

SUN YAT-SEN'S POLITICAL THOUGHT AND ITS INFLUENCE
ON CHINESE NATIONALISTS AND COMMUNISTS

by

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INTRODUCTION

Sun Yat-sen's life was, and still is, a controversial subject in modern China. His noble personality made him sacrifice himself and struggle for the welfare of the Chinese people. His revolutionary activities aroused the Chinese people and awakened that sleeping lion. He was deified by his followers and talked about by all Chinese. Throughout his short sojourn revolution was his life, and he encountered many frustrations. Such a distinguished person with such an extraordinary life merits thorough study.

Leaving the Revolution unfinished Sun left a much disputed ideological legacy to his followers. His thought puzzled many people and his attitude aroused many arguments. His ideas ranged from the right to the left, from the ancient to the modern. Breadth without depth led to doubts and disputes. For the admirable goal--the reconstruction of China, Sun used all possible ideas and means to solve his problems. The result was "chop suey"--a combination with great variation. Such was Sun's thought. With this in mind this paper will try to define his political philosophy.

For example, the story of Sun's relations with the communists is controversial. He had close relations with the Russian Communists, and allowed the Chinese Communists to join

his Kuomintang (Nationalist party). Today, both the Nationalists and the Communists claim themselves to be the legitimate successors of Sun Yat-sen and vilify the other side as the betrayers. The final part of this paper will investigate Sun's position in relationship to the Nationalists and the Communists, his impact on them, and their deviations from his ideas.

CHAPTER I

LIFE

Boyhood

Sun Yat-sen was born in Choy-hung, a little village in the Southern China province, Kwangtung, on November 2, 1866. Both his parents were illiterate. Father was a poor tenant farmer who had to pay 50 percent of what he reaped to the landlord. Mother was a foot-bound woman, hence could not help in the farming but stayed at home and managed the family.

Sun was the youngest of several brothers and sisters. When he was born his father was over 50. The eldest brother, Sun Mei, was one of many Southern Chinese who went to seek their fortunes in Hawaii. Later when Sun was plotting for the revolution, his elder brother gave him substantial financial help.

His childhood years were spent in the little, quiet village, helping the family in every possible way. But the calmness of the village life was not going to last long. It was a calmness between the tumultuous storms.

The Taiping (Great Peace) Rebellion (1850-1864) had been subdued just two years before Sun was born. It was a big-scale rebellion against the corrupt Manchu Dynasty. The Taiping army, which originated in South China, not far from

Sun's birth place, swept over half of China and came a few miles near Peking, the Manchu capital. When the rebellion was finally suppressed the Ching Dynasty was coming to its end too.

The event had tremendous impact on Sun. In his later years he would tell his revolutionary comrades the stories of his childhood. He used to listen to the Taiping veterans' stories. He was fascinated. In his mind he began to have the idea that the Manchu regime was bad, and it did more harm than good to the Chinese people.

As there was no formal educational system Sun was sent to the village's only private tutoring school at the age of nine. In a small room a few students of similar ages followed the only tutor reciting Chinese classics all day long and seven days a week. Since nothing else was taught, the tedious classic course bored Sun. He disobeyed and had heated arguments with the stubborn, old-fashioned tutor on several occasions.¹

Sun stayed in the tutoring school until thirteen when his successful businessman brother came back from Honolulu. Opportunities in Honolulu were very good. Sun Mei wanted his brother to help in his business, so the father and the elder brother arranged to send Sun to Hawaii at the age of fourteen.

In Hawaii Sun helped his brother's enterprise. But in

¹ Stephen Chen and Robert Payne, Sun Yat-sen, a Portrait (New York: The John Day Company, 1946), p. 8.

order to give the young boy the chance to learn English Sun Mei sent him to Iolani School, a boarding school run by Bishop Willis of the Church of England.

Sun was one of the few Chinese boys who attended the school while wearing pigtails. He received a general modern education with emphasis on English language. When he entered the school he knew not one English word, but when he graduated in 1882 he was awarded "the second prize in English grammar"² by King Kalakaua of Hawaii. Aside from that he seemed to be quite an ordinary student. Bishop Willis' comment in his Diocesan Magazine in 1896 was:

As far as can be remembered Tai Cheong's (Sun's given name which he used in his early years) school days gave no indication of his future career. He has left no tradition of hatching plots against magisterial authority. Nor will anyone suppose that he was indoctrinated at Iolani with the love of a republican form of government, much less with the desire of revolutionizing the Celestial Kingdom after the model of Hawaiian Republic, which was then unborn.³

But the contrast of Hawaii, a free and safe society, with China where people were in constant danger of being suppressed and robbed by the Manchu government must have given Sun a deep impression.

But the most salient influence he got in this period was that he, living in a deeply religious atmosphere, was

² Henry Bond Restarick, Sun Yat Sen, Liberator of China (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1931), p. 15.

³ Cited by Restarick, op. cit., p. 14.

converted to Christianity. He told his brother that he wanted to be baptized. The brother, who was a traditional-type, poorly educated Chinese, was furious. To him, to believe in a foreign religion meant to forsake one's ancestors and the Confucian teachings. That was too much for him. He sent word to the father saying that the younger brother was getting truculent and becoming a traitor of Chinese traditions. They agreed to send the young boy back to China to prevent him from being influenced by a foreign religion.

In 1883 Sun arrived in China. His father, a strict Confucian, compelled him to accompany the parents to go to worship the gods and goddesses in the village temple. Superficially he had to obey his father's authority, but in his heart he was getting rebellious. He began to look upon the shiny symbols his father compelled him to worship as idols. He began to reason that the poverty and backwardness in China were mainly because of people's belief in superstition and the control of human beings by the imagined good and evil spirits. The more he thought the more he was urged to do something against the deep-rooted superstition.

The outburst came soon after his return from Hawaii. It was at this time that he met a Shanghai educated youth, Lu Hao-tung, who would later become an intimate friend of Sun Yat-sen and the martyr of the first revolutionary attempt. The two youths plotted to do something against the village temple, the fountain of superstition. The event was depicted vividly by

one of Sun's biographers who interviewed some of Sun's old Cantonese-speaking friends:

Animated by the spirit of rebellion against ancient superstitions, the two youths invited a few companions to accompany them to the village temple at a time when its guardian would be absent. There, at one end, were the three chief idols, the one in the center being Buck Dai, the god to whose service Tai Cheong had been dedicated by his mother. This god had the finger of one hand upraised, while in the other he grasped a sword. In order to show defiance of this god and of idolatry in general, Tai Cheong, the leader, went to the idol and broke off the upraised finger; he also tried to twist off the head, but only succeeded in partly turning it.

Then he went to the goddess on the left, and with his knife scraped off the paint from her face. Her name was Keum Fah, the goddess of flowers, to whom was committed the care of children. Some alarm being given, the goddess on the right, Tin Hau, the queen of Heaven, was not molested.⁴

The next morning, when the event was spread throughout the village, the village people were outraged. They feared that because of the work of a foreign-educated devil the gods and goddesses might seek revenge upon the whole village. To appease the deities the people demanded Sun's father pay for the repair for the damage and Sun had to leave the village.

In late 1883 he arrived in Hong Kong. The next year he entered Queen's College. Soon after that his parents arranged a marriage for him. His bride was also a native of Choy-hung with little bound feet like most women at that time. The temple event seemed to have been forgotten and Sun spent most of his weekends and holidays in Choy-hung.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 24-25.

It was during this period that the Sino-French War occurred. Even though the Manchu army won several battles in Annam (Vietnam) and Formosa, the Manchu regime had developed a xenophobia complex and eagerly negotiated to give up the suzerainty of Annam. The Manchu regime's ridiculous action infuriated Sun as well as millions of Chinese and aroused bitter hatred against the Manchus.

Sun's study at Queen's College was interrupted in 1835, when his brother called him to Honolulu to settle the problem of land that had been bought in Sun Yat-sen's name. After coming back to China he spent a short period as an assistant in Pok Tsai Hospital in Canton. In 1887 he entered the newly established Hong Kong School of Medicine, an institution attached to Alice Memorial Hospital headed by Dr. James Cantlie. Sun stayed there five years and got a diploma to practice medicine and surgery in 1892.

Sun had begun his political activities in secret societies even before his graduation. When he opened a drug-store and began to practice medicine in Macao in 1892, according to an author, "all nine of his employees were secret society members."⁵ He spent much of his time in political activities and most of his earnings to finance them. He wrote later in his biography:

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S. Y. Teng, "Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese Secret Societies," *Studies on Asia*, 1963, p. 82.

All the years between 1885 and 1895 were like one day in my hard fight for national liberty, and my medical practice was no more to me than a means to introduce my propaganda to the world.⁶

But the little Portugese colony, where revolutionary activities could not be investigated by Manchu officials, was not the place for Sun to stay long; soon Sun found himself forbidden to practice medicine because he did not have a Portugese diploma.

Sun went to Canton and was joined by Lu Hao-tung to participate in more political activities. While still having some hope in the Manchu regime Sun wrote down his suggestions to save China, and together the two youths travelled to Tien Tsin to see Li Hung-chang, the most powerful among the "liberal" officials. Sun's suggestions, which later became an important document in his early political thought, were succinctly summarized by a biographer:

Sun took as his goal the same 'Rich country, strong defense' which had served as a slogan for Meiji Japan. He urged four steps: proper employment of human abilities, of the soil, of goods, and free circulation of currency. Under these headings Sun denounced traditional learnings as useless, urged new attention to production techniques and riparian works, and suggested the abolition of bothersome taxes on goods in transit. Sun capped his argument by pointing out that Japan, which had followed these four steps, was now in a far better position than China, although it had met the West a good deal later.⁷

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Chen and Payne, op. cit. p. 25.

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Marius B. Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 61-62.

Sun's advice fell on deaf ears and the two youths returned to Canton dejectedly, losing the last hope in the hopeless regime. One way remained to solve the problem--revolution.

Revolutionary Years

Hung Hsiu-chuen, the leader of the Taiping Rebellion, still lived on in the people's mind. Despite his failure, Hung continued to be admired by Sun as well as many other Southern Chinese as a Chinese hero who fought unsuccessfully against a "foreign" Manchu regime. When all the peaceful means failed to reform the incorrigible government in Peking, Sun began to think seriously of armed rebellion. To him the Taiping Rebellion was a good example. Once started, a revolution could get the active support of patriotic people. From now on Sun would spend most of his life in planning and carrying out armed revolutions.

Shortly after coming back to Canton from Tien Tsin, Sun and Lu began to plan for a coup. They planned to attack the yamen (government office) guards and capture the ammunition and the yamen itself. From there they hoped to have the support of the people in Canton and of the discontented Chinese soldiers in the Manchu army.

The revolutionaries began to solicit contributions to buy weapons and gather comrades from the teeming secret societies. Lu Hao-tung even sold his land and his wife's jewels

to finance the plot. He also designed the flag later used as the national flag of the Republic.

Sun and Lu's petition aroused the Manchu officials' suspicion and their activities from then on were spied upon. Even though the conspirators tried hard to keep everything secret, their plot was detected shortly before action. In the headquarters Lu and four other comrades were arrested and executed. It was in 1895--shortly after China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War.

With difficulty Sun escaped to Hong Kong and from there he went to Kobe, Japan. In Japan he was not safe either, for the Manchu agents might kidnap him and send him back to China to be executed. To escape the detection of Manchu agents Sun managed to transform himself and get rid of the typical Chinese features. In 1896 he accounted the event in the Strand Magazine:

At Kobe, whither I fled from Hong Kong, I took a step of great importance. I cut off my queue, which had been growing all my life. For some days I had not shaved my head, and I allowed the hair to grow on my upper lip. Then I went out to a clothier's and bought a suit of modern Japanese garments. When I was fully dressed I looked in the mirror and was astonished--and a great deal reassured--by the transformation. Nature had favored me. I was darker in complexion than most Chinese, a trait I had inherited from my mother, for my father resembled more the regular type. I have seen it said that I have Melay blood in my veins, and also that I was born in Honolulu. Both these statements are false. I am purely Chinese, as far as I know; but after the Japanese war, when the natives of Japan began to be treated with more respect, I had no trouble, when I let my hair and moustache grow, in passing for a Japanese. I admit I owe a great deal to this circumstance, as otherwise I should

not have escaped from many dangerous situations.⁹

Meanwhile Sun's name grew notorious rather than famous in China. He had been branded "Sun, the Big Gun" for his articulate modern thinking and his agitations against the Manchu regime against bound feet, and against superstition and ancestor worship. The nickname gained more and more popularity until the revolution in 1911. He and three other prominent revolution leaders were called the "Four Bandits". Only after several unsuccessful attempts did most of the people cease to be antagonistic to Sun and his revolutionary activities. On the one hand, the revolutionary activities were educating people. On the other hand, the people were gradually losing faith in the Manchu regime. Because of his unpopularity among the Chinese masses in this early stage of the revolution and because of the persecution of the Manchu government, the Sun family discovered that Choy-hung was no longer a safe place to live in. In 1896 Sun's mother, wife, a four-year-old son--Sun Fo-- and a little daughter sailed for Honolulu to join Sun Mei.

Sun did not stay long in Japan. He began to think that the revolution needed the support of overseas Chinese--affluent businessmen as well as patriotic students. With the intention of converting more supporters and raising more funds

Sun began his first tour around the world. Following his family, Sun sailed for Honolulu where there were many Chinese immigrants.

In Hawaii Sun made speeches which caused many people to believe in the revolutionary movement and organized a branch of Hsing Chung Hui (Revive China Society) with approximately a hundred members. Some of the members were later called back to fight in China by their leader--Sun Yat-sen.

After six months' stay in Hawaii Sun sailed for continental America. In San Francisco, like Honolulu, the center of Cantonese immigration, Sun received a big welcome and generous contributions. He continued to tour the continent, making speeches in big cities. But, at the same time, he had to pay much attention to his own safety, for he had heard that some Manchu agents were seeking him.

In September, 1896, he crossed the Atlantic from New York to London. But soon after his arrival he was to meet the greatest danger in his life. "Sun's own account of this adventure, entitled Kidnapped in London, reads like a detective thriller."¹⁰ The following is the story in his own words:

I was walking down Devonshire Street on my way to church, when a Chinese met me and asked whether I was a Chinese or a Japanese. I told him, and he said he was a Cantonese too. Conversing in Punti as we walked along we met another Chinese. They pressed me to go to their

lodging and have a smoke. I demurred as I said I was to meet Dr. Cantlie at church. We met another Chinese and the first one left us. When we were near the door of a house, which door was open, one on each side compelled me to enter the house. I suspected nothing but when I was inside the door was shut and locked, all at once it flashed over me that I was in the Chinese Legation.

The Legation people had been informed from Washington and they had been watching for me. They sent to Dr. Cantlie's house for my papers, but he would not give them up in my absence, and if they had received them, there would have been many executions in China for all the names of the Society were on them. Sir Halliday McCartney was my chief inquisitor and he told me that a berth had been engaged to take me to China and that I was to be hidden until the ship sailed.

I was locked in a room under strict surveillance for twelve days, awaiting my transportation on board ship, as a lunatic, back to China, and I should never have escaped, had not my old friend, Dr. Cantlie, been then living in London. To him I managed after many failures to get through a message.¹¹

While being held Sun desperately attempted to bribe anyone to carry the message of kidnap to Dr. Cantlie by throwing out notes wrapped with money which he always carried with him. Finally a note with the following words was picked up by an English servant:

I was kidnapped into the Chinese Legation on Sunday and shall be smuggled out from England to China for death. Pray rescue me quick? A ship is already chartered by the C. L. for the service to take me to China and I shall be locked up all the way without communication to anybody. O! Woe to me!¹²

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Restarick, op. cit., p. 51.

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Cited by Hsi-chi Chen, Sun Yat-sen before the Establishment of Tung Meng Hui (China: Kwangtung People's Press, 1957), p. viii.

The following morning Dr. Cantlie received a letter with the following message:

There is a friend of yours imprisoned in the Chinese legation here since last Sunday; they intend sending him out to China, where it is certain they will hang him. It is very sad for the poor man, and unless something is done at once he will be taken away and no one will know it. I dare not sign my name, but this is the truth, so believe what I say. Whatever you do must be done at once, or it will be too late. His name is, I believe, Sin Yin Sen.¹³

Dr. Cantlie lost no time in rescuing his protege. He informed government officials, the Scotland Yard and reporters, and hired some detectives to watch the legation building. The next day onlookers and reporters began to gather outside the Chinese Legation. The Chinese Legation, seeing no hope to smuggle out Sun, finally released him after twelve days' retention.

Now Sun Yat-sen emerged as a world famous man to the detriment of the Manchu regime. The tactics utilized by the government to kidnap a political opponent enraged many people. On the contrary, in the minds of those people, Sun became a revolutionary hero, who was trying to overthrow a corrupt government. The event was more effective in changing the minds of the apathetic Chinese as well as foreigners, than any of Sun's eloquent speeches.

While he was gaining an international reputation, Sun was having little progress in his revolution. Later he would

confess:

The years between 1895 and 1900 were the most difficult time in the progress of the revolution. Since I have failed, the hold on China, my personal work, the position of further operations, and the foundation of revolution built during more than ten years, have all disappeared. Propaganda overseas was without any effect. Just at this time there grew up the pro-monarchist party, which worked for the enemy. Its opposition to revolution and republicanism was greater than that of the Manchu government. At this time the prospect of revolution was dark beyond comparison, and nearly all hope was lost.¹⁴

But Sun did not waste his time. He spent most of his time in the British Museum studying diplomacy, law, mining agriculture, animal husbandry, mechanics, politics and economics.¹⁵ Among these Sun paid most attention to the study of social sciences. Sun's former education in Hawaii, Hong Kong and Canton mainly concerned pure science and other applied science courses. After all the revolutionary years, he began to realize that China's backwardness was not solely because of the corrupt Manchu regime. To reform China, besides overthrowing the Manchu regime, many social, political, and economic problems must also be solved. The establishment of a utopian republic in China could not alone save China. It was during this period that Sun began to form his Three Principles of the People.

