THE UKRAINIAN GALICIAN ARMY IN THE
UKRAINIAN-POLISH WAR 1918-1919

by

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ABSTRACT
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I owe an irrepayable debt to my wife, Neonilia M. Kondratiiuk, for her constant interest and encouragement and for this I dedicate my work to her.

I have used a modified Library of Congress system of transliteration but without diacritical marks and ligatures as used by Voldymyr Kubijovyc, (ed.), Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia, (Toronto, 1963-1971). Names of cities and towns are transliterations from Ukrainian; hence, Lviv, rather than Lwow, Lvov, or Lemberg.
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

With the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in October 1918 five states emerged: Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Western Ukraine. The last, Western Ukraine, had never been a separate country, a former Polish province, it was historically part of the Ukraine.

In spite of its name, the Western Ukrainian Republic consisted primarily of Eastern Galicia. The Ukrainian majority, ruled for years by the Polish minority, took advantage of the confusion created by the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire to proclaim their independence in October 1918, but Poles, both within and without the country, saw Eastern Galicia as a historic and integral part of Poland. The inevitable result was an armed conflict.

The Ukrainian-Polish War of 1918-1919 was fought by two nationalities that had coexisted, albeit with political friction, for centuries. However, there was an element of social conflict as well; the landowners and civil servants were primarily Poles, the Ukrainians, with a small middle class, were peasants. Yet the war was free of ethnic and social antipathy. The soldiers of both armies, former peasants themselves, often mingled between the fighting.

The Ukrainians saw the conflict as a war of national liberation. They believed in the principle of self-determination and were surprised
by the attitude of the Poles. Both sides, convinced of the rightness of their positions, sought diplomatic recognition from the Paris Peace Conference.

The latter initially viewed the conflict as a border dispute. However, the war took on greater significance when the Conference grew alarmed over events in Russia. Although the Allied Powers attempted to mediate the dispute, events on the battlefield determined the outcome of this conflict.

For the Allies the Eastern Galician question was but a part of the larger issue of containing Bolshevism. As the Ukrainian hold on Eastern Galicia became more precarious, the Poles magnified the Bolshevik menace to their own advantage. Convinced that the Poles had to be supported in their burgeoning fight against the Bolshevists, the Allies quickly dismissed Ukrainian aspirations and authorized the Poles to occupy all of Eastern Galicia.

Historians have studied the diplomatic aspects of the Ukrainian-Polish conflict but the role of the Ukrainsha Halytska Armia (Ukrainian Galician Army or UHA) remains largely untold. The UHA composed of veterans of the Austrian Army grew into a sizeable well disciplined organized armed force. Led by officers drawn from the small Ukrainian intelligentsia, the army saw the war as a national crusade for the self-determination of Western Ukraine.

The Ukrainian-Polish war is an interesting study of the fate of post-war minority armed forces in a state of flux between major powers and their allies. The Poles, initially supported by the French, won the eventual support of the Allies. The Ukrainians, with a past largely unknown by the West, never had any real diplomatic support. In wars of
national liberation the minority cannot succeed without outside assistance and great power recognition. The Ukrainian-Polish war is an excellent case study.
CHAPTER II

EASTERN GALICIA—WESTERN UKRAINE

The Ukrainian Cultural and Political Awakening.

In order to place the Ukrainian-Polish conflict over Eastern Galicia and the role of the Ukrainian Galician Army in proper perspective, it is appropriate to outline briefly the character of Ukrainian-Polish relations prior to World War I.

Eastern Galicia (roughly the size of West Virginia) was one of the three West Ukrainian provinces that were formerly part of Austro-Hungary. Once part of the Kievan principality, it had been independent in medieval times. Absorbed by the Poles during the fourteenth century, it remained part of Poland until the first partition in 1772 when it was taken by Austria and joined with adjacent Polish territory to form the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria, commonly known as Galicia.

The majority of the population were Ukrainian peasants known as Rusyny (Ruthenians), a name derived from the medieval term for the Ukraine, Rus. The landed gentry was completely Polish, while the inhabitants of the cities and towns were Poles and Jews. The educated Ukrainians were primarily Uniate (Greek Catholic) priests. The initial result of the partition proved to be beneficial to Ukrainians. The Uniate Church was granted equal status with the Roman Catholic Church. The Habsburg kings also opened new Uniate seminaries, created a Ukrainian chair of philosophy and theology at Lviv University, and facilitated church
administration by establishing cathedral chapters headed by bishops.¹

These reforms raised the educational and cultural standards of the Ukrainian clergy, and led to their assumption of the political and cultural leadership of the Ukrainian community.²

Although the reforms ended with Emperor Joseph II's death in 1790, the life of the Ukrainian serf had improved; minor personal rights, such as marriage, and the right to appeal to governmental offices, were granted; peasants were given possession of cultivated plots, while the corvee was limited to 156 days per year. The end of the Napoleonic Wars turned the policies of the Austrian government toward the interests of the Polish landed gentry; however, by then the Ukrainian peasant had become a legal entity rather than a form of chattel.³

Though in the late 1820's and early 1830's, the older Uniate clergy were conservative, the younger clergymen came under the influence of the Romantic movement. In 1832 a patriotic circle was formed in the Lviv Seminary, the leaders known as the Ruthenian Triad; were Markian Shashkevych, Ivan Vehylevych, and Jacob Holovatsky.⁴ In 1837 they published Rusalka Dnistrovaia (The Nymph of the Dniester), a volume of folk and original poetry in the Ukrainian language. This created an uproar among church authorities. Until that time, Ukrainian was spoken only by peasants, Uniate services were conducted in Old Church Slavonic, while the spoken language among the literate classes was Polish. Shashkevych was stimulated by the vernacular literary movement in Eastern Ukraine, while Vehylevych and Holovatsky were influenced by the ideas of the Czech national movement. In an article published in 1846 Holovatsky appealed to Austrians to support the Galician Ukrainians, who would influence "those living in the Russian Empire."⁵ The Ukrainian national revival in Galicia now passed
from "the literary to the political field." 6

While the Ukrainian revival was just beginning, the attempts by Polish patriots to regain Poland's independence had never ended. In 1846 Polish revolutionaries attempted to foment a rebellion among the Polish peasantry in Western Galicia. Instead the peasants, encouraged by rumors of reform from Vienna, turned on the revolutionaries and nobility in a bloody jacquerie. Eastern Galicia remained quiet. In 1847 the Eastern and Western sections of the province were divided into two administrative districts, a move long awaited by Ukrainians.

In May 1848, the first Ukrainian political organization in Galicia, the Holovna Ruska Rada (Central Ruthenian Council), was established under the leadership of Bishop Yakhymovych. 7 The Council declared that Ukrainians were a distinct people different from the Poles and Russians. The Council also called for the partition of Galicia into Ukrainian and Polish provinces. 3

The Regelutions of 1848 also affected Galicia. When news of outbursts in Vienna reached Galicia, Polish activists staged large-scale demonstrations that demanded greater autonomy for the province. The politically conscious Ukrainians, realizing that the Polish demand for autonomy would place the government of the province in Polish control, petitioned for equal rights for both nationalities.

The Austrian governor of Galicia, Count Francis Stadion, encouraged the Central Ruthenian Council in its national claims in an attempt to thwart the irredentism of the Polish gentry and intelligentsia. 9 He also abolished the corvee, thus causing both Polish and Ukrainian peasants to support the regime. In March 1949, permission was granted for a provisional regiment of "Ruthenian Riflemen" formed with Ukrainian peasant volunteers to aid
the hardpressed Austrian Army in suppressing the rebellion in Hungary. 10

During the Slav Congress in Prague the Czechs acted as mediators between the Poles and Ukrainians on the Polish-Ruthenian Council. The Ukrainians agreed to postpone the issue of dividing Galicia, while the Poles agreed that both groups "were to have equal rights in all administrative and educational matters." 11 Although this resolution never came into being, because of the forced dissolution of the Slav Congress, this was the only time that Ukrainian and Polish representatives compromised until 1914. 12

In 1849, Count Agenor Goluchowski, a Pole, was appointed provincial governor. He opposed any reforms that would benefit the nascent Ukrainian movement. Goluchowski denounced the Ukrainians as dangerous Russophiles, and further implied that they were disloyal toward Austria. And though his attempt to Latinize the Ukrainian alphabet failed, he was successful in replacing Germans with Poles in the Galician civil service. 13

During the 1850's the Ukrainian movement split into two factions; the Russophiles, or Old Ruthenians, made up of older intelligentsia, who looked forward to union with Russia, and the Narodova (Populists), or Young Ruthenians later the "Ukrainians", who saw a worsening of the Ukrainian national situation. 14 The Russophiles, politically and culturally more powerful, made little effort to compromise with the Poles. Polish authorities, suspecting a Russophile collusion with Russian agents alerted Vienna with their suspicions. 15 The Russophiles, who thought of themselves as Russians rather than Ukrainians, could not provide the leadership that was needed to nurture the growing Ukrainian political movement.

The Populists, many of them members of the rising lay intelligentsia, concentrated on educational and cultural work, especially, among the peasants.
Politically weak, the Populists organized secret student groups and also published Ukrainian books and newspapers.\(^{16}\)

During the latter half of the nineteenth century, Polish-Ukrainian bitterness intensified. The Poles considered Eastern Galicia part of historic Poland. The Ukrainians, who saw themselves as second class citizens in their own country, believed that Poland should be composed solely of ethnic Poles. The Poles were in the dominant position; in 1867 Vienna turned over the administration of Galicia to the Polish aristocracy and Polish became the official language. Galicia was now a \textit{de facto} Polish autonomous province.

The two groups were also separated socially; Poles dominated the landed nobility and upper middle class, while the Ukrainians, with a small middle class, were predominately peasants. The Ukrainian intelligentsia, whose origins were only one or two generations removed from the village, remained a very small element of Ukrainian society. Thus the Ukrainian struggle was national as well as social.\(^{17}\)

Most Poles thought the idea of a nation composed of Ukrainians with rights equal to those of Poles as ridiculous. Poles who often called the Ukrainian movement an Austrian or Russian intrigue also controlled the Galician Diet and heavily outnumbered the Ukrainian representatives in the Viennese parliament. In 1873 when the \textit{curia} system of election was introduced, the percentage of Ukrainian delegates dropped drastically from 33\% to 10\%.\(^{18}\)

Meanwhile, the Populists increased in number and influence. Many Russophiles joined the Populists after their own leaders were discredited in an 1882 court trial where their duplicity, in professing loyalty to Vienna while accepting Russian payments, was uncovered.\(^{19}\) By 1890 the
Populists had assumed the leadership of the Ukrainian community.

The Galician Ukrainians were also in close contact with the Russian-controlled Dnieper Ukrainians. Galicia became a "sanctuary from tsarist persecution." Since Ukrainian cultural and educational activities were prohibited in Dnieper Ukraine from 1876-1906, Galicia became a Ukrainian "Piedmont". This "Piedmont complex" convinced many Galician Ukrainians that Eastern Galicia would play the leading role in the Ukraine's struggle for independence.

Between 1890 and 1914 the Ukrainians in Galicia made great strides politically, economically, and culturally. Ivan Rudnytsky, an American-Ukrainian scholar, called it a time of tremendous change. "In the place of a depressed peasant mass arose a politically conscious peasant nation."

Between 1890 and 1894 efforts to effect a political compromise between Poles and Ukrainians failed. But from these activities two new Ukrainian political parties emerged; the Ruthenian-Ukrainian Radical Party and the Ukrainian National Democratic Party. The Radicals maintained a policy of agrarian socialism and militant anticlericalism. The National Democrats, a coalition party, had a common platform of democratic nationalism and social reform. Both parties advocated future independence for a unified Ukraine.

The number of Ukrainian schools and libraries increased by hundreds. In 1894 Mykhailo Hrushevsky, a young Ukrainian professor from Kiev, was appointed to the chair of East European History at the University of Lviv. While writing the ten volume History of Ukraine he also presided over the Shevchenko Scientific Society raising it to the level of an unofficial Ukrainian academy of arts and sciences.
Two gymnastic societies Sokil (Falcon) and Sich (named for the Cossack fortress of the 16th-18th centuries) combined physical education with the promotion of patriotic and cultural interests. Both groups sponsored reading halls, choirs, libraries, theater groups, and educational courses that spread national sentiment and consciousness among Ukrainian youth. 24

However, the status of the peasantry remained unimproved. Agricultural production remained low, the peasants still using primitive implements. In the agricultural areas of Eastern Galicia there were 182 people per square mile, such population pressure resulted in an average of 50,000 people dying a year from malnutrition. Over 40% of the farmland was still in latifundia. 25

A bright side, however, was the growing number of Ukrainian immigrants to America and Canada who were able to send money to their families in Galicia. This relief of population pressure and return of capital resulted in some peasant families purchasing parcels of land. Also during this period, the cooperative movement aided peasants in purchasing land, establishing credit unions, cooperative stores and dairies, as well as forming agricultural marketing associations. The Silskyi Hospodar (Village Farmer), a national peasant agricultural organization, gave advice on improving farming methods. 26

A general agrarian strike in 1902, involving some 200,000 peasants, was a protest against the low wages paid by the Polish nobles as well as against the bureaucratic hindrance in the issuing of seasonal emigration work permits. The strike, because of its adherence, proved a success as wages were increased and seasonal emigration became easier. 27 The general
strike was by no means an isolated event.

The period just before World War I was also marked by political rallies, demonstrations, and riots which often resulted in arrests and trials. In 1908 a hotheaded Ukrainian student assassinated the Polish governor, Count Andrzej Potocki, in retaliation for the deaths of two peasants during a dispute over a fraudulent election.

The major political issues involved educational and electoral reform. Ukrainians wanted to open a new university in Lviv, after the Polish dominated administration of the University of Lviv refused to create additional Ukrainian chairs. Clashes between Polish and Ukrainian students over this issue culminated in the death of one and the mass resignation of 600 other Ukrainian students. In 1912 the Austrian government promised to establish a Ukrainian university in four years, but even this was obstructed by the Poles. Limited electoral reform was achieved in 1907 with universal suffrage instituted in Galicia. Although Ukrainian representation doubled, the gerrymandering of electoral districts maintained Polish predominance in the Galician delegation to the Reichstrat in Vienna.

