, the 2003 National Defense Authorization Act established the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD-I).<sup>467</sup> In 2005, President Bush made the USD-I the number three official within DoD after the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense, highlighting how much the administration valued intelligence support to operations. Based on his position, experience and knowledge of the Intelligence Community, Rich Haver was the logical choice to become the first USD-I, but this did not happen. Prior to his Pentagon return, Haver told Cheney and Rumsfeld that he would only serve two years in the administration and departed the administration in the Summer of 2003, accepting an executive position with Northrup Gruman.

Instead of finding another intelligence professional to serve as the first USD-I, Rumsfeld reached out to one of his closest aides, Dr. Stephen Cambone. Tenacious and stubborn, Cambone is a determined ideologue who in 2012 argued the future will prove that the United States’ invasion of Iraq was the “greatest decision of the century.”<sup>468</sup>

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<sup>466</sup> Haver, Richard. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and former Intelligence Advisor to Secretary of Defense (Cheney and Rumsfeld). Interview by author, Great Falls, VA, 01 December 2015 and email exchange with author, 04 January 2016.

<sup>467</sup> Public Law 107-314. *Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003*. 107th Cong., 02 Dec 2002. In 2010, President Obama changed the order of precedence and moved the USD-I to number nine.

<sup>468</sup> Shachtman, Noah. “Rumsfeld’s Intel Chief: Iraq War ‘Greatest Decision of the Century.’” <http://www.wired.com/2012/07/cambone-iraq/> (accessed 26 February 2016).



Cambone spent his early career moving between academia and government, when in 1998, Rumsfeld selected him to be his staff director for the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States. Early in the Bush administration, Cambone gained a reputation as the Secretary of Defense's "henchman" for aggressively pursuing Rumsfeld's reform vision. Although no doubt intelligent, Cambone was probably selected for his loyalty and indefatigability, not his intelligence expertise.<sup>469</sup> His appointment as USD-I was perceived by some as an element of Rumsfeld's strategy to assert more authority over the Intelligence Community. It was more likely that he chose Cambone because he trusted him to implement his vision for building a self-sufficient DoD. Rumsfeld did not want to run the Intelligence Community, but he did want to increase DoD's influence, independence and role.<sup>470</sup> To assist Cambone, Rumsfeld selected an experienced special operator who proved to be as controversial and as ideologically driven as either Cambone or Rumsfeld.

LTG Jerry Boykin, the career special operations officer who criticized HUMINT support in Somalia during TF Ranger where he served as the commander for Combat Applications Group (Airborne), was selected as the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (DUSD-I). Boykin's special operations experience and his time detailed to the CIA, must have made him an attractive candidate to help achieve Rumsfeld's vision for increasing DoD's HUMINT capability. According to Boykin, it was Rumsfeld's annoyance at DoD dependence on CIA that led to the establishment of USD-

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<sup>469</sup> Armed Forces Journal Website. <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/who-is-steve-cambone/> (accessed 26 February 2016).

<sup>470</sup> Ogden, Pete. "Who is Stephen Cambone," <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2004/07/20/941/who-is-stephen-cambone/> (accessed 26 February 2016).

I.<sup>471</sup> Boykin and Cambone soon initiated a plan to sever that dependence, even if it meant duplicating intelligence collection efforts that Congress and the executive branch had been trying to eliminate for the past decade.

### **HUMINT Independence**

In late 2004 and early 2005, controversy struck Rumsfeld's intelligence reform efforts when articles about DoD's HUMINT activities started appearing in newspapers. According to the articles, Rumsfeld and his advisors concluded the Secretary of Defense possessed greater HUMINT authority than had previously been understood and wanted to build a capability to exploit this authority. The articles described a new HUMINT collection organization called the Strategic Support Branch (SSB) that was responsible for conducting clandestine operations throughout the world. According to the articles, the SSB was established because Rumsfeld was frustrated with CIA support to DoD's operations and disagreed with Tenet on priorities. The articles were not completely accurate, but were accurate enough to raise concern within the intelligence oversight committees.<sup>472</sup>

In early 2002, Rumsfeld had his lawyers review DoD's HUMINT collection authorities and subsequently pressured USD-I Cambone and his deputy Boykin to develop a better HUMINT capability.<sup>473</sup> MajGen (R) Ennis, then director of DoD

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<sup>471</sup> Boykin, 7.

<sup>472</sup> Gellman, Barton. "Secret Unit Expands Rumsfeld's Domain." *Washington Post* (23 January 2005).; Schmitt, Eric. "Pentagon Sends its Spies to Join Fight on Terror," 24 January 2005. <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/24/politics/pentagon-sends-its-spies-to-join-fight-on-terror.html> (accessed 15 March 2016).

<sup>473</sup> Rumsfeld, Donald. Memo to Steve Cambone. "Defense HUMINT Service." 27 January 2004.

HUMINT, said Rumsfeld “did not have any confidence in the DIA or DHS,” because they “lacked money and were cautious not to trample on CIA’s turf.” Instead, Cambone and Boykin worked through SOCOM to conduct the type of operations described in the newspaper articles. The always-coy Rumsfeld was careful not to call the activities intelligence and instead referred to them as the Strategic Support Branch.<sup>474</sup> Although the articles accurately described Rumsfeld’s SSB, it mistakenly placed it under the direction and authority of VADM Jacoby and the DIA. The DIA was working on their own program to build DoD HUMINT capacity, but they were focused on providing tactical intelligence support to the troops on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan, something that was clearly DoD’s responsibility.<sup>475</sup>

The Defense HUMINT Management Office (DHMO), the DIA office responsible for “deconflicting and enabling DoD HUMINT activities,” was established in December 2004.<sup>476</sup> Michael Ennis, a Marine Corps major general, was the first director of DHMO, overseeing the rejuvenation of the military’s tactical HUMINT capability. As a young infantry lieutenant, Ennis was close friends with a fellow infantry officer, Lt. Jim Mattis. One day Ennis and Mattis were discussing whether Ennis should remain an infantry officer or become a Foreign Area Officer (FAO). After some discussion, Mattis said, “Mike you do that FAO shit and I will stay with infantry and we will see where we are in

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<sup>474</sup> Ennis, Michael, Major General (R). Former CIA Deputy Director of HUMINT. Interview by author, Leesburg, VA 17 November 2015.

<sup>475</sup> Jacoby, Lowell. “Message to the Workforce-DH Strategic Support Teams,” 27 January 2005. <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB520-the-Pentagons-Spies/EBB-PS36.pdf> (accessed 26 February 2016).

<sup>476</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Forces. Statement for the Record-Dr. Stephen Cambone, USD-I, 28 April 2005. [https://fas.org/irp/congress/2005\\_hr/042805cambone.pdf](https://fas.org/irp/congress/2005_hr/042805cambone.pdf) (accessed on 10 February 2017).

20 years.” Thirty some years later, both were general officers at the top of their chosen career fields. Jim Mattis rose to four stars and retired as the CENTCOM commander. MajGen Ennis spent his career as a Russian FAO and intelligence officer, serving at the USMLM in Potsdam, as the Director of Marine Corps Intelligence and as the first CIA Deputy Director for Community HUMINT.

DoD’s tactical HUMINT capability had been a casualty of the “peace dividened;” with the Cold War over and budgets being slashed, the military reduced their number of Counterintelligence (CI) HUMINT collectors and interrogators to create space for other requirements. This proved to be a poor decision when battalions, brigades, and divisions found themselves in dire need of tactical HUMINT support in Afghanistan and Iraq. The tactical HUMINT these troops required was not the clandestine HUMINT collection Rumsfeld was trying to build with his SSB, but more in-line with the tactical CI HUMINT and interrogator capability that had been “decimated” in the 1990s.<sup>477</sup> Commanders on the ground required HUMINT capabilities that could collect on tactical threats to coalition forces and local atmospherics in their area of operations, information that could often be attained without depleting the finite DHS clandestine officer pool.

The tactical HUMINT shortfalls forced the Army to pull HUMINT trained officers from DIA’s Defense HUMINT Service (DHS) to support tactical units in Iraq and Afghanistan, even if these HUMINT officers possessed different skill-sets, such as more advanced fieldcraft training, than what was required by commanders. This negatively affected DIA’s ability to conduct HUMINT operations, creating an additional

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<sup>477</sup> Ennis, Michael, Major General (R). Former CIA Deputy Director of HUMINT. Interview by author, Leesburg, VA 17 November 2015.

problem for the military. To remedy this problem, MajGen Ennis and his DHMO team looked for ways to expand the military's HUMINT training capacity. The DHMO team started from scratch, without a training plan, course syllabus, or even a training location. LTC Bridget Kimura, a Reserve officer that worked for Ennis, was able to secure training facilities in south central Texas. To quickly develop a training program, they adapted a CIA syllabus to fit their tactical needs, reducing the program of instruction (POI) from six months to three months. The tactical HUMINT teams operated on the battlefield and did not require the same level of training as CIA officers. The graduates of this course were part of the Strategic Support Teams (SST-originally called Human Augmentation Teams) that deployed in support of tactical units in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The CIA and congressional committess were not concerned with DIA's SSTs because they were created to fill a tactical HUMINT gap within military units, something clearly a DoD responsibility. DIA was also careful to discuss the concept with the oversight committees and requested additional funding through Congress.<sup>478</sup> On the other hand, Cambone's and Boykin's SSB was not discussed with Congress and it used "reprogrammed funds without explicit congressional authority or appropriation."<sup>479</sup> Congress was also concerned the SSB could cause confusion in the field or risk an intelligence blowback if proper coordination did not occur. Tensions surfaced between the CIA and DoD when SSB teams conducted operations without proper coordination, causing confusion in the field and potentially putting operations at risk.

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<sup>478</sup> Jacoby, Lowell. "Message to the Workforce-DH Strategic Support Teams," 27 January 2005. <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAE/NSAE/NSAE520-the-Pentagons-Spies/EBB-PS36.pdf> (accessed 26 February 2016).

<sup>479</sup> Gellman, Barton. "Secret Unit Expands Rumsfeld's Domain." *Washington Post* (23 January 2005).

Congressional and newspaper inquiries discovered Rumsfeld's SSB was originally established in April 2002.<sup>480</sup> Two months later in July 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld identified SOCOM as the lead in the global counterterrorism fight and gave them authority to coordinate and wage the DoD's counterterrorism operations across the different Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) territories.<sup>481</sup> This decision, coupled with the concept of "preemptive" action articulated in Bush's June 2002 West Point speech and codified in the 2002 National Security Strategy, were not only significant steps in expanding DoD's role in foreign policy, but created conditions for the military to justify trespassing on CIA turf.<sup>482</sup> If GWOT was truly global, than DoD could argue what appeared to be clandestine operations was merely preparation for future combat operations, or what the military calls Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB), giving them the ability to operate globally without limitations.<sup>483</sup>

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<sup>480</sup> Scahill, Jeremy, *Dirty Wars: The World is a Battlefield* (New York, NY: Nation Books, 2013), 95.

<sup>481</sup> United States Special Operations Command History. <http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/socom/2007history.pdf> (accessed 29 December 2015).

<sup>482</sup> 2002 NSS says "we will disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by...defending the United States, the American people, and our interests at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders. While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country.

<sup>483</sup> U.S. Congress, House. *Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991*, Report 102-166, 102nd Cong., 1st sess., 25 July 1991, 29. In 1991, Congress clarified the definition of "traditional military activities" stating that they, "include activities by military personnel under the direction and control of a United States military commander (whether or not the U.S. sponsorship of such activities is apparent or later to be acknowledged) preceding and related to hostilities which are either anticipated to involve U.S. military forces, or where such hostilities involving United States military forces are ongoing, and, where the fact of the U.S. role in the overall operation is apparent or to be acknowledged publicly." Jeremy Scahill mentions in his book *Dirty Wars: The World is Our Battlefield* a memo from Rumsfeld where he declares, "the entire world is our battlespace."

