The Development of Professional Military Education at the United States Air Force Academy

by

Douglas Blake Kennedy

B.S., United States Air Force Academy, 1989
M.A., University of Georgia, Athens, 1997

AN ABSTRACT OF A DISSERTATION

submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of History
College of Arts and Sciences

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas

2017
This dissertation examines the development of the professional military studies curriculum at the United States Air Force Academy. The study explores the rationale behind establishing an Air Force Academy, along the lines similar to the U.S. Military Academy at West Point or the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis. The quest for an additional academy emphasized the need for specialized training of air force cadets and creating a common bond for its future officer corps, rather than recognizing the necessity to equip them with a professional military education regarding warfare and how air power influences war, for example. This trend continued in the two main studies used to justify the Air Force Academy, as well as the development of the initial curriculum, where an integrated academic curriculum, one that emphasized both the sciences and engineering as well as the social sciences and humanities, placed any discussion of professional military studies on the back burner. The challenge of the Academy’s general academic curriculum on the cadet’s time left little room for the development of a strong, rigorous professional military studies program. However, the confluence of a cheating scandal at West Point and the resulting report, as well as a reflection during the 25th anniversary of the Academy’s founding in 1979, which developed questions on the professional military studies program within the curriculum, led to the establishment of a Permanent Professor within the Deputy Commandant for Military Instruction, and resulted in drastic changes to the curriculum for the cadets, specifically involving professional military studies. Today, the United States Air Force Academy has a Department of Military and Strategic Studies under the overall authority of the Dean of Faculty. This department has as its charter the role to provide “the study of the context, theory, and application of military power”—with special emphasis on the role of airpower to the art and science of war. The document that helps define the duty of the department also states that this necessary study for officer candidates constitutes “the essence of a military academy education” and, most certainly, the central core of a professional military studies program.
The Development of Professional Military Education at the United States Air Force Academy

by

Douglas Blake Kennedy

B.S., United States Air Force Academy, 1989
M.A., University of Georgia, Athens, 1997

A DISSERTATION

submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of History
College of Arts and Sciences

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas

2017

Approved by:

Major Professor
Donald J. Mrozek
Abstract

This dissertation examines the development of the professional military studies curriculum at the United States Air Force Academy. The study explores the rationale behind establishing an Air Force Academy, along the lines similar to the U.S. Military Academy at West Point or the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis. The quest for an additional academy emphasized the need for specialized training of air force cadets and creating a common bond for its future officer corps, rather than recognizing the necessity to equip them with a professional military education regarding warfare and how air power influences war, for example. This trend continued in the two main studies used to justify the Air Force Academy, as well as the development of the initial curriculum, where an integrated academic curriculum, one that emphasized both the sciences and engineering as well as the social sciences and humanities, placed any discussion of professional military studies on the back burner. The challenge of the Academy’s general academic curriculum on the cadet’s time left little room for the development of a strong, rigorous professional military studies program. However, the confluence of a cheating scandal at West Point and the resulting report, as well as a reflection during the 25th anniversary of the Academy’s founding in 1979, which developed questions on the professional military studies program within the curriculum, led to the establishment of a Permanent Professor within the Deputy Commandant for Military Instruction, and resulted in drastic changes to the curriculum for the cadets, specifically involving professional military studies. Today, the United States Air Force Academy has a Department of Military and Strategic Studies under the overall authority of the Dean of Faculty. This department has as its charter the role to provide “the study of the context, theory, and application of military power”—with special emphasis on the role of airpower to the art and science of war. The document that helps define the duty of the department also states that this necessary study for officer candidates constitutes “the essence of a military academy education” and, most certainly, the central core of a professional military studies program.
# Table of Contents

Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................................... vii
Dedication ....................................................................................................................................... ix
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... x
Chapter 1 - The Need for Military Studies .................................................................................... 1
Chapter 2 - Foundations for an Air Force Academy ............................................................... 22
Chapter 3 - The Studies that Shaped the Academy .............................................................. 66
Chapter 4 - Inception of the Curriculum ............................................................................. 131
Chapter 5 - The Rise of Professional Military Studies ......................................................... 181
Chapter 6 - Academic Credibility for Professional Military Studies .................................... 224
Chapter 7 - Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 268
Bibliography ............................................................................................................................... 272
Appendix A - Air Force Academy Planning Board .......................................................... 279
Appendix B - Members of the Service Academy Board and the Respective Panels ........... 285
Acknowledgements

To complete this work, which was a second, completely different topic than my original attempt, I required the support of some special people who deserve acknowledgement and thanks. Most evident, without the sage advice and mentorship—academic and personal—as well as his administration skills and established relationships, none of this would have been possible without my major advisor, Dr. Don Mrozek. He is a gem. Most impressive is his patience and forgiveness—which I tested over and over. This process was worthwhile just for my growing relationship with him. Drs. Mike Krysko and Dale Herspring provided me with a great education and constructive feedback in their courses, challenged me with their exams, and remained faithful as committee members through this long process. I am grateful that Dr. Charles Sanders, who sat on my comprehensive exams, and Dr. Suzanne Orr agreed to sit on my committee as I worked through this topic. I thank all of the professors who encouraged and developed my abilities while at Kansas State. Additionally, Dean Carol Shanklin and Angie Pfizenmaier from the Graduate School demonstrated patience, wisdom, good judgment, and assistance in guiding me through this process.

I was fortunate to discover this topic when I got stymied with the first. Dr. Betsy Muenger, the United State Air Force Academy’s Command Historian, and Dr. James Titus, from the Academy’s Department of Military & Strategic Studies, both were instrumental in recommending this topic. Dr. Mary Elizabeth Ruwell, the supervisor for the Academy’s Special Collections branch—the U.S. Air Force Academy’s archives—demonstrated amazing flexibility and forbearance as she assisted with materials and, even more important, provided me with friendship and an excellent venue to do my work. Her assistants, especially John Beardsley, were more than helpful. I am so thankful to them.

My colleagues provided much needed support and friendship during this graduate experience. Ivan Zasimczuk, Will Pituch, Daniel Aksamit, and Brian Laslie made the start of my journey at Kansas State worth it, as well as the rest of my friends in the program. Kristi Lowenthal, also a sponsored Air Force officer a year ahead of me in the program, became a great friend to both Bettina and me—and it was special to teach on the faculty with her. My colleagues in the Academy’s Department of History also have provided their friendship and support in this endeavor. I am thankful to Brigadier General (Ret.) Mark Wells, who, as the Permanent
Professor and Head of the Department of History, agreed to my sponsorship for the Ph.D., and to Colonel Meg Martin, who, as the present Permanent Professor and Department Head, offered her support and provided me opportunities to complete the work. John Abbatiello, Drs. Jeanne and David Heidler, Robert Carriedo, Derek Varble, Ben Jones, Scott Schaefer, David Bachler, Bob Wettemann, John Clune, and Greg Hospodor always gave encouragement and advice and friendship. Other friends and colleagues outside of the department also provided support and cheer, such as Joel Witzel, John Farquhar, Ryan Guiberson, Charles Dusch, and Jobie Turner. Most significant, my colleague, friend, and work out partner, Mark Grotelueschen, had to listen to endless excuses and complaints, but always retorted with positive thoughts and inspiration. I am so grateful for good friends.

My family has been of greatest assistance. My mom and dad have always given me confidence and hope—their love is enduring. Most important, I bow to my wife, Bettina, and two great kids, Sean and Karis. Karis has only known her dad to be working on his dissertation, and she has often queried me on when it was going to be done—never quite pronouncing “dissertation” correctly. They had to bear the burden of the work, especially whenever we scheduled something—would this interfere? I am so thankful for their love and support, as I would not have completed it without their sacrifices, which is why I dedicate this to them.
Dedication

To Bettina, Sean, and Karis.
Introduction

“You officers amuse yourselves with God knows what buffooneries and never dream in the least of serious service. This is a source of stupidity which would become most dangerous in case of serious conflict.”¹

Frederick the Great

In an interview provided in 1999 for the U.S. Air Force Academy’s Department of History’s Oral History Project, retired Brigadier General Philip Caine, the first Permanent Professor in the office of the Deputy Commandant for Military Instruction, told the interviewer, Lieutenant Colonel Vance Skarstedt: “When you were a cadet you didn’t have professional military studies. You had military training, and military training occurred at God knows what time and what location, taught by what person on what subject. It was utter hodgepodge. Well, as I approached that I said the first thing I’ve got to do is I’ve got to have military studies. If you’re going to teach the profession, the things people need to know professionally, then we’ve got to do it in an academic atmosphere.”² Lt. Col. Skarstedt had graduated from the Academy in 1978. Just a year later, on the authority of the Superintendent, the Academy undertook a thorough review of its programs, especially the curriculum, on the 25th anniversary of its founding. A conclusion of that review was that the Academy lacked a solid professional military studies program, one that was academically rigorous. Also, the office of the Commandant of Cadets did not have a stable cadre of personnel to administer any rigorous, academic course work. The

result was the appointment of an academically credentialed, professionally successful officer from the Dean of Faculty beginning the tenure on the Commandant’s staff to effectively change and institute a credible and stable military studies program.

The main question this exchange raises is why it took twenty-five years to establish a solid professional military studies program at a service academy? Also, why do professional military studies have such a minimal focus and importance at the Air Force Academy, and what does this say and how does this affect the greater Air Force? The answer could lie in the familiar disparaging remark that the Air Force is not a highly intellectual institution and instead focuses too much on specialized training, though this is beyond the scope of this work. This study suggests that the inclusion of professional military studies competes with the general academic education program, which involved, and continues to involve, a highly demanding course load that includes an emphasis on the sciences and engineering, as well as the social sciences and humanities. The core curriculum consists of a robust number of classes that leaves little time for military studies, which does not carry the weight of the more common academic course work. Additionally, the idea of what constitutes military studies often gets confused with material that would most align with military training. However, during the critical period of review in 1979, when individuals recognized the need for greater emphasis on military studies, the Superintendent of the Academy appointed the first Permanent Professor housed within the Commandant of Cadets’ sphere, and the institution marginally adjusted the vector in a more positive, influential, and meaningful direction for the officer candidate’s professional military education.

With the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq remaining muddled endeavors in the fall of 2009, Congressman Ike Skelton queried the Academy’s Dean of Faculty on a book list for “a budding
strategist.” The Congressman even provided his own suggestions. Reaching out to the
departments that were “most closely linked to ‘strategy,’” the Dean asked for inputs from the
departments of History, Political Science, and Military and Strategic Studies. As the Permanent
Professor and Department Head for History, then-Colonel Mark Wells replied, regarding
building strategists:

I believe we need to start here at USAFA—from the very beginning of a cadet’s career—in
encouraging them to begin to think about conflict (in all its forms and at all levels), the
profession of arms, and their role in society. Frankly, I’m not convinced everyone is
wired to be a visionary, nor to think in truly strategic terms. Nevertheless, our job as
faculty, in part, is to “increase the pool” of potential strategists by challenging and
inspiring them at appropriate educational levels throughout the four years. If we wait
until our officers are captains or majors to introduce them to the notion of strategy, or,
even worse, as colonels, we will suffer what Dr. Richard Kohn has so eloquently called
the “withering of strategy which has been manifest in a continual string of military
problems.”

Trying to study the subject on the role of professional military studies program at the
U.S. Air Force Academy is made more feasible by the fact that a vast body of resources is
available in the Special Collections Branch on the top floor of the Air Force Academy library.
Each year, Air Force Academy historians write a summary of the past year’s events. This
tradition began at the Academy in 1956 when Lieutenant Colonel Edgar A. Holt, on the direction
of the second Superintendent, Major General James E. Briggs, developed a history discussing the
origins of the Academy. Colonel Holt’s history of 1954-1956 also includes a multi-volume

3 Mark Wells, “Books for Strategists,” email received by author, 21 July 2009. This email
responded to an email from the Dean’s office, with the subject, “HOT! Reading List from
CM Skelton.”
appendix that contains some of the relevant material used to create his history. Holt, a former Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Omaha and Chairman of the History Department at the University of Kansas City, was recalled back to active service during the Korean War, and he fulfilled a need that the Air Force had for an historian. In this initial role, he first documented the participation of the 5th Air Forces in the Korean conflict as part of the USAF Historical Division. Soon afterwards, he ended up at the Pentagon with the Air University Historical Liaison Officer, and then took a job at the Air Force Academy as the Chief of the Historical Division—part of the Office of Information Services. The Air Force saw that the kind of work he had done as a college professor teaching history would be beneficial for the service. General Idwal Edwards noted: “For once [the Air Force] got a round peg in a round hole!” Colonel Holt’s initial history laid the groundwork for years of annual histories concerning the Air Force Academy.

The histories primarily followed the fiscal year, which was the period from 1 July to 30 June in its early years—this makes it seem to follow some sort of academic year, since this is how most of the historical periods of the Academy are made. The first historical study completed in August 1957 actually covered two years, 1954-1956, but it also included commentary on the entire period prior to the Academy’s establishment. The historians for these volumes—two volumes of history and another five appendices—were then-Lieutenant Colonel Edgar Holt, Dr.

---


M. Hamlin Cannon, and Dr. Carlos R. Allen, Jr. The annual histories for most other years take between one and three volumes.

In a January 1957 interview with Brigadier General Charles Lindbergh, the Air Force Academy Command Historian, then-Major Edgar Holt, queried: “Do you think that the emphasis at the Air Force Academy should be on technical training, a broad basic education in the sciences and in the humanities as well as military studies, or on purely military studies?” The famous aviator remarked: “That is really a tough question and I supposed we will be trying to find the best answer for a long time to come.”6 This history is an examination on the evolution of military studies within the overall Academy curriculum. To the proposed question, however, General Lindbergh responded expansively:

In one sense, Air Force Academy planners are faced with the need of providing future air commanders who are primarily concerned with physical survival in atomic war; but in the long run physical survival depends on a good deal more than technical training and military excellence. A study of the humanities is also of great importance. Such civilian institutions as MIT and Cal Tech are faced with this problem. Each year engineers and scientists require more and more specialized training to keep up with the complicated developments of our times. But I believe it is wise to keep in mind Arnold Toynbee’s statement to the effect that the emphasis and perfection of techniques, both military and civil, have accompanied the disintegrating stages of past civilizations. I think this can be summarized by saying that while our short-term survival may depend on military strength, our long-term survival depends on such relatively intangible elements as character, spirit, and wisdom for the use of our military strength. These latter elements cannot be attained through the overemphasis of technical training. They require a balance in training which fluctuates with time, and for which probably no formula can

---

be written. But it is upon this balance that the life of our civilization depends; and since it relates to survival, it is of essential importance in planning the courses to be given at the Air Force Academy.\textsuperscript{7}

The importance of learning about strategic thinking and planning stems from the fact that it is a specialized ability, and it is one that can be developed over time. As defense analyst and commentator Andrew Krepinevich has observed:

The strategist’s situation is fundamentally different from the engineer’s. Engineering problems deal with physical laws and regularities, which means they can have genuine solutions. In war or business a given strategy may succeed, but then again it may not — especially if one has overlooked important features of the situation or the opponent responds with an effective counterstrategy. Strategies, consequently, are always conditional, hostage to how events play out in the unpredictable future, and subject to unforeseen changes in the nature of the competitive environment.\textsuperscript{8}

Moreover, the “mindset” of individuals may be set at an early time, so that it is harder to achieve the ability to conduct effective strategic thinking and planning if one waits too long.

Krepinevich and Barry D. Watts have observed: “By the time most individuals reach their early twenties, they either have developed the cognitive skills for strategy or they have not.”\textsuperscript{9} The role of military studies in coordination with a liberal arts foundation assists with this development.


\textsuperscript{8} Andrew F. Krepinevich and Barry D. Watts, “Regaining Strategic Competence,” 2009 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments from the Strategy for the Long Haul Series, 17.

\textsuperscript{9} Krepinevich and Watts, “Regaining Strategic Competence,” 18.
Right after World War II, after serving on the Operations and Plans Division (OPD) of the General Staff of the War Department, Major General George “Abe” Lincoln, a Rhodes Scholar recipient in 1929 upon his graduation from West Point, was asked by Colonel Herman Beukema to return to West Point to teach. Beukema “convinced [Lincoln] that the powerful strategy for intervening in the education of general officers was to equip them for handling political and military high command matters at West Point—not at the military war colleges.”

The service academy is a good time to begin an education in military studies as an officer candidate.

Today the United States Air Force Academy has a Department of Military and Strategic Studies under the overall authority of the Dean of Faculty. This department has as its charter the role to provide “the study of the context, theory, and application of military power”—with special emphasis on the role of airpower to the art and science of war. The document that helps define the duty of the department also states that this necessary study for officer candidates constitutes “the essence of a military academy education” and, most certainly, the central core of a professional military studies program.

10 Robert S. Jordan, *An Unsung Soldier: The Life of Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2013), 5, 13, 162n4. Lincoln was the first West Point recipient of the Rhodes Scholar and would work under Beukema as the deputy head of the then soon-to-be-named Department of Social Sciences. Lincoln took a two-rank demotion to Colonel to accept the position. Lincoln also established his “Lincoln Brigade” in the Strategy and Policy Group, which was situated in OPD, in which he actively recruited Rhodes Scholars. See again, Jordan, 13.

The Air Force established its Academy in the foothills of Colorado Springs in 1954. The role was to “educate, train and motivate many of the men who are to command the air power of the United States.” In the same month that President Eisenhower signed the Congressional bill to establish the Academy, April 1954, the cover of Newsweek magazine was graced with the question, “The Bomb—What Odds for Survival Now?” There was also a picture of a Vietnamese paratrooper, who was supporting the French forces in Indochina around Dien Bien Phu. A year later, in the same month in which the new air cadets showed up at the interim campus, housed at Lowry AFB, Colorado, just outside of Denver, the magazine had a picture on the cover of a French Foreign Legionnaire with his formation of other, similarly-uniformed troops, with the cover title, “Foreign Legion: Time’s Running Out for Beau Geste; Can French Arms Save North Africa?—See International.” The problem suggested by covers such as these and the stories to which they applied was the difficulty of trying to predict the character and processes of future wars. Even as the Air Force Academy was established, then, there were questions and uncertainties about what needed to be done and what needed to be taught.

---


13 Newsweek, 5 April 1954 and 26 April 1954, respectively. The April 26 edition also had a ribbon on it with the caption, “Inside the New Communist Party, U.S.A.”

14 Newsweek, 11 July 1955. The cover explanation on page 9 states, “The Cover: Amid mounting terror and unrest in North Africa, the French Legionnaire stands as the symbol of French determination. For a report on the struggle between Arab Nationalism and French Colonialism, see page 35.”
So what constitutes the most appropriate form of education for the military professional? Josiah Bunting suggested early on an argument that he maintained for decades:

It is the liberal education which can best teach a man [that they learn the value of what they may have to defend, to learn to love the richness and variety of their culture and of other cultures, to shape in their minds some conception of what is meant by the phrase *the good life*, to learn tolerance and charity, to develop standards of criticism, to learn to refresh their minds with the tonic of great literature and history and their spirit with great music and art, to learn the fierce corrosiveness of hate, to learn that military victory must not be purchased in ways that utterly defeat the purpose for which campaigns are undertaken.]

It is a kind of education least likely to flourish, at least in any formal, academic way, in times of great economic crisis and international tension. But, it should be the heart of the education of men who take their soldier’s pay.\(^{15}\)

In his scathing indictment on American generalship and the lack of accountability since World War II—what he terms the “Marshall system”—veteran journalist Thomas E. Ricks discusses the inadequacy of the education of modern American generals to develop strategic understanding as the basis for sound action. Ricks attributes the failure of today’s generals to the “feud” between two generals, General William DePuy and Major General John Cushman, who

\(^{15}\) Josiah Bunting, “The Humanities in the Education of the Military Professional,” in *The System for Educating Military Officers in the U.S.*, ed. Lawrence J. Korb (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh, 1976), 158. In Bunting’s lecture he quotes what John Rosenberg told cadets years back—this is the material above in brackets, as Bunting suggests this role of the humanities is why liberal education is best for the military person. Bunting gave these remarks while presenting on a panel, “Civilian Education for the Military Officer” at the International Studies Association (ISA) convention in Washington, D.C., 1975. The above document is a publication of ISA.
could not compromise their different and complex views of how to rejuvenate the Army after Vietnam. The result was a system and a doctrine that “emphasized training, which prepares soldiers for the known, far more than education, which prepares them to deal with the unknown.” DePuy’s vision resulted in producing generals unable to resolve the ambiguous wars in the Middle East and Central Asia in the twenty-first century.16

In a collection specifically addressing military education of past, present, and future, the editors claim that the lack of rigorous professional military education is understandable. They observe: “Burdened with the responsibility to be operationally capable, and often short of money, men, and equipment, the professional military has always seen a purely academic education as a luxury.”17 Unfortunately, “[w]ar fighting is the greatest challenge to a student’s capacity for dealing with the unknown, and those trained, as opposed to educated, have seldom managed to muster the wherewithal to cope with the environment” of war.18

16 Thomas E. Ricks, The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today (New York: Penguin Books, 2012), 346, 349. The entire chapter on “DePuy’s Great Rebuilding” does an excellent job of outlining the difficulties of professional military studies, between those who believe in training versus education—the resulting conflict between General DePuy and General Cushman, who advocated the broad education and understanding of warfare. See ibid., pp. 335—353. According to Ricks, the resulting failures in strategic generalship of General Tommy Franks and Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez in Iraq came from the DePuy system—one that was training dominant—that raised them. See ibid., 398, 419-421.


18 Kennedy and Nelson, xi.
In his address to the military history symposium on officer education, General Philip Caine, who was the first Permanent Professor and Deputy Commandant for Military Instruction in the Commandant’s Office overseeing military education, observed:

Given the mission of the service academies, it follows that professional military studies should be the cornerstone of that portion of the core curriculum (the courses required of all cadets regardless of major) which sets these institutions apart from the normal college or university. The professional part of the core curriculum includes the relatively few courses generally unique to service academies and essential in the military preparation of officers. At the Air Force Academy these include military history, aeronautical engineering, leadership concepts, language and expression, and ethics. Together with military studies, they form what I call the professional core.19

This analysis, then, explores the role (or lack of role, during some periods) of professional military education at the Air Force Academy—those studies that develop the officer candidate to become a life-long learner in the profession of arms, national defense, and the nature and character of warfare. As General Caine suggested:

[The professional curriculum at the Air Force Academy] builds the base for understanding the military profession and the responsibilities of service so that graduates, throughout their careers, will realize the importance of keeping current and continually broadening their knowledge and understanding of their chosen profession . . . . This is the responsibility of the military studies curriculum and those who teach it. A great deal of progress has been made in this cornerstone of military education. Nevertheless, there are still very basic issues to deal with and to solve before the total professional

This work offers a discussion on what the path was on why military studies was not emphasized at the Academy and how there was finally a recognition and a proper and effective role for professional military studies at the Air Force Academy, at least to some degree.

I have chosen to end this discussion in 2005. Although the professional military education program continues to confront challenges, it was in 2005 that the Academy decided to create a Department of Military and Strategic Studies, the department being placed within the authority of the Dean of Faculty, cementing the idea that forming a strong officer candidate required a solid education in the more specific content pertaining to the military profession.

A special focus for the Air Force has always been the development and integration of new technologies, which is understandable given the roles and functions of the service. However, as the airpower historian, David MacIsaac reflected: “Machines can be made to do work, but they never have nor ever can build an air force that will work.”

A department

20 Caine, 235-236.

21 David MacIsaac, Lt. Col., (USAF), “Commentary” in Alfred F. Hurley and Robert C. Ehrhart, eds. Air Power and Warfare, (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1979) 286-287. MacIsaac’s “Commentary” was to the panel on, “The Search for Maturity in American Postwar Air Doctrine and Organization, 1945-1953” during proceedings of the 8th Military History Symposium, United States Air Force Academy, 18-20 October 1978. MacIsaac was relaying an anecdote that “Air Power” was “People Power,” thus the need for effective education in professional military studies, a concept advanced by a fellow Department of History faculty member in the early 1970s, who in 1978 was then-Colonel Ron Fogleman. General Fogleman was the 15th Chief of Staff of the Air Force (1994-1997), and the first Air Force Academy graduate (Class of 1963) to hold that position.
focused on studying the military profession itself was to be a major step to providing a remedy for this problem.
Chapter 1 - The Need for Military Studies

“US airmen have long been known for their fascination with technology and the mental toughness required to press home a bombing attack against fierce resistance or to outduel an enemy fighter. But they have never been known for their academic inquisitiveness, their devotion to the study of the art of war, or their contributions to the theory of airpower. Instead, American airmen have remained ‘doers’ rather than introspective ‘thinkers’.”

Dennis M. Drew

The Air War College (AWC) was the institution set up to provide Air Force field grade officers with strategic-level preparation. In the days of insurgent warfare of the 1960s, an AWC student paper did provide “a more balanced view of airpower in counterinsurgent operations.” Colonel Robert Hardie prepared a paper that examined the British and French efforts in Malaysia and Algeria, respectively, that emphasized the integration and cooperation of military and non-military means to have strategic effects in insurgent warfare. This paper was the first, and one of the only, serious papers “to link insurgency theory and experience directly to air operations,” and it was done in 1967—no further examples would come until the 1980s. Then-Colonel Dale Smith reflected on education in the Air Force in correspondence with General Hubert Harmon, the “father of the Air Force Academy.” Smith stated: “Education is a lifetime proposition…. In the Air Force we can be assured that an enterprising officer is sent to schools progressively

23 Established in 1946. Field grade officers are majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels. Air War College is the senior-level professional military school that is normally attended by lieutenant colonels and colonels.
24 Drew, 336.
throughout his career. Thus we need not cram his lifetime education into his four years at the academy. Instead, we can teach him what he must know to best pursue his junior officer duties, and be sure that he has learned it. It seems to me that such a program should rightfully include flying.”

Understanding the overall training and education processes required in officer production is central to discussion of the development of professional military education at the Air Force Academy. In his Harmon Memorial Lecture, a lecture series at the United States Air Force Academy going back to the year of its first graduating class, 1959, the eminent military historian Richard Preston posited that there were four significant aspects associated with effective officer development. He listed these as fostering the qualities of character and leadership, providing a strong general education, inculcating military training, and ensuring a solid professional education. Balancing these aspects has been challenging to all military academies, and the Air Force Academy continues to struggle with the most effective mix of coursework and training that

sufficiently prepares its officer candidates to meet the challenges in this volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous world.

Some argue that the military professional should have a solid understanding of warfare. The *sine qua non* for military officership would actually be that he was prepared to operate in the chaotic, ambiguous, and enigmatic world of warfare. The military historian Williamson Murray offered three reasons why he returned to the academic realm—in 1969 at the age of 28 he enrolled in Yale’s graduate program—the final one being that he “hoped to use my study of history as a tool to help future military leaders avoid the costly, palpable mistakes that their predecessors had made in waging that dismal conflict known to Americans as the Vietnam War.” He added that it “has been the avowed purpose of much of my writing to help America’s military and political leaders perform more competently in the future.”²⁷ In a similar vein, I.B. Holley, Jr., a renowned military historian and general officer, noted: “A service that does not develop rigorous thinkers among its leaders and decision makers is inviting friction, folly, and failure.” As Holley suggests, “When one attempts to grapple with the problem of how these thinkers especially officers in the different services at different times, have tried to integrate technological innovations effectively in their organizations, the crucial importance of professional military education becomes clear.”²⁸ So the necessity to emphasize the study of warfare and to allow it to permeate the studies of officer candidates at a service academy seems common sense.

Samuel P. Huntington introduced the reader to individuals who initiated and established military professionalism in the American military. This “creative core” ensured that the American military understood its role in society, specifically “to focus upon their ‘real business—war’,” and that the military “must always be ‘organized and governed on true military principles’ so as to preserve in peacetime the ‘habits and usages of war’.”

The idea that the military professional must study those subjects to enhance and improve one’s ability to make war was integrated into the core military concept early in its existence.

In his tour de force, *The Soldier and the State*, Huntington wrote in his chapter on the “Rise of the Military Profession” that the early nineteenth century had witnessed “[t]he objective emergence of a complicated science of war and of professional institutions devoted to that science [that] rendered obsolete eighteenth-century conceptions of war as an ill-defined craft and of the general as a natural genius.” Huntington noted that Carl von Clausewitz’s *On War*, which was not published in English until 1879, offered an approach to fulfill this distinct concept of learning about war. Huntington is given great credit, especially by military historian Russell Weigley, as placing the rise of military professionalism in the state of Prussia, and later the Prussian-dominated German empire, when the origins of the professional officer corps began—aside from the fact that this period also ushered in the term *militarism* to our vernacular in the

---


30 Huntington, 55.
20th century. As Weigley credits Huntington with observing, this period is when the aristocracy’s dominance of the officer corps began to wane and the systematic study of the military profession arose.31

Clausewitz understood the value of the study of war. His thoughts developed gradually, concluding in his most enduring maxim—a mere slogan to some—that “war is merely the continuation of policy by other means.” But what did Clausewitz contribute regarding professional military studies? He stated clearly: “Theory should be study, not doctrine…. It is meant to educate the mind of the future commander, not to accompany him to the battlefield; just as a wise teacher guides and stimulates a young man’s intellectual development, but is careful not to lead him by the hand for the rest of his life.”32 According to Clausewitz, then, one needs to study warfare for the intellectual benefits that may produce future fruits, not merely to define principles to stand as rules that may not work in future wars. Similarly, education was to be a process beyond inculcating obedience. It was to be “[t]he systemic instruction of individuals in


subjects that will enhance their knowledge of the science and art of war.”33 By contrast, military training, as suggested in Department of Defense documents, was: “1. The instruction of personnel to enhance their capacity to perform specific military functions and tasks. 2. The exercise of one or more military units conducted to enhance their combat readiness.”34 “Military science” was also often seen as “cut and dried.” One collection of terms defined “military science”: “The study of the ways and means, as well as the hows and whys [sic], of military affairs. Dame Rebecca West (1892-1983), the English novelist and journalist, once wrote that: ‘Before a war, military science seems a real science, like astronomy, but after a war it seems more like astrology.’ 2. The technology of war.”35

Finally, Kelly C. Jordan has observed:

Military science is defined as a systemized body of knowledge regarding and relating to the theory, application, and employment of military units and weapons in land warfare…and armed conflict encompassing issues related to the following areas: military leadership, military organization; military training and education; military history; military ethics; military doctrine; military tactics, operations, and strategy; military geography; and military technology and equipment…[It] has always had a narrow, limited, and technical connotation and is considered to be a subset of the larger body of knowledge known as the military art…Critics, however, see military science as simply a

vocational body of knowledge akin to plumbing, as opposed to promoting its utility to the public by studying conflict, war, and the organized application of coercive force in a world that has been characterized far more by conflict than by peace.\textsuperscript{36} Johnson’s contribution concerning this term ends with mention of “recent developments,” which includes “cultural studies” and “officership.” The author concludes: “These new concepts suggest the need for an expanded conception of the military science field of study, based solidly in the humanities and social sciences and perhaps dubbed \textit{military studies}, which would be more in line with current academic practice and which would be a much more accurate characterization of this immensely interesting and far-ranging field of inquiry.”\textsuperscript{37}

General Arnold, in his final report to the Secretary of War on 12 November 1945, had stressed the significance of avoiding complacency, stating: “National safety would be endangered by an Air Force whose doctrines and techniques are tied solely to the equipment and processes of the moment. Present equipment is but a step in progress, and any Air Force which does not keep its doctrines ahead of its equipment, and its vision far into the future, can only delude the nation into a false sense of security…. The basic planning, development, organization, and training of the Air Force must be well rounded, covering every modern means of waging air war, and the

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{37} Jordan, 880-885.
\end{flushright}
techniques of employing such means must be continuously developed and kept up to date. The Air Force doctrines likewise must be flexible at all times and entirely uninhibited by tradition.”

At his 50-year reunion at West Point, General Dwight Eisenhower remarked to General Omar Bradley, “You know, Brad, this goddamn place hasn’t changed a friggin’ bit since we graduated in 1915.” Whatever accounted for this somewhat “ill-tempered” remark, Lance Betros suggests that Eisenhower was not only off the mark—things had changed a lot in the five decades—but also that they would change even more drastically in the subsequent five decades. However, academically, West Point had undergone some change since Brad and Ike’s graduation. The changes at West Point have implications for the Air Force Academy as well, partly because many of the earliest leaders of the independent Air Force studied at the Army’s academy. In the 1920s, Colonel Herman Beukema, who chaired a department of economics, government, and history, strove hard to change the curriculum toward a more general, or liberal, education.

The reason why a focus on the Academy and its development of an effective professional military studies program is so significant is, as sociologist Morris Janowitz noted in a ground-breaking work, “Although attendance at a service academy is not universal for generals and

39 Quoted in Lance Betros, Carved in Granite: West Point since 1902 (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2012), 310-302.
admirals, the academies set the standards of behavior for the whole military profession.\textsuperscript{41}

Janowitz also presciently remarked that in the future “military leaders must be prepared to assist in accurately estimating the consequences of the threat or use of force against the potentials for persuasion and conflict resolution.”\textsuperscript{42}

In 1959 the Air Force Academy’s Department of History began the Harmon Memorial Lecture series on Military History, whose purpose was to enhance the cadets’ own sense of military identity and their ideas about military professionalism. The series was named after the Academy’s first Superintendent, Lieutenant General Hubert R. Harmon. In 1988, Lieutenant Colonel Harry Borowski from the department compiled thirty of these lectures into a book, which he dedicated “To Those Who Study War, To Assure Freedom and Liberty.”\textsuperscript{43} The Harmon Lecture Series demonstrated the seriousness of the Academy, or at least of one department, in seeing the need for the officer candidate to understand his or her role, and to appreciate the significant impact, either negative or positive, that the service could have as an arm of national power.

A large swath of scholarship on the military emphasizes an inability of the institution to change from within. However, in the foreword to this collection of Harmon Lectures, released as \textit{The First Twenty-five Years}, the editorial committee suggested: “Change, not stability and

\textsuperscript{41} Janowitz, \textit{The Professional Soldier}, 127.

\textsuperscript{42} Janowitz, 417. Janowitz, in this epilogue, offers four dilemmas that face the military professional—this is a most noteworthy one.

tradition, has been a characteristic feature of cadet educational programs thus far in the Academy’s history; it appears that the willingness to modify, to innovate, to seek more effective educational combinations and techniques is likely to remain alive in the future.”44 This proved to be true of the professional military studies program at the Academy.

Since this work concentrates on professional military studies, or professional military education, development at the Air Force Academy, it is essential to offer some discussion of what is meant by these broad, sometimes seemingly all-encompassing terms. Specifically, it is crucial to grasp the difference between two terms frequently used in professional development: “training” and “education.” A sweeping and original study on military education by John Masland and Laurence Radway presents an excellent discussion and succinct description of these terms. As they suggest, even though the two words are often used interchangeably—which by itself demonstrates misunderstanding—they really do mean different things. They assert: “[T]raining identifies instruction that is oriented to a particular military specialty and that is designed to develop a technical skill….Education, on the other hand, implies instruction or individual study for the purpose of intellectual development and the cultivation of wisdom and judgment. It prepares a man to deal with novel situations….Training is job-oriented; education goes beyond the next assignment and seeks to prepare the officer for a lifetime career of service involving ultimately the greatest responsibility that can be imposed.”45 A simple example of how

44 The United States Air Force Academy’s First Twenty-five Years: Some Perceptions (U.S. Air Force Academy: Special Collections, 1979), xi.
the service and its academic professionals continued to blur this distinction can be found in a seminal work on the officer personnel system. In this solid work by Vance Mitchell, the index contains a listing for “Education, professional military,” but it includes guidance to “See also Flight Training; Training admission of blacks into training school.” Professional military studies and professional military education actually has more to do with the professional intellectual growth, specifically in officer development, while training is more task-specific and immediate.

The distinction between education and training is far from new. Xenophon stated that Socrates interrogated a man who had attended military school and found that the course was limited to basic drill. Socrates criticized the man’s education by noting “that drill was only the smallest part of military command.” He suggested that intelligence was a more significant factor than leadership or experience, and so studies in “supply, planning, and effective management” and other pursuits were necessary. Some modern writers have been influenced by classical thinkers as well as by more recent ones. British Air Vice-Marshal R.A. Mason is among them. Mason makes clear what he thought to be necessary in professional military education, specifically at the academies. He emphasizes: “In the classrooms we need to reinforce professional awareness by emphasizing those subjects which distinguish the military studies here [at the Air Force Academy] from those anywhere else, including the evolution, potential, and


47 Preston, 269.
constraints of aerospace power: the military exploitation of the third dimension by man and woman, not necessarily with man and women. These should be studied in the context of the history of warfare, of the fluctuating impact of technology, of the interaction of war and politics, especially the often-uncomfortable subordination of the military method to the political objective. We need to expand still further the junior officer’s awareness of, and sensitivity to, cultural diversity.” Here Mason revealed the necessity of professional education—specifically how to implement air and space power—within the realm of a broader, more traditional, academic education.

In his essay “A U.S. Air Force Academy Dilemma: Professional Military Studies,” Brigadier General Philip Caine stated the problem as seen in his time: “Given the mission of the service academies, it follows that professional military studies should be the cornerstone of that portion of the core curriculum (the courses required of all cadets regardless of major) which sets these institutions apart from the normal college or university.” However, one can easily see the conundrum presented by military studies, according to Caine, since “many members of the staff and faculty at the Air Force Academy can neither define military studies nor explain the differences between it and military training, often using the two terms interchangeably.” This issue has never been fully resolved.

Speaking to members of the cadet wing in 1996, Brigadier General John Flanagan said what had helped him in his time as a Forward Air Controller (FAC) in Vietnam three decades earlier. Most notably, he first cited his military training—“the assault course and physical conditioning, combat skills, rifles and bayonets, the things we went through as basic cadets”—as key to his success in theater. However, earlier he had recalled the confusion of most military officers in that conflict. As he suggested, “we were thrust into a jungle environment [instead of the Fulda Gap], a guerilla war, something that was alien and that we did not understand.”50 Later he mentioned the value of some his academic coursework—possibly presented in the order of significance to him and his Vietnam experience. He mentioned chemistry, aerodynamics, mathematics, physics, and astronautics before he mentioned history, political science, economics, foreign languages, and his geography and cartography coursework. Nowhere mentioned is any aspect of professional military studies—the closest reference was to the history he had studied that had specifically touched on coalition warfare.51 

Flanagan had his opinions. But he seemed to miss the fact that many people already saw military studies as crucial—even the term itself suggests its importance—and this, many thought, should be the cornerstone of an academy education. Each officer candidate, some believe, should have at least a “Fox Conner” experience. This refers to the pivotal and instrumental experience

---


51 Flanagan, 368.
that Dwight Eisenhower had as a young officer during his time in Panama with Colonel Fox Conner. Eisenhower, later in life, argued that Conner was “the ablest man I ever knew.”

Eisenhower also stated: “In sheer ability and character, he was the outstanding soldier of my time...outside of my parents he had more influence on me and my outlook than any other individual, especially in regard to the military profession.”

What is significant is that Conner fulfilled Eisenhower’s military studies, which actually should have occurred during his West Point education, while in Panama.

Civilians could also see importance in serious study of military affairs, making it all the more apparent that military officers should not slight the detailed study of warfare and strategy. Although not a military professional, to broaden the example, Nelson Mandela had his own Fox Connor moment. As he explained in his autobiography, central to his development as a leader in the South African movement was his study of warfare. Although he was never a soldier, he had the task of starting an army—the *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (“The Spear of the Nation”). His organization would “wage acts of violence against the state”—so he read and talked to experts. He studied general armed warfare, but concentrated on waging guerilla war—he read the report by Blas Roca on the organized fight against the Batista government, the tactics of the Boer


generals, Guevara, Mao (on whose work he took 65 pages of notes), Menachem Begin, the Ethiopians’ struggle against Mussolini, and the conflicts in Kenya, Algeria, and Cameroon. But most instrumental was the period he spent underground—in a white suburb in Berea—under the tutelage of Wolfie Kodesh. According to Mandela, Kodesh, a veteran of warfare in North Africa and Italy during the Second World War, not only had firsthand experience with warfare on the battlefield, but also was knowledgeable about warfare on all levels. He provided Mandela more reading on the subject, to include Clausewitz’s *On War*, which resonated with Mandela as he embraced one of the central themes—that warfare is an extension of politics. In most military officers’ cases, this quip is often reproduced without a strong understanding—Mandela’s “Fox Conner moment” with Kodesh provided him with all sorts of context—and so he was a true student of warfare.54

In his chapter “On Military Genius,” Carl von Clausewitz, after laying out the vast challenges of warfare in his first two chapters of book two, concludes: “No wonder, then, that war, though it may appear to be uncomplicated, cannot be waged with distinction except by men of outstanding intellect.” He emphasizes: “Even junior positions of command require outstanding intellectual qualities for outstanding achievement . . . . Such officers may appear to be rather simple compared to the polymath scholar, the far-ranging business executive, the statesman; but we should not dismiss the value of their practical intelligence.” Clausewitz extols the intellectual virtues of the “genius”—that commander-in-chief who has the deep understanding of national policy and can integrate a successful strategy to achieve it, thus being

“simultaneously a statesman.”\textsuperscript{55} He closes his chapter on the military genius with a question: “What sort of mind is likeliest to display the qualities of military genius”? Clausewitz answers: “Experience and observation will both tell us it is the inquiring rather than the creative mind, the comprehensive rather than the specialized approach, the calm rather than the excitable head to which in war we would choose to entrust the fate of our brothers and children, and the safety and honor of our country.”\textsuperscript{56} Clausewitz supports the broad-minded officer rather than the specialist, and recognized the requirement for not only professional military education, but also the more general academic education, as emphasized by the Academy’s founders.

The concentration on the requirement for a broad education received support in the first decade after the founding of the Air Force Academy. This emphasis on the general academic studies, in both the sciences and humanities, left little time or thought for professional military education. In his forward to Major William Simons’ work \textit{Liberal Education in the Service Academies}, Edward Katzenbach states: “It is also significant that [an academy graduate], such as the lieutenant general at present (1964-1965) Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is able to take a master’s degree in engineering at Princeton University while working for his doctorate in political science.”\textsuperscript{57} Katzenbach noted that around “70%” of academy graduates could gain acceptance and perform well at the “most highly regarded universities.” The stress was always on an effective academic education, not so much a professional military education.

\textsuperscript{56} Clausewitz, 112.
Much of the historiography on the development and operation of the Air Force Academy has rather simply suggested that the influence of the existing military academies shaped the Air Force Academy. John Lovell remark: “The design that emerged from the long years of planning is remarkable, however, not for its novelty or inventiveness but, on the contrary, for its close resemblance to the traditional pattern of training and education at the older academies.”58 But what actually happened was different. In an interview with the Air Force Academy historian in Washington, D.C., on 26 October 1956, Lieutenant General Idwal H. Edwards recalled: “It was a feeling in the service that the old Academies—the Naval Academy and the Military Academy at West Point—that a new look was needed, and that the four-year course as carried on for many years at the old service Academies did not fit, let’s say, modern day requirements.” They considered a plan combining two years of “civilian” education with two years of military training. Edward stated: “It might be interesting to note that the people who favored such a system as that [the 2-year/2-year proposal] were, in themselves, Service Academy graduates.” Father Guthrie, President of Georgetown University, was one who adamantly opposed any inventive plan, thinking that a four-year academy was a necessity to mold young men into leaders of character, as envisioned by the officer development program. The desire for a broad understanding of military thinking and military experience persisted, yet it also left questions. Could one achieve a genuinely military education using a traditionally civilian academic structure and program. Also, if the education of new officers was to be broad, how did something seemingly narrow such as “tactics” fit into it? In fact, some leaders at the Academy were praised for broadening the available education rather than for fitting it specifically to

military needs. As Lance Betros has noted in Carved in Granite, Lt. Gen. Garrison Davidson’s four years as superintendent (1956-1960) were “unusually productive” in introducing much needed change. Among the changes was the reform of academic programs, which, he “believed[,] had lagged behind the rapid advances of knowledge in the post-war era.” The reforms included his five main priorities: to establish an elective program, to allow advanced students more challenging courses, to offer more courses in the humanities and social sciences, to provide more instruction in nuclear science, and to put less emphasis on military training, especially during the school year, keeping it to the “minimum essential” required.59

Elting Morison has studied large-scale societal change that was brought on by technical innovation, and how societies adapt to that change, and, more important, how people work to control and manage society’s reaction to the change. Morison suggests: “[T]he current problem is how to organize and manage the system of ideas, energies, and machinery so it will conform to all the human dimensions.” In attempting to tackle this complexity, Morison offers three approaches that the human dimension should not take – offering ideas that can help in analyzing programmatic changes at the Air Force Academy. The most significant approach is “to develop some grand synthesis to bring the whole system of ideas, energies, and machines under suitable control.” But the attempt to do this—to offer these grand syntheses—does not usually move easily and well from theory into practice. Morison’s caution comes from the idea that the move to synthesis discounts “too many variables in a situation where human beings enter in to be successfully comprehended in any fixed grand design.”60 Similarly, in his discussion of military

59 Betros, 53-54.
reform, Peter Paret concluded in 1966: “No one will claim that our political and strategic competence even approaches the excellence and sophistication of our weapons system[s].” As he suggests with the European leadership from the end of the 19th century up to the First World War, “[t]he leaders of the warring nations possessed only very imperfect ability to use their military tools, and they no longer fully understood how to relate war to national policy….The technological complexities produced by the industrial revolution had led to greater emphasis on the technical training of officers and on the mastery of certain administration and organizational problems—for instance mobilization and supply.” Paret concluded: “What the soldier [and airman] of today must do is to step outside the very close circle of his duties and seek to understand what he and his country are involved in. Not only the techniques of your profession matter, but also their purposes. You may object that it is unrealistic to expect a serving officer to

61 Peter Paret, “Innovation and Reform in Warfare” in Harry R. Borowski, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, ed., The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History, 1959-1987: A Collection of the First Thirty Harmon Lectures Given at the United States Air Force Academy (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1988), 402. Lecture delivered at the US Air Force Academy in 1966. Interesting in this lecture is his analysis on the discipline of history and his reflection on the widening conflict in Southeast Asia, to which he observes, “Every event in the past is unique, as is every incident of our own day….Oddly enough, however, people that are not professionally involved in the study of the past do sometimes invest history, or their view of it, with a kind of universal authority. An example of this tendency, very much in evidence in recent weeks, is comparing Vietnam to the Czechoslovakia of 1938…. The wisdom of American policy in Southeast Asia is not at question here; but those of its supporters who attempt to explain and defend it by recalling the failure of western democracies in 1938, or who claim to base their decisions on lessons learned from this failure, do their cause less than justice,” 397.

62 Paret, 403.
be concerned with the implications of his work. But isn’t that the mark of the true professional?”  

Changes among the military services and changes within any one of them are always political acts as much as they are matters of military thinking and organizational theory and planning. In a dissertation completed in 1969, called “The Founding of the Air Force Academy: An Administrative and Legislative History,” Edward Anthony Miller, Jr., reviews the events leading to establishment of the Academy in 1954. Besides showing the better organization and growing maturity of the Air Force staff system, this work shows the interaction of the defense organization with Congress. Miller examines the development of air doctrine, to include the concept of “‘airpower,’ a term used to describe the evolution both of aircraft and employment concepts.” This work details the legislative process of even a “minor project” such as the establishment of a new academy, but it also shows the importance of the military service structure to sustaining such an effort. The struggle of the Air Force to gain its own academy “was finally carried, not necessarily on its merits, but because of the persistence of the Air Force and the coincidence of a new war which began the trend toward massive military expenditures.”

In the concluding chapter of his study of service academies, John Lovell states: “Change is inescapable.” He suggests that cries for the abolition of the academies—he was writing in 1979—mainly to use more cost-effective alternative commissioning sources instead, had led to a number of proposals, generating more issues and questions rather than offering satisfying answers. As he saw it, all that was proposed were rather improbable solutions. What he

63 Paret, 408.
concluded without reservation, however, was that the status quo was just as implausible. He observed that the increasing ratio of women at the academies, among other pressing issues, would require some significant modifications in programs. “Similarly,” he asserted, “continuing changes in technology and in demands upon the military profession inescapably will lead to requirements for further modifications of academic coursework and military training.”

But Lovell concludes that the most probable kind of change that would occur at the academies, and one that did occur, was by means of “incrementalism.” In this prediction he was correct—even though he thought that this incremental change might be broadened or even replaced later with something more radical. Although not the radical change he envisioned, the move in the 1970s to establish professional military studies as an important focus in the academic curriculum proved this.

---

65 Lovell, 277.
66 Lovell, 289.
Chapter 2 - Foundations for an Air Force Academy

In October 1956 Lieutenant General David M. Schlatter had an interview with Air Force Academy historian Major Edgar Holt. General Schlatter was then the commandant of the Armed Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia, but earlier he had been a driving figure in the establishment of an air force academy when he was assigned immediately after the war as the commander of Maxwell Air Field and as the acting commandant of the Army Air Forces School. He became the Deputy Commanding General for Education at Air University when it was established a year later in 1946. Major Holt queried if “the history of the Air Force Academy should be written…within a context of an evolving air doctrine and within a context of a growing demand for a new organization for the Air Force.” General Schlatter, who had also served on the Service Academy Board in 1950 (better known as the Stearns-Eisenhower Board), said that he “most certainly” agreed. He added that the creation of a separate Air Force and the concurrent demand for an Air Force academy were “part and parcel of the whole dish…it became quite evident that the matter of functional type of organization and centralized command control [sic] were the only ways to get the most of [employing aircraft] and that has been the consistent stand of all airmen almost ever since.”67 Two ideas are clear in this conversation. First, along with almost three decades of pressing for their independence, Air Force officers also recognized the need to establish an academy to develop a significant portion of its future officer corps—an idea that took an additional decade to achieve. Also, Schlatter makes clear the importance of Air Force doctrine and how this might have played a central role in the creation of a service academy

dedicated to this specific service branch. Once the service was independent, the Air Force’s quest for its own academy occurred less from a desire to give the young officer corps an intellectual grasp of serious professional studies—since most leaders believed that would come later in an officer’s career—instead the founders were focused on gaining a dedicated corps of personnel ready to engage in a specialized training program that would further demonstrate the Air Force’s independence.