On the eve of the outbreak of World War I there was a glimmer of hope for political reconciliation. After a series of political battles, both Poles and Ukrainians agreed to compromise in the revision of the electoral laws for the Galician Diet. On February 14, 1914, the reform bill was passed; Ukrainians now had 62 of the 228 seats. Ukrainians were also appointed to provincial boards and diet committees, and were given control of their own school system. In return, the Ukrainians agreed that in rural districts, where Poles were a minority, non-Ukrainians would be entitled to proportional representation. Although Ukrainians had won
important concessions, they still were not satisfied with their political status. Many Ukrainians felt that the only answer was an autonomous Ukrainian crownland within the empire, and then eventual independence. Overall, Ukrainians remained loyal to the Emperor, while the government began distrusting the Poles.

Little was said about the status of the 38% of the population that was non-Ukrainian. In the last prewar census (1910) Eastern Galicia had 5,335,800 people divided into 61% Ukrainians, 25.3% Poles, and 12.4% Jews. 31

The outbreak of World War I seriously hampered Ukrainian efforts toward greater political autonomy. There had been a growing trend toward political compromise between Poles and Ukrainians. It was evident that a reborn Poland was in sight and that the Ukrainians could be harmonious neighbors. The earlier viciousness between Polish and Ukrainian politicians had also lessened; both groups felt that differences could be worked out amiably.

The Poles also realized that the Ukrainians had matured into a political force and could not be assimilated or knuckled down. However, the war reopened healed sores.

To many prominent Poles in Eastern Galicia Austro-Hungary was the enemy. Only with its defeat could Poland emerge again. The Ukrainians, perhaps with less political acumen, remained loyal to the Emperor. They felt that political autonomy was in sight, and possibly, in ten or twenty years, independence. Ukrainians did not want to jeopardize their newly won political rights. As a result, the Poles and Ukrainians once more became adversaries, and their political antagonisms resumed.
Eastern Galicia and World War I.

It was evident to some Ukrainians that war between Austro-Hungary and Russia was inevitable. In December 1912, representatives of Ukrainian political parties decided, thinking of a future united Ukrainian nation, that in case of war, "the entire Ukrainian people will unanimously and resolutely stand on the side of Austria against the Russian empire, as the greatest enemy of the Ukraine." 32

In reality, the Ukrainians had little choice in their support of Austria, as any indications of nonsupport or passivity would have resulted in the Galician Poles labeling them as traitors. 33 Nevertheless, Ukrainian support for Austro-Hungary remained firm.

On August 3, 1914, the newly formed Holovna Ukraїnska Rada (Central Ukrainian Council) composed of representatives of the three largest political parties, called for the Ukrainian people to stand united against the Tsarist empire. The Council also ordered the unofficial Ukraїnska Boїova Uprava (Ukrainian Military Administration) to start organizing volunteer units for service at the front. 34 The following day in Lviv, the Soiuz Vyzvolennia Ukraїny (Union for the Liberation of Ukraine) was formed as a political organization of East Ukrainians determined to take advantage of the war to promote the idea of an independent Ukraine. 35

During the Fall of 1914, with the collapse of Austrian defenses, some Poles denounced local Ukrainians as a potential fifth column full of Russian agents. Retreating Hungarian units arbitrarily executed 2,000 priests, peasants, and members of the intelligentsia. 36 Over 10,000 Ukrainians were imprisoned in Austrian concentration camps and were not released until 1917. 37
As Ukrainian deputies in Vienna attempted to convince the Austro-Hungarian High Command of the atrocities its units had committed, Tsarist occupation officials instituted their own repressive regime. The Tsarist government attempted to Russify the Uniate Church by replacing the deported Ukrainian priests with Russian Orthodox priests. Ukrainian cultural and educational institutions were closed and prominent Ukrainians, such as Metropolitan Count Andreij Sheptysky, were exiled to Siberia. While visiting Lviv, Tsar Nicholas II, calling the population "truly Russian," proclaimed the union of Galicia with Russia. During the Russian retreat in June 1915, thousands of peasants were forced by the Russian Army to evacuate, many of them dying from hunger and disease.

Ukrainian political leaders in Vienna led by Konstantin Levytsky, Evhen Olenytsky, and Nykola Vasylko worked to improve conditions and resolve political problems of Eastern Galicia. In May 1915, the Zahalna Ukraїnska Rada (General Ukrainian Council), made up of Western and Eastern Ukrainians was formed to work for the independence of Eastern Ukraine from Russia and for the political autonomy of Western Ukraine within the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The General Council also requested that units of the Ukrainian Sich Rifles replace Polish troops in occupation duties in conquered areas of Russian Ukraine. Even though the request was denied, Ukrainian officers organized cultural and educational groups in Volhynia. The General Council also organized relief and protection efforts for the war-ravaged areas of Eastern Galicia.

In November 1916, Germany and Austria jointly proclaimed an independent Poland made up of the former Russian gubernias and Galicia. Ukrainian members of parliament, led by Evhen Petrushevych, vigorously protested that the Ukrainian people would never relinquish their fight for
political autonomy. The new Austro-Hungarian emperor, Charles I, assured the Ukrainians that the Galician question would be resolved after the end of the war. However, the Ukrainian delegates demanded a settlement as soon as possible. With the outbreak of the Russian Revolution in March 1917, Eastern Ukraine declared itself an independent Peoples Republic headed by Professor Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the Central Rada. As a result, aspirations for an independent Western (Galician) Ukrainian state, which had always been an idealistic dream, was now a viable alternative to Austrian refusals of an autonomous crownland. Ukrainian students urged the Ukrainian parliamentary delegation to declare its intention to form a Republic from the Ukrainian provinces of Austro-Hungary.

The Ukrainian parliamentary delegates chose to continue to strive for autonomy within the Austrian state. Evhen Petrushevych, in an address to parliament in May 1917, declared that Ukrainian lands could not be merged with Poland. However, it was not until February 1918 that the Ukrainian delegates, in a speech made by Konstantin Levytsky, threatened that if the separation of Galicia into Polish and Ukrainian divisions was not accomplished, then preparations would be made to unite with the Ukrainian People's Republic. A secret organization of Ukrainian officers in Vienna was formed to plan the unification of Ukraine, while Ukrainian students now called for a unified Ukraine under the rule of the Central Rada.

The Central Rada was also interested in unifying Eastern and Western Ukraine. In February 1918 at Brest-Litovsk, where German, Austrian, Bolshevik, and Ukrainian delegations attempted to negotiate the end of hostilities, the Central Rada attempted to force Austria into seceding its Western Ukrainian provinces to the Ukrainian Republic. Count Ottokar Czernin, the Austrian foreign minister, though desperate for Ukrainian
grain, refused to consider this demand. However, a secret supplement to the treaty was signed whereby Eastern Galicia and Northern Bukovina were to be joined in an Austrian crownland.47

The secret provisions of the treaty were divulged by a Ukrainian diplomat to Galician Ukrainian politicians in Vienna, Polish delegates, when informed of the treaty's secret provisions, protested the separation of Galicia especially since the proposed Ukrainian capital, Lviv, was essentially a Polish city.48

To further complicate matters, the Germans engineered a coup d'état in the Ukraine in April 1918. General Pavlo Skoropadsky proclaimed himself Hetman (an old title for the leader of the Ukrainian Cossacks), overthrew the Central Rada and established a new government in Kiev.49 The Austrian government, under Polish pressure, accused the Ukrainians of violating the grain delivery terms of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. This gave the Austrian government the opportunity to renounce the secret agreement in regard to Galicia, calling it an internal matter. The Hetman, dependent upon German occupation troops for his survival, was forced to acquiesce.49 Ukrainian protests in Vienna proved ineffective.

On October 16, 1918, Charles I, with his empire about to collapse, announced a manifesto that would reconstruct Austria into a federation of German, Czech, and Ukrainian states. However, at a meeting in Lviv, Ukrainian parliamentary delegates, representatives of political parties and several Uniate bishops convened themselves, on October 19, as the Ukrańska Narodna Rada (Ukrainian People's Council). The latter hastily passed a statute of five articles which included plans for an independent Western Ukrainian State composed of Eastern Galicia, Northwestern Bukovina, and Carpatho-Ukraine.50 On the next day, October 20, the Council proclaimed
the Western Ukrainian People's Republic an independent state.

The Council expected a peaceful transition from an Austro-Hungarian province to an independent country. Noticeably absent from the deliberations were army officers; they were not invited, naively, because the Council thought their presence as unnecessary. There was little thought that, perhaps, Western Ukraine would have to maintain its independence with the force of arms. In the glow of political victory, after years of struggle, there was little thought that Ukrainian independence would be opposed; the Austro-Hungarian armies had collapsed, Germany was on the verge of defeat, Russia's attention was diverted by internal problems, while the Poles were busy organizing their own government and country.

As a result, the Council did not plan for the military take-over of Eastern Galicia. Only a few politicians realized that some military force would be needed. Others felt that the Austrian military authorities would simply transfer their authority and march out of Eastern Galicia. The few Ukrainian officers of the Austro-Hungarian Army in Galicia, joined together in the secret Central Military Committee, also thought that a minimum of military force would be needed.

Ukrainian officers gave little thought toward the formation of an army and even less toward the possibility of armed resistance or war with Poland. Consequently, few preparations were made to defend the interests of the Council by forming a nucleus of an army.

Meanwhile the future core of the Ukrainian Galician Army, Ukrainian veterans of the Austrian Army, rapidly demobilized and began returning to their villages. Few efforts were made to stop them. The situation was indictative of the attitude of the Ukrainian intelligentsia toward the military.
There had been a dichotomy toward military service among Ukrainians. To the peasants, although it was an additional burden, military service was accepted and complied with. To the middle class, it was something to be avoided.

Ever since the adoption of universal military service in 1868, among the peasants, service in the army had become a tradition in many areas of the Ukrainian provinces. It was not unusual to have three generations serving in the same regiment. Ukrainians usually served in regiments composed of two or more nationalities, most often with Poles and Polish officers. Several regiments were completely Ukrainian except for the officers and higher ranking sergeants who were usually German. Yet Ukrainians made up only 8.6% of the enlisted strength of the peacetime Austro-Hungarian Army. In early 1914 there were 25,000 Ukrainians serving in 42 regiments. Of the 6,500,000 men who served in the Austro-Hungarian Army during World War I, over 500,000 were Ukrainians.

While there was a tradition of enlisted service in the army, there were extremely few Ukrainian officers. There were three reasons for the small number of Ukrainian officers: (1) the primary one was that the Ukrainian middle class was so small, there were few Ukrainians eligible to receive commissions; (2) Ukrainian students, who were more interested in civilian professions, had a definite aversion to serving in the feudal-aristocratic Austrian officer corps; (3) official policy was to favor the recruitment of officers from the socially and educationally privileged nationalities. Germans, who made up 24% of the population, composed 79% of the regular officer corps, and 59% of the reserve officer corps.

In spite of this, several Ukrainians did serve as regular officers, while a larger number served in the reserves where they remained first
lieutenants as it was not until 1916 that reserve and temporary officers could be promoted to the grade of captain.\textsuperscript{55} During World War I several thousand Ukrainians were commissioned, the vast majority serving as lieutenants and captains. Few Ukrainians achieved field grade while only four became generals.\textsuperscript{56}

The most famous Ukrainian regiment in the Austrian Army was the \textit{Ukrainski Sichovi Striltsi} (Ukrainian Sich Rifles). In August 1914, the Supreme Ukrainian Council called on Ukrainians to volunteer for a legion of division size for war service. Although 28,000 men volunteered, because of Polish pressure the Austrians limited the unit to a regiment of 2,500 men.\textsuperscript{57} The nucleus of the regiment was the \textit{Sichovi Striltsi}, a paramilitary organization, formed in 1913. The Ukrainian Sich Rifles was formed with the idea that it would be the foundation of a future Ukrainian Army. The politically conscious volunteers, mostly students, strongly supported the idea of an independent Western Ukraine.

Except for several Austrian officers, the entire regiment was Ukrainian; composed of two infantry battalions, a cavalry troop (disbanded in 1917), and a regimental depot. It was first committed to combat in September 1914 against Russian troops in the Carpathian Mountains.\textsuperscript{58} The regiment saw heavy fighting on the Eastern Front and distinguished itself in the Battle of Makivka in May 1915. But after it suffered heavy losses in the Battle of Berezhany in September 1916, it was reorganized into one battalion. In early 1918, the Sich Rifles was serving with an independent \textit{Landsturm} Brigade in Bessarabia; in the Fall the battalion was transferred to Bukovina.\textsuperscript{59}

Perhaps, the regiment's two greatest contributions to the future Ukrainian Galician Army was the number of commissioned officers it produced,
and the nationalistic spirit that these officers inspired among the soldiers. This spirit would be severely tested.

Both the National Council and the Central Military Committee blithely looked forward to Ukrainian independence. They believed that the years of political strife had finally paid off. The Western Ukrainians were entitled to independence and were ready for it, or so they believed.

The vast majority of Ukrainians, the peasants, were not fully politically conscious for after years of serving the Emperor, the events during and after the war confused them. To the peasants an independent Ukraine was something hard to imagine. Many peasants were illiterate and, therefore, could not read about events in Lviv and Vienna. The idea of being a Ukrainian rather than a Ruthenian was fairly recent and had not taken hold in all of Eastern Galicia. Therefore, it would take months before the peasants would appreciate the full meaning of nationhood.

Little was done to form an army that would depend on peasant soldiers. Many of the demobilized peasant veterans returned to their villages. Instead of propagandizing and assembling the veterans, battalions were allowed to drift away. Other Ukrainian officers and soldiers were still stationed on the Italian front or were POW's. The one regiment that could have served as a nucleus of an army, the Sich Rifles, was sitting in Bukovina, 230 kilometers from Lviv, while some of its members were involved in political affairs to the exclusion of military matters.

Therefore, the Ukrainian political and military leadership did not realize their tenuous position. They ignored the fact that 38% of the country was non-Ukrainian and that the Poles would resist a Ukrainian government. Many Poles fully expected Eastern Galicia to be incorporated
into Poland. The Polish National League saw Eastern Galicia and the Ukrainians as an integral part of Poland. The war had proved that compromise between the Poles and Ukrainians was now out of the question. All factors pointed toward armed conflict, yet, when it occurred, both sides were surprised.
CHAPTER III

INITIAL STAGES OF THE WAR

The Coup d'Etat in Lviv

During the latter part of October 1918, the Ukrainian People's Council started negotiations with the Austrian governor, Count Von Huyn, for the take over of the administration of Eastern Galicia. The Council, faced with Von Huyn's refusal to transfer governmental authority, now sanctioned a coup d'etat.

