

AMERICAN RATIONING DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR

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PREPARE

Total rationing is a product of total war. Rationing in certain restricted senses has been practiced ever since Roman legionaries marched through Britain on fixed rations of wheat, but rationing as a nation-wide weapon of defense has been practiced only during the two World Wars of the current century. With the single exception of point rationing, all of the important rationing techniques used in the current world conflict were developed during the First World War.

As projected by President Woodrow Wilson and directed by Food Administrator Herbert Hoover, American rationing during the First World War was intended to conserve food at home for shipment to the fighting fronts abroad. No attempt was made to secure an equitable distribution of civilian supplies, although the Food Administration added a quantitative rationing of sugar, meat, and flour to its original program of simple self-denial as the war progressed. Late in 1918, Harry A. Garfield's Fuel Administration introduced a form of gasoline rationing to the United States.

The purpose of this study is to survey briefly the rationing controls affecting the American consumer during the First World War. It is the outgrowth of an interest which has existed since February, 1942, when an earlier attempt to write on the history of rationing was put aside because of a lack of data on the subject.

A reasonable quantity of literature on rationing during the First World War is now available, but most of it deals with the administration and results of food control rather than with the actual development of consumer rationing during this period. Perhaps the best single work on consumer rationing under the United States Food Administration is Ivan L. Pollock's The Food Administration in Iowa, although it naturally ignores the high degree of compulsory rationing attained in the industrial states. For this thesis, chief reliance was placed on government records, publications, and documents, particularly those released by the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Several persons aided materially in the preparation of this thesis. Dr. A. Bower Sageser proved a friendly guide through the paths of research and made many fruitful suggestions during the time of investigation and writing. Dr. Verne S. Sweedlun proved very helpful in editing the manuscript for the purpose of obtaining a reasonable clarity of expression. Acknowledgments should be made to the entire staff of the Kansas State College Library, but mention must be made of Associate Librarian Grace E. Derby, who provided excellent assistance and the incidental use of a typewriter throughout the period of research.

CHAPTER I. EUROPEAN PRECEDENTS AND EXPERIENCE

Some nations were prepared to fight a war in 1914, but no nation on earth was ready in 1914 to wage a World War that would last 52 months before a decision was reached on the major battlefields. What started as a "protective" war of conquest in 1914 became a total war of attrition by late 1916. Because finance and production became increasingly important as factors of resistance in the war's later phases, the First World War featured violent campaigns on the home front as well as battles in Flanders and Mesopotamia. Every major warring power conducted huge bond drives and propagandized in behalf of conscription, production, and conservation. In general, the First World War produced on the home front a vast extension of state control over production and distribution facilities which before the war had been ruled by private business.

This development was particularly striking with respect to food and other farm products. Before the First World War, the only extensive wartime attempt by a government to control retail prices had been made during the French Revolution.¹ By the time the First World War ended, every major

¹ Monthly Labor Review, IV:526 (April, 1917).

belligerent and many neutral nations had gone beyond price-fixing to establish some form of nation-wide rationing.²

The nation-wide rationing systems that appeared during the First World War produced four characteristic patterns. Nations with strong bureaucracies followed the German system of granting a monopoly of food distribution to various government agencies. Countries dependent on food brought by sea tended to follow the British principle of subjecting imports and exports to rigid government control. Nations which produced an abundance of food within their borders looked with favor on "voluntary conservation" of food rather than outright rationing; this system of food control reached its highest state of development in the United States. A fourth system, which used rationing as an instrument of political policy, was tried out during the earliest years of the Soviet regime in Russia.

Although none of these rationing systems appeared before 1915, rising food prices caused many governments to take food control measures by the end of 1914, because the constantly rising cost of food tended to create a marked popular

² Ibid., I:43-44 (July, 1915), IV:727-744 (May, 1917), VI:191 (July, 1917), VII:1267-1270 (November, 1918); Vossische Zeitung, August 23, 1916, as quoted in Ralph Haswell Lutz, ed., Fall of the German Empire 1914-1918, (Palo Alto, 1932), II:172-173; Congressional Record, 65 Cong., 1 Sess., 3798.

unrest that hindered the prosecution of the war.³ This rise was generally attributed to the credit and currency inflation produced by unprecedented wartime expenditures.⁴ Blame was also given to reckless government buying, to increased consumption by the armed forces and by the lower classes of the civilian population, to decreased production as soils deteriorated and skilled labor was drafted into the armed forces, to wartime taxation, and to hoarding by civilians.⁵

Whatever its causes, the rapid rise in food prices brought food control in its wake. Price-fixing became the universal rule in Europe during the first year of the war, although Great Britain and Sweden proved very reluctant to apply it.⁶ Another very common measure during the early months of the war was an export embargo on crucial foods. As one source explains,

Denmark, Egypt, Great Britain, Italy, Russia, Spain, and Turkey prohibited the export of practically all foodstuffs. France, Norway, and Sweden listed certain articles which must not be exported, and Holland placed an embargo on butter and cheese.⁷

3 cf. the statement which the British Labor Party issued after its conference of January 23-26, 1917, as quoted in Simon Litman, Prices and Price Control in Great Britain and the United States during the World War, (New York, 1920), 99-100, and the speech of Haase to the Imperial German Reichstag on March 10, 1915, as quoted in Lutz, op. cit., I:205 ff.

4 Litman, op. cit., 36.

5 Litman, op. cit., 36-63.

6 Monthly Labor Review, I:44 (July, 1915).

7 Ibid., I:43 (July, 1915).

Germany was the first nation to supplement food price control with food rationing to consumers. What produced rationing in Germany was not German efficiency, but the Allied blockade. Before 1916, this blockade reduced Germany's normal food imports by a third, leaving two-thirds of the German population dependent on a home agriculture which was impaired by conscription and rising industrial demands.⁸ This situation was met by establishing a government monopoly of distribution that tried to force food prices down by eliminating the middleman from the German food business. Other nations echoed German denunciations of the middleman as an arch-profitier,⁹ but no other country followed, as a belligerent, the German example of liquidating the food middleman as a class.

The first step in this process was taken on January 25, 1915, when the Imperial German Bundesrat issued an ordinance establishing a War Grain Company to monopolize trade in wheat, rye, and other grains.¹⁰ Under its provisions, a farmer was required to sell at a fixed price to the Company all grain in excess of his requirements as a citizen and as a food producer, while a consumer was permitted to buy flour at a fixed price from his municipality. All other steps in

⁸ Lutz, Fall of the German Empire 1914-1918, II:141.

⁹ Speech of Haase to the Reichstag, March 10, 1915, in Lutz, op cit., I:205 ff.

¹⁰ Ibid., II:554.

the normal process of distribution were monopolized by the German government. On January 31, 1915, bread ration cards appeared in Berlin.¹¹

This rigid control of bread, flour, and grain was only the first step in the development of German rationing. After the third wartime session of the Reichstag revealed a growing demand for the revision of home front policies,¹² the extension of rationing throughout Germany was greatly accelerated.

On April 12, 1915, the Imperial Bundesrat set up an Imperial Office for Potato Supplies, and granted to it the monopolistic powers over distribution that had been given to the War Grain Company, except that the potato supply office was to control only one commodity. A striking feature of the order establishing the office was its provision that municipalities which sold potatoes to the lower classes at prices below cost, "in order to maintain an equitable distribution of potatoes to all classes throughout the Reich," were to receive the difference between the selling price and the cost price in the form of a special payment from the Imperial Office for Potato Supplies.¹³ This was one of the earliest attempts to secure an effective consumer subsidy.

11 Ibid., II:554; Announcement of the Prussian Ministry of State Concerning the Order of the Bundesrat of January 25, 1915, in ibid., II:153-154.

12 Ibid., II:555.

13 Lutz, op. cit., II:157-159.

Meanwhile, flour rationing became effective throughout Germany, with a maximum daily allowance of 200 grams per person permitted after March 15, 1915.¹⁴ This stringent ration of three pounds per week was a sign that the Allied blockade was already threatening the German war effort. However, in October of 1915 the doubling of potato prices and the trebling of fresh vegetable prices since 1913 at the retail markets of Berlin were attributed to "unscrupulous profiteering" rather than to actual food shortages caused by the war.¹⁵

After potatoes and cereal products had been made subject to government monopolies, no further German food control steps of national importance were taken for a year. The spring of 1916, however, brought several important moves as more food shortages developed. On March 27, 1916, the Bundesrat established an Imperial Meat Board to monopolize the distribution of meat throughout the Reich,¹⁶ and by October 2, 1916, all Germans were placed on a maximum meat ration of 250 grams, or slightly more than eight ounces, per week.¹⁷ On April 6, 1916, an agency was set up to monopolize the dis-

14 Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, March 4, 1915, in Lutz, op. cit., II:157.

15 Vorwärts, (Socialist journal), No. 286, October 16, 1915, 5, in Lutz, op. cit., II:160.

16 Official Statement Concerning the Decree of the Bundesrat Establishing the Imperial Meat Board, March 27, 1916, in Lutz, op. cit., II:165-166.

17 Vossische Zeitung, August 23, 1916, in ibid., II:172-173.

PLATE I

THE CHAIN OF RATIONING AUTHORITY IN IMPERIAL GERMANY
DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR

—————→ Direct Control

- - - - -→ Indirect Control; local autonomy permitted or
encouraged

tribution of coffee, tea, and hot substitute beverages.¹⁸ The movement toward state control of distribution was climaxed on May 22, 1916, by the founding of a special War Food Supply Department to regulate the distribution and consumption of "all kinds of food all over Germany, of raw materials and other things necessary for the food supply, as well as all food for animals, all raw materials and other things necessary for cattle raising." Food price control was placed within its jurisdiction, and violations of its orders were made punishable "by an imprisonment of one year and by a maximum fine of 10,000 marks."¹⁹ A year of development had produced a central agency for the wartime distribution of food within Germany.

German efficiency in setting up machinery to control the distribution of food did not end food production problems in Germany. By 1918, poor soil and the Allied blockade caused a breakdown in German food control. This collapse had been foreseen by German military leaders,²⁰ but attempts to meet it in 1918 by cutting the flour, sugar, and meat rations all failed.²¹ The 300 percent price rises from 1913

18 Kölnische Zeitung, April 6, 1916, in ibid., II:169-171.

19 Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, May 23, 1916, in ibid., II:171-172.

20 See the letter of General Ludendorff to General von Arz dated March 25, 1917, as quoted in Lutz, Fall of the German Empire 1914-1918, II:186-187.

21 Lutz, op. cit., II:197.

levels that occurred in many German food markets by November of 1918 were coupled with acute local food shortages in industrial areas.²² These factors accounted for much of the unrest that helped Germany to lose the war.

Although Great Britain was one of the last great belligerents to adopt compulsory rationing, this sea-going nation developed the second main type of food control practiced during the First World War. The British system was a sharp contrast to the German procedure of creating government food-distribution monopolies. The British government held a rigid grip on the export and import of food from the start of the war, and gradually evolved a system of wholesale and retail price ceilings on specific commodities as the war progressed, but throughout the war it left food distribution in the hands of the regular trades.

For a fair appraisal of the British food-control effort, it should be mentioned that British propaganda during the early years of the war made much of the fact that Germany was forced on rations while England ate without benefit of

²² Ibid., II:181-184.

cards or coupons.²³ When England adopted compulsory coupon rationing in the spring of 1916, a Berlin comic publication, the Lustige Blätter, featured an ironic cartoon with the following caption:

GREAT BRITISH "VICTORY".

The British have just "conquered" their dislike of food-tickets. A great procession will celebrate it in London.²⁴

Although a rigid clamp was placed on British food exports and imports during the first weeks of the war, further action on food control was delayed for twenty-seven months. This delay proved costly. By January 1, 1917, the question of British food control became a subject for bitter economic and political debate. At the beginning of 1917, the retail cost of "necessary foods" in Britain averaged 87 percent higher than at the outbreak of the war.²⁵ On January 26,

23 of. the following "air post" piece dropped into German cities in 1916, as quoted in Lutz, op. cit., I:159.

A. P. 45

A QUESTION OF BREAD

How long will it be before Germany has sufficient bread?

Why is it that England is never forced to distribute her bread in rations?

In England everybody eats as much bread as he wishes.

In Germany the bread ration is lowered continually....

24 Reproduced in Literary Digest, LVII:28 (April 6, 1918).

25 Litman, op. cit., 32.

1917, a national conference of the British Labor Party adopted a series of demands for a rigid system of food control. These demands requested a government control of food distribution, a government monopoly of food imports, a government wheat-trading concern, government lunches for women and children in areas of food shortage, a consumer subsidy to keep down the price of bread, and a system of proportional rationing on a family basis for foods in which there was a critical shortage.²⁶

Lord Davenport, who became Great Britain's first Food Controller in December of 1916,²⁷ failed to act on these proposals. He fixed maximum wholesale prices for wheat, continued the price control of milk which had been started by the Board of Trade, staffed his food-control agency with civil service personnel, and proclaimed "maximum wholesale prices" for potatoes that were later interpreted as government-guaranteed minimum prices.²⁸ On February 5, 1917, Lord Davenport introduced England's first official attempt to ration food. He appealed to the nation to limit its use of bread to four pounds per person per week, and prescribed as voluntary weekly limits a use of 2.5 pounds of meat and .75

26 Report of the Sixteenth Annual Conference of the Labor Party, (1917), 5, as quoted in Litman, *op. cit.*, 99-100.

27 Litman, *op. cit.*, 109.

28 *Ibid.*, 130, 120, 110, 123-126.

pound of sugar per capita. Lord Davenport also brought the meatless day to England. Effective April 15, 1917, London restaurants observed "Meatless Tuesday" and public eating places elsewhere in England did not serve meat on Wednesdays. The use of potatoes was restricted to meatless days and Fridays.²⁹

The extension of food control to the ordinary British consumer was left to Lord Rhondda, who became British Food Controller after Lord Davenport resigned in May of 1917 because of ill health.³⁰ Lord Rhondda, who won fame and fortune before the World War as David A. Thomas, a Welsh coal baron,³¹ took vigorous measures to bring British food industries under government control as far as prices were concerned, but he was slow to develop a system of compulsory rationing. Under his rule, the British food control office set up maximum retail prices for beans, peas, beef, butter, cheese, wheat flour and bread, milk, potatoes, tea, coffee, cocoa, chocolate, oleomargarine, and onions.³² Retail prices of flour and bread were reduced 20 percent after September 17, 1917, through consumer subsidies that cost the British treasury about 40 million pounds a year. On

²⁹ Monthly Labor Review, IV:942-943 (June, 1917).

³⁰ Litman, op. cit., lll. It may be unkind to suggest that inefficiency and political turmoil played as large a part as illness in Davenport's resignation.

³¹ Review of Reviews, LVII:202 (February, 1918).

³² Litman, op. cit., 140, 133, 136, 137, 130, 120, 129.

November 17, 1917, a consumer subsidy to keep potato prices down was begun which cost the treasury five million pounds during the course of the war.³³

Viscount Rhondda's first step toward framing a system of compulsory food control at the consumer level was his Food Control Committees Order of August 22, 1917. As Simon Litman has observed,

This order requested local authorities to appoint food control committees, whose functions would be to administer a new scheme of sugar distribution, to continue the campaign for food economy, to deal with other food supplies such as bread and meat, and to assume special responsibilities with regard to food prices.³⁴


The "new scheme of sugar distribution" was a very long time in the making. Since 1914, the importation of sugar into the United Kingdom had been controlled by the Royal Commission on the Sugar Supply. In accordance with its right to sell sugar and ration its delivery within Great Britain, the Royal Commission in 1917 restricted the use of sugar by manufacturers to one-fourth of the 1915 use. By October 1, 1917, food retailers had to secure certificates from their local food control committee in order to be able to sell sugar, and by January 1, 1918, a British consumer could buy sugar only from the dealer to whom he had given a sugar registration card issued by food control authorities.³⁵

³³ *Ibid.*, 129-131.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 113.

³⁵ Litman, *op. cit.*, 114, 118-119.

PLATE II

THE CHAIN OF RATIONING AUTHORITY IN GREAT BRITAIN
DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR

Before sugar or any other food was rationed on a compulsory basis, however, the English coal crisis caused coal to be rationed in the London area by Act of Parliament. The price of coal had been regulated since July 29, 1915, and all British coal mines had been operated by the government since February 22, 1916, with Guy Colthrop acting as Controller of Coal Mines, but rising industrial demands and the drafting of British miners into the armed forces created a great coal crisis in 1917. To meet this crisis, a Household Coal Distribution Act for the London district was passed which limited consumer use of coal according to the plan shown in Table 1.

