

NATIONALISM AND REGIONALISM IN NIGERIA

by

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CHAPTER I

NATIONALISM, THE NATION AND NATION-BUILDING

With the rise to self-assertion of the former colonial peoples, nationalism seems to have taken a strong hold; yet, at the same time in Europe nationalism appears to be taking on new dimensions. The molding of the U.S.S.R. into a single political unit with cultural autonomy, and the steps taken towards political and economic integration of Western Europe, may well be two extreme examples of the shape of things to come. At the same time we see a similar phenomenon in many of the new nations--the molding of a new unit out of many former sovereignties. These new nations--some ruled by colonial powers for as little as fifty years--were created from an amalgamation of individual autonomous units. In each case the problem is to develop new loyalties to the new order, be it the U.S.S.R., the E.E.C. or a new nation. The configuration of these loyalties for lack of a better term is known as nationalism.

It has been well established that nationalism is a recent phenomenon. Certain basic changes in concepts of the state and in the social environment of man, both of which are closely interwoven, have been involved. First, "nationalism is inconceivable without the ideas of popular sovereignty preceding--without a complete revision of the

position of ruler and ruled, of classes and castes."¹ This means that the nation or the state can no longer be looked upon as the personal property of the ruler, but rather as the concern of all the citizenry and as such the citizen is considered sovereign. Yet, for this concept to emerge, first there had to appear the citizen rather than the subject. Nationalism then appears at the same time or after mass mobilization or "the process of integration of the masses of the people into a common political form."² In the context of the developing nations this can be seen more clearly.

The two most significant elements in the rise of nationalism as the modern world intrudes upon different countries are the disintegration of the older forms of society and communal life and the emergence of the bourgeoisie and the "common man." For reasons which remain only partially explained, the interaction of these elements produces a vigorous sense of national identity which shortly translates itself into political action.³

This vigorous sense of national identity has a tendency to be molded by certain objective factors. Among the most important are language, territory, political entity, customs and traditions, and religion. Language certainly can be considered among the most important, for "a striking coincidence can still be found between emphasis on language and the emergence of the nation. . . . What lay behind the

¹Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism (New York: Macmillan and Co., 1944), p. 3.

²Ibid., p. 4.

³Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), p. 93.

eruption of the language issue was, of course, the emergence of the middle class and then of the broader masses of the people, familiar only with the vernacular languages but given a social and geographical mobility which overrode local dialects."⁴ Although an international language such as English may be imposed from above and at first create a picture of unity among the elites, certainly the rapid emergence of a broader base of education will bring the language question to the fore.⁵ Territorial boundaries and the established political entity can go far in creating a sense of exclusiveness. For example, the colonial regimes in Africa have definitely created hardened political boundaries separating peoples on each side giving rise to a sense of a national "we" as opposed to a foreign "they". This sense of identity, the setting of secondary symbols upon primary symbols, however, need not only apply to the state as conceived on paper or in form; it may and certainly does also apply to smaller entities.

But the nation and nationality have not been defined. It seems that for the discussion of the preconditions for nationalism a functional definition would be the most useful. In this sense, then, we approach the nation from the concept of a nationality or from the constituent

⁴Ibid., p. 134.

⁵Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1966), pp. 134-137.

elements of the nation.

In the political and social struggles of the modern age, nationality then, means an alignment of a large number of individuals from the middle and lower classes linked to regional centers and leading social groups by channels of social communication and economic intercourse both indirectly from link to link and directly with the center.⁶

Then nationality and the nation are synonymous. This definition over others which stress consciousness, or the state of mind has the advantage in that it emphasizes the means by which the state of mind or the consciousness is produced.

By this definition then we must differentiate between the nation and the state. The nation can only consist of a mobilized population with the consciousness developed through communication of being a "we" or a nation. The state, then, refers to the political organization under which various people or peoples are governed. The nation can create the state as in the case of Germany or the state can create the nation as in the case of the United States. Yet it seems essential in the modern mind that the nation and the state should coincide.

Since the state is in modern times the most significant form of organization of man and embodies the greatest concentration of power, it is inevitable that there should have been and should still be, a great and revolutionary struggle to secure a coincidence between state and nation.⁷

⁶Ibid., p. 101.

⁷Emerson, op. cit., p. 96.

Almond and Powell have identified four system problems that each political system must solve: 1) state-building--the problem of integration and control; 2) nation-building--the problem of group identity and loyalty; 3) participation--the involvement in decision-making and 4) distribution--the allocation of goods and services and other values.⁸ It seems apparent that all four system problems are present in the developing nations, but that two seem paramount. In contrast to the major developed nations which appear to have approached the four problems sequentially, the development of new nations must telescope their problem-solving in such a way that there is mutual interaction. However, the problems of state- and nation-building, in view of the mobilization of numbers of people in the struggle for independence, must be approached simultaneously.

The question of what is nation-building remains. Is it the problem of building group identity and loyalty? If so, how intensive is this loyalty to be? Will there be ultimate loyalty in a monolithic state or will there be rather a federation of cultural units under a single state form? It has been suggested that nation-limiting should be a prime consideration for the new states.

This would be the art of persuading new nations to limit themselves to a size manageable for their own integrative and decision making capabilities, as well

⁸Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell, Cooperative Politics: A Developmental Approach (New York: Little Brown and Company, 1966), p. 314.

as the art of separating populations and territories wherever too many people seem to be imprisoned in hardened deadlock of mutual frustration and rising resentment.⁹

Yet, this would seem to be visionary idealism. Once a state is established as such, it is not likely to divide itself into smaller although perhaps more manageable units. The American and Nigerian civil wars tend to indicate that once a state has been established as such in modern times, the constituent units lose the freedom to decide for themselves as to whether to participate in the state or not. Although attempts at union-formation have occurred relatively frequently, the voluntary dissolution of a state is almost unheard of.¹⁰ Dissolution may be achieved by war, but can this be considered nation-building or even nation-limiting?

Carl Friedrich has stated that nation-building can be considered "a matter of building group cohesion and group loyalty for purposes of international representation and domestic planning."¹¹ This can apply both to the new nations of the world and to the older nations which are considering and working towards federation. It emphasizes the

⁹Karl Deutsch and William J. Foltz, eds., Nation-Building (New York: Atherton Press, 1966), p. x.

¹⁰See Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1965), pp. 329 and 332 for a distinction between union and political community or state.

¹¹Deutsch and Foltz, op. cit., p. 32.

originally be with the political unit as envisioned. In the new nations of Africa, particularly, we see a phenomenon of divided loyalty. The mobilization of large groups in these nations has brought a consciousness of being a part of the state in which they now reside. However, it has also brought a consciousness of what is known as subnationalism or tribalism and a consciousness of being African rather than anything else, a consciousness which was heightened by historical circumstance and color prejudice. The problem of nation-building in Africa then deals with the problem of terminal loyalty. Will the new states be able to generate loyalty to the state as presently constituted? Will loyalty remain in the large tribal federations? Or will loyalty be ultimately given to Africa as a whole?

CHAPTER II

THE METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

If, as defined above, nationalism is a recent African phenomenon, it is necessary to look into ways and means of analyzing and discussing nationalism on a country by country basis. In most cases today, it should be noted that nationalism and the nation remain goals to be achieved rather than fully defined entities in their own right. The problem is to determine the focus for this study. Does one look for the modern man, the one who has divorced himself from his traditional way of life enough so that he has a wider perspective? Or does he approach nationalism and nation-building from the cultural point of view? In other words, should we look for the underlying compatibilities or incompatibilities in the cultural configuration of the groups within the political unit, or should we look at the way the unit handles political decisions and questions? Various approaches have been proposed and it seems necessary at this point to discuss a few of them.

The human bases of nationalism

Perhaps the best definition of modern man has been given by Daniel Lerner. It is his thesis that "high empathic capacity is the predominant personal style only in

modern society, which is distinctively industrial, urban, literate and participant."¹ It is this empathic capacity which distinguishes the modern man, the mobile personality.

The mobile person is distinguished by a high capacity for identification with new aspects of his environment; he comes equipped with the mechanisms needed to incorporate new demands upon himself that arise out of his habitual experience.²

This man is an essential ingredient of the modern system; he creates it and in turn the system molds him. Further, modern media can be considered the mobility multiplier. Modern media are only found in systems which are considered modern by other tests. They grow only where there are available talents and skills to create a vast complex mass media system. Thus, modern media "by simplifying perception while greatly complicating response have been great teachers of interior manipulation."³

While it is difficult, if not impossible, to measure empathy through statistics, there are other indicators which may be used. Lerner found a direct sequence of modernization which starts from urbanization. This creates a matrix of skills and resources which further develops the attributes of the next two phases, literacy and media growth. Urbanization appears to create the necessary conditions for

¹Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1958), p. 50.

²Ibid., p. 49.

³Ibid., p. 54.

modernization, that is increased literacy and media growth. Literacy further acts upon media growth but both produce the modern participant society.

An alternative approach would be one in which the persons who are placed in a situation where empathic qualities become essential were to be isolated statistically. Karl Deutsch has suggested the use of the concept of social mobilization, "the process in which major clusters of old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior."⁴ To describe this process in quantitative terms, Deutsch uses seven indices: (a) mass media audience, (b) change of residence, (c) literacy, (d) urbanization, (e) population in non-agricultural employment, (f) per capita income and (g) voting participation. Changes in these statistics (in terms of percentage of population) over the years are used in the determination of the rate of social mobilization. The entire process of social mobilization creates a shift in emphasis, at least for segments of the population "away from the parochialism and internationalism of many traditional cultures to a preoccupation with the supralocal but far less than world-wide unit of the territorial and, eventually, national state."⁵

⁴Karl Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," in H. Eckstein and David E. Apter, Comparative Politics: A Reader (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), p. 523.