Thus far Sun had been emphasizing Chinese nationalism,

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 48.

¹⁵ Hsi-Chi Chen, op. cit., p. 40.

which he used against the Manchu regime and the foreign imperialists. During this period he developed his second (Democracy) and third (People's Livelihood) Principles. He studied Montesquieu's theory of separation of power and checks and balances. He also studied the democracies of the United States, Britain, France and Switzerland. He found the Western "three power" constitutions inadequate, and, by adding two old Chinese institutions, he created the "five power" constitution.

Sun formed his theory of "People's Livelihood" from socialist theories. For this he had apparently studied Karl Marx and was greatly influenced by Das Kapital. Fourteen years later he would say: "There was a German called Marx who studied thoroughly the problem of capitalism for nearly thirty years, and wrote a book called Das Kapital which fully expounded the truth and systematized the former undisciplined theories. Now the students of society can have something to depend on and do not have to resort to crude and radical opinions."¹⁶ But Sun did not think that the Marxian theory could be used in China. Instead, to prevent the future evils of capitalism in China, he considered Henry George's theory of land control by the government most appropriate. In short, he wanted a half-Chinese, half-Western socialism to be carried out in China.

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Ibid., op. cit., p. 42.

After staying in London for several months Sun toured continental Europe. There he made speeches and converted some Chinese students who were studying in France and Germany. From Paris he sailed for Singapore, Japan and the United States, making speeches and raising funds for the second revolutionary attempt.

Meanwhile the deteriorating situation in China gave Sun a big opportunity. In Peking the conflicts between foreigners and the superstitious Boxers, who claimed that no bullets could go through their bodies, were widened. The aging Empress Dowager, had in 1898 imprisoned her impotent ruling grandson, captured and executed many of Kang Yu-wei and Liang Chi-chao's followers in the "Hundred-day Reform." Now she was eager to find a chance to revenge all the evils and humiliations caused by foreigners. The Boxers' slogans like "Protect the Ching (Manchu) Dynasty, destroy the barbarians (Westerners)" fascinated her and enticed her clandestine support and encouragement. When the Boxers began to ransack foreign legations and murder foreigners in the summer of 1900, the united troops of eight foreign powers came upon Peking, looted and burned the beautiful capital while Empress Dowager escaped to the interior.

Sun planned to use the confusion in the North to strike Weichow, a seaport about a hundred miles north of Canton. He made a contract with the Japanese government to buy munitions and weapons. While the revolutionaries waited in Canton, Sun

continued to solicit funds outside of China. He also printed paper money which he promised to redeem upon the success of the revolution. But his plans and efforts were rendered futile by two unfortunate events. The government in Japan, with which Sun had an arrangement, fell shortly before Sun's planned date to strike. The new government cancelled the contract. When Sun landed in Hong Kong he was also closely watched by the Hong Kong authorities who had been warned by the Manchu government. While trying to avoid attention much precious time was lost and the order to disperse the revolutionaries was delayed. The detachment in Waichow did rise and strike. They fought half a month and held back many Manchu troops. When their munitions ran out they had to disperse. The battle changed the people's attitude and gave Sun tremendous encouragement.

After the failure Sun again made a tour around the world, again accusing the Manchu regime of corruption and atrocity and arguing that the only way to save China was the overthrow of the Manchu regime and the establishment of a republic. But this time the Kang-Liang groups who were expelled by the Empress Dowager after the "Hundred-day Reform" were powerful in many overseas Chinese communities. In order to attract more followers for his cause Sun had to battle the Kang-Liang theory of constitutional monarchy. To the Reformists the best way to save China was the creation of a constitution under the Manchu emperor. But to Sun the Manchu regime was

beyond any hope of reform.

Sun went to Japan and then arrived in Honolulu in 1903. After staying there for six months he, trying to avoid the exclusion of foreigners' entry under the new policy, signed the following document:

I, Sun Yat-sen being first duly sworn, depose and say that to the best of my knowledge and belief I was born at Waimanu, Ewa, Oahu, on the twentyfourth day of December, A.D. 1870; that I am a physician, practicing at present at Kula, Island of Maui; that I make my home in said Kula; that my father, Sun Tet Sung, went to China about 1874 and died there about eight years later; that this affidavit is made for the purpose of identifying myself and as a further proof of Hawaiian birth; that the photograph attached is a good likeness of me at this time.

Sun Yat-sen¹⁷

In April 1904 Sun arrived in San Francisco and made a speaking tour across the continent to New York. It was during this period that he began to be influenced by Lincoln's idea of "government of the people, by the people and for the people." The later triple division of his political thought, nationalism (of the people), people's sovereignty (by the people), and people's livelihood (for the people), was apparently modeled on Lincoln's idea.

From New York Sun sailed for London and continental Europe. He held conventions in Brussels, Berlin and Paris. This time he attracted more students. The young, progressive

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Cited by Chen and Payne, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

followers gave new blood to the revolutionary cause.

From Europe Sun went to Japan in July 1905. There he inaugurated the first chapter of Tung Meng Hui (Chinese Revolutionary Alliance) which later evolved into Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist People's Party). The meetings were attended by students as well as scholars who would later become prominent figures in the Republican era. Six principles were also adopted, some of which later continued to be the policies of the Republican government:

1. The overthrow of the present government.
2. The establishment of a republican government.
3. Maintenance of world peace.
4. Nationalization of the land.
5. Promotion of friendship between the Japanese and Chinese peoples.
6. Requests to foreign countries to support the work of reform.¹⁸

Meanwhile Sun was planning another coup. In October, 1907, he struck near Tonkin Gulf. Again the ammunition ran out. While other revolutionaries withdrew to Vietnam, Sun had to escape disguised as a beggar. With 750,000 Mexican silver dollars on his head he had to be careful.

Before the imprisoned Emperor Kuang Hsu and the despotic Empress Dowager died in November, 1908 Sun had led seven unsuccessful revolutionary attempts, all in the area near Canton.

The death of the Empress Dowager and the ascendancy of

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Ibid., p. 72.

the puppet child Emperor Pu Yi gave the Reformists a good opportunity. The Reformists had been very active since the Sino-Japanese War of 1904-5. The victory of a tiny constitutional Japanese monarchy over a gigantic despotic Chinese monarchy greatly encouraged the Reformists to promote a Japanese-style constitution in China. Since the Empress Dowager was unwilling to give up any bit of her absolute power, nothing much had been achieved. After the Empress Dowager's death the new Manchu rulers began to yield, though reluctantly, to the Reformists who were gaining momentum among the masses. The Manchus promised to adopt a constitution in nine years which was reluctantly shortened to six years. But when there was no choice, the Manchus had to set up, shortly before the 1911 revolution, a responsible cabinet whose members were preponderantly the Manchu aristocrats.

From the very beginning of the constitutional movement Sun realized that the movement as well as the promise by the Manchu regime was a farce. He reasoned:

It is absolutely impossible for the Manchus to reform the country, because reformation means detriment to them... The Manchu dynasty may be likened to a collapsing house; the whole structure is thoroughly rotten to its very foundation...¹⁹

He staunchly believed that the regime was hopeless and that the only hope for China was the establishment of a republic. With

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Cited by Palmer, op. cit., p. 196.

this conviction in mind Sun continued to struggle for his goal, despite numerous frustrations and failures.

After the seventh unsuccessful attempt Sun was again preparing for more. He was having his third tour around the world while directing two more unsuccessful attempts in Canton in early 1910 and early 1911. From Singapore he went to Japan, then to the United States. While in the United States he heard the news that revolution had broken out in Wuchang, central China. In New York he received a cable from China, asking him to return to China immediately. During his brief stay in New York he made several speeches, soliciting support for the new Republic. From New York he sailed for London. In London he received another cable from China telling him that he was elected the President of the Republic of China. From London Sun went to Europe, acquiring more supporters for the Republican cause.

Triumph, Frustrations and Untimely Death

Sun arrived in Shanghai in December, 1911. Instead of hiding himself, this time Sun drew big cheering crowds and saluting guns. Instead of being called a "bandit", he was now a hero. A new China was born and Sun Yat-sen was the founder of the Republic.

The representatives of all the provinces that had declared their independence from the Manchu regime assembled in Nanking and formally elected Sun Provisional President. Li Yuan-hung, who led the uprising in Wuchang, was elected

Provisional Vice-President. On January 1, 1912 Sun was inaugurated Provisional President of the Republic of China.²⁰

Meanwhile North China was still under the control of the Manchu government. When the Manchus realized the hopelessness of the situation as well as their dynasty they began to remember Yuan Shih-kai who was deprived of military power shortly before. A cunning warlord and an ambitious soldier, Yuan had contributed a lot to the stability of the falling Manchu Dynasty. Shortly before the 1904-5 Sino-Japanese War the Manchus sent Yuan to stabilize the deteriorating situation in Korea and train a new army for the Korean government. Despite the ultimate defeat of the Manchu army and navy in the Sino-Japanese conflict in Korea, Yuan's achievements in Korea made the Manchu officials consider Yuan a young, able officer. During the Boxer Uprising in 1900 Yuan saw the futility of the superstitious and chauvinistic Boxers, and tried to suppress them in his domain in Shangtung. When the uprising was over, not only the Manchus thanked him but also foreigners appreciated his farsightedness.

The Manchu government asked Yuan to head the newly established cabinet and commissioned him to control the armed forces in order to deal with the Republic in the South. Instead

of staying loyal to the Manchu regime, he used his power to realize his own ambition. He made a secret deal with the South to remove the Manchu regime. To the Manchus he said that there was no more hope for their dynasty and that the only way to keep their lives, properties, and prestige, was the abdication of the Emperor. The Manchus also saw the futility of further struggle, and the baby Emperor abdicated on February 12, 1911.

For the South, Yuan's strategy was to keep a neutral position between the Emperor and the Republic. He hinted to the South that he could depose the Emperor if he were made the President of the Republic. When Sun was inaugurated Provisional President Yuan cabled the government of the South opposing the establishment of a republican government in China.

Sun realized Yuan's unreliability. But to achieve internal peace and establish a republic Sun saw no way out but give up his Presidency to satisfy the ambition of Yuan, who was in control of a strong army. After Yuan had promised to have his capital in Nanking instead of Peking where he had strong support and keep the republican form of government, Sun resigned on February 14, two days after the abdication of the last Manchu Emperor. The National Assembly in Nanking elected Yuan to the Presidency.

But Yuan, despite his promise, was unwilling to leave his nest in Peking. He knew if he became the President in Nanking, he would only be a figurehead and impotent. His ambition was

more than that. He ordered his soldiers to make chaos in Peking and told the National Assembly in Nanking that for the safety of Peking and North China he could not leave Peking. On March 10, Yuan was inaugurated Provisional President in Peking. The National Assembly saw no reason to remain in Nanking while the President was in Peking, and voted to move to Peking.²¹

Now that Sun had rid himself of his political duties, he had the intention to contribute to the country as a civilian. For a long time he had believed that China needed a railway network more than anything else in the process of modernization. Immediately after his resignation Sun set up the Bureau of Railway Development in Shanghai and he became the Director-General of the Bureau. In this period he also made speeches in Peking, talking about his hope for the Republic and his plans to rebuild China.

But soon Yuan's conspiracy began to be seen. On March 20, Sung Chiao-jen, a Kuomintang leader in the National Assembly and a staunch supporter of cabinet government, was assassinated in Shanghai. As no assassin was caught, most people believed Yuan to be the plotter. In April, in order to increase his military power, Yuan negotiated with the Five-Power Consortium for a loan of 75,000,000. The loan was negotiated without the

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Ibid., pp. 345-353.

knowledge of the National Assembly. Upon learning the fact, the supreme legislature voted to void it, but Yuan was indifferent. He used the money to buy weapons from the Krupps, instead of working for internal improvement.²² Now the people began to be disillusioned by Yuan's regime.

Sun, now a civilian, could do nothing but entreat the foreign powers to stop paying Yuan and accuse Yuan as a tyrant. On the other hand, Yuan, considering Sun an obstacle for his ambition, wanted to get rid of him. Being pursued by the secret police, Sun escaped from Peking to Nanking. Upon his arrival at home he discovered that the house had just been searched and his wife questioned.²³ Again, Sun had to leave the Republic he had created and became a political exile. Early in 1913 he sailed for Japan to start his uneven career for the "Second Revolution", while his position of Director-General in Shanghai was taken away from him.

In Peking, Yuan was vigorously plotting to become an emperor. He had his lackeys organize the so-called "Restore Monarchy Petition Group". He dissolved the majority Kuomintang, and finally in early 1914, suspended the National Assembly.

In domestic affairs Yuan was omnipotent and dictatorial. But in foreign affairs he was impotent and dastard. When World War I broke out Japan attacked and captured Chiao-chou

²²
Ibid., pp. 390-391.

²³
Restarick, op. cit., p. 117.

Gulf, a German colony in China. Japan refused to give up the land despite China's effort to regain it. Not only that, but right after the event, Japan handed Yuan the notorious Twenty-One Demands, dealing with Shangtung Peninsula, Manchuria and other territorial privileges in China, which would humiliate China and cause her to be Japan's semi-colony. Being eager to become an emperor which on January 1, 1916 he claimed himself to be Yuan accepted all the Twenty-One Demands.

Meanwhile sporadic resistance against Yuan's attempt to restore China to monarchy broke out. Yuan's submission to the Twenty-One Demands angered many people. Sun declared his resolution to bring down Yuan's illegal regime while revolutionaries made an abortive attempt to capture the Shanghai arsenal. In the South, General Tsai Ao raised a powerful army and began armed conflict with Yuan's forces. Soon some provinces began to declare independence. Yuan, under great pressure, had to renounce the monarchy and on March 22, he restored the Republic. But this time his opponents were resolved to overthrow him. On June 6 Yuan, frustrated and defeated, died a melancholy death, and the Presidency was resumed by Li Yuan-hung, the Vice-President. From this time on until the end of Kuomintang's Northern Expedition, North China was under the control of selfish and militaristic warlords.

During his civilian years in Shanghai, Sun had a young American-educated secretary, Eling Soong. When Eling Soong was married to H. H. Kung, her younger sister, Chin-ling,

succeeded to her position. Soon Sun fell in love with the charming, American-educated lady, who also adored the revolutionary leader. Sun divorced his wife who now had three children, a boy and two girls, and secretly married Chin-ling Soong in Japan.²⁴ When the secret became known his enemies as well as friends began to attack him as immoral and unchristian, though many continued to follow his leadership in behalf of the unfinished revolution.

When Yuan suspended the National Assembly the Southern Assemblymen escaped to the South. When Sun managed to set up a military government in Canton in August, 1917, and was elected generalissimo by the Assemblymen, he hoped that the military government could be a tool to fight for the Republican cause in China. But, since the government had no territory and no army and was not supported by any foreign power, Sun soon found it difficult to continue. He resigned and went to Shanghai where he wrote the program of National Reconstruction.

In late 1920, Chen Chiung-ming, one of Sun's followers, was powerful enough to capture Kwangtung Province. Sun returned to Canton, set up a government and was elected President by the National Assembly. Soon Sun began to plan for a military expedition against the Northern warlords who were fighting against

²⁴ Elmer Clark, The Chiangs of China (New York: Abingden, 1939), pp. 57-59.

one another most of the time, and did succeed in several expeditions in the nearby areas. But in June, 1922, Chen Chiung-ming turned his guns against Sun, and Sun had to escape through Hong Kong to Shanghai.

In February, 1923, Sun returned to Canton after Chen Chiung-ming was expelled. He was again planning to conquer the North. When the Western colonial powers which considered the government in Peking the only legitimate one, refused to help Sun, not even allowing him to have the customs taxes in the South, Sun began to turn to Russia for help and for revolutionary guidance. It was in this period that he began to lean toward communism and interviewed the Soviet envoys. In preparation for setting up a military institution to train soldiers Sun sent Chiang Kai-shek to Moscow. In June, 1924, Whampao Military Academy was established with Chiang Kai-shek as its head. Later the Academy was to contribute tremendously to China's unification by force.

While Sun was prospering in the South and winning some battles in the contacts with the forces of the warlords, he did not give up the hope for a peaceful unification of China. He had been communicating with the government in Peking for a conference and was invited to go to Peking as a Southern envoy. In November, 1924, Sun left Canton for Peking. He fell sick on his way, and upon arrival in Peking was sent to the missionary Peking Union Medical College. There

...he was operated upon by Dr. Adrian Taylor, a former

missionary and head of the Department of Surgery and it was discovered beyond all doubt that the disease was cancer--the liver was hard like a stone. When the wound was closed, a treatment of ultraviolet rays was employed as a last resort, but on February 18, when nearly all hope was abandoned, he was removed to Wellington Koo's Chinese home...There he spent his last days.²⁵

When it became apparent that Sun had no chance for recovery, his followers begged him to give his will. Wang Chin-wei, a prominent, scholarly revolutionary, and a staunch follower of Sun, was asked to make the following draft:

For forty years I have devoted myself to the cause of the National Revolution, the object of which is to raise China to a position of independence and equality (among the nations). The experience of these forty years has convinced me that, to attain this goal, the people must be aroused and that we must associate ourselves in a common struggle with all the peoples of the world who treat us as equals.

The Revolution is not yet finished. Let all our comrades follow (the principles and methods set forth in) my writings, the Plans of National Reconstruction, the Fundamentals of National Reconstruction, the Three Principles of the People, and the Manifesto, issued by the First National Convention of our Party, and continue to make every effort to carry them into effect. Above all, my recent declarations in favor of holding a National Convention of the People of China and abolishing the unequal treaties should be carried into effect as soon as possible.