Since early in the development of aircraft and their integration into the military, air leaders recognized a need for training the air-focused officer corps in an academy that was a service-specific environment. In the immediate aftermath of World War I, given that the new technology had performed so well, calls went out not only for an independent Air Force, but also for an academy to train its officer corps. As the Director of the Air Service concluded, only the Air Service could accomplish this effectively—the military academy at West Point was too restrictive in its education for it to be fully useful for airmen.68 For example, soon after the armistice in 1918, Air Service officers had discussed establishing an air academy at Camp Mabry, near Austin, Texas—at least as an interim site for an academy—that would be modeled on West Point and Annapolis.69 The main concept for this academy’s mission would be to train

68 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Vol. 1, 2, 9-10. The air forces of the United States were initially integrated as the Aviation Section of the Army’s Signal Corps. However, by two presidential orders, the air component of the Army became a separate branch—the Air Service, United States Army (1918-1926). This branch was precursor to the United States Army Air Corps (1926-1941), the United States Army Air Forces (1941-1947), and, finally, the United States Air Force (1947-present).

an expected 300-400 officers per year in aviation and aeronautical sciences. The emphasis on specialized training dominated all discussions about creating a service academy devoted to this new branch of the Army, and not so much the need for professional military education of its officer corps. From the earliest inclination to develop an academy, then, the impetus was specific training and study in technology—the new aeronautics.

The conversations about an air academy continued until, through, and after the next war, but they gained special momentum after the Air Force received its independence in September 1947. Again, some of the first thrusts for an academy came from the state of Texas, as Representative Paul Kilday introduced H.R. 4547 in November 1947, which called for establishing an Air Force academy at Randolph Field, Texas—Senator Tom Connally introduced the resolution’s companion bill within a month after the House Resolution. Similar to previous discussions on an air academy, these resolutions dictated that this academy would function “under the regulations prescribed by the [Air Force] Secretary for the instruction of aviation cadets in aerodynamics flying, navigation, bombing, the use of atomic weapons and in such other technical aviation matters as might be deemed necessary by the Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF) ‘to be necessary to the maintenance of adequate trained officer personnel.’” The conversations about an air academy continued until, through, and after the next war, but they gained special momentum after the Air Force received its independence in September 1947. Again, some of the first thrusts for an academy came from the state of Texas, as Representative Paul Kilday introduced H.R. 4547 in November 1947, which called for establishing an Air Force academy at Randolph Field, Texas—Senator Tom Connally introduced the resolution’s companion bill within a month after the House Resolution. Similar to previous discussions on an air academy, these resolutions dictated that this academy would function “under the regulations prescribed by the [Air Force] Secretary for the instruction of aviation cadets in aerodynamics flying, navigation, bombing, the use of atomic weapons and in such other technical aviation matters as might be deemed necessary by the Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF) ‘to be necessary to the maintenance of adequate trained officer personnel.’”

Although West Point and Annapolis did not engage in much specific technical training, this

In a letter written by Lt Col A.J. Hanlon to the Air Service Chief of Training, dated 26 Nov 1918, this academy would provide “uniformed initial training to all officers…[and] inculcate proper ideas of discipline, and to ‘foster high ideals of honor’.” The letter had the subject of “United States Aeronautical Academy.” See again, AFAHD, 1954-1956, Vol. 1, 3n6.

proposed Air Force academy seemed prepared to focus entirely on aviation-specific training, with some leadership training and academic education in aeronautical engineering. The biggest omission in this education was the area of professional military studies, which, for example, would examine and assess the role of these airpower capabilities in future wars.

Kilday’s bill was not the only proposed legislation advocating a separate academy for the Air Force, but it set the conditions for the Air Force to move quickly ahead on examining the concept of an air academy. Besides setting the pace on studying why and how to establish this new academy, the various legislative proposals also made clear that the focus of the new academy should be on the technical and training aspects of the new service branch. Of course, the various Congressional representatives were not especially knowledgeable about what constituted the necessary professional military education requirements for effective officer training, as they were mainly interested in the practical consequences of having a federal service academy in their respective states. As an Academy historian noted: “The legislative floodgates were opened…scores of Air Force Academy bills were introduced…designed to locate the academy in a specific state or even in a specific Congressional district.”

The legislative actions, however, did set the parameters on developing an air academy focused on specialized training and academic pursuits tied to technology while slighting professional military studies and a focus on the liberal arts.

Even with this early legislative push by Congressmen in 1947, the Air Force had already taken the stance that an academy was not required at that time, which demonstrated that even some air leaders saw no special rationale for airpower-specific education for officer candidates in

---

72 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Vol. 1, 27. The number of sites considered by the Air Force would exceed 300 proposals.
theory and doctrine. General Carl Spaatz, as the first Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, believed that building a new academy was too costly and that the agreement of West Point and Annapolis to provide service academy graduates to the Air Force would be quite sufficient.73

The first Secretary of the Air Force, W. Stuart Symington, responded to Representative Kilday that an air academy was not necessary at that time—this was late November 1947—as he reinforced the policy of his Chief that the agreement with the other two service academies would sufficiently provide service academy officers into the ranks.74 Symington even stated publically—possibly to put the other academies on notice—that the Air Force was happy gaining “its pilots from the service academies” in a demonstration of “true unification.”75 Even though


75 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Background and Legislation (Cont’d), Number 176, “Symington Doesn’t Favor ‘Air Academy,’” Extract from USAF News Digest, Vol.1, No. 440, 16 December 1947.” The extract comes from the Baltimore Sun, same date, as the Secretary addressed the Maryland Historical Society the evening before (December 15).
air power had existed for nearly three decades and though there was now a newly established service, still the senior leaders did not believe the Air Force required its own institution – its own academy – to educate its officer corps.

Especially as the service chief saw it, the Air Force officer required no special air service academy education on how to use airpower—never mind ensuring a healthy education about the nature and character of warfare in general—as West Point and Annapolis could properly and effectively provide this education. The USAF Deputy Chief of Staff of Personnel and Administration, Lieutenant General Idwal Edwards, notified the Chief in a memorandum summarizing the Army-Air Force agreement on the Military Academy graduate quota to the Air Force: “There would be no distinction” in West Point’s course of instruction between cadets going into the Army and those going into the Air Force.76 The top Air Force leaders did not recognize the role of air-centric professional military education as integral to its culture—USMA graduates had always entered the air forces without this education. As USAF Deputy Chief of Staff of Operations Major General Earle Partridge noted, the air academy, if the Air Force did develop an academy, should not resemble the sister service academies, but instead be a “finishing school” after the candidates completed some civilian university schooling—then these candidates “could be taught to fly, navigate, or become engineering officers” while in this

“finishing school” environment. The emphasis for this senior leader was an academy that concentrated on specialized training for pilots and navigators, and an academic program that focused on engineering. The lack of vision by service leaders existed because they did not recognize the value of air-specific professional military education—educating officer candidates on doctrine, theory, or application of airpower. Some could even argue that the study and understanding of warfare, in general, did not need special emphasis. This was essentially true at West Point, though that institution had already made changes in the post-war period when General Maxwell Taylor reigned as Superintendent, and began addressing the situation. The emphasis was on a technical academic degree and specialized military training—not professional military studies.

The hesitation to create an academy to educate Air Force officer candidates in the final months of 1947, however, became a rush to action in the opening months of 1948. In a total reversal of his attitude from just months earlier, Secretary Symington agreed to the establishment of an Air Force academy by the end of March. This was an especially quick turnaround even

77 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Vol. 1, 27. Partridge, who taught mathematics at West Point (1928 as a lieutenant), would later make General and command the North American Air Defense Command and the Air Defense Command at Ent Air Force Base, Colorado—he was a graduate of the Air Corps Tactical School (1938) and the Command and General Staff College (1939).


79 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Background and Legislation (Cont’d), Number 170, “Ltr, W. Stuart Symington to W.G. Andrews, Chairman Committee on Armed
from his position at the beginning of the new year, when he argued with an Arizona senator that an Air Force academy, whose development the department was still investigating, was not a necessity given the agreements with the Army and Navy on providing enough service academy graduates to the Air Force. As with similar service issues in 1948, Secretary Symington had concentrated on service unification, and the creation of an Air Force academy seemingly went in the direction of service competition.80 As the future first Superintendent of the Academy later suggested, “Opposition [to an Air Force academy] seems to stem from the idea that a new academy for the Air Force spells Triplification rather than Unification.”81 The impetus for an Air Force academy did not hinge on proper and effective professional military education of the officer candidate. Instead, other factors really led to its establishment.

Motivating the Secretary to work on establishing an air academy were two factors: There was continued Congressional pressure to establish an academy, and the Air Force was not

---


81 Letter to Brigadier General John B. Ackerman, Air Attaché, London, from General Hubert Harmon, 16 February 1950, Personal Correspondences, USAFA Special Collections, SMS 325, Addendum #4, Series 1, Box 10, Folder 4.
receiving its expected allocation of service academy graduates from West Point and Annapolis. First, Congress was making headway toward establishing an academy. The law organizing an independent Air Force—the National Security Act of 1947, passed in July of that year—guided them in the direction of creating an Air Force academy—a topic of discussion since the founding of the Air Service. As noted earlier, Kilday’s resolution in late 1947 “opened the floodgate.” A workable formula emerged in early 1948. The series of measures in 1948 that were introduced to start the air academy began with Senator Homer E. Capehart’s Senate Resolution 1974 on 12 January. Significant in his legislation was guidance that the Secretary of the Air Force would prescribe a curriculum “designed to provide a balanced and liberal education in the arts and sciences and a broad basic military education, and to develop special skills in the field of military aviation.” This resolution recognized the need for service-specific military education. However, the Senator also recognized that a general education was a requirement for the proper development of officers. More importantly, his resolution recognized the requirement of a broad military education—not defined specifically in the bill, but still stated as a basic requirement so that the academy could ensure a strong basis for its military education. Another House resolution, accompanied in the Senate by an identical resolution, was advanced by a representative and a senator from Missouri in May 1948. This included similar provisions regarding the liberal arts and military education.*82 Getting an academy in their own backyard, 82 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Vol. 1, 29-30, 30n38. The Academy historians note the various legislation: S. 1974, 80th Cong., 2d Session, 12 January 1948, as well as the Missouri push through H.R. 6536 and the Senate bill 2645 on 11 and 12 May respectively. The first Congressional action towards establishing an Air Force academy in the post-war period was immediately after the effective date of the National Security Act of 1947, 18 September 1947 (the US Air Force’s birthday).
however, was the greater motivation for various Congressmen advancing this kind of legislation. Even so, most of the other Congressional proposals also included language stating a need to educate the proposed officer candidates in the liberal arts and sciences and also to provide a sound military education—not merely military training. The continuous pressure by Congressional authorities caused the Secretary to realize that the Air Force was behind the curve and that it needed to get out in front of Congress.

The second event that motivated the Secretary to push for an air academy was the continued shortfall of service academy graduates inducted into the Air Force. Immediately after the creation of the Air Force, air leaders recognized that their service required a core constituency of service academy graduates to establish service-culture professionalism. The air leaders, however, were concerned that costs might prohibit establishing an air academy. Thus the department had been conducting studies on how best to produce its officer corps, while still gaining accessions from the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) program, Officer Candidate School (OCS) program, and the Aviation Cadet program. Included in this study was a radical proposal. As General Spaatz put it to the “Secretary of National Defense” (later “Secretary of Defense”), they should consider “departing from the traditional four-year service academy concept and adopting a program which would require the trainee to study certain prescribed subjects at a civilian university prior to receiving specialized academy training.”

civilian university, directly followed by an intense two-year program at an academy campus for military indoctrination, as well as some form of military education. This period might include specialized training, such as in navigation or even aviation. Certainly this was a radical proposal compared with the West Point system, but others had been advocating a similar method of educating the service academy officer candidate for a decade.84 Until the Air Force completed its studies, however, General Spaatz agreed to the arrangement that the Air Force should receive a third of each academy’s graduating class—a number that would bring the Air Force about 500 academy graduates annually.85

Again, Spaatz felt no need to have his academy officer candidates educated in a professional military studies curriculum that emphasized airpower’s contribution to warfare. He may not have even seen the necessity of understanding the profession of warfare in its entirety—at least not for officer candidates. All of that knowledge and investigation, in his estimation, might come later for these candidates during their careers. He did not deem this a necessity because he, along with many other senior Air Force general officers, was a West Point product who had gained whatever airpower knowledge he had—specifically of doctrine or theory—later in his service career.86 Instead, his concern grew mainly out of the reality that West Point and

84 Patton, pp. 425-434.
86 Spaatz was not seen as an airpower intellectual. Although he was a acolyte of Mitchell, he neither enjoyed the academic or theoretical world of airpower and its doctrine, nor contributed to its development in a major way—the second Chief of Staff of the Air
Force, General Hoyt Vandenberg, was similar in his lack of intellectual contributions—he was a low academic achiever at West Point, but a brilliant tactical and operational planner—but not comfortable with doctrinal development or airpower theory. (See Mark Clodfelter, “Molding Airpower Convictions: Development and Legacy of William Mitchell’s Strategic Thought,” 107, and I.B. Holley, Jr., “Reflections on the Search for Airpower Theory,” 589-590, in Phillip S. Meilinger, ed., *The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1997); Holley states, referring to Spaatz and Vandenberg, “Is it not ironic that the two men who later became the first and second chief of staff, respectively, of the newly established Air Force both displayed so little imagination in grappling with [not supporting the proposed development of the drop tank for escort fighters in World War II]?” See also, Richard G. Davis, *Carl A. Spaatz and the Air War in Europe* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Air Force History, 1993), 3, 23-24, 33, and 74-76. Finally, on Vandenberg, see Noel F. Parrish, “Hoyt S. Vandenberg: Building the New Air Force” in John L. Frisbee, ed., *Makers of the United States Air Force* (1987; repr., Washington D.C.: GPO, 1996), 205-208.) This conclusion seems so at odds, however, with the Chief of Staff, who, in his final weeks of a 34-year career, would publish a two-part article in *Life* magazine convincingly articulating the need for a 70-group Air Force, since its role would be so significant and necessary in the new environment of the “Cold War.” See Carl Spaatz, “If We Should Have to Fight Again,” *Life*, July 5, 1948, 34-44, and a subsequent article in the August 16, 1948 publication, “Gen. Spaatz on Atomic Warfare,” 90-104. Also, General Spaatz was the “air and military consultant” for *Newsweek* magazine from 1 August 1948 – 20 November 1961, when he was replaced by the recently retired Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Thomas White. General Spaatz offered his first contribution in the September 20, 1948 edition, titled “The Era of Air-Power Diplomacy,” following that up with “Strategic Thinking and Western Civilization” in the October 18, 1948 edition. It is amazing that historians view Spaatz as no intellectual. He had a keen sense of the unique perspective of the airman, one in which he labeled in his *Life* article “geography in time” – given that “this mobility of the airplane has revolutionized the whole methodology of war” – and in which he concluded
Annapolis could not, or would not, provide the new service with enough academy graduates. By the end of March 1948, the Secretary and the Chief, as well as the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff, General Hoyt Vandenberg, concluded that the service’s personnel needs now dictated a separate service branch academy. Vandenberg was really leading this effort, as Spaatz’s declining health would lead to his retirement three months later, and Vandenberg would be sworn in as the new Air Force Chief of Staff at the end of April. Foremost in the new assessment was that the Army and especially the Navy were reneging on the October agreement to supply the Air Force the required service academy graduates. But what was clearly not among the concerns of these Air Force leaders was any sense of need for their own service academy for the purpose of inculcating their own service-specific doctrine and theory among those who would be joining the service as junior officers.

At the beginning of March, General Vandenberg received an assessment on this personnel issue, an assessment that also included seven basic reasons for promptly establishing an academy. The Chief’s staff and others would eventually enhance this memorandum so it that “The airman is something of a revolutionary.” The article justified the need for a larger strategic force—more planes and bases—but failed to directly address personnel or the education of those members. The follow-on article again focused on the technical aspects of airpower and of possible atomic warfare between the great superpowers, rather than on the education of the personnel who would employ that force, even though in the article Spaatz reversed Clemenceau’s quip by suggesting that airmen wonder if warfare was now too important to be left to the politicians. Parrish also comments (see above) that “General Spaatz did not consider scholastic achievement a major indicator of future performance” 206. A critical review of Spaatz’s articles, however, at least going into the mid-1950s, does seem to support that he was not an intellectual heavyweight. But he did contribute to the public conversation on airpower’s role—more so than today’s Air Force leaders tend to do.
could be made official policy. This justification, from the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and Administration, Brigadier General Robert W. Burns,\(^87\) underscored that the efforts to gain accessions into the Air Force officer corps from the two service academies had “met with failure.” Burns then summarized the seven reasons for pressing forward with an academy to the Vice Chief, after Burns again mentioned that the Air Force should receive 500 of its 1000 annual requirement of new officers from service academies.\(^88\) First, the Air Force recognized that the two existing academies seemed unlikely even to provide a combined total of 125 graduates to become Air Force officers—well below the requirement. Second, the curriculum at these two academies would never emphasize what the Air Force required. Among his examples were aeronautical engineering, navigation, and meteorology—there was no mention of the need for airpower-specific military education in theory and doctrine and so forth. Although he offered evidence of the need for education, Burns recognized only the technical subjects as well as specialized education and training, as evident with navigation and meteorology. Third, the Burns memorandum discussed the ground-centricity of military training – evidently, thinking more about West Point than Annapolis – and insufficient attention to those aspects of training that Air Force officer candidates should receive. Burns mentioned such issues as squadron, group, and

\(^{87}\) Burns was born in 1916, and enlisted into the cadet aviation service in 1939—receiving his pilot wings and commission by November 1939. He was a 32-year old brigadier general serving in Air Force Headquarters in 1948—later becoming a major general, retiring in 1970. See his Air Force biography at www.af.mil/AboutUs/Biographies/Display/tabid/225/Article/107535/major-general-robert-wiygul-burns.aspx. Burns was Lieutenant General Idwal Edwards’ number two.

\(^{88}\) This number had remained constant throughout this period of 1947-1948—that the annual requirement of new Air Force officers was about 1000 and that at least half of these should be service-academy educated.
wing organization, air tactics, aerial gunnery, and air discipline, but again there was no
discussion of the larger educational elements of airpower studies such as strategic imagination.
Burns concluded this memorandum with four more paragraphs. One focused on the cost of a
new academy—the general had earlier noted that the other two academies could not produce
more than 125 candidates combined “without expansion of existing facilities at a prohibitive
cost.” He claimed that there was a need for this new academy to supplement the officer
candidate paths already in place, and it could at the same time be a source of physically qualified
pilot candidates. Finally, this new academy would complete the “educational system in the Air
University…designed to give us leaders in Air Power.”89 None of the reasons addressed to the
Vice Chief included the advantage of a service-specific academy to the specifically military
dimensions of prospective cadets’ professional education.

The Air Staff continued to refine the wording of this official memorandum giving the
rationale for developing an air academy. Once completed and coordinated through the ranks, the
memorandum became the outline for the official policy. In just over a week after Burns had
submitted his draft version, the Chief’s staff, primarily Lieutenant General Edwards’ office, re-
worked the product and moved it on to the Secretary. This pressure to move immediately came
from the Secretary. Symington was not even on board with the conclusion that it was time for a
new academy in early March, but, with the pressure from various Congressmen and the
continued bad news from the Navy that it would not provide any service academy graduates that
year, he knew the time was right to grab the initiative. Major General William McKee, assistant

89 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Background and Legislation (Cont’d), Number
175, “Memo for General Vandenberg, from R. W. Burns, Brigadier General, USAF,
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel & Administration, Subj: Air Academy, 2
March 1948.”
to General Vandenberg, sent the routing memorandum, along with the revised proposed policy paper, to Lieutenant General Edwards. The routing slip opened with the statement that “[t]he question of an Air Academy has not as yet been resolved” and with the direction to use Burns’ draft as well as a draft memorandum prepared by a Colonel Swofford, who had been working on the issue for two years, to complete the final policy memorandum with the Chief’s signature for the Secretary. McKee emphasized the newfound urgency by writing in hand “Need by Saturday,” with bold underlining, after the final paragraph. The air service’s leaders recognized that it was time to press for their own academy, and they needed the civilian Secretary of the service on board. The Secretary really did not need convincing, but he required that the Air Force make its argument simple, clear, and solid before advocating it outside the Air Force—to the greater Department of Defense and Congress—so the draft went to the Secretary and then back down to the staff for refinement. The document that went from the Chief’s office to the

90 “Headquarters Army Air Forces “Routing and Record Sheet” from Major General William F. McKee, Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, United States Air Force to DC/S Personnel & Administration, Subj: “Air Academy,” 9 March 1948” in AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Background and Legislation (Cont’d), Number 174, “Department of the Army, the Adjutant General’s Office, Washington, D.C., File on the Air Academy, 12 March 1948.” The 9th of March was a Tuesday; the staff would have a memo, with the date of 13 March, for the Chief’s signature on Friday, 12 March. See, Department of the Air Force, Air Staff Summary Sheet, 12 March 1948, with signed Signature Block by Lieutenant General I.H Edwards in AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Background and Legislation (Cont’d), Number 174, “Department of the Army, the Adjutant General’s Office, Washington, D.C., File on the Air Academy, 12 March 1948.”

91 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Background and Legislation (Cont’d), Number 172, “R&R to DCS/P and Chief of Staff from Plans and Policy Branch, Subj: Air
Secretary, with which the Secretary could relay the Air Force argument elsewhere, did not differ much from the document as it had gone earlier to the Vice Chief.

The work on stating this new rationale for an air academy was finished within the month, and the Secretary signed the final version on March 25. The push was on by the Air Force to get its own service academy. The Secretary’s assessment of the initial draft of the policy was that the “fundamental arguments” justifying the academy had to be “clearer and more succinct.”

The final statement of policy failed to include as part of its rationale the need to invigorate a professional military studies program for cadet candidates, yet some ideas suggested and some terms used in the final memorandum could make it seem that professional military studies were to be considered—at least as a selling point. For example, in the initial draft, the Air Force staff honed in on the engineering curriculum, which, at the new air academy, would be different from what was in the programs at West Point and Annapolis. The memorandum specifically discussed the need for aeronautical engineering instead of civil engineering. This initial draft also

Academy, 25 March 1948.” The “R&R” was a routing slip for coordination. The coordination of the official Air Force memo came from Lieutenant General Idwal Edwards, who would prove crucial in the upcoming planning on the Academy, and contained the March 13, 1948 refined memorandum that was forwarded with Assistant Vice Chief of Staff’s signature block, Major General William McKee. This routing slip of 25 March had the re-written March 13 memorandum, which added thoughts from the Secretary.

92 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Background and Legislation (Cont’d), Number 172, “R&R to DCS/P and Chief of Staff from Plans and Policy Branch, Subj: Air Academy, 25 March 1948,” 1. This routing slip from Lieutenant General Idwal H. Edwards, the DCS/Personnel and Administration, was the cover letter for the package that had the final draft of the memo. The Secretary would use this memorandum as the talking point for those agencies outside of the Air Force.
stressed the differences in military instruction—but this paragraph focused merely on air tactics and on basic organizational structure—not on a greater concept of military studies. However, the final version signed by the Secretary, which again reflected his earlier criticism, left out these two paragraphs and instead emphasized the role academies have in producing career-minded officers. As explained in one paragraph, “[t]he control inherent in an academy permits the development of officers according to a pattern which conforms to the need of the Air Force. The responsibility for the product of an Air Academy would rest squarely on the Air Force.” But it

93 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Background and Legislation (Cont’d), Number 172, “R&R to DCS/P and Chief of Staff from Plans and Policy Branch, Subj: Air Academy, 25 March 1948,” 1. Of interest was the paragraph after this one, discussing the need for professional and academic education. This fourth paragraph in the rationale for an academy, out of eight, discussed how academies were a “democratic means” to gain officer candidates that are prepared personally and educationally to serve—that public education was sufficient to prepare the candidate for success at a military academy—as the Congressional appointment method leads to “a real opportunity for a small town boy in Abilene, Kansas to aspire to a service career as an officer.” This was an unmistakable reference to General Dwight Eisenhower, one of the more popular general officers in the nation, who had recently retired as the Chief of Staff of the Army and was then the President of Columbia University.

94 Memorandum for Secretary of the Air Force from General Carl Spaatz, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, 26 March 1948 in AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Background and Legislation (Cont’d), Number 174, “Department of the Army, the Adjutant General’s Office, Washington, D.C., File on the Air Academy, 12 March 1948.” This final draft, written on 24 March (see above document), included the Secretary’s comments as noted by General Edwards’ R&R in previous citation. See, AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Background and Legislation (Cont’d), Number 172, “R&R to DCS/P and Chief of Staff from Plans and Policy Branch, Subj: Air Academy, 25 March 1948,” 1. The Secretary initially drafted that paragraph to read: “A cadet is under the
was the opening paragraph of this policy paper that covered the necessity of the Air Force’s academy. This paragraph stated: “The need for an Air Academy is clearly evidenced by those same sound arguments which prompted Congress to establish academies for the Army and the Navy.”95 The Chief’s final draft to the Secretary, which Symington would use to influence those in Congress and the greater National Military Establishment, included this flimsy rationale for an academy but left out much regarding the actual education of these officer candidates. The Air Force would now be engaged in trying to establish its academy, and it had the policy paper to circulate.

By the end of March 1948 the Air Force was equipped to establish its academy. The main rationale was the inability of West Point or Annapolis to provide the agreed-upon contingent of officers for the Air Force. This entire March event—of preparing the official talking points for an academy and, even more, coming to complete agreement that an academy was needed—essentially ended with a March 30 notification to Representative Kilday and a March 31 letter from Secretary Symington to the Honorable W.G. Andrews, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. The Secretary informed Kilday that the Air Force would now support his complete control of academy authorities during his formative years; his military and physical training and his character building go hand in hand with his professional and academic education.”

95Memorandum for Secretary of the Air Force from General Carl Spaatz, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, 26 March 1948 in AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Background and Legislation (Cont’d), Number 174, “Department of the Army, the Adjutant General’s Office, Washington, D.C., File on the Air Academy, 12 March 1948.” See paragraph 2.a. of this document.
bill, given a few modifications—a reversal from its November 1947 position. 96 As the office chosen to respond to Representative Andrews—the Congressman had sent a letter to the Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, who requested that the Air Force act as the office of primary responsibility (OPR) to answer—the SECAF informed the Chairman that the pending two resolutions: H.R. 4547 (Kilday’s bill) and H.R. 4912 (the companion bill in the House to Senator Capehart’s bill in the Senate from January 12, introduced by Representative George Landis, to establish the Air Force Academy). Symington said that both were sufficient for the Air Force’s needs. 97 Recognizing that establishing a new academy would seem counter to the press towards unification of the services, the Secretary emphasized the way in which the Air Academy would complement the existing professional development system of Air University, as well as Air Force ROTC, Officer Candidate School (OCS), and the aviation cadet programs that would provide the education for future Air Force officers and leaders. 98 These two communiqués now set the Air Force on course to plan effectively and develop its academy.

97 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Background and Legislation (Cont’d), Number 170, “Letter, W. Stuart Symington to W. G. Andrews, Chairman Committee on Armed Services, 31 March 1948,” 1. Representative Landis, R-IN, was not a relation to the Kenesaw Mountain Landis family—the famous baseball commissioner had two brothers (Charles and Frederick) who were both Indiana politicians.
Before commissioning a plan for the academy’s development, the first action was to ensure that all Air Force leaders were properly informed on the way ahead, which again revealed the issues of greatest importance for the Air Force. Specific attention to professional military studies was not a significant issue. Educating the greater Air Force about the way ahead, as well as receiving further support for an academy, began with informing a majority of Air Force leaders. The planners did this by briefing the Air Board. Established by General Spaatz in 1946, the Air Board then consisted of the “commanding general, the deputy commanding general, the secretary-general [Major General Hugh J. Knerr was the first], the commanders of major AAF [Army Air Force] commands, and such other retired officers, civilians, and Air National Guard and Air Reserve officers as the commanding general of the Army Air Forces might care to appoint.”

In the newly independent Air Force, the Air Board offered General Spaatz an organization “similar to the board of directors in a business organization.” This group of senior-level general officers did the final groundwork necessary before any official planning for an academy began, such as investigating what curriculum would be effective—that is, how cadets would best receive their professional military education.

100 “Report of the Secretary of the Air Force to the Secretary of Defense for Fiscal Year 1948, (1 July 1947-30 June 1948)” (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Officer, 1948), 23. Spaatz established this “new” Air Board on 5 March 1946. This definition is in the Chief of Staff’s section of the report. See ibid., 213. Futrell states that by the beginning of 1948, the Air Board, which evolved for Spaatz from the Air Corps Board (see p. 95), had already begun to lose its influence—first by the LeMay-inspired Aircraft and Weapons Board and then by the USAF Senior Officers Board. The Air Board was inactive by the fall of 1949.
For the May Air Board meeting, the Air Staff prepared the proposed discussion points, which noticeably excluded any serious discussion about the role of professional military studies. The staff used the talking points in the final version of the March memorandum as the basis to construct a presentation for the Board members. Besides the talking points, the staff also incorporated aspects of the only two “plans” that had already been produced that argued for an air academy: a large draft study by Air Training Command and a smaller study by an Air University directorate, neither of which had actually been approved by the Air Staff leadership and neither of whose results had been approved as well. These two studies focused more on the role of flight training at a proposed Air Force academy and the essential requirements of a general education program, rather than demonstrating a focus on professional military studies.

The pressure on the Air Force to develop a more educated officer corps in the post-war period influenced these studies, which went beyond merely creating a separate academy. The Air Force lagged behind the other two services in the educational level of its officer corps—a result of wartime necessity. A general sense of uneasiness existed in the Air Force as leaders realized that it was made up mainly of technicians—aviators—rather than professional officers. An Air Force survey showed that just over 40 percent of regular Air Force officers had a college degree, a number that was nearly half the percentage of Army and Navy officers with a baccalaureate


degree. In addition to those with college degrees, another 40 percent of the regular Air Force officer corps had at least some college study. Also, only 10 percent of the regular Air Force officers had received their commission from one of the two academies—by contrast, the Army and Navy drew 30.2 percent and 38 percent of their officer corps from academy graduates, respectively. This information greatly concerned Air Force leaders, who recognized that relying on the two existing academies as sources for their own officer corps might mean even lower numbers. Moreover, the officers they did receive did not come with the technical education demanded by the Air Force. Both studies recognized a need for the air officer corps to have a general college education.

The March 1948 draft study by Air Training Command (ATC) concentrated on what specialized training was required for future Air Force officers. The main proposal was laid out in a 90-page document (excluding an appendix that discussed the existing and proposed facilities at Randolph Air Force Base, the recommended site for the academy) detailing the organizational structure, cadet admission eligibility and requirements, religious activities and social life, discipline system, honor system, and the course curriculum. This vision of an academy included an outline for an enhanced flying program, which had been a serious topic of conversation from the beginning. This flying program was the sixth point among the “General Concepts and

\[103\] AFAHD, 1954-56, Vol. 1, 369. The Air Force number of Bachelor degrees was given as 41 percent. The Army and Navy surveys showed those services had 72.4 percent and 75.4 percent of their officer corps with college degrees, respectively.

\[104\] AFAHD, 1954-56, Vol. 1, see table 369. This came from a 30 June 1948 study, but would have been general knowledge understood by those accomplishing the two studies in the winter 1947 or spring 1948.

Assumptions” that opened the plan. It asserted: “Air Cadets will receive pilot training during the four year course at the Air Academy, and...the successful completion of pilot training will result in the awarding of a pilot rating upon graduation from the Air Academy.”\textsuperscript{106} The plan envisioned amassing 270 flying hours within the final 23 months of the academy program.\textsuperscript{107} ATC planners naturally wanted to generate pilots specifically—more so than merely officers. An assumption stated early in the work was that the academy would conduct pilot training during the four-year period, with graduates earning their aeronautical ratings.\textsuperscript{108} As one might expect, the training command, whose most significant responsibility was to provide specialized training to the

\textsuperscript{106} USAFA Special Collections, United States Air Academy Plan, Headquarters, Air Training Command, Barksdale AFB, LA, 26 April 1948, Foreword, 3, 13. This opening section of the plan, “General Concepts and Assumptions,” has seven major topics, each given between a few sentences and a solid paragraph of explanation. The section includes, “Legislation,” “Mission of the Air Academy,” “Status of Trainees,” “Length of Training and Status Thereafter,” “Numbers Involved” [how many cadets to start and per class], “Pilot Training,” and “Installation and Facilities.” The final section had five points—all related to airfield operations and necessary weather patterns and terrain to assist with flying training. The Special Collections copy of the plan has “26 April 1948” written in pen on the top right of the opening page, and on the opening pages of each section/tab. However, the \textit{AFAHD, 1954-1956}, Vol. 1 refers to this plan a number of times, and always states that its publication was March 1948—for example see footnotes on page 443, which suggests “26 Mar 48”—probably the first draft that the Air Staff members reviewed in their preparation for the Air Board meeting.

\textsuperscript{107} United States Air Academy Plan, Headquarters, Air Training Command, Barksdale AFB, LA, 26 April 1948, Foreword, 3, 13. As a point of comparison, when this author went to pilot training in 1989-90, the flying program was approximately 12 months, full time, logging just over 200 hours—about 110 in the T-37 and around 90 in the T-38.

\textsuperscript{108} United States Air Academy Plan, Headquarters, Air Training Command, 1-3.
aviators and navigators in the greater Air Force, focused its efforts on training rather than educating this proposed officer force.

The form, organization, and layout of the plan itself best demonstrate the fact that this specialized training was the main feature of the document, much to the detriment of serious education in military studies. The nine-page section called “Training Plan,” for example, devotes four pages just to the flying program, yet only a total of four pages to all the remaining academic curriculum. In addition, the six tabs at the back of the report include one with a 16-page entry on the “Flying Course Curricula”—the comments at the tab on the academic curriculum run to just five pages, and nothing similar exists for a military studies curriculum. The document details the flying training requirements—to include even the maneuvers required (such as “Lazy Eights,” “Chandelles,” instrument flying requirements). The planners categorized the curriculum by course requirements, and also devoted a page of the cadets’ proposed academic schedule for each of the four years. However, the document does not discuss professional military studies or specific military education for the air cadet. The report, instead, specifically concentrated on

109 United States Air Academy Plan, Headquarters, Air Training Command, 13-21, Tab C, Tab D. Page 20 of this document includes a section on “Elimination Criteria” that states: “An Air Cadet found for academic deficiency only, will not be considered ineligible for subsequent appointment as Aviation Cadet, if qualified under Aviation Cadet entrance criteria.” These dismissed cadets could eventually receive their U.S. Air Force commissions, but only two years after their former Academy class’s graduation date.

110 Under the curriculum tab, the planners further break down the hours for programs in the Social-Humanistic, Science-Engineering, Professional, and Military Instruction. The professional section includes, Ordnance and Armament, Military Hygiene, Military Law, Weather, Air Installations, Navigation, Practical Maintenance, and Theory of Flight. The
the role of flying training. This was so much the case that, when the Academy Superintendent, under various pressures, decided to integrate more flight training into the Academy program in 1956, this report was once again used to explain what would be involved.111

Air Training Command planners who focused on a new academy recognized the influence of the other services’ academies. They viewed the Military and Naval academies as “both of the type and quality that we wish to create. For this reason, the Air Academy portrayed herein will resemble the existing Service Academies in character, and yet have Air Force complexion.”112 Significant in this short, but detailed proposal, though, was that more effort went towards the development of a flying program than to discussion of the academy’s curriculum—especially since the contributors recognized that the air academy would be modeled after the other service academies and “civilian educational institutions,” and would lead to the air cadets having the Bachelor of Science degree conferred upon them at graduation.113 So the plan did seemingly take seriously the development of a liberal arts and sciences general education

military instruction section includes Basic Training, Ceremonies and Inspection, Physical Training, Practical Training Instruction Underclass, Training Trips to Other Stations, Maneuvers, Flying Training, Administration Training [for those who will not fly or cannot complete the flying curriculum], Psychology of Military Leadership, Tactics and Techniques, Reception Processing. Some of these programs could bleed into what one would deem professional military studies, but the document leans towards merely training. See United States Air Academy Plan, Headquarters, Air Training Command, Tab C, 1.

112 United States Air Academy Plan, Headquarters, Air Training Command, Foreword.
113 United States Air Academy Plan, Headquarters, Air Training Command, Foreword, 21. Although hinted at in the Foreword, the actual statement about the degree is not until page 21.
program, but with a heavy emphasis on sciences and engineering, particularly mechanics and aeronautics. The new academy would continue the engineering emphasis of the other two academies, with even more specialized education in newer engineering disciplines and in specialized flight training.

The plan did account for a modicum of instruction in professional military education. It discussed the necessity of inculcating “a military understanding of the Armed Forces that is necessary to cope with the responsibility which devolves upon the career officer,” so seemingly it contained at least a modicum of professional studies—beyond some of the academic coursework. In the section of the “Training Plan” called “Fundamental Course Curriculum,” one could deduce that the professional military education showed up in four specific areas: political and military history, government, and economics; ordnance and armament; military hygiene; and tactics. Besides the academic coursework, which would provide the cadet with a broad


115 United States Air Academy Plan, Headquarters, Air Training Command, 14-18 and Tab C, 16-18. The “Fundamental Course Curriculum” included fourteen subsections, “a” through “n.” These subsections were: a. mathematics; b. drawing; c. physics; d. modern languages; e. English; f. chemistry; g. mechanics; h. political and military history, government, and economics; i. electricity, communications, and radar; j. law; k. civil engineering, air installations; l. ordnance and armament; m. military hygiene; and, n. The Department of Tactics. The planners provided specific objectives in the paragraph that supported each course description. Law, for example, was all about “fundamental legal principles…related to the operation of, and administration of, justice within the military establishment.” So one could discuss this under the realm of professional military studies.
education and strong foundation on which to build a structure of military studies, one can easily see that the other areas were more relevant to military training rather than to more fundamental education.

Although many of these courses contribute to one’s professional study of warfare, Air Training Command’s curriculum emphasized the technical aspects of education rather than the liberal arts or military studies, and it also focused mainly on military training. The planners included an appendix that provided a breakdown of studies based on the “nature of instruction”—whether social-humanistic, scientific-engineering, professional, or military instruction. Social studies and humanities (English, languages, political and military history, government, economics and “internal” [sic] relations, and basic law) received 703 hours of instruction. Scientific- and engineering-oriented courses (mathematics, drawing, physics, chemistry, electricity, communications, and radar, mechanics and aeronautics) included 1,612 hours. “Professional” coursework (ordnance and armament, military hygiene, military law, weather, air installations, navigation, practical maintenance, and theory of flight) consumed 524 hours. Finally, military instruction (basic training, ceremonies and inspection, physical training, practical training instructing underclass, training trip to other stations, maneuvers, flying training, administration training, psychology of military leadership, tactics and techniques, and reception processing) was given a significant portion—2,401 contact hours—but most of it was training (basic training [511], flying training [652], and physical training [419] took well over

However, this does not suggest a discussion of military ethics or just war doctrine, which may be even more directed at study of warfare.
half of those hours).\textsuperscript{116} This military instruction was actually “military training,” rather than “education,” for the most part. Again, the objective for ATC was producing officers ready to fly in a technical service, so the importance of flying training and technical studies overshadowed an officer candidate’s quest to study and understand his service’s role as an element of national power and in warfare.

In organizing their evidence for the necessity of an Air Force academy, the Air Staff also mentioned an Air University study that also emphasized the required general education required of future officers. These planners envisioned a five-year program—one that drastically differed from those of the two existing academies. Officer candidates would attend a civilian institution for two years for a more general, core education. These two years would then be followed by three years at the military academy, which would complete their undergraduate program.\textsuperscript{117}

These two studies had influenced the Air Staff to conclude that there were only three main unresolved issues among all the documents to this point: how long the program would be; what role, if any, flying training would have at this new academy; and whether all graduates

\begin{footnote}
116 United States Air Academy Plan, Headquarters, Air Training Command, Tab C, 1. The total course that these planners envisioned was 5,240 hours. Note, \textit{AFAHD, 1954-1956}, Vol. 1, 443 incorrectly has the total coursework as 5,421, adding 744, 2,131, 1,726, and 640, which the sum is actually 5,241. Paul Ringenbach (page 32) and William Woodyard (page 39) use these numbers. I am not sure where Major Edgar Holt, the Academy historian who produced this volume, got his numbers—maybe an earlier or later copy of the ATC plan.
\end{footnote}

\begin{footnote}
117 \textit{AFAHD, 1954-56}, Vol. 1, 441-442. This Air University staff study, accomplished in late 1947, believed that the two years at the civilian institution would also be “buttressed by a common military education.” This was because all officer candidates from all services would take this common program. After the two years, the candidates would then go to their respective service branch academy for the completion of the program.
\end{footnote}
would matriculate in a rated field (mainly pilot or navigator) or, instead, whether there should be an even number of rated and non-rated personnel. These interests offer some strong insight on what concerned at least mid-level leadership in the Air Force. The emphasis was on specialized training—flying training—and on the broader academic course load. A significant element missing from the staff’s discussion was a focus on professional military studies—especially the need for some type of air-centric course requirement.

The Air Board met on May 5 to discuss the establishment of an Air Force academy. The objective was to address “the present plans, [an academy’s] location and organization.” The Air Staff’s presentation to the Air Board covered eleven main areas. The first two statements mentioned, first, the failure of the two existing academies to provide the agreed number of cadet graduates, 500 of a total 1,000 officers brought into the Air Force annually, and, second, the restrictive costs of any proposed expansion of the two existing academies in order to meet an agreement that would give the Air Force the number of service academy officers it required. The cost of the new air academy was another topic, and there were two lengthy sections discussing legislative issues. Lt. Col. Abbey, the representative from the Air Staff’s Operations and Plans Directorate who briefed the Board, addressing the need to commission a planning group for the

---


academy to cover the remaining issues—including four key matters ranging from location to curriculum.120

Besides those topics, the Board also heard about two other significant issues that related directly to the education of the officer candidate that the Board believed could justify the new academy. First, the Air Staff claimed that the new academy would be a substantive addition to the “educational system of the Air Force”—allowing at the earliest opportunity the ability to “produce the Air Force officer fundamentally trained for duty within the Air Force.”121 As this statement suggests, the vision of the new academy was to train the cadets so that they were prepared to assume the technical, specialized duties required of them. The statement ignored, as did the other topics in the presentation, the effective professional military education required of the cadets—the role of airpower, doctrine, and other air-centric course studies. This statement directly connected with the second issue—the general design and direction of the academy. The staff had distilled from the talking points and other plans what the academy would emphasize, and this revealed the role—or lack of role—that professional military studies would have in its curriculum.

The presentation to the Board began to solidify what became the major reason why professional military studies would take, and would long continue to take, a position subordinate to other areas of emphasis. The spokesmen from the Air Staff offered six discussion points that underscored the Air Force’s vision of their proposed academy. First, like the existing academies,

120 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Background and Legislation (Cont’d), Number 169, “Presentation to the Air Board on the Air Academy,” 5-6.
121 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Background and Legislation (Cont’d), Number 169, “Presentation to Air Board on the Air Academy, 5 May 1948,” 1. Emphasis within the quotation is mine.
the air academy would have a four-year program that would confer a Bachelor of Science degree—already suggesting the favoring of technical studies that existed at the other academies. Second, flight training would be required as an essential part of the curriculum—this would continue to be a matter of significant debate. Third, it would graduate at least 500 officers a year—the incoming classes would have to account for attrition during the four years, so the academy would admit more than 500 candidates. Fourth, continuing to emphasize technical education, the curriculum would be “primarily engineering adapted to those phases of science which best prepare the graduate for a position within the Air Force Officer Corps.” This meant that aeronautical engineering would be the major focus—within a more general emphasis on all kinds of engineering and on science-related coursework since “the ever growing technological aspects of the Air Force” required “more and more specialization.” Fifth, the staff offered, almost as a side note, that the “curriculum will include cultural subjects and military training (italics added) in order to produce a well-rounded educational background for the graduate.” Finally, all cadets at the proposed academy would take the same academic program.\textsuperscript{122} It is significant that, even at this relatively early stage in discussion of a new academy, the debate and struggle had begun over two charged issues: one, the tension between military training and military education, and, two, the relative importance of technical and non-technical studies in general education. The debates surrounding these two issues were passionate, and they would continue not only at the time the academy was founded but also throughout its whole history. The founders would contest what type of education would help produce the strongest officer

\textsuperscript{122} AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Background and Legislation (Cont’d), Number 169, “Presentation to Air Board on the Air Academy, 5 May 1948,” 1-3.
corps. The debate between the focus on STEM\textsuperscript{123} courses and an emphasis on the social sciences and humanities had begun. Noticeably missing from the discussion, even this early on, was discussion of a professional military studies curriculum—even though this was a military academy.

With the Air Board informed and committed, the Air Staff was now tasked to formulate a solid plan for the future academy, to include all the specific details regarding location, role and functions, assigned personnel, and, most significantly, the curriculum creation and composition of the academy. On June 24, 1948 the Acting Director of the Bureau of the Budget, Frank Pace, Jr., wrote a letter addressed to the Secretary of the Air Force that further motivated this effort. Pace informed the Secretary that he had received a letter from the Under Secretary of the Air Force, Mr. Arthur Barrows, which included copies of the proposed report for the Senate Armed Services Committee discussing the Senate and House Resolutions on establishing an academy. Offering his frank advice, the Director set the Secretary, the Air Staff, and its planners straight. The Director advised the Air Force that it had a lot of work to do before petitioning the executive branch. Pace said that, before submitting any legislation, “it is believed essential that a thorough study be made of the functions which such an Academy is expected to perform in the training program of the Air Force and of the organization, size, and type of training required in the light of those functions.”\textsuperscript{124} Along with more study of roles and training programs of a proposed

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{123} The modern acronym for “Science, Technology, Engineering, Mathematics.”
\textsuperscript{124} Air Force Academy Planning Board Study, Vol. 1, “A Plan for an Air Force Academy” (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Headquarters, The Air University, January 1949), vii. Pace’s letter is included in the first volume of the Air Force Academy Planning Board Study, which shows its significance. Only three letters are included: Pace’s letter; a letter from the Chief of Staff to the Commanding General of Air University, dated 1 September
\end{flushleft}
academy, it was necessary for the Air Force to “review existing legislation pertaining to the Military and Naval Academies to assure that parallel or consistent provisions, so far as applicable, are drafted for the proposed Air Academy.” Then the elements comprising the National Military Establishment could coordinate on a draft bill. Only this attention to comparable form and function for the new academy would ensure Congressional and Executive Branch support. Air Force leaders had to ensure that they had a well-crafted plan that could enjoy wide supported before revealing it outside the Air Force itself. Even in his report for the fiscal year ending in June 1948, Secretary Symington reported that the answer to the “question of an Air Academy” did not have a foregone conclusion—if the Army and Navy were to allow adequate accessions into the Air Force from their academies, the next steps could be different.

125 Air Force Academy Planning Board Study, Vol. 1, “A Plan for an Air Force Academy” (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Headquarters, The Air University, January 1949), vii. This advice, which emphasized a coordinate report on all service academies, influenced not only the Air Force to establish its Air Force Academy Planning Board, but also the Secretary of Defense to establish the Service Academy Board by spring 1948. Emphasis in the original.

126 “Report of the Secretary of the Air Force to the Secretary of Defense for Fiscal Year 1948, (1 July 1947-30 June 1948)” (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Officer, 1948), 15. Symington noted that, in the promotion of true unification, the Army and Navy should give the Air Force a third of their commissioned classes. The Secretary did not submit this report to the Secretary of Defense until 31 December 1948. See this report, page v.
So to safeguard appropriate planning, the Air Force looked to those elements that had previously done some work on this matter, as much of this prior planning had been accomplished in a manner that was sometimes almost clandestine and surely was not altogether openly circulated. For example, in late 1947, soon after the Air Force gained its independence, General Spaatz had charged Lieutenant General Muir Fairchild, who was then the commandant of Air University—the commanding general of this operational unit—with preparing plans for an academy. Those plans, which were never officially approved by the Air Force, were mentioned in those earlier discussions in March through May 1948 about a possible way ahead for an academy and they included an outline of the curriculum. However, now the Air Force needed a better organized and officially sanctioned approach, and Air University took the lead. The Air Staff’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and Administration, Lieutenant General Idwal Edwards, provided that direction in the summer of 1948. His office had an Academy Planning Group, but now with a formidable workload, Edwards again passed the charge to Air University, giving it responsibility to move ahead with formalizing plans. The thought was that Air University would be in a better position to recommend a program for the proposed academy, since it was responsible for Air Force officers service schools and many believed it would also provide the oversight for an academy.

With responsibility for planning, Air University’s commander, Major General Robert Harper, now looked to a directorate within his organization. In 1947, while he was the Air University commander, General Fairchild formed an initial academy planning directorate on General Spaatz’s instruction. Harper had appointed Colonel Delmar Spivey to head the directorate, and now Spivey convened a meeting in late July with the goal of organizing a conference of “Air Force officers and distinguished civilians” whose focus would be to discuss the mission and structure of the new academy.128

The meeting of distinguished officers and civilians that occurred on 9 August really tackled what sort of academy the Air Force would create. This was the first official, systematic study addressing the establishment of an Air Force Academy and the legislation required to accomplish this objective.129 The meeting addressed two significant questions regarding the new academy. First, would the academy seemingly mimic the two established academies—a four-year institution with general academic and military training and education? And, since this was an Air Force academy, would flight training be an integral part of the overall education—or training—process? Known as the “Fairchild Board,” this group had as its focus the general educational structure of the Academy and the role of flight training for the cadets.

128 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Background and Legislation (Cont’d), Number 163, “Minutes of Panel Meeting, 26 July 1948” 1; Ringenbach, Battling Tradition, 29, 41. Spivey was the first project officer for Academy planning, and was considered General Harmon’s first choice as Dean in 1951.

The fifteen board members included some heavy-hitters in the realm of the military and higher education. Besides General Fairchild, the board included Major General Maxwell Taylor, West Point’s superintendent; Lieutenant General Idwal Edwards, the deputy chief of staff for Personnel and Administration; Lieutenant General John Cannon, commanding general of Training Command; and Major General Orvil Anderson, commanding general of the Air War College. The civilian representation consisted of Dr. Raymond Paty, the chancellor for the University of Georgia; Dr. Harry Rodgers, the president of the Brooklyn Institute of Technology; Dr. John Tigert, President Emeritus of the University of Florida; and Father Hunter Guthrie, then a professor of foreign relations at Georgetown University, who would become the school’s president the following year. The decision of this board would shape the argument on the roles and functions that the academy would have in developing officers.