⁵Ibid., p. 588.

However, this "same process may tend to strain or destroy the unity of a state whose population is already divided into several groups with different languages or cultures or basic ways of life."⁶ So that although the process of social mobilization may indeed widen horizons beyond the traditional perspectives, it may also create a preoccupation for a larger but subnational group. However, while it is certainly true that the process of social mobilization may strain the unity of a multi-cultural state, it is certainly not a foregone conclusion that this process will destroy the state. Political decisions and actions may well be the final determinant.

The cultural bases of nationalism

Professor Von der Mehden in his discussion of the search for national identity deals primarily with the questions of political alienation. He offers a general outline of factors to look for in a situation marked by alienation. In dealing with secessionist threats he finds the cause in such factors as religion, geography (areas either remote from the political center or hampered by poor communication), separate administration during the colonial era, and the hope of foreign involvement. A milder form of alienation would demand constitutional guarantees for minority rights. More general causal variables for the lack of the development of a

⁶Ibid., p. 539.

national identity can also be delineated. These new states are generally artificial, that is they do not often have a national heritage before colonialism, but rather are a conglomeration of different tribal groups. Closely related to this is the factor of artificial borders, that is the division of tribal, ethnic and linguistic groups into separate states by the colonial powers. Colonial policy, although not always consciously following the principle of divide and rule may also be a contributing factor. The lack of communications and modern media have contributed to the persistence of village and regional parochialism. All of these factors influence minorities who may, in turn, exert pressures for separatism. Positive policies to combat alienation could include the extension of political parties to outlying regions, the creation of patriotism and propaganda designed towards a national focus, national languages and education and anti-guerilla measures.⁷

Another approach deals specifically with the problem of cultural pluralism. The authors say that

social mobilization and cultural assimilation take place simultaneously on different levels. Terminal loyalty may well come to reside in the existing state, or in some cultural component smaller than the internationally recognized territory or indeed vacillate between one and the other.⁸

⁷See Fred Von der Mehden, Politics of the Developing Nations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall, 1964).

⁸Charles W. Anderson, Fred R. Von der Mehden and Crawford Young, Issues of Political Development (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), p. 16.

Cultural loyalties and subnational loyalties develop at the same time as national loyalties (and for the same reasons) and both act and react in the developing state. An individual as he moves into the modern world is involved with a multiplicity of potential foci of loyalty and his perception of a situation will determine his ultimate loyalty at that particular moment. Further

it is pertinent to note that a feedback situation to solidarity occurs: the more frequently and intensively a given circle is activated by perceptions of situation, the more deeply ingrained in the social consciousness of the actor this circle becomes.⁹

Subnational consciousness seems to appear most readily with certain particular issues, such as language policy, localization of civil service, electoral competition and resource allocation. Intensification of subnational loyalties grouped around these issues gives rise to alienation, dissension, and even secession. Means of reducing possible areas of conflict are seen in federation, a culturally neutral state and ideology.

Another approach could be that of political culture which concerns the milieu in which political action takes place. As such it does not deal with political actions per se, but rather with the belief systems which surround and operate upon the political system. Its chief focus is towards national integration or nation-building. "The

⁹Ibid., p. 62.

political culture of a society consists of the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which defines the situation in which political action takes place."¹⁰ One may very well ask how to study political culture, what are the relevant beliefs, attitudes, and symbols which delimit political culture? According to Verba

the study of political culture leads invariably to the study of political socialization, to the learning experiences by which a political culture is passed on from generation to generation and to the situations under which political cultures change.¹¹

All culture is learned and it is the various structures and institutions through which political culture is learned which must be examined. The history of the unit as well as the operation of the political system are closely related to the feelings of national identity. For example, the way in which the nation is formed may be crucial. Equally important, political crises may be relevant particularly if they tend to divide commitment rather than giving the members of the polity a sense of common commitment. The politicization of personal relationships as well as the feelings of trust and distrust regardless of the form the government takes are very important. The direct socialization process stressing perhaps education or voluntary association behavior must also be examined. From these

¹⁰ Lucien Pye and Sidney Verba, Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 513.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 517.

institutions, we get a picture of the political culture which, incidentally, is not homogeneous in any culture. Generally, there are at least two, one for the masses and one for the elite; however, there need not be a barrier between the two, rather a sequential politicization from the mass to the elite culture. It is also conceivable to have several different strains of culture within a political unit, but there must be a great deal of congruence between them for stability. From an analysis of the political culture then, the degree of homogeneity with the culture or cultures or the degree of disharmony can be assessed.

The political bases of nationalism

Professor Etzioni has presented a paradigm,¹² a set of dimensions for the study of political unification. Although primarily applied to the unification of existing states, it can also be applied to the evolution of other unifications such as tribal unification into a nation.

Whatever the independent variable--background condition, integrating powers, retarding factors--we turn to the same dependent variables; the level and scope of integration; that is, we wish to outline the problems involved in determining the effect these various factors have on the success or failure of unification.¹³

¹² Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1965), p. 2. "It provides a set of inter-related questions, but no account of validated propositions."

¹³ Ibid., p. 14.

The ultimate goal of a political union is the creation of a political community which is:

a community that possesses three kinds of integration: (a) it has an effective control over the use of the means of violence...; (b) it has a center of a decision-making that is able to affect significantly the allocation of resources and rewards throughout the community; and (c) it is the dominant focus of political identification for the large majority of politically aware citizens.¹⁴

Power is essential in the creation of a political union. However, it is necessary to divide the concept of power into three constituent parts: (a) identitive; (b) utilitarian; (c) coercive. The more identitive and utilitarian power the elites or the system builds up, the more successful that system will be. However, in contrast to the above two forms of power, it seems that the application of coercive power above a certain level will decrease the chances for a successful union. A premature union, that is one where exist'ng loyalties are strong, will require more force than a mature or overdue one. It seems that in building up the union, identitive power is more effective at least in the initial stages than an attempt at reallocation of resources. Finally it seems that each union reaches a crisis state or coercive showdown. This tends "to come at a particular point in the life history: (a) as the power of external elites declines, (b) before the union's utilitarian and

¹⁴Ibid., p. 4.

identitive systems and power are built up, or (c) after they have weakened."¹⁵ Strategies to be used in times of crisis are acceleration, which tends to be more effective in anticipation in mature unions, and deceleration, which tends to be more effective in premature unions.

Summary

Nationalism as a recent phenomenon would seem to depend upon modern man. However, it is first necessary to define modern man and then to be able to delineate him from the rest of the population within a given country. Modern man has been defined by Daniel Lerner as the mobile personality with a high empathic capacity. But Mr. Lerner concentrates his discussion on the conditions of modernity rather than modern man as such. Therefore, it seems necessary to turn to the concept of social mobilization to find the modern man. But measuring the statistical definition of modern man does not tell much about the milieu in which he operates. One approach could be through an analysis of the problem of political alienation and the background factors behind it. Another could be the discussion of cultural plurality and the ways in which it operates on and within the system. This approach could also look into the development of sub-national loyalties. Another could take a view of the cultural milieu as a whole as it relates to the political

¹⁵Ibid., p. 96.

system. Not only are the background factors to alienation considered, but also the situations in which subnational loyalties develop. The concept of political culture can help also to determine those situations in which subnational loyalties are not disruptive. The question of political alienation and subnational loyalties all deal with the problem of identification to the political system. Yet in many cases identification to the political system comes after a period of time in which the political system has been held together by other forces. Therefore, it is also necessary to discuss and analyze the political and economic decisions which may help to integrate or disintegrate the system. Professor Etzioni has delineated the coercive forces and utilitarian decisions as being particularly important in the discussion of political integration.

Theory, then, is important when discussing nationalism and nation-building on a country by country basis. It seems that rapid social mobilization has an effect on the integration or disintegration of the political culture or the identitive force in the state or political community. However, as it is apparent that the state or political community can build up the identitive force or a political culture or cultures which are cohesive, it seems necessary to take other important elements into

consideration. The coercive and utilitarian forces can build up identity to the community or national political culture. Therefore, the use of these forces must be taken into consideration. The purpose of this paper is to apply these considerations to a particular country, Nigeria.

CHAPTER III

SOCIAL MOBILIZATION

Background

During the rush for empire in the 19th century, Great Britain acquired the area now known as Nigeria, starting first with the colony of Lagos in the middle of the century and finally completing her conquest with the addition of the protectorate of Northern Nigeria by the beginning of the 20th century. In 1914 the various colonies and protectorates were amalgamated to form what is now Nigeria. The British laid the foundations for the present educational and economic structure during the interwar period. With the coming of World War II, greater pressure was made throughout the world for independence of all colonies. The decision was made to proceed with all possible speed to grant independence to the colonies within the British empire by the end of the war. In response to pressure mounting in Nigeria various commissions and constitutions were formed. Independence was finally granted to Nigeria on October 1, 1960 and in 1963 Nigeria declared herself a Federal Republic.