This is my last will and testament.

March 11, 1925

Sun Wen ²⁶

When it was read to him, Sun nodded with agreement. A few

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Chen and Payne, op. cit., p. 215.

²⁶

Arthur N. Holcombe, The Chinese Revolution, a Phase in the Regeneration of a World Power (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1930), p. 351.

days later, on March 12, 1925, Sun died while muttering:
 "Peace...Struggle...Save China."

Comment of Sun's Life

Sun Yst-sen was the product of the old Chinese traditions, but he was also the creator of the new order in China. In his family Sun was the only one that was critical of the outmoded traditions. His father, mother and elder brother who had much influence on the revolution leader were all old-styled Chinese and die-hard traditionalists. But in these circumstances Sun emerged as a revolutionary, iconoclast, and reformer.

With his background and training Sun should have been able to have a comfortable and peaceful life in China as well as abroad. But Sun gave up this and followed a turbulent life in order to pursue his aspirations. His mother, after the evacuation to Hawaii, was alleged to have said: "Oh, Tai Cheong! Why did you not live peaceably in Choy-hung instead of making all this disturbance?"²⁷ Under this family influence Sun had an admirable determination to rebel against the deep-rooted beliefs. It was fortunate for China to have a determined revolution leader like Sun who was educated abroad and totally modernized.

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Restarick, op. cit., p. 3.

Sun was ambitious; he was ambitious for the future of China. But, one might ask, had he been struggling all those years for his own personal ambition like Yuan Shih-kai? Apparently the answer is a negative one. When Sun gave up his Presidency, the fruit of his struggle for fifteen years, he apparently had a goal higher than personal ambition in mind. What he had in mind was peace, unity and reform in China. He was a contrast to the warlords who possessed armies, and occupied territories to realize their personal ambitions. If Sun were personally ambitious, he would have tried to keep the position he had acquired no matter what happened. The fact that he gave up his Presidency and nominated Yuan to be a President of the Republic showed his magnanimity and unselfishness. He might have been naive in trying to prod an unscrupulous military man to rule a newly established Republic, but his motive was beyond doubt a good one.

As to his resignation in behalf of Yuan, was it wise? Sun thought so. He reasoned: "True, Yuan Shih-kai cannot be relied on, but I want to use him to uproot the Manchu autocracy of more than 260 years. It is wiser than using ten thousand troops."²³ But if Yuan should do evil things? Sun's answer was: "Should Yuan follow the Manchus to do evils, he can easily be

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Cited by Huang Chi-lu, "Sun Yat-sen's Diplomatic Decisions," Biographical Literature (Chinese text, published in Formosa), January, 1966, p. 25.

toppled, because his base is not so stable as before."²⁹ Wise or not, Yuan's ascendancy made the situation in China more confused. But, if Sun had not yielded, would the situation have been better? Would there have been civil war and more confusion? Or could Sun have bested Yuan, have unified China with force, and have established a republic? These are the questions that are still puzzling historians today.

Another illustration of Sun's unselfishness was shown in his refusal to satisfy his brother's personal ambition. When Sun became the President of the government in Canton, his brother who spent most of his fortune in financing Sun's revolutionary activities wanted to have the governorship of Kwangtung Province as the reward for his enterprise. But Sun refused, reasoning that the businessman brother had no ability to be a governor. When the brother wanted his money back Sun had to give him \$20,000, considered the return of the loan to the Republic. Sun's unselfishness was a salient contrast to the preceding and succeeding rulers whose nepotism was notorious.

The Reverend Teiichi Hori, who had some contacts with Sun in Honolulu and Yokohama, Japan, commented that he had a high opinion of Sun who was sincere, able and devoted to his cause.³⁰ Throughout his revolutionary career Sun trusted his

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Ibid.

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Restarick, op. cit., p. 101.

colleagues and followers and was never betrayed except by Chen Chung-min's rebellion in Canton. Despite his integrity, he was also a Machiavellian in some instances. To facilitate his revolutionary activities he made a fraudulent birth certificate in Hawaii. To finance the revolution he printed paper money. But always in his mind there was a higher goal, and he never deviated from his goal--to pull down a corrupt regime and establish a republic in China. The goal justified all necessary means.

One thing that remains unjustified and disputed is his marriage to Soong Chin-ling. To the young idealistic followers the marriage proved that Sun, a genuine revolutionary, fought against everything traditional--including a traditional wife. But to the moralistic people and the Christian Fundamentalists Sun's marriage was unforgivable.

As to his revolutionary efforts, one might ask, despite his goal, his perseverance and determination for the revolution, did he have any influence on the revolution of 1911? The 1911 revolution was unplanned by Sun or his followers. It was a spontaneous uprising and when it occurred Sun was still abroad. Nevertheless, Sun's ten unsuccessful attempts did succeed in arousing people's anti-Manchu sentiment. When his second attempt at Waichow failed in 1900 Sun noticed the gradual change in people's mind. Later he was to say:

After the Waichow failure I noticed the difference in the minds of those Chinese people. Before that I was considered a traitor. Vilifications against me never

stopped...and no one dared to be my friend. After that I heard few attacks on me and many began to regret my failure. The difference greatly pleased me and I know my fellow countrymen have gradually waken up from their illusion.³¹

In 1910 while soliciting funds and recruiting followers in the United States for another attempt, he was so confident of success that he expected people to help him voluntarily wherever and whenever he attempted an uprising. Some of the fighters were Sun's followers when the armed revolt broke out in Wuchang in 1911. In fact, after fifteen years' efforts, Sun had so many followers and gained so many people for the Republican cause, that he became the most eminent revolutionary leader in China. This is the reason that Sun was immediately recalled back to China to lead the triumphant revolutionaries.

At any rate Sun Yat-sen was a great revolutionary leader. Because of his efforts, a republic was established in China. He had succeeded in waking up the sleeping lion. And he had earned himself a place in the history of China.

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Hsi-chi Chen, op. cit., pp. 66-67.

CHAPTER II

POLITICAL THOUGHT

On his deathbed Sun left his will with the advice: "The work of the Revolution is not yet done. Let all our comrades follow my Program of National Reconstruction, Fundamentals of National Reconstruction, Three Principles of the People, and the Kuomintang Manifesto, and strive on earnestly for their consummation..." In this will Sun had indicated all his writings which would later become the basis of the Republic's national policy.

The Three Principles of the People

Among Sun's voluminous writings, San Min Chu I (Three Principles of the People) remains the most important. Owing to his unstable revolutionary life, Sun took a long period to complete the work. In the book he said:

...Part one, The Principle of Nationalism, had already gone to press; the other two parts on democracy and livelihood were almost completed while the general line of thought and method of approach in the other parts had already been mapped out. I was waiting, for some spare time in which I might take up my pen and, without much further research, proceed with the writing. Just as I was contemplating the completion and publication of the book, Chen Chiung-ming unexpectedly revolted... My notes and manuscripts which represented the mental labor of years and hundreds of foreign books which I had collected for reference were all destroyed by fire. It was a

distressing loss.¹

Later when Chen was defeated and Sun returned to be the leader in the Canton government, he found that he had time to deliver one lecture a week. The stenographic reports of the lectures were compiled and published under the title San Min Chu I in March, 1924. Originally Sun planned to deliver six lectures on each of the three principles. But, because of his peace conference with the Peking government, he delivered only four lectures in his Third Principle.² Today, the book has sixteen lectures instead of eighteen as Sun had planned.

Nationalism

After being engaged in the early political agitations Sun began to realize the importance of nationalism. If the Han people, the main ethnic group among the Chinese races, had national consciousness, Sun thought, the Manchu dynasty could easily be overthrown and colonial powers easily expelled. In the early stages of his revolutionary career he emphasized the superiority of Han people over the other races in China. But when the Republic was established he began to stress the need for unity and cooperation of the five major races in China.

¹ Sun Yat-sen, San Min Chu I, trans. Frank W. Price (Chungking, China: Ministry of Information of the Republic of China, 1943), p. xi.

² Another argument for Sun's discontinuing the lectures was that the Soviet advisers were against Sun's criticisms of Marxism in his first two lectures on Socialism and urged him to stop the lectures. See Arthur Holcombe, The Chinese Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University 1930), p. 146.

Among the three principles, Sun put Nationalism before the other two. To Sun, to build a consolidated Chinese Republic, the nationalism of Chinese people must first be aroused. Nationalism was a necessary tool to build the Republic. Only after the establishment of the Republic could the Second (Democracy) and the Third (Socialism or People's Livelihood) Principles be realized.

Sun's lectures on Nationalism started with his explanation of the difference of race and nation. A race could form several nations while a nation could have several races. The Anglo-Saxon race had two big nations in the world. But inside the British Empire there were many races.

Sun divided human beings, according to their colors, into five major races: white, black, red, yellow and brown. The Chinese belonged to the yellow races which included Mongols, Malays, Japanese and Manchus. There were four factors that contributed to the racial differences: blood kinship, common language, common livelihood, common religion and common customs. Based on these factors China was a nation and the Chinese a race. In Sun's own words:

The Chinese race totals four hundred million people; of mingled races there are only a few million Mongolians, a million or so Manchus, a few million Tibetans, and over a million Mohammedan Turks. These alien races do not number altogether more than ten million, so that, for the most part, the Chinese people are of the Han or Chinese race with common blood, common language, common religion, and common customs--a single, pure race.³

Even though the Chinese were a homogeneous race, there was still one big trouble--lack of unity. Like "a sheet of loose sand", Chinese were more loyal to the semi-autonomous families and clans than to the state. Lack of unity made the country weak and divided.

Another danger that remained for China was population stagnation. While the populations of strong powers like Britain, Japan, Russia, Germany and America were increasing, the population in China had stopped increasing or even decreased, because of wars, famines and living conditions. Among the imperialist countries France alone was "suffering from too small a population, all because of the poisonous Malthusian theory."⁴ France's example should be a warning to China, Sun argued. Instead of birth control which was pernicious to China, Sun insisted that China should encourage population growth.

Sun devoted his second lecture to review China's status at that time. The Chinese, thank God, had been "extremely prolific". Because of the population advantage, China had finally engulfed two foreign dynasties--Mongol and Manchu, and assimilated their minority races. For the past the Chinese had triumphed, Sun said, but for the present they were encountering a much greater danger.

Sun worried about the future of China. He reasoned that, according to the theory of natural selection, only the fittest

⁴ Ibid., p. 25.

would survive. If China did not struggle today, she would not be able to survive, for what she faced was not only the disadvantage of the Great Powers' increasing populations which would someday wipe out the Chinese race, but also political and economical dominations by the Great Powers. To Sun the situation was more dangerous than the rules of the Mongols and the Manchus.

Politically speaking the Great Powers had taken territories, sea-ports and occupied the "spheres of influence," and damaged morality and self-confidence of the Chinese people by unequal treaties and the principle of extraterritoriality. Economically the Great Powers used their gunboats to make trade with the Chinese. They took raw materials from China, and through the foreign-controlled customs, dumped manufactured goods on the Chinese market and made great profits. All these economic aggressions were intangible, but they were more dangerous. They gradually sapped China's economic base. The political economic domination by foreign powers made China a "hypo-colony", a status inferior to a colony itself. If China did not get rid of these three outside pressures, population, political influence and economic pressure, she would be exterminated in the future.

"Nationalism is that precious possession which enables a state to aspire to progress and a nation to perpetuate its existence."⁵ But unfortunately China lost that "precious

possession" because of the loss of national spirit.

Before the revolution there were many anti-revolutionary articles. Later, the Reformists, who supported the Manchu dynasty, were very popular, even among the overseas Chinese. These were good examples that indicated the loss of Chinese nationalism. Even though the Manchus tried to recruit the educated Chinese to serve the alien regime and convinced them that the Manchus had the Heaven's mandate to rule China, nationalism still survived in the lower class, especially among secret societies. Many secret societies avowed to overthrow the foreign Manchu dynasty in order to restore the preceding Chinese Ming dynasty.

The Manchu Emperors were very clever. They told the Chinese scholars that some of the best kings in ancient China were barbarians like the Manchus. So the Manchus could also rule China in case they had Heaven's mandate. Besides the subjection to the rule of alien races, the Mongols as well as the Manchus, kind of cosmopolitanism which the alien regimes advocated also damaged the national aspirations of the Chinese people.

The theory of cosmopolitanism advocated by the Great Powers was another trap for China. It was a camouflage for imperialism and a pretext for subjugating China. Sun used a little story to show that China was not ready to accept cosmopolitanism yet. A coolie used a bamboo pole to carry passengers' baggages at the steamer jetties. One day he bought

a lottery ticket and hid it in his bamboo pole, his means of maintaining life. When the lottery was drawn and he found that he had won the first prize he was overjoyed. Thinking that a rich man had no use for a bamboo pole he threw it into the sea, together with the lottery ticket. To Sun, if China forgot nationalism and adopted cosmopolitanism, it would be like the coolie throwing away the bamboo pole.

The white races--Teutons, Slavs, Anglo-Saxons and Latins, were the most powerful in the world, said Sun. "The rivalry between the Saxon and Teutonic races for control of the sea" and "each nation's struggle for more territory" were the main causes of World War I. When the war broke out, "the British used the plea of race relationship to stir up the people of the United States,"⁶ and Woodrow Wilson brought the United States into the war with the principle of "self-determination". The slogan broke Germany's control over the minority races. But it also brought turmoil to the post-war world, for the principle of self-determination conflicted with the interests of the imperialistic powers. In the turmoil, the Russian Revolution brought "a great hope" to the suppressed people, for Russia, as a white country, was willing to give up the imperialistic policy and help the oppressed peoples of the world.

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Ibid., pp. 80-81.

As for China, she even had benevolent imperialism as early as the Han dynasty (202 B.C.-220 A.D.). Even in ancient times some scholars were opposing the government's using force and political means to oppress the barbarians. Compared with ancient China's imperialistic policy the Great Powers today were too vicious. China had a profound philosophy and long intellectual traditions. On the contrary, what the Western powers had today was only "material civilization." If China wanted to survive, Sun argued, the Chinese must "revive our lost nationalism and make it shine with greater splendour, then we will have some ground for discussing internationalism."⁷

To revive China's nationalism the Chinese people must be awakened to understand China's position. The four Great Powers--Japan, the United States, Britain, and France--had great military might. Each of them posed a great threat to China's existence. Even though the Washington Conference limited military expansion of the Great Powers, their imperialism could not be stopped. China should not depend on the balance of power or armament control, for different powers could be united to divide China like Germany, Russia and Austria did Poland.

Foreigners had the opinion that China was like a sheet of loose sand. Each individual was more loyal to the family and clan than the nation. Sun proposed that the clans be

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Ibid., pp. 99-100.

brought together. Thus unity and cooperation could consolidate China easily, for the nation had no need to make direct contact with each individual as a unit. Gradually the loyalty to the family or clan could be transformed to the loyalty to state, and a person's fear of the extinction of his family could be transformed to the fear of the extinction of the Chinese race.

To resist foreign aggression Sun also thought of Gandhi's effective "non-cooperation" policy. With their rich natural resources the Chinese people could stop using foreign goods. If they stopped buying foreign goods or helping imperialists, they could cripple the aggression of the imperialists.

Summing up the means of resisting foreign aggression Sun said:

There are two ways of resisting a foreign power. The first is the positive way--arousing the national spirit, seeking solutions for the problems of democracy and livelihood, struggling against the power. The second way is the negative way--noncooperation and passive resistance--whereby foreign imperialistic activity is weakened, the national standing is defended, and national destruction is averted.⁸

To revive Chinese nationalism Sun proposed to restore the Chinese spiritual achievements. For many centuries China had moral standards much higher than any other country in the world. The items of China's ancient morality Sun suggested

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Ibid., p. 121.

were: loyalty (formerly to the Emperor only, now to the Republic and the whole people), filial piety, kindness, love, faithfulness, justice, harmony and peace. Besides these high moral standards, Sun also noticed: "China has a specimen of political philosophy so systematic and so clear that nothing has been discovered or spoken by foreign statesmen to equal it. It is found in the 'Great Learning'..."⁹ Yet, despite China's profound culture, foreigners often had a bad opinion about the Chinese people. It was, Sun said, because of the lack of personal refinement. It had nothing to do with Chinese culture. So, what they had to do were: individually each person should refine his own personality, and collectively they should restore their ancient morality.

In the material world China also had great achievements. The Chinese had important inventions like the compass, printing, porcelain and gunpowder. The discovery of tea, the use of silk, the creation of suspension bridges, etc. also showed that the Chinese had great abilities. But in the modern world China was lagging far behind other countries in the field of science. China ought to learn the strong points of the West--scientific knowledge and methods. Also, only the best and most advanced science should be introduced to China, e.g., electric rather than steam power which was outdated.

Finally, what if China was updated and made strong?

⁹
Ibid., p. 134.

Sun wanted China as a modern world power to be like ancient China which, unlike the Great Powers crushing other countries whenever possible, was kind to the neighboring countries and "rescue the weak, lift up the fallen." In other words, "We must aid the weaker and smaller peoples and oppose the great powers of the world."¹⁰ What Sun had in mind was that China, as a strong power, should smite the imperialism from which China had been suffering.¹¹

Democracy

In his lectures on democracy Sun discussed the need for democracy in modern China and how democracy could be established.

Democracy, to Sun, meant the rule of a sovereign people. A staunch believer of Darwin's evolution theory, Sun thought that in human history democracy was the result of long evolution. There were four major periods in the process of this evolution. The first period was the age of wilderness. At that time there was struggle of man with beast. Human beings had to cooperate to fight against gigantic beasts. But there was no authority or sovereignty. The second stage was the struggle of man with nature, such as floods and famines. Because of his limited power, man tended to have superstitious beliefs. For this

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 146-147.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 147.

reason theocracies were established. The third period was the struggle of man with man and autocracies were created. The fourth period was the struggle within the states for human rights, and the rise of democracies was the result. From this evolution democracy became the most up-to-date and most appropriate form of government in the modern world.