---

130 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Background and Legislation (Cont’d), Number 162, “Summary of Arguments Presented at Air Force Academy Conference, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama – 9 August 1948,” 1. The other fifteen members of the Fairchild Board included: Dr. Kenneth Williams, Director of Educational Advisory of the Air University; Lt. Gen. Barton Yount, retired commanding general of Training Command; Maj. Gen. John McIntyre, Legislative Liaison, Headquarters Air Force; Maj. Gen. Harper, Commanding General, The Air University; Brig. Gen. Kenneth McNaughton, Training Division, Plans and Operations, Headquarters Air Force; and, Colonel Delmar T. Spivey, Deputy Commander for Education, the Air University. Certainly this was an impressive ad hoc board to address the establishment of the Academy, but two of the military men, other than Maxwell Taylor, are quite impressive, especially regarding the role of professional military education: Idwal Edwards and Orvil Anderson. Edwards, besides his impact before and during the Second World War, had even more impact in the forward-looking Air Force. Faced with a chaotic personnel situation because of the quick drawdown, and influenced by Benjamin O. Davis, Edwards
Each invitee had received a letter from General Vandenberg, suggesting the importance of convening this board, which set some guidelines. In the letter, Vandenberg said that the Air Force needed to get ahead of the legislative process to ensure that the academy would meet the service’s expectations—the Chief noted that Congress had already scuffled over three bills meaning to establish the academy.131 Central among the discussion points at the conference, the letter noted, was this question: “How many years…should be devoted to the education of an Air

acted on President Truman’s executive order and swiftly recommended the integration of the Air Force to then-Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Hoyt Vandenberg. See Alan Gropman, “Benjamin O. Davis, Jr.: History on Two Fronts” in John L. Frisbee, ed., Makers of the United States Air Force (1987; repr., Washington D.C.: GPO, 1996), 229-30, 246. Anderson was a thinker, too, leading to his final assignment as the Commandant of Air University. He was among the architects of the Air War Plans Division in establishing strategic doctrine of bombardment against German—AWPD-1. Recognition of this plan is almost always limited to Lt Cols Harold George and Kenneth Walker, and Major Haywood Hansell. However, Orvil Anderson was right smack in the middle of this division. Other air officers contributing to this precursor of strategic bombing against Germany were Colonels Max Schneider and Arthur Vanaman, and Majors Hoyt Vandenberg, Laurence Kuter, and Samuel Anderson. See Robert F. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine, Vol 1, Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907-1960 (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1971), 109.

Force officer?"132 However, one could wonder why the course of studies and what was included within it was not considered more important to discuss than just the length of a program.

Under the original Air University (AU) educational plan for an academy, from 1947, the new academy would have embraced a five-year program—two at an accredited civilian university followed by three at the service academy. This AU plan notably stipulated that the two years at a civilian university offered the officer candidate a general education—which would still require planning for some form of standardized coursework for all officer candidates. This would then be “buttressed by a common military education” at the service academy.133 What the AU group meant by “military education” is not defined in the study, but it could reasonably mean continued coursework in general education—not necessarily centered on the study of war or military professionalism, but more focused towards the sciences and engineering. More likely, this additional education that officer candidates would receive in their three years at the new service academy would be focused toward military training—drill and order and flight training, to be more specific—and not truly military “education” or military studies. Nevertheless, as the summer closed in 1948 the AU directorate put in motion what everyone involved believed would be the final push for an Air Force Academy.

Regarding the type of general educational program to be established, the Fairchild Board reflected on two approaches. The original AU plan from 1947 embodied one of the approaches. This approach, referred to as the “composite plan,” envisioned a five-year program—two years

of subsidized attendance at a civilian institution followed by the three years at the new academy. The group also considered a more traditional approach, known to the board as the “conventional plan,” which followed the arrangement of the other two academies (and most colleges and universities) as a four-year program, all accomplished at the new academy. The discussion listed the pros and cons of each approach.

The idea of requiring just three years at a military academy was partly a result of the recently concluded war. The demanding situation in World War II had created a precedent that had the potential to affect the academies far beyond the war years. For example, in order to gain trained officers for combat units, West Point and Annapolis shortened their programs from four to three years, with the Coast Guard Academy making “sharp cuts…in so-called general subjects (principally English, history, and social studies).” This move to a “three-year program reflected not merely the elimination or shortening of activities previously included, but also a shift in the direction of even greater emphasis than before on immediately utilizable skills, especially those applicable to combat.” The Naval Academy cut academic course work that included English, social sciences, military history, and civil engineering.134 This change in the length of the program and in what courses were required during the war would continue to influence the curriculum of the Air Force Academy in the near future, as the competition between the liberal

134 John P. Lovell, Neither Athens nor Sparta? The American Service Academies in Transition (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1979), 40-41. Lovell interviewed William Appleman Williams, one of the founders of 1960s revisionist history, who was a 1944 graduate from the Class of 1945 at the Naval Academy. Williams stated that the atmosphere during the war made the environment martial and not collegiate and that he “learned much more history, literature, etc. than my civilian colleagues imagine,” given the “tough intellectual discipline” required at the time. See 41, 317n5.
arts and the seemingly more utilitarian courses, such as engineering and sciences, as well as specific military training, became more pronounced.

After reflecting on the plans for the day, the Board voted on the two main questions at hand. The consensus was that flight training should not be incorporated into the new academy’s program—that would come after graduation. This contradicted the proposed direction in April 1948, when Secretary Symington concluded in a letter to the commander of Air Training Command that flight training would be an “integral part” of any Air Force academy. This would remain a sensitive topic. The majority also voted in favor of the composite plan. The structure that this astute board selected reveals what they wanted the program at the academy to emphasize. All board members supported a broad education, and the majority believed that civilian colleges would better prepare “a broader and more flexible officer graduate,” as well as offer a “better view” in courses in the humanities and the social sciences. The military academy would be more focused, then, on the technical subjects and training.  

135 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 3, Number 22, “Chronological Summary of Actions Affecting the Air Force Academy Project, n.d.,” 2. The 14-page document ends with a 9 April 1951 entry—its initial entry is a 1918-1947 general comment that various studies and attempts occurred during this period; the first dedicated entry was a 15 Sep 1947 discussion on Army-Air Force agreements per the National Security Act. The entry on the memorandum from the SECAF to commander, ATC was dated 5 April 1948.

136 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Number 162, “Summary of Arguments Presented at Air Force Academy Conference, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama—9 August 1948,” 2, 4. An additional concern of the board regarding the conventional plan was, “Military would be unable to provide the caliber of instructors that civilian colleges have.” This was “f” in an “a” through “g” listing under “5. Arguments presented in opposition to conventional plan . . .” in the notes to this meeting. Again, see, AFAHD,
Significant in this vote is which of the two plans the various members favored. Four of the military members and four of the civilian members favored the composite plan—and service academy graduates were among those in favor of this plan.\textsuperscript{137} The other four military members and one civilian, Father Guthrie, supported the conventional plan. The two remaining members abstained from a vote. Guthrie discussed his disapproval with General Idwal Edwards, who also opposed the composite plan, offering his concern that leaning on the civilian universities and taking a year from the military academy experience would be detrimental to the development of the military culture of the officer candidate—not so much his military education, but his training and character. General Edwards agreed, and he discussed this with the Chief, General Vandenberg.\textsuperscript{138}

With the decision made by the board, the Air University commander, Major General Harper, who had taken part in the discussions, addressed a letter on August 21 to the Chief of Staff recommending that the Board’s majority opinion be approved.\textsuperscript{139}

\textsuperscript{139} \textit{AFAHD, 1954-1956, Vol. 1, 444. Harper was the Commanding General of Air University when Vandenberg and Edwards gave the August 1948 task to develop plans for an Air Force Academy. He held the position for about six months, and then General Kenney took over.}
In response to the Fairchild Board’s recommendations and to the pressure exerted by Acting Director of the Bureau of the Budget Frank Pace, the Chief of Staff moved forward to translate the Board’s findings into a detailed academy plan. On August 16, 1948, he directed his Vice Chief, General Fairchild, to officially notify Air University of its designation as the central “Air Force agency responsible for the preparation of plans for the establishment of an Air Force Academy.”\(^{140}\) Vandenberg had responded to General Harper’s letter by first agreeing with the Board’s recommendation that pilot training should not be accomplished as part of the Academy program. He responded to the recommendation that the new academy be part of a five-year program, with the officer candidates first attending two years at a civilian institution, with a note that it was “not favorably considered”—the Chief directed a four-year program “generally along the lines of the present service Academies.”\(^{141}\)

The Air Force had moved forward toward establishing its academy. Although many advocates of air power had wanted their own academy – in fact, this had been a desire of the various air force organizations from the time of its origins as a branch within a larger service –


the newly independent Air Force often found itself “behind the curve” as some Congressmen moved quickly to seize the opportunity to benefit on their own terms from a new academy. In the end, the persistent reason for a service-specific academy was so that such an academy could be used to firm up the service’s own distinct culture. But the practical need of an academy, if the service was to be able to perform its mission, was to train future officers not only in the culture but also in technical areas that the service employed. The desire to educate those officer candidates more broadly and perhaps more deeply went only so far as ensuring that they received a form of college education—without much regard for the need for a strong military studies program. That could come later in an officer’s career—or so most leaders believed. The work accomplished in the year since the Air Force had been established as an independent service resulted, then, in the two studies that would now set the standard and the focus for how to educate the officer candidates.
Chapter 3 - The Studies that Shaped the Academy

The discussions that took place during the August 1948 meeting with General Fairchild and his group, and the agreements that came out of them, led to the first concentrated, comprehensive, service-backed study toward an air academy. However, the decision to better organize the planning for an Air Force academy did not result only from the August meeting but also from pressure by the Air Staff in Washington DC—who were themselves being pressed by members of Congress.\(^{142}\) The issue of an academy was so important and so demanding for the Air Force that the Director of Personnel Planning at the Pentagon could not keep up with all the extra demands put upon him to develop a way ahead for an academy, along with the “normal” duties that occupied his directorate.\(^{143}\) Assistance came quickly to the Pentagon personnel in two main forms: First, the Air Force immediately assigned a lead Air Force-level command to perform the necessary study. Specifically, the Air Force Chief of Staff now subordinated all previous studies and concurrent working groups dealing with establishing an air academy to Air

\(^{142}\) AFAHD, 1954-1956, Vol. 1, 29-30; pages 25-141 of this volume traces the legislative evolution to establish the Academy, to include the main hearings and discussion of the bill signed 1 April 1954 by President Eisenhower.

University at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.\textsuperscript{144} Second, just over a year after the Chief picked Air University to form a study group, the Air Force organized an office in the Pentagon responsible for coordinating all studies and plans about an academy and nominated an individual to head it—to centralize efforts in Washington DC. Both moves furthered the establishment of the academy and influenced the direction that it would take including how it might aim to accomplish an officer candidate’s professional military education.

As the leaders of the Air Force pressed the service to move vigorously to plan an academy in the autumn of 1948, their focus on professional military education also influenced the Secretary of Defense to review the entire military academy structure. The review board that he composed examined the existing academies, and entertained the support for an additional academy. General Vandenberg’s order to Air University, which made it the lead command on planning for an air academy, also supported this planning group. This group, formed in 1949, was known as the Service Academy Board and more popularly as the “Stearns-Eisenhower” Board—for the chairman and vice chairman of the group.\textsuperscript{145} The study that this group submitted, “A Report and Recommendation to the Secretary of Defense by the Service Academy Board,”

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{144} Letter from Muir S. Fairchild, General, US Air Force, Vice Chief of Staff, to the Commanding General, Air University, Subject: “Establishment of an Air Force Academy,” 16 August 1948 in Air Force Academy Planning Board Study, Vol. 1, “A Plan for an Air Force Academy” (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Headquarters, The Air University, January 1949), v, USAFA Special Collections. (The study will now be referred to as “AFAPBS”). The signature block was Fairchild’s, however, prior to the signature block was the emphasized order and authority “BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF.”

\textsuperscript{145} Dr. Robert L. Stearns, President of the University of Colorado, and Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of Columbia University.
also proposed what it saw as the most effective way to educate an officer candidate—primarily an academic education focused on scientific fields and liberal arts.

These two studies—the study that came out of the Fairchild group meeting and the one directed by the Secretary of Defense—outlined a solid philosophy and curriculum that would eventually be seen in the Air Force Academy when it appeared a half decade later.\(^{146}\) The personnel involved in these two studies included individuals who, in some cases, became even more instrumental at the time of the founding in 1954—as they created the initial structure and developed the curriculum. The founding fathers of the Air Force Academy concentrated their efforts on creating a solid, broad academic experience, one they thought would be effective in developing officers and in motivating the new cadets to a full career of service to the Air Force. Professional military studies held a second-class position to the broad academic curriculum. Also, this education would encompass a fairly broad range of course work, but, after an emphasis on the social sciences and humanities early in a cadet’s time at the proposed academy, it would

shift and become a more technical curriculum. This was no accident – the founders focused on the new institution as supporting an advanced technical service.

**Air Force Academy Planning Board Study**

The immediate response to the Fairchild Board’s deliberations in August 1948 and to the call of the Air Force Chief of Staff to create an academy was the decision to produce a comprehensive study that the planners believed would be the blueprint for the new institution. The Fairchild Board had provided some basic structure and objectives for an academy, but it had not, for example, set out a specific curriculum. General Vandenberg had selected Air University as the single point of contact on this issue because of his Vice Chief of Staff, Muir Fairchild. That Vandenberg relied on his assistant was prescient. Prior to becoming the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force in May 1948, Fairchild had been the acting commander of the newly organized Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base. Although the concept of Maxwell housing an air university might have seemed original to uninitiated observers, the base had a history of accommodating officers developing air doctrine and advancing professional studies going back to the Air Corps Tactical School of the 1930s, with Fairchild as one of the school’s graduates. Thus programs at Maxwell had been focused very much on doctrine and professional

---


148 Although the location of Maxwell Field (later, Air Force Base) had housed various air service-related schools, the re-designation of Air University occurred in March 1946—Fairchild was the first Commandant of this school. See [www.au.af.mil/au/audocs/AU_Maxwell_Heritage_Pamphlet_2014.pdf](http://www.au.af.mil/au/audocs/AU_Maxwell_Heritage_Pamphlet_2014.pdf).
military studies, but, after the Air Force had its independence, those responsible for the study aimed toward an academy that would put comprehensive military studies in second-tier status while elevating the place of a broad, general academic education for the officer candidate. Whether this would be achieved was another matter.

The study that Air University produced was the Air Force Academy Planning Board Study (AFAPBS). The group responsible for the study produced three volumes in their nine months of work—about 650 pages—under the titles of “A Plan for the Academy” (published January 1949), “The Curriculum” (May 1949), and “Site Survey at Randolph Field, Texas” (January 1949)—the final volume inspired by legislative pressure from Representative Kilday and others to house the school at the established base in San Antonio. Essential to this study was the central question, “What did [the Air Force organization] want a young Air Force officer to be?”149 This question inspired all individuals involved and the various assembled working groups that were charged with assisting the effort.

The first two volumes are of main interest to this work, since they provide the thinking of the Academy’s planners on an overall direction for the program of study—to include their view of professional military education. The first volume summarizes the curriculum, so understanding it gives a sense of the context planners envisioned for professional military studies. As the study’s project director later stated, planners and higher education consultants

149 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 3, Background and Legislation, Number 1, “Interview with Colonel Arthur E. Boudreau by the Air Force Academy Historian, Major Edgar A. Holt, 10-11 October 1956,” 4. The first volume is 170 pages; the second 433; and the site survey is 39 pages, with a number of additional pages housing some field diagrams. The third volume was also classified “Restricted,” mainly since Congress had given no authorization on location.
developed the first volume as the basic outline of the curriculum, while the hired academic specialists took this basic outline as the basis for developing a more extensive and much more detailed program in the second volume.150 The board concentrated on the general academic curriculum for developing an officer candidate who would “represent the Air Force advantageously in any educated group, at home or abroad, socially or officially.”151 The emphasis would be on the academic curriculum without a heavy focus on specifically military studies. The Planning Board, however, was still central in formulating the curriculum for professional military studies at the new academy, however lacking the curriculum may have been. As wanting as the military studies course work would be, the Board’s proposal did set the precedent for the actual curriculum used when the new Academy opened in 1955.152

150 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 3, Background and Legislation, Number 1, “Interview with Colonel Arthur E. Boudreau by the Air Force Academy Historian, Major Edgar A. Holt, 10-11 October 1956,” 6. Again, realize that the first volume is 170 pages, while the second volume is 433 pages—both projects are solid work. See also, Jay D. Miller, Ted Ownby, Jr., and Charles W. Walters, “USAF Academy Military Training History” (research report, Air Command and Staff College, Air University, May 1978), 30.

151 AFAPBS, Vol. 1, “A Plan for the Air Force Academy”, 113. This was included in the opening paragraph of Chapter 10, “Introduction to the Curriculum”—Volume 2 expands the discussion and laboriously outlines the proposed curriculum.

152 “Program of Instruction, 4 January 1954,” in Colonel Arthur Boudreau’s Files, 1954, Special Collections, USAFA. Document’s author unknown, but presumed to be Boudreau. As stated in the document, “The ground work was laid at the Air University in 1948 and 1949 by a group which included a number of Air Force officers and some sixty selected civilian educators,” 1-2.
Besides providing the study group with their overt support, Air Force senior leaders also had presented the AFAPBS personnel with some specific guidance that would ultimately affect the Board’s conclusions. In the first directive, the Air Force Chief stipulated that the Air Force’s academy would be aligned with the other academies—a four-year course of instruction. The second directive was that the focus would not be on flight training—this specialized training should not even be part of the program.  

Although the first directive provided a sound framework for developing the Academy, the one on flight training proved contentious—and the debate over this issue later distracted and distorted the focus of professional military studies at the institution.

General Vandenberg did not want any pilot training done at the new academy, because he believed that it would be in tension with education at the academy. He recognized the difference between education and training, and he had confidence in, as the Fairchild Board members agreed, that all more specialized training should be accomplished after the commissioning of the

\[153\text{Letter from Hoyt S. Vandenberg, General, US Air Force, Chief of Staff, to the Commanding General, Air University, Subject: “Establishment of an Air Force Academy,” 1 September 1948 in Air Force Academy Planning Board Study, Vol. 1, “A Plan for an Air Force Academy” (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Headquarters, The Air University, January 1949), iii. See also Chapter 2, where, among other issues, the debate was about whether an officer candidate would go to a university for a couple of years, followed by a 2-3 year academy education. This discussion on length of civilian versus academy education falls into the realm of service unification—which was a post-war push by many in the establishment. On the extent of consensus for no flight training in the program, see Edward Anthony Miller, Jr., “The Founding of the Air Force Academy: An Administrative and Legislative History” (Ph.D. diss., University of Denver, August 1969), 232.}\]
officer candidate. He believed that the focus should be on education. Also, Vandenberg had history as his guide concerning pilot training while a cadet was at an academy. During World War II, West Point instituted a program that trained and prepared the officer candidates for their flying career, since pilots were at a premium. Cadets actually earned their pilot’s certification. Although the War Department authorized 60 percent of each West Point class to take the training and join the Army Air Forces, only about 40 percent actually completed the training. This focus


155 For a different interpretation of why flying training failed during this time at West Point, see, AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 3, Background and Legislation, Number 12, “Interview with General Dale O. Smith, Planning for the Establishment of the Air Force Academy, Washington, D.C. 18 April 1956,” 1-2. Smith, an advocate for a strong professional military studies program at the new academy, also believed that “flying training should constitute the central core of studies for the professional education of potential Air Force officer in the Air Force Academy,” 2.

156 General George Marshall provided the final direction. See, AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 3, Background and Legislation, Number 3, “Record of Interview of Lieutenant General Idwal H. Edwards by Air Force Academy Historian in Washington, D.C. on 26 October 1956,” 7. General Edwards was the General Staff’s G-3—in charge of Operations. He recommended that pilot training while a cadet at West Point not be done. West Point graduates, specifically Hap Arnold, overruled him. Edwards believed that if you had some cadets doing the flying program, and the others performing “onerous’ drills”—this would create a rift. Those flying cadets “would pile in their trucks and drive out to Stewart Air Field with their flying clothes on while the other fellows were marching down some hall to do some drill that nobody cared about.” For the flying program at West Point, see M. Hamlin Cannon, Flying Training at West Point (U.S Air Force Academy, 1970) in the USAFA Special Collections.
on flight training while those taking the training were still cadets was a departure, because it veered away from West Point’s tradition of more drill and ceremony training as well as their standard practice of keeping studies broader and more general. In fact, the Academic Board at West Point had to alter the curriculum for “air cadets” to accommodate the flight training, since it was being conducted during the regular academic year. This affected the first class that graduated with wings in January 1943. West Point’s wartime Superintendent, Major General Francis B. Wilby, directed a review of the curriculum by the Academic Board in 1943, preparing for post-war normalcy for West Point. The Academic Board used this opportunity to bring back its traditional focus in favor of more generalized training and studies—and this would mean eliminating pilot training while cadets were at the Academy. The Board believed that the specialized flight training “had caused class distinctions, branch jealousies, and claims of discrimination among the cadets.” The last class that had pilot training while at the Academy was the class of 1946.\footnote{Lance Betros, \textit{Carved in Granite: West Point since 1902} (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2012), 225-226. For the information of that first January 1943 graduating class, Betros credits West Point’s \textit{Annual Report to the Superintendent} (1943), see Betros, 403n72 and 403n73, and notes that the first class had 245 initial participants of the program—39 failed to graduate and “four died trying.”} Those who opposed flight training at West Point had eventually won out. Lieutenant General Idwal Edwards, one of those opponents and one who also opposed having flight training at a new Air Force Academy, later suggested: “The purpose of [an Air Academy] was not to turn out aviators—it was to turn out officers who were basically educated in the
military profession—officers who could be *trained* to fly later.”¹⁵⁸ Even though this decision in 1948 would affect the curriculum of the AFAPBS, flight training at the Academy was not laid to rest.

Although the Chief’s directive gave Commanding General of Air University Major General Robert Harper overall responsibility for the program, the actual practical work in conducting the Planning Board’s study rested on the shoulders of the project officer, Lieutenant Colonel Arthur E. Boudreau. Colonel Boudreau would have a lasting impact on and association with the Academy, eventually becoming its Assistant Dean. When General Harper recalled him back to the service in August 1948, Boudreau was serving as the Executive Vice President and Dean of the Inter-American College at Coral Gables, Florida. He was a traditional civilian educator—a fact that affected his outlook on what really constituted professional military studies. He was more interested in developing the broad-based education that he believed was necessary for the education of an officer.¹⁵⁹ Boudreau had worked for Harper during the war when Harper was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Training and Boudreau oversaw the “wartime civilian pilot training contracts in colleges and contract schools.” He also organized the Air Force College Training Program in approximately 150 colleges and universities.¹⁶⁰ Boudreau’s


influence on the direction of the new academy’s curriculum cannot be overstated, since he was an organizer and participant for the AFAPBS, was centrally involved in the Secretary of Defense’s study of all service academies, and played an integral part in actually establishing the Academy’s academic curriculum in his role as the Assistant Dean upon the Academy’s founding.\textsuperscript{161}

One of Boudreau’s first acts upon accepting his duties shows the direction the new academy would ultimately take in the education of the officer candidate. Boudreau was not only the overall project officer for the study, but he also assumed the duty of directing the Curriculum Group—one of four groups comprising the whole study team. On October 1, 1948, Lieutenant Colonel Boudreau assigned the officers under him in the group on curriculum development into three committees: One team was responsible for the technical field subjects, another for the humanities and social sciences, and the third for the areas of physical and military training.\textsuperscript{162}

These committees were comprised of the planners for the curriculum, as stated above, that would set the course for the curriculum that the specialists would then provide more specific direction

\textsuperscript{161} Lieutenant General David M. Schlatter, who was also involved in the Service Academy Board study in 1949-1950, as well as directly involved with the post-war organization of the service school system of the Army Air Force/Air Force, suggests that Boudreau was the “main full-time contact man” of the Service Academy Board, and “had the longest continuity [on planning for the Air Force Academy]…of any man I know.” See \textit{AFAHD, 1954-1956}, Appendix, Vol. 3, Number 10, “Record of Interview with Lieutenant General David M. Schlatter by Air Force Academy Historian [Major Holt] in Norfolk, Virginia on 24 October 1956,” 6-7.

\textsuperscript{162} \textit{AFAHD, 1954-1956}, Vol. 1, 446. He did this through an official memo, see ibid., 446n14.
for the program. The listing of “military training”—rather than “education”—in the third and final grouping reveals the role, or lack of role, that military studies would have in the curriculum.

Apart from Colonel Boudreau’s group was another one that became subordinate to the planning team was the Educational Advisory Staff to Air University. This was an already established division within Air University that now was attached to the overall planning study, as directed by the Air Force Chief—his message was for any group working on any plan for an academy were now subordinated to General Harmon’s work. This group’s primary goal upon its founding in 1946 was to improve “the educational process for the training of professional Air Force officers, rather than to determine the content specific courses,” since these were civilians who held terminal degrees in various disciplines. The team advised the Planning Board on how to achieve the broad, general education of the officer candidate that would also motivate the candidate to a lifetime of service, rather than to put the focus on specifically military studies.

The emphasis of this group of educators to avoid specific military studies, then, resembled the

---


view expressed by many others working to establish the new academy’s curriculum that military studies should not have an influential position at this military academy.

Time was now of the essence, as the voices to establish the new academy grew stronger, including those in Congress, and this predicament would affect the study. The goal became promptly providing the information needed to assist the legislative effort, and a perfect curriculum was not really a part of the required solution.\textsuperscript{165} Even though it would not be the perfect solution, then, what this study developed did become the blueprint for the future discussion about establishing the academy. Given the time pressure, the planners had to do the best they could without the time needed for full reflection—a faultless result was thus an extreme challenge. As Colonel Boudreau stated in a later interview:

One factor to consider was that we started working “all out” on Academy planning in September, which was a bad time for educators…. The period from September 1948 to June of 1949 was our great period of production. The planning and development of the plan of the establishment of the Air Force Academy, as well as the curriculum was done between September 1948 and June 1949, and…there was no chance to do long-range planning…. We had to locate the best men that we could find who could give us the time…. We brought in a group of educators on a high administrative level. They were not teachers or professors; instead they were deans and presidents of colleges…. We picked those people first because of their successful administrative experience in high level positions,

and second, we tried to pick those who would be conversant with the changing aspects of education in the scientific and technical areas in social-humanistic areas…. 166

Although the study, according to Boudreau, might not have had the assistance of the most perfect contingent of collegiate educators, the consultants that did participate still were of solid pedigree. 167

The first accomplishment of the group was to establish what it believed a young officer should be, and this led to the study’s statement of the twelve objectives in the development of the cadets. First among these were that the officer candidate, through this program, would be “well-grounded in Air Force principles, practices and procedures,” as well as educated in military studies. 168 This emphasis, as its first objective, seemed to align with the requirement of a strong professional military studies program. These objectives matched nicely with the group’s conclusion why an Air Force Academy was so necessary. In this section, titled “The Necessity for the United States Air Force Academy,” the study’s members, specifically the full-time members of the AFAPBS (see “members” in the Appendix), recognized: “The disposition of the people of the United States is historically so unwarlike that to the vast majority it seems unusual

167 Boudreau believed that those educators “in the trenches” provided the most recent pedagogy and methods in the modern classroom, thus the desire to get those who were doing some heavy lifting in the classroom.
168 AFAPBS, Vol. 1, 7.
for a person to seek a career in the profession of arms.”\textsuperscript{169} Therefore, this new academy would provide an officer candidate a robust program of instruction in professional military studies.

Since this study would provide future Air Force leaders and the academy’s founders with a vision of a professional airman who would win a commission through the Air Force Academy, its specifications merit attention – they were not only the elements of this one group’s study but became the premises for future studies and discussions on about the role of the new academy. The specifications were stated clearly and simply:

The aim of the Air Force Academy will be to produce an officer who will be:

a. Well-grounded in Air Force principles, practices and procedures.

b. Broadly and soundly educated in the humanities, sciences, and military studies.

c. Conscious of the mission and responsibilities of the profession of arms.

d. Devoted to his career and sensible of his obligation to his country and service.

e. Motivated to work for the preservation of peace and willing to fight for its effective accomplishment.

f. Instilled with a high sense of loyalty, duty and the subordination of his individual desires for the common good.

g. Skilled in human relations and possessed of a knowledge of the world and its peoples.

h. Respectful of the rights and liberties of individuals, institutions and nations.

i. A calm, effective, resourceful leader.

j. Receptive of new ideas and learning.

\textsuperscript{169} AFAPBS, Vol. 1, 3.
k. A man who knows how to “win,” and how to take his place on a winning team.

l. An honored representative of the Air Force.¹⁷⁰

With these stated objectives to fulfill, the curriculum would seemingly need a strong focus on military studies. The first four requirements on the list aligned directly with the need for professional military studies and provided an indisputable basis for the new institution.¹⁷¹ Toward the end of the opening chapter of the work, under the subheading “Urgency,” the planners connected the founding of West Point—which came about because “Washington, Knox, Hamilton, Jefferson, and Monroe” were men who “knew from bitter experience the need of a school for the professional training of officers”—to the pressing requirement for an academy to serve the newly independent service. The planners emphasized: “It can hardly be disputed that maintaining national security or, in the last extremity, the conduct of war, is such a serious business that it should be entrusted only to the most carefully trained and highly qualified men.”¹⁷² Colonel Boudreau recognized: “The AFAPB decided…that they were not going to consider the point of articulation between the Academy and civilian institutions in any specific

¹⁷⁰ AFAPBS, Vol. 1, 7. This list is the only page that constitutes the second chapter in Part One of Volume 1. The title of the chapter is, “The Mission of the United States Air Force Academy.” The first volume of the AFAPBS has five parts, with three “chapters” in the first part, six in the second part—which is administration and organization, four in the third part—the summary of the curriculum, two in the fourth part, and only a single chapter in the fifth part.

¹⁷¹ Although the first four have a specific relationship to military studies, most of the points can relate to a strong military studies program. The points also lean heavily on disciplines housed in the humanities and social sciences.

¹⁷² AFAPBS, Vol. 1, 6.
degree. Civilian colleges have specific objectives; the Air Force Academy would have the primary objective of starting professional airmen on their careers.... A young graduate of the academy would receive the professional education of an airman in the same manner as a man going to law school comes out a lawyer.”

So the AFAPBS proposed that the academy would be the central mechanism for producing the country’s Air Force professional core. The planners seemingly stressed the need for this particular service school to properly and effectively educate its future officers in thoroughly understanding the “conduct of war”—especially as it pertains to the service proper.

Instead of emphasizing professional military studies at the heart of the curriculum, however, those shaping it pushed instead into the broader area of general education. After all, some thought, the Air Force had already been struggling with its status as the service with the smallest share of its officers who had had college educations, and this was something that the founders of the new academy needed to address. Again, in the opening chapter of the plan, under the subheading “Educational Status,” the document noted: “Among the serious problems facing the United States Air Force is that of establishing a system of undergraduate education which will prepare officers for careers in its service…. The Air Force needs a system of procurement that will provide an adequate number of college-educated, uniformly trained officers with the character and personal attributes desired—a system that will give stability to the


officer corps and unity to the objectives and ideals of its members. The new academy would solve the problem by offering a “broad general education as well as a sound background in aeronautical science and tactics, a requirement unique to the Air Force,” conferring a Bachelor of Science degree on the graduate. The planners suggested that, although various civilian colleges and universities could offer an effective and economical education, these institutions did not offer a degree that would include all the courses that Air Force officers needed. Moreover, they claimed, “civilian colleges are unprepared to accept the responsibility of weeding out the students lacking the traits of character, qualities of leadership, and amenability to discipline that are essential to an efficient officer corps.” Discipline and training, as well as motivating the officer candidates for service, were more important than specifically military education. Again, Boudreau’s organization of the curriculum emphasized the general education in the humanities and the sciences over military education—which he had already pigeonholed into the more technical, more limiting, and less “academic” term “military training.”

The organizational structure proposed in the plan, however, seemed to emphasize, once again, the role that military studies would have in the overall program. In Chapter 4, “Organization of the United States Air Force Academy,” a chart depicts the three main organizations under the Superintendent—the general officer overseeing the entire command. The three organizations were under the Dean of Faculty, the Commandant of Cadets, and the Deputy for Administration—this final organization was responsible for ensuring the base and logistical support for the academy. The organizational chart for the Dean of Faculty is further

175 AFAPBS, Vol. 1, 4.
176 AFAPBS, Vol. 1, 5.
177 By law, this position was initially a Major General (2-star) and subsequently became a Lieutenant General (3-star) position. See also, AFAPBS, Vol. 1, 31.
delineated to show three constituent divisions, which included the Chairman, Division of Humanities; Chairman, Division of Science; Chairman, Division of Military Studies. Later in the chapter, placed after the organizational charts, the respective roles and responsibilities of the various organizations and divisions are given. The basic separation of responsibilities seems rather clear as the Dean’s office was to head “all organized instruction,” and the Commandant was to be “directly responsible for military training, administration, personnel services, and discipline of Air Cadets.” The structured program seemed to offer a solid division of labor—with a division under the Dean organizing the academic approach to military studies and the Commandant implementing the appropriate military training.

However, besides overseeing the military training of the officer candidates, the Commandant shouldered an additional responsibility as the Chairman of the Division of Military Studies. Although the study’s planners seemingly differentiated in the program’s structure between academic work in military studies and other kinds of work in military training, this arrangement actually blurred demarcation, even though it was intended to “complete coordination in the daily routine of each Air Cadet,” by placing some of the academic responsibility in the commandant’s realm. While also the division’s Chairman, the Commandant would then be responsible to provide “personnel to the Division of Military Studies for

178 The school’s library was the fourth division under the responsibility of the Dean. See, AFAPBS, Vol. 1, 25.
179 AFAPBS, Vol. 1, 33, 34. Both the Dean and Commandant are Brigadier Generals—one-star generals, subordinated to the Superintendent. To assist civilian educators, the Commandant is often compared to a Dean of Students. Author’s emphasis.
180 AFAPBS, Vol. 1, 33.
instruction in military subjects,”181 which added a layer of confusion. This mingling of tasks across levels and types of responsibility would be noticeable and problematic upon the founding of the Academy, specifically involving the personalities of the first commandant and the second dean, as discussed below. So the Commandant’s office, recognized to be the administrative, training, and disciplinary branch, was expected also to have a significant role in the development of the academic work in military studies.

Before investigating the specific courses proposed for the Division of Military Studies to gauge the rigor expected in a cadet’s military education, it is useful to review the emphasis each division received under the Dean in the plan. In the first volume, written by those planning teams that developed the broader outline of a curriculum, the third section summarized the goals embodied in the curriculum, while briefing describing courses and supporting course material.182 The section opens with a disclaimer that the anticipated second volume (completed some four months after this first volume and running to 433 pages) might include updated information on the proposed courses, since the second volume would incorporate the results of further study and deliberation by subject matter experts.183 But the first and second volumes assigned similar distributions of course hours to the three divisions.184 The breakdown, as depicted in the chart

181 AFAPBS, Vol. 1, 42-43. In the plan’s delineation of each area’s responsibilities, the commandant is given fourteen, labeled “a” – “n.” The responsibility as chairman of the division, and his role to provide the instructors and instruction are “k” and “l” respectively.
182 This third part of the plan is titled “Summary of the Curriculum with Brief Course Descriptions,” AFAPBS, Vol. 1, 111.
183 AFAPBS, Vol. 1, 111.
184 Comparing the two “Master Program” charts in the respective volumes shows the same total credit hours—195—with the humanities and the sciences the same devised
“Master Program” in the first volume, allots 33.8 percent for the humanities, 39 percent for the sciences, and 27.2 percent for military studies. The planners determined this distribution by mapping out the proposed four-year curriculum with its supporting credit hours—66 hours in the humanities, 76 in the sciences, and 53 in military studies, for a total of 195 credit hours for the candidates to receive the bachelor’s degree. The planning team acknowledged that this total number of credit hours was extremely high compared with the requirements at civilian colleges and universities. However, as the academy’s planners discovered, the quest to “do all” and “be all” was a difficult one to navigate, and the high demands of the program became a persistent program. The only minor change is in the military studies program between the two volumes—two of the proposed credit hours are moved from the summer to the academic year between volumes. See AFAPBS, Vol. 1, 115 and, AFAPBS, Vol. 2, vii. Look at the final three rows and columns for the comparison.

AFAPBS, Vol. 1, 115. Refer to the final two rows of the chart. As a point of comparison, the Air Training Command plan from 1948, as discussed in the previous chapter, had a total of 5,240 contact hours planned, with 13 percent (703 hours) dedicated to the humanities/social sciences, 31 percent (1,612) for sciences/engineering, 10 percent (524) for professional education (primarily training coursework, but with military education interspersed), and 46 percent (2,401) for flying training and physical education—this training organization concentrated on specialized training, which was rejected by all other plans. See “United States Air Academy Plan,” Headquarters, Air Training Command, Barksdale AFB, LA, 26 April 1948, 16-17. A committee of civilian consultants met with Academy planners in October 1948 and reported a month later that the three divisions seemed “logical and desirable” and that having the cadets take 23 courses (69 semester hours) “should accomplish as adequately as possible, considering the professional demands inherent in the nature and function of the Air Force Academy, the objective of a broad general education.” Quoted in AFAPBS, Vol. 1, 447, from “Memo for Lt Col Boudreau, unsigned, subj: Report of Curriculum Planners, 11 Nov 48,” 447n16; original document not found.
issue at the academy. Nevertheless, the fact that the Division of Military Studies received somewhat lower hours for its coursework affords some early hint of the lower level of emphasis on military studies among the planners.

But the difference in the total hours devoted to Military Studies compared with the other divisions was less significant than the level of rigor in the courses the division offered. Again, what the planners proposed would have cadets to take around 200 credit hours—requiring a cadet to take between 20 and 23 hours per semester (the program included some credit hours, primarily in military studies—or training—during the summer semesters). The planners of the curriculum recognized that this was an “inordinately high” number of hours—compared with the 18-20 hours per semester deemed normal at West Point, Annapolis, and civilian universities—but acknowledged that some subjects would require little or no outside preparation by the cadet.186 Specifically, no homework would be needed in “the tactics, air science and physical education courses”—all within the Military Studies Division. So, they concluded: “When this is taken into consideration the academic load is not appreciably higher than is carried by good students in civilian universities.”187 Also, the Curriculum Planning Group suggested: “The ratio of academic credit to hours or periods of instruction is one to one for classroom courses, one to three for tactics and field courses and one to two for laboratory courses and physical education.”188 This seemed to give the appearance of a lack of rigor in the military studies program.

186 Betros, 140. West Point was evaluating its curriculum, also, in the late-1950s. Their total was 19-21 hours a semester.
188 AFAPBS, Vol. 2, vi.
The vision the planners had for the military studies program was rather rudimentary. The division’s responsibility “[was] the preparation of the Air Cadet mentally, psychologically, and physically for exercise of command and fulfillment of the responsibilities and duties which must be assumed upon graduation,” with a focus on “command and leadership.” The organizational chart in the first volume, for example, shows two departments housed in the Division of Military Studies: the Department of Air Science and Tactics Instruction and the Department of Health and Physical Education Instruction. In the third part of this first volume are four chapters that better outline the curriculum that the planners proposed—the final chapter of this section more clearly discusses the Division of Military Studies and its block of courses amounting to 53 credit hours. In investigating these two departments, one can easily conclude that they embraced much that was not consistent with an academic approach in professional military studies.

In the second department, for example, the program of courses designed by the planners included physical education and basic military hygiene. The three-credit course in Military Hygiene, a junior-level course, was intended to investigate basic “health and disease to the personnel of the Air Force in both war and peace,” along with understanding the necessary defenses against nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare. Although this was a necessary

---

189 AFAPBS, Vol. 2, 216.
190 AFAPBS, Vol. 1, 133. The planners’ volume, Volume 2, seemingly maintains this same structure as its organizational chart continues to show two departments, but the third part of this second volume, pages 215-433, devoted to the Division of Military Studies, discusses three “stems” within the division—Air Science, Tactics, and Health and Physical Education. See AFAPBS, Vol. 2, viii, 216-217.
191 AFAPBS, Vol. 1, 133. The listing of the expanded course work demonstrates that the discussion on nuclear, biological, and chemical (“NBC”) warfare does not include any intellectual classroom discussions, merely the training and preparation of such warfare.
component of military training, serious proponents of military education would not have considered the various courses developed within these two categories as more broadly meaningful in an officer’s military education. Instead, these courses more likely revealed a bias favoring military training rather than a broader kind of military education and learning. In addition, the fifteen credits in physical education courses, spanning four years, were to provide the cadet with instruction and training in various athletic activities.¹⁹² So even though this department was within a division included within the Dean’s accountability, these “studies” align more with training than with than education.

The Department of Air Science and Tactics Instruction, the other department in the Division of Military Studies, offered courses that seemed more closely aligned with course work in military studies. This department, as defined in the section’s summary, was responsible for

The specialists did not include these topics in their proposal. See AFAPBS, Vol. 2, 384-395. The course plan opens with a period offering an historical discussion on the necessity for hygiene in warfare, as the discussion includes reviewing how good health was necessary in over 18 conflicts from the Peloponnesian War through World War II—the Korean War is somehow omitted—see page 385.

¹⁹² AFAPBS, Vol. 1, 138-140. The 15 credit hours for physical education break down as 6 during the freshman year, 5 for the sophomore year, and 2 each offered in the junior and senior year. Besides basic sports, some delved more into Boy Scouting activity—camping and “campcraft,” canoeing, fishing, hiking, etc.—such as PE 200, which Air Cadet took during his summer after the freshman year. See ibid., 139. Noteworthy is the effort put forth by the civilian consultants on the physical education course work. For example, the physical education plan included three years of Tennis—20 periods in PE 100; 14 in PE 101; 17 in PE 102; none in PE 200, but had to accomplish an “activity card” demonstrating at least 12 sets of tennis; 17 in PE 201; 17 in PE 202; 12 in PE 301; and 8 in PE 302. Other sports required a similar amount of attention. This emphasis on PE—one course—was as much as the emphasis on pure military studies coursework. See AFAPBS, Vol. 2, 307, 313-315, 325, 345, 359, 368, 373, 375, 401.
courses in “Tactics, Orientation, National Military Establishment, Military Law and Administration.” The planning specialists’ volume, the second and more comprehensive volume on the curriculum, appears to maintain this same structure as the plan envisioned above, as it continues to show two departments in the Division of Military Studies. However, the third part of the second volume, which is devoted to the Division of Military Studies, discusses three “stems” within the division—Health and Physical Education, Air Force Tactics, and Air Science. With this structure in mind, a more thorough review of what comprises this department’s coursework—the remaining 35 of 53 total hours for the Division of Military Studies—provides a better understanding that the focus was, again, more on training than on education.

The “Air Force Tactics” courses—20 credit hours dispersed throughout the academic year and summer—were primarily drill and ceremony courses. Similar to the physical education courses, the tactics courses were “non-classroom courses.” As the cadet advanced, he assumed leadership roles in this training, but the cadet received little academic education on leadership, or other aspects of military studies, in these courses. However, Tactics 400, the summer course

195 AFAPBS, Vol. 2, 216-217. The third part of volume 2 is the Division of Military Studies—Part 1 and 2 explored the humanities and sciences—encompasses the pages 215-433 of the volume, a majority of which discusses the Health and Physical Education program (307-433). There is no discussion that these three stems would comprise three departments.
196 AFAPBS, Vol. 2, 217. Reviewing the expanded proposed curriculum in this volume, found in chapter 11, pages 269-305, reveals why no outside class preparation is needed for this coursework, since it is so concentrated on drill and ceremony.
provided to those cadets matriculating into their senior year, did include field trips to Air Force bases, so that the cadet would receive an education on “phases of the national economy related to national defense” and interaction in the joint military community.\textsuperscript{197} Some of this coursework may have been relevant to effective military education. However, almost two-thirds of the coursework in this department, 20 of the remaining 35 hours,\textsuperscript{198} was actually training rather than education.

The final stem within the Division of Military Studies, the “Air Science” course work, did have some significant relevance to the cadet’s military education. This is apparent in the second volume, since the specialists who tackled this area formulated some changes to the proposed curriculum put forth by the planners in the first volume. The main change between the planners’ volume and the later specialists’ volume revealed itself in the introduction of course work called “Orientation.” This change between the two volumes demonstrates that the specialists recognized that the weak military studies program, as outlined in the first volume, required some strengthening.\textsuperscript{199} Although a single credit hour seems like a minor change, the structure into which it fit showed more important implications. As discussed in the first volume, the “Orientation” course is the basic training that the cadets receive upon arriving at the academy in the summer before their freshman year—“Orientation 100.” This period focuses on drill and ceremony, proper dress and bearing, basic heritage of the service, and the like—merely military

\textsuperscript{197} AFAPBS, Vol. 1, 135-138. Author’s emphasis.
\textsuperscript{198} As discussed in the next paragraph, the Master Program plan differs slightly, but significantly, between volume one and two. In volume one, the Tactics courses comprise 21 credit hours. This figure of 20 comes from volume two.
\textsuperscript{199} The documentation does not provide who instituted the change, or the specific rationale for the change.
training.\textsuperscript{200} However, when the specialists constructed their program, they took two summer credit hours—one from the “Orientation 100” program and one from the “Tactics 100” program—and invented two new “Orientation” courses (given the numbers 101 and 102), which were to be taken during the fall and spring terms of the freshman year—each at one credit hour. Although they amounted to just two credit hours in two semesters, what these two courses involved was significant.

The proposed freshman year “Orientation” course work concentrated specifically on military studies. As discussed in the expanded explanation, the specialists proposed: “The purpose of [these courses] is to provide a general military background that will make the service career more meaningful.”\textsuperscript{201} Although the focus remained on “the lives of great military leaders over the centuries and the characteristics of leadership displayed by these leaders,” the courses offered the cadet some understanding of the “evolution of warfare,” “foundations of national power,” “military problems of the United States,” and “military policy of the United States.”\textsuperscript{202} The expanded bibliography included work from major contributors to the general field of military studies and in the more specific field of air power, to include Clausewitz, Jomini, Foch, Fuller, Creasy, Earle, Douhet, de Seversky, Slessor, and Arnold, among others.\textsuperscript{203} These were serious works in military theory and history, and it was a significant change for the officer

\textsuperscript{200} AFAPBS, Vol. 1, 134. The planners did include, in their vision of this program, instruction in the “Articles of War,” which would be difficult to instruct without some education on warfare and conduct of airpower in conflict, which would be solid military studies. However, this was a minor portion of the 8-week course.

\textsuperscript{201} AFAPBS, Vol. 2, 227.

\textsuperscript{202} AFAPBS, Vol. 2, 227-230.

\textsuperscript{203} AFAPBS, Vol. 2, 232-233. Note that the study pertaining to Clausewitz is not from his On War, but Principles of War.
candidates at the Academy to be given this healthy challenge to enhance their professional education.

Besides the Orientation classes, the Air Science department oversaw other course work that had relevance to the cadet’s military education. The junior-level “Military Law” course focused on the military courts-martial system and included an introduction to basic law. But the expanded description makes clear that the material did not really address topics that represent a fuller or broader military education. Material in military studies, however, did touch on constitutional law and the place of military authority within the system.\textsuperscript{204} This was certainly in line with military education. The senior-level course “Administration” was a two-semester course to investigate “Air Force administrative procedures and policies, military management and personal responsibilities…proper understanding of the officers personal affairs, as well as personal affairs of airmen who will later be under his command.”\textsuperscript{205} Like other courses, this one may have provided useful knowledge, but most would fall under training and not military education.

Finally, however, is the sophomore-level, two-semester course in “The National Military Establishment.” Although the planners wanted the cadets to understand the air base organizational structure and duties, the evident focus of the course was on studying the greater military established as well as the other services’ roles and responsibilities in the joint warfare environment, and the Air Force’s specific contribution to national defense.\textsuperscript{206} These courses

\textsuperscript{204} AFAPBS, Vol. 1, 134-135. In the 1970s, as discussed below, this course began to include a significant section concerning Just War Theory and its relation to laws of armed conflict—most certainly a solid professional military education topic. See Chapter 5.

\textsuperscript{205} AFAPBS, Vol. 1, 135.

\textsuperscript{206} AFAPBS, Vol. 1, 134.
incorporated what little military education there was at the academy—at least those courses to be housed in the Division of Military Studies. Although the courses in the Air Science “stem” contributed to a cadet’s military education, much of this proposed coursework in the division was to be focused on training rather than on education.

The proposed Division of Military Studies was not the only unit with responsibility in various aspects of professional military education. The planners believed that all aspects of the curriculum taken together would effectively educate and prepare the officer candidate for professional service in the Air Force. Contributions to the cadet’s military education came in work in other academic departments, too, beyond what was offered in the Military Studies Division. The general curriculum met the planners’ broad approach for the intellectual development of the air cadet, while at the same time this program was also expected to be central to the cadet’s professional military education. As the planners recognized, “The program of the Military Studies Division has been developed in cooperation with and to coordinate with the other divisions of instruction…in order that the entire program of instruction…will represent an integrated whole without unnecessary duplication.” The general academic program included various courses, or certainly lessons, that substantially contributed to the military professionalism of the officer candidate. As the Curriculum Planning Group constructed the

program of studies for the academy, its main aim remained ensuring that the Air Force gained officers who “will always be culturally up-to-date and ever on the frontiers of knowledge and thought, thereby providing far-sighted leadership in the furtherance of our national security.” To do this, the group reflected, although insight from other higher education programs was necessary (to include, specifically, ideas from the other service academies), this new program would be unique – one in which “the emphasis has been given to the humanities and ethical values of the spirit, purposes, methods, and implementation of democracy, as well as aeronautical and military indoctrination.”

Emphasizing the broad, general education for the cadet, the planners believed that this kind of curriculum—especially with regard to the humanities—would give the cadet not only the knowledge but also a way of viewing the world that would inform his professionalism.