Table 1. The London household coal allowance.³⁶

Number of rooms occupied :	Weekly coal allowance October 1 - March 31 (pounds)
4 or less	200
5 or 6	300
7	2240
13, 14, or 15	4480
16 or more	5480

Six months after coal was rationed, the compulsory rationing of food began in Great Britain. On February 25,

³⁶ Litman, *op. cit.*, 145-150. These allowances were halved from April 1 to September 30, but additional coal not to exceed 200 pounds per week could be obtained for a home which lacked gas or electricity, or which housed aged persons, invalids, or young children.

1918, the residents of London and of the surrounding counties were placed under a coupon rationing system which allowed about a pound of meat a week to adults and a half pound per week to children under ten. Each of the 60 coupons in the original meat card was good for fivepence worth of meat each week. Every card had to bear the name and business address of the consumer's butcher as well as the name of the householder to whom the card was issued.³⁷

The death of Lord Rhondda on May 3, 1918³⁸ interrupted a nation-wide extension of the London card system that had been in progress since early April.³⁹ Rhondda's successor as food controller was J. R. Clynes, a Labor M. P. and cabinet member who controlled Britain's food until the wartime system was dropped in 1919.⁴⁰ On July 17, 1918, Mr. Clynes introduced a nation-wide system of ration books which contained printed coupons for sugar, butter, oleomargarine, lard, and meat. In addition, the books also held sheets of blank coupons which local committees could use to ration other foods. On July 29, 1918, the weekly sugar ration was placed at eight ounces, and the weekly ration of butter and oleomargarine was fixed at five ounces, with two ounces of

37 Independent, XCIII:406 (March 9, 1918); Literary Digest, LVII:27-28 (April 6, 1918).

38 Review of Reviews, LVIII:131, 138 (August, 1918).

39 Literary Digest, LVII:27-28 (April 6, 1918).

40 Who's Who, 1942.

lard allowed each week.⁴¹

Russia, which was slow to adopt wartime food control, developed a unique type of rationing system under the early Soviet dictatorship. After August 2, 1916, Czarist Russia had four meatless days a week on the home front.⁴² The Soviet regime, however, solved its food problem during the Russian Civil War by using a rationing system based on class discrimination. "Excess food" was confiscated from the producers and given to ration card holders in Communist-controlled cities. The confiscatory feature of this program was abandoned in 1921 in order to halt an extremely rapid decline in food production.⁴³

Wartime rationing in other European countries showed interesting minor variations from the patterns established by Germany and Great Britain. France, which had a price-control law of 1791 which was still on the books in 1917, added new ones during the war that fixed prices for many crucial products by the end of 1916. To maintain the government price of \$2.04 per bushel of wheat, a farm subsidy of 16 cents per bushel was paid after February 5, 1916. Sugar rationing was made effective early in 1917, and bread rationing according to age, sex, and occupation appeared in Paris on November 30, 1917. Following a decree of June 30,

41 Monthly Labor Review, VII:1268 (November, 1918).

42 Ibid., V:191 (July, 1917).

43 George Vernadsky, A History of Russia, (New Haven, 1931), 281-282.

1918, a corps of police agents was detailed to act as price-checkers and report all profiteers in order to hold down the cost of living.⁴⁴ A curious feature of the French experience was that wartime controls on food prices were revived for a brief time after the war in a vain attempt to halt postwar inflation.

⁴⁴ Monthly Labor Review, IV:526-529, 532 (April, 1917); IV:917 (June, 1917); VI:368-370 (February, 1918); VII:1277 (November, 1918).

CHAPTER II. THE GREAT DEBATE ON RATIONING

The food control which brought rationing to Europe during the First World War was an emergency development created under the stress of battle. Food control in the United States was very seriously discussed before this country entered the war, and rationing was carried out in this country during the First World War with a very careful regard for the experience and precedents developed in Europe during the first three years of the war.

Although the armed forces of the United States did not fight in Europe until 1917, America was in the first World War in an economic sense by early 1915. During the First World War, America was the granary of warring Europe. Now serving as an arsenal of democracy, the United States won the First World War with American food, American men, and European weapons.

This fact brought unusual prosperity to the American farmer, but it brought inflation and high food costs to the American housewife. After 1913, competitive bidding and unrestrained food purchases by the Allies brought a 15 percent rise in retail food prices by June of 1916. By June of 1917, domestic speculation by "war profiteers" had been added to the pressure of military buying at home and abroad

to force an additional rise of 35 percent in a single year.¹

Furthermore, this rise was selective. Cuts of beef and pork rose not more than 35 percent. Milk and poultry were held within a 20 percent rise, but flour and potatoes more than doubled in price during the year which ended on June 15, 1917. The same period also brought the price of a pound loaf of bread up to 10 cents, ending forever the 5 cent loaf which had prevailed until 1914.²

Food control in the United States, because of these price rises, began as a local measure even before the United States entered the war. The last weeks of February, 1917, featured food riots and demonstrations against high prices in New York City and Philadelphia.³ In March, 1917, Governor Martin G. Brumbaugh of Pennsylvania appointed a Committee of Public Safety which had a Department of Food Supply as one of its divisions. The head of the food supply department in this Pennsylvania committee was Howard Heinz of the H. J. Heinz Company, who in September, 1917, was appointed Federal Food Administrator for Pennsylvania.⁴

Other early attempts to control the price and wholesale distribution of food were made in New York, and throughout

1 Monthly Labor Review, VIII:89 (January, 1919).

2 Monthly Labor Review, VIII:89 (January, 1919).

3 New York Times, February 20, 21, 23, and 24, 1917.

4 George Nox McCain, War Rations for Pennsylvanians, (Philadelphia, 1920), 19-20.

1917 and 1918 individual states and localities made many useful innovations in American food control. When the United States declared war against Germany on April 6, 1917, the problem of controlling the wartime production and distribution of food became national in scope.

Congressional action on nation-wide food control during wartime began in the last days of April. Serious consideration of the final food-control bill began in the House of Representatives on June 18, 1917, and the Lever Food and Fuel Control Act became law on August 10.

The intervening time was characterized by administration spokesmen as an inexcusable delay in view of the urgent need for food control.⁵ On the whole, the Congressional record on food control was a very clean one. The food control law which was signed by President Wilson was an immense improvement, from the standpoint of wartime rationing and food control, over a somewhat sketchy measure which the House Agriculture Committee received from the Department of Agriculture in the spring of 1917.⁶

Much of the delay came about because of a fundamental conflict between the food-control plans of the Administration and the Congressional ideas of what wartime consumer

5 William C. Mullendore, History of the United States Food Administration 1917-1919, (Palo Alto, 1941), 55-56.

6 Congressional Record, 65 Cong., 1 Sess., 4074 (Representative Horace M. Towner of Iowa).

controls should be like. In general, Congress favored the establishment of something comparable to the present-day controls over all consumer commodities, although the Senate was a good bit more enthusiastic about such controls than the House. On the other hand, what the Administration wanted and finally secured was something comparable to the crop-incentive and crop-distribution powers of the New Deal Agricultural Adjustment Administration.

This basic conflict was revealed in the food-control measures discussed by Congress during the opening weeks of the 1917 war session. Representative William A. Ayres of Kansas submitted a bill on April 19 to punish the artificial manipulation of prices during wartime. On April 30, Senator Thomas P. Gore of Oklahoma introduced a joint resolution in the Senate which proposed to grant Secretary of Agriculture David F. Houston broad powers over the wartime sale, distribution, and conservation of food. On May 4, Representative Asbury F. Lever of South Carolina introduced a bill conferring broad price-fixing powers on the President. The Senate spent the first few days of May considering a bill which Senator Gore introduced on May 1 in order to establish a British-style Food Controller in the United States. By May 15, Congress had joined battle on the issue of control for the benefit of the consumer as opposed to control for the benefit of the producer. After a conference with members of the House and Senate Agriculture Committees, President

Woodrow Wilson tipped the scales in favor of the latter alternative with a formal food-control statement issued on May 19, 1917.⁷

This statement is worth quoting in full at this point because it provides a complete summary of food control as planned under the American system of voluntary conservation. As published in The New York Times, the Wilson statement of May 19, 1917 shows that the "Hoover program" of wartime rationing was also to a large extent a "Wilson system", and indicates that Woodrow Wilson must share a part of the praise and blame which Herbert Hoover won as Food Administrator during the First World War.

The Wilson statement reads as follows:

It is very desirable, in order to prevent misunderstandings or alarms and to assure co-operation in a vital matter, that the country should understand exactly the scope and purpose of the very great powers which I have thought it necessary in the circumstances to ask the Congress to put in my hands with regard to our food supplies. Those powers are very great, indeed, but they are no greater than it has proved necessary to lodge in the other Governments which are conducting this momentous war, and their object is stimulation and conservation, not arbitrary restraint or injurious interference with the normal processes of production. They are intended to benefit and assist the farmer and all those who play a legitimate part in the preparation, distribution, and marketing of foodstuffs.

⁷ Congressional Record, 65 Cong., 1 Sess., 867, 1940, 2777, 2085, 2324, 2325, 2501, 2633-2659, 2239; New York Times, May 16 and 20, 1917.

It is proposed to draw a sharp line of distinction between the normal activities of the Government represented in the Department of Agriculture in reference to food production, conservation, and marketing, on the one hand, and the emergency activities on the other. All measures intended directly to extend the normal activities of the Department of Agriculture in reference to the production, conservation, and the marketing of farm crops will be administered, as in normal times, through that department, and the powers asked for over distribution and consumption, over exports, imports, prices, purchase, and requisition of commodities, storing, and the like which may require regulation during the war will be placed in the hands of a Commissioner of Food Administration, appointed by the President and directly responsible to him.

The objects sought to be served by the legislation asked for are: Full inquiry into the existing available stocks of foodstuffs and into the costs and practices of the various food producing and distributing trades; the prevention of all unwarranted hoarding of every kind and of the control of foodstuffs by persons who are not in any legitimate sense food producers, dealers, or traders; the requisitioning when necessary for the public use of food supplies and of the equipment necessary for handling them properly; the licensing of wholesome and legitimate mixtures and milling percentages, and the prohibition of the unnecessary or wasteful use of foods.

Authority is asked also to establish prices, but not in order to limit the profits of the farmers, but only to guarantee to them when necessary a minimum price which will insure them a profit where they are asked to attempt new crops and to secure the consumer against extortion by breaking up corners and attempts at speculation, when they occur, by fixing temporarily a reasonable price at which middlemen must sell.

After announcing that Herbert Hoover had been asked to lead the nation's food-control effort on a voluntary basis, the President continued his statement with a flat demand for unprecedented executive powers over the food supplies

of the United States.

Although it is absolutely necessary that unquestionable powers shall be placed in my hands, in order to insure the success of this administration of the food supplies of the country, I am confident that the exercise of those powers will be necessary only in the few cases where some small and selfish minority proves unwilling to put the nation's interest above personal advantage, and that the whole country will heartily support Mr. Hoover's efforts by supplying the necessary volunteer agencies throughout the country for the intelligent control of food consumption and securing the co-operation of the most capable leaders of the very interests most directly affected, that the exercise of the powers deputed to him will rest very successfully upon the good-will and co-operation of the people themselves, and that the ordinary economic machinery of the country will be left substantially undisturbed.

The proposed food administration is intended, of course, only to meet a manifest emergency and to continue only while the war lasts. Since it will be composed, for the most part, of volunteers, their need be no fear of the possibility of a permanent bureaucracy arising out of it. All control of consumption will disappear when the emergency has passed. It is with that object in view that the Administration considers it to be of pre-eminent importance that the existing associations of producers and distributors of foodstuffs should be mobilized and made use of on a voluntary basis. The successful conduct of the projected food administration by such means will be the finest possible demonstration of the willingness, the ability, and the efficiency of democracy, and of its justified reliance upon the freedom of individual initiative. The last thing that any American could contemplate with equanimity would be the introduction of anything resembling Prussian autocracy into the food control in this country.

It is of vital interest and importance to every man who produces food and to every man who takes part in its distribution that these policies thus liberally administered should succeed, and succeed altogether. It is only in this way that we can prove it to be absolutely unnecessary to resort to the rigorous and drastic measures which have proved to be necessary in

some of the European countries.⁸

This food-control statement by Woodrow Wilson was amplified in its administrative details by a simultaneous statement from Herbert Hoover, who had just returned to America from his foreign post as Belgian Relief Administrator. The Wilson statement promised that Hoover would be put in charge of America's food-control effort. In his own statement of May 19, 1917, Herbert Hoover set forth what came to be the five cardinal principles of his Food Administration:

First: That the food problem is one of wise administration...not expressed by the words "dictator" or "controller" but "food administrator."

Second: That this administration can be largely carried out through the co-ordination and regulation of the existing legitimate distributive agencies of the producers, distributors, and consumers.

Third: The organization of the community for voluntary conservation of foodstuffs.

Fourth: That all important positions, so far as may be, shall be filled with volunteers.

Fifth: The independent responsibility of the food administration directly under the President, with the co-operation of the great and admirable organizations of the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Commerce, the Federal Trade Commission, and the railway executives.⁹

Despite these statements by Wilson and Hoover on the

⁸ New York Times, May 20, 1917.

⁹ Mullendore, History of the United States Food Administration, 52.

Administration ideas of what wartime food control should be like in the United States, a satisfactory bill containing these ideas was not drafted for several weeks. On June 11, 1917, Representative Asbury F. Lever, chairman of the House Committee on Agriculture, presented to the House a long bill, listed as H. R. 4961, which two months later became law as the Lever Food and Fuel Control Act.¹⁰

As favorably reported back from the House Committee on Agriculture on June 12, 1917,¹¹ the Lever bill contained 21 sections establishing a government control of "food necessities" for a period to extend not more than one year beyond the duration of the war. Although farmers and other producers of non-processed foods were exempted from its provisions, the bill required all food distributors above the retail level to be licensed by the President at his discretion, and forbade with appropriate penalties any attempt to hoard food or manipulate its price for excessive private gain during wartime. The President was authorized at his discretion to purchase and store food in the name of the United States, and to limit the production of alcoholic beverages. He was also authorized to fix in an emergency "a reasonable, guaranteed price for any necessities, in order to assure the producers a reasonable profit." For these purposes, the bill

¹⁰ Congressional Record, 65 Cong., 1 Sess., 3484.

¹¹ Ibid., 3544.

granted a fund of \$150,000,000. In addition, \$2,500,000 was appropriated to pay the administrative expenses of any food control agency which might be created by the President under the authority granted to him by the food control act, and the franking privilege was granted to all official business connected with wartime food control.¹²

This, in brief, was the measure which the House began to debate on June 18, 1917, as its exclusive order of business until passed.¹³ The debate opened with a factual appeal from Representative Lever of South Carolina to pass the bill speedily in order to halt the rise in retail food prices and curb the wartime waste of food.¹⁴ He laid particular stress on the point that no nation taking part in the war which the United States had just entered had reached these aims without resorting to some degree of governmental food control.¹⁵

Although this speech was countered by Representative James Young of Texas, a ranking member of the House Committee on Agriculture, who contended that the Lever food bill was designed to fasten a permanent dictatorship on food producers and consumers throughout the nation,¹⁶ the general House reaction to the food control bill as presented by Lever was highly favorable. Everyone was in favor of war-

¹² Congressional Record, 65 Cong., 1 Sess., 3633-3634.

¹³ Ibid., 3561-3563, 3566.

¹⁴ Ibid., 3793-3799.

¹⁵ Ibid., 3798.

¹⁶ Congressional Record, 65 Cong., 1 Sess., 3801-3808.

time food control; the only subject for debate was how that control should be applied.

