

BHARATIYA JAMA SANGH: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
A POLITICAL PARTY IN INDIA

by *PS*

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The increasing importance and appeal which the Bharatiya Jana Sangh has achieved makes it a significant political party in India. It is intriguing to note that it is the only party that has shown an upward trend in obtaining the popular vote and in capturing parliamentary and assembly seats in each successive general election from 1952-1967. Moreover, since the 1967 election, it has gained even more distinction as a potent factor in the National Parliament and particularly in several of the Indian states by sharing governing responsibilities in coalition governments. Another fact which makes this study very pertinent is that this emerging political force is probably the least well known or studied in the Western world of all major parties in India. Hence it is important to look into the party - to study its history, organization, ideology, electoral performance, its position in the Indian political system and to speculate about the future of the party. What trends if any, are discernible about its development? Will it become a serious contender to replace the rule of the Congress party in India? Or are there some elements present that will limit the growth of the party?

In the General election of 1967, the Indian political system underwent a dramatic transformation. The dominance of the Congress party in the system was unexpectedly shattered and political power was dispersed between many parties on a regional basis. Until then opposition parties in India were not considered a serious threat to the rule of the Congress. But now, at the state level, the power of opposition parties is no longer a threat, but a reality. The Jana Sangh has been in the forefront of this movement and at

present is an important opposition force in the North Indian states of Uttar Pradesh (U.P.), Madhya Pradesh (M.P.), Haryana, Delhi, Bihar and in the Punjab, where its members are in the state cabinet. The party aims at becoming one of the major opposition parties in the country and also aspires to become the ruling party. The validity of these aspirations has to be verified.

While doing so, two significant considerations must be kept in mind. The first is the entrenched position of the Congress party and the factions within it which perform the function of opposition parties. The second is the flexibility with which the Jana Sangh is capable of operating and performing.

The Congress party, accomodating under its wings other parties which are now in opposition to it, spearheaded the national movement under which India gained its independence in 1947. Hence the Congress party was able to cultivate strongholds of power that have carried over, and serve as bases of operation in the post-independence decades. Therefore it will take the opposition parties more time to establish themselves as strongly as the Congress. The Jana Sangh came into existence only in 1951, four years after India gained her independence. Thus, it has had a late start, even though the Hindu Mahasabha did operate under the Congress and the Mahasabha has been called the political ancestor of the Jana Sangh. The Congress also reaped the advantage of having in its ranks many nationally known leaders who had participated in the independence movement and they were able in later years to draw more votes to the party. Besides, the umbrella-like movement has brought another advantage to the Congress party, though often this characteristic has also been detrimental in its effects to the party. The Congress harbored many shades of opinion within it in pre-independence days and was able to maintain them, since the primary aim of all participants was to

achieve independence. After independence was achieved, some of the participants, such as the Socialists, formed their own party but other members retained their Congress membership which has led to the cultivation of several factions within the Congress party itself. These factions then have performed the function of opposition parties within the Congress - criticising and balancing issues. However, this base of strength which the Congress had cultivated is undoubtedly facing erosion as the results of the four general elections held in the country show. The question of flexibility or pragmatism with which the Jana Sangh performs and operates and on which depends the future of the party, is the main concern of this paper. It could be said that the Jana Sangh had its origins in a defense mechanism which had essentially religious moorings, but has since its inception been politicised. To demonstrate this it will be necessary to look first at the historical origins of the Jana Sangh, then to consider party ideology as revealed in manifestoes and public statements and finally to judge the party's performance in electoral competition. And while doing so there are some important conflicts that must be observed.

Underlying all of them is the Aryan non-Aryan, or North-South differentiation. The Jana Sangh is often classified as a party of North Indian Brahman interests. This becomes apparent in the party's adherence to Hindi as the national language of India, and the rejection of English. The language issue has become anathema in the South, particularly in Tamilnadu, where the Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (DMK)¹ party is in favor of retaining English and the regional language.

The Jana Sangh is also classified as a party of communal interests; and many people argue that communal ties are a threat to secular democracy in

India and point to the increasing electoral success of "communal" parties like the Jana Sangh as evidence of the impending doom of Indian democracy. The problem seems aggravated by the declining fortunes of the Congress Party especially at the State level and the possibility that the Jana Sangh may be one of the successors to Congress rule.

The accusation that the Jana Sangh is a communal party is often refuted by Jana Sanghis who point to the fact that the membership of the party is open, and it has sponsored other than Hindu candidates in the elections. Yet, the party is almost exclusively Hindu in membership, control and support; and many of its beliefs in a traditional Indian society are of dubious value to non-Hindus. To be fair, though, it should be noted that there are degrees of communalism. The Jana Sangh is not so rigidly Hindu as the other two major Hindu parties, the Hindu Mahasabha or the Ram Rajya Parishad, nor does it stand solely for the interests of its community as does the Sikh Akali Dal or the Muslim League. To project an all-India image and increase its electoral support, it will be imperative for the Jana Sangh to diversify its appeal. It is beginning to do so - whether it will continue to do so will be a measure of its success.

The fact that it does support the flowering of a traditional Hindu society brings the conflict of the traditional versus modern into the Jana Sangh itself. The party has put it thus:

...the rebuilding of Bharat on the basis of Bharatiya Sanskriti and maryada as a political social and economic democracy granting equal opportunity to and liberty to all individuals so as to make her a prosperous, powerful and united nation, progressive modern and enlightened.²

Yet, it seems inevitable that the very modernization demanded by the Jana Sangh will go far to destroy, or at least undermine the fabric of the

traditional society. The Jana Sangh would like to import Western technology and use Western capital, while barring the entry of Western secularism and liberalism. It seems possible that the only way forward will be a moderation of such espoused aims.

A similar moderation has to be considered in the context of the expansion of the influence of the party in the country. In a democratic society, a party must win power through electoral success. The party has not been strong enough to obtain power and become the major government-forming party in any state by itself alone. But it has been able to do so in coalition with other parties. Such agreements have often been reached with parties with whom the Jana Sangh differs in policy. This means that a certain degree of moderation is prerequisite to expansion. How much will the Jana Sangh be willing to modify its policy, then, becomes a crucial question, which may in turn be dependent upon the leadership at the helm of party affairs. If it remains very strictly controlled by Hindu communal elements, moderation will be impeded. Thus, a great measure of the success of the Jana Sangh will depend upon the flexibility that the party has and will be able to display. This aspect can be observed in policy statements, and particularly in election behavior, in the alliances that the Jana Sangh makes and the modification of policy that it adopts. If inflexible, the Jana Sangh will contribute to the already confused divisiveness of the Indian political culture. Where its attempts at polarization of public opinion will not achieve a significant level, fragmentation will result. To assure itself of a significant role in Indian politics, the Jana Sangh must recognize that moderation and accommodation will be necessary for existence.

The Jana Sangh in the Indian Political System

Parties, where they exist in a political system, are a connecting link between the government and people. Often they are studied to gain greater insight into the workings of the system. Parties become important vehicles because the people realise that through them they can influence the use of power. Political parties provide the machinery through which people can participate in the system; in the management of controversy they can help to aggregate and articulate interests; by their activities they can promote integration and by their own organization they can contribute to developing structural differentiation. Developing nations, like India, face several crises while they are in the process of developing. Parties can be instrumental in helping to resolve some of these crises of legitimacy, participation and integration.³ At the same time parties can also accentuate crises by exploiting certain issues to obtain mass support. E.g., in India the national language controversy, reorganization of states were inflamed by political parties, thus adding greater stress on the system.

The Jana Sangh party in India acts as the organ that performs the interest aggregation function for that section of the society that believes in Hindu nationalism while the RSS, the organizational precursor of the Jana Sangh, performs the interest articulation function for this same section of society and also for the Jana Sangh.⁴ Both these organizations also help to socialise people into the system by providing them with the party channels to do so and by encouraging them to vote. The Jana Sangh uses the press, public meetings and national conventions to communicate with the electorate. While the Jana Sangh by acting as spokesman for the Hindu majority helps to consolidate them into one group, it at the same time puts other communities and

some castes on the defensive to protect their own rights because they perceive the threat of majority domination. Under these circumstances tensions between communities can develop and can also easily assume larger proportions, endangering the peace and stability of the country. Yet by participating in the election process, the Jana Sangh endorses the system and recognizes and helps to establish its legitimacy.

The existence of parties in opposition to the one(s) in power is a sign of the freedom to express one's views. Opposition parties perform three important functions in the system: They represent interests that may have been overlooked by the majority party; they also provide a channel for conveying information--to the government they bring the impact of and reactions to its policies, while to the people, they interpret these policies. A third responsibility of the Opposition is "providing criticism and posing useful alternatives to government policies."⁵

The opposition party (or parties) is an ever present reminder to the party in power that the authority to make decisions in the national interest can be challenged and can change hands. Opposition parties often make this known by the tactics they employ. In India this occurs and can be explained in terms of the pre-independence experience. The efforts of political parties were directed against the foreign power, Britain, and this negative feeling has now carried over to parties that are ranged in opposition to the ruling Congress party. Maurice Duverger's⁶ classification of internal and external parties can be well adapted to the Jana Sangh. In Duverger's opinion internally created parties, are those that have their origin within their respective legislatures, and thus adhere to and respect parliamentary procedure. In India, unlike Western parties all parties had their origin outside

the legislature, in a national movement for freedom against colonial rule. In this sense they are not internally created parties. While most Indian parties operated under the Indian National Congress, the Jana Sangh did not. It can thus be called an external party - a party external in comparison to many other parties. At present, there are other parties, e.g., Swatantra and DMK, that have originated outside the Congress. The Jana Sangh has features that closely resemble the external party described by Duverger. It is more centralized than other parties. The drive for its origin came from the RSS leadership and Syama Prasad Mookerjee, its founder, not from local communities - though local organizations were ostensibly created before the national organization was proclaimed. It has greater discipline within its ranks and a marked absence of factionalism so prevalent in other Indian parties, especially the Congress. Besides the electoral significance of the party, great stress is laid on the cultural sphere towards promoting a way of life. The importance that the Jana Sangh ascribes to electoral gain distinguishes it from Duverger's external party. This aspect, increased electoral support for the party which has resulted in some flexibility on party activities, has brought the Jana Sangh into conflict with the RSS. This flexibility can be seen as a political maturing of the Jana Sangh and is of considerable importance to the development of the Indian political system. What are the effects of such a development in the party? How does it affect its relationship with the RSS, and with the party in power? Does it affect the configuration of the party system?

The party system is characterized by the kind of parties that comprise it. The Indian system till 1967 was in Roy Macridis' classification⁷ both integrative and competitive; integrative in support⁸ and in function and mode

of action;⁹ competitive also in support and particularly in organization where there is a diffusion of political parties. A more graphic description is that used by Almond.¹⁰ It is a dominant non-authoritarian system, dominated by the Congress party. The other political parties that existed and functioned were overshadowed by this towering organization. The distance between them and decision making power was great and often led to the unrealistic positions taken by the parties in opposition. However, the opposition parties have gradually consolidated their positions. The populace has been mobilized to a greater extent and this has resulted in increased participation in the political system. In the 1967 elections the Congress party did not obtain its usual majority in the states, and political power has been distributed among various other parties. The Congress has maintained a majority in the Center, yet the configuration of the system has undergone a change from a dominant non-authoritarian to a multi-party system, at least at the state level. It is too early to say whether, as it is now, the configuration will remain or revert to the former dominant non-authoritarian type if the Congress should regain power, or evolve into a multiple party competitive system. The situation at present is fluid. Rapid social and economic change will also influence the development of the system. The role of the Jana Sangh will be interesting to observe. Whether it will become more ideological in defense, or evolves into a pragmatic traditional party, remains to be seen.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE JANA SANGH

The roots of the Jana Sangh lie immediately in the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, which together with the Hindu Mahasabha and the Ram Rajya Parishad had its beginnings in the traditions of late nineteenth century Hindu nationalism.

The response of the nineteenth century Indian middle class to British rule can be termed either reformist or revivalist.

In their emphasis to reform of the traditional social order, both (the reformists and revivalists) agreed in principle. Both were influenced by English education, rule of law, Christian missions and their methods of work and organization. But, while the reformists responded favorably to Western influence, the revivalists regarded them as a serious affront to India's cultural heritage and intellectual pride.¹¹

The factors that led to this revivalist response were both economical and psychological. Among the economic factors was the frustration with British rule especially in the sphere of the employment of the educated. There were insufficient jobs for the numbers of those who were now obtaining a Western education. Also, examinations for the Indian Civil Service, were held in England, and thus posed a difficulty for those who could not afford to make the trip overseas. This kind of a journey created social problems of many kinds. One faced ostracism from caste after a journey abroad, because living in the West was often associated with breaking dietary restrictions and with immoral behavior. Often those educated abroad displayed a disparaging attitude towards anything indigenous. "Revivalism was also a reaction to what was considered a psychological surrender."¹²

Hinduism was indeed faced with a crisis of culture. It arose from the British policy to build on the foundation of a traditionally

caste ridden agricultural society, an educational, legal and political system which had in the West resulted basically from the Industrial Revolution and a flexible social system...The acceptance of the Western concept of social mobility constituted a real challenge to Brahmanism and the exclusive concept of its class order.¹³

To the revivalists, political freedom was essential for religious and cultural freedom.

Anti-Hindu influence in the form of Westernization and Western ideas, and Islam, were the alien influences that Swami Dayanand Saraswati (1824-1883) founder of the Arya Samaj tried to counteract, in an effort not only to conserve Hindu society, but also to reform and revitalize Hindu society. He sought to arouse the Hindu community into active resistance to the alien influences which threatened it and confidently proclaimed the superiority of the Hindu religion over Christianity. His watchword was "back to the Vedas." In this slogan was the implication of the exclusion of extra-Hindu influences such as Islam, Christianity and the British government.

Bal Gangadhar Tilak (1856-1920) also came in the tradition of the Revivalists. Tilak blended religion with politics and was able to carry his message to the masses. It was Tilak who thundered "Swarajya is my birthright and I shall have it." Tilak with strong support from Lala Rajpat Rai from the Punjab, and B. C. Pal from Bengal formed the axis of the Extremist group in the Indian National Congress and was opposed to Constitution agitation (of the Moderate wing) as the channel for demanding independence. This new approach gave added zeal to the National movement, but at the same time further alienated many Muslims from the Swarajya Movement. Tilak used Hindu festivals such as Ganapati puja,¹⁴ and celebrations in honor of Shivaji,¹⁵ heroic Maratha King, to provide the symbols of a nascent nationalism. At the same time Tilak did encourage Western education, but he put the emphasis on

Vedic religion. He wanted the younger generation educated in Western science and literature to derive their cultural values from the traditional Indian view and way of life. Tilak decried any English interference in Hindu traditional customs. For example, he opposed child marriage reform. As such in the beginning of the twentieth century, a mixture of the Hindu religion and a patriotic spirit exists which makes it difficult to draw a clear dividing line between Indian nationalism and Hindu communalism.

Nationalism inevitably drew part of its inspiration from India's ancient cultural traditions, and these were mainly Hindu. India was the only home of the Hindus, and whatever patriotic demands were made in the name of the majority would naturally appear to be expressions of Indian Nationalism.¹⁶

In contrast to Hindu extremists the Moderates who had believed in institutional reform never developed a mass following because "any movement on a mass scale had to appeal to the people in a language intelligible to them, the language of religion."¹⁷ In 1906, Tilak helped Vinayak Savarkar to go to England for his studies in law. During his stay in England, he became famous as a terrorist against the British regime and was sentenced to life imprisonment in the Andaman Islands of India - where he found his elder brother Ganesh, a renowned terrorist, also imprisoned. During his imprisonment Vinayak scratched on prison walls his treatise on Hindutva¹⁸ (Hindu-ness). This treatise was published in 1924, four years after Tilak's death. Thus in the tradition of Hindu nationalism Vinayak Savarkar followed Tilak. Hindutva and the thoughts of Vinayak on the superiority of the Hindu nation to all other politics gave a theoretical foundation to the Hindu communal party, the Hindu Mahasabha.

This drive for the unity of the Hindu community became most intensely anti-Muslim, as more and more Muslims followed Sir Syed Ahmed Khan's advice

to boycott the Indian National Congress and nationalist parties. It was during the years (1905-1907) that the Extremists dominated the Congress movement that the Muslim League was founded in 1906. It was the first communal organization that made its appeal on an all-India basis.¹⁹

Meanwhile the communally minded Hindus within the Congress, were gradually alienated by the Congress leadership's "appeasement policy" toward the Muslims. By the Lucknow Pact (1916) Congress accepted the Muslim League's principle of separate electorates for the two communities. Under Mahatma Gandhi's leadership, the Congress participated in the Muslim Khilafat movement (1920) which agitated for the restoration of the Sultan of Turkey, the Caliph of Islam, to his pre-war status. At this time it was felt that Gandhiji was completely ignoring the demands of the Hindus in his attempt to reconcile the Muslims, and his compromises only led to greater demands on the part of the Muslims.²⁰

But, as with Lokmanya Tilak, so with Gandhiji, their followers were not able to distinguish between the broader aim of independence and the means applied to obtain them.

Gandhiji tried to convert his leadership in the Congress into an instrument intended not only to fight for political freedom, but also to reconcile through a religious approach, the conflicting interests of labor and capital, landlord and tenant, Hindu and Muslim, Brahman and Harijan. But the mass of the people could not distinguish between religion, race and communalism. A resort to religion as the basis of political appeal, produced violence and communal riots.²¹

Though the origins of the Hindu Mahasabha can be traced to the Punjab Hindu Conference in Lahore in 1907, its first important session was held in 1923.²² At that time its work was devoted mainly to a cultural sphere and members of the Mahasabha continued to be members of the Congress. At this session which was held in Benaras, the Mahasabha endorsed Shuddhi, the

reconversion of Hindus who had left the fold. There were two immediate reactions to this move: communal riots, and counter propaganda by the Muslims. By 1933, the Mahasabha came out in open opposition to the Congress and decided to put up its own candidates in the elections.

In the pre-independence period, the Mahasabha did not stand for the creation of a Hindu state, and claims that the vacillation of the Congress leaders in appeasing the Muslims brought this aspect into focus. In the post-independence decades, the Mahasabha ideology embodies a stand for Akhand Bharat (undivided India); Hindu Raj; strictly reciprocal relations with Pakistan, complete integration of Kashmir with India. The Mahasabha makes a distinction between Hindu and non-Hindu citizens of Akhand Bharat. It claims that Hindus alone are the nationals of India, and non-Hindus can be classified only as Indian citizens. The non-Hindus shall be entitled to equal

TABLE I

ELECTION RESULTS OF JANA SANGH AND HINDU MAHASABHA 1951-1967

	1951		1957		1962		1967	
	<u>L.S.*</u>	<u>L.A.**</u>	<u>L.S.</u>	<u>L.A.</u>	<u>L.S.</u>	<u>L.A.</u>	<u>L.S.</u>	<u>L.A.</u>
Hindu Mahasabha	4	24	2	8	1	6	-	-
Bhartiya Jana Sangh	3	34	4	46	14	115	35	264

* Lok Sabha

** Legislative Assembly

rights and privileges under normal conditions; in the event of war or other emergencies, however, the government, would have powers to distinguish between Hindu and non-Hindu citizens.²³ It was V. D. Savarkar, President of the Hindu Mahasabha from 1937-1942, who first formulated systematically the

concept of the Hindu state in the earlier mentioned treatise, Hindutva.

Though some of the ideological principles of the Mahasabha have been incorporated into the Jana Sangh ideology, the Mahasabha as a political party has steadily lost ground since independence. This trend can be seen by examining the general election fortunes of the Mahasabha and Jana Sangh in Table I.

In the wake of the communal riots that swept the city of Nagpur in 1925, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) was founded by Dr. Keshav Hedgewar.²⁴ The RSS literally means National Self-Service organization, and derives its ideology from Savarkar's ideas which also served to revitalize the Mahasabha. This Hindu nationalist organization, RSS, however, consists of a highly disciplined cadre of workers and a strict hierarchical structural organization. At the apex of the structure is the Sar Sanghchalak, who exercises autocratic control of the organization. Dr. Hedgewar was succeeded by "Guruji" Golwalkar in 1940 and he is still in office. The RSS promotes obedience and uniformity of opinion within its ranks. Each member belongs to a cell of fifty individuals and he must attend daily exercise sessions. A kind of military discipline is maintained and the Swayamsevaks (Volunteers) are even taught lathi drill. Uniformity of ideology is maintained in the organization through weekly discussions, identical libraries and itinerent officials.

RSS ideology is best expressed in Golwalkar's book We, or Our Nationhood Defined.²⁵ Golwalkar defines nation as a cultural unit, not a political one. He claims that in India the best solution to the minorities problem is their assimilation with the Hindu nation. Hinduism is exalted and religion plays a vital role in public and political life. Thus by defining the nation in this way, Golwalkar is trying to justify the existence of the RSS.

Other scholars, however, tend to classify the RSS as an organization that has features that are

Highly reminiscent of fascist movements in Europe...the leader principle, the stress on militarism, the doctrine of racial cultural superiority, ultranationalism infused with religious idealism, the use of symbols of past greatness, the emphasis on national solidarity, the exclusion of religious or ethnic minorities from the nation concept - all of these features of RSS are highly reminiscent of fascist movements in Europe. The major difference is that the concept of state-worship, the state as all absorbing reality in which the individual loses himself to find meaning is totally absent.²⁶

In fact the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh has always claimed that it is a sociocultural organization mainly interested in the regeneration of Hindu society. It has never openly contested elections.

With the partition of the country in 1947, feelings ran high in the Mahasabha and the RSS. They had been opposed to Gandhiji's compromises with the Muslims. On January 30, 1948, Mahatma Gandhi was assassinated by Nathuram V. Godse, a Maharashtrian Brahman who had been affiliated with the RSS and the Hindu Mahasabha and was still known as a devoted lieutenant of V. D. Savarkar. General public opinion held the two organizations responsible though the judicial hearings found no evidence of direct participation of the RSS and the Mahasabha in the assassination.²⁷

The Mahasabha under the leadership of Shyama Prasad Mookerjee decided to suspend political activity. On February 4, 1948, the RSS was banned by the Government of India.²⁸ After the ban was imposed on the RSS, it was felt that if RSS had political representation in Parliament, it would not have been possible for the government to ban it.²⁹ The need was felt to enter the political arena but the RSS did not consider the Mahasabha an adequate forum for representation, and so looked for a new platform.

At this time, Shyama Prasad Mookerjee,³⁰ a brilliant member of

Parliament, was also looking for an organization, having had a distinguished career in the academic and political fields. Dr. Shyama Prasad was the son of a noted Bengali educationist, Sir Ashutosh Mookerjee. Sir Ashutosh as Vice-Chancellor of Calcutta University had chartered the educational program of Calcutta University. Shyama Prasad, was called to the bar in England in 1927, and in 1929, he started his political career. He was elected to the Bengal Legislative Council in 1929, as a member of Congress. In 1934, he was elected to Vice-Chancellor of Calcutta University, the same position that his father had held, at the age of thirty-three. He served in a number of academic positions during this period. But he became increasingly disenchanted with the Congress and opposed the Muslim League, and under the advice of Hedgewar and Savarkar, joined the Hindu Mahasabha in 1939. He was impressed by RSS organization. Mookerjee continued to be active in the struggle of independence, and with the advent of independence on August 15, 1947, Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru included him in his cabinet as Minister of Industries and Supplies. However, after the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi, when the Mahasabha became a suspect organization, there were no aspersions cast on Mookerjee's character and he retained his cabinet rank. But in 1948, he differed with Mahasabha leaders over the question of open membership in the party. Mookerjee suggested that the party drop its communal membership requirement and open its rolls to members of all communities, not only to Hindus. But his proposal was defeated by the Working Committee and Mookerjee resigned in December 1948.³¹ From then until 1951, when the Jana Sangh was founded, he did not belong to any party. In the Cabinet his views differed from those of Mr. Nehru on Kashmir and Bengal. Matters came to a head on the East Bengal issue, and in 1950, Mookerjee resigned from the Cabinet in protest

of the Liaquat-Nehru Pact³² which affected the status of Hindus in East Bengal. The Pact contained a pledge to maintain equal rights for minorities in each country. It also provided for the return of refugees without hindrance to place of origin and gave them the right to carry all movable property and to dispose of all immovable property and carry the proceeds with them. Thus each government would have no extra territorial claim on the minorities of the other country. Mookerjee could not accept this "desertion" by India of the Hindus of East Bengal. The Pact violated his "pledge" to the Hindus of East Bengal, and so he resigned from the Cabinet. He now began "the quest for a platform" which ended with the formation of the Jana Sangh.³³ From Mookerjee's view point, the Mahasabha's name was still tarnished from Gandhi's murder, and it would be difficult for him to gain India-wide backing were he again to join this organization.