The CIA's chiefs of station are overall responsible for clandestine operations within non-war zone countries and were angry about the lack of awareness about DoD operations. During testimony before one of the Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committees, the Director of the National Clandestine Service, Jose Rodriguez contradicted earlier testimony from Cambone and SOCOM commander General Bryan Brown. Cambone and Brown told the committee there was no issues between the CIA and DoD, but Rodriguez disagreed, telling the committee there was still inadequate coordination with between the DoD and CIA.<sup>484</sup> The failure to coordinate was a serious transgression that not only duplicated CIA efforts and ignored CIA's role in coordinating overseas intelligence operations, but also risked a blowback in the countries where DoD was conducting IPB. Neither Cambone nor Brown deserve blame for this failure, the guidance not to coordinate with CIA came directly from Rumsfeld who argued the capability was DoD's and there was no need to coordinate. Rumsfeld was determined to make DoD self-sufficient and was not going to be CIA's "baby bird" any longer.<sup>485</sup>

The two organizations eventually worked through their coordination issues, but congressional concern lingered. In the 2010 Intelligence Authorization Act, HPSCI stated the military often hid intelligence activities under the guise of operational preparation of the environment (OPE) to avoid HPSCI and SSCI oversight.<sup>486</sup> HPSCI

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<sup>484</sup> Rodriguez, Jose. Former Director of the CIA's National Clandestine Service. Telephone interview by author, 21 September 2015; Ennis, Michael. Major General (R). Former CIA Deputy Director of HUMINT. Interview by author, Leesburg, VA 17 November 2015.

<sup>485</sup> Jacoby, Lowell E. Vice Admiral (R). Former Director Defense Intelligence Agency and former J2 Joint Staff. Interview by author, Ashburn, VA, 18 November 2015.

<sup>486</sup> U.S. Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. *R. 111-186 to Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010*, 111th Cong., 1st sess., 26 June 2009, 48-49. *JP 2-01.3: Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment* (16 June 2009) states "the purpose of joint

members argued the potential damage of these activities were as great as other clandestine intelligence activities under HPSCI's purview and HPSCI should be briefed on these "OPE" activities.<sup>487</sup>

The creation of the SSB was not Cambone and Rumsfeld's only attempt at usurping power and authority from the CIA. In a September 2004 memo, Cambone raised the question of whether DoD should take over CIA's unconventional warfare activities, offering an earlier CIA mission in Iraq as an example. That mission involved CIA setting up a base in the mid-1990s to work with Saddam's opposition and maintain a presence in the region. The mission was temporarily halted in 1996 after a controversy involving Ahmad Chalabi and then re-established in the run-up to the Iraq War.<sup>488</sup> Cambone's memo went beyond this one mission and suggested stripping covert action from CIA and "distribute the missions among various departments and agencies." Cambone was not the first to raise concern with covert action in the CIA, but his criticism

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intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) is to support the joint force commander (JFC) by determining the adversary's probable intent and most likely courses of action (COAs) for countering the overall friendly joint mission."

<sup>487</sup> Best, Richard A. "Covert Action: Legislative Background and Policy Questions," <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33715.pdf> (accessed 7 January 2013). In response to a question on covert action, Senator Roberts commented "The CRS report is misleading. It was the concern of one member, Vice Chairman Kit Bond, about the United States Director of Intelligence's expansion of "military source operations" authority to "Committee concerns." The CRS also erroneously stated these questions were for Jim Clapper's confirmation hearing when they were in fact for Dennis Blair. Since leaving the committee in 2006, it is my understanding that Members of the Committee continue to work closely with the military to ensure that all military intelligence activities are reported to the intelligence oversight committees.

<sup>488</sup> Baer, Kindle Location 3014-3755.; Mahle, 216-217.



was not due to the effectiveness of covert action as a foreign policy tool or the ease with which policymakers resorted to its use, Cambone's motivation was parochial.<sup>489</sup>

Cambone's memo highlighted an ongoing debate in the national security community that became more relevant with the GWOT. The United States has conducted covert actions throughout its history, but the use of covert action by the United States government has been a particularly controversial topic since the early 1970's.<sup>490</sup> In response to the CIA's alleged involvement in the overthrow of Chilean President Salvadore Allende, Congress passed the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, limiting the executive branches ability to conduct covert action by requiring a presidential finding for all covert actions.<sup>491</sup> Subsequent covert action controversies in South America and the Middle East led to additional executive orders and legislation, further limiting its use without proper notification and oversight.

The coexistence of a covert action arm within a clandestine foreign intelligence collection agency has caused some friction since the CIA's founding. Both covert action and paramilitary operations are offensive in nature, looking to shape reality, while foreign intelligence collection looks to understand the world as is. DCI Richard Helms, who served in the OSS before embarking on a long career in the CIA, voiced concern with

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<sup>489</sup> Rumsfeld, Donald. *Snowflake*, "Paramilitary." 30 September 2004.; Helms, Richard. *A Look over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency*. New York, NY: Random House, 2003.; Woods, Randall B, 177.; <http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/features/the-rise-and-fall-of-richard-helms-19761216?page=3> (accessed 16 March 2016). Helms looked at Covert Action with a jaundiced eye and believed other avenues should be attempted prior to resorting to its use, while Colby was more supportive of Covert Action.

<sup>490</sup> Knott, Stephen, *Secret and Sanctioned: Covert Operations and the American Presidency* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1996), 3-4.

<sup>491</sup> Oakley, David. "Taming the Rogue Elephant?" *American Intelligence Journal* 26, no. 2 (2008-2009): 63; Oakley, David. "Partners or Competitors."

covert action being employed too often as the president's favored foreign policy tool instead of relying on lengthy diplomatic efforts. Despite these concerns, Helms understood that covert action was a necessary tool to have within the United States' arsenal and that retaining it within the CIA provided the compartmentalization and ease of deniability that covert actions require.<sup>492</sup> Although not always ideal, maintaining the covert action mission within the organization responsible for foreign intelligence collection was the best possible approach.

The United States Code Title 50 definition of "covert action" states that "traditional diplomatic or military activities or routine support to such activities" are not considered covert activities and do not require a presidential finding.<sup>493</sup> Although understandable in print, distinguishing between traditional military activities and covert actions is more problematic in practice. In 1991, Congress clarified the definition of "traditional military activities" stating that they, "include activities by military personnel under the direction and control of a United States military commander (whether or not the U.S. sponsorship of such activities is apparent or later to be acknowledged) preceding and related to hostilities which are either anticipated to involve U.S. military forces, or where such hostilities involving United States military forces are ongoing, and, where the fact of the U.S. role in the overall operation is apparent or to be acknowledged publicly."<sup>494</sup> Since 2001, this expanded definition of what constitutes and does not

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<sup>492</sup> Helms, Kindle Location 2045.

<sup>493</sup> <https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/3093> (accessed 6 July 2016).

<sup>494</sup> U.S. Congress, House. *Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991*, Report 102-166, 102nd Cong., 1st sess., 25 July 1991, 29; Best, Richard. "Covert Action: Legislative Background and Policy Questions." Best's paper says Congress also clarified that "traditional military activities" would not include the "clandestine" recruitment of individuals in third-party countries who have access to the targeted

constitute covert action has become problematic. The legal definition of covert action does not specify time horizons, but merely states that the “role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.”<sup>495</sup> Arguably, if the United States military plans to acknowledge an activity publicly in the undefined future, by definition it is not a covert action

The 1991 covert action definition was premised on a traditional nation-state military conflict within a limited and defined theatre of war. Since 2001, the United States has been waging “war” against a global non-state actor. Therefore, the military can posit that their “operational preparation of the environment” in the numerous countries where the identified terrorist organizations reside constitutes traditional military activities. In a 2012 interview, former SSCI chair Senator Pat Roberts stated that one of the specific tests of whether or not an activity is covert is if the activity will be acknowledged if it is revealed publicly. According to Senator Roberts, an activity is not covert if there is a willingness to acknowledge if revealed publicly.<sup>496</sup> While this definition of covert action appears to meet the letter of the law, it is debatable whether it completely meets the post-Church spirit of the law.<sup>497</sup> The discussion over CIA retaining covert action authority quieted down after Rumsfeld and Cambone departed.<sup>498</sup>

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country or the recruitment of target country citizens to “take certain actions” when military operations are initiated.<sup>494</sup> It also stated that the “clandestine efforts” to influence foreign population to support war efforts is not a “traditional military activity”; Oakley, David. “Partners or Competitors.”

<sup>495</sup> <https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/3093> (accessed 6 July 2016).

<sup>496</sup> Roberts, Pat. Senator and former Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. E-mail interview by author, 9 January 2013.

<sup>497</sup> Oakley, David. “Partners or Competitors.”

<sup>498</sup> During a 2012 interview, Mr. Garry Reid, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict, provided the most compelling, reason when he said shifting

In 2012, USD-I Michael Vickers, a former CIA case officer who gained notoriety for his depiction in *Charlie Wilson's War*, and DIA Director Michael Flynn, an Army LTG who served as McChrystal's J2 and helped develop the fusion concept that brought together intelligence capabilities in Iraq and Afghanistan, proposed establishing a Defense Clandestine Service (DCS) to correct shortfalls in DoD HUMINT.<sup>499</sup> The DCS garnered support from both the Department of Defense and the CIA's National Clandestine Service (NCS). The DoD looked at the DCS as increasing their ability to collect much needed intelligence on global issues, while the NCS embraced the idea of more DoD HUMINT collectors available to collect on military commander requirements, thus freeing up the CIA to collect on strategic issues.<sup>500</sup> Military collection requirements were taxing CIA capability, with one chief of station estimating that over 75% of his requirements were military driven and wondering when the military was going to collect against their own needs.<sup>501</sup> The DCS also served as an opportunity to break down the parochialism by introducing a greater number of DoD officers who were "farm" trained,

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paramilitary covert action to the DoD might run counter to the American public's image of the military as the "doer of good things." Mr. Reid accurately pointed out that "black bag dirty stuff does not fit" the image America has of the military and that the CIA is doing a "perfectly fine job of conducting CA."

<sup>499</sup> McChrystal, Stanley, *My Share of the Task*. London, (UK: Penguin, 2013), 156.; [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/dia-to-send-hundreds-more-spies-overseas/2012/12/01/97463e4e-399b-11e2-b01f-5f55b193f58f\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/dia-to-send-hundreds-more-spies-overseas/2012/12/01/97463e4e-399b-11e2-b01f-5f55b193f58f_story.html) (accessed 15 March 2016).

<sup>500</sup> Wise, Doug. Deputy Director Defense Intelligence Agency. Interview by author, Washington D.C. area, 28 August 2012 and 3 September 2105; Sims, Jennifer. "More Military Spies: Why the CIA is Applauding the Pentagon's Intelligence Grab." <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2012-05-18/more-military-spies> (accessed 8 July 2016). Sims article argues the CIA liked the DCS concept because it would professionalize the defense HUMINT and reduce the number of short-term assignments in the field, it would improve integration and cooperation, and the CIA could use DoD resources outside the war zone to enable their operations as part of a "networked team." Although there is probably some truth to Sims' observations, the relief from military collection requirements seems to be what garnered the most support from those the author spoke with.