The opening days of food control debate in the House revealed a tendency to ask why the control proposed for farm products could not be extended to "clothing, shoes, and other necessities of life..." which under wartime demands were rapidly rising in price.¹⁷ On being told by Representative Lever that the regulation of clothing and other necessities had been excluded from the bill because Herbert Hoover had suggested to the Agriculture Committee "that there was no one single brain in the world which could handle all that was contemplated in the first bill,"¹⁸ Representative George Scott of Iowa suggested that the House should strengthen the regulatory features of the bill lest Herbert Hoover should prove to have ideas on food control which approximated those entertained by the Chicago Board of Trade.¹⁹ An even bleaker view of the Hoover plans was expressed by Representative Jacob E. Meeker of Missouri, who commented as follows:

17 Ibid., 3819-3820 (Harold Knutson of Minnesota); 3828-3829 (William R. Wood of Indiana); 3870 (Scott of Iowa); 4035-4036 (Gilbert N. Haugen of Iowa). All of these representatives were Republicans.

18 Ibid., 3870.

19 Ibid., loc. cit.

If this bill is worth anything it can pay its way. ...There is a great difference between a man's good intentions and his ability to do a thing. This talk about what Mr. Hoover wants to do for nothing does not appeal to me at all...I think the heads of the departments ought to do the advising.²⁰

However, the California delegation came to the rescue of Hoover's reputation,²¹ and Representative Fiorello H. LaGuardia of New York announced his intention to secure passage of a constitutional amendment to make the control of food production, conservation, and distribution a permanent power of the United States government.²²

Despite the speeches favoring the control of other consumer goods, all attempts to extend the authority of the Lever act beyond food and fuel were voted down in the House.²³ An attempt to Representative Marvin Jones of Texas to weaken the bill by striking out its compulsory features failed,²⁴ but an amendment by Representative Lever providing for a maximum fine of \$10,000 and imprisonment for not more than two years as penalty for food hoarding and profiteering was adopted with enthusiasm.²⁵ Other amendments which won the approval of the House included one denying the franking privilege to food control material, second, another which made retailers with a food business grossing \$100,000 a year sub-

²⁰ Congressional Record, 3970.

²¹ Ibid., 3973, 3988-3990.

²² Ibid., 4016.

²³ Ibid., 4049 et supra.

²⁴ Ibid., 4083.

²⁵ Ibid., 4111-4112.

ject to all provisions of the food control act.²⁶ A third one provided that the food control act would cease to be effective at the end of the war with Germany, although prosecutions for wartime violations of the act could continue beyond that time. A fourth amendment required the President to submit an annual food-control report to Congress.²⁷

As amended, the Lever food control measure passed the House on June 23, 1917 by the amazing vote of 365 to five.²⁸ Of the five representatives opposing the bill, three - Jeff McLemore, James Young, and James L. Slayden - came from Texas,²⁹ whose cattle raisers fought throughout the war for higher beef prices and less meat rationing.

This rapid and nearly unanimous action on the part of the House was made in response to a special appeal from President Woodrow Wilson, who asked that the legislation by Congress be placed in his hands by July 1, 1917. As expressed in a letter to Representative William P. Borland of Missouri dated at the White House on June 18, the Wilson de-

26 Ibid., 4108, 4189.

27 Congressional Record, 4189, 4188.

28 Ibid., 4190.

29 Loc. cit., McLemore, Meeker, Slayden, Ward, and Young of Texas voted "no" on the roll call, and five others - Gallagher, Gordon, Hulbert, Kitchin, and Sabath - answered "present". Of 55 representatives recorded as "not voting", 15 were paired against the bill.

sire took this form:

A certain disservice has been done the measure by speaking of it as the food-control bill. The object of the measure is not to control the food of the country but to release it from the control of speculators and other persons who will seek to make inordinate profit out of it, and to protect the people against the extortions which would result. It seems to me that those who oppose the measure ought very seriously to consider whether they are not playing into the hands of such persons and whether they are not making themselves responsible, should they succeed, for the extraordinary and oppressive price of food in the United States. Foodstuffs will, of course, inevitably be high, but it is possible by perfectly legitimate means to keep them from being unreasonably and oppressively high.

I hope and believe that the Congress will see the measure in this light, and that it will come to an early passage, for time is of the essence. The legislation should be secured by the 1st of July to make the country safe against the dangers it is meant to guard against.³⁰

Whatever reaction this letter may have produced in the House, it did not spur the Senate to a speedy consideration of the pending food-control legislation. The Senate was distinctly hostile to the original Lever bill as it came from the House Committee on Agriculture. This bill, which Senator George E. Chamberlain of Oregon presented to the Senate as S. 2463 on June 15, 1917,³¹ was reported back from the Senate Committee on Agriculture on the following day,

³⁰ Congressional Record, 65 Cong., 1 Sess., 4467. This letter to a representative who maintained residence at Kansas City, Mo., was read to the Senate on June 29, 1917, by Senator W. H. Thompson of Kansas.

³¹ Ibid., 3633.

but no report or recommendation was made because the committee members could not agree among themselves on what should be done with the bill.³² Aside from an extremely desultory and inconclusive debate on its general provisions, no further action was taken on the so-called Chamberlain food control bill until Senator Chamberlain substituted for it on June 25 the Lever bill as passed by the House.³³

After the Lever food control bill as passed by the House had been reported favorably with amendments by the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry,³⁴ the Senate debate on the measure opened on June 29, 1917, and continued throughout the first three weeks of July.³⁵

A Food Administration spokesman, Mr. William C. Mullendore, has commented on the undesirable effects of this debate on the food control projected by Woodrow Wilson and Herbert Hoover. As Mullendore expressed it,

Many issues were discussed in connection with the bill, some of which were quite unrelated to the necessity for and the problems of good legislation. The attempt to include steel, cotton, and many other commodities, as well as the raising of the prohibition issue, were among the causes of the prolongation of the debate.³⁶

³² Ibid., 3699.

³³ Ibid., 4196.

³⁴ Congressional Record, 65 Cong., 1 Sess., 4356. This event occurred on July 27, 1917.

³⁵ Ibid., 4403 et seq.

³⁶ Mullendore, History of the United States Food Administration, 55.

The fact is that the President and Herbert Hoover got much more than they bargained for in the Senate. The Lever bill came into the Senate as a food control measure; it left it as a bill designed to control the wartime distribution and price of almost all consumer commodities. If the measure had become law in the form in which it left the Senate, the Wilson regime could have fostered an Office of Price Administration rather than the Food Administration and Fuel Administration which it did organize.

The Senate movement to extend the scope of H. R. 4961 as it had passed the House began on June 29, 1917. On that day, the Senate voted to adopt a committee-sponsored amendment which established a wartime government control over the production, distribution, and price of "foods, feeds, and containers therefor, fuel, including petroleum and its products, steel and iron and their products, copper and its products, hemp, jute, and sisal and their products, lead, timber, lumber, farm implements and machinery, and fertilizers..."³⁷ Subsequently, amendments were offered by individual senators and adopted by the Senate which extended this list to include fertilizer ingredients, wool, cotton, and aluminum and its products.³⁸ On July 2, Senator James W. Wadsworth of New York remarked truthfully of the Lever

³⁷ Congressional Record, 65 Cong., 1 Sess., 4471.

³⁸ Ibid., 4473, 4480 (Smith of South Carolina); 4589-4590 (Bankhead of Alabama); 4589 (Brandegge of Connecticut); 4090, 4607 (Reed of Missouri).

measure that it was "no longer a food-control bill..."³⁹

Other Senate amendments were not so admirable. The House-approved penalties against hoarding were stricken out, and the section prohibiting undue speculation and manipulation with respect to prices was also eliminated.⁴⁰ A valiant blow was struck for patronage when the Senate voted to take out the House provisions that all paid food control employees must be hired under civil service, and that food-control employment was no cause for draft exemption.⁴¹

After these steps were completed on July 11, 1917, there came a time for demagoguery. An agreement to end debate was reached on July 10,⁴² but this agreement left room for a stormy discussion which extended until July 19 and featured the truculent speeches of Senator James A. Reed of Missouri, who shed more heat than light with such declarations as "I refuse to compel all the farmers of the United States to await Mr. Hoover's ukase before they dare to plant or sow."⁴³

Despite the delay caused by Senator Reed's fulminations, the Senate passed its version of the Lever food control bill by a vote of 81 to 6 on July 21, 1917.⁴⁴

39 Ibid., 4609.

40 Ibid., 4625-4626, 4822.

41 Ibid., 4933, 4956.

42 Congressional Record, 65 Cong., 1 Sess., 4899-4902.

43 Ibid., 5157.

44 Ibid., 5367. Senators Francoe, Reed, Hardwick, Penrose, Sherman, and Sutherland voted "Nay".

Since the Senate modified the House food control bill so greatly that it had been converted into a bill to control food, fuel, and consumer and durable goods, H. R. 4961 was sent to conference.⁴⁵ The conference committee reconciled the two versions of the bill by reducing the scope of the legislation to include only foods, feeds, fuel, fertilizer, and farm implements, and by adopting the Senate viewpoints on food control patronage and enforcement. In addition, it wrote new sections providing for a comprehensive governmental control of coal and coke, and appropriating the sum of \$10,000,000 to procure nitrate of soda.⁴⁶

Although Representative LaGuardia of New York objected to the excision of the House section requiring that all paid food-control employees must be hired under civil service regulations,⁴⁷ this protest was more than offset by the enthusiastic House reception of the \$2.00 minimum wheat guaranty which the Senate wrote into the bill.⁴⁸ On August 3, 1917, the House passed the conference committee version of the Lever food control bill by a vote of 360 to nothing.⁴⁹

45 Ibid., 5367 et seq.

46 Ibid., 5733-5739.

47 Congressional Record, 65 Cong., 1 Sess., 5435.

48 Ibid., 5431, 5433.

49 Ibid., 5768. Of the five representatives who voted against the original food control bill in the House, Meeker and Young voted for the conference report, McLeMore answered "Present", and Slayden and Ward did not vote. The five representatives who answered "Present" on the roll call for the original bill voted in favor of the conference report.

The Senate treatment of the conference report was somewhat stormy. Some senators expressed regret that the conference committee had decided to restrict the scope of the bill to food, fuel, and farm tools, but half of the three-day Senate debate on the conference report was monopolized by Senator James A. Reed of Missouri in order to castigate Herbert Hoover and his voluntary system of food control.⁵⁰ On August 8, however, the Senate approved the conference report on H. R. 4961 by a vote of 66 to 7, and sent the bill to the President.⁵¹

Two days later, on August 10, 1917, President Woodrow Wilson signed the Lever Food and Fuel Control Act into law and issued an executive order creating a United States Food Administration headed by Herbert Clark Hoover.⁵² Four months after the United States entered the First World War against Germany, it was prepared for the system of food control which introduced wartime rationing to the American nation.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 5801-5805, 5817-5827, 5905-5908, 5919-5925.

⁵¹ Ibid., 5927. Senator Sutherland, one of the original Senate opponents of H. R. 4961, voted for the conference report, but Senators France, Gronna, Hardwick, Penrose, and Reed were joined by Hollis and La Follette in opposing the report. Of 23 senators not voting on the conference report, ten were placed on record as favoring it.

⁵² Congressional Record, 65 Cong., 1 Sess., 7532; Annual Report of the United States Food Administration for the Year 1917, (Washington, 1918), 16-17.

CHAPTER III. THE VOLUNTARY PHASE OF THE FOOD ADMINISTRATION

Two months before Congress passed the Lever Food and Fuel Control Act, President Woodrow Wilson asked Herbert Hoover to begin to organize the voluntary aspects of the food control program that had been planned since May 19, 1917. For two months after the Lever Act was passed by Congress, the policies of the Food Administration remained essentially the same as those which were developed by Hoover at the request of President Wilson. Although various forms of compulsory rationing replaced much of this early program after 1917, the decentralized administration set up during the summer of 1917 remained the basic pattern for the duration of the war. Throughout its existence, the United States Food Administration relied heavily on the propaganda techniques and devices which it used to further the cause of "voluntary conservation of food" during its early months. Force replaced persuasion as 1918 wore on, but Herbert Hoover, possibly with the unhappy example of England's Lord Davenport regime in mind, at all times sought to make the work of his Food Administration a moral obligation rather than a political issue. He

succeeded overwhelmingly in this task.

The real genesis of the Food Administration came on June 12, 1917.¹ On that day, Woodrow Wilson wrote a letter to Herbert Hoover in which he urged the immediate organization of a nation-wide system of voluntary food conservation. In this letter, Wilson gave his reasons for suggesting this step in these words:

It seems to me that the inauguration of that portion of the plan for food administration which contemplates a national mobilization of the great voluntary forces of the country which are ready to work toward saving food and eliminating waste admits of no further delay.

The approaching harvesting, the immediate necessity for wise use and saving, not only in food but in all other expenditures, the many undirected and overlapping efforts being made toward this end, all press for national direction and inspiration. While it would in many ways be desirable to wait complete legislation establishing the food administration, it appears to me that so far as voluntary effort can be assembled, we should not wait any longer, and therefore I would be very glad if you would proceed in these directions at once.

The women of the Nation are already earnestly seeking to do their part in this our greatest struggle for the maintenance of our national ideals, and in no direction can they so greatly assist as by enlisting in the service of the Food Administration and cheerfully accepting its direction and advice. To provide adequate supplies for the coming year is of absolutely vital importance to the conduct of the war, and without a very conscientious elimination of waste and very strict economy in our food consumption, we can not hope to fulfill this primary duty.

¹ Mullendore, History of the United States Food Administration, 53.

I trust, therefore, that the women of the country will not only respond to your appeal and accept the pledge of the Food Administration which you are proposing, but that all men also who are engaged in the personal distribution of foods will co-operate with the same earnestness and with the same spirit. I give you full authority to undertake any steps necessary for the proper organization and stimulation of their efforts.²

Having received this Presidential green light, Herbert Hoover proceeded to draft his food-control personnel. Leaders in the food industries which the food-control legislation pending in Congress proposed to regulate for the duration of the war were summoned to Washington and assigned without pay to the tasks of drafting plans and creating a detailed national organization to enforce the nation-wide aspects of food conservation. Other outstanding persons from the business and academic worlds were asked to serve as food-control heads for their respective states. After the Food Administration was given full legal status, the Federal Food Administrator for each state, in addition to forming his own state organization, was required to appoint local Food Administrators for every county and important city within his state. Each volunteer worker in the Food Administration was awarded his appointment in the name of the President of the

² Mullendore, op. cit., 53-54.

United States.³

One of the outstanding features of the Hoover Food Administration was its complete respect for local conditions and practices. The almost completely decentralized form of control which Herbert Hoover advocated and fostered permitted most food control problems to be solved within the state or locality which experienced them,⁴ although the number of national "suggestions" and orders increased sharply as the initial program of "voluntary conservation" was gradually transformed into a rationing system that used the food trades as its agents.

As the local problems of rationing and food conservation became more acute throughout the nation, a need was felt for a better interchange of information and co-ordination of practices than was provided through the States Administration Division of the United States Food Administration in Washington. To meet this need, many Federal Food Administrations held occasional state-wide meetings of county and city food administrators. A national meeting of state food control heads was held in Washington, D. C. on July 10


3 Simon Litman, Prices and Price Control in Great Britain and the United States during the World War, p. 211; Mullendore, op. cit., 55; Ivan L. Pollock, The Food Administration in Iowa (Iowa City, Iowa, 1923) I:33-34, 37-38.

4 Calman R. Winegarden, Stabilization of Food Prices at the Retail Level 1917-1918, 13-15. Hereafter cited as Historical Study No. 48.

and 11 of 1917 - a full month before the Lever Food and Fuel Control Act became law. Another meeting took place on August 14 and 15. The November, 1917, meeting inaugurated a series of two-day Washington sessions which were attended by all of the Federal Food Administrators. The last of these meetings took place on November 12 and 13, 1918. Partly as a result of the national meetings, the Food Administration in May, 1918, divided the country into 11 zones for the purpose of holding regional conferences on food-control policies. So far as possible, these zones included states that yielded similar crops and enjoyed identical economic interests.⁵

Throughout its existence, the United States Food Administration emphasized "voluntary conservation of food" as opposed to compulsory rationing, although rationing in the European fashion was adopted in many of the individual states. To secure its goal of voluntary food-saving, the national food administration under Herbert Hoover resorted to a gigantic barrage of propaganda. During the eighteen months of the food-conservation effort, the Food Administration was donated nearly \$20,000,000 in the form of free advertisements. Nearly 60,000 billboard posters and signs appeared on the streets and highways of the nation. Printed advertising in

⁵ Mullendore, *op. cit.*, 74-76. The national meetings of Federal Food Administrators were held, in addition to the dates mentioned above, on November 14-15, 1917, and on January 8-9, March 12-13, May 28-29, and September 4-5 in 1918.



newspapers and magazines was valued at \$3,000,000, and 100,000 posters adorned the sides of Railway Express trucks and the delivery vans of retail merchants. After the railroads were nationalized under William G. McAdoo's Railroad Administration, 50,000 Food Administration car signs were displayed in railroad coaches. More than 120,000 such signs were carried by street cars, elevated trains, and Fifth Avenue busses.⁶

A determined effort was made to convince the housewife that she should serve as a soldier in defending the food supply of the nation. Churches, fraternities, and religious organizations all contributed pledges and four-minute speakers to the cause of food conservation, and Hollywood made special two-reel movie shorts showing the necessity for food control. Lessons on how to conserve food were given in pamphlets, newspaper features, and magazine articles prepared under the direction of the Food Administration. The schools of the nation taught conservation lessons to their students, and retail storekeepers used food-control slogans as subjects for effective window displays.⁷

During its early months, the Food Administration conducted two campaigns in which it tried to get every American housewife to pledge herself to conserve food in her home.