Also, although the AFAPBS wanted a curriculum (including professional military studies) that fostered the intellectual development of cadets, it did not assume that perfection was the goal. In a sense, the ultimate underlying goal of the Board at this time was not to investigate the role of professional military studies in the curriculum, or even to examine the proper balance of course work in the overall education of the officer candidate. Instead, their aim was to facilitate and justify the proposed legislation to establish the academy. Many airmen believed the time was right for the service to have its own academy and commissioning source. In this context, it was important to envision a solid and plausible curriculum, so that one possible barrier to winning legislative approval for the academy could be removed.

---


Even so, the sciences did predominate in the course work, but the concentration on the social sciences and humanities was significant – it was believed necessary as a means by which a new officer could understand and communicate in the global environment. The planners viewed their approach as visionary. This would be a radical departure from the other two academies—yielding a difference that would continue to gain shape with the founding of the Air Force Academy and in its early years.\textsuperscript{211} Given that the Air Force would be assigning officers all over the world, the officer candidate must learn how to readily and easily operate anywhere and how to relate to different peoples and cultures. He should “have enough knowledge of the affairs of the world and its people to be an ambassador of good will where-ever he goes. It is a well established fact that to get along with people and to like people is to know them. Such knowledge should include those things about each country that affect their civilization, their development, their economic resources as compared to our own economic resources….” The planners and consultants developed the curriculum in accordance this thinking.\textsuperscript{212} Moreover, unlike what the Air Training Command had proposed in March 1948, where those planners had assigned only 766 contact hours from a total 5,241-hour program to humanities and the social sciences, the Planning Board Study asserted that a more satisfactory program rested on a balanced approach, giving more emphasis to the social sciences and the humanities.\textsuperscript{213} For example, as a group of civilian consultants to the study stated: “We support the idea of integrated courses in the junior and senior classes, such as [the courses] \textit{Comparative Government and}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{211} Lovell, \textit{Neither Athens nor Sparta?}, 63.
\textsuperscript{213} AFAHD, 1954-1956, Vol.1, 443. The ATC plan is discussed in Chapter 2.
\end{flushleft}
Economic Systems, History of the Americas, and in International Relations which includes international law and American foreign policy, and we feel that such course might develop into something original, valuable, and educationally sound” for officer professional development.214 This offers some insight that the general academic course work was aligned to educate the professional officer. Even though West Point had been a strong influence for many who now sought to establish a new air academy, this curricular proposal was an example of a clear departure from what was done at the other two sister service academies.

One area of emphasis in the AFAPBS’s curriculum that supported professional military education, according to the planners, was study in foreign languages. The foreign language department’s stated objective was to include “wide and significant coverage,” for example, in a host of languages. This was to cultivate in the officer candidate “an understanding of the salient features of foreign civilizations by integration with courses in world history, economics, government and geography,” as well as offer “familiarization with current political problems” and an opportunity to engage with people who speak the language.215 The planners responsible for the department’s course work saw as their responsibility the education of the cadet in preparation for duties around the world.

Another strong example of the focus on general academics, particularly within the social sciences and humanities, as strong support in developing military studies was the capstone class for senior cadets. The planners developed the interdisciplinary course, “Great Issues 402.” The

purpose of this course was to help the cadet “in interrelating and integrating his previous
education and experience through the process of seeking to identify what are the most
fundamental issues of our time.” The course was supposed to use an interdisciplinary approach
to discuss the issues and strengthen the critical thinking process among the cadets. Among the
topics included, however, was “Atomic Energy, Atomic Technology, and World Strategy,”
offered in the introductory section on great issues. There was also to be a lecture by Lewis
Mumford; and there was an entire section, composed of nine class lectures and discussions, on
“American Diplomatic and Military Responsibilities in the Modern World.” One should note the
ambitious reach to bring outstanding speakers to the new academy, such as Paul Hoffman and
Thomas Finletter to lecture on “The Marshall Plan” and George Kennan to speak about “Basic
Factors in American Policy.” So the planners had confidence that their approach to the general
academic course work would greatly contribute to the cadet’s professional military studies.

In its study, the Planning Board attempted to build a proper relationship among the
various disciplines and courses had a direct impact on the development of professional military
studies. Whereas the AFAPBS could use the expertise of the civilian consultants to assist in
developing a curriculum, to include the various disciplines and courses that would effectively

216 AFAPBS, Vol. 2, “The Curriculum,” 130, 134. Hoffman was the director of the
Economic Cooperation Administration (“Marshall Plan”), among other positions; for
more, see Alan R. Raucher, Paul Hoffman: Architect of Foreign Aid (Lexington, KY:
University Press of Kentucky, 1986). Finletter was the chief of the ECA’s mission to the
United Kingdom, as well as the second Secretary of the Air Force (1950-1953). Some of
the other class lecturers were: Reinhold Niebuhr, “Religion in the Twentieth Century”;
James Conant, “On Understanding Science”; James Reston, “How to Read a
Concepts of Democracy.”
educate an officer candidate, there really was no similar design to follow in establishing an Air Force professional military education program. Since the Air Force had been part of the Army until just the previous year, the only service-related training that seemed relevant was a newly established Air Force ROTC curriculum. Some of the Planning Board members visited West Point and determined that “little was known [among the Army officers] about Air Force training [needs].”\textsuperscript{217} With the focus on general academics, the planners established the precedent that gave professional military education a back seat. In exploring the extent to which military studies were being considered as planning for the new academy proceeded, the Academy historian later asked Colonel Art Boudreau, who was one of the major organizers and planners of the report:

“To what extent were your plans for military studies in the Air Force Academy influenced by West Point and Annapolis experience? To what extent by the experience of civilian military colleges and universities?” Boudreau answered: “We were in a very difficult situation on this area…and all the military sciences taught were Army programs. There was only a beginning of Air Force ROTC in the offing…[so] the military science program within the Air Force Academy Planning Board is not so much more than Army ROTC. It was not satisfactory in a sense of the word.”\textsuperscript{218} The planners realized that this was a shortcoming of the overall curriculum.

Unfortunately, the failure to seriously consider the central role professional military studies, at

\textsuperscript{217} AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 3, Background and Legislation, Number 1, “Interview with Colonel Arthur E. Boudreau by the Air Force Academy Historian, Major Edgar A. Holt, 10-11 October 1956,” 7. The context of this interview is really about “education” rather than training. So Col. Boudreau is really discussing how West Point had no curriculum to educate those cadets matriculating into the Air Force.

least as it pertained to understanding airpower’s role in warfare, ensured that this vital potential element of an officer candidate’s education would receive no more than cursory attention in the final curriculum.

Nevertheless, the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force was pleased with the work of the Planning Board. General Fairchild notified General George Kenney, the new Air University Commanding General, that the plans—set out in three volumes—“reflect a great deal of serious thought, diligent effort and conscientious objectivity in fulfilling the mission which was assigned.” He added that the plan would be “accepted as a working plan for implementing the proposed Air Force Academy.”219 The planners working on the study had set out the blueprint for the new academy’s curriculum, one that would be adopted by those who continued to carry the torch to establish and academy for the Air Force. The main outcome of the first curriculum plan, which was to concentrate on a broad, general academic education, included frustrating the efforts toward establishing a solid professional military education program.

Service Academy Board Report

The work of the Air Force Academy Planning Board was hastened by the momentum felt widely in the defense community after passage of the National Security Act of 1947. As 1948 continued, and certainly as discussions accelerated for the Air Force during that summer, the larger defense community also began to organize a more detailed investigation of the service academies in general, especially centered on proper officer accessions for each of the services. This investigation included discussions about the possible need for an air academy. The situation peaked when on November 9 Secretary of Defense James Forrestal wrote to the three service secretaries requesting their comments on the composition of a proposed committee that “might study the overall question of requirements of all Services for Academy graduates, the desirable proportion of such graduates in each of the regular establishments, the annual quotas required to maintain such proportions, and related problems”—which included the topic of forming a third academy.220 The main problem, as everyone recognized from the previous year, was how the Air Force was to receive its “share” of service academy-educated officers given the challenges posed by the two established academies and their respective services and whether the creation of an Air Force Academy was the long-range solution to this problem? Forrestal’s memorandum, which revealed the continuing conflict over officer procurement, would lead to a report recommending a new service academy to support the Air Force. But besides determining that another academy was warranted, the ad hoc group evaluated the undergraduate education system that developed the officer candidate, to include ROTC at civilian universities. Concluding that the Air Force

220 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Background and Legislation (cont’d), Number 158, “Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force, from James Forrestal, 9 November 1948.”
needed its own academy also undercut the thought that some had had to use sharing of the 
academies by more than one service as a means of encouraging “unification.” More important,
this team, the Service Academy Board, would influence the professional military education at the 
academies, specifically regarding the proposed Air Force Academy, by highlighting the need for 
a broad, general education program with some clear emphasis on technical studies as well, which 
had the consequence of lessening the emphasis on professional military studies.

Motivating Secretary Forrestal was information coming out of a committee that cast light 
on the shortcomings of military education in the United States. The Commission on the 
Organization of the Executive Branch of Government, also known as the Hoover Commission 
after its chairman, former President Herbert Hoover, released information from its first 
committee in November 1948, which informed Secretary Forrestal’s urgency. Although the 
Hoover Commission’s main goal was to ensure effective organization of the Executive branch, 
the Committee on National Security Organization, under its chairman, Ferdinand Eberstadt, 
focused its attention on the National Military Establishment. The Committee gave attention to 
military education, concluding that “efforts be made throughout the entire educational process to 
instill a stronger sense of interservice unity”—in fact, it reviewed the entire National Military 
Establishment’s educational system.221 One of Forrestal’s advisors, General Dwight Eisenhower, 
believed that the academies instilled early in the officer candidate a sense of rivalry rather than

221 Quoted in John W. Masland and Laurence I. Radway, Soldiers and Scholars: Military 
This educational system discussed in this committee referred to the service schools 
system in place for already commissioned officers, but also engaged the military’s 
undergraduate programs.
unity among the services, a view also held by President Truman. Eisenhower thought that the
defense community did not need a new academy, which might cause still more disunity among
the services. His views were shaped in part by his experience in World War II, where there had
been such clear need for strong cooperation between the services. This most influential
military officer of the period stated before the Eberstadt Committee in June 1948: “We should
not have another academy for the air service.” As the Eberstadt Committee determined, the
“establishment of an air academy would mark a fork in the educational road of the services [from
which] there can be no turning back,” and so it recommended a larger study focused on the
undergraduate education of officer candidates. The Air Force recognized the momentum
building against an air academy, especially from civilian leaders who pressed for more steps
toward unification, and realized that the institution needed a concerted public relations campaign

222 President Truman was not a big supporter of the service academies. See Masland and
Radway, 110-111. Eisenhower had become a principal advisor to the new Secretary of
Defense by the end of 1948, while he was president of Columbia University—a term that
began in June 1948. While President of Columbia he retained his position as General in
X, Columbia University (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
1984), 380, which demonstrates that they had come to some terms on their relationship
by the end of 1948. See also Galambos, 383.

University, 211-212n25, 373, 374n2.

224 Quoted in William E. Simons, ed., Professional Military Education in the United
2000), 291.
to change the course.\footnote{AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Background and Legislation (cont’d), Number 160, “Memo from Major General William F. McKee, Assistant Vice Chief of Staff for the Secretary of the Air Force, Subj: Air Force Academy, 8 February 1949.” Major General Richard Nugent was the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, under Lieutenant General Idwal Edwards.} In addition, Forrestal needed to reconcile the push-back from West Point and Annapolis on officer accessions into the Air Force with the impetus within the National Military Establishment to integrate the military academies within one academy, or at least make each academy generic and not service-specific.

Forrestal also sent the service secretaries a more detailed attachment that offers insight into his thinking about the role of professional military education within the structure of the curriculum. In this attachment, which focused on accessions of officer candidates from the two established academies into the regular Air Force, the Secretary of Defense suggested that the “Course of Instruction” for those officer candidates be the same for all cadets, regardless of the service into which they would be commissioned.\footnote{AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Background and Legislation (cont’d), Number 158, “Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force, from James Forrestal, 9 November 1948,” Attachment, Point 4. This had been primarily the case at West Point for cadets going into the Army Air Force or, later, cross-commissioning into the Air Force.} That is, for those West Point and Naval Academy cadets who would end up in the regular Air Force, their instruction would remain the same as for the other cadets, who would eventually go into the Army and Navy. There was no sense that academy cadets going into the Air Force needed service-specific education before
their commissioning. Clearly, then, service-related professional military studies were not a dominant factor in the Secretary’s calculus.

Again, the debate whether to make the service academies generic and not service-specific was a serious topic in this post-war environment. The more generic approach was sometimes thought to be one step toward achieving unification among the services, and it would inform the Air Force Academy’s approach to academically strong military studies – namely, their generally secondary status. As Chief of Staff of the Army and now advisor to Secretary of Defense Forrestal, General Eisenhower had discussed a “United Services Academy” that would make the academies already in existence “provide graduates to all three services on a substantially proportional basis.” He believed that “[u]nification must start simultaneously from the top and bottom,” and he advocated coordinating course work in the middle of years of each service academy (so cadets were studying largely the same things) along with encouraging major student exchanges. In January and February, Forrestal sent follow-up memoranda to the Joint Chiefs

227 Masland and Radway, 110-111. Masland notes that Forrestal “indicated in his journal as early as July 30, 1945 that the President favored ‘a common basic and beginning education for all officers, Army, Navy, and Air Force, on the general thesis that modern war is a composite and not separate business. I told him that his views fitted in to a large extent with our own thinking on postwar education” 110-111. This was the traditional view that no special educational requirement existed for West Point cadets going into the Army Air Corps/Air Forces or Air Force.

228 Galambos, ed., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Vol. X, Columbia University, 208, 211-212n25, number 165, letter to Ferdinand Eberstadt, September 20, 1948; 383, number 303, letter to James Vincent Forrestal, December 21, 1948; and, 427-428, number 323, letter to Charles Binford Gray, January 13, 1949. Eisenhower’s idea to begin early the education of officer candidates on a certain topic—in this case unification of the services—has a similar approach as a recent article on educating “strategic
of Staff stating that in order to increase sufficiently the total numbers of cadets at service academies a third academy probably would be necessary. The logistics of expanding the existing two were already deemed too difficult. However, even though he referred to an “Air Academy,” Forrestal did not firmly establish that the intent of this academy was to provide commissioned officers only to the Air Force. He, too, considered alternatives for the academy structure, to include “a single ‘university’ of which each of the three academies will become an integral part and which would supply the needs of all three Services for academy officers.”


229 *AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Background and Legislation (cont’d)*, Number 156, “Memo to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from James Forrestal, 4 January 1949,” and Number 153, “Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 16 February 1949.” Eisenhower had recommended the inclusion of the JCS per directives within the National Security Act. See, Galambos, ed., *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Vol. X, Columbia University*, 373, no. 299, a letter to James Hallowell Ohly, the special assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 18 December 1948. Forrestal had a War Council meeting (the three service secretaries, CJCS, service chiefs) on February 8, 1949, with a main objective of providing guidance for National Military Establishment legislative guidance—to include the push for an “Air academy.” This effort would lead to the more comprehensive study of the Service Academy Board. The SecDef’s 16 February
requirement for service-related professional military education did not seem a priority to senior leaders, since an integrated approach seemed legitimate, with the main goal being simply that the officer candidates receive their undergraduate diploma.

Even though he was one of the civilians initially against a third academy, Secretary Forrestal now recognized need for one, if merely to boost the total number of academy graduates. Now he created a commission to determine the best service academy structure. After discussions with some of his advisors, most significantly General Eisenhower, the Secretary decided to establish a board to find the best structure for undergraduate military education in the post-war environment.\textsuperscript{230} He wanted the committee to recommend how these service academies should educate the cadets as well as how and where the future officers would enter into specific service branches. In a detailed memorandum, Forrestal provided his “Terms of Reference” for the board on March 14. He first emphasized that leadership training was necessary for the future officer candidates, but he also noted that they should learn “basic knowledge of the techniques of modern warfare”—which he suggested had always been part of the service academy tradition. Forrestal demanded that future officers educated at service academies would “have a background of general knowledge similar to that possessed by the graduates of our leading universities.” After a few paragraphs outlining his vision, Forrestal provided the details in the memo for this memo for the Joint Chiefs discussed this Board, and requested their input on his terms of reference, or commission.

\textsuperscript{230} Besides agreeing with the concept of a Board, see again, Galambos, ed., \textit{The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower}, Vol. X, \textit{Columbia University}, 373-374, Eisenhower provided Forrestal with the basic outline of terms and arrangement for such a Board. See Galambos, 422-426. This memorandum to Forrestal, at the Secretary’s request, provided the example draft of a memo that would go to participating members. Eisenhower even named some possible civilian participants.
group—to include the make-up of the board. Most significantly, Forrestal stated that the purpose of the board was “to recommend that general system of basic education which [the Board] believes is best adapted to provide all three Services with a sufficient number of young men qualified to meet the needs of the regular armed services.” This included considering the “general fields of academic instruction” required of all career officers and what, if any, “specialized military instruction” might be needed either in service-specific training or in a joint environment.231 Although Forrestal did give some specific instructions, the Board most definitely had the experience to go in any direction it wanted, freely looking for the best path that all service academies should take to produce the core of the nation’s military officers, especially, prospectively, at the newest academy.

The end result was the establishment of the Service Academy Board. Comprised of influential civilian and military leaders, the Board was of the utmost importance to the establishment of the Air Force Academy. The “Stearns-Eisenhower Report,” named after the board chairman, Dr. Robert L. Stearns, president of the University of Colorado (Boulder), and vice chairman, General Dwight Eisenhower, then president of Columbia University, was chartered to offer a significant discussion of professional military education. Although much is known about Eisenhower, the president of the Board, Robert Stearns, was widely appreciated as

an excellent choice to lead a highly prestigious group in a significant task. He was a lawyer and historian who had served during World War II in the Operations Analysis Division of Twentieth Air Force. He was held in such esteem that in the autumn of 1950, as the Service Academy Board was nearing its completion, Secretary of the Air Force Thomas Finletter sent him to Korea to evaluate the Air Force’s performance.232 Besides the two leads, the Board had seven other members: James P. Baxter, president of Williams College; Frederick A. Middlebush, president of the University of Missouri; George D. Stoddard, president of the University of Illinois; Edward L. Moreland, executive vice president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Major General Bryant E. Moore, superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy; Rear Admiral James L. Holloway, superintendent of the US Naval Academy; and Major General David M. Schlatter, who was one of the early post-war reformers of Air University, later serving as its deputy commander for education, a post which he left in July 1948. Serving as the executive secretary for the group was John L. Hoen, who acted as the tenth member of the team.233 The Board was a

relevant contributor to the Air Force Academy’s development and to the understanding of professional military education at all academies.

On March 30, 1949, still within its first month of operation, the Board offered its first report. Secretary Forrestal had provided the group a short deadline for the Board’s view on the requirement for a new academy, as he wanted to push forward with the proposed legislation; however, he recognized that some of his other fundamental questions required further study and additional time.234 An exhausted Forrestal had resigned just two weeks after establishing the Service Academy Board, and his replacement, Louis Johnson, received this first submission on April 4 from Hoen, the executive secretary. The report “[u]nanimously recommended that an Air Force Academy should be established without delay,” and Johnson directed the Air Force to lead the legislative effort.235 Important in this report is that the Board recognized that “[a] separate academy…would increase the Air Force’s sense of autonomy and would provide officers with the specialized knowledge currently imparted only by the Air Force’s institutions of advanced


235 _AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Background and Legislation, (Cont’d),_ Number 151, “Memo from Louis Johnson for Secretary of the Army, Secretary of the Navy and Secretary of the Air Force, Subj: Legislation authorizing the establishment of an Air Force Academy and Service Academy Board, first report, 13 April 1949,” and Galambos, ed., _The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Vol. X, Columbia University_, 551n5. Forrestal had issued a similar directive—for legislative efforts to press ahead—over a month earlier (see his 16 February 1949 memo to the JCS)—but now the new Secretary weighed in on the affair.
The Board’s members, both civilian and military, reasonably recognized that officer candidates needed military education—in this case, a more service-specific military education curriculum.

On 21 December 1949, Hoen submitted the final report to Secretary Johnson. It contained the recommendations agreed upon by the nine board members, which supported the Service Academy Board’s charter to recommend “the manner in which officer candidates should receive their basic education for a career in the armed services.” Specifically affirming that an

236 Galambos, ed., *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, Vol. X, Columbia University, 549, 551n5; *AFAHD, 1954-1956*, Appendix, Vol. 4, *Background and Legislation, (Cont’d)*, Number 135, “Memo for General Landry from William F. McKee, Major General, US Air Force, Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, Subj: Air Force Academy, 3 August 1949.” Eisenhower had not believed the members had agreed upon this part of the recommendation at the March 18 and 19 meetings. However, he was absent from subsequent meetings, suffering from an illness, when the Board did agree that this was a necessary provision provided to Secretary Johnson. Forrestal had advised that the Board understand all aspects of officer-level advanced schooling, such as Air University programs, so as to realize what basic knowledge an officer candidate should have as he entered the service. See the March 14 memorandum, 4.

237 *AFAHD, 1954-56*, Appendix, Vol. 4, *Background and Legislation (cont’d)*, Number 143, “Memo for the Chairman of the Service Academy Board from James Forrestal, Subj: Terms of Reference for the “Service Academy Board” 14 March 1949.” This four-page memorandum, besides naming the board members, clearly and methodically provides the members with scope and depth to study. The above quoted charter is mentioned in other documents—to include the main press release of February 16, 1950 and the report itself—the opening paragraph of the report offers this purpose of the board. However, this opening paragraph also quotes even more of Forrestal’s memorandum, restating, with reference to “basic education,” that it was the system “which [the Board] believes is best adapted to provide all three Services with a sufficient number of young
Air Force academy should be established, the Board not only called for a new academy to be developed in the near future, but it also established the basic framework of the professional military education for the new academy’s future officer candidates. These findings of December 1949 became public in February 1950. The report was a dense sixteen-page, single-spaced product that offered discussions and observations relevant to service academy education. It included the many diverse ideas and plans that the defense community had entertained in this post-war period, such as that there be just one service academy preparing officer candidates for all the services. The final eight pages of the report provided forty recommendations, each with a small explanatory paragraph. Besides this sixteen-page report, the document contains another sixty-five pages of appendices—eleven separate appendices labeled “A” through “K.” Six panels of both military and civilian experts had assisted the Board members to reach their conclusions and had helped to construct some of the appendices.

---

238 Stearns-Eisenhower Report, 1; see the press release from Department of Defense, Office of Public Information contained in the Stearns-Eisenhower Report in USAFA Special Collections. The release of the report was Thursday, February 16, 1950.

239 The Board organized the forty recommendations as follows: 1-6 were “The System of Service Academies”; 7-19 involved the “Administration of Service Academies”; 20-28 examined “Faculties at the Service Academies”; 29-33 were on the ROTC programs; and 34-40 discussed “Cross-Education and Unification,” even though the emphasis remained on the three individual academy structure.

240 These were appendices D-I. Panels on: “Instruction in Science and Engineering” (pp. 43-56), “Social Sciences” (pp. 57-62), “Language and Area Studies” (pp. 63-65), “Teaching and Testing Methods” (pp. 67-70), “Health and Physical Education” (pp. 71-72), and “Military Education” (pp. 73-78).
The Board supported the service academy structure in place, a service academy dedicated to a specific branch, and thus the requirement for an air service-specific academy. The report stated as its fifth main point, dealing with “The Need for Service Academies”:

The American people have traditionally depended upon armed forces composed of citizens as the final bulwark in any crisis threatening the existence of the Nation. They have insisted upon the maintenance in times of peace of armed forces trained to high professional standards and fully competent to train and condition the expanded forces of citizens required for war. It is recognized that the competence of a military establishment depends in great measure upon the character and professional ability of its military leaders; that there must be maintained, therefore, at all times a nucleus of Regular officers educated and trained from youth in the principles of leadership and in the art of war and dedicated to a lifetime of service to the Nation. The maintenance of Service Academies has long been a recognized means of accomplishing this purpose.241

The education of this “nucleus” of defense-minded individuals was focused on leadership and the art of war, according to the Board. The Board clearly intended that preparation at the academies would include demanding study of warfare and, more specifically, of the need for officers in all services to understand their service’s role in any unified effort. Again, it seemed that there would be an important emphasis in the program on military studies.

241 Stearns-Eisenhower Report, 2. This was the opening paragraph, although numbered the overall fifth point, to the sub-section titled, “Service Academies in the System of Military Education.” The first four points were under the sub-section, “Purpose of the Board.”
The Board followed its discussion of the “Need for Service Academies” with remarks on the “Mission of the Service Academies,” which included this among its seven points:

The Service Academies should develop in the student a high degree of mental alertness—the capacity for clear analytical thought and of carrying it to a logical conclusion. The need is for initiative and, above all, for judgment and common sense. The complexity of the arts and techniques of modern war and the degree to which the conditions to be met are unforeseeable all emphasize the necessity for such qualities in a leader.  

However, the Board defended its emphasis on a broad education, even if it came at some expense to coverage of professional military studies. The opening paragraph recognizes the rightness of studying leadership and warfare, as does the next paragraph, which focuses on the type of education that will prepare the academy graduate to operate in a complex and ambiguous world of warfare. But just paragraphs later as the Board undercut this commitment:

Professional military knowledge alone will not suffice to solve the problems of modern war. In the last war officers of the Armed Services often became engaged in pursuits other than purely military which required a general education background. Graduates of the Service Academies as they progress to positions of high responsibility in the military establishment will have an increasing range of contacts among leaders in civilian life, both at home and abroad. The complexities of modern war require large numbers of officers to undertake postgraduate studies. The board, therefore, considers it essential that a graduate of a Service Academy should have a background of knowledge comparable to that possessed

by graduates of our leading universities. His field of knowledge, therefore, should include the arts and sciences in addition to professional military subjects.243

The role of general education would be significant in the program. Additionally, already in the minds of military leadership was the role of post-graduate education in effective officer development, so much so that the emphasis on general academics trumped concentration on military studies—the officer had to be prepared to move on to graduate work.

Certainly, the Board’s vice chairman fostered the emphasis on a broad, liberal education. Eisenhower updated Secretary of Defense Johnson after a two-day meeting of the Board in Denver in August 1949. The meeting reaffirmed the basic direction set at the previous meetings in March, April, and June, which supported a strong emphasis on broad education. As he came to embrace the need for a third academy, General Eisenhower remained firm and influential in defending the traditional four-year program, and the Board as a whole agreed. Pressing the need for a broad education, Eisenhower declared at the August 8 meeting: “Well, if life hasn’t become more complicated, if the impact isn’t felt more directly by most of us, if it doesn’t take more brains today to comprehend this world, more training, then I think something’s wrong.” He argued that even four years of education and training of officers for modern warfare might not be sufficient.244 Eisenhower, who had experienced his own conversion about the need for

---


244 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Number 133, “Letter from Dwight D. Eisenhower for Honorable Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense, 10 August 1949.” In this letter, Eisenhower notes of his vice-chairmanship of the Board, “This is one of the finest
professional studies, which he now accepted, had an equal affinity for a broader education. Later in his career, and certainly while at Columbia University, Eisenhower came to value higher education and to appreciate its broadening effects. He was most certainly impressed by the role of education for the democratic masses, and he believed the academies had a special role in offering opportunity to a broad span of citizens.\textsuperscript{245} The decision to emphasize a broad academic education would contribute to the relative lack of emphasis on purely professional military studies.

Besides the Vice Chairman’s influence, two Air Force officers swayed the Board. Major General David Schlatter, who was a contributing member of the Board as the Air Force representative, and Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Boudreau, who worked as General Schlatter’s

---

\begin{quote}
Boards upon which it has been my privilege to serve. Each man is definitely a friend of the Armed Services and everyone is earnestly seeking to do his part in producing sound unification and not merely lip service to the idea”; quoted in Galambos, ed., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Vol. X, Columbia University, 694n4. Giving the context, and as discussed, how “training” and “education” often get muddied, this author believes Eisenhower really meant “education”—to include military education—to be comfortable with this modern environment. Only the chair of the Military Education panel did not agree with the four-year education format; instead, he had supported “a common course of instruction at a single institution for one or two years for all students prior to their entry into the Military, Naval, or Air Force Academy to undertake a three or four year course of instruction.” See Galambos, 715-716n2.

\end{quote}
“Air Force Academy Specialist,” both had also been prominent participants in the Air Force Academy Planning Board Study. They now took lessons that they had learned from the earlier study and influenced this larger defense-level study.246 The plan for a separate air academy and the curriculum proposed for it in the earlier Planning Board Study heavily swayed the members of this Board.247 Regarding the curriculum, the senior Air Force officer of the Board recognized that one issue that swayed members of the Board—especially civilian members—was the “very liberal quantity” of humanities and social science courses, as well as the inclusion of scientific

246 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 3, Number 1, “Record of Interview of Colonel Arthur E. Boudreau by Air Force Academy Historian at Headquarters United States Air Force Academy in Denver, Colorado on 10 and 11 October 1956,” 8; Stearns-Eisenhower Report, 73. General Schlatter was then the Commanding General of the Air Research and Development Command, but had been Deputy Commanding General for Education at the Air University Command. His inclusion on this Board presumably was because he was seen as likely to be names to the post of Superintendent. See Edward Anthony Miller, Jr., “The Founding of the Air Force Academy: An Administrative and Legislative History” (Ph.D. diss., University of Denver, August 1969), 296, USAFA Special Collections. Similar to General Eisenhower’s remarks on the Board, Lt. Gen. Schlatter would look back on his career and note: “I must say that in all of my many years of service I’ve never had a more rewarding or satisfying job to do than being a member of that Board. It was one of the finest things that I think has ever happened to me.” See AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 3, Number 10, “Record of Interview of Lieutenant General David M. Schlatter by Air Force Academy Historian in Norfolk, Virginia on 24 October 1956,” 3. 247 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 3, Number 3, “Record of Interview of Lt General Idwal H. Edwards by Air Force Academy Historian in Washington, D.C., 26 October 1956,” 10; Ringenbach, 34.
courses, over those that one would consider “strictly military courses.” As the General noted, it was not necessarily the lack of military-specific courses, but rather the strong balance between scientific and the humanities and social science courses that influenced Board members. The strong academic curriculum, an emphasis first established, once again, by the AFA Planning Board, seemed in line with the thinking of the Board members that the officer candidates who would graduate from the proposed Air Force Academy would have that “firm basic education of the coming soldier-statesman.” The young officers would likely face ever greater demands as they achieved the higher ranks, and they would be called upon to fulfill the role of soldier-statesman that the new world required. The Board members were in step with the findings of the AFAPBS on requiring a broad education rather than one focused strictly on military studies or military training.

248 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 3, Number 10, “Record of Interview of Lieutenant General David M. Schlatter by Air Force Academy Historian in Norfolk, Virginia on 24 October 1956,” 4. The comment on “strictly military courses” was part of the question of the interviewer, Major Holt, not of the General. Even though the Board members were intrigued by the seemingly heavy inclusion of humanities and social sciences—as compared with the curricula at the other two service academies—the emphasis remained on technical studies. As the Curriculum Group of the AFAPBS went through its iterations of the program of instruction, the drafts “were sent to the other service academies and outstanding engineering schools throughout the country for analysis and critical comment”—not liberal arts colleges. See AFAHD, 1954-1956, Vol. 1, 448.

The Board made a concerted effort to highlight the technical aspects of education. The tenth recommendation of the Board was “[t]hat in the teaching of sciences at the academies emphasis should be placed on individual problems and the initiative of the student in approaching these problems.” The rationale was that increasing laboratory time for science classes “develops in the student inquisitiveness and a deeper understanding of the principles.” The report did not mention any other discipline in this way. There was a sense that the sciences developed the critical thinking skills required of future military officers. On the other hand, as Masland and Radway note:

The other observation is that method is heavily influenced by curriculum. In introductory mathematics, natural science, and engineering courses there is often a greater presumption that questions can have a single determinate answer. Such answers cannot be argued about; they can only be found…A revealing incident occurred when the Service Academy Board’s social science panel noted that to develop a skeptical, inquiring mind in future officers might breed indecision. In a superintendent’s copy this passage was underlined in red and the word “yes” written in the margin. Scientific and military studies occupy a prominent place in all the curricula. Methods thought to be appropriate to them have spilled over into the humanities and social sciences, whose problems are somewhat different and whose instructors are only now beginning to evolve techniques better suited to their needs.

---

250 Stearns-Eisenhower Report, 10.
251 Masland and Radway, 231.
In addition, the twenty-sixth recommendation underscores the need for the academies to improve scientific research capabilities. These two recommendations focused on technical subjects within a proposed curriculum. No other recommendation singled out, in a similar way, a requirement for some course or method specific for the social sciences or humanities.

The Board’s justification for an Air Force Academy leaned on the technical nature of the new service. The new autonomy of the Air Force itself made an air academy seem sensible. Beyond that, though, the Board implied that the needs of air officers were different from those of other services. “The basic academic work in the Air Force Academy should furnish an excellent foundation for officers entering [the Air Institute of Technology and the Air University] . . . .” The Board then noted that Air University “maintains a complex pattern of advanced and specialized education” emphasizing technological studies, especially at the former institute.

Air Force leaders had voiced concerns that an undergraduate education at their academy should prepare the future officer so that there were qualified by the four years of undergraduate study as not to need any remedial work to pursue advanced degrees. Although the report mentioned in

252 Stearns-Eisenhower Report, 12.
254 For example, AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 3, Number 24, “Basic Assumptions Utilized in the Formation of the Air University Plan for the Establishment of an Air Academy, n.d.,” (likely early-1949), which the first assumption declared the awarding of the Bachelor of Science degree, and, ibid., Number 28, “Memorandum for General McNaughton re Determination of a Mission for USAFIT, n.d.,” likely post-February 1949, which includes the recommendation from the Institute that it “be the responsible agency for postgraduate (“after Air Academy” or equivalent) education of Air Force officers in the technological field,” 5. Then- Brigadier General, later Major General, McNaughton was chief of the Directorate of Training, Office of DCS/P, under General
general terms the technical aspects of modern warfare, it discussed this special consideration only with respect to the proposed Air Force Academy.

Although the study included a Military Education Panel, other panels provided their own input on the curriculum in military education. For example, the panel on “Instruction in Science and Engineering” commented on the proposed Air Force Academy curriculum noting that there seemed to be balance between the scientific and engineering, humanistic-social, and military course requirements, recognizing “the clear-cut objectives, for military officers, of the humanistic-social portion of the curriculum.” Even so, the panel observed that, although “we are in agreement with the inclusion of a suitable proportion of humanistic-social studies in all the academy curricula, we believe an unduly large proportion of time has been devoted to such studies in the curriculum of the Air Force Academy.” Their concern was that “subjects have been omitted from the very heart of the aeronautical portion of the curriculum” – namely, those on structures and propulsion – and that a four-credit course was needed. Moreover, this “should be done without decreasing the time devoted to other courses in science and engineering.” Thus the tension began between the technical studies, on the one hand, and the humanities and social sciences, on the other. This panel offered one major recommendation regarding military education for all academy programs, “namely, that a strong course on the National Military

Idwal Edwards. The USAF Institute of Technology was now concentrating towards more graduate-level work, see “USAF Education Board: Discussion and Proposals of the USAF Educational System for Officers, 1950,” USAFA Special Collections. This board, also called the “Fairchild Board,” met in late-January 1950. See the “Principal Recommendations” regarding the USAF Institute of Technology; AFAPBS, Vol. 2, “The Curriculum, 142”; finally, AFAPBS, Vol. 1, “A Plan for the Academy,” 5, envisioned the awarding of a Bachelor of Science.
Establishment be included (one is proposed for the Air Force Academy). This course should deal primarily with the national and international economic, social, and political significance” of the establishment “and not merely with matters of military organization and procedures.” So the panel was mirroring the service leaders who had already pointed out this requirement.

One of the final recommendations from the Board again emphasized technical studies within this broad education. This recommendation, the 37th of 40, envisioned a “consulting board, with rotating membership” that would focus on the schools’ educational requirements and would ensure “the promotion of the concept of unification at the academies.” Three civilians were to serve on the consulting board—“at least one of whom shall be a scientist or engineer”—as well as the three Superintendents of the major academies. Although designed as a watchdog partly to ensure “unification,” this Board would also protect the scientific and technical emphasis of the program of instruction.

The final committee that offered insight to the Board was the “Military Education Panel,” chaired by Admiral (Retired) Raymond Spruance. The six-man panel reviewed the existing academies’ military education, took information from the Air Force Academy Planning Board Study, and heard from, as well as visited, various Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC)...

---

255 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 3, “Background and Legislation (Cont’d),” No. 27, “Report to the Service Academy Board by the Panel on Instruction in Science and Engineering at the United States Military Academy and the United States Naval Academy and as proposed at the United States Air Force Academy, n.d.,” (circa November 1949), 1-2. This is the only panel document that is individually stored in AFAHD, 1954-1956. The panel’s insights are included in the appendices—Appendix D—of the Service Academy Board Report, the first of the six consultant panels. Author’s emphasis.

256 Stearns-Eisenhower Report, 15.
programs.\textsuperscript{257} Demonstrating the military’s conservative habits, the panel affirmed the traditional structure of one academy for each major service and “concluded that it would be inadvisable to discard the present system of proven value for a new untried system.”\textsuperscript{258} Recognizing the “broad subject of military education,” the panel distilled its thoughts about “Military Education at Service Academies” in one concluding paragraph:

The primary objective of the military education program at a service academy should be the preparation of the student mentally, psychologically and physically for the fulfillment of the responsibilities and duties which must be assumed by an officer of the Armed Forces in the service of his country. The guiding principle of the program should be to further the all-round development of the student and to provide knowledge and understanding with direct carry-over value to future duty

\textsuperscript{257} Stearns-Eisenhower Report, Index, 73. The military education panel’s report was the final panel in the annex—even behind physical education. The opening paragraph of the panel’s report specifically mentions Lt. Col. Boudreau and the AFAPBS. The panel’s members were: Spruance, Lt. Gen. Troy Middleton (USA, Ret.), Maj. Gen. F.A. Irving (USA), Rear Admiral William Parsons, Lt. Gen. George Brett (USAF, Ret.), and Major General Robert Harper (former Commanding General, The Air University. On meeting Spruance for the first time, in connection with this work, Eisenhower reflected: “Frankly I think he is one of the finest Naval officers I have ever met. He is quiet, modest, and self-confident without being either dominus [sic] or patronizing. I like him extremely and wish I could have had more time with him.” See Galambos, ed., \textit{The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower}, Vol. X, \textit{Columbia University}, 720—Ike’s letter to his friend, Edward Everett “Swede” Hazlett, Jr., August 12, 1949, #519.

\textsuperscript{258} Stearns-Eisenhower Report, 74. Masland and Radway note that only Spruance dissented—he wanted 2-3 years at a civilian university followed by 3-4 years within the academy system—see Masland and Radway, 121.
situations. No attempt should be made to train the student in a particular specialty, but rather, emphasis should be directed continually toward broad knowledge and understanding and the development of characteristics necessary to leadership and command. Occupational specialty training should be limited to that which is necessary to produce a sound, energetic, responsible junior officer. The panel considers the curricula of existing academies as adequate in respect to military education.\textsuperscript{259}

The panel endorsed the “general education” path over something narrower that would concentrate on specialized training to cadets—specialized training would make it more of a trade school than a college program, although maintaining some specialized training would remain a thread in the discussion of military education throughout the Air Force Academy’s planning and operation stages. The panel offered no ideas about how to strengthen the academies’ military studies program.

In concert with the emphasis among all senior leaders for “unification” of the services, the panel informed the Board about its recommendations for “Cross-Education and Indoctrination in Unification in the System of Military Education.” It recommended a program of instruction at all service academies,

Will increase the understanding of the undergraduate officer candidate with respect to:

(1) An awareness of the major problems affecting the security of the Nation.

\textsuperscript{259} Stearns-Eisenhower Report, Appendix I, 74-75. Besides reviewing the military education curricula at the academies, the panel also had the charge to review “modifying the present ‘academy system’,” appointment process, entrance requirements, post-graduate educational program of the Department of Defense and ROTC, as well as “procurement of regular [versus reserve] officers.”
(2) An understanding of the relation between the military and all other elements such as labor, industry, management and agriculture, which combine to maintain a total national security.

(3) A consciousness of the crucial significance in terms of security of a healthy national economy upon which modern defense measures impose a heavy burden.

(4) An understanding of the role of the Department of Defense in our Government.260

So the Board, at the advice and assistance of the panel, provided what it envisioned as the absolute minimum of military studies course work.

The Board’s recommendations became the guideline for securing the new academy and safeguarding the traditional structure of the existing two academies, with some minor adjustments within the realm of military studies that were a nod toward unification. The Board recognized the need for a broad, academic education. Although influenced and intrigued by the AFAPBS’s greater emphasis on liberal arts in the curriculum, the Board embraced a substantial emphasis on the more technical course work within the program of instruction. However, even with the strong recommendations of the Board, the Secretary of Defense did not approve the report until the summer 1950. This delay was due initially to the Secretary’s concern over service unification—and the creation of a new academy seemed to undercut that aim.261 Even so, both civilian and military members recognized the need for a service-specific academy for the Air Force.


Special Assistant for Air Force Academy Matters

While the Service Academy Board was wrapping up its report and submitting its recommendations, Air Force leaders decided that the work toward establishing the Air Force Academy had to be centralized. Currently under the Deputy Chief of Staff of Personnel office, the effort of coordinating and overseeing all the work toward an academy needed more time and attention than it was getting. As Lt. Gen. Idwal Edwards and one of his deputies were getting overwhelmed with various projects, including the Hook Committee, which was investigating an updated Pay Act, Lieutenant General Hubert Harmon stepped into his office. Then the Air Force military representative on the United Nations Military Air Staff Committee, Harmon was bored. The committee’s only achievement from meeting to meeting was to agree on scheduling the next meeting. Edwards acknowledged that Harmon was “very much of a forward thinker” and that Harmon would be effective organizing and heading an office on the Air Staff to plan for an air academy. After talking with the Chief of Staff, Edwards secured Harmon’s selection to work Air Force Academy issues.\(^{262}\) Having completed its study of a curriculum for the Academy, Air Force leaders would now concentrate on the legislative effort, and this needed the right kind of attention. In a memorandum for record on 19 December 1949, General Fairchild established the Office of Special Assistant for Air Force Academy Matters. This position would “have complete responsibility and authority within the Air Staff for all matters concerning the establishment of plans and policies pertaining to the proposed Air Force Academy. [The Special Assistant] is further given direct access to all echelons of the Air Staff in all matters concerning the

establishment, organization, and operation of the proposed Air Force Academy.’” By virtue of this memorandum, the office fell under the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, and the Special Assistant enjoyed the staff jurisdiction of the Air Force Academy Planning Group Field Extension, originally at Air University, that would now come under his office’s purview.263 This initiative was intended to allow for a more organized, concerted effort to establish the Air Force Academy and the program of instruction developed for the future officer candidates.

The choice to head this position would profoundly influence the direction of the new academy. Serendipity had helped Harmon gain the position, but he was prepared for such service and the right person for the job. When he was the Army Air Forces personnel chief, Harmon oversaw a study on an air academy, and he offered his vision for an academy to General Edwards in August 1948. As Harmon’s most prominent biographer would suggest, what he sent Edwards “was a remarkable letter” that “had presaged their [AFAPBS and Service Academy Board Report] findings in most areas.”264 Harmon was more than prepared for the assignment. When asked about the future Academy’s curriculum, General Spaatz answered: “General Harmon was the inspiration of curriculum planning more than anyone else. I think he felt, and I am sure a lot of us agreed with him, that there should be a little more emphasis on the liberal arts in the Air

263 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Number 126, “Memo from General Muir S. Fairchild, Vice Chief of Staff, for DCS/C, DCS/P, DCS/O, DCS/M, Secretary of the Air Force, Subj: Special Assistant for Air Force Academy Matters, 19 December 1949.” (The acronyms stand for the deputy offices under the Chief: Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller; Deputy Chief of Staff Personnel; Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations; Deputy Chief of Staff, Materiel). Lt Col. Boudreau, who was already at the headquarters assisting General Schlatter, Lt. Col. Easton, and Major Thomas Sheldrake assisted Harmon. General Harmon was a West Point classmate of General Eisenhower.

264 Meilinger, Hubert R. Harmon, 188-189.
Academy than had been the case at West Point or Annapolis.”  

Although General Harmon had the planning studies to assist him, he had to work some corrections soon after the release of the Stearns-Eisenhower report because of Congressional pressure to now include flight training in the cadet program.

The completion of the AFAPBS and the support it received through the Service Academy Board ensured that the new academy seemingly had a solid plan for its curriculum—one that departed from the main path of West Point and Annapolis. However, the situation still remained fluid. The pressure on the planners, now housed in General Harmon’s office, to include flight training in the curriculum grew stronger. By April 1950, this pressure had become too great to ignore. The Chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services, Representative Carl Vinson, whose support was necessary to introduce any bill advocating for an academy, advised the Secretary of the Air Force that he believed the curriculum needed to include comprehensive flight training—or at least to the extent of what the Naval Academy was providing. 

Secretary Symington directed the head of the Site Selection Board to consider basic flight training requirements when examining proposed sites—and the planners recognized the need to


incorporate significant flight training in the curriculum, which required revising the curriculum.\textsuperscript{267} The challenge was to now integrate a flight training program and still keep a solid undergraduate education while allowing a portion of the available time to remain specific to an academic approach toward military studies.

The development of professional military education at a new Air Force academy had a blueprint. The work accomplished by the AFAPBS and the Stearns-Eisenhower Report offered some solid material but at the same time showed little sophistication. After years in which advocates had pushed for an Air Force academy, events during the spring 1950 conspired to delay the creation of the institution for almost another half-decade, which allowed still more opportunity for further revision of the military studies program. The report of the Service Academy Board that was submitted to the Secretary of Defense was forwarded to the President on January 13, 1950. The next day, the Secretary of Defense informed Dr. Stearns of everyone’s solidarity with the Board’s recommendations—the chief recommendation being the establishment of the Air Force’s own academy.\textsuperscript{268} With the work that was being completed on

\textsuperscript{267} \textit{AFAHD, 1954-1956}, Vol. 1, 474 and \textit{AFAHD, 1954-1956}, Appendix, Vol. 4, \textit{Background and Legislation (cont.)}, Number 22, “Chronological Summary of Actions Affecting the Air Force Academy Project,” 11; \textit{AFAHD, 1954-1956}, Vol. 1, 454-455. Secretary Symington understood that in order to get the Academy, everyone would have to make concessions. He notified the Site Selection Committee on 5 April, after discussions with other Congressmen. Symington resigned later in April in protest over Air Force funding, given the Soviets’ recent explosion of its atomic bomb; as a senator, he continued to champion the Academy.

\textsuperscript{268} \textit{AFAHD, 1954-1956}, Appendix, Vol. 4, \textit{Background and Legislation (cont.)}, Number 22, “Chronological Summary of Actions Affecting the Air Force Academy Project.” On
site selection and on the drafting of legislation, many people believed that, if things were not completed for the 1950-1951 academic year, then certainly all things would be set—at least at an interim site for the academy—for the 1951-1952 year. But then significant matters would continue to postpone the necessary decision-making for the academy, most notably the North’s invasion of South Korea. In addition, the costs surrounding a new academy, the “lingering controversy” of the B-36 bomber between the Air Force and Navy, and a West Point cheating scandal propagated by the football team all contributed to growing concerns about a new academy.269 The events in Korea, however, delayed the momentum for an academy more than anything, as the Air Chief stated in a meeting on 22 July 1950, that “we would not be ‘playing the game’ to take advantage of the situation and start beating the bushes re the Air Academy.”270 The postponement allowed for continuous fiddling with the curriculum for the future cadets, which continued to see the broad academic program as more significant than more military studies course work.

12 January, Secretary of State Dean Acheson delivered his infamous “perimeter speech” to the National Press Club.

269 Masland and Radway, 123. It is interesting to note that, when the Senate debated the Air Force Academy legislation in 1954, only Senator Al Gore, Sr. (D-TN) spoke in opposition—he continued to be concerned about moving away from unification of the services. In response, Senator Leverett Saltonstall (R-MA) retorted that President Eisenhower and Secretary of Defense Wilson’s plan for an additional service academy was better, since now “There will be three football games instead of two [sic] football games.” Quoted in Masland, 125-126. This concentration on service academy rivalries through football games is of significance in the history of the academies.

Chapter 4 - Inception of the Curriculum

By 1950, the Air Force and the Department of Defense had established the necessity for a new academy. The organizations had validated the requirement for an academy through both the Air Force Academy Planning Board Study (AFAPBS) and the work of the Service Academy Board. The AFAPBS even had developed a template for use as draft legislation to support an Air Force academy through Congress. The Service Academy Board produced the Stearns-Eisenhower Report that also had provided the required justification for a new academy. More important, both studies, though primarily the AFAPBS, included a sound framework for the new academy’s curriculum necessary to educate and to develop the ideal officer candidate. Within this curriculum the planners had included a foundation for course work specific in military studies, as distinguished from general academic course work or functions related to military training. Even though the proposed military studies course work, as discussed in the previous chapter, was relatively minimal, the AFAPBS plan included a Division of Military Studies within the Dean of Faculty’s purview, one of three divisions under the eye of the Dean, but with responsibility to the Commandant and the military studies program.271 However, within weeks of disseminating the Stearns-Eisenhower Report in the winter and early spring 1950, a report that also had agreed in spirit with the curriculum proposed within the AFAPBS, objections to the planned program materialized. The most influential voice came from Congressman Carl Vinson, who threw a wrench in the plan by demanding that a significant pilot training program be included in the overall curriculum for the cadets. Others followed suit, significantly the Secretary of the Air Force, and many agreed that an Air Force academy required flight training for motivation, as a minimum. The Air Force Academy planners, now organized within the Office of

271 The other two divisions were the Division of Science and the Division of Humanities.
the Special Assistant (OSA) for Air Force Academy Matters, led by Lieutenant General Hubert Harmon, continued to revise the already packed, proposed curriculum to now include some type of specialized flight training program. The planning for an air academy during this formative period, as well as the curriculum implemented during the initial years of the Air Force Academy, relegated professional military studies to a second-tier position as the emphasis was on the need to incorporate flight training and to remain focused on the general academic education of the officer candidates, specifically to ensure accreditation of the entire institution.