<sup>501</sup> Ennis, Michael, Major General (R). Former CIA Deputy Director of HUMINT. Interview by author, Leesburg, VA 17 November 20015.

thus furthering the interaction between the DoD and CIA. The new DoD case officers could work closely with CIA, thus ensuring deconfliction of collection activities, something that had not always occurred in the past, as exemplified by Rumsfeld's SSB initiative.<sup>502</sup>

Despite support from both the CIA and DoD, the DCS concept met congressional resistance when the 2013 Defense Authorization Bill halted its establishment, citing past career management issues with DoD clandestine operatives.<sup>503</sup> According to former senior intelligence officials, Congress was not properly briefed on the DCS concept before it was publicly released, annoying Congress and resulting in their non-support.<sup>504</sup> The DCS was established, but has not achieved the status or strength envisioned by Vickers and Flynn.<sup>505</sup>

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<sup>502</sup> Wise, Doug. Deputy Director Defense Intelligence Agency. Interview by author, Washington D.C. area, 28 August 2012 and 3 September 2105; Miller, Greg. "Pentagon's Plans for a spy service to rival the CIA have been pared back." *Washington Post* (1 November 2014). [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/pentagons-plans-for-a-spy-service-to-rival-the-cia-have-been-pared-back/2014/11/01/1871bb92-6118-11e4-8b9e-2ccdac31a031\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/pentagons-plans-for-a-spy-service-to-rival-the-cia-have-been-pared-back/2014/11/01/1871bb92-6118-11e4-8b9e-2ccdac31a031_story.html) (accessed 27 June 2016); Oakley, David. "Partners or Competitors."

<sup>503</sup> Miller, Greg. "Senate Moves Blocks to Block Pentagon Plans to Increase Number of Spies Overseas." *Washington Post*. [http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-12-10/world/35745387\\_1\\_defense-clandestine-service-pentagon-dia](http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-12-10/world/35745387_1_defense-clandestine-service-pentagon-dia) (accessed 7 January 2013).

<sup>504</sup> Hayden, Michael V, General (R). Former Director Central Intelligence Agency and former Director National Security Agency. Interview by author, Washington, D.C., 18 September 2015.; Jacoby, Lowell E. Vice Admiral (R). Former Director Defense Intelligence Agency and former J2 Joint Staff. Interview by author, Ashburn, VA, 18 November 2015.

<sup>505</sup> Wise, Doug. Deputy Director Defense Intelligence Agency. Interview by author, Washington D.C. area, 28 August 2012 and 3 September 2105.

## **Intelligence Community Reforms**

Between November 2002 and March 2005, the United States conducted two significant commissions. The first commission, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission), was established to “investigate facts and circumstances relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.”<sup>506</sup> The 9/11 Commission conducted an exhaustive review, focused not only on the 9/11 attacks, but the rise of bin-Laden, the associated terrorism threat and the United States’ actions against the threat. It concluded by recommending a “global strategy” and changes to the national security structure to ensure the United States government was organized to implement this strategy. Many of the recommendations were embraced by Congress and implemented in the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA). The Director of National Intelligence (DNI), which was recommended by the Boren and McCurdy proposals in the 1990s, was established, as was a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to create a unity of effort against terrorism. Established within NCTC was a Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning (DSOP) “to conduct strategic operational planning for counterterrorism activities, integrating all instruments of national power, including diplomatic, financial, military, intelligence, homeland security, and law enforcement activities within and among agencies.” This was a much-needed organization to coordinate government planning, but planning was also an activity the

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<sup>506</sup> National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. *The 9/11 Commission Report*. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 2004, xv.

DoD was more capable of conducting than other government agencies, thus necessitating an influential role for DoD.<sup>507</sup>

The IRTPA also mandated the CIA and DoD “develop joint procedures to be used by the DoD and the CIA to improve coordination and deconfliction of operations that involve elements of both the Armed Forces and the CIA consistent with national security and the protection of human intelligence sources and methods.”<sup>508</sup> These coordination procedures were much needed during a period when Rumsfeld was trying to assert what he viewed was his expanded authority under U.S. law to conduct intelligence operations in support of possible future military operations. As mentioned earlier, Rumsfeld directed operations created significant tension between the DoD and CIA.

The 9/11 Commission Report described the growing influence the military had over technical collection capabilities within the Intelligence Community following Desert Storm. Although it understood the military’s grab for greater control and believed it appropriate to support operations, the committee was concerned about the “unintended consequence” of the DCI losing control of these organizations. The commission appreciated the military’s need for intelligence, but wanted a DNI who actually ran the community and possessed the ability to shift resources between all the Intelligence Community members.

Although Rumsfeld’s push for Intelligence Community Reform prior to 9/11 appeared on its surface to be non-parochial, his stance after 9/11 was centered on what

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<sup>507</sup> The DoD is one of the only organizations in the United States Government that develops and trains planners. While other organization have made efforts to lessen the divide, the DoD is far better at planning as an institution. Although understandable, it can become problematic when DoD becomes the only element of national power because the rest are not organized to contribute to planning efforts.

<sup>508</sup> Public Law 108-458. *Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004*. 108<sup>th</sup> Cong., 17 Dec 2004.

was in DoD's best interest. When congressional discussion started to arise regarding establishing a DNI, Rumsfeld rallied his staff to prepare arguments about why this was a "bum idea." As the DNI recommendation gained traction and its establishment was certain, Rumsfeld switched his focus to weakening the position. Rumsfeld tried to distance himself from the broader Intelligence Community and discussions regarding intelligence failures, arguing that DoD capabilities should not be taken away just because FBI and CIA could not coordinate.<sup>509</sup> When Lt. Gen (R) Jim Clapper, the NGA Director at the time, and General Mike Hayden, the NSA Director, told Rumsfeld they supported their two agencies becoming independent from DoD and placed under DNI, he became visibly angered, telling them, "it is a terrible idea; I can't support it."<sup>510</sup> Rumsfeld wanted intelligence to support DoD efforts, but also wanted to build DoD's intelligence capabilities separate from the Intelligence Community, as the establishment of the SSB highlighted. A line from James Joyce's *Ulysses*, encapsulates Rumsfeld's opinion on intelligence capability, "what's yours is mine and what's mine is my own;" so much for a community.<sup>511</sup>

The most significant change the 9/11 Commission recommended regarding the CIA/DoD relationship was removing the CIA's paramilitary capability and placing it under SOCOM to centralize the capability for operations and training.<sup>512</sup> The

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<sup>509</sup> Rumsfeld, Donald. *Snowflake*, "Intelligence." 9 December 2002.; Rumsfeld, Donald. *Snowflake*, "Moving DoD Intelligence Capabilities." 21 June 2004.; Rumsfeld, Donald. *Snowflake*, "Intelligence Reorganization." 5 October 2002.

<sup>510</sup> Allen, Michael, 69.

<sup>511</sup> Joyce, James, *Ulysses* (Not So Noble Books, 2013), 295.

<sup>512</sup> Best, Richard A. and Andrew Flicker. "Special Operations Forces (SOF) and CIA Paramilitary Operations: Issues for Congress," <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22017.pdf> (accessed 22 August



commission argued it was not efficient for the United States to have two separate paramilitary organizations, one residing in CIA and the other in DoD's SOCOM. Instead, the CIA and DoD should each "concentrate on its comparative advantages in building capabilities for joint missions." The commission clearly placed the military in the lead for operations, arguing, "CIA experts should be integrated into the military's training, exercises, and planning. To quote a CIA official now serving in the field: 'one fight, one team.'" <sup>513</sup>

According to Senator Pat Roberts, who was the SSCI chairman when IRTPA was passed, the 9/11 Commission recommended placing all paramilitary in DoD because they believed, despite CIA's successful early Afghanistan operations, that "the CIA did not invest sufficiently in a robust paramilitary capability prior to 9/11, but instead relied on foreign proxies." Senator Roberts said the CIA developed their paramilitary capabilities and "made progress" in their coordination efforts with DoD, during the period between the commission's investigation and the report's release. Senator Robert's "was comfortable" with the changes made and believed the new "procedures worked well to prevent conflict and duplication," which was Congress' main concern.<sup>514</sup> The paramilitary recommendation did not make it into IRTPA, but the legislation mandated further operational "coordination and deconfliction" measures between DoD and CIA

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<sup>513</sup> National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. *The 9/11 Commission Report*. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 2004, 415-416.

<sup>514</sup> Roberts, Pat. Senator and former Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. E-mail interview by author, 9 January 2013. It is not clear why the SSCI possessed this opinion even after the CIA performed well in the early days of Afghanistan, providing the United States the ability to quickly enter the country and link up with indigenous forces. Despite this success, according to Senator Roberts, SSCI still had concerns with the CIA; Oakley, David. "Partners or Competitors."

entities and agreement on the strategic objectives being pursued when they were conducting joint operations. In 2005, President Bush ordered the CIA and DoD to provide recommendations on whether or not paramilitary operations should shift to the DoD. In response, both the CIA and DoD recommended the CIA retain their paramilitary capabilities. Since receiving the CIA and DoD responses, Congress has shown little interest in revisiting this debate.<sup>515</sup>

The second commission, *The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction* (Silberman-Robb Commission) was meeting when the 9/11 Commission issued the report and when the IRTPA passed Congress. President Bush's Executive Order 13328 established the Silberman-Robb Commission on February 6, 2004 to "assess whether the Intelligence Community is sufficiently authorized, organized, equipped, trained, and resourced to identify and warn in a timely manner" against the WMD threat and "other threats of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century." On March 31, 2005, the Silberman-Robb Commission published a report that identified seventy-four recommendations for "improving the Intelligence Community."<sup>516</sup> After review by multiple "interagency expert panels," the President decided to pursue seventy

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<sup>515</sup> Best, Richard A. and Andrew Flicker. "Special Operations Forces (SOF) and CIA Paramilitary Operations: Issues for Congress," <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22017.pdf> (accessed 22 August 2012), 3.; Reid, Garry. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict. Telephone interview by author, 19 September 2012. Mr. Garry Reid provided the most compelling reason when he said shifting paramilitary covert action to the DoD might run counter to the American public's image of the military as the "doer of good things." Mr. Reid accurately pointed out that "black bag dirty stuff does not fit" the image America has of the military and that the CIA is doing a "perfectly fine job of conducting CA."<sup>515</sup> Although often forgotten, the narrative of American institutions is very important in ensuring continued support from the American populace. Although the narrative of the American military always being forces of good in the world is a simplistic and contestable notion, it is important to remember that in a democracy, the military requires the support of its population.

<sup>516</sup> Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. *Report to the President*. Washington, D.C.; Government Printing Office, 31 March 2005, 34.

of the recommended changes and have the Intelligence Community consider three of the remaining four before taking action. The final recommendation dealt with an expanded role for the military in covert action, which Bush decided not to pursue.<sup>517</sup>

The recommendations focused on strengthening the community foundation that was first initiated with the IRTPA legislation that created the DNI. Regarding the CIA/DoD relationship, the most notable change was the creation of a National Clandestine Service within the CIA that was responsible “for coordination, deconfliction, and evaluation of clandestine HUMINT operations across the intelligence Community.” On its surface, the creation of the NCS appeared merely to be a name change for the CIA’s Directorate of Operations (DO). A CIA DO officer saw little change in his or her job responsibilities or how the CIA HUMINT arm operated when the NCS stood up. Where the changes occurred, was with the authority given to the DCIA leadership to integrate and synchronize HUMINT operations across the Intelligence Community to reduce redundancy and better allocate community resources, all in an effort to improve HUMINT operations.<sup>518</sup>

### **Reforming Defense Initiative**

A month after the Silberman-Robb Commission released its report, Stephen Cambone and DIA Director VADM Jacoby testified before SSCI on DoD’s Remodeling Defense Initiative (RDI). The RDI grew out of two earlier studies undertaken shortly

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<sup>517</sup> Lowenthal, 60.; <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/06/text/20050629-5.html> (accessed on 3 March 2016).