Some RSS leaders (including two later Presidents, the late Deen Dayal Upadhyaya,³⁴ and Balraj Madhok³⁵) had already made contacts with Mookerjee and in fact he had been assured of RSS support should he start a new party.³⁶ He realized the need for an all-India party, and kept contact with the Delhi group of the RSS who had approached him and also with his friend N. C. Chatterjee who had joined the Mahasabha at the same time as Mookerjee.

A long time observer of the Indian political scene once described the founding of the Bhartiya Jana Sangh as the coming together of a political leader in need of an organization, an organization in need of a leader for the political aspects of its program. The leader was Dr. Shyama Prasad Mookerjee; the organization, the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh.³⁷

Balraj Madhok makes it clear that RSS members at least as individuals were closely tied to the political organizing which led to the formation of the Jana Sangh. About the organization as a whole participating in such adventure he wrote:

It (RSS) however permitted its workers to cooperate and collaborate with Dr. Mookerjee for the formation of a party which might reflect their viewpoint on national questions.³⁸

On May 5, 1951, in Calcutta, Mookerjee announced the formation of the People's Party which was the precursor of Jana Sangh.³⁹ As the time went on similar units of the People's Party were formed in Delhi, Bombay, Uttar-Pradesh, Rajasthan, Karnatak, Vindhya Pradesh, Gujerat and Bihar.⁴⁰ Finally, the delegates of these branches met in Delhi on October 21, 1951 to establish the Bharatiya Jana Sangh.⁴¹ Mookerjee was elected President and in his acceptance speech emphasized the role of a responsible opposition party.

...one of the chief reasons for the manifestation of dictatorship in Congress rule is the absence of well organized opposition parties ...Bhartiya Jana Sangh emerges today as an All India political party which will function as the principal party in opposition...(opposition) does not mean senseless or destructive approach to all problems that confront responsible government. While, therefore, we may have to attack or criticise official measures or acts, our aim will be to approach all problems in constructive spirit so that we may keep the public vigilant and make humble contribution in developing a real democratic structure for the sound administration of the country.⁴²

In the same speech Mookerjee declared that the party would be open for all Indians, a stand which was more liberal than the RSS or Mahasabha.

We have thrown our party to all citizens of India irrespective of caste, creed or community...the people must be united by a bond of fellowship and understanding inspired by deep devotion to the spirit of a common motherland...it is obviously for the vast majority of Bharat's population to assure all classes of people who are truly loyal to their motherland, that they will be entitled to full protection under the law and to complete equality of treatments in all matters, social, economical and political. Our party gives assurance unreservedly.⁴³

Thus the Bharatiya Jana Sangh came into existence. Its organization base lay mainly in the RSS; from the Mahasabha it inherited the mantle of participating in political activity. The Mahasabha had fallen from grace due to suspected affiliation in the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi, and has

never recovered.

The success of the Jana Sangh was based on the strength of the organizational structure of the RSS, but also is a result of the party's willingness to be somewhat flexible in order to obtain a greater following. This will become evident by observing the policy statements and election results in the following chapters. As will be further observed, the Jana Sangh has become a recognized force in the Indian political system, especially in Northern India.

CHAPTER III

PARTY ORGANIZATION⁴⁴

While competition for public office gains a party more attention, it is the party organization which provides continuity, form, and to some extent direction to the party. Moreover, the types of conflict which occur with all political parties are often more evident within the party organization or between the organization and the elected members. In India, this has been particularly true of the Congress party, but organizational considerations are also pertinent to the study of opposition parties such as the Jana Sangh.

The organization of the Jana Sangh assumes importance in view of the fact that attempts at recruiting a greater number of people into the party's ranks tend to make the party more open to the accommodation of different view points. This has especially come into focus with attempts on behalf of the party to assume a more national character by expansion in Southern India. Whenever the question of expansion in the South comes up, it is always faced with the party's rigid stand on making Hindi the national language. The south opposes this stand, and instead prefers retention of English along with the southern regional languages. When crises of this nature arise which have as their focal point language, or religion, the party is faced with a decision to be either flexible or rigid in its response. Greater participation and consequent electoral success have led to growing accommodation within the party, and in the case of the Jana Sangh, to a lessening of the communal facade. For increased participation the party needs to communicate with the electorate, socialise it, and provide it with a stable organization and leadership to articulate its demands.

The communication and socialization functions are performed by the formal organizational wings of the party, and by volunteer organizations or associations that are affiliated or closely allied to the party. It will be seen in the course of this discussion that the question of succession has also been institutionalized as has been seen in the face of two emergencies, when the President of the Party died or resigned. It will also be important to consider the aspects of factionalism in the party, and member recruitment.

The diffusion of organization enables the party to reach the masses. In India this is important, because about 85% of the population lives in the rural areas. Interest articulation among the masses can take place at the most rudimentary level. Important party meetings like conventions or National congresses play an important part in arousing enthusiasm for the party. In India meetings of national calibre are often planned on a lavish scale, and hence tend to excite curiosity on the part of the public to come and see what the big "tamaashaa"⁴⁵ is about. In doing so, the party is in a subtle way initiating people into its ranks. On the other hand, the formal organization of the party enables it to function smoothly, so that the Central party organization is not overburdened with work, and also cannot assume too rigid a control over the subsidiary organizations. It also helps to create leadership at the local level. The formal organization of the Jana Sangh exists at six levels: the precinct, block, Zila (district), Pradesh (state or provincial), Zonal and Bharatiya (national).

The basic unit of the Jana Sangh is the Sthaniya Samiti, the territorial extent of which corresponds to that of a polling booth (precinct) at the General Election. The members of each Sthaniya Samiti elect their Working Committee called the Karya Samiti which consists of a President,

Secretary, Treasurer, and four other members if the total membership in the precinct is less than 300, and eight members if the total membership in the precinct is 300 or more. The Sthaniya Samiti plays an important part in the organization of the party in carrying its message to the masses. It is the connecting link between the party and the actual voter, and conveys the ideals and programs of the Jana Sangh. It enrolls new members, executes the policies and directions issued by the Pradeshik Karya Samiti (Provincial Working Committee).

The Karya Samitis of the various Sthaniya Samitis within the jurisdiction of a Mandal (area equivalent to a block with approximately 60,000 inhabitants) elect the office bearers to the Mandal Samiti. The officers of the Mandal Samiti are a President, two Vice Presidents, a Secretary, not more than two Joint Secretaries and a Treasurer. If the membership in the precinct is less than 25, the officers of its Sthaniya Samiti are not eligible to vote in the Mandal Samiti elections. Besides its elected members, the Mandal Samiti also has members (six to twelve) who have been appointed by the President of the Mandal Samiti. The Mandal Samiti supervises the work of the Sthaniya Samitis, forms new Sthaniya Samitis, and reorganizes the old Samitis with the approval of the Pradeshik Karya Samiti, and prepares the list of voters. The Mandal Samitis are also authorized to deal with local problems and express their opinions regarding national problems by passing resolutions which are forwarded even to the Central Executive of the Party. They elect a representative to the Pradeshik Pratinidhi Sabha, which is the supreme body of the State.

The Mandal Samitis within a district (Zila) elect the Zila Samiti. Some members of the Zila Samiti are nominated by the elected President of the




Fig. 1. Structural Organization of the Party.

same. The President and Secretary of each Zila Samiti are members of the Bharatiya Pratinidhi Sabha (National Delegates Conference). As such they play an important role in the election of the All India President of the Jana Sangh.

Delegates and representatives from different parts of the state constitute the Pradeshik Pratinidhi Sabha (State Delegates Conference). The Working Committee at the state level, the Pradeshik Karya Samiti is elected from these delegates, or nominated by its president. The Pradeshik Karya Samiti is independently organized from the Central bodies, and therefore has full scope to form policy at the State level and to supervise the former bodies of the State. The election of its members is not ratified by the Central Committee.

The Central Executive has no power of superceding the State Executive, but it has powers of issuing directions and controlling the working of the State Executive.⁴⁶

The State Executive has in turn a hand in the policy making at the Central level by the fact that the State Secretary attends the meetings of the Central Working Committee. It can also offer suggestions and send resolutions to the Central Executive. Moreover, on vital provincial matters, the Center takes into consideration the views of the State Executive.

It would appear that the State Executive has scope for initiating policy not in accordance with the wishes of the Central Executive provided it does not affect the basic principles of the Party.⁴⁷

The next level in the structural organization is at the National level. The Bharatiya Pratinidhi Sabha (National Delegates Conference) is constituted of the two office bearers of all district committees viz, the President and Secretary of the district Committees. The body elects the All India President of the Jana Sangh. The President of the party nominates the other office

bearers and members of the Bharatiya Karya Samiti (Central Executive). The Bharatiya Pratinidhi Sabha is the supreme body and chief organ for laying down the policy and program of the Jana Sangh. It enjoys the power to deal with all matters and situations that may arise, including the power of issuing any directions to the various bodies. It meets at least once a year, and the meeting is convened whenever required by the Karya Samiti, or on a joint requisition by not less than 50 members specifying the purpose for which it is required. It can affiliate to the Jana Sangh any organization or association and give it such representation it may deem fit. The quorum for Pratinidhi Sabha meetings is 1/10 of the membership. The Bharatiya Pratinidhi Sabha frames the rules and issues directions for the proper working of the Jana Sangh constitution. It superintends, directs, and controls all Pradeshik Karya Samitis and takes such disciplinary action as it may deem fit against any individual Samiti or Sabha, other than the Bharatiya Karya Sabha. It takes all steps necessary for implementing the objectives of the party, it controls the funds, makes rules for their proper disbursement to the various bodies and arranges for their audit.

The Bharatiya Karya Samiti (Central Executive) consists of the President of the party, and not more than 31 members nominated by the President from among the Pratinidhi Sabha. Of these the General Secretary assumes great importance. According to the Constitution of the Jana Sangh, the President could prove to have overriding powers, and therefore become extremely powerful. In practice, the President of the Jana Sangh has "so far been a nominal head (rather) than an effective force, the real influence being exercised by the General Secretary."⁴⁸ Whereas the Jana Sangh has had a number of Presidents, the General Secretary tends to stay in office for a

TABLE II

PRESIDENTS AND GENERAL SECRETARIES OF THE PARTY - 1951-1969

<u>Year</u>	<u>President</u>	<u>Home State</u>	<u>General Secretary</u>	<u>Home State</u>
1951	Dr. Shyama P. Mookerjee	West Bengal	Mauli Chandra Sharma Dr. Mahavir	Punjab Delhi
1952	Dr. Shyama P. Mookerjee (died in 1954)		Mauli Chandra Sharma Deen Dayal Upadhaya	Uttar Pradesh
1953	Mauli Chandra Sharma (resigned in 1954)	Punjab	Deen Dayal Upadhaya continued to be General Secretary till 1967 when he was elected President.	
1954	Bapu Saheb Sohoni	Madhya Pradesh		
1955	Prem Nath Dogra	Jammu & Kashmir		
1956-59	Deva Prasad Ghosh	West Bengal		
1960	Pitamber Das	Uttar Pradesh		
1961	Rama Rao	Andhra Pradesh		
1962	Dr. Raghuvira (died in a car accident)	Delhi		
1963	Rama Rao			
1964	Deva Prasad Ghosh			
1965	Bachraj Vyas	Maharashtra		
1966	Balraj Madhok	Delhi		
1967	Deen Dayal Upadhaya (killed in 1968)	Uttar Pradesh	Surindar Singh Ehandari (at present General Secretary)	Rajasthan
1968	Atal Bohari Vajpayee	Uttar Pradesh		

relatively long time. Thus the General Secretary is able to consolidate his power. The Central Executive carries into effect the policy and programs laid down by the Bharatiya Pratinidhi Sabha and is responsible to it. In practice, the Bharatiya Karya Samiti formulates all policy decisions and resolutions and presents them for discussion and approval to the Bharatiya Pratinidhi Sabha.

This basic structure of the party underwent a change in 1958. To improve communications from the Center and the states, the office of Zonal Secretary was created. The zonal set-up allotted the entire country to four zones. The zones had as their core states those in which the Jana Sangh was reasonably well established, the new ones being attached to the established areas. Therefore, though not geographically logical, the division is sound organizationally.

The northern zone includes Punjab, Delhi, Himachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir. Of the eastern zone, the core state is Uttar Pradesh, and the other states are Bihar, West Bengal, Assam, Manipur and Tripura. The western zone extends from the Arabian Sea to the Bay of Bengal and includes Rajasthan, and Madhya Pradesh as core states, with Gujarat and Orissa.

Attempts to extend the Jana Sangh to the south led to the formation of the southern zone which includes Maharashtra, Mysore, Goa and Pondicherry. To assist in the advancement of the Jana Sangh in the south, the Jana Sangh has consciously held its sessions or sessions of the Bharatiya Pratinidhi Sabha in those sections of the country. In 1959, the general session was held in Bangalore. A meeting of the Bharatiya Pratinidhi Sabha was held in Hyderabad in 1960. In his Presidential address, Ghosh said that the reason for the meeting was two-fold. First, "they should know more intimately the

message of the Jana Sangh." Secondly:

...the South as such had many local problems of her own---problems peculiar to its position and its people...I thought accordingly that, in order that the Jana Sangh might develop a broad all-India outlook and might really claim to represent India as a whole, it must extend its activities to the South and feel its (of the South) pulse and heart-beats...⁴⁹

Thus through the formal organization of the Party, the Jana Sangh hopes to carry its message to all parts of India in an attempt to achieve the image of a national party. Yet at present, its strength remains concentrated in the Hindi heartland of Northern India. Its success in the South requires not only formal organizational status, but also ideological moderation.

Every member of the Jana Sangh on enrollment, has to contribute to the membership fund. However, he cannot seek election to any office of body of the party except the local committee (Sthaniya Samiti) unless he has been active for one year after enrollment. An active member is expected to attend 50% of the meetings of the unit he belongs to and devote some time daily to party work or function as a member of Parliament, Legislative Assembly or local body, or participate in any other social service organized by the party. Any member who absents himself from the unit concerned continuously for three meetings without permission, or fails to pay the fees fixed by the Constitution within three months from the date of his enrollment as a member, is considered an inactive member. However, the All India Working Committee may make an exception to the above rules and the Provincial President has the right to free any member from the liability created from his being inactive.

In cases where the Constitution of the Jana Sangh has to be amended, a quorum of 2/3 of the majority of members present and voting is required of the Bharatiya Pratinidhi Sabha. Any dispute arising under the Jana Sangh constitution is referred to the next higher body or a body especially

constituted for the purpose. Any person aggrieved by the decision of such a body appeals to the President.

The Jana Sangh raises funds by way of donations, membership fees, purse collections, monthly donations by party members, sale of party literature and monthly contributions by party legislators. Within the State, collections made by the district and lower bodies are distributed among the different organs at all levels in the manner and proportion fixed by the State Executive.⁵⁰

Auxiliary Organizations

Organizations or associations that are affiliated or closely allied to the party play an important role of "socializing" the masses into the mainstream of the thought of the party. Among those that do sympathize with the Jana Sangh are:

- a. The Rashtriya Swyam Sewak Sangh
- b. Akhil Bharatiya Vidhyarti Parishad (All India Students' Organization)
- c. Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh (Indian Labour Organization)
- d. Mahila Agadhe (Women's Organization)
- e. Publications--The Organizer, Pratap, Panchajayna.

The RSS has not only been the "organizational ancestor" of the Jana Sangh, but helps the Jana Sangh in time of election campaigning. Along with many other elections, RSS workers campaigned extensively and effectively for the Jana Sangh when it captured the Delhi Corporation seats in 1967. It is said that Jana Sangh policy makers do not act without consulting Nagpur. (RSS Headquarters.) Moreover the other auxiliary organizations are also RSS oriented.

The Vidyarthi Parishad was founded in 1948, and is run mainly by

volunteers who are sympathetic to the cause of the RSS. For elections, demonstration marches and similar endeavours, the Jana Sangh will call upon the members of the Parishad. It has been observed that delegates to the Jana Sangh Conferences are usually young people.

The Jana Sangh tries to win the minds and allegiance of young men while they are in college. The party can offer them political work and political advancement soon after they leave their studies.

On the labour front, the Jana Sangh is closely associated with the Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh (BMS), which was founded in 1955 by Daltopant Papurao Thengade. The initial Conference declared the BMS to be the "labour front of the Jana Sangh." The BMS has continued but has achieved no notable gain in membership and is not recognized by the Government of India as one of the four national labour federations.⁵¹ The reason for this relative unimportance may be attributed to the fact that the connection of the Jana Sangh is mainly with shopkeepers, small industrialists and professional people who are not good prospects as sponsors of labour fronts.

The Jana Sangh is becoming active among women voters. The first woman to be elected on the Jana Sangh ticket was Mrs. Shakuntala Nayar in Uttar Pradesh in 1962. The Working Committee first had a woman in its membership at the Ambala Session in 1958. Since then, off and on, women have held positions in the Jana Sangh organization. A Mahila Sammelan (Women's Conference) has become a regular part of the Jana Sangh annual Convention. Mrs. Kamala Madhok (wife of Professor Balraj Madhok, a prominent member from Delhi), urged the Sammelan in 1958 to "wrest the leadership of Indian womanhood from the hands of a few Westernized fashionable ladies."⁵²

The Organizer is a weekly published both in Hindi and English, from

Delhi, is largely RSS controlled, and at times can be extremely anti-Muslim. However, it vividly reports all Jana Sangh national conventions and related news. Other publications are the Hindi weekly Panchajanya of Lucknow, which is also RSS controlled. Outside the directly controlled press, one Urdu daily in Delhi which has often supported the Jana Sangh is Pratap. It was founded in Lahore by Mahashya Krishan, a staunch Arya Samajist, and now, is run by his sons from Delhi and Jullundar.

After observing the overall structural components of the party it is important for our discussion of 'party appeal' to consider the characteristics of Jana Sangh membership. The appeal of the party is greater to

various dislocated or dispossessed segments of the population refugees from Pakistan, former princely state retainers, and many lower middle class elements, such as lesser Rajputs, landholders, smaller businessmen and shopkeepers, traders and the like,⁵³

rather than to people in the rural areas. It would seem that the slogan of a united Hindu people would appeal easily to the simple minded villager, but this is not so. One reason for the failure to appeal to the rural areas, can be the deep entrenchment of the Congress party since pre-independence days. Moreover, the Congress party still has the lustre symbolised by Gandhiji and Pandit Nehru. In addition to the above, the platform of a militant Hinduism is alien to most of these people. On the other hand, refugees, former princely retainers, lesser landlords, and others mentioned above, are the ones most affected by the new order, and may be searching for a distinctive cohesiveness. The Jana Sangh is able to supply these with a religious and traditional affiliation, a status and role as members within the party. The concentration of Jana Sangh membership in urban areas can partly be attributed to its historical foundations. Western influence was more or less concentrated in the growing towns and it is here that the revivalist reaction to

Westernization originated. Besides, "dislocated" and "dispossessed" people would naturally come to the urban areas to find employment, or make a new beginning, and would thus be more in search for a new identity. The Jana Sangh has capitalized on this, and concentrates on gaining control of civic bodies. In the General Election of 1967, it was able to capture control of the Municipal corporation of the city of Delhi. It seemed ironic that in the capital city where the Congress party controlled the National Parliament, it was unable to control the civic administration of the city.

Earlier in the discussion the question of leadership was mentioned. An overall effect of the differentiated party organization is to ensure that leadership in the party can be handed down peacefully and continuity in party organization can be maintained. This aspect the Jana Sangh organization has encountered with particular success in at least two emergency situations-- once in 1954 when Dr. Mookerjee suddenly died while participating in the Kashmir satyagraha (passive resistance), and for a second time in 1954 when the President Mauli Chandra Sharma resigned from the party because he opposed the RSS organizational control of the party. Both times leadership was successfully handed down.

A very important issue to the Jana Sangh organization is factionalism within the party ranks. Factionalism⁵⁴ has been described as the existence of internal party conflict, by which two or more points of view may be supported within the party. Often this difference of opinion may lead to intense competition for obtaining party tickets for elections at all levels, and may in some cases lead to the formation of splinter groups that oppose the party and this costs votes to both groups. To this date, factionalism of this kind has been absent from the Jana Sangh, whereas there are two Socialist parties,

two Communist parties, and various Congress party factions. The reason for the Jana Sangh being factionless is largely the influence of the RSS. Those members of the RSS who join the Jana Sangh have already been trained to adhere to discipline and the policy line. Since the RSS does not allow any dissension in its ranks, these members when they join the Jana Sangh bring to it the discipline they have incorporated in their RSS training. Those members who do not come up through the RSS ranks often may find themselves feeling restless under the RSS yoke. This minority group, in order to keep the party image, accept a majority decision and by adding their own consent make it unanimous. At this juncture it would have been extremely pertinent to present the number of total membership in the Jana Sangh, and also examine the percentage of RSS and non-RSS members, but these figures are not readily available, as it is the party's intention not to expose its close affiliation with the RSS.

The role of the organization of the Jana Sangh becomes more important when it is considered that the party has increased its representation in Parliament and in the Legislative Assemblies in each successive General Election, especially in view of the fact that it has not had the advantage of a powerful charismatic leader for a continued length of time as the Congress party has had. Hence the debit side would seem to lie in the dedication of the workers, and the organization and ideology of the party that they espouse.

CHAPTER IV

PARTY IDEOLOGY

In general, ideology refers to those principles that form the guidelines for the conduct of party members in connection with the political party. It links the actions of members of a political party to a wider set of meanings and by doing so lends a dignified complexion to social conduct. It can on the other hand, also become a cloak for less honorable motives. The description of an ideology tends to make it seem less abstract than the actual abstractions contained within it, and gives moral prescription to collectivities. In developing countries at least ideology helps to perform two main functions: one social, binding the community together, and the other individual, organizing role personalities of the maturing individual. Both these help to legitimize authority.⁵⁵

In the social solidarity aspect, ideology can help to create a myth that may be based on a superior historical perspective, that aids in bringing together people who accept this general myth, though they may differ on subtle issues. On the individual level, ideology is able to satisfy the identity function among individuals. By helping people to identify with a certain ideology, it binds them together, and they then promote the authority of that ideology. The Jana Sangh seems to perform all these functions. Under its banner all Hindus can be organized as a collectivity and thus the party promotes solidarity among them; for those involved in an identity crisis between the traditional and the modern the Jana Sangh helps to provide at least one kind of stable source of identity. Party ideology thus establishes a basis of authority that the party exercises. Furthermore the ideology of the party

becomes important in augmenting the strength of the party, attracting and helping to recruit greater numbers of people into its fold. All this assumes importance in that it increases electoral support of the party and enhances the possibility of its victory at the polls. One further factor why the study of ideology is particularly relevant to this paper is that it may be possible to observe certain trends or instances where increased participation by the party in the political system has resulted in a flexibility of party ideology especially in regard to communalism. Do the actions taken by party leaders correspond to their ideological standing, or are there some confused issues? Where does the appeal of the party ideology lie, and to whom does it appeal and why? The answers to these questions may lead to clues about the base of party membership.