With the completion of two major studies that proposed an Air Force academy, and with the office organized around General Harmon as the Special Assistant for Air Force Academy Matters to promote the Academy’s establishment, the planners continued to refine the proposed curriculum. The main effort was still under the leadership of General Harmon, but it took place at Bolling Field—across the Potomac River from the Pentagon—where a planning group had been validating and revising the projected curriculum for the Academy since the Air Force released the AFAPBS.\textsuperscript{272} Prior to the reorganization under General Harmon’s office, this group was referred to as the Air Force Academy Planning Group Field Extension, and included those officers who the Air Force expected to be among the academy’s first faculty members. With the realization that Congress, and some in the Air Force, demanded some form of flight training in the Academy curriculum, this group now concentrated on integrating this specialized training into an already crowded and demanding proposed curriculum. To assist with the justification of their own academy, these Air Force planners recognized that they needed to demonstrate to

\textsuperscript{272} \textit{AFAHD, 1954-1956}, Appendix, Vol. 4, Number 126, “Memo from General Muir S. Fairchild, Vice Chief of Staff, for DCS/C, DCS/P, DCS/O, DCS/M, Secretary of the Air Force, Subj: Special Assistant for Air Force Academy Matters, 19 December 1949.”
Congress that the new academy would do things differently. So, while this group envisioned a curriculum with increased emphasis on the humanities and social sciences, it also fostered “a professional sense of ‘airmanship’ and to make the potential officer air-minded.” The latter objective provided the necessity of the air academy—as different from the other two primary academies. The inclusion of fight training contributed to this support of an air-minded officer candidate. However, specialized training of the officer candidate already was receiving more support than general military education. Due to a number of factors, to include the stress of the Korean War, as well as budget battles and a cheating scandal at West Point in 1951, the Air Force disbanded the group of planners at Bolling. Now planning was left to General Harmon and the three remaining officers in his office. The result of this effort by the Bolling group, which

---

273 *AFAHD, 1954-1956*, Vol. 1, 97. A significant voice in the pressing Congress for the Air Force Academy, and then criticizing the original curriculum because it did not include flight training and it was too liberal arts-oriented, was Deputy Secretary of the Air Force Roger M. Kyes. As quoted in the official history, his testimony to Congress on 13 January 1954, states: “Air power is the keystone to our military strength. We are spending billions of dollars on aircraft and related equipment…[The best] professional training can best be accomplished by…an Air Force Academy whose curricula would be specifically tailored to the training of air-minded young men in the art of aerial warfare.” Kyes really was focused on training, not educating the officer candidate, as were many proponents of the Academy.

274 John W. Masland and Lawrence I. Radway, *Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and National Policy* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957), 122. Besides General Harmon, the three remaining officers were Lt. Col. Art Boudreau, Lt. Col. Gilbert Cooke, and Major Thomas Sheldrake. Lt. Col. Arthur Easton also assisted from the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel’s office. All had done work on the Academy planning since the 1948 Fairchild Board at Air University, Maxwell, AFB, as discussed in the previous chapter. See Paul T. Ringenbach, *Battling Tradition: Robert*
was a direction in which many Air Force officers believed the new academy should head, was to shy away from a proposed broad-based curriculum to get to something more air-centric and more technically oriented—incorporating flight training assisted with this vision. Also, now the duties to revise curriculum as well as to lead the legislative and bureaucratic efforts for getting the Air Force academy were on the shoulders of a few individuals.

The attention in Congress and from civilian leadership to include flight training in the curriculum planning now pressured General Harmon and his Academy planners to make major revisions. Within the month of April 1950, after Congressman Vinson had relayed his disapproval of an air academy with no flight training, an initial plan came out of the Air Staff’s Individual Training Division. The division chief, Colonel G. P. Disosway, had constructed a program for a cadet’s final three years that focused on navigational training with some flight orientation, which did not necessarily mean that the cadets earned any pilot credentials, such as Air Force pilot wings, or even a civilian pilot’s license. Even so, the colonel’s minimal plan “greatly depended upon certain parts of the academic curriculum” to integrate some specialized flight training classes in their overall course work—he suggested incorporating such course work within the Division of Science and the Division of Military Studies—“for the development of basic concepts and a foundation of scientific knowledge” required for flight training.275 The limited proposal demonstrates that the introduction of flight training into the already crowded curriculum affected any possible proposed academic course work that could focus on military studies. Instead, the military studies program, as envisioned by this curt report, focused primarily

---


on the specialized training of flight, versus a more academic approach to topics in military studies.

General Harmon agreed to include a limited flight training program. However, as he weighed the pros and cons of such a training program, he recognized that any pilot training went against the AFAPBS and the Service Academy Board, both of which rejected any form of specialized training in this academic environment. General Harmon believed that incorporating 30 hours of flight training was economically feasible, both in money and in time, and that this limited amount of training would not drastically affect the planned curriculum, even though it required 136 total training hours, which included the ground training and the pre-flight and post-flight time. Even more significant, 30 hours of flight training was what an Air Force ROTC cadet received during summer training. Nevertheless, Harmon did conclude that integrating flight training “would not be in the best interests of the academic program”—which included any military studies content. In March 1951, General Harmon presented this plan to the Secretary

276 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Vol. 1, 477-478. See previous chapter on this discussion from the AFAPBS and the Stearns-Eisenhower Report. In his discussion of Harmon’s dilemma, Holt references a document, “Tab I, ‘Advantages and Disadvantages of Flying Training at the Air Force Academy,’ R&R to Dir/Fly Tng for coordination and C/S, USAF, for approval fr Spec Asst for AFA Matters, subj: Flying Training at the Air Force Academy, 4 June 50.” The original document was not located. Harmon’s biographer emphasizes the General’s enthusiasm towards general education. See Meilinger, 45, 204. In an interview, Harmon’s daughter remarked, in response to a question on curriculum and flight training: “The only comment I have on that is that he was terribly impressed with the liberal education that the young British officers had that he met opposite him when he was the air attaché to the Court of Saint James.” She added: “My dad did make it quite clear that he did not want kids being diverted by flying training. He didn’t want to take their concentration away from academics. My dad was purely concerned about
of the Air Force, Thomas K. Finletter, to demonstrate the impact that the program could have on
the academic plan for an academy, but he noted that it might still be necessary to accept it in
order to allay Congressional concerns. General Harmon recognized that the obvious effect of
adding more work and objectives to an already demanding program was to the detriment of the
academic program as a whole.

When the critics began to hound him about his readiness to modify the academic program
to allow for some specialized training, General Harmon received support from individuals who
also saw the necessity for flight training. One significant example was the academy’s Dean-
designate, Colonel Dale Smith. Smith was the Director of Education at Headquarters Air
University, having recently completed his Master of Arts and a doctorate in education at
Stanford University. He worked with General Harmon and his planners primarily from Maxwell,
with occasional trips up to the Pentagon, as needed. As discussions to include flight training in
an academy program intensified, Harmon began a correspondence with Smith on this puzzle.
General Harmon received a lengthy official letter from Smith in December 1952, the first
paragraph of which recognized that any academy bill might not pass without a modicum of flight
training, given the position of some members of Congress. So Smith believed the academy
program had to have such training. He argued that, from the Fairchild Board (1948) on, the
critics who rejected flight training at the academy based their position on the World War II

academics.” See “August 29, 2002 Interview by Colonel James C. Gaston, USAF, Ret.,
with Ms. Eula Harmon Hoff and Mr. Kendrick Harmon” in USAFA Special Collections,
United States Air Force Academy, 1954-2004: 50th Anniversary Oral History (Colorado

277 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Vol. 1, 480. None of the official Academy histories or
documents have any reaction of Finletter to this information in 1951.
experience at West Point—Smith emphasized that the West Point program had been a full-fledged pilot training program during an already condensed three-year, war-time curriculum. He concluded: “It seems advisable to work out alternate schedules which will include flying training as an integral part of the program, through basic stage…Congress may insist this be done and we should be prepared to implement it.” He recognized that they should be prepared to have a plan with an intense flight program. The “basic stage” was one complete course—almost 6-months of concentrated flight training—at Air Force pilot school. However, significant in his memorandum, Smith suggests that military training periods, or “tactics” courses, be used to accommodate the training. He meant to substitute specialized flight training in the curriculum.278

278 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 7, Commandant of Cadets, Number 147, “Memorandum for General Harmon, from Dale O. Smith, Colonel, USAF, Subj: Examination of Pilot Training for the U.S. Air Force Academy, 15 December 1952.” Many senior leaders believed that Smith would be the first Dean of the Academy—had Congress established the academy in the time frame Smith wrote this letter—he was in the running from 1950 to just after he wrote this letter. See Edward Anthony Miller, Jr., “The Founding of the Air Force Academy: An Administrative and Legislative History” (Ph.D. diss, University of Denver, August 1969), 351; also, AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Number 12, “Interview with General Dale O. Smith, Planning for the Establishment of the Air Force Academy, Washington, D.C., 18 April 1956,” 2. Smith’s proposal meant that a cadet graduated with his pilot wings—“basic stage”—this means that 270 flight hours was necessary. Smith calculates that planning 810 total hours within the last two years allowed for this enhanced program—3 hours for every flight hour.

NOTE: In his agreement to get each cadet 30 hours of flight, Harmon calculated 136 ground hours…4.5 hours per flight hour. A similar requirement for Smith’s 270 flight hours, equates to over 1,215 total hours. These extra hours are among those that Smith incorporated into military studies and training, as well as the general academic program. The flight program would begin with the summer before the cadet’s junior year, to allow
at the expense of academic subjects within the intended military studies program. Any level of flight training had an effect on the proposed program, especially military studies.

Smith followed up his official memorandum with an informal letter to General Harmon a week later offering his basic views on education and the role of an Air Force academy. The letter begins with a discussion about flight training. The intent of Harmon’s letter was to note that his previous official correspondence had discussed the rigorous pilot training course, since the planners had to be prepared to satisfy Congress. However, Smith stated: “I do think a reasonable emphasis on flying training is feasible,” even at a level much below the necessity for earning one’s pilot wings. He added: “Education is a lifetime proposition…. In the Air Force we can be assured that an enterprising officer is sent to schools progressively throughout his career. Thus we need not cram his lifetime education into his four years at the academy. Instead, we can teach him what he must know to best pursue his junior officer duties, and be sure that he has learned it. It seems to me that such a program should rightfully include flying.”

Smith believed that flight training was integral for consistency. What is interesting about the pressure the air leaders received from Congress on flying training, is that on 27 June 1951, Senator Styles Bridges (R-NH), entered Senate Bill 1760, to provide for a United States Air Force Academy. In the record, Senator Bridges, as well as the co-sponsor, Senator Richard Russell, stressed the need for an Academy to provide officers “educated and trained from youth in the arts of war and leadership and strongly motivated to a lifetime of service to our country.” They did not mention flying training at all. See AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Number 99, “Congressional Record – Senate, June 27, 1951 (EXTRACT).”

Smith’s insistence on a robust flight-training program put him at odds with those who wanted to limit the program. This position was one reason why he chose not to be in the running to become
training should replace some of the academic program, including that devoted to military studies. Also, Smith underscored the belief of many other senior officers that serious military studies, to include any air-centric lessons of warfare and doctrine, were not a requirement for officer candidate education, assuming that this study occurred later in the service school education program after one had become a commissioned officer.

General Harmon took Colonel Smith’s recommendations seriously. The day after receiving Smith’s official memorandum, Harmon directed the planners to use Smith’s calculations for a proposed flight program, interpolated over a three-year program, instead of two-year—Smith proposed a flight training program only in the final two years of a cadet’s career. The result was 292 flight hours requiring 1,168 scheduled hours. Much like Smith, Harmon wanted to be prepared for Congress. With this information, General Harmon requested that the Chief of Staff of the Air Force convene a board of senior officers to address the flight training issue. Colonel Smith prepared the briefing for the ad hoc board. He admitted that this pilot training program seriously affected the academic program, but so did athletics, and athletic training was a necessity. The leaders recognized that there were opportunity costs for

---

280 Today’s undergraduate pilot training is a year-long program in two phases. Pilot trainees are trained in a different aircraft for each phase. The total hours received in the entire program is just over 200 hours. This offers some perspective on what Harmon and Smith were planning in order to mollify Congressional opponents of and Air Force Academy with no flight training.

everything, and accepting the requirement for flight training was essential to gaining an academy, even if it was to the detriment of the academic program. Incorporating flight training into the already crowded proposed program would have a direct impact on military studies, since any time that was once devoted to military education might now support the flight program.

At about the same time when Harmon proposed the meeting of an ad hoc board of senior leaders to discuss flight training and other curriculum issues, the Air Force Council convened also to discuss the flight training requirement for the Academy. General Harmon had given the Council three presentations at the request of the Chief of Staff to request senior leader guidance concerning various issues. General Nathan Twining, the Air Force’s Vice Chief of Staff, sent a memorandum to the Chief with the recommendations. The final of the three presentations was on the curriculum. Responding to this, the Council first concurred with the Special Assistant concerning the focus towards a more “generalized curriculum…as opposed to a curriculum specializing in engineering courses.” Even though the Council agreed on this, it did stipulate that the proposed senior-year elective course be eliminated with the cadets taking additional course work in either aeronautical engineering or foreign languages. The Council included two items that occasioned some measure of attention to what the Council saw as professional military studies. One of the issues was that, although “the entire curriculum should be oriented toward qualifying the Cadet for a professional military career in aviation,” which included a flight training program “to the greatest degree practicable,” the proposed 35 hours seemed sufficient, but only minimally so. The other issue was that “tactics and strategy of air warfare should be included in the curriculum for the First and Second Classes [seniors and juniors].” This proposal, the Council concluded, “[s]hould clearly indicate the USAF view as to requisite
training for a career Air Force Officers can best be obtained through an Air Force Academy.” 282 Although the Council’s comments on Harmon’s view of the way ahead did reveal that Air Force leaders recognized the need for a military studies program, they also reflect the leaders’ emphasis to the specialized training. The Academy curriculum had to include flight training, but it was to the detriment of other academic course work.

At the request of General Harmon, the ad hoc board of senior leaders met at the beginning of January 1953 to review all curriculum planning. After reviewing the program, the board came to three conclusions: 1) “That the curriculum of the Air Academy should lead to the award of a Bachelor of Air Science degree”; 2) “that the concept of ‘global indoctrination’ should be made part of the Air Academy curriculum”; and 3) “that the curriculum of the Air Academy be developed so as to produce competent airmen, trained and rated as aircraft observers, who have completed the pilot training now included in the Phase I Primary Course, as

282 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Number 84, “Memorandum for: The Chief of Staff, N.F. Twining, General, USAF, Chairman Air Force Council, Subj: (Unclassified) Air Force Academy, December 1952,” 3. The issues required attention since the plan was to open an interim site in 1953. On the minimum flight program, the Council advised that “actual flying training to the greatest degree practicable should be included in the curriculum.” General Vandenberg had established the Air Force Council on 26 April 1951 in order to “speed the process of making basic policies and decisions.” The Air Force Council was similar to the Army Air Force Board (Air Board) established 5 March 1946 by General Spaatz, as discussed in Chapter 2. See also Ibid., 209. The Vice Chief acted as the chairman of the Council (a change instituted in July 1951), with the five deputy chief of staffs as Council members. See Robert F. Futrell, Ideas Concepts, Doctrine, Vol. 1, Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907-1960 (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1989), 305-306.
a minimum objective.”283 This statement is of significance because it offered a level of training that equated to the cadet receiving navigator’s wings—thus the reference to “rated as aircraft observers.” Other officers had discussed this level of training, but now the idea gained further traction. Most significant is that these senior leaders of the Air Force were rejecting the recommendation of the AFAPBS and the Stearns-Eisenhower Report that the Academy not include flight training in the curriculum.

Three main issues seemed to favor an Air Force academy as 1953 opened. The Air Force continued to grow in size, primarily because of the Korean War, but also because of the developing containment strategy of the early Cold War.284 Also, most top graduates of West Point and Annapolis were choosing to cross-commission into the Air Force. And, most significant, the other two academies solidified their academy traditions—so the entire service academy structure was not going to meet with any radical changes, such as the creation of a joint academy that some had been proposing.285 Also, the architects of the two studies examining the structure of service academies and the air academy, specifically, believed they had advanced the rationale for an additional academy, had created a solid curriculum and structure, and, more significantly, had done the leg work for a legislative proposal. However, even though a new press for an Air Academy was reactivated in January 1953, when the Honorable Dewey Short

284 Masland and Radway, 124.
285 Ringenbach, 40-41.
(R-MO), the Chairman of the HASC, introduced H.R. 2328, “To provide for the establishment of the United States Air Force Academy and for other purposes,” Congress did not move on the Academy. Congressman Short re-introduced a DoD-sponsored bill as H.R. 5337 in May. More significantly, in February, General Harmon had reached mandatory retirement age and so was prepared to end his career—General Vandenberg extended his active duty commitment by six months to see the Academy come to fruition. The May effort in Congress also failed, so General Harmon, again retired his position as the Special Assistant for Air Force Academy Matters at the end of June 1953—though he kept abreast of issues concerning the Academy. As 1953 came to a close, the new Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Nathan Twining, believed things were set for a final push. To ensure everything would be in order for the presentation to Congress—Congressman Short had reintroduced the bill for a third time—President Eisenhower recalled his classmate, General Harmon, back to active service for a third time. After the continued delays and debates in creating the Air Force’s academy, President Dwight Eisenhower signed its establishment into law on 1 April 1954. The Secretary of the Air Force officially established the U.S. Air Force Academy on 27 July 1954 as a “separate operating agency…under the direct control of the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, with the procedural functions and responsibilities of a major air command.” However, until the Academy was manned and coordinated to do so, Air Training Command assisted in all administrative and logistical


The proposed curriculum that was in place at the beginning of 1954 embodied an intense academic program with a demanding observer program included as well. The flight program, however, did not include actual pilot time, but was dedicated to training an observer, or navigator. By March 1953, the organizational plan had diverged from what had been proposed originally by the AFAPBS. Specifically, the plan to have a Division of Military Studies under the Dean of Faculty, who would be under some control from the Commandant, as well as to have the two other divisions, was now changed by the planning team. Instead, the OSA designed the Academy structure so it had two branches: the Academic Curriculum, under the supervision of the Dean of Faculty, and the Airmanship Program, supervised by the Commandant of Cadets.\footnote{AFAHD, 1954-1956, 493.}

The small coterie of officers under General Harmon in the Officer of the Special Assistant (OSA) presented the completed “Program of Instruction” in January 1954. The planners proposed a curriculum of 5,353 total contact hours: 3,177 devoted to the Academic Curriculum and 2,176 in the Airmanship Program—effectively the same plan from 1953.\footnote{USAFA Special Collections, RG 104, Col. Boudreau’s Files, 1954, “Program of Instruction,” 16; AFAHD, 1954-1956, 467-468.} This was the plan circulated right before President Eisenhower signed the bill to establish the Academy, and it would undergo final modifications before the cadets arrived the following year.
Examining this proposal illuminates the declining role of professional military education in the program. The Academy historians, writing in 1957, recognized that one reason for the success in creating the new academy was that academy officer candidates were required to gain a “basic education in military matters and in the arts and sciences and dedication to the service of the Air Force and the Nation which was required of the Air Force officer,” and only an Air Force academy could accomplish this goal. More significantly, academy planners and proponents agreed on a curriculum that showed a more “functionalized and modernized” approach to education, one that recognized the two main considerations for an Air Force academy: “the influence of technological advancements in aerial warfare and the influence of the global aspects of aerial warfare.”

One might agree with these ideas, which might suggest a curriculum with a concentration in military studies. Yet the actual program as envisioned at the beginning of its existence, when the President signed the bill, integrated a specialized training program that demanded much time and discouraged wrestling with larger concepts.

However, the attention that flight training had received since the AFAPBS and the Stearns-Eisenhower report had changed the framework of the program. In the 1954 Program of Instruction, the planners divided the Airmanship Program into four divisions: Basic Training, Physical Training, Flying Training, and Leadership Training. The planners included any military studies material within the Basic Training area. The emphasis in this area, as explained in the program’s content, however, was merely on drill and ceremony and tactics, as “the majority of the instruction will be devoted to military fundamentals.” But the program did not


ignore military studies entirely. As the area description continues, it stated: “Orientation in the material, methods and techniques of the various arms and services of the Armed Forces…will be included within this area and unification will be stressed. Instruction will be given in the various weapons of warfare, particularly air warfare.” The program does not provide a distribution of the hours in the Basic Training area. Instead, the designers combined the Basic and Leadership Training hours, which amounted to 958 program hours. So, the 2,176 hours devoted to the Airmanship Program was distributed as 958 hours for Basic Training and Leadership, 373 hours for Physical Training, 645 hours for Observer Training (for the cadets to receive navigator’s wings), and 200 hours for Pilot Training (Phase I)—almost more hours for flight training than all other training and education.293 The inclusion of a flight program—which now included Observer Training and a basic Pilot Training—created tension for a military studies program. Even though the planners believed they had created a solid product, it drastically departed from the AFAPBS, especially regarding the proposed Division of Military Studies in that plan. The integration of a rigorous flight training program affected military studies. As an historian of the service academies notes: “When the Air Force Academy moved from planning to the operational stage, problems latent in the organizational design became manifest almost immediately, aggravated by clashes of disparate personalities. For example, the prescribed curriculum, despite the years of planning that had gone into it, was a jerry-built structure, the enormity of which reflected the inability of planners to reconcile their differences other than by including virtually

293 USAFA Special Collections, RG 104, Col. Boudreau’s Files, 1954, “Program of Instruction,” 16.
everything that was proposed.”294 In the attempt to include everything, the planners restricted the military education of the officer candidates.

Besides a focus on the new requirement of flight training, the planners recognized the need to validate its general academic curriculum as most important. The emphasis on the academic realm overshadowed every other aspect of the Academy—this discussion was central to its developers. The main reason was that the Air Force leaders involved in the planning, such as General Harmon, knew that if an academy was to be an attractive institution, it would need proper formal academic accreditation. As was insisted in the AFAPBS, “Accreditation requirements should be taken into consideration in the organization and overall operation of the academy.”295 Also, as the early plan acknowledged, this quest for recognition as being on a par with its peers across the country required a solid faculty, which the Board considered necessary to “secure early accreditation.” The Board also believed that the Academy’s organizational structure would meet any accrediting institution’s basic requirements.296 Accreditation was central, the AFAPBS members believed, to provide “a concrete basis for self analysis,

294 John P. Lovell, *Neither Athens nor Sparta?: The American Service Academies in Transition* (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1979), 66. Note that two solid monographs on the Academy and its beginning discuss this struggle, even though so much planning had already taken place. Lovell’s work has a chapter on the Air Force Academy (Chapter 4) with a section called “Turbulence at Takeoff” (pp. 66-69); similarly, Paul Ringenbach calls this chapter “Turbulent Beginnings—McD [McDermott] Emerges” (Chapter 3: pp. 50-78)—nice references to unstable air disturbing a smooth flight.

295 AFAPBS, Vol. 1, “A Plan for the Air Force Academy,” 67; Ringenbach, 67. In the AFAPBS, the “Accreditation” subsection falls under the “Educational Administration” in Chapter 5, “Faculty, Staff and Educational Administration.”

improvement, and continuous progress toward the degree of excellence desired.” As the planners concluded in discussing accreditation, “The institutional prestige accruing to the Air Force Academy from such accreditation, with the desired public and academic esteem and the consequent assured status of those to whom it grants degrees, places early accreditation in the category of a major objective.” The early planners began to plan based on the requirements of the Association of American Universities. Since the location of the Academy was not yet decided, the AAU was a prudent choice, since it was the only national accrediting organization. However, the planners understood that most accrediting associations “require that an institution be in operation for a sufficient period of time so that it may be judged objectively.” The early operators of the new Academy, who wanted their first graduates to matriculate from an already accredited institution, were not satisfied with a waiting period.

The focus on the need for accreditation drove even stronger emphasis on the general academic curriculum. General Harmon remained adamant that the curriculum maintain its balance between the sciences and the humanities to assist with this effort. As he reviewed the work done by the 1949 Planning Board Study, he had suggested that there be “slightly more emphasis” on the humanities. The future Superintendent believed that the education of officer candidates should focus on “human relations and negotiations and with ‘communications’ [more] than with detailed technical activities.” This concept suggested the General’s vision of effective military studies, also. Furthermore, he realized that in the immediate future at least 50 percent of the Regular officer corps had to come from civilian institutions, so the Air Force could gather its

technical specialists from that source. Colonel Robert McDermott also recognized the need to emphasize the humanities and social sciences. His experience attending and teaching at West Point led him to conclude: “There was too much emphasis on engineering in our curriculum.”

McDermott arrived at the Academy in 1954 and assumed the role as Vice Dean. As the early social scientists Masland and Radway note, “The service academy provides the most complete nontechnical education that [officers] will get during their careers. For all of them this experience comes at an age when they are still relatively impressionable. Even if this were not so, the academies would warrant close examination because they are peculiarly the repositories of service ethos. It is at their academies that the services define the ideals to which they expect their officers, from whatever source derived, to aspire.”

As Colonel Boudreau admitted in 1956, just a couple of years after the Academy’s founding:

Civilian colleges have specified objectives; the Air Force Academy would have the primary objective of starting professional airmen on their careers . . . . Only those subjects and those things which would produce the kind of an Air Force officer we wanted were to be included in the program of instruction. A young graduate of the academy would receive the professional education of an airman in the same manner as a man going to law school comes out a lawyer. This was to be a distinct educational program developed to produce a professional airman. 

---

299 Quoted in AFAHD, 1954-1956, Vol. 2, 732. Since the beginning of the discussions on the Air Force Academy, planners recognized that 500 of the approximate 1,000 regular officers would be graduates of a service academy.


301 Masland and Radway, 169-170. Emphasis in text.
in the Air Force, we will go to MIT for them. They can produce better engineers then we can.\textsuperscript{302}

So the Academy planners had an idea of what constituted a solid professional military studies background, and they intended on developing that at the new academy. But it focused on the part of the professional military studies course work that was within the responsibility of the Dean of Faculty—in the disciplines such as history and political science, for example. And yet, now a challenge was put to make the curriculum more technical in nature than be steeped in the humanities and social sciences. The professional military studies program continued to be under pressure, struggling for time and space in the education the cadets.

The focus on the academic curriculum, and now the debate on the proper balance between the humanities and social science coursework versus the emphasis on the sciences and engineering-related courses, most definitely affected the role and emphasis on professional military studies throughout the Academy’s history. When the act of Congress creating the Academy was signed into law, one of the first criticisms launched at General Harmon, which was a continuation of complaints and struggles when the Academy was being formed, involved this balance within the curriculum. Specifically, the complainants criticized what they saw as an imbalance favoring studies that were not “technical” in nature. In an 18 May 1954 letter to the Air University commander, Lt. Gen. Laurence S. Kuter, General Harmon answered the recent criticism that had been passed to him through General Ira Eaker from Air University students who believed the proposed Academy curriculum had too much emphasis on “Cultural

subjects”—the humanities—instead of the more “Technical studies.” The Air Force already had a cabal of officers who believed the only coursework needed by any officer candidate was that which focused on the modern-day equivalent of “STEM” (Science, Technical, Engineering, Mathematics) coursework—and they were ready to neglect studies within the social sciences and humanities realm. This seems to have been the first shot across the bow on the debate that continues even well into the 21st century concerning the Academy’s curriculum. According to the concerned officers, General Eaker informed General Harmon, the curriculum favored the cultural studies over technical studies by 70 percent to 30 percent. Again, this complaint reveals the belief that the Air Force Academy needed to mirror the service’s significant technical role in national defense. A defensive General Harmon replied in the memo that, “while I personally admit or, if you wish, advocate considerably more emphasis on the Cultural side than now exists at either West Point or Annapolis, our figures are nowhere near as much out of balance as the above statements would indicate.” Instead, General Harmon showed that science and engineering coursework was already the emphasis. Those cadets who took languages had a balance of 1,548 hours “Cultural,” with 1,395 hours “Technical”—a 52½ percent to 47½ percent split. Whereas, as Harmon wrote, “the other portion of the class (inferentially the more technically minded cadets)” had a balance of 1,314 hours cultural and 1,629 hours technical—or a 44.7 percent versus 55.3 percent split. Furthermore, General Harmon informed General Eaker that the cultural hours included 288 hours in courses such as “Psychology of Leadership, Military Law, and Military Art”—courses that Harmon defined as “Military Training.” An additional 490 hours, beyond those already discussed, were those Aircraft Observer hours, which consisted of

303 This affects the curriculum within the military studies program and that course work within the Dean that also contributes to professional military studies.
“classroom and laboratory instruction in all types of navigation and bombing equipment and techniques”—one would most definitely classify these hours as military training, and technical in nature. Harmon intended for this letter to reach the original officer complainants.304

Besides his own views of what was necessary in professional education, General Harmon received input from others on the subject of curriculum. The various exchanges usually mentioned the necessity of ensuring an effective academic curriculum—hinting at the need for accreditation. General Harmon received support for his curriculum from Colonel Dale Smith. Smith favored more emphasis on the liberal arts within the curriculum. Also, in the same letter in which he addressed the need for a flying program and stressed the humanities in education, Colonel Smith disclosed his thoughts on professional military education and his “educational philosophy.” The lengthy comment deserves notice:

We have separated [military studies] from academics in our plans. This follows the American belief that things military are not quite respectable as central courses of study, that if we must deal with these undesirable subjects, they should not taint our pure liberal arts and (civilian) professional subjects by being included in the same curriculum. So we teach them “after school” like vocational subjects. The end result is that tactics and strategy take a back seat to subjects like Chemistry and Physics. To me this does not put first things first. For example, in 19 years of service I cannot recall one time when I have needed to use my knowledge of Chemistry, consequently I have forgotten it so

completely that I couldn’t use it now if I were required to. But tactics and strategy have been of continued concern and interest to me and to my contemporaries.

Why must this body of fundamental knowledge be treated so lightly? Why isn’t it central to the curriculum as Math and English? I believe it is a mistake to start out with a dichotomy with things civilian on one side and things military on the other. If we do so the military subjects will stagnate because orthodox academic subjects are backed by the whole weight of the educational world. If we integrate our [military studies] with our academics, we will tend to build respectable and systematic bodies of knowledge which will eventually be utilized in the academic world.

I strongly recommend that all scheduled education and training be a responsibility of the Dean. The Com[mandant] could act as the Director of Tactics, but should be responsible to the Dean for all training of whatever nature.305

305 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Number 86, “Letter from Dale O. Smith, Colonel, USAF, to Lieutenant General Hubert R. Harmon, Senior Air Force Member, Military Staff Committee, United Nations, 22 December 1952,” 1-2. Emphasis in the original. This letter is a 3½ -page, single-spaced document. Smith had recently visited Cranwell—a UK military academy—where he was respectful of how the UK “secondary schools…stress classical subjects,” which betters prepares the military cadets. Smith even considered himself as the Dean-designate, as he concludes this section with “Please believe me, there is no personal ambition implied here. It would be much easier for me not to be bothered [as the Dean] by tactics [military studies]. Smith was not the first Dean. He went on to a number of jobs that culminated in his appointment as one of the “Three Wise Men” on the Joint Strategic Security Council (JSSC) in 1963 as a two-star general. This organization, established by General George Marshall in 1942, acted as an advisor to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Composed of a two-star from each service, with an accompanying colonel-captain acting as their secretaries, the JSSC allowed these men to
Not only did Colonel Smith support General Harmon’s emphasis on the social sciences and the humanities, which greatly contributed to the cadet’s professional military education. He also supported the necessity of a strong military studies curriculum, also advocating that all education topics fall under the Dean.

The Superintendent’s supposed emphasis on social sciences and the humanities was not without its headaches. When the first curriculum was unveiled, besides Air University pushback, the Academy’s office in D.C. had been inundated with inquiries about the cadet academic program, and the Academy’s balanced program, as opposed to a more rigorous science and engineering program. The most recent attack had come from Mr. Roger Kyes, Deputy Secretary of Defense, who “was disappointed that the technical aspects were not stressed more.”

He objected to the balance, instead demanding more technical instruction and less liberal arts course work. As he suggested to Chief of Staff General Thomas D. White, the Air Force Academy had strategize about U.S. Forces “divorced from day-to-day pressures and allowed [them] to examine the world scene as a whole.”

See www.af.mil/AboutUs/Biographies/Display/tabid/225/Article/105605/major-general-dale-o-smith.aspx, accessed 26 August 2015. This lists Smith’s accolades as a “strategic thinker.”

a “technical aspect…not applicable to West Point and Annapolis.”307 This fallout led the Vice Chief to direct that the Academy submit a “periodic report” on all its positive actions—especially regarding the curriculum.308

The planning group continued to focus on the academic course work throughout the summer, since it received the majority of the criticism, which affected any course design for military studies. The small group assigned to the Office of Special Assistant recognized that there were not enough people assigned to tackle all of the major issues. A common belief was that the office should have been manned with personnel for all the staff and major fields and programs immediately after the signing of the Academy Act. Instead, the OSA only had the same three personnel to accomplish the monstrous effort to organize and complete major aspects of work regarding the Academy until the late summer 1954. “All the planning…initially was on the faculty side. There was a very minimum amount of planning for the staff and Commandant of Cadets”—who was responsible for the military studies program. As one of the planners noted, “We were always concerned with the necessity for economy of personnel and resources. We undermanned some activities due to lack of knowledge and to lack of proper support capabilities from Training Command. Our biggest problem was an outgrowth of the lack of organizational

planning.” The lack of manning and planning would weaken both the vision and the consistency of effort toward an effective military studies program.

The general academic program received most attention from the planners. Lt. Col. Cooke was in charge of manpower in the OSA, and he first secured the assignment of department heads and assistants for each academic department. He accomplished this pressing matter because, even though the OSA had the assistance of approximately sixty-five “leading educational consultants” in the period between 1951-1954 to firm up the curriculum, he wanted to have the academic heads of each department to begin their own curriculum planning.

As the Academy prepared to welcome the first class at the temporary location at Lowry AFB, just outside of Denver, the final version of the curriculum received approval. One of the many issues that the Dean needed to resolve resulted in a staff study on the “Establishment of the Course in Military History.” A key question concerning this topic was whether this necessitated another department—a Military History Department separate from the already staffed History Department. The issue that drove this question was the view that the military history course would consist in part of traditional military history, as in a study of “the great military leaders…and of significant battles and campaigns,” integrated with study, during the second half of the course, “devoted to air power and air doctrine, the methods by which military power is

309 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 3, Number 2, “Record of Interview with Lieutenant Colonel G.C. Cooke by Air Force Academy Historian, 11 July 1956,” 7-8. The OSA started to have two locations: some personnel moved to Lowry AFB, Denver, CO, which is where the temporary site for the Academy was set up; some remained at the Pentagon.

formed, and ‘military power as an instrument of national policy’.” General Harmon approved the recommendation to establish a Military History Department and course. More significant was the possibility of having some of the course instruction provided by the Airmanship Program, which was the new title given to what the AFAPBS organized as the Division of Military Studies.

The Office of Operations and Training, subordinate to the Commandant, published its draft Airmanship Program curriculum in January 1955, which also contained the sub-organization structure and the course work for military studies. Within the Airmanship Program was the Department of Military Training, whose function was “to provide each cadet with a broad military education.” Set up in October 1954, this department was divided into three sections: the Tactical Division, “in charge of cadet discipline, guidance and character formation”; the Training Division, “charged with basic military training”; and the Leadership Division, “responsible for the task of leadership training and the Aptitude for Commissioned Service System.” Upon receiving the January 1955 Airmanship Program curriculum General Harmon stated that he was in general agreement, even though “he had not…examine[d] the program in detail,” but the general had concern about the practical ability of the Commandant to execute this comprehensive plan. He asked: “Can you do it all?” Similar to the academic curriculum, the Commandant’s office was attempting to do it all. Although the simple definitions do not offer insight into which division was responsible for an academic program, the role of education fell to

312 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Vol. 2, 815-816. This early program was developed by then-Lt. Col. Arthur Holderness, Jr., and then-Major James B. Townsend.
the Training Division. The lack of discussion on any program devoted specifically to military
education demonstrates how it was subordinated even within the Commandant’s responsibility.

The Commandant’s office published the first complete Airmanship Program curriculum
on 15 June 1955. This larger plan contained the program of courses dedicated for military
studies. The four-year program, which included the Military Training, Flying Training, and
Physical Training departments, allocated 2,543 hours of cadet participation, which had already
been increased from 2,505 hours just six months earlier—the January plan. From this program,
the plan allocated 231 contact hours during the fall semester—only 36 hours to the Military
Training Department (the rest was devoted to flight training and physical education), of which
seventeen were for drill and five for a survey course, called “National Defense Organization,” on
the functions of the Department of Defense and the three service branches. The final fourteen
hours was reserved for a familiarization course on the “Operational Commands of the Air
Force,” which was intended “to acquaint” the cadets with the organization and functions of the
Air Force’s combat commands. This was the program for the freshman entering the Academy
in its first year. The emphasis on flight training and physical education hindered the cadet’s
education in military studies.

Any emphasis on professional military studies – that is, intellectually demanding study of
military and strategic issues and not mere repetitive training – at first suffered because of the
Academy’s need to win accreditation. In winter 1955, Colonels McDermott, Boudreau, and
Rigsby, and Lt. Col. Larsen, met with Manning Pattillo, Jr., the Associate Secretary of the North
Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools. Mr. Pattillo confirmed the fears of the
Academy officials by emphasizing “that the Academy would not qualify for accreditation until it

had completed at least four academic years of instruction.” The major issue for the Academy was the need for a “legislative body that represented all educational interests”—so that the changeover of each Superintendent did not create drastic changes. West Point and Annapolis had developed a Faculty Board.314

In the spring 1955, Dr. Pattillo visited the Academy to provide an initial appraisal for accreditation, and to continue the discussion on the school’s legislative body. In a productive meeting with General Harmon, Pattillo shared that he thought the Dean, General Zimmerman, was not the proper person for the job. As Pattillo put it later, “[Zimmerman] was floundering badly.” Providing this individual assessment was not a standard procedure for Pattillo. However, Pattillo was not the only person questioning the Dean’s ability. Word had gotten back to the Director of Personnel Planning, Brigadier General William Stone, on the Air Force staff. He, too, had heard issues about Zimmerman’s ability. General Stone met with Dr. Pattillo in Chicago, and Pattillo again stated his “reservations on General Zimmerman’s ability to handle the position of Dean.” Given all of the evidence and criticism, General Harmon relieved Zimmerman as Dean on 1 December 1955—just as the first semester was concluding.315 The mission to achieve accreditation led to the quick sacrifice of anything, such as Zimmerman.

In the summer of 1955, the Superintendent formally established the Academy Board. Colonel McDermott had recognized that this organization assisted their efforts towards accreditation—not all decision making was in the Superintendent’s hand. The issue was membership on the board, which would be the main policy-deciding organization for the

314 *AFAHD, 1954-1956*, Appendix, Vol. 6, *Dean of Faculty*, Number 30, “Memo for Dean of Faculty, from Assistant Dean of Faculty, Subj: Report of Staff Visit, 9 March 1955,” 1, 3.

315 Ringenbach, 71, 76; Meilinger, *Harmon*, 273-274.
Academy—the “institution’s governing body”—and delineating some of its subsequent responsibilities and reach, which did not yet extend to changing the curriculum or determining admission standards for incoming cadets—that was still the Superintendent’s purview. A debate between the Commandant and the Vice Dean on membership, and, according to Colonel McDermott, the Commandant’s disapproval was that the Dean dominated so much of the Board. As the Vice Dean discuss in a memorandum for record, “[Too many representatives from the Dean’s officer] would establish a precedent for a composition of the Board with a plurality of more than one of ‘career educators’ as opposed to ‘career line officers.’ [General Stillman] stated that this institution was first a service academy and second, an undergraduate college…. [The General] stated that he felt that the present plurality of one in favor of the ‘career educators’ is a danger point beyond which he would not care to go.” This discussion demonstrates the continuing tug between those emphasizing specifically military interests and those emphasizing broader academic preparation at the Academy.

316 William T. Woodyard, “A Historical Study of the Development of the Academic Curriculum of the United States Air Force Academy,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Denver, 1965), 105-106; Ringenbach, 52. Ringenbach incorrectly suggests that the early role of the Board was to make curriculum changes. This was significant because it was General Stillman, the Commandant, who wanted more than just professors on the board, as he felt all decisions should be made by the Board. But, as Ringenbach states, the inclusion of Commandant and athletic personnel, et. al., allowed for those voices to permeate the academic halls.

317 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Vol. 2, 703-706. Nevertheless, General Harmon approved the make up of the Board in August 1955, and then its reorganization in March 1956 with the Superintendent, the Dean of Faculty, the Commandant, the Director of Flying Training, the Director of Military Training, Director of Physical Training, and six Permanent Professors. See ibid., 706-707.
Much of the lack of vision for the initial development of the professional military studies program at USAFA must be tied to the first Commandant of Cadets, Brigadier General Robert Stillman. Even when there was increased emphasis on a broad education, there was still a cabal of individuals who believed that any move to provide too rigorous a curriculum would not help the development of warriors, and General Stillman led this group. In his remarks in the cadet’s first year’s catalogue, General Stillman offered his narrow view of the Academy’s mission. He emphasized military training – not a fuller education – and he focused on the making of aviators. The best example of this came in the institution’s first official catalogue for the Academy’s first academic year (1954-55). In this catalogue, section seven provided the prospective candidate the “program of instruction,” which first outlined the academic curriculum before offering an insight into the professional curriculum. The section on the professional curriculum included as its the main subtitle “Airmanship.” The broad purpose of this program was “to train and condition the cadet for his destined role of leadership in the field of aviation.” The Commandant’s work included oversight of flying training, military training, physical training, and leadership training. The military training program, the catalogue specified, “starts promptly upon the new cadet’s arrival at the Academy and has as its objective the development of character and the provision of a broad military education”—this was focused on airpower and air tactics, as well as on acquainting cadets “with the equipment and techniques of all the Armed Force of the United States.”

program of study, and the role of more demanding and intellectually rich professional military studies was reduced to merely specialized training within the aviation realm—a very narrow viewpoint.

Early in the first academic year 1955-1956, the heavy workload of the academic program already was taking a toll on cadets. After a meeting on the previous day, General Stillman composed a memorandum to the Dean on 16 September expressing empathy with the cadets in the matter of the academic workload, which, if not reduced, would crush the confidence of “our boys” early in the program. The Commandant’s evidence, besides some inquiries around the campus, included three football players who were “obviously dragging at football practice” because they had been staying up late and getting up early to study, as well as the fact that none of the cadets were attending football practices as spectators. This was a concern of the Commandant. The Commandant pleaded with the Dean to “err on the other side” rather than have too much of a workload, until they could find the right mix.\(^{319}\) Although he had a point with the crowded curriculum and a program that was possibly too demanding, General Stillman was not overly concerned with the infringement on the academic approach to military studies, but was instead insistent on military training—and he included football training in his vision of what was effective training.

But General Stillman could go too far, and he was one reason why professional military education was hostage to a comparatively anti-intellectual posture. This became clear in an incident that grew out of an effort to avoid a “terrazzo gap”—that is, to bridge the “terrazzo,” or terrace in the middle of the main core of buildings with the offices of the Commandant and Dean.

\(^{319}\) *AFAHD, 1954-1956*, Appendix, Vol. 6, Number 13, “Memo from Commandant of Cadets to Dean of Faculty, Subj: Academic Workload, 16 September 1955.”
on opposite sides. The Commandant and the Dean were assigned space so they would live next
door to each other in Academy housing. As he recalled later in life, General McDermott decided
to car pool one day with then-General Stillman to drive up to Lowry AFB to go flying together.
On the drive up, General Stillman remarked: “I want you to know that I’m doing this to give you
a chance to understand: I have no intention of socializing with you. We’re not in the same
profession. When you got a graduate degree, you gave up your right to be referred to as a
professional military officer.” Stillman believed that all members of the faculty, especially the
permanent professors, were not professional officers. McDermott concluded that, if this was the
first Commandant’s view of how to educate officers, “you can imagine how difficult it was to do
anything about the terrazzo gap while he was Commandant of Cadets.”

General Stillman was never shy about expressing his views. After the relief of General
Zimmerman, for example, the Academy established a board to determine the next Dean. General
Stillman announced to the board: “We’re teaching cadets defense policy and international
relations. They are reading books that I never read until I went to the Air War College. I never

_____________________________
320 Quoted in Colonel James C. Gaston, “Interview with Brigadier General Robert F.
McDermott, USAF, Ret.: Dean of the Faculty, USAFA, August 1, 1956-July 31, 1968,”
Interview date of March 19-20, 2002, in United States Air Force Academy, 1954-2004:
50th Anniversary Oral History (USAFA: The Friends of the Academy Library, 2005),
182.
321 James C. Gaston, Colonel, “Interview with Brigadier General Robert F. McDermott,
USAF, Ret.: Dean of the Faculty, USAFA, August 1, 1956-July 31, 1968,” Interview date
read a book from the time I graduated until I went to the Air War College. [The faculty] shouldn’t muddle up [cadets’] minds with course like this.”322

This attitude extended throughout the new Academy, including the Athletic Department. When the Academy met with the North Central Association to accredit the institution, the director of athletics opened his presentation with a chart that quoted the Secretary of the Air Force: “The mission of the Air Force Academy is to beat Army and Navy in football.”323

In contrast to Stillman’s interpretation, General Harmon had a broader vision of how to develop the professional military officer. He viewed the mission as three-fold: The first part was to instill in the cadets a desire for life-long service to the country, through Air Force duty. The second was “to provide them with an education, tailormade [sic] to meet what we conceive to be their requirements as officers of the Air Force.” And the third was “to develop character—that is to say, integrity, patriotism and leadership.” Harmon believed that, if the Academy could meet these three objectives, then “the results for the Air Force will be a continuing, dependable supply of highly capable young officers—a group which can be relied upon to form the hard core of the Air Force in peace or in war.”324

324 Quoted in AFAHD, 1954-1956, Vol. 1, 6-7. These quotes, as noted in this volume’s footnote, come from a film-recorded interview with General Harmon on 17 November 1955.
In his time as Dean of the Faculty, Brigadier General Robert F. McDermott also sought a balanced approach to keep humanities and social sciences in a good balance with STEM-related coursework. Reflecting on his own service in an interview after he retired, McDermott said the achievement of this balance was his best accomplishment in the core curriculum, which set the precedent and tradition to this present day. McDermott had wanted to emphasize the humanities, but he constantly battled those who believed the Academy needed to put much more emphasis on STEM coursework. As he put it, “Individual disciplines fight for their disciplines, the professors have tunnel vision…they don’t think of…preparing the [officer candidates]. They think in terms of their discipline, research, and education of their discipline. So, I was trying to put the focus the other way…Is there a common area that everybody should know something about.”

During 13-18 February 1956, another group of general officers convened for the Curriculum Review Board. The Board’s final recommendation, responding to the pressures that cadets experienced in their first academic year, was to reduce the total number of hours for graduation to 140: social sciences and humanities, 65 hours; science and engineering, 63 hours; professional studies, 12 hours—only 2.6 semester hours was devoted to military studies subjects during the academic year. The Academy approved and implemented a new curriculum of 141 semester hours, with the addition of one more semester hour for the sciences. Given the turbulence and change in the curriculum, the most significant recommendation was: “In the interest of stability during the formative years of the Air Force Academy, the Board recommends

that there be no further changes in curriculum...for a period of at least 3 years.”

In addition, total program contact hours in the first year were reduced from 2,577 to 2,490. Flying training took a large hit, as it was reduced from 83 to 34 hours.

The Academy’s academic year 1956-57 saw a major change to the curriculum, despite the Curriculum Review Board’s recommendation for a three-year stay in changing it, which again showed the second-class status of academically meaningful military studies. Prior to this year, the discussion of the Academy’s academic program had always been about a prescribed curriculum—similar to West Point and Annapolis—where every cadet took the same courses in the same manner. The Academy planners had created the curriculum based on the assumption that cadets would have had no previous college experience. However, 114 cadets of the 306 members of the Class of 1959, and 103 cadets of the 300 members of the Class of 1960, had already had one or more semesters of college instruction—28 members of the Class of 1960 had at least two years of college. The leaders of the Academy recognized that many of the cadets were already familiar with some of the coursework, so the Academy began the Enrichment program. The Enrichment program allowed cadets to test out or validate certain program requirements and subsequently take elective classes.

326 Jay Miller, et.al., 134. See endnote 209n20, which states, “This recommendation for stability can be found in nearly any evaluation report during the formative years.”

327 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Vol. 2, 709, 737-738. The academic program went from 1,742 hours to 1,688; the Airmanship program went from 835- to 802; graphics was reduced from 146 to 74, chemistry from 327 to 318. Only history and mathematics were increased in the academic program, from 276 to 294 and from 396 to 405, respectively.

328 AFAHD, 1956-57, 115-116; Lovell, 72. Recognizing that some of the freshman class was not challenged during the first semester of the Academy, the Mathematics Department began to accelerate the “gifted cadets.”
The initial emphasis of the program, however, was to accelerate the students in the mathematics and engineering courses. In the move for accreditation, Colonel Archie Higdon, who had been the head of the Mathematics Department during the initial year and had assumed duties as the head of the new Department of Mechanics and Materials during the 1956-57 academic year, did a comparison of the courses at the Academy with what the American Society of Electrical Engineers called for. He found a disparity—the Academy’s program was not demanding enough in engineering sciences.\(^{329}\) So an initial push was to use the Enrichment program to assist the move to give more attention to courses in engineering.

Then the new Dean, General Robert McDermott did not want the entire focus of the Enrichment program on only mathematics and engineering. A strong proponent of the balanced curriculum, General McDermott did not want all attention on one or two areas. Instead, he believed that additional course work in the social sciences and humanities “might have more cultural than vocational value to the cadets.” He even opened the accelerated program to the Commandant, whose Director of Military Training, and later Division of Military Studies chief, Colonel H.L. Hogan, III, did not believe this program was amenable for courses in the Department of Military Training. Colonel Hogan observed that “all of [the military training] courses were new to the cadets.” He did, however, recognize that some professional military studies courses were in the Dean’s purview, and he recommended that the Humanities Division, specifically Military History, offer advanced courses on “great military leaders, campaigns, weapon development, etc.”\(^{330}\) Although the Department of Military Training did not do itself any

\(^{329}\) Ringenbach, 83-84; *AFAHD, 1956-57*, 120-121.