Was China ready for democracy? Sun's answer was yes. Despite the corruption, graft, nepotism, inefficiency, low education and politically apathetic masses, Sun still thought China was ready for democracy. Even though China had not had any kind of democracy before, Sun argued, there were democratic thoughts in the ancient times like the teachings of Confucius and Mencius. Besides, democracy was the inevitable current of the modern world. The tide of democracy started by Cromwell and followed by American and French revolutions was surging in the rest of the world. China could not and should not go against the tide.

The idea Rousseau had that men were born equal and free was false, Sun argued. In an autocracy men were born shackled. The freedom and equality men enjoyed was the result of revolution and continuous struggle.

In China the Taiping Rebellion was a struggle for freedom and equality. It failed because of the internal rivalries for power. The only remedy that remained for China was democracy. A democracy could make China strong and also guarantee freedom and equality of the people. For a long time

Chinese strong men had only one ambition--to become an Emperor. Today this attitude should be changed. To avoid civil war and to rebuild China everyone must work for the Republic, not for his own personal ambition.

In the West different peoples had been struggling for liberty. In the French Revolution, the French people shouted "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity." They wanted to be free from the despotic rulers. The American people wanted liberty and independence from the English rule. Because of the long despotic traditions, the peoples in the West did not have much liberty.

In China, on the contrary, the people had enjoyed too much freedom. The foreigners' opinion that China was like a sheet of loose sands indicated that China had too much freedom. Despite the fact that the Chinese Emperors were autocrats, they did not interfere too much with their subjects' freedom. What they wanted was just to get taxes to maintain their dynasties. If people did not oppose their regimes or try to overthrow them, they were allowed to have much freedom. Having this idea in mind, Sun thought that what the Chinese needed was unity and consolidation, cement for the loose sands. The Chinese did not need personal liberty as many scholars and students asserted, but national liberty. Lack of national liberty and overindulgence in personal liberty made China submerge into a "hypo-colony." So, instead of enjoying more freedom after the revolution, the Chinese should have personal sacrifice for the freedom of the nation. Instead of "Liberty,

Equality, and Fraternity," Sun proposed "People's Nationalism," "People's Sovereignty," and "People's Livelihood." For further comparison, Sun said:

Liberty in the French revolutionary watchword and People's Nationalism in our watchword are similar. The People's Nationalism calls for the freedom of our nation. Equality is similar to our Principle of the People's Sovereignty which aims to destroy autocracy and make all men equal... The idea in Fraternity is similar to our Principle of the People's Livelihood...¹²

Associated with liberty there should be equality.

Sun thought three conceptions were related to the idea of equality: inequality, false equality and true equality. Inequality was the result of man-made classes, for example, king, duke, marquis, earl and people. Men were not born equal, but the artificial ranks accentuated natural inequalities. The false equality was a supposition that men were born equal, equal at the top not at the bottom. Hence a simpleton was considered equal and equally treated as a genius. The theory of "natural equality" was advocating a false equality. It was invented by European revolutionaries to counter monarchs' "divine rights," and helped to tear down the deep-rooted monarchies. The true equality Sun envisaged was based on equal footing, but people of different talents should have different advantages and achievements. He said, "Equality is an artificial not a natural thing, and the only equality which we can create is equality in political status."¹³

¹² Ibid., p. 214.

¹³ Ibid., p. 221.

In the West there had been continual struggle for equality. The revolutions in England, France, America and Russia also had equality as an aim. In China, since the aristocrats were not hereditary, inequality was less serious. The Revolution and the realization of the Three Principles would, Sun expected, bring liberty and equality to the Chinese people.

To solve the problem caused by natural inequality Sun had a moral and philosophical answer. Men could be divided into three groups: "those who know and perceive beforehand, those who know and perceive afterward, and those who do not know and perceive--the discoverers, the promoters and the practical men." "Although Nature produces men with varying intelligence and ability, yet the human heart has continued to hope that all men might be equal." To achieve this equality:

Everyone should make service, not exploitation, his aim. Those with greater intelligence and ability should serve thousands and ten thousands to the limit of their power and make thousands and ten thousands happy. Those with less intelligence and ability should serve tens and hundreds to the limit of their power and make tens and hundreds happy...Those who have neither intelligence nor ability should still, to the limit of their individual power, each serve one another and make one another happy. In this way, although men now may vary in natural intelligence and ability, yet as moral ideals and the spirit of service prevail, they will certainly become more and more equal. This is the essence of equality.¹⁴

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 244-245.

In the process of the struggle for democracy, Sun thought, the nations in the West had encountered three great setbacks: The first one was when the Federalists won the day in America. When Hamilton's policy of limiting democracy prevailed over Jefferson's more democratic policy the government was centralized and the people in America as well as in the world met a great setback in democracy. The second setback was when the French Revolution deteriorated to mob-rule; the general reaction was mistrust in democracy. This gave the rulers a good pretext to restrict democracy. The third setback was Bismarck's skilful tactics to transform democracy to state socialism. Even though unity and prosperity were achieved in Germany, the German people suffered limitation on their democracy. Despite the setbacks, the tide of democracy could not be averted. Republican governments were set up in many places, and in Switzerland direct democracy was practiced. But, contrary to what was expected, the advancement of democracy was gradual and slow. Despite their long struggles, what the Western countries had achieved in democracy was only universal suffrage. From this Sun foresaw difficulty in carrying out democracy in China.

From the success of federal system in the United States many people advocated the same system in China. Sun opposed it. His reason was that, unlike the new territories in America, China had long been united. The unitary form of government had lessened the difference among the provinces. Besides, many of

those who wanted federalism were ambitious people who desired to be the rulers of the semi-autonomous states.

The Boxer Uprising of 1900 was a turning point in the change of the attitude of the Chinese people. Before that the people thought China was the Middle Kingdom and everything in China was superior. But after the humiliating defeat the Chinese people began to think everything foreign was good. To Sun both attitudes were wrong. The Western countries had many superior things. Their battleships were bigger and faster, and their weapons sharper and more deadly. But in the field of government the Western nations still had not solved many problems. Battleships and weapons of ten years ago were discarded and new, better items were produced. But Plato's Republic, a product of more than 2000 years ago was still admired and unsurpassed. This showed that in the Western nations social science was lagging far behind physical science. For this reason China should not imitate Western social science totally.

The dilemma the Western countries were facing was the choice between a powerful government with little freedom for the people and an impotent government with much civil freedom. Sun had a solution for this. He divided people into three groups, as indicated before. He reasoned that the able people in the first and the second groups should be selected to serve the whole people. But sovereignty should be vested in the masses, the third group. This was called the Theory of the Division of

Ability and Sovereignty. Sun cited several examples to explain the theory. In the period of the Three Kingdoms (220-265 AD) Chu Ko-liang, an able prime minister, had the ability to serve the country, but sovereignty was in the hands of Ah Tou, the stupid king, and the government functioned well. A business company must hire able managers, but the power was in the shareholders. A chauffeur was an expert, but the car belonged to the owner. Since a chauffeur knew more about mechanics and roads, the owner should let him do what he could do best, such as choosing a better road. By the same token, people should let officials do what they knew and could do without unreasonable interference.

An ideal government should be like a high-powered engine. Although the Western nations had produced high-powered engines, high-powered political machinery had not been created yet. The reason was lack of effective control, and the people feared that an omnipotent government would tread on their liberties. If people would utilize their power of suffrage, recall, initiative and referendum, a government could be controlled easily. Suffrage had been used in many countries, but thus far only Switzerland had used suffrage, initiative and referendum, and some of the northern American states had used all four. Where all the four items were used, the result was excellent. China should imitate this example and the Chinese people should have all the four items of sovereign power.

As to the government, Sun gave it five administrative powers: legislative, judicial, executive, civil service examinations and censorship (or control). Sun thought that a Five-power Constitution, with the government having these five powers, was much needed in China. The first three of the five powers were adopted from the West, and Sun adopted the fourth and the fifth from the Chinese traditions. China had long had a system of examination for selecting civil servants. So, Sun suggested that there should be an independent organization in the central government, taking care of the civil service exams. In Sun's opinion both Tang and Manchu dynasties had good consoling systems, and it was worthwhile for the new Republic to adopt a similar one.

The balance of power was what Sun intended to achieve. To him a high-powered government with five separate functions and staffed by able people could function well. But it also could be controlled efficiently by the sovereign people with four sovereign powers. These were Sun's concrete proposals to administer democracy in China.

People's Livelihood

Sun's Third Principle; the Principle of People's Livelihood, was aimed at solving the social and economic problems in China. He advocated the Marxian ideal, but he also criticized Marx's methods and mistakes. In his criticisms he reflected the ideas of Maurice William, a Marxian critic. To

solve the most urgent agrarian problem Sun adopted Henry George's ideas.

Sun's ambiguous position and his adoption of different contradictory theories made him one of the most controversial figures in modern China. In this Principle of People's Livelihood both the Nationalists and the Communists could find substantial justifications for being the successors of Sun Yat-sen.

Sun said of his Principle of People's Livelihood that it "denotes the livelihood of the people, the existence of society, the welfare of the nation, the life of the masses... The Principle of Livelihood is socialism, it is communism, it is Utopianism."¹⁵ The Principle, according to Sun, was a kind of socialism. But socialism in the early twentieth century was too variegated, too vague, and too confusing, and could hardly be understood by the Chinese masses. Hence, Sun used the simple term Min-shen (people-life).

To Sun, Marx was a great socialist and his scientific socialism was more scientific and more practical than the preceding utopian socialism. But his idea that material forces were the center of history was wrong. According to an American disciple of Marx, Maurice William, subsistence or the struggle for a living, determined history. Sun argued with William's

¹⁵
Ibid., p. 364.

theory that "livelihood is the central force in social progress, and that social progress is the central force in history."¹⁶

Marx could only be called a social pathologist, not social physiologist. He saw only the disease of society--conflicts of society, but not their compromise, adjustment and reconciliation. His theories of "surplus value" and down-fall of capitalist system were either false or mistaken. The result of recent economic progress in the West--"social and industrial reform, public ownership of transportation and communications, direct taxation, and socialized distribution" proved what Marx predicted were wrong.¹⁷

To emphasize the importance of his Third Principle Sun summed up his social philosophy:

Livelihood is the center of government, the center of economics, the center of all historical movements. Just as men once misjudged the center of the solar system, so the old socialists mistook material forces for the center of history...We can no longer say that material issues are the central force in history. We must let the political, social, and economic movements of history gravitate about the problem of livelihood. We must recognize livelihood as the center of social history. When we have made a thorough investigation of this central problem, then we can find a way to a solution of the social problem.¹⁸

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 383.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 385.

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 406-407.

Economically speaking, China was an underdeveloped country. Compared with the Western countries there were no rich people in China. China had only poverty of different degrees. It would be relatively easy to solve social problems at this stage for lack of resistance from the rich people. Sun's Principle of People's Livelihood was aimed at solving the social problems at this stage.

His methods for applying his third principle were: equalization of land ownership and regulation of capital. Land ownership, not capital income, still provided most of the income of the Chinese people. To minimize economic inequality the land problem must first be solved. Sun proposed that the landowners must declare the values of their lands. The government could tax or buy the lands according to the values declared by the owners. The increased values of the lands after the value declaration should go to the government, because the people living near the lands, not the owners, improved the lands, and they should share the profit of their labor. If no city was built near a piece of land, the land's value would not increase.

The method of the regulation of capital was a step to prevent the excessiveness and evils of capitalism. The government should not only regulate private capital, but also develop state capital. State power should be utilized to build large scale, vital enterprises like the means of communication. The use of state power to carry out socialism

was different under Marx's argument.

All in all, the ideals of Marxism and the Principle of People's Livelihood were identical. But Sun's communism was not a present one. It was a future utopian communism. When everything was carried out as planned, then the communist world would come. Sun also opposed Marx's advocacy of radical means to achieve communism. Evolutionary and gradual method was what Sun preferred. Despite his mild tactics Sun still met great resistance from the members of the reactionary faction in his own Nationalist party, who would have nothing to do with communism of any kind. He was quite critical of those die-hard anti-communists.

The necessities of life were four-fold: food, clothing, shelter and means of travel. With people's cooperation the government must solve the problems of these four necessities of livelihood and greatly reduce their costs.

"The chief problem in the Min-shen Principle is the food problem."¹⁹ Food was vital to the existence of a nation, in peace time as well as in war time. Countries like England and Japan had to spend much capital on food every year. In war time food was extremely important for victory. During World War I Germany had won many battles, but since her

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Ibid., p. 446.

seaports were blockaded, food shortages began to occur. Germany's surrender was because of a food shortage.

China was an agricultural nation. But the food produced in China was not enough to feed 400 million people. The conditions of the peasants in China were deplorable. Ninety percent of them did not own lands and had to pay 60 percent of their crops to the landlords. To solve the agrarian problem and to increase the farming product the peasants must first of all own their lands. Besides this first vital step, there were several other necessary methods for increasing agricultural production: use of machinery, use of fertilizers, crop rotation, eradication of pests, food manufacture, food transportation and prevention of natural disasters.

The next problem of Min-shen was clothing. In ancient times clothing was only a necessity. But as human civilization developed, people began to consider the elements of comfort and luxury. To clothe the Chinese people attention should be paid to necessity and convenience only.

The sources of clothing came from: silk, hemp, cotton and wool. China had once been famous for being the inventor and producer of silk. But now other countries had outstripped China's silk production. To revive China's silk industry, sericultural improvements and Pasteur's discovery must be studied and practiced. Silk products were chiefly for export, for the Chinese people did not need that kind of luxury at this stage. Hemp was also first discovered in China; cotton,

after being introduced to China from India, was profusely produced in China; and wool was also rich in China. Despite China's abundance in clothing material, China never had a big clothing industry and had to buy clothing products from foreign countries. The reason was that China had been under the Great Powers' political and economic dominance. The Great Powers bought cheap raw material from China and dumped the industrial product to China. Despite agitations to boycott foreign goods, no success had been seen. When China would be unified in the near future, the state power must be used to impose tariffs on importing foreign goods. This was the only way to protect China's infantile industry.

Since clothing was a necessity in people's daily life, the state must run clothing factories and provide necessary and comfortable clothes for every citizen. But the citizens also had the obligation to work. Sun said:

And the people must of course fulfill the obligations of citizenship to the state or disqualify themselves as citizens. Those who disqualify themselves citizens disqualify themselves as masters of the state. Lazy vagabonds are parasites upon the state and upon the people. The government should force them by law to work and try to convert them into honorable laborers, worthy to share in the rights and privileges of the nation. When loafers are eliminated and all men have a share in production, then there will be enough to eat and to wear, homes will be comfortable, and the people will be content, and the problems of livelihood will be solved.²⁰

In other words, the state and the people were mutually dependent. The state was an agent through which the functions of "from everyone what he can; to everyone what he needs" could be maintained.

Sun had scheduled to make two more lectures on shelter and means of travel. For one reason or another, he failed to make the last two lectures as planned. When he died in Peking he had never forgotten that his work was not accomplished.

Program of National Reconstruction

To Sun Yat-sen the aim of the revolution was the realization of the Three Principles of the People.²¹ But to carry out the aim Sun encountered resistance among his followers. On the one hand they thought that the task of the revolution was over as soon as the Manchu regime was overthrown. On the other hand, many of them considered Sun's Three Principles of the People utopian, idealistic, and impractical. In order to show his comrades that the task of the revolution was to build up China, not just to overthrow the Manchu dynasty, and to convince them that the Three Principles of the People were in fact practical and easy to be carried out, Sun wrote the Program of National Reconstruction.

21

Sun Yat-sen, *Fundamentals of National Reconstruction* (Taipei, Taiwan: China Cultural Service, 1953), p. 1.

To rebuild China Sun planned to have three reconstructions: psychological, social and material. He wrote a book for each reconstruction. Therefore, the Program of National Reconstruction actually consists of three books: Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary, A Democratic Primer and International Development of China.

Psychological Reconstruction

Sun liked to quote a famous ancient Chinese military strategist, "The best way to attack your enemy is to attack their mind." In order to attack the mind of his Nationalist comrades as well as other Chinese patriots Sun wrote a booklet called Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary.

The problem Sun faced here can be summed in this proverb, "To know is easy but to do is difficult." This idea impeded the action of his revolutionary comrades. Always believing that to do was more difficult than to know, they were afraid of doing anything, not even to mention undertaking great revolutionary task. To encourage his comrades to carry out his revolutionary program Sun tried hard to prove that doing was easier than knowing.

First of all, he cited three major examples to prove that to do was easier than to know. His first example pointed out that although men could use money few of them knew the background of money. Few people knew the history of money from the use of sea shells to barter, to currency, and to

banknotes. Even fewer knew the theories of finance and banking. But they could use money. "And so I say that people unfortunately know only how to spend money, but very rarely understand its secrets. This is the first proof of my theory that 'action is easy but knowledge difficult.' "22

His second example stressed that men, even new-born babies, could eat, but very few knew the functions of food and its calorie contents. Related to food there were knowledge of digestion, dietary, nutrition, cuisine, etc. Again, he concluded that to do was actually easier than to know.

Sun's third major example was about Chinese writing. The ancient Chinese scholars did not study logic; they had no knowledge of linguistics, theory of writing or grammar and often could not converse well; but by repetition and memory they could write good essays and poems. This also proved that action was easier than knowledge.