6 Mullendore, op. cit., 84.

7 Mullendore, op. cit., 90-95, 98-99, 84-86.

The first pledge campaign, which opened a month before the Food Administration secured a legal status under the Lever Act, met with little success because it was not adequately financed. The second pledge campaign was vigorously pressed and placed the following "kitchen card" in 14,000,000 American homes by October 27, 1917:⁸

HOME CARD

UNITED STATES FOOD ADMINISTRATION

WHAT YOU CAN DO TO HELP WIN THIS WAR

OUR PROBLEM is to help feed our Allies this winter by sending them as much food as we can of the most concentrated nutritive value in the least shipping space. These foods are wheat, beef, pork, dairy products, and sugar.

OUR SOLUTION is to eat less of these and more of other foods of which we have an abundance, and to waste less of all foods.

BREAD AND CEREALS.--Have at least one wheatless meal a day. Use corn, oat, rye, barley or mixed cereal rolls, muffins, and breads in place of white bread certainly for one meal and, if possible, for two. Eat less cake and pastry.

MEAT.--Use more poultry, rabbits, and especially fish and sea food in place of beef, mutton, and pork. Do not use either beef, mutton, or pork more than once daily, and then serve smaller portions. Use all left-over meat cold or in made dishes. Use soups more freely. Use beans; they have nearly the same food value as meat.

MILK.--Use all of the milk, waste no part of it. The children must have whole milk, therefore, use less cream. There is a great waste of food by not using all skim and sour milk. Sour milk can be used in cooking

⁸ Ibid., 86-87.

and to make cottage cheese. Use buttermilk and cheese freely.

FATS (BUTTER, LARD, ETC.).--Dairy butter has food values vital to children. Therefore, use it on the table as usual, especially for children. Use as little as possible in cooking. Reduce the use of fried foods to reduce the consumption of lard and other fats. Use vegetable oils, as olive and cottonseed oil. Save daily one-third of an ounce of animal fat. Waste no soap; it contains fat and the glycerine necessary for explosives. You can make scrubbing soap at home, and, in some localities, you can sell your saved fats to the soap maker, who will thus secure our needed glycerine.

SUGAR.--Use less candy and sweet drinks. Use less sugar in tea and coffee. Use honey, maple sirup, and dark sirups for hot cakes and waffles without butter or sugar. Do not stint the use of sugar in putting up fruits and jams. They may be used in place of butter.

VEGETABLES AND FRUITS.--We have a superabundance of vegetables. Double the use of vegetables. They take the place of part of the wheat and meat, and, at the same time, are healthful. Use potatoes abundantly. Store potatoes and roots carefully and they will keep. Use fruits generously.

FUEL.--Coal comes from a distance, and our railway facilities are needed for war purposes. Burn fewer fires. If you can get wood, use it.

GENERAL SUGGESTIONS

Buy less; cook no more than necessary; serve smaller portions.

Use local and reasonable supplies.

Patronize your local producers and lessen the need of transportation.

Preach and practice the "gospel of the clean plate."

We do not ask the American people to starve themselves. Eat plenty, but wisely, and without waste.

Do not limit the plain food of growing children.

Do not eat between meals.

Watch out for the waste in the community.

You can yourself devise other methods of saving to the ends we wish to accomplish. Under various circumstances and with varying conditions you can vary the methods of economizing.⁹

The "home card" reflected the unalloyed idealism which marked the early days of the Food Administration. According to the early plans, the American people were not to have their food rationed; they were to be persuaded to save food through their own voluntary restraint at the table and cookstove.

This attitude produced several benefits. It revealed the amount of wasted food which could be saved with a little caution on the part of the food preparer, and it prompted many cities to reduce garbage waste by adopting pig-feeding programs or by constructing plants to convert the garbage into industrial fats.¹⁰ It drew the people of the United States into one vast organization dedicated to producing and conserving food in order to win the war. And it made food-control a moral obligation rather than a legal duty.

On the other hand, the "voluntary conservation" idea had a number of very serious defects. In many localities, persons who did not observe the "suggestions" of the Food Ad-

⁹ Ivan L. Pollock, The Food Administration in Iowa, I:138-140.

¹⁰ Mullendore, op. cit., 120.

ministration were denounced as "pro-Guns", and suspected food hoarders were subjected to private snooping and public search.¹¹ And voluntary conservation failed to forestall the necessity for compulsory rationing. By the end of 1917, the Food Administration devised rationing systems for wheat flour, meat, and sugar. Although "voluntary conservation" remained the watchwords at Washington headquarters, the food administrations of 36 different states adopted or approved European-type food ration cards by August, 1918.¹²

11 McCane, War Rations for Pennsylvanians, 42, 61, 135-139, 175.

12 Stella Stewart and Irving Bernstein, Sugar Rationing in 1918, 20-21. Hereafter cited as Historical Study No. 27.

CHAPTER IV. RATIONING AND PRICE CONTROL BY THE FOOD ADMINISTRATION

Despite President Woodrow Wilson's assertion, on May 19, 1917, that "The last thing...any American could contemplate with equanimity would be the introduction of anything resembling Prussian autoeracy into the food control of this country",¹ the Food Administration, once it received the go-ahead signal from Congress, lost no time in subjecting food production and distribution in the United States to a rigid discipline which rivalled the system used in Imperial Germany.

The United States Food Administration did not attempt to secure any German-type monopolies of food distribution. Throughout the war, it followed the British practice of leaving the distribution of foodstuffs within the hands of the regular trades. In other respects, however, the Food Administration under Herbert Hoover soon went far beyond the scope of the corresponding British food control effort. By November 1, 1917, food importers, manufacturers, and wholesalers in the United States could do business only if they held a license from the Food Administration and abided

1 New York Times, May 20, 1917.

by the food-conservation rules which were prescribed from Washington. Price-fixing at the wholesale level appeared in 1917, and an indirect form of retail price-fixing was resorted to during 1918. Rationing of critical foods appeared in October of 1917, and during 1918 the rationing controls applied to flour were made more severe than the controls applied to most foods in the United States during the Second World War.

As Food Administrator, Herbert C. Hoover was often cautious but never irresolute. He was disposed to give the food producer a little more than an even break, but he did not, as Lord Davenport had done in England, defer action on food control until prices and supplies were almost uncontrollable. As Hoover told the United States Chamber of Commerce on September 19, 1917,

We shall find as we go on with the war and its increasing economic disruption that...one commodity after another will have to be taken into control. We will, however, profit by experience if we lay down no hard and fast rules, but...deal with every situation on its merits. So long as demand and supply have free play in a commodity we had best leave it alone. Our repairs to the break in normal economic control... must be designed to repair the break, not with a view to setting up new economic systems or theories.²

The licensing provisions of the Lever Food and Fuel Control Act furnished a powerful weapon which the Food Ad-

² New York Times, September 20, 1917.

ministration used to enforce food conservation by the food trades of the United States. The extension of license control was very rapid. On August 14, 1917, all wheat and rye elevators and millers were required to obtain licenses by September 1. The sugar industry was placed under license control on September 7, and on October 8 all food importers, manufacturers, and distributors were required to secure general licenses by October 1. In November, dealers in white arsenic were licensed, and January of 1918 brought license control to the ammonia industry. Although the system of licensing was abandoned during 1919, the Food Administration had a peak of 263,737 concerns under license control on January 1, 1919.³

Table 2. The distribution of Food Administration licenses.⁴

Licenses	: Number
General licenses	152,100
Sugar licenses	473
Baker's licenses	38,800
Salt-water fisherman licenses	69,218
Steamship baker's licenses	1,103
Beer-manufacturer's licenses	377
Arsenic licenses	511
Coffee licenses	1,155
Total licenses in effect on January 1, 1919	263,737

³ Stella Stewart, Importance of Powers to License Industry as an Aid to Price Control, 5-12, hereafter cited as Historical Study No. 17.

⁴ Annual Report of the United States Food Administration for the Year 1918, (Washington, 1919), 16.

The 20,766 storers and dealers of wheat and rye who secured licenses during August, only to have them replaced with general licenses in October, were treated as a pilot group for the industries which received licenses at a later date.⁵ According to the license regulations prescribed for this initial group, the licensee "was prohibited from making any unjust or unreasonable profit," was permitted not more than a 30 days' supply of wheat at one time, and was required to permit the government to inspect books and business records and requisition any storage space which might be needed for war purposes.⁶

On November 1, 1917, the Food Administration issued a set of general regulations applicable to all licensees. The 22 general regulations in "Series B" were for the most part an amplification and extension of the group which had been formulated during August as "Series A". Rule Five of the new group prohibited every "unjust, exorbitant, unreasonable, discriminatory or unfair commission, profit or storage charge." Rule Six admonished the licensee to keep all food commodities moving in as straight a line as possible from producer to consumer, and Rule 13 extended the maximum storage period for most commodities to 60 days. In addition,

⁵ Mullendore, *op. cit.*, 200-201.

⁶ Albert N. Merritt, War Time Control of the Distribution of Foods, (New York, 1920), 29.

Rule 17 brought the unlicensed retailer and restaurateur under control by providing that no licensee could sell food to persons who hoarded food or profiteered on food prices. Some degree of price control at the retail level was obtained in the early days of the Food Administration through the special "cost basis" rule that prohibited the selling of licensed foods at "more than a reasonable advance over the actual purchase price...."⁷

These regulations were vigorously enforced. Most of the specific penalties provided by the Lever Act as it was developed by Congress had failed to pass the Senate, but the Food Administration found that it could enforce its rules through the simple expedient of withdrawing its license and thereby forcing the recalcitrant food firm out of business. However, this drastic remedy was applied to a very few cases. In many instances, a warning proved sufficient. In others, the Food Administration resorted to a food embargo imposed by a "stop order" or "unfair order" which forbade the sale of licensed foods to the violator until further notice. In various states, the "Red Cross Penalty" was used to force individual food hoarders and profiteers to make amends by contributing to the Red Cross.⁸

⁷ Ibid., 30-33; Annual Report of the United States Food Administration for the Year 1917, 24-27.

⁸ McCain, op. cit., 61; An Outline of the Work of the Federal Food Administration in Pennsylvania, 21-23.

Table 3. The penalties imposed by the Food Administration⁹
(To November 21, 1919).

Penalties	: Number
Unlimited revocations	306
Limited revocations	192
Unlimited unfair orders	63
Limited unfair orders	43
Temporary suspensions and minor penalties	3,665
Refunds and (Red Cross) contributions	4,129
Requisitions, etc.	65
Stop orders	294
Cancellations	12
Criminal cases	72
Total	8,769

Once it had extended its control over the food industries of the nation, the Food Administration began to introduce a system of food rationing to the American people. "Voluntary" sugar rationing was recommended to the western states on October 15, 1917, and "meatless Tuesday" and "wheatless Wednesday" made their debut a week later. As in the European countries which tried rationing, the special days set aside for self-denial proved to be the opening wedge for a system of quantitative limitations on consumption. As in Great Britain, quantitative rationing in the United States was placed largely in the hands of the food retailer. On

⁹ Mullendore, *op. cit.*, 334. Of these penalties, only 166 were for cases originating during 1919.

December 10, 1917, food retailers were told to limit sugar sales to five pounds per sale to a city customer and ten pounds per sale to a country consumer.¹⁰ March 20, 1918, brought a sale limitation on flour of 24.5 pounds in the city and 49 pounds in the country.¹¹ On June 11, 1918, consumers were limited to 1.25 pounds of clear beef per person per week.¹²

An interesting result of the Food Administration's emphasis on a federal structure which permitted a maximum of local adjustments in food control can be seen in the course of sugar rationing during 1918. At first, an attempt was made to avoid the extension of sugar restrictions to the consumer level, since it was felt that the industry controls projected by the American Sugar Refiners' Committee in 1917 might make consumer rationing unnecessary.¹³ This hope was soon blasted by Allied demands for a million tons of sugar during 1918.¹⁴ In December, 1917, retailers were asked to make no sugar sale larger than ten pounds, while wholesalers

10 Stella Stewart and Irving Bernstein, Sugar Rationing in 1918, 5. Hereafter cited as Historical Study No. 27.

11 Stella Stewart and J. Donald Edwards, Controls of Wheat Flour and Bread during World War I, 65. Hereafter cited as Historical Study No. 47.

12 Irving Bernstein, Meat Conservation in the Distribution to Consumers, 17-18. Hereafter cited as Historical Study No. 35.

13 Mullendore, op. cit., 173.

14 Enoch Needham, Control of the Sugar Market during World War I, 6. Hereafter cited as Historical Study No. 35.

were requested to limit their sales to a maximum sale quantity of 1,000 pounds. On December 13, 1917, the American public was asked to pledge itself to use not more than three pounds of sugar per person per month.¹⁵ These steps proved inadequate, however, and the Food Administration began to seek more stringent measures. It voted down the idea of using a European-type card rationing system with the comment that it

would cost the Government \$5,000,000 to put the householder on a ration card and take the services of 100,000 people to carry it out. We cannot afford the labor or money and if householders will cooperate it can be avoided.¹⁶

However, Herbert Hoover had no objection to card rationing within the states, so long as such rationing enabled Washington headquarters to announce that national food conservation was a result of voluntary effort.

On July 26, 1918, after a government-financed Sugar Equalization Board had been created to buy foreign sugar and distribute it through the Federal Food Administrations in the forty-eight states to the various food trades, the nationwide consumer ration of sugar was reduced to two pounds per person per month.¹⁷ After July 1, 1918, sugar could be bought for industrial and commercial uses only if the purchaser presented a Food Administration certificate for the desired sugar. Issued in values of 50, 100, 500, 1,000,

¹⁵ Historical Study No. 27, 5.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 6.

¹⁷ Historical Study No. 27, 19.

5,000, 10,000, and 60,000 pounds, these certificates were allotted within each state at the discretion of the Federal Food Administrator. Sugar allowances for each state were determined in Washington, but the amount of sugar which essential manufacturers, non-essential manufacturers, public eating places, bakers, and retail grocers should receive was determined within the states. In general, only essential manufacturers escaped sugar restrictions under this plan, although retail grocers were assigned 69 percent of the sugar distributed.¹⁸

Table 4. Sugar distribution under the certificate plan.¹⁹
(July-November, 1918)

Class	: Establish-: : ments : : involved :	Quantity allotted (in tons)
A. Non-essential manu- facturers	56,130	151,071
B. Essential manufacturers	34,398	104,508
C. Public eating places	121,393	48,730
D. Bakers	34,662	70,081
E. Retail grocers	375,361	843,063
Totals	621,934	1,207,453

Stringent sugar rationing in 1918 took several forms. For consumers in many states, it meant a European style of rationing. In August of 1918, 23 states used a system which

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 7, 20-24, 12, Exhibit I:3.