\(^{330}\) *AFAHD, 1956-57*, 120, 122. In the Dean of Faculty structure from the 1956-57 Program of Instruction, the Department of Military History and Geography was slated to
favors, the emphasis of the Enrichment program was already on the general academic course work. There were various changes in the following years including name changes. Overall, however, the decision prevailed not to drastically change the curriculum for the next four years.

The Academy’s attention to accreditation reaped dividends in 1959. As desired, the Academy received accreditation on 24 April 1959, just before the first class graduated. In the North Central Association’s report, the examiners endorsed the institution’s approach for a “broad general education” as well as the institution’s balance between the sciences and liberal arts. They believed that the course work, including the academically meaningful military studies program, met the “goals of the institution.” Recognizing the requirement for military education, the examiners noted that the institution provides “for an understanding and commitment to the proper relationship of the military establishment to the civilian government which our democratic ideals require, for an understanding of present and potential weapon systems, and for a basic orientation to key problems and decisions of national defense.”

Just as the Academy received positive acknowledgment of its program, the military studies program went through a few turbulent years. After the departure of General Stillman in 1958, the Dean pressed for a more rigorous academic approach in the military studies program to teach the military history course work. This was the same for the following academic year. Military History was a senior-level course, so the course had not yet been offered. The Dean eliminated this department in 1958, and all responsibilities returned to the Department of History. See AFAHD, 1956-57, 144; USAFA Special Collections, The United States Air Force Academy’s First Twenty-Five Years: Some Perceptions (United States Air Force Academy, 1979), 148n10.

331 USAFA Special Collections, “Report to the Executive Board of the Commission on Colleges and Universities North Central Association, Commission on Colleges and Universities, 9-10 February 1959,” 18.
by involving his faculty more heavily. The weight given to the general academic coursework led to a reorganization of the military studies program in 1960. For 1959-1960, the Airmanship Studies program took 29½ hours of the total 176-hour curriculum. However, only 5¼ semester hours were tied to military studies. To facilitate the instruction of the course work, the Superintendent, Major General William S. Stone, agreed with McDermott to include most of the military studies program in a newly designed May term—the Dean used fifty faculty members to facilitate the courses’ instruction. ³³² Although the May term concentrated on military studies and leadership studies, the Dean did offer some other academic courses during this truncated term. However, the concentration of military studies in this one condensed period allowed for total focus on academic subjects during the academic year. Significant in this effort is that the faculty worked with the Department of Military Studies through weekly course preparation during the spring semester, and many believed that this enhanced cooperation between the Dean’s and Commandant’s personnel, which had always had a level of conflict. ³³³

³³² Stone was intimately familiar with the planning for the Academy. As then-Colonel Stone, he was in charged of the Field Extension at Bolling AFB. Some time this group of planners is referred to as the “Stone Group.” I used the term “Bolling Group” above. ³³³ AFAHD, 1959-60, 302-305, 447-455; Ringenbach, 169; ³³³ AFAHD, 1960-61, 90.

Incoming freshman took a course their initial summer on “Growth and Development of the USAF,” for ¾ credit hours and during the May term, as they prepared to enter their sophomore year, the freshman cadets had “National Security and the Armed Forces”—a 1½ credit hour course; sophomores preparing to be juniors took “Applied Aerospace Power and Armed Forces” in the May term; and juniors had, “Contemporary Military Thought”—1 credit hour. The military studies program had, beyond the 5¼ credit hours already mentioned, additional military studies credit for summer programs. This included Military Studies 210, “Field Study of the Armed Forces,” where the new sophomores toured the domestic combat commands, which provided 4 semester credit hours; Military
However not everyone agreed that this effort was so beneficial. The Royal Air Force exchange officer within the Department of Military Studies recognized the relative lack of serious military studies course work. In his end of tour report, which encompassed his tour from August 1958 until May 1960, Wing Commander R.W.G. Freer commented on the second-tier role that military studies had assumed in the officer candidate’s program at the Academy. His perspective included the program’s status during 1958-59, and then the change to rid the academic year of any military studies program as the Academy now relegated that course work to the May term in 1960. For the first May term, the Commandant had reduced his department by over 30 percent, due to the assistance provided by the Dean’s personnel. As the Wing Commander reflected:

My predecessor’s [Group Captain MacDougall] observation is true that the bulk of formal instruction in military or purely Air Force subjects is provided by the Department of Military Studies. It is this department which...characterizes this institution as a military and not a civilian university. However, since the baccalaureate degree is tied firmly to civilian accreditation requirements, the academic programme does not generally permit the employment of military subjects as vehicles for education. Thus the subject of “military studies” is physically divorced from the faculty and the associated study fields of History and Political Science. Moreover, where once ‘military studies’ were taught throughout the Academic Year with the same status as purely academic subjects, they are now compressed into a special four week May Term.... I personally believe it to be an

Studies 310, “Field Studies of the Overseas Areas”—at trip throughout Europe, which offered 2¾ additional credit hours; and Military Studies 433, “Field Study of Missile Installations,” done by seniors during the May term, for ¾ credit hours.
inferior way of educating a cadet in his chosen professional field. The principal problem would seem to be a lack of Military Studies contact between one May programme and another and there may be evidence for this in the growth of the cadet’s Professional Studies Group and the basic Air Force instruction which Upperclassmen are endeavoring to give the plebes in “4th Class Schooling.”

The view from an outside observer succinctly and astutely captured the dilemma of military studies. Freer justifiably relates the lack of attention to military studies to the cadets’ creation of the Professional Studies Group (PSG), which was “designed to acquaint cadets with the latest activities and developments in the Air Force and the field of aerospace power and to provide literature and trips motivational to an officer career.” Within the year, the PSG began publication of its “Aerospace Newsletter,” and the group included over 500 members.

334 AFAHD, 1 July 1959-30 June 1960, Appendix, Documents COC-1 - COC-77, A-1 and A-2, Number COC-47, “Wing Commander R.W.G. Freer, RAF, Exchange Officer, End of Tour Report, 25 April 1960,” 16-17. This single-spaced, 26-page document discusses all aspects of Wing Commander Freer’s reflections on the Academy—he was active with the Athletic Department as an assistant soccer coach and lectured for the History Department, also. He equated his position in the Department of Military Studies with the War Studies Team at Cranwell. See ibid., 2. He also notes the lack of emphasis on the military studies curriculum as he compares his reflection with his predecessor, Group Captain MacDougall. On the reduced Manning in the department from fifteen to a “coaching” staff of ten instructors, see ibid., 3. Freer comments that his predecessor’s method of instruction was a discussion-based class, due to small size, where Freer suggests that he and his peers rely more on lecture. Also, outside preparation time was condensed from two hours to 90 minutes—and the May Term reduced it even more to 45 minutes. See ibid., 10.

335 Quoted in AFAHD, 1 July 1962-30 June 1963.
Wing Commander Freer recognized the second-tier status, even the poor implementation, of the military studies program within the Air Force Academy curriculum.

The May term program continued with the 1960-61 academic year, as the success claimed of the first May term caused the institution to repeat the effort. The Director of Military Studies, Lieutenant Colonel M.L. Boswell, concluded that the May 1961 term had been the most effective instruction in military studies provided to the cadets since his involvement in the program beginning in 1958. However, he did lament that limiting military studies education to a one-month period “leaves a tremendous void throughout the academic year.” Even so, the director noted that the execution of the one-month program was a better alternative to the future plan, which moved more of the program to the Dean and began some of the military studies instruction on Saturdays, during AOC time. Military studies again took a back seat to the other demands of the institution, primarily those within the general academic program.

The inclusion of more military studies courses under the Dean’s authority through a transfer from the Commandant came about because of the success of the May initiative and because of a study ordered by the Superintendent. Facilitating this move to put classroom military studies courses under the Dean’s purview, the Superintendent, Major General William Stone, presented a major reorganization to the Academy through his “Progress Report: United States Air Force Academy, January-July 1961.” In an attempt to integrate academic and military training responsibilities, and to prevent unnecessary overlap, the Superintendent assigned “responsibility for all academic instruction, including classroom instruction in military subjects”

to the Dean. He developed a Division of Military Affairs within the Dean’s organization that would effectively assimilate the 26½ program hours of “military-oriented” courses, to include military and diplomatic history, psychology and management, economics of national security, international relations and defense policy, and weapon systems and their employment. The Dean had to incorporate these courses into the academic year—nullifying the need for the separate May period. Stone believed that this reorganization and division of responsibilities would allow for the “clear cut division between [professional military studies] and Military Training” which “will make for a better integration of the traditional academic subjects and those which include a military orientation.” He also notes that this change would keep the academic “balanced program”—that ensured an even division between the humanities and social sciences on one hand with the science and engineering on the other.

The leaders recognized deficiencies within the military studies course work, and continued an ad hoc restructuring within the institution to create an effective military studies program.

Wing Commander Freer’s replacement, Wing Commander J.A.G. Slessor, suggested that the change in the 1961-1962 academic year military studies program led “to the demise of the never popular May Term.” At the same time, putting the program back under the Commandant’s authority led to an organizational change that created the Military Training Division. He remarked: “I do feel very strongly that the Academy missed a great opportunity during the Summer of 1961 when, with the demise of the May Term already mentioned, they did not combine the integration of the military training programme into the academic year, with an

increase in the establishment of this department. Had this been done it would in one move have recognized the status that the department deserves and would have enhanced the standard of professional education that the cadet receives.”\(^{338}\) The Academy struggled to provide a consistent approach for its military studies program. But the move from the academic year to the May terms and back demonstrates that its significance was not on as high a level as was the general academic program.

The change to the Academy’s military studies program that Wing Commander Slessor alluded to above occurred in 1962, although this one had lasting effects. Continuing to be introspective, the Superintendent appointed a Military Training Review Panel to offer a “penetrating analysis of all phases of military training and to evaluate major changes in the military program during the past year.” One of the observations was: “The transfer of officers from the faculty to positions under the Commandant of Cadets has made a valuable contribution to a more effective integration of the military and academic training programs.” The instructors from the Faculty were not teaching academic subjects within the Commandant’s curriculum; instead, the transfer of faculty members to the Commandant was to provide a second Air Officer Commanding in each of the cadet squadrons. This initiative was how the institution was attempting to correct the “Terrazzo Gap.” In general, however, the sense of improvement was widespread. As the evaluators noted: “The entire curriculum of the military training courses was enthusiastically endorsed…courses are well organized…placement of the courses in the curriculum is both logically and educationally sound…panel is particularly impressed with the

---

constant updating effort by the staff in the military training area.” The military studies program under the Commandant was now reduced to 4 semester credit hours of classroom instruction. Also, the organization reverted back to the “Military Training Division,” which comprised the instructors for the military studies coursework. The Academy had come full circle in a few years, landing back into the comfortable realm of training, and having little emphasis on military studies.

To support this effort, General McDermott recommended in May 1962 that the Faculty Council eliminate the year-old Military Affairs Division, which housed the Department of Military Studies, under the Dean of Faculty. The Military Studies Department was only three faculty strong, with the responsibility of instructing one course during the 1961-62 year, which was Military Studies 432, “Weapon and Space System Technology”—a 2½ semester hour course provided to 269 seniors in the spring semester. The Faculty Council, Academy Board, and Superintendent all agreed to this new arrangement. One casualty of this move was the interdisciplinary major in Military Affairs. Another was the 4½ semester hours of Military


341 Ringenbach, 190. In addition, this agreement deleted the year old Military Affairs major in the same month. Ringenbach, 191.
Studies that had been proposed under the new division but really never came into effect. The Dean had dropped all responsibility for teaching military studies by returning all elements back to the Commandant. General McDermott’s support to end the May term and to eliminate Military Affairs from the academic program concluded a few years of solid cooperation between the Dean and Commandant.\textsuperscript{342} This also led to stagnation and to the relative insignificance of the military studies program.

The effect of ending the May program without any substantial vision resulted in the continued marginalization of military studies within the academic program. Starting in 1962-1963, the Academy implemented the new curriculum, with military studies course work, under the designation as “Military Training,” administered once again by the Commandant of Cadets. The total Program of Instruction for a cadet was now 186½ semester hours. This included 143½ semester hours per cadet for academics, 14½ in athletics, and 28½ hours in the “Airmanship Program”—which contained the military studies program and a 2½ airmanship. However, the program only included 5 hours of what one can consider military studies, instead of military training.\textsuperscript{343} The 5-hour curriculum was spread over the cadet’s four years. This course work

\textsuperscript{342} Jay Miller, et. al., 185.

\textsuperscript{343} AFAHD, 1 Jul 1962 – 30 Jun 1963, 137-140. The 1962-1963 academic year was an anomaly. As the bridge between the military studies May terms and the move of all academic course work back to the Commandant, it included 28.5 hours in the Airmanship Program. The significant five hours included: Military Training 114 (freshman-level), “National Security and the Armed Forces” (1½ credit hours); Military Training 215 (sophomore-level), “The USAF and Contemporary Forces” (¼ credit hours); Military Training 311 (junior-level), “Employment of Aerospace Power” (1½ credit hours); and, Military Training 402 (senior-level), “Aerospace Weapons and Space Systems” (1 credit
required little work outside of the classroom. The leaders of the Academy kept this basic military studies structure in place for the next decade and a half with little change to the overall program. Between the first significant curriculum change in the realm of military studies in 1955 and significant change that was to occur toward the end of the 1970s, at least 21 changes in the military studies curriculum were made. The military studies program never received the attention and priority necessary to ensure that it would provide a solid military education for the cadet. Instead, the focus was on an intense academic program and the requirement to offer specialized military training.

The general academic program was central to Air Force leaders and Academy planners from the beginning. Even after the institution gained accreditation, the emphasis remained on the Academy’s general academic program with the military studies program almost an afterthought. The Dean encouraged departments to develop academic majors in the summer and fall of 1963, pushing for individual disciplines to get those majors accredited—chemistry did such a thing through the American Chemical Society. Colonel John Ault, Professor of Mathematics, suggested a math major in September, and Colonel Ruenheck, the head of the Department of History, proposed a history major in October. The move to the enrichment program in the late 1950s opened the path to the development and planning for academic majors. General McDermott also was leading the effort to make it a reality. In January 1966, the Academy announced that an academic major for every cadet was a mandatory requirement, and the Dean pressed his faculty to create new majors that inspired the cadets. One of the first approved was

---

hour). Most of the Military Training hours were assigned to summer training for each class—such as 7½ hours given to the freshman for Basic Cadet Training. 

344 Ringenbach, 210-11.
the Military Arts and Science major, “for cadets desiring to focus on their chosen profession,” yet only a few cadets chose this path. This coursework did not reach all cadets. The Dean created the “General Studies” major, recognizing that some cadets could have trouble completing a major before graduation and commissioning.345 The core program for all cadets within the military studies sphere suffered because of the attention always given to the general academic curriculum.

The attention given to the general academic program and the inclusion of flying training meant that other areas suffered, notably the military education responsibilities of the Commandant. The Academy, however, was still experiencing excitement in the 1960s that this whole venture was really working, at least well enough. So now the Academy leaders believed the institution required a period of less innovation and change, even as the conflict in Vietnam expanded.346 Also, in January 1965, the Academy experienced a monumental cheating scandal—on a par with the West Point scandal of 1951. The Secretary of the Air Force appointed a committee to investigate the incident with retired General Thomas D. White as the chair. Findings of the White Committee in response to the scandal included concerns over “strong peer groupings, poorly trained AOCs [Air Officer Commanding], and inadequate military training.”347

The cheating scandal and the White Report could have been an excellent opportunity to

345 Ringenbach, 240.
346 Lovell, 90.
expand and improve the military studies program. The incident of 1965 and the subsequent report did lead to some minor changes, including a small role for AOCs to teach some academic coursework within the Dean’s realm, and Dean of Faculty instructors acting as assistant AOCs and participating in cadet wing inspections. These measures were intended to break up the “good guy/bad guy (academic instructor/AOC) dichotomy that had developed over the years.” However, the larger result after the scandal was merely a continued effort to maintain stability and status quo rather than to pursue the kind of innovation and adaptation often shown in the formative years—specifically within the general academic realm. This was so even though the report of a Congressional subcommittee “voiced concern about the curriculum only in a suggestion that ‘the professional and military training aspect of the curriculum may not receive its proper share of attention.’”

Even though officers such as General McDermott had recognized the need for a more rigorous and expanded military studies program, it was the general academic curriculum that received the attention.

The role given to the military studies program by this time is best reflected in an article written in 1968. That year’s final edition of the *Air University Review* focused on the Academy. The new Commandant, Brigadier General Robin Olds, contributed only a small article on military training and education at the Academy, offering only a single paragraph on military studies. He stated: “During the academic year, both faculty and cadets teach a variety of military subjects designed to familiarize cadets with the armed forces of the United States and its allies and the forces of the Communist powers. Classes are also conducted on the combat operations and tactics used by the United States Air Force…. Through the use of officer-conducted

---

348 Mitchell, 229.
349 Lovell, 90.
seminars and guest speakers, cadets are kept abreast of current military and political affairs.\textsuperscript{350}

The coursework to which he referred, and as discussed above, did not match the rigor and amount included in the general academic curriculum. The Academy would have to experience additional incidents and pressures to review the military studies program and to push for a more solid contribution. This would occur in the ensuing decade.

\textsuperscript{350} Brigadier General Robin Olds, “The Leadership and Military Training Program” in \textit{Air University Review}, Vol. XX, No.1, Aerospace Studies Institute, Maxwell AFB, AL, November-December 1968. GPO, Washington D.C., 34. Although his contribution is seven pages, Olds’ article is really only two pages as the rest contains pictures (pp. 33-39). In addition to the Commandant’s article in this special edition devoted to the Academy, the Superintendent, Lieutenant General Thomas S. Moorman, provided a ten-page article on, “Basic Philosophical Concepts of the United States Air Force Academy” (pp. 1-10); the Dean of Faculty, Brigadier General Robert F. McDermott, USAF (ret) provided another ten-page article on “The USAF Academy Academic Program” (pp.11-20); Colonel Jesse C. Gatlin, Jr., the head of the Department of English, offered, “The Role of Humanities in Educating the Professional Officer,” demonstrating the continued need to educate the service on why humanities was almost as influential in the course work at the Academy (pp. 21-25); and Colonel Richard F. Rosser contributed, “The Air Force Academy and the Development of Area Experts” (pp. 26-32).
Chapter 5 - The Rise of Professional Military Studies

After the cheating scandal in 1965, the White Report had called for a period of stability in the Academy’s curriculum. This came to an end, marked by reviews associated with two landmark events. The Academy’s 20th and 25th anniversaries inspired the officers serving as Superintendent at each of those times to examine how the Academy was doing, especially in light of the extensive transformations that occurred in the military branches after the Vietnam War. The reviews that the Academy personnel conducted for these anniversaries ultimately led to more attention being given to the professional military studies program, which remained under the direction of the Commandant of Cadets. The Military Training Division, the organization responsible for classroom instruction in military studies under the authority of the Commandant, was certainly one of the areas that experienced little stability and continuity. In response to the inquiries conducted in the 1970s, major modifications of the military studies program were instituted. One key provision was the appointment of a Permanent Professor for the military studies program, under the general authority of the Commandant, and, as the decade of the 1980s began, the Permanent Professor worked to improve organization and to demand rigor and continuity within the program. Like counterparts in other disciplines such as History or Chemistry, the Permanent Professor would enjoy a special status substantially protected from short-term changes of mind among higher-ranking leaders.

The country’s involvement in the Vietnam War was the most significant event in the world at large affecting the Academy since its founding. Especially since it was the first conflict involving graduates of the Air Force Academy, the war provided an early rationale for self-evaluation of the institution’s military training and academic curriculum—specifically, those courses and initiatives that support a cadet’s overall professional military education. Because of
the nature of the conflict, academic departments began to include, while the war was being fought, various courses that provided previously disregarded material to a cadet’s military education. For example, the History Department developed an elective course on “Theory and Employment of Unconventional Warfare” that it first offered in the spring term of 1964. Other departments followed suit. However, these necessary changes and the course work that emerged did not reach all cadets.

While History offered certain new courses, a whole new department was also established in that period – the Philosophy and Fine Arts Department – which added “a whole new dimension” to professional military studies at the Academy. Created in 1967, the department was fortunate to have a forward-looking thinker at its helm. The Dean, Brigadier General Robert McDermott, had selected then-Captain Malham Wakin as the fifteenth Permanent Professor at the Academy in 1964. Since Wakin was one of only a few officers in the Air Force with a doctorate in philosophy, the Dean chose him to oversee the newly-created department from its beginning. By 1970, Wakin, now a Colonel, saw a need for change. For example, almost half

351 Brigadier General Jesse C. Gatlin, Jr., et. al., eds. The United States Air Force Academy’s First Twenty-Five Years: Some Perceptions (U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado, 1979), 154; AFAHD, 1 July 1963-30 June 1964, 136. The course “was a study in depth of insurgent warfare. The social, economic, philosophical and political backgrounds of each country were studied to place the insurgent problem in proper perspective. The course traced briefly the evolutionary development and employment of theories of revolutionary warfare.” This “enrichment” course—beyond the core or major requirement, had 39 cadets enrolled in the spring 1964 —25 enrolled in fall 1964 and 53 in spring 1965.

352 The Department of Philosophy and Fine Arts was established on 1 July 1967. Wakin, who graduated from the University of Notre Dame with a degree in mathematics in 1952,
of the senior class was enrolled in the department’s ethics course, which was a core elective course that competed with a modern English literature course. (Cadets had to take one or the other.) The core philosophy course focused on the great thinkers in the Western tradition. However, the issues brought up by the contentious conflict in Vietnam motivated cadets to take the course in philosophy, which was widely considered more challenging than the English course.\footnote{USAFA Special Collections, “Interview of Brigadier General (Retired) Malham M. Wakin by Lieutenant Colonel Vance Skarstedt, Department of History, April 20, 2000,” 9, 11. Wakin notes that the literature course was “fun”—reading novels, such as \textit{Catch-22}, whereas the Philosophy 440 Ethics course was seen as more challenging, with major papers and a rigorous reading list.} By the mid-1970s, Wakin had modified the optional core philosophy course so that it became a professional ethics course. Although he did not ignore the great thinkers, Wakin later recalled, he “added a very hefty set of reading on the role of ethics in the military profession and the concept of professionalism in the military profession and then all of the sticky questions earned a Master’s degree the next year at the State University of New York at Albany. He accepted an opportunity later, while in the Air Force, to receive a Ph.D. in philosophy from Stanford in 1959. As the only person in the Air Force with such credentials, the Dean got Wakin a step promotion from Captain to Lieutenant Colonel in September 1964 to become the fifteenth Permanent Professor—a Title 10 U.S.C. position. He received a similar step promotion to Colonel in 1967 to become the department head. See Paul T. Ringenbach, \textit{Battling Tradition: Robert F. McDermott and Shaping the U.S. Air Force Academy} (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 2006), 221, 253; “Interview with Brigadier General Malham M. Wakin, USAF, Ret. by Colonel James C. Gaston, USAF, Ret., May 20, 2003” in \textit{United States Air Force Academy, 1954-2004: 50th Anniversary Oral History} (Colorado Springs, CO: The Friends of the Air Force Academy Library, 2005), 304.
having to do with morality in warfare.” In the fall of 1977 the elective core course made its transition complete. The course, Philosophy 310, focused on professional ethics and became a new course in the core curriculum required of all juniors. As an academic course that greatly contributed to the officer candidate’s professional military education, the course was “designed to foster an intensive inquiry into human values and their relevance to the military profession. This is accomplished by looking critically at some major ethical themes including: views of man’s nature, conceptions of moral responsibility, human rights, the concepts of duty and obligation, notions of the general good, moral complexities of the military profession, and the relationship of war and morality.” Within the year, Colonel Wakin developed a compilation of readings to use as a text, until he published it the following year. This text, War, Morality, and

---

354 USAFA Special Collections, “Interview of Brigadier General (Retired) Malham M. Wakin by Lieutenant Colonel Vance Skarstedt, Department of History, April 20, 2000,” 12. This course in “applied ethics” mirrored a development occurring throughout the United States, as various disciplines recognized the need to investigate ethical behavior—such as in medicine, business, law, and, of course, war and peace. Wakin suggests that the Vietnam War set the stage for this academic change—and acceptance in the curriculum by the permanent professors and department heads of other departments—including engineering. As Vietnam passed into memory, the continued Cold War confrontation and nuclear arms race bolstered the course—see, 12. The Philosophy 440 core course made the transition beginning with the 1971-1972 academic year. Prior to this, the course was a pure Western canon ethics course. However, during this academic year it included, “the problem of alienation, morality and war, relativism, egoism and altruism, authority and dissent, freedom and responsibility.” See USAFA Special Collections, USAFA Curriculum Handbook, 1971-72, 99, and compare with USAFA Special Collections, USAFA Academic Program Handbook, 105.

the Military Profession, became the standard not only at the Air Force Academy but also at other institutions of higher learning. This course remains a pivotal part of the cadet’s professional military studies, although it was housed within an academic department other than the military studies branch in the Commandant’s realm.

Although the academic departments introduced new courses and incorporated course changes that would affect a cadet’s study of military professionalism, the military training department under the Commandant did not meaningfully change its academic coursework until certain events transpired in the mid-1970s.

20th Anniversary Study

In July 1975, just a few months after the fall of Saigon in Vietnam, Colonel Philip Erdle submitted the 20th anniversary report on the Academy to the Superintendent, Lieutenant General James Allen. Colonel Erdle was the Vice Dean of the Faculty, and he had been entrusted to serve as chairman of the special study group charged with assessing the Academy and its programs. Formally named the “20th Anniversary Study: Curriculum and Cadet Way of Life, Final Report, 11 July 1975,” this work was the culmination of thousands of hours of committee work, tasked in the autumn of 1973 by the direction of the previous Superintendent, Lieutenant General A.P. Clark. General Clark had recognized the need for reflection and accountability as

---


357 20th Anniversary Study: Curriculum and Cadet Way of Life, Final Report, 11 July 1975, USAFA Special Collections Branch, i-ii. A. P. Clark was the sixth Superintendent of the Academy, 1 August 1970 – 31 July 1974. He retired in 1974 as a lieutenant
the Academy reached the milestone of 20 years since the signing of the act that had established it. He had charged Colonel Erdle with the “terribly important responsibility” of setting the course of the Academy for years to come, and emphasized that the committee’s “singular and clear aim must be the establishment of wise recommendations which lead away from parochialism toward a program of professional excellence.” Colonel Erdle’s memorandum accompanying the report to the new Superintendent notes: “There was a general agreement by those subcommittee personnel reviewing cadet programs that the existing curriculum and the general training syllabus of this institution were very fine by every educational measure…several subcommittees’ efforts were addressed toward the goal of simply ‘fine tuning’ an already well recognized and successful educational program.” The 20th Anniversary Study saw no need to overhaul a program and structure that already had revealed some shortcomings, and it certainly did not change the vector so as to foster a more robust, rigorous professional military studies program. Parochialism seemingly would win out.

Organized in thirteen chapters—to a total of just over 130 pages—the report opens with a comprehensive chapter of recommendations followed by more detailed rationale for the recommendations from the twelve topically focused committees in the remaining chapters. The longest chapter was from the Cadet Scheduling and Program Interface Committee (22 pages),

---

general, but continued a strong relationship with the Academy. He was a World War II POW, and part of the infamous Stalag Luft III escape attempt, memorialized in the book, and later movie, The Great Escape. The character Flight Lieutenant Robert Hendley (an American RAF pilot), played by actor James Garner, was an amalgam of POWs, one of whom was General Clark.

358 20th Anniversary Study, i. This memorandum, “20th Anniversary Study,” from the Superintendent to DFV (Col Erdle), is dated 5 Oct 1973.

359 20th Anniversary Study, ii.
followed closely by the 21-page input from the Scheduling Committee’s (which expanded the investigation of scheduling issues beyond merely the cadet schedule to include all personnel and mission elements on the Academy]), while the Physical Education Subcommittee and Committee on Intercollegiate Athletics (this entire entity was one single committee) provided only a one-page summation stating that its five officers had participated in other committees and therefore had had “significant input” in the report. This committee did not offer any specific recommendations.\textsuperscript{360} The report included 88 recommendations.\textsuperscript{361}

An event as pivotal as the United States’ military involvement in Vietnam arguably might have warranted a significant review, resulting in changes reflecting the characteristics of the current war. However, the rapid pace at which the Academy initially developed led many to believe that what they had accomplished in the first two decades was already rather special, and the time now dictated that the institution stay its course, perhaps even “resting on its laurels”—that it be a place, as one historian has put it, where “the emphasis was on stability rather than innovation.”\textsuperscript{362} The Academy also had done well in its second round of accreditation in 1969 and

\textsuperscript{360} 20th Anniversary Study, XIII-1. The page number signifies the thirteenth chapter, the final of the twelve-committee inputs—the first chapter is the group’s recommendations to the Superintendent.

\textsuperscript{361} 20th Anniversary Study, I-1 – I-12. The report lists the twelve committees with their proposed recommendations in this chapter.

\textsuperscript{362} John P. Lovell, \textit{Neither Athens nor Sparta? The American Service Academies in Transition} (Bloomington and London: Indiana Press University, 1978), 90. Lovell states that, during the period after the mid-1960s, “There continued to be incremental program developments, of course. But the organizational milieu had been decidedly altered,” best demonstrated with the retirement of the Dean, General McDermott, after 12 years.
its leaders therefore believed its entire program had been justified a success. Although there were some minor changes due to the military and societal disorder caused by the Vietnam conflict, the Academy did not undergo considerable transformation until later in the 1970s—to include the professional military education of the cadets. It is noteworthy that the 20th anniversary study of the institution only used the term “military training” for the same kinds of subjects that a later study—the 25th Anniversary Study—called “professional military studies” at least part of the time. Overall, however, the professional military studies program would remain largely unchanged until more time and reflection had occurred.

With respect to academic subjects, the report reinforced the thinking of the founders regarding the balance of the curriculum between the science and engineering courses, on the one hand, and social sciences and humanities course work, on the other. Supporting what General McDermott believed contributed to the success of the Academy, the study’s Curriculum Review Committee recommended that the overall academic program should require a minimum of 138 semester hours (supervised by the Dean—this did not include military training, aviation, and

363 USAFA Special Collections, “United States Air Force Academy Institutional Report for the Review Examination by the North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools, 1968-1969,” 1-4. The report, accomplished by all major elements and departments of the Academy, is 355 pages—most of it glowing. The Deputy Commandant for Military Instruction highlights as strengths its faculty and curriculum. The only areas of concern are airmanship training and the budget for off-Academy grounds summer training. See ibid., 105-106.
physical education hours, which added another 41 semester hours), 102 of which would comprise the core curriculum, “evenly divided between social science/humanities and engineering/basic sciences.” 365 This included the action of the Dean to add three additional “technical” core courses (a third physics course, a materials course, and an engineering design course) in compliance with a Superintendent’s directive. 366 This seemingly went against Clark’s aspiration to “lead away from parochialism,” because the established tradition of keeping a balanced curriculum now became even more binding—each department understandably fought

365 20th Anniversary Study, I-1. This was the fourth recommendation of this committee—arguably the most influential and important of the twelve committees. The 138 minimum hours would be for a general B.S degree. A disciplinary degree might take 144 hours. The other recommendations were to keep 14 semester hours for physical education and a maximum of 27 hours for military training and studies, which will be discussed below. General McDermott was Dean from 1956 to 1968.

366 AFAHD, 1 July 1975 – 31 December 1975, 44, 46-48. In this official annual history, as well as the letter from the Dean that informed this history (see AFAHD, 1 July 1975 – 31 December 1975, Appendix, Vol. II, Documents DF 17 – DF 64, CW 1 – CW 65, Number DF-44, “Ltr, DF to CS, subj: Notes from Dean’s Remarks at Supt’s Staff Meeting, 28 Oct 75, 29 Oct 75”), it refers to the 20th Anniversary Study as what caused this change to add more technical course to the core; however, there is nothing in the 20th anniversary report that states this change. Instead, the Superintendent, Lt. Gen. James Allen, under pressure from the Air Staff, proposed “a very modest expansion of the core curriculum, primarily in the scientific/engineering subjects” to expose cadets to those disciplines with the plan that it would entice more majors in technical subjects. See ibid., Number DF-40, “Ltr, SUPT to DF, subj: Graduation of Cadets with Scientific/Engineering Degrees, 29 Sep 75.” The Dean complied. However, to keep the balance, he added a management course (Social Sciences) and another (the fourth) English course (as well as additional Physical Education Courses), reducing the overall major’s requirement from 17 to 11.
to keep its own influence in the curriculum. This enforced the conservative approach to changes in the curriculum that continued to affect the military studies program, as there was little room to expand the curriculum. This recommendation by the Curriculum Review Committee did not really explore the best ways of transforming the officer candidate into a strong military professional. Instead, the traditional notion remained – namely, that a broad education, encompassing a range of disciplines, was effective by itself to prepare the officer candidates, much as the Air Force Academy Planning Board had concluded in 1949.

The report did address some issues concerning the program of professional military studies. One of the major committees tasked with reviewing the Academy program was the Professional Military Training Review Committee. It provided the third chapter to the report. The committee included the Deputy Commandants for Military Instruction and the Cadet Wing, members of the Military Training Division, the Director of Athletics, and members of the Department of Law, Department of Life and Behavioral Science and the Department of History.

367 This significant recommendation actually concerned itself with scientific and engineering studies more than military studies. As the members agreed, “The total academic load should approximate that of the better engineering programs, particularly in view of the need for Air Force officers to understand technical issues.” See 20th Anniversary Study, II-4. The Superintendent’s push to include more technical core supports this view of the greater Air Force on what was most important. He assured a member of Congress, “The Air Force is a technically oriented service, and increasing emphasis is being placed on graduating more cadets in the basic and engineering sciences.” See, AFAHD, 1 July 1975 – 31 December 1975, Appendix, Vol. II, Documents DF 17 – DF 64, CW 1 – CW 65, Number DF-39, “Ltr, SUPT to The Honorable Jim Lloyd, House of Representatives, Wash., D.C., 26 Sep 75.”
It met twenty-three times in the year—its last meeting was on 8 January 1975. The committee offered thirteen recommendations. The committee’s members understood that it needed to cast a wide net, since, as the report later stated, the “cadet’s professional military experience is achieved through: (1) Academic studies, (2) Leadership and military instruction, (3) Physical education and athletics, and (4) The entire cadet environment.” This included interaction with the military faculty and staff as well as just the day-to-day requirement of being in a military environment. The committee reviewed the Air Force’s recommended pre-commissioning core curriculum (for all commissioning sources—the Academy, ROTC, and Officer Training School), the Academy’s core curriculum, and the Academy’s military environment. The committee did recognize that it needed to address military studies in some way.

Among the committee’s thirteen recommendations only three directly referred to “Academic studies,” which concerned the military studies program. The committee continued to support the two semesters of military studies for freshmen — each semester consisted of only ten double-period blocks (so ten hour and a half classes each semester). This provided cadets with “the fundamentals” of Air Force military studies—Air Force structure and the service’s role in overall national security. The senior-level “Officer Transition” course, Military Studies 420,

368 The Commandant had a Vice Commandant, a colonel who supported his boss, and two Deputy Commandants—one each for overseeing the Cadet Wing responsibilities and Military Instruction, which included the Military Training Division (where the military studies program and summer programs were housed) and an Aviation Division (flying and jump programs).


was proposed for expansion from eight lessons to twenty, which would include “no outside preparation.”371 Finally, the committee proposed that the sophomore-level two-semester military studies communications curriculum be redesigned, since the core English course assumed some of the responsibility for the objectives that overlapped in the course—reducing military studies for sophomores to one semester.372 The committee that was specifically designed to tackle and improve military studies and training at the Academy did not seem too concerned with the Military Training Division that managed the program nor with the rigor or attention that this program received.

The committee called on the Dean to give more attention to the military education program. This again showed the committee’s recognition that some elements of the military studies curriculum were housed in other departments’ academic course work. One very clear good example of the course topics that the committee agreed should remain. Just because each lesson had two 50-minute periods devoted to it, does not mean that the instructors efficiently used the allotted time. As discussed below, evidence from 1979 shows that the second-half of each lesson was for showing films about the Air Force, which were optional for the freshmen.

371 20th Anniversary Study, I-3; AFAHD, 1 July 1973 – 30 June 1974, Appendix, Vol. III, Documents DF 39 – DF 64, CW 1 – CW 39B, Number CW-28, “Annual USAFA History, CW to HO, 18 Jul 74,” “Military Training Division (CWIT),” 2-3. This was really not a rigorous military studies course. As a ten-lesson (single period) course, it had five classroom sessions and three panel discussions, with one lesson for introduction and one for concluding session, with no exam.

recommendation stated: “Cadets should receive more formal instruction on Contemporary Military Ethics.”

Although this certainly assisted the change in the core philosophy course as discussed above, this also led to adjustments in the Law Department’s core curriculum. The senior-level core course was “Law for the Commanders.” Given the struggles in the Vietnam War, the committee advised that, since the curriculum did not yet offer instruction on the laws of war, “an additional ½ semester hour [should] be added to the Law Core Curriculum to provide instruction in the laws of war and additional instruction concerning the legality of orders.”

The Academy instituted this change with the 1976 fall course. Again, the professional military studies course work was not confined to the Deputy Commandant for Military Instruction’s curriculum.

However, besides the Professional Military Training Review Committee, other committees offered recommendations that affected the overall military studies program within the Commandant’s sphere. Most significant was the continued competition to get the reasonable portion of cadet time. The Curriculum Review Committee (CRC), for example, stressed: “The formal military training and military studies curriculum should not exceed 27 semester hours and should extend through the four-year curriculum. Some aircrew duties should be a graduation

373 20th Anniversary Study, I-3.
requirement for all cadets.”376 This was the report’s ninth recommendation. The military training and military studies program gave credit for summer training programs at 20.5 semester hours and the military studies curriculum at only 6.5 semester hours for a cadet’s four years.377 However, even though it limited the maximum number of semester hours for the entire military studies and training program, this recommendation actually proposed an increase in the total hours semester hours for military studies. Established midway through the 20th Anniversary Study, the Cadet Scheduling and Program Interface Committee exhaustingly reviewed the formula for semester hour credits and determined that Military Studies course work should receive 1.5 semester hours per course. This would bring the total to 9 semester hours in a cadet’s program, so the summer military training hours would be reduced. The committee also recommended an “expanded military studies program”—merely a scheduling recommendation—that would not be attempted in earnest until the beginning of the new decade. It proposed that the senior course be made up of 42 lessons, instead of the 10 lessons and that other times in cadets’ schedules be used to enhance contact time in the professional military studies curriculum.378 Even though these recommendations were not carried out, they did demonstrate that elements within the Academy recognized an issue within the military studies program.

The 20th Anniversary Study itself did not introduce major changes into the military studies curriculum. However, it did bring together the various personnel from the offices of the Commandant, the Dean of Faculty, the Athletic Department, and other staff agencies to

376 20th Anniversary Study, I-1.
377 20th Anniversary Study, II-6. The credit was 1 hour for each semester course the first three years (Mil Stud 111/112, 221/222, 321/322) and ½ semester hour for the senior-level course.
378 20th Anniversary Study, I-1-2, I-11, XI-1, XI-12 -13
recognize that a need did exist to examine the Academy’s program and that some specific attention was needed to bolster the military studies program.

**Honor Review Committee**

Soon after the submission of the 20th Anniversary Study, which sparked little progress in the program of military studies or in other areas at the Academy, an incident outside the Academy put in motion efforts to make drastic changes that put more emphasis on its military studies program. In March 1976, West Point experienced a serious cheating scandal whose impact rivaled earlier problems at West Point in 1951 and the USAFA 1965 honor code scandal. At the end of this West Point investigation, 152 cadets either resigned or were involuntarily separated.379 This developed into an “unprecedented drama” that led the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Bernard Rogers, to form what would became the West Point Study Group (WPSG), which included three investigative committees chaired by a one- or two-star general.380 General Rogers received the final report from this group in July 1977.381

---

379 Lance Betros, *Carved in Granite: West Point Since 1902* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2012), 57. This incident received significant attention in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* during the months after the event, when in April and May many cadets began to resign or receive punishment. See, *AFAHD, 1 January 1976 – 1 December 1976*, Appendix, Vol. IV, *Documents CW 1-74, AH 1-38, CSU 1-13*.


381 Betros notes: “As a blueprint for reform, [the West Point Study Group report] was the most significant document since Thayer established the four-year curriculum over 150 years earlier” (59). To implement the recommendations, in December 1976, the Army
the WPSG would inform the Superintendent of the Air Force Academy, who would order his own studies and would institute substantial changes because of this latest and damaging incident. This affair eventually led to serious reforms at the Air Force Academy, specifically with respect to the professional military studies program.

The WPSG investigation and subsequent report inspired self-reflection at the Air Force Academy. The report offered 152 recommendations, including the need to create various committees for further study and to implement organizational changes. Both actions were intended to address the environment that had led to the cheating scandal, as well as other reforms. For example, the report specified the need for a “Committee on Professional Development” and a “Committee on Cadet Life” that would allow for “continuing review of all aspects of the educational training and extracurricular programs of the Academy.” Also, the report advised the Commandant to reorganize and rename his offices. The changes were to include moving one department from under his purview to the academic Dean’s responsibility.382

recalled to service as its new Superintendent General Andrew Goodpaster—he had to wear three stars rather than show his four-star rank—as General Rogers prepared to establish the group. Rogers wanted a strong, stable, academically sound choice to lead the Academy out of the quagmire (60). Betros observes: “The thoroughness of the WPSG report merits special note. In my extensive research of the Military Academy, I have come across no other external committee report that so ably balances breadth, analysis, clarity, and cogency. The quality of the report had much to do with Gen. Rogers’s deep personal interest in the work of the WPSG. He received periodic reviews from the chairmen of the three investigative committees and provided guidance that influenced the WPSG’s final recommendations.” See ibid., 342-343n105.

The span and significance of these proposed changes spilled over to the other service academies as, if nothing else, a measure against anything as embarrassing as what had occurred at West Point and against the brutal publicity that came with the affair.

Responding to events at West Point, and motivated by the WPSG, Air Force Academy Superintendent Lt. Gen. Kenneth Tallman directed his own investigation into the structure and climate of the cadet wing. Sworn in as the eighth Superintendent on June 27 1977, General Tallman used those WPSG recommendations as a springboard to justify and to implement his own radical changes. On 28 July 1977, he convened the Honor Review Committee (HRC) to “evaluate the administration of the cadet honor system and related aspects of cadet life.” The committee interviewed a broad cross-section of over 300 cadets and staff personnel, and, although it “asserted its firm belief that the Cadet Honor Code remains the paramount feature of

West Point Study Group], 27 Jul 77,” 10-11. The report recommended that the Office of Military Psychology and Leadership be renamed as the Department of Behavior Sciences and Leadership and fall under the Dean as an academic department. The report recommended that other offices within the Commandant’s purview, such as Military Instruction, be named “departments.” The report had 156 recommendations, but four concerned the US Military Academy Preparatory School. See Betros, 343n106. Merely coincidental that there were 152 recommendations in the report and 152 cadets resigned or were dismissed.

383 Quoted in AFAHD, 1 January 1978 – 31 December 1978, 4. Although his letter came out the day after the official release of the WPSG report, there is little doubt that he was fully aware of what the group was finding and subsequently recommending prior to the official release. See, again, Betros, 342-343n105. The group was releasing information at it went along. There is no doubt that Gen. Tallman received information about the group’s work—either formally or informally—especially after the Air Force named him as the next Superintendent and as he was preparing to assume the position.
the cadet way of life,” its September interim report did recommend that follow-on subcommittees investigate eight areas for “possible improvement actions.”\textsuperscript{384} The committee specifically recommended forming subcommittees to further study “Professional Development” and “Cadet Life,” which were suggestions that the WPSG had recommended for its institution.\textsuperscript{385} Tallman approved creation of the subcommittees and gave the HRC until the beginning of the year to provide the findings and recommendations.\textsuperscript{386}

The HRC submitted its final report on January 1, 1978. The report gave special attention to some significant problems that both staff and cadets had with the military studies program. The subcommittee focused on “Management of Cadet Wing” and gave eleven findings, one of which was the issue concerning “Stability of Military Training Programs.” As the HRC report stated, “[o]ne of the greatest sources of irritation or confusion” for cadets and staff were the “continual changes” within the military studies program that came with the turnover (about every


two years) of the Commandant of Cadets. As the report notes, “[b]oth cadets and graduates point out that there have seldom been two [cadet year group] classes who have undergone the same program of military training [education].” The result of this “institutional turmoil” was that the cadets had a “negative view” of military studies—the cadets did not view military studies as an important aspect of their education, and they viewed the program as one with little rigor. This was not an original finding, as the committee provided similar examples of cadet end-of-course critiques that showed the program had “little stability since the mid-1960s” or was of little significance to the cadets. However, the pressure now affecting the academies due to the scandal at West Point made clear to Academy leaders and faculty that meaningful change was necessary in the organization of professional military studies and in its curriculum.

Upon receiving the final report, General Tallman immediately established an Implementation Committee to develop some direct actions on the findings and recommendations from the HRC. This included findings about how to improve the professional military studies

387 The Commandant of Cadets traditionally is a relatively recent pinned-on brigadier general, one who is expected to advance further in his or her Air Force career. In recent years, especially, accomplishing the tour as Commandant leads almost immediately to a two-star promotion, upon completion of the tour; thus the reason for a short tour of two, versus three or more years. Recent Superintendents, on the other hand, are already pinned-on lieutenant generals whose last assignment will be with the Academy.


program. Headed by Colonel Tom Richards—who already was a Brigadier General-select and was in line to become the Academy’s 10th Commandant of Cadets upon pinning on the rank—this group of six officers reviewed the HRC’s over 200 findings and recommendations and gave the Superintendent an outline of which ones to implement as soon as possible, those that required further study, and those that could be dismissed outright. The committee provided its input to the Superintendent within the month.390

The Implementation Committee specifically addressed the situation within the military studies program. Among the recommendations from the HRC, which acknowledged the lack of consistency over time and level of rigor in the professional military studies curriculum, was the suggestion that a colonel manage all aspects of training and education within the Commandant’s realm as well as coordinate between the Commandant’s military studies program and related faculty departments. In addition, the committee believed that this person should be the Deputy Commandant for Military Instruction. They wanted the new Deputy Commandant to receive at least two continuous tours of duty (each tour was two or three years) or “some form of assignment stability to lend coherence and continuity to this very important program.” Finally,

the committee recognized the need for this Deputy Commandant to have under him or her “a limited number of continuous tour positions within” the division so that the instructors could help build and maintain this continuity.\footnote{AFAHD, 1 January 1978 – 31 December 1978, Appendix, Vol. I, \textit{Documents SUPT 1-38, RR 1-37, Number SUPT-2}, “Report of the Honor Review Committee, 1 Jan 78,” IX-8-IX-9.} In the five years before this report (January 1973 to January 1978), four officers had held the position of Deputy Commandant for Military Instruction (CWI).\footnote{Colonels A.K. Taylor, Ben M. Pollard, William Breckner, and Lt. Col. Gary Knight. During this pivotal year of 1978-1979, three others would assume the position: Col. Jack Farris (Aug 78 – Mar 79), Lt. Col. Jack Singleton (Mar 79 – Jun 79), and Lt. Col. Michael Pavich (who took over on 22 Jun 79). This demonstrates the extremely high turnover within this important division. See AFAHD annual histories—the opening paragraph in the “Commandant of Cadets” section usually lists appropriate personnel, if not within the first page.} Putting a full colonel in this position, and providing him or her the authority and responsibility that goes with it, would demonstrate a level of seriousness for change. Although it tentatively agreed with the findings and proposed recommendations from the HRC, however, the Implementation Committee believed that something of this significance required further study.\footnote{AFAHD, 1 January 1978 – 31 December 1978, Appendix, Vol. I, \textit{Documents SUPT 1-38, RR 1-37, Number SUPT-3}, “Honor Review Implementation Committee Report, Jan 78,” II-28.} Lieutenant General Tallman contacted the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General David Jones, who was interested in these studies due to the continued scrutiny on West Point. General Tallman said that, although the Academy would implement various solutions to issues immediately, some “recommendations are primarily in the academic area or
Academy…organization and would require greater lead time for implementation.” This included the desire to change the organization of the military studies branch. General Tallman was preparing himself for serious change at the Academy, specifically within the program of military studies.

As the cadets entered the fall term of 1978, General Tallman revealed his earnestness to create change within the military studies program. He had assigned to the Implementation Committee the responsibility for organizing project committees for all those issues requiring further study. Among these issues was how to structure the administration of the military studies program and how to staff it, as well as to determine the structure and content of the academic course work. These project committees were composed of members from across mission elements (Dean of Faculty, Commandant of Cadets, Athletic Department, staff agencies, etc.) and were responsible for offering specific recommendations. They provided updates to the Implementation Committee and then to the Superintendent throughout the year. The Superintendent informed the Dean and the Commandant of his proposed radical change by letter in late September. He said: “The best long-term interest of the Academy will be served by a complete reorientation of our efforts in the area of Leadership and Military Studies…. It is my intention to examine placing both the challenge of [the military studies] program development


and the responsibility for teaching the subject matter pertinent to this professional division with the Dean of Faculty.” This was because “excellence can be achieved only through long-term continuity and program coherence, with most of the instruction provided by a faculty possessing appropriate advanced degrees.” Realizing that the Commandant did not have the personnel needed to realize his vision, nor the continuity of personnel, General Tallman believed that this profound new arrangement that he was instituting would then allow similar radical changes in “program content, faculty manning, and other issues of pedagogical importance to be considered on a detailed and comprehensive basis before beginning this exciting venture in military education.” The letter to the Dean and Commandant directed them to establish whatever organization was necessary to provide “semi-monthly progress reports” to him.  