<sup>518</sup> <https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/press-release-archive-2007/february-28-2007.html> (accessed 3 March 2016).

after Cambone became USD-I. Similar to numerous post-Desert Storm reviews, the first study, *Taking Stock of Defense Intelligence*, was initiated in 2004 to review what intelligence support the combatant commanders and others required on the future battlefield. The second study focused on how to rebuild defense HUMINT after years of neglect and during two wars when the military was in dire need of HUMINT support. These two studies provided the first two objectives for RDI, meeting the needs of the combatant commanders and building defense HUMINT. The final RDI objective focused on increasing jointness among the service intelligence organizations to ensure the combatant commanders' intelligence needs were met, while also reducing unnecessary duplication.

The RDI initiative was fundamentally about making DoD intelligence a community and ensuring this community was structured to best support the needs of the commanders in the field, not solely focused on the requirements of their individual service. RDI also sought increased operationalization of intelligence through the transformation of Joint Intelligence Centers (JIC) into Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOC) and the introduction of intelligence campaign plans (ICP).

JIC(s) were first established around Desert Storm to reduce the cost of intelligence support to combatant commanders.<sup>519</sup> The motivation to create JIC(s) was driven by the fiscal environment, but increased jointness and the improved linking of intelligence to operations were results of its creation. The JIOC concept was Cambone's attempt to operationalize intelligence by theoretically increasing the linkages between

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<sup>519</sup> LeVitre, Rosanne M, Rear Admiral (R). National Intelligence Manager for Military Issues DDNI for Intelligence Integration. Interview by author, Washington D.C., 4 November 2015.

operations and intelligence. Although the creation of the JIOC(s) briefed well to individuals unfamiliar with the workings of military operations, in reality the only thing that changed was adding an “o” to the acronym. In a combatant command, the Director of Operations (J3) is responsible for short-term planning and execution of operations, while the Director of Plans (J5) is responsible for long-term planning. Personnel from the Director of Intelligence (J2) were already involved in planning efforts and were present within the J3’s operation center. Since operations are driven by the J3, but the JIOC was purely J2, there was no increased operationalization of intelligence; nevertheless, it briefed well.<sup>520</sup>

Unlike the JIOC concept, the ICP brought value to operationalization of intelligence because it encouraged a discussion with the commander on priorities for allocating finite intelligence capabilities. Understanding the priorities of all the combatant commanders allowed the DoD intelligence community, under the USD-I, to shift intelligence resources as necessary and to inform the DNI on defense intelligence requirements for future budget requests and capability development.

RDI also sought to identify the available intelligence collection capabilities and ensure the collection requirements went to the best-positioned capability. It established the DIA Director as Strategic Command’s (STRATCOM) “functional component commander” for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). The DIA director was responsible for parsing out the collection requirements to the asset (DoD or national

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<sup>520</sup> Ennis, Michael, Major General (R). Former CIA Deputy Director of HUMINT. Interview by author, Leesburg, VA 17 November 20015. Maj Gen Ennis commented that JIOCs did not provide anything additional and establishment of the JIOCs were not supported by Jacoby, but Cambone was insistent on JIOCs being established.

intelligence) that was best positioned to collect on the requirement. Regarding HUMINT, the RDI looked to build upon the changes instituted with the establishment of DHMO in 2004. This meant increasing the military's HUMINT strength, while also providing a centralized point for identifying intelligence collection requirements and "deconflicting and enabling DoD HUMINT activities." Similar to the ISR initiative, RDI looked to bring together "DNI-directed HUMINT and COCOM-requested or authorized activities in a seamless and mutually supporting manner." In other words, DoD wanted to ensure DoD HUMINT and CIA HUMINT worked together to support commander's collection requirements with the best positioned asset. During his RDI briefing to SASC on April 28, 2005, Cambone reiterated that DoD's was "ready and eager to help the DNI," but the briefing made it clear DoD's focus was building DoD capability.<sup>521</sup>

### **DoD/CIA During Operations**

As intelligence reform was ongoing, the CIA and DoD were working together in Iraq and Afghanistan. The policy pronouncements and organizational changes made in the 1990s conditioned the environment for greater CIA/DoD interoperability.<sup>522</sup> Since Desert Storm, the CIA had increased its focus on support to military operations and the evolving CIA/DoD relationship had been tested in small-scale operations. The military

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<sup>521</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Forces. Statement for the Record-Dr. Stephen Cambone, USD-I, 28 April 2005.

<sup>522</sup> Baratto, David, Major General (R). Former CIA Associate Director for Military Affairs, telephone interview by author, 23 January 2013. MG David Baratto, former Associate Director of Military Affairs (ADMA), commented that he saw a vast difference in the CIA/DoD relationship from his time as the commanding general of the US Army Special Warfare Center and School (SWIC) from 1988-1992 compared to his time as the ADMA from 1994-1995.

and CIA became more familiar with each other during these operations, but the lack of a significant unifying threat to the United States kept CIA and DoD collaboration at low levels. Out of tragedy often grows common purpose, the terrorist attacks on the World-Trade Center and the Pentagon gave the United States' national security apparatus a new focus and helped establish a common purpose for the CIA and DoD.

The CIA/SOF partnership took off shortly after September 11, 2001 when combined cross-functional teams supported the Northern Alliance's efforts to overthrow the Taliban.<sup>523</sup> Although these composite teams did not always agree and friction did occur, the CIA/DoD partnership strengthened out of a need to benefit from each other's capabilities.<sup>524</sup> The melding together of the DoD's military capabilities with the CIA's intelligence and paramilitary capabilities provided a good template for counterterrorism operations that were increasing in importance for both organizations. Since 1986, the CIA's CTC served as the leading intelligence organization focused on international terrorism.<sup>525</sup> Although SOCOM was created partially in response to terrorist attacks in the 1980s, its primary focus was on low-intensity conflicts.<sup>526</sup> This changed after Rumsfeld identified SOCOM as DoD's lead for the Global War on Terror and gave it authority to coordinate and wage the DoD's counterterrorism fight across the different

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<sup>523</sup> Reid, Garry. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict. Telephone interview by author, 19 September 2012.

<sup>524</sup> Schroen, Gary, *First In: An Insider's Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan* (New York, NY: Ballantine Books, 2005) and Blehm, Eric, *The Only Thing Worth Dying For: How Eleven Green Berets Forged a New Afghanistan* (New York, NY: Harper Collins E-Books, 2010). Schroen's book described a largely positive relationship between the CIA and DoD, while Blehm's book focused more on the friction in the relationship.

<sup>525</sup> Crumpton, 122; Oakley, David. "Partners or Competitors."

<sup>526</sup> United States Special Operations Command History, 6-7.

geographic combatant command territories. The elevation of SOCOM as the DoD counterterrorism lead helped formalize a relationship that had already grown out of necessity.

This relationship expanded further in Afghanistan under the leadership of General Abizaid, the CENTCOM Commander, and DCI George Tenet when they worked together to set-up a Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) to drive counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan. As described in General Stanley McChrystal's autobiography, *My Share of the Task*, the "JIATF would be a way to fuse the various intelligence agencies' specialties in order to better understand the enemy." JIATF brought together the talent, expertise access and capabilities of the CIA, NSA, FBI, DIA, NGA, and others to execute counterterrorism operations in Pakistan and Afghanistan.<sup>527</sup> The JIATF served as a good template for future interagency operations, demonstrating how multiple elements of national power could come together to wage war.

During the run-up to the Iraq War, the CIA/SOF partnership continued to grow. In the summer of 2002, CIA teams operating in Kurdistan and adjacent countries began introducing soldiers to Iraqis who could help convince Iraqi soldiers to surrender prior to conflict initiation. These CIA teams assisted with the preparation of the battlefield and military planning by developing relationships that enabled future operations and by providing intelligence to CENTCOM in support of planning efforts. At CENTCOM, the designated CIA lead in Iraq worked with General Tommy Franks and his staff during the preparation for war. In Iraq, the integration of DoD/CIA operations manifested both formally and informally. Formally, CIA officers were "feeding real-time information to

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<sup>527</sup> McChrystal, 117.



the warfighters” and their locations were coordinated with military elements to protect against accidental fratricide.<sup>528</sup> Informally, military and CIA personnel on the ground were reaching out to each other and developing partnerships.<sup>529</sup>

On April 5<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> 2003, Colonel (COL) David Perkins, commander of 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade, 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division was leading “Thunder Runs” into Baghdad to disrupt the Iraqi defense and “create as much chaos” as possible in the Iraqi capital.<sup>530</sup> In October 2012, then LTG Perkins recalled how a CIA officer arrived at his Tactical Operations Center (TOC) on the eve prior to his unit’s assault into Baghdad. The CIA officer, who turned out to be the future Baghdad chief of station, asked if he could accompany Perkins into the capital city. The COL Perkins not only agreed, but upon arrival to Baghdad he and the CIA station chief began to cooperate and support each other’s operations. Although unplanned, this encounter set a positive tone for future CIA/DoD interactions.<sup>531</sup>

The fortuitous interaction between COL Perkins and the CIA in the early days of Iraq mark the initial stages of a relationship between CIA and conventional forces that was unparalleled in history. The CIA deployed numerous Crisis Operations Liaison Teams (COLT) to the region in support of military forces. These COLTs worked closely with military partners, providing intelligence and linking military commanders with

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<sup>528</sup> Tenet, 6083, 6198 and 6224.

<sup>529</sup> Oakley, David. “Partners or Competitors.”

<sup>530</sup> <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/invasion/interviews/perkins.html> (15 March 2016); Fontenot, Greg, E.J. Degen, and David Tohn, *On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 336.

<sup>531</sup> Perkins, David G, Lieutenant General. Commander U.S. Army Combined Arms Center. Interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 3 October 2012; Oakley, David. “Partners or Competitors.”

HUMINT and other CIA capabilities.<sup>532</sup> In support of these operations, the CIA established the two largest stations since the Vietnam era Saigon Station in Baghdad and Kabul.<sup>533</sup> Although not all the CIA's work in Afghanistan and Iraq focused on supporting military operations, a significant portion of it did. While the CIA/DoD partnership in Iraq and Afghanistan strengthened as the wars progressed, the one back in Washington D.C. was more tumultuous.

Rumsfeld's frustration with DoD's inability to be operationally self-sufficient caused friction during the early days of the Afghanistan War, not only within DoD, but also with CIA. Rumsfeld had a good relationship with Tenet, lunching together weekly to discuss issues of common concern, but despite a good professional relationship with the DCI, other CIA leaders viewed the Secretary of Defense as many of his subordinates did, a stubborn leader with control issues.<sup>534</sup> Rumsfeld valued intelligence and had been one of the officials who pushed for intelligence reform early on in the Bush administration. Although Rumsfeld valued intelligence and was supportive of strengthening the CIA early in the administration, he also wanted DoD to have the central role in the GWOT. A strong CIA was good, as long as it did not appear to weaken or impede DoD operations, and more importantly, Rumsfeld's power.

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<sup>532</sup> Michael Pick, "What the Joint Force Commander Needs to Know about CI and HUMINT Operations," 2002, 2002, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a405644.pdf> (accessed 5 May 2017) and History Commons, "Profile: Crisis Operations Liaison Teams," [http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=crisis\\_operations\\_liaison\\_teams\\_1](http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=crisis_operations_liaison_teams_1) (accessed 3 February 2013).

<sup>533</sup> Jehl, Douglas. "2 CIA Reports Offer Warnings on Iraq's Path," *New York Times*, 7 December 2004, [http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/07/international/middleeast/07intell.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/07/international/middleeast/07intell.html?_r=0) (accessed 31 January 2013) and Miller, "CIA Expanding Presence in Afghanistan."