Nigeria's geography encompasses the densely wooded tropical rainforest region on the coast, the plains of the central region, and the semi-forest regions in the North. The populations in each of these geographical belts were

and are widely divergent with different traditions, religions and mores. Before the arrival of the British the most developed area in terms of political structure was that of the North. But its landlocked location blocked it from receiving the early contact with the West, and Western technological and industrial knowledge. Early contacts with the British on the part of the population of the South gave it an advantage in the education necessary for the modern industrial system. This education also brought with it the early demands for self-government and independence.

Independent Nigeria appeared to show great promise in both rapid economic development, political stability and democracy. It seemed to have a position of great moral weight with the other nations of Africa. But in January, 1966, a group of young officers, largely Eastern in origin, gained control of the government through a revolution. This new group replaced the federal structure with a unitary one but was unable to maintain itself for long. In July of 1966 a counter-revolution set up an interim military dictatorship. This counter-revolution was led largely by Northern officers and in its wake thousands of Easterners living outside the region were killed in riots. Although order was reestablished, distrust and a fear of genocide remained and finally resulted in the secession of the Eastern Region. The establishment of the secessionist state of Biafra in this region, in May 1967 led to the

current civil war. The following chapters examine the background conditions to the revolution and counter-revolution, using some of the techniques described in Chapter II.

Social mobilization: the seven indicators

Most experts agree that in the post war years Nigeria has undergone a period of rapid social mobilization. As has been seen, this may have a tendency either to focus attention upon the nation as a whole, or to disrupt the nation. Although Nigeria as a whole has been undergoing a period of rapid social mobilization, this process has been uneven throughout the country; some groups were mobilizing faster than others. Although regional statistical information is incomplete, it is possible to make an approximation of the trends this social mobilization has been taking.

The media provide an extremely far-reaching means of achieving social mobilization and expanded horizons. Included among the modern media are not only newspapers, but also radio, television and film production. Newspapers in Nigeria are for the most part privately owned but tied to one or the other of the three major political parties. This would suggest that except for the overseas newspapers, which are available only in the major cities and Federal capital, influence of a particular newspaper would not go beyond the regional stronghold of each party. While the

newspapers may play a part in mobilizing the masses of people, emphasis would seem very likely to be placed upon regional affairs, or national affairs as they affect regional politics, rather than as a unifying or nationalizing agent. "Other mass media, including radio, television and film production enterprises, are publically owned (by the federal and regional governments). The ratio of people to radios in Nigeria is about 130:1."¹ No regional statistics were given. It seems likely, however, that the media would tend to emphasize the broader view in terms of regions, rather than in terms of the nation as a whole. No attempt was made to assess the relative rates of growth.

Urbanization, or the proportion of the population living in cities, is another indicator of social mobilization. Before discussing the differences in the rates of mobilization, it is necessary to discuss the city as such. When a Westerner discusses urbanization, he visualizes a city where there is increased contact between and among groups, a chance for division of labor, and above all, a money economy. However, there appears to be a traditional pattern of occupation where family compounds will group together largely for the purpose of defense. The chief occupation of the inhabitants of the city was agriculture while, in addition,

¹Richard L. Sklar and C.S. Whitaker, Jr., "Nigeria," in Gwendolyn M. Carter, ed., National Unity and Regionalism in Eight African States (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966), p. 27.

there was also a small differentiation of labor. Although the general population might very well be homogeneous, "heterogeneity was expressed, however, in their social stratification and the elaboration of the political structure."²

Whereas, both the Yoruba of the West, and the Hausa-Fulani of the North, are more urbanized than the Ibo of the East or the other smaller tribal groups, the increase in urbanization has been most phenomenal in the Eastern Region.

In 1952, the percentage of the total population living in urban centers of 20,000 or more varied from 26 percent in the Western Region to 8 percent in the Eastern Region and 3.5 percent in the Northern Region. Yet the Eastern Region showed the greatest increase in urbanization (688 percent) between 1921 and 1952.³

The Yoruba did not show as marked an increase in urbanization, perhaps because of all the groups in Nigeria this was the one which was most urbanized to begin with. In this instance the traditional pattern of urban society may also have cushioned the impact of secular forces which would tend to produce social disorganization. There is no evidence that there has been any remarkable change or even a marked increase, in the patterns of urbanization in the North.

Change of residence is also a factor of urbanization. Here again, it is apparent that the Ibo of the Eastern Region have been the ones to travel most extensively out-

²Hilda Kuper, ed., Urbanization and Migration in West Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), p. 12.

³Richard L. Sklar, Nigerien Political Parties (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 20-21.

side of their home region in search of employment, as Table 1 shows.

TABLE 1⁴
DEGREE OF URBANIZATION OUTSIDE IBOLAND
(Early 1950's)

City	Indigenous Group	Percentage of Ibos in Nonindigenous population
Lagos	Yoruba	44.6
Benin City	Edo	53.6
Sapele	Urhobo	48.0
Calabar	Efik	50.7
Kano	Hausa	38.0
Zaria	Hausa	39.0
Kaduna	Mixed	40.7

Non-traditional towns which are commercial and administrative in origin such as Lagos, Kaduna and Jos will necessarily have a higher proportion of non-indigenous population. It is interesting to note that before the civil war, in all of the newer cities, the Ibo made up at least one-third of the non-indigenous population. If groups were ranked according to change of residence, the ranking would be:

1) Ibo, 2) Yoruba, 3) Middle Belt tribes, 4) Hausa-Fulani.

Another indicator of social mobilization is the population involved in non-agricultural employment. As late as the early 1960's some three fourths of the population of Nigeria was engaged in agriculture, forestry, animal hus-

⁴James S. Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), p. 77. It should be noted that interest has been focused on the major tribal groupings. There are many smaller groups, dominated by the larger ones, but very little information is available.

bandry, fishing, and hunting. There is some indication, that particularly in the Western Region, agriculture was becoming organized around more "modern" marketing values, although the pattern of ownership and operation remained traditional. In the non-agricultural sector of the economy, the largest single employer was the government.

In 1958, 63.2 percent of the 478,000 persons employed in the nonagricultural sector of the economy were public employees, including salaried employees of the Federal and Regional governments, local government councils, and public corporations, in addition to wage laborers.

Recent discoveries of sulphur-free oil in the Southern regions of Nigeria led to the beginning of local processing industries which very likely employed increasing numbers of persons. However, this was set back by the civil war. Economic indicators showed that the economy of Nigeria was about to reach the point where growth becomes normal. This seems to indicate that before 1967 increasing numbers were being employed in the non-agricultural sector. At independence the Southern regions had a larger population of wage earners than the North. See Table 2. It is probably safe to assume that the South has maintained this proportional lead, although the North has increased the non-agricultural sector of its economy.

⁵Sklar and Whitaker, op. cit., p. 96.

TABLE 2⁶

EMPLOYMENT BY REGION AND TYPE OF EMPLOYER

Regions	1958	1960		Total
	(total)	Governmental	Non-governmental	
Lagos	95,620	26,393	68,134	94,527
Northern	150,741	70,802	73,379	144,181
Western	96,430	62,492	70,521	133,013
Eastern	96,167	52,970	75,257	128,227

Education has been recognized as one of the major factors contributing towards development, be it political or economic. Literacy is also an indicator of social mobilization as it provides the capabilities for one to move outside of his traditional subsistence form of life, either actually, or figuratively. Like most of the so-called developing nations, the literacy rate for Nigeria is low.

In 1932, of the total population over seven years of age, 8.5 percent were literate in roman script in all Nigeria, 16 percent in the Eastern Region, 18 percent in the Western Region and 2 percent in the Northern Region. There were (and still are) significant differences. In the predominantly pagan provinces of the Middle Belt, 3.3 percent were literate, whereas only 1.4 percent were literate in the northern, predominantly Muslim provinces.⁷

Both the federal and regional governments have instituted massive programs in order to overcome this illiteracy. In the middle 1950's, the Western Region made mandatory primary schooling for all children a goal, although it

⁶Federation of Nigeria, Digest of Statistics, Vol. 11 No. 3, July, 1962, p. 81. These statistics do include agriculture as an industry, but appear to be a compilation of wage earners.

⁷James S. Coleman, op. cit., p. 133.

would be some time before it was achieved. The 1960's brought an increased recognition of the need for literacy in the North, which produced an intensive program in adult literacy in the cities. In the early part of the twentieth century, the Eastern Region found that education was the means of escaping increasing poverty in an overcrowded area. Consequently, in addition to mission schools, it established a number of private schools. By 1962, at least in urban areas, there was a marked increase in literacy.

TABLE 3^B

LITERACY IN THE REGIONS (Voting Population)

	Illiterate	Self-taught	Koranic Schools	Some Schooling
East	33%	---	---	67%
West	65%	12%	---	24%
North	13%	25%	40%	22%

The expenditures for education is another indicator of the attempts to increase literacy in Nigeria.

^B John P. Mackintosh, Nigerian Government and Politics: Prelude to Revolution, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. 340. This table refers to the sample used by the author, and as it represents three urban areas, this cannot be an indicator of the situation as a whole. The major Southern languages are written in Roman script, as is English, an official language. A larger percentage of the Northerners attend Koranic schools where they learn Arabic. As the Arabic script is also used for Hausa, the language of the North, the teaching of Hausa is probably made easier.

TABLE 4⁹EXPENDITURES FOR EDUCATION
FEDERAL AND REGIONAL
IN ₦ 000

	Total	Federal	Northern	Eastern	Western
59-60	18,707	2,662	3,320	5,564	7,161
60-61	20,883	2,808	3,691	7,288	7,096
61-62	22,445	3,258	4,192	7,732	7,265

It is clear that the Northern Region lags far behind the Southern regions, both in literacy and expenditures for education.

This uneven development can also be seen at the university level. It seems that virtually all students at university level in the 1950's, both in Nigeria and overseas, were from the Southern regions. In fact, although there were a few students from the Hausa regions of the North at University College, Ibadan, in the 1960's, they were outnumbered by the students from the Middle Belt. A study of the students at the college in 1960, concluded that:

Southern minorities and the Northern Hausa-Fulani will feel increasingly threatened. The data indicate that (a) the disparity in power and education between the two major ethnic groups and other southern groups is increasing and (b) the minority groups in the Northern Region are advancing more rapidly than are the powerful Hausa-Fulani.¹⁰

⁹Ruben Frodin, "A Note on Nigeria," American Universities Field Staff, Reports From the Field, West Africa Series, Vol. 1; 4, p. 14.

¹⁰William J. Hanna, "Students," in James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., eds., Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), p. 442.

Overall per capita income is at about \$60.00 annually. This again is rather unevenly distributed. The Southern regions have the greatest industrial development and hence a greater income from this source. Since the Southern regions lead the other areas in agricultural export production, they also have an advantage in this field. For 1952-53, per capita income (in pounds sterling) was 34.0 for the Western Region, 21.0 for the Eastern Region and 17.0 for the Northern Region.¹¹ It would seem that while the Western Region is probably the richest in per capita income at the present, development of mineral resources and concomitant industrialization in the other regions, may very well leave it behind.

Voting participation overall is high, although there is a residue of feeling against putting one's name down on the voter registration lists. Many Nigerians assume that there is a connection between the tax lists and voter registration lists. It is for this reason that many eligible voters fail to register. This feeling is stronger in the North than in the South. No figures were available.

Summary

The Ibos of the Eastern Region appear to be the ones who are most rapidly mobilizing, with the peoples of the Western Region a close second. Evidence indicates

¹¹Coleman, op. cit., p. 66

that one must divide the Northern Region further into the Muslim north and the largely pagan south. In literacy and urbanization, both the pagan southern region and the Middle Belt, seem to have taken a lead over the Northern Muslim areas. Since the northern Muslim areas have the strongest development of organized political activity, which dates furthest back into history, it seems evident that traditional controlled change does not proceed at as rapid a pace as uncontrolled change. As a result of the rapid social mobilization of the Ibo people, there has perhaps developed the strongest feeling of nationhood among them. Through contact with the Southern people, the people of the Muslim north have become increasingly conscious of their backwardness. This has, perhaps, also placed a strong awareness of nationhood upon the Northerners.

CHAPTER IV

THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF NIGERIA

As in so many of the developing nations today, the political culture of Nigeria can be described as kaleidoscopic. Traditional and modern elements blend together and interact in varying patterns which cannot be described except for specific situations. Yet it is our problem to present the salient characteristics of these cultures. In some points there will be similarity; in others there will be strong divergence. The identification of similarities and differences, even sharp schisms, is not an exercise in prediction, but rather an indication of problem areas. Whether integration can be a success or not depends on the manner in which problem points are handled. This only time will tell.

Historical background

Nigeria as a whole first came under British rule in the scramble for African colonies in the late 19th century. By 1900, the British consolidated their control in three protectorates, the North, the West and the East, and in one colony, Lagos district. Before the coming of the British, Southern Nigeria had had many contacts with the West, dating from the 16th century, when it acquired the name, "Slave

Coast". Slave wars until well into the 19th century had disrupted older forms of tribal government and had been replaced by others, more adequate for defense. The conquest of the North in 1900 brought a final end to the slave wars and a beginning of enforced peace.

Western Nigeria is dominated by the Yoruba, held together by the belief in a common ancestor and a common political organization. Compared to other groups in the area, the Yoruba were urbanized, with more than 35% of them dwelling in towns. Although many of these towns were founded through mass migrations,

the Yoruba tended to see their communities as permanent, self-contained economic and social entities. Most activities were carried out within the framework of community life, and a man was expected to grow up, marry, rear his children and die in his natal community, except when disasters forced him to migrate.¹

At the head of the government was a chief paramount who was recruited from a royal lineage or clan. However, he was not all powerful. "The village chiefs and the traditional councilors were under no compulsion to obey the orders of the paramount chief; rather he depended on them for his authority."² Within the towns, families organized themselves in

¹W.B. Schwab, "Ogshobo--An Urban Community?," in Hilda Kuper, ed., op. cit., p. 27.

²L. Grey Cowan, "Local Politics and Democracy in Nigeria," in Gwendolyn Carter and William O. Brown, eds., Transition in Africa: Studies in Political Adaptation (Boston: Boston University Press, 1964), p. 46.

compounds and there was some specialization of labor.

Eastern Nigeria is dominated by a group of peoples who during the late 19th century began to call themselves the Ibo. For environmental and historical reasons, the Ibo organized themselves around autonomous local communities. Life there tended to be highly competitive and emphasis was placed upon achieved status. Decision-making was controlled by associations to which one could purchase membership. There appears to have been no example of royal lineages or clans such as were found among the Yoruba. Land hunger and a large population have dominated Ibo life from the 19th century.

Perhaps the most important factor conditioning Ibo history in the nineteenth century and in our own time is land hunger. . . . The Ibos pressing against limited land resources had, of necessity, to seek other livelihood outside the tribal boundaries.³

Although each village was autonomous, there were linkages between the villages.

Yet, within societies of this type there were a variety of institutionalized forms of cooperation and linkages operating to maintain a sense of unity among the population as a whole; the assumption of a common descent from one original ancestor, the existence of recognized ad hoc procedures for the arbitration of disputes between different sub-groups, traditions of kinship, pan-tribal associations such as age-grade associations, related religious dogmas, and common ceremonial rites.⁴

³K. Onwuksa Dike, quoted in James S. Coleman, op. cit., p. 322.

⁴J. S. Coleman in Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 256.

Emphasis, however, must be placed upon competitiveness as a dominant characteristic.

The dominant group in Northern Nigeria is the Hausa-Fulani. This group came to power after a Wahabi "jihad" in the early nineteenth century. The political structure of the society was that of an empire, with a sultan at the head, and minor sultans scattered throughout the larger cities. The political structure and the integrative force of Islam was placed upon agriculturally based societies with

. . . denser and more settled populations producing an economic surplus which permitted a degree of specialization of labor, either on tribal or craft lines. Such specialization facilitated trade, which meant the existence of market centers, towns and cities, and the emergence of a class structure.⁵

This type of organization can be considered somewhat more developed than the type seen in the Southern regions, as it was based upon specialization and, within limits, achievement. Special mention should be made of the so-called Middle Belt groups which are found in the North. To a certain extent they were not touched by the Fulani "jihad" and remained what they had traditionally been, small autonomous communities whose organization was similar to that found in the Eastern Region.

Between 1900 and 1914, the North and the South of Nigeria were administered separately. The South, "largely pacified" by the British, concentrated upon economic and

⁵Ibid., p. 253.

political development on the model of a crown colony, first seen in the American colonies. In the North, on the other hand, Lord Lugard was faced with the problem of pacification and suppression of the slave trade which was accomplished by about 1903. The Native Authority System which he instituted in the North made full use of the existing emirate administrations. It was in the North that Lugard evolved his theory of indirect rule.

An inherent assumption of the Native Authority System was that all communities possessed certain natural leaders who wielded authority and who could command at least some degree of obedience from the people. Northern Nigeria having been conquered a century earlier by the Fulani corresponded in all respects to this preconception.⁶

In 1914, with the amalgamation of Nigeria into a single unit, the Native Authority System conceived in the North was extended throughout the Southern regions. The former village councils reverted to the original tribal forms in the West, with the exception that the paramount chiefs virtually wielded absolute power. In the East, on the other hand, traditional native authorities could not be found and experiments in government were tried until a system similar to British local government was settled upon. In essence, the Native Authority System locked the Northern Region in its traditional form of government, isolating it from external influences. In the Southern regions and the

⁶Cowan, op. cit., p. 45.

animist areas in the Middle Belt missionaries were welcomed. It was through the missionaries that these groups gained an advantage in modern education and which eventually provided the impetus for the demands of self-government.

The first voices demanding self-government for Nigeria began to be heard in the South shortly before World War II. The post-war period brought the Labor Government to power in Britain and a clear determination to implement policies leading to self-determination for the colonies. The decade of the 1950's was spent largely in the process of Constitution writing and revision. In this task most of the major groups, and to a certain extent even village levels, were involved. A constitution was accepted and internal self-government was granted to the two Southern regions in 1956. Northern Nigeria waited until 1959 for internal self-government. On October 1, 1960 full self-government was granted to the Federation of Nigeria.

The post-war period brought the development of political parties which organized the demands for self-government. The first to appear was the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), led by Herbert Macaulay and Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe. It established itself as a political party in 1941. Originally this party was based upon the affiliation of numerous organizations, among which the powerful Ibo tribal unions played the chief role. However, attempts were made to expand its base and appeal beyond groups of Eastern origin

and to make it a more national party. The early orientation of Azikiwe, strongly influenced by his American experiences in the 1920's, was towards a pan-African nationalism, a Renaissance Africa which would unite for independence. However, with the inception of the NCNC, the focus was directed more specifically to a Nigerian nationalism, although there was a residue of pan-African sentiment. Tours of the country-side in all regions did much to help create a vague feeling of a Nigerian national "we". However, in elections the NCNC could not gain a majority outside of the Eastern Region, the Ibo stronghold. By 1959, all hopes that the NCNC would become a national party were ended, although nominal contacts remained with the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), a minority party. Since 1959, the NCNC has had its power base in the Eastern and Mid-Western Regions.

Another powerful early voice was that of Chief Obafemi Awolowo, leader of the Action Group, (AG). This party evolved out of the Egbe Ome Oduduwa, a Yoruba cultural society at about the same time as the NCNC. At first its program was directed towards advancing Yoruba nationalism, but later it was forced by the NCNC's popularity to advocate self-government and Nigerian nationalism. As late as 1947, Awolowo said that:

Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression. There are no Nigerians in the same sense as there are "English", "Welsh", or "French". The word "Nigerian" is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria from those who do not.⁷

Again, as with the NCNC, campaigns were conducted on a nationwide basis, but the AG was largely successful only in its own Western Region. As such it was the smallest of the three major parties and, since 1962, when scandal and the treason trial which convicted Awolowo caused a split in the party, it has not been able to control the Western Region.

The third and strongest political organization in Nigeria, the Northern Peoples Congress, (NPC), emerged in 1949 as a necessary organization

. . . First to foster peaceful reform and democratization. . . . Secondly to ensure that the inevitable movement for self-government in the North would be led by moderate Northerners rather than radical Southerners who were feared by the traditional and educated elites of the North as a potentially alien power.⁸

The leader of this party was Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, the Sarduna of Sokoto, thus combining both the traditional and modern leadership roles in the North. Fundamentally, the aims of this party were directed towards Northern problems and membership was open only to Northerners. In a strong sense the NPC was the personal instrument of the Sarduna

⁷Obafemi Awolowo, "Nations and Federal Union," in Rupert Emerson and Martin Kilson, The Political Awakening of Africa (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 61.

⁸Richard Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 93.

Unlike the other major national parties, the NCNC and the AG, the NPC held no national party congresses and issued no national platform. The Sardeuna appointed its last secretary general without canvassing the leaders or the rank and file.

Although by 1959, it was clear that the political bases of the parties were in their own separate regions, attempts were still made by the NCNC and the AG to achieve power on a national basis. In 1961, there was an opportunity for a coalition between the two which would have given the south control of the Federation. However, the AG proposal was turned down by Azikiwe who, instead, allied himself with the Sardeuna. After 1962 and the split in the AG, the NPC was able to dominate one faction. Then, the two southern parties grew steadily weaker on the national level, so that by the 1965 elections, politics and the political bases of the parties had become more strongly regionalized than before.

National identity

National identity or the feeling of being a part of a nation is necessarily an essential ingredient for national unity. Certain objective factors can help draw a nation together. In the case of Nigeria, where the majority of the masses have not been mobilized politically, a national elite can serve to draw a nation together, or at least mark time until a national, mobilized population can be achieved.

⁹Gally Brown-Peterside, "Why Balewa Died," Africa Reports 11, March, 1966, p. 16.

There is both a traditional elite and a so-called "new" elite in Nigeria, and although from time to time the two may merge in one person, it is necessary to look at this "new" elite since the traditional elite rests fundamentally on local bases. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that it does not have a strong transtribal and transregional base.

TABLE 5¹⁰

TRIBAL DISTRIBUTION OF 156 SELECTED ELITE

Tribe	Number	Per Cent
Yoruba	61	37.2
Ibo	49	31.4
Hausa-Fulani	23	14.8
Bini	2	1.3
Ibibio	2	1.3
Igbirra	1	.6
Biron	1	.6
Tiv	1	.6
Ija(w)	1	.6
Itsekiri	1	.6
Unknown	14	9.0

It is clear from this table that the vast majority of the "new" elite come from the South and readily give their tribal affiliation. To a certain extent, this elite is based upon educational attainment. However, the table also shows that the North, which has a majority of the population, has a very small minority of the "new" elite. Coleman has suggested that:

¹⁰ Hugh Smythe and Mabel Smythe, The New Nigerian Elite (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960), p. 82.

the absence of a trans-tribal class of an economic interest group, means that the Nigerian Nationalist movement has been supported principally by a melange of individuals whose only basis for unity was the desire for self-government, the symbol for all things desirable.¹¹

Traditional rulers, however, remained a necessary source of power. Clearly the NPC needed the traditional elites to remain in power and, in fact, based its political organization upon these elites. It is less obvious that despite the emphasis upon the modern educated elite, the southern political groups also depended upon these traditional elites. It has been suggested that during the years of independence there was growing estrangement between the new and the traditional elites. "The new political entrepreneurs were supported, not as believed abroad, by 'mass parties' but, as Henry Bretton and others have convincingly demonstrated, by political machines."¹² These machines with their exclusiveness and increasing corruption alienated the traditional elites to such a degree that the machine could no longer count on support from the traditional groups which constitute the majority population.

Because independence was granted to Nigeria without a major political struggle, there were few event before

¹¹Coleman, op. cit., p. 413.

¹²Edward Feit, "Military Coups and Political Development: Some Lessons from Ghana and Nigeria," World Politics, XX: 2, 1968, p. 184.

independence which helped implant the awareness of Nigerian nationality. There seem to have been few situations of mass organized protest followed by mass arrests as were seen elsewhere particularly in India. Certainly there was no war for independence. In fact, only one event has been mentioned as uniting the national consciousness of all groups. This was the fatal shooting of 21 coal miners by police at Enugu in 1949, following a period of prolonged unrest. This tragedy provided an occasion for a coalition of all the leading nationalists in Nigeria, which however, split as soon as the moment of crisis passed.

There also appears to be little in the way of symbolism to which a feeling of national unity could be attached. Charismatic leadership has a tendency to unite a people behind it through a period of crisis. However, there has been no one leader capable of capturing the imagination and attachment of all Nigerians, although the figure of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe was well-known. Common culture heroes are unknown as each major tribal grouping has its own traditions.

Language, an important factor in unity, has not been a significant factor either in identification, or in divisiveness. Language can become a source of conflict in a polyglot country when it becomes a means of national identification. This may occur when the largely monolingual middle and lower classes join the political life. As this

has not occurred to any great extent, language as an issue has not been important. Although Hausa (a Northern language) is the native language of the largest number of Nigerians, and is spoken as a second language by many others, there has been opposition against its adoption as a national lingua-franca. English is the common language of the educated elite, but this further emphasizes the cultural divergence between them and the masses. Those who are monolingual, remain outside of the mobilized, articulate population. Among the mobilized population, Hausa or English or both are spoken and hence communication is not hampered.

Religion has been an important factor, not in overt political disputes, but rather in reinforcing the underlying differences between the North and the South. In the South, the elite is generally Christian and the masses are animist. The North, on the other hand, is basically Moslem, with the exception of some groups in the Middle Belt. In fact, it was Islam which united the North in the first place. However, the religion of the North is that of the Wahabi movement, a conservative and fundamentalist type. It appears that some 18 months prior to the January 1966 coup, "the Sardauna began to spend more and more of his time on militant proselytizing and there were allegations of religious persecution and discrimination."¹⁵ Some intercommunal

¹⁵"Reflections on the Nigerian Revolution," South Atlantic Quarterly, 65:4, p. 426.

rioting seems to have been fomented by religious differences. In May, 1953 riots broke out in Kano between Northerners and Southerners residing in 'stranger cities'. It seems

that conservative Koranic mallams in Kano City who viewed the non-indigenous southern population of Kano as a threat to religious orthodoxy, were aroused by anti-southern political agitators. Those mallams are said to have played a part in the instigation of the riots.¹⁴

Trust and distrust

The events of 1966, as well as frequent intertribal warfare, would indicate that there is a large element of distrust and open hostility in Nigerian society. However, distrust appears to arise in intertribal rather than intra-tribal situations.

This is a culture in which the word "brother" may be used to describe a spectrum of relationships from those of blood, to village, to tribe and in which the antonym is the word "stranger". A brother is a member of the in-group, a stranger is not. In the not so distant past, he was probably a mortal enemy. A stranger is not to be trusted--is, perhaps, even to be feared.¹⁵

In most cities, strangers live in their own section generally suburbs, and are not integrated into the society as a whole. The pattern of occupation could be compared to that of American cities, particularly the Negro and Jewish ghettos.

¹⁴Sklar, op. cit., pp. 478-9. These riots are also said to have been the result of conflict between a class and classless society. The Southerners represent the society structured by class.

¹⁵J. Donald Kingsley, "Bureaucracy and Political Development with Particular Reference to Nigeria," in Joseph La Palombara, ed. Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 306.

On the other hand, ethnic solidarity and trust are highly prevalent among intratribal groups and, to some extent, those larger groups which have defined themselves as "nations". This has led most notably to a strong development of ethnic associations, primarily within cities and away from tribal lands. These have been formed largely as self-help societies and as societies which can provide a link with the former tribal homeland.

Particular emphasis should be placed on the Northern hostility vis a vis the South. In this century, the North has been designated the "backward" area of Nigeria and its awareness of this characterization has caused widespread resentment and hostility. As the South with its earlier contacts with the West was able to provide many more persons skilled in modern administrative practices than it could absorb, many Southerners migrated to the North to provide skills needed there. It seems that many of these educated Southerners expressed very strongly their opinion of the North's backwardness and their own advancement. This stimulated fears of Southern dominance and encouraged the North to expand educational facilities and to "northernize" the civil service. "All of these efforts are aimed at the migration of elites in the spirit of combating, what one Ivory Coast intellectual has called, 'black sub-colonization'."¹⁶

¹⁶Kuper, op. cit. p. 159.

The political arena

There seems to be agreement that a Federal arrangement is necessary for Nigeria, but there exists no deep attachment to the system current until January, 1966. The North favored a very weak central government, with most of the powers reserved for the Regions. In this way, the Federal Government was quite adequate--the North had the control of the Federal legislature and, therefore, if any interference were necessary, it would be done by the North. In the words of the Sardauna of Sokoto:

On the other hand, a sudden grouping of the Eastern and Western parties (with a few members from the North opposed to our party) might take power and so endanger the North. . . . It would therefore cause us to take measures to meet the need.¹⁷

The Action Group also favored a Federal arrangement, but was not committed to the three regions provided by the final form

The Action Group insists that federalism is necessary to protect cultural group interests. This principle has led the party to advocate the creation of three new states or regions out of the existing regions in order to accommodate cultural diversity, a program that would inescapably entail a redress of the present constitutional balance in favor of a stronger central government.¹⁸

Residual functions must be left to the various regions, so

¹⁷ Sir Ahmadu Bello, My Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), p. 229.

¹⁸ Richard L. Sklar and C.S. Whitaker, Jr., "Nigeria", in James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., eds., Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), p. 639.

that citizens of other regions would not feel justified in interfering in the domestic affairs of any other region. Although this is rather vague and capable of varying interpretations, the prime consideration apparently was that: "no one state or region in the federation must be so large that it can override the wishes of all the other states or regions put together."¹⁹ Thus, what was satisfying to the North and Sir Ahmadu Bello, was strongly opposed by the Action Group in the South.

In the Eastern Region, the NCNC appears to have originally advocated a unitary form of government with more universalistic loyalty directed towards it. However, as this proved impracticable, the NCNC directed its activities towards a federal arrangement more like that proposed by the Action Group. The Azikiwe, and hence NCNC position was that: "the country be divided along the main ethnic and/or linguistic groups in order to enable each group to exercise local and cultural autonomy within its territorial jurisdiction."²⁰ The January 1966 revolution, sponsored by those who would be likely to support the NCNC, had as a fundamental element in its program the implementation of the idea of a unitary state.

¹⁹Chief Obafemi Awolowo, Awolowo: The Autobiography of Chief Obafemi Awolowo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), p. 178.

²⁰Nnamdi Azikiwe, Zik: A Selection from the Speeches of Nnamdi Azikiwe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961), p. 108.

Although attempts have been made to give Nigerian politics a mass base, politics remains fundamentally an elite province. For a while, there was no great break between the traditions of the past and present. There is in Nigeria some fusion of both the traditional and the new elites; for example, "soon after Awolowo became a Minister, chieftancy titles were bestowed upon him by his home town and other towns. . . . Traditional office thus legitimizes the authority of the new political elites."²¹ Thus there would seem to be a continuity passing from the old to the new. However, the means of achieving elite status differ in the North and in the South. Although recently educational opportunities and facilities have expanded in the North, the prevalent means of establishing elite status, both traditionally and presently, is through ascriptive criteria. Thus the leadership of the NPC fell to the Sardauna of Sokoto who inherited his position. In the South, both among the Yoruba and the Ibo, traditionally as well as currently, leadership roles have been largely based upon merit or achievement.

Non-political socialization:
Education and voluntary associations

The uneven development in education has been shown in Chapter 3. But not only the fact of education, but also

²¹Peter C. Lloyd, "Traditional Rulers," in Coleman and Rosberg, op. cit., p. 391.

the content of education is important. Traditionally, the content of education followed that of the schools in Britain, with heavy emphasis upon a literary education. Although this is still prevalent, there seems to be a gradual change in content, with more and more attention devoted to technical subjects and to a certain extent Africanization (specifically, heavy emphasis on African History) of the curriculum. In addition there is also an increasing interest in citizenship training.

It is by no means universal, but more and more youngsters are being taught the difference between the active and the passive citizen, why rates and taxes must be paid, how elections should be conducted, why the printed word is not necessarily the truth, how bribery and corruption can undermine a nation, the nature of religious tolerance and the fallacy of racial prejudice.²²

A noncredit course in citizenship and leadership training, which appears to be highly popular, is also available. Although only a small minority is involved with these citizenship programs, it does seem likely that due to their increasing popularity more and more people will be affected by them.

Participation in voluntary associations, both as member and office holder is another indication of citizenship training. Early in the 1920's, voluntary associations began to proliferate, a development which was recognized and encouraged by the colonial administration.

These groups went beyond the political into the religious, recreational, occupational, entertainment, and social areas; from the more traditional and mutual aid

²²Helen Kitchen, The Educated African (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 362.

societies some of the newer associations emerged. These organizations differed from those customary in traditional society in two ways: first, they were formed to meet needs which had arisen specifically out of the dislocations of an urban environment, and second, goals were more comprehensive.²³

Later, these voluntary associations were recognized by the colonial administration as schools for self-government, even if the goals were not specifically political.

One of the primary forms these voluntary associations took was that of the ethnic or nationality union. These unions arose out of a need to provide a social base for those ethnic groups which had newly migrated to the city. These tribal unions provide the connecting link between the traditional society and the modern. Although membership is based upon a broad definition of nationality, the goals of these societies were modern.

Tribal unions wield extensive influence and powers, and the larger ones have played a significant role in the spread of education; they offer scholarship aid to young people, and some even operate schools. . . Moreover, they serve as pressure groups for better hospitals, dispensaries, roads and other public facilities; they have worked to democratize traditional councils; and they provide a forum for the discussion of national political issues and constitute an avenue to leadership positions.²⁴

This type of organization is diffuse, performing numerous functions, although its main function is that of integrating the newcomer into the social and economic life of the city. The two major Southern political parties draw at the

²³Smythe and Smythe, op. cit., p. 29.

²⁴Ibid., p. 30.

base of their power, support from tribal unions.

Furthermore, voluntary associations with more specific functions are not restricted to the elite. In the 1950's, in Lagos, "women traders, farmers, lawyers, palm wine sellers, produce-buyers, lorry owners, all had organizations. . . ." ²⁵

Another widespread form of association is that of the savings club, with a format much like that of a credit union. There are also merchant and craft guilds. Finally,

there are numerous social, recreational, and mutual aid clubs. Frequently these associations are ephemeral, and particular groups disperse or divide after a short period; yet other groups of the same kind spring up to take their place. ²⁶

This does indicate that there is a strong awareness of the ends to be achieved through organized and purposeful social action.

However, a word of caution is necessary. Like so many other developments in Nigeria, the North has lagged behind in the development of voluntary associations. It appears that the Hausa do not as a rule form tribal unions. It seems that Islam serves as an integrative factor in society thus eliminating the need for the unions. It could be suggested also that the Hausa-Fulani have not been confronted with the new urban situation out of which these organizations have arisen. There seems to be general agreement that the

²⁵ Ibid., p. 32.

²⁶ Schwab, op. cit., p. 103.

proliferation of voluntary associations has developed to fill a need in the more urbanized South, a need which is not present in the North.

The political experience:
Corruption

As the actual independent Nigerian political experience has been short, there has been little chance to assess the operation of the political system. Such groups as minorities, who felt themselves, and probably were, left out, have not had much chance to learn to organize themselves into pressure groups, or to work their way up in the party structure through sheer ability. On the other hand, several political studies mention a high frequency of "corruption" or, that Nigerian politicians ". . . were out to benefit themselves--that is, they were out for more money and the good life--rather than the nation."²⁷ These themes, constantly repeated along with charges that elections are fixed in favor of one party or another, give an indication of the lack of confidence in the governors. It does seem that these charges are justifiable in terms of actual experience. Nigerian politicians do receive rent free houses, allowances and, if their status is high enough, have cars at their disposal. Mackintosh has suggested that the inclusion of Nigerians in the process of constitutional revision before they were strongly integrated into the civil

²⁷Hanna, op. cit., p. 436.

service tended to make ". . . professional politics even more than before a career in which the prospects of power and material advancement were immeasurably superior. . . ." ²⁸

Generally speaking then, the standards of governmental output have not, on the whole met with the population's expectations.

Overview

Thus we have seen that there has been little development of a national consciousness in Nigeria. Political parties and even the national movements, have not been able to operate on a Nigeria-wide basis. On the contrary, actions have been on a regional basis with somewhat frequent inter-communal conflict with outsiders. Even the armed forces could not instill a national consciousness, as the army was organized on a regional basis and, for six months before the outbreak of the civil war, soldiers were posted in their original region.

Development in any area has been uneven throughout Nigeria, with the South in the vanguard and the North now trying to "catch-up" at its own pace. The South appears to have the rudiments of a modern society while before the civil war the Eastern Region had the greatest rate of development. By any indicator, the North is the "backward" region of Nigeria. This uneven development in

²⁸ Mackintosh, op. cit., p. 171.

social, economic and political areas has been the greatest single cause for the cleavage between the North and the South. If one assumes that the inter-communal rioting in the North has been the product of the conflict between a traditional classless society and an emerging class, then this cleavage becomes clearer.

The attitudes towards politics would appear to be aspirational, although there is considerable evidence that at least the Southern Nigerians have had experience coping with government, and the elite could be called political or administrative aspirants. As an increasing number of the rural population leaves the villages for the urban centers, it is assumed that loyalties become more universalistic. Even now, the voluntary associations and tribal unions are expanding their entrance requirements. However, it also seems that these new universalistic loyalties still are located at varying levels below that of the national state. Primarily then, we may observe rudiments of cohesive political cultures which are operating on regional rather than national levels with, perhaps, a minimum of cooperation between and among them.

CHAPTER V

THINGS FALL APART

Etzioni has provided a paradigm for studying political unification which is equally applicable to the process of nation-building. It has been seen that Nigeria has a fragmented culture with few points of contact between and among the major groups and also that in the process of social mobilization the major groups are mobilizing at different rates. Both of these points demonstrate a lack of identificative power and could be sufficient to act as causation factors in the dissolution of a society. Yet there have been other countries with differences as great or even greater than Nigeria's which have not fallen apart. Therefore, rather than looking for something innate within the society as the chief cause of dissolution, it is necessary to look at the uses of coercive and utilitarian powers to provide an explanation for this. It seems entirely possible that political actions could keep a country together long enough for it to settle into a nationality. Then of course, the obverse must also be possible, that through specific actions a government may increase tensions within a society so that it will fall apart.

A letter to the editor of the New York Times from the Vice Consul for information of the Consulate General of

Nigeria said: "I wish to make it clear that the crisis in Nigeria is political and economic rather than religious or tribal." He further stated that the Federal government desired "a true federal system of government with a strong center based on the principle of small states with almost equal population strength, so that one state would not, because of its size, dominate the rest."¹ On the other hand, the Government of Biafra claims that the crisis is a struggle for survival, that without independence the Easterners would not be secure in their lives and property. What is the background of the struggle?

On October 1, 1960 the Federation of Nigeria achieved self-government within the Commonwealth of Nations. Because of the wide variance in culture and development in Nigeria, federalism was considered the only feasible means of governing the state. Federalism, however, has wide meaning which encompasses not only the federal state, but also a federation of states. The civil war in Nigeria is testing the concept of the state. Is the state a federal state, or is Nigeria a confederation of states?

Former theory therefore inclined to make secession the test as to whether a composite political order was federal or confederal. . . . At one end of the federalizing process, the ability to secede regardless of the formal right will obviously exist. It

¹New York Times, June 12, 1967, p. 44.

will decline and tend to disappear as the inclusive community is extended to ever widening spheres of the common values, interests and beliefs, so that at the other end, neither admission or secession is likely to occur.²

Civil war following secession still appears to be a test as to whether the system is federal or confederal. In Nigeria, evidently, the majority population conceives of its state as a federal state, thus disallowing the possibility of secession.

Under the Constitution, the federal government was based upon population and simple majorities. The Northern region has a little more than 50% of the total population of the country, with the rest of the population divided between the Western, Mid-western and Eastern regions. This meant that the North could obtain a majority of the seats in the Federal legislature and thereby control the government. When this occurred: "this initial advantage was used by Northern leaders to entrench themselves in power and to extend their influence at the expense of the Southern parties, whose rivalries prevented them from agreeing on effective counter-measures."³ Effective control of the federation then passed to the poorer and more traditional North, which by 1964 was ruling without the basic support of the South.

²Carl J. Friedrich, Man and His Government, An Empirical Theory of Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill Books Co., Inc., 1964), p. 606.

³John R. Chick, "Nigeria At War", Current History, 54 (February, 1968), p. 65.

The 1962 census presented the Southern Regions an opportunity to demonstrate that they were the most populous area and, therefore, entitled to increased representation. The imbalance in size between the regions became an actual discussion of figures. After the 1962 census was taken, it was discovered that the East had inflated the figures by counting all those who had moved from the region. When this became known, the figures were thrown out and another census was taken in which every group inflated the figures. "The results produced another storm when announced early in 1964. Nigerians still talk of the census as though it were an election--who won and by how many people."⁴ No accurate census figures have been obtained because all the figures were tampered with to gain control of the Federal government.

The battle over the census reflects the major problems of balance and imbalance in Nigeria. The Southern regions, as has been shown, are and have traditionally been economically better developed than the Northern region. They have a higher proportion of educated people and can, as a result, claim a higher proportion of government jobs which are still the chief source of employment in the non-agricultural sector. The North felt very strongly this sense of backwardness and wished to "catch up", but at its own pace. In particular, one could see the attempt to "catch up" in the bureaucracy. Formerly, because the Southern

⁴"Reflections on Nigeria," op. cit., p. 423.

peoples were more educated, they dominated the available reaches of the bureaucracy. The Ibo in particular, because they were willing to leave their own Eastern Region, benefited most. These Southern bureaucrats developed a patronizing attitude toward the more backward North, and the feeling arose in the North of being colonized. When independence was approaching and the Nigerization of the bureaucracy was taking place, those in control of the government, the Northern element, sought to obtain a more proportionate ratio of jobs for the North. In short, a Northernization of the bureaucracy was attempted with many Southerners losing their jobs.

1964-65 was slated for a series of national elections which would determine the new federal and regional governments. Aside from talk of corruption of election officials in the North, East and Mid-west, the elections proceeded in these areas without widespread civil disturbances. The Western regional elections were the last to be held in October 1965. These elections were vital to both the North and the South in the struggle for control of the Federal parliament--

To the Sardeuna's MNA and the opposition UPGA, these elections were vital. To the UPGA they represented the best hope of checking perpetual domination of the Federal Parliament by the North and the Sardeuna; to the

NNA, they were the means of continuing the North-South political alliance that was the mainstay of northern parliamentary strength.⁵

It was obvious that the elections were rigged in favor of the North. Widespread looting, arson and murder broke out in Western Nigeria in protest against the alleged trickery. Although aid was repeatedly requested by the Western Government, Prime Minister Balewa continually refused to intervene saying that this was a regional matter. On January 13, 1966

Minister of State for the police Alhaji Angulu Ahmad told the federal House of Representatives that 153 persons had been killed in the Western Region since the October 11 elections. In reply to opposition members requests for a new declaration of a state of emergency in the region, the government said it was reluctant to intervene in a regional matter.⁶

From the outside the Nigerian economy looked very healthy. There was a steady upward trend in a laissez-faire type of economy according to all economic indicators. Immediately after independence, there was a boom in private investment, largely in secondary industries such as the processing of local raw materials. Great hopes were placed on the middle class, which was certainly stronger than most other African "middle classes". Another great plus for the Nigerian economy was the discovery of sulphur free oil, greatly in demand in the developed smog-ridden nations, and plans and projects both for the development

⁵Gally Brown-Peterside, *op. cit.*, p. 17. The United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) was a coalition of the AG and NCNC formed to oppose the Northern dominated NNA.

⁶Africa Reports, 11:6, p. 34.

of this resource and its processing. However, at the same time there was very little interest in heavy industrial investment, meaning that a basic industrial infrastructure was not developing.

Most new nations of the world have turned to some form of state planning for economic development. In Nigeria, however, no basic plan for the shape of the future economy had been made up to 1967. Development plans were presented and accepted, both by the regions and the Federal government. But as in the regions

the same ambivalent attitude to the vital question of economic control, to the choice of direction--either towards state capitalism leading into socialism or towards state capitalism leading into "free enterprise"--governed the later and much larger all-Nigeria economic plan of 1962.⁷

It seemed that each project was taken on a piece-meal basis. Overseas capital, both private and aid funds, became drastically low, at the same time the national debt became increasingly burdensome. The 1962 plan anticipated a total of 327 million from external sources for the entire period of six years. But at the end of four years, only 86.7 million had been received.⁸

During the seven years of independence before the civil war, the Nigerian economy certainly made advances. In fact, one of the most significant advances was made in the

⁷ Basil Davidson, Which Way Africa? (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1967), p. 15E.

⁸ Alan Reke and J.D. Farrell, "Nigeria's Economy: No Longer a Model", Africa Reports, 12, 7, p. 19.

field of education. However, the concentration of local funds in secondary industries, and the slow development of the basic industries and utilities, did not expand the non-agricultural employment sector of the economy as fast as the educational systems were educating people. Moreover, each region competed for the development funds which were coming into the country. More often than not, these funds were channeled to the North, often in preference to well-prepared plans for development made in the South. Finally, the royalties from the oil resources were channeled to the Federal government, which proposed to use them for its development plans. Since the Northern Region held control of the government, it was expected that Northern projects would receive preferential treatment.

On January 15, 1966, a group of junior and middle grade army officers engineered a revolt which resulted in the suspension of civil government and the deaths of the Prime Minister of the Federation, Sir Abubakar Balewa, the Finance Minister, the Northern Premier, Sir Ahmadu Bello (the Sardauna of Sokoto) and the Western Premier Chief S.L. Akin-tola (leader of the NNA). Radio Kaduna named Major Chukwan Nzuguw, an Ibo, as leader and reported that he formed a "Supreme council of the Revolution of the Nigerian Armed Forces. . . to bring an end to gangsterism and disorder, corruption and despotism."⁹ Shortly afterwards, power

⁹Ibid., p. 35.

was passed to General Aguiyi-Ironsi who, in May, called for a unitary government with the former Regions as provinces and the abolition of all political parties. By abolishing the Federal structure, the revolution was centralist, desiring focus and loyalty towards the central government, i.e. Nigeria as a whole. It was also nationalist, as it was a reaction against the increased tribal and regional hostility in the 1960's. However, in execution, it was largely regionalist--the Ibos and other similar groups were attempting to wrest control from the dominant North. Important here is the attempt to establish a unitary government over the entire area of Nigeria.

Soon after the declaration of the unitary government, anti-government demonstrations and rioting broke out in the North with the violence directed in large part against Southerners in the "stranger cities", or suburbs. After great difficulty, police were able to restore a semblance of order. However, on July 29, another revolution took place. This one, instigated by Northern soldiers who believed that the Ibos were seeking to dominate the country, resulted in the death of General Ironsi and the assumption of power by Army Chief of Staff, Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon (a Christian from a Northern minority tribe). Gowon said that;

putting all considerations to the test--political, economic, as well as social--the base of unity is not there or is badly rocked. I therefore feel that we

should review our national standing and see if we can help stop our country from drifting away into utter destruction.¹⁰

Gowon's regime regionalized all the services to a great extent--Northerners serving the North and Southerners serving the South. High officials in Lagos were replaced by Northerners, largely from the Middle Belt region. Severe intercommunal rioting in the North caused a mass exodus of Southerners, at first largely Ibos, but later a more general flow, back to their homelands.

Attempts were made to call a Constitutional Convention, but with little success. The delegation from the Eastern Region refused to come to Lagos because they did not believe in the given guarantees of personal safety. During the next year the Eastern Region withdrew more and more within itself, becoming an island in Nigeria and cutting itself from contact with other areas. Neighboring states served as mediators between the Federal Government and the Eastern Region but plans at compromise although accepted, failed. By March, the Eastern Region assumed control of all Federal services and monies collected in the area; this was answered by a blockade on the part of the Federal Government. In May, Chief Awolowo of the Western Region announced that if the Eastern Region seceded, the West and the Federal territory of Lagos would also secede. On May 21, 1967 a regional peace plan was accepted by Gowon of the Federal Government,

¹⁰ Africa Report, 11:7, p. 53.

which would remove Northern troops from Western Nigeria and lift the economic sanctions against the Eastern Region. However, on May 27, 1967, Major Ojukwu of the Eastern Region called for independence, which was voted on the next day. May 29, brought the Federal announcement of a reorganization of Nigeria in which twelve ethnic states would be carved out of the original four. The Eastern Region would be divided into three and the Ibo would be cut off from the sea and the oil areas. On May 31, 1967, the Eastern Region seceded, calling itself Biafra. Contrary to earlier statements, the West did not follow the East but rather was incorporated into the Federal Government.

It seems that the pre-1966 Northern dominated government was either unwilling or unable to make the necessary decisions which would enhance the Nigerian unification effort. In fact, what stands out is an attempt to redress the imbalance of power and influence which was evident in 1960. Through its control of the government, the North made a strong attempt at reallocation both of resources and influence so that it might "catch up" to the more advanced Southern regions. The battle of the census and the 1965 Western Region elections were clearly direct affronts to an increasingly alienated South. That the first action taken by the Ibo was an attempt to gain control of the center, shows that the system was integrated enough to be considered a federal state. The massacres in July and August only served to increase distrust already felt so that, perhaps, to the Ibo war was the only solution.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

One of the major problems of the world today is that of creating viable national states out of the former colonial empires. The mobilization of masses of people in these new states before independence, seemed to be directed towards the creation of a national state. Yet, at the same time this mobilization can give a heightened awareness of local ties. In the nineteenth century, nationalism was often based upon common cultural background, but in the twentieth century, a common culture as criterion for national identity has receded into the background and attempts have been made to create a new criterion for national identity, which may or may not recognize cultural differentiation.

Etzioni has provided a paradigm for discussing the political bases of unification. Background conditions were weak for the creation of a national identity as seen in the discussion of both social mobilization and political culture in Nigeria. However, in 1960 and the years following, it was still possible for the national government to make the necessary political decisions for integration and to build up the power necessary for integration. Let us turn to a discussion of integrating powers then.

The problem of identitive power has loomed large in this discussion. It was seen that the population of Nigeria was rapidly mobilizing, but that the Southern regions were mobilizing faster than the Northern ones. Deutsch suggested that this in itself could be the basis for disruption of the political order. This does, of course, have an effect on the integration or disintegration of the political culture or the identitive power of the community. The political culture of Nigeria is certainly not cohesive. There is no historical record of Nigeria ever being a single state, and even during the colonial period, the regions were administered separately. The precolonial cultures had few points of contact and interaction. The mobility brought about by the colonial government increased contacts between the various indigenous groups but did not effectively lessen hostility and suspicion. The uneven development in social, political and economic areas heightened the cleavage, at least between the South (the Ibo, in particular) and the North.

It has been repeatedly seen throughout this discussion that little, if any identitive power was established by the national government. First, the control of the government was in the hands of the Northern conservative elements who were anxious to retain power so that the other groups in the nation could not interfere with the development of the North. This was quite clearly stated by Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello.

At the same time, resentment built up in the South among the mobilized groups against a regime controlled by what they considered backward elements. Focus of political interest and concern then turned to the local or regional levels. This interest and identity were strongly present in 1960, and there was no attempt on the part of the national government to diminish regional identity and replace it by a national focus. On the contrary, regionalism increased during the years of independence, perhaps, enhanced by the strong emphasis upon the need of the North to "catch up". Closely related to this is the lack of utilitarian power in the national government and the use of utilitarian resources in regional terms, albeit for the economic development of Nigeria. Finally, there was weak control over the coercive power, or merely an unwillingness to use it when necessary.

A premature union such as Nigeria requires more force than a more mature one. Both the use of too little and the use of too much force tend to dissolve or strain the success of a unification effort. In this instance, it seems that it was a case of too little force and an unwillingness to use force, which caused the crisis which led to the first revolution. Force would not have been necessary had there been a concentration upon building up identitive power, rather than the reallocation of resources. Both the West Indian Federation and the U.A.R. dissolved because of

tensions arising from reallocation of resources. It is also clear that in Nigeria tensions within the society were heightened by the attempt to reallocate resources. Educated Southerners lost jobs through the attempt to Northernize the civil service. Complaints were made that the economic development of the Southern regions was placed second to that of the North. Perception of an attempt to favor the North over the South was strong.

Hence, there was no surprise that Nigeria reached a point of coercive showdown. In this case the showdown came before the nation's utilitarian and identitive systems and powers were built up and after the power of the external elite (i.e., Great Britain) had declined. By October 1965, events within Nigeria had reached crisis proportions. The inability of the national government to use force, or the fear that it would use force, led to the January 1966 revolution. In this case we have an attempt at an acceleration strategy in a crisis. The unitary government can be viewed as an attempt to force the integration of Nigeria. However, it also seems clear that the revolutionary forces did not have full control over the means of violence or the coercive forces. The difficulty in putting down the riots in the Northern cities and the ease with which the second revolution took place, would indicate this. It is clear that the Gowon government attempted to decelerate integra-

tion, while at the same time attempting to please the Southern groups with a different federal division, giving no group the predominant place. But the Gwonn government was not in effective control over the means of violence, and the August and September 1966 riots in the Northern cities probably created a situation in which no compromise was possible.

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NATIONALISM AND REGIONALISM IN NIGERIA

by

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Nationalism and nation-building are prime considerations today. To study these problems within a nation, for example, Nigeria, one must base the discussion on three major factors. Through social mobilization an increasing number move from the traditional to the modern sector. Political culture describes cooperation or else cleavage between and among major groups within the country. Finally, the uses of power by the government can increase or decrease unity and cooperation between groups in the country.

Although Nigeria appeared at independence to be very stable, under examination certain disparities become apparent. There is a high rate of social mobilization; however, it is not uniform throughout the country. The Ibos of the Eastern Region were mobilizing most rapidly, with the peoples of the Western Region close behind. The pagan areas of the Northern Region were also mobilizing faster than the Muslim areas. Since the Northern Muslim areas had originally the strongest development of organized political society, it is evident that traditional controlled change does not proceed as rapidly as uncontrolled change.

An uneven development in social, economic, and political areas has been the greatest single cause for the cleavage between the North and the South. The attitudes towards politics are aspirational, although there is considerable evidence that at least the Southern Nigerians have had experience with go-

vernment, and the elites could be called political or administrative aspirants. As an increasing number of the rural population leave the villages for the urban centers, it is assumed that loyalties become more universalistic. However, these new universalistic loyalties still are located at levels below that of the national state. Primarily, we observe rudiments of cohesive political cultures which operate on regional rather than national levels, with a minimum of cooperation between and among them.

As seen above, background conditions were weak for the creation of a national identity. Between 1960 and 1966 the national government was dominated by the Muslim North which felt a definite need to "catch up" with the more Westernized South. There was little if any attempt on the part of the federal government to increase or redirect identitive power from the regions to the nation. Utilitarian power, an attempt to reallocate resources, was also used in this attempt to "catch up". Coercive power was not adequate to maintain the government. The January 1966 revolution was an attempt to accelerate the national focus; but again coercive power was not adequate. Resentment accumulated over the years led to violent discrimination against the Ibo of the Eastern Region and, ultimately, to the civil war. It does seem clear that the decisions made by the Federal government between 1960 and 1966 increased regional rivalry and interest rather than creating a national focus.