The Central Military Committee had been planning for a coup for several weeks. On October 30 Captain Dmytro Vitovsky of the Sich Rifles arrived in Lviv, assumed leadership of the plotters, and decided that the coup would take place during the night of October 31. That evening Captain Vitovsky issued orders for the disposition of the 1,400 Ukrainian soldiers of the 10th, 30th, 33rd, 58th, and 89th Infantry Regiments. Eight hundred men took over the barracks and public buildings, and disarmed non-Ukrainian troops. The remainder (plans for an additional 1,000 men had fallen through) were either held in reserve or guarded supply depots.

On the morning of November 1 the city awoke to find the blue and yellow Ukrainian flag flying in place of the Austro-Hungarian national colors, while Ukrainian troops, still in Austrian uniforms, but distinguished by blue and yellow arm and hatbands, held Lviv. Governor Von Huyn, now under house arrest, still refused to transfer his powers but later agreed to hand over his authority to his Ukrainian deputy, Volodymyr Detsikevich,
who promptly signed the documents that turned over the government to the Ukrainian People's Council. On the same day the Council issued a proclamation announcing the transfer of power to the Western Ukrainian Republic. A second proclamation to the city of Lviv called for peace and order.

Although the extent of Austro-Ukrainian collaboration in the coup is unclear, Polish historians claim that the local authorities and the Austrian High Command aided preparations, while Ukrainian historians deny any prior Austrian assistance. However, General Rudolf Pfeffer, the Austrian garrison commander, clearly sided with the Ukrainians. In an address to his officers, he urged them to volunteer for service in the Ukrainian Galician Army (UHA).

However, the Polish population (which consisted of over half of the 206,000 people) had no intention of living in a Ukrainian state. They had expected Eastern Galicia to be formally annexed to Poland by the Polish Liquidation Commission which was to have arrived on November 1. As word of the preparations for the coup leaked out, the secret Polish military organizations met on October 31 to discuss their strategy.

The three recently organized military groups; the POW (Polish Military Organization) supporters of Jozef Pilsudski, the PKW (Polish Military Cadre) the military arm of the National Democratic Party, and the PKP (Polish Auxiliary Corps) made up of former Polish Legionnaires who had broken with Pilsudski, laid aside their political differences and agreed to the leadership of Captain Czeslaw Maczynski. Although their entire armament consisted of only 64 rifles, the Poles decided to strike back on the afternoon of November 1. On that busy day, they occupied the Sienkiewicz School, an army barracks, and the Technical Hall which
became their headquarters. Polish soldiers were reinforced by students, workers, and several women. Ukrainian troops, sent to dislodge the Poles, were halted by sniper fire.

The Poles initially armed themselves by attacking Ukrainian sentries and by stealing weapons from the patients of an Austrian military hospital. Polish supply problems ended on November 2, when the lightly held freight station, with thousands of rifles and boxes of ammunition, was captured.

As the Poles attempted to enlarge their front, the Ukrainians fought back; however, the UHA forces were too scattered to effectively repress the Polish insurgents. On the night of November 2, Polish soldiers captured the main railroad station which disrupted the Ukrainian government's communications with the rest of Western Ukraine.

During the fighting a crisis developed within the Ukrainian High Command; the newly promoted Colonel Vitovsky, realizing that he did not have the skills for tactical command, asked to be relieved. He assumed the position of War Minister while Colonel Nikola Marynovych became acting commander of UHA.

The Ukrainian forces, which had been nearly equal in size to the Poles, began to diminish. Replacements for the casualties were not available, while some soldiers, bewildered by the urban streetfighting, began to desert. The only major reinforcement, the Sich Rifle Regiment, did not receive orders to move until November 2. Disruptive efforts on the part of Polish railroad workers delayed the unit's arrival for two days.

Now strengthened with reinforcements, the Ukrainians renewed their attacks on Polish positions. However, the battle went badly for the
Ukrainians when their uncoordinated thrusts were met by Polish counterattacks on their flanks. The Poles also attacked the Ukrainian positions at the Main Post Office and the Ferdinand Barracks. On November 3, a three-pronged assault partially expanded the Polish base in the central city. Later in the day, the Ukrainians unsuccessfully hit Polish positions in the southern part of the city while control of the streets changed several times.\textsuperscript{17}

The Ukrainians planned to mount a general attack at 0600 November 4, with advance elements of the Sich Rifles and companies of the former 35th Infantry assaulting the central part of Lviv while another battalion moved against Polish positions in the west.\textsuperscript{18} Just before the attack was to begin the Ukrainian Command discovered that the Poles had occupied the Cadet School the previous night. Since the Polish positions on the grounds of the Cadet School obstructed the Ukrainian attack, a company of the Sich Rifles went to clear it. However, the rest of the force came under a crossfire and had to fall back.\textsuperscript{19}

After the unsuccessful Ukrainian attempt, the Poles launched their own operations in the center of the city. Their occupation of the Ukrainian Seminary, next to the strongly held Main Post Office, gave them an excellent position for future attacks.\textsuperscript{20} For a time it seemed as if the Ukrainian front would collapse. However, desperate actions by small units prevented a breakthrough by inflicting heavy casualties. Exhausted by the assaults, the Poles gave way to local UHA counterattacks. Also during the day, several aircraft of the recently organized Polish Air Force began operations over Lviv by making two bombing sorties.\textsuperscript{21}

On the next day, November 5, Colonel Hryhorij Kossak assumed command of UHA. The fighting lasted all day until both sides agreed to a twenty-
four hour truce. The Poles used the time to organize a provisional cavalry troop and construct an armored car and train. The Polish Command also planned a commando raid of sorts to capture the Ukrainian High Command headquarterd in the Ukrainian National Home, however, the operation had to be cancelled because of insufficient forces.

With the renewal of hostilities on November 7, a definite front emerged; the Ukrainians held the eastern half of Lviv, while the Poles held the western half. After another two days of continuous fighting the government became dissatisfied with Colonel Kossak. The government, eager for a quick victory, disagreed with Kossak's defensive tactics. On November 9, Colonel Hnat Stefaniv, one of the few Ukrainians who had been an Austrian regular, became UHA commander.

Colonel Stefaniv ordered reinforcements from other cities, changed troop dispositions, and ordered attacks on the Zamartyniv area and on the Cadet School. The Poles also launched assaults on UHA's flanks, on an armory in the suburbs, and also successfully stormed the Main Post Office. These were the last general Polish attacks, several hundred casualties and the weariness of the civilians forced the Polish Command to go over to the defensive. The Poles were also forced to exchange their Austrian weapons for Russian rifles when the supply of 3mm ammunition ran out.

After Colonel Stefaniv successfully repulsed the Polish flanking movements, he reorganized the Ukrainian High Command into a General Staff, eliminated the chaos in Army Headquarters by banishing civilian and military petitioners, and organized military police units to halt desertion. One of his major errors, however, was his refusal to enlist
Ukrainian civilian inhabitants of Lviv to act as scouts, intelligence agents, and guides. UHA units, hampered by their unfamiliarity with the city, had little information about the size and dispositions of the Polish forces.

The fighting took on another dimension when each side formed support units. Both sides organized field artillery batteries that often engaged in counterbattery fire. The Poles also organized cavalry, engineer, and signal units. While the lone Polish armored car was destroyed after two days of fighting, Polish aircraft and armored trains continued to harass the Ukrainians.

On November 15, Colonel Stefaniv launched another general assault by making frontal attacks on the northern and southern Polish flanks. The attacks failed since Stefaniv did not plan any supporting or diversionary actions, nor did he have any adequate reserves. He also ordered the third assault on the Cadet School, considering it a threat to his southern flank. Another attack on the school on November 17, preceded by two hours of artillery shelling, lost its momentum when the Poles counterattacked. Exhausted and nearly out of ammunition, both sides agreed to a forty-eight hour truce which began at 0600 November 18.

During the truce Polish and Ukrainian soldiers mingled with one another and discussed the previous fighting. Colonel Stefaniv visited each unit and urged his soldiers to continue fighting for Ukrainian independence, and further ordered that commanders maintain discipline in their units. While the troops rested, talks aimed at settling the situation failed. However, an extension of the truce for another twenty-four hours was agreed on. With all hope gone for a compromise, both sides looked for
more reinforcements. Control of the city would be determined by the force of arms.

The Polish situation was critical. The city had lost its electricity and water supply, while the stores had been emptied of food days before. Faced with a food shortage and tired of the constant fighting, elements of the civilian population demanded Captain Maczynski make peace within three days. Rather than surrender, Captain Maczynski dispatched an emissary to Warsaw to plead for more troops. Polish Chief of State General Joseph Pilsudski, recently released from a German prison, agreed to send 800 men under the command of General Roja to Lviv. At the same time reinforcements consisting of 1,368 men with eight howitzers from Cracow arrived in Lviv on the night of November 20. Together with Captain Maczynski's command, the Poles had over 6,000 men under arms.

The Ukrainians also did their best to find reinforcements; in a general order issued to district and area commanders, Colonel Vitovsky, acting as Secretary of State for Military Affairs, ordered detachments of troops from all over Western Ukraine to report to Lviv. He also visited several cities and towns in an effort to expedite the arrival of troops. On November 21, the strength of UHA in Lviv was 161 officers and 4,517 enlisted men.

The Final Phase for Lviv

At 0600 November 21, the Polish Army began a general offensive; its plan called for a pincer movement on the Ukrainian flanks on the north and south, timed with a frontal attack on the UHA center. In the north the first and second UHA lines were overrun; the third line of resistance
managed to check the Polish advance. In the city, the Poles failed to take the UHA-held Citadel, in spite of heavy mortar and artillery fire. However, the Polish movement in the south, which consisted of three infantry battalions, an artillery battery, and a cavalry troop forced the Ukrainians to pull back.

At 1100 hours the Poles renewed the assault with air and artillery support. Fierce UHA resistance stalled the Polish advance. However, at 1500 hours, when the Poles made their third and final thrust, the Ukrainians held on with the greatest of difficulty. The UHA artillery, which had lost its communications with its forward observers, fired at suspected enemy locations instead of directly supporting the infantry. In one position Polish units captured two howitzers, while other battery positions either ran out of ammunition or were destroyed by counterbattery fire. By the end of the afternoon the UHA artillery was out of action.

Colonel Mefaniv and his staff did their best to halt the Polish offensive; however, Stefaniv, convinced that his army was in a hopeless situation, decided to evacuate his troops from the city. On the Polish side, General Roja, who had arrived that day with an additional two infantry companies, decided to halt any further advances until more reinforcements arrived.

At midnight the evacuation began and by morning most of the UHA troops had left Lviv, leaving large stocks of food, uniforms, and ammunition. UHA units took positions outside the city, gradually encircling it. The battle for Lviv would now be fought in the villages.

The Battle for Peremyshl and the Frontier

While most of UHA and the Polish Army were engaged in the fighting
for Lviv, other Ukrainian and Polish units fought for control of the towns and cities along the border of Eastern and Western Galicia. The battle for Peremyshl turned out to be the most critical.

Peremyshl, situated on the border of Eastern Galicia and Poland, was the major rail link with Lviv and Eastern Galicia. The only Polish supply line was the Peremyshl-Lviv railroad. Therefore, without the occupation of the city and the capture of the railroad the Polish Command in Lviv would eventually collapse without the necessary reinforcements, arms and supplies.

In late October 1918, Ukrainian officers attempted to recruit demobilized soldiers for the defense of Peremyshl. In spite of their efforts, these Austrian veterans returned to their villages. On November 1, Polish troops occupied the city without firing a shot. A provisional Ukrainian battalion, which had been disarming non-Ukrainian troops in a nearby town, attempted to retake the city but was stopped by a Hungarian battalion with supporting artillery. The Hungarians, unaware of Ukrainian independence, assumed that the Ukrainians had mutinied.43

Three days later a battalion of Ukrainian irregulars recaptured Peremyshl along with an armory that contained 7,000 rifles, thousands of uniforms, several cars, and one airplane.44 However, the Ukrainian commander was less than energetic in preparing to meet Polish counterattacks and after two days of fighting the Poles recaptured the city on November 11.45 The capture of the railroad bridge over the Syan River, which the irregulars had not destroyed, assured the Poles uninterrupted rail service from Cracow.

With the supply base in Peremyshl securely held, the Poles mounted a four-pronged invasion of Western Ukraine. With most of the UHA units in
Lviv, Ukrainian resistance proved weak. Two railroad centers, Khyriv and Rava Ruska, were occupied before hastily organized Ukrainian units halted the Polish advance. In spite of Ukrainian sorties, the Poles managed to hold onto the Peremyshl-Lviv railroad. Although rail traffic was often interrupted, Polish supply trains usually made it through to Lviv.

The only senior UHA commander in the frontier area who clearly understood that Peremyshl was the key to Eastern Galicia was Colonel Anton Kraus, a German-Austrian volunteer. Colonel Kraus planned to advance to the Western Ukrainian border and recapture Khyriv and Permyshl. The second objective of his scheme was to destroy the Syan River bridges and then establish a defensive line along the river. 46

On December 7, Colonel Kraus and a 900-man battalion captured Khyriv. Two days later, with less than 600 men, he attacked Peremyshl. Diverting troops intended for Lviv, the Poles fiercely resisted the Ukrainian attack. After several days of fighting the outnumbered Ukrainians were forced out of the Peremyshl area and later out of Khyriv. 47 Kraus could now only harass rail operations along the Peremyshl-Lviv line.

Operations in the northwest also went poorly for the Ukrainians. The towns of Rava Ruska and Yaraslav were taken by Polish troops from Lublin. However, a group (an UHA unit equivalent to a regiment with supporting arms) commanded by Colonel Krawchuk managed to fight its way to the outskirts of Peremyshl on December 9, before it was forced to withdraw. 48

The first several weeks of the war had gone badly for the Ukrainians. The High Command and several unit commanders had made serious strategic and tactical errors that contributed to the evacuation of Lviv and the loss of
Peremyshl. The change of commanders during the fighting in Lviv resulted in conflicting orders, confusion, and lost tactical opportunities which ultimately led to the Ukrainian withdrawal. The Ukrainian High Command, preoccupied with the Lviv battle, virtually ignored the struggle in the west. While reinforcements were sent to Lviv, the commanders in the west had to rely on local forces of demobilized soldiers and irregulars. Thus, the important rail and supply center of Peremyshl, which should have been secured first, remained in Polish hands. The Ukrainian High Command believed that once the capital, Lviv, was captured then the rest of Western Ukraine would fall into their hands. Therefore, Lviv continued to act as a magnet drawing UHA reinforcements and supplies to the detriment of the commanders on the western border.