<sup>534</sup> Crumpton, Henry A, 180 and 314. Crumpton highlights Cofer Black's dislike of Rumsfeld.

Tension between the CIA and elements within Rumsfeld's Pentagon preceded the establishment of the USD-I and the SST. Dissatisfied with CIA's Iraq analysis, Douglas Feith, Rumsfeld's Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, put together his own intelligence team to build a case against Saddam. Feith, an experienced lawyer, approached his newfound job as an intelligence analyst, with the vigor of an attorney serving his client, not as a professional analyst searching for understanding. Ideologues like Feith and his subordinates advocated for Saddam's overthrow prior to 9/11 and seized the tragedy as an opportunity to push their agenda.<sup>535</sup> Feith's policy planning shop was using raw intelligence to build a case linking Saddam's Regime to the 9/11 terrorists and then presenting their argument to Paul Wolfowitz, the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Wolfowitz took this information and sent VADM Jacoby "snowflakes" asking him to look into supposed connections between Saddam Hussein and the 9/11 terrorists. Jacoby and the rest of the Intelligence Community found no link between Saddam and 9/11, but this did not discourage Feith and his subordinates from prosecuting the case.

In the Summer of 2002, as the drumbeat for war with Iraq was intensifying, Jacoby, then acting DIA Director, received a phone call from DCI Tenet telling him to "get your ass" to CIA Headquarters for a meeting the next day at 3:00 P.M.. As the senior uniform intelligence officer, Tenet wanted Jacoby present for a briefing from members of Feith's policy planning shop. Jacoby arrived the next day, still uncertain

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<sup>535</sup> Perle, Richard. "Iraq: Saddam Unbound," in *Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy*, edited by Robert Kagan and William Kristol, 99-110. New York, NY: Encounter Books, 2000.; During an interview with VADM(R) Jacoby, he relayed a story that he described as "third hand information from an impeccable information flow." The event occurred on 9/12, as the fire department was still trying to get access to and extinguish a fire in the 5<sup>th</sup> floor attic area of the Pentagon that threatened the building's communication lines. On that day, an officer found an "incomprehensible" celebratory mood in Feith's outer office because they now had a reason to go to Iraq.

what the meeting was about, taking his seat alongside a group of CIA officers that included CIA Deputy Director John McLaughlin and Jamie Miscik, the CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence. A short time later, two of Feith's subordinates, a Navy lieutenant and civilian, arrived announcing they were there to brief the CIA on a connection between Al Qaeda and Iraq. Not completely surprised since Wolfowitz and Feith had been pushing for overthrowing Iraq even before 9/11, Jacoby considered the meeting "really goofy" and DCI Tenet must have considered it annoying. Tenet halted the meeting before the self-confident lieutenant could brief his slides and then promised to have his people review the documents and get back with Feith. Tenet escorted the visibly disappointed lieutenant and his colleague to the door before telling his subordinates not to waste time chasing the policy planning shops ideologically driven fantasies.<sup>536</sup>

### **An Intelligence House Cleaning**

***"I still accepted the reality that I had believed in 2004 that the Congress will not ultimately approve handing over those authorities from the Secretary of Defense to the DNI, so my pitch with McConnell and Clapper and to a lesser extent Hayden, how can the four of us, we have a unique opportunity here, four heads that control the intelligence assets, who have known each other for decades and trust each other, how can we take advantage of this unique moment in time to agree (on some items) that will empower the DNI without crossing any lines on the Hill."- Robert Gates<sup>537</sup>***

Porter Goss, an eight-term congressman from Florida who served as HPSCI Chairman from 1997 to 2004, replaced George Tenet in 2004. Goss served as the last DCI, and following the establishment of the DNI in 2005, the first DCIA. For Goss, who

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<sup>536</sup> Jacoby, Lowell E, Vice Admiral (R). Former Director Defense Intelligence Agency and former J2 Joint Staff. Interview by author, Ashburn, VA, 18 November 2015.; a detailed background on Feith's efforts can be found at <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB456/>

<sup>537</sup> Allen, Michael, 162.

served as a CIA case officer for about a decade in the 1960's, his return to Langley was somewhat of a homecoming. Goss' experience as an intelligence officer, a member of the Aspin-Brown Commission, and as head of the HPSCI gave him a diverse knowledge of intelligence, making him, at least on paper, an ideal candidate to lead the Intelligence Community. Two months after Goss became DCI, President Bush told him to grow the clandestine service by 50%. With the support of President Bush, Goss began to increase the number of operation officers and analysts to help wage the GWOT, a welcomed development with the increasing demand for CIA capability.<sup>538</sup> Despite Goss' background and efforts to grow the agency, he quickly ran afoul of the CIA workforce.

Accompanying Goss to the CIA were a group of his HPSCI staffers pejoratively referred to as the Gosslings. This imperious group of advisors arrived at the CIA wreaking havoc throughout the building and causing friction with some senior CIA officers. In November 2004, two months after Porter Goss became DCI, Stephen Kappes, the Deputy Director of Operations resigned after a confrontation with Goss' Chief of Staff Patrick Murray. According to reports, Murray castigated Mary Graham, the CIA's Counterintelligence Chief for not stopping purported leaks about Goss' nominees for senior CIA positions. Angered by the treatment of one of his subordinates, Michael Sulick, the number two in the Directorate of Operations, confronted Murray about his behavior. Murray responded by telling Kappes to fire Sulick, but Sulick and Kappes resigned from the Agency instead.

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<sup>538</sup> <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A8650-2004Nov23.html>; Garthoff, 283 and 287.

Murray's anger stemmed from the failed nomination of Michael Kostiw to serve as the CIA's Executive Director when it came to light that he had resigned from the CIA years earlier following an alleged shoplifting incident. Piling poor executive decision upon poor executive decision, and despite warnings from senior CIA officers, Goss then nominated Dusty Foggo, an officer within the CIA's Directorate of Support to be the Executive Director. In 2006, Foggo was sentenced to 37 months in prison on corruption and fraud charges for directing government contracts to a boyhood friend in return for gifts and financial rewards. Failing to make a lasting imprint on the CIA, Goss and the Gosslings departed Langley after a rocky 19 months. Goss' successor not only brought Kappes and Sulick back to Langley, but promoted Kappes to CIA Deputy Director and Sulick to the Director of the National Clandestine Service.<sup>539</sup>

Air Force Gen Michael Hayden, an experienced intelligence officer who served as the Director of NSA and first Deputy Director of National Intelligence, replaced Goss at CIA. Hayden, a native of Pittsburg and graduate of the city's Duquesne University, is a cerebral intelligence professional that is well liked by those he leads. Hayden's early actions, such as bringing back Stephen Kappes and Michael Sulick, were popular with the workforce and helped rectify some of the mistakes of his predecessor. Although General Hayden's status as an active duty Air Force general caused some apprehension

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<sup>539</sup> Klaidman, Daniel. "Broken Furniture at the CIA." *Newsweek*, 28 November 2004. <http://www.newsweek.com/broken-furniture-cia-124599> (accessed 28 June 2016); Ignatius, David. "How the CIA Came Unglued." *Washington Post*, 12 May 2006. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/11/AR2006051101947.html> (accessed 28 June 2016); Markon, Jerry. "Former Top CIA Official Sentenced to 37 Months." *Washington Post*, 27 February 2009. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/26/AR2009022601742.html> (accessed 28 June 2016); [http://www.nbcnews.com/id/29391260/ns/us\\_news-crime\\_and\\_courts/t/feds-cia-boss-had-history-bad-behavior/#.V3Kfd1d--t8](http://www.nbcnews.com/id/29391260/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/t/feds-cia-boss-had-history-bad-behavior/#.V3Kfd1d--t8) (accessed 28 June 2016). Tyler Drumheller, a former senior CIA officer writes about the friction with Goss in his book *On the Brink: An Insider's Account of How the White House Compromised American Intelligence*.

early on with those who feared a military takeover of national intelligence, Hayden's non-parochial style eased those concerns.

Goss' resignation in May 2006 was followed with the resignation of Donald Rumsfeld and Stephen Cambone in December 2006 and DNI John Negroponte a month later. Negroponte was replaced by Michael McConnell, the former NSA Director who was Powell's J2 during Desert Storm. Replacing Cambone was James Clapper, the retired Air Force Lt. Gen who served as the Air Force G2 during Desert Storm and then as DIA Director before retiring from the military in 1995. A few years into his military retirement, Clapper returned to the Intelligence Community as the NGA Director. To replace Rumsfeld, Bush asked former DCI and then president of Texas A&M University Robert Gates to be Secretary of Defense. Having served with Bush's father and unwilling to look the other way when his nation needed him, Gates reluctantly departed a position he loved to return to government service.<sup>540</sup> These four gentlemen knew each other well and unlike their predecessors, except Goss, all brought an intelligence officer background to their new position.

Gates arrived to the Pentagon preaching the importance of finding balance in US foreign policy between the DoD, the Intelligence Community, and the State Department. Encouraging greater State Department funding, Gates requested the 2006 NDAA Section 1207 stipulation that funds can be transferred from DoD to State Department for certain activities be increased. Originally devised through collaboration between Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Rice to establish the State Department's Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization, Gates requested doubling Section 1207 funding to

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<sup>540</sup> Gates, *Duty*, 4-6.

\$200 million per year. Although the leader of DoD, Gates was concerned with his department's influence over the Intelligence Community and had a growing concern with the militarization of foreign policy. During a July 2008 speech, Gates stated, "as a career CIA officer I watched with some dismay the increasing dominance of the defense 800-pound gorilla in the intelligence arena over the years." Gates' argued "the lines separating war, peace, diplomacy, and development have become blurred," and the United States' national security organizations had to appreciate the role each played individually and collectively.<sup>541</sup>

Early on in their new assignments, Gates, McConnell and Clapper showed they were going to bring a new collaborative approach to how the Intelligence Community operated. Gates described in his 2014 autobiography, *Duty*, how he worked with McConnell, Clapper, and Hayden "to remedy the deficiencies of the 2004 Intelligence Reform Act and bring the Intelligence Community closer together."<sup>542</sup> One of their first actions made the USD-I a leader within the Intelligence Community, not just DoD. This was a significant change that made the USD-I subordinate not only to the Secretary of Defense, but to the Director of National Intelligence, thus giving the DNI a degree of authority and control that Rumsfeld sought to avoid. Rumsfeld created the USD-I position to organize and shield DoD intelligence efforts and wanted the position to remain independent of the Intelligence Community. In May 2007, Gates and McConnell went against Rumsfeld's vision when they agreed to dual-hat the USD-I as the DNI's

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<sup>541</sup> Tyson, Ann Scott. "Gates Warns of Militarized Policy." *Washington Post*, 16 July 2008. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/15/AR2008071502777.html> (accessed 15 March 2016).; <http://archive.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1262> (accessed 15 March 2016).

<sup>542</sup> Gates, *Duty*, 93.