¹⁹ Joshua Bernhardt, A Statistical Survey of the Sugar Industry and Trade of the United States (New York, 1920), 93, 96, 103.

required every consumer to place his name on a grocer's register and sign this register each time he made a purchase of sugar. Thirteen states permitted the use of local consumer cards issued by a dealer, a group of dealers, or local Food Administrators. In some instances, these local cards bore detachable coupons; in others, they were punched after each purchase of sugar.²⁰ For manufacturers of ice cream, soft drinks, and the like, stringent sugar rationing meant a 50 percent cut in their previous use of sugar. Bakers experienced a 30 percent slash, and public eating places were limited to two pounds of sugar for every 90 meals served.²¹ Although the Armistice ended sugar rationing by December 4, 1918, the five months of rigid conservation under the certificate plan saved at least 337,000 tons of sugar for export to the Allies.²²


The Food Administration efforts to ration meat were disappointing in their effect and confusing in their application. "Meatless Tuesday" was announced in October of 1917, but it met with active consumer opposition in the Middle West and received the denunciations of meat producers throughout the nation. In part because of these factors, "Meatless Tuesday" failed to conserve meat. The Food Administration

20 Historical Study No. 27, 20.

21 Ibid., 17-19.

22 Ibid., 23.

PLATE IV

THE CHAIN OF RATIONING AUTHORITY IN THE UNITED STATES
DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR

abandoned "Meatless Tuesday" in February, 1918, after unseasonable weather and a railroad transportation crisis had created a temporary glut of meat in the greater part of the United States.²³

Efforts to conserve meat at the consumer level were resumed on June 11, 1918, when every person in the United States was limited to 1.25 pounds of boneless beef or 1.5 of beef with bone per week. On June 17, 1918, all public eating places were ordered to observe Sunday, Tuesday, and Friday as beefless days. In addition, they were urged to serve beef in any form at only the noon meal during the other days of the week.²⁴

A severe drought did the second meat-rationing program what snow and a railroad tangle had done to the first experiment. In August of 1918, all restrictions on meat consumption were lifted to permit the slaughtering and eating of thousands of starving Texas cattle. Plans for a third attempt to ration meat were ended by the Armistice of November 11, 1918.²⁵

"Wheatless Wednesday", which appeared in the same week that brought "meatless Tuesday" to the nation, marked the beginning of the most extensive rationing effort undertaken

23 Historical Study No. 35, 9-10, 15-17.

24 Ibid., 17-18.

25 Ibid., 18-19, 20-21.

by the Food Administration.²⁶ Although the Food Administration sought to head off the wheat problem in 1917 by encouraging wheat production, this tactic proved only moderately successful. On August 14, 1917, President Wilson established a United States Grain Corporation with a capital of \$150,000,000. He charged it with the task of buying all of the farm wheat produced during the war for re-sale to the nation's flour and baking trades, and also appointed a committee which on August 30 fixed the minimum market price of wheat at \$2.20 per bushel.²⁷ These incentives came too late to influence the disappointingly small wheat crop of 1917, however, and it soon became apparent that any surplus for export would have to be secured by cutting down the average home consumption of 42,000,000 bushels per month.²⁸ To meet this situation, President Wilson, on January 18, 1918, issued a proclamation imploring American consumers, bakers, and retailers to limit their use of wheat flour and other wheat products to not more than 70 percent of their 1917 consumption.²⁹

This proclamation marked the high point of "voluntary conservation" under Herbert Hoover and was the last attempt

26 Historical Study No. 35, 9.

27 Herbert Hoover in Mullendore, *op. cit.*, 25; Historical Study No. 47, 59.

28 Mullendore, *op. cit.*, 103-104.

29 *Ibid.*, 104.

to save food through purely voluntary methods. The coming of flour rationing was hastened by a threatening cable that Hoover received from Lord Rhondda, the Food Controller of Great Britain, on January 24, 1918:

Unless you are able to send the Allies at least 75,000,000 bushels of wheat over and above wheat you have exported up to January 1st, and in addition to the total exportable surplus from Canada, I cannot take the responsibility of assuring our people that there will be food enough to win the war...it now lies with America to decide whether or not the Allies in Europe shall have bread to hold out until the United States is able to throw its forces into the field....³⁰

The first step toward a compulsory rationing program for wheat had been taken on December 10, 1917, when a prohibition was placed on the return of bread to bakeries from retailers. Further steps were delayed for nearly two months.³¹ One factor in the delay was Herbert Hoover's unwavering opposition to the suggestion of a flour ration card for American consumers.³² Much time was spent in discussing how compulsory rationing could be made to look like voluntary conservation, and the Food Administration finally announced the "50-50 rule" as its solution of this problem.

The "50-50 rule", which appeared on January 28, 1918, required consumers to buy one pound of "flour substitutes"

³⁰ Mullendore, op. cit., 103.

³¹ Historical Study No. 47, 63.

³² Merritt, op. cit., 75.

for every pound of wheat flour which they purchased.³³ Six days later, a list of wheat flour substitutes was announced as follows:

Table 5. The wheat flour substitutes.³⁴ (February 5, 1918)

Potatoes	Potato flour
Bran	Sweet potato flour
Shorts	Milo flour
Middlings	Milo meal
Corn flour	Kaffir flour
Buckwheat flour	Kaffir meal
Edible corn starch	Feterita flour
Hominy	Feterita meal
Corn grits	Soya bean meal
Barley flour	Peanut meal
Rolled oats	Cassava flour
Oatmeal	Taro flour
Rice	Banana flour
Rice flour	Corn meal

This rule was supplemented on March 20 by a quantitative rationing which limited consumer purchases of wheat flour to 24.5 pounds per customer per month in the city. Rural customers were restricted to 49 pounds monthly. July 22 brought an adjustment of these limits to 25 pounds in cities and 50 pounds in rural districts, but the corner grocer was retained as the rationing agent for the duration of the war.³⁵

³³ Historical Study No. 47, 65.

³⁴ Ibid., 66.

³⁵ Ibid., 65.

Other conservation measures were put into effect to strengthen and supplement flour rationing to consumers. Since bakers proved more amenable to wheat conservation than did housewives, considerable agitation was developed by bakers to have home baking declared unpatriotic,³⁶ and it is worth noting that the current supremacy of bakery bread in the United States dates from 1918. Before the First World War, most of America's bread was baked in the home.³⁷ During 1918, however, some housewives and many public eating places pledged themselves to use no wheat until the harvest was in.³⁸ Effective February 1, 1918, bakery wheat bread which contained at least 20 percent substitute flour was marketed as "Victory Bread", and "victory pastries" boasted not less than one-third substitute flour.³⁹

Wheat and flour rationing in their most stringent forms lasted less than a year. The bumper harvest of 1918 caused the Food Administration to scrap the "50-50 rule" on September 1 and fix a requirement that only one pound of substitutes need be bought for every four pounds of wheat flour. All consumer restrictions on flour and bread were dropped on November 12, and all other wheat conservation rules were abandoned by February 1, 1919.⁴⁰

36 Pollock, op. cit., II:74-75.

37 Mullendore, op. cit., 159.

38 Pollock, op. cit., II:62-63.

39 Merritt, op. cit., 95.

40 Pollock, op. cit., II:55-56; Historical Study No. 47, 65-66.


In addition to its rationing and conservation efforts, the United States Food Administration undertook to control the retail prices of food during 1918. As in England, this First World War price-control program was a piecemeal effort. Commodities were brought under control one by one, and no attempt was made to secure a general price ceiling over all foods or all commodities. Nevertheless, the Food Administration brought most food prices under control by the time of the November armistice, and developed several price-control techniques which proved valuable in later times.

The Food Administration found its price-control problems complicated because Congress had given a blunt warning that the power to fix minimum guaranteed prices to producers was not to be construed as a power to fix maximum retail prices to consumers.⁴¹ For this reason, the Food Administration did not venture to fix compulsory retail prices until November 7, 1918, although it carried favor with producers by fixing high initial production price guarantees and by increasing them on demand.⁴²

⁴¹ Congressional Record, 65 Cong., 1 Sess., 3801, 3848-3849, 3982-3984, 4090, 4822, 5157.

⁴² cf. the \$2.20 wheat minimum price per bushel, raised to \$2.26 by President Wilson on June 21, 1918 (Historical Study No. 47, 59); the freezing of meat packer profits at the "scandalous" levels of 9 percent and 15 percent (J. Donald Edwards, Wartime Controls of Beef and Pork 1916-1918, 9-10 - hereafter cited as Historical Study No. 8), and Herbert Hoover's boosting of a \$15.50 hog guarantee to \$17.50 in November 1918. (Mullendore, op. cit., 264 ff.)

Fig. 1. The trend of American food prices during 1917 and 1918.



(United States Bureau of Labor Statistics index numbers for whole-sale food prices, with 100 as the index number for 1913).

Source of data: Simon Litman, Prices and Price Control in Great Britain and the United States during the World War, 1914-1918.

When the Food Administration did fix retail prices, it used a method which Representative Eugene Black of Texas tried in vain to get the House of Representatives to forbid.⁴³ It did not establish maximum prices as such, but secured their effect by fixing maximum profit margins on all food transactions from the producer through the wholesaler and retailer to the consumer. As early as June 30, 1917, volunteer price-checkers were sending data to the national food-control organization. These consumer reports were used to make up the Weekly Reports on Retail Prices which the Food Administration published regularly after November 3, 1917. In October of 1917, the Food Administration began to publish in Chicago newspapers a daily list of "fair prices" to consumers for certain staple foods.⁴⁴ By May 16, 1918, when the "price-publication system" had been extended over the nation, the Food Administration fixed maximum retail margins for wheat and rye flour, corn meal and flour, sugar, dried beans, hominy, corn syrup, oatmeal and rolled oats, rice, dried beans and fruit, lard and lard substitutes, and canned corn, peas, tomatoes, salmon, and sardines.⁴⁵ Before the November armistice, the Food Administration added to this list maximum retail margins for bacon and hams, butter and butter substitutes,

⁴³ Congressional Record, 65 Cong., 1 Sess., 3962-3984 (June 20, 1917).

⁴⁴ Calman Winegarden, Stabilization of Food Prices at the Retail Level 1917-1918, 4-7. Hereafter cited as Historical Study No. 48.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 20.

potatoes, onions, eggs, and cheese.⁴⁶

Because Federal Food Administrators from the industrial states objected that the national retail margins were too low for their states, while administrators in agricultural states characterized them as too high,⁴⁷ the Food Administration created local executive committees and price interpreting boards to adjust nationally-published margins and retail prices to local conditions. Unlike the corresponding British price panels, these local groups did not include consumer representatives, but were drawn exclusively from the food trades whose prices were to be controlled.⁴⁸

This practice, together with the Food Administration's known solicitude for the producer as opposed to the consumer, had much to do with the results of Food Administration's retail price policy. Although some foods, such as flour and sugar, were forced down somewhat, the general tendency was to stabilize rather than decrease prices at the retail level.⁴⁹ Because of this tendency, the full effect of the Food Administration's price-control work was not revealed until the coming of the sharp price rises of early 1919, in the months immediately following the post-Armistice removal of control.

46 Ibid., 51.

47 Historical Study No. 48, 46-50.

48 Ibid., 9-10.

49 Ibid., 27-30.

CHAPTER V. CONSUMER CONTROLS BY OTHER WARTIME AGENCIES

Although the Food Administration introduced rationing to the United States, it was not the only wartime agency which regulated the American consumer during 1918. As war production cut into stocks of materials which were once used to make devices for civilians, it became necessary to curtail civilian production. Furthermore, since the United States supplied coal to many of the Allies and exported more than a fifth of its gasoline production during the war, some regulation of fuels was also necessary.

Section 22 of the Lever Food and Fuel Control Act had been added by Congress to provide a comprehensive governmental control of the coal and coke industry.¹ On August 23, 1917, President Woodrow Wilson implemented this section by fixing maximum wholesale prices for coal and establishing a United States Fuel Administration headed by Fuel Administrator Harry A. Garfield.²

¹ Congressional Record, 65 Cong., 1 Sess., 5738.

² Litman, Prices and Price Control in Great Britain and the United States during the World War, 268. Although President Wilson fixed bituminous prices on August 21, 1917, he deferred action on anthracite prices until August 23 and did not issue his executive order creating the Fuel Administration until the latter date.

Dr. Garfield, who enjoyed a distinguished career as an educator and as president of Williams College in Massachusetts, won more than his fair share of brickbats while Fuel Administrator. Before he ended his voluntary term of office as the nation's first wartime food controller, Harry Garfield received hearty condemnation from many quarters because of the "heatless Mondays", "gasless Sundays", and "lightless nights" which he introduced to American wartime life.

Garfield's price policy proved particularly irksome to economists. Unlike Herbert Hoover, who guaranteed high farm prices in order to encourage food production, the Fuel Administration tried to protect consumers by fixing low prices for coal and other fuels. The Food Administration permitted a gradual rise in wholesale food costs during its entire wartime existence. By October of 1917, the Fuel Administration effected a drastic cut in wholesale fuel and lighting costs which it maintained until the fuel crisis of 1917-1918 forced an upward revision in the wholesale and retail coal prices.³ Economists who praised the Hoover system

³ Litman, *op. cit.*, 181-182, 266-267, 270. For July, 1917, the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics gives wholesale index numbers of 180 for food, 204 for farm products, and 183 for fuel and lighting. The index numbers for farm products show a steady rise to 236 in September, 1918, after which there is a drop to 223 in December. Food index numbers rise slowly to 186 by February, 1918, are stabilized at 179 from March to June, and then rise steadily to a peak of 207 in December. Fuel and lighting index numbers dip to 142 in October, 1917, are held at 153 in December, and rise from a January, 1918, figure of 169 to 183 in December.

of incentive guarantees were quick to blame the 1918 fuel crisis on the fact that Garfield had set coal prices so low that they yielded only a limited profit even to efficient operators.⁴

However, profit limitation played a very minor part in creating the great coal crisis. During 1917, war industries failed to secure stockpiles of coal during the summer and fall, and neither the Fuel Administration nor the War Industries Board attempted to make them do so.⁵ As in Great Britain, wartime coal production in America suffered from army drafts, inefficient production methods, and industrial unrest. In addition to these factors, the very severe winter of 1917-1918 which snarled railroad transportation for weeks and wrecked the Food Administration's first meat conservation program made it impossible to secure coal when the demand for it was at its height.⁶

No matter what caused the coal crisis, the Garfield remedies for it were unique. Alone among all the warring nations, the United States closed down its war industries to conserve coal.⁷ On January 18, 1918, the Fuel Administration ordered all factories east of the Mississippi to close for a period of five days. It also requested all

⁴ Ibid., 267 and especially 271-273.

⁵ Calman Winegarden, Electric Power in Wartime 1917-1918, 1. Hereafter cited as Historical Study No. 54.

⁶ Litman, op. cit., 272.

⁷ Loc. cit., quoting the New York World.

offices, industries, and commercial establishments, except food and drug stores, to observe a series of ten "heatless Mondays" on which only enough fuel was used to prevent damage to equipment and supplies.⁸ Although the coal situation improved so rapidly that the Fuel Administration actually permitted only nine "heatless Mondays",⁹ the conservation order that created them was justly termed a "drastic and unprecedented decree."¹⁰

"Lightless nights" were ordered by the Fuel Administration to tide the nation's electrical industries over the coal crisis. Effective December 16, 1917, merchants were required to refrain from using electricity for outdoor illumination on Thursdays and Sundays, except between 7:45 p. m. and 11 p. m. Street lights, outdoor restaurants, and theaters were not restricted in their use of electricity. In its original form, this order imposed few special hardships, but regional power shortages which developed by February of 1918 caused many state fuel administrators to proclaim additional "lightless nights" and decrease the number of exemptions.¹¹

After the advent of nation-wide daylight saving time on April 1, 1918, by act of Congress, the first "lightless nights" program was terminated on April 25, 1918. On July

8 *Ibid.*, 271-272.

9 *Ibid.*, 273.

10 *Litman, op. cit.*, 273.

11 Historical Study No. 54, 7-8.

18, however, "lightless nights" re-appeared in a more drastic form. As one writer points out,

The new order forbade outdoor illumination and store-window lighting prior to thirty minutes after sunset. It further stipulated that the former 'lightless night' rule be applied on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday in the New England states, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, and the District of Columbia. In other areas, Monday and Thursday were designated as the curfew nights. Reduction of street lighting "to the minimum required for safety" was also specified....¹²

A program designed to extend the conservation of electricity into homes was planned by the time of the Armistice, but the end of formal warfare brought the termination of all Fuel Administration conservation efforts.¹³

Among other things, the Fuel Administration gave the United States its first experience in restraining gasoline consumption. Although American gasoline production increased during the war, American automobile production added five million passenger cars to the nation's streets and highways during the period 1914-1918.¹⁴ By 1918, American motorists were using 3.7 gallons of gasoline per day per car.¹⁵ If the already high exports of gasoline and aviation

¹² Ibid., 9.