Next, Sun cited seven more minor proofs of his theory. They were the building of houses (Chinese built their houses without any knowledge of architecture), shipbuilding (Chinese could build big ships despite lack of scientific knowledge), the building of fortifications (Chinese built

the gigantic Great Wall, despite lack of the knowledge concerning civil engineering), digging of canals (Dictated by necessity, Chinese built the Grand Canal, without preliminary plan or knowledge), chemistry (Chinese produced gunpowder, porcelain, bean oil...without having any knowledge of Chemistry), electricity (People could use telephone, electrical lamp...without knowing the theory of electricity), and evolution (Mankind improved the specimens of plants and transformed wild animals to domestic animals and knew nothing about evolution before Darwin).

After the ten examples and arguments Sun finally concluded that in the ancient times people did everything without any knowledge of it. This was the stage of "action without understanding." But as men acquired more knowledge, they began to think. So the second stage was "action with reflection." Through the third stage--"action after reflection," men came to the fourth stage--"understanding before action." When men understood more they began to visualize the difficulty of action and stopped doing anything. This was a bad tendency and a wrong idea. If men could do without knowing, of course they could do while knowing, and they should be able to do more. If the Kuomintang comrades believed this, Sun thought, his Three Principles of the People could easily be carried out in China.

Social Reconstruction

Sun's idea of Chinese social reconstruction was outlined in a treatise on parliamentary law--A Democratic Primer. This treatise was intended to educate the people in the skills of public assembly and debate.

Sun did not devote much thought to social reform in China, and he had no intention to catalyze rapid social change. The book he wrote for social reconstruction was not aimed at changing Chinese society. It was merely to educate the people in preparation for democracy.

Sun's treatise on parliamentary law lacked originality. It was only a repetition and summary of parliamentary practices in some Western countries. But Sun thought that the Chinese people were too urgently in need of a guidebook of democratic procedures for him to wait longer and spend more time on his treatise. Urgency made him tackle the problem without much thought.

The treatise soon became obsolete, but it had great initial impact on the Chinese people. It was Sun's book that first systematically introduced parliamentary law to China. Before that, the Chinese did not have any democratic basis for solving a political problem, for force had been the only determining factor of power politics. Although Sun's treatise is out-of-date, it has become a symbol of democratic means.

A Democratic Primer also indicated Sun's belief in democracy. As a revolutionary he did agitate the people to use force to overthrow an evil regime. But that was an exception. His ultimate belief was democracy, not dictatorship or militarism. The introduction of a parliamentary law into China stemmed from Sun's staunch belief in the Chinese people and in democracy.

Material Reconstruction

Material reconstruction was the most important item in Sun's national reconstruction program. After much deliberation, he wrote a long book, International Development of China which expounded detailed plans.

The book was written soon after World War I. When the war ended, Sun thought that the Great Powers would again regard the Far East as important in world affairs. Now that China was building a republic, Sun hoped the Great Powers would invest capital in China. With the help of foreign capital Sun hoped China could accomplish material reconstruction.

While the Western countries were experiencing the Second Industrial Revolution, China was still in the age of handicraft. China had great industrial and agricultural potentials in the yet undeveloped mineral reserves and vast expanse of land. Sun reasoned that the interest of both the Great Powers and China could be served, if the former would assist China in her plans for economic development. When the

Great Powers stopped producing war supplies, demobilized and started to use their manpower reserves for industrial production again, overproduction would result. It was a good time, Sun urged, for the Great Powers to invest their capitals, machinery and technology in China's development.

Sun listed important items for China's material reconstruction. On each item Sun gave detailed plans for its development. The following is the brief outline of the reconstruction items Sun proposed:

I. Development of Communication Systems

- a. Railroad--100,000 miles
- b. Macadam roads--1,000,000 miles
- c. Improvement of existing canal and construction of new canals
- d. River conservancy
- e. Construction of more telegraph lines, telephone and wireless systems

II. Development of Commercial Harbors

III. Water Power and Irrigation Development

IV. Mineral and Heavy Industrial Development

V. Agricultural Development and Reforestation

VI. Immigration to Bordering Provinces

For mutual benefit as well as to prevent the acute selfish competitions among the Great Powers in the post-war period Sun presented some preventive proposals:

First, that the various Governments of the capital-supplying Powers must agree to joint action and a unified policy to form an international organization,

with administrators and experts of various lines to formulate plans and to standardize materials in order to prevent waste and to facilitate work. Second, the confidence of the Chinese people must be secured in order to gain their cooperation and enthusiastic support. If the above two steps are accomplished, then the third step is to open formal negotiation for the final contract of the project with the Chinese Government.²³

Fundamentals of National Reconstruction

After the failure of the Second Revolution against Yuan and the resulting confusion spread throughout the whole country, Sun thought that the ideal of the Three Principles could not be realized unless there were practical steps to carry it out. With this in mind he wrote the Fundamentals of National Reconstruction. In the introductory Statement of the document Sun said:

In short, the Fundamentals of National Reconstruction are so drawn up as to start with the removal of all obstacles and end up in the culmination of reconstruction, all steps to be taken in logical sequence as well as in order of their importance.²⁴

The Fundamentals of National Reconstruction, drafted by Sun and approved by the National Assembly in Canton, later became the internal policy of the Republic. The document had

23

Sun Yat-sen, Selected Works of Sun Yat-sen (Peking: People's Publication, 1962), p. 191.

24

Sun Yat-sen, Fundamentals of National Reconstruction, op. cit., p. 6.

twenty-five articles dealing with the steps to carry out the Kuomintang's revolutionary goals: the Three Principles of the People and the Five-power Constitution.

The first part of the document dealt with the general principles of national reconstruction. "The primary requisite of reconstruction lies in people's livelihood."²⁵ The four necessities of the people--food, clothing, shelter and means of travel must, in cooperation with the people, be provided by the government. "Second in importance is the people's sovereignty."²⁶ It was the government's responsibility to train the people to exercise their sovereign powers--suffrage, recall, initiative and referendum. The third item was nationalism. The government should guide racial minorities toward self-determination. To foreign countries the government should resist any aggression and try to raise China's international position to be equal with other countries.

The national reconstruction was divided into three stages: military rule, political tutelage and constitutional government. In the first stage the government should use military force to enforce its orders, to eradicate all obstacles against unification and to propagate the Three Principles of the People. When order was restored in a province the first stage would end and the second stage would begin. The second

²⁵

Ibid., p. 9.

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Ibid., p. 9.

stage was preparation for democracy. The government would have responsibility for training the people to exercise their sovereign powers and select officials of different levels. Every hsien (county), after establishing a self-government, could elect a delegate to the National Assembly. The third stage would commence in the province in which all the hsiens had achieved self-government. In the third stage the national government should set up Five Yuans (Departments): Executive, Legislative, Judicial, Examination and Control (Censor). When one half of the provinces entered the third stage the National Assembly should make a constitution and elect the President of the Republic. At this point the National Government should resign on behalf of the popular government.

Manifesto of the Kuomintang

Another document Sun made shortly before his death was the Manifesto of the First National Congress of the Kuomintang (January, 1924). In fifteen articles Sun pronounced the Kuomintang's foreign and domestic policies. In these fifteen articles Sun summed up his political thought.

In foreign policy Sun wanted to achieve equality among nations. The first step toward this aim was abolition of all the unequal treatise imposed upon China by the Great Powers to assert China's sovereignty. Any country willing to renounce its unequal treatise in China would be recognized by China as

a "most favored nation." And the appropriately contracted foreign loans would be guaranteed and repaid.

In domestic policy the Kuomintang resolved to carry out Sun's detailed schemes for executing the Three Principles of the People. The powers of the central government and the local governments should be determined by the principle of equilibrium of powers. Matters with national concern should be assigned to the Central Government while those local in nature should be determined by the local governments.

The hsien was to be the unit in a local self-government. The people in a self-governing hsien would have four powers: suffrage, initiative, recall and referendum. The provincial government was a bridge between the local self-government and the central government. The people in a self-governing province could have their constitution which should not contradict the national constitution; and the governor, elected by the people, was under the direction of the central government. A local self-government would have to contribute 10-50 percent of its annual income to the national revenue.

The other things to be done included: establishment of an examination system, guarantee of civil liberties, national conscription and improvement of the conditions of the lower status soldiers, standardization of land tax, census, establishment of labor law, promotion of women's equality, popularization of the basic education and development of the

higher education, and nationalization of the enterprises beyond private capacity.

Comment on Sun's Political Thought

Lack of originality is the most salient feature of Sun's political thought. He travelled extensively and had rich experiences in the Western countries. He picked up the most fashionable ideas at that time and put them together with some Chinese ideas, and that comprised his thought. His followers might claim that Sun's thought was the cream of the intellectual world. But a critic was equally justified to call it "intellectual chop suey: a mixture of intellectual materials taken indiscriminately from everywhere and thrown together with little regard for fitness and proportion."²⁷ Another critic also had a similar opinion:

Sun Yat-sen was nothing if not eclectic; he was nobody's exclusive disciple; he picked over foreign ideas, chose what appealed to him and conglomerated what he had selected. In his treatise, China's Revolution... he definitely says that his Third Principle was arrived at by comparative examination of social theories and the selection of the best ideas from among them. That was his method always, but not always with coherent results.²⁸

Sun had a personality mixed with candor, credulity and naivete. He believed and trusted anyone. His political thought also reflected his personality. He picked up ideas

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Nathaniel Peffer, The Far East (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1958), p. 299.

28

Lyon Sharman, Sun Yat-sen, His Life and Its Meaning (New York: The John Day Company, 1934), p. 281.

without much choice and believed them with great credulity. It was with this attitude that he picked up both democracy and communism. Commenting on this a critic said:

It is characteristic of the man that two years after writing a book advocating the loan of billions from capitalistic and presumably imperialistic countries he becomes, if not a communist believer at least a convinced Marxist, and then, on reading one book by an author so unknown to him that he mistakes his name, he changes back again and repudiates Marxian thought. Again he had caught ideas on the fly--two contradictory ones in two years--and swallow both, one after another.²⁹

Sun's belief in different contradictory ideas made him a controversial leader in modern China and left a controversial legacy to his followers. He intended to synthesize different unsynthesizeable doctrines. The result was that a disinterested person had no idea what he was talking about or what his exact position was. But to his followers of both left and right wings, good justifications for their opposite positions could easily be found. He made both communists and democrats justified in claiming themselves to be his followers. He wanted modernization but he also respected tradition. No wonder a critic commented: The Three Principles of the People is a very usable book for purposes...usable by

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Peffer, op. cit. p. 301. Here Peffer is referring to Maurice William's Social Interpretation of History. In his Third Principle Sun misspelled the author's name and called him Williams. William was originally one of the Marx's disciples, but later he became a critic of Marxism. According to William, Sun read his book and also became a critic of Marxism. See Maurice William, Sun Yat-sen versus Communism (Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins Co., 1932).

either the left or the right wing, by communists or Confucianists."³⁰

Despite lack of consistency and profundity, one can detect a tenacious central core in Sun's political thought. He never deviated from his staunch belief in socialism, democracy and Chinese nationalism. He might espouse different doctrines which appeared contradictory to an observer. But in his heart he always had admirable goals. He never forgot that he was struggling for the Chinese people, not for himself.

Sun had high ideals, but possessed no concrete means for carrying them out. He constructed highly imaginative plans and programs for carrying out his goals step by step. But he showed his naivete in believing that his followers sincerely wanted to execute his schemes. In fact, what his successors had in mind was not the people, but their own power, prestige, and privileges. Sun's magic formula meant nothing to them.

Sun was an idealist, not a realist. In trying to achieve his ideals what he met in his life was only discouragement and disappointment. In his later years he realized the impracticality of his ideals, and began to set up a series of schemes to achieve the ideals. Sun thought he had made concrete steps to be followed, as he indicated in his

³⁰ Sharman, op. cit., p. 274.

will. But they were just utopian steps toward a utopia. His candid, credulous, and naive personality made him unable to understand the human factor which was the most important criterion in a revolution. Failing this, his ideals, plans, programs remained a magic formula for building a new China.

CHAPTER III

INFLUENCE ON THE NATIONALISTS AND THE COMMUNISTS

Sun Yat-sen and the Nationalists

The Nationalists claimed to be the genuine and legitimate successors of Sun Yat-sen. They had the right to do so, for they had inherited the whole set of Sun Yat-sen's mantle. They had, at least in form, been maintaining Sun's heritage. The Nationalist party was founded by Sun, and most of the party leaders were formerly Sun's followers. The Nationalist constitution, though made after Sun's death, was aimed at promoting Sun's Three Principles of the People as the nation's goal. And the Nationalists leaders had been repeatedly claiming to fight against the Communists in order to restore Sun's teachings.

After Sun's death, the Nationalist party was led by Wang Chin-wei and Chiang Kai-shek, and the Communists were still allowed to stay in the party as Sun had admitted them. In fact, they were getting more powerful. In 1927, when the Northern Expedition army arrived in Handow, the National Government was set up there. The party, which had been under the control of the left-wing faction after Sun's death, called a meeting of the party's Central Executive Committee. Chiang Kai-shek, a right-winger, refused to attend and was expelled

from the Committee, and he was removed from his position as the Commander of the Northern Expedition army. Wang Chin-wei was again elected chairman. But Chiang, who had a strong army in his hand, defied the decision and set up his own government in Nanking. The government in Hankow, without troops, soon capitulated. Some left-wing Nationalists joined Chiang and some became communists who, after being persecuted, went underground.

The Nationalists continued to survive until 1949 when they lost Mainland China and escaped to Formosa. All the while, they ruled in the name of Sun Yat-sen whom they called "Sun Tsung Tsai" (Sun, the Party Leader)¹ and who was considered the predecessor of "Chiang Tsung Tsai" (Chiang, the Party Leader). Inside the Nationalist party Sun was deified. Before every meeting the party song which started with "Three Principles of the People, the goal of our party..." was sung and then Sun's will was read while everybody bowed his head. To "unify thoughts" the Nationalists compelled the people to observe the ceremonies for revering Sun, and through the party-controlled government ordered all

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The Constitution of the Kuomintang, adopted in 1924 and amended in 1929 had an interesting regulation. Article 21 reads "Dr. Sun, the originator of the Three Principles of the People and of the Five-power Constitution, shall be the President of the Party." See Arthur Holcombe, The Chinese Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1930), Appendix C.

the schools and public institutions to observe the ceremonies of reading Sun's will and singing the party song which later became the National Anthem.

To emphasize the "Education of the National Spirit," the Nationalists managed to have the Three Principles of the People become a required course in the high schools and the colleges, and an item of every examination, including the school entrance examination and civil service examination. Through the efforts of his able followers, Sun Yat-sen, the founder and leader of the Nationalists party became the required deity of all the people, including non-Nationalists, the opponents of the Nationalists, under the rule of the party.

Not only was Sun deified, his works also became the "Bible". What was said in the "Bible" was "the truth" and could not be criticized or changed. "Bible" quoting became a fashion among the party members.

The Nationalists had a cherished goal to implement Sun's Three Principles and establish a republic with the Five-power Constitution. Under their rule, "The Republic of China is a San Min Chu I Republic."² Superficially they were observing Sun's teachings and carrying out his policies.

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This sentence appeared in the Kuomintang's constitutional draft for the Republic. But later when opposed by other minor parties the Kuomintang had to change it in a milder tone. See page 80.

But, in reality, Sun's legacy became a democratic facade for the party dictatorship.³ Sun's first two steps for carrying out democracy in China, were "military rule" and "political tutelage". Apparently Sun had the intention to unify China and educate the Chinese people for democracy. But when Sun died, the Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek were unwilling to give up the dictatorial power; and when, under great pressure, they finally announced plans to establish a constitutional government, in reality the power was still in Chiang's hands. The promise to carry out democracy was nothing but a farce. With good intentions, Sun's ideas were valuable, but without sincerity they could be the pretexts for evildoing.

The constitution of the Republic, adopted in 1946 by the National Assembly was an important legacy of Sun to his Nationalist followers. Filled with Sun's ideas, the document was the dogma of the Nationalists and a tool of the party

3

The Kuomintang dictatorship was vividly reported by a US State Department representative who visited China in 1947. The following was his report:

"...There is still warlordism, but a kind of higher warlordism and a worse one. Twenty years ago the warlords were local satraps...now they are organized in a single, centrally controlled machine...The centrally controlled machine is the party called the Kuomintang, which in fact--if no longer in law--is the government of China; and its head is Chiang Kai-shek..."

"The Kuomintang is not a political party in the accepted sense. It is best described as a holding company for a country..."

"In any case China has become the private possession of the Kuomintang, and the Kuomintang is controlled by a

leaders. No country in the world, not even the communist countries, has ever adopted a constitution with the purpose of realizing a person's teachings. Marx's disciples could not even make a constitution categorically specifying Marxism as the goal of a nation, but Sun's followers could adopt a constitution with a preamble of "The National Assembly of the Republic of China... in accordance with the teachings bequeathed by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in founding the Republic of China...do hereby establish this Constitution," and with the first article "The Republic of China, founded on the Three Principles of the People..." In short, there are few cases in history in which a revolutionary leader is so much idolized and his teachings so much dogmatized. No wonder a critical biographer commented: "...I found a hero already stiffened into an idol. The making of a lacquered god out of human flesh and blood has probably never been accomplished with such speed and thoroughness as in the case of Sun Yat-sen."⁴

The Constitution of the Republic was the summary of Sun's political thought. If Sun were to make the constitution himself, there would not be too much difference. Sun's important political ideas like nationalism, democracy, socialism,

small coterie of which Chiang Kai-shek is unchallenged chief."

For details see Nathaniel Peffer, "Time to Get Out of China," Harpers's Magazine, v. 195, July, 1947, pp. 49-56.

⁴

Lyon Sharman, Sun Yat-sen, His Life and Its Meaning (New York: John Day Company, 1936), pp. vii-viii.

separation of powers, checks and balances, equilibrium of local and central powers, etc. were all incorporated in this Constitution.