The Battle for Lviv

In their search for reinforcements, the Western Ukrainian Government turned to the East Ukrainian Government of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky. During the first week of fighting in Lviv two government representatives, Dr. Osip Nazuruk and Captain Shukhevich, were sent to Kiev to ask for troops and supplies. The Western Ukrainian Government specifically requested that the Sich Rifle Regiment of the East Ukrainian Army (a sister regiment of the UHA unit), which was composed of Galician Ukrainians who had been Russian POW's, be sent to Lviv. When the representatives were told that the regiment was secretly plotting to revolt against the Hetman, they asked that only half of the regiment be sent to Lviv.

Hetman Skoropadsky, wishing to reduce the risk of war with Poland, planned to transfer the Sich Rifles to Lviv for incorporation into UHA.51
However, the regiment's officers decided to remain in the Ukraine to take part in the revolt against the German supported Hetman and help reestablish an independent Ukrainian government. During these discussions, the Hetman sent an infantry company and a military aid mission to Lviv, and an infantry battalion to the Peremyshl area.

Angered by the Hetman's proclamation that the Ukraine would join a Russian federation and by his reactionary internal policies, taking advantage of the German collapse, an insurrection led by the Directory began in mid-November, and within a month controlled Kiev and much of the Ukraine. The Directory, composed of Social Democrats and Social Revolutionaries, thought that protection of Western Ukraine's borders was important, and immediately made plans to dispatch troops, weapons, and supplies. Within weeks 100,000 artillery shells, thousands of Russian rifles and machine guns, tons of medical supplies and uniforms as well as $100,000 in cash were dispatched to Western Ukraine. The troops sent to Lviv raised the original battalion to division status.

The Koziatyn Separate Infantry Brigade, sent to the Lviv area in December, would be followed by the Dnieper Infantry Division and an artillery brigade, composed mostly of Galician Ukrainians. In addition, senior officers of the Directory's army filled UHA positions such as commanding general, army and corps chief of staff, and other important staff and command positions. Directory railway troops operated and guarded the rail lines from Eastern Ukraine.

On December 10, 1918, Major-General Mykhailo Omelianovych-Pavlenko assumed command of UHA and appointed Colonel Evhen Mishkovsky as Chief of Staff and Deputy-Commander. General Omelianovych-Pavlenko, an East Ukrainian
officer born in 1878, was the son of a Zaporozhian Cossack officer and a Georgian princess. Commissioned in 1900 after graduating from an imperial military academy, Omelianovych-Pavlenko was posted to a Ukrainian regiment in the Russian Army. After commanding a company in the Russo-Japanese War he served as a training officer and in 1911 attended the Staff College. He served as a regimental commander during the first two years of World War I. After being seriously wounded, the highly decorated Omelianovych-Pavlenko had been appointed chief of staff of the 2nd Guard Corps. His next assignment was as Commandant of the Staff College and in the summer of 1917 he returned to the Galician front as commander of a grenadier regiment. After the Russian Revolution he had been commissioned a major-general in the Ukrainian Army with command of the Cossack Infantry Division.  

General Omelianovych-Pavlenko transformed UHA from a collection of regiments, separate battalions, and irregular groups into a well organized, battle-hardened army.

As Commanding General, Omelianovych-Pavlenko's primary objective was to force the Polish Army out of Lviv. After the evacuation of the city, UHA units had taken positions to the north, east, and south of Lviv. The Poles retained control of the western approaches as well as the Peremyshl-Lviv corridor.

The Polish position in Lviv had become precarious; constant shelling, lack of food, water, and electricity had lowered the morale of the civilian population, while the Polish Command thought that the East Ukrainian units were the advance elements of the entire East Ukrainian Army.
General Omelianovych-Pavlenko and his staff planned to make a major assault on Lviv on December 27. The plan called for three infantry groups to sortie from the north and east of the city. While this blow diverted the Poles, the major thrust would come from the southwest by the Koziatyn Infantry Brigade. Colonel Kraus's group would cut off rail traffic in the west, and then cover the western approaches to the city, while Colonel Doluda's irregulars harassed Polish units in the north. The UHA units in Lviv consisted of 8,000 infantry supported by eight batteries of field artillery.  

The Polish High Command knew the outline of the operation; Ukrainian sources agree that, whatever details Ukrainian deserters failed to mention, a Polish spy in UHA Headquarters supplied the rest of the plans. As a result, Polish units broke off contact on the Khyriv front and marched to Lviv. The largest group of reinforcements, General Sopotnicki's 2,400-man infantry regiment supported by a squadron of cavalry and ten guns, arrived on December 24, in Horodok about 30 kilometers from Lviv.  

During the next three days General Sopotnicki's force fought its way toward Lviv. On the morning of December 27, Polish units attacked the Koziatyn Brigade and pressed it back with heavy casualties. In spite of this setback, the Ukrainian High Command began the assault. The northern and eastern advances went well on the first day. However, by the second day, when the timing of the Koziatyn Brigade's attack became critical, the demoralized East Ukrainian soldiers could no longer continue to advance. When General Sopotnicki's troops entered Lviv, the Polish situation improved. The UHA advance slowed down and then on the third and final day
of the offensive Polish counterattacks stopped it.

The Ukrainian High Command now realized that more troops and heavier artillery were necessary for future success. The High Command, worried about the possible spread of the declining morale of the Koziatyn Brigade to other units, transferred it back to the Ukraine. Planning for, yet, another offensive, in early January 1919, began immediately.

Although the first two months of the war, at best, could be called a draw. UHA constantly fought on the offensive. As long as the West Ukrainians could retain the initiative, they thought, the sooner the Polish Army would be driven out of Eastern Galicia. However, the Ukrainian High Command failed to realize that the longer the war lasted, the less chance they had to win. It was only a matter of time before a larger and better equipped Polish Army could take the field. Meanwhile, the Secretary of War issued orders for the mobilization of Ukrainian men between the ages of 18 and 35. Plans were also made for a 100,000-man army. But it remained unclear how long Western Ukraine, with a Ukrainian population of three million, could continue to resist, even with the aid of Eastern Ukraine, engaged in its own life or death struggle with the Bolsheviks and Whites, the larger and better supported Polish state.

The 1919 Winter Campaign

Although the Paris Peace Conference had discussed the Ukrainian-Polish conflict over Eastern Galicia, the Ukrainian High Command decided that success on the battlefield was the key to diplomatic success in Paris. With this goal in mind, General Omelianovych-Pavlenko and his staff continued to plan offensive operations; the battle for Lviv would go on.
While the Ukrainian High Command planned an offensive, so did the Polish High Command. The Polish plans were to secure the railroad between Peremyshl and Lviv, and Yaroslav-Rava Ruska-Lviv, following that, the Poles would then push UHA from Lviv as far as possible.63

The Polish offensive began on January 6, 1919, with Group Byh, under the command of General Jan Romer, marching south from Rava Ruska toward Lviv. Two days later the Polish units ran into elements of the newly organized UHA I Corps and fell back after a brief but fierce action.64 Polish columns from Lviv, attempting to link up with Romer, were also forced back, while another column, advancing from the west along the Peremyshl-Lviv railroad, was also stopped. However, several days later General Romer's force attempted another breakthrough to Lviv which proved successful.

The Ukrainian High Command's plan for the offensive was similar to the last attack, this time, however, UHA forces included 16,000 men supported by eight artillery batteries.65 After an artillery barrage, the UHA battalions launched a frontal attack on the north and east. The Sich Rifles and the 3rd Brigade reached their objective; however, the 2nd Brigade, which had to attack the most fortified part of the Polish line, was bloodily repulsed. The 4th Brigade's attack from the east was also unsuccessful. Later in the day, two Polish battalions made a counterattack on two companies of the 7th Brigade, near the village of Burativ. After a spirited three-hour firefight the UHA companies abandoned the village, after inflicting such casualties that the Polish battalions could no longer advance. However, the gains made on the first day of the battle had been far short of the Ukrainian High Command's expectations, in two areas they had actually lost terrain.66
The next day, January 12, went little better, the Polish tactical plan, to beat off the UHA attacks, and then counterattack, resulted in the UHA advance bogging down. On the final day of the offensive the Polish Army took the initiative by launching several counterattacks. Two battalions of the 2nd Brigade under heavy attack broke, leaving an exposed flank. The brigade commander rallied his men and recaptured the lost ground. The Sich Rifles easily turned back a Polish advance in the north.

After two successive defeats, the Ukrainian High Command decided that new plans had to be formulated, units reorganized, and officers reassigned. The tactical plan to take Lviv had to be totally revised. Mass frontal assaults had proven ineffective. The war had become less positional and more one of movement with troops maneuvering in the large open areas of Western Ukraine. Many of the officers and men had never fought in open mobile operations, most were used to the trench type warfare of the Italian front. The UHA soldiers were also tired, many had recently returned from several years of fighting in Italy only to be thrust back into the constant fighting in and around Lviv.

General Omelianovych-Pavlenko and his staff decided to continue their strategy of taking Lviv but with one major change; Peremyshl would also be attacked. Therefore, the next three months of fighting would involve operations to take Lviv and Peremyshl. The northern front would become a minor theater of the war, the Ukrainian High Command considering it unimportant and garrisoned it with second line troops. The western front around Peremyshl received additional troops and supplies and became a major campaign. The High Command had finally realized that Peremyshl was the key to the capture of Lviv and eventual victory.
General Omelianovych-Pavlenko approved a plan to reorganize UHA into an army consisting of three corps of twelve brigades. During the next three weeks the army reorganized, only minor actions were undertaken by rotating battalions so that the entire army did not withdraw from the front. At the same time these actions tightened the ring around Lviv, took enemy held areas of the city, and secured the flanks. \(^{72}\)

Certain supply problems also had to be corrected. UHA was rearmed with Russian weapons as ammunition for their Austrian weapons had run out. Artillery as well as aircraft, trucks, and armored trains arrived. Support troops such as engineers, signal corps personnel, and mechanics had to be recruited and trained. Munitions were purchased from Czechoslovakian exchange for crude oil from the Drohobych-Boryslav oil fields. \(^{73}\)

Although the two previous offensives for Lviv were unsuccessful, the Ukrainian High Command felt that with the reorganization, and the growth of the army to 60,000 men, that a late winter campaign would be successful. \(^{74}\) The staff had also realized that as the Polish Army grew in strength and size, chances for a Ukrainian victory would diminish.

While UHA planned for a new offensive, the governments of Eastern and Western Ukraine united on January 22, 1919. Eastern Galicia, now designated as the Western Province of the Ukrainian People's Republic, retained internal and external autonomy. Therefore, the union of the two Ukrainian republics was "more nominal than real and enabled two different and at times contradicting external and internal policies to develop." \(^{75}\) Western Ukraine maintained its own foreign ministry while the UHA, nominally under the Directory's General Staff, operated within the previously established chain of command. Even though, East Ukrainian troops were fighting
Poles in Volhynia, the Directory refused to declare war on Poland; nothing would deter it from vigorously pressing its war with the Bolsheviks.

In preparation for the next offensive, new troop dispositions were made with the I Corps on the northern flank, II Corps in the center around Lviv, and the III Corps on the southern flank. While most of the front was quiet except for occasional skirmishes and artillery duels, units of the I Corps fought Polish units for control of the northern towns of Uhniv and Belz. After one of the fiercest battles of the war, both towns were captured by the Poles on January 29. In spite of several UHA counterattacks, the towns remained in Polish hands. 76

Within days of this attack, the Ukrainian High Command was ready to launch the Vovchukhiv Operation. The operational plan contained two phases; in the first, the III Corps would make the main attack on the towns of Horodok and Sudova Hyshnia cutting the Peremyshl-Lviv railroad. I Corps would continue their offensive on the northern front between the towns of Rava Ruska and Velz. The II Corps, supported by a brigade from the I Corps, would make a secondary attack from the north toward Lviv. The second phase of the operation called for the II Corps to capture Lviv and then link up with the III Corps in a double envelopment on the Peremyshl-Lviv salient. Following the end of this operation, UHA would be in position to take Peremyshl and force the Polish Army completely out of Eastern Galicia. 77 Both the government and the High Command were confident of the success of the operation. The Secretary of Military Affairs promised General Omelianovych-Pavlenko an additional 10,000 troops. 78

The offensive began on the northern front on February 2, when battalions of the I Corps surrounded Belz, and two days later Sokal, while
the III Corps began harassing attacks on the Lviv railroad. Colonel Kraus, commander of the III Corps, also wanted to attack the town of Khryiv which was one of the major Polish points of resistance on the western front. General Omelianovych-Pavlenko felt that the units assigned to the attack were too weak and that the action might draw off troops from the main operation. Therefore, units at this particular point on the front were placed on the defensive.

On February 4, a reinforced Polish battalion with supporting artillery left Peremyshl for the Khryiv area. Colonel Minkiewicz the force commander, had orders to destroy the UHA forces in the Khryiv-Sambir area and then to conduct counterinsurgent operations along the Peremyshl-Khryiv railroad. However, this attack and a supporting attack failed; the tactical advantage of entrenched lines with supporting heavy machine gun fire was well illustrated in the attack on Chujok where two UHA companies successfully defended the town against two Polish battalions.

After several weeks of preparation, the main attack on the Peremyshl-Lviv salient was set for the morning of February 15. The Ukrainian High Command had infiltrated intelligence agents into Warsaw and Lviv in order to find out Polish military strength and troop dispositions. Newly organized UHA batteries of medium and heavy artillery were in support, as were three air corps squadrons. An armored car squadron and three armored trains, that resembled land-going destroyers, were also in support.

The first day of the attack went well; a number of villages in the Horodok-Sudova Vyshnia area were captured along with 350 Polish soldiers, 22 machine guns, and 6 howitzers. As operations on the northern front renewed, the offensive on Lviv also began. As the assault increased in
intensity and scope, UHA units steamrolled over the Polish Army positions. Within three days, the first phase of the Vovchukhiv Operation had succeeded when the railroad between Horodok and Sudova Hyshnia fell to UHA units, thus cutting Lviv's supply line.