The Dean and the Commandant worked to fulfill the Superintendent’s intent by organizing the eight-member Professional Development Studies Committee, which the Superintendent formally commissioned

396 AFAHD, 1 January 1978 – 31 December 1978, Appendix, Vol. I, Documents SUPT 1-38, RR 1-37, Number SUPT-29, “Ltr, SUPT to DF and CW, subj: [reorientation of leadership and military studies], 26 Sep 78. In this decision, not only was the Superintendent influenced by the Honor Review Committee and the subsequent Implementation Committee, but also in a professional development report prepared by faculty member, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Taylor, a Department of Economics, Geography and Management professor, who had submitted his own study, “Professional Development: A Report,” which acknowledged the significance of stability in a professional development program. The report, fourteen pages of comments and observations followed by five appendices of 42 pages outlining a proposed curriculum, was completed in August 1978. See, “The Professional Development Curriculum, Lt [Col] Robert L. Taylor (Econ/Geog/Management), August 1978,” USAFA Special Collections, Vertical Files, Box 12, Folder 33.
in November, approving the proposed committee.\textsuperscript{397} The Superintendent continued his determined drive for serious change in order to provide continuity and rigor to the military studies program.

The Superintendent was not the only one who pushed for change, as the Board of Visitors also demanded rigor and organization in the program. General Tallman had briefed the Board about the on-going study by the Honor Review Committee during the October 1977 visit. And in its annual report for 1977, the Board noted that members would expect an update the following year.\textsuperscript{398} The Board received “an extensive review” of the findings and recommendations during

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{397} AFAHD, 1 January 1978 – 31 December 1978, Appendix, Vol. I, Documents SUPT 1-38, RR 1-37, Number SUPT-32, “Ltr, SUPT to DF and CW, subj: Professional Development Studies Committee, 7 Nov 78. Colonel John Wittry, who became the Vice Dean in late November, chaired this eight-member committee. Notably present on the committee was Lt Col Robert Taylor, whose professional development study from August 1978 influenced the Superintendent (see note 43 above); Colonel Philip Caine, the Deputy Department Head for the Department of History, whom the Superintendent appointed as the first Permanent Professor in the Commandant’s office; the Deputy Commandants for the Cadet Wing and Military Instruction; and, Colonel Ervin Rokke, who was the Permanent Professor and Department Head for Political Science, who was appointed Dean in 1983. Rokke had already been a participating member of the Honor Review Committee and the Implementation Committee.

\end{flushright}
its November 1978 visit, and the Superintendent closed his “USAFA Update on Academy Changes,” given to the Board, with word that “studies and committee actions are continuing in several areas including…a broader curriculum for cadet professional development.” The Board, in discussing future meetings, stated that it was “particularly interested in a thorough discussion at the next meeting of academic methodology and military studies,” requesting a “seminar-type discussion” with appropriate personnel and Board members. Senator Gary Hart, the co-chairman of the Board, followed up the BOV visit with a letter to General Tallman about the issues regarding “the study of warfare” at the Academy. The Superintendent responded with his outline to revamp the military studies curriculum that included an objective “to increase significantly the cadets’ perception of the importance of the Military Studies curriculum vis-à-vis their other academic studies.” Tallman believed that the proposed changes to the program “are

consists of fifteen members: six appointed by the President (for three-year periods), four designated by the Speaker of the House (two of which come from the House Appropriations Committee), three members are appointed by the Vice President or the President pro tempore of the Senate (two are members of the Senate Appropriations Committee), and the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee appoint one member each. Board members are required to visit the Academy annually and “inquire into the morale, discipline, curriculum, instruction, physical equipment, fiscal affairs, academic methods and other matters relating to the Academy which the Board decides to consider.”

400 USAFA Special Collections, United States Air Force Academy, Board of Visitors Annual Report, 1978, 21. Of the fifteen Board members only six attended the visit: Co-Chairman, Senator Gary Hart, Representative Frank Evans, Representative John J. Flynt, Jr., Lieutenant General (Ret) Brent Scowcroft, Mr. Bruce Sundlun, and Dr. Sheila Widnall (Secretary of the Air Force, 1993-1997).
closely aligned” with those mentioned by Senator Hart in his letter.401 General Tallman now received both support and pressure from the Board of Visitors.

Besides the Board of Visitors, the third accreditation visit by the North Central Association (NCA) offered insight into the military studies curriculum. The Association granted accreditation of the bachelor’s degree in July 1979 for another ten years, but it offered a significant criticism: “The distinction between academic and military studies seems artificial to the members of the team and appears likely to lead to the description of these activities as first- and second-class studies.” The NCA concluded that the Academy should do what is appropriate “where military studies represent a significant and professionally necessary part of the work of every student.”402 So yet another organization from outside the Academy gave its support to the Superintendent to intensify the rigor and perception of the military studies curriculum for the cadets.

Finally, the Superintendent’s ambition to revitalize the military studies program received endorsement by the Professional Development Studies Committee. Given his charge to determine if the military studies program should be under the supervision of the Dean of Faculty, the committee agreed that such a measure was warranted and used its report as a proposal for implementation. In its report, submitted on April 6, the committee suggested that the Superintendent should announce as soon as possible the creation of the Department of Professional Military Studies (DFPMS) under the supervision of the Dean of Faculty. However,

although the report did propose this major change to occur by 1 June 1979, so that the new
department could use the entire summer to work through reorganization and refine a new
curriculum, the committee also recognized that with summer assignments already made by the
Air Force it would be more practical to wait until summer 1980 for so major a move to be
made. 403

Noteworthy in the report is the committee’s rationale for the reorganization and structure
of military studies. As with other studies and discussions during these two years after the West
Point scandal, this report affirmed the need for continuity in the military studies program. It
highlighted the need for a Permanent Professor as well as four other “chairmen of instruction,” to
whom the Air Force would give longer tours or even tenured status, to assist with curriculum
development and to “provide the bureaucratic clout” necessary for daily operations and tussles
with the other academic departments. 404 To good effect, the committee discussed professional
development of the cadets, which it conceded was accomplished through all aspects of the
Academy’s effort to fulfill its mission. But the committee clearly saw the difference between
military studies and military training, and it insisted on strengthening the academic studies by
adding four, 3-semester hour courses in the cadet’s overall program. 405 This is especially
significant because the committee affirmed that courses had not yet received sufficient attention

403 USAFA Special Collections, Vertical Files, Box 12, Folder 28, “Report of the
Professional Development Studies Committee, 6 April 1979,” 16-17. The report is 18
pages with another 10 pages of appendices.
404 USAFA Special Collections, Vertical Files, Box 12, Folder 28, “Report of the
Professional Development Studies Committee, 6 April 1979,” 10.
405 USAFA Special Collections, Vertical Files, Box 12, Folder 28, “Report of the
Professional Development Studies Committee, 6 April 1979,” 2-6, 12.
and, as a result, military studies held only “second-rate status in the eyes of the cadet.” The committee supported the Superintendent’s campaign to introduce drastic changes in the cadet program.

Although it agreed with many of the findings of the committee, the Commandant’s office pushed back on the ultimate recommendation to transfer the responsibility of military studies to the Dean. The Military Training Division (CWIT), which remained responsible for the military studies curriculum under the supervision of the Deputy Commandant for Military Instruction (CWI), responded to the three major criticisms that the Professional Development Studies Committee had strongly articulated, which actually echoed criticisms that had been made for quite some time. First, the division reorganized itself, establishing two branches that recognized the difference between military studies (CWITS) and training (CWITT). Certainly

407 The Military Training Division (CWIT) did not show any concern or reveal any issues with its program. For example, the division provided inputs for an endeavor by the Dean. In late-1978, the fourth academic Dean, Brig. Gen. William Orth, who had recently replaced Brig. Gen. William Woodyard, appointed a committee to publish essays on each academic department, including the mission elements of the Athletic Department and Commandant of Cadets. Completed in May 1979, this work did receive inputs from the Deputy of Military Instruction: Chapter 22 (pp. 289-323) of the compilation discusses the airmanship programs and Chapter 23 (pp. 325-331) provides a curt discussion of “Military Studies: 1955 to 1979,” which includes more pages on summer training programs than on the classroom academic course work. So, this effort is not a very thorough or engaged look at military studies at the Academy. See USAFA Special Collections, Brig. Gen. Jesse Gatlin, Jr., et al, eds. The United States Air Force Academy’s First Twenty-Five Years: Some Perceptions (United States Air Force Academy, 1979), 289-331.
this occurred because of the scrutiny being given to the program and because of the continuing
discussions about the role of military education as distinct from military training. Second, the
division established an Objectives Review Committee (ORC) to ensure effective integration
between the courses in each branch as well as to revise the curriculum within the military studies
branch. Finally, a third branch—CWITZ—was established to build an effective instructor corps.
This branch was responsible for training of new instructors and was also expected to promote
standardization and to conduct evaluation.408 These actions and continued studies persuaded the
Superintendent to delay any major rearrangement.409 These evolutionary changes acknowledged
problems with the program and introduced some important changes to improve the credibility
within the division and for the curriculum.

25th Anniversary Review Group

The critical evaluation of the Academy that General Clark had called for at the time of its
20th anniversary is what General Tallman pursued. General Tallman insisted on an honest
assessment of the Academy’s programs, particularly of those under the Commandant’s care, at
the time of the 25th anniversary. The Superintendent respected the pushback he received from the
Commandant that the military studies program remain under the Commandant’s authority, but
General Tallman used the 25th anniversary of the Academy as a chance for yet another review of

408 AFAHD, 1 January 1979 – 31 December 1979, Appendix, Vol. III, Documents CW 1-
38, AH 1-16, CSU 1-14, AC 1-6, Number CW-1, “CW History, 1 Jan-31 Dec 79,” 74.
The instructor training was also involved in continuation training of the instructors, to
include “upgrade” instructor training.
409 AFAHD, 1 January 1979 – 31 December 1979, Appendix, Vol. III, Documents CW 1-
38, AH 1-16, CSU 1-14, AC 1-6, Number CW-1, “CW History, 1 Jan-31 Dec 79,” 23.
this issue raised by the Board of Visitors. As the visit of the Board began in August 1979, General Tallman asked the Board to establish a subcommittee, the Twenty-fifth Anniversary Review Group, to act as the instrument for the review. The BOV recommended that, at a minimum, “The subcommittee should focus primarily on the core (or required) curriculum, the military studies program, and the curriculum review and change mechanism.” The Board immediately named General Brent Scowcroft and Dr. Sheila Widnall as the member representatives to the subcommittee, while recognizing that more time was needed to fully establish the group. What proved to be the final and most effective review of the professional military studies program received its commission in November 1979 from General Lew Allen, Jr., Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and from Senator Gary Hart, Chairman, USAFA Board of Visitors. General Tallman was going to get his officially sanctioned and strongly supported review of the professional military studies program.


The final report of the 25th Anniversary Review Committee offered two significant observations and recommendations regarding the professional military studies program. The 33-page report, submitted to the Chief of Staff, the BOV, and to General Tallman in March 1980, and released for public consumption along with the minutes if the BOV annual visit in April, included 30 recommendations.\(^{412}\) The committee agreed with similar observations made in the previous several years and in other studies that the program needed to “create permanent positions in Military Studies” and “enhance visibility, strength, and content of professional academic curriculum under leadership of [the] Superintendent.”\(^{413}\) Similar to the other reports, this one recognized that the professional military studies curriculum required some continuity of faculty in order for the program to be solid and capable of competing with other academic departments, while bolstering its rigor and credibility with cadets.

The report provided another significant input that was related to the two formal recommendations. To better understand the elements of the Academy program, the committee


members developed their own framework to organize what was occurring at the institution. Similar to other studies, they offered an outline of five areas of focus within the Academy program that included: “1. ‘Regular’ academic curriculum, 2. ‘Professional’ academic curriculum, 3. Professional military activities, 4. Physical Training, 5. Military environment.” The members realized that the main, or “regular,” academic curriculum—the responsibility of the Dean of Faculty—concentrated on the core curriculum and branched into the offerings for various academic majors. This academic curriculum, however, included some courses—the committee named six—that directly contributed to the professional military education of the officer candidate. These six courses, combined with the military studies courses, fulfilled the “professional” academic course work. To give the entire professional military development program credibility with the cadets, the committee concluded that the Commandant had to continue, but further develop, a serious academic program. So the report stated that the majority opinion of the committee was to keep a portion of the military studies program under the Commandant’s control, executing that mission and providing assistance and support to the military training branch. This was a major stance taken by the committee in the report, and,

although it supported the emphasis that General Tallman desired, the committee members agreed with the Commandant’s studies from the previous summer to keep the military studies academic program where it already was. An additional comment in the report, again emphasizing the need for rigor and prominence for the military studies course work, was that the Commandant’s curriculum, as well as the Dean’s “professional” course work, should require minimum “levels of proficiency” as a graduation requirement.415 The BOV’s 25th Anniversary Report Committee most definitely stressed the significance of professional military studies, showing support for the Superintendent’s initial efforts.

The Board of Visitors seemed to intensify its support for the military studies curriculum and the 25th anniversary study’s conclusions just a month later. The Board met in April 1980 and released its annual report at the beginning of June. This BOV report included the entire report of the 25th Anniversary Review Committee, but it gave even stronger commitment to the idea of a minimum level of proficiency. The BOV report stated: “Designate the military studies and other professional courses (such as ‘Law for Commanders’) as a ‘professional’ academic curriculum with a minimum required grade point average and special weight in computing the cadets’ graduation order of merit.”416 The Board’s report of 4 June 1980, which summarized the work of their various committees and the Board’s own sessions in April, again underscores the significance that the Board required for the Commandant’s staff—the need for a Permanent Professor and for a more comprehensive and rigorous curriculum. Specifically, the Board

asserted: “The purpose of the new program should, at least in part, be to produce officers who are conceptual thinkers versed in such areas as military history, strategic doctrine, and concepts of tactical warfare.” The Superintendent had presented the BOV with issues and possible solutions, and he got the support from the BOV to make the structural and other necessary changes to improve the credibility of the professional military studies program.

The release of the 25th Anniversary Review Committee’s report and the subsequent meeting of the BOV in the month after its release gave General Tallman the endorsement to pursue change in the Commandant’s office. He received even more public support on the Senate floor at the end of June from Senator Hart, who, in discussing the latest appropriations bill, exclaimed: “Today, our military schools, from the service academies through the National War

417 “Report of the Board of Visitors, 7-9 April 1980, U.S. Air Force Academy,” USAFA Special Collections, 21. Another recommendation of the Board was to reduce the core curriculum by 12-16 semester hours—the core had inched up to 111 total semester hours, of a total 136-142 semester hours for graduation, in recent years, thus reducing the flexibility available in the curricula of various majors. See ibid., 19. Commenting on the 20th Anniversary Review, which discussed the demand on cadet time—a constant concern since the founding—the Board of Visitors again emphasized the demands on cadets’ time, pertaining specifically to lack of study time, in their 1977 report. This was still an issue even though the disciplinary major had been reduced from 53 credit units to 48 credit units (the report used the aeronautical engineering degree as an example), and only 46 credit units for a divisional major (the example was a general engineering degree). *AFAHD, 1 January 1978 – 31 December 1978, Appendix, Vol. I, Documents SUPT I-38, RR I-37, SUPT-1, “Ltr, John C. McDonald, Chairman of the USAFA BOV to the President of the United States, subj: Report of BOV, 22 Dec 77.” The BOV members present for the meeting, other than McDonald, were Dr. James E. Brown, Mr. Robert Herring, Dr. Dorothy W. Nelson, Mr. Robert F. List, Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Brent Scowcroft, and Representative John J. Flynt, Jr.
College, concentrate on management, give some attention—at least in the junior level schools—to leadership, and largely ignore [military] theory. Military history, which is the basis of military theory, receives little emphasis. A cadet can today graduate from any of the service academies with only one semester of military history.” This motivated General Tallman to continue with his reforms to ensure that rigor and continuity permeated the military studies curriculum.

**Permanent Professor in the Commandant’s Office**

With the Honor Review Committee’s findings and the recommendations of the subsequent Implementation Committee, as well as with pressure from the Board of Visitors and the proposal from the Professional Development Studies Committee, Lt. Gen. Tallman had the rationale and support to institute his plans to improve the military studies program. On 6 June 1980, he signed a letter recommending Colonel Philip Caine for the position of Permanent Professor in the Commandant’s department, specifying that his initial assignment was as the Special Assistant to the Commandant for Professional Military Development, pending higher approval. Colonel Caine’s immediate task was to “work on the concept, content, and

---

418 *AFAHD, 1 January 1980 – 31 December 1980, Appendix, Vol. I, Documents SUPT 1-23, RR 1-31*, Number SUPT-17, “Memo, Lt Col Richard H. Slye, USAF, Chief, AFA Activities Group, Wash, DC to Lt Gen Tallman, subj: [Sen Hart’s views on teaching military theory in the military schools], 7 Jul 80.” This was similar to the line of argument and concern that Senator Hart had communicated to General Tallman years earlier; one can deduce that these conversations occurred between the two annually at the BOV meetings, if not on other occasions as well.

419 The Permanent Professor position at the academies requires Senate confirmation.
organizational structure of the department.” The three-year journey to fix military studies was coming to fruition.

General Tallman chose Colonel Caine since Caine had the attributes necessary to make this move successful. First, Colonel Caine had a solid background in academia. He held a Master’s and a doctoral degree in history from Stanford University, and he had completed tours at ranks of instructor up to that of a tenured professor in the History Department at the Academy. Colonel Caine brought to a new department the experience and stability that he had already demonstrated, since he had served as acting department head and was in line as a candidate to compete for the Permanent Professor and Department Head of the History Department. In the operational Air Force, he had graduated at the top of his pilot training class and had accumulated over 5,000 flying hours in various aircraft—primarily airlift. Also, he served a tour in Vietnam as the acting head of Project CHECO (Contemporary Historical Examination of Current Operations). The General realized that Colonel Caine could bridge the “Terrazzo Gap” between the Dean of Faculty and the Commandant of Cadets. Nonetheless, as Caine later reflected: “With few exceptions, I was [still] looked upon as an outsider; as one whose qualifications to be in the Commandant’s area were marginal, given my long faculty background


at the Air Force Academy.” 422 The challenge remained as it did at the founding of the Academy – to bridge the gap between the two pillars. General Tallman believed that Caine could do just that.

The temporary position as the special assistant did not work out well. As General Tallman and Colonel Caine soon realized “very, very, rapidly…the Special Assistant to the Commandant wasn’t anything . . . . [The Superintendent and Commandant] had these grandiose ideas…but the [Special Assistant] didn’t have any authority to do anything.” 423 Without the authority, even with the support of the Commandant, Colonel Caine found it difficult to implement his ideas.

Even though he did not implement major programs, Colonel Caine did learn the organization and prepared himself for the task at hand. He had an understanding of what he needed to do. Given direction by General Tallman to develop a military studies program “that was responsive to cadet needs, responsive to Air Force needs, academically viable, stable, [and] 

422 Philip D. Caine, Brigadier General, USAF (Ret.), “CWI 1980-1992 End of Tour Report” (1992), 10. As discussed in Chapter 4, the “Terrazzo Gap” was the tension between the Commandant’s and Dean’s personnel. Dean of Faculty personnel were often viewed by Commandant’s personnel as lacking the necessary military credentials—even though they were officers. The friction between Colonel Stillman and Brigadier General McDermott in the previous chapter reveals this bizarre situation.

credible,” Caine began to reorganize since he understood the different aspects of cadets’ professional development. He realized that military training included those things that a cadet needed to know and learn during his or her cadet military experience – things needed “in order to function out in the operational Air Force.” However, in professional military studies, “you need to know how warfare works…how strategy is built…[a] much more academic” approach to understanding and learning about the profession. Although the interim period was difficult for him, Colonel Caine was thus well prepared to take fuller responsibility when the time came.

The first change that helped Colonel Caine to institute his programs came in October. The Commandant, Brigadier General Tom Richards, found an opportunity for the current Deputy Commandant for Military Instruction, Lt. Col. Michael Pavich, to move into a deputy wing commander position at another base—a promotion. This gave the opening for Colonel Caine to assume the duties as the deputy commandant on October 2, 1980.

To implement his vision about training versus education, Colonel Caine first made an organizational change. This happened that November. Continuing the evolution that began the previous year, he made a permanent split in the Military Training Division. This divisional name remained, but it was now responsible for all training activities of the cadets, including some work in professional development. The other division was already within the deputy

---


426 Michael Pavich would advance to the rank of Major General before he retired.

commandant’s realm, the Aviation Sciences Division. It remained an entity to itself, but it would experience modifications in the years to come, aimed at improving programs and span of control for leaders. Finally, Colonel Caine created the Military Studies Division (CWIS), under the direction of Major James Simpson, to concentrate the academic courses and programs that were responsible to the Commandant.\textsuperscript{428} He now had a working structure under his authority—three divisions with their distinct responsibilities.

The Academy received Senate approval of Colonel Caine as the first Permanent Professor of Military Instruction, as he continued as the Deputy Commandant for Instruction in January 1981. As one of the Academy’s Permanent Professors, he had greater authority and recognition—he was on a strong footing from which to compete. As Caine later reflected, General Tallman’s influence was absolutely necessary to create a Permanent Professor position in the Commandant’s office, since the conflict with the academic faculty would have ensured that, if it had been up to a vote, he “wouldn’t have won” a permanent position.\textsuperscript{429} The conflict with the Dean was going to be initially difficult.

In the effort to bring credibility and rigor to the course work, Colonel Caine now reorganized his supporting faculty and worked on the curriculum. The role of the academic military instructor was a significant factor for Colonel Caine, since he was familiar with the role from his time on the faculty. The emphasis on a solid force of well-qualified instructors began

\textsuperscript{428} \textit{AFAHD, 1 January 1980 – 31 December 1980}, 131, 137.

\textsuperscript{429} USAFA Special Collections, “Interview of Brigadier General (Retired) Philip D. Caine by Lieutenant Colonel Vance Skarstedt, Department of History, 13 December 1999,” 10. Caine was named a Permanent Professor in November, but did not assume the official position until the New Year. See, the \textit{Academy Spirit}, Friday, November 21, 2014, 12 in USAFA Special Collections.
with the first study of the Air Force Academy Planning Board Study from 1949. The study’s first volume includes a chapter specifically on “Faculty, Staff and Educational Administration” that recognized the importance of the qualifications and credentials of faculty and staff. The planners devoted fifteen pages to discuss the number, quality, status, educational level, and method of selection and appointment of the proposed academy’s faculty. In a proposed breakdown of the academic faculty, the planners estimated that 28.5 percent should hold Ph.D. degrees, 43 percent a Master’s degree, and the remaining 28.5 percent a minimum of a Bachelor’s degree. They further recommended that of the proposed 260-member faculty, there should be 37 professors, 37 associate professors, 74 assistant professors, and 111 basic instructors. According to the AFAPB, one of the functions of the Commandant of Cadets was to provide personnel to conduct instruction in “military subjects” for the Division of Military Studies. The Commandant decided to rely on the squadron tactical officers overseeing the day-to-day running of the cadet squadrons to assist with maintaining the desired student-teacher ratio by facilitating the coursework in the Military Studies Division, even though they might not have formal education in some of the coursework—for any military officer, leadership believed,

---

431 AFAPBS, Vol. 1, 51.
432 AFAPBS, Vol. 1, 42-43. In the plan’s delineation of each area’s responsibilities, the commandant is given fourteen, labeled “a” – “n.” The responsibility as chairman of the division, and his role to provide the instructors and instruction are “k” and “l” respectively.
could instruct military subjects since they were already military specialists.\textsuperscript{433} This notion persisted for two decades.

Colonel Caine agreed, as earlier studies had proposed, that a strong and well-qualified staff of instructors was needed to teach the military studies course work. Many of the studies in this chapter concentrated on establishing the Permanent Professor, as well as some additional instructors who would stay for more than one tour, to provide some consistency and continuity in the program. The Commandant began the process of providing a more capable instructional staff in the summer of 1980. He wrote to Officer Assignments at Headquarters, Air Force Military Personnel Center (HQ AFMPC) in June to advise them that the current Air Force Regulation required updating, so that it would now show that personnel coming to teach in the Commandant’s office needed at least a Master’s degree.\textsuperscript{434} Colonel Caine continued this reorganization of personnel in November when he divided the staff into those who had legitimate Master’s degrees and those who did not and then placed them, respectively, in either the academic division or the training division.\textsuperscript{435} He also strengthened the course that prepared instructors for the classroom. Colonel Caine instituted an instructor-training week in the summer 1981 to facilitate better lesson planning and teaching in the classroom. He also had these instructors audit academic courses taught within the Dean of Faculty for information and

\textsuperscript{433} AFAPBS, Vol. 1, 48. The planning team believed this would bring the student-teacher ratio down from 10-1 to 8-1.

\textsuperscript{434} AFAHD, 1 January 1980 – 31 December 1980, Appendix, Vol. III, Documents CW 1-45, AH 1-10, CSU 1-13, AC 1-11, Number CW-34, “Ltr, CW (CWIT) to HQ AFMPC/DPMRPP, subj: Changes to AFR 36-20 Officer Assignments, 24 Jun 80.”

techniques of instruction. Finally, within that first year, Colonel Caine sent off his first
Commandant-sponsored Ph.D. student, when Captain Jerry Martin headed to Ohio State to work
on his doctorate in military history. The pursuit of a solid faculty to instruct the course work
focused on military studies was in motion.

Finally, in his first year as the Permanent Professor and Deputy Commandant, Colonel
Caine began a process to improve courses and the curriculum as a whole. Some effort to develop
better courses was already present. The Objectives Review Committee (ORC) evaluated its
curriculum and began to find solutions to a more rigorous program. A previous Commandant and
Deputy Commandant had promoted this committee when the Professional Development Studies
Committee submitted its report in spring 1979. The ORC redesigned all four core courses as 42-
lesson classes and started to rename them Professional Military Studies courses. These
redesigned courses were submitted to the Dean of Faculty’s Curriculum Review Committee in
the spring 1980. These efforts set a solid foundation as Colonel Caine and the CWIS division
continued refinement of the four core courses that were actually used in the fall semester
1981. The drive for a rigorous and credible program had begun.

60-75, CW I-56, Number CW-5, “Military Studies Division (CWIS), 1981,” 1-2. The
USAFA Annual history for 1981 does not exist, since there was no Command
Historian—thus the combining of years 1981 and 1982. The courses audited by some
instructors included Political Science, History, Electrical Engineering, Behavioral
Sciences and Leadership, and Management.


The recognition by Academy leaders, especially Lt. Gen. Tallman, that the military studies curriculum required significant improvement began a process of change leading to a Permanent Professor in the Commandant’s office who focused on this subject area, as well as a stronger teaching faculty and growing desire to improve curriculum. The arrival of a new Commandant just a month after Colonel Caine officially became a Permanent Professor demonstrated that the change and improvement would continue. Brigadier General Robert D. Beckel, the first Commandant who had graduated from USAFA – Beckel was in the Class of 1959 – reflected that it was important to “have a credible educational element of that total concept…There’s a tendency to think of the commandant as in a training mode only and not a more stylized educational process…. [Caine] gave appropriate credibility to the type of courses of instruction that were responsibilities of the commandant…. The symbolism of him being a part of the commandant’s office was very, very important.”439 Professor Caine had started his reforms with change in the organization, the strengthening and improvement of the division’s faculty, and implementation of a stronger core curriculum for the military studies program. His first year had produced results, and he would use the following decade to continue this work.

Chapter 6 - Academic Credibility for Professional Military Studies

The professional military studies program continued to gain credibility during the 1980s. The program prospered because of the creation of a Permanent Professor of Military Instruction within the Commandant of Cadets’ office, especially since the first person the U.S. Senate confirmed to the position came with strong academic and professional qualifications. Colonel Philip Caine’s attributes provided the much-needed firepower and attention required for the Commandant to establish an academically respectable program that offered some stability and continuity for the military studies program within the overall officer candidate’s education. The effort to develop a curriculum with rigor, continuity, and credibility, similar to what the academic community had accomplished within the authority of the Dean of Faculty during the first twenty-five years, reached a crescendo in the 1990s. Finally, after decades of second-class status, professional military studies now had a role in officer candidate development at the Academy and a significant place in its structure so that it also had a chance to gain the cadets’ approval, as the program taught three full-credit courses, offered additional elective courses, developed a strong academic major, and gained respect from the Dean’s academic faculty. The continuing efforts of the Deputy Commandant for Military Instruction, the office that Colonel Caine pioneered, allowed this meaningful progression to occur. This success as an academic program finally revealed itself when the sexual assault and harassment crisis struck the Academy.

440 Colonel Caine had already received his line officer promotion to Colonel—he was not a Lieutenant Colonel awaiting promotion—having amassed over 5,000 flying hours during a career that included a tour in Vietnam. He received his M.A. and Ph.D. in history from Stanford, attended and was later a Professor of Strategic Studies at National War College, and had completed two tours in the Academy’s Department of History, with some time as the Acting Department Head.
during the early 2000s and a resulting study recommended, and the institution approved, that the professional military studies program be moved under the Dean’s direct responsibility as an academic department in its own right as one among equals.

The changes that Colonel Caine introduced in 1981 received strong approval from the Board of Visitors early in the following year. As requested, Colonel Caine reported on his work as the new Deputy Commandant of Cadets for Military Instruction during the Board’s visit in April 1982. In his presentation, he confirmed that all twenty-five officers in the Military Studies Division had a Master’s degree, with the division sponsoring its first two officers to pursue the Ph.D.—one in educational measurements and evaluation and one, Captain Jerry Martin, in military history and strategy. Colonel Caine also discussed the three new professional military studies courses that were now, for the first time, being offered as full-semester, academically accredited core courses that demonstrated a strong emphasis on military education. These three courses provided the cadet one full-semester class for each of the first three years. More important, Colonel Caine instructed the Board on the partitioning of his organization into three divisions—military studies, military training, and aviation—that he regarded as the most significant contribution yet. This allowed for the effective focus on the respective areas in the aviation program, in military training, and in the academic military studies program. But he also presented a concern to the Board revealing what many of the Academy’s leaders thought: “Our graduates are not familiar enough with air power as it relates to the total spectrum of war: strategy, tactics, heritage, doctrine, and associated topics.” This was the work that he and his staff continued to tackle in the coming years. A sample solution, he offered, was a proposal to reform the senior-level course into a study of military thought followed by the force analysis of the Soviet Union’s military structure. In its final report to the President, the Board emphasized its
approval that the Academy was effectively directing its efforts toward sustaining and improving a solid program of professional military studies.\textsuperscript{441} Placing a Permanent Professor under the Commandant was already paying dividends for the academic study of the profession of war at the Academy.

Besides satisfying the Board of Visitors, these timely reforms in the professional military studies program eased the concerns of another civilian leader. In February 1982, the new Superintendent, Major General Robert E. Kelley, replied to a query from the Secretary of the Air Force, Verne Orr, regarding the continued pressure to reform the professional military studies program. Referring to the Board of Visitors’ meeting from 1979 that first questioned the lack of emphasis on military studies at the Academy and then to the 1980 findings of the 25\textsuperscript{th} Anniversary Review Committee, General Kelley assured the Secretary that the Academy was

\textsuperscript{441} “Report of the Board of Visitors, 6-8 April 1982, U.S. Air Force Academy,” USAFA Special Collections, 6, 47-49; \textit{50th Anniversary Oral History} (Colorado Springs, CO: The Friends of the Air Force Academy Library, 2005), 525. The current Permanent Professor and Head of the Department of Military and Strategic Studies, Colonel Thomas Drohan, states that this splitting of CWIT into two divisions, to introduce CWIS, created a “dedicated academic organization” with the objective to establish a solid professional military studies curriculum. See Thomas Drohan and Steven Pomeroy, “Who Speaks for Our Profession? Military & Strategic Studies at the USAF Academy,” \textit{Airman Scholar Journal} 17 (Fall 2011): 2, USAFA Special Collections. Again, although the institution had courses in military studies (some years these courses were designated as “military science”), Colonel Caine did not recognize them as rigorous academic courses. The courses, as discussed in the previous chapter, were not dedicated for a full semester, nor was the content stable, challenging, or of a serious academic nature. In reviewing the courses and content, he considered them more in line with military training. See USAFA Special Collections, “Interview of Brigadier General (Retired) Philip D. Caine by Lieutenant Colonel Vance Skarstedt, Department of History, 13 December 1999,” 5.
now on the right path. Recognizing, as Senator Gary Hart had suggested, that the “academies have virtually squeezed out the required study of military history and tactics in favor of social and political sciences,” General Kelley believed the increasing rigor of the curriculum, combined with the strengthening of the instructors who taught the courses, alleviated many of the concerns initially voiced by Senator Hart and other senior leaders. Also, General Kelley agreed with the structural changes within the Commandant’s realm, which divided the Deputy Commandant for Military Instruction’s responsibilities into a division supporting training and one supporting military studies—the latter of which would assist the “development of officers who are conceptual thinkers versed in such areas as military history, strategic doctrine and concepts of tactical warfare.”

The academic approach to military studies was receiving attention. General Kelley supported his predecessor’s changes, desired to continue building the military studies program, and recognized the requirement for the Permanent Professor in that area.

The support of the Superintendent and attention from the Board of Visitors and senior leaders resulted in the increasing rigor of the military studies curriculum in the first few years, as the experience and commitment of a dedicated Permanent Professor shepherded the changes along. Although the first three courses seemed satisfactory to Colonel Caine in early 1982, as suggested in his discussion with the Board, he was already calling for additional, necessary

---

442 AFAHD, 1 January 1981 – 31 December 1982, Appendix, Vol. IV, Documents, DF 60-75, CW 1-56, Number CW-45, “Ltr, 3 Feb 82, From Maj Gen R. E. Kelley to the Honorable Verne Orr, using attachments 2 and 3 only,” 1. See previous chapter on Senator Hart’s interest and role in enhancing the military studies program at USAFA (and at other service academies and service schools).
revisions. With purposeful courses established, Colonel Caine used his remaining tenure to oversee this evolving curriculum within the military studies division. Nuanced revisions did not upset overall stability within the curriculum, as Colonel Caine’s oversight ensured that the changes were reasonable and necessary and not merely pushed at the whim of an instructor or under pressure within the institution or the greater Air Force community. As he understood his leadership role in the directorate, Colonel Caine would use the military training curriculum, also under his authority, to respond to concerns of the institution or the Air Force—or other “outside influences”—so that, quite apart from military training, the course work for the military studies program could continue to build a solid academic reputation. Colonel Caine’s leadership inspired the Military Studies Division’s personnel with enthusiasm, since they recognized that the institution now endorsed the more involved professional military studies curriculum—especially since the first three-year groups now received a 42-lesson course. However, the objective for Colonel Caine and his military studies division was to provide more rigor in each course and effective connection between the courses.

The military studies division changed the freshman course Professional Military Studies (PMS)-110, for example, to emphasize professionalism. During Colonel Caine’s inaugural year, 

443 As Colonel Caine notes, “The 1981-82 academic year, was, in many ways, a holding pattern [an aviation term where aircraft are put prior to executing an approach to an airfield] year with the real significant changes to come the following year.” Quoted in Philip D. Caine, “CWI, 1980-1992: End of Tour Report of Brigadier General, USAF (Ret), Deputy Commandant for Military Instruction and Permanent Professor, 1980-1992,” USAFA Special Collections, 37.

the course was titled “Introduction to Military Studies,” but the name—and presumably the focus—was now “Professional Foundations.” As the division chief, Major Charles A. Wood, asserted: “The goal is to build a firm foundation upon which these future leaders can base a career…[with] lessons in the human elements in war, the obligations and responsibilities of military service, and the meaning of teamwork, corporateness and commitment to the mission.”445 This satisfied Colonel Caine, who believed that the revised curriculum for all military studies courses required a focus on professionalism and air power and who also believed that the previous course for the freshmen was a waste—no need to use this course to set a basis for military studies since that would be emphasized consistently within each course.446 The Permanent Professor had a vision and ensured that the revised curriculum had a purpose. The course changes provided better focus for how and why they were included in the program, and they reinforced a strong intellectual approach to military studies.

The greatest change in these initial years occurred with the sophomore-level course. The division dropped the PMS-220 course, “Air Force Organizational Communication,” after the spring term 1982 and replaced it with PMS-225, “Command and Control of Airpower,” during the fall term. PMS-220 had undergone a serious revision in 1978, when it was Military Studies 220. At that time, the Superintendent bowed to pressure from the Air Staff and Air Force Public


Affairs that there was a need to educate officer candidates on the role of the public affairs specialty in the Air Force and on the need for effective communication. As stated above, this is what Colonel Caine was now attempting to avoid: using the academically-focused military studies program to bend to the Air Staff’s interest in the latest concern or fad. Military Studies 220 had provided study of the role of public affairs and the value of effective communication, but now Colonel Caine integrated the necessary objectives and information in this specialty into the senior-class military training program—and this communications coursework went from an entire semester course to only a few lessons. Since he saw the emphasis as no longer relevant, Colonel Caine released the officers with the public affairs specialty code from this Academy assignment, even while many of them were at graduate school in preparation for instructor duty in the Commandant’s office. Instead of the focus on communication and public affairs, and in keeping with his vision, Colonel Caine’s Military Studies Division developed a new course on the “Air Force organization and command systems and their relationship to combat power…with its focus on the organization, command, control, communication, and intelligence networks necessary to win on the modern battlefield.” This course, Caine believed, linked PMS-110 to PMS-330, which was a course on “U.S. Force Employment Concepts” that had remained the

same since the reorganization of all courses in 1980-81. In order to facilitate the course change and to prevent any confusion, the division gave the course the designation “PMS-225.” The division renamed the course “Airpower Doctrine and Employment” by 1983, since the faculty believed this title more effectively captured what the course description and supporting lessons emphasized. As the early-1980s progressed, the division personnel turned the military studies program into a series of strong academic classes with a pertinent focus and meaningful relationships among the courses.

Besides the significant changes in the sophomore course, the Military Studies Division began to concentrate on its capstone course for the seniors. Refinement of the senior-level course, PMS-440, “Military Theory and Force Analysis,” had begun in the fall semester 1981. As Colonel Caine had informed the Board of Visitors during their interaction, the course’s opening lessons included discussions on various military theorists, with “the remainder of the course…designed to demonstrate to the students a technique for the analysis of a nation’s military force.” Given the geopolitical realities of that period, the course used the Soviet Union as a test case for instruction. The course offered an introduction into Russian and Soviet military history, the role of Marxist and Leninist doctrine, Soviet military strategy and doctrine, and the


Order of Battle for Soviet forces.\textsuperscript{450} Also, for the first time, a military studies course participated in the Academy’s academic Honors Program. The PMS-440 core course offered an Honors section beginning in the fall semester 1983. The Dean now recognized the improvement in the rigor of the military studies curriculum and allowed the Commandant to contribute to the overall academic Honors program.\textsuperscript{451} Although the revised coursework for the entire PMS-440 class was well received by the Dean and the cadets – and some cadets even put on their course critiques that the Professional Military Studies course was their favorite of all courses –\textsuperscript{452} the cadets remained disappointed that the military studies courses in general, and not just PMS-440, did not receive unit course load credit for this 42-lesson course. A typical unit course load for a cadet was five or six courses a semester. So even though PMS courses carried semester credits and contributed to a grade point average, not having a course unit load meant the cadet had to take another class. Cadets viewed PMS as not as significant as other academic courses, since all academic classes had a course load. The lack of this recognition contributed to this course, and military studies courses in general, not winning “complete academic credibility in the eyes of


\textsuperscript{452} USAFA Special Collections, “Interview of Brigadier General (Retired) Philip D. Caine by Lieutenant Colonel Vance Skarstedt, Department of History, 13 December 1999,” 14.
cadets.” This remained a stumbling block to cadets’ regarding the course work as necessary and on par with the Dean’s course work. Even though the course received the appropriate two or three credit hours, which factored into the cadet’s overall grade point average, cadets often grouped military studies courses with other activities that did not receive unit loading, and therefore they did not see them as being as necessary as courses in traditional academic disciplines.

In the early 1980s, in order to add to academic rigor, other initiatives were taken to strengthen the academic instructors in the division beyond demanding that instructors now come equipped with a pertinent graduate degree. First, in 1982, with the continued development of the senior-level course that emphasized the Soviet Union’s airpower model and order of battle, the division sent four instructors, with the intent to send as many as possible in future offerings, to a five-day program known as “Soviet Military Power Week.” The Soviet Awareness Team of the Air Force Intelligence Service (AFIS/INC) at Bolling Air Force Base in Washington, D.C. taught the course. Also, three instructors from the division, who instructed the PMS-440 course, entered a doctoral program sponsored by Denver University and completed their first course on

453 AFAHD, 1 January 1981 – 31 December 1982, Appendix, Vol. IV, Documents, DF 60-75, CW 1-56, Number CW-5, “Military Studies Division (CWIS), 1982,” 5. A standard unit course load for a cadet was five courses, which would mean that Math, Chemistry, Psychology, History, and Mechanical Engineering could hypothetically make up a cadet’s schedule—since these five courses would each have a unit load—and the military studies class was in addition to this load.
contemporary Soviet defense policy.\textsuperscript{454} The division continued to strengthen its faculty with continued study and appropriate credentials.

The program of military studies had profited from some coherent changes in just a few years. Whereas the findings of the various studies and committees led to the establishment of 42-lesson courses for each class, by the 1982-83 academic year the Academy finally had an academically reputable program of four courses in military studies that “was logical and which took the cadet from looking with a broad view at his or her profession, through air power, the employment of air power, and, finally, to military theory and a look at the Soviet Union,” the country’s largest competitor.\textsuperscript{455} Also, the division began to offer academically solid elective courses. In addition to the core course work, in the fall 1983 the division provided its first PMS-


\textsuperscript{455} Philip D. Caine, “CWI, 1980-1992: End of Tour Report of Brigadier General, USAF (Ret), Deputy Commandant for Military Instruction and Permanent Professor, 1980-1992,” USAFA Special Collections, 41. As a point of comparison, the previous course work for freshmen in the military studies curriculum included only 20 lessons during the semester, instead of the typical 42 for all academic course work, as military studies courses integrated with physical education courses during the semester. However, one may view that since the 20 lessons were actually double lessons, this made up for it. Similar to physical education lessons, which were also double periods, rarely did the instructors efficiently use the entire time—the lesson material did not require two periods. For example, in the 1979 curriculum, the instructors used the second period of each lesson to show an optional film on some aspect of the “real Air Force.” See AFAHD, 1 January 1979 – 31 December 1979, Appendix, Vol. III, Documents CW 1-38, AH 1-16, CSU 1-14, AC 1-6, Number CW-1, “CW History, 1 Jan-31 Dec 79,” 75-76. Physical Education classes had two periods so that the cadet could have time to get to the gym, change, have the lesson, shower, and return back up to the main cadet area.
495 elective course, which “examined and analyzed selected air battles to a depth not achieved by any other course taught” at the Academy.\footnote{AFAHD, 1 January 1983 – 31 December 1984, Appendix, Vol. V, Documents DF 83-103, CW 1-75, Number CW-32, “Deputy Commandant for Military Instruction (CWI) 1983,” 1. The “495” designation at the Academy denotes a “Special Topics” course that each faculty department may offer per semester.} The Deputy Commandant for Military Instruction, and his Military Studies Division, had established a solid framework of courses.

Also by 1983, the overall objective of the office of the Deputy Commandant for Military Instruction, specifically the Division of Military Studies, was codified into a basic military mission statement. The previous years of developing a rigorous, stable, and dedicated program for the academic study of the profession of arms culminated in constructing this vision. The Academy regulation states: “Professional Military Studies Division/CWIS: Plans, implements, and evaluates formal courses of Professional Military Studies. Manages curriculum development. Integrates professional military studies content with that of courses taught by the Dean of Faculty.”\footnote{AFAHD, 1 January 1983 – 31 December 1984, Appendix, Vol. V, Documents DF 83-103, CW 1-75, Number CW-32, “Deputy Commandant for Military Instruction (CWI) 1983,” 2. Attached to Colonel Caine’s one-page submission to the annual history is this second page, which is an extract from U.S. Air Force Academy Regulation (USAFA) 23-1, 28 January 1983, 3-3, the various division histories are attachments. This mission statement for the CWIS division differs only slightly from the statement Colonel Caine offered in 1981 that defined his role as the CWI: “The Deputy Commandant for Military Instruction is responsible for the Commandant of Cadets Professional Military Development Program. He directs the functioning of three subordinate divisions: Aviation Sciences (CWIN), Military Studies (CWIS), and Military Training (CWIT). He supervises the planning, development, scheduling, and presentation of the leadership and
its own mission statement, too. The division was “responsible for providing future Air Force officers with a solid understanding of the traditions, tools, operating practices, theoretical principles and challenges of the military profession.” These statements underscore the division’s work to enhance its credibility—especially within the academic community—and the division did begin to receive it.

The increased attention given to the office of the Deputy Commandant for Military Instruction led to significant personnel changes during the first decade of the office having a Permanent Professor. Besides immediately sending two members off to earn doctoral degrees and rearranging personnel between the Military Training Division and the Military Studies Division, Colonel Caine acted on his new authority to gain more qualified personnel. He was able to make a deal with the Dean of Faculty and hired Lieutenant Colonel Jim Titus to take over the Military Studies Division in 1983. Titus came equipped with a doctorate in history from Rutgers University, had Air Force operational experience, and had taught in the Academy’s Department of History. Colonel Caine thought that it was even more significant not only that Lt.


Col. Titus had experience with curriculum development and teaching experience but also that he
had the background and ability to be a Department Head and Permanent Professor. Within a
short time, Colonel Caine, with the support of the Superintendent, had established a solid
Military Studies Division with a credible and rigorous curriculum that was now headed by a
credentialed and capable leader.

This action created a stir between the Dean’s personnel and the Commandant’s deputy.
Specifically, the new Permanent Professor and Head of the Department of History, Colonel Carl
Reddel, questioned the role and focus of the new Military Studies Division. Once again, the
Superintendent offered significant support to Colonel Caine to ensure the success for the
division. Caine faced difficulties upon his elevation to be the Deputy Commandant for Military
Instruction in 1981. One of those was the veto power that General Tallman had given the
Professional Development Review Committee, which included a number of Permanent
Professors from the Dean’s realm, who could influence curriculum development within the

\[\text{\small 460 Philip D. Caine, “CWI, 1980-1992: End of Tour Report of Brigadier General, USAF (Ret), Deputy Commandant for Military Instruction and Permanent Professor, 1980-1992,” USAFA Special Collections, 43. Similar to Caine, Titus also had operational experience as an Intelligence officer, with a deployment during the Vietnam War, besides his time serving in the Department of History. Following his retirement from active duty in 1992, Titus later served as the Dean of Research at Air University and taught at the Air War College as an adjunct, where he also was the series editor for The CADRE Papers (Air University Press, 1998-2002)—the Center for Aerospace Doctrine Research and Education, which was established in 1983—now the LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education. Titus would be one of the instructors sent to the Soviet Military Power Week program, as discussed above, in the summer of 1983. See AFAHD, 1 January 1983 – 31 December 1984, Appendix, Vol. V, Documents DF 83-103, CW 1-75, Number CW-36, “Professional Military Studies Division (CWIS) 1983,” 3.}\]
Military Studies Division. Although General Tallman later agreed to disband this group, after it had helped develop the initial curriculum under the Commandant, the current Superintendent, General Kelly, “bought... a hundred percent” that CWI/CWIS could develop its own curriculum without other input from other departments. Even so, Caine notes: “In military art and science or professional military studies...we certainly made some significant compromises in curriculum in terms of what we would have like to have done versus what we actually did do driven by the concern that [the History Department, specifically] had.” 461 This development with the History Department in the early 1980s suggests that the Dean’s permanent faculty recognized the academic quality that Colonel Caine had brought into his program in dealings within the Commandant’s branch, so that, in this case with the History Department, other disciplines showed some concern that the military studies curriculum would impinge on their own established fields of instruction.

Although the division had a solid program of courses for each class year by 1983, which seemingly embodied a logical progression from year to year, this did not eliminate the need for change or correction. However, Colonel Caine understood change as being “evolutionary”—he expected nothing to reverse or invalidate the half-decade of study, reflection, and implementation, which could now be forged into a rigorous and stable military studies

However, tension remained between the Military Studies Division and the Dean of Faculty to keep the division’s core course program within the overall academic core curriculum. Whenever the Academy Curriculum Committee made changes in the academic core requirements, the change usually affected all academic departments, to include the Military Studies Division.

The most serious adjustment occurred just a couple of years after establishing a seemingly reliable and credible curriculum. In the spring semester in 1984, the Academy experienced another cheating scandal, this time in the Physics Department. In response to this crisis, and showing the ability to be flexible with his curriculum, Colonel Caine agreed to incorporate a serious readjustment of the freshman-level core course for the incoming class of cadets that fall of 1985, the class of 1989. This change was logical in that the new course brought serious attention to ethical issues to an early point in cadets’ studies. However, the division now split the freshman-level semester course into two half-semester courses, PMS-110 and PMS-111. The first course emphasized “the role of honor, integrity, and other professional values at the Academy” through a number of lessons directly discussing the Cadet Honor Code. PMS-111, “U.S. Defense Establishment,” followed in the second half of the semester. It was to cover as many topics from the original course within the 21 lessons that it could—a challenge that could not be met. In order to teach the entire freshman class the first semester, the division used instructors from the sophomore-level course, which meant that PMS-221, “Airpower Theory and Doctrine,” was not taught during the first half of the semester—so it also was reduced to 21

lessons. The solid line-up now had now been significantly altered because of events outside the division itself, and the resulting disjointedness would take time to work through.

Once the Military Studies Division instituted these changes, it was hard to reverse course. Colonel Caine participated in the sabbatical program at USAFA from January 1987 until January 1988, with Lieutenant Colonel Titus substituting for him as the Acting Deputy Commandant for Military Instruction. Upon his return in the middle of an academic year, Colonel Caine noted that the big issues facing his organization came from those changes in 1985, however necessary they had been at the time. He reflected that there were three significant concerns “internal to the [Military Studies] program” that his organization would need to address “in an evolutionary manner.” The most significant was the now normalized half-semester sophomore course, PMS-221. The second concern focused on the freshmen courses that allowed only a half-semester for each topic—one related to the Cadet Honor Code and the other on the introduction to professionalism. The final issue concerned the senior-level capstone course, which failed to capture the cadets’ attention and interest and did not receive favorable evaluations from them.464

Colonel Caine would use his final years on active duty as the Deputy Commandant for Military Instruction to resolve these problems, an effort that gradually strengthened the academic quality of the program.