To avoid the inconvenience of the people's executing their four sovereign powers in a vast, populous country like China, Sun's method was the formation of a representative body--the National Assembly, representing the people in every self-governing hsien. It had the functions "To recall the President or the Vice-President;" "To vote on proposed Constitutional amendments submitted by the Legislative Yuan by way of referendum;" and to represent the people's rights of initiative and referendum. Sun's idea of indirect democracy in a big country like China was very appropriate. But, the functions of the National Assembly given in the Constitution did not work well. Under a dictatorial central government the National Assembly became only a tool and rubberstamp of the Executive. It had never assumed its function of checking the overpowerful executive branch of the government. Since the majority Assemblymen were the Kuomintang members who were under the control of the party leader who, instead, was the Executive, the party discipline and the suppression by the Executive who controlled the troops made them unable to express their opinions as the "representatives" of the people. Deprived of genuine functions the gigantic body became a heavy burden to the people. The more than 2,000 Assemblymen got salaries and dividends from the people's

taxes, and they convened only a few days every six years just to "elect" the President. The same person had been "elected" four times despite the Constitution's forbidding more than two terms.

The inability of the Assemblymen to execute their assigned functions revealed a serious defect in Sun's scheme of building a political system. The scheme was at best a balanced, idealistic one. But it could not work. A party dictatorship could manage to keep the scheme, and destroy its essence and spirit. The British democracy, without any scheme or strict constitution, works well. Democratic spirit and party system are two important elements in its success. Power corrupted Sun's followers who inherited the Master's grand projects to rebuild China, but not his spirit to execute them. If Sun had devoted himself to the study of power politics and party system, instead of the fanciful, utopian schemes, he might have held the Nationalists in control even after his death, for the rivaling party or parties might restrain the Nationalists from going toward dictatorship. Losing the popular base and eliminating any fair means of political competition, the Nationalists aroused the Communists' military rival and finally caused its own downfall. Sun failed to foresee the corruption of the party he created. He was too busily trying to unify all elements to unite and rebuild China that he failed to see that his followers, after China's unification, would strive for their self-interests

rather than work for the people's welfare.

By the same token, all the political organs which Sun imagined or imitated and which were put in the Constitution, were just more rubber stamps and red tape. The Five Yuans (Departments)--Executive, Legislative, Judicial, Examination, and Control, were the reproduction of Sun's theory of the Five-power Constitution. They were supposed to be the highest political organs of the National Government, functioning independently and checking and balancing each other. But from the very beginning they never performed their assigned functions. Chiang Kai-shek, as the President of the Republic, dominated all the government officials and made them his puppets. He checked everyone and was checked by none.

"Government in China," according to an author, "is personal government, and the person who counts most is Chiang Kai-shek."⁵ And Chiang claimed himself to be the only legitimate successor of Sun Yat-sen, and repeatedly avowed to carry out Sun's teachings. To understand the meaning of "Sun Yat-senism" and its implementation in the post-Sun era, Chiang Kai-shek must first be studied.

From the very beginning Chiang Kai-shek represented the right-wing faction of the Kuomintang. When he was ousted from the Central Committee of the party in Hankow, which was under the control of the left-wing factions, he set up his own

⁵
Peffer, op. cit., p. 51.

government in Nanking. His military power made his government viable and subdued his rival in Hankow. When the Northern Expedition Army under his control conquered all China in 1936 he established a fascist-type of central government in Nanking, and Sun's teachings were twisted to suit the situation at that time.

Though Sun tried to preserve some of the traditional Chinese moralities, spirit and institutions, his general tone was modernity of China--modernization without Westernization. When the idea came to Chiang Kai-shek, he emphasized the traditional side of Sun's teachings, and paid little attention to modernity, as a biographer commented: "To think of Chiang Kai-shek as attempting to break from the past or as having started China entirely on the lines of mechanical progress and modernization is to misunderstand him completely."⁶

When Sun Yat-sen's liberal widow was saying:

...The structure of our present society is radically changing and it is difficult to solve the many problems that arise from great changes. Confucianism cannot help to solve these problems; it has lost every practical value...Confucian teachings are feudalistic and autocratic from beginning to end...We must make great efforts to uproot Confucian ideas from every nook and corner of our life and thought.⁷

Chiang Kai-shek was singing in a different tune. He said:

⁶
H.H. Chang, Chiang Kai-shek: Asia's Man of Destiny (New York, Doubleday, Doran, 1944), p. 26, quoted in Lawrence K. Rosinger, China's Crisis (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1945), p.47.

⁷
Soong Ching Ling, The Struggle for New China (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1953), p. 96.

"China's own philosophy of life, developed by Confucius, amplified and propagated by Mencius, and further explained by the Han scholars, automatically became a lofty system that is superior to any other philosophy in the world...The glories and scope of our ancient Chinese learning cannot be equalled in history of any of the strong Western nations of today."⁸

At the time when the people were suffering from hunger and poverty, Chiang, instead of urging more development, cleaning his corrupt government, eliminating the prevalent nepotism, and the usury and exploitation of poor peasants by the rich landlords, sponsored the "New Life Movement" and urged the Chinese people to "button their shirts, keep their houses clean, and lead a righteous life,"⁹ and, above all, to observe the ancient moral codes. In short, he preferred the stale moral reform to a social or economic reform.

Mary C. Wright did a penetrating study of the transformation of the Nationalist ideology under Chiang Kai-shek. When Chiang became the only ruler of China he began to identify himself with the ancient despotic sage king and looked upon his regime as the promoter of the ancient moralities. Now that order and peace rather than turmoil and agitation were needed to preserve an established regime, Chiang shifted from revolution to restoration. Confucianism, a semi-religion, but more opistic than any religion, was

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Chiang Kai-shek, China's Destiny, trans. Philip Jaffe (New York: Roy Publishers, 1947), p. 16.

9

Ibid.

restored and became the official ideology of the Nationalist party. Confucianism was indeed a good tool to rule the Chinese people, as Mary C. Wright said:

In the view of the Kuomintang ideologists, Confucianism was the most effective and cheapest means ever devised by man for this purpose, (insuring social stability and popular discipline). They saw that the Confucian order had held together because certain canons of behavior had been hammered in by precept and example so effectively that deviation was nearly impossible. In their view the content of these canons mattered less than reviving the habit of behaving in accordance with fixed and unquestioned rules. This it was hoped would end the opposition to Kuomintang control. That the disciplinary effectiveness of the canon was dependent on its whole content and its whole context seems never to have occurred to them.¹⁰

The shifting of the official Kuomintang ideology from revolution to restoration reflected the rise of the right-wing faction. The left-wing factions had no favor for the feudalistic Confucianism. When they were in power they let mobs ransack the Confucian temples. But when the right-wingers assumed power the Confucian temples became sanctuaries. The interesting change was described as following:

Public and avowed veneration for Confucius was resumed in 1928. As late as 1927 a mob had dragged a straw effigy of Confucius through the streets of Changsha and beat and burned it, and the National Government itself had on February 15 ordered the abolition of official Confucian rites and turned the funds over to public education on the grounds that "The principles of Confucius were despotic. For more

than twenty centuries they have served to oppress the people and to enslave thought...As to the cult of Confucius, it is superstitious and out of place in the modern world...China is now a Republic. These vestiges of absolutism should be effaced from the memory of citizens." The vestiges were not effaced for long. On November 6, 1928 Chiang Kai-shek was urging his officers to spend their leisure in the study of the Four Books. In 1931 Confucius' birthday became a national holiday. Nationalist troops were ordered to give special protection to all local Confucian temples. Recognition increased by degrees, culminating in the reconanization of Confucius in 1934...¹¹

Sun Yat-sen wanted to destroy the old order and build a new order in which both modernization and preservation of some old things he considered good were to be done. But Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists considered the time for revolution, which meant destruction to them, was over, and it was time to restore the old order. "With their new outlook, they declared that the new period of revolutionary construction required qualities opposite to those needed in the preceding period of revolutionary destruction."¹² The Taiping Rebellion which Sun adored, and which stimulated his revolutionary activities was now vilified. Instead, Tseng Kuo-fan, who fought the rebellious disloyal and foreign-influenced Taiping rebels with the purpose to preserve the Manchus and the old order, was restored and worshipped as a hero; and his writings were reproduced by the government, and Chiang Kai-shek urged the people to study them. As Chiang

¹¹
Ibid., p. 520.

¹²
Ibid., p. 523.

took more power in his hands, his reactionary attitude became more acute, as noticed by an author:

In 1924, while Chiang extolled Tseng, his references to the Taiping Rebellion were polite. In 1932 he spat upon it. And in 1933-34 at Lu-shan Chiang took his stand not only against the Communists and the Taiping Rebellion but against all the rebellions in Chinese history...¹³

"The Kuomintang never ceased talking about revolution, It merely redefined the term in a precisely opposite sense."¹⁴ In Sun Yat-sen's days the party was identified with the Taiping Rebellion, but when Chiang Kai-shek came to power the Taiping Rebellion became the destroyer of the Chinese traditions of which the party now became the revolutionary carrier. Not only that, Sun's portrait which was set up together with those of Marx and Lenin in a town park was moved into a Confucian temple.¹⁵ From a revolutionary leader Sun now became a restoration forerunner.

Chiang Kai-shek personally had a strong and favorable feeling for Chinese classic literature and the traditional ethics and morality. Being a soldier, receiving no modern education and speaking no foreign language (except Japanese through which he learned Japanese militarism), he had no

¹³ Ibid., p. 519.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 521.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 520.

liking for any modern or Western learning, except, perhaps, modern weapons. Unlike Mao Tse-tung, who identified himself with the working class and avowed to fight for their welfare, Chiang considered himself a ruling aristocrat. That was why when Mao wanted to break the traditional society which oppressed the lower class, and liquidate the upper ruling class which exploited the peasants, Chiang, on the contrary, avowed to restore the gentry and the traditional moralities and disciplines--the best tool and tranquilizer the Chinese rulers could find to rule the Chinese people. For this purpose Sun's teachings to restore the ancient virtues were reiterated, much more than any other parts of Sun's teachings. On numerous occasions Chiang lectured students, troops and civil servants, stressing the importance of li, yi, lien, chih--ancient moral codes connotating meticulous behavior, order, discipline, loyalty and virtue--all tranquilizers. In his "New Life Movement" he specified these four moral criteria to be observed by the people of all walks. Today, in Formosa, the school pupils are still instructed to memorize what their four school moralities are.

Either just to be different from the communist materialism or because he had staunch belief in the spiritual, Chiang reiterated spiritual importance in human life. In 1942 he declared: "Victory will be due 90 percent to spiritual

factors and only 10 percent to material factors."¹⁶

Connected to this kind of spiritualism and revivalism was his personal philosophy and attitudes. Appraised by an American observer:

Chiang is in no sense a democrat in either his philosophy or political actions. By temperament and associations, experience and conviction of self-interest, he is hostile to programs of reform and deeply intolerant of popular criticism. The whole bent of his thought and personality is in the direction of uniformity of opinion and obedience to a single authority. To him dissent probably seems an immoral thing--a gross breach of proper behavior, as well as a political threat...He probably conceive of himself as the teacher and uplifter of the Chinese people and identifies his own powerful ambition with the inculcation of the moral ideas of ancient Chinese philosophy--loyalty, dignity, acceptance of one's place in life, and a reflective spirit. It would be a mistake to regard these traits as a pose, or to doubt that these are really Chiang's ideals.¹⁷

Chiang Kai-shek thought that the main reason for China's backwardness and its inability to stop Japan's aggression and to suppress the rise of the Communists was the decline of the ancient virtues. "As his armies fell back before the advancing Japanese in 1939, he blamed the neglect of the doctrine of the rites and urged the salvation of the nation through renewed emphasis on loyalty and filial piety."¹⁸

16

Norman Palmer, "Makers of Modern China, VI. Chiang Kai-shek: Immovable Stone," Current History, v. 16, January, 1949, p. 5.

17

Rosinger, op. cit., pp. 49-50.

18

Wright, op. cit., p. 524.

In 1949 when his troops either escaped the Communists or joined them, he blamed them for lack of morale. To revive morale he told them: "We must inherit our five thousand year old culture and make it a guide to human progress."¹⁹ In short, instead of fighting for democracy and the people's livelihood which were Sun's goals, Chiang fought the Japanese and the Communists just to preserve the ancient traditions. His reactionary attitude was succinctly expressed in what he said: "If we do not exterminate the red bandits, we cannot preserve the old morals and ancient wisdom handed down from our ancestors..."²⁰

Chiang fully expressed his reactionary attitude in his major work, China's Destiny. In the book Chiang claimed that the most important cause for China's poverty, weakness and backwardness was the aggression of the Great Powers which pressed upon China unequal treaties which, instead, broke China's traditions. To rebuild China he again urged the revival of the ancient virtues. The book quoted heavily of Confucius, Mencius and Sun Yat-sen. To Sun's three reconstruction items--psychological, social and material, he added two more: ethical and political. In the Ethical Reconstruction he added, he wanted to revive the ancient

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Ibid.

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Ibid., p. 525.

pao-chia system (a rural political and social system in which the rich, land-owning class controlled and oppressed the peasants), China's ancient virtues and the teachings of the ancient Chinese saints such as Confucius and Mencius. In the Political Reconstruction he wanted the people to sacrifice their material enjoyment and individual freedom, and struggle for the common goal--the well-being of the nation. Chiang might well claim that he was expounding Sun's teachings, but, in fact, he was twisting Sun's thought in a way that completely lost the original meaning. While Sun reiterated the importance of his Material Reconstruction and gave detailed plans for its execution, Chiang preferred Sun's psychological and his own Ethical and Political Reconstruction.

During the war time Chiang's government published millions of the copies of the book, claiming it to be the most important book ever since the Three Principles of the People. It became a required textbook in the schools of different levels and a required course in every examination held by the government. But the book was so anti-democratic and anti-West that the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, refused six Congressmen's request to translate it into English.²¹ Later a translator, Philip Jaffe, was to call it "Mein Kampf" of China, and in his view the book became the

²¹

Chiang, op. cit., p. 18.

bible of the Nationalist reactionaries who were "distinguished by their championing of China's ancient culture, particularly the political and social concepts embodied in the Confucian feudal philosophy of life;" and the government of such people claimed that "it intends to introduce democracy, when in practice it has followed a policy of bloody suppression of civil liberties and has made extensive use of secret police and concentration camps to enforce its system of 'thought control'".²²

Of course this kind of reactionary attitude could not possibly be accepted by all, especially the educated liberals. But the way Chiang eliminated his opponents and dissenters scared all and silenced all dissenting voices. Nevertheless, there was one exception--Madame Sun Yat-sen.

Madame Sun claimed to be the ideological successor of the Master. She did not hesitate to attack Chiang for his deviation from Sun's teachings. Early in 1927 she made the "Statement Issued in Protest Against the Violation of Sun Yat-sen's Revolutionary Principles and Policies" in which she said that Sun was earnest in trying to improve the peasants' living conditions, but today the peasants were suffering more while Chiang sought his personal ambition.²³ In 1931 she

²²

Ibid., pp. 11-13.

²³

Soong, op. cit., pp. 1-6.

attacked her own party in "The Kuomintang Is No Longer a Political Power," saying that the reactionary group surrounding Chiang Kai-shek was no more qualified to be called a political party.²⁴ When the War ended she issued the "Statement Urging Coalition Government and an Appeal to the American People to Stop Their Government from Militarily Aiding the Kuomintang."²⁵ She also attacked Confucianism which Chiang worshipped and tried to restore.²⁶ In short, the articulate widow of the Master sincerely believed and uttered that Chiang Kai-shek and the people around him were doing anything to betray her late husband's teachings.

In conclusion, the Nationalists inherited the whole mantle of Sun's legacy. They glorified their great revolutionary leader by making a national constitution out of Sun's teachings. The Constitution was fine. "It provided the framework for a more democratic regime, if the will to implement it really existed."²⁷ But that was exactly what the followers of the Master did not have, as an American scholar said:

As a matter of fact, the constitution could serve as a workable basis for responsible representative government-- if those who hold power had any desire for such

²⁴ Ibid., pp. 27-31.

²⁵ Ibid., pp. 180-184.

²⁶ Ibid., pp. 92-104.

²⁷ Palmer, op. cit., p. 4.

government. The point is that they have no such desire. The constitution was "granted" in order to allay a mounting discontent among the Chinese people, on which the Communists were capitalizing, and, still more, in order to meet criticism in America and thus get a large American loan.²⁸

The Nationalists also inherited Sun Yat-sen's Kuomintang, which Sun had imagined could be a tool to unify, educate and democratize China. But when he died the tool became the master, and the party and the government were combined. "Since government and party were the same thing, the army was a party army. The Kuomintang controlled the censorship; party work was supported by government funds; party functionaries lived on public taxes. And since all other parties were outlawed, criticism of the Kuomintang became a state offense."²⁹ The party Sun created to be the trustee of the Chinese people to bring China toward democracy now became the owner and ruler of China.

As to Chiang Kai-shek, the protege of Sun Yat-sen, his impact on the post-Sun Yat-sen Nationalists was perhaps greater than the Master himself. But his impact was a bad one, because, according to his philosophy, he lived in a wrong generation. As observed by a historian,

He could repeat words out of the lexicon of democracy when making public speeches or talking to Americans,

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Peffer, op. cit., p. 50.

29

Theodore H. White and Annalee Jacoby, Thunder Out of China (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1946), p. 97.

but he had neither understanding of democracy nor sympathy with it. That there should be division of power was for him beyond real comprehension or, when comprehended, heretical. He may have thought of himself as paternal. He was in fact medieval. He was an authoritarian of the ancient pattern, of the Confucian pattern, without the sanctions and restraints of the Confucian moral code.³⁰

"Chiang Kai-shek could not understand the revolution whose creature he was..."³¹ "He still spoke of a Nationalist Revolution--but the fact that the revolution involved the will of the people escaped him."³² Even though he might claim that he was the legitimate successor of the revolutionary leader, he stood too far to the right of his predecessor and too above the suffering masses to really appreciate Sun Yat-sen's aspirations.