¹³ Historical Study No. 54, 10; Litman, op. cit., 275.

¹⁴ Irving Bernstein, Curtailment of Automobile Production in World War I, 16. Hereafter cited as Historical Study No. 23.

¹⁵ Edmund Nash, Gasoline Conservation - 1918, 5. Hereafter cited as Historical Study No. 37.

naphtha were to be increased, some civilian conservation of gasoline would be necessary.¹⁶

The Fuel Administration threatened to restrict gasoline consumption several weeks before it resorted to positive action. On June 21, 1918, the Fuel Administration asked the public to observe strict economy in the use of gasoline. Less than three weeks later, on July 9, it announced that waste in gasoline consumption must be halted. Finally, on August 30, 1918, it decreed "gasolineless Sundays" for all pleasure vehicles east of the Mississippi.¹⁷

"Gasolineless Sundays" were denounced as "class discrimination" by persons who pointed out that "the workingman who had only Sunday for recreation was made to feel the pressure of public opinion while public officials paid little heed to it."¹⁸ Despite this opposition, the Fuel Administration continued this voluntary measure until October 18.¹⁹ On October 1, 1918, it released the information that "gasolineless Sundays" had conserved 500,000 barrels of gasoline for shipment to France.²⁰

As Congress foresaw in the course of its debate on

16 Ibid., 5, 7. Starting with a total of 209,700,000 gallons in 1914, American exports of gasoline and aviation naphtha rose 70 million gallons each year until 1918, when conservation doubled this rate of rise.

17 Ibid., 12.

18 Historical Study No. 54, 5-6.

19 Ibid., 12.

20 Ibid., 7.

the Lever Food and Fuel Control Act, the Wilson administration did not want to regulate the distribution of manufactured goods to consumers.²¹ In 1918, Bernard M. Baruch's War Industries Board slashed the amount of wood, metals, shellac, cotton, paper, rubber, and wool used in civilian production, but no attempt was made to protect the consumer against rising retail prices or to ration the dwindling supplies of essential manufactured items used by consumers.²²

21 Congressional Record, 65 Cong., 1 Sess., 3829, 3870, 4035-4036, 4205-4206, 4210, 4471, 4588-4590, 4609.

22 Consumer Goods (Other than Food) Government Controls in 1918 (Historical Study No. 40), passim and especially 1.

CHAPTER VI. THE LEGACY OF RATIONING

As in other countries, the signing of the Armistice brought a quick end to all forms of wartime consumer controls in the United States. President Wilson sought to end the government controls over imports at the same time, but Congress and the world-wide sugar shortage of 1919 combined to thwart this aim. In early 1919, the United States Sugar Equalization Board purchased surplus army sugar and distributed it in shortage areas east of the Rockies. On July 29, 1919, the Cuban government offered to sell the 1919-1920 Cuban sugar crop to the Board, but no action was taken on the proposal because President Wilson failed to approve it. In an effort to force the President's hand, Congress on December 20, 1919, passed the McNary Act extending the life of the Sugar Equalization Board until December 31, 1920, in order that the Board might purchase the current Cuban sugar crop. President Wilson signed the McNary Act, but expressed strong disapproval of its "subsidy" for the Cuban sugar crop. In deference to his wishes, the United States Sugar Equalization Board restored trading in foreign sugars to private hands on February 16,

1920.¹

Since the 1918 program of the Food Administration had anticipated that the war would last at least until July 1, 1919, the November armistice found vast stocks of American foodstuffs piled at the docks ready for export to the Allies. To reduce this surplus, Herbert Hoover transformed the Food Administration into a relief organization for war-devastated regions and transferred its headquarters and activities to Europe.² Although the Food Administration, according to the terms of the Lever Food and Fuel Control Act, remained in legal existence until July 2, 1921, its work became completely identified with that of the American Relief Administration in Europe by the end of 1919.

During its wartime career, the United States Food Administration obtained complete success in the chief task which it set for itself. This task was not so much to ration food to the American people as it was to secure food for export to the Allies by increasing production and restraining consumption. Through rationing, the Food Administration conserved 377,000 tons of sugar and 1,710,000 tons of wheat for

1 Historical Study No. 33, 28-30; Joshua Bernhardt, Government Control of the Sugar Industry in the United States, (New York, 1920), 117, 119-122.

2 Herbert Hoover in Mullendore, op. cit., 35 ff. In 1920, Hoover wrote that the post-Armistice surplus of American food for export to the Allies amounted to 18,000,000 tons.

overseas export. Although other conservation efforts did not yield an exportable surplus, increased farm production enabled the Food Administration to double and treble the prewar rate of American food exports.

Table 6. The increase in American food exports during the First World War (Short tons).³

Products	:Average of : :three prewar: :fiscal years:	1917-1918	: : 1918-1919
	Fiscal year		
Wheat and rye	3,720,398	4,590,928	10,382,094
Other cereals	1,607,296	4,584,633	3,221,624
Pork	498,115	868,551	1,472,154
Beef	93,187	350,983	551,133
Vegetable oils	165,116	75,732	148,910
Dairy products	13,019	306,940	439,294
Fruits and vegetables	350,040	1,279,351	1,893,914
Sugar (Cuban)	511,384	269,796	558,255
Totals	6,959,055	12,326,914	18,667,378

None of the four great rationing systems developed during the First World War is in full force today. All, however, furnished valuable precedents and experience to the rationing systems in effect during this war. British regulations imposed in 1939 stem directly from the import control experiments carried on during the First World War. The Third Reich of Adolf Hitler uses a streamlined version of the monopolistic rationing controls employed by the

³ Herbert Hoover in Mullendore, *op. cit.*, 13.

Second Reich of Kaiser Wilhelm, with the addition of some of the class-discrimination features of the early Soviet rationing system. Most of the rationing practices of the Office of Price Administration in the United States were developed by Herbert Hoover's Food Administration.

Sugar rationing in its current form was developed during the First World War by local units of the Food Administration. Price panels and consumer reporting boards are two other devices which the Office of Price Administration has borrowed bodily, if somewhat belatedly, from the Food Administration. On the other hand, the O. P. A. consumer pledge plan is as yet a very poor imitation of its Food Administration prototype. Unlike the Food Administration Home Card, the O. P. A. pledge card demands an observance of rationing rules without explaining fully why such rules must be observed.

This contrast in card techniques is, however, only one instance of a great fundamental difference between the enforcement attitudes of the Food Administration and the O. P. A. No one tried to halt inflation during the last war; in fact, it can be strongly suspected, in view of the many Administration rebuffs of Congressional attempts to regulate and investigate wartime industry, that government leaders intended to use inflation as a stimulus to war production. Rationing during the last war was not intended to protect consumer supplies so much as it was intended to in-

sure large military supplies. For this reason, great emphasis was placed on "wheatless days", "meatless days", and "gasolineless Sundays", while civilians were told in great detail of the military aims to be gained through the program of self-denial. Since the Office of Price Administration was founded to curb inflation and secure an equitable distribution of consumer supplies, it has ignored the Food Administration propaganda for conservation and has pushed as a substitute its own campaign against inflation and "black markets." A greater degree of co-operation might have been secured from the outset by making clear the military advantages to be obtained through saving food, fuel, and clothing at home.

With this single significant exception, the Office of Price Administration has rivalled or surpassed the records set up by the Food Administration. By starting with compulsory controls and relying for the most part on paid personnel, it has avoided the hysteria and "food slacker" persecution which marred so much of the "voluntary" program fostered by the Food Administration. In line with Bernard M. Baruch's recommendations after the last war, it has relied on general price stabilization rather than the piecemeal price-fixing which the Food Administration resorted to during the last war. It has bettered the Food Administration's price-stabilization record on food by only a slight margin, but it has compensated for this by regulating all of

the consumer products for which Congress vainly sought regulation during the First World War. To the best of its ability, the O. P. A. has championed equitable distribution rather than arbitrary conservation. In this task, its chief tool at the consumer level has been point rationing, a technique which was developed in England during the early years of the current war.

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APPENDIX

THE LEVER FOOD AND FUEL CONTROL ACT

August 10, 1917

An Act To provide further for the national security and defense by encouraging the production, conserving the supply, and controlling the distribution of food products and fuel.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That by reason of the existence of a state of war, it is essential to the national security and defense, for the successful prosecution of the war, and for the support and maintenance of the Army and Navy, to assure an adequate supply and equitable distribution, and to facilitate the movement, of foods, feeds, fuel including fuel oil and natural gas, and fertilizer and fertilizer ingredients, tools, utensils, implements, machinery and equipment required for the actual production of foods, feeds, and fuel, hereafter in this Act called necessities; to prevent, locally or generally, scarcity, monopolization, hoarding, injurious speculation, manipulations, and private controls, affecting such supply, distribution, and movement; and to establish and maintain governmental control of such necessities during the war. For such purposes the instrumentalities, means, methods, powers, authorities, duties, obligations, and prohibitions hereinafter set forth are created, established, conferred, and prescribed. The President is authorized to make such regulations and to issue such orders as are essential effectively to carry out the provisions of this Act.

Section 2. EFFECTIVE POWERS VESTED IN THE PRESIDENT. That in carrying out the purposes of this Act the President is authorized to enter into any voluntary arrangements or agreements, to create and use any agency or agencies, to accept the services of any person without compensation, to cooperate with any agency or person, to utilize any department or agency of the Government, and to coordinate their activities so as to avoid any preventable loss or duplication of effort or funds.

Section 3. GOVERNMENT AGENTS FORBIDDEN TO SOLICIT OR INDUCE CONTRACTS. That no person acting either as a voluntary or paid agent or employee of the United States in any capacity, shall solicit, induce, or attempt to induce any person or officer authorized to execute or to direct the execution of contracts on behalf of the United States to make any contract or give any order for the furnishing to the United States of work, labor, or services, or of materials, supplies, or other property of any kind or character, if such agent or employee has any pecuniary interest in such contract or order, or if he or any firm of which he is a member, or corporation, joint-stock company, or association of which he is a member, officer or stockholder, or in the pecuniary profits of which he is directly or indirectly interested, shall be a party thereto. Nor shall any agency or employee make, or permit any committee or other body of which he is a member to make, or participate in making, any recommendation concerning such contract or order to any council, board, or commission of the United States, or any member or subordinate thereof, without making to the best of his knowledge and belief a full and complete disclosure in writing to such council, board, commission, or subordinate of any and every pecuniary interest which he may have in such contract or order and of his interest in any firm, corporation, company, or association being a party thereto. Nor shall he participate in the awarding of such contract or giving such order. Any willful violation of any of the provisions of this section shall be punishable by a fine of not more than \$10,000, or by imprisonment of not more than five years, or both; Provided, That the provisions of this section shall not change, alter or repeal section forty-one of chapter three hundred and twenty-one, Thirty-fifth Statutes at Large.

Section 4. PROFITEERING MADE UNLAWFUL. That it is hereby made unlawful for any person willfully to destroy any necessities for the purpose of enhancing the price or restricting the supply thereof; knowingly to commit waste or willfully to permit preventable deterioration of any necessities in or in connection with their production, manufacture, or distribution; to hoard, as defined in section six of this Act, any necessities; to monopolize or attempt to monopolize, either locally or generally, any necessities; to engage in any discriminatory and unfair, or any deceptive or wasteful practice or device, or to make any unjust or unreasonable rate or charge, in handling or dealing in or with any necessities; to conspire, combine, agree, or arrange with any other person, (a) to limit the facilities for transporting, producing, harvesting, manufacturing, supplying, storing, or dealing in any necessities; (b) to restrict the supply of any necessities; (c) to restrict distribution of any necessities;

(d) to prevent, limit, or lessen the manufacture or production of any necessities in order to enhance the price thereof, or (e) to exact excessive prices for any necessities; or to aid or abet the doing of any act made unlawful by this section.

Section 5. LICENSES. That, from time to time, whenever the President shall find it essential to license the importation, manufacture, storage, mining, or distribution of any necessities, in order to carry into effect any of the purposes of this Act, and shall publicly so announce, no person shall, after a date fixed in the announcement, engage in or carry on any such business specified in the announcement of the licensing of the importation, manufacture, storage, mining, or distribution of any necessities as set forth in such announcement, unless he shall secure and hold a license issued pursuant to this section. The President is authorized to issue such licenses and to prescribe regulations for the issuance of licenses and requirements for systems of accounts and auditing of accounts to be kept by licensees, submission of reports by them, with or without oath or affirmation, and the entry and inspection by the President's duly authorized agents of the places of business of the licensees. Whenever the President shall find that any storage charge, commission, profit, or practice of any licensee is unjust, or unreasonable, or discriminatory and unfair, or wasteful, and shall order such licensee, within a reasonable time fixed in the order, to discontinue the same, unless such order, which shall recite the facts found, is revoked or suspended, such licensee shall, within the time prescribed in the order, discontinue such unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory and unfair storage charge, commission, profit, or practice. The President may, in lieu of any such unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory, and unfair storage charge, commission, profit, or practice, find what is a just, reasonable, nondiscriminatory and fair storage charge, commission, profit, or practice, and in any proceeding brought in any court such order of the President shall be prima facie evidence. Any person who, without a license issued pursuant to this section, or whose license shall have been revoked, knowingly engages in or carries on any business for which a license is required under this section, or willfully fails or refuses to discontinue any unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory and unfair storage charge, commission, profit, or practice, in accordance with the requirement of an order issued under this section, or any regulation prescribed under this section, shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by a fine not exceeding \$5,000, or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or both: Provided, That this section shall not apply to any farmer, gardener, cooperative association of farmers or gardeners, in-

cluding live-stock farmers, or other persons with respect to the products of any farm, garden, or other land owned, leased, or cultivated by him, nor to any retailer with respect to the retail business actually conducted by him, nor to any common carrier, nor shall anything in this section be construed to authorize the fixing or imposition of a duty or tax upon any article imported into or exported from the United States or any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia; Provided further, That for the purposes of this Act a retailer shall be deemed to be a person, copartnership, firm, corporation, or association not engaging in the wholesale business whose total sales do not exceed \$100,000 per annum.

Section 6. PENALTIES FOR HOARDING. That any person who willfully hoards any necessaries shall upon conviction thereof be fined not exceeding \$5,000 or be imprisoned for not more than two years, or both. Necessaries shall be deemed to be hoarded within the meaning of this Act when either (a) held, contracted for, or arranged for by any person in a quantity in excess of his reasonable requirements for use or consumption by himself and his dependents for a reasonable time; (b) held, contracted for, or arranged for by any manufacturer, wholesaler, retailer, or other dealer in a quantity in excess of the reasonable requirements of his business for use or sale by him for a reasonable time, or reasonably required to furnish necessaries produced in surplus quantities seasonally throughout the period of scant or no production; or (c) withheld, whether by possession or under any contract or arrangement, from the market by any person for the purpose of unreasonably increasing or diminishing the price: Provided, That this section shall not include or relate to transactions on any exchange, board of trade, or similar institution or place of business as described in section thirteen of this Act that may be permitted by the President under the authority conferred upon him by said section thirteen: Provided, however, That any accumulating or withholding by any farmer or gardener, cooperative association of farmers or gardeners, including live-stock farmers, or any other person, of the products of any farm, garden, or any other land owned, leased, or cultivated by him shall not be deemed to be hoarding within the meaning of this Act.

Section 7. SEIZURE AND SALE OF HOARDED NECESSARIES. That whenever any necessaries shall be hoarded as defined in section six they shall be liable to proceeded against in any district court of the United States within the district where the same are found and seized by a process of libel for condemnation, and if such necessaries shall be adjudged to be hoarded they shall be disposed of by sale in

such manner as to provide the most equitable distribution thereof as the court may direct, and the proceeds thereof, less the legal costs and charges, shall be paid to the party entitled thereto. The proceedings of such libel cases shall conform as near as may be to the proceedings in admiralty, except that either party may demand trial by jury of any issue of fact joined in any such case, and all such proceedings shall be at the suit of and in the name of the United States. It shall be the duty of the United States attorney for the proper district to institute and prosecute any such action upon presentation to him of satisfactory evidence to sustain the case.