Colonel Caine resolved the issue of the freshmen-level course through a practical measure. As he recognized, since he had worked curriculum issues for over twenty years, in order to receive some benefit, there often must be a trade-off.\textsuperscript{465} Caine noted that the Commandant and Athletic Department got only a single vote each on the Academy Curriculum Committee, but the Dean’s faculty got one vote per Permanent Professor (for each department or discipline). This established the pattern that, “If the [Dean’s] faculty doesn’t want something to happen[, it] isn’t going to happen.”\textsuperscript{466} Since Caine’s goal was to solidify the three upper-level courses, and to ensure that each course was assigned three credit hours, he knew that he had to concede something. The three credit hours per course was significant because this determined the amount of work outside the classroom that a discipline could assign, and Colonel Caine believed

---


\textsuperscript{466} USAFA Special Collections, “Interview of Brigadier General (Retired) Philip D. Caine by Lieutenant Colonel Vance Skarstedt, Department of History, 13 December 1999,” 16. According to Colonel Caine, this included the establishment of the Permanent Professor in the Commandant’s office. Caine give great credit to General Tallman for not putting this effort up for a vote, as “it wouldn’t have won.” See ibid., 10.
that fewer than three hours restricted “in-depth study” of a topic.\textsuperscript{467} The Military Studies
Division’s wild card was having a freshmen-level core course—even though it was now only a
half-semester by the time he returned from sabbatical leave. In 1987, the division had convinced
the institution to use other avenues, to include a military training period after lunch every other
day, as an opportunity to expose the cadets to a more rigorous Cadet Honor Code curriculum. So
the half-semester freshmen-level PMS-111 class that concentrated on this curriculum ended as a
Military Studies Division responsibility, with its last offering in the fall semester 1987.\textsuperscript{468} Now
the division had only the half-semester course on professionalism for the freshmen.

In 1992, in his last year on active duty, Colonel Caine jumped into a curriculum-wide
effort to reduce the freshmen-year course load. He offered to eliminate the half-semester PMS-
110 course, but asked that the other three military studies core offerings all receive three credit
hours, so that the remaining three would be rigorous, including expectations of more work
outside the classroom. The curriculum committee agreed.\textsuperscript{469} This development was not limited to
the Air Force Academy. A similar change occurred at West Point with the arrival of Lt. Gen.
Dave Palmer as their new Superintendent. He, too, was concerned about the overloading of cadet
time, which resulted in cadets neglecting their military science subjects—these courses carried
less weight for a grade point average than other academic courses. He was pushing West Point in

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{467} Philip D. Caine, “CWI, 1980-1992: End of Tour Report of Brigadier General, USAF
(Ret), Deputy Commandant for Military Instruction and Permanent Professor, 1980-
1992,” USAFA Special Collections, 111-112.
\item \textsuperscript{468} AFAHD, 1 July 1987 – 30 June 1988, Appendix, Vol. IV, Documents, CW 17-60, AH
1-7, Number CW-25, “Military Studies Division (CWIS),” 1.
\item \textsuperscript{469} AFAHD, 1 July 1992 – 30 June 1993, Appendix, Vol. VI, Documents, CW 78-119,
Number CW-81, “Military Art and Science Division (CWIS),” 1.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
a direction similar to that which was developing at the Air Force Academy. Colonel Caine’s efforts took a decade, but now the three remaining military studies courses each spanned a full semester with a full three-credit hour load. He could feel vindicated, knowing that he had at least three strong core courses in the curriculum and that he had done his part to assist in the efforts with streamlining the curriculum.

Eliminating the freshman-level course allowed the division to concentrate on strengthening the sophomore-level course. PMS-220, which had escaped the designation of PMS-225 and later PMS-221, as the course came to seem more normal in the curriculum, continued to emphasize air power, specifically doctrine, force structure, and force employment. In the 1988-89 academic year, the course regained its full-semester, 42-lesson curriculum, and

470 Lance Betros, *Carved in Granite: West Point since 1902* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2012), 234. Betros’s example from Palmer, however, seems misleading from a professional military studies point-of-view: according to Betros, Palmer asked: “What’s the cadet going to do, study history or study armored tactics? He’s going to study history because you’re going to grade him…. It doesn’t matter what is going on in military science class.” The discipline of history, especially military history, is in line with professional military studies. However, the overall point is that the cadet will put time in the coursework that has more influence on the grade point average—whether engineering or basic sciences or humanities—than the coursework in military studies, specifically. General Palmer was West Point’s superintendent from 1986-1991. An historian in his own right, Palmer earned a Master’s degree in history from Duke University, publishing *River and Rock: the History of Fortress West Point* (1969), *The Way of the Fox: American Strategy in the War for America* (1975), *Summons of the Trumpet: US-Vietnam in Perspective* (1978), and *1794: America, Its Army, and the Birth of the Nation* (1994), among others, and was president of Walden University (1995-1999).
reverted to the PMS-220 label. With the additional lessons, the course again underwent some fine-tuning. The course was still focused on air power operations, but the increased number of lessons allowed for greater study of air power in the Middle East and a major case study of the Falklands War air campaign from 1982. The course included three new texts: *Air Power: A Concise History*, by Robin Higham; *War in the Third Dimension*, by R. A. Mason; and, presciently, *Air Campaign*, by John Warden. The next year, Warden, the architect of the air war in the First Gulf War, even provided a lecture, both semesters, to all sections of the course that detailed his vision of changes in theory and doctrine that he considered justified by modern improvements in air power. That academic year, 1989-90, saw increased enthusiasm and positive evaluations for the course. With the elimination of the freshmen core course, PMS-220 then gained its three credit-hour status by 1992, up from its standard two hours, and increased its rigor and status among the cadets and academic faculty.

Finally, Colonel Caine put more emphasis on the study of war for the senior-level capstone course. This course continued to provide an introduction to military theorists, with the


bulk of the course serving as a “force analysis” study focused on the Soviet Union. For the first few years, the course had used a division-developed, course-wide compendium of readings, some written by the instructors, to discuss the nature and theory of warfare. The intention was that, “As [the cadet] examines the great theorists and their works, the student realizes that war is a complex matter which requires more than simplistic quantitative comparisons of force levels”—and certainly more study. But the course’s emphasis, again, was mostly on Soviet military structure, doctrine, and capabilities.474 In 1985, incurring the disdain of the History Department, the course used portions of Hew Strachan’s *European Armies and the Conduct of War* (1983). To strengthen the investigation of military theorists and to provide “sufficient illustration of the concepts to make them understandable and relevant,” the cadets used most of the first seven chapters of the text, which covered the Age of Limited War, Napoleonic Warfare, Jomini, and Clausewitz—thus the need to use a historically-based text.475 The conflict was that


475 *AFAHD, 1 Jan 1985 – 30 June 1986*, Appendix, Vol. VI, *Documents, DF 84-94, CW 1-46*, Number CW-44, “Military Studies Division (CWIS) (1 January – 31 December 1985),” 4, Atch 9; *AFAHD, 1 Jan 1986 – 30 June 1987*, Appendix, Vol. VIII, *Documents, CW 106-173, AH 1-44*, Number CW-147, “Military Studies Division (CWIS) 1986,” 3-4. The course opened with an introductory lesson, and then a lesson each on Sun Tzu and Machiavelli, before using the Strachan book for lessons 4-10. Following lesson 9’s discussion of von Moltke and his views of Clausewitz, from the book, the course had four more lessons on various topics that did not use the text, before a review and mid-term exam on lesson 15 and 16, respectively. The rest of the course was focused on a force analysis of the Soviet Union—which included bringing in a guest speaker, former Afghan Colonel Ali Jalali—to discuss Soviet operations in Afghanistan. Also, the 1986 CWIS report contains almost a two-page, single-spaced “Abstract” that defines and
one of the History Department’s two core courses, the “Introduction to Military History” course, also used this book as one of its five texts for the course. So, to end the dissension, the division began to use Peter Paret’s revised version of *Makers of Modern Strategy* (1986).

After using the Paret text that first year, Colonel Caine and the instructors recognized that it did not meet the need, nor did the cadets think it did, as they made clear in their evaluations of the course. But Caine was resolved to expose the cadets to the theorists who had examined and written about war. So, although in the following year the course reverted to an instructor-compiled reading guide, the senior-level course returned to using the Paret text, with supplemental readings, during the 1989-90 academic year. This practice continued for a number of years. According to Colonel Caine, “The problem was not the [Paret] book but with the way it was used and taught.” So Colonel Caine leaned on one of his “master teachers who had been extraordinarily successful” with applying the text in the classroom, and had this instructor design and teach an orientation course for the rest of the staff, during the summer of 1989 on how one could effectively use the text—“the result was positive and the student evaluations completely defends the curriculum of military studies, and offers the distinction between, and the need for incorporating so much military history in the program. This discussion does justice to providing the rationale for the senior-level curriculum, specifically the intertwining of theory, history, and war gaming.

---


The division had demonstrated again its ability to deliver course rigor. Colonel Caine and his instructors pushed for improvement within the course curriculum, and they ensured that the instructors were well prepared to provide sound education.

Not only were the courses continually in refinement during this period, but also the military studies instructors continued to improve and contribute in this more sophisticated academic environment. What happened regarding the senior-level military theory course, then, offers some understanding of the effort to enhance instructor performance and capability. Even more significantly, Colonel Caine also continued to send qualified officers to get advanced degrees in international relations, military history, and instructional technology. The academic


The year 1989-1990 saw two of the division faculty leading the Academy’s Soviet and East European Studies Group (SEESG), as well as continuing the tradition of instructors teaching in the Political Science and Foreign Languages departments. The increasing credibility of the military instructors led to academic promotions—other than Colonel Caine—recognized by the Dean of Faculty. For example, in the 1991-1992 academic year, Major Michael Whyte, whom military history (1982-1985), the division sent Captain Milton Nielson to the University of Texas (Austin) to pursue a degree in Curriculum Instruction Specialization Instructional Technology (Microcomputer Application) in 1985, to continue computer integration and war gaming into the CWIS curriculum; Major Doug Erwin completed his Ph.D. in international relations at Denver University and Captain Glen Kennedy received his Master’s degree in military history from Texas A&M, both in 1986; Captain Michael Whyte was sponsored for his doctorate in instructional technology from the University of Southern California (1988-1991); Major Allen Dorn completed a Ph.D. in political science at the University of Indiana (1989-December 1992); Captain Forsyth also went to Denver University on a Ph.D.-sponsored program in international relations (1990-1993), and Major Greg Elder did a Ph.D. in IT at Arizona State University (1990-1993). This demonstrates that Colonel Caine solidified Academy-sponsored credentialed degrees for his personnel, similar to what the Academy Dean of Faculty had put in place since its inauguration.

480 AFAHD, 1 July 1989 – 30 June 1990, Appendix, Vol. IV, Documents, CW 1-72, AH 1-10, Number CW-38, “Military Studies Division (CWIS),” 2-3. The SEESG was an Academy-wide program, primarily targeting interested faculty serving on the Dean’s side, as well as those in staff positions with the Superintendent and Commandant. Newly-selected Lieutenant Colonel Martin, still the Military Studies Division head, chaired the organization, and Captain Yurij Holowinsky, a fluent Russian speaker who taught in the Foreign Language department, acted as the group’s secretary. Major Ishino, the Japanese Air Force exchange officer, similar to previous exchange officers, also taught in the Foreign Language department.
the division had sponsored for a Ph.D., received an academic promotion to associate professor; eleven other division members attained assistant professor status. The Dean now included the military studies instructors under his academic promotion regulation. By the time of Colonel Caine’s retirement, not only had the curriculum achieved a level of parity with those of other academic departments under the Dean, but his instructor force had also gained acceptance by the academic community.

To support this more enriched academic environment, the division began various programs to enhance learning. In the 1987-1988 academic year, the division initiated the Visiting Airpower Professional Program (VAPP), which was “designed to increase cadet exposure to retired officers who have made significant contributions to the development or employment of airpower.” In the inaugural program, Major General Haywood S. Hansell, Jr. (USAF, Retired) spent a day with the cadets and offered a lecture to all PMS-221 students on “Airpower Doctrine in WW II.” Also, the division continued to support a speakers’ series initiated by the Commandant, Brigadier General Beckel, in 1981. This program, the Commandant’s Leadership Series (CLS), introduced the cadets and staff “to some of the prominent military and civilian leaders” of the day. During the first year, the division sponsored talks from Captain Richard Stratton (USN), Director of Operations, U.S. Naval Academy and former Prisoner of War (POW) in Southeast Asia; Brigadier Robinson Risner, an ace from the Korean War and also a


former POW in Southeast Asia; and Tom Lasorda, manager of the Los Angeles Dodgers.\footnote{AFAHD, 1 January 1981 – 31 December 1982, Appendix, Vol. IV, Documents, DF 60-75, CW 1-56, Number CW-5, “Military Studies Division (CWIS), 1982,” 1-2.} By 1985, the CLS series focused on military leaders—primarily Air Force—as it sponsored General T.R. Milton, the former chairman of the NATO Military Committee; Lieutenant General Merrill A. McPeak, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs and Resources; Colonel Ali Jalali, formerly of the Afghan Army; and Ronald de Valderano, 18\textsuperscript{th} Duke of Valderano, a terrorism expert.\footnote{AFAHD, 1 January 1985 – 30 June 1986, Appendix, Vol. VI, Documents, DF 84-94, CW 1-46, Number CW-44, “Military Studies Division (CWIS) (1 January – 31 December 1985),” 2. General McPeak would visit the Academy again in this capacity, this time as the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. See AFAHD, 1 July 1991 – 30 June 1992, Appendix, Vol. V, Documents CW 55-107, CW-75, “Military Art and Science Division (CWIS),” 7. That same academic year that Gen. McPeak visited, Lt. Gen. Charles Horner, the 9\textsuperscript{th} Air Force Commander—the air component supporting CENTCOM—discussed his role in DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM (his lecture was 6 Dec 1991), as the senior Air Force officer, and Maj. Gen. Buster Glosson, in charge of the air plans in Riyadh (his visit was 20 Sep 1991), also visited. Sometimes these were single lectures provided by the distinguished visitor, other times it was an opportunity for a seminar setting for an entire course. As a point of interest, during the 1982-1983 academic year, Gene Roddenberry spoke to the sections of PMS-440. See AFAHD, 1 January 1981 – 31 December 1982, Appendix, Vol. IV, Documents, DF 60-75, CW 1-56, Number CW-5, “Military Studies Division (CWIS), 1982,” 4.} Colonel Caine’s leadership and vision as the Permanent Professor of Military Instruction ensured that a solid academic program would form under his watch.

The difficulties that Colonel Caine had confronted regarding the curriculum upon his return from sabbatical leave were now resolved as he entered his last year of active duty in 1992. His vision had been to establish a rigorous, credible, and relatively stable curriculum in military

studies that the academic community accepted before he retired. He was successful in this endeavor. But as he closed his career, Caine implemented two final changes. One concerned the name of the division that carried out the academic education of the cadets in military studies. The second was a rearrangement of the curriculum—the order in which the core courses were delivered by the academic division. The name change was not only cosmetic but also a matter of public relations, taking on the name “Military Art and Science Division” with the initials “MAS”—as Colonel noted, “thus eliminating the dreaded ‘PMS’ acronym.”485 – The new name also reflected a philosophy that encapsulated Colonel Caine’s vision of a rigorous, academic approach to military studies. The idea was that “Military Art referred to ‘the creation and exploitation of advantages in war that enable military power to achieve political objectives’ and Military Science represented ‘a discipline concerned with the nature of war and methods of conducting war’.”486 To some, this may have seemed to be a minor change, but it did restore some credibility with cadets, and it suggested the philosophical ground for the significance of military studies.

The other change was with the line-up of courses offered to the three most senior classes. Colonel Caine felt vindicated in removing PMS-110 from the core curriculum, as he now had three upper-level core courses, each given at three credit hours—he actually gained one credit

hour for his academic division’s total. But now the division had the opportunity to restructure the three remaining courses. The study that Colonel Caine and the Military Art and Science Division undertook was also affected by geopolitical changes in the world, specifically the break-up of the Soviet Union. The senior-level course, PMS-440, had already “reduced the emphasis” on the section of the course that dealt with Soviet force analysis and, therefore, had already allowed more time to discuss military theory and theorists. The decision was to discuss military theory and professionalism in MAS-220, air power theory and doctrine in MAS-330, and lessons on joint and combined operations in the senior-level MAS-440. As Colonel Caine put it: “The fundamental academic purpose in making the change was the realization that, in today’s study of warfare, theory and the theorists had to come first to provide the bedrock on which to build the remainder of the program.” As he concluded, the order of the coursework that

487 Philip D. Caine, “CWI, 1980-1992: End of Tour Report of Brigadier General, USAF (Ret), Deputy Commandant for Military Instruction and Permanent Professor, 1980-1992,” USAFA Special Collections, 112; AFAHD, 1 July 1992 – 30 June 1993, Appendix, Vol. IV, Documents, CW 78-119, Number CW-81, “Military Art and Science Division (CWIS).” Before the change, only PMS-440 earned 3 credit hours. PMS-110, the half-semester course, was valued at only one credit hour; PMS-220 and 330 each were 2 credit hours each. The division could now expect more dedicated time, and more focused time, on their coursework outside of the classroom (instructors could assign more reading, writing, etc.).


cadets took was now almost entirely reversed from what had been originally developed.\textsuperscript{490} Even so, the first Permanent Professor of Military Instruction within the Commandant’s realm could be satisfied with the work that his directorate had accomplished, especially within the academic coursework offered in military studies.

Colonel Caine’s retirement in 1992 offered a significant opportunity for the institution to name another Permanent Professor to head the Deputy Commandant for Military Instruction. Colonel Caine retired after thirty-seven years of active service—twenty-seven of those years had been committed to the Academy. Staying true to the newly-established tradition, the Academy replaced now-Brigadier General (Retired) Caine with another confirmed Permanent Professor of Military Instruction, Colonel David Wagie. Colonel Wagie, a former KC-135 pilot, had taught at the Academy in the Department of Astronautics, eventually becoming the department’s deputy head. He held a doctorate from Purdue University in aeronautics and astronautics.\textsuperscript{491} Although not specifically credentialed in military studies, or in another discipline that would have seemed more compatible with heading the military instruction directorate, Wagie was at least

\textsuperscript{491} Biography of Brigadier General David A. Wagie, http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/Biographies/Display/tabid/225/Article/105323/brigadier-general-david-a-wagie.aspx. Colonel Wagie would take a sabbatical in 1994 and not return as the Deputy Commandant for Military Instruction, as he inaugurated a larger Academy the vision to create the Center for Character Development at the Academy—now the Center for Leadership and Character Development. He served as the Academy’s Vice Dean from 1996-1998, and then as the Dean of Faculty from 1 July 1998 – October 2004.
academically credentialed with strong ties and previous experience with the Dean of Faculty. The new Permanent Professor and Deputy Commandant for Military Instruction implemented portions of the new military studies program during the 1992-1993 academic year, followed by the entirely new curriculum in 1993-1994.

Colonel Wagie and his subordinates continued to advance the academic reputation of the Military Art and Science Division. His assistant deputy, Lt. Col. Jerry Martin, who was the first officer whom Colonel Caine’s directorate had sponsored for a doctorate, had been the division head for four years and had returned that summer of 1992 from a year long sabbatical, during which he graduated from Air War College. When Martin left for the year, the division was then headed by Major Michael Whyte, who also had earned a directorate-sponsored Ph.D. As well as ensuring that the core courses continued to offer the cadets solid academic instruction, the division maintained instruction in some elective courses. Also, the division began an Aerospace Study Group, which provided a forum to discuss various military topics. Finally, the division inaugurated an academic journal, initially with a small circulation of 600, which included other service academies and military schools, the Pentagon, and various entities in Air University at

Colonel Wagie continued to advance the unit’s academic relevance where General Caine had left off.

Following the 1992 Air Force-wide unit reorganization and restructuring, which were part of the downsizing of the military in the era following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Commandant’s office at the Academy went through its own organizational realignment, mostly in name, during the 1994-95 academic year. Although the Military Studies Division had just been renamed the Military Art and Sciences Division, now the entire organization was scheduled to align more with designations of the larger Air Force. On 7 November 1994, the Commandant of Cadets was renamed as the 34th Training Wing, and the Deputy Commandant for Military

---

493 AFAHD, 1 July 1992 – 30 June 1993, Appendix, Vol. VI, Documents CW 78-119, CW-81, “Military Art and Science Division (CWIS),” 7-8. The ASG had a lecture by the RAF Cranwell Briefing Team; a lecture by Lt. Col. Martin on “Airpower Theory in the Gulf War” (a CADRE paper produced while he was at Air War College); a briefing by Dr. Benjamin Lambeth, RAND Corp., on “The Future of the Russian Air Force”; and, various “Military Theory Discussion Colloquiums” on books (Martin van Creveld’s, The Transformation of War) and articles (Eliot Cohen and John Gooch, “Military Misfortunes”), among other activities that year. The journal was the MAS Quarterly, which delivered copies to USMA, USNA, USCGA, Texas A&M, et. al., and provided an academic forum that “discusses current military issues.” The division published an issue in both the fall and spring academic semesters that year. Since it received such a large response, it was continued the following academic year as Soldier-Scholar (the Departments of English, History, and Computer Science contributed to the spring edition, as well as an Air Force student at the University of Georgia; the publication went from 15 pages in the fall to 36 pages for the spring edition). See AFAHD, 1 July 1993 – 30 June 1994, 104. The journal would be renamed the Airman-Scholar journal for the Spring 1997 edition, and increased its circulation, to include all AF ROTC detachments, and continues to be published. See AFAHD, 1 July 1996 – 30 June 1997, 111-112.
Instruction was activated as the 34th Education Group (34th EDG), as one of four groups under the wing. Also, in another major milestone, Lt. Col. Jerry Martin took command of the group, replacing Colonel Wagie. Lieutenant Colonel Michael M. Whyte assumed command of the 34th Education Squadron (ES), which had been the Military Art and Science Division. The division kept its three core courses: MAS 220 – Foundations of the Military Profession; MAS 330 – Air Power Theory and Doctrine; and, MAS 440 – Joint and Multinational Operations. Although the changes were mostly in names to be used, this move did open discussion of whether the division responsible for providing the academic program in military studies should be moved under the Dean’s authority.

The restructuring of units late in 1994 provided an opportunity for the Superintendent to initiate a review of all USAFA programs. Lieutenant General Paul Stein organized a “Relevance Committee” that focused on all aspects of education and training at the Academy, which directly involved the 34th Training Wing (previously called the Commandant of Cadets) and its subordinate 34th EDG. The issue that affected the 34th EDG was a proposal from the committee to house all academic endeavors under the Dean—this would include the military studies program. What started all of this discussion, however, was that the Military Art and Science Division, now renamed the 34th ES, had proposed MAS as an academic minor, which quickly

494 AFAHD, I July 1994 – 30 June 1995, 77, 90. The Wing took the designation of the 34th Bombardment Group from World War II. The four groups under the 34th Training Wing were the 34th EDG, the 34th Training Group (TRG), the 34th Operations Group (OG) and the 34th Support Group (SG).

blossomed into advocating an academic major. 496 Two issues influenced the committee to make the recommendation: One was the belief that the MAS program “was redundant with material already taught” by the Dean of Faculty. The other was the concern among those who recognized the Dean as the sole office for “degree-granting authority” and thus believed that any organization that desired an academic major should be under the Dean. 497 Although the situation was a positive indicator of how academically credible the military studies program had become, the committee’s proposition did instill a greater concern in the Commandant’s organization. The review process revealed that, if the Superintendent disbanded the 34th ES to move it into the Dean’s area, then there was a possibility that the coursework and curriculum might slowly be eliminated. However, a significant study of why a previous Superintendent, General Tallman, had initially established what was now the 34th EDG in 1980, with its own Permanent Professor, helped put an end to this endeavor—at least it stopped the momentum to place military studies within the Dean of Faculty. 498

The drive to establish an academic major within the 34th EDG reveals how influential the organization had become. During the 1994-95 academic year, the 34th EDG began to advocate for a military studies major that would be reflected on a cadet’s academic transcript and diploma. This effort had its roots from the time of the break-up of the Soviet Union, which had created a

496 AFAHD, I July 1995 – 30 June 1996, 107. The Commandant, Brigadier General John D. Hopper, Jr., became more involved in the discussion, and he was the one who pressed for the major.


498 AFAHD, I July 1994 – 30 June 1995, 101. The 34th ES member who compiled this information, Captain Dave Landfair, developed a talking paper and slide briefing on this relevant information—with the assistance of Brigadier General (Retired) Philip Caine. However, these informational histories were not found.
period of drastic reevaluation in the Commandant’s military studies program. Specifically, the senior-year course had focused on conflict with the Soviet Union and the faculty realized that a significant change had to be made in this course, since it was the culminating experience in a cadet’s military education at the Academy. As discussed above, the course direction now turned toward more emphasis on military theory and theorists and toward their relationship to the different levels at which warfare is to be understood: strategy, operational art, tactics, and force employment.\textsuperscript{499} Although the transfer of the MAS department to the Dean of Faculty did not occur, the 34th EDG leadership, and members of the 34th ES, recognized that idea to move the MAS department under the Dean’s authority “reflects the academic credibility” that the organization had fostered since its inception in 1980.\textsuperscript{500}

Nevertheless, the 34th EDG did get approval for an academic major by the end of the 1996 academic year. The “Military Doctrine, Operations, and Strategy” major “features interdisciplinary studies and offers cadets the opportunity to study the modern military profession from the perspective of its evolving doctrine and complex, interdisciplinary environment.”\textsuperscript{501} Although this major would become available only with the Classes of 2000 and 2001, at that time, a minor was offered for the Classes of 1998 and 1999—enrollment for cadets began in the fall of 1997. Members of the 34th ES were excited that they “had a table” seeking


\textsuperscript{500} AFAHD, I July 1994 – 30 June 1995, 90.

enrollment in the new programs at the Dean’s majors night in fall 1997—a first.\textsuperscript{502} Having the Curriculum Committee and the Academy Board approve an academic major validated the decade-and-a-half of work to provide a rigorous, credible, and stable curriculum, and it testified to the academic legitimacy of the program.\textsuperscript{503}

Even with this accomplishment, the Education Group continued to press for still higher academic standing. In March 1998, the 34\textsuperscript{th} EDG commander submitted a strong proposal to mirror some Dean of Faculty programs. One proposal, for example, called for a Distinguished Visiting Professor (or Professional) and the institution of the Academic Chair Structure. The commander saw these two initiatives “as a step in the evolution of the academic quality of military education” at the Academy. The proposal received approval from all necessary Academy agencies, including the Dean of Faculty. The Superintendent generally agreed but

\textsuperscript{502} \textit{AFAHD, 1 July 1997 – 30 June 1998, Vol. V, Documents 34 TRW 107-176, 557 FTS 1-32, Number 34 TRW-111, “34\textsuperscript{th} Education Squadron (34\textsuperscript{th} ES) Annual History, 1997-1998,”} 3. “Majors night” is a night where all departments set up tables to promote their disciplines and majors; cadets move visit with the instructors to help assist with their decision on what to study in their upper class years. At the end of June 1998, ten students were enrolled in the MDOS major for the Class of 2000 and two from the Class of 2001.\textsuperscript{503} The only stipulation was that since the 34\textsuperscript{th} EDG did not move under the Dean, then a special “MDOS Committee,” under the direction of Colonel Douglas Murray, the Permanent Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science, and composed of representatives from the four academic divisions under the Dean (Basic Sciences, Engineering, Humanities, and Social Sciences), would help administer the major. See \textit{AFAHD, 1 July 1996 – 30 June 1997}, 107.
wanted more dialogue between the Commandant and Dean. Also, the 34th ES began to contract with the American Heritage Custom Publishing Company to produce solid texts for the core courses. This was Lt. Col. Martin’s last major effort to demonstrate the legitimacy and seriousness of the military studies program. He retired that summer and turned over the continued responsibility to Colonel Larry Smith.

One of the first issues that Colonel Smith faced was the Curriculum Committee’s decision to reduce the core course work for cadets. The 34th ES lost one of its three remaining core classes, MAS 220, due to this reduction. Academic year 1998-1999 was the last year in which all cadets in all three upper classes received a core course in Military Art and Science. To ensure that the curriculum maintained the military theory block that was in the MAS-220 course, the 34th ES designed two new core courses. The following academic year was a transition year for the squadron, so that academic year 2000-2001 saw the implementation of the new courses.

---


507 AFAHD, I July 1998 – 30 June 1999, Vol. V, Number 34 TRW-127, “34th ES Annual History,” 13. This was such an anomaly, anyway, that one discipline at the Academy had three core courses. By this change, most disciplines were reduced to two core courses, at the most.
courses—a freshman-level course for 3 semester hours and a junior-level course of 4½ semester hours. The squadron maintained its major and minor options, and it continued to present academically sound core courses for the cadets.

The 34th Education Group experienced more than just the core course modifications that academic year, as two other changes considerably altered the direction of military studies. First, on 2 July 1999, Colonel Thomas A. Drohan became the next Commander and Permanent Professor of Military Instruction for the 34th Education Group. Colonel Drohan, a 1979 Air Force Academy graduate, former C/HC-130 pilot, and Ph.D. recipient from the Department of Politics at Princeton University, then used the opportunity of his arrival to perform an academic and professional review of the group. Influenced by a recent article published in the journal World Politics, Colonel Drohan and his subordinates adapted an idea proposed by social scientist Richard Betts and applied it to the Academy’s military studies program. The Education Group renamed the discipline as “Military Strategic Studies,” believing that this better represented what they needed to do for the institution. They aimed to answer this overall question: “What should the military studies faculty teach to enhance the existing academic core curriculum?” Colonel Drohan presented this vision:

Military strategic studies as a distinct field of study differs from military science in that the former is broader than the tactical or operational level science of

winning battles; differs from political science in that it begins military analysis where political science typically ends; and differs from history in its method—focusing on concepts, processes and emerging issues of military power rather than historical exploration. As educators in this profession-focused field of study, we organized the department along the lines of this field of study to promote the development of MSS knowledge.511

The 34th Education Squadron courses now took on the prefix of “MSS,” having established a philosophy for Military Strategic Studies as a discipline. Also, a new Permanent Professor of Military Instruction was prepared to continue expanding its academic respectability.

The situation for the 34th EDG changed significantly in 2005 due to another scandal at the Air Force Academy. In the early days of 2003, the Secretary of the Air Force, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Senator Wayne Allard, Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell, other U.S. Congressmen, and various media sources received an email under the pseudonym “Renee Trindle” alleging that the U.S. Air Force Academy had a “significant sexual assault problem…that had been ignored by the Academy’s leadership.”512 This resulted in numerous investigations, primarily by the U.S. Congress, led by Congresswoman Tillie Fowler (former Representative from Florida, who had served four terms, from 1993 to 2001), the Office of the

Secretary of the Air Force, led by the Air Force General Counsel, the Air Force Office of the Inspector General, and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations. The Air Force had already issued its *Agenda for Change* within two months after the initial exposure, which put in place some policies and procedures to “restore trust and confidence” in a policy of zero-tolerance of sexual assault among the cadets, faculty, staff, and public. However, the succeeding investigations implemented greater change, and some specifically affected Military Strategic Studies.

One result of these investigations was to include in the 2004 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) a study of the role of the permanent professor positions at the Academy. The reason for incorporating this charge in the NDAA was a finding in the first completed investigation, the Fowler Panel Report. This report concluded:

The Panel is concerned that the Dean of Faculty may have become too ingrained in the Academy’s institutional culture to have fully appreciated the indicators of a sexual misconduct problem. Currently, it is a statutory requirement that the Dean of Faculty be appointed from among the permanent professors who have served as heads of departments of instruction. This requires the Dean of Faculty position to be filled by an individual who has already served at the Academy for some time and it precludes expanding the pool of potential candidates to qualified individuals outside of the Academy. **Accordingly, the Panel recommends that the Air Force prepare a legislative proposal to revise 10 U.S.C. § 9335(a) to**

---

expand the available pool of potential candidates for the position of Dean of 
Faculty beyond the current limitation to permanent professors.  

The issue was that a negative climate had developed at the Academy, and a large part of the failure was that the leaders who were most present and stable at the Academy—the Dean of Faculty and the various department permanent professors—were the problem.

The subsequent report from Admiral (Retired) Charles R. Larson recommended the transfer of military studies to the Dean of Faculty. The Larson Report was a 52-page report fulfilling the 2004 NDAA’s order to the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Air Force “to complete a ‘study and report related to permanent professors at the United States Air Force Academy.’” Among the findings and recommendations from Admiral Larson was that the cadets, “regardless of gender, also consistently show faculty as having the greatest influence over their officer development.” The problem, the study concluded, was that many of the faculty had issues with the role of military training at the Academy, specifically how the Commandant performed this task, and that “[g]reater integration of the Academy system should ameliorate this

515 Charles R. Larson, Admiral (ret.), "Study and Report Related to Permanent Professors at the United States Air Force Academy," (paper conducted for the Secretary of the Air Force, April 2004), ES-1, USAFA Special Collections, Box 10. Admiral (ret.) Larson was twice the Superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy, chaired a study of the “Maryland statewide system of higher education,” and was the current vice-chairman of the Maryland Board of Regents.
The finding that the Academy mission elements were not well integrated led Admiral Larson to recommend “that careful consideration be given by the new Superintendent, Commandant, and Dean of Faculty to returning [the Military Strategic Studies major and curriculum] to the Dean. This will contribute to cooperation and integration of the Academy system.” The Academy’s leaders followed this recommendation and on 1 August 2005

516 Charles R. Larson, Admiral (ret.), "Study and Report Related to Permanent Professors at the United States Air Force Academy," (paper conducted for the Secretary of the Air Force, April 2004), 4-4, 5-1, USAFA Special Collections, Box 10.
517 Charles R. Larson, Admiral (ret.), "Study and Report Related to Permanent Professors at the United States Air Force Academy," (paper conducted for the Secretary of the Air Force, April 2004), 6-3, USAFA Special Collections, Box 10. Admiral Larson compared USAFA with the other two main service academies and showed how USMA and USNA did not make this separation. He also used the word “return” since, as Chapter 3 and 4 show, at one time there was a consideration, and a small period of time, when military studies was under the Dean. As Finding 9 states: “The Placement of the Military Strategic Studies Major in the Training Wing May Contribute to Unnecessary Competition between the Commandant and the Dean. It appears that education has become a competition between the Commandant and the Dean. The Commandant is responsible for cadet training as well as an entire academic department and major—Military Strategic Studies (MSS). This is in contrast to the other two service academies and promotes a separation of the education mission and blurs the distinction between education and training. Admiral Larson believes it creates the perception that the Dean’s faculty are neither good military role models nor current and capable enough to oversee and teach courses in the MSS major,” ES-2. The recommendation begins, “[The Military Strategic Studies major] is the only academic major that does not fall under the Dean of Faculty. As discussed in the findings, Admiral Larson believes this split may have contributed to the Terrazzo gap.” What is interesting is that when the reorganization occurred in 1994, as discussed earlier in this chapter, and the Dean wanted to incorporate Military Art and Science into his responsibility, one major dissent that came from many senior members in the 34th EDG was that the rising academic credibility
inactivated the 34 EDG, moving all elements under the Dean as the Department of Military and Strategic Studies.\textsuperscript{518} Since the military studies program had advanced to become academically credible, the transition was rather threatened practically no one.

The military studies curriculum had become a rigorous and respectable academic program. The inclusion of a Permanent Professor in the Commandant’s area of responsibility had produced enormous dividends in creating this solid program. In his article about the Air Force Academy’s dilemma regarding professional military studies, Brigadier General (Ret.) Philip Caine, who had been the driving force in changing the military studies program and curriculum in the 1980s, wrote that the record of military studies at the Academy was “not very good,” suggesting that it was “too often characterized by frequently changing courses, poor instruction, and second-class status in the education of future officers.”\textsuperscript{519} By the end of his career, General Caine had established a solid professional foundation for the program on which follow-on personnel were able to build. When in 2004 crisis once again faced the Academy, and the pressure was to place the military studies program under the Dean to help address the crisis and within the Commandant’s purview “serve[d] as a valuable bridge between the Dean’s organization and the Commandant’s area of responsibility.” See \textit{AFAHD, 1 July 1994 – 30 June 1995}, 91. This bridge between the Commandant and Dean began with the founding of the Academy. This author puts the impetus on the first Commandant, Brigadier General Stillman, who said outright that members of the Dean’s faculty were not real officers. See Chapter 4.

\textsuperscript{518} Department of Military and Strategic Studies, Dr. John Farquhar, Historian, Vol. 1, \textit{34\textsuperscript{th} Education Group Annual History Reports}, “34\textsuperscript{th} Education Group Annual History Report, 30 June 2004 to 31 July 2005,” 1.

to erase possible negative perceptions from cadets, the program was academically and philosophically sound enough to ensure that the transition was easy.
Chapter 7 - Conclusion

As many histories tend to do, the preceding discussion on professional military education at the Air Force Academy appears as a story of progression. But even though the Department of Military and Strategic Studies has been under the responsibility of the Dean of Faculty for over a decade, the department still works to define itself and prove its relevance as a discipline. Nevertheless, it is the department that advances and explores the fundamentals for professional military education. The education pursued through the coursework offered by this department aims at laying a foundation on which to better integrate various subjects taught in other academic disciplines that reinforce military studies for an officer candidate.

From the early use of air power in war, the United States air forces recognized a need to gain its independence as a separate service branch. Almost hand-in-hand with this aspiration was the recognition among air leaders of a related need to establish their own service academy to educate a significant segment of the service’s officer corps. Although the early planners demanded an academy, the proposed curriculum was often burdened with more specialized training rather than education in subjects essential for their officer candidates, such as in theory, doctrine, organization, the study of warfare, and, most significantly, how air power affects the character of war. Some air leaders recognized the need for this essential education, too. The narrative above traces the evolution of military studies within the overall education of officer candidates at the Air Force Academy.

During the planning and preparation for a service academy specific to the Air Force, and during the formative years of developing the curriculum, air leaders and planners wrestled with whether to focus the efforts on specialized training, such as flight training, or to integrate more academically-oriented military studies coursework into the curriculum. This debate usually
occurred within one of the mission elements of the Academy, namely, the Commandant of Cadets, who was responsible for the training and education of the officer candidates in military matters.

In addition, the emphasis was also on educating the officer candidates through a general academic program. This, too, created a tension between those who demanded what is often viewed as a more vocational education consisting of science and engineering and those who advocated a vigorous program of social sciences and the humanities.

These two tensions as discussed in this study, which were present during the authorization, formation, and later development of the Academy, still continue today. Although it had not come in a simple linear progression, by the 1980s the Air Force Academy recognized the need for a more stable and rigorous military studies program. To assist in this effort, the Academy recommended, and the Senate approved, a Permanent Professor and Deputy Commandant for Military Instruction, to ensure the military education of the officer candidates through a strong curriculum. The Permanent Professor became the advocate of the military studies program to encourage that it contributed to the overall education of the cadet and that military studies received some importance over exclusively military training.

The continued emphasis on the military studies program became a necessity. Yet it remained difficult to keep a strong military studies emphasis with the necessary elements from social sciences and humanities coursework. The observations that John Masland and Laurence Radway stated in their seminal work on military education in 1957 remains pertinent today:

It may be well, however, to summarize at this point some of the obstacles to further evolution. First, weapons grow more complex daily. This creates a demand for a more technical curriculum….Second, applicants to the academies seem to have a somewhat
greater interest and aptitude for technical and mechanical matters. Third, because the academies are public, national institutions they must appear to be tending to business. A curriculum believed to have inadequate technical content is vulnerable to criticism by Congress, by the American people, and by officers who retain reservations about all education that is not somewhat vocational in nature. Fourth, the commandants and their staffs are extremely influential agents at the academies, and important aspects of their programs are necessarily designed to prepare students for combat leadership rather than to interest them in policy level assignments in the service.

A fifth obstacle to further evolution is the prescribed curriculum. A premium is placed on courses that can be shown relevant to known future tasks. Sixth, the purpose of the academies is clearly defined. Military and technical courses seem to them to meet [the requirement to graduate this known member of the military profession] and, Seventh, not only do the academies know the future business of their graduates, but a central part of that business has always been war.520

And war is chaotic and ambiguous, requiring professionals to be not only the absolutely best possible technicians but also the best strategists and theorists. The professional requires a solid education in the nature of conflict and its changing character.

This requirement for the Air Force professional to be well educated in the military arts and sciences as well as in studies that concentrate on the human experience and cultures and societies may not yet be fulfilled effectively enough. The question that may yet cause concern is whether the service academies are providing a suitable and properly demanding education that

brings preparedness for all the challenges that follow. More specifically, does the Air Force Academy? A recent article posed “Why Airmen Don’t Command.” In looking at regional commands in which several services participate, author Rebecca Grant underscored that only four of 110 theater commanders, since World War II, have come from the Air Force.⁵²¹ Although Dr. Grant’s thesis concerns various factors such as the overall military’s “stunted” view of air power, the scarcity of Air Force leaders at the head of these commands could raise questions about the propriety and sufficiency of the education of the Air Force officer. In this effort, a part must be played by military and strategic studies, and the decades of work in establishing a department for its pursuit at least makes achieving it a possibility.

Bibliography

Most of the source material comes from the United States Air Force Academy archives, the Special Collection Branch. *AFAHD* is the abbreviation for the Air Force Academy Historical Division, which produces annual histories of the Academy. This began with the 1954-1956 volumes, and then had the subsequent annual histories, except for a few transitions where the history includes two years. The annual histories are between 1-3 volumes, with subsequent volumes of supporting documents.


Papers of Colonel Arthur E. Boudreau.

Papers of Lieutenant General Hubert R. Harmon.

Papers of Brigadier General Robert F. McDermott.

A Report and Recommendation to the Secretary of Defense by the Service Academy Board, January 1950.

Report of the Board of Visitors, 26-28 August 1979, United States Air Force Academy, Twenty-Fifth Anniversary.


Books:


Magazines:
*Air Force Magazine*

*Life*

*Newsweek*
Articles:


Appendix A - Air Force Academy Planning Board

Air Force Academy Planning Board (September 1948 – May 1949)\textsuperscript{522}

Members of the Air Force Academy Planning Board

Project Office

- Lt. Col. Arthur E. Boudreau, Project Officer
- Maj. Ralph W. Keller, Secretary to the Board
- Capt. Russell J. Gardinier, Editor and Historian

Curriculum Group\textsuperscript{523}

- Lt. Col. Arthur E. Boudreau, Director
- Maj. Ralph W. Keller, Assistant Director
- Maj. James E. Crosby
- Maj. John S. White
- Capt. Orr Y. Potebnya
- Capt. William A. Hunter
- Capt. Russell J. Gardinier
- Capt. John C. Adams
- Capt. David B. Thomas

Administration and Organization Group

\textsuperscript{522} AFAPBS, Vol. 1, “A Plan for the Air Force Academy”, xi-xiv. The order of the various participants and groups changed from original document to emphasize what may be of significance to this study. See AFAPBS, Vol. 1, “The Curriculum”, iv.

\textsuperscript{523} This group had a minor change by the time it completed the volume “The Curriculum.” Captain Thomas Sheldrake joined the group, while Majors Crosby and White left the Group.
Lt. Col. David W. Reed, Director
Lt. Col. Joseph M. Murphy,
Lt. Col. John Coolidge
Maj. William L. Mitchell, Jr.*
Maj. Capers A. Holmes
Capt. Thomas L. Sheldrake

Legislative and Interim Group
Col. Robert M. Stillman, Director
Lt. Col. Joseph R. Ambrose
Lt. Col. Sidney F. Wogan

Site and Construction Group
Brig. Gen. James B. Newman, Jr., Director
Col. Clarence Renshaw (C.E.)
Maj. William J. Small, Jr.
Capt. John F. Schaffner
Capt. Arthur G. Witters

Civilian Consultants
Dean Linton H. Baer, Marion Institute, Marion, Ala.
Dr. J.H. Belknap, Engineering Advisor, Air Institute of Technology, Wright Field
Dr. Oliver E. Boyd, M.D., Director, Department of Hygiene, School of Education, Stanford University
Dr. W.G. Carleton, Department of Political Science, University of Florida
Dr. Lloyd W. Chapin, Dean of Faculties, Georgia Institute of Technology
Dr. Homer L. Dodge, President, Norwich University
Dr. Donald D. Durrell, Dean of School of Education, Boston University
Miss Elizabeth Fackt, Social Science Foundation, University of Denver
Mr. Carl W. Files, Department of Mechanical Engineering,
A & M College of Texas
Dr. B. Von Haller Gilmer, Chairman, Department of Psychology and Education,
Carnegie Institute of Technology
Dr. Henry B. Hardt, Head of Department of Chemistry,
Texas Christian University
Dr. Richard Hartshorne, Professor of Geography, University of Wisconsin,
President of American Association of Geographers
Dr. Douglas E. Howes, Professor of Electrical Engineering,
Mr. Ellery Husted, Representative of the Secretary of the Air Force
Dr. Robert F. Jackson, Department of Mathematics, University of Delaware
Dr. Irving J. Lee, Department of Speech and Semantics, University of Chicago
Dr. William M. Lepley, Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State College
Dean W. W. Little, Dean of General College, University of Florida
Dr. Earl McGrath, Department of Education, University of Chicago
Dr. John McLure, Dean of College of Education, University of Alabama
Mr. Elias T. Novikow, Instructor in the Far Eastern Department,
University of Washington
Dr. Raymond B. Paty, Chancellor, Regents of the University System of Georgia
Dr. Merritt B. Pound, Department of Political Science, University of Georgia

Dr. Robert J. Raudebaugh, School of Chemical Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology

Dr. Carroll E. Reed, Instructor of German, University of Washington

Mr. Walter L. Riley, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Washington

Dr. Harry S. Rogers, President, Brooklyn Polytechnic Institute

Mr. Claude A. Roys, Former Chairman Board of Directors, Babson Institute, Wellesley Hills, Mass.

Dr. John Dale Russell, Division of Higher Education, U.S. Office of Education

Mr. Harry Clifton Savage, Department of Drawing, Georgia Institute of Technology

Charles R. Scherer, Professor, head of Department of Mathematics, Texas Christian University

Dr. Josef Solterer, Graduate School Chairman, Department of Economics, Georgetown University

Dr. Lawrence G. Thomas, School of Education, Stanford University

Dr. J. J. Tigert, President, Emeritus, University of Florida

Dr. Homer S. Weber, School of Mechanical Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology

* Changes from the original document come from Errata inserted on the inside of cover for Volume 1, i.
Dr. Arthur Wilson, Director Great Issues Seminar, Dartmouth College

Dr. J. Hooper Wise, Chairman, English Courses, University College, University of Florida

Dr. Ben Wood, Columbia University

Dr. Dean G. Worchester, Jr., Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Washington

Military Consultants

General George C. Kenney, Commanding General, The Air University

General Muir S. Fairchild, Vice Chief of Staff, Hq., USAF

Lt. Gen. John K. Cannon, Commanding General, United States Air Forces in Europe

Lt. Gen. Idwal H. Edwards, Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, Hq., USAF

Lt. Gen. Barton K. Young (Ret.)


Maj. Gen. James D. McIntyre, Deputy Director of Legislative Liaison, Office of the Secretary of Defense

Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Superintendent, United States Military Academy

Brig. Gen. Kenneth P. McNaughton, Chief, Training Division, Hq., USAF

Col. Delmar T. Spivey, Deputy Commander for Education, The Air University

Col. Herman Beukema, Professor, United States Military Academy

Col. T. L. Futch, Commandant of Cadets, The Citadel

Lt Col. S. N. Garrett, Assistant Commandant of Cadets, Virginia Military Institute
Col. G. M. Williamson, Jr., Professor of Military Science and Tactics, Alabama Polytechnic, Institute, Auburn, Alabama

Lt. Col. James C. Stewart, Professor of Air Science and Tactics, Alabama Polytechnic Institute, Auburn, Alabama
Appendix B - Members of the Service Academy Board and the Respective Panels

Service Academy Board:
Robert L. Stearns, Chairman
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Vice Chairman and General of the Army
James P. Baxter, President, University of Williams College, Member
Frederick A. Middlebush, President, University of Missouri, Member
George D. Stoddard, President, University of Illinois, Member
Edward L. Moreland, Executive Vice President, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Member
Major General Bryant E. Moore, Member and Superintendent, United States Military Academy
Rear Admiral James L. Holloway, Member and Superintendent, United States Naval Academy
David M. Schlatter, Member and Major General, USAF
John L. Hoen, Executive Secretary

Panel on Instruction in Science and Engineering:
Dr. Harry Hammond, Dean of Engineering, Pennsylvania State College (Chairman)
Dr. Ivan C. Crawford, Dean, College of Engineering, University of Michigan
Dr. Louis F. Fieser, Professor of Organic Chemistry, Harvard University
Dr. Donald B. Prentice, Professor, Mechanical Engineering, Yale University
Dr. Harold L. Hazen, Head, Department of Electrical Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Mr. C.J. Freund, Dean of Engineering, University of Detroit

Panel on Social Sciences:
Father Edward V. Stanford, Rector, Augustinian College (Chairman)
Dr. Hardy C. Dillard, Professor of Law, University of Virginia
Dr. Richard Hartshorne, Professor of Geography, University of Wisconsin
Dr. Edward S. Mason, Graduate School of Public Administration, Harvard University
Dr. Richard A. Newhall, Professor of History, Williams College

Panel on Language and Area Studies:
Dr. J. Milton Cowan, Director, Modern Language Division, Cornell University (Chairman)
Dr. Stephen A. Freeman, Vice President and Director, Language Schools, Middlebury College
Dr. L. G. Thomas, Associate Professor of Education, Stanford University

Panel on Military Education:
Raymond A. Spruance, Admiral, USN (Ret.) (Chairman)
Troy H. Middleton, Lieutenant General, USA (Ret.)
F.A. Irving, Major General, USA
William S. Parsons, Rear Admiral, USN
George H. Brett, Lieutenant General, USAF (Ret.)
R.W. Harper, Major General, USAF
John J. Easton, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, Executive Security

*The Board also had Panels on Teaching and Testing Methods and Health and Physical Education