The second phase of the operation, the II Corp's general attack on Lviv, started off well. However, the Ukrainian High Command did not press the attack with any great vigor. On February 18, the High Command received a telegram from the Allied commission, later known as the Berthelemy Commission, of the Supreme Council of the Paris Peace Conference, requesting that hostilities cease while the commission travelled to Lviv. The High Command initially ignored the telegram. 86

The Ukrainian High Command, surprised at its own success, grew cautious and ordered the brigade that was maneuvering toward Peremyshl to halt, while it confined the offensive on Lviv to the suburbs. 87 The Polish Army, in defensive positions since early February, made its first major counterattack, retaking the town of Vovchukhiv on the 19th. 88 The fighting intensified on all fronts with villages exchanging hands several times. Polish supply trains managed to break through to Lviv, while on the 22nd, the Poles launched another major counterattack to the west of Horodok. After a day-long battle, with heavy shelling by armored trains and medium artillery, the Poles were finally pushed back to their original positions. 89 UHA's drive to the west halted while the Polish Army fought back furiously.

As the fighting intensified, diplomatic efforts on the part of the Berthelemy Commission to stop the fighting increased. On February 28, UHA agreed to a temporary ceasefire while negotiations for a truce line began.
The Vovchukhiv Operation

(shaded areas indicate areas of major fighting)
However, hostilities renewed on March 3, when the Western Ukrainian Government rejected a proposed truce line that would have given Poland a third of Eastern Galicia.

The next several days of fighting proved inconclusive. However, on March 5, UHA artillery destroyed an ammunition dump in Lviv resulting in the leveling of several buildings and causing numerous fires. The resulting chaos threw the Polish garrison into confusion. The Polish positions, manned by militiamen, were quite vulnerable but the High Command failed to take advantage of the situation by not attacking.

The Ukrainian High Command now decided to consolidate its tenuous hold on the Lviv railroad by attacking the town of Horodok. The new plan called for the III Corps to capture the town and then advance to Lviv. Meanwhile, the Polish brigade at Vovchukhiv advanced toward Sudova Vyshnia but was driven back. Instead of following up this success, the III Corps turned toward their original objective of Horodok.

The attack began on March 8, with the unique capture of a Polish armored train by a troop of UHA cavalry. The battle for Horodok lasted for several days with the Poles fighting a desperate holding action while waiting for reinforcements. In the west, a new Polish brigade from Peremyshl arrived in the vicinity of Sudova Vyshnia and immediately attacked UHA positions, and on March 13, the Poles pushed the Ukrainians out of the area.

When the Polish units from Lviv began an offensive on the UHA positions in Horodok, the Ukrainian High Command realized the tactical error of the III Corps commander in not holding Sudova Vyshnia. With both of these towns in their possession UHA could have disrupted rail traffic
to Lviv and starved it into submission, and the link up of the III Corps with the II Corps would have encircled Lviv.\textsuperscript{94}

The position of the III Corps around both towns was precarious. Reinforced by the Poznan brigade, the Polish Army inflicted so many casualties on the UHA brigade opposing it during an attack from Sudova Vyshnia, that the brigade was later disbanded. In spite of UHA reinforcements from the II Corps, the Poles recaptured Horodok on March 19. While another Polish force under the command of General Aleksandorowicz, turned north to Yavoriv and forced the 10th Brigade and the Doluda Division of the I Corps to retreat.\textsuperscript{95}

On March 22, General Omelianovych-Pavlenko and General Rozwadowski, commander of the Polish Eastern Front, both received telegrams from the Supreme Council in Paris requesting that hostilities cease while another commission headed by General Louis Botha attempted to negotiate an armistice.\textsuperscript{96} General Omelianovych-Pavlenko accepted the cease-fire immediately but the Polish High Command did not order one for several days until pressed by Major-General Francis Kernan, the American military advisor to the Paris Peace Conference, who was on assignment in Warsaw.

Thus, the UHA winter campaign ended in another setback. Although several major operational errors had occurred in the November battle for Lviv, UHA could have taken the city had the High Command been more tenacious and confident. With the failure of the December offensive on Lviv, the High Command should have realized the inadequacy of its tactics and planning, instead they believed the answer was more troops and guns. The Vovchukhiv Operation was a sound plan and may have succeeded had the High Command vigorously pressed the offensive. At the critical time the advance of the II and III Corps bogged down, while their link-up was tenuous at best.
The failure of the III Corps commander to take Sudova Vyshnia forced the corps to fight on two opposite fronts at the same time. As a result both fronts went into a defense that eventually gave way. The High Command, which lacked a professionally qualified general staff, could not decide whether to reinforce the III Corps or continue the Lviv operation. When it finally decided to transfer units of the II Corps to the Horodok area it was a matter of too little too late.

The Vovchukiv Operation was the high point of UHA's fortune, it would never come so close to driving the Polish Army from Eastern Galicia. By the time UHA transformed itself from a conscript-war weary veteran army into a tough small semi-regular army the massive Polish Army forced it out of Western Ukraine. However, the winter campaign forced the Paris Peace Conference to recognize the conflict over Eastern Galicia and to consider the right of self-determination for Western Ukraine. Militarily a failure, the campaign was, at the least, a partial success by placing the Ukrainian question before the Western Powers.
CHAPTER IV

ORGANIZATION, DIPLOMACY, AND DEFEAT

Organization of UHA

During the first two months of the Ukrainian-Polish War the UHA, an army in name only, consisted of separate units ranging from bands of demobilized soldiers and peasants to battalions of the elite Sich Rifles. UHA was similar to other nationalist inspired armies in that organizational structure were secondary to the immediate conduct of military operations.

When General Omelianovych-Pavlenko assumed command of UHA in December 1918, it became quite apparent that one of his primary tasks was to organize his groups, separate battalions, and regiments into a conventional army. Without a disciplined, structured army a protracted struggle with the Poles would not be possible.

The Ukrainian High Command believed that success or failure on the battlefield would determine the outcome of the Paris Peace Conference's decision whether to award Eastern Galicia to Poland or let it remain independent. With a military victory fait accompli the Peace Conference would be forced to recognize Western Ukrainian independence, thought the High Command. Therefore, a military triumph could only be achieved by an organized, trained army. General Omelianovych-Pavlenko and his staff, as professional soldiers, realized this.

The Western Ukrainian Government, after grasping the fact that military success could not come overnight, agreed with the High Command
that military organization and diplomatic initiatives were connected. However, the government pressed the High Command to continue its operations. The Government wanted the best of both worlds; continued fighting and an organized army. Omelianovych-Pavlenko had to reorganize UHA during the latter part of January 1919. As a result, only the larger formations could be standardized. Regrouping of smaller and support-type units was carried out during lulls in the fighting. Therefore, the plan for organization was an ongoing process lasting several months.

In mid-January 1919, Colonel Evhen Mishkovsky, UHA Chief of Staff, had his table of organization approved. UHA would be reorganized into a tactical army with three corps each consisting of four brigades. There had been some thought of an army of six to eight divisions, however, due to UHA's serious shortage of staff and field officers the formation of division headquarters did not seem possible.

Colonel Mishkovsky also proposed to make the infantry mobile by carrying them to battle in horse-drawn wagons (trucks were considered but there were too few available). Upon entering the battle zone the infantry would dismount. As result, advances could be faster and further while the troops would be ready to engage in combat immediately. Although not a new idea, the assignment of organic mounted machine gun troops, horse-artillery batteries, and ground-support air corps squadrons to the brigade was an innovation. However, these ideas proved to be too novel for the traditional senior officers to adopt.

Responsibility for UHA was divided between the Commanding General and the Secretary of State for Military Affairs. The Secretary, usually a senior colonel, dealt with the administration, recruiting, training,
and logistical matters of the army. To facilitate recruiting and provisioning, Eastern Galicia was divided into three military area commands with headquarters in Lviv, Ternopil, and Stanislav. Each area command was divided into four district commands which were subdivided into four local command areas. The district commands were also responsible for brigade depots where recruits were trained, equipped and assigned.³

The Secretary's staff, similar to the Austrian War Ministry, contained directorates of infantry, cavalry, artillery, technical troops (signal, engineer, ordnance), and supply. Each directorate took charge of the training and administration of its particular branch while the supply directorate procured arms, equipment, munitions, and rations. At first, UHA relied on leftover Austrian supplies but as this source diminished, the supply directorate began to rely on supplies from Eastern Ukraine. Later, Czechoslovakia became a major source of supply when the Western Ukrainian Government began exchanging barrels of crude oil for munitions. However, UHA remained short of arms and equipment. The number of available rifles, rather than the number of men, determined the size of the army.⁴

The Army School Command and the Rear Echelon Command (later the Reserve Army) also reported to the Secretary of Military Affairs. The Army School Command included various officer schools, the Officer and Non-Commissioned Officers Candidate School, and the Aviation School. The Rear Echelon Command operated the line of communication which included operation of the supply line, railroads, hospitals, postal services, depots, and the command of newly raised infantry units.⁵ Also assigned to the command were the military police and gendarme units.
The Ministry of Military Affairs, under the circumstances, did an excellent job of provisioning, arming, and training troops. While it derived its organization from the Austrian War Ministry with some of the red tape that suited the Galician Ukrainian penchant for bureaucracy, the Ministry realized that it was a servant of UHA. Colonel Dmytro Vitovsky, the War Minister, maintained good relations with General Omelianovych-Pavlenko. Unlike the situation in many other armies the situation of strained relations, between the War Minister and the field commander, too often existed to the detriment of the army. Vitovsky, a former commander of UHA, was well aware of the General's problems.

The War Ministry continued to function until the end of the war. Only in June 1919, when UHA had lost most of Eastern Galicia, was the Ministry abolished. The Commanding General assumed control of the Reserve Army and the schools while many of the administrative functions were transferred to the Ministry of War of the Ukrainian People's Republic.6

The Commanding General of UHA served as the commander-in-chief of all frontline troops which included Army Headquarters (usually referred to as the Ukrainian High Command), army troops (units directly assigned to Army Headquarters), and the three corps. The Commanding General, who reported directly to the president, was also responsible for the overall direction of the war.7 In formulating operational matters, plans, and strategy he was assisted by his staff, the Ukrainian High Command. The High Command served two functions; as a General Staff that served as the chief military planning agency for the government, and as the staff of a tactical army headquarters.
The Chief of Staff/Deputy Commanding General headed the High Command which consisted of two branches; an operations branch and a support branch. The Chief of the Operations Branch directed on-going operations as well as planning futures ones. His staff included intelligence, communications, ammunition, engineer, transportation, railroad, motor, and aviation officers. The Chief of Support provided both staff service and logistical support. The adjutant-general, chief chaplain, provost-marshal, paymaster, judge-advocate general, surgeon-general, information officer, chief veterinarian, and quartermaster-general served under the Chief of Support. Also assigned were battalions of engineer, ammunition, maintenance, transportation, signal, and railroad troops. (See Appendix)

One of UHA's greatest weaknesses was its shortage of senior officers and professionally trained staff officers. Since the Austrian Army promoted only regulars to field rank, the vast majority of Ukrainians, who were temporary officers, served during World War I as company grade officers. In 1918 none of the four Ukrainian generals of the Austrian Army were available for service and the number of regulars who had been promoted to field grade proved quite inadequate to fill the various command and staff positions of UHA. Many of the reservists and temporary officers that might have served in these positions were prisoners of war in Italy. The small number of East Ukrainian Army officers assigned to UHA did little to fill the gap.

UHA, thus, had to recruit non-Ukrainian officers. Several dozen German-Austrians, Czechs, Croats, Hungarians, and German-Galicians, all former Austro-Hungarian regulars, had volunteered for service as staff officers. Many had served with Ukrainian regiments of the Austrian Army.
Several had commanded provisional regiments and battalions until General Omelianovych-Pavlenko replaced them with experienced Ukrainian officers. Most of the non-Ukrainians served in the High Command while a few served on corps staffs.

The officer corps of UHA, one of the army's few assets, was composed of members of the intelligentsia with ideological motives and combat experience. But most had not commanded anything larger than a company. During the formation of UHA these officers received commissions in the same grade that they had held in the Austrian service. Because of the shortage of field officers, brigades were often commanded by majors, battalions by captains, and companies by lieutenants. Since promotions came by merit and experience; it was not until the Spring of 1919 that promotions to field rank, along with the first promotion of general officers, were made in appreciable numbers.

The officers had a close rapport with their men. They explained to their troops the necessity of maintaining the struggle with Poland. Throughout the war the morale of the soldiers remained high.

The UHA enlisted man, usually a former peasant with previous military service, was respectful toward his officers; he proved to be brave, well-disciplined, and loyal. During the Spring of 1919, with the worsening logistical situation, the UHA soldier stood up to the severe test; many went into battle barefoot, ill-clothed, and poorly equipped and armed. Although a great many deserted, the majority of the soldiers remained at their posts.

At times it was difficult to motivate the troops, even though most of the soldiers realized that they were fighting for an independent
Western Ukraine. Those who had little nationalistic spirit merely deserted. In spite of their proximity to Ukraine, Bolshevik agitators had little influence in UHA. The Galician Ukrainian Workers-Peasant Party, formed in January 1919, remained a small, ineffective group. Its only success was to incite mutiny in the garrison, made up of second line soldiers and militia, in the oil producing city of Drohbbich. Otherwise, Bolshevik influenced in Western Ukraine remained negligible.

UHA units were territorial in make-up. Replacements were assigned to a battalion composed of soldiers from the same area. Just as in the British Army, UHA found that units recruited from the same region fought better and maintained *esprit de corps*. Each territorial battalion was assigned to a brigade which had its depot in the same district as its soldier's homes.

The brigade became the standard tactical combat unit with UHA usually fielding twelve brigades with a total of 50 infantry battalions. For a short time the III Corps consisted of one division and two brigades. The 1st Brigade (Ukrainian Sich Rifles) was actually a three battalion regiment while most of the other brigades had four battalions. In addition to its infantry battalions, the brigade also had a headquarters company, a regiment of field artillery, a cavalry troop, and an engineer company.11

(See Appendix) The infantry battalion consisted of three rifle companies and one heavy machine gun company. When extra machine guns were available one rifle platoon in each company was converted to a light machine gun platoon.12 The table of organization for an infantry battalion called for 32 officers, 1,007 enlisted men, 26 machine guns, 132 horses, and 59 wagons.
However, the average strength was usually 875 officers and enlisted men. The rifle company has an establishment of 4 officers and 186 enlisted men.  