Section 8. PUNISHMENT FOR WILLFULLY DESTROYING NECESSARIES. That any person who willfully destroys any necessities for the purpose of enhancing the price or restricting the supply thereof shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not exceeding \$5,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both.

Section 9. PUNISHMENT FOR CONSPIRACIES RESPECTING NECESSARIES. That any person who conspires, combines, agrees, or arranges with any other person (a) to limit the facilities for transporting, producing, manufacturing, supplying, storing, or dealing in any necessities; (b) to restrict the supply of any necessities; (c) to restrict the distribution of any necessities; (d) to prevent, limit, or lessen the manufacture or production of any necessities in order to enhance the price thereof shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not exceeding \$10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both.

Section 10. AUTHORIZED REQUISITION OF NECESSARIES FOR PUBLIC USE. That the President is authorized, from time to time, to requisition foods, feeds, fuels, and other supplies necessary to the support of the Army or the maintenance of the Navy, or any other public use connected with the common defense, and to requisition, or otherwise provide, storage facilities for such supplies; and he shall ascertain and pay a just compensation therefor. If the compensation so determined be not satisfactory to the person entitled to receive the same, such person shall be paid seventy-five per centum of the amount so determined by the President, and shall be entitled to sue the United States to recover such further sum as, added to said seventy-five per centum will make up such as will be just compensation for such necessities or storage space, and jurisdiction is hereby conferred on the United States District Courts to hear and determine all such controversies: Provided, That nothing in this

section, or in the section that follows, shall be construed to require any natural person to furnish any necessaries held by him and reasonably required for consumption or use by himself or dependents, nor shall any person, firm, corporation, or association be required to furnish to the government any seed necessary for the seeding of land owned, leased, or cultivated by them.

Section 11. PURCHASE AND SALE OF FOOD NECESSARIES BY THE UNITED STATES. That the President is authorized from time to time to purchase, to store, to provide storage facilities for, and to sell for cash at reasonable prices, wheat, flour, meal, beans, and potatoes: Provided, That if any minimum price shall have been theretofore fixed, pursuant to the provisions of section fourteen of this Act, then the price paid for any such articles so purchased shall not be less than such minimum price. Any moneys received by the United States from or in connection with the disposal by the United States of necessaries under this section may, in the discretion of the President, be used as a revolving fund for further carrying out the purposes of this section. Any balance of such moneys not used as part of such revolving fund shall be covered into the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts.

Section 12. AUTHORITY TO TAKE OVER AND OPERATE PLANTS TO MANUFACTURE NECESSARIES. That whenever the President shall find it necessary to secure an adequate supply of necessaries for the support of the Army or the maintenance of the Navy, or for other public use connected with the common defense, he is authorized to requisition and take over, for use or operation by the Government, any factory, packing house, oil pipe line, mine, or other plant, or any part thereof, in or through which any necessaries are or may be manufactured, produced, prepared, or mined, and to operate the same. Whenever the President shall determine that the further use or operation by the Government of any such factory, mine, or plant, or part thereof, is not essential for the national security or defense, the same shall be restored to the person entitled to the use thereof. The United States shall make just compensation, to be determined by the President, for the taking over, use, occupation, and operation by the Government of any such factory, mine, or plant, or part thereof. If the compensation so determined be unsatisfactory to the person entitled to receive the same, such person shall be paid seventy-five per centum of the amount so determined by the President, and shall be entitled to sue the United States to recover such further sum as will be just compensation, in the manner pro-

vided for by section twenty-four, paragraph twenty, and section one hundred and forty-five of the Judicial Code. The President is authorized to prescribe such regulations as he may deem essential for carrying out the purposes of this section, including the operation of any such factory, mine, or plant, or part thereof, the purchase, sale, or other disposition of articles used, manufactured, produced, prepared, or mined therein, and the employment, control, and compensation of employees. Any moneys received by the United States from or in connection with the use or operation of any such factory, mine, or plant, or part thereof, may, in the discretion of the President, be used as a revolving fund for the purpose of the continued use or operation of any such factory, mine, or plant, or part thereof, and the accounts of each such factory, mine, plant, or part thereof, shall be kept separate and distinct. Any balance of such moneys not used as part of such revolving fund shall be paid into the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts.

Section 13. REGULATIONS AUTHORIZED TO GOVERN DEALING IN NECESSARIES AT EXCHANGES AND BOARDS OF TRADE. That whenever the President finds it essential in order to prevent undue enhancement, depression, or fluctuation of prices of, or in order to prevent injurious speculation in, or in order to prevent unjust market manipulation or unfair and misleading market quotations of the prices of necessaries, hereinafter in this section called evil practices, he is authorized to prescribe such regulations governing, or may either wholly or partly prohibit, operations, practices, and transactions at, on, in, or under the rules of any exchange, board of trade, or similar institution or place of business as he may find essential in order to prevent, correct, or remove such evil practices. Such regulations may require all persons coming within their provisions to keep such records and statements of account, and may require such persons to make such returns, verified under oath or otherwise, as will fully and correctly disclose all transactions at, in, or on, or under the rules of any such exchange, board of trade, or similar institution or place of business, including the making, execution, settlement, and fulfillment thereof. He may also require all persons acting in the capacity of a clearing house, clearing association, or similar institution, for the purpose of clearing, settling, or adjusting transactions at, in, or on, or under the rules of any such exchange, board of trade, or any similar institution or place of business, to keep such records and to make such returns as will fully and correctly disclose all facts in their possession relating to such transactions, and he

may appoint agents to conduct the investigations necessary to enforce the provisions of this section and all rules and regulations made by him in pursuance thereof, and may fix and pay the compensation of such agents. Any person who willfully violates any regulation made pursuant to this section, or who knowingly engages in any operation, practice, or transaction prohibited pursuant to this section, or who willfully aids or abets any such violation or any such prohibited operation, practice, or transaction, shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by a fine not exceeding \$10,000 or by imprisonment for not more than four years, or both.

Section 14. ESTABLISHMENT OF A GUARANTEED WHEAT PRICE TO STIMULATE PRODUCTION. That whenever the President shall find that an emergency exists requiring stimulation of the production of wheat and that it is essential that the producers of wheat, produced within the United States, shall have the benefits of the guaranty provided for in this section, he is authorized, from time to time, seasonably and as far in advance of seeding time as practicable, to determine and fix and give public notice of what, under specified conditions, is a reasonable guaranteed price for wheat, in order to assure such producers a reasonable profit. The President shall thereupon fix such guaranteed price for each of the official grain standards for wheat as established under the United States grain standards Act, approved August eleventh, nineteen hundred and sixteen. The President shall from time to time establish and promulgate such regulations as he may deem wise in connection with such guaranteed prices, and in particular governing conditions of delivery and payment, and differences in price for the several standard grades in the principal primary markets of the United States, adopting number one northern spring or its equivalent at the principal interior primary markets as the basis. Thereupon, the Government of the United States hereby guarantees every producer of wheat produced within the United States, that, upon compliance by him with the regulations prescribed, he shall receive for any wheat produced in reliance upon this guaranty within the period, not exceeding eighteen months, prescribed in the notice, a price not less than the price therefor as fixed pursuant to this section. In such regulations the President shall prescribe the terms and conditions upon which any such producer shall be entitled to the benefits of such guaranty. The guaranteed prices for the several standard grades of wheat for the crop of nineteen hundred and eighteen, shall be based upon number one northern spring or its equivalent at not less than \$2 per bushel at the principal interior primary markets. This guaranty shall not be dependent upon the action of the President under the first part of this section, but is hereby made

absolute and shall be binding until May first, nineteen hundred and nineteen. When the President finds that the importation into the United States of any wheat produced outside of the United States materially enhances or is likely to materially enhance the liabilities of the United States under guaranties of prices therefor made pursuant to this section, and ascertains what rate of duty, added to the then existing rate of duty on wheat and to the value of wheat at the time of importation, would be sufficient to bring the price thereof at which imported up to the price fixed therefor pursuant to the foregoing provisions of this section, he shall proclaim such facts and thereafter there shall be levied, in addition to the then existing rate of duty, the rate of duty so ascertained; but in no case shall any such rate of duty be fixed at an amount which will effect a reduction of the rate of duty upon wheat under any then existing tariff law of the United States. For the purpose of making any guaranteed price effective under this section, or whenever he deems it essential in order to protect the Government of the United States against material enhancement of its liabilities arising out of any guaranty under this section, the President is authorized also, in his discretion, to purchase any wheat for which a guaranteed price shall be fixed under this section, and to hold, transport, or store it, or to sell, dispose of, and deliver the same to any citizen of the United States or to any Government engaged in war with any country with which the Government of the United States is or may be at war or to use the same as supplies for any department or agency of the Government of the United States. Any moneys received by the United States from or in connection with the sale or disposal of wheat under this section may, in the discretion of the President, be used as a revolving fund for further carrying out the purposes of this section. Any balance of such moneys not used as part of such revolving fund shall be covered into the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts.

Section 15. USE OF FOODS AND FEEDS TO PRODUCE DISTILLED SPIRITS FORBIDDEN. That from and after thirty days from the date of the approval of this Act no foods, fruits, food materials, or feeds shall be used in the production of distilled spirits for beverage purposes: Provided, That under such rules, regulations, and bonds as the President may prescribe, such materials may be used in the production of distilled spirits exclusively for other than beverage purposes, or for the fortification of pure sweet wines as defined by the Act entitled "An Act to increase the revenue, and for other purposes," approved September eighth, nine-

teen hundred and sixteen. Nor shall there be imported into the United States any distilled spirits. Whenever the President shall find that limitation, regulation, or prohibition of the use of foods, fruits, food materials, or feeds in the production of malt or vinous liquors for beverage purposes, or that reduction of the alcoholic content of any such malt or vinous liquor, is essential, in order to assure an adequate and continuous supply of food, or that the national security and defense will be subserved thereby, he is authorized, from time to time, to prescribe and give public notice of the extent of the limitation, regulation, prohibition, or reduction so necessitated. Whenever such notice shall have been given and shall remain unrevoked no person shall, after a reasonable time prescribed in such notice, use any foods, fruits, food materials, or feeds in the production of malt or vinous liquors, or import any such liquors except under license issued by the President and in compliance with rules and regulations determined by him governing the production and importation of such liquors and the alcoholic content thereof. Any person who willfully violates the provisions of this section, or who shall use any foods, fruits, food materials, or feeds in the production of malt or vinous liquors, or who shall violate any rule or regulation made under this section, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding \$5,000, or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or both: Provided further, That nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize the licensing of the manufacture of vinous or malt liquors in any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or any civil subdivision thereof, where the manufacture of such vinous or malt liquor is prohibited.

Section 16. AUTHORIZED COMMANDEERING OF DISTILLED SPIRITS IN BOND FOR GOVERNMENT USE. That the President is authorized and directed to commandeer any or all distilled spirits in bond or in stock at the date of the approval of this Act for redistillation, insofar as such redistillation may be necessary to meet the requirements of the Government in the manufacture of munitions and other military and hospital supplies, or in so far as such redistillation would dispense with the necessity of utilizing products and materials suitable for foods and feeds in the future manufacture of distilled spirits for the purposes herein enumerated. The President shall determine and pay a just compensation for the distilled spirits so commandeered; and if the compensation so determined be not satisfactory to the person entitled to receive the same, such person shall be paid seventy-five per centum of the amount so determined by the President and shall be entitled to sue the United States to recover such further

sum as, added to said seventy-five per centum, will make up such amount as will be just compensation for such spirits, in the manner provided by section twenty-four, paragraph twenty, and in section one hundred and forty-five of the Judicial Code.

Section 17. PUNISHMENT FOR ASSAULTING OFFICIALS. That every person who willfully assaults, resists, impedes, or interferes with any officer, employee, or agent of the United States in the execution of any duty authorized to be performed by or pursuant to this Act shall upon conviction thereof be fined not exceeding \$1,000 or be imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.

Section 18. APPROPRIATION FOR ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES. That the sum of \$2,500,000 is hereby appropriated, out of any moneys in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to be available until June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and eighteen for the payment of such rent, the expense, including postage, of such printing and publications, the purchase of such material and equipment, and the employment of such persons and means, in the city of Washington and elsewhere, as the President may deem essential.

Section 19. APPROPRIATION FOR OTHER PURPOSES. That for the purposes of this Act the sum of \$150,000,000 is hereby appropriated, out of any moneys in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to be available during the time this Act is in effect: Provided, That no part of this appropriation shall be expended for the purposes described in the preceding section: Provided further, That itemized statements covering all purchases and disbursements under this and the preceding section shall be filed with the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives on or before the twenty-fifth day of each month after the taking effect of this Act, covering the business of the preceding month, and said statements shall be subject to public inspection.

Section 20. EMPLOYEES NOT EXEMPT FROM MILITARY DRAFT. That the employment of any person under the provisions of this Act shall not exempt any such person from military service under the provisions of the selective draft law approved May eighteenth, nineteen hundred and seventeen.

Section 21. DETAILED ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT TO CONGRESS EACH YEAR. The President shall cause a detailed report to be made to the Congress on the first day of January each year of all proceedings had under this Act during the year pre-

ceding. Such report shall, in addition to other matters, contain an account of all persons appointed or employed, the salary of compensation paid or allowed each, the aggregate amount of the different kinds of property purchased or requisitioned, the use and disposition made of such property, and a statement of all receipts, payments, and expenditures, together with a statement showing the general character, and estimated value of all property then on hand, and the aggregate amount and character of all claims against the United States growing out of this Act.

Section 22. INVALIDATION OF ANY CLAUSE NOT TO AFFECT REMAINDER OF ACT. That if any clause, sentence, paragraph, or part of this Act shall for any reason be adjudged by any court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, such judgment shall not affect, impair, or invalidate the remainder thereof, but shall be confined in its operation to the clause, sentence, paragraph, or part thereof, directly involved in the controversy in which such judgment shall have been rendered.

Section 23. CONSTRUCTION OF TERMS. That words used in this Act shall be construed to import the plural or the singular, as the case demands. The word "person," wherever used in this Act, shall include individuals, partnerships, associations, and corporations. When construing and enforcing the provisions of this Act, the act, omission, or failure of any official, agent, or other person acting for or employed by any partnership, association, or corporation within the scope of his employment or office shall, in every case, also be deemed the act, omission, or failure of such partnership, association, or corporation as well as that of the person.

Section 24. ACT EFFECTIVE UNTIL END OF WAR WITH GERMANY. That the provisions of this Act shall cease to be in effect when the existing state of war between the United States and Germany shall have terminated, and the fact and date of such termination shall be ascertained and proclaimed by the President; but the termination of this act shall not affect any act done, or any right or obligation accruing or accrued, or any suit or proceeding had or commenced in any civil case before the said termination pursuant to this Act; but all rights and liabilities under this Act arising before its termination shall continue and may be enforced in the same manner as if the Act had not terminated. Any offense committed and all penalties, forfeitures, or liabilities incurred prior to such termination may be prosecuted or punished in the same manner and with the same effect as if this Act had not been terminated.

Section 25. PRESIDENTIAL POWERS OVER COAL AND COKE.

That the President of the United States shall be, and he is hereby, authorized and empowered, whenever and wherever in his judgment necessary for the efficient prosecution of the war, to fix the price of coal and coke, wherever and whenever sold, either by producer or dealer, to establish rules for the regulation of and to regulate the method of production, sale, shipment, distribution, apportionment, or storage thereof among dealers and consumers, domestic or foreign; said authority and power may be exercised by him in each case through the agency of the Federal Trade Commission during the war or for such part of said time as in his judgment may be necessary.

That if, in the opinion of the President, any such producer or dealer fails or neglects to conform to such prices or regulations, or to conduct his business efficiently under the regulations and control of the President as aforesaid, or conducts it in a manner prejudicial to the public interest, then the President is hereby authorized and empowered in every such case to requisition and take over the plant, business, and all appurtenances thereof belonging to such producer or dealer as a going concern, and to operate or cause the same to be operated in such manner or through such agency as he may direct during the period of the war or for such part of said time as in his judgment may be necessary.

That any producer or dealer whose plant, business, and appurtenances shall have been requisitioned or taken over by the President shall be paid a just compensation for the use therefor during the period that the same may be requisitioned or taken over as aforesaid, which compensation the President shall fix or cause to be fixed by the Federal Trade Commission.