What Chiang did after Sun's death and after his taking the supreme power in his hands was utilizing Sun's popular facade for acquiring his personal ambition. "The Generalissimo was the key man in the one-party dictatorship which governed in the name of Sun Yat-sen."³³ Despite his repeated promises to clean his government of corruption, squeeze and nepotism, and carry out Sun's social and economic reforms, nothing had been achieved. As commented by a political scientist shortly

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Nathaniel Peffer, The Far East (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1958), p. 445.

³¹

White, op. cit., p. xv.

³²

Ibid., p. 122.

³³

Palmer, op. cit., p. 2.

before his debacle in China,

Under Chiang Kai-shek the government became increasingly autocratic, relying more and more on military support, and paying only lip service to the social and economic aims of the revolution as expounded by Sun Yat-sen.³⁴

While the Communists were confiscating the landlords' lands and distributed them to the poor peasants in the area under their domain, the numerous poor peasants tended to look upon Chiang's new promise as another farce. With the masses alienated, Chiang was digging his own grave. The prediction of Sun's widow was too true. As early as 1927 she said:

Whether the present Kuomintang at this moment rises to the height of its ideals and courageously finds a revolutionary corrective for its mistakes, or whether it slumps into the shamefulness of reaction and compromise, the Three Principles of Sun Yat-sen will conquer in the end. Revolution in China is inevitable.³⁵

As the Nationalists were turning toward restoration, another revolution, this time a communist revolution, was to come up and sweep across the land of 600 million.

Sun Yat-sen and the Communists

Sun Yat-sen and the Communists were mutually influenced. Through association Sun was influenced by the Russian Communists. It was through Sun that the weak, insubstantial Chinese Communists were able to survive and grow

³⁴ Ibid., pp. 1-2.

³⁵ Soong, op. cit., p. 6.

in number. His utopian half-Chinese, half-Western socialism was a springboard toward the communization of China.

In his early revolutionary years Sun was influenced by the Russian Communists. He was fascinated by Marx's aspirations to struggle for the suffering working class of the world. He also admired the Russian revolutionaries who tried to establish a communist country and implement Marxian ideology in Russia. His writings indicated that he had some contacts with the Russian revolutionaries in England in his exile year in 1907.

His interest in Russia and his contacts with the Russians were early. In 1905, soon after the February Revolution, Sun cabled the new government to congratulate the success of the revolution. Again, in 1917, when the Communists took over the government, Sun cabled Lenin to congratulate him on his success. In the later contacts Sun expressed his admiration of Russia's progress. In return, the Communists praised Sun for his anti-imperialist spirit. The intimate contacts were an important factor which later urged Sun to adopt the policy of "Alliance with Russia and Cooperation with the Communists."

The Russian Communists adhered to their anti-imperialist policy and avowed to rid Russia of Czarist imperialism. In 1919, the Soviet government issued the "Manifesto to the Chinese People" in which the Communists offered to return all territories wrongfully taken from the Manchus by the Czars,

renounce the Boxer indemnity and the control of the railway in Manchuria, and give up extraterritoriality and other unjustified special privileges.³⁶ It was the time when Sun's military Government in Canton was ignored and his aspirations to unify and reconstruct China were ridiculed by the Great Powers. A friend in need is a friend indeed. Sun gratefully shook the friendly hand offered by the Soviet government.

In China the Communists began to appear soon after the Communist revolution in Russia. At the beginning, the communist movement was a patriotic aspiration to save China. Some intellectuals began to form Marxist study groups. This kind of association was popular at Peking University, the leading educational institution at that time. And the prominent leaders were two professors, Chen Tu-hsiu and Li Ta-chao. In 1919 when the decision of the Paris Peace Conference reached China and the May Fourth Movement followed, communist and communist sympathizers were numerous among the agitators. But these communists were Chinese Communists. Often their aspirations for Chinese nationalism were stronger than their aspirations for social reform. They would have liked to reform Chinese society according to the Marxian theory. But, at the same time, they found that Sun's Nationalism which urged the struggle for the elevation of China's international status admirable and his moderate "communism" without violent means attractive. So, in many cases the Communists found that they could also follow Sun's

policy. An American scholar even went further to say that the Chinese Communists were Sun Yat-senists, not Marxists. He said: "Not Marxism but the perversion of Sun Yat-senism--the original philosophy of the republican and nationalist revolution--has recruited Communists."³⁷ The compatibility of Sun's ideology with communism was the second important factor that later urged Sun to allow the Communists to be the members in his Kuomintang.

In Russia, the Communist revolutionaries also had early interest in China as a potential locality for the communist revolution. Lenin, though he knew little about China and was occupied with revolutionary activities, "before the Russian revolution...had written a scant dozen articles on China."³⁸ In his famous book, Imperialism the Highest Stage of Colonialism, Lenin predicted the inevitability of the communist revolution in the colonial or semi-colonial areas such as India and China. He approved Sun Yat-sen's "bourgeois-democratic" revolution, for he thought that it was a necessary step toward the communist revolution. After Lenin's death, Trotsky's "permanent revolution" theory gained strong influence. Trotsky thought that the time was ripe for the communist revolution in China, and Russia should help

37

Peffer, "Time to Get Out of China," p. 53.

38

Allen S. Whiting, Soviet Policies in China, 1917-1924 (N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1954), p. 11.

promote it. Following Trotsky's exile, Stalin implemented his theory of "socialism in one country" which theoretically implied less attention to the communist revolutions in other countries. But Stalin never ignored China, a gigantic neighbor and potential ally. It was under Stalin's direction that the first Soviet envoy was sent to China.

Following several other unsuccessful missions, the Soviet Government sent Adolf Joffe to China in 1922. In January, 1922 he arrived in Shanghai where Sun had a temporary residence following Chen Chiung-min's rebellion in Canton. Following their conversations, the famous "Sun-Joffe Manifesto" was issued:

Dr. Sun Yat-sen holds that the communistic order, or even the Soviet system, cannot actually be introduced into China because there do not exist the conditions for the successful establishment of either communism or Sovietism. This view is entirely shared by Mr. Joffe, who is further of the opinion that China's paramount and most pressing problem is to achieve national unification and attain full national independence; and regarding this great task he has assured Dr. Sun Yat-sen that China has the warmest sympathy of the Russian people and can count on the support of Russia...³⁹

Further talks resulted in exchange of missions when Sun returned to power in Canton in February, 1923. Among the lieutenants Sun sent to Russia to study most had favorable opinions about the Soviet regime, but there was one notable

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Stephen Chen and Robert Payne, Sun Yat-sen, a Portrait (New York: The John Day Company, 1946), pp. 197-198.

exception, Chiang Kai-shek.⁴⁰ Though Chiang did not like the communist ideology, he learned a lot of the communist tactics, such as secret policy, party control of the government and placement of political commissars in the armed forces, which were later fully utilized in his regime.

In January, 1924 Michael Borodin, an astute political organizer who stayed in the United States and England long enough to speak fluent English, was sent by Moscow to Canton to help Sun Yat-sen. An intimate relationship soon developed between Borodin and Sun, and the former was trusted and relied on by the latter. Urged by Borodin, Sun began to reorganize his Kuomintang, modelling it on the Russian Communist party. For a long time the Kuomintang was only loosely organized and disciplined, and most of its members adventures seeking self-interests rather than revolutionary ideals. The success of the Russian Communist party in promoting the communist revolution and rebuilding a corrupt and backward country inspired Sun to reorganize his own party. In the reorganization, party discipline, propaganda effort and widening of the popular

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Chiang wrote back from Russia, warning Sun that Russia could not be relied on. But Sun's pro-Soviet policy was unshakable. It's ironical that in 1924, shortly before his death, Sun would write Chiang, a die-hard anti-communist, saying: "...Today we must learn from the Russian revolution... If we don't imitate Russia, our party's revolution will never have any success..." See Sun Yat-sen, The Selected Works of Sun Yat-sen (Peking: People's Press, 1962), p. 876.

basis with central control (democratic centralism) were stressed.⁴¹ To promote the party's unity Borodin urged Sun to call the First National Conference of the Kuomintang, and most of the important resolutions passed by the Conference were drafted by Borodin. Borodin also urged Sun to rejuvenate the Kuomintang by admitting the fervent Communists and members of other splinter political parties into the Kuomintang. Besides the party, Sun also rebuilt the Canton Government according to the Russian pattern. The government was so sovietized that a Harvard scholar called it the "Chinese Soviet Republic."⁴² Impressed by the important role of the Red Army in the Russian Revolution, Sun also set up Whampoa Military Academy to build a powerful army for the revolution.

It was in this period of Russian influence that Sun developed his "Three Cardinal Policies": alliance with Russia, cooperation with the Communists, support for the peasants and workers. The Three Cardinal Policies were considered the new interpretations of Sun's Three Principles of the People: Nationalism was explained as alliance with Russia against imperialism; admission of other parties' members into the Kuomintang to foster Democracy; support for the peasants and

⁴¹ Tsui Shu-chin and Others, Sun Yat-sen and Communism (Republic of China: Book World Co., 1965), pp. 53-61.

⁴² Holcombe, op. cit., p. 184.

the workers to implement the People's Livelihood. The new policies, though accepted by all factions at that time, became controversial after Sun's death in 1925. Later when the right-wing faction headed by Chiang Kai-shek rose to power, the three new policies were ignored. The Communists charged that Chiang and his people had betrayed the revolution and Sun's teachings, while the Nationalists argued that Sun had no intention of maintaining permanent alliance with Russia and that the Communists lacked sincerity to work with the Nationalists.

Sun's opinion of communism was the most disputed topic. In the lectures on his Third Principle, he wrote long paragraphs dealing with communism. Apparently he was greatly fascinated by the ideal world of communism. It was this fascination that made him say:

The Principle of Livelihood is socialism, it is communism, it is Utopianism.⁴³

Communism is a very high ideal of social reconstruction... Communism is an ideal of livelihood, while the Min-sheng Principle is practical communism. There is no real difference between the two principles--communism and Min-Sheng--the difference lies in the methods by which they are applied.⁴⁴

They (the Kuomintang comrades) do not realize that our Principle of Livelihood is a form of communism. It is

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Sun Yat-sen, San Min Chu I, trans. Frank Price (Chungking, China: Ministry of Education, 1943), p. 364.

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Ibid., p. 416.

not a form that originated with Marx...The first society formed by man was a communistic society and the primitive age was a communistic age.⁴⁵

No doubt Sun imagined that the goal of the People's Livelihood would be a communistic one. But he thought that Marxism was not a pure communism and that Marx's teachings were often mistaken and contradictory. The communism of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, as shown in the Communist Manifesto, subscribed to the ideas of the class struggle, the proletarian dictatorship, dialectical materialism and the withering away of the state. Sun agreed to none of these. He preferred a primitive communism which he believed existed in primitive society. In such a society people shared property, cooperated and coexisted peacefully without class distinction and struggle. From the Sun-Joffe Manifesto we can see that Sun did not believe that the communism established in Russia was suitable for China. But from his later policies in Canton he apparently thought that the Russian Communists were more reliable than the Western imperialists and the ideal communist system was superior to other political systems.

In his early revolutionary years Sun did not seem to give much attention to the application of the communist theory to China, though he often expressed his admiration for Marx's profundity and magnanimity, and the unfailing efforts of the Russian revolutionaries. But when the Western Powers failed

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Ibid., p. 429.

to assist Sun in his plan for Chinese reconstruction, he accepted Russian offers to send advisers and exchange missions. He began to identify his socialism as a kind of communism. He did not change his pro-Soviet policy until his death. The last message he left in this world was a letter to the Soviet Government, trusting it his Kuomintang followers and the unfinished revolution.⁴⁶

Sun's ideas were generally acceptable to the Chinese Communists, but they did not consider them perfect. To them, Sun's "bourgeois-democratic" revolution was the first step toward the communist revolution, and Sun was going the right direction, though not far and fast enough. With this idea in mind Mao Tse-tung, celebrating the ninetieth anniversary of Sun's birth, paid tribute to the great "bourgeois-democratic" revolutionary:

Let us pay tribute to the memory of our great revolutionary predecessor, Dr. Sun Yat-sen!

Let us pay tribute to his memory for his steadfast struggle against the Chinese reformists (the Kang-Liang group)...

Let us pay tribute to his memory for the great work he did in leading the people to overthrow the monarchy and found the Republic...

Save for a handful of reactionaries, all the Chinese of our day are heirs to the revolutionary cause which Dr. Sun Yat-sen worked for.

We completed the democratic revolution left unfinished by Dr. Sun; we have developed it into a socialist revolution, which we are now in the course of completing.⁴⁷

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Sun, Selected Works, p. 922.

47

Mao Tse-tung and Others, Dr. Sun Yat-sen (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1957), pp. 9-10.

Mao, unlike Chiang who ruled in the name of Sun Yat-sen, did not claim that he completely accepted Sun's teachings, but he repeatedly indicated that he admired the revolutionary hero. In Edgar Snow's interview, Mao said that Sun's impact on him was early. He said:

I learned also of Sun Yat-sen at this time, and of the program of Tung Meng-Hui. The country was on the eve of the First Revolution. I was agitated so much that I wrote an article, which I posted on the school wall. It was my first expression of a political opinion, and it was somewhat muddled. I had not yet given up my admiration of Kan Yu-wei and Liang Chi-chao. I did not clearly understand the differences between them. Therefore in my article I advocated that Sun Yat-sen must be called back from Japan to become President of a new Government, that Kang Yu-wei made Premier, and Liang Chi-chao Minister of Foreign Affairs!⁴⁸

It was in 1911, and Mao was eighteen. An author commented about the event: "The naivety of this proposal was obvious, and understandably it was the last time that its author spoke in favor of Kang and Liang."⁴⁹

But Mao did not cease admiring or talking of Sun Yat-sen. He seemed much impressed with Sun's magnetic personality, unselfish efforts and revolutionary fervor. On the occasion of Sun's ninetieth anniversary birthday he said:

Dr. Sun was a modest man. I heard him speak on many occasions and was impressed by the grandeur of his mind...

His whole life was devoted heart and soul to the rebuilding of China. Of him it could be said that he gave

⁴⁸ Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (New York: Grove Press, 1961), p. 135.

⁴⁹ Jerome Chen, Mao and the Chinese Revolution (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 30.

his best, gave his all till his heart ceased to beat.⁵⁰

The Reds liked to look at Sun's teachings with the Marxian viewpoint. Sun Yat-sen's San Min Chu I...were not the San Min Chu I of Chiang Kai-shek, for the Reds brought to them their own Marxist interpretation."⁵¹ Mao and his followers talked more about Sun's later left-leaning ideas and policies than any other parts of Sun's teachings. When Chiang Kai-shek was kidnapped in Sian in 1936 and his captors, including the Communists and other elements, demanded Chiang to "Put into effect the will of Dr. Sun Yat-sen" the Reds were thinking of Sun's Three Cardinal Policies. But the policies of alliance with Russia, cooperating with the Communists and supporting the peasants and the workers were beyond Chiang's comprehension or too far to the left to be tolerated.

The way the Communists explained Sun's will was that Sun was actually sympathetic with the proletariat and wanted alliance with Russia, for he said: "...To attain this goal the people must be aroused and we must associate ourselves in a common struggle with all the peoples of the world who treat us as equals." Apparently Mao thought that he was implementing Sun's teachings, as he said:

⁵⁰ Mao, op. cit., p. 11.

⁵¹ Snow, op. cit., p. 476.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary Three People's Principles, abandoned by the Kuomintang reactionaries, were upheld by the Chinese people, the Chinese Communists and other democrats.⁵²

Later, on the eve of his total victory, he said:

Twenty-four years have passed since Sun Yat-sen's death, and the Chinese revolution, led by the Communist party of China, has made tremendous advances both in theory and practice and has radically changed the face of China. Up to now the principal and fundamental experience the Chinese people have gained is twofold:

- (1) Internally, arouse the masses of the people...
- (2) Externally, unite in a common struggle with those nations of the world which treat us as equals...⁵³

In 1945, when the anti-Japanese war was near the end, Mao advocated a coalition government after the war, and expounded his theory of New Democracy. He thought that the best way to solve China's problem at that time was to unite all parties and establish a new-democratic state in which all classes should be equally treated and protected in order to struggle for the common goal. Of course, proletarian dictatorship was Mao's ideal. But he thought New Democracy was most appropriate for the post-war China. It was at this stage that Mao completely agreed with or was greatly influenced by Sun. Mao said:

The new-democratic politics we advocate consists in the overthrow of foreign oppression and feudal and fascist oppression within the country and the setting

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Anne Fremantle (ed.), Mao Tse-tung: An Anthology of His Writings (New York: The New American Library, 1962) p. 146.

⁵³

Ibid., p. 188.

up of a political system, not of the democracy of the old type but of the united front of all democratic classes. These views of ours are completely in accord with Dr. Sun Yat-sen's view on revolution.⁵⁴

In short, what Mao wanted was to have a coalition government to replace the Kuomintang dictatorship. In the coalition government Mao hoped the Communist party would have its voice. He demanded the termination of the Kuomintang dictatorship and the convening of a national assembly in which the popularly elected representative would have the supreme legislative power.

Here one might convincingly argue that Mao had no sincere belief in Sun's teachings and was actually using them as a tool for the ascendance of the Communists. But, whether he was sincere or not, he was not championing militarism. At least in this decisive period he was advocating democratic means to solve the problems in China.

Mao's moderate ideas and his temporary agreement to Sun's solutions of China's problems indicated that Mao and his followers would have been satisfied with the "bourgeois-democratic" state Sun had imagined and tried to build, and would have abandoned the aggressive proletarian revolution which would then be considered an ideal or utopia. Mao was a kind-hearted man, and had no intention to eliminate his

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Ibid., p. 156.

enemy with dirty means.⁵⁵ Had not the situation compelled him to do so, he might not have used arms to achieve his goal. But as the Kuomintang was unwilling to yield the dictatorial power and suppressed all dissenters, armed struggle became the only way to solve the problem.

As his armies were sweeping over China, Mao became tougher, and was becoming more militant. In June, 1949, his report to the Communist party congress was entitled "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship", no more "New Democracy". From the united front of different classes he shifted to proletarian dictatorship. He said:

"You are leaning to one side." Exactly. The forty years' experience of Sun Yat-sen and the twenty-eight years' experience of the Communist Party have taught us to lean to one side, and we are firmly convinced that in order to win victory and consolidate it we must lean to one side.

"You are dictatorial." My dear sirs, you are right, that is just what we are. All the experience the Chinese people have accumulated through several decades teaches us to enforce the people's democratic dictatorship, that is, to deprive the reactionaries of the right to speak and let the people alone have that right.⁵⁶

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An interesting contrast between Chiang and Mao was drawn by Anne Fremantle: On April 12 (1927), Chiang Kai-shek suddenly attacked the organized workers in Shanghai and killed over four thousand. "No Northern General would have dared kill so many in his territory," remarked an eyewitness. Mao Tse-tung: An Anthology of His Writings, p. xxix. He (Mao) lectured Abbas (Algerian leader) on the need of persuading and re-educating people opposed to him. "They should not be killed. It is a mistake to believe that by physically eliminating traitors or enemy prisoners, you can serve a revolutionary cause." (page xlvi).

56

Ibid., pp. 188-191.

Now Mao was ruling China in the name of the people who were identified with Sun Yat-sen, contrary to thirty years ago when Chiang Kai-shek ruled in the name of Sun Yat-sen who was identified with Confucius.

There are many similarities between Sun Yat-senism and Marxism-Leninism, though in many cases Sun was more moderate. Sun learned a lot from the theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism, digested and produced his own theory. As he was growing older and getting more influence from the Soviet Union he became more sympathetic with the masses and leaned more toward the left. It was at this point he died. It was also at this point that the Communists claimed to succeed him. Because Sun leaned to the left at the time of his death, the Communists had legitimate reason to claim to inherit his ideological legacy.

The Communism in China was not pure Marxism-Leninism. It was a mixture of Marxism-Leninism and "Sinoism". Mao was not the one who carried out the first communist policy in China. Much of what the Communists were doing had actually been advocated by Sun, except, perhaps, the Communists went a step further. The Communists endorsed Nationalism and wanted a strong China which would help small nations of the world against imperialism. The Communists also had Democracy, though it was "People's Democracy." In short, either in form or in spirit the Communists were doing or saying much of what Sun had done and said before. It might be fair to say that

Chinese Communism was one third Marxism-Leninism, one third Sun Yat-senism and one third "Maoism."

Finally, one might ask, should Sun Yat-sen be responsible for the Communist take-over of China? Possibly. Sun might be able to exterminate the Communists in China, but he did not and would not. His policy of cooperation with the Communists gave the latter a good chance to grow. But it was not a wrong policy. The policy, which was intended to widen the popular basis of the National Government for a united effort to reconstruct China, was a right policy in the right time. Modern examples indicate that communist parties can be peaceful parties and can coexist with other moderate political parties under a democratic government. But, if Sun were to be blamed, he should be blamed for his failure to cultivate a prominent liberal leader to succeed him. Because he failed to do this, the government the party fell into the hands of the militarists and reactionaries who did not understand the revolution.

The rapid rise of the Communists occurred in the post-Sun period. China under Chiang Kai-shek's Government, which "had all the nastiness of a dictatorship without a dictatorship's efficiency,"⁵⁷ was actually a hot-bed for the Communists. Early in 1947 an American scholar reported:

The young men, the men of spirit or those who despair,

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Peffer, The Far East, p. 292.

see no alternative to the Kuomintang except the Communists...Since the Kuomintang has repelled them beyond recall, young men of vigor and idealism are turning to the Communists...Chiang Kai-shek, the Kuomintang, and the present ruling class are doing all they can to throw China into the arms of Communism.⁵⁸

If that was the case, then Chiang Kai-shek, rather than Sun Yat-sen, should be responsible for the final victory of the Communists.

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Peffer, "Time to Get Out of China," p. 53.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

For forty years Sun Yat-sen struggled for the Chinese Revolution. He agitated to overthrow a corrupt government and succeeded after numerous failures. He also aspired to build a new China. But he failed to build a viable republic, and China fell into the hands of militarists and, finally, communists.

Sun's noble personality was unquestionable. He forsook his personal glory and happiness in order to pursue the welfare of the Chinese people. In contrast to the petty warlords and selfish satraps of his time, Sun's noble heart will always be remembered and appreciated by the Chinese people.

Sun's unfailing determination and continuous efforts succeeded in bringing down the Manchu regime, which Sun considered to be the enemy of the Chinese people and the obstacle of China's progress. His admirable efforts resulted in a new era in China's history, the Revolution of 1911.

The role Sun played in the Chinese Revolution was a prominent and vital one. He was not a mere product of his age. He helped create his age and the ages to come. He was not merely another unknown soldier in the tide of history. He

assumed an utterly important role in the tumultuous age of revolution in China. Without Sun as a catalyst and director, the revolution might have happened and the Republic been built, but with Sun, the revolution quickened its step and was guided toward the correct direction.

Not only was Sun a political activist, he was also a political theorist. His political theory was the guide of the new China which he aspired to build. He thought that the new China needed "Nationalism," "Democracy", and "People's Livelihood." Expounding the three items he wrote his famed Three Principles of the People.

Sun's Nationalism was aimed at inculcating the Chinese people with national consciousness and elevating China's international status. Sun thought that the Chinese people had the same ethnic origin and should cooperate to build a strong nation. To achieve this, Sun thought that the people should be taught about their long cultural traditions. Sun wanted to preserve some of the Chinese traditions, the old virtues, the profound philosophy, and humane ethics. But not all of them should be preserved. The corruption of the officials, the dictatorial rule of the royal families over the whole country, and feudalism, all of these Sun considered out-of-date and should be discarded.

When a nation is unified and strong, its international status will naturally be elevated. To elevate China's international status, Sun's first step was to unify and make

China strong. Besides that, Sun planned to eliminate the unequal treaties, to solicit international loans to develop China, and to promote international peace.

After China's unification and the elevation of its international status, Sun planned to carry out democracy in China. Sun thought that democracy was the only choice for China, and the only way to save China was to get rid of the deep-rooted monarchy and establish a republic. Besides, he said, democracy was the contemporary world tide, and China could not and should not go against the world tide.

In his "Chinese Democracy" Sun hoped to implement the Western democratic ideas of that time. The people were to have four sovereign powers--election, recall, initiative and referendum--and the government was to be endowed with five administrative powers--executive, legislative, judicial, "control," and "Exsmination." Sun imagined that a high-powered government with the five administrative powers could be efficient and able, but at the same time it could also be checked effectively by the sovereign people. Thus, checks and balances produced Sun's ideal government.

After a democracy was established in China, Sun planned to set up a socialist economic system. To avoid confusion and to promote understanding among the Chinese masses, Sun used "People's Livelihood" to replace "socialism." Sun's "People's Livelihood" was aimed at promoting socialism in China. Sun considered Marx a great socialist, and admired his profundity

and his "scientific" theory. But he was against Marx's notion of class struggle and the use of revolutionary means to achieve communism. Sun thought that his People's Livelihood was a kind of communism, a future, peaceful communism without class struggle and bloodshed. It was an ideal, but not to be carried out too soon. When everything had been carried out as planned, Sun imagined the goal, a communist world, would be the result.

When Sun began to expound his Three Principles, he thought that China was ready to accept his ideas and that the Three Principles could be carried out easily. But soon he met resistance. To overcome the resistance and other obstacles Sun formulated "The Program of National Reconstruction," including "Psychological Reconstruction," "Social Reconstruction," and "Material Reconstruction." These reconstruction items were aimed at building the Chinese Republic and carrying out the Three Principles of the People.

Sun's program to build a new China was appropriate and timely. Nationalism was much needed in the day when China was divided, disgraced, and the Chinese people suffered under the economic and political pressures of the Great Powers. Democracy was the only way to save China from decaying and the Chinese people from suffering under the rule of the corrupt monarchs. The People's Livelihood would lead China to socialism. China would certainly be a strong, unified, democratic state if Sun's Nationalism, Democracy and People's

Livelihood could be implemented.

Both in his Nationalism and Democracy Sun wanted the combination of Chinese and Western elements. Through Nationalism he thought that there would be a revival of part of the old Chinese virtues and ethical standards, and that this would be beneficial to the Chinese people. In his writings he devoted long passages to the discussion of the merits of traditional Chinese virtues. Although Sun was not a reactionary and had no intention to revive the whole set of the Chinese traditions at the expense of modernity, his argument for the partial revival of the Chinese traditions legitimized the attitude of the traditionalists who preferred total revival of the Chinese traditions. Partial or selective revival of the old Chinese virtues was either difficult or impossible, for the whole set of the feudal philosophy could not be separated and partially revived. It was out-of-date and detrimental to a new China. As a revolutionary Sun should have advocated total modernization and ignored the archaic philosophy. His attempt to synthesize the traditional and modern elements created confusion and contradiction in his political thought.

In his plan for Democracy Sun created a Five-Power Constitution, adding two traditional Chinese institutions (censure and examination systems) to three Western political institutions--executive, legislature and judiciary. Again, this shows Sun's attempt to combine the old and the new, Chinese and Western ideas. Nevertheless, the attempt created

nothing new but more confusion. The two elements Sun added to the three governmental powers were redundant and unnecessary. Without the two elements the Western system worked well. But with the two added elements Sun's constitution never worked. Joining an animal body to a human head, Sun created a sphinx, not a man.

In People's Livelihood Sun imagined a socialist economic system in which each citizen, with the government as an agent, was to work for the whole people and would be supported by the whole people. This kind of utopian world was too idealistic to be practical. Sun should not have forgotten that the China of the early twentieth century was still a feudal society with a privileged class exploiting and the masses suffering. How could a society like that be peacefully transformed to a communist-like society in a short period? Here, in fact, Sun was dreaming; He was dreaming that someday a communist society would be established in China.

Sun was an overly ambitious person. He looked too far ahead to be conscious of the obstacles under his nose. He looked forward to the achievement of a communist world while the exploiting class was unwilling to give up its privileges. He wanted the people to execute their four sovereign powers while ignorance prevailed among them. He planned to establish a Chinese Democracy while the petty warlords were dividing the nation and fighting for their self-interest. To look upon Sun's Three Principles as ideals or

goals for China was fine. But to carry them out as a solution to China's problem in that complicated situation was beyond possibility. Later Sun realized the difficulty and planned preparations and steps to implement his ideals. But they were, in Shakespeare's words, "much ado about nothing," for China was not ready to accept his utopian ideals.

Sun's thought ranged from traditionalism of the far right to communism of the far left. This wide range of Sun's political legacy caused heated ideological disputes between the Nationalists and the Communists. Both sides claimed to be Sun's legitimate successors and that they had inherited Sun's political legacy. Each side cut off a little part of Sun's thought and asserted that this part was the best of Sun's thought and avowed to follow this part of Sun's teachings.

The official Nationalist interpretation of Sun's thought was that Sun was a revivalist. To them Sun's Nationalism was more important than his Democracy and People's Livelihood. Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of the Nationalists, repeatedly promised to follow Sun's Democracy and People's Livelihood, but he wanted first of all, the Chinese people to study and revere their long, glorious history, to revive and observe their virtuous traditions. Apparently this was an impossibility. In China's long history the privileged class had been the oppressor and exploiter of the masses, and the kaleidoscopic rituals were their tools for suppressing the people. If China's traditions were to be revived, there was

no room for democracy or socialism. By the same token, if democracy and socialism were to be carried out in China, the old traditions must first be buried. Chiang's reiteration of the Chinese traditions and his preference for them over the modern ideas of democracy and socialism indicated that he had no intention to implement Sun's Democracy and People's Livelihood. Chiang might have made many utterances decorated with democratic and socialist terminology, but they were just a facade for his personal rule and his reactionary attitude.

Superficially the Nationalists inherited the whole mantle of Sun's legacy. The Kuomintang (Nationalist party) was founded by Sun; most Nationalist leaders were formerly Sun's followers; the Nationalist constitution was a summary of Sun's thought. But the Nationalist policy after Chiang Kai-shek's assumption of the supreme power in China did not follow Sun's teachings. What Chiang and his followers did was to use Sun's teachings to legitimize a dictatorship which Sun would have opposed. In Sun's widely ranging teachings the post-Sun Nationalists could easily find justification for their dictatorship. By doing so they were not following Sun's spirit and his general goals. They were only keeping Sun's minor ideas while ignoring his major points.

While the Nationalists were reiterating Sun's Nationalism, the Communists claimed that the center of Sun's thought was his People's Livelihood which Sun had said was socialism and communism. Indeed, in his People's Livelihood Sun adopted socialist and

communist ideas such as state control of the land and the supply of the people's daily necessities by the state. These ideas were similar to the ideas that the Communists struggled for. But the Communists, like the Nationalists, also ignored part of Sun's teachings. Concerning Sun's Nationalism, the Communists did not like Sun's advocacy of the revival of the Chinese traditions, though they also aspired to struggle for the elevation of China's international status. Mao Tse-tung, the leader of the Communists also wanted to have democracy in China, but his democracy was People's Democracy--a dictatorship in disguise. Again, like the Nationalists, the Communists were actually using Sun's Democracy as a facade for the communist dictatorship. They cut out the left part of Sun's wide teachings, and avowed to observe this part as representing Sun's whole thought. By doing this they were also only following Sun's minor ideas while ignoring Sun's main ideas and goals.

In short, Sun's political thought was a good facade for the Nationalist revivalism and the Communist radicalism. It well served the purposes of the Nationalists and the Communists. But neither the Nationalists nor the Communists had the intention to follow Sun's teachings completely, though both competed for the legitimacy of being Sun's followers. They dissected Sun's thought and adopted a part of it and twisted its meaning to fit their purposes. Though both sides claimed to be Sun's true followers, they were, in a sense,

Sun's betrayers.

Sun outlined admirable goals for a new China. His goals were consistent but idealistic, hence they were difficult to carry out. Aside from his goals, many of Sun's ideas were shallow, inconsistent, and often contradictory. It is the tragedy of China that Sun's cherished goals should be ignored and that his perplexing teachings have become the pretexts for extremism.

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SUN YAT-SEN'S POLITICAL THOUGHT AND ITS INFLUENCE
ON CHINESE NATIONALISTS AND COMMUNISTS

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Sun Yat-sen, the founder of the Republic of China, was one of the greatest revolutionaries of the twentieth century. His revolutionary efforts changed the old China. He also aspired to build a new China. But his short life prevented his accomplishing the great task.

Born in 1866 in a traditional Chinese family, Sun, nevertheless, received a thorough Western education. He went to school in Hawaii and studied medicine in Hong Kong. His education opened his eyes to the modern world and inspired him to overthrow the corrupt Manchu Empire and attempt to reform the backward China.

Sun's revolutionary activities started in his early life. In Macao and Hong Kong his medical profession was only a cover for his underground activities. Soon he gave up his medical profession and devoted himself completely to the revolutionary task. Inside and outside China he organized and led armed rebellions against the Manchu regime. Failures frustrated, but never discouraged_x him. Each failure was followed by another attempt. He experienced ten miserable failures before he finally brought down the Manchu regime.

After the Revolution in 1911, Sun continued his revolutionary efforts, first against Yuan Shih-kai, then to unify and rebuild China. His struggle stopped with the end of his life.

Throughout his life Sun had only one ambition--to unify and rebuild China. He gave up his personal glory to seek the welfare of the Chinese people. Though he did not

succeed as much as he intended, his aspirations were always praiseworthy.

Not only was Sun a revolutionary, he was also a political theorist. He wrote voluminous books and articles in which he constructed a set of plans to rebuild China. He intended to introduce a democratic political system and a specialist economic system to China. He wanted to keep some of the old Chinese traditions, but at the same time, adopt some Western democratic ideas. The "socialism" he imagined was a combination of democracy, communism and the traditional Chinese social system. In short, Sun tried to include everything he thought good, without much consistency and profundity.

Width without depth and consistency resulted in impracticality and confusion. To reconstruct China with Sun's ideas was tantamount to building a utopia. Difficulty caused confusion. When Sun's alleged followers found it difficult to implement his teachings, they simply ignored them.

The inclusion of traditionalist and communist elements in Sun's political thought also sowed the seeds of ideological disputes between the Nationalists and the Communists. The Nationalists claimed themselves to be Sun's genuine followers, for they said that Sun adored traditional Chinese virtues which Chiang Kai-shek championed. But Sun had close relations with the Russian Communists, and his "socialism" was similar

to communism. For this reason, Mao Tse-tung and his followers thought that Sun was their precursor.

At any rate, Sun's efforts to overthrow the corrupt Manchu regime and his aspirations to rebuild China were admirable. But his plans to implement his aspirations were unpractical and inadequate. He succeeded in tearing down a monarchy but failed to build a viable republic. Amidst the confusion and anarchy, communism came in. Sun welcomed communism. But the communism he imagined was a peaceful, future communism, without violence and class struggle.

Sun's early death left his Nationalist followers the heavy burden of implementing his legacy. But the Nationalists, under Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary leadership, detested and ignored Sun's left-leaning teachings. They resorted to force to crush all dissenters. The Nationalist dictatorship and militarism provoked the Communist armed struggles and brought Chiang Kai-shek's downfall. Sun introduced communism to China and helped the growth of the Communist party, and Chiang gave the Communists the best opportunity to conquer China.