When the Austrian Army vacated Western Ukraine it left behind large stocks of weapons. As a result, UHA relied on Austrian arms. The infantryman carried the Manlicher M95 rifle and a bayonet, while officers were armed with the M7 automatic pistol and the M61 sword. The standard machine gun, the Schwarlose M7112, weighed 170 pounds and had a rate of fire of 450 rounds per minute. In the Spring of 1919, when stocks of Austrian ammunition ran out, UHA had to discard its Austrian weapons and rearm with Russian small arms.

A unique unit in UHA was the Jewish Battalion. Several hundred Jews served as individuals in UHA. They identified with the Ukrainian cause and served as officers and NCO's. Therefore, UHA officers did not consider it strange that a battalion composed of Jews volunteered for duty.

Solomon Leinburg, a former Austrian lieutenant, organized the Jewish Battalion in early 1919. Initially it had been formed as a militia unit to protect the Jewish residents of Ternopil. The battalion volunteered for active service and was incorporated into UHA in May. It consisted of 1,200 officers and men organized into six infantry companies, an engineer company, and a signal platoon. After the battalion's initial training it was assigned to I Corps and first committed to battle in July. The Jewish Battalion proved to be one of the best units in the I Corps and served to the end of 1919 when it was decimated by typhus.

The field artillery became UHA's best equipped and trained branch. The artillery, unlike the infantry which started with several organized
battalions, had to be organized battery by battery and then formed into regiments in December 1918 and January 1919.

Light batteries consisted of between four and six guns while the medium batteries had only two guns. Each regiment consisted of three batteries of 76.5 mm M17 field guns (sometimes 80 mm guns), one battery of 100 mm M14 howitzers, and one battery of 150 mm M15 howitzers manned by 600 artillerymen with 525 horses. All the guns were of Austrian manufacture.

Every brigade had one artillery regiment with an additional regiment at corps headquarters. A heavy artillery brigade of two regiments was assigned to army headquarters. At its peak strength the field artillery consisted of twenty regiments.16

The cavalry proved the weakest combat branch. The wide open areas of Eastern Galicia, almost perfect cavalry country, made this arm vital, however, no tradition of cavalry service existed among the Galician Ukrainians that UHA could draw on as opposed to Eastern Ukraine where Cossack traditions had been preserved in the regiments of the Tsarist army.

The creation of cavalry units had low priority and the reactivated Sich Rifle cavalry squadron remained the only horse unit for several months.17 Major-General Myron Tarnavskyi, II Corps commander, took the initiative by organizing and assigning cavalry troops to each brigade. The rest of the army adopted this solution. As a result, the cavalry rarely played its traditional role of shock action, but rather, were confined to reconnaissance and liaison duties. Unfortunately, only in June 1919, did the High Command recognize the need for larger cavalry formations when it authorized the creation of a cavalry brigade; however, the war was over
before it could take the field. 18

While the High Command initially ignored the cavalry, it devoted serious effort to the development of the Air Corps. The UHA Air Corps, established in December 1918, by attached East Ukrainian pilots, initially consisted of two squadrons and a repair and supply depot. 19 When several dozen Ukrainian pilots, formerly of the Austrian Air Corps, reported for duty a third squadron was activated.

The Air Corps consisted of a mixed bag of captured, often worn out, German, Austrian, and French (captured from the Russians) aircraft. The Austrian Albatross 22 and the Brandenburg 64 were the two most common airplanes. The German aircraft were usually DFW, LVG, Lloyd, and Fokker while the French aircraft were Nieuport 17C1 and 28C1 all distinguished by the blue and yellow roundel of the UHA Air Corps. 20

Although the Air Corps consisted of 80 aircraft with plans for the activation of an additional two squadrons, lack of spare parts grounded many of the airplanes. Within several months the Air Corps had less than two dozen aircraft in operable condition. Accidents, worn out airframes, and cannibalization contributed to this decline.

Air operations were decentralized; the 1st and 2nd Squadrons supported ground operations while the 3rd Squadron was assigned to army headquarters for reconnaissance and observation missions. For much of the war the UHA Air Corps maintained air superiority, often strafing Polish columns at will. UHA sources claim that sixteen Polish airplanes were shot down as against one UHA airplane. 22

Overall, the Air Corps, because of its small size, contributed little to the outcome of the war. The squadrons participated in reconnaiss-
sance and liaison duties with occasional dogfights and strafing missions. There were only occasional bombing missions as few aircraft were rigged to carry bombs. Some pilots resorted to throwing bombs out of the cockpit.22

During the Spring campaign the Polish Air Force virtually eliminated the UHA aircraft from the skies. Thus, the Air Corps remained an auxiliary rather than an important service.

The armored service, another new branch, consisted of officers and soldiers assigned to armored car companies and armored trains. Each corps had a company of armored cars that were used to support the infantry. But as the cars broke down and were not replaced, the company's effectiveness diminished. UHA also had several armored trains which were, in fact, mobile artillery batteries with supporting heavy machine guns. The first armored trains were but improvised armor plated flatcars and boxcars. Within months, specially made armored trains supported each corps.

When General Omelianovych-Pavlenko assumed command of UHA, he realized that the army could not function without technical support troops. He immediately began making plans for the activation of signal, ordnance, transport, and sapper and pioneer units.

Engineer companies were organic to brigades and corps. Signal platoons were assigned to brigades and signal companies maintained communications for each corps. Corps headquarters also had transportation, ammunition-ordnance, quartermaster, and maintenance companies, while army headquarters had these units in battalion strength. There were also several other support units such as military intelligence, military police, judge-advocate general, adjutant-general, information-propaganda, medical corps, and veterinarian corps.
The intelligence branch remained weak; only six trained intelligence officers served in the entire army. Unlike most European armies where intelligence officers served on battalion staffs, in UHA, intelligence officers were posted only at corps and army level.\textsuperscript{23} As a result, intelligence and reconnaissance missions were additional duties for other staff officers. In addition to its police and guard duties, the military police also performed counterintelligence functions. Military police units existed at brigade and higher levels.

The judge-advocate and adjutant-general were supported by their branch troops at corps and army level. There were also 79 chaplains assigned from battalion to army level.\textsuperscript{24} The information-propaganda service served the important function of keeping the army informed and motivated. At corps and army level the information-propaganda detachment consisted of military history, information, newspaper, and library sections. The newspaper section published corps newspapers; "The Cossack's Voice" of the I Corps being the most notable, while "The Rifleman" was distributed army-wide. The library section maintained a lending library of books dealing mostly with Ukrainian history. Although a third of the soldiers were illiterate, the newspapers and books proved to be popular with the troops.\textsuperscript{25}

The information-propaganda service's primary purpose was to operate an internal troop information program. Booklets, similar to the US Army's "Why We Fight" series of World War II, explained the army's purpose in the war. All of the soldiers knew that they were fighting to preserve Western Ukraine's independence. The service tried to counter the almost
overwhelming Polish propaganda effort. In spite of its name, the service, because of its small size, spread very little propaganda among the peasantry and Polish civilians, confining its efforts to its own troops.

The army medical department, consisting of the medical and veterinary corps, was initially well organized and equipped. Medical platoons, under the supervision of a doctor, were assigned to brigades, while some battalions also had attached surgeons. Field hospitals were located at corps and army level while general hospitals functioned in the rear. During battles, hospital trains operated close to the front. There were also several sanitation units.

The medical corps consisted of 121 doctors and 102 medical students with several hundred nurses, orderlies, and medics. Since there was a shortage of doctors several dozen non-Ukrainian medical officers were accepted for service.\textsuperscript{26}

The medical department resembled the Austrian service since many of the doctors had served in it. Overall the quality of medical care was good. However, toward the end of the war, when the supply system broke down, medical care deteriorated due to the lack of medical supplies. The quality of medical care and the number of battle causalties directly influenced the size of the army.

At its peak strength, in March 1919, UHA numbered 126,000 officers and men, within two months its strength dropped to 54,636 but in June, it increased to some 66,000 men. These numbers included the frontline troops, reserves, support troops, trainees and draftees en route to training centers.
Frontline strength of UHA in March 1919, was 69,000, in April it dropped to 37,967, and in June 25,000. Most of the losses were due to desertion, sickness, and battle casualties. Several thousand draftees and volunteers were also released when the supply of rifles ran out.

During the Chortkiv offensive in June 1919, cadres for eight new brigades were organized with assignment to the IV and V Corps. However, these new units were soon broken up and the troops used as replacements.

In comparison, the total strength of the Polish Army in February 1919, was 156,057, in June 278,772, in July 379,390, and in August 518,284. The Polish Army grew in size because it had a stable internal area where it could organize, whereas, UHA had no secure rear area where troops could be trained and units formed. Perhaps, the greatest reason for the Polish Army's increase in strength was because the Allied military aid mission provided huge stocks of weapons, uniforms, and equipment. In fact, the Allies equipped and trained complete Polish divisions. Poland, with a much larger population than Western Ukraine, also had thousands of experienced regular officers. Service as an officer in either the Austrian or the Russian armies was a traditional career for a young Pole.

UHA, as in the case of other similar forces, had numbers of "summertime soldiers." When the tide of war favored the Ukrainians, UHA units were up to strength, during periods of retreat, large numbers of soldiers melted away.

It is evident that as UHA grew better organized it declined in numbers. Instead of a mass conscript army, UHA became a smaller semi-regular army that relied on a core of battle-hardened veterans. UHA could
not maintain its strength while fighting a fairly large scale conventional war. Successful organization meant adopting a type of war that UHA could not win. As the Polish Army grew increasingly sophisticated, UHA began fighting a rearguard action.

As military victory became more remote, UHA's fate hinged on diplomatic gains in Paris. While UHA was successful and a threat to Poland, Ukrainian representatives had powerful chips. However, once it was evident that Ukrainian resistance in Eastern Galicia was about to collapse, the Allies turned their attention to Poland. Only as long as UHA was a powerful military force was Western Ukrainian independence a viable alternative. By late Spring 1919 hope of a military solution had declined among Ukrainians and it seemed that the destiny of Western Ukraine rested in Paris rather than with UHA in the field.

The Diplomatic Front

Western Ukraine's attempts to achieve political recognition began almost immediately with independence; on October 26, 1918, in a telegram to Woodrow Wilson, President Petrushevich informed the American Government of the formation of the Western Ukrainian Republic and outlined its policies and goals. A second communication, sent several weeks later, asked President Wilson to intervene and arbitrate the dispute between Western Ukraine, Poland, Rumania, and Hungary, the latter states threatening Western Ukraine's right to self-determination.

The Polish National Committee in Paris attempted to gain Allied support by claiming that German and Austrian machinations, with the aid of the Ukrainians, were obstructing "the unification of the newborn Poland."
Roman Dmowski, President of the Polish National Committee, although admitting that Eastern Galicia was "disputed territory," stated, before the Supreme Council, that "the Ukrainians might be entitled to home rule but they were unable to create a separate state." He called the Western Ukrainian Government an organized anarchy. In a memorandum submitted to the Supreme Council, Dmowski added that Eastern Galicia had been part of Poland for over five hundred years, and was important because of its natural resources and that its border allowed Poland and Rumania to become neighbors.

Petrushevich replied by protesting the Polish invasion and calling the Polish statements slander and lies.

With the exception of the French none of the Allied powers were well prepared to deal with the intricacies of the Polish-Ukrainian question and the French, owing to their sympathy for Poland, were hardly objective.

In January 1919, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George and President Wilson agreed that both the Poles and the Ukrainians should stop fighting. The Supreme Council called for both sides to cease hostilities while an Allied mission attempted to negotiate an armistice. However, each of the Allies had already formed opinions about the situation in Eastern Galicia; the French wanted Eastern Galicia to become an autonomous province that would form part of a Polish-Rumanian buffer between Bolshevik Russia and Western Europe. The United States, at first divided between the incorporation of Eastern Galicia into Poland or into a Ukrainian state, decided on the former solution. The Italians sided with Poland while the British sympathized with the Ukrainians.

The French and British members of the Allied Commission, known as the Berthelemy Commission, were poor choices for their task of mediation.
General Marie-Joseph Berthelemy and Brigadier Adrian Carton de Wiart headed the respective military aid missions to Poland; both were strongly pro-Polish. In their first meeting with General Omelianovych-Pavlenko on February 22, 1919, UHA was given five minutes to accept the mission's armistice proposal or else be faced with a conflict with the Entente. General Omelianovych-Pavlenko explained that he was not authorized to negotiate for the government but that a truce could be arranged so that the mission and representatives of the Ukrainian Government could meet.39

Three days later, the Ukrainian delegation met with the Allied mission. During the first day of talks, the Allies stated that they wanted the Ukrainian and Polish delegations to negotiate an armistice line, failing that, the mission would dictate terms for an armistice.40 Later that evening, the Polish and Ukrainian delegations met. The Polish representatives proposed that the Zbruch River, the traditional border between Eastern and Western Ukraine, be designated as the truce line. The Ukrainians, who held nearly all of Eastern Galicia, proposed that the Syan River, the border of Western and Eastern Galicia, be designated as the demarcation line. The talks broke off when the Ukrainians rejected the final Polish compromise; an offer for a third of Eastern Galicia.

On February 28, the Allied representatives presented their solution along with a warning to the Ukrainian delegation that a rejection would result in the Allies sending the Haller Army (a Polish army consisting of six divisions trained and equipped by the French for service against the Bolsheviks) to Eastern Galicia.41 The proposed armistice line gave the Poles a third of Eastern Galicia including Lviv and the Drohobych-Boryslav oil fields.
The Ukrainians, in the middle of a successful offensive, rejected this proposal. The government needed crude oil to buy arms from Czechoslovakia while any thought of surrendering the traditional capital, Lviv, was abhorrent. The Western Ukrainian Government notified the Supreme Council of its decision but further requested that a new more impartial commission be sent to Eastern Galicia.

On March 19, Dr. William Lord, the American member of the Berthelemy Commission, recommended four proposals to the Supreme Council: (1) that the Conference order the belligerents to cease hostilities, (2) that the armistice be based on the current military situation but in any case Lviv would remain in Polish hands along with the Peremyshl-Lviv railroad, (3) that both Poland and Western Ukraine should send delegations to the Conference, and (4) that the final armistice line be determined by an interallied commission after consultation with both sides and presented to the Conference as a basis for mediation.  