That if the prices so fixed, or if, in the case of the taking over or requisitioning of the mines or business of any such producer or dealer the compensation therefor as determined by the provisions of this Act be not satisfactory to the person or persons entitled to receive the same, such person shall be paid seventy-five per centum of the amount so determined, and shall be entitled to sue the United States to recover such further sum as, added to said seventy-five per centum, will make up such amount as will be just compensation in the manner provided by section twenty-four, paragraph twenty, and section one hundred and forty-five of the Judicial Code.

While operating or causing to be operated any such plant or business, the President is authorized to prescribe such

regulations as he may deem essential for the employment, control, and compensation of the employees necessary to conduct the same.

Of if the President of the United States shall be of the opinion that he can thereby better provide for the common defense, and whenever, in his judgment, it shall be necessary for the efficient prosecution of the war, then he is hereby authorized and empowered to require any and all producers of coal and coke, either in any special area or in any special coal fields, or in the entire United States, to sell their products only to the United States through an agency to be designated by the President, such agency to regulate the resale of such coal and coke, and the prices thereof, and to establish rules for the regulation of and to regulate the methods of production, shipment, distribution, apportionment, or storage thereof among dealers and consumers, domestic or foreign, and to make payment of the purchase price thereof to the producers thereof, or to the person or persons legally entitled to said payment.

That within fifteen days after notice from the agency so designated to any producer of coal or coke that his, or its, output is to be so purchased by the United States as hereinbefore described, such producer shall cease shipments of said product upon his own account and shall transmit to such agency all orders received and unfilled or partially unfilled, showing the exact extent to which shipments have been made thereon, and thereafter all shipments shall be made only on authority of the agency designated by the President, and thereafter no producer shall sell any of said products except to the United States through such agency, and the said agency alone is hereby authorized and empowered to purchase during the continuance of the requirement the output of such producers.

That the prices to be paid for such products so purchased shall be based upon a fair and just profit over and above the cost of production, including proper maintenance and depletion charges, the reasonableness of such profits and cost of production to be determined by the Federal Trade Commission, and if the prices fixed by the said commission of any such product purchased by the United States as hereinbefore described be unsatisfactory to the person or persons entitled to the same, such person or persons shall be paid seventy-five per centum of the amount so determined, and shall be entitled to sue the United States to recover such further sum as, added to said seventy-five per centum, will

make up such amount as will be just compensation in the manner provided by section twenty-four, paragraph twenty, and section one hundred and forty-five of the Judicial Code.

All such products so sold to the United States shall be sold by the United States at such uniform prices, quality considered, as may be practicable and as may be determined by said agency to be just and fair.

Any moneys received by the United States for the sale of any such coal and coke may, in the discretion of the President, be used as a revolving fund for further carrying out the purposes of this section. Any moneys not so used shall be covered into the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts.

That when directed by the President, the Federal Trade Commission is hereby required to proceed to full inquiry, giving such notice as it may deem practicable, into the cost of producing under reasonable efficient management at the various places of production of the following commodities, to wit, coal and coke.

The books, correspondence, records, and papers in any way referring to transactions of any kind relating to the mining, production, sale, or distribution of all mine operators or other persons whose coal and coke have or may become subject to this section, and the books, correspondence, records, and papers of any person applying for the purchase of coal and coke from the United States shall at all times be subject to inspection by the said agency, and such person or persons shall promptly furnish said agency any data or information relating to the business of such person or persons which said agency may call for, and said agency is hereby authorized to procure the information in reference to the business of such coal-mine operators and producers of coke and customers therefor in the manner provided for in sections six and nine of the Act of Congress approved September twenty-sixth, nineteen hundred and fourteen, entitled "An Act to create a Federal Trade Commission, to define its powers and duties, and for other purposes," and said agency is hereby authorized and empowered to exercise all the powers granted to the Federal Trade Commission by said Act for the carrying out of the purposes of this section.

Having completed its inquiry respecting any commodity in any locality, it shall, if the President has decided to fix the prices at which any such commodity shall be sold by producers and dealers generally, fix and publish maximum prices for both producers of and dealers in any such commodity, which maximum prices shall be observed by all producers and dealers until further action thereon is taken by the

commission.

In fixing maximum prices for producers the commission shall allow the cost of production, including the expense of operation, maintenance, depreciation, and depletion, and shall add thereto a just and reasonable profit.

In fixing such prices for dealers, the commission shall allow the cost to the dealer and shall add thereto a just and reasonable sum for his profit in the transaction.

The maximum prices so fixed and published shall not be construed as invalidating any contract in which prices are fixed, made in good faith, prior to the establishment and publication of maximum prices by the commission.

Whoever shall, with the knowledge that the prices of any such commodity have been fixed as herein provided, ask, demand, or receive a higher price, or whoever shall, with knowledge that the regulations have been prescribed as herein provided, violate or refuse to conform to any of the same, shall, upon conviction, be punished by fine of not more than \$5,000, or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or both. Each independent transaction shall constitute a separate offense.

Nothing in this section shall be construed as restricting or modifying in any manner the right the Government of the United States may have in its own behalf or in behalf of any other Government at war with Germany to purchase, requisition, or take over any such commodities for the equipment, maintenance, or support of armed forces at any price or upon any terms which may be agreed upon or otherwise lawfully determined.

Section 26. HOARDING OR DESTROYING OF NECESSARIES A FELONY. That any person carrying on or employed in commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, or with or in the Territories or other possessions of the United States in any article suitable for human food, fuel, or other necessities of life, who, whether in his individual capacity or as an officer, agent, or employee of a corporation or member of a partnership carrying on or employed in such trade, shall store, acquire, or hold, or who shall destroy or make away with any such article for the purpose of limiting the supply thereof to the public or affecting the market price thereof in such commerce, whether temporarily or otherwise, shall be deemed guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not more than \$5,000 or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or both; Provided, That any storing or holding by any farmer, garden-

er, or other person of the products of any farm, garden, or other land cultivated by him shall not be deemed to be a storing or holding within the meaning of this Act: Provided further, That farmers and fruit growers, cooperative and other exchanges, or societies of a similar character shall not be included within the provisions of this section: Provided further, That this section shall not be construed to prohibit the holding or accumulating of any such article by any such person in a quantity not in excess of the reasonable requirements of his business for a reasonable time or in a quantity reasonably required to furnish said articles produced in surplus quantities seasonally throughout the period of scant or no production. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to repeal the Act entitled "An Act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies," approved July second, eighteen hundred and ninety, commonly known as the Sherman Antitrust Act.

Section 27. PRESIDENT MAY PROCURE AND SELL NITRATE OF SODA TO AID AGRICULTURE. That the President is authorized to procure, or aid in procuring, such stocks of nitrate of soda as he may determine to be necessary, and find available, for increasing agricultural production during the calendar years nineteen hundred and seventeen and eighteen, and to dispose of the same for cash at cost, including all expenses connected therewith. For carrying out the purposes of this section, there is hereby appropriated, out of any moneys in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, available immediately and until expended, the sum of \$10,000,000, or so much thereof as may be necessary, and the President is authorized to make such regulations, and to use such means and agencies of the Government as, in his discretion, he may deem best. The proceeds arising from the disposition of the nitrate of soda shall go into the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts.

Approved, August 10, 1917.

EXECUTIVE ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT PROVIDING FOR ORGANIZATION
OF UNITED STATES FOOD ADMINISTRATION

Whereas under and by virtue of an act of Congress entitled "An Act to provide further for the national security and defense by encouraging the production, conserving the supply, and controlling the distribution of food products and fuel," approved August 10, 1917, it was provided among other things, as follows:

"That, by reason of the existence of a state of war, it is essential to the national security and defense, for the successful prosecution of the war, and for the support and maintenance of the Army and Navy, to assure an adequate supply and equitable distribution, and to facilitate the movement, of foods, feeds, fuel, including fuel oil and natural gas, fertilizer and fertilizer ingredients, tools, utensils, implements, machinery, and equipment required for the actual production of food, feeds, and fuel, hereafter in this Act called necessities; to prevent, locally or generally, scarcity, monopolization, hoarding, injurious speculation, manipulations, and private controls, affecting such supply, distribution, and movement; and to establish and maintain governmental control of such necessities during the war. For such purposes the instrumentalities, means, methods, powers, authorities, duties, obligations, and prohibitions hereinafter set forth are created, established, conferred, and prescribed. The President is authorized to make such regulations and to issue such orders as are essential effectively to carry out the provisions of this Act;"

And whereas it is further provided in said act as follows:

"That, in carrying out the purposes of this Act the President is authorized to enter into any voluntary arrangements or agreements, to create and use any agency or agencies, to accept the services of any person without compensation, to cooperate with any agency or person, * * *;

Now, therefore, under and by virtue of the power conferred upon me by the provisions of said act and for the purpose of carrying the same into effect, I, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States, hereby order and direct as follows:

There is hereby established a governmental organization to be known as and called

UNITED STATES FOOD ADMINISTRATION

Said organization shall consist of an officer designated as United States Food Administrator and such subordinate assistants and employees as may be selected by him for service in the city of Washington, D. C., and elsewhere, with the consent and approval of the President and under such rules and regulations as may from time to time be prescribed.

Herbert Hoover is hereby appointed United States Food Administrator, such appointment to take effect from this date.

Said United States Food Administrator shall hold office during the pleasure of the President.

Said United States Food Administrator shall supervise, direct, and carry into effect the provisions of said act, and the powers and authority therein given to the President so far as the same apply to foods, feeds, and their derivative products and to any and all practices, procedure, and regulations authorized or required under the provisions of said act, including the issuance, regulation, and revocation, in the name of said Food Administrator, of licenses under said act; and in this behalf he shall do and perform such acts and things as may be authorized or required of him from time to time by direction of the President and under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the President from time to time.

He shall also have the authority to make use of the services of legal counsel and employ and fix the compensation of such counsel as may from time to time be deemed by him necessary for the purpose of aiding him in carrying this act into effect.

And whereas the President is further authorized in carrying out the purpose of said act "to utilize any department or agency of the Government and to coordinate their activities so as to avoid preventable loss or duplication of effort or funds," all departments and established agencies of the Government are hereby directed to cooperate with the United States Food Administrator in the performance of his duties as hereinbefore set forth and to give said administrator such support and assistance as may be requisite or expedient to enable him to perform his said duties and avoid duplication of effort and expenditure of funds.

In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done in the District of Columbia, this 10th day of August, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and seventeen, and of the independence of the United States of America, the one hundred and forty-second.

WOODROW WILSON.

By the President:
ROBERT LANSING, (SEAL.)
Secretary of State.

INDUSTRIES LICENSED BY THE UNITED STATES
FOOD ADMINISTRATION¹

- I. All firms, persons, corporations, and associations engaged in the business of operating cold-storage warehouses, or of any place artificially or mechanically cooled to or below a temperature of 45 degrees above zero Fahrenheit in which food commodities are placed and held for 30 days or more.
- II. All persons, firms, corporations, and associations engaged in the business of importing, manufacturing (including milling, mixing, or packing), or distributing the following commodities:

Barley

Fresh, canned, or cured beef, pork, or mutton (including veal, lamb, ham, canned cornbeef, chipped beef, dried beef, sliced bacon whether in containers or not, and excluding the distribution of beef juice, bologna, canned chili meat, cornbeef hash, deviled ham, luncheon tongue, mincemeat, potted meats, sausage, scrapple, tripe, and veal loaf)

Buckwheat and buckwheat products

Canned dried beans (including canned pork and beans and chili con carne with beans)

Canned corn (including canned hulled corn and canned hominy)

Canned peas

Canned salmon, sardines, or tuna (domestic or foreign)

Canned tomatoes (including tomato paste, pulp, or puree)

Casings made from the intestines of animals, for sausage and other food commodities

Condensed, evaporated, or powdered milk (excluding malted milk)

Corn (including snap corn and excluding popcorn)

Corn grits, corn meal, raw corn flakes

Cottonseed

¹ Modified from list in William C. Mullendore, History of the United States Food Administration, 197-200.

Cottonseed oil, cottonseed cake, cottonseed meal
 Dried beans (including dried lima beans, soybeans,
 pinto beans, velvet beans, and excluding
 castor beans)
 Dried prunes, apples, and peaches
 Dried raisins (excluding dried black grapes and
 currants)
 Mixed flours containing one or more licensed
 flours
 Wheat flour, (including graham flour, whole
 wheat flour, and gluten flour), rye flour,
 corn flour, barley flour, rice flour, and
 oat flour
 Fresh or frozen fish
 Fresh fruits or vegetables (including Irish or
 sweet potatoes, lemons, oranges, and berries)
 Hominy (including canned hominy)
 Milk, butter, and cheese (including buttermilk,
 whey butter and cottage cheese)
 Oatmeal or rolled oats
 Oats
 Soybean oil, soybean meal, palm oil, palm kernel
 oil, copra, copra oil, Chinese vegetable
 tallow, coconut stearine, coconut olein,
 cod oil, cod liver oil, fish and marine
 animal oils, lard oil, lard stearine, lin-
 seed oil, mutton tallow, mustard seed oil,
 neatsfoot oil, neutral lard, oleo stearine,
 oleo stock, olive oil, rapeseed oil, sesame
 oil, shea nut oil, sunflower seed oil, and
 tallow
 Oleomargarine, lard, lard substitutes, oleo oil,
 or cooking fats (including butterine, coconut
 oil butter, nut oil for cooking, edible
 tallow)
 Pea seed or dried peas
 Poultry or eggs (Fresh or frozen and including
 dried egg albumen or dried yolk, and canned
 eggs)
 Rice (including brewer's rice and rice screenings)
 Rye
 Sugar, syrups, or molasses (including raw, refined,
 clarified, plantation washed, and open-kettle
 sugar, milk sugar, and sorghum syrup, and
 excluding beverage or medicinal syrups and
 rock candy syrup)
 Wheat

III. Those persons, firms, corporations, and associations engaged in the business of storing wheat, rye, corn, oats, barley, beans, rice, cottonseed, cottonseed cake, cottonseed meal, cottonseed hulls, peanut meal, and malt; or of operating warehouses or other places in which any food or feed commodities are stored for hire.

IV. Those persons, firms, corporations, or associations engaged in the business of

- (a) Importing, storing, distributing, or manufacturing (including mixing and processing of all kinds) any commercial mixed feeds (including dairy feeds, horse feeds, mule feeds, stock feeds, hog feeds, and poultry feeds)
- (b) Manufacturing feeds from any of the following commodities or importing, storing, or distributing any of the following commodities as feeds or feed ingredients:

- Baled alfalfa
- Animal or fish products or by-products
- Beans
- Buckwheat
- Broom corn
- Emmer
- Feterita
- Brewers' grains
- Dried yeast grains
- Grain and yeast screenings
- Baled hay
- Kaffir
- Linseed-oil cake
- Linseed-oil meal
- Malt sprouts
- Millet
- Peas
- Cane seed
- Spelt
- Baled straw

- (c) Importing, manufacturing, storing, or distributing as feed any product or by-product of any of the following commodities:

- Alfalfa
- Barley
- Soybeans

Velvet beans
 Sugar beets
 Buckwheat
 Sugar cane
 Copra
 Ear corn
 Shelled corn
 Sorghum grains
 Grain and seed screenings
 Hay
 Oats
 Palm kernel
 Palm nut
 Peanuts
 Peas
 Rice
 Rye
 Straw
 Wheat

- V. Those engaged as salt-water fishermen, whether fishing independently or on shares, at any period of the year in the commercial distribution, including catching and selling, of any and all varieties of salt-water fish, including menhaden, and of shell fish and crustaceans.
- VI. Those engaged in the business of manufacturing (including packaging) alimentary paste, tomato soup, tomato catsup, or other tomato products; fermented beverages containing less than one-half of one percent alcohol; mild-cured, hard-cured, salted, dried, smoked, pickled, or otherwise preserved salmon; near-beers or other similar cereal beverages.
- VII. Those engaged in the manufacture for sale of cake, crackers, biscuits, pastry, or bread in any form, or other bakery products, whose consumption of flour, meals, and substitutes in the aggregate is three barrels or more per month on an average throughout the year.
- VIII. Those engaged in the business of importing or distributing green coffee.
- IX. Those engaged in the manufacture and distribution for sale of white arsenic and arsenic insecticides.