Director of Military Intelligence. This new role strengthened the DNI's influence over the Intelligence Community and alleviated some of the concerns regarding the USD-I usurping control from the DNI.<sup>543</sup> As Gates points out, the personalities of these four gentlemen allowed them to "mitigate otherwise intractable hostility" between the CIA, DoD, and the Intelligence Community. Much of this hostility was caused by the parochial approach taken by Rumsfeld and Cambone, and the alienation of their own organizations by these two leaders and Porter Goss. Luckily, Gates, McConnell, Hayden, and Clapper initiated the long process of healing those wounds. The relationship improvement in DC was reinforced with an increasing CIA/DoD partnership in the field, with military leaders like Generals David Petraeus and Stanley McChrystal working closely with their CIA counterparts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Although mission requirements drove the CIA and DoD partnership, non-parochial officials from both organizations deserve credit for their actions. Personalities matter and the tone of cooperation set by leaders in both Washington D.C. and in the warzones encouraged cooperation at lower levels.<sup>544</sup>

The DoD/CIA's increasingly operational relationship was understandable since the United States' foreign policy focus was being consumed by Iraq, Afghanistan and GWOT. The military lacked HUMINT collectors and depended on CIA's significantly larger and better trained HUMINT capability in Iraq and Afghanistan. Although

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<sup>543</sup> Hayden, Michael V, General (R). Former Director Central Intelligence Agency and former Director National Security Agency. Interview by author, Washington, D.C., 18 September 2015. General Hayden described how the creation of the USD-I and placing an individual in charge of 80% of the capabilities within the Intelligence Community could weaken the authority of the DNI.

<sup>544</sup> Gates, *Duty*, 92; Crumpton, 187; McChrystal, 116. All these individuals mentioned leaders who helped strengthen the partnership and highlight how personalities matter.

understandable and the collaboration efforts of DoD and CIA leaders commendable, the evolving CIA/DoD relationship did not come without its costs. CIA's increased focus on paramilitary actions and support to military operations hastened a CIA shift away from its traditional focus of support to policymaker that had been occurring since the early 1990s. This not only risked subordinating the CIA to military operations, but could result in the CIA becoming a 21<sup>st</sup> Century OSS; something Hayden warned incoming DCIA Petraeus about in 2011.<sup>545</sup>

During the 2008 election, candidate Barack Obama promised to “renew the American dream” by improving the economy, tackling poverty and increasing access to health care. Similar to Bill Clinton, Obama's platform was focused domestically, but unlike 1992, the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the GWOT did not allow him to ignore national security issues. Organizationally, Obama promised to continue intelligence reform initiated with IRTPA and to better prepare the military for the type of conflicts they were conducting in the post 9/11 world. With a majority of Americans believing the invasion of Iraq a mistake and the Republican candidate John McCain arguing that “maybe 100 years” was the length of time the US military would be in Iraq, Obama won the election with nearly 53% of the popular vote.<sup>546</sup> Barack Obama was inaugurated as the 44<sup>th</sup> President of the United States on January 20, 2009, two months later he ended the GWOT and the Long War. Although official documents no longer

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<sup>545</sup> Hayden, Michael V, General (R). Former Director Central Intelligence Agency and former Director National Security Agency. Interview by author, Washington, D.C., 18 September 2015.

<sup>546</sup> <http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/02/14/mccain.king/>;  
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showelection.php?year=2008> (accessed 7 March 2016).

referred to a global war on terrorism or the long war, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and America's counterterrorism operations raged on.

**Chapter Nine: Conclusion: Everything Comes with a Cost-Improved Operations,  
Organizational Subordination and Strategic Shortfalls**

*While the military has a role in the Intelligence Community, it would be a mistake to place our entire Intelligence Community or operation in the Department of Defense at a time when competition for world leadership is being increasingly defined in economic and social terms. Nor can the State Department be expected to totally meet the intelligence needs of our government. It is not equipped to provide the kinds of intelligence needed by our military services. Furthermore, the collection of raw intelligence is not always consistent with the process of diplomacy. For intelligence to be as objective as possible, the producers of intelligence should not be subordinate to any consumer agency, whether the State or Defense Department.- SSCI Chairman Senator David Boren<sup>547</sup>*

*“a lot of things are going to be neglected while you’re providing military intelligence. Military Intelligence is important, but it is not the whole world.” - Lee Hamilton, former Congressman and 9/11 Commission Co-Chair<sup>548</sup>*

The relationship between central intelligence and the military has been an issue even before the founding of the CIA and DoD through the 1947 National Security Act. The 1944 Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board specifically noted the requirement for an intelligence capability to “know as much about other major world powers as they know about us,” while noting this responsibility was not just the military’s, but “a national problem.”<sup>549</sup> To ensure the independence of the CIA, the 1947 National Security Act required the DCI, even if a military officer, sever chain of command and reporting connections to the DoD or the military services.<sup>550</sup> The 1949 Eberstadt Report and the

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<sup>547</sup> Boren, David L. President of the University of Oklahoma and former Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. E-mail interview by author, 20 November 2012.

<sup>548</sup> Johnson, 237-238.

<sup>549</sup> U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. *Pearl Harbor Attack*. 79th Cong., 1st sess., 14 January 1946, 141.

<sup>550</sup> Public Law 253. *National Security Act of 1947*. 80<sup>th</sup> Cong., 26 July 1947.

Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report of the same year recommended improving coordination within the Intelligence Community and the empowerment of the DCI, but still supported the DCI's independence. These two reports also recommended the CIA remain the lead for both clandestine operations and covert action, a decision that was upheld in future reviews, although the Eberstadt report argued the Joint Chiefs should assume responsibility for clandestine operations during war. The Dulles report was so concerned with the militarization of the CIA that it questioned the "number of military personnel assigned" and argued the "DCI should be a civilian."<sup>551</sup>

Despite six of the DCI/DCIAs being active duty flag officers, the CIA and DoD have maintained separation and their distinct cultures. The two organizations operated together over the years, particularly in Vietnam when they worked together conducting pacification programs and paramilitary operations, but it never reached the degree it has since 9/11. The CIA, DoD and other U.S. agencies integrated activities as part of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam's (MACV) Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) program. Ostensibly subordinate to MACV, CORDS was built to support mutual pacification efforts and CIA took a significant role in developing, leading and executing the programs.<sup>552</sup> Beginning in the 1990s and

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<sup>551</sup> Best, Richard A. "Proposals for Intelligence Reorganization, 1949-2004." <https://fas.org/irp/crs/RL32500.pdf> (accessed 21 April 2016), 3-11. A flag officer could remain on active duty, but DoD could have not authority over the individual.

<sup>552</sup> Ahearn Jr., 95, 228-229; Prados, John. *Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2009), 320; Prados, John. *Lost Crusader: The Secret Wars of CIA Director William Colby* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), 213-214. Ahearn and Prados both discuss how CIA initially led the pacification efforts, but, encouraged by Robert Komer, the efforts were placed under MACV to gain more resources and instill a unity of effort. In Prados' book about Colby he discusses Colby's and Ted Shackley's desire to focus CIA on "more traditional intelligence functions" in Vietnam.

proliferating after 9/11, the CIA began to not only work with the DoD, but pushed by policymakers, adopted a supporting role during military operations. Although this role was never technically a subordinate relationship, PDD-35 and the numerous criticisms directed toward the CIA raised expectations that the CIA was available and responsive to commanders' needs.

Beginning in the 1980s, policymakers started pushing for increased intelligence support to military operations along with improving how the military planned and conducted joint operations. The call for increased intelligence support to military operations was an important development because it reflected a subordination of national intelligence capabilities to military commanders during conflicts; something that had been recommended in the Eberstadt report during periods of war, but had never been implemented. Congress was now asking the CIA to conduct operations in support of force protection and military operations, not just declared wars or as part of a collective interagency effort. It appeared that instead of mutually working towards national policy objectives, Congress expected the CIA to put its resources at the military commander's disposal. Although a significant change, it was still manageable if military operations were viewed as temporary in nature, allowing the CIA and others to surge in support, without shifting too much focus away from long-term analysis and support to policymakers. This level of support was problematic following September 11, 2001 when the United States entered a perpetual state of war.

In 1986, Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Act, a law that weakened the services' authority, but improved how the military conducted joint operations. In addition to softening the service parochialism, the legislation centralized authority within

DoD and established a planning structure that linked defense strategy and contingency planning with national security strategy. Centralizing DoD power under the concept of jointness also increased the influence of the joint regional combatant commanders, giving them a more significant role in U.S. foreign policy. Although intelligence support to military operations was mentioned along with service interoperability as issues in previous after action reviews, Goldwater-Nichols focused on service interoperability and did not resolve the intelligence support to operations deficiency. The 1989 Invasion of Panama confirmed that Goldwater-Nichols improved joint interoperability, while highlighting that intelligence support remained an issue.

The congressional supporters of defense reform viewed increased intelligence support to military operations part and parcel to the changes brought about with Goldwater-Nichols. With the military on path to improved service interoperability, Congress now wanted to turn to “the civilian side of the coin” to improve interagency operations.<sup>553</sup> The Goldwater-Nichols legislation might have weakened service barriers that limited interoperability, but the military still required greater intelligence resources to support the planning and operations of the joint force. With the Cold War over and the White House and Congress pursuing reductions in spending and slashing redundancy, the expectation was that national intelligence capabilities had to increase its role in military operations.

Embracing the call for improved national intelligence support to military operations, the CIA came together with their military intelligence brethren to serve the

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<sup>553</sup> U.S. Congress, House. Congressional Record Daily Edition. *Operation Just Cause: Preliminary Session*. 101st Cong., 2nd sess., 5 February 1990.

troops on the ground during Desert Storm. Despite this novel effort, criticism over intelligence support during the war surfaced in congressional testimony and on the front pages of the United States' leading newspapers. Wanting to improve support to the military, while at the same time getting General Schwarzkopf and the pressure he brought to bear "off their back," the CIA embraced changes.<sup>554</sup> These changes included the addition of a military flag officer and the establishment of an office focused on improving CIA's support to military operations. Even before these changes were fully implemented, the CIA was sending officers and resources to the Balkans in support of military operations. Unlike Vietnam, these actions were largely focused on supporting the military commander and his operations, not on conducting unified, separate or parallel operations.

In Somalia, the CIA deployed capability as part of the National Intelligence Support Team to the operational commander and a separate HUMINT team to conduct Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB), assuming a supporting role to the military in both cases. In Bosnia, the CIA once again deployed as part of the National Intelligence Support Team and became part of a HUMINT effort to ensure the commander's operational and force protection needs were met. Back in Washington, the DCI established a Balkan Task Force whose responsibility included tactical intelligence support to the military. In Kosovo, the CIA expanded its support to the military operations by becoming part of the air campaign's targeting effort, a role atypical to how CIA operated in the past and one that subordinated it to the military's needs.

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<sup>554</sup> Lajoie, Roland, Major General (R). Former/First CIA Associate Deputy Director for Operations/Military Affairs. Telephone interview by author, 10 November 2015.



The rise in importance of national intelligence support to military operations, that reached its pinnacle when President Clinton made it the top priority through PDD-35, paralleled the rise of DoD's influence in foreign policy and its increasing role as America's favorite foreign policy tool.<sup>555</sup> As the Cold War was ending, DoD gradually shifted away from preparing for large-scale operations and towards low-intensity conflicts and peacekeeping operations. Believing that American military power was indispensable within the post-Cold War "New World Order," elected officials regularly turned towards DoD.

In 1994, the Clinton administration published their first National Security Strategy that focused on the United States engaging globally in order to enlarge the number of democratic allies throughout the world.<sup>556</sup> This engagement strategy became more assertive, when the 1997 National Security Strategy declared the military and other elements of national power should be used to "shape the international environment."<sup>557</sup> Over time, this new policy of "shaping the environment" moved beyond broad strategy documents and became part of military doctrine and lexicon. In 2006, DoD's *JP 3-0*:

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<sup>555</sup> <https://www.ncafp.org/2016/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Amb.-Eikenberry-Mil-USFP.pdf> (accessed 16 March 2016).

<sup>556</sup> Mandelbaum, Michael. *Mission Failure: America and the World in the Post-Cold War World* (New York, NY.: Oxford University Press, 2016). Mandelbaum argues the end of the Cold War resulted in the U.S. neglecting the concept of national sovereignty over internal affairs and the U.S. becoming involved in numerous OOTW(s) to change the characteristics of a state and not in response to what a state did outside its borders.