Also involved in the discussion was the larger question of the Russian problem. Marshal Ferdinand Foch, the Supreme Allied Commander, advocated Allied intervention in Russia with an Allied force landing in Odessa to join with a Polish-Rumanian army. Foch believed that the conflict in Eastern Galicia was connected with the Bolshevik menace. Haller's Army must be sent to Eastern Galicia to plug the gap on the eastern front caused by the Ukrainians. Lloyd George adamantly opposed the Marshal's plan, calling it an eventual invasion of Russia under the guise of relieving Lviv.  

Thus, the Conference was temporarily sidetracked by the question of "anti- or pro-interventionist policies rather than on the intrinsic merit of the Eastern Galicia situation."
Turning to the immediate problem of the Ukrainian-Polish conflict, the Supreme Council decided on March 19, to order the opposing generals to cease fighting while the Council mediated the dispute. A new Allied commission, headed by South African General Louis Botha, was appointed in April to negotiate an armistice. Meanwhile, attempts by the Ukrainians and Poles to negotiate their own truce failed.

The Botha Commission met with the Ukrainian and Polish delegations during the last few days of April 1919, in Paris. The commission meetings were marked by major disagreements between General Botha and the French members, General Henri Le Rond and M. Legrand. After meeting with the Ukrainians, General Botha blamed the Poles for the continued fighting while Legrand defended them. Botha objected to the line of questioning by the French members during the meeting with the Ukrainians when they accused UHA of recruiting former German army officers and insinuated that the Western Ukrainian Government did not control UHA. 45

After meeting with the Polish delegation, the French accused the British members of phrasing their questions as if the Poles were responsible for the fighting. 46 The Polish delegation clouded the issue when they accused UHA of being in the process of becoming Bolshevik and that any armistice would compromise the security of Poland. 47 In a later meeting with the commission, the Polish delegation presented three conditions for an armistice: (1) that the Polish Army be allowed to advance and link up with the Rumanian Army (a condition that the Ukrainians were unaware of), (2) that the Allies assume control of UHA and order the purge of Bolshevik and Austro-German elements, (3) that Poland was to control the oil fields.
The chief Polish negotiator, Roman Dmowski, also charged the Ukrainians with having agreed to a Bolshevik request to allow the Red Army to cross Eastern Galicia into Hungary. This charge as well as the charge of Bolshevik elements in UHA were Polish red herrings.

On May 8, the commission met with the Ukrainian delegation for the last time. The Ukrainian representatives gave two conditions for an armistice: (1) a military truce, (2) the armistice line would be the Syan River.

The commission recommended to the Supreme Council that the demarcation line leave Lviv on the Polish side while the oil fields remain in Ukrainian hands. The line was not to affect the final settlement. With some minor modifications the Ukrainian delegation accepted the terms. The Poles, however, rejected anything less than the military control of Eastern Galicia. With the Bolsheviks in Volhynia, the Poles insisted that the military situation demanded their control of Eastern Galicia.

The commission, unable to force the Poles to accept, referred the question to the Supreme Council. Lloyd George, angry over news that the Haller divisions were in combat with UHA, accused General Haller of a breach of faith as these divisions were trained to fight the Bolsheviks. He accused the Poles of using the Bolshevik menace in furthering their imperialistic aims. Lloyd George suggested that the Council order General Haller to withdraw his divisions. On May 27, a telegram from the Supreme Council threatened Marshal Pilsudski with a cut off of supplies unless the Poles renewed negotiations with the Ukrainians. Pilsudski acknowledged the telegram but by the time the Haller divisions were withdrawn the current Polish offensive had pushed UHA into southeastern Galicia.
However, within several weeks the mood of the Council changed. Communications from Allied observers and French and British generals in Warsaw recommended that the Poles be allowed to occupy all of Eastern Galicia. With the Red Hungarian armies in Slovakia and the Bolsheviks in contact with the Poles in Volhynia, the occupation of Eastern Galicia had become a strategic necessity. On June 25, the Supreme Council authorized Poland to occupy all of Eastern Galicia. Poland was to establish a civil government while a plebiscite, later determined to be held in twenty-five years, would ultimately determine Eastern Galicia's future.

The Final Military Effort

The Poles halted operations on March 27, 1919, in order to meet the UHA delegation in Khyriv. The Polish High Command, however, was in no mood to negotiate; UHA was to accept the Berthelemy line or else the war would continue. The Ukrainian High Command had no intention of accepting the Berthelemy line as terms for an armistice. It rejected the Polish demands with the hope that a more favorable solution would be achieved in Paris.

UHA also halted its operations while waiting for the outcome of the Paris negotiations. The Polish Army, in spite of the Supreme Council's request, renewed its advance during the last days of March. The Poles mounted minor operations that forced the I Corps in the north and the II Corps in the south to fall back. To the east, the Bolsheviks forced Petliura's army to retreat westward.

The Ukrainian High Command had to change its strategy. The High Command realized that it could not hold onto the remaining portion of
Eastern Galicia and still keep the army together. The High Command resolved to conserve the army at the cost of giving round to the advancing Polish Army. General Omelianovych-Pavlenko proposed that UHA go over to an active defense and gradually pull back to defensive positions along the Dniester River. He planned a final defensive battle after which UHA would continue to fight as a partisan army in the Carpathians. 52

General Omelianovych-Pavlenko asked the government to iron out its political differences with Czechoslovakia and Rumania with the idea that these governments would provide some type of military aid. Plans were made to reduce the number of support troops in the rear and transfer them to the front. At the same time Otaman Simon Petliura pressured the High Command to end its fighting with the Poles so that UHA and the Directory's Army could consolidate their forces and drive the Bolsheviks out of Ukraine. 53 However, Omelianovych-Pavlenko, now a lieutenant-general, and his officers refused to consider Petliura's proposal.

By early April, the morale of UHA had seriously deteriorated; the troops suffered from shortages of food and supplies while a typhus epidemic filled the hospitals. Still it came as a surprise when the UHA garrison and the local militia mutinied in Drohobych. The Bolshevik Galician Ukrainian Worker-Peasant Party had infiltrated cadre among the soldiers and persuaded them to mutiny by repeatedly calling for an end of all fighting. The High Command dispatched its most trusted regiment, the Sich Rifles, to put down the mutiny. Yet, this incident indicated that the army, once indomitable, showed signs of stress. Strained by mutiny, desertion, sickness, lack of food, and under constant Polish military pressure, UHA's ability to continue the war was in question.
While the Ukrainians regrouped, the Polish High Command launched a limited offensive on April 19. The Polish Army hit the 3rd and 7th Brigades of the I and II Corps, forcing the UHA units several kilometers south. On the following day, the Poles struck the 2nd and 3rd Brigades sending both units reeling back. During the following week, the II Corps was also knocked back, losing several key villages to the advancing Poles. Under heavy shelling, the I Corps retreated. The Polish 3rd and 4th Divisions maintained steady pressure on the Ukrainians.

The Ukrainian High Command, aware of Polish plans for a major offensive, with the government's approval, proposed another armistice. The Polish High Command rejected this overture and continued preparations for its offensive. The Polish Command planned to employ two divisions of the Haller Army when General Haller, along with advance elements of his army, arrived in Lviv on April 30. Although the Entente had stipulated that this army could only be used against the Bolsheviks, later events proved that General Haller was not aware of this stipulation and that Marshal Foch deliberately contributed to this misunderstanding.

Heavy rains temporarily halted the Polish advance. When the weather cleared the Polish Air Force regained air superiority and mounted a bombing campaign on UHA troop concentrations and depots. The UHA Air Corps, outnumbered and outclassed by newer superior aircraft, played a minor role in aerial operations.

In spite of the morass of mud, both armies renewed operations. UHA artillery fire managed to slow the Poles in several areas. The UHA 5th and 9th Brigades, which fought in muddy trenches reminiscent of the Western Front, continued to hold the right flank in the Belz area.
UHA's condition worsened as losses due to casualties, sickness, and desertion increased. The flow of replacements from the rear virtually ceased. With the front line strength of the army seriously diminished, several battalions were disbanded with the troops and their troops used as replacement. Adding to the problem, Polish saboteurs seriously hampered rail movement by damaging trains and tracks. UHA, with a 300 kilometer front manned by 38,000 front line troops, braced for the expected Polish offensive. 58

General Haller, now designated as Commander of the Eastern Front, planned to strike the Ukrainians in three places: the first phase of the offensive involved forcing Petliura's Ukrainian Army out of Volhynia, and then two simultaneous attacks against UHA, which would force the III Corps to retreat upon the rear of the II Corps. Meanwhile the I and II Corps would be tied down by a frontal assault. Thus, UHA could be destroyed as an effective fighting force.

On the morning of May 15, 1919, Haller launched his general attack on the Ukrainians. Petliura's army in Volhynia, weakened by Bolshevik attacks from the north and southeast, was severely mauled by the Poles from the west. General Osetsky's 2,000 man brigade surrendered after being completely surrounded while the remnants of the Petliura army retreated to the southeast.

In Eastern Galicia, the I and II UHA Corps bore the brunt of the attack. The Poles, with some 50,000 men organized into 57 infantry battalions, heavily engaged the UHA center. 59 The III Corps also came under heavy attack. With only four battalions to resist the Polish 4th Division, the III Corps had to fall back. The unexpected retreat of the
III Corps created a gap in the left flank. The Poles poured additional troops into the breech and forced UHA to retreat to new, hastily organized defensive lines. The Mountain Brigade, cut off from the rest of the III Corps, had to cross into Czechoslovakia where it was interned for the duration of the war.

On May 17 General Omelianovych-Pavlenko personally organized a desperate counterattack on the left flank. Eight infantry battalions supported by two artillery regiments advanced toward the towns of Drohobych and Stryj. The Poles stopped the UHA advance when it reached Drohobych and within twenty-four hours forced the Ukrainian troops out of the town.

While the II and III Corps fell back, the I Corps, on the north, managed to hold on for several more days. However, the I Corps right flank became exposed when the Petliura Army fell back, forcing the Corps to withdraw. 60

When word of the offensive reached Paris, President Wilson and Prime Minister Lloyd George became outraged that the Poles had renewed hostilities and that the Haller Divisions had been employed against UHA. On May 21 they agreed with the reluctant support of French Premier George Clemenceau, to dispatch a telegram to Pilsudski ordering him to cease operations in Eastern Galicia. 61

However, the telegram was delayed by the French for six days while the Polish Army pushed the battered UHA out of Eastern Galicia. The French, especially Marshal Foch encouraged the Polish demands for Eastern Galicia. 62 By the time Pilsudski responded UHA had been defeated.

With the failure of the III Corps to hold Drohobych, the High Command decided to regroup toward the extreme southeastern corner of
Galicia in a triangle formed by the Dniester, Zbruch, and Zolata Lypa Rivers. While the army retreated, further attempts for an armistice went on. The High Command and the government also debated the fate of the army. General Omelianovych-Pavlenko suggested two courses of action: turning the army over to the service of the Entente or else leaving Eastern Galicia to join Petliura's Army in its fight with the Bolsheviks. The Chief of Staff, Colonel Kurmanovych, and several ministers wanted to cross over into Rumania and reconsolidate but this option proved impossible when the Rumanian Army marched into the southeastern part of Eastern Galicia capturing the remaining UHA stocks of supplies and ammunition. However, a fourth option arose: UHA would make one more final effort to recapture Eastern Galicia. The chief proponents were President Evhen Petrushevych and Major-General Alexander Hrekiv, a Russian officer assigned to UHA from Petliura's Ukrainian Nationalist. Petrushevych felt that if UHA could recapture Eastern Galicia the chances for a favorable settlement in Paris would be increased. The Allies, he thought, would have to recognize Western Ukraine as a viable tenacious nation willing to defend its interests to the last soldier. He dismissed Omelianovych-Pavlenko, who had serious reservations about the proposed offensive, and appointed General Alexander Hrekov as commanding general. General Omelianovych-Pavlenko agreed to remain at UHA Headquarters to help plan the offensive.

Although the staff soon came up with what was thought to be a good plan, the condition of the army was anything but battle ready. UHA combat strength had dropped to less than 25,000 men. Most infantrymen had less than twenty rounds of ammunition, while the artillery had less than twenty rounds per gun. The Quartermaster-General even ordered peasants to dig for bullets in deserted Russian trenches from the World War. However, the
The Chortkiv Offensive
morale of the army soon rose when the troops learned of the offensive. The soldiers, tired of retreating, wanted to fight back.

The first objective would be the town of Chortkiv. After its capture UHA would push toward Lviv as the final objective. On June 7, 1919, General Omelianovych-Pavlenko, during his last day as commanding general, ordered two probing attacks toward Chortkiv. UHA units swept through the surprised Poles and easily captured Chortkiv along with several hundred prisoners, six guns, and 60,000 rounds of ammunition. Encouraged by this initial success General Hrekov ordered the offensive to begin, I Corps was to capture Ternopil; the II Corps' objective was Buchach, while the III Corps would advance along the Dniester River toward Stanislav.66

The Chortkiv offensive surprised the Polish Command which had written off UHA. In fact, several divisions had been all ready transferred to Lithuania and Volhynia. Now orders were hastily issued to recall these units.

The Ukrainian advance continued with the Poles falling back. On June 11, Buchach was taken along with several dozen guns, machine guns, and a large quantity of supplies. The Polish Command intended to block the I Corps advance on Ternopil at Terebovlya. Major-General Myron Tarnavskyi took command of the combined I and II Corps while his German-Galician chief of staff, Colonel Alfred Shameneck, directed the operations for the coming battle.

The brunt of the Polish attack fell on the II Corps, however, Colonel Shameneck moved the II Corps away from the Polish center toward their right flank.67 The I Corps moved toward the Polish left flank and
center and in a coordinated counterattack with the I Corps, the Polish 13th Infantry Regiment was destroyed along with elements of the 36th and 40th Regiments. 68

UHA now controlled the town; however, the Poles rushed in reinforcements from Lviv which brought their strength to fourteen battalions. Local Polish counterattacks did little to impede the Ukrainian advance. By June 16, the Polish Army continued to fall back, while the I Corps marched toward Ternopil. 69

The II Corps' next objective was the town of Berezhany held by six Polish battalions. 70 On June 16, UHA attacked the Polish positions around the town. The next day, the Polish Army, now strengthened by several battalions, launched their own attack on the Ukrainian line. Fortunately for the Ukrainians, the brigades of the II Corps held their positions and inflicted heavy casualties on the Poles. The Polish Army, weakened by the assault, abandoned the town on June 20. The Polish Command's only plan was to hold its positions as long as possible until reinforcements could arrive.