The main sources of information of Jana Sangh party ideology is from election manifestoes, issued prior to the each of the four general elections of 1952, 1957, 1962, and 1967. The manifestoes reveal not only what the party positions are on various subjects, but also the changing trends in Jana Sangh policy. They also show the slogans which are adopted to suit a particular election but later incorporated in party policy. As such manifestoes tend to indicate the flexibility in the party ideology, the mood of the leadership at a given election, the target population for party appeal. It should not be understood that the manifestoes are the only sources of information on party ideology as frequently other forms of writings and speeches by the party leaders are also important. For the purpose of analysis, party ideology has been discussed under two major sections of this chapter the first dealing with the domestic and the second treating the foreign policies. Since it is important to review closely the party's ideological stand on the

status of minorities, a part of the domestic section is devoted to this purpose.

a. Domestic Policy

The major Jana Sangh policies were contained in the eight-point program presented by Dr. Mookerjee when he announced formation of the Peoples Party on May 5, 1951 in Calcutta. The program was as follows:

1. a united India, i.e. reversal of partition.
2. "reciprocity instead of appeasement" in relation with Pakistan.
3. "a more independent attitude in matters of foreign policy consistent with Bharat's paramount self interest".
4. rehabilitation of refugees from Pakistan.
5. increased agricultural and industrial production.
6. "maintenance and development of a common culture for the whole country based on Bhartiya Sanskriti and maryada."
7. equal rights for all citizens, and improvement of "socially and economically backward classes", and
8. a local issue, "the equitable readjustment of the boundaries of West Bengal".⁵⁶

In the party manifesto of 1951, the Jana Sangh, then newly formed from its precursor, the People's Party, stated its "fundamentals" as "one country, one nation, one culture and rule of law."

By putting the emphasis on a Bharatiya rashtra and culture, the Jana Sangh tries to project an Indian image. How different Bharatiya rashtra is from a Hindu rashtra it is difficult to say. The Jana Sangh does not for example make a clear distinction between Hindu citizens and other citizens, yet some of the measures it advocates, e.g., Gurukul system of education, and Aryurvedic medicine, are drawn from the Hindu tradition. The Jana Sangh makes no conscious effort to draw upon any other. At the same time, the dilemma can also be seen as a real difficulty in differentiating between Hindu communalism and Indian nationalism. Therefore it becomes easy to equate Hindu with Indian.

On basic economic policy, the party made fewer comments, but instead proposed in some detail principles for land and industry. The Jana Sangh saw the provision of "food, clothing and shelter," as "the most pressing economic problem before the country." It added, "the middle class, which is worst hit, has to be saved to avoid a breakdown of the entire intellectual and cultural activity."⁵⁷ As stated before, by making such policy statements, the party was asking for the support in both funds and votes of the urban Hindu middle class.

Under the heading "land policy" the Jana Sangh proposed a number of steps many of them essential for the increase of agricultural production: consolidation of holding, better seeds, small irrigation and tube-well projects, greater mechanization. One step which was omitted was the increased use of chemical fertilizers because, "chemical fertilizers, if they are not mixed with green manures in proper proportions and if the land in which they are put is not properly irrigated, destroy the fertility of land and make it barren within few years."⁵⁸ This argument seems to be an attempt to work on the unfounded fears of the farmers, more to obtain their sympathy rather than to make them aware of the proper advantages and disadvantages of the use of chemical fertilizer application. To fulfill the nutrient requirement of crops greater use of natural manures was suggested. However, in a country such as India where most of the organic natural refuse is used either as fodder or as fuel for cooking, such a suggestion seems quite infeasible. Similarly, the party opposes such measures as the BCG vaccination for tuberculosis. To popularize new methods among the farmers, the Jana Sangh called for the use of "bands of volunteer workers", using the Hindi term *swayamsevak*, though apparently, not in the RSS sense.

The party gave some support to land reform, but tried to couch it in such terms that would not frighten away any landlords who might be inclined otherwise to join the Jana Sangh. The Hindu landlord in Uttar Pradesh has generally been a person of conservative religious and social views, and like his counterpart in Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh formed a base of support for the Jana Sangh. "The party would like to take all steps to introduce land reforms, so as to make the cultivator the virtual owner of the land." Presumably, this meant the legal ownership of the land would remain with the zamindar, but the cultivator would be given guaranteed tenancy and receive an increased share of the produce. However, the party did say:

If it found essential in the interest of the economy of the country the party would abolish Jagirdari and Zamindari with compensation and distribute the land to the tillers . . . Enough land however would be left with such Zamindars and Jagirdars as would settle down as land owning farmers.⁵⁹

The land section included:

The party stands pledged to the prohibition of cow slaughter. Special steps will be taken to improve breeds of cow, to make it an economic unit in our agricultural life.⁶⁰

While the land policy tried to steer a middle course between conservatism and radicalism, the industrial policy did the same. The party stands for public ownership of industries especially catering to the essential defense needs of the country. As for other large industries, state ownership had generally not worked efficiently and economically in this country. The Jana Sangh "will encourage private enterprise instead of talking vaguely about nationalism." Expansion, however, should be "under the general control and regulation of the state in the interest of consumers and producers alike." Industry should be decentralized, both to alleviate crowding in the cities and it "will also be advisable from the point of view of defense."

In 1954, the Pratinidhi Sabha had its session in Indore, in the shadow of Mookerjee's death. The Jana Sangh was deprived of its ablest and most widely known member.⁶¹ He was succeeded by Pandit Mauli Chandra Sharma who had been the General Secretary. However, he (Sharma) clashed with the RSS dominated wing of the party and resigned on November 3, 1953, his main complaint being that the RSS wanted to take over the party.⁶² At this session, the Pratinidhi Sabha criticized Sharma and issued a new manifesto for the Party.⁶³ The new program "contained a number of radical changes, some of which were short lived, and strengthened some other provisions." The most radical provisions came under the heading of economic policy where seven points were emphasized. The party proposed that the Fundamental Rights of the Constitution should include the right to work; cottage industries should be encouraged and saved from competition; foreign capital was welcome, without political strings, and should allow 2/3 Indian participation; labour should receive some profits from industry; though labour has the right to strike, this should only be a last resort; minimum and maximum wage should be established; and, finally, zamindari, should be abolished immediately without compensation to the zamindars. The most radical of all the changes suggested was the abolition of zamindari without compensation. The reason why this was proposed is not clear, as the Jana Sangh obtains considerable support from zamindars, but the fact that the issue was "fuzzed" later shows that Jana Sangh was not necessarily earnest in proposing it.

On the socio-political side the manifesto also made changes. The 1954 Manifesto contained the proposal for a unitary system of government. This can be justified by the rising tide of sub-national tendencies which has divided the country into linguistic states. The Jana Sangh proposed the

elimination of the State governments as a stratum between the district and central government. The party suggested the election of Janapada councils at the district level and the further development of the Panchayat raj. However this ideal has persisted in the Jana Sangh liturgy, though the party has utilized the state system for electoral and parliamentary purposes. This proposal of unitary system government was looked upon with suspicion by other political groups.

The real idea behind Jana Sangh's policy is that they want to use the power of a unitary state not to promote a democratic unity, which is unity in diversity, but rather to build a unity which one religion, one culture, and one language dictate to others.⁶⁴

The idea of a unitary state does not seem very possible at present for two major reasons. Firstly, because the parties in power at the state and center level are not the same and one would not surrender political power to the other. These parties in the state have been successful in awakening regional loyalties and coercion of people into a unitary state does not seem democratic or possible. In addition, a strong leader to create a unitary state is not visible on the political horizon.

Before the 1957 Manifesto was issued the following topics came up for consideration--The Christian Missionaries, Goa, Cow slaughter, the Hindu Code Bill and States reorganization.

The Niyogi Committee, officially the Christian Missionary Activities Enquiry Committee on Madhya Pradesh was appointed in 1954 to study the mission work in that State. A similar body, the Rege Committee, was set up in Madhya Bharat. The report of the committee came out squarely against missionary activity, and hinted that such activity had political overtones. It suggested among other measures, that missionary activity be checked, and the Indian churches should establish an independent and united Christian Church

in India. The Constitution should be amended to make it clear that the right to propagate a religion is available to Indian citizens only. The Jana Sangh saw dangers from Christian missionary activities not only in Madhya Pradesh and Madhya Bharat, but, also among the tribals of Assam, Bihar and Orissa. The Jana Sangh has essentially an anti-Christian outlook, which was recently demonstrated in its negative attitudes towards Cardinal Gracias of Bombay and the visit of Pope Paul to India in 1965.

The Jana Sangh and the RSS designated October 26, 1952, Anti-Cow Slaughter Day and began the collection of signatures for a petition. The Jana Sangh ritually but not regularly passes resolutions on the subject. Coupled with the Jana Sangh demand for banning cow slaughter was a nebulous proposal for upgrading the quality of the cattle in India. There is no doubt that the matter is one of deep feeling for the party, which in this gained not only the support of the other Hindu parties, but also of many within the Congress, such as Seth Govind Das, Purushottam Das Tandon and Thakur Das Bhargava.

The Hindu Code Bill (1955-56) also engaged much of the time of the Jana Sangh and the other Hindu Parties. The Jana Sangh opposed the codification of the traditional Hindu law, while Prime Minister Nehru considered the bills a key issue in his regime. The Jana Sangh charged the Congress with communalism to attack the measures. In short, said the Jana Sangh and its allies, any bill which applies to only one community has no place in a secular state. Any codification should apply equally to all communities. There is certainly justification in the Jana Sangh charge of communalism, because, till 1968 there has been no codification of the civil law for any other community.

With regard to states reorganization and the Akali demand for a Punjabi Suba, the Jana Sangh opposed a separate Punjabi Suba. The Akalis had worked closely with Mookerjee in Parliament and in the Kashmir satyagraha. The Jana Sangh placed before the Commission a demand for a Maha-Punjab, which would include Punjab, PEPSU and Himachal Pradesh. The party combined its state units into a Maha-Punjab Jana Sangh and held to that position until the bitter end, an end which saw the creation of the Punjabi Suba in 1966.

The 1957 Manifesto⁶⁵ was basically the same in philosophy and program as that presented to the electorate in 1952. Balraj Madhok wrote of the Jana Sangh:

Jana Sangh aims at democracy nationalism, unitary form of government and full integration of Jammu and Kashmir State with the rest of India, together with greater attention to national defence, in the political side. Its economic objectives are a fair deal to the common man through abolition of sales tax and reduction in other direct taxes, appointment of a National Wage Board and guarantee of economic work to all through decentralization of economic power and a fair field for free enterprise...Along with safeguarding democracy, Jana Sangh aims at strengthening the forces of nationalism and unity to checkmate the separatist forces from within and the forces of aggression from without.⁶⁶

But looking at the details we do find some differences. The 1957 Manifesto continued the call for the abolition of zamindari, but obscured the question by saying zamindars should be "rehabilitated." In domestic policy, the manifesto added a specific demand that the Preventive Detention Act be repealed. (Opposition parties in India usually demand this, because the provisions of the Act are most often used against them.) Mookerjee had led the opposition to the renewal of the act while he led the National Democratic Party in Parliament. The Party also found that the Legislative Councils, the upper houses in States to be expensive additions to the legislative machinery. The party supported the separation of the judiciary from the executive by

taking the magisterial powers away from the district collectors and deputy commissioners.

The party now endorsed an encouragement of union membership for industrial workers. In July 1955, the Jana Sangh had started its own affiliated labor organization, the Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh. The Party now called for further Indianization of foreign companies and for the complete Indianization in capital and management of plantation industries. The party would place a limit on the repatriation of capital and earnings by foreign owned companies.

The Jana Sangh statement on national unity was:

For the preservation of national unity:

1. Creating a feeling of equality and oneness in the Hindu society by liquidating untouchability and caste-ism.
2. Nationalising all non-Hindus by inculcating in them the idea of Bharatiya Culture.

The recommendations of the Niyogi Committee and the Rege Committee will be implemented to free Bharatiya Christians from the national influence of foreign missionaries.⁶⁷

The party also labelled the Akali Dal demand for the Punjabi Suba, the Dravidistan Movement (which has now been withdrawn by the DMK) and the Naga rebellion as anti-national.

It is important to discuss two events which occurred on the Indian political scene which would assist in viewing the 1962 Manifesto properly. The Congress Session at Nagpur in 1959, proclaimed Cooperative farming as one of its major goals, and in August of the same year, the Swatantra Party (a conservative opposition party) was formed under the leadership of Chakravarti Rajagopalachari.⁶⁸ He had been Governor General of India, and twice Chief Minister of the state of Madras.

In January 1959, the Jana Sangh in a thirteen point program stated its policy on agriculture.⁶⁹ Among the points were: equal application of the land ceilings in all states, special efforts to bring waste land under

cultivation, ownership of land by the cultivator who would pay compensation based on ten times the annual rent to the dispossessed landlords, a "crash program" on tube-wells, increased use of cow dung as manure and less dependence on "dangerous" chemical fertilizers, the setting aside in each village of a common grazing area and the encouragement of cooperative societies for such matters as credit, seed development, and marketing, but this has to be done with a minimum of government interference. This was in fact a progressive program, as was seen from later events, especially when the monsoons failed, and many of these suggestions would have been of value if they had been implemented. While the Jana Sangh therefore did not oppose in principle the Congress program of land reform and land ceilings it came out very strongly in opposition to collectivization of holdings as proposed by the Congress party in Nagpur.

The reaction of the Jana Sangh to a new party, the Swatantra Party, which could be considered its (the Jana Sangh's) rival, was skeptical. Organiser⁷⁰ editorially "welcomed" the new party but wondered whether it could add or detract from the work of the Jana Sangh and of conservative policies in general. The paper also saw a weakness in the new party's lack of workers and surfeit of name politicians. Balraj Madhok took a critical view of the party:

In the South Shri C. Rajagopalachari has been advocating for some time the formation of a new conservative party which may act as a brake on the Congress party and work for preserving and conserving what is good in the traditional Indian way of life...The economic programme of the proposed middle-of-the-road party of Mr. Masani and the role visualised for the "brake" party of conception by C. R., however do not seem to be much different from...the, Bharatiya Jana Sangh. As such ideologically there is little scope or need for the creating of any such new party except that it will provide a new platform to the intellectual and economic aristocracy which is finding itself out of tune with the new rhyme of the ruling party but considers it below its dignity to join the ranks

of the Jana Sangh...

The one good that such a party can and may do is to create a better understanding and appreciation for the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, which has already made its mark as a forward-looking and open minded conservative party of India. The Jana Sangh circles, therefore, are indifferent about the formation of such a party though they would like all those who sincerely feel the need for it to study Bharatiya Jana Sangh more closely and objectively before plumping for a new party.⁷¹

Since then, as will be seen later, the Jana Sangh has at times allied with the Swatantra, though there have been some basic differences on specific issues such as the language question.

In this period preceding the third election there also occurred severe communal riots between the Hindu and Muslim communities in Jabalpur and Raipur in Madhya Pradesh. The Jana Sangh was accused along with the RSS of stirring up the trouble, but there has been no proof that the Jana Sangh or RSS as organizations were instrumental in communal riots. The aftermath of the riots produced the appointment of a committee headed by Ajit Prasad Jain to consider means to ban communal parties. The committee called for legislative means to ban communal parties, but the suggestions of the committee have not been put into legislation. The Congress party which initiated this move found it possible though, to ally with the Sikh Akali Dal in Punjab in 1957 and with the Muslim League in Kerala in 1960, both of which represent separate communities.

In the 1962 Manifesto the party reaffirmed its opposition to the Preventive Detention Act. It also repeated its demand for the elimination of the Legislative Councils, although it had members in the directly elected Andhra Pradesh and Mysore without having members in the directly elected assemblies. Again the unitary form of government was proposed, at least in theory, with democratic decentralization to the district level. Hindi should

be the national language and the language of communication between the states; the regional languages should be used within the state. An Indian system of education should be developed which would accept much of the gurukul methods and reject much of the Western. These methods were not explained in detail.

Economics received more attention than in earlier Jana Sangh manifestoes. The Policies proposed agreed in most respects with the policies of the Swatantra Party and where they differed it was mainly a question of emphasis and not of substance. The party would continue planning but would curtail the powers of the Planning Commission. Agriculture would be given the highest priority with small-scale and rural industries given second priority. In the agricultural sector: "All possible steps will be taken to free agriculture from its dependence on the vagaries of the monsoon." The party proposed a crash program of small irrigation works including tube wells, the damming of rivulets, and the building of storage tanks. It also called for immediate revision and improvement of the drainage system and for the repair and rechanneling of existing major canal systems. This was all to be done with a decrease in water rates and no provision was made for alternative sources of revenue to finance the projects. However, with the serious monsoon failures in several of the years since the 1962 election and the failure of the Congress Party to cope adequately with the problem, it is possible the Jana Sangh proposals, if carried out, might have gone far to save the disaster of famine.

The party came out in opposition to the Nehru-proposed joint cooperative farming program of the Congress, a program which has, in any event, never gotten off the ground. Voluntary service cooperatives received the party's support but they should be free from government control. The party

also desired that increased attention be given to forests, not only for forest products but for the curtailment of erosion and improvement of soil. "The Bharatiya Jana Sangh will amend the Constitution to prohibit the slaughter of the bovine species..." Again the Hindu basis of the Jana Sangh comes out in the perennial demand for the preservation of the cow, whether healthy or diseased, whether useful or a parasite on limited food supplies.

In the area of social policies, the Jana Sangh hinted at a change in its total opposition to the Hindu Code Bill: "Without changing fundamentally the age-old scientific principles of social organization, the Jana Sangh will enlarge and make more substantial the property rights of women." In medicine the Jana Sangh reverted to Hindu traditionalism and supported "Aryurveda" as the national system of medicine.

Before the general election of 1967, the Jana Sangh at its Vijayawada session, adopted a new policy statement which primarily endorsed its well known policies.⁷² This also contained a philosophical statement which attempted to relate modern democracy to Hindu traditions. While devotion to Bharatiya sanskriti and maryada was restated, the object of the party was to be the attainment of Dharma Rajya: "The nearest English equivalent of Dharma Rajya is the Rule of Law." Dharma Rajya can be attained only through democracy; the institutional form can vary from time to time and from country to country. The remainder of the document spelled out specific matters, which if implemented would carry out the basic program. In the 1967 manifesto,⁷³ the Jana Sangh emphasized foreign policy and called for liberation of lost territory and an independent foreign policy and strong measures of defence, even the manufacture of nuclear weapons and missiles. In domestic issues, it called for national unity, equality, and renewed its demand for decentralization and reform of the judiciary. On the language policy which was becoming

very important in the political scene, it indicated that the use of English should be discontinued in the schooling system--the languages should be the mother tongue, Hindi and Sanskrit; a modern Indian language being prescribed for those whose mother tongue is Hindi. The study of foreign languages would be optional. Sanskrit would be declared the country's national language and used on special occasions. Hindi and provincial languages will be used by the Center where the Center has to directly communicate with the States. Otherwise, Hindi would be used at the central level, with the option to use English for ten years for those who have not learned Hindi. At the provincial level the regional language will be the official language. The Jana Sangh volunteered to prepare a common scientific terminology for all the Indian languages.

In the industrial sphere, the party called for the decentralising of industrial units that can be established with internal resources, and industries needing foreign exchange need not be expanded until they were working in full capacity. It put itself on record as opposed to nationalization of private sector industries, and any nationalization should be taken on the recommendation of a judicial commission. It further called for a Tax Enquiry, and drastic economy in government expenditure. From its economic stance, it seems that the Jana Sangh was becoming more openminded--however, it participated vigorously in the anti-cow slaughter demonstrations in Delhi, and continued its attack on Pakistan.

Minorities

The question of the Jana Sangh position toward minorities, particularly towards Muslims, was raised in the first Manifesto and has been raised regularly throughout the history of the party. The Manifesto of 1951 said

that the party did not recognize religious minorities. The policy that the Jana Sangh has continued to maintain was stated by Sharma in Nagpur, October 29, 1951. He acknowledged that there were Muslims in the Jana Sangh, but added that the party would not beg persons of any religion to join the party simply to give it a national character. The typical position of the Jana Sangh was stated thus:

The Jana Sangh considers them (Muslims) flesh of our flesh, the blood of our blood. That is its basic unalterable attitude toward them, the Jana Sangh invites them to accept our hand of brotherhood. It expects them to shed all those complexes which mutilate against this brotherhood. It looks forward to their disassociating foreign ways from the tenets of their religion. They are welcome to worship the Islamic way. They are expected to live the Bharatiya way.⁷⁴

In the Manifesto of 1962, the Jana Sangh spoke of nationalizing all non-Hindus by inculcating in them the idea of a Bharatiya culture, and freeing Bharatiya Christians from the anti-national influence of foreign missionaries. Some of the measures that could be used to achieve this nationalization of the minorities could be the use of Indian names by Muslims and Christians, the establishment of a United Church for Indian Christians, and perhaps changing the Urdu script. The question of the Hindu minority, especially in East Pakistan, and the migration of refugees from there has received a sympathetic attitude in the Jana Sangh. They have always spoken for proper rehabilitation of refugees from East Pakistan saying that it is the duty of the government to provide adequately for them.

The whole question of the Jana Sangh's attitude towards the minorities has often led the party to be characterized as communal--that is representing the interests of the Hindus in the country. The Jana Sangh generally refutes this by arguing that it is a national party, not a Hindu party; its membership is open to all communities, and the party principally stands for a

Bharatiya rashtra, not a Hindu rashtra. The Party has sponsored non-Hindu candidates in the elections; it has had a Christian President in the Madras unit; has had National Presidents who have been other than Hindi speakers. However, leadership and membership of the party is overwhelmingly from the Hindi Heartland. Thus

the differences in adjectives and in membership policy may be technical, but they cannot be totally ignored and have been stated in different terms deliberately.⁷⁵

On the other hand, the Jana Sangh has attacked the Congress for being communal because it sponsored the Hindu Code Bill of 1955, by which Hindu law was codified by the government, but a similar Code has not been legalized for other communities, even though such was promised over a decade ago. The Jana Sangh has labelled the government's secular policy as being one of Muslim appeasement. The Jana Sangh constantly quotes the Congress-Muslim League alliance in Kerala after the 1962 elections. Yet, at times the Jana Sangh itself has found it expedient to ally with groups which it calls communal and separatist, e.g., the Akali Dal in the Punjab, and also the Communist and Socialist Parties. The alliance with the Akali Dal is one prime example in which participation in the political sphere had led to a flexibility in alliances. It is also significant that the Jana Sangh does not see eye to eye with the Shiv Sena,⁷⁶ which has evolved as the spokesman for Hindu Maratha nationalism since the mid sixties in the State of Maharashtra. In fact, the Shiv Sena and the Jana Sangh have opposed each other in the Thana Municipal elections. The reasons for this difference have not been made absolutely clear, but the Shiv Sena claims that the Jana Sangh has not done anything in particular for the Maharashtrians. The Jana Sangh may see the Shiv Sena as a rival for Hindu sympathy, especially in view of the fact that the Jana Sangh

has not received overwhelming support in Maharashtra due to the party's leadership being in the hands of the Brahmans, while the Congress party leadership is in the hands of the dominant Maratha caste. But the position of the Jana Sangh depends in a large measure on its relationship with the RSS. It is a welcome trend that the Jana Sangh was beginning to show signs of a certain amount of independence from the RSS in seeking broader alliances, with other parties and the leadership of the party is in more pragmatic hands. At the same time it is important to remember, that the RSS provides the Jana Sangh with a well trained and disciplined group of workers. They are very efficient in times of elections for socialization purposes and are seldom found to dissent with the views of the Party. This absence of factionalism is a decided advantage to the Jana Sangh especially when it is compared to the factionalism of the Congress party. The factionalism in the Congress party has led to fragmentation and loss of power. Yet, there is also a negative aspect to this relationship. The RSS is more doctrinaire and openly communal than the Jana Sangh, and the Jana Sangh association with it thus tarnishes the name of the Jana Sangh too. It seems from press reports⁷⁷ that at present the RSS control over the Jana Sangh has grown not only organizationally, but also in the sphere of policy. This trend would not be favourable to a detente with minority communities like the Muslims and the Christians, or to any relaxation on the language policy.

Conclusion

The Jana Sangh's basic philosophy is the ideal of a modern society set in the background of the ancient culture of India. This then leads to certain contradictions that arise particularly because the party retains certain traditional demands in order to cater to the desires of its membership base.

This base of Jana Sangh membership is concentrated in the urban middle class, and petty land owners. The Jana Sangh has been solicitous of retaining their support, and this explains its implicit stand on land ownership. The party has not recommended the total ownership of land by the tillers of the soil. Although increased food production and population control are two stated priorities by the party for the development and prosperity of India, however, the Jana Sangh does not stress these to any appreciable extent. Education and language policy are two other spheres in which it supports traditional demands: a "gurukul" system of education that prevailed in Ancient India, and the emphasis on Hindi and Sanskrit as national languages. It is doubtful if the Jana Sangh's demand for Sanskrit is considered seriously by other parties; but the strict line on Hindi will have to be reconsidered by the Jana Sangh if the party desires to expand its influence in Southern India. Keeping the study of foreign language as "optional" will have serious repercussions in terms of India's contacts with the developed world. This problem can become acute in the spheres of scientific as well as other aspects of studies abroad. A more pragmatic approach will have to be taken on the language issue if the Jana Sangh seriously desires expansion in the South.

On the other hand, there are certain issues on which the Jana Sangh has been more pragmatic: electoral alliances. Those whom the Jana Sangh has labelled "communal" it has not found totally unacceptable as political partners. For example the Akali Dal and the Jana Sangh supported different demands for the establishment of a Punjabi Suba, yet at present it is the Akali Dal and Jana Sangh that have joined together to form that state's government. The Jana Sangh has also worked with the Socialist and the Communist parties at different times. Perhaps this is the influence of "integral

humanism", propounded by the late Deen Dayal Upadhyaya leading to such display of an integrated approach. Another pragmatic change has been observed in the party's attitude to the Hindu Code Bill, where it has accepted to a slight extent the position of women as stated in the Act, though total acceptance would be impossible. Moreover, the Jana Sangh has made some tangible proposals especially the stress on agriculture in the 1962 election manifesto.

On the whole in the last sixteen years Jana Sangh's domestic ideology seems to have moved slightly from a socio-cultural emphasis to an economic emphasis. The two most frequent criticisms of Jana Sangh ideology were the lack of an economic program, and the Jana Sangh's being representative of communal interests. Earlier discussion has shown that the Jana Sangh does stand for the interest of Hindus. However, other communal elements e.g. Muslim League and Akali Dal are not attacked as vehemently by the Congress party as the Jana Sangh is, and in India the word communal has tended to have only a negative connotation. This should not be necessarily so. The fact that the party for the sake of political expediency has not acted completely in espousal of the principles it advocates, especially in the sphere of electoral alliances, is a welcome trend.

b. Foreign Policy

Foreign policy in India assumes an important place because of India's geopolitical significance⁷⁸ between the Eastern and Western bloc and her proximity to the People's Republic of China. Moreover, her own developmental needs and acute problems of population and food place her in a position where she must act in her best interests too.

The foreign policy views of the opposition are important because they reflect what position the party will take if and when it comes to power. The

opposition in India is weak; its remoteness from power leads to extremist positions; and its policy may have low saliency for the people. Yet, the steady rise of the Jana Sangh since 1951 makes its foreign policy views important. (Though the chances of the Jana Sangh becoming the party in power are slim due to its limited appeal in the South.)

During the years 1947-1964, when Mr. Nehru was Prime Minister of India and since he also held the Foreign Policy portfolio, he was India's most important spokesman in foreign affairs. "Right wing sentiment was latent because of his towering personality and commitment to socialist rhetoric."⁷⁹ But new ground was broken by the birth of the Swatantra Party in 1959, the ouster of Krishna Menon, Defense Minister (often accused of having Communist tendencies), and the motion of no confidence in 1963 were growing signs of right wing activity.

The foreign policy views of the Jana Sangh are essentially those of nonalignment, but it believes that the implementation of policy has relegated the national interest to a subordinate position. The implication is that though India has achieved fame in her actions in Korea, and played an important part in the Congo operation, the nonalignment policy has not brought positive results in connection with her immediate foreign policy concerns; e.g. Pakistan and China. The Jana Sangh advocated "non-involvement,"⁸⁰ in affairs that do not directly affect India. Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee⁸¹ has criticized the late Prime Minister Nehru's habit of pronouncing on any and every event or issue in the world.

Therefore the Jana Sangh advocates an independent policy, which means that India must deal with every country individually, irrespective of blocs, and choose her friends and allies according to her own assessment of her

interests. (Basically this is nonalignment) but the Jana Sangh has since the Chinese invasion of 1962, moved closer to a stand that may advocate a pro-Western alliance.

The Jana Sangh also lays heavy stress on defense needs.

Foreign policy must help in the defense of the country against the neighbors if they happen to be hostile and aggressive as Communist China and Pakistan are towards India. The search for friends by India has to be made with an eye on this basic reality of the Indian situation.⁸²

The Jana Sangh policy with regard to India's Asian neighbours is the one that has the more important place in its foreign policy pronouncements.

Pakistan

Pakistan has been a focal point of Jana Sangh proposals on foreign policy. The party has never accepted the partition of the country that took place in 1947. It proposed an "Akhand Bharat."⁸³ (undivided India). Akhand Bharat can be achieved by helping the Muslims of India to shed their separatist outlook, and once they live in amity with India, the raison d'etre of Pakistan would be lost, and unity of the subcontinent could be achieved. Since 1951, when the party was formed, the Jana Sangh has maintained this point of view. It seems an impractical and unrealistic aim, and shows the intransigence of the party. In the early years, this repeated demand may have been possible, but today Pakistan is a country in its own right and on the way to development. If pressing the demand were to help in keeping the issue alive and therefore legal, the Akhand Bharat proposal has not been positive in such achievement. And when such unity cannot be achieved, the policy of the Jana Sangh would be one of "reciprocity" and not "appeasement."

The other two areas of foreign policy pronouncements are Kashmir and West Bengal. Where Kashmir is concerned, it is in its entirety Indian, by

virtue of the accession of the Maharaja. There is no question of a plebiscite. The only matter remaining to be settled is the full and complete evacuation by Pakistan of the areas occupied by Pakistan of the Azad Kashmir government. In this case, unlike in the Akhand Bharat proposal, the steady repetition of this position has had its effect on the policy of the Government of India.

The shift in India's official policy from moral and political plane to a purely legalistic one--based on Maharaj Hari Singh's signature on the instrument of accession and the resolution of the Constituent Assembly of the State--may, at least partly, be attributed to the pressure that the Jana Sangh was able to build up in the country.⁸⁴

The Praja Parishad was founded in Kashmir, and advocated the full integration of Jammu and Kashmir into the Indian Union. The Parishad strongly objected to the provision in the Indian constitution (Article 370) which gave Jammu and Kashmir a special status. It also objected to the permission granted to the State to have its own constitution, unlike any other state in the India Union. This gave rise to the Parishad war cry:

Ek desh men do vidhan	In one country two constitutions
Ek desh men do nishan	In one country two flags
Ek desh men do pradhan	In one country two Prime Ministers
Nahin challenge ⁸⁵	Will not be tolerated.

Being unable to fight the polls, the Parishad decided to offer satyagraha (passive resistance) in Kashmir. Meanwhile, in April 1952, the Nehru-Abdullah Pact was signed by which limited accession of Kashmir to the Indian Union was decided upon. Mookerjee attacked the Pact in Parliament, and was now to join the Parishad in its activities in Kashmir.

At one point in all the fray, the correspondance between Mookerjee and Nehru, and Mookerjee and Abdullah, Mookerjee was prepared to consider the possibility of partition in which Jammu and Ladakh would be fully integrated

and Kashmir maintained as an autonomous state in the Union.⁸⁶ Sensing partition as inevitable, Mookerjee worked for the partition also of Bengal and the Punjab, rather than surrender the whole of these two states. Mookerjee had a degree of pragmatism, and under him the Jana Sangh retained a degree of pragmatism too. But his venture into Kashmir was short lived, because after he was arrested while offering satyagraha, he died on June 23, 1953. Mookerjee's death and the circumstance surrounding it, have given rise to many rumours that he was either murdered or when he became sick, was allowed to die. These allegations have not been substantiated. Soon Sheik Abdullah was removed from office. (Some attribute this to the effect of Mookerjee's work in Kashmir.)⁸⁷

Since then, the Jana Sangh has demanded specifically the recovery of the territory of the state of Jammu and Kashmir under Pakistani occupation. It has continued to press for the full integration of the state but any reference to the full integration being applicable to only Jammu and Ladakh has been omitted. It has consistently demanded the abrogation of Article 370 of the Constitution which gives Kashmir a special status.⁸⁸

After the Sino-India conflict of 1962, a Jana Sangh leader openly expressed the opinion that partition of the state was the "only practical and feasible solution of the problem of Kashmir."⁸⁹ Madhok left no doubt that he felt a settlement along the lines he proposed was necessitated by an American and British desire to see India and Pakistan join in defending the sub-continent against the Chinese threat. This was a step beyond any Jana Sangh proposal so far. Since then, the 1965 conflict has hardened the attitude of most Indians on the Kashmir issue. Nonetheless, Madhok's presidential address at Jullunder in April 1966, and the resolutions passed there contain

no specific demand that Pakistan yield the areas on her side of the cease-fire line. It therefore seems possible that the experiences of August and September, 1965, have convinced even the Jana Sangh that recapturing the areas of the state occupied by Pakistan is for all intents and purposes impractical. Perhaps, when Pakistan comes to a similar conclusion that she cannot force India to a plebiscite, negotiations can take place. This step should be seen as really a maturing of Jana Sangh policy on one of the topics closest to its heart. It definitely is a rational attitude they now take.

The refugee question in East Bengal is another issue with Pakistan. Mookerjee had resigned from the Nehru Cabinet in 1950 because he felt that the Nehru-Liaqat Ali Pact was not fair to the refugees who came to India. The Jana Sangh acknowledges that the rehabilitation of refugees is legally the responsibility of the Indian government, but demands that full compensation be given for property left by displaced persons in Pakistan.

The Jana Sangh has never been fully reconciled to the Nehru-Noon Agreement of 1958. The agreement provided for the division of the Berubari Union on the East Pakistan-India border. The Jana Sangh has argued that portions of Berubari that went to Pakistan were "given away" without consulting the people of the region. The issue is still pending, because several court cases have been filed alleging the agreement to be in violation of the Indian Constitution.

The Tashkent Agreement of 1966, by which the 1965 hostilities between India and Pakistan were mediated by the U.S.S.R. was considered a great betrayal too. President Ayub Khan faced a barrage of criticism in his country; so did Prime Minister Shastri--only he was not there, personally to brave the attacks which were sobered by the fact of his tragic death in Tashkent.

The most recent issue between India and Pakistan in which the Jana Sangh has taken active interest is the Kutch agreement of 1968. It was an internationally arbitrated dispute, but the Jana Sangh refused to accept the Agreement. Some Jana Sangh members offered civil disobedience by entering Kutch (some Madhya Pradesh Jana Sangh Ministers resigned to participate in it) but they were arrested. Pakistan is anathema to the whole concept of the Bharatiya rashtira of the Jana Sangh, and it will always find in it a fit target to attack.

The attitude to Pakistan is important because it carries over to the Jana Sangh attitude towards those who are either friends or allies of Pakistan, or have an outstanding difference of opinion with it. Thus the party gives lip service to a Pukhtoonistan and urges the government of India to aid the Pakhtoons in establishing a separate state. Thus Afghanistan which is an Islamic state is not derided by the Jana Sangh.

India must extend all possible moral and diplomatic support to her for the liberation of Pakhtoonistan...must also pay more attention to the revival of pre-Islamic cultural ties, between India and Afghanistan.⁹⁰

Towards Israel and the Arab states, the Jana Sangh urges that India adopt a policy of strict reciprocity. So far the United Arab Republic has remained neutral between India and Pakistan, and claims to be a good friend of Pakistan and the People's Republic of China, while retaining the friendship of India. Therefore, it is possible for India too, to be a good friend of Israel while retaining the friendship of the U.A.R.

Not surprisingly, the attitude of the Jana Sangh is hostile to Pakistan's allies--Turkey and Iran, in the Central Treaty Organization and Regional Cooperation for Development.

Towards other nations, the Jana Sangh has varying attitudes. Towards

Nepal, it takes a very brotherly stance, which is not overly appreciated by the sensitive Nepalese. It sees Israel, Japan, Malaysia and the Philippines as democratic nations with whom India should have the closest of relations. The last three, together with Taiwan and South Korea are nations viewed as potential allies against an expansionist China. Of course Pakistan is not considered in such alliances. A number of Jana Sanghis have travelled to these countries. The question of overseas Indians pervades the Jana Sangh view toward Burma and Ceylon. It regularly assails Ceylon, Burma and Malaysia among others for maltreating Indians. It was definitely opposed to the Bandarnaike-Shastri agreement about the stateless Indians.⁹¹

China

Towards China, the attitude of the Jana Sangh has changed from brotherliness to animosity. The Jana Sangh argues that China and Pakistan are both menaces comparing them to tuberculosis and the plague, respectively. But though China is stronger, there is greater hope of obtaining Western aid in fighting it.⁹²

But in the beginning the Jana Sangh was as naive as the Congress Party. In October 1951, the Organiser welcomed the Chinese cultural delegation. The paper said:

...Since the dawn of history Bharat and China have been friends
 ...We loved and respected each other. Today we reinforce those
 ancient foundations of friendship. The Chinese Mission will experience
 an immense fund of good-will for China in this country.⁹³

Yet the party did not approve of the communistic method being tried by the Chinese. The Chinese takeover in Tibet opened the eyes of many in India, including the Jana Sangh, to the expansionism of Chinese communism. The party stated its position in a resolution in December 1953;

In view of the fact that the Communist Government of China is becoming increasingly more aggressive in the northern frontier of India that it has overrun Tibet through her troops destroying her age-old autonomy, that she . . . is constructing military bases within striking distance of Northern India . . . that she is issuing maps containing many areas of Indian territory . . . showing them as her own territory, the Jana Sangh is of the opinion that the Government of India should instruct her . . . representative in Peking to protest emphatically . . . and to declare categorically that the MacMahon Line existing between China and India must stand intact . . .⁹⁴

Thus the Jana Sangh saw China as an ancient partner of India, one to which India had exported its Buddhist religion, but now under communist rule the cultural partner had become a country to be feared and guarded against.

By 1957, the party was basically hostile to China, and China began to play a greater role in the Manifesto as the Jana Sangh saw a potential enemy to the north. The incursions of the Communist Chinese in Ladakh led some in the party to place the dangers from China ahead of the dangers from Pakistan. China too was threatening "erosion of the sacred soil." As these claims matured into an actual occupation of territory in Ladakh, China assumed a place along side Pakistan as the enemy of India.

In the inter-election period this feeling grew rapidly. The public knowledge that China had occupied areas in Ladakh claimed by India sealed the hostility of the party to China. On March 30, 1959, the Jana Sangh demonstrated in front of the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi, the first of a number of demonstrations. The party accused Nehru of taking an equivocal stand on the issue. Upadhyaya stated the Policy of the Jana Sangh:

...If our betrayal of the Tibetan people's cause and justification of uncalled for aggression by communist China be the price for Sino-Indian friendship, it is not worth that sacrifice...An atmosphere conducive to mutual trust and goodwill can hardly exist when the Chinese army is concentrated on our borders, especially when China has already created serious suspicions in our minds, due to mischievous cartography...Those who demand a submissive attitude by India, stand not for respectable relations between two equals but

the ultimate enslavement of India by the Communist world...⁹⁵

The first Jana Sangh session which took specific note of Chinese occupation of Indian claimed territory, was that at Nagpur in January 1960. In his presidential address Pitamber Das said the Government "has failed completely to discharge its responsibility."⁹⁶ He added "for a time it kept the people and Parliament entirely ignorant of the fact of aggression."⁹⁷ The resolution passed at the session said, "Communist China has created a crisis by posing a challenge to the freedom of the countries of south and South East Asia."⁹⁸ The party saw the "lull created in Europe" by the Soviet Union as being utilized by China and saw this as evidence of a joint world communist plan; "Russia has never condemned the Chinese efforts to disturb peace and create an atmosphere of war."⁹⁹ In discussing the Indian problems with China the party saw China using both military means and fifth-column methods to subject "Vietnam, Indonesia, and Laos" as well as India, and said the Chinese must be faced jointly on all fronts. Beside calling for the military expulsion of the Chinese the party asked: (1) the recognition of Tibetan independence; (2) the withdrawal of Indian support for China's admission to the United Nations; (3) a close watch on "pro-Chinese elements" in India; and (4) increase in India's military capacity. While these demands have changed in detail or have been more strongly emphasized they remain the basic posture of the Jana Sangh toward Communist China. The visit of Chou En Lai to Delhi in April 1960, gave the Jana Sangh an opportunity to address a memorandum to Nehru on the evil designs of the Chinese on India.¹⁰⁰

Wrapped up with the party's opposition to China was its strong denunciation of Defense Minister V. K. Krishna Menon of whom Upadhyaya wrote: "There is not merely a suspicion but a firm belief in the minds of most

diplomats at the U.N. that he has communist leanings."¹⁰¹ The late General Secretary went on to say, "At a time when our northern borders are seriously threatened by Communist China, Sri Krishna Menon's silence has confirmed the people's belief in his leanings."¹⁰² Menon's stand on Pakistan, however, was occasionally appreciated when for instance, the delegate to the United Nations set a record for marathon speech making.

The Commonwealth¹⁰³

Ever since the Jana Sangh was formed in October 1951, it has opposed India's association with the Commonwealth, mainly on account of the attitude of Britain and some other Commonwealth countries with regard to the Kashmir issue. Its opposition however was not so vehement as that of the CPI or the PSP.

At the opening convention of the Party its President Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee stated that India's continuance in the Commonwealth had to be reexamined with great care.

We frankly recognize that we have gained very little by continuing to function within the Commonwealth. On the other hand in our dealings with Pakistan we have been struck by a strange policy of partiality towards that country observed by Great Britain...the party would insist on India getting out of the Commonwealth, if Britain and other Commonwealth countries followed the present policy of always supporting Pakistan and opposing India in the U.S. and elsewhere.¹⁰⁴

These views were reiterated in the Party's Election Manifesto (1952) and on many other occasions. The party seemed to be less occupied with the Commonwealth in later years.

At the time of the Anglo-French aggression against Egypt in 1956, the Jana Sangh did not join the fray with other opposition parties. U. N. Trivedi the Party leader in the Lok Sabha did not support the demand for

quitting the Commonwealth. Instead he pleaded that India should advise and correct her friend Britain. And it was not impossible that Britain would feel "the strength of our argument and retrace her steps." The Suez issue, he said "cannot be a ground for our getting out of the Commonwealth."

The Jana Sangh in its 1957 Manifesto made no demand for India's withdrawal from the Commonwealth. But still it was critical of the Commonwealth link. In 1960, Deen Dayal Upadhyaya, General Secretary of the Party expressed his doubts about the usefulness of the Commonwealth as a "medium of international co-operation." "He wanted the Commonwealth to 'fashion a future for itself'."¹⁰⁵

The party's view on Commonwealth membership was clarified further in an editorial in the party organ. It stated:

We should leave the Commonwealth because it is neither honourable nor even profitable for us to be there...For its economic 'aid' it is simply an investment on purely business lines...On the military plane it is equally meaningless. It is no use getting some military training in a country which is no more much of a military power. On the cultural plane we have had so much of anglicism in India that any diminution of it can do us nothing but good...With the passing away of one who was endearingly described not the first Prime Minister of Independent India, but the last Viceroy of British India the time for quitting the British Commonwealth is high indeed.¹⁰⁶

In short the party had opposed Commonwealth membership on the ground that it was neither honorable nor profitable. It had contended that Britain had been partial to Pakistan to the detriment of India's interest and honor. Because of its policy of strict reciprocity towards Pakistan, the Jana Sangh cannot but condemn any attempt on the part of Britain or any country, in favour of Pakistan. At times its opposition was not so effective as that of the other opposition parties. In any case the party did not vigorously oppose Commonwealth membership.

The United States

The Jana Sangh view of the United States can be characterized both as generally favorable and dependent upon American relations with Pakistan. The bilateral agreement between the United States and Pakistan on arms supply to India's neighbour came in for sharp criticism which has continued with little abatement. When Pakistan did not come directly to India's assistance in the fall of 1962, when China attacked India, this was taken as "proof" that the arms were not accepted by Pakistan to resist international communism but to use against India, and of course, when in 1965, fighting took place between India and Pakistan, the Jana Sangh had "proof" again that the intentions of Pakistan were to use the arms against India.

The United States recognized the influence of Sarvarkar as early as 1948;¹⁰⁷ but the Jana Sangh had often suspected the U.S.A. in the case of Kashmir, and missionary activity in India. American policy came in for sharp criticism on the Goa issue.¹⁰⁸ The Jana Sangh had long been agitating for the evacuation of Goa by the Portuguese. Eventually in 1961, the Government of India did take over Goa by Police action. But the American Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles was criticized when he recognized Goa as a province of Portugal.

Nonetheless, the Jana Sangh expressed the view that the "oldest and largest" democracies in the world must pull together. Madhok in his Jullunder presidential address again expressed this view: "Mutual interests of India and U.S.A. apart from their common attachment to the democratic way of life point to closer relations between them in the days to come." After the Chinese invasion of 1962, the Jana Sangh moved towards a consideration of regional and pro-Western alliances. Some attention has been paid to the

problems of nuclear cover from either the Eastern or Western bloc. Many Jana Sangh leaders are willing to defend the American involvement in Vietnam (including the bombing in the North), although not without some latent apprehension about western neo-imperialism.¹⁰⁹

U.S.S.R.

For the USSR the Jana Sangh showed no enthusiasm. It is strongly anti-communist in its views, though it has welcomed support in some matters (Goa). A Soviet journal has attacked the Jana Sangh as "a party of the landlords, big bourgeoisie and the Hindu Priests."¹¹⁰ It has implied that the party is reactionary and capitalistic, and as propagating a racial superiority of the Hindus over the Muslims, Christians and Sikhs.

Defense

As mentioned before one important aspect of the Jana Sangh foreign policy view is that based on defense. If the country must follow a policy of noninvolvement, it must be able to supply its own defense needs. It supports an increase in all three wings of the Indian Defense forces--the army, navy and the airforce. It also believes in the "development of an independent nuclear deterrent" and priority should be given to the development of defense industries so as to make the country self-sufficient in regard to defense equipment. The Jana Sangh would like to get assistance in this respect from any quarter¹¹¹ to enable India to become a strong and self-reliant military power at the earliest. The justification for expenditure in the defense field is

We are convinced that this can be achieved without much harm to economic development because much of the money spent on defense production and in the form of salaries to the defense personnel, contributes directly or indirectly to the economic development of the

country. Much of the development in Punjab, particularly in the agricultural field, is the result of the investment of funds coming to the villages from the jawans serving in the army.¹¹²

Therefore one object of foreign policy should be to draw such countries nearer to India which can help her to develop her defense industries. The Jana Sangh believes this is possible.

Jana Sangh-Swatantra Alliance and Foreign Policy

It is the foreign policy issues that largely prevent a Jana Sangh-Swatantra alliance, which has often been speculated upon. In the early years when the Swatantra Party was formed, around the early sixties, the hopes of such an alliance were bright, but it is ten years since, and no permanent agreement has thus far been reached. Both parties urge a more "realistic"¹¹³ foreign policy view upon the Congress, but they differ about the salience of issues to achieve India's self-interest. Briefly the Swatantra party's position is that China is the greatest threat to Indian security, hence India must seek a pro-West alliance to combat the Chinese threat. Since the question of Pakistan and Kashmir stand in the way of friendly relations with the U.S.A., a settlement on Kashmir should be made and a detente of relations with Pakistan would follow. The Swatantra supports the war in Vietnam as being in the interest of Indian national security. Also, as it is obvious from the preceding discussion, Swatantra is anti-U.S.S.R.

The Jana Sangh on the other hand sees China and Pakistan as equally dangerous to Indian security, and sees in an alliance with the West the threat of neo-colonialism. It does not see Kashmir as the outstanding problem between India and Pakistan. Therefore, since Western alliance is guarded with suspicion, it advocates building up an indigenous military and atomic capability. The Jana Sangh is also virulently anti-U.S.S.R. and has recently

begun to support the Vietnam war.

The differences in the Swatantra and Jana Sangh policies were somewhat modified by the Chinese invasion of 1962, and the war with Pakistan in 1965. The Chinese threat made the Jana Sangh assume a more pro-regional alliance stand and support the Vietnam war; the Swatantra after the Pakistani war began to question the capacity of the U.S. to help India in such situations and hence gave increased attention to the same idea which Jana Sangh had advocated, that is, the idea of developing an indigenous military capability. As a result of these events there has been a tendency towards convergence, but not to the extent of obliterating all major differences between the two parties. The Jana Sangh charges Swatantra with being "anti-national"¹¹⁴ and guilty of "appeasement" vis-a-vis Pakistan. Swatantra counters charges that "there is a constant assault on a peaceful atmosphere by politicians with anti-Muslim bias to which they give name of Hindu culture."¹¹⁵ Thus this implicit communal accusation stands in the way of conciliation. For the Jana Sangh to back out of the hostile Pakistan attitude, would as explained earlier, alienate public opinion. This has become quite evident after the 1965 war with Pakistan. Thus the stand that is crucially important to Jana Sangh ideology hinders the party's affiliation with the Swatantra party.

The question whether there have been any conflicts within the party itself concerning foreign policy issues is also an important consideration. Two opposing views are not clearly visible within the party, however some different shades of opinions at times emerge. One position voiced by Atal Bihari Vajpayee advocates non-involvement in the affairs that do not directly affect India, and can be seen as a "Gaullist" or a chauvinistic approach; the other is the pro-west stand that Balraj Madhok often supports. It is the

latter that may represent the less communal stand. On the other hand it has been speculated that if the fight for power was ultimately between the Jana Sangh and the Communist parties, the west (U.S.A.) would probably support the Jana Sangh with its Hindu ideal, communalism etc., the precedent being support of the conservative regime of Spain headed by General Franco.¹¹⁶

In matters of foreign policy, the issues that are the most important to Jana Sangh mass membership are Kashmir, and the vociferous anti-Pakistani stand that the party takes. Since 1962, the fear of China has also unleashed feelings of patriotism and nationalism. Otherwise, party policy on other issues (e.g. the Commonwealth, Defense, relations with U.S. or U.S.S.R.) are not so important to the masses, because the people are less directly confronted with them. Yet a need for caution has been voiced on the Jana Sangh's militant approach to foreign policy issues. It has been remarked that if the Jana Sangh should internalise the feelings of hostility for other countries, "the manipulative capacity of the government will be restricted and flexibility in conduct of foreign policy will be greatly reduced".¹¹⁷

The reasons for emphasis on Pakistan and Kashmir are not far to seek: the base of the party membership is concentrated in northern India which felt to a greater degree the repercussions of the partition of the country. The question of Kashmir is closely allied to the same stream of thought and many North Indians especially those who were involved in the mass migration of 1947, or had close family ties in the area and were victims of the arson, slaughter etc., feel very strongly about it. In fact they were therefore able to strongly identify with the Jana Sangh Hindu stand. It may be possible that the next generation, which was not directly involved in the issue may not put such a strong emphasis on it. To them the question of China may

assume greater importance. Jana Sangh policy may then be seen as maintaining this hard line to avoid offending public opinion. The "hard line" is in conformity with the total nationalistic appeal of the Jana Sangh, on the basis of which it draws a wider mass appeal than the Swatantra party. The emotional appeal of the Jana Sangh has greater value because the Congress party advocates the economic issues very strongly. Thus the main foreign policy issue of a strong attitude towards Pakistan draws in a large measure to the Jana Sangh its North Indian support, and vice versa, the large support then makes the party maintain its hard line. At the same time it is this issue that largely prevents the Jana Sangh-Swatantra "convergence" on foreign policy matters.

To sum up, the attitude of the Jana Sangh in foreign policy matters can be characterized as "Gaullist."¹¹⁸ The basic instinct for the Jana Sangh is to be chauvinistic and isolationist, building Indian power and involving India only where she is directly and immediately involved. Yet, the effect of the Chinese aggression has been to persuade the party that India can not stand alone. As a result more attention has been paid to regional defense. The maturing of policy on Kashmir is a landmark that should not go unnoticed. Characteristically, it was voiced by Balraj Madhok, who had spearheaded the liberal movement in the Jana Sangh to make its ties with the RSS less binding.

CHAPTER V

ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE

A general election in India is a national "tamaasha", a source of entertainment and diversion, an absorbing experience involving in one way or another almost every adult, and many children as well.¹¹⁹

Elections reflect the mood of the people. A general election is also a major form of political participation by the masses of the people, who otherwise are left out of it all. Elections are a recognized means of providing succession in leadership. The problem of political succession is common to all systems, even in a dictatorship. Elections can also control policy decisions of the government through devices such as initiative, referendum and repeal. Policy decisions of the government may be influenced by the elections. Furthermore, elections also serve to secure the legitimation of a regime or to maintain the legitimacy that may have already been established. The former, that is securing the legitimation of the regime is important especially in developing countries, where universal suffrage has been achieved without the struggle that western societies e.g. England had to undergo. It is also posited that elections may help maintain legitimacy by bringing together, in support of a single party, individuals who are otherwise remote from or in conflict with each other on grounds of class, status or religion. On the other hand, an election may be functionless if it has no consequences for the political system. This could be possible in the case of a country where elections are unfamiliar, communications poor and administration primitive.¹²⁰

Voting in an election can serve several functions for the individual. It brings a certain awareness to the common man and is a channel through

which he expresses his feelings. It involves his choice of governmental policies, political parties, and their representatives. It also brings to him a feeling of power of being able to influence the choice of the election. Voting is also seen as contributing to the "development or maintenance of an individual's allegiance to the existing constitutional regime."¹²¹ The individual can also express his disaffection with the regime by voting for the opposition or by not voting at all. On the other hand, voting can also be functionless i.e. devoid of any emotional or politically significant personal consequences. This can be the case when the electorate is largely illiterate.¹²²

The above mentioned functional aspects of elections and voting are significant in India. Elections in India can be a unifying force, for people from other regions and speaking different languages can unite under one party slogan. This has also led to a polarization of forces in a regional context where regional loyalties have been increasingly mobilized. With each successive election the individual voter is learning the meaning of the power of the ballot and "increasing number of participants are maneuvering for their place in the system."¹²³ If in the early years after independence, people in remote areas were not affected by the elections, at present the politicians are so eager to woo them for their votes that they are becoming aware of their right to exercise the ballot.

Elections can also provide an effective channel through which the Opposition can make its voice heard and can effectively perform as a pressure group, aggregating and articulating the interests of a certain section of the community. The Jana Sangh is usually recognized, as the representative voice of the interests of the Hindu majority. It has contested seats in all the

four General Elections conducted in India and has obtained an increased number of seats in the Lok Sabha (Parliament) and Vidhan Sabhas (State Legislative Assemblies) and an increased percentage of the popular vote. The increasing participation by the party in the political process has brought to it a certain degree of flexibility, resulting in pragmatism. In the electoral sphere, this has meant alliances with other political parties, maybe not of the same political hue as the Jana Sangh, but political expediency has prompted such action, when ideology may have specifically repudiated it.

In India, general elections to the Lok Sabha (House of People) are held every five years. The Lok Sabha consists of a maximum of 500 members directly elected by voters in the states for a term of 5 years on the basis of adult franchise and territorial constituencies, plus not more than 20 members from the Union territories to be either elected or appointed, as Parliament may decide. For the purpose of elections to the Lok Sabha, the states are divided into single member constituencies which are more or less of the same size in population. The adoption of population as the basis of allotment of seats in Parliament creates certain political disparities among the states and gives an obvious political advantage to the more populous ones.

The Rajya Sabha (House of States) consists of a maximum of 250 representatives of the States, elected for a term of six years by the state legislatures. The President nominates 12 of these for their special knowledge or practical experience in such matters as literature, sciences, art and social service. The Rajya Sabha is a continuous body and not subject to dissolution. One third of the members retire every two years. The number of seats allocated to each state in the Rajya Sabha is determined on the basis of relative population, but the smaller states have been accorded source weightage in

representation.

In the states, there exists a system of responsible parliamentary government which resembles that of the central government; where there is a bicameral legislature, the upper House is known as the Legislative Council, and is a permanent body which renews one third of its membership every two years through a complicated system of indirect election. The Legislative Assembly, or lower house of each state is chosen by direct election from territorial constituencies, unless dissolved earlier it serves for 5 years.

It is the function of the Election Commission to delimit the constituencies for the Lok Sabha and Assembly elections. In the case of vacancy of a seat due to death or resignation, a by-election for the seat is held; a mid-term poll is the election of a new state government in case the previous one has lost its majority and the House is dissolved by the Governor. When examining election data for India, two important considerations must be kept in mind. The reorganization of states often makes it difficult to compare data from one election to the other, and statistical information about the elections is not often identical in all sources, small discrepancies being found often.

We shall now consider the performance of the Jana Sangh in the four General elections held in India in 1952, 1957, 1962 and 1967. Since the Lok Sabha is the popularly elected House, greater attention will be paid to the Lok Sabha elections and party behavior concerning these.

a. The First General Election - 1952

Selection of Candidates and Organization of the Campaign

It seems that the selection of candidates in 1952 was hasty. This is seen by a comparison of the selection of candidates in 1952 and 1957. Of the

683 candidates that the Jana Sangh ran in 1952, thirty were successful. In 1957, only twelve of the thirty stood for re-election, and less than 8% of the 1952 candidates were nominated. Disciplinary problems were responsible for some measure of this--in Rajasthan, only three of the eight persons elected in 1952 stood for re-election in 1957.

Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee was the principal campaigner and he addressed people in many constituencies in and out of Bengal. The principal speaker against the party was Nehru himself, who in the 1952 elections apparently feared the nationalistic and reactionary right more than the socialist and communist left. In a note to the Election Committee of the Congress, he said that they should beware of any communal element in the Congress and should choose their nominees with great care.¹²⁴ Mookerjee took care to repudiate such statements and the charges flew back and forth.¹²⁵

Alliances

The attempt of the Jana Sangh to enroll a number of the smaller parties under its label failed. Both the Orissa Jana Sangh and the Ganatantra Parishad of the same state declined to join and fought the elections under their own banner. The Bharatiya Jana Sangh did not contest in Orissa leaving the door open for a later alliance of the Orissa parties with it. This hope in the Ganatantra Parishad was unfounded. The talks with the Janata Party of Chota Nagpur for alliance or merger also failed, and Raja Kamakhya Narain Singh of Ramgarh ran his candidates without an alliance with any party. The Jana Sangh did not oppose him due to a lack of candidates.

The natural allies of the Jana Sangh were the Hindu Mahasabha and the Ram Rajya Parishad. It was easy for Mookerjee to cement an alliance with the Mahasabha in West Bengal with the Mahasabha leader, Chatterjee. The parties

decided to run their candidates under their own labels with support of the other party. Elsewhere, the three parties were generally unsuccessful in resolving their differences. In Delhi, the Jana Sangh and Mahasabha tried to set up an alliance for the Civic elections, and failed even though the issue was put to arbitration.¹²⁶ In Uttar Pradesh, alliance was broken, at the last minute, though the Jana Sangh was able to ally with the U.P. Praja Party. Local agreements were made elsewhere in U.P. and Rajasthan.¹²⁷

Results

The results of the election were disappointing to the Jana Sangh because it had expected to do better at the polls.

The Election Commission had set a level of 3% of the total popular vote as the minimum to be polled by a party for it to be accorded recognition as an "all India Party." The Jana Sangh managed to do this by a very narrow margin; it polled 3.06% of the Lok Sabha vote, and was thereby entitled to have its election symbol the Deepak (lamp) reserved for the exclusive use of its members. Four other parties obtained all India recognition--the Congress, the Communist Party of India, the Socialist Party and the Kisan Nazdoor Praja Party (the latter two later merged into the Praja Socialist Party, leaving four national parties in the field.)

Three Jana Sanghis were elected to the Lok Sabha--among them Syama Prasad Mookerjee. In the Assembly elections, Mookerjee's personality and following brought the Jana Sangh successes in Bengal which were unrelated to its organizational strength. In all, the Jana Sangh won 34 Assembly seats and 2.76% of the vote; eight seats were from Midnapur (W. Bengal), and there it received 12.68% of the vote.

In the Punjab, the party had the greatest disappointment. The party

TABLE III
JANA SANGH ELECTION RESULTS - 1952

<u>Lok Sabha</u>					<u>State Legislative Assemblies</u>					
Seats ¹	Cont. ²	Won ³	LD ⁴	% ⁵		Seats	Cont.	Won	LD	%
42	-	-	-	-	Andhra Pradesh	241	-	-	-	-
12	2	0	1	3.64	Assam	105	3	0	3	0.29
53	2	0	2	.42	Bihar	318	44	0	42	1.15
22	-	-	-	-	Gujarat	160	4	0	3	0.10
17	-	-	-	-	Kerala	129	-	-	-	-
38	11	0	4	5.92	Madhya Pradesh	339	126	6	68	5.66
39	-	-	-	-	Madras	198	-	-	-	-
42	4	0	2	2.01	Maharashtra	299	36	-	32	1.29
25	4	0	4	2.22	Mysore	212	25	0	21	1.21
20	-	-	-	-	Orissa	140	-	-	-	-
23	12	0	11	4.99	Punjab	186	85	2	59	5.07
22	4	1	2	3.67	Rajasthan	189	65	11	35	6.34
86	41	0	23	7.29	Uttar Pradesh	430	210	2	153	6.44
36	6	2	0	5.59	West Bengal	250	85	9	60	5.31
<u>Union Territories</u>										
4	3	0	0	25.92	Delhi	48	30	4	4	21.88
4	2	0	1	10.72	Himachal Pradesh	36	9	0	8	3.46
2	-	-	-	-	Manipur	-	-	-	-	-
2	2	0	2	6.14	Tripura	-	-	-	-	-
489	93	3	52	3.06	TOTAL	3283	722	34	488	2.76

Note: The Praja Parishad did not contest the Election in Kashmir.

1. Seats: Total number of seats.
2. Cont.: Number of seats contested.
3. Won : Number of seats won.
4. LD : Lost Deposit. Number of candidates who lost their deposit because they failed to obtain 1/6 of the vote.
5. % : Refers to the percentage of the vote obtained in the Lok Sabha and Legislative Assemblies respectively.

Adapted to states as in 1958.

Sources: Craig Baxter, "Jana Sangh: A Brief History" in South Asian Politics and Religion, (Princeton, 1966).

from Election Commission of India, Report of the First General Elections in India 1951-52, Vol. II, New Delhi, not dated.

was founded here and expected to achieve major success. Of the 85 seats contested, two were obtained in the election, and 59 contestants lost their deposits. (i.e., obtained less than 1/6 of vote.) It seems that the Jana Sangh and the Akali Dal cancelled each other out.

In Delhi, the Jana Sangh showed signs of strength, three out of four contestants retained their deposits. This initial start would later lead to a near polarization between the Congress party and Jana Sangh in 1962, and by 1967, the Jana Sangh would be in control of the Delhi Municipal Corporation.

In Rajasthan, the Jana Sangh won eleven of the seats and in Madhya Bharat four. Elsewhere in Central India the Jana Sangh won two assembly seats in Vindhya Pradesh. In Madhya Pradesh, as then constituted, the party failed to win any seats, but it began the foundations of an organization which would win seats in the future in the Hindi-speaking Mahakoshal area. In the vast expanse of Uttar Pradesh the Jana Sangh won but two assembly seats, one in Gonda District and the other in Badaun. In the other states, the party made but a token show. A few candidates managed to retain their deposits. In Mysore, a bare beginning was made in the south. No seats were won, but about 2% of the votes were obtained in the State.

Appraisal

Balraj Madhok writing after the election said:

Viewed in the light of the serious handicaps under which the Jana Sangh contested the elections, it was a remarkable achievement. Being the youngest party it hardly had any time to make itself known to the people...Lack of political and electoral experience in its workers, who were mostly young men, and paucity of resources badly handicapped it. But, perhaps, the greatest factor against it was the concentrated and systematic attack on it by Pt. Nehru whose virulent denunciations of Jana Sangh were echoed by almost the entire press and all the leftist parties in the country...¹²⁸

The editor of the Organizer said it this way:

A major factor in Jana Sangh's election fight was the inexperience of its workers...

In the case of Jana Sangh, if the candidates were poor financially, the organization was even poorer in that respect.

...taken as a whole they (the Muslims) voted mostly for the Congress...The matter assumed a certain decisiveness by virtue of the fact that Muslims were concentrated in the North where the hope of the Jana Sangh particularly lay.

Another serious difficulty was the absence of supporting sectional organization...It did not have a women's organization...Also there was no Jana Sangh organization on the Harijan front...And above all the Jana Sangh lacked a Labour Front...¹²⁹

The major problems of the party were thus outlined. Organizational support was obtained by the formation of womens' groups, students and labour groups. Details were given in Chapter III.

The RSS chief, Golwalkar gave the Jana Sangh a "well done" and said the party should not be pessimistic and "should go ahead with calm confidence in themselves and their mission."¹³⁰

The historian of the Mahasabha said "at many places the Hindu Mahasabha lost seats by a few votes...on account of the opposition of Jana Sangh."¹³¹ Prakash's complaint assumes that had one party withdrawn its candidate in favor of the candidate of the other party, all votes secured by the withdrawing candidate would have been polled by the candidate remaining in the contest. Besides, that the total vote combined would have secured the candidate success at the poll is also an assumption.

The elections of 1951-52 are now history. The party had made a reasonable showing, was recognized as a national party and had its nationally known leader to carry on both in Parliament and in the organization. It also had the substantial backing of the RSS and it had drawn in a number of non-RSS people. The party saw its shortcoming and was prepared to use the

ensuing five years to build itself into a stronger force before the next general election.

In the results of the first election some of the trends of the future of the Jana Sangh are visible. The failure of the attempted alliance between the Hindu Mahasabha and the Jana Sangh had important portents. No one organization wanted to be submerged under the other, and the Jana Sanghis tended to look down upon the older Mahasabhaites as having seen their day. They considered the Jana Sangh a youthful and vital organization and did not want to associate it with an organization that had been branded "communal". Since then the Jana Sangh has tried to repudiate the communal label that is often attributed to it, and has never contracted an effective alliance with the other Hindu communal parties, the Hindu Mahasabha and the Ram Rajya Parishad.

The success of the Jana Sangh accrued mainly from the North Indian region. This is a reflection of its membership base, and the appeal of its ideology. This is going to be the region which the Jana Sangh will draw its most substantial support. Its success in West Bengal was a reflection not of the party but of the personality of Syama Prasad Mookerjee, because after his death the Jana Sangh has not even had the meagre success it did in the first election. In the Southern parts of the country, the only state where the Jana Sangh obtained some support was Mysore. Though no study of this aspect has been made, it can be speculated that this support for the Jana Sangh came from the Mysore Brahman caste, which can identify with the Hindu feeling of the Jana Sangh.

Inter-election Period

The Jana Sangh

had a clear indication of its areas of strength and weakness. It

set itself now to the task of growth and consolidation based on Mookerjee as a parliamentary and national leader, and the RSS as the spearhead of local organization. The Jana Sangh would also attempt to bring the Hindu Mahasabha and Ram Rajya Parishad into its fold.¹³²

Mookerjee's first step was the formation of the National Democratic Party, (NDP) consisting of the opposition forces in Parliament, and included members drawn from the Jana Sangh, Hindu Mahasabha, Ganatantra Parishad, Akali Dal, Commonwealth Party, Tamilnad Toilers Party and nine independents from South India. Mookerjee had hoped to unite the conservative elements of the opposition. Today, had the alliance been secure, the results would have been "incalculable." It would have included South Indian parties (the Jana Sangh does find itself restricted to the northern Hindi heartland) and the Akalis. But, the NDP was not adequately consolidated, and with the death of Mookerjee in 1953, its existence was also short lived. For the Jana Sangh, and the opposition as a whole, this was an irreparable loss.

At its annual session in Kapur, U.P., in December 1952, Mookerjee had been re-elected President and Deen Dayal Upadhaya was appointed General Secretary, a post he held till 1967, when he became President of the Jana Sangh. The Praja Parishad of Kashmir sent its representatives to the session, and the Parishad's affiliation to the Jana Sangh was recognized.¹³³ Soon Mookerjee would offer satyagraha (passive resistance) in Kashmir to protest the acceptance of the special status of Kashmir in the Indian Union under the Nehru-Abdullah Pact.¹³⁴ But while doing so, he was arrested and died while under the custody of the Government of Kashmir.

However, as mentioned earlier, the NDP collapsed and soon the merger talks between the Jana Sangh and Mahasabha, which were under progress, in Mookerjee's life time failed now, with considerable bitterness on both sides.

Each side did not want to be absorbed into the other. Moreover, the Jana Sangh seemed too liberal for the Mahasabha leaders. The charisma of Mookerjee was lacking to patch up any sort of merger. Ever since then, though the Jana Sangh has absorbed members from the Mahasabha, an alliance has not been successful.¹³⁵

The Sharma incident also showed an important facet of the Jana Sangh organization. On Mookerjee's death, Sharma, one of the General Secretaries of the party succeeded him as President. But he clashed with the RSS dominated wing of the party, and went to the press with his grievances. Sharma alleged "domination and interferences by the RSS" and "a vigorous and calculated drive on its part to turn the Sangh (Jana) into a convenient handle."¹³⁶ He resigned, and his successor issued a strong statement which condemned Sharma's action, and his indictment of the party. Since then it has been said,

the Jana Sangh organization came almost completely under the control of persons associated with the RSS. Since Sharma's exit, factionalism, a factor in other Indian Political Parties has been all but non-existent in the Jana Sangh.¹³⁷

But, since then, a similar kind of feud seemed to have developed between the late Deen Dayal Upadhaya, and Balraj Madhok, who represent the organizational and flexible sections of the party.¹³⁸ Since the death of Upadhaya early in 1968, Atal Bihari Vajpayee has more or less represented his cause. But it is essential to emphasize that the kind of factionalism that is present in other parties is absent in the Jana Sangh and they usually have less disciplinary problems to encounter.

b. The Second General Election - 1957

Selection of Candidates and Organization of the Campaign

It appears that the Jana Sangh was much more careful in the selection of its candidates than it was in 1952. For Legislative Assemblies the Jana Sangh ran 722 candidates in 1952. Only 47 of these were candidates again in 1957, and eight others transferred from Assembly to Lok Sabha seats. Of the 34 Assembly seat winners, in 1952 only 14 were renominated and only one of the three Lok Sabha winners was renominated. The results showed that care in the selection of candidates was profitable to the party.

The Jana Sangh relied on its few better known speakers to some extent, but mainly turned to the local workers.

The election campaign received guarded support from Golwalkar himself. In an article in the Organizer, he said:

I belong to no political party and no political party has any special claims on me. I do not, therefore, advocate the cause of any particular person or party. But as a Hindu...I make bold to express my personal views and to make a few suggestions...

I address myself to the great Hindu people...I pray to them to rouse themselves in their self-consciousness and freely and boldly exercise their right of vote without being misled, without being distracted or frightened into upholding any individual or party. Let them be alert and discriminate, and resolutely vote for men and parties dedicated to the Hindu people and the Hindu Cause.¹³⁹

The party was once again branded communal. Nehru particularly worked hard to keep the Jana Sangh down. The Praja Socialist Party (PSP) and the Communist Party of India (CPI) also bore down hard on the Jana Sangh, except of course in Maharashtra and Gujarat where the parties were allied.

Alliances

Upadhaya declared the basic policy of the Jana Sangh to be opposed to national alliances with any party. He said the party would agree to local adjustments with all parties except the Communists and communal parties: Akali Dal, Muslim League, Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK).¹⁴⁰

In the Punjab, the Congress and Akali Dal came to an election agreement under which Master Tara Singh's party agreed to run its candidates under the Congress label. Organizer published a report that the Congress invited the Jana Sangh to come under its fold,¹⁴¹ but the report has not been confirmed elsewhere.

As in 1952, in 1957 also, the Hindu parties were unable to come together. They did agree to a partial alliance in West Bengal, but the three parties there were so weak, that it did not matter. With the Mahasabha alone the Jana Sangh wanted to discuss "concrete steps"¹⁴² at a working committee meeting in Poona. The negotiations broke down in a series of recriminations of which this, by Upadhaya is typical:

The Hindu Mahasabha seems to be following a suicidal policy while setting up candidates for the ensuing elections. Instead of concentrating their energies in those areas where the Mahasabha won some seats and where the people know its name, its leaders are trying to fritter away its meagre resources in setting up candidates in those areas where no Hindu Sabha committee exists, and where they are sure to lose their deposits. They are envious of Bharatiya Jana Sangh, and desire to finish its all-India recognition...Unless the Hindu Sabha leaders intend to act as tools of the Congress, there is no reason why Bharatiya Jana Sangh and Hindu Mahasabha cannot come to some adjustment...¹⁴³

In the controversy of dividing the bilingual Bombay state, the Jana Sangh supported the complementary demands of a unilingual state in Maharashtra and a unilingual state in Gujarat. The Jana Sangh joined the Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti (United Maharashtra Committee) which included the Socialist Party, the Peasants and Workers Party and the CPI and FSP. This paid off later in terms of winning seats; in Maharashtra the Jana Sangh had a well disciplined cadre of workers to offer. The Mahagujarat Janata Parishad was less well put together and the Jana Sangh participation in it had less to offer to the Jana Sangh and vice versa.

Results

The Jana Sangh made considerable gains over 1952. It increased its Lok Sabha representation only slightly from three to four seats, but increased its share of the poll from 3.06% to 5.93%. In the contests for state assemblies the party won 46 seats as compared to 34 in 1952. This time all the 46 remained with the party at least until the assembly opened while in 1952, four deserted as soon as the votes were counted. In assembly elections the party polled 4.03% of the vote as compared with 2.76% in 1952.

With two Lok Sabha seats and 17 assembly seats, Uttar Pradesh became the leading state in terms of Jana Sangh representation. In Lok Sabha contests in Uttar Pradesh, the party raised its share of the poll from 7.29% to 14.79%. In the assembly poll in the state, the Jana Sangh raised its vote from 6.44% to 9.84%.

In the Madhya Pradesh Lok Sabha poll the Jana Sangh contested 21 of the 36 seats, lost deposits on 6, and won no seats. In the assembly seats, the Jana Sangh contested 127 of the 288 seats, won ten, and 64 candidates lost deposits. The party won 9.89% of the vote.

In Rajasthan, the party contested only seven of the 22 Lok Sabha seats, winning none, but losing no deposits, while polling 11.10% of the vote. For the assembly, the Jana Sangh contested only 47 of the 176 seats winning six, losing 26 deposits and polling 5.52% of the vote, a decline in both seats won and percentage of votes in 1952.

Punjab was both a failure and an improvement to the party. Again it failed to do well in Lok Sabha contests, but, drawing on the urban Hindu vote, it won nine seats in the assembly. The party contested 16 of the 22 Lok Sabha seats and gained 16.04% of the vote. With the exception of Delhi this was the

TABLE IV
JANA SANGH ELECTION RESULTS - 1957

<u>Lok Sabha</u>					<u>State Legislative Assemblies</u>					
Seats	Cont.	Won	LD	%		Seats	Cont.	Won	LD	%
43	1	0	1	0.04	Andhra Pradesh	301	8	0	8	.11
12	-	-	-	-	Assam	108	-	-	-	-
53	2	0	2	0.08	Bihar	318	29	0	22	1.10
22	-	-	-	-	Gujarat*	133	5	0	1	0.55
18	-	-	-	-	Kerala	126	-	0	-	-
36	21	0	6	13.96	Madhya Pradesh	288	127	10	64	9.89
41	-	-	-	-	Madras	205	-	-	-	-
44	7	2	1	4.73	Maharashtra*	263	18	4	7	2.00
26	5	0	4	2.48	Mysore	208	20	0	14	1.37
20	-	-	-	-	Orissa	140	-	-	-	-
22	16	0	6	16.04	Punjab	154	65	9	31	8.60
22	7	0	0	11.10	Rajasthan	176	47	6	26	5.52
86	61	2	30	14.79	Uttar Pradesh	430	235	17	131	9.84
36	5	0	3	1.43	West Bengal	252	33	0	30	0.98
					<u>Union Territories</u>					
5	5	0	2	19.72	Delhi	-	-	-	-	-
4	-	-	-	-	Himachal Pradesh	-	-	-	-	-
2	-	-	-	-	Manipur	-	-	-	-	-
2	-	-	-	-	Tripura	-	-	-	-	-
494	130	4	53	5.93	TOTAL	3102	587	46	334	4.03

*Gujarat and Maharashtra as they are constituted at present.

Sources: Election Commission of India, Report on the Second General Election in India, 1957, Vol. II, New Delhi, 1958.

Craig Baxter, "Jana Sangh: A Brief History" in South Asian Politics and Religion, ed. Donald E. Smith, (Princeton, 1966).

highest percentage polled in any state by the Jana Sangh.

With the abolition of the Delhi Legislative Assembly, elections were held only for the five Lok Sabha seats. The Jana Sangh contested all five, won none and lost two deposits while polling 19.72% of the vote. Madhok finished a distant second to Mrs. Sucheta Kripalani, who was now the Congress candidate.

Maharashtra presented a special case. The Jana Sangh won two of the seven Lok Sabha seats it contested and four of 18 assembly seats. In the area covered by the Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti the party won two of the three Lok Sabha seats and four of six assembly seats and it lost no deposit in this area. The victories for the Jana Sangh were almost solely attributable to the alliance on the unilingual state issue.

In West Bengal the rout of the Jana Sangh was all but complete. The sitting Lok Sabha member did not contest for re-election and only three of the nine elected to the assembly in 1952 stood again. All were defeated, although each retained his deposit. The vote polled for assembly constituencies dropped to 0.98% and for Lok Sabha seats to 1.43%.

Elsewhere the party showed little strength. Seats were contested for the Lok Sabha in Mysore (5), Bihar (2), and Andhra Pradesh (1), but with the exception of the candidate in Belgaum, Mysore, all lost their deposits. Assembly seats were contested in these states as well as in Gujarat but only in Rajkot District of Gujarat and South Kanara District of Mysore did the party poll more than 5% of the vote.

Appraisal

Malkani, editor of the Organizer assessing the early returns from the election wrote: "The Jana Sangh progress is real but hardly spectacular."¹⁴⁴

The resolution of the working committee said:

...The Committee feels that the Jana Sangh in spite of the odds against it has registered a definite advance both in respect of votes polled and seats won...

In respect of state assemblies the election results in U.P., Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Punjab and Bombay have been quite encouraging...

Jana Sangh however, has got a set-back in West Bengal--here it has not been able to maintain the position it had secured in the last elections--as also in Bihar and Karnatak...Lack of solid organizational base and lack of resources were found to be the main factor responsible...

The Committee feels deeply concerned over the important part played by casteism and communalism, particularly Muslim communalism.¹⁴⁵

The question of alliances with the Mahasabha and the Ram Rajya Parishad again occupied the attention of the Jana Sangh leaders, though not to the extent it had following the 1952 elections. Steps were taken to attempt a union of the Jana Sangh and the Parishad in Rajasthan after the elections under which the two parties would operate as a single assembly bloc.

The number of contests between the three Hindu parties was greatly reduced from the number in 1952, although the Jana Sangh and the Ram Rajya Parishad still contested against each other in 47 assembly constituencies in the states in which both parties were recognized.

The party had obtained its largest measure of support from the state of U.P. and this has continued ever since. It made an important showing in M.P. too. Its success in Maharashtra was temporary, being based on one issue, the formation of the unilingual state of Maharashtra, while in West Bengal it was nearly out. In Rajasthan support for the Jana Sangh ideology met heavy competition from the most conservative of Hindu parties the Ram Rajya Parishad. Although the Jana Sangh does obtain a fair representation in the state, its opposition has met with greater challenge here.

Thus the party had now faced its second electoral challenge. It had

increased its seats slightly in Parliament and markedly in the states, especially when allowance is made for the abolition of the Delhi and Ajmer assemblies. Beyond seats, the party had developed a good base from which to expand in some of the states, most notably Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh. It was now ready to refine and develop further in the period between the 1957 and 1962 elections.

Inter-election Period

Atal Bihari Vajpayee was to become the star performer in the Lok Sabha. He became leader of the parliamentary party of four in 1957 and, although he was defeated for re-election in 1962, he has retained his position by being elected to the Rajya Sabha.

The Jana Sangh was involved in two key by-elections to the Lok Sabha. The first of these was Gurgaon, in the Punjab. The seat was won by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, the Education Minister in 1957 and became vacant by his death. The largest single group in the constituency is the Muslims and they had voted en bloc for Azad against a Jana Sangh candidate in 1957. In the by-election, the Congress gave its ticket to Pandit Mauli Chandra Sharma formerly president of the Jana Sangh. The Jana Sangh relished the opportunity to oppose its former president. The second largest group in the Gurgaon constituency was the Arya Samajists. Prakash Vir, an Arya Samajist entered the contest, and was supported by the Jana Sangh. The highly organized Arya Samaj bodies also supported him. It seems likely he also drew support to some extent from the Muslims who were not pleased with having the Congress nominate a non-Muslim. Prakash Vir won, obtaining 61% of the votes. While not exactly a victory for the Jana Sangh, the support given by the party was known, and largely credited for Vir's victory.¹⁴⁶

The second key election came in April 1961, in the prestigious New Delhi constituency. The seat had been won in 1952 and 1957 by Mrs. Sucheta Kripalani of the Congress Party. In 1960, she resigned from the Lok Sabha to accept a place in the newly formed ministry in U.P. In the by-election the Jana Sangh again nominated Balraj Madhok who had lost to Mrs. Kripalani in 1957. There was a Congress candidate, and also, one from the Swatantra. Balraj Madhok won by a margin of about 10,000 votes over the Congress candidate. The Swatantra candidate lost her deposit. The result was a morale builder for the Jana Sangh. It was a signal to the Delhi Congress that it faced a very strong challenge from the Jana Sangh. And, it was a humiliating defeat for the Swatantra. It also served as a lesson for the conservative parties that they were more likely to hurt each other than the Congress if one tried to expand into areas in which the other was already present and strong.¹⁴⁷

In the other states, e.g. U.P. the Jana Sangh trailed both the Praja Socialist Party among the opposition groups, but it extended its membership in the Legislative Council. In Rajasthan, the Jana Sangh was second to the Ram Rajya Parishad among the opposition parties. The general lack of cohesion in the Ram Rajya Parishad gave the small Jana Sangh group in the assembly an influence out of proportion to its numbers. In Madhya Pradesh, the Jana Sangh placed just behind the twelve of the PSP in M.P.; and in the Punjab, it was the largest opposition party.

In Maharashtra, the Jana Sangh formally broke with the Samuykta Maharashtra Samiti in February 1958. From now on the Jana Sangh would go to it alone. In 1960, the party added two more seats in the Council from the Poona and the Greater Bombay Teacher seats, where many of the voters are Brahmans.

In Maharashtra, the appeal of the party has been to the educated Hindu so too in Andhra Pradesh and Mysore. A. Ramo Rao was elected from Andhra Pradesh, and later became the only South Indian president of the party. There were certain organizational changes that were made in 1958. The post of the zonal secretary was created to coordinate the work of the General Secretary of the Jana Sangh. This addition to the organization was discussed in Chapter III.

Membership in civic bodies was another area in which the Jana Sangh emphasized in its participation in the political process. In October 1957, elections were held to municipal bodies in Uttar Pradesh. The elections included the corporations of the five major cities: Kanpur, Agra, Benares, Allahabad and Lucknow. In contests for 104 municipalities the Congress won absolute majorities in 29, the Jana Sangh in two. Of the 2222 seats the Congress won 856 and the Jana Sangh took 187 for second place among the organized parties.¹⁴⁸ It was a strong showing for the Jana Sangh in the urban areas.

In 1958, the municipal corporation of Delhi was elected. The result was a crushing setback for the Congress which lost its majority in the corporation. Of the 80 elective seats, the Congress took 31 and the Jana Sangh 25. (Communist 8, Mahasabha 1, Praja Socialist 1, and 14 Independents.)¹⁴⁹

The Delhi corporation elections also resulted in the loss of Congress control of the electoral college which is called upon to elect a Delhi member of the Rajya Sabha. The Congress nominated the president of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind; the opposition supported Mirza Ahmad Ali. Ahmad Ali won, moving Organizer to editorialize:

This election has made it clear that the Congress is very much on the way out in Delhi. Also that it is thriving only on the divided vote of the opposition. In supporting Mirza the Jana Sangh taught Congress quite a few lessons. One of these is that, contrary to

Congress propaganda, it has no animus against Muslim priestly class. And thirdly, it has reminded the Congress that it cannot overlook the place of the Jana Sangh in the political life of the Capital.¹⁵⁰

The coalition of the opposition however did not hold together and a Congress candidate was elected to the Rajya Sabha in 1960.

The Punjab civic elections gave another indication of Jana Sangh voting power in the urban areas of northern India. In March, 1959, 43 urban areas went to the polls to elect members of the municipal boards. The Punjab Jana Sangh won 66 of the 392 seats with an additional 49 Jana Sanghis having been elected as independents. This total of 115 was in excess of the number of Congressmen returnees. Sharma claimed outright Jana Sangh majorities in five towns, including Karnal, Rohtak and the industrial town of Ballabgarh.¹⁵¹ Previously the Congress had controlled 40 or 43 towns.

The most important to the Jana Sangh of the series of civic elections held between the two general elections were the October 1959 elections in the five large cities of Uttar Pradesh. The Jana Sangh made an all out effort to gain successes in the elections. It issued a manifesto which called for increased efficiency, including incentive awards for outstanding municipal workers, mobile clinics to provide free medical treatment, abolition of beggary, abolition of the cycle tax, banning of obscene posters, opening of primary schools to provide education for all and the adoption of Hindi at all levels of administration. In kicking off the campaign in Lucknow, Upadhyaya condemned the Congress and the PSP for having concluded an electoral alliance with the Muslim League in Kerala. "The nationalist democratic forces should consolidate their ranks by supporting the Jana Sangh,"¹⁵² said Upadhyaya. When the results were in they showed that the Jana Sangh had moved from fourth place into second behind the Congress. The Congress won none of the

cities outright, although it was the largest party in four cities. In Lucknow the Jana Sangh was the largest party.

TABLE V
UTTAR PRADESH MAJOR CITY CIVIC ELECTIONS - 1959

City	Seats	Congress	JS	PSP	SP	CPI	Independ- ent
Agra	54	16	7	1	-	--	30
Allahabad	54	18	5	10	2	--	19
Banaras	54	17	14	--	-	6	17
Kanpur	72	33	4	3	3	3	26
Lucknow	63	13	26	6	-	2	16
Total	279	97	56	20	5	11	108

Source: Organizer, XIII:12 (November 9, 1959.)

The Jana Sangh was understandably pleased with the results in Uttar Pradesh. The party paper quoted press comments which supported its contention that the Congress was slipping in Uttar Pradesh while the Jana Sangh was rising.¹⁵³ Jana Sanghi Raj Kumar Srivastava was elected mayor of Lucknow. The Congress elected mayors of the other four cities. In succeeding years the Jana Sangh retained control of the office of the Lucknow mayor as G. D. Rastogi and Dr. P. D. Kapoor followed Srivastava in the office.

The urban vote has been the strength of the Jana Sangh. In the next elections the Jana Sangh demonstrated awareness of this, and worked to obtain the rural vote.

c. The Third General Election - 1962

Selection of Candidates and Organization of the Campaign

In selecting candidates for the 1962 elections, the Jana Sangh had a much higher renomination rate than it had shown in 1957, as compared with 1952. The party nominated primarily from among persons experienced in the organization, but there were some notable exceptions. Dr. Raghuvira¹⁵⁴ who had recently joined the party contested from Benaras. With a few exceptions, the Jana Sanghis elected to the legislatures in 1957 and remaining with the party were renominated in 1962. Of the eight members of Parliament, seven including the sole Rajya Sabha member were nominated for Lok Sabha seats.

Thirty of 46 members of the Legislative Assemblies elected in 1957 were renominated i.e., 65%. In addition to renomination of sitting members, a much larger number of candidates who lost in 1957 were given another opportunity in 1962, than was true in 1957 over 1952. The Jana Sangh was trying to build up a core of experienced campaigners, yet it was also not unwilling to drop a 1957 candidate when he did poorly, or more important, when he had failed to nurse his constituency in the inter-election period. The tradition of RSS discipline led candidates to accept the decision almost invariably without public complaint.

The Jana Sangh ran more candidates both for Lok Sabha seats and for assembly seats throughout India than any party except the Congress itself. In no state, except Delhi, did the party contest all Lok Sabha seats but it did contest a majority of the seats in Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Punjab and half the seats in Rajasthan. No Lok Sabha seats were contested in either Orissa or Assam.

In the assemblies the Jana Sangh contested 377 of 430 seats in Uttar

Pradesh and 195 of 288 in Madhya Pradesh. The only other states in which more than half were contested were Punjab and Rajasthan but the numbers were only marginally above half. The party did put up candidates in each state holding assembly elections. On the other side of the coin the Jana Sangh candidates lost more deposits than those of any other party.

Tactics

The presence of the deepak symbol throughout India on the ballot papers came at the end of the campaign during which the party used its many candidates to publicize its program. The saturation technique could not fail to bring the Jana Sangh to the notice of the voters of 40% of the assembly constituencies and a slightly higher percentage of the Lok Sabha Constituencies. The frequent attacks against the communal Jana Sangh by the Congress, especially Nehru and Indira Gandhi gave the party some free mass publicity.

The Jana Sangh, as usual, both made a statement that no electoral alliances would be contracted with other political parties, and went about attempting to make local adjustments with several parties. Talks were held with the other Hindu parties--Ram Rajya Parishad, Hindu Mahasabha and also with the Swatantra Party. The results were few.

The Jana Sangh, the PSP and the Swatantra Party joined hands in a contest which was billed as one of the titanic struggles of the election. This was the campaign of Acharya Kripalani as the independent nominee supported by the three parties against Congress-nominee Krishna Menon in North Bombay.¹⁵⁵ Kripalani was defeated, but the Jana Sanghis who worked for him no doubt profited by their association with the campaign of a distinguished former Congress party member and with other groups working for Kripalani. In the public eye, the name of the Jana Sangh would be associated with Kripalani; by

working with other parties, ground work may have been laid for the future.

Results

The Jana Sangh was pleased with the results of the 1962 elections. This does not mean that there were not some considerable disappointments in certain states and in many key election contests. The party however did increase its membership in the Lok Sabha to 14 from the four elected in 1957 and the seven sitting just before the elections. In State assemblies Jana Sangh now filled 116 seats as compared with but 46 elected in 1957. The increase in popular vote was moderate: from 5.9% to 6.44% in the Lok Sabha and 4.03% to 6.07% in the assemblies. The party made a gain in the percentage of the poll received in assembly voting in each state contested, except West Bengal, and also in Lok Sabha voting the poll increased except in Maharashtra, West Bengal, Punjab and Rajasthan.

In the Lok Sabha the major disappointments came when all sitting members were eliminated from the House, the contesting six being defeated in the elections. On the other hand the Jana Sangh achieved the status of "official opposition" i.e., the largest opposition party having at least ten percent of the seats in both Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh. For the first time the party entered the assembly in Bihar; and for the first time it contested seats in Kerala. The seats gained in 1957 in Maharashtra as a result of the Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti alliance were lost in 1962.

Uttar Pradesh continued to be the key state for the Jana Sangh. The Lok Sabha membership increased from two to seven and the assembly strength from 17 to 49. Vajpayee contested two Lok Sabha seats. He was beaten in Balrampur, U.P., the seat from which he was elected in 1957 by less than one percent of the total vote, by Subhadra Joshi of the Congress. He was also

defeated in the Lucknow seat. The reason for this was that both he and Balraj Madhok, who was also defeated, spent excessive time campaigning for the party outside their respective constituencies. Raghuvira was defeated in Benares. In all, the Jana Sangh contested 74 of the 86 seats, won seven and lost 33 deposits while polling 17.57% of the vote.

One of the assembly elections designated by observers as "key" was the contest in Jaunpur between Jana Sangh assembly leader and incumbent Yadhuvendra Dutta Dubey, Raja of Jaunpur, and the state Home Minister, Hargovind Singh. The result was a substantial win for the Raja. Among the newly elected members was Mrs. Shauntala Nayar, the only Jana Sangh woman ever to have been elected to office.

Madhya Pradesh also saw created a Jana Sangh official opposition in the assembly and sent three Jana Sanghis to the Lok Sabha. In this state, the Jana Sangh received a higher percentage of the vote, 17.87%, than in any other state. The party contested 28 of the 36 seats, winning three and losing 13 deposits. In another prestige contest a Jana Sanghi, Laxminarayan Pandey, defeated Madhya Pradesh Chief Minister Kailash Nath Katju, by a small margin. In the previous election the fortunes had been in the reverse.

Rajasthan saw substantial gains by the Jana Sangh in the election for the assembly; the number of seats won increased from 6 to 15, as compared to 1957 and the percentage of the vote rose from 5.42% to 9.15%. The party also won a Lok Sabha seat, although its share of the poll for the Lok Sabha decreased as four of the eleven candidates lost their deposits while none of the seven contesting in 1957 had done so. The southeastern reaches of the state were the strongest areas of the party.

In the Punjab, the Jana Sangh won three Lok Sabha seats where none had

TABLE VI
JANA SANGH ELECTION RESULTS - 1962

<u>Lok Sabha</u>					<u>State Legislative Assemblies</u>					
Seats	Cont.	Won	LD	%		Seats	Cont.	Won	LD	%
43	8	0	8	1.17	Andhra Pradesh	301	70	0	70	1.04
12	-	-	-	-	Assam	105	4	-	4	0.45
53	13	0	11	2.34	Bihar	318	75	3	61	2.77
22	5	0	5	1.44	Gujarat	154	26	0	23	17.47
18	4	0	4	0.68	Kerala	126	3	0	3	0.06
36	28	3	13	17.87	Madhya Pradesh	288	195	41	91	16.66
41	1	0	1	.04	Madras	206	4	0	4	0.08
44	17	0	13	4.40	Maharashtra	264	127	0	100	5.00
26	7	0	6	2.68	Mysore	208	63	0	56	2.29
20	-	-	-	-	Orissa	140	-	-	-	-
22	17	3	10	15.18	Punjab	154	80	8	47	9.72
22	11	1	4	9.28	Rajasthan	176	94	15	55	9.17
86	74	7	33	17.51	Uttar Pradesh	430	377	49	192	16.46
36	4	0	4	1.05	West Bengal	252	25	0	24	0.45
<u>Union Territories</u>										
5	5	0	0	82.66	Delhi	-	-	-	-	-
4	2	0	2	4.49	Himachal Pradesh	-	-	-	-	-
2	-	-	-	-	Manipur	-	-	-	-	-
2	-	-	-	-	Tripura	-	-	-	-	-
494	196	14	114	6.44	TOTAL	3122	1143	116	730	6.07

(Total includes Kerala mid-term assembly election of 1960)

Sources: Election Commission of India, Report on the Third General Elections in India, 1962, Vol. II, New Delhi, n.d.

Seminar 94, June 1967.

been won before and the percentage of votes received was more than 15%; in the assembly, the number of seats dropped from nine to eight while the percentage of votes rose but moderately from 8.6% to 9.7%. The division of the Punjab into Punjab and Haryana, with some areas becoming part of Himachal Pradesh and Chandigarh city becoming a Union Territory, will necessarily have an impact on the politics of the former states and its successor states and will be felt within the Jana Sangh. The party was badly split after the division, and was brought together by the personal efforts of Balraj Madhok.

In Delhi, the Jana Sangh sharply increased its share of the Lok Sabha vote from 1/5 to 1/3 and lost the only seat it had before the election. There is no assembly in Delhi, but elections to the Delhi municipal corporation were held simultaneously with the Lok Sabha polling. Here too, the Jana Sangh increased its share of the vote from 26.36% in 1958 to 30.97% and saw the number of seats held drop from 25 to 8. While the results in terms of seats won were more than disappointing to the Jana Sangh, the extension of support for the party to new levels and in all areas of the Union Territory were taken as a source of encouragement.

In Bihar, the Jana Sangh had shown almost no progress at all between the 1952 and 1957 elections. The RSS base was relatively weak, in comparison with other states of the Hindi-speaking areas. Much of the southern part of the state is populated by tribals, many of them Christians, with whom the Jana Sangh was unable to make much headway. The hopes of merger with the Janata Party were dashed, because it merged with Swatantra soon after the latter was launched. The gains of the Jana Sangh were modest. The party won three seats in the assembly; of 75 seats contested, 61 candidates lost their deposits. The percentage of the vote received by the Jana Sangh more than

doubled, but it was still a tiny 2.77%. The party also contested 13 of the 53 Lok Sabha seats, lost 10 deposits and polled 2.34% of the vote. While the record was not outstanding it was a beginning.

In 1957, the Jana Sangh won two Lok Sabha seats and four assembly seats in Maharashtra. In 1962, the party increased its share of the vote 2 1/2 times and won no seats either in the assembly or in parliament. The increase in vote is illusory for it was attained only by increasing the number of candidates from 18 to 127 for the assembly and 100 of them lost their deposits. The situation is not difficult to explain. The seats in 1957 had been won on the strength of Jana Sangh participation in the Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti. The Jana Sangh withdrew early from the Samiti and in any case, the *raison d'etre* of the Samiti disappeared when the object of the alliance, a separate Maharashtra state, was attained on April 1, 1960. Having conceded a popular demand, the Congress both brought increased popularity to itself and fragmented the opposition alliance. The Congress which in 1957 had barely won a majority of the seats in the areas that were to become Maharashtra swept all before it in 1962 and achieved in Maharashtra the largest victory in India for the ruling party. The Jana Sangh was simply swept aside. The party also continued to pay the penalty in Maharashtra for a large Brahman membership and for its association with the RSS---"the murders of Gandhi" slogan was still a millstone around Jana Sangh necks.

In the South Indian states the Jana Sangh has not been very successful. In the state of Tamilnadu (Madras) the Jana Sangh tends to be identified with a Hindu chauvinism and North India Brahmans. The DMK also enjoys vast financial support from the film industry and has leaders with great oratorical skill in Tamil. The Jana Sangh lacks the resources, leadership and mass media

communication in the state.¹⁵⁶ Another factor acting against the Jana Sangh in Madras was the emergence of the Swatantra Party and its venerated leader "Rajaji", who enjoys a very respected place in Madras politics.

In Andhra Pradesh, the Congress is very strongly entrenched and has been able to absorb the Socialist party and defectors from the Congress party who have returned to its folds and hence there seems to be no room for the Jana Sangh in Andhra politics.¹⁵⁷ In Kerala, the Jana Sangh made bold to enter the election contest only in 1962, by contesting 4 parliamentary seats, and 3 legislative assembly seats in the mid-term poll. But the party was totally unsuccessful. The failure of the Jana Sangh is a very interesting phenomenon in the state. Since the Communist Party is powerful in the state, the rightest elements looked for a strong party to represent their interests, and the Congress party has been able to fulfill this need. And hence, the chances for the Jana Sangh being established in the state are not very great.¹⁵⁸ In Mysore state, caste works against Jana Sangh expansion. Though the trading and peasant castes are numerically larger than the Brahman, and though the Jana Sangh has been able to appeal to trading castes in other parts of India, in Mysore it has failed to do so. The reason being that the Jana Sangh has been identified with the numerically small Brahmans; and there is enmity between the Brahmans and other castes, so the latter do not support the Jana Sangh.¹⁵⁹

Appraisal

The party was generally pleased with the results, and commentators and the press were by and large impressed. Upadhaya noted that the "party decided to set up candidates in as many areas as was organizationally possible..."¹⁶⁰ The Jana Sangh had shown "marked progress in numbers, but was still far behind

the strength necessary for the fulfillment of the historic task assigned to it."¹⁶¹ The Punjab and Maharashtra units expressed the feeling that had they concentrated on fewer seats they might have done better. The official party line was that as many candidates as possible should be exposed in the belief that this would pay off in the long run, even if it was conducive to a set back in the short run.

The Indian press commented on the increase in Jana Sangh votes and representation. The Times of India said:

Their hard organizational work paid dividends, but their success surely is primarily due to the fact that they voice the political aspirations of a large section of the electorate which is becoming increasingly critical of the economic policies of the Congress... The vote received by these two parties must...be regarded principally as a vote against the Congress Party's socialism.¹⁶²

The Hindu also linked the increase in Jana Sangh votes with the emergence of the Swatantra:

If any clear outline is to be traced in this contradictory, and confusing, shift of electoral opinion in the various states, it must be sought primarily in a developing contest between pragmatic socialism of the Congress...and the extremism of the Communists, on the one side and, on the other, the progressive liberalism of the Swatantra and Jana Sangh parties, with their emphasis on limits to the State's incursions in the economic field and greater realism in planning.¹⁶³

It is significant that both the Times of India and the Hindu omitted a charge of communalism and the latter coupled the Jana Sangh with the Swatantra Party as progressive and liberal.

The Communist Party journal New Age also reacted to the increase of the vote for the "Right", though with shock and concern:

What should really shock all Congressmen is the grim fact that in eight states of the Union, their leadership has adopted such a course that the reactionary Right has acquired the status of the main opposition and in the nation's Parliament their representation has increased more than ever before.¹⁶⁴

The Eastern Economist remarked:

It is the Jana Sangh again that promised, because of its militant and disciplined character, a far greater opposition to the Congress in the years to come. One might or might not like this particular expression of opinion of the Hindi electorate but it is undoubtedly a force of great importance which needs quickly to be evaluated.¹⁶⁵

Moreover, it would seem that the possibility of a long-range decline in the strength of the Congress Party in the Hindi-speaking "Prussia"¹⁶⁶ of India can become a reality. This can be seen from the electoral endorsement of the party in these areas. But at the same time, it must be kept in mind that the Jana Sangh is dominated by the northern areas too in the party organization.

In Uttar Pradesh, it was seen that the Jana Sangh had increased its rural vote, but in the Punjab, it still relied on the urban vote. The Hindu parties opposed each other again in many contests, but the Jana Sangh succeeded to a greater extent than its rivals. To sum up, the effects of the 1962 election were:

First the Jana Sangh made no substantial headway outside the Hindi-speaking area. All of its parliamentary and assembly seats were won in the states of north India. Outside this area approximately 90% of the Jana Sangh candidates lost their security deposits when they failed to poll one-sixth of the vote in their constituencies. Secondly, a study of the assembly constituencies in Uttar Pradesh shows that the Jana Sangh increased its share of the votes in rural areas, though both in rural and urban areas the share increased. Many observers had considered the Jana Sangh a party of the urban Middle-class Hindu. In Uttar Pradesh this seems to be changing, although in Punjab the party remains confined to the cities and dependent upon the votes of the urbanized Hindu population rather than the rural Sikhs. Thirdly, another theory held that the Jana Sangh would poll best in areas where the number of Muslims was substantial. A study of the districts in Uttar Pradesh shows that there is no apparent correlation between the percentage of Muslims and the percentage of votes received by the Jana Sangh.¹⁶⁷

The emergence of the Swatantra Party brought a rival to the Jana Sangh in its role as a conservative party as distinct from the role it plays as a

Hindu party. The parties contested mainly in Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan and Gujarat. The future alliance of the parties was a question that was very much in the minds of the observers of the Indian political scene.

The 1962 election brought a much stronger Jana Sangh prepared to play the role of official opposition in Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh and ready to make its voice heard more frequently in the Lok Sabha.

Inter-election Period

During this period the Jana Sangh elected as its President Dr. Raghuvira, the well known China expert. In foreign policy the Jana Sangh stressed the need for the party to work closely with the west in order to contain China.

In the Spring of 1962 elections were held to the Rajya Sabha and Legislative Councils. The Jana Sangh elected one member each in Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh. In the Legislative Councils three seats were won in Maharashtra and one more in Andhra Pradesh.

In the by-elections the Jana Sangh was not successful. During the election campaign for four Lok Sabha seats Raghuvira was fatally injured in a car accident. Again, tragedy had struck at the highest echelon of the Jana Sangh and it was deprived of promising potential leadership.

In the Vijayawada session of 1965 the Jana Sangh adopted a new policy statement which prefixed a philosophical statement which attempted to relate modern democracy to Hindu traditions. The object of the party was stated to be Dharm rajya, "the nearest English equivalent of dharm rajya is rule of law." The economic objective was stated to be sanctity of private property with necessity of social control. The slogan of "one country, one people, one culture, one nation" was repeated."168

The Jana Sangh used the 1965 period when hostilities broke out between India and Pakistan to propagate its nationalist and anti-Pakistani views. It called for all out war against Pakistan in order to settle the issue finally. The Jana Sangh was active in the Ban Cow Slaughter March that took place in New Delhi.

In 1966 the Jana Sangh selected one of its best known leaders, Professor Balraj Madhok as President to lead the party into the 1967 elections.

d. The Fourth General Election - 1967

Selection of Candidates and Organization of the Campaign

For Legislative Assembly elections, the Jana Sangh contested almost all the seats in U.P. and Delhi. In Haryana the party contested 48 of 81 seats and 30 out of 60 in Himachal Pradesh. In Bihar 265 candidates were set up for 318 seats. In Maharashtra 165 of 270 seats were contested. In all other states the number was less than 50%. In Delhi 54 candidates out of 56 were nominated for the Metropolitan Council and 96 out of 100 for the Delhi Municipal Corporation.¹⁶⁹ Having no branches in Manipur, Pondicherry, Andamans and Laccdive islands, the party set up no candidates. In Tripura, Assam, Tamilnadu, Kerala, Gujarat and Orissa candidates were selected in only a few constituencies.

Out of 520 Lok Sabha seats, the Jana Sangh contested 249. All the seats from U.P., M.P., Haryana, Punjab, Bihar and Himachal Pradesh were contested except where independents were supported or adjustments were made with other parties. In an interview with Madhok it was learned that the Jana Sangh was expecting victories in U.P., M.P., Rajasthan and Haryana.¹⁷⁰

The organization was geared up early but, in many instances the party was late in choosing Lok Sabha candidates and many cases filed its nomination

on the last date. This way many a good seat was lost.

In the Orai constituency of U.P. women campaigners were effective in going and talking to women in their houses.¹⁷¹ There was an emphasis on drawing more people to the polls.¹⁷² The symbol of the party was widely displayed. Widespread disenchantment with the Congress helped the Jana Sangh campaign.

Tactics

Anti-Congress propoganda was used by all opposition parties to a considerable extent. The economic situation was exploited by all parties as being a tremendous failure of the Congress rule. With the Chinese invasion in 1962, and the war with Pakistan in 1965, national feeling could also be exploited.

Election strategy was adopted by the Bharatiya Pratinidhi Sabha at Nagpur on November 3-6, 1966. Even though the people were discontented with the Congress, Deen Dayal Upadhyaya said,

...it is considered necessary and desirable that instead of basing our strategy on a negative approach to the Congress we would strive to present a positive programme and build an alternative. We therefore decided to keep away from the joint fronts forged with all sorts of combinations by other opposition parties. Instead we decided to contest the elections on our own ticket and programme. The Pratinidhi Sabha however permitted adjustments with national democratic elements.¹⁷³

Such adjustments were made with the Swatantra Party in Gujarat, Orissa, Rajasthan and Haryana. Attempts were made in Bihar and U.P., but they failed. The Swatantra leaders did not want to ally with the Jana Sangh for fear of losing communist support in Madras and Andhra. The Organizer lays the blame for some election losses e.g. Junagadh on Swatantra party indiscipline.¹⁷⁴

In M.P., an adjustment was made with the Rajmata of Gwalior. She had

been a Congress party member before, but was now leading her own party the Jana Congress. Four of her nominees were to contest on the Jana Sangh symbol. "This Jana Sangh-Palace axis was simply a marriage of convenience."¹⁷⁵

There was considerable debate in the Jana Sangh Pratinidhi Sabha about the party participating in post election coalition governments. The General Council did approve of such a move, but there were arguments on both sides of the question. The strongest arguments put forth in favour of joining coalitions were that the people's choice ought to be respected and if they had given no clear mandate to one party, coalition government would be the result. When members were aghast about working with the Communists, a reasonable counter-comment was that the ministry could be better controlled by participating inside it.¹⁷⁶

Results 1967¹⁷⁷

The results of the elections were widely acclaimed by all opposition parties. Congress had maintained its majority at the Center, but lost its majority in half the states in the Union.

For the Jana Sangh, the results showed a general upward trend in all the states and for Lok Sabha seats too. In the Lok Sabha, the Jana Sangh won a total of 35 seats; compared to 14 in the 1962 elections. They were won in the same states as in 1962 - M.P., Haryana, Punjab, Rajasthan and U.P. with one seat from Bihar. The popular vote polled for the Jana Sangh in the Lok Sabha seats rose from 6.44% to 9.37%.

In the contest for the Legislative Assembly seats, the Jana Sangh was successful in the North Indian "Hindi" states, and made small headway in some other states as well. In U.P. the Jana Sangh was returned as the official opposition party with 97 seats out of an Assembly of 425 and was soon to

TABLE VII
JANA SANGH ELECTION RESULTS - 1967

<u>Lok Sabha</u>					<u>State Legislative Assemblies</u>				
Seats	Cont.	Won	LD	%		Seats	Cont.	Won*	%
<u>State</u>									
41	6	-	5	1.44	Andhra Pradesh	287	80	3	2.26
14	3	-	2	5.59	Assam	126	20	0	1.86
53	48	1	32	1.14	Bihar	318	267	27	10.69
24	-	-	-	-	Gujarat	168	17	1	2.06
9	7	1	2	19.94	Haryana	81	47	12	1.35
19	4	-	4	1.39	Kerala	133	94	-	.9
37	32	10	4	29.50	Madhya Pradesh	296	265	77	28.28
39	4	-	4	0.22	Madras	234	24	7	.14
45	24	-	19	7.00	Maharashtra	270	165	4	8.34
27	3	-	2	2.10	Mysore	216	39	4	2.71
20	2	-	2	0.64	Orissa	140	19	-	.54
13	8	1	3	12.56	Punjab	104	49	9	9.36
23	6	3	1	9.71	Rajasthan	184	63	22	11.61
85	77	12	24	21.98	Uttar Pradesh	425	400	97	21.53
40	7	-	5	1.39	West Bengal	280	58	1	0.9
<u>Union Territories</u>									
1	1	1	-	-	Chandigarh	-	-	-	-
7	7	6	-	46.60	Delhi	-	-	-	-
6	3	-	-	28.00	Himachal Pradesh	60	33	7	-
2	-	-	-	-	Manipur	30	-	-	-
2	-	-	-	-	Tripura	30	5	-	-
1	-	-	-	-	Pondicherry	no election	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	Goa Daman & Diu	30	-	-	-
509	243	35	94	9.37	TOTAL	3477	1575	267	8.74

*Figures are not yet available for number of deposits lost in Assembly Elections.

Sources: R. Chandidas, Leon Clark, Richard Fontera, Ward Morehouse (eds.)
India Votes: A Source Book on Indian Elections, (New York, 1968).

Seminar 94, June 1967.

Indian Express, Feb. 23, 1967.

participate in the United Front Ministry which followed when the Congress ministry fell on April 3, 1967.¹⁷⁸ A phenomenal success for the party was the capture of Kanpur city. In U.P. the party had nominated a number of Muslims too.

In Bihar the party won 26 seats and had members in the Bihar state Cabinet. This was a considerable achievement because in 1962, it had claimed only 3 seats, and none in 1957. In the United Front Ministry there were Jana Sangh members in the state cabinet. Soon there would be Jana Sanghis in the M.P. cabinet, and in the Punjab too, after the mid-term poll in February 1969.¹⁷⁹

In Rajasthan the party did not fare as well as was expected though it polled seven seats more than in 1962. This was partly due to the presence of the Swatantra and its support by the Jaipur Royal family.

In Delhi, the Jana Sangh won spectacular success. It won by 7 Lok Sabha seats; 33 of the 56 Metropolitan Council and 52 of the 100 Municipal Corporation. The Jana Sangh became the ruling party in the capital. Its success there is attributed to 2 important factors: its cadre of RSS workers and the people's disenchantment with Congress rule, and the exploitation by Jana Sangh propaganda of this disillusionment. Of those on the Metropolitan Council, one was a Muslim - Anwar Ali Delhvi.

Besides its success in the Hindi speaking areas, the Jana Sangh won seats in some other non Hindi states as well--three in Andhra, one in Gujarat, four in Maharashtra, three in Mysore and one in West Bengal.

Appraisal

The election results were a jolt to the Congress Party; the electorate had rejected the party, but its choice of another one party was not clear,

mainly because there is no one all-India party of the calibre of the Congress. Coalition governments had come into power in Punjab, Bihar, West Bengal, Orissa and Kerala. The stability of these coalitions was very much in doubt and it was expected that there would be considerable efforts to cause defections and topple ministries. The Jana Sangh participated in coalitions in Bihar, U.P. and Punjab. In Haryana it was decided to support the government, not to accept any Cabinet positions. In M.P. the Jana Sangh would soon participate in the coalition government that was formed after the Congress ministry fell in July. The situation was extremely fluid and mid-term polls were predicted for many states.

The election results were a success for the Jana Sangh, and showed the right wing trend of the electorate. The party had improved its position in all the states and Union territories where it participated in the election. The results also showed a broadening base of Jana Sangh support by the seats outside the Hindi heartland. Leaders were beginning to speak of modified policies. Yet the RSS base of the party was strong. It is still too early to discern with finality the trends that will emerge out of a fluid situation, but the developments will be interesting. "As the Indian political experiment enters a new phase portents of trouble ahead and signs of an increasingly effective participatory democracy appear in kaleidoscopic confusion giving an atmosphere of confusion and excitement to the changing Indian scene."¹⁸⁰

Since the Elections of 1967

Since the 1967 elections there have been numerous changes on the Indian political scene. In fact it becomes difficult at times to keep track of the changing face of the state governments. Defections in party ranks




Fig 2. Percentage of votes obtained by the Jana Sangh in five state Legislative Assemblies in the four General Elections.

¹ For the 1967 Election Results, the State of Punjab is considered in its form before the present division into Punjab and Haryana.

have been common. There were anti-Congress coalitions in the Haryana, Punjab, Bihar, U.P. and M.P. Soon there was President's rule in Rajasthan, Haryana, and West Bengal. In the Punjab the Congress faced a crisis and the M.P. ministry has not been stable. Bihar had a United Front rule, which replaced the Soshit Dal. In all, the situation was in a state of flux. The Congress tried to manipulate the fall of the non-Congress ministries and there have been many "aayee rams" and "gayee rams"¹⁸¹ in the government. In February 1969, mid-term elections were conducted in the states of Bihar, Punjab, U.P., West Bengal, and Nagaland. The Congress has come to power in Bihar and U.P. In West Bengal the Communist Party won an overwhelming victory, while in Nagaland, the Naga National Organization came to power. In the Punjab, the Akali Dal with the Jana Sangh has formed the government.

Since its success in the 1967 Elections, the Jana Sangh has been trying to project an all India image.¹⁸² The question of a national language has been the one uppermost in the minds of the politicians. Balraj Madhok had recently expressed a modified stand, and the late President Deen Dayal Upadhaya accepted any modern Indian language, but not English as a medium of instruction. The party was also relaxing its policy on the state trading of food grains, where before it had opposed all such moves.¹⁸³

The discussion of the action of coalition governments had led to further filtering of opinions in the Jana Sangh among those who see a difference between the Right and Left Communists. One cannot practice "political untouchability"¹⁸⁴ it was said. Stands of political reality are as such being accepted by the Jana Sangh and this may seem to match the trend of loosening the RSS control over the party. This trend was visible when Deen Dayal Upadhaya was elected President of the Jana Sangh against the RSS

candidate Professor Mahavir.¹⁸⁵ Upadhaya stood for more alliances and broadening the party base in M.P. and U.P.

Unfortunately, Upadhaya was found dead in a train compartment in February 1968.¹⁸⁶ A high level judicial enquiry was set up to determine the cause of his death, because the circumstances did look suspicious. He has been succeeded by Atal Behari Vajpayee who ranks among the younger leaders of the Jana Sangh and is in the flexible wing of the party. In fact, his stand at the National Integration Council has been quite secular, but RSS Chief Golwalkar called it a bluff to win Muslim votes.¹⁸⁷ The RSS is also striking at the points where the non-RSS people had a stronghold--in the legislative sphere of the Jana Sangh development. The RSS cadres are efficient workers, highly disciplined and toe the party line with extremely few dissensions. Hence they make effective campaign workers. The Jana Sangh is dependent upon their support for success in elections. Yet, it would seem that the development of the party on broader lines will definitely be hampered if its organization and policy is RSS-controlled.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

In this study we have observed various facets of the Jana Sangh, in particular the direction in which the party is evolving and the part it will play in the future Indian political system.

From the support that the Jana Sangh obtains in its electoral victories in Northern India and the leadership that the area provides for the party it is evident that the North is the bastion of support for the Jana Sangh. Moreover the Jana Sangh as a protagonist for the maintenance of Hindi as the national language obtains a vast following in these predominantly Hindi states. At present it seems that the language issue is the main source of attraction for Jana Sangh support in the North. And, in order to retain this support, the party continually advocates the maintenance of Hindi as the national language of India.

The language issue has become an important part of the regional chauvinism that is flourishing in India and, in the South, this espousal of the maintenance of Hindi as the national language restricts the appeal of the Jana Sangh. Evidence of this restricted appeal can be observed in the Election results, and leadership positions within the party. Of twelve Presidents only one has been a South Indian and the General Secretary of the party who is considered more powerful than the President has always been a North Indian. Besides, there are other strong parties like the DMK and Communists in the South, and they limit the scope of the expansion of the Jana Sangh south of Maharashtra. Even the Swatantra with whom the Jana Sangh has allied itself in some northern states does not favour similar alliances in the southern

states of India, like Andhra Pradesh and Tamilnadu, because such alliances would jeopardize Swatantra's relationship with other parties of the South and endanger its position. The attempts at a permanent Jana Sangh-Swatantra alliance have been inconclusive. Even the slight gains that the Jana Sangh made in the South in the Fourth General Election can be accounted for by the general anti-Congress attitude that prevailed in the political mood of the country and the Jana Sangh was able to take advantage of it. Therefore it seems that Jana Sangh influence will be limited to the Northern states. Hence the aspirations of the party for assuming all-India status and commanding a majority in the National Parliament seem limited in the near future. But in the north, the prospects for the future expansion of the party are bright. It seems that its strength will lie mainly in U.P., M.P., Delhi, Rajasthan, Haryana, Punjab and Bihar. But whether the Jana Sangh will be the sole majority party in a state is again doubtful. It has and will come to power within coalition governments. But to participate in coalition governments, the party can ill afford to be doctrinaire. Flexibility¹⁸⁸ in contracting alliances and participating in coalitions will be virtually necessary. The Jana Sangh has exhibited such pragmatism in the past. The Jana Sangh and Swatantra differ on many issues - language policy, foreign affairs, and economic policy; yet in 1967 the two parties concluded alliances in Gujarat, Orissa and Rajasthan. The most recent and startling example has been the Jana Sangh-Akali Dal success in the Punjab in the mid-term poll of February 1969 and both parties are now represented in the state cabinet. The two parties had opposed each other bitterly on the formation of a separate state for the Sikh minority in the former state of the Punjab. This was a Hindu v. Sikh confrontation and the Jana Sangh had advocated a Maha-Punjab that would

include the present Punjab, Haryana, PEPSU and Delhi. But, once the Punjabi Suba was conceded by the Central Government in 1967, Jana Sangh leaders especially Balraj Madhok worked hard to create a viable Jana Sangh party in the new Punjab. Their foresight has paid dividends and the party is now in a governing position in the state. Where once the Jana Sangh had shunned even an electoral alliance with the Akali Dal, today it is in partnership with it in the control of a state.

This participation by the Jana Sangh should affect its outlook with beneficial effect. When far removed from power, parties tend to take unrealistic stands in policy. But, once they are faced with responsibility these demands may be modified. Utopian goals like full employment and a house for every family with a plea for independent nuclear capability will have to be modified.

Pragmatism in another sphere is also important for the Jana Sangh. This is to fight the label of "communalism" that is often applied to the party. The Jana Sangh a by-product so to speak of the RSS and the Mahasabha is the least communal of the three organizations. Both the RSS and Mahasabha have restricted membership regulations, but while the former opposes even social reform, the latter advocates liberal reform in terms of the removal of: caste distinctions, untouchability, restricted caste dining and temple entry. The Jana Sangh on the other hand has an open membership, and claims that its emphasis is on a "Bharatiya" rather than a "Hindu" rashtra. It has accepted Muslims and Christians in its membership. Some people regard these features skeptically, yet the difference in emphasis cannot be absolutely disregarded. It can also be argued that certain slogans are used because they have a greater appeal to the mass of an electorate that is largely

illiterate. It must also be remembered that there are other parties that are communal too: the Akali Dal, Muslim League, DMK. Somehow they are less vociferously attacked by the Congress Party than the Jana Sangh. This may be because the Jana Sangh as the representative of the Hindu majority is seen as a greater threat in exacerbating social tensions. But the Jana Sangh must guard against too liberal a use of such slogans. The refusal of the party to support birth control measures, or the use of chemical fertilizer will lay it open to a charge of being communal. The positive advocacy of such measures is vital for the development and progress of a modern India.

A considerable measure of the open mindedness of the Jana Sangh will depend upon the leadership of the party. The two most widely known members who represent the flexible wing of the party are Prof. Balraj Madhok and Atal Behari Vajapayee. The RSS has been the organizational bulwark of the Jana Sangh. Its cadre of Swayamsevaks who join the Jana Sangh are efficient workers, trained to obey orders implicitly and hence factionalism, the bane of other Indian political parties, very rarely appears in the Jana Sangh ranks. Until very recently the RSS had not perceived the Parliamentary group in the Jana Sangh with its more flexible attitude, as being a threat to its (RSS) hold of the party. But the increasing electoral success of the Jana Sangh seems to have made the RSS cautious. From recent press reports it seems that the organizational supporter of the Jana Sangh wants to control policy too. Madhok was replaced as the leader of the Parliamentary party by a RSS nominee.¹⁸⁹ Madhok did not deliver his usual pro-U.S. foreign policy speech at the National Council in Indore.¹⁹⁰ In fact the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia was not condemned on the ground that it did not affect India. This is sparse evidence and may not be a permanent trend. However, it would not

be wrong to conclude that while moderation and flexibility¹⁹¹ have brought electoral success to the Jana Sangh this very stance of moderation is threatened by the doctrinaire RSS wing of the party which may be riding high on a rising feeling of communalism in the country.

Thus from the present trend of development it becomes evident that moderation in leadership has enabled the Jana Sangh to profit in terms of gaining political power. Continued flexibility and reduced RSS control may enable the Jana Sangh to become a stronger participant in coalitions and an effective opposition party at least at the state level on the Indian political scene.

FOOTNOTES

FOOTNOTES

¹Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (DMK) literally translates as the Dravidian Progressive Federation. The DMK is a party of Tamil nationalism, and at present, the party in power in the state of Tamilnadu (Madras).

²Organiser V:11, October 29, 1951, The First Election Manifesto appeared in this issue of Organiser. Sanskriti means culture, and maryada, status. To refer to Bharatiya Sanskriti and maryada means, Indian culture and values.

³The concept of parties in developing areas, the loads they carry and the crises they encounter are found in La Palombara and Myron Weiner (ed) Political Parties and Political Development, (Princeton, 1966), pp 399-435.

⁴In India, approximately 80% of the population believes in or follows some form of the Hindu way of life. However, the Constitution of India embodies in itself the principle of secularism, in which every citizen has the right to practice his own faith, and has the same political and social rights as every other citizen, but a state which is neutral in matters of religion and is not organized along religious lines. In Part III of the Constitution the Fundamental Rights are listed, and in Article 325 provides for one general electoral roll for every territorial constituency and does not recognize communal electorates.

⁵David E. Apter, Some Conceptual Approaches to the Study of Modernization, (New Jersey, 1968), p. 76.

The other material on opposition parties in developing countries was also from the above source.

⁶Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, translated by Barbara and Robert North, (New York, 1966), xxiii - xxxvii.

⁷Roy C. Macridis (ed), Political Parties: Contemporary Trends and Ideas, (New York, 1967).

⁸Integrative in support would mean that it has "exclusive, regional" parties.

⁹Integrative in mode of action and function in that parties promote "national integration, community building and resort to mobilization."

¹⁰Gabriel C. Almond and James S. Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas, (Princeton, 1960), pp 38-44.

¹¹Bankey Bihari Misra, The Indian Middle Classes - Their Growth in Modern Times, (London, 1961), p. 368.

¹²Ibid., p. 367.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴The worship of an elephant-headed deity of good-will.

¹⁵Shivaji (1627-1680) was a Maratha King who defied the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb and carved out a kingdom for himself in the territory of present day Maharashtra state. He is considered to have put up a brave Hindu resistance to Mughal rule.

¹⁶Jawaharlal Nehru, Recent Essays and Writings: On the Future of India, Communalism and Other Subjects, (Allahabad, 1934), pp 48-49.

¹⁷Misra, op. cit., p. 399.

¹⁸Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, Hindutva, (Poona: 1942).

¹⁹Richard D. Lambert, "Hindu Communal Groups in Indian Politics," Leadership and Political Institutions in India (ed) Richard L. Park and Irene Tinker, (Princeton, 1959), pp 211-225.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Misra, op. cit., p. 399.

²²Donald Eugene Smith, "Challenge of Hindu Communalism," India as a Secular State, (Princeton, 1963), p. 456.

²³Ibid., pp 457-464.

²⁴See J. A. Curran, Jr., Militant Hinduism in Indian Politics: A Study of the RSS, (New York, 1951).

²⁵M. S. Golwalkar, We or Our Nationhood Defined, 4th ed., (Nagpur, 1947), pp 55-56.

²⁶D. E. Smith, India as a Secular State, op. cit., p. 468.

²⁷Ibid., p. 220.

²⁸Myron Weiner, Party Politics in India: The Development of a Multi-Party System, (Princeton, 1957), p. 183.

²⁹Ibid., p. 184.

³⁰Craig Baxter, "Jana Sangh: A Brief History," Religion & Politics in South Asia, (ed.) Donald E. Smith, (Princeton, 1966), pp 74-76. Also see Balraj Madhok, Dr. Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, A Biography, (New Delhi, 1954).

³¹Myron Weiner, op. cit., p. 188.

³²Michael Brecher, Nehru, A Political Biography, (London, 1959), pp 428-9.

³³Myron Weiner, op. cit., p. 186.

³⁴Deen Dayal Upadhaya was born in Mathura, U.P., in 1918, and earned his college degree from the Allahabad University. He joined the RSS as a student, became a full time worker and eventually joint organizing secretary for the RSS in U.P. When the Jana Sangh was floated he switched to the political party as general secretary of the Uttar Pradesh unit. He held the important post of General Secretary from 1954-1967. In 1967 he became the President of the Jana Sangh, but was killed in early 1968 in a train. Upadhaya was a recognized leader and spokesman of the Party.

³⁵Balraj Madhok was born in 1920 at Skardu, in the Ladakh Division of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Although his family background was Punjabi, he has considered himself as a Kashmiri in politics. An Arya Samajist, he taught at the Srinagar Dayanand Anglo Vedic College. He joined the RSS as a young man, and in 1947 was instrumental in founding the All Jammu and Kashmir Praja Parishad. In 1950, he joined the faculty of the Dayanand Anglo Vedic College, as professor of history and still holds that position. He was used by the RSS as a point of contact with Mookerjee, and in 1967 became the President of the Jana Sangh. He is identified with that group within the Jana Sangh which is more flexible than the others. This is particularly significant when we realize that Madhok rose through the RSS ranks.

³⁶Myron Weiner, op. cit.

³⁷Quoted in Craig Baxter, "Jana Sangh: A Brief History," Religion and Politics in South Asia, (ed.) D. E. Smith, (Princeton, 1966), p. 74.

³⁸Balraj Madhok, Political Trends in India, (Delhi, 1959), p. 45.

³⁹Organizer IV:35, April 16, 1951.

⁴⁰Information from issues of Organizer at that time.

⁴¹Madhok, Mookerjee, op. cit., p. 59.

⁴²Ibid., pp 67-8.

⁴³Ibid., p. 68.

⁴⁴The greater part of the information on the organization has been drawn from Motilal A. Jhangiani, Jana Sangh and Swatantra; A Profile of the Rightest Parties in India, (Bombay, 1965), pp 28-44.

⁴⁵In Hindi this means the "big noise" or "big affair".

⁴⁶Jhangiani, op. cit., p. 31.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 35.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Organizer, XII:16, Jan. 5, 1959.

⁵⁰Information from Jhangiani, op. cit.

⁵¹India 1965. Government of India Publications Divisions, (New Delhi, 1965), pp 377-8.

⁵²Organizer, XI:31, April 1, 1958.

⁵³Howard L. Erdman, The Swatantra Party and Indian Conservatism, (Cambridge, 1967), p. 34.

⁵⁴Myron Weiner, Party Building in a New Nation: The Indian National Congress, (Chicago, 1967), p. 84.

⁵⁵David E. Apter, "Ideology and Discontent", in Some Conceptual Approaches to the Study of Modernization, (Englewood Cliffs, 1968), pp 233-271.

⁵⁶Craig Baxter, "The Jana Sangh: A Brief History", in South Asian Politics and Religion (ed.) Donald E. Smith (Princeton, 1966), p. 79.

⁵⁷Organizer, V:11 Oct. 29, 1951. The Jana Sangh Manifesto for the 1951 Election was printed in this issue of the Organizer and quotations of the Manifesto are obtained from there.

⁵⁸Balraj Madhok, Why Jana Sangh? (Bombay, n.d.), p. 19.

⁵⁹Organizer, V:11, Oct. 29, 1951.

⁶⁰Ibid.

⁶¹Syama Prasad Mookerjee had organized the National Democratic Party (NDP) in Parliament as an opposition group of which he was chief spokesman. It is said that the attention he received on his intervention in the House was comparable to that which is available to the Leader of the House the Prime Minister. (Lanka Sundaram, "The Role of an Independent Member" in A. B. Lal, ed. The Indian Parliament, Allahabad, Chaitanya Publishing House, 1956), p. 65. The NDP had members of a varied colour: representing the Jana Sangh, Ganatantra Parishad, Mahasabha, Tamilnad Toilers Party, Akali Dal, Commonweal Party, Dravida Kazhagani, Lok Sewak Sangh and Independents.

⁶²Craig Baxter, op. cit., p. 89.

⁶³Organizer, VIII:2, Aug., 1954.

⁶⁴P. D. Devanandan and M. M. Thomas (eds.) Problems of Indian Democracy, (Bangalore, 1962), p. 187.

⁶⁵Organizer, X:25, Feb. 25, 1957.

⁶⁶Balraj Madhok, "Jana Sangh and Elections," in National Politics and the 1957 Elections, (ed.) S. L. Poplai, (Delhi, 1957), p. 62.

⁶⁷Organizer, X:25, op. cit.

⁶⁸Rajagopalachari now felt that the Congress needed a Conservative opposition.

⁶⁹Organizer, XIII:7, Oct. 3, 1959.

⁷⁰Organizer, XIII:5, June 15, 1959.

⁷¹Balraj Madhok, Political Trends in India (Delhi, 1959), p. 142-4.

⁷²Organizer, XVIII:2, August 24, 1964.

⁷³R. Chandidas, Leon Clark, Richard Fontera, Ward Morehouse (eds.) India Votes: A Source Book on Indian Elections, (New York, 1968), pp 19-32.

⁷⁴Craig Baxter, op. cit., p. 82.

⁷⁵Craig Baxter, op. cit., p. 101.

⁷⁶Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. II:42, Oct. 21, 1967, p. 1903.

⁷⁷Link, July 14, 1968.

⁷⁸Norman D. Palmer, United States and South Asia (Boston, 1966), p. 4.

⁷⁹Howard L. Erdman, "The Foreign Policy Views of the Indian Right," Pacific Affairs, XXXIX, Spring-Summer, 1966, p. 6.

⁸⁰Jhangiani, op. cit., p. 45.

⁸¹Atal Bihari Vajapayee was born in Gwalion M.P., in 1926, and studied at the Dayanand Anglo-Vedic College in Kanpur, and was General Secretary of the Arya Kumar Sabha, an Arya Samajist youth group, in 1944. In 1941, Vajapayee joined the RSS, and worked on papers close to the organization, the Panchajanya of Lucknow. He was Mookerjee's personal secretary and at present Vajapayee is President of the Jana Sangh, and has also shown himself to belong to the more flexible of the party.

⁸²Balraj Madhok, Why Jana Sangh?, (Bombay, N.D.), p. 10.

⁸³Jhangiani, op. cit., p. 46.

⁸⁴Balraj Puri, "Sangh's Influence on Indian Policy," Kashmir Affairs, II:3, Jan.-Feb. 1960, pp 22-23.

⁸⁵Balraj Madhok, Kashmir: Center of New Alignments, (New Delhi, 1963), p. 123.

- ⁸⁶Balraj Madhok, Syama Prasad Mookerjee, (New Delhi, 1953), p. 276.
- ⁸⁷Ibid., p. 290.
- ⁸⁸Organizer, X:25, Feb. 15, 1952.
- ⁸⁹Balraj Madhok, Kashmir: Center of New Alignments, op. cit., Chap. XI.
- ⁹⁰Balraj Madhok, Why Jana Sangh, op. cit., p. 11.
- ⁹¹Howard L. Erdman, Pacific Affairs, p. 11.
- ⁹²Organizer, July 20, 1964.
- ⁹³Organizer, V:12, Nov. 5, 1951.
- ⁹⁴Organizer, VIII:20, Dec. 28, 1953.
- ⁹⁵Organizer, XII:36, May 25, 1959.
- ⁹⁶Organizer, XIII:24, Feb. 1, 1960.
- ⁹⁷Ibid.
- ⁹⁸Ibid.
- ⁹⁹Ibid.
- ¹⁰⁰Organizer, XIII:36, April 25, 1966.
- ¹⁰¹Organizer, XIII:1, August 25, 1959.
- ¹⁰²Ibid.
- ¹⁰³Material drawn from K. Raman Pillai "India and the Commonwealth: Attitudes of Opposition Parties", The Modern Review, 120:6, 1966.
- ¹⁰⁴Who Bharatiya Jana Sangh, Presidential address of S. P. Mookerjee. Opening Convention, Delhi, Oct. 1951, p. 6.
- ¹⁰⁵Organizer, Vol. VIII:40, May 23, 1960.
- ¹⁰⁶Organizer, XVII:52, July 27, 1964, p. 3.
- ¹⁰⁷Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, Vol. 1, pp 180-1.
- ¹⁰⁸Organizer, IX:18, Jan. 2, 1956.
- ¹⁰⁹Organizer, Aug. 10, 1964.
- ¹¹⁰"Main Political Parties of India," International Affairs, 1962, Part 2, p. 105.

- 111 emphasis added.
- 112 Balraj Madhok, Why Jana Sangh, op. cit., p. 13.
- 113 Howard L. Erdman, "Foreign Policy Views of the Indian Right", Pacific Affairs, op. cit., p. 17.
- 114 Ibid.
- 115 Ibid.
- 116 Conversation with Dr. Amiya Chakravarty in Manhattan, Kansas, on April 11, 1968.
- 117 B. L. Maheshwari, "Foreign Policy of the Jana Sangh," Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 11, No. 35, Aug. 31, 1968, p. 1334.
- 118 Howard L. Erdman, Pacific Affairs, op. cit., p. 15.
- 119 Norman D. Palmer, "India's 4th General Election," Asian Survey, VIII:5, May, 1967, p. 275.
- 120 Richard Rose and Harve Mossawir, "Voting and Elections: A Functional Analysis," Political Studies, XV:2, June 1967, pp 174-179.
- 121 Ibid., p. 175.
- 122 Rose and Harve, Political Studies, pp 174-176.
- 123 Paul Wallace, "India: The Dispersion of Political Power," Asian Survey, VIII:2, Feb. 1968, p. 88.
- 124 The Statesman (New Delhi), Sept. 27, 1951. Quoted in Nehru on Communalism, (New Delhi, 1965).
- 125 The Statesman (New Delhi), Dec. 12, 1951. Quoted in Nehru on Communalism, op. cit., p. 237.
- 126 Organizer, V:7, Oct. 1, 1951.
- 127 S. V. Kogekar and Richard Park, (eds.) Reports on the Indian Elections 1951-52, (Bombay, 1956), p. 155.
- 128 Balraj Madhok, Political Trends in India, (Delhi, 1959), p. 155.
- 129 Organizer, V:29, March 5, 1952.
- 130 Ibid., V:28, Feb. 25, 1952.
- 131 Indra Prakash, A Review of the History and Work of the Hindu Mahasabha and Hindu Sanghatan Movement, (Delhi, 1952).

¹³²Craig Baxter, "A Short History of the Jana Sangh," South Asian Politics and Religion (ed.) Donald E. Smith, Princeton, 1966), p. 85.

¹³³Ibid., p. 87.

¹³⁴Motilal A. Jhangiani, op. cit., p. 52.

¹³⁵Myron Weiner, Party Politics in India (Princeton, 1957), p. 214.

¹³⁶Sisir Gupta, "Parties Between the Elections," National Politics and 1957 Elections in India, ed. S. L. Poplai, (Delhi, 1957), p. 37.

¹³⁷Craig Baxter, op. cit., p. 88.

¹³⁸Link, August 6, 1967.

¹³⁹Organizer, X:24, Feb. 18, 1957.

¹⁴⁰Organizer, X:20, Jan. 21, 1957.

¹⁴¹Organizer, X:1, Aug. 20, 1956.

¹⁴²Ibid.

¹⁴³Organizer, X:21, Jan. 28, 1957.

¹⁴⁴Organizer, X:28, March 28, 1957.

¹⁴⁵Organizer, X:34, April 29, 1957.

¹⁴⁶Organizer, X:39, June, 1958.

¹⁴⁷Organizer, XIV:35, April 10, 1961.

¹⁴⁸Organizer, XI:8, Nov. 4, 1957 and XI:9, Nov. 11, 1957.

¹⁴⁹Organizer, XII:26, Sept. 22, 1958.

¹⁵⁰Ibid.

¹⁵¹Organizer, XII:8, March 16, 1958.

¹⁵²Organizer, XIII:8, Oct. 2, 1958.

¹⁵³Organizer, XIII:13, Nov. 13, 1958.

¹⁵⁴Dr. Raghuvira was at first a member of the Congress party, and an expert on China. He differed with Nehru and Menon on India's China policy, and wrote a booklet on Tibet criticizing China. He resigned from the Congress in 1961 and joined the Jana Sangh and was Jana Sangh President in 1962-63. He died in an automobile crash, while campaigning.

- 155 For an account of the election see Norman D. Palmer, "The 1962 Election in North Bombay", Pacific Affairs, Summer, 1963, 36, p. 110-17.
- 156 Jhangiani, op. cit., p. 161.
- 157 Myron Weiner, Party Building in a New Nation: The Indian National Congress, (Chicago, 1967), p. 155.
- 158 Jhangiani, op. cit., pp 164-65.
- 159 Ibid., pp 162-64.
- 160 Organizer, 88:4, May 28, 1962.
- 161 Ibid.
- 162 Times of India (Delhi), March 2, 1962, p. 7.
- 163 The Hindu, March 3, 1962, p. 5.
- 164 New Age, March 11, 1962, p. 10.
- 165 Eastern Economist, March 2, 1962, p. 5.
- 166 Surinder Suri, 1962 Elections: A Political Analysis, (New Delhi, 1962), p. 58.
- 167 Craig Baxter, op. cit., p. 99.
- 168 Organizer, XVIII:2, Aug. 24, 1964, pp 7-8.
- 169 Ibid., 20:36, April 3, 1967.
- 170 Indian Exoress, June 9, 1967.
- 171 Organizer, XX:27, Feb. 2, 1967.
- 172 Organizer, XX:36, April 3, 1967.
- 173 Ibid.
- 174 Local units put up a candidate despite provincial orders.
- 175 Indian Express, Feb. 14, 1967, p. 7.
- 176 Organizer, April 30, 1967.
- 177 Results obtained from Indian Exoress, Feb. 27, 1967, p. 3.
- 178 Paul Wallace, Asian Survey, p. 10.
- 179 India News, VII:49, Feb. 21, 1969, p. 1.

180Norman D. Palmer, op. cit., p. 291.

181In Hindi parlance this means those that come and those that go. These expressions became common to refer to those party members who would cross the floor without much provocation.

182Hindu Weekly Review, Jan. 8, 1968.

183Indian Express, Jan. 7, 1968.

184Indian Express, Jan. 10, 1968.

185Link, Dec. 10, 1967.

186Indian Express, Feb. 12, 1968.

187Link, Jul. 14, 1968.

188Flexibility exhibited by the party in terms of political behavior can also be called opportunism. The result of such behavior has been increased votes for the Jana Sangh.

189Link, Aug. 11, 1968, p. 7.

190Link, Sept. 22, 1968, p. 23.

191It is possible that flexibility (in tactics) and increasing traditionalisation of the electorate have both been responsible for Jana Sangh success.

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BHARATIYA JANA SANGH: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
A POLITICAL PARTY IN INDIA

by

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The purpose of this study is an investigation of the development of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh Party and an attempt to calculate the future position of the party in the changing Indian political system. At present, the position of opposition parties is assuming greater importance in India due to the declining fortunes of the dominant Congress party, a fact which is evident after the fourth General Elections in 1967. The Jana Sangh has obtained an increased share of the popular vote and seats in the National Parliament and State Legislative Assemblies in each successive election. The rise of the Jana Sangh, a "communal" party is often perceived as a threat to India's secular democracy, but observation of the party indicates that participation in the electoral process tends to modify and moderate the communal character of the party.

In order to calculate the future trends of the party, the origins of the party, its organizational attributes, ideology and electoral performance are studied.

The historical foundations of the Jana Sangh lie in Hindu communal organizations, but the Jana Sangh has been more successful at the polls than other Hindu parties, partly due to less doctrinaire behavior. Further expansion of the party's influence seems to require that this flexibility be maintained. The functioning of the organizational apparatus of the Jana Sangh ensures stability and continuity of the party, and indicates that the Jana Sangh derives its support and leadership from the North Indian states. The study of party ideology reveals a slight change in domestic policy from socio-cultural to economic issues and this is interpreted as a maturing of the party. It is also evident that the popular appeal of the party is greatest in areas of North Indian urban dislocation, and to maintain this following

a hard line on certain foreign policy issues is maintained. It is also clear that the emphatic support of Hindi as the national language in a large measure alienates support for the party in the south Indian States. The electoral performance of the party portrays the increasing support the Jana Sangh has received at the polls. For the present it is evident that aspirations of becoming the party in power at the Center must be postponed, but the Jana Sangh's hopes of achieving power at the State level are justified by its performance. Yet, it is likely that the Jana Sangh will come to power in the States, as it already has in some, in coalition with other political parties. To participate in such coalitions flexibility is necessary, and such flexibility is likely to continue to modify the party's communal character. It is in the states of Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Rajasthan and Bihar that the party will play its most significant role.