<sup>557</sup> Adams and Murray, Kindle Location 3597; Bacevich, Kindle Location 834. Bacevich describes the increasing militarization of foreign policy. Priest, Dana. *The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America's Military* (New York, NY: W.W. Norton and Company, 2003), 97. Priest mentions a "Clinton administration's National Security Strategy" that "directed the CINC's to 'shape, prepare, respond' all over the globe."

*Joint Operations* expanded its “phasing model” from four phases to six, incorporating “Phase 0: Shaping,” which involved ongoing military operations “to enhance international legitimacy and gain multinational cooperation in support of defined military and national strategic objective(s).”<sup>558</sup> Although not yet in doctrine in 1997, empowered combatant commanders were now engaged in ongoing shaping operations and planning efforts that required significant intelligence support to enable. This increased intelligence requirement was problematic for an Intelligence Community that was already dealing with significant capability cuts.

In the late 1990s, some policymakers and national security professionals became concerned that intelligence support to military operations had gone too far, weakening the long-term analysis required for strategy development and to support policymakers. Despite these concerns, no major changes to either the national intelligence organizations or its priorities were implemented. These concerns were forgotten after 9/11, as the United States shifted towards global counterterrorism efforts and policymakers increasingly focused on tactical and operational actions. Instead of being as concerned with the United States’ position in relation to Russia, China, or other world powers, policymakers became obsessed with defeating a non-state actor and the tactic it employed. In pursuit of this objective, the CIA focused a significant amount of its resources towards global counterterrorism efforts and in support of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

As the CIA and DoD were waging two wars, the United States’ Intelligence

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<sup>558</sup> Department of Defense. *Joint Publication 3-0: Doctrine for Joint Operations*. Washington, D.C.; Department of Defense, 17 September 2006 (w/changes from 13 February 2008), IV-27.

Community was undergoing reform. The Intelligence Reform Terrorism Prevention Act implemented recommendations that preceded the 9/11 attacks, but a significant portion of the reform measures were focused on making the Intelligence Community better postured to identify terrorist threats and conduct operations to defeat them. The citizens of the United States do not yet know whether the IRTPA and other post-9/11 reforms are responsible for preventing domestic terrorist attacks, but it is safe to say that measures have improved interoperability among many agencies and departments, to include the CIA/DoD partnership---but, at what cost?

The evolution of the CIA/DoD relationship over the last twenty-five years is both encouraging and astounding, while at the same time reinforcing US foreign policy trends that are disconcerting. Although there might be nuanced disagreement over why the relationship has improved, with some individuals pointing to Desert Storm and others 9/11, there seems to be universal agreement among current and former senior leaders within both DoD and CIA that the relationship has never been better. Garry Reid, a former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Special Operation's and Low-Intensity Conflict (SOLIC) and a former special operations soldier with over twenty-eight years of service, stated in 2012 that "overall the relationship has never been stronger across the board."<sup>559</sup> The CIA sends representatives to dozens of military commands and professional military schools and in 2012, DoD students made up 25% of the student population at the Farm.

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<sup>559</sup> Reid, Garry. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict. Telephone interview by author, 19 September 2012.

Historians within the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence stated that interviews with CIA personnel highlight significant improvement in CIA's relationship with other government organizations since 9/11. These improved partnerships have resulted in less parochialism and increased collaboration. Most important, the officers recognize the value of these partnerships and are now more receptive to engaging their interagency colleagues instead of operating alone. Even during periods when the structure has not completely evolved to enhance partnerships, officers find new and innovative ways to work around constraints.<sup>560</sup> While these officers still understand and appreciate the difference in their two organizations' mission and culture, they now view each other as indispensable members of the larger U.S. national security profession.

Deputy DIA Director, Doug Wise, an experienced and respected intelligence leader and retired military officer who has been involved in some of America's most significant operations in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 period, compared today's CIA/DoD partnership to his experience as a military liaison in the late eighties and early nineties. When he first arrived at CIA there were only a handful of liaison officers located at CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia. Today, there are hundreds of uniformed personnel (active, guard, and reserve) serving at CIA and nearly half of those individuals are active duty service members. Although Wise said the relationship has never been better, he also pointed out that over the last decade, the CIA has largely served in a "supporting" role to the military's "supported" status and the question remained whether or not the DoD could handle a role reversal.

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<sup>560</sup> Candace B. CIA Analyst, interview by author, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 12 August 2012. Both the After Action Review and the interview highlighted the willingness and creativity of officers to break down barriers to accomplish mission objectives.

Although organizational leaders highlighted improvements in the CIA/DoD relationship and understood the necessity of interoperability after the 9/11 attacks, many also appreciated the tradeoffs. In 2012, former Deputy CIA Director John McLaughlin said intelligence support for force protection is a top intelligence priority, but warned that support to military operations necessarily takes resources away from other global missions.<sup>561</sup> That same year, former SSCI Chair David Boren voiced concern with the CIA mission becoming subordinate to military operations, stating, “I think there is great danger if the CIA becomes primarily an agency dedicated to the support of military operations it will neglect its primary role of providing objective intelligence to the policy makers.” President Boren believed CIA’s “military support roles in Iraq and Afghanistan had resulted in reduced intelligence collection and analysis in parts of the world which are more vital to America’s long term interests.”

President Boren also worried that a greater “emphasis on a military support role runs the risk of compromising the objectivity in intelligence analysis,” a concern shared with Dr. Richard Russell, a university professor and former CIA analyst who argued that CIA analytical support to certain programs are intensive and drain analytical resources from other areas. Boren went even further with his concerns regarding the influence of the DoD on CIA stating “I do not think it is healthy when a person whose principal experience has been in the military is asked to serve as Director of the CIA, it tends to bias policy in a way that places too much emphasis on military intervention instead of

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<sup>561</sup> McLaughlin, John. Former Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Telephone interview by author, 19 September 2012.

carefully evaluating the use of diplomacy and other policy tools.”<sup>562</sup> A sentiment that Dr. Robert Gates agreed with as a “general rule,” while also previously stating that he did not believe the DNI could contain the military commander’s growing appetite for intelligence.<sup>563</sup>

Former military leaders have also voiced concern with the future implications of the CIA/DoD relationship. Former DCIA Admiral William Studeman acknowledged to Loch Johnson that support to military operations “presented an endless demand on America’s finite intelligence resources.”<sup>564</sup> Studeman later pointed out the United States had dropped fundamental intelligence coverage because it focused on “Lucy and the football” (i.e. terrorism), a sentiment shared by former DDCIA for HUMINT MajGen(R) Michael Ennis who believed CIA’s focus on tactical collection had distracted it from strategic collection. Although Ennis believes the military does not fundamentally understand HUMINT and often alienates HUMINT officers, he argues for an enhanced clandestine service that has the resources to support both national and military collection requirements; with military officers that understand the type of HUMINT intelligence commanders require working alongside their civilian counterparts who are focused on

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<sup>562</sup> Boren, David L. President of the University of Oklahoma and former Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. E-mail interview by author, 20 November 2012. “I do not think it is healthy when a person whose principal experience has been in the military is asked to serve as Director of the CIA. It tends to bias policy in a way that places too much emphasis on military intervention instead of carefully evaluating the use of diplomacy and other policy tools.”; Richard L. Russell, Professor at National Defense University, telephone interview by author, 14 September 2012.

<sup>563</sup> Gates, Robert, Dr. Former Secretary of Defense and former Director of Central Intelligence. Telephone interview by author, 29 March 2016. Gates said he thought it used to be important for the CIA deputy to be a military officer. Now with the DNI, he believed this requirement was less important; Allen, Michael, 154.

<sup>564</sup> Johnson, 237.

strategic issues.<sup>565</sup> This would enable the military to benefit from the civilian expertise in HUMINT operations and training, while also maintaining officers focused on military collection requirements who understand military operations.

Former DCIA GEN(R) Michael Hayden and former DDCI ADM(R) Bobby Ray Inman highlighted that focusing CIA HUMINT capability on supporting military operations has greater potential repercussions on strategic analysis than technical intelligence collection disciplines. SIGINT and other passive technical collection systems are able to compile large amounts of data that can be exploited for either tactical or strategic analysis, unlike HUMINT collection where the individual asset normally has access to limited detailed information. Focusing on individuals with access to information that supports military operations necessarily distracts from spotting, assessing and developing individuals with access to strategic information; a time consuming endeavor that cannot easily be surged. Dr. Robert Gates, the former Secretary of Defense and DCI, made a similar argument when he posited that technical collection should be distributed between military and national intelligence requirements, but the tactical HUMINT support to military operations should come from the DIA and the services.<sup>566</sup>

Admiral(R) Inman also raised concern with what he saw as CIA's increasing

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<sup>565</sup> Studeman, William O, Admiral (R). Former Deputy Director CIA and former Director NSA. Interview by author, Severna Park, MD, 24 November 2015; Ennis, Michael. Major General (R). Former CIA Deputy Director of HUMINT. Interview by author, Leesburg, VA 17 November 20015. Ennis relayed a story about Marine General Peter Pace when he was SOUTHCOM Commander. Pace had such a distrust and misunderstanding of HUMINT collection that he would not allow certain defense attaches in meetings with foreign officers. A shortsighted view for a senior leader in DoD.

<sup>566</sup> Gates, Robert, Dr. Former Secretary of Defense and former Director of Central Intelligence. Telephone interview by author, 29 March 2016.

focus on tactical operations, which he believed was first attempted by Admiral Stansfield Turner, and then realized after 9/11. Inman argued the CIA pursued a tactical focus to maintain relevance, but he believes this was often driven by presidents who were enamored by tactical operations and tales of derring do. Hayden voiced a similar concern when he warned the new DCIA David Petraeus in 2011 that the CIA risked becoming a 21<sup>st</sup> Century OSS, an organization conducting paramilitary operations to win conflicts instead of intelligence collection operations to inform strategic analysis.<sup>567</sup> Salivating for immediate results and seemingly as concerned with UAV strikes and the targeting of individual terrorists as they are with the United States' relative position in the world, policymakers have driven the CIA towards this tactical focus. This increasing CIA focus on tactical operations is a symptom of a broader issue, the militarization of foreign policy.<sup>568</sup>

Dr. Robert Gates warned in 2008 of the “creeping militarization” of U.S. foreign policy. Arguing the United States, “cannot kill or capture our way to victory,” Gates stated the military should take a “supporting role” to diplomats in “America’s

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<sup>567</sup> Hayden, Michael V, General (R). Former Director Central Intelligence Agency and former Director National Security Agency. Interview by author, Washington, D.C., 18 September 2015.; Inman, Bobby Ray. Admiral (R). Former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Agency. Interview by author, Austin, TX, 27 August 2014.