On the left flank, the III Corps also met with success. A double envelopment resulted in the capture of Halich when the Polish commander, unaware of the III Corps' rapid maneuver, convinced himself that the initial attack was a reconnaissance by irregulars.

As the army continued to advance, tens of thousands flocked to recruiting stations to volunteer for the newly formed IV and V Corps, however, only 15,000 men were accepted before stocks of rifles were exhausted. The army's drive was supported by the local Ukrainian population; peasants gave the army food, civilian doctors volunteered their services, while numbers
of rear echelon troops deserted their units in order to fight at the front. 71 While the Chortkiv offensive was popular with the Galician Ukrainians, the leaders of Eastern Ukraine were not happy over it.

Petliura had been pressing the Galician Ukrainians to accept an armistice with the Poles for months. The Eastern Ukrainians felt that the primary struggle should be against the Bolsheviks. Petliura was desperate for the use of the well organized and disciplined UHA. Under Bolshevik military pressure on three sides, Petliura took matters in his own hands and sent General Delvig to sign an armistice for the Ukrainian People's Republic as well as for the Western Ukrainian Province. When President Petrushevich, who had been given emergency dictatorial powers, heard of the armistice he disavowed it as did General Hrekiv. With UHA units advancing on Lviv, both felt that the final Ukrainian victory was close at hand.

The UHA drive continued to smash piecemeal Polish resistance. On June 23, the III Corps reached the Hnyla Lypa River, while brigades of the II Corps, after encountering stiff resistance, crossed the Zolota Lypa River. The I Corps, on the right flank, occupied the town of Brody which was less than 100 kilometers northeast of Lviv. However, by June 25, the day the Foreign Ministers at the Paris Peace Conference authorized Poland to occupy all of Eastern Galicia, the Ukrainian advance began to slow down. If there had been better communications with Paris, UHA would have known that to continue the offensive and even resistance had become politically senseless.

Pilsudski, freed of any diplomatic constraints upon his policy towards Western Ukraine, assumed direct command of the Eastern Galician
front with the intention of forcing UHA into the small strip of Eastern Ukraine still held by Petliura.

As UHA began to encounter stiffened Polish resistance it suffered its first setback; units of the II Corps were forced to retreat along the Svir River. On the northern front, the I Corps fought its way to Zolochiv with great difficulty. It was evident to the Ukrainian High Command that the Poles were planning a counteroffensive.

The High Command continued to press forward with plans for an attack on Peremyshilany less than 50 kilometers from Lviv. The II Corps, with units from the I Corps, planned its attack on June 28, but thirty minutes before the attack, the Poles launched their own assault. The 3rd Brigade of the II Corps bore the brunt of the onslaught and tenaciously held on while it inflicted heavy casualties on two Polish divisions. By midday, the 3rd Brigade was forced to retreat. The counterattack at Peremyshilany signaled the start of the Polish general offensive along the entire front. Even though the armies were nearly equal in size (Poles 41,000, UHA 40,000) the Ukrainians were outclassed by the better-equipped Haller divisions. The ragged, poorly armed Ukrainians were no match for the modern, well-armed Polish Army. High morale could not be substituted for bullets and shells.

Within days, UHA went into a general, but orderly, withdrawal along the entire front. At this point, the Ukrainian Soviet Republic appealed to President Petrushevich to join in a joint campaign against the Poles and Rumanians. In spite of the enticing appeal, Petrushevich threw in with Petliura, and on July 4 he ordered UHA to coordinate operations with Petliura's army. The struggle was almost over when General
The Situation in Early July 1919

Adapted from Chortikivska ofenyva, (The Chortkiv Offensive), Munich 1953
Hrekiv received orders for UHA to cross the Zbruch River into Eastern Ukraine. On July 8, the first elements of UHA crossed the river and immediately went into combat against the Bolsheviks.

By the time the Ukrainian High Command, now under the command of Major-General Myron Tarnavsky, learned of the decision of the Foreign Ministers in Paris awarding Eastern Galicia to Poland, the evacuation was in full gear. During July 16-17, some 80,000 UHA soldiers crossed into Eastern Ukraine. One war was over and another had just begun.

The Western Ukrainian Government and the High Command had placed extremely high hopes on the last offensive. Both groups felt that UHA had had a chance to evict the Poles from most of Eastern Galicia and at the same time gain the support of the Allies in Paris. But Omelianovych-Pavlenko saw the plan for what it was: a final futile gesture.

Petrushevich and his government stubbornly believed, in spite of all indications otherwise, that the army could defeat the Poles. The Polish Army, with a total strength of almost 300,000 men, was a formidable, modern fighting force. Even though Poland faced border problems with Lithuania, Germany, and Czechoslovakia, and with the Bolsheviks in Volhynia, its army could still deal with the Ukrainians. UHA stood little chance of defeating it.
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The Foreign Ministers of the Paris Peace Conference awarded Eastern Galicia to Poland because they saw Poland as the West's bulwark against Bolshevik Russia. Eastern Galicia, along with Volhynia and part of Belorussia, would be Poland's eastern defensive border. Therefore, the Ministers saw Eastern Galicia as a vital geographical link; Poland and Rumania, another anti-Bolshevik country, sharing a common border, would form a cordon sanitaire from the Baltic to the Black Sea.

The Foreign Ministers were more pragmatic than the Supreme Council. The Ministers were willing to sacrifice Western Ukrainian independence, to the larger and more important problem of stopping the growth of Bolshevism. The Supreme Council, still cognizant of the policy of the right of self-determination, could not agree to Western Ukraine's fate, and therefore, with a touch of hypocrisy, transferred the matter to the Council of Foreign Ministers.

World War I impeded Western Ukraine's progression toward autonomy and eventual independence. In 1918 it did not have all the prerequisites for a successful nation. Another ten years of political consciousness, education, and maturity would have made Western Ukraine a viable state.

UHA, the military arm of the state, tried to establish its legitimacy while claiming disputed territory. When the hope of military success seemed distant, the government's diplomatic representatives in
in Paris attempted to gain the same political objectives by diplomatic action. Clearly, it failed in both instances.

As UHA grew more sophisticated in terms of organization, it began to fight a war it could not win. UHA officers had been inculcated by Austrian military training. Novel methods, bold maneuvers, or guerrilla actions were alien to them. When Lieutenant-General Omelianovych-Pavlenko suggested employing harassing operations, similar to those of his Cossack forebears, he found little support either from his staff or the government. Yet several years after the war, when former UHA officers formed the secret Ukrainian Military Organization, guerrilla warfare was employed against the Poles.

Moreover, the Western Ukrainians were caught in the middle of a larger struggle between the Entente and the Bolsheviks. The Allies, especially the French, clearly favored the reborn Polish state as an important keystone for their cordon sanitaire. French favoritism and Polish efforts in Paris eventually led the Allies to reject the Ukrainians. Greater Poland would best serve as a protective buffer for the Entente. Only a strong Polish state could hold off the Red menace.

However, Western Ukraine's situation had not been hopeless, at least initially. During the first few months of 1919, UHA had the ability to capture Lviv and most of Eastern Galicia. Lloyd George, if not a supporter of the Ukrainians, was willing to hear both sides of the argument. Woodrow Wilson, although dedicated to Polish independence, was also aware of the Ukrainian problem. But General Botha felt that the voice of Western Ukraine was drowning in a sea of Polish propaganda.
As UHA lost one battle after another, Western Ukraine's viability to survive as a political entity grew less assured. At a time when both the army and the state began to function efficiently, its ability to exist in the face of Polish invasions, remained in doubt.

The Western Ukrainian Government's inflexible attitude toward negotiating with the Poles extended to Petliura and the Ukrainian People's Republic as well. The Western Ukrainian Province, nominally part of Petliura's government, continued to function as an independent government even after its unification with Eastern Ukraine. As a result, Ukraine's military resources, hardly sufficient for one front, were divided between fighting the Poles in the West and the Bolsheviks in the East. The Western and Eastern Ukrainians, divided by almost three centuries, found it difficult to compromise. Each side was convinced that it was fighting the primary enemy of the Ukrainian state. It was only after UHA was forced out of Eastern Galicia, that the Western Ukrainian politicians realized that the road to Lviv lay through Kiev. By then it was too late.

There has been little discussion of the causes for the defeat. Memoirs and historical accounts of the UHA campaigns stress the lack of leadership at the brigade and corps level for the army's defeat. Other Ukrainian authors believe that the breakdown of logistical support ultimately led to defeat. As this study makes apparent the causes of the defeat were far more extensive. The very nature of the war, into which the UHA found itself drawn after the unsuccessful coup in Lviv, placed extraordinary demands upon the entire military organization of Western Ukraine. This struggle, which involved the UHA in a contest with a better armed, better led and better supplied Polish Army, drained the existing military resources
in the territories occupied by the UHA.

In the absence of external diplomatic and military support and a safe rear area, where the training of new units and the production of domestic arms could be undertaken, the UHA found itself confronted by an escalating struggle. The efforts of UHA commanders to create a conventional army were frustrated because of the economic backwardness of the region itself, the extraordinary pressure under which such organizational efforts had to be undertaken and the short period of time during which Western Ukraine existed as a political entity.
APPENDIX
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<th>Symbol</th>
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Key to Symbols
Composition of a UH-60A Battalion
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CHAPTER II


2 Ibid.

3 Ibid., p. 395.


6 Kubijovyc, Ukraine, I, p. 699.

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13 Ibid., p. 403.

15 Ibid., p. 257.
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54 Rothenburg, *Army*, p. 128.
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CHAPTER III

1 Krezyb, Narys, p. 32.


3 Shankowsky, Ukrains'ka, p. 42.

4 Krezyb, Narys, p. 33.

5 Lozyns'kyi, Halychyna, p. 43.

6 Ibid., pp. 42-43.

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10 Ibid.

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30 Ibid., p. 371.
31 Bailly, A City, p. 273.
32 Ibid., pp. 286-288.
33 Kuzma, Lystopadovi, p. 392.
34 Ibid., pp. 372-373.
36 Bailly, A City, pp. 288-289.
37 Ibid., pp. 292-293.
38 Kuzma, Lystopadovi, p. 401.
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42 Ibid., p. 427.
43 Krezyb, Narys, pp. 50-52.
44 Kuzma, Lystopadovi, p. 240.
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5 Ukrains'ka, Vol I, p. 77.
6 Ibid., p. 362.
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ARTICLES AND PERIODICALS


UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL

THE UKRAINIAN GALICIAN ARMY IN THE UKRAINIAN-POLISH WAR 1918-1919

by

LEONID KONDRAIUK
B.A., The Citadel, 1971

AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S THESIS

submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of History

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas

1979
With the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in October 1918, five states emerged: Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Western Ukraine. The last, Western Ukraine, had never been a separate country. A former Polish province, it was a historic part of the Ukraine. In spite of its name, the Western Ukrainian Republic consisted, primarily, of the province of Eastern Galicia. The Ukrainian majority had been ruled, for years, by the Polish minority. During the confusion of the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Ukrainians took advantage of the situation by proclaiming their independence. Poles, both in and outside of the country, saw Eastern Galicia as a historic and integral part of Poland. The inevitable result was an armed conflict, the Ukrainian-Polish War of 1918-1919.

The war was the result of years of political friction between Poles and Ukrainians. During the mid-nineteenth century, the Ukrainians rediscovered their ethnic and cultural identity. This revival led to Ukrainian demands for a greater role in government. However, the Poles, who were the landowners and civil servants, viewed the Ukrainian revival as an Austrian intrigue. From 1848 to 1914 Ukrainians slowly gained political concessions. In 1914 Ukrainian politicians believed that autonomy and eventual independence were in sight.

However, when World War I ended the Ukrainians attempted to determine their own destiny. On October 20, 1918, the Ukrainian National Council declared the independence of Western Ukraine. On November 1 Ukrainian soldiers seized the city of Lviv. The Polish residents of the city, which included several hundred demobilized soldiers, resisted the Ukrainians
and an armed struggle ensued. The Ukrainian soldiers, loosely organized into the Ukrainska Halytska Armia (Ukrainian Galician Army, UHA), attempted to put down the rebellion. Both the Polish Army and the UHA sent reinforcements to Lviv as the battle intensified. However, UHA evacuated the city on November 21, intending to fight a more conventional battle outside of the city.

As the UHA encircled Lviv, the conflict expanded into a full-fledged war. UHA, organized into a conventional army, attempted to storm the city with conventional tactics. However, the Polish invasion of Eastern Galicia further expanded the war. While an Allied Commission, representing the victorious Western Powers at Versailles, attempted to stop the fighting, UHA and the Polish Army battered themselves in a series of offensives and counteroffensives.

During the course of war the UHA attempted to transform itself from a mass conscript force into a semi-regular army. Its leadership created an efficient military organization. However, this structure imposed upon UHA a type of war that it could not win. In conventional battles of attrition better armed and supplied Polish troops drove the now ragged UHA into Southeastern Galicia. By the end of May 1919, it seemed that UHA was defeated. In a bold, but futile, offensive UHA pushed the surprised Poles back to the gates of Lviv. However, the Polish Army, now under the command of Marshal Jozef Pilsudski, rallied and with fresh reinforcements drove the UHA, once and for all, out of Eastern Galicia.

As chances of a military victory diminished, the Ukrainian redoubled their diplomatic efforts at the Paris Peace Conference. However, events in Russia undermined the Western Ukrainian cause. Once the Conference was
committed to an Anti-Bolshevik barrier in Eastern Europe, the logical step was to award Eastern Galicia to Poland. Poland was to be the buffer against the Bolsheviks and their possession of Eastern Galicia was a strategic necessity. Neither Ukrainian Galician pleas for the right of national self-determination nor the UHA's residual military capability could alter the geopolitical reality.

In the absence of external diplomatic and military support and a safe rear area, where the training of new units and the production of domestic arms could be undertaken, the UHA found itself confronted by an escalating struggle. The efforts of UHA commanders to create a conventional army were frustrated because of the economic backwardness of the region itself, the extraordinary pressure under which such organizational efforts had to be undertaken and the short period of time during which Western Ukraine existed as a political entity.