<sup>568</sup> Recent CIA changes might encourage a further tactical focus/operationalization of intelligence. In 2014, DCIA John Brennan announced a reorganization change within CIA that will create more CTC like centers, where CIA operations officers and analysts work closely together identifying collection requirements and then targeting collection efforts. During a Washington Post interview, Hayden commented that centers can be “consumed with the operational challenges of the moment,” while another former senior intelligence official raised concern that placing analysts and case officers in the same organizations risks compromising independent analysis. See [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cia-director-john-brennan-considering-sweeping-organizational-changes/2014/11/19/fa85b320-6ffb-11e4-ad12-3734c461eab6\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cia-director-john-brennan-considering-sweeping-organizational-changes/2014/11/19/fa85b320-6ffb-11e4-ad12-3734c461eab6_story.html)



engagement with the rest of the world.”<sup>569</sup> Dr. Loch Johnson, a former staffer on both the Church Committee and the Aspin-Brown Commission and a well-known intelligence studies academic, raised a similar question when he wrote “I continued to wonder if at least a few more resources directed toward national (civilian) intelligence targets wouldn’t make the United States more effective at diplomacy and less drawn toward war fighting.”<sup>570</sup> This concern is not limited to civilians, but also held by some former military professionals. Karl Eikenberry, a retired lieutenant general and former ambassador to Afghanistan, argued in 2012 the militarization of U.S. foreign policy and an unequal investment in DoD over other departments, has resulted in the military becoming the “starting and relief pitcher for a number of foreign policy problems.”<sup>571</sup>

ADM Michael Mullen, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, articulated his concern with DoD’s increasing role in foreign policy during a 2010 speech at Kansas State University, stating, “My fear, quite frankly, is that we aren’t moving fast enough in this regard. U.S. foreign policy is still too dominated by the military, too dependent upon the generals and admirals who lead our major overseas commands. It’s one thing to be able and willing to serve as emergency responders; quite another to always have to be the fire chief.”<sup>572</sup> In an earlier interview, Mullen described a vicious cycle of policymakers

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<sup>569</sup> Tyson, Ann Scott. “Gates Warns of Militarized Policy.” *Washington Post*, 16 July 2008. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/15/AR2008071502777.html> (accessed 15 March 2016).

<sup>570</sup> Johnson, 238.

<sup>571</sup> <https://www.ncafp.org/2016/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Amb.-Eikenberry-Mil-USFP.pdf> (accessed 16 March 2016).

<sup>572</sup> <http://www.cfr.org/defense-strategy/admiral-mullens-speech-military-strategy-kansas-state-university-march-2010/p21590> (accessed 23 March 2016).

turning to the military because they have greater trust in military capability and then increasing the DoD's funding over other agencies, which in turn makes the military even more capable in relation to its national security brethren.<sup>573</sup> Instead of correcting a significant imbalance in resourcing national security capabilities, policymakers just turn to the military to handle an increasing array of missions. The military then becomes the lead effort while other organizations find themselves supporting DoD actions.

This tension and unequal influence of DoD's priorities has been noted in the field. For example, in 2010, as US troops were preparing to depart from Iraq, the military was focused on short-term conditions to ensure the smooth transition to Iraqi forces, while the State Department and others were focused on longer-term objectives. Although both were in pursuit of national policy, the short-term military focus was sometimes at odds with the longer-term perspective of other agencies. This friction was articulated best by an interagency leader who stated that while they wanted to assist the military as much as possible, they had to consider the long-term effects of their actions. According to him, "the military is on a sprint to 2011 and we are running a marathon."<sup>574</sup>

Although the evolution of the CIA/DoD relationship has brought greater cooperation and resolved many of the issues identified in the late 1980s and 1990s regarding intelligence support to military operations, it has not come without its costs. The DoD already controls an estimated 80-90% of the Intelligence Community funding and even national intelligence organizations such as the NRO, NSA, and NGA have a

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<sup>573</sup> Gordon and Murray, Kindle Location 192.

<sup>574</sup> Wise, Doug. Deputy Director Defense Intelligence Agency. Interview by author, Washington D.C. area, 28 August 2012 and 3 September 2015.

significant military contingent and/or serve as a combat support agency. This leaves the CIA as the only truly independent intelligence organization within the Intelligence Community. As the only independent agency not focused on serving the needs of a department, it is important the CIA retains a focus on supporting policymakers with the strategic analysis and warning it was created to provide.

Since the Gulf War and particularly after 9/11, this focus has been significantly distracted by its support to military operations and its involvement in offensive counterterrorism operations, resulting in less long-term analysis focused on the broader world.<sup>575</sup> The CIA rightly has a role in the counterterrorism fight and the DoD/CIA should maintain a strong relationship, but CIA's focus on these two missions has consumed an inordinate amount of its attention and resources. As Senator Boren pointed out in 2013, when he rhetorically asked,-- "in the long run, what's more important to America: Afghanistan or China?"--issues like a rising China or an aggressive Russia are more important to America's long-term interests than either Iraq or Afghanistan.<sup>576</sup> Unfortunately, the post-9/11 fear of terrorism has resulted in Afghanistan and Iraq receiving priority, while the post-Desert Storm prioritization of intelligence support to the military has resulted in the CIA assuming a greater operational role at the detriment of

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<sup>575</sup> Kibbe, Jennifer. (2014). The Military, the CIA, and America's Shadow Wars. In G. Adams and S. Murray (Eds.), *Mission Creep: The Militarization of US Foreign Policy* (Kindle Location 4917-4922). Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press. Kibbe mentions news articles by journalist Greg Miller and Julie Tate that discuss the rise of CIA "targeters" focused on tactical operations that even concerned DCIA Brennan who said CIA's role in CT operations were an "aberration from its traditional role."

<sup>576</sup> Miller, Greg. "Secret report raises alarms on intelligence blind spots because of AQ focus." *Washington Post* (20 March 2013). [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/secret-report-raises-alarms-on-intelligence-blind-spots-because-of-aq-focus/2013/03/20/1f8f1834-90d6-11e2-9cfd-36d6c9b5d7ad\\_story.html?hpid=z1](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/secret-report-raises-alarms-on-intelligence-blind-spots-because-of-aq-focus/2013/03/20/1f8f1834-90d6-11e2-9cfd-36d6c9b5d7ad_story.html?hpid=z1) (accessed 28 June 2016).

strategic analysis.

Over time, CIA support to military operations could lead to subordination to the military, while the CIA's dual focus on military support and counterterrorism operations could leave existential threats such as China and Russia insufficiently covered: two realities that would leave the United States without an adequate independent intelligence organization to inform foreign policy and strategy development.<sup>577</sup> The CIA and DoD are the ones immediately affected by this evolving relationship, but it is policymaker preference for military force to "shape the environment" and the militarization of foreign policy that has led both organizations down this path.<sup>578</sup> In this regard, the evolved CIA/DoD partnership is both a symptom and a cause of the militarization of America's foreign policy. Although there are definite short-term operational benefits to an improved CIA/DoD partnership, the long-term repercussions are not yet known, but could be significant.

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<sup>577</sup> Wise, Doug. Deputy Director Defense Intelligence Agency. Interview by author, Washington D.C. area, 28 August 2012 and 3 September 2015.

<sup>578</sup> At the same time, the US government has lacked a long-term vision and become obsessed with tactical actions in the erroneous belief that military force can solve a number of crises and shape the world to America's liking. Seemingly as concerned with UAV strikes and the targeting of individual terrorists as they are with the United States' relative position in the world.

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## Acronyms

ADCI/MS Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support

ADDO/MA Associate Deputy Director of Operations for Military Affairs

ADMA Associate Director of Military Affairs

ADDO Assistant Deputy Director of Operations

ASD-C3I Assistant Secretary of Defense-Command, Control, and Communications

ASD-I Assistant Secretary of Defense-Intelligence

ASD-SOLIC Assistant Secretary of Defense-Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflicts

AFCENT Air Force Central Command

AOR Area of Operations

ARCENT Army Central Command

BDA Battle Damage Assessment

BG/Brig. Gen/ BrigGen Brigadier General

CENTCOM Central Command

CFR Council on Foreign Relations

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CINC Commander in Chief

CIO Central Imagery Office

COL Colonel

COLT Crisis Operation Liaison Team

CoS Chief of Station

CRS Congressional Research Service

CTC Counterterrorism Center

CYBERCOM Cyber Command

DCI Director of Central Intelligence  
DCIA Director of Central Intelligence Agency  
DCID Director of Central Intelligence Directive  
DCS Defense Clandestine Service  
DDCI Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
DDI Deputy Director of Intelligence  
DDIC Deputy Director of the Intelligence Community  
DDO Deputy Director of Operations  
DHMO Defense Human Intelligence Military Office  
DHS Defense Human Intelligence Service  
DI Directorate of Intelligence  
DMI Director of Military Intelligence  
DO Directorate of Operations  
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency  
DO Directorate of Operations  
DoD Department of Defense  
DoDD Department of Defense Directive  
DODJIC Department of Defense Joint Intelligence Center  
DoS Department of State  
DNI Director of National Intelligence  
DUSD-I Deputy Undersecretary of Defense-Intelligence  
FAA Federal Aviation Administration  
FAO Foreign Area Officer  
FDO Flexible Deterrent Operations

GCC Geographical Combatant Command

GDIP General Defense Intelligence Program

GWOT Global War on Terrorism

HASC House Armed Services Committee

HPSCI House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

HUMINT Human Intelligence

IAA Intelligence Authorization Act

IC Intelligence Community

IC21 Intelligence Community 21<sup>st</sup> Century

IG Inspector General

IMINT Imagery Intelligence

INF Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces

INSCOM Intelligence and Security Command

IPB Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

IRTPA Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act

J2 Joint Staff-Intelligence

J3 Joint Staff-Operations

J5 Joint Staff-Plans

JIATF Joint Intelligence Agency Task Force

JIC Joint Intelligence Center

JILE Joint Intelligence Liaison Element

JIOC Joint Intelligence Operations Center

JITF-CT Joint Intelligence Task Force-Counterterrorism

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JSOC Joint Special Operations Command

JTF Joint Task Force

LDK Democratic League of Kosovo

LTG/Lt. Gen/LtGen Lieutenant General

MACV Military Assistance Command Vietnam

MASINT Measures and Signals Intelligence

MG/Maj Gen/MajGen Major General

MIB Military Intelligence Board

MINX Multimedia Information Network System

MNF Multi-National Forces

MOOTW Military Operations other than War

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCS National Clandestine Service

NDAA National Defense Authorization Act

NEO Non-combatant Evacuation Operations

NHITC National Human Intelligence Tasking Center

NIC National Intelligence Council

NIMA National Imagery and Mapping Agency

NIO National Intelligence Officer

NIMA National Imagery Mapping Agency

NIO National Intelligence Organization

NIST National Intelligence Support Teams

NJM New Jewel Movement

NMISC National Military Intelligence Systems Center

NMICC National Military Intelligence Collection Center

NMJIC National Military Joint Intelligence Center

NORTHCOM Northern Command

NPIC National Photographic Intelligence Center

NPR National Performance Review

NRO National Reconnaissance Office

NSA National Security Agency

NSD National Security Directive

NSDD National Security Decision Directive

NSR National Security Review

OMA Office of Military Affairs

OOTW Operations Other Than War

OPE Operational Preparation of the Environment

OSIA On-Site Inspection Agency

PACAF Pacific Command Air Force

PACFLEET Pacific Command Fleet

PACOM Pacific Command

PDD Presidential Decision Directive

PDF Panamanian Defense Forces

PFIAB President Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

PIAB President Intelligence Advisory Board

PLO Palestinian Liberation Organization

PM Paramilitary

RADM Rear Admiral

RDI Remodeling Defense Initiative  
R & D Research and Development  
SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe  
SASC Senate Armed Services Committee  
SIGINT Signals Intelligence  
SOCOM Special Operations Command  
SOF Special Operations Forces  
SOUTHCOM Southern Command  
SSB Strategic Support Branch  
SST Strategic Support Teams  
SSCI Senate Select Committee on Intelligence  
SSE Sensitive Site Exploitation  
STRATCOM Strategic Command  
SWIC Special Warfare Center and School  
TCA Technical Collection Agency  
TOC Tactical Operations Center  
TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command  
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicles  
USD-I Undersecretary of Defense-Intelligence  
USD-P Undersecretary of Defense-Policy  
U.S.C. United States Code  
USMLM United States Military Liaison Mission  
USMNF United States Multi-National Forces  
VADM Vice Admiral

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction