
By

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B.S., Norwich University, 1985
M.A., Louisiana State University, 1996

AN ABSTRACT OF A DISSERTATION

submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of History
College of Arts and Sciences

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas

2014
Abstract

After the Second World War, the leaders of the Department of the Army (DA) worked to inform those in the service that they had a duty to help the American people understand what the Army was doing to provide security for the nation. Their goal was for the public to have, at a minimum, the same amount of understanding of the Army as it had during World War II. To achieve this goal they believed that the officer corps had to be convinced that explaining to the public what the service was doing was in the best interest of the Army. The effort of the leaders to convince the officer corps was conducted by two primary means. First, the leaders made many public statements announcing that the Army would continue to inform the American people. Second, they added a requirement for those setting the curricula at the senior two schools of the service to provide instruction about the program that the Army had, which had three sub-programs, to update the American public.

Between AY 1947 and 1989, the leaders continued to talk about the importance of informing the public. However, those approving the curricula at the two Colleges of the Army placed decreasing emphasis on educating students about what public affairs was and how to conduct it. This assertion is based on three primary findings. First, there is a clear decrease in the number of hours allocated to teaching about public affairs. Second, over the course of this period students were provided with fewer chances to apply what they were learning. Third, the coverage of the instruction went from covering at least two of the components of the Army’s program to at best only one. In the end a gap is clearly visible between what the leaders of the Army were saying regarding the importance of educating officers about public affairs and what was included in the curricula of these two schools: deeds did not match words.

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Approved by:

Major Professor
Donald J. Mrozek
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After the Second World War, the leaders of the Department of the Army (DA) worked to inform those in the service that they had a duty to help the American people understand what the Army was doing to provide security for the nation. Their goal was for the public to have, at a minimum, the same amount of understanding of the Army as it had during World War II. To achieve this goal they believed that the officer corps had to be convinced that explaining to the public what the service was doing was in the best interest of the Army. The effort of the leaders to convince the officer corps was conducted by two primary means. First, the leaders made many public statements announcing that the Army would continue to inform the American people. Second, they added a requirement for those setting the curricula at the senior two schools of the service to provide instruction about the program that the Army had, which had three sub-programs, to update the American public.

Between AY 1947 and 1989, the leaders continued to talk about the importance of informing the public. However, those approving the curricula at the two Colleges of the Army placed decreasing emphasis on educating students about what public affairs was and how to conduct it. This assertion is based on three primary findings. First, there is a clear decrease in the number of hours allocated to teaching about public affairs. Second, over the course of this period students were provided with fewer chances to apply what they were learning. Third, the coverage of the instruction went from covering at least two of the components of the Army’s program to at best only one. In the end a gap is clearly visible between what the leaders of the Army were saying regarding the importance of educating officers about public affairs and what was included in the curricula of these two schools: deeds did not match words.
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<td>Army Information Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>APAP</td>
<td>Army Public Affairs Program</td>
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<td>AR</td>
<td>Army Regulation</td>
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<td>AWC</td>
<td>Army War College</td>
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<td>AVF</td>
<td>All Volunteer Force</td>
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<td>AY</td>
<td>Academic Year</td>
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<td>BG</td>
<td>Brigadier General</td>
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<td>CGSC</td>
<td>Command and General Staff College</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJSC</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>COI</td>
<td>Chief of Information</td>
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<td>COL</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
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<td>CONARC</td>
<td>Continental Army Command</td>
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<td>CSA</td>
<td>Chief of Staff of the United States Army</td>
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<td>DA</td>
<td>Department of the Army</td>
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<td>DCSPER</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
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<td>FM</td>
<td>Field Manual</td>
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<td>GEN</td>
<td>General</td>
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<tr>
<td>I&amp;E</td>
<td>Information and Education</td>
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<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>LTC</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
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<td>MG</td>
<td>Major General</td>
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<td>NME</td>
<td>National Military Establishment</td>
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<td>OCINFO</td>
<td>Office of the Chief of Information, Department of the Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCPA</td>
<td>Office of the Chief of Public Affairs, Department of the Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAO</td>
<td>Public Affairs Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIO</td>
<td>Public Information Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRO</td>
<td>Public Relations Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>POI</td>
<td>Program of Instruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>Research and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>(ret.)</td>
<td>Retired</td>
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<td>United States Army War College</td>
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Chapter 1 - Introduction

After World War II (WW II), explaining the actions and policies of the Army to the American people and their elected representatives became a special concern of the leaders of the Army. Prior to the Second World War the Department of the Army (DA), the headquarters of the Army in Washington, D.C., had limited interaction with the public for two reasons. First, the Public Affairs Branch, a staff section in DA that was responsible to update the American public about the actions and policies of the Army during the 1930s was subordinate to the Intelligence Department. Historian William Hammond argues that, among the leaders of the Intelligence Department, “concern for secrecy hampered legitimate efforts [of the Public Affairs Branch] to keep the public and [the] Congress informed.”

Looking back upon the period before WW II General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower best articulated the other reason. He noted in 1967 that “[t]he general public, either as an interested audience or as a source of support, was largely ignored because of a long tradition, accepted by the Army, that soldiers should be seen but not heard.” Eisenhower also pointed out a change in the tasks that an officer in the post-WW II era needed to be able to perform when he stated: “Among all the contemporary skills with which a soldier these days must concern himself, not the least important is public relations – a phrase almost unknown to the Army and a profession little practiced by it until World War II.”

Generals George C. Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower were two examples of officers who changed their approach to the press and the public during World War II. As the Chief of Staff of the Army, Marshall initially tasked his staff officers to talk with the press. Then about the middle of 1944, Marshall began to appear at press conferences in an effort to explain the problems of the Army and to answer questions. Marshall also gave “off-the-record briefings for top Washington correspondents,” Forrest Pogue notes, to explain the context for certain actions.

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4 Ibid., 320.
of the Army. According to Pogue, Marshall changed his behavior because he had come to believe that the public and the press needed to understand what problems the Army was facing. These briefs had the potential to get the support of the public for Army programs. These members of the press reciprocated Marshall’s confidence by agreeing not to publish that “off-the-record” information without his approval. In Crusade in Europe, Eisenhower gave another example of a senior leader trusting the press, noting that he had briefed certain correspondents on upcoming operations, such as the invasion of Sicily, as a means to “stop [their] speculation” about future operations. Eisenhower also wrote that during the war he had learned that the Army needed to report its actions to the press because:

The press is primarily and properly concerned with providing information to the public at home. . . . Civilians are entitled to know everything about the war that need not remain secret through the overriding requirement of military security. Indeed, the commander in the field must never forget that it is his duty to cooperate with the heads of his government in the task of maintaining a civilian morale that will be equal to every purpose.

Marshall and Eisenhower learned on the job how to interact with the press, not in the Army school system. It is arguable that during the Second World War the approach of many senior leaders of the Army toward talking with the press and the public experienced a transformation. Before the conflict, the leaders did not consider their interaction with the public important, but both during and after the war they recognized the criticality of gaining popular support, which helped to get funding for programs. This study examines how the developers of the program at both the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and the Army War College educated their students in public relations during the Cold War to continue this effort.

The term “Cold War” applies to the period between 1946 and 1989. There is no firm consensus on the date when the Cold War began, but this study will use 1946 because two key public statements were made that year. First, Joseph Stalin in a speech on 9 February 1946 said that a future confrontation was unavoidable because of the conflicting values of Marxism-

7 Ibid., 298-300.
Leninism and capitalism. The other statement was Winston Churchill’s speech on 5 March 1946 in Fulton, Missouri. Churchill, Walter LaFeber notes, said that “an iron curtain has descended across the [European] Continent” and that the Soviet Union was using the outcome of World War II to expand its power. These statements represented the polarization of the post-World War II period. On 12 March 1947, President Harry S. Truman made the first official public statement of the U.S. government on the Cold War, announcing what became known as the Truman Doctrine and the “Containment Policy.” In his speech, Truman tried to convince both the Congress and the American people that the destiny of America was entangled with the fate of other nations. He did this by arguing that America had a choice; it could either defend itself by helping others, such as Greece, or choose not to help others and risk its own liberty. The Cold War may be said to have ended on 9 November 1989 when the leaders of the Soviet Union chose to not stop the government of East Germany from opening the Berlin Wall that had become one of the symbols of the conflict.

During the Cold War, the senior leaders of the U.S. Army, especially Secretaries of the Army and Chiefs of Staff, and many boards that the Department of the Army (DA) had authorized to investigate the system that educated officers often mentioned that the Army had an obligation to inform both the public and the troops about what it was doing to accomplish assigned missions. However, it is the thesis of this dissertation that between academic year (AY) 1947 and AY 1989 those who approved the curriculum at both CGSC and the Army War College placed a decreasing priority on educating their students – majors through colonels, also known as

12 Ibid., 353.
field-grade officers\textsuperscript{13} – about the official program of DA to inform the public and the troops about the actions of the Army. This decline was due to the leaders at DA failing to prioritize instruction about public affairs when they were also directing a constant increase in the number of subjects that these officers needed to study to be successful and a decrease in time available. This drop in emphasis was contrary to the public statements of the leaders of DA about the importance of the information program. This thesis will be developed in three parts. The first determines the number of hours that decision-makers on the curriculum at each school allotted to any instruction about the official program of DA because this is a big indicator of the importance that they placed on the subject. This program was initially called the Army Information Program (AIP) and was composed of three sub-programs – troop information and education, public information, and legislative liaison.\textsuperscript{14} The second part determines what method of instruction was used to teach public affairs at each school, such as a lecture or a combination of lecture and practical exercises. The method chosen suggests whether the student was passively or actively involved in learning that subject. The third part will uncover whether the curriculum at each school included instruction on all or only parts of AIP. Also, what was the level of learning that the authors of each lesson concerning public relations wanted the student to achieve? Combining these three factors will determine which period had the most comprehensive education about the information program. For example, the period with the most hours allocated, which had the students apply what they were learning, and covered all parts of AIP could be considered the most complete. This study will not address any of the actions by the Army to inform the public for the purpose of either recruiting or re-enlisting.

The number of hours the developers of the curriculum allotted to a subject at either CGSC or the War College reflects the importance given to the topic; the higher the number, the

\textsuperscript{13} The Army divides it commissioned officer corps into three groups. Company grade level consists of Second and First Lieutenants and Captains. Field-grade officers are majors, lieutenant colonels and colonels. Lastly is general officers and they range from brigadiers to full generals.


http://www.history.army.mil/books/root/index.htm#contents, (accessed Sep 30, 2010). With the re-organization of 1950, the office of legislative liaison was removed from under the OCINFO and made its own staff section.
more significant it was. The time for a particular lesson listed in the curriculum at either Army school typically shows the total number of hours. This is different from, for example, a three-credit hour course in most civilian academic institutions. In this study, the number of hours actually allocated to the information program by those who developed the curriculum was determined by examining the annual program of each school or curricular documents from academic year\(^{15}\) (AY) 1947 through AY 1989 looking for titles of lessons about public affairs. This study focuses primarily on public information and troop information.\(^{16}\) At CGSC, the College provided each student what it called an “advance sheet” a day or so before each lesson. This advance sheet listed the aim and scope of the lesson, and required readings. Meanwhile, the War College issued a document for each lesson in the directive for each course which contained information similar to that on the “advance sheet.” Most of the evidence about the hours and content of instruction regarding public relations that is used in this dissertation comes from these kinds of curricular documents. More detail on the official program of DA for conducting public affairs will be provided later.

The second part examines whether students were passive or active learners. Having students apply what they were learning is considered to be a more effective means of education than passively listening to a speaker. The methods of instruction that the developers of the curriculum at both the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and the War College primarily used for this subject were either a lecture or a combination of lecture and exercise. The Army, as an institution, believed that a student acquired a skill more effectively if he was required to apply what he had learned. For example, the authors of the 1947 report of the “Survey of the Educational Program, The Command and Staff College” claimed: “The major emphasis in instructional methods is intended to be applicatory and experiential in nature, as it

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\(^{15}\) The academic year refers to the time that the students are in school, and for Army schools usually lasts from August of one year to June of the following year. For example, at CGSC the first post-war class began in September 1946 and graduated July 1947, and this class would be called AY 1947.


[http://www.history.army.mil/books/root/index.htm#contents](http://www.history.army.mil/books/root/index.htm#contents), (accessed Sep 30, 2010). With the re-organization of 1950, the office of legislative liaison was removed from under the OCINFO and made its own staff section.
Continuing this emphasis, in 1986 a board reiterated that students needed to apply the concepts that they were learning. The practical exercises were designed to enable each student to gain experience as either a commander or a staff officer in performing certain tasks. The scenarios for these practical exercises were based either on real or fictitious events. For example, most of the scenarios in these exercises in public affairs used in the late 1940s were based on situations from World War II.

The third part will determine whether all three sub-programs of the official plan or just some of them were included in the curriculum. To gain a full appreciation of the aim of the entire program, a student needed to know about all three sub-programs and how they were connected. The content of each lesson will show whether the entire program was emphasized or only parts of it. Benjamin S. Bloom’s taxonomy, which was first published in 1956, will be used to determine the “level of learning” that the authors of a lesson wanted the student to achieve. Bloom described six categories of learning, listed lowest to highest: “knowledge . . . comprehension . . . application . . . analysis . . . synthesis . . . [and] evaluation.”

For this dissertation, the Army term “general knowledge” is associated with Bloom’s term “knowledge,” then “working knowledge” is aligned with Bloom’s term “comprehension,” and “understanding” is associated with Bloom’s term “application.”

This study assesses how the Army educated its field-grade officers concerning public affairs during the Cold War. It explores the tension between the emphasis that the Army’s leaders placed on teaching future leaders about how to explain actions of the Army to the American people and what was in the curriculum at the Army’s top two schools. Any mere assertions by senior leaders of the Army and findings by boards about the need for officers to be able to conduct public relations were hollow if DA did not educate them to perform this task. If decision-makers at different schools added lessons about public relations into their curriculum, 

18 Department of the Army, “Professional Development of Officers Study,” (February 1985), Vol. I, xxviii. Subsequently called PDOS.
then there was clear testimony that this subject might have been important. If not, then the words meant little, even if they had been spoken sincerely.

**Adult Education**

A delineation must be made between “education” in general and “adult education.” Gordon G. Darkenwald and Sharan B. Merriam assert that most people think of “education” as preparing “young people” for their future. But Darkenwald and Merriam also contend that there has been “no universally acceptable definition” of adult education, because there are “certain assumptions and value judgments that will not be acceptable to everyone.” Their definition of adult education will be used in this dissertation: “Adult education is a process whereby persons whose major social roles are characteristic of adult status undertake systematic and sustained learning activities for the purpose of bringing about changes in knowledge, attitudes, values, or skills.” During the Cold War, CGSC and the Army War College, and civilian graduate institutions all provided their students with an experience that matched this definition.

The curricula of civilian and military graduate schools focused more on education than on training. Some civilian adult educators and Boards that were established by the Department of the Army (DA) to investigate how the Army educated the officer corps used similar definitions of the terms “education” and “training.” The definitions of training and education that Darkenwald and Merriam use were, in part, from Leonard Nadler’s *Developing Human Resources.* Darkenwald and Merriman wrote: “Training thus includes activities ‘designed to improve performance on the job the employee is presently doing or is being hired to do.’ Education prepares an employee for a place in the organization different from the one now held.” Both the Williams Board, which was conducted in 1958, and the Haines Board,


23 Ibid., 64-65. Italics in the original.
conducted in 1965, concluded that the Army considered training as teaching a “skill.”

The Williams Board stated in its report that education, unlike training, was “given without regard to the student’s job assignment or membership in a particular unit” and that “[e]ducation implies formal instruction and study leading to intellectual development to include the making of sound decisions.” This way of distinguishing between “training” and “education” will be used to determine the balance of training and education in the curricula at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and the War College.

The level of experience of each student was an important difference between graduate schools of the Army and those of civilian graduate schools. Students who attended a War College, authors John W. Masland and Laurence I. Radway note in their seminal study of the education of officers, were “mature men who already have had heavy responsibilities and rich and varied experiences.” This, they claimed, was different from “other professional graduate schools.” Each student at either CGSC or the Army War College was already a professional in his field with at least eight years of experience. Many students in civilian graduate schools had just completed their undergraduate degrees and had limited to no experience in their fields.

A comparison of instructional methods used in the two Army colleges with those most frequently used in graduate schools will indicate to what degree, if any, the educational approach of these Army colleges resembled those used in academia. Generally, in Army colleges, the developers of the curriculum chose the method of instruction that they thought would best achieve the learning objectives for each lesson. This study will examine three methods used in adult education: the discussion group, the lecture, and simulation or practical exercise.

Many educators use the “discussion group” as the primary method of learning in adult education. The term “discussion group” will be used to represent all efforts to have students

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26 Masland and Radway, Soldiers and Scholars, 319.

engage in a dialogue on a topic in a classroom. For example, the report advocating the re-opening of the Army War College in 1949 recommended that discussion groups should be used.28 The authors of the report the Haines Board (1965) which investigated the Army education system wrote that the developers of the curriculum at both CGSC and the War College used the discussion group more than any other method of instruction.29 Darkenwald and Merriam stated that “the group discussion method” exemplifies the informal style of learning that represents “‘adult-oriented’ learning processes.”30 Supporting Darkenwald and Merriam, Stephen D. Brookfield, Distinguished Professor of Adult Education at the University of St. Thomas, said in 2004 that “discussion . . . has perhaps become enshrined as the adult education method ‘par excellence,’” because it “is the most participatory and the most respectful of learners.”31 These authors praise the discussion group, since the adult learner is both actively involved in and responsible for his own learning.32

Adult educators had differing opinions on whether the lecture was an appropriate method of instruction for graduate students. Masland and Radway noted in their study that the curriculum at both CGSC and War College used lectures, especially at the War College.33 Darkenwald and Merriam reported that the lecture was used about 35 percent of the time according to a 1972 survey by the Educational Testing Service.34 Shirley J. Farrah, Assistant Dean of Nursing Outreach at the University of Missouri-Columbia, argues in 2004 that contrary to what many adult educators advocate “the lecture is a legitimate instructional method for use

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28 Department of the Army, “Report of the Department of the Army Board on Educational System for Officers,” (15 June 1949), 43. Subsequently called the Eddy Report. A conference and a seminar are considered similar to discussion groups.


30 Darkenwald and Merriam, Adult Education, 10.


33 Masland and Radway, Soldiers and Scholars, 280-283 and 330-332.

34 Darkenwald and Merriam, Adult Education, 128-129.
by adult education practitioners.”35 She claims that a lecture is appropriate when the information is “needed by a large group of learners in a short period of time.”36 Farrah adds that lecture is most effective when used “with other instructional methods.”37 She points out that, with “an audience with relatively little knowledge on the topic, and a learning situation requiring a clear explanation and transfer of knowledge, lecture might be the ideal approach.”38 What she outlined resembles how military education, in part, was conducted. All these authors assert that lecture is a viable method for adult education.

Another instructional technique was to put each student into a situation where he had to apply what he was learning. Different names have been used for essentially the same technique, but for this dissertation the term “practical exercise” will be used. As previously stated the 1947 survey of the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) advocated the use of exercises.39 The report of the Haines Board (1965) noted that the developers of the program at CGSC gave about one third of the total hours in the curriculum for conducting exercises.40 Jerry W. Gilley, a Professor of Human Resource Development at Colorado State University, noted in 2004 that this type of exercise “is a technique which enables adult learners to obtain skills, competencies, knowledge, or behaviors by becoming involved in situations that are similar to those in real life.”41 The developers of the curricula at CGSC and the War College and in many civilian graduate schools used each of these methods – discussion group, lecture, and exercise – to educate their students.

The knowledge needed by officers who served during the Cold War was more than what officers had needed prior to World War II. In both periods, all military officers had to be competent in the use of military force, but senior officers – lieutenant colonels through generals – were also required to assist in the creation of military policy. During the Cold War, however, 

36 Ibid., 228.
37 Ibid., 229-230.
38 Ibid., 251.
senior officers had an additional task of understanding ways in which military policy interacted with economic policy and international relations, and how these individually and collectively affected both national policies and priorities.\footnote{Masland and Radway, \textit{Soldiers and Scholars}, 27-46.} For example, the Eddy Board (1948) reported that new fields of learning, such as “atomic energy” and “business management,” were added to the curricula at Army colleges in the post-World War II period.\footnote{Eddy Report, 4-5. Masland and Radway, \textit{Soldiers and Scholars}, 31-35.} The addition of these subjects caused the decision-makers at CGSC and the Army War College to make increasingly tough decisions about what to include in the curriculum. These decisions were hard because the leaders of the Army wanted students to study more subjects, but they did not increase the amount of time students spent at each educational institution. Something had to give.

During the Cold War era, the curriculum at both the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and the War College focused more on education than training. For many of the years of the Cold War, the Commanding General (CG) of United States Continental Army Command (CONARC) and the Commandants of CGSC and the War College were among the senior leaders of the Army who determined what subjects were included in the curricula of the school system.\footnote{Robert A. Doughty, “Dr. Ivan J. Birrer: Service at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 20 January 1948 to 30 June 1978.” (Unpublished Thesis, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1978), 80-81. Harry Ball, \textit{Of Responsible Command: A History of the U.S. Army War College} (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Alumni Association of the U.S. Army War College, 1983), 299-300.} Dr. Ivan J. Birrer, who was the Educational Advisor to the Commandant of CGSC from 1948 through 1978, described the changes in the curriculum during his tenure as “consistent evolution away from immediate use of the graduates [or training institution] to an investment in career education.”\footnote{Doughty, “Dr. Ivan J. Birrer,” 171.} The curriculum at the Army War College also experienced changes. When General J. Lawton Collins, the Army Chief of Staff, decided to re-open the Army War College in 1949, Harry Ball claims, Collins wanted the curriculum to achieve a “balance between emphasis on the great problem of national defense and the great problem of military science.”\footnote{Ball, \textit{Of Responsible Command}, 272-273 and 487-491.} Finally, in the early 1970s, Major General (MG) Dewitt Smith, then the Commandant of the War College, according to Ball, re-focused the curriculum on having students learn about how to apply
military power to the conduct of warfare.\textsuperscript{47} The emphasis on education made sense because for many officers these were the last schools they would attend.

In support on the priority on education, the final major adjustment to the curricula for both CGSC and War College for the Cold War was initiated in AY 1968. In 1965, Lieutenant General (LTG) Ralph Haines, as the president of a DA established board, recommended changing the structure of the curriculum at certain Army schools to allow the students to individualize some of what they studied. The Haines Board proposed that the Department of the Army (DA) divide the curriculum at certain schools – CGSC and the War College being two of them – into two segments: “core”\textsuperscript{48} and “electives.”\textsuperscript{49} Up to this point, the approach of the leaders at each school had been that one program was sufficient for all students. Under this new curricular plan, the leaders at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and the War College required all students to take the lessons in the core curriculum which represented the knowledge and skills that the leaders of the Army wanted these future leaders to know.\textsuperscript{50}

Starting in AY 1968, the leaders of DA added a program of electives into the curriculum of CGSC and the War College for two main reasons. First was to allow each student the opportunity to study subjects “according to his needs and interests.” The second reason was to reduce the need for other courses for officers who need “a specialist’s knowledge in given areas.”\textsuperscript{51} The second reason seems to reflect the dramatic increase in fields of study that the officer corps needed to know, which went beyond narrowly construed military education.

The Creation of the System to Educate officers

Over their entire history, the hierarchy of schools that the U.S. Army used to educate its officers underwent four distinct phases. The first phase started with the creation of the United States Military Academy in 1802. West Point was the first institution of formal education in the U.S. Army, and it was intended to provide an undergraduate education for future officers. Also,

\textsuperscript{47} Ball, Of Responsible Command, 455 and 487-491.

\textsuperscript{48} Curricular documents of both CGSC and the Army War College used both “core” and “common,” but the term “core” will be used to describe the curriculum that each student received during each academic year.


\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., 39-40.

each post had a school where an officer was to continue learning his trade after graduating from the academy.52 The second phase of this system began with the addition of a few technical schools, such as the Artillery School in 1824, where students learned the skills of their respective branches. In the nineteenth century, most of an officer’s education and training was conducted within units rather than at centralized institutions which became dominant in the twentieth century.53

In 1875, Secretary of War William Belknap and General William T. Sherman, the Commanding General of the Army, tasked Brevet54 Major General Emory Upton, according to Historian Timothy Nenninger, to lead a group “to study the organization, tactics, and educational systems of foreign Armies.”55 Returning two years later, Upton proposed establishing “[a] War Academy . . . to educate officers in the art of war, and to prepare them for the staff, and to hold high command.”56 Upton stated that “most governments [that his group had visited] have established post-graduate institutions for nearly all arms of service, where meritorious officers . . . may study strategy, grand tactics, and all the sciences connected with modern war.”57 The U.S. Army should, Upton advocated, create a comparable institution “for the infantry and the cavalry” that was based on the model of the Artillery School.58

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54 A brevet appointment is one in which a commissioned officer promoted to a higher rank on what was officially a temporary basis, exercising the authority of the higher rank without being paid for it. Random House, The Random House College Dictionary, revised edition (1984), 167.
58 Ibid., 366.
The third phase began in 1881 and lasted through 1903. It started when General Sherman, accepting Upton’s recommendation, established, historian Boyd Dastrup wrote, “the School of Application for Infantry and Cavalry at Fort Leavenworth.” Nenninger says that “[t]he purpose of the school [at Fort Leavenworth] was to train junior officers in professional military subjects, particularly small unit tactics.” Sherman, Nenninger argues, wanted the school to “[emphasize] practical instruction in military subjects, such as organization, tactics, and drill” so that each student could learn to conduct his wartime tasks. Books were used to educate the students in both military subjects beyond the tactical level and in non-military subjects, such as mathematics.

Dastrup notes that General R. C. Drum, the Adjutant General of the U.S. Army, directed in January 1882 that the top priority of the school was “the practical instruction of . . . everything which pertains to [A]rmy organization, tactics, discipline, equipment, drill, care of men . . . and generally everything which is provided for in Army Regulations.” The next priority, Drum wrote, “is ‘theoretical instruction[,]’ which ought to precede a commission” such as “reading, [and] writing.” Finally, there was “the ‘science and practice of war[,]’ so far as they can be acquired from books.”

Over the next two decades, the developers of the curriculum continued to require each student to apply what he had learned.

The leaders at DA shut down the Leavenworth school at the start of the Spanish-American War, and it did not re-open until 1902. As a result of the Army’s experience in this war, those in position to make decisions at CGSC changed the curriculum. Indicating a change from Sherman’s initial intent for the school, the War Department, Nenninger reports, wanted the school at Leavenworth to prepare each student “for general utility in the administration and


60 Nenninger, “The Fort Leavenworth Schools,” Introduction, no page number.


62 Dastrup, The US Army Command and General Staff College, 15. This guidance was written in January 1882.

63 US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), Catalog, 1981-82, 1-6. Sometimes the name change reflects a change in purpose and at other times it was just a name change such as when, in 1886, the name changed from "School of Application for Cavalry and Infantry" to “US Infantry and Cavalry School.”

handling of higher commands of all arms.” Richard W. Stewart, supporting Nenninger, states that the purpose of this school in 1902 was “to train officers in the employment of combined arms and prepare them for staff and command positions in large units.” It is probable that large units meant division and above. After 1902, the developers of the curriculum at Leavenworth focused on broader and more integrated subjects than before the Spanish-American War and teaching officers those skills that General Drum stated were priority at the Leavenworth school became the task of the school at each post.

Secretary of War Elihu Root’s General Order 155, dated 27 November 1901, changed the structure of the system that educated officers and marks the start of the fourth phase. Root created a school system, Dastrup notes, “to ensure a ‘high standard and general training of officers in the Army.’” General Order 155 outlined a tiered system of professional military education that has remained in force from then through the start of the Second World War. After receiving their commissions, new officers were sent to their first assignments. The school at each post, the order stated, provided its officers with “elementary instruction in theory and practice” at the company level and below. Then, there were the service schools, such as the Artillery School. Harry Ball reports that these schools “[produced] technically proficient officers” for branches such as engineers and “cavalry and field artillery.” The next level was the College at Leavenworth. Graduates from this institution would have studied about combined arms for the first time in their careers. At the pinnacle of the system was a new institution called the Army

67 This is based on War Department, Field Service Regulation (Washington, DC: Government Printing office, 1905), 13. This stated that Division is the basis of the Army’s wartime organization and is both a tactical and administrative headquarters http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/docs/field_service_1905.pdf (accessed 13 Oct 2010).
69 Dastrup, The US Army Command and General Staff College, 42. DA, A Review of the Army Schools, 2.
War College. By 1903, the War College was finally established and Congress also approved Root’s proposal to create a general staff. James E. Hewes writes that Root tasked the War College “to train officers for General Staff duties” by having these officers work through real problems, such as “Congressional liaison, and war planning” rather than studying books and theories. Here, just like at Leavenworth the senior leaders wanted students to apply what they were learning. Ball reports that Root ordered that the students at the War College would “study and confer on the great problems of national defense, of military science, and of responsible command.” For this dissertation, conducting public affairs is seen both as one of the “great problems of national defense” and as a problem of “responsible command.” For example, each commander was held accountable to his superior for explaining the Army to the troops and the public, which was to be done through his public affairs program. The leaders at the Department of the Army (DA) recognized that the Army must have the support of the public to obtain the resources they believed necessary to accomplish the Army’s missions. During World War I, the leaders at DA closed both Army colleges as part of an effort to maximize the number of officers available for field duty.

The leaders at DA re-opened both the Army War College and the Leavenworth school in 1919. Between World War I and World War II, the developers of both programs provided students with a chance to practice, through application exercises, being a general staff officer at the division level and above. Dastrup notes that a student who attended CGSC from AY 1920 through AY 1940 learned about Army doctrine that was based on lessons from the First World War. For example, the curriculum for AY 1940 had students learn the doctrine that was contained in the 1939 version of the Field Service Regulation. This doctrine stated that “[t]he ultimate objective of all military operations is the destruction of the enemy’s armed forces in

74 Hewes, The War Department from Root to Marshall, 11-12. (Accessed on 29 August 2010.)
http://www.history.army.mil/books/root/chapter1.htm#b1
75 Ball, Of Responsible Command, 80.
76 Dastrup, The US Army Command and General Staff College, 60. Ball, Of Responsible Command, 137.
77 Dastrup, The US Army Command and General Staff College, 60. Ball, Of Responsible Command, 158 and 165.
78 Dastrup, The US Army Command and General Staff College, 74-76. Ball, Of Responsible Command, 244-248.
battle.” An example of an application exercise conducted at CGSC was for students to apply a combination of infantry, armor, artillery and air power to break through an enemy position in an effort to avoid trench warfare and initiate maintain mobile warfare. Meanwhile at the Army War College, Harry Ball asserts, the curriculum included both military topics and non-military topics. Non-military subjects were those not directly related to combat. Starting in AY 1938, DA had the War College create committees to investigate certain topics. An example of an application exercise at the War College was when students of the class of 1940 examined the “Influence of Public Opinion on the Conduct of War.” The designers of the curriculum gave students an opportunity to study how public opinion effects how the military fought a war. It is not clear whether the students learned how conducting a war could affect public opinion.

Between 1802 and 1940, DA modified both the hierarchy within the system that educated officers and the skills that the graduates of the different schools were expected to have. Students who attended CGSC learned both to plan and implement actions in combat. Students at the War College learned to be general staff officers at the highest levels of the Army. At both institutions, lectures introduced various topics, and usually some form of exercise was used that had students apply what they had learned within a realistic scenario.

**Education during World War II**

The leaders of the Department of the Army (DA) changed the approach to educating the officer corps during the Second World War. Starting in February 1940, DA began graduating classes early, such as those at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), to release officers for troop assignments. Later, it announced the suspension of all classes that were scheduled for the next academic year at all service schools, and both CGSC and the War College. The leaders of CGSC had created a new program called the “Special Class.” Dastrup claims they had “narrowed [the curriculum] to the essentials and taught students to serve in a...


81 Ball, *Of Responsible Command*, 239 and 245. Other studies for the class of 1940 was the “Influence of Seapower on the Causes and Conduct of War.” The class of 1938, examined the Spanish Civil War. Masland and Radway, *Soldiers and Scholars*, 97

specific areas of the staff because they arrived [at the college] knowing their assignment after graduation.” One could call this instruction more training than education. The curriculum could be covered in a four-month period, and the first class started in December 1940. In short, the leaders of the Army sacrificed the breadth of education for a few officers to increase the number of graduates who would have narrower capabilities. By 1943, the leaders changed the focus of the curriculum to emphasize components of the Army such as air, ground, and service and the name of the class had been changed to “General Staff Course.” During the war, Leavenworth conducted a total of twenty-seven iterations of this instruction.

Just like in the “Special Class,” the focus of the curriculum of the “General Staff Course” was on essential tasks only. The methods of instruction used were lecture, conference – which was a form of discussion group – and practical exercise. The following discussion centers on both the 26th and the 27th General Staff Course, which ran October 1945-February 1946 and February 1946-May 1946, respectively. The designers of the curriculum for the ground component of both courses included a one-hour lesson titled “Public Relations” and a one-hour lesson on “Internal Security and Censorship” out of a total available time between 580 and 594 hours. The number of hours given to each lesson concerning public affairs equaled the time allocated for an overview of the principles of either the offense or the defense. Since this

83 Dastrup, The US Army Command and General Staff College, 78-79. DA, A Review of the Army Schools, 8-9. The number of students that attended this course grew over time and by Oct 1941, the fifth course, it reached 359. Also a separate course was established to meet the need of the Army Service Forces. Command and General Staff School, Program and Schedule for 27th General Staff Class, Feb 1946 – May 46 in file 7th General Staff Class Feb-May 1946, CGSC/ 1946.


87 Command and General Staff School, Program and Schedule, Twenty-sixth General Staff Class, 3-5, and 8-12 in File: 26th General Staff Class, 15 Oct 1945-02 Feb 1946, CGSC/ 1946. Command and General Staff School, Program and Schedule, Twenty-Seventh General Staff Class, 3-5, and 8-12 in File: 27th General Staff Class, Feb – May 1946, CGSC/1946.
program was limited to the most critical topics, the inclusion of topics related to how the Army communicated with the public indicated that some decision-makers at CGSC thought that officers needed to know about these functions, even if the total amount of time devoted to it was not great.

Starting in November 1941, the leaders at Fort Leavenworth ran an “Army Orientation Course” (AOC) in conjunction with a “Special Class.” Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Francis R. Sweeney, director of the AOC, stated in an article published in 1943 that a goal of this course was to inform “selected business and professional men” about war-related problems and how these issues might impact civilians.\(^8^8\) Each course provided ninety or so civilians some general instruction about the Army, such as the organization of and functions of the Department of the Army (DA) and the structure and capabilities of combat forces. For example, in one exercise students determined the amount of gasoline an armored division required daily. This exercise was intended to help students understand how much gas the Army required and why gas was thus being rationed at home. Sweeney claimed that another benefit of the course was “a better understanding by military and civilian personnel alike of each other’s problems.” DA, Sweeney noted, expected to run this course “until a total of about five hundred top-flight civilians have attended.”\(^8^9\) After attending this course, Sweeney reported, one of the civilians wrote the following to other graduates:

> I personally believe that all who attended the 2nd A.O.C. are convinced that the existing organization of the Army is as satisfactory a machine as we are capable of producing in this country at this time for both combat and supply and it would be nothing short of disastrous to change our course now even if a possibly superficial examination showed it to be theoretically desirable.\(^9^0\)

The leaders of the Army expected that graduates would tell other civilians in their home areas about what they had learned.\(^9^1\) The fact that DA authorized this type of course is interesting. It was a new approach for DA to attempt to directly educate representatives of the public about


\(^{8^9}\) Sweeney, “Civilians Learn at Leavenworth,” 56-57.

\(^{9^0}\) Ibid., 57.

\(^{9^1}\) Ibid., 57.
ways in which the Army operated and about the different functions the service performed and the
challenges it faced.

By the end of World War II, then, DA had experienced two changes related to public
relations. First, DA had been trying to educate civilians about how the Army functioned and
about some challenges the Army faced. Second, the developers of the curriculum at CGSC had
incorporated a lesson on public relations. These changes foreshadowed what was to occur during
the Cold War.

**Education in the immediate Post-War Era**

The leaders of the Department of the Army (DA) made two changes in the system of
officer education between the end of the War and the start of the classes for AY 1947. The first
was a short-term fix but the second looked further into the future. “In August 1945,” Harry Ball
notes, the first modification to the system occurred when “General Marshall approved
Leavenworth’s initiating a Command Class for about fifty specially selected officers” bound for
positions at the highest levels of the Army.92 Major General (MG) Karl Truesdell, then the
Commandant of the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), reported that the curriculum
for the Command Class “[covered] general staff duties” and lasted about twenty weeks. One part
of the program had the students form into groups to conduct analytical studies. Resembling a
subject students in the War College class of 1940 studied, one topic for the first class, Truesdell
stated, was “Public Opinion and the Conduct of War.”93 In the second iteration of the Command
Class a group studied “Public Relations in Theaters of Operations.” This group reported that
 “[p]rior to World War II there was no clear-cut [DA] public relations policy defining [the]
mission, control, or methods for use by theater commanders.” After World War II, DA had
issued guidance for conducting public relations in a theater of war. The group made a few
proposals to update this policy, but only one is essential to this study. Since the leaders at DA
wanted to have meaningful control over the Army’s public relations, the group advocated, then
they should permanently establish a staff section in the headquarters of all divisions and armies

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92 Ball, *Of Responsible Command*, 265.
to help their commanders conduct their mission to inform the public.\textsuperscript{94} The inclusion of topics related to public affairs indicates that those who made decisions about the curriculum for each Command Class thought that future leaders needed to study why talking to the public was important and how public opinion could impact the Army.

On 23 November 1945, the Secretary of the Army appointed LTG Leonard Gerow, then the Commandant of CGSC, as the president of a board to determine the structure of the future system to educate officers; this was subsequently known as the Gerow Board. This Board examined the general education of an officer from the time he entered the Army to the end of his career.\textsuperscript{95} The Gerow Board argued in the “Report of [the] War Department Military Education Board on Educational System for Officers of the Army” that officers needed to study how to conduct military operations while also exploring topics such as “leadership . . . civil affairs . . . [and] public relations,” to name a few.\textsuperscript{96} The Board recommended that:

The mission of the educational system for officers of the Army is to provide instruction which stimulates progress in the art of war, and which, together with actual duty in command and staff positions, will insure the development of personnel capable of efficient leadership in the preparation for war, the prosecution of war, and the execution of responsibilities of the Armed Forces after cessations of hostilities.\textsuperscript{97}

A recommendation of the Board was to create a three-tiered educational system for Army officers. The most senior level school would be called the National Security University, which was composed of five colleges, under the authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). One college would be called the National War College. At that College, students would study ways to generate and employ the military in support of national policy.\textsuperscript{98} The next level down would be

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{95} War Department, “Report of War Department Military Education Board on Educational System for Officers of the Army,” (1946) 1, 5, and 14-15. Also known as the Gerow Report.
\item \textsuperscript{96} Gerow Report, cover page, 8 and 51-59. Department of the Army, \textit{Field Service Regulation, Operations}. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1944), ii. This describes what operations were and how it relates to combat.
\item \textsuperscript{97} Gerow Report, 5.
\item \textsuperscript{98} Gerow Report, 6, 27-30. \textit{Ball, Of Responsible Command}, 262. The other schools were the Administrative College, Intelligence College, Industrial College, and the State Department College.
\end{itemize}
the Armed Forces College where students would learn “to plan and direct operations of Army forces and to coordinate these operations with Naval forces.” This College would be under the Army unless the Navy agreed to attend and then it would be under the JCS. 99 Then each of the major commands of the Army – Air Forces, Ground Forces, and Service Forces – had schools “to produce commanders, staff officers and specialists qualified in the duties of their respective Major Command.” For example, the top educational institution for the Ground Forces – Ground College – was to instruct officers to be “commanders and staff officers” at division and corps levels. 

Then each of the major commands of the Army – Air Forces, Ground Forces, and Service Forces – had schools “to produce commanders, staff officers and specialists qualified in the duties of their respective Major Command.” For example, the top educational institution for the Ground Forces – Ground College – was to instruct officers to be “commanders and staff officers” at division and corps levels. 100 The description of what students would learn at this school resembled that of CGSC. In early 1946, General Eisenhower, the Army Chief of Staff, accepted the proposals of the Gerow Board to create the National Security University and to close the Army War College. Eisenhower’s decision meant that the subjects students had studied at the Army War College before the Second World War – such as staff functions of DA – had to be divided between the curricula at the National War College and CGSC. 101 The creation of this new hierarchy, then, was the second attempt to shape the post-war system for educating officers.

The leaders of DA made a few changes to the system that educates Army officers between 1880 and September 1946. They changed the focus of the program at Leavenworth from teaching officers how to comply with Army regulations to having students study ways of conducting mobile operations to destroy the enemy. Furthermore, they created the Army War College. Between World War I and World War II (WW II), the leaders of DA understood that officers needed to learn subjects beyond just the conduct of war. For example, they required that students examine the effect that public opinion had on the conduct of war at the War College. During WW II, those who approved the curriculum at CGSC allocated one-hour for each of two lessons concerning public affairs in the curriculum of both the 26th and the 27th class of General

99 Gerow Report, 6 and 37.
100 Ibid., 6 and 51-59.
101 Ball, Of Responsible Command, 260-265. Gerow Board, 6-10. Masland and Radway, Soldiers and Scholars, 142 and 145-146. DA, “A Review of the Army School Systems,” 19-20. General Dwight D. Eisenhower was the Chief of Staff of the United States Army when the board was initiated, and when the Army accepted the Board’s recommendation. http://www.history.army.mil/faq/FAQ-CSA.htm (accessed 03 Oct 2010).
Staff Course, which shows that they recognized officers’ need to know about this function.\footnote{102} There was a discernable trend to teach students at CGSC and the War College on how the public influenced the actions of the service.

**Public Relations**

“Public relations” can be a confusing term. One dictionary defines public relations as “the efforts of a corporation to promote good will between itself and the public.”\footnote{103} For this study, the terms “public relations” and “public affairs” are synonymous. It should be noted that the Army had its own definition, which will be described later. Historically, any attempt by the U.S. government or the U.S. military to tell the public what it was doing had had mixed results.

A historical example of an effort by the U.S. government to conduct public relations was during World War I. The secretaries of state, war, and the navy, and journalist George Creel were the leaders of the Committee of Public Information. In *How We Advertised America* (1920), Creel noted, this Committee was created “to plead the justice of America’s cause before the jury of [American] Public Opinion.”\footnote{104} The actions of the Committee, Creel said, rested on the “continuous presentation of facts. We did not call it propaganda.”\footnote{105} Historians Alan Brinkley and Philip Knightley dispute Creel’s claim. What energized the American public, they conclude, was the Committee’s use of stories of supposed German atrocities, which translated into increased support for the war.\footnote{106} Future leaders of the Army needed to grasp why some Americans might sometimes consider their efforts to inform the public to be propaganda, and leaders needed to do their utmost to minimize providing any support for this claim.

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\footnote{102}{Command and General Staff School, *Program and Schedule, Twenty-sixth General Staff Class*, 8-12. Command and General Staff School, *Program and Schedule, Twenty-Seventh General Staff Class*, 8-12.}

\footnote{103}{Random House, *College Dictionary*, Revised Edition (1984), 1069.}

\footnote{104}{George Creel, *How We Advertised America: The First Telling of the Amazing Story of the Committee on Public Information that Carried the Gospel of Americanism to Every Corner of the Globe* (New York: Arno Press, 1972, original copyright was 1920.), xi and 3-5.}

\footnote{105}{Creel, *How we Advertised America*, 4-5.}

The importance of public relations in American society expanded between World War I and World War II. One sign of this development came when in 1937 the American Association for Public Opinion Research founded a magazine called Public Opinion Quarterly. The content of the Quarterly was to include theory about public opinion, as well as stories about public relations from both civilian organizations and the government.\(^{107}\) In one of the first issues, Edward L. Bernays, who then held the job of Counsel on Public Relations for New York City, argued that “[t]he public relations profession enlarged its activities throughout the great depression” by helping companies convince the public that they had a good product and that their actions were “in the public interest.”\(^{108}\) Bernays’ statement aligns with the dictionary definition.

Another sign was that, as the nation moved closer to involvement in the Second World War, the Secretary of the Army made organizational changes resulting in his direct supervision of the staff responsible for the public relations of the Department of the Army (DA). As previously stated, in the 1920s and 1930s, public information was a staff function within the intelligence section at DA.\(^{109}\) In an article published in Public Opinion Quarterly in 1941, James R. Mock and Cedric Larson noted that, on 24 July 1940, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson had moved the “Public Relations Branch” from the “Military Intelligence Division (G-2), to the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff” only at DA.\(^{110}\) Later, in February 1941, Mock and Larson asserted, Stimson created a new organization – the Bureau of Public Relations – that combined “[t]he Public Relations Branch, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, and the Current Information Section of the Office of the Under-secretary of War.”\(^{111}\) This integrated the effort to conduct public relations by the military and civilian staffs at DA. In March 1941, Secretary Stimson asserted, at a conference on public relations held in Washington, the U.S. Army must only use


\(^{111}\) Ibid., 277.
facts when informing the troops and the public about its efforts. If the Army played loose with facts this could be used by some Americans to justify a charge of propaganda. This could result in two negative outcomes. First, the American people could lose trust and confidence in the Army. Second, if the public lost faith in the Army that would have a negative effect on civilian and military morale; neither Stimson nor Marshall would accept that risk. Stimson’s position represented how the Army wanted to conduct public relations. The emphasis was on providing facts and not putting a “spin” on the information.

Rex F. Harlow was a key civilian writing about public affairs in the 1940s. In *Public Relations in War and Peace* (1942), Harlow wrote, supporting Bernays, that public relations had become increasing important in the previous decade for the both the government and the private sector. He said, “public relations work is a science and art . . . [that] seeks to improve the relations of human beings with one another, not singly but in groups.” Some of the important principles of public relations that he advocated were that people and organizations must be “honest, truthful, open, authoritative, and responsible.” Another point was that the wording of the message must be accurate and should avoid using jargon. Harlow concluded: “No institution of size can afford to overlook [public relations] in winning and holding public will.” Three years later in an article published in the winter of 1945, Harlow stated that there was no consensus on what public affairs entailed, but “[m]ost competent public relations men would recognize that public relations includes all that is thought, said and done to create and maintain effective relations between an institution and its public.”

Bernays and Harlow were leaders that helped define what public relations was for both private and public organizations. How an organization conducted public relations would

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113 Ibid., ix, 5-7, 28-29, and 73-84.
114 Ibid., xi.
115 Ibid., ix, 5-7, 28-29, and 73-84.
116 Ibid., xi.
influence how the public felt, positively or negatively, about the organization and its product. Harlow claimed that there were a few accepted principles, such as being honest and maintaining the credibility of an organization. Harlow’s and Bernays’ ideas will be used in gauging whether the Army’s instruction in public affairs was comprehensive. The Army would have to clearly establish a policy for how it wanted to conduct public relations.

**The Official Program of the Department of the Army (DA) for Public Relations**

On 14 May 1946, General Eisenhower, the Army Chief of Staff, approved Circular 138 announcing the creation of a staff section at DA that was responsible for managing the information effort of the Army. This office would be called the Office of the Chief of Information (OCINFO) for most of the Cold War. According to Circular 138, the person in charge of that staff section would:

- advises the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff on matters of policy relating to public relations and information and coordinates the operations of the Public Relations Division, the Legislative and Liaison Division, and the Information and Education Division, [of the] War Department Special staff.

LTG J. Lawton Collins was appointed the first Chief of Information (COI). Collins noted in his autobiography that, as the COI, his job was to help the secretary and chief of staff consider

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118 The name of the new organization in the circular was “Chief of Public Information” but this was soon changed to “Chief of Information.” For consistency purposes, Chief of Information will be used. “Department of the Army Circular 138, 14 May 1946” in Richard I. Wolf. *The United States Air Force: Basic Documents on Roles and Missions*. (Washington, D.C.; Office of Air Force History, 1987), 30-35.


how the public, members of Congress, and the Army might react to their policy announcements. Collins implied that the plan for explaining the actions of the Army to the public, Congress, and the Army would be developed concurrently with the development of the policy or decision. Once these leaders of the Army approved the plan for revealing the information, Collins and his office would supervise the implementation. If the Army could continue this approach will be an indicator whether the officer corps grasped the intent of this program. According to Collins, the leaders of the Army had a few key reasons for communicating with the public. One was to tell the public what actions the Army was taking to accomplish its missions, thus fulfilling its obligation as a public servant. Following Stimson’s guidance, they would provide the public with facts and to interpret those facts in an effort to garner support or to counter anticipated criticism of the Army’s actions. If the Army wanted to seize the initiative in the information domain, as Harlow advocated, then it needed to initiate discussions about its actions with the public and the troops.122

In August 1946, DA published Army Regulation (AR) 600-700 “Public Relations,” which defined the purpose of the Army’s public relations effort and assigned responsibility for its conduct. The authors of AR 600-700 described public relations “as any planned program or procedure that will elicit public understanding and good will.” The Army, as a public servant, was responsible “to insure that the American public is fully and accurately informed concerning the purpose and activities of the Army.” This approach aligned with Harlow’s concept.123 The goal of DA in conducting its public relations effort was “to maintain close and friendly understanding between the Army and the public through the dissemination of information, the attainment of public recognition, and the maintenance of public confidence in the Military Establishment, to insure efficient and adequate military security for the United States.”124

Comparing this definition with that contained in the dictionary would illuminate the difference

Lightning Joe (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1994), 339-340. With the re-organization of 1950, the office of legislative liaison was removed from under the Chief of Information and made their own staff section.


124 War Department, AR 600-700, Personnel, Public Relations, (1946), 1.
between how some civilians looked at conduct public relations and how the leaders of DA wanted to implement their program. The Chief of Staff held all commanders accountable for their units’ conduct of public relations. It was through regulations such as this that the leaders of the Army provided broad guidance for how the Army was to perform this function. The content of this regulation resembled some of the suggestions of Bernays and Harlow.

The OCINFO developed and published the overarching official plan of DA – the Army Information Program (AIP) – for how the leaders of DA wanted the Army to communicate with the public, Congress, and the troops. Collins described these three groups in a lecture that he gave to the class of 1947 at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and in an article, which was based on that address, which was published in September 1947 edition of *Military Review*. He stated:

> First, we have our dealings with the public at large – direct public relations. We frequently forget the next part of our program, and that is our relations within the Army itself – between the various elements of the Armed Forces and with our men, which I like to regard as our internal public relations. Finally we have our relations with the Congress, which is a very important element of our public relations.

His description of how the Army looked at “internal public relations” will be validated throughout the Cold War. By itself each group was distinct, but together they represented all Americans. Each division of the OCINFO – Public Information, Troop Information and Education, and Legislative and Liaison – was responsible for a sub-program to inform a

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The leaders of DA through the OCINFO provided guidance to subordinate commanders in the form of a plan that assigned goals for them to achieve. More details about each division will be provided later. Collins stated in his article that he convinced the operations officer of DA to add “brief courses on Public Information” into the system that educated officers, including CGSC. This showed that future leaders had to be educated on this topic if the wartime effort was to be maintained. Collins tried to explain to both the class at CGSC and readers of his article what the leaders of DA wanted to achieve through the Army’s public relations effort and why it was important, and that each officer had a duty to help achieve the goals of AIP. In this article, Collins set the example for conducting public relations when he provided facts about public relations and interpreted them for the readers so that the officer corps would learn how to explain the service’s actions both to the public and to the troops. The military and the public shared responsibility for the defense of the U.S. Therefore, he said, the leaders at DA such as the chief of staff had to give the public clear descriptions of their plans, and candidly indicate what resources they thought would be needed to provide security. Collins’ article was intended to initiate both a public and internal discussion on the merits of information program.

The people of the Public Information Division of the OCINFO developed policies to manage DA’s “Public Information Program.” Collins declared, in his 1947 article in Military Review, the Public Information Division circulated among subordinate echelons “the whole text of the major speeches and the statements before Congressional committees that are made by the Secretary of War or the Chief of Staff and other [Department of the Army] representatives.” The purpose of this distribution was to ensure that all commanders, through their officers in charge of public information sections at the division and above had the latest statements of the leaders of DA. Having this text enabled each commander either to reiterate a point made by these leaders in his discussion with the public or to correct any confusion that may result from a news story. This also allowed members of the Army to speak in unison.

131 Ibid., 9-10.
132 Ibid., 10-12.
Collins, echoing comments by Stimson and Harlow, stated that each commander is charged to release “factual information” to the public. In his 1946 article titled “An Information Policy for the New Army,” Collins claimed, “[t]he Army has nothing to hide, and nothing to fear, if it recognizes the public as a partner, as well as a boss; . . . and [it] assumes that public confidence is there for the making.” The developers of the curriculum at CGSC, in 1948, produced a manual that defined public information as “all information about the Army that is not classified for security reasons.” In an effort to help their students grasp when information should be classified, the authors of this manual noted that information should only be classified if its release would either “help the enemy” or “injure our [the United States] relations with our allies.” This statement runs contrary to the claims of many critics that the Army, as a matter of policy, classified information to hide errors. The Army should expect that the American people will thoroughly examine all of the information it releases.

The Army should release data in such a way as to make sense to those receiving the information. This follows Harlow’s proposal to avoid “jargon.” It was up to the person writing the document for release to determine the way he would present and interpret the data. Of course, some data may be included in some statements while other data may be excluded. The aim of any release was to describe to the public the perspective of the Army, or what some may call its “slant.” It is logical and perhaps almost inevitable that the language of the information released would reflect somewhat the biases of the person who organized the data. The intent of the information policy of the Department of the Army (DA), Collins wrote in his 1946 and 1947 articles, was to provide the public data about what happened as impartially as possible to enable the public to make its own decision on whether to support the Army. It should be noted that Collins did not emphasize putting a positive “spin” on the information. Only in his 1947

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136 Harlow, Public Relations in War and Peace, ix, 5-7, 28-29, and 73-84.


lecture at CGSC did Collins differentiate between “propaganda” and “information.” He declared that propaganda was “to influence people’s ideas along a certain line with certain things in view.” Yet “information is factual, is complete, is honest and above board.”

Public information was the program to provide information about what the Army had accomplished as a means to show that the Army was worthy of the public’s support. The Troop Information and Education Division of the OCINFO managed the “Troop Information and Education Program” (TI&E) for what Collins’ called “internal public relations.” The OCINFO issued broad guidance to subordinates about the aim of the TI&E program, but left the details to each commander. This program was the result of combining two different concepts. One part was to help each soldier in the Army who wanted to pursue a civilian degree continue his “education.” The other was “troop information,” which, Collins claimed in his 1947 article, was to explain to each soldier “what the Army was doing and some of the reasons why.” Commanders conducted this program to convince their soldiers that the way the Army functioned was appropriate. Another expected benefit from this program, Collins asserted, was that it could, if properly conducted, create men who were “advocates for the Army and national security when they returned to civilian life.” It is noteworthy that there was a sharp difference between the ways the Army conducted troop information versus public information. Troop information was to shape the perspective of the soldier. For example, Collins’ use of the term “indoctrination” reflected this aim. Meanwhile, the leaders of the Army such as Secretary Stimson wanted subordinates to provide the public with data as objectively as possible so that the public could make their own conclusions. The difference in what was acceptable in the conduct of each program meant that using manner and methods that


144 Collins, “The War Department Spreads the News,” 16.

were acceptable for troop information while trying to inform the civilian public at large would probably lead to accusations of “propaganda,” and as such had to be avoided.

The third staff section of the OCINFO, between AY 1947 and AY 1950, was called the Legislative and Liaison Division. This division, Collins reported, helped “to prepare legislation for the Congress” and “coordinate[d] the preparation of the testimony submitted by [the Department of the Army] witnesses.” It also provided members of Congress information on the programs of DA.146 In 1950, the leaders of DA removed the legislative liaison division from the OCINFO and elevated community relations, which had been part of public information, to replace it.147 During the Cold War, neither Army college covered to any meaningful degree the educational part of TI&E or the Army’s liaison effort with Congress.

The effort of the leaders of DA to get the Army, especially the officer corps, to accept the importance of public relations was more than just creating a new office or providing instruction within the officer school system. For example, starting in May of 1946 the Army started to publish the magazine *Army Information Digest*. It is interesting that this was the same month in which Circular 138, formally establishing the office at DA to handle information, was published.148 This suggested a concerted effort of the leaders of DA to emphasize the need to get the Army to accept the duty to keep the public informed. In the May 1946 edition, Brigadier General (BG) Williston Palmer, then the commandant of the Information School, reported that General Eisenhower had “authorize[d] the establishment of the Army Information School.” Graduates of this school, Palmer argued, would help their commanders implement their own information programs “to prevent the misconceptions and avoid the misunderstandings which have haunted the Army and confused the public during World War II.”149

In the same edition as the articles written by LTG Collins and BG Palmer, Colonel (COL) Bryan Houston proposed a two-part plan to improve the image of the Army held by the public. First, the Army had to educate officers about the aims that the leaders of DA had for public relations to counter the negative opinion that some service members had about public relations before the Army as a whole could effectively implement AIP. He reported, for example, some service members believed “that public relations is a somewhat dishonest and certainly ungentlemanly combination of . . . bragging and . . . lying.” They also thought that “we [the Army] can tell only that part of a story which is to our advantage.”

A means to correct misunderstandings such as these was to educate the officer corps on the intent of leaders of DA for public relations and how to execute the information function.

Second, the Army had to prove that it was deserving of the support of the public. Houston also proposed ways for the Army to enhance its image with the public. He argued that “[m]ost of the real underlying public opinion of the Army is the result of what the people have either seen the Army do or heard the Army say.” The Army, he argued, must “admit mistakes” because “[t]he American people . . . will forgive any error that was not intentional.” He also advocated working with reporters because most of the public got its information about the Army from that source. Cooperating with the press, Houston stated, meant ensuring that all press inquiries “[were] answered promptly, courteously, and thoroughly” to help reporters meet their deadlines. Houston’s proposals resembled some of the principles of public relations that Harlow had described. The publishing of AR 600-700: Public Relations by DA was a good initial attempt to clarify for the officer corps what the leaders of the Army wanted from this program.

The leaders of the Department of the Army (DA) understood they had a duty to educate future leaders of the Army. It should also be noted the leaders of the Army select only those officers who based on their potential to be a senior leader attend either the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) or the War College. As a frame of reference, a board in 1949

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151 Ibid., 7-8.
152 Ibid., 9-10.
153 Harlow, Public Relations in War and Peace, ix, 5-7, 28-29, and 73-84.
154 War Department, AR 600-700, Personnel, Public Relations, (1946), 1.
determined that about 50% to 90% of officers who were commissioned in the Army during one year would attend CGSC. Although by 1984, the authors of another study wrote, only about 50% of a year group attends CGSC. This suggested that over the period of the Cold War fewer officers by each commissioning year by percentage attended CGSC. If the leaders of the Army wanted these officers to lead the Army into the future, then it would only make sense that they studied how the service wanted to explain its actions and policies to all Americans. One of the key concepts that officers must study was public relations, why it was important, the components of AIP and techniques to effectively conduct it. Also, an aim of this instruction was to convince each officer that his execution of public relations contributed to obtaining public support of the Army which influenced the amount of resources that Congress gave the Army.

The leaders at DA put together a coordinated effort to continue the progress made in public relations during the Second World War. They had personal oversight of the conduct of the program. A regulation was published to describe both the aim and the implementation of the program for the Army. On the education front two events occurred. A school was established to train specialists on how they were to help their commander achieve the goals of the program. Second, officers were introduced to the subject when the attended professional military schools. All this proves that they matched their words on the criticality of conducting the program with deeds.

Chapter Two covers the academic years (AYs) 1947 through 1950, a time when leaders of DA introduced teaching about the Army Information Program as a means to justify the service’s existence. They devoted the most hours to teaching about public relations, more sub-programs of AIP were covered, and the majority of the students conducted practical exercises. These lessons seemed to touch on many of the principles that Harlow advocated. In this period, the developers of the curriculum at CGSC provided the most comprehensive instruction in public relations than at any other time during the Cold War.

Chapter Three covers between AY 1951 through AY 1958, when the leaders of the Army were concerned the priority that administration placed on atomic warfare might drop the Army to secondary status relative to the Navy and the Air Force. The developers of the curriculum at

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155 Eddy Report, 48.
156 PDOS Board, Vol. 1, 63.
CGSC decreased the average number of hours, as compared with the period AY 1947-AY 1950, which were devoted to topics connected to public relations. At the War College, developers of the curriculum decreased the number of lectures and practical exercises regarding the Army Information Program. However, in AY 1955, leaders of the War College initiated a three-day “National Security Seminar” that brought together public leaders and future leaders of the Army to have a dialogue on issues of national security.\(^{157}\) This seminar included some aspects of public relations, especially informing the public. The overall decline in hours seems contradictory to the aim of the senior leaders of the service to emphasize the need to explain the Army to the public.

Chapter Four covers AY 1958 through AY 1967. The number of hours developers of the curriculum at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) devoted to public affairs varied between six and zero. Authors of instruction about public affairs inconsistently used practical exercises. Meanwhile, the developers of the curriculum at the War College included, for a majority of these years, at least one lecture concerning public affairs. The developers of the curriculum integrated the lessons on informing the troops and the public into a single lesson. They also continued to decrease the number of hours for this instruction.

Chapter Five covers AY 1968 through AY 1973. During this time the Army Chief of Staff authorized both schools to divide their curriculum into two different programs. The first part was called the core curriculum and all students took these courses. The second part was called an elective program, where students chose what subjects they would study. The number of hours that the developers of the core curriculum at CGSC devoted to public affairs varied between three and zero. The amount of practical exercises in the advance sheet mirrored the number of hours. More hours meant more exercises and the opposite was also true. For the majority of these years the War College used a panel to expose the students to topics about public relations. Each panel brought together journalists and military officers to discuss topics such as freedom of the press and military-media relations. Two noteworthy changes in how students learned about public affairs at either CGSC or War College appeared during the period between AY 1968 and AY 1973. First, the developers of lessons concerning public affairs in the core curriculum at both schools emphasized informing the public over the other two sub-

\(^{157}\) Masland and Radway, *Soldiers and Scholars*, 337-339.
programs: troop information and community relations. Second, neither institution offered a course specifically about public relations in its elective program.

Chapter Six describes AY 1974 through AY 1989. The number of hours that developers of the core curriculum at CGSC gave to public affairs continued to decline reaching the lowest level. Starting in AY 1981 and lasting through AY 1989 there were no lessons, zero hours, on public affairs in the core curriculum. Starting in AY 1974, CGSC offered its first course concerning public affairs in its elective program, but the course was not always offered in subsequent years. Meanwhile, the developers of the curriculum at the War College continued to use a variety of methods of instruction for public affairs. AY 1980 saw the return of a panel as the chosen format to facilitate debate between students and journalists on a wide range of topics about public affairs. Between AY 1976 and AY 1989, the developers of the elective program at the War College offered a course in public affairs.

Chapter Seven is the conclusion. Senior leaders of the Army such as the secretary and chief of staff continually noted that the service was responsible to inform the public about what it was doing. However, students who attended either college during the Cold War did not always learn to perform those tasks associated with each of the three sub-programs of DA for public affairs. Both institutions, periodically, used the application methodology as part of their instruction in public affairs. Leaders at DA accepted the premise that having students apply what they learned, being actively involved in the learning process, was a critical part of its educational philosophy. In the immediate post-war period, AY 1947 through AY 1953, those who developed the curriculum at each school allotted the largest number of hours to teaching about public affairs, and the number decreased thereafter. Also, initially the program at each college taught their students, to some degree, about each of the three sub-components of DA’s official plan. However, as the years of the Cold War passed, students primarily studied in the core curriculum at each college how to communicate with the public instead of the other two sub-programs. This study will demonstrate that there was a gap between what senior leaders said about the importance of the Army conducting public relations and what was included in the instruction that all students at the Army’s top two schools were to take about explaining the Army to the American people.
Many factors shaped the environment of the Cold War. Three of them – the development of the atomic bomb, the introduction of the intercontinental bomber, and President Harry S. Truman’s approval of the National Security Act (NSA) of 1947 – influenced how the leaders of the Army believed the public saw the long-term importance of their service. The idea of an adversary potentially having bombers armed with atomic weapons, Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski argue, forced the U.S. government to reconsider “its defense policy [which had been based] on the dual concepts of maritime security and wartime mobilization.” As a result, the Truman administration adopted a new defense policy that was called a “strategy of deterrence,” which was based on a threat to use atomic bombs.  

“President Truman in particular,” Richard W. Stewart writes in American Military History, “considered the American nuclear monopoly as the primary deterrent to direct Soviet military action.” Millett and Maslowski assert, “nuclear weapons appeared to be the ultimate deterrent” because they would make a potential aggressor refrain from attacking.  

Senior leaders of the Army were concerned that the Truman administration’s adoption of the “strategy of deterrence” and approval of NSA of 1947 would lead to their service becoming a force of secondary importance within the U.S military. This meant that the leaders of the government might not consider the Army as critical and the funding for the service could be reduced to provide for the other services. One event indicated that the administration might consider the Army to be secondary. As Stewart reports, Truman wanted to reduce the cost of

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government. Members of his administration thought, in Stewart’s words, that “the advent of the atomic bomb appeared to provide an economic alternative to large standing armies and navies.” Thus the atomic bomb coupled with the bomber became a way for the president to achieve security, which Stewart defined “as a low risk of Soviet invasion of Western Europe,” at a lower cost.161

Truman’s approval of the National Security Act of 1947 changed the organization of the armed forces at the seat of government. In his memoirs, Truman wrote that he approved the Act because he expected it to accomplish three specific goals: increase economic efficiency, enhance overall defense effectiveness, and to improve “civilian control of the military.”162 The Act created the “Department of the Air Force” from what had been the Army Air Corps and changed the title of the “Department of War” to the “Department of the Army” (DA).163 This law merged the three services into what was called the National Military Establishment (NME). It also created a civilian leader of the MNE, the secretary of defense, who could encourage the services to work together, but he could not order them to do so.164 Within two years of the passage of NSA of 1947, Congress approved amendments to it. The 1949 measure replaced the title of NME with a Department of Defense (DoD), and it stated that the secretary “shall have direct authority, and control over the Department of Defense.”165 These Acts had the aim of integrating the military services. The actions of Truman reflect an attempt to maintain what he considered to be a reasonable military posture while also reducing the overall cost of the military. The leaders of the Army viewed his actions with apprehension, and they had two choices on how to react – do something or accept secondary status. They chose to act. Continuing a trend that started during the Second World War, they decided to explain to the public why the Army was a force crucial to the ability of the military to achieve national security. If the American people

162 Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, Vol. II (New York: Da Capo, 1956), 46-52.
supported the Army, then the leaders of DA believed they would support the service’s request for funding.

This chapter covers the period from the start of the first post-war class at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) in September 1946 through the graduation of the class of academic year (AY) 1950. Educating future leaders who were attending CGSC about the reasons behind the Army Information Program (AIP), which was the official plan of the Army to inform the troops and the public, and how to implement it was crucial to sustaining public support for the Army over the long term. If graduates of this school were convinced that effectively implementing AIP would contribute to preventing the Army from dropping into secondary status within the military, then they might perform two vital tasks. First they would share with the rest of the officer corps why it was important to explain the actions of the Army to others in the service and the public. Second they could set the example for how to execute this program for other officers to follow. If graduates effectively performed these two tasks they would help achieve the recommendation that COL Houston made in his May 1946 article, which was to neutralize the critics of the information program who were in the officer corps as a way to improve the image of the Army held by the public. The thesis of this chapter is that between AY 1947 and AY 1950 the decision-makers at CGSC came closest to matching the words of the senior leaders of DA when they gave their students the most comprehensive education – one with the most hours, requiring students to apply, and covering more sub-programs of AIP – in public relations than in any other period in this study.

On 17 September 1947, General Dwight Eisenhower, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and General Carl A. Spaatz, the future Chief of Staff of the Air Force, provided a plan to Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal for separating the Air Force from the Army. This agreement specified how many functions were conducted at the seat of government, including “Public Information,” “Troop Information and Education,” and “Legislative and Liaison,” to name a few, would be divided between these two departments. Senior leaders of the Army showed the

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167 Houston, “Manners and Method in Public Relations,” 6-10.

importance they attached to these three functions by the very fact of including them in this document.

General Eisenhower’s decision in 1946 not to re-activate the Army War College caused the curriculum at CGSC to become the only means within the Army school system to educate officers to perform duties at ranks from a major through a general officer. An impact of this decision was that the Department of the Army (DA) provided field-grade officers and above with only one year of education to prepare them to become senior leaders, whereas prior to the Second World War the overwhelming majority of general officers had a year at CGSC and another at the War College.\textsuperscript{169} If the decision-makers at CGSC did require students to study about AIP, then it is arguable that they believed that potential future senior leaders needed to have this skill.

The mission of the curriculum at CGSC remained much the same from AY 1947 through AY 1950. Before the Second World War, the curriculum at CGSC had students study how to be either a commander or staff officer from brigade through corps levels in wartime. A key instructional method was the practical exercise, where students applied what they were learning.\textsuperscript{170} The purpose of the curriculum at CGSC listed in the Program of Instruction (POI) for AY 1948 was to produce officers who were capable of being commanders and staff officers at the “division, corps, army and comparable levels in the communications zone” and who could be staff officers in one of the four staff sections from the army group through DA.\textsuperscript{171} In FM 100-5 Field Service Regulation, Operations (1944), the leaders of DA defined certain terms such as communications zone that were used in wartime and within the curriculum at CGSC. For example, a “[t]heater of operations is a term used to designate that portion of the land, sea, and air areas . . . necessary for military operations,” the authors of the manual wrote, and it was


divided into two main zones. The “combat zone” was where an army group engaged the enemy. The other was the “communications zone.” This area was behind the combat zone where support forces were located that both kept the armies supplied and received casualties evacuated from the combat zone. At CGSC, the students were to study those subjects that were critical to conducting combat operations. They were also to learn about subjects which were not directly related to combat, such as public relations. By including both combat and non-combat subjects, those determining the curriculum implied that the students needed to have a broad education.

Starting in September 1946, the decision-makers divided the curriculum at CGSC into two components which were to accomplish the educational goals DA had assigned. The first segment was called the “[core] course,” and it encompassed thirty weeks. During this period, the students learned both the knowledge and skills that the leaders of the Army thought they needed to be effective commanders or general staff officers from the division to the army level. The second segment, which lasted ten weeks, was called “specialized instruction,” according to curricular documents. LTG Manton S. Eddy, then the Commandant of CGSC, wrote in the December 1948 edition of Army Information Digest that the “specialized instruction” was to prepare students “for duty in one of the general staff sections at theater, zone of interior, and

172 DA, Field Service Regulations, Operations (1944), 1. Emphasis in the original text.
175 Dastrup, The US Army Command and General Staff College, 90.
176 COL. E. A. Salet, “Reorganization of the Command and General Staff College,” Military Review (Sept. 1948): 6-9. Although the author used the term “common” for consistency purposes it will be called “core.” Dastrup, The US Army Command and General Staff College, 90.

Department of the Army levels.”

“[T]he general staff sections” at the higher levels, Eddy noted, were “personnel, intelligence, operations and training, or logistics” – before World War II (WW II) officers typically studied these subjects at the War College.  

“The zone of the interior,” the authors of FM 100-5 (1944) wrote, “comprises the area of the national territory exclusive of areas included in the theater of operations.” Including the “zone of interior” in the “specialized instruction” implied that the students would be studying subjects not related to combat. The decision-makers at CGSC for AY 1949, for example, allotted 282 hours for the “specialized instruction.” During this phase, on average, each student spent over 28 hours per week in the classroom; this shows why he could only learn about one staff section. It is worth noting that only students who were in the personnel (G-1) section of the “specialized instruction” studied public relations. None of the curricular documents explain why only these students learned about public relations. One possible explanation was that each personnel officer, the authors of FM 101-5 Staff Organization and Procedure (1950) asserted, was responsible for monitoring the status of the morale of both the public and the troops. Having personnel officers learn about public relations, which was linked to the morale of both the troops and the public, made sense.

The number of hours allotted was an indicator of the priority that those determining the curriculum placed on subjects, including public relations. Between academic year (AY) 1947 and AY 1950, the total number of hours in the curriculum averaged about 1300. Those officers determining the core curriculum during this period allotted about eight and a half hours, less than

one percent of available time each year, to instruction on public relations. An example of the variation in hours was seen in the core curriculum for both AY 1947 and AY 1948 that had five hours allotted for students to study public relations while AY 1949 had a total of 14 hours. Also, the developers of the curriculum for the personnel section of the “specialized instruction” for AYs 1947 and 1948 provided approximately nineteen hours, about five and one-half percent of the available hours, for instruction about public relations. However, there was no instruction concerning public relations in the personnel portion of the “specialized instruction” for AY 1949 and AY 1950. These wide variations in hours represent the inconsistency that plagued the instruction about public relations throughout the era of the Cold War. By comparison, the core curriculum of AY 1948 listed six and one-half hours for students to learn about “Trends in Future Warfare” but only five hours for discussing topics of public relations. Therefore, it seems that those determining the curriculum for AY 1948 considered teaching the students about possible aspects of future warfare to be more important than educating them to effectively present the Army to the public.

Between 1945 and 1947, DA authorized two boards to examine its policies related to education. The first was the Gerow Board in 1945, which was covered in more detail in Chapter 1. This Board specifically recommended that the students should learn about “public relations” at

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CGSC, showing that it thought this skill was important.\(^{188}\) If the system that educated Army officers did not have the students study public relations then the next generation, as had the previous generation of officers such as Eisenhower, had to learn this task on the job. This was a risk that the members of this Board seemed unwilling to accept.

In February 1947, General Eisenhower appointed LTG Wade Haislip, who was a member of his advisory group, as the president of the other board.\(^{189}\) This board was “[t]o review present [Department of the Army] policies and programs concerning Regular Army, National Guard, Organized Reserves, ROTC [Reserve Officer Training Corps] and Universal Military Training for FY [Fiscal Year] 1949 and beyond, and to recommend new and/or revised over-all policies and programs.”\(^{190}\) In August 1947, the Haislip Board, as it was subsequently known, wrote in its report titled “War Department Policies and Programs Review Board” that, for the foreseeable future, the nation would be in “a state of undeclared emergency” somewhere between peace and war.\(^{191}\) The public, the Board believed, did not understand this new state of affairs and what actions were required to provide a minimum level of national security.\(^{192}\) The Board proposed a possible way for the Army to help the American people be better informed.

The Haislip Board suggested that the executive branch, including the Army, needed an “information program” to explain to “the Congress and the people” two key items. First, what the executive branch and DA considered the existing and anticipated military threats to the nation; and second, the details of how the Army’s proposed programs would mitigate those threats.\(^{193}\) As an example, the Board asserted that it “[was] disturbed at the apparent public misconception of [the Army’s] actual military strength. The public tends to confuse potential and

\(^{188}\) Gerow Report, 59.

\(^{189}\) War Department, “War Department Policies and Programs Review Board,” Washington, D.C, August 1947, 67. Subsequently known as the Haislip Report. Bradley, \textit{A General’s Life}, 469. The Board was examined how to support the proposed military establishment within the proposed budgetary limitations. 


\(^{190}\) Haislip Report, 1-2. Italics are in the original document.


\(^{192}\) Haislip Report, 4-10.

\(^{193}\) Ibid., 56-61.
actual military strengths, forgetting the time involved in converting from one to the other.”
“These public misconceptions,” the Haislip Board argued, “[were] fostered by the overemphasis on the 1,070,000 [man] Army, the six-billion-dollar budget, and new developments in weapons.”194 The Board suggested that the information plan of the Army should explain three factors to correct this confusion. First, defining the capabilities of the force in existence. Second, it took time to transform potential strength into actual strength. For example, although not included in the report, during WW II it took a few years to induct men into the service, train and equip them, and have them prepared for battle. Third, the government had placed very great missions on the Army, although not stated in the report such as occupying both Germany and Japan, while also requiring the service to have forces ready to conduct offensive operations in other locations.195 The majority of Americans, the Board implied, would support a military policy proposed by the executive branch when they were convinced of the validity of both the assessment of the threat and the plan to counter it. Repeating the advice of Stimson and Harlow, the Board noted, the information plan “should assiduously avoid propaganda and adhere strictly to the facts.”196 The Board provided a few clear examples of topics which could be integrated into this plan. As an example, the Board stated that explaining why having 1.07 million men in the Army was insufficient to successfully achieve all assigned missions. Another benefit for the Army of effectively conduct of this plan was the potential to reduce the differences of opinion about national security between the public and itself. Before the Army could carry out the information plan, it first had to convince the officer corps about the importance of effectively conducting the program.

Arguably, obtaining the support of the public for the Army was a part of the profession of arms – one which derived from being a public servant. The Department of the Army (DA) recognized, the Board argued, the need to be “on the alert to build up prestige and public confidence and support of the Army itself.” The authors of the report noted:

One of the biggest hurdles in making headway in this direction is the failure of many of our officers to realize their responsibilities in the field of Public

194 Ibid, 7.
195 Ibid., 7-10.
Relations and Troop Information and Education. This problem can never finally be solved save by education. This should work from top down, through the chain of command . . . [and] through the school system.  

The Board reiterated that educating officers was key to correcting the identified failures of the officer corps when it came to understanding the linkages between effectively implementing AIP, gaining the support of the public, and then getting the resources needed to accomplish assigned missions.

Educating the officer corps in both its combat missions and public relations was a key means to demonstrate to the public that the Army was a critical part of the defense team. The Army had to be competent in its assigned missions, but it also had to report its capabilities, positive and negative, to the public. One reason that the leaders of the service wanted the officer corps to effectively conduct its information program was that they believed that it would contribute to gaining the support of the American people to get funding from Congress. One challenge that the leaders of DA faced, Houston wrote, was that many officers were skeptical about the merits of the information program. Whether this education in public relations would help the officer corps could overcome its skepticism remained to be seen.

**AYs 1947 and 1948: Introducing Public Relations**

Officers who determined the core curriculum at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) for AY 1947 and AY 1948, such as the Commandant, decided that all students needed to learn about how the Army wanted them to conduct AIP. They allocated five hours each year to accomplish this aim. These lessons used methods of instruction including a lecture, where students were passive learners, and classroom discussions and practical exercises, where students were active in their learning. A few days before each lesson, the College issued each student what was called an “advance sheet” that listed the assigned readings, and it could also include some scenario information for any practical exercise. Starting in AY 1948, the authors of the

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197 Haislip Report, 60-61
advance sheet included a description of what they expected each student to learn in that lesson. The majority of the evidence for the assessments contained in this study comes from curricular documents such as these.

In both years, the students studied ways in which commanders and members of the officer corps should explain the service to both the public and the troops. If done effectively, the actions of those people might contribute to gaining the support of the American people for the Army. But, the opposite is also true. For AY 1947, the instruction about public relations consisted of three one-hour lessons and a two-hour lecture. Two of the three one-hour lessons were titled “Public Relations” and “Information and Education.” Each student, the authors of the advance sheets stated, was to learn about the duties of both a commander and the appropriate staff officer responsible each task. The content of the lesson titled “Public Relations” will illustrate. The authors of this advance sheet provided twelve questions to focus the students thinking and an outline of the topics that would be covered in this lesson. They directed the students to read Army Regulation 600-700 (1946), Public Relations. The key points of AR 600-700, which were described in greater detail in Chapter 1, were these two: The Army must inform the public about its actions if it wanted to have the support of the American people. Also, Commanders were responsible to their superiors for how their units conducted public relations. This regulation was an example of the leaders of the Department of the Army (DA) providing broad guidance for defining the program and its goals, and how DA organized itself to oversee the Army’s conduct of the program. It also showed that the leaders gave wide latitude for subordinates to determine how best to accomplish this mission.

The third one-hour lesson on public relations in 1947 was titled “Information and Education - - Public Relations.” The goal of this lesson, the authors of the advance sheet noted, was to provide the students with an overview of both “the organization of the Information and

200 USACGSC, “Public Information, Troop Information and Education and Morale in the Combat Zone,” (AY 1948), 1.
201 USACGSC, Program and Schedule Regular Course 1946-1947 (Less Phase V), 15 and 17.
Education Division and the Public Relation Division . . . and the operations of those two divisions” of the Office of the Chief of Information (OCINFO) at DA. Each of these divisions was responsible for publishing the guidance of the leaders of DA that stated how they wanted each program to be carried out, and then it monitored the implementation of its own sub-program. For example, the authors wrote that the “Information and Education Division” would publish “basic plans and policies for information and non-military education for military personnel.”204 All three of these lessons included practical exercises that will be described later. It is worth noting that there was no lesson in AY 1947 which focused on liaising with Congress, which was the third component of the information program of the Army.

In the fourth and final lesson on public relations, LTG J. Lawton Collins, the Chief of Information at DA, spoke to the class of AY 1947 about how the leaders of DA wanted their subordinates to explain what the Army was doing to others in the service, the Congress, and the public. In his lecture, Collins gave two examples of the way in which informing the troops could indirectly contribute to explaining the policies and actions of the Army to the public. First, he told the students that each commander had to ensure that his soldiers and his unit “participate in the community life” in order to affirm the connection between the military and the local public.205 Second, the Army, he asserted, must take the initiative in explaining the service’s policies and actions to both the troops and the public. He claimed that, if the Army had done a better job telling the approximately 11 million soldiers who served during WW II why they were doing certain tasks, the Army might have had many more supporters than critics. His speech also reinforced what students had studied in the other three lessons in public relations while also showing how these sub-programs were interdependent. Conducting liaison with Congress was covered only in Collins’ lecture.206 The main points of Collins’ lecture were described in his 1947 article that was discussed in Chapter 1.207 The curriculum for AY 1947 represents one of the few times between AY 1947 and AY 1989 when all three sub-programs of AIP were covered.

The instruction on public relations in the core curriculum for AY 1948 had three main differences from that of AY 1947. First, the curriculum for AY 1948 had only one lesson, titled “Public Information, Troop Information and Education and Morale in the Combat Zone,” instead of four. Second, the authors of the advance sheet for AY 1948 wrote that students would study “the principles and procedures in the planning for and the implementation of” these functions in combat whereas AY 1947 had covered both wartime and peacetime. Third, these students did not study about the organization and functions of OCINFO.208

To prepare for this lesson for AY 1948, students read the chapters on “Public Information” and “Troop Information and Education” (TI&E) in CGSC-produced The G-1 Manual. This manual was a reference book for all of the instruction on “the functions of Assistant Chief of Staff G-1” (the personnel officer), and among these functions was public relations. The personnel officer of a unit was interested in the “troop information and education, and [the] public information” programs, the authors of the manual claimed, due to the effect they had on the morale of the troops for whom he was responsible.209 This justified why the students who were taking specialized instruction in the area of personnel were the only ones who studied these topics. The definition that the authors of The G-1 Manual used for “public information” resembled that of “public relations” in AR 600-700 (1946).210 “[M]uch of the public information function in the combat zone,” the authors of this Manual noted, involved getting reporters to events that the leaders of a unit considered to be of “probable news value.” To effectively conduct this task, students needed to have an idea of what was considered news, but that was not covered in the Manual.211 They also reported that in combat the focus of the TI&E program was troop information. The aim of troop information, the authors described, was “to make the soldier . . . the best informed in any army.” An example of topics that leaders should keep their soldiers

208 USACGSC, “Public Information, Troop Information and Education and Morale in the Combat Zone,” (AY 1948), 1. USACGSC, Program of Instruction for Regular Course, (AY 1948), 31.
informed on was local customs in the area where they were operating so as not to offend the local population. Information such as this was applicable in both wartime and peacetime. The “Presentation Plan,” or timeline for conducting the lesson, showed that the authors had allocated about four of the five hours for students to conduct exercises.

In the lessons in public relations for AY 1947 and AY 1948, the practical exercises exposed the students to a variety of situations they might encounter after graduation. These scenarios, in general, were rooted in WW II experiences. Usually, each student developed his solution to the problem in the scenario. Then the group – students and faculty together – discussed some of the students’ solutions. The aim of this discussion was to point out the pros and cons of some of the proposed solutions, letting students learn from each other. This approach closely paralleled the growing use discussion groups in civilian graduate schools.

Practical exercises used in the three lessons in academic year (AY) 1947 were based on scenarios in both a theater of war and within the United States in peacetime. These scenarios had the students portray only staff officers. For example, in a peacetime scenario, students were cast as an “Information and Education officer” who had to develop “a plan for a Troop Information Program which [would] convince the trainees of the demonstration battalion of the necessity and desirability of Universal Military Service” (UMS). Each student had to determine both what the best method was and what resources were needed to achieve this goal. Of note, UMS was not law in 1947, but CGSC was using it within a scenario to help students prepare for that future possibility. This exercise gave each student an opportunity to consider how he would convince young soldiers to support this concept. In this scenario, for example, if the troops were convinced about the need for UMS, then they could carry the Army’s message to their family.

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213 USACGSC, “Presentation Plan,” 1 and 2 for “Public Information, Troop Information and Education and Morale in a Combat Zone,” (AY 1948). The Presentation Plan was similar to a lesson plan used in civilian academia.
216 USACGSC, Information and Education - - Public Relations,” (AY 1947), I-3.
and friends, which was public information. The Haislip Board (1947) came to a similar conclusion when it said: “If [the soldier] is well informed and satisfied he will insure adequate public support of the Army.”217 Exercises such as this gave the students chances to apply principles they learned to inform both the troops and the public and that these two functions were linked.

Exercises used in AY 1948 had the students examine issues related to public information and troop information and education in wartime only. One example will illustrate. Each student, portraying an information officer at an army level, had to develop a public information plan for a fictitious operation. His plan, according to the scenario, should describe “the mission of public information and its purpose” in the unit and the “basic policy governing release of information to the press and public.” Exercises such as this were to help each student gain some experience applying the “principles and procedures” for both sub-programs.218 In both AY 1947 and AY 1948, students studied only the perspectives of a few staff officers but not that of a commander.219 Having students examine how to conduct public relations from only the standpoint a staff officer seems to be flawed. A staff officer advises, but it is up to a commander to make the decision. Since only a commander was accountable for how his unit conducts his information program, not having students make those decisions might have been a missed opportunity.

The core curriculum for AYs 1947 and 1948 introduced the students to the definition and description of both the “public information” and the “troop information and education” programs. However, only General Collins’ lecture in AY 1947 addressed ways in which the Army interacted with Congress. A lecture and practical exercises were the methods of instruction used in the lessons about how the students should explain the Army to both the troops and the public. Furthermore, since the hours allotted to this instruction were few, the scope of study was limited largely to familiarization with the subjects. During these two years, each student had a

217 Haislip Report, 61.
chance to study why explaining the actions and the policies of the service to the troops and to the public was important to the long-term success of the Army, which was to gain support of the American people. This was done in an effort to avoid having the public consider the Army of less importance than the other services.

The developers of the curriculum for the specialized instruction in personnel for AY 1947 and AY 1948 allotted eighteen hours and twenty hours, respectively, for students to study both the public information and the troop information programs.\(^{220}\) Each student would study the actions of the staff section, consisting of an officer-in-charge (OIC) and his subordinates, which was responsible for each of these sub-programs of AIP. Each lesson about public relations included a “Presentation Plan” or timeline.\(^{221}\) The authors of the majority of these lessons, according to the presentation plans, allowed about fifteen minutes each hour to a lecture, and the remainder of the time was for conducting exercises. This division of time suggests that the authors wanted each student to be an active learner.\(^{222}\) Lessons about public relations for AY 1947 illustrate the content. The authors of the two-hour lesson titled “The Army Information Program,” according to a curricular document, divided the time between discussing “the functions of both Public Relations and Information and Education.”\(^{223}\) In his lecture notes on public relations, COL J. R. Beishline repeated many of the key points about these topics that were in the core curriculum. He also provided a historical overview, which was a new aspect in the curriculum, on how the Army had performed these functions in the past. He asserted that the


\(^{221}\) The Presentation Plan was similar to a lesson plan used in civilian academia.


Army had failed to educate the officer corps about these functions before World War II. In his notes for a lecture on the Information and Education (I&E) program of the Army, LTC J. H. Minton wrote that in the past this program had had mixed effectiveness. The information program that mentally prepared the soldiers who had taken part in the D-Day operation, he claimed, was worth emulating. Resembling the findings of the Haislip Board, Minton effectively linked I&E with public relations when he wrote: “Every officer is responsible for winning and holding the good will and confidence of the soldier and[,] through him, of the American people.”

As an aside, Minton wrote an article titled “The Army Information Program” for the June 1947 edition of Military Review in which he summarized the content of the lesson of the same title. In this article, Minton was trying to reach a larger audience than just the students in the classroom with a description about what the information program was and why it was important.

The two-hour lesson “Future Public Relations” stressed differences in the doctrine of the Army concerning public relations before and after World War II. In the lecture notes, LTC C. J. Hackett stated that the main difference was that after the war DA had been trying to take the initiative through “the ‘continuous dissemination of information to the public’” to fight what he called “those twin enemies of clear-thinking, ‘Lack of Information,’ and ‘Misinformation.’” Commanders, he argued, needed to release data immediately and to interpret them for the troops and the public. He insisted that “the Army seeks only to tell the people the truth and only the truth about the Army and let the chips fall where they may.” Army leaders, Hackett asserted, did not think they were engaging in propaganda because they thought that they were providing

the most pertinent details of the situation, which were supposedly in themselves neutral. Their conscious aim was to be neutral.

The other fourteen hours were divided into four lessons per topic for students to study the functions of the staff section that was responsible for the either sub-program: public information or troop information. In a one-hour lesson, students learned about how to conduct each sub-program in a theater of operations. In another one-hour lesson, each student was to examine the duties of the OIC of each staff section. A two-hour lesson described the duties that the people in the staff section performed to help the commander conduct each sub-program. The only difference in time allotted to either topic was in the lesson in which students applied what they had learned. The developers of the instruction allotted four hours to having students apply tasks in public information, but only two hours for students to gain experience in informing the troops.\(^\text{229}\) This difference in time indicates that those approving the curriculum prioritized having students learn how they should communicate with the public more than with others in the Army. The lessons in public relations will illustrate.

Each student in the personnel section of the specialized instruction learned about the functions of the staff section in charge of public relations in two lessons. One lesson focused on the functions of the OIC of the section, which was titled “Public Relations Officer in Operations.” LTC Minton, the author of this lesson, asserted that a critical function of this officer was to oversee the production of what he called an “Estimate of the Public Relations Situation.” In 1947, there was no doctrinal format for this estimate. In his notes, Minton recommended using the “Staff Estimate of the Personnel Situation” as a starting point.\(^\text{230}\) This estimate, just like all other estimates in FM 101-5 (1950), was a means by which the OIC described the current situation in public relations and proposed ways to integrate the function he represented into the overall planning process to accomplish the unit’s mission.\(^\text{231}\) The other lesson was called “Public Relations Staff Sections.” In his note for his lecture, LTC Minton wrote that the OIC had to ensure that the “Estimate of the Public Relations Situation” addresses “the public relations mission of the Army” and that of his commander. The discussion about the

\(^{229}\) USACGSC, Program and Schedule Regular Course, 1946-1947 (Phase V), 1-3.
mission of public relations resembled the content of an exercise in the core curriculum for academic year (AY) 1948 where the students, each cast as an information officer, had to build a public information plan for an upcoming operation.\textsuperscript{232} The estimate was also to include suggestions for what the commander might want his soldiers to say or not to say to the media. The staff section used its estimate as a basis for developing the public information program that was to describe how the unit would explain its actions with the public.\textsuperscript{233}

In their last lesson related to public relations, students had opportunities to apply what they had learned in the previous instruction to fictitious situations. In each of the four hours of application for topics on informing the public, students were presented with a different problem to solve. For example, in one scenario the instructor described the merits of “[e]xhibits and displays” – these could either show how the Army performs a task or show the capability of the equipment. If a commander provided a display at an event, such as a county fair, the very act of doing so would suggest that he considered his unit to be a part of the local area – thus fostering positive community relations.\textsuperscript{234} This reinforced comments on community relations made by LTG Collins during his speech at CGSC in AY 1947.\textsuperscript{235} By participating in this type of event made it easier for soldiers to talk with the public about the display or about the Army in general. No examples of the problems that students were presented were found.

All students who attended CGSC during AY 1947 and AY 1948 studied about both the public information and the troop information programs but only from the perspective of a staff officer. The core curriculum familiarized all students with why AIP was important and how to effectively conduct the information function. Students opting for the personnel section in the specialized phase learned specific tasks that the staff section for each sub-program was to


\textsuperscript{233} USACGSC, “Public Relations Officer in Operation,” (AY 1947), 5 and “Public Relations Staff Section,” (AY 1947) 1-4.


\textsuperscript{235} USACGSC, “War Department Information Program,” (AY 1947), 1-14.
perform. For the most part, students learned about public relations as a separate entity, not as an integral part of all actions of a staff. Also, students were given opportunities to apply what they were learning. If commanders were being held accountable for what units that would be in their charge would be doing, then failing to emphasize the commanders’ duties during the course was a serious mistake.

**AY 1949 and AY 1950: Core Curriculum Only**

The curriculum at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) for AY 1949 and AY 1950 included mention of lessons about public relations only in the core. The hours they allotted for students to study public relations nearly tripled in AY 1949, reaching fourteen hours, compared with the five hours in both AYs 1947 and 1948. Then the number of hours decreased to ten for AY 1950.\(^{236}\) No explanation was found for the change in number of hours, even though the annual curriculum for AYs 1949 and 1950 had about 1200 hours which was 200 fewer than AYs 1947 and 1948.\(^{237}\) The variation in the number of hours given to public relations allowed an increase both in the amount of topics that could be covered and in the depth of discussion.

The objective of the lessons about public relations in AY 1949 and AY 1950 emphasized the ways in which the Army conducted both the public information and the troop information programs, which resembled the objectives stated in AYs 1947 and 1948. Each year had a total of five lessons that covered the same topics, but some of the specific titles of lessons varied. “The Army information function,” the authors of the advance sheet for the lesson of the same name in both AYs wrote, “embraces those activities which are designed to promote better internal and external relations for the Army through the dissemination of information,” which the leaders of DA expected to improve how the public saw the Army. The “Public Information (PI) and [the] Troop Information and Education (TI&E)” programs, the authors of the advance sheet for AY


1950 stated, were the means to perform this function.\textsuperscript{238} Also, the definition of public information only in the advance sheet for AY 1949 resembled the definition of public relations in AR 600-700 (1946) and in The G-I Manual (AY 1948).\textsuperscript{239} The definitions show some consistency in meaning, but not always in wording. The authors of the advance sheet for AY 1950 did not define either public information or troop information.\textsuperscript{240}

The authors of the advance sheet for “The Army Information Function” in both academic years used excerpts from statements made by senior officers asserting that explaining the policies and actions of the Army to both the public and the troops was an important task. An extract was from LTG Manton Eddy’s “Final Report” as the Chief of Information (COI) at DA in December 1947 will illustrate a few key points. Resembling the content of Collins’ speech to the class of AY 1947 at CGSC, Eddy noted that the Army had a duty to inform the public and the Congress on matters related to national security.\textsuperscript{241} He also stated:

> The Army cannot accomplish its assigned missions and tasks properly unless the people and their representatives in the Government understand and give approval (by providing the necessary means in men, money, materials and enabling legislation) to the policies, plans, programs, practices and operations of the Army.\textsuperscript{242}

Eddy’s comment connected the Army’s obligation to explain to the public how it viewed issues linked to national security as a means to both justify the Army and get the resources that the leaders of the Department of the Army (DA) believed were required to perform its assigned missions.

\textsuperscript{238} USACGSC, “The Army Information Function,” (AY 1949) 1. USACGSC, “The Army Information Function,” (AY 1950) 1. USACGSC, Program of Instruction for Regular Course, (AY 1949), 22. USACGSC, “Schedule Regular Course 1949-1950 (less Phase V, ”) (AY 1950), 7. The two hours for AY 1949 is based on the number of hours allocated to the course 5233 in the Program of Instruction, but the titles and content of this lesson were different between what was in the POI from what was included in the advance sheet.


A problem could arise when public statements of leaders of the military contradicted either themselves or other leaders. The developers of the lessons “The Army Information Function” for AY 1950 and “The Army Information Program” for AY 1949 used excerpts of a study conducted by the Office of the Chief of Information of what happens when this occurs.\(^2^{43}\) In the lessons, members of this study concluded that statements by the leaders of DoD had contributed to the “apparent misunderstanding about the role of the Army.”\(^2^{44}\) For example, the authors stated: “The most recent definition of the role of the Army appears in the statements made before the Senate Armed Services Committee [in March 1948] by the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Army, Chief of Staff, et al” and these declarations “embody present doctrine.” The authors of the study summarized what they believed the leaders said. These were “[t]hat the Army is no longer considered as a force capable of decisively changing the balance in war” and “[t]hat the present concept of Army employment in war is primarily that of a defensive screen for the Air Force.”\(^2^{45}\) These messages contradicted what DA was trying to express; DA’s message was that the Army was critical to ability of the military to achieve the goals that the government had assigned. Not included in the curriculum during these years, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, in the April 1949 edition of Military Review, wrote: “If the Army is to function as an effective member of the national security team, there must be a clear public understanding that land forces will continue to be indispensable as a primary fighting arm.”\(^2^{46}\) This seems to contradict his earlier statement. Therefore, the authors of the study recommended that the leaders within DA and DOD ensure that they expressed the importance of the Army in their public statements.\(^2^{47}\) These lessons show the unintended consequences that statements made


by senior leaders could have on the understanding of the public about what the Army provides the nation. This reinforced the need to ensure that the curriculum at these schools provided the officers both the knowledge of the program and opportunities to apply that information in realistic scenarios.

In both AYs, students attended a lesson titled “Army Organization and Policy for Information,” which, according to a curricular document from AY 1949, was to “outline Army organization, policy, and practice for the exercise of the information function.” This lesson for AY 1949 illustrates what topics students studied. The description of the organization of Office of the Chief of Information at DA resembled what was given in the lesson “Information and Education – Public Relations” in AY 1947. The authors of the advance sheet for “Army Organization and Policy for Information” had students read LTG Eddy’s definitions of both propaganda and information, which were contained in his “final report as Chief of Information,” as an example of policy. “Information,” Eddy claimed was, “[t]he act or process of communicating knowledge; to enlighten.” By contrast, he considered “propaganda” to be “[a] plan for the propagation of a doctrine or system of principles.” Eddy’s definitions resembled those that LTG Collins had used in his address to the CGSC during AY 1947. These definitions indicate that DA thought officers should provide facts to the public and not “spin” the information.

In addition to describing some of the concepts of the information function, the authors of this lesson for AY 1949 offered some concrete tips for performing the function. These tips were included in the section of the supplemental materials called “Ground rules for Army information,” which described how each officer should practice this function. Some of these rules described why the information function existed, while others provided a baseline for how

250 USACGSC, “Army Organization and Policy for Information,” (AY 1949), 1-5. USACGSC, “War Department Information Program,” 12-13. Collins’ stated that “‘propaganda’ has a connotation of something sinister, some purpose that cannot be brought out into the open but must be concealed under the guise of something else. On the other hand information is factual, is complete, is honest and above board.”
each officer should conduct AIP. One example of a rule that made the program important noted that “We [the Army] must always be conscious that we are collectively and individually in the public service and, as such, we are public property.” This rule established clearly what many thought the connection between the Army and the public ought to be. Other rules illuminated why communicating with the public was necessary. For example, “The people are entitled to know about their Army,” read one ground rule, while another cautioned that “The Army will not be provided the means to do its job without public understanding and support.” These rules resembled some of Eddy’s comments in his final report as COI about why public relations was important for the long-term effectiveness of the Army.\textsuperscript{251} Other guidelines noted ways in which officers should conduct tasks related to the information function such as that “[those speaking to the public] must always adhere to the Army’s greatest asset: honesty,” adding that “we must present professional opinion as well as facts.”\textsuperscript{252} The leaders of DA, through this instruction, were explaining to students both how to conduct the information function and why this function, when effectively conducted, would contribute to justifying the positions of the Army to the public.

Students studied the goals, “scope, and methods of the Public Information Program,” according to the advance sheets for AY 1949 and AY 1950, in a two-hour lesson titled “Public Information.”\textsuperscript{253} The authors of this lesson for both AYs had students read the supplemental material contained in the advance sheet. Only the authors for AY 1950 had students read sections of a CGSC-produced text titled \textit{The Public Information Manual}, which reflected Army doctrine.\textsuperscript{254} The lesson of AY 1949 illustrates the topics covered. First, the authors of the supplemental material clearly described the policy of DA: “The Army must first merit, and


\textsuperscript{252} USACGSC, “Army Organization and Policy for Information,” (AY 1949), 6-7. Italics were in the original.


\textsuperscript{254} USACGSC, “Public Information,” (AY 1949), 1-3. USACGSC, “Public Information,” (AY 1950), 1.
second, *gain*, public esteem and support. By making available honest, factual information, the Army can contribute to these aims.” They also asserted: “Information must be presented without distortion.” This description supports the assertions by both Collins and Eddy that the intent of the leaders at DA was to provide data without “spin.”

Public opinion,” the authors noted, “is largely a reflection of the Army, its behavior, and accomplishments.” This lesson explained the why and the what of the program but not how these students should conduct it. It also made clear that public opinion about the Army was based on actions and not just words.

Each year the authors of the advance sheet included at least one document that was produced by a unit in the Army which provided an example of how that unit performed a function related to public information. For example, a memorandum from General Courtney Hodges, the Commanding General of First United States Army, which was dated December 1947, was included in AY 1949. In it, he directed his staff to develop and execute “an aggressive program to enhance the profession of the soldier and to acquaint the American public with the continuing need to maintain our armed forces at their highest peak of efficiency in the nation’s history.”

“SPEED” and “accuracy” were the guiding principles that he wanted his staff to use in releasing information to the public. Also, he expected his soldiers “to be courteous, frank and authoritative” when answering inquiries from the public. Hodges’ directive indicated that he understood the need for those in positions of authority to speak to both the press and the public, and how well that was done would show whether the Army was transparent and a legitimate organization. Students could use these documents as examples when they were developing their own procedures for conducting the information function in class and after graduation.

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256 USACGSC, “Public Information,” (AY 1949), 2.


258 First name was not in the course information. It stated that General Hodges was the First Army Commander when the memorandum was issued. The first name was found at http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/chhodges.htm. (accessed 28 November 2010)

259 Appendix 1 to the Advance sheet for USACGSC, “Public Information,” (AY 1949), A1-1.

The following two exercises show the range of scenarios that were included in the advance sheet for the “Public Information” lesson for both AY 1949 and AY 1950. One exercise described a situation in which a public information officer (PIO) got an editor of a newspaper to admit an inaccuracy in a published story and then to correct it. Captain Fitzhugh Lee, US Navy, the PIO for the Bikini atomic bomb test, wrote a letter to the editor of the *Washington Post* claiming that the paper had misrepresented the content of a speech made by the test’s safety officer. Students read both Lee’s letter and the editor’s subsequent admission that the paper had made an error. Then each student had to describe why he thought Captain Lee was successful in getting the correction.261 The other exercise involved COL L. E. Gould, the executive officer to a hospital commander, who agreed to an interview with a local reporter to explain why personal radios were restricted in a hospital ward. The reporter based his questions to Gould on an anonymous letter that the paper had received. The author of that letter stated that the hospital had not let him listen to his radio. After reading the printed story that resulted from the interview, each student was asked to evaluate whether he thought Gould had been effective in stating the position of the commander of the hospital.262 Both exercises focused on correcting, when possible, any potential confusion among the press or the public about an action of the Army. An officer’s ability to help the Army present its side of the story and to correct potential misunderstandings was very important to his role as a servant of the public.

The developers of the curriculum for both AY 1949 and AY 1950 included a lesson titled “Troop Information and Education” (TI&E). They allotted one hour for this lesson in AY 1949 and two hours in AY 1950, but only AY 1950 had any practical exercises during peacetime.263 The aim of this lesson for both AYs, like that of the lesson about public information, was for the students to study the aim, “scope, and methods” of this sub-program. To prepare for this lesson

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each student was to read both the supplemental material in the advance sheet and parts of a CGSC-produced text called the *Troop Information and Education Manual*. The mission of the TI&E program, the authors of the *Manual* for AY 1949 stated, was “to make the soldier of the United States Army the best informed in any army and to provide the opportunity whereby he may become the best educated.” This resembled the definition included in this lesson for AY 1948. They also noted that DA, through command channels, would provide the materials, such as magazines and films, to name a few, to help each commander accomplish his goals for this sub-program. It is difficult to see how students from AY 1949 would have effectively learned the methods to conduct this program in peacetime since they were not required to apply them.

Many of the practical exercises included in AY 1950 will be described in the next chapter, because these scenarios were similar to those used in AYs 1951 and 1953. One situation will illustrate. In this exercise, each student was cast as a newly assigned Chief of Staff of a division that was moving overseas in the near future. A regimental commander told the student that “we [do not] get the help we need from division headquarters in running” troop information. This commander, according the advance sheet, thought that division should do several things. For example, the commander should: Conduct a “[b]riefing of company discussion leaders. [Produce a] division newspaper. [Provide troop information] supplies and material.” Each student had to state which functions belonged to the division and which to subordinate commanders.


Students who attended CGSC during AY 1949 and AY 1950 also learned ways in which a commander should conduct the information function in combat. “Troop Information in Combat” was the title of the lesson in AY 1949. Each student, the authors of the advance sheet for AY 1949 wrote, was to “examine the problem of troop information in combat and to discuss methods for carrying out this function.”270 Showing consistency with AY 1948, the authors of AY 1949 also reported that troop information, which was the priority of the TI&E program during wartime, was to ensure that the soldier was informed of “what he and his unit are trying to do, and why.”271 To be successful in combat, commanders, they claimed, should consider training their unit to inform the troops to be as important as weapons training, because both were needed.272 For AY 1950, students in a lesson titled “Public and Troop Information in Wartime” were to “consider the commander’s applications of public information and troop information in wartime, particularly in combat.”273

Many of the wartime scenarios used in AY 1949 and AY 1950 were created from actual events in World War II. In both academic years, a scenario in a troop information exercise had each student portray the commander of an army that was being prepared to invade a country. Each student had to decide whether he would tell his soldiers that, even though “the government of the enemy country” that they were about to invade had just surrendered, another military power that still occupied the country had not.274 General Mark Clark had faced a similar situation prior to the invasion of Italy. Only the lesson from AY 1950 had exercises that provided the students a chance to ponder issues regarding public information during wartime. In one scenario, a reporter told the student, portraying a division commander, that he had witnessed a regimental commander strike a soldier who was crying due to being shelled and that he was going to write a story about the incident. The student had to determine what, if anything, to say to the

270 USACGSC, “Troop Information in Combat,” 1 in Regular Course, 1948-1949, Department of Command and General Staff, Set 3- Part 1, U415 F82.
correspondent. This scenario was similar to the slapping incident involving General George Patton in World War II. These exercises compelled each student to think about how he would apply the concepts provided in the instruction within a realistic scenario.

In summary, each student who attended the Command and General Staff College between AYs 1947 and 1950 received the most comprehensive education on what AIP was and his responsibility for its conduct for the period of the Cold War. At a minimum, those making decisions about the core curriculum did expose the students to the aim and scope of both the public information and the troop information programs. The level of understanding of each student achieved was directly linked to whether he was given an opportunity to apply what he had learned. The leaders expected that, the more time for application the students had, the more comprehensive his understanding would have been. For the preponderance of lessons this was achieved. The third sub-program of AIP through about 1950 was legislative liaison, but this was noticeably missing from the curriculum. The number of hours allocated for students to study public relations and the content of the lessons both lacked consistency. Each graduate should have had the ability to make a firm connection between effectively performing the information function and enhancing the bond between the Army and the public. What had been included in the curriculum between AY 1947 and AY 1950 was a good start, but could have been better. The level of effort that was seen between AY 1947 and AY 1950 was not continued for the rest of the Cold War. The trend was a decline in emphasis on teaching student about the information program of the Army.

276 USACGSC, Program and Schedule, Regular Course (less Phase V), (AY 1947), 3 and 15-17. USACGSC, Program of Instruction for Regular Course, (AY 1948), 2, 8 and 96. USACGSC, Program of Instruction for Regular Course, (AY 1949), 1 and 22. USACGSC, Program and Schedule, Regular Course (less Phase V), (AY 1950), 3.
Chapter 3 - Army Public Relations as Defense Against Secondary Status (AYs 1951-1958)

Two critical events influenced the way in which the Army educated its officers between AYs 1951 and 1958. One was the decision by the leaders at the Department of the Army (DA) – the headquarters of the Army at the seat of government – to re-establish the Army War College. The other was Dwight D. Eisenhower’s becoming President of the United States. The leaders at DA decided to establish a Board to examine the effectiveness of the system for educating officers after three years of operation. In 1949, Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall appointed LTG Manton Eddy as the president of this board. In his directive, Royall tasked the Board to identify any “excessive overlaps or gaps in the instruction considered necessary up to the level of the National War College” and to determine whether DA should re-activate the Army War College.\(^{277}\) The aim of the Army’s school system, the Board noted in the “Report of the Department of the Army Board on Educational System for Officers,” was to educate “an officer to perform effectively those duties to which he may reasonably expect to be assigned in war, with emphasis on the art of command,” which resembled that used by the Gerow Board.\(^ {278}\) A key suggestion of this Board, included in its report, was to re-open the Army War College.\(^ {279}\) The Eddy Board, as it has subsequently been called, determined that there was a gap in the educational system for officers. This gap, the Board wrote, was “that nowhere does an officer get the broad problems of the commander and the entire general staff at the higher Army echelons.”\(^ {280}\) The Board advocated re-opening the Army War College as a means to fill that


\(^{279}\) Eddy Report, 8.

\(^{280}\) Ibid., 3-4 and 38. Italics in the original text.
It also proposed that, when classes at the War College began, the school system should return to the pre-World War II delineation of responsibility for the education of officers between the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and the War College. The curriculum at CGSC, the Board noted, should educate officers to perform “the duties of the commander and general staff of the division, corps, army, and comparable levels of the communications zone.” Meanwhile, the curriculum at the Army War College would concentrate on the army group and above. “The methods of learning” that the Board recommended for use at the War College “should be those comparable to the ones employed in a graduate school of a civilian institution. .. The instructional methods should stimulate constructive and logical thought, rather than blind adherence to a formulated faculty solution.”

On October 11, 1949, Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray approved two of the proposals of the Eddy Board: to re-establish the Army War College and how to divide responsibility for the education of the officer corps between CGSC and the Army War College.

When Eisenhower became the President of the United States in 1954 he meant to increase the emphasis on the deterrence value of the atomic bomb, as compared to the Truman administration. This additional weight significantly affected what the leaders of DA thought their mid-career and senior officers needed to know, such as public relations. The Eisenhower administration continued the effort of the Truman administration, Millett and Maslowski note, to reduce government spending combined with the emphasis on the deterrent value of nuclear

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281 Ibid., 4, 8-9 and 40-41.
282 Ibid., 3-4, and 8.
283 Ibid., 40
284 Eddy Report, inclosure 1 “Modifications of the Department of the Army Board on Educational Systems,” dated October 11, 1949 and this was published for implementation by order of the Secretary of the Army. Bell, Secretaries of War and Secretaries of the Army, 134. However, according to Ball, Of Responsible Command, 272, General J. Lawton Collins approved the Eddy report.
weapons enabled it to “[deemphasize] conventional forces.” The priority that the Eisenhower administration placed on nuclear weapons created an environment where the leaders of DA were more concerned than before about the long-term future of their service.

This chapter covers the period from the start of the first post-war classes at both the Army War College in October 1950 through the graduation of the classes at CGSC and the War College of academic year (AY) 1958. The thesis of this chapter is that developers of the curriculum at both CGSC and the War College from AY 1951 through AY 1958, for the early part of this period, provided the students an effective education in conducting public relations which supported the efforts of the leaders of DA to prevent the service from becoming a secondary force. However, toward the end of the period the effectiveness declined. Overall, officers who attended CGSC and the War College received the second most effective instruction in public relations when compared with instruction in the other periods of this study. This assertion is based on the fact that the majority of the developers of the lessons in public relations at each college gave students chances to apply what they were learning to scenarios to help them understand the main concepts of the topic being studied. For most of these years, at CGSC the students studied how to inform the troops but not always the public.

Before examining the curriculum an investigation into a few other factors that affected how the Army conducted public relations is needed. These other factors were changes to Army doctrine and regulations, to how the service was organized, to how the Army, and other services, educated their future senior leaders in public relations, and finally to articles written by senior officers about how the Army conducted public relations.

The leaders of DA took many steps to convince the Army, especially the officer corps, to accept the importance of helping the public understand what the service was doing for the nation. One of those steps was updating doctrine. For example, in August 1949, the Army updated Field Service Regulations, Operations, which, according to its authors, “contains the doctrines of leading troops in combat and the tactics of the combined arms. It constitutes the basis of

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287 Ball, Of Responsible Command, 281-283.
instruction of all arms and services for field service.” The developers of the curriculum at CGSC used this manual. The authors of the 1949 version of Operations outlined, for the first time in an edition of this manual, some of the duties of the public information officer (PIO). He was, they wrote, to oversee “the activities of press correspondents, photographers, radio broadcasters, and visitors” in his unit.

Between AY 1951 and AY 1958, DA updated FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Procedure twice and produced a special regulation that governed how the Army was to conduct troop information and education. These will be examined in the order in which they were published. The authors of the 1950 edition of FM 101-5 reported that the Chief of Information (COI), who was authorized only at the echelon of an army and above, was to “[advise] the commander and staff on all matters pertaining to relations with the public in general.” The COI also “[c]oordinates and supervises all public information and troop information and education functions within the command.” At both the corps and the division echelons, two staff officers performed the duties of the COI. Why DA established a position to coordinate public information and troop information above corps only, but not below, is not clear. The PIO, the authors of this manual wrote, “[o]bserves and analyzes trends in public opinion,” while also coordinating all of his unit’s contacts with the media. This resembled what was stated in FM 100-5 (1949). This officer was also responsible for writing an annex that contained “the public information portion of standing orders and of operation plans.” “Written annexes,” the authors of the 1950 manual also noted, “usually follow the five-paragraph form prescribed for the operation order,” which includes “situation, mission, execution, administration, and signal.” Surprisingly, the authors made no reference to what curricular documents used at CGSC such as the Public Information Manual (AY 1949), had called the “Staff Estimate [of] [t]he Public

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Relations Situation.” According to this document, a PIO used this estimate to develop the annex that describes how the unit would inform the public during an operation. This illuminates a gap in doctrine. The operations officer (G-3), the authors of the 1950 manual noted, was responsible for the “planning, coordination, and supervision of activities pertaining to . . . [t]roop information and education” (TI&E). It is worth noting that there was no section in this manual covering the duties of the staff officer responsible for TI&E. This flaw suggests that the leaders of DA believed that the duties of the officer who was to help each commander update his soldiers did not need to be described in doctrine.

DA published Special Regulation (SR) 355-20-1: Troop Information and Education in March 1953, which described the program. DA, the authors of this regulation wrote, would annually publish “[a] troop information quarterly guidance letter” which described the “certain areas to be stressed within the minimum standards for troop information.” This statement was similar to what was found in the CGSC-produced manual on troop information for AY 1949. This implied that the TI&E program was centrally run which might have contributed to the negative attitudes that existed around this program. The authors of the regulation also stated that “plans for major field exercises and maneuvers will include a troop information annex.” But the format of this annex was not specified. This was the first time that a requirement for this annex was codified in an official document. The troop information annex might have followed the same five-paragraph format for annexes listed in FM 101-5 (1950). At a minimum, the content of a troop information annex that was part of a combat order, the authors of the regulation noted, should describe the commander’s plan to use information to “combat enemy propaganda.”

In November 1954, DA published another version of FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Procedure that showed consistency, with the previous edition, in the description of the duties of three staff officers who were involved in the conduct of the Army Information Program (AIP)

298 DA, SR 355-20-1, Troop Information and Education, Troop Information, (March 1953), 5.
but also provided some development. The duties of a COI specified in this revised manual resembled those listed in the 1950 edition.\textsuperscript{299} A PIO, the authors of the 1954 edition reported, had three additional duties as compared with those listed in the 1950 version. First, the PIO “[c]oordinates all public information functions within the command and supervises such functions within the headquarters.” Second, he was to develop “positive and continuing public relations programs to gain and maintain public understanding, goodwill, and support.” The third additional duty was to “[inform] the troop information and education officer [regarding] material [available] for publication in unit newspapers and periodicals.”\textsuperscript{300} This last statement was the first in either this manual or FM 100-5 \textit{Operations} that a specific connection was made between the conduct of these two sub-programs of information program.

The authors of the 1954 edition created, for the first time in this manual, a separate section depicting the functions of a TI&E officer, just as had been done with the PIO in the 1950 edition. An example of a TI&E officer’s duties given in the 1954 version was that he “[advised] the commander and staff on all aspects of troop information and education.” He was also “[p]repares the troop information and education portions of plans and orders.” These were similar to the duties of the PIO listed in the 1950 edition. They also resembled those functions listed to be performed in SR 355-20-1. What had not changed was that the operations officer, at the corps and division level, retained the onus to integrate TI&E activities into all actions of the unit.\textsuperscript{301} Commanders and staff officers needed to know what the duties were for a staff officer who was responsible for either public information or troop information in order to effectively integrate them into all staff processes. The leaders of the Department of the Army (DA) were codifying in official documents, field manuals and a special regulation the importance of AIP and who was responsible for certain tasks. Doctrinal materials were important because officers used them both in school and in the field.

General Williston B. Palmer, the Vice Chief of Staff, explained, in the November 1956 edition of \textit{Army Information Digest}, why he separated “troop information” from “education.” He


believed that there was a divide within the chain of command about the benefits of the Army’s Troop information and Education (TI&E) program. Many commanders at division level and above, he stated, “backed [information and education] enthusiastically,” but commanders below the division level “denounced” it because they thought it was a “waste of time.” DA, he reasoned, was wrong to merge these subjects, because they were distinct. This false linkage, in all probability, added to the confusion that some officers had about the purpose of TI&E. Each commander was to use his “troop information program” (TIP) to explain to his soldiers, Palmer noted, why they were doing what they were doing and how their efforts contributed to the Army accomplishing its missions. Palmer’s description of troop information resembled what was included in the curriculum at CGSC between academic year (AY) 1947 and AY 1950. Although not discussed by Palmer, his description of the aim of the TIP supported a position taken by the Haislip Board (1947). For example, the Board had argued that, if troops were well informed, they might share their knowledge with their families and friends. In other words, a commander’s effective conduct of his TIP could contribute indirectly to winning public support for the Army. Palmer reported that “education” was a program that helped soldiers “keep up with their civilian school work, and round out deficiencies in their civilian educations.” By separating these functions, Palmer expected, all commanders would see the “high potential” for the TIP that he did. The decision to separate these functions, Palmer stated, resulted in placing “the Troop Information section of any staff with the Public Information section, the two heading up through a Chief of Information or (Information Officer) to the commander” and education “under the Personnel [B]ranch of the staff.” Palmer implied that, from now on, a staff officer at all echelons above division would integrate both public information and troop information, and this was a change. It would not be until AY 1959 that the curriculum at CGSC would combine

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304 Haislip Report, 61.
these subjects. Meanwhile, many lecturers at the War College had already been talking about how both sub-programs were linked.

Senior leaders of DA made a concerted effort to convince the officer corps of the need to explain the policies and actions of the Army to get the American people to support the service’s missions. The system that educates officers, especially the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and the Army War College, was a key means to convince future leaders about the value of the information function and how to perform it.

During these seven years the leaders of DA made one key change to how the service was organized. This modification was to establish the Continental Army Command (CONARC) on 01 February 1955 to replace the Army Field Forces. LTC John G. Blair, who was then assigned to CONARC, wrote in the October 1955 edition of Army Information Digest that the CG of CONARC, who would report to the CSA, retained responsibility for “all matters pertaining to training, equipment and material for individuals and units” that the Chief of Army Field Forces had held. This meant he had oversight of the majority of Army schools, including CGSC and the War College. General John E. Dahlquist, the first CG of CONARC, spoke to the class of AY 1955 at the Army War College. In his opinion, according to his lecture notes, the “overriding functions” of his command were “the development and teaching of [Army] doctrine, the development and testing of field equipment, and the training of individuals and units.” The CG of CONARC, along with the Commandant of each Army school, represented those who approved the curricula in the system that educates Army officers.

In an effort to achieve his mission in training, the CG of CONARC, like his predecessor, authorized his staff to publish a “Common Subjects Letter.” In this letter, the CG directed each Commandant of an Army school that he supervised to include certain subjects in their

For example, in the “Common Subjects Letter” for AY 1955, dated 25 March 1954, the Chief of Army Field Force ordered the Commandants at both CGSC and the War College to include topics such as “Public Information” and “Troop Information and Education” (TI&E) in their curriculum. The scope of the lesson about “Public Information,” in this letter, at both schools was nearly identical. The scope for the “Public Information” at CGSC was for each student to grasp the:

Effect of public opinion on Army plans and actions; necessity for public understanding and support; organization; public information vehicles, to include media and community agencies; public information planning; command and individual responsibilities and [the] role of the public information officer.

However, the scope listed in the advance sheet for this lesson at CGSC for AY 1955 was for students to learn “the purpose, scope, and methods of implementing the public information function with emphasis on the commander’s responsibility for this function and his discharge of it, particularly in combat.” This seemed to indicate a gap between what the leaders of the Army wanted and what was included in the curriculum. The one clear constant between both statements was that students would study the duties of a commander.

In this letter, the scope of the lesson on TI&E at these schools was similarly described. At CGSC, the authors of the letter wrote, each student was to study “the role of troop information and education as a means of maintaining and increasing the efficiency of the Army.” This seems different from what the scope of this lesson was at CGSC for AY 1955, according to curricular documents, which was for students to learn the “purpose, scope, and methods troop information and education (TI&E) in peace and in war with emphasis on the commander’s

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311 RG 546 Records of the United States Continental Army, US, Army Schools, 546/290/36/12/- 06- Command and General Staff, FT LV, KS, Box 11, 352 “Common Subjects Letter for Academic Year 54-55,” 74 and 77.
312 USACGSC, “Public Information,” 1 in Regular Course, 1954-1955, Command and General Staff College, Subjects 0 Thru 5104, Book -1.
313 RG 546 Records of the United States Continental Army, US, Army Schools, 546/290/36/12/- 06- Command and General Staff, FT LV, KS, Box 11, 352 “Common Subjects Letter for Academic Year 54-55,” 78.
At the War College, the authors of this letter stated, the scope of this lesson expanded upon what was covered at CGSC. Each student would also learn that TI&E was “one element in a three-fold informational and communicative relationship of the Army, as an institution, to the people of the United States. . . . The importance of this responsibility [was] at all echelons and its increasing importance at higher levels.” One possible reason that TI&E was more significant at the higher levels, the authors claimed, was because each senior commander had the responsibility “to fortify military personnel against enemy propaganda and subversion.” Although not in the letter, it is likely that the emphasis on troop information was related to preventing a repetition of what had happened when U.S soldiers taken as prisoners of war had collaborated with the North Koreans. One of the benefits of the public information and the TI&E programs that the leaders of CONARC were trying to show these future senior leaders was how these sub-programs helped to improve the public’s understanding of how the Army contributed to achieving the nation’s military objectives.

Field-grade officers and above needed to study topics that were broader than the skills that a company-grade officer had to know. John W. Masland and Laurence I. Radway’s Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and National Policy broadly described the framework of military education that existed in 1957, but they focused on one of the numerous topics that officers studied. They examined how senior officers, primarily field-grades and generals, were educated throughout their careers “to participate in the formulation and execution of the most diverse national security policies and programs.” The blurring of the “distinction between military and civilian affairs,” Masland and Radway noted, meant that the system which educated senior officers should include both what were called military subjects, which were those related to combat, and what were called non-military topics, which included those that were not directly connected to combat. Their conclusion agreed with the school of thought, which Ball notes

315 RG 546 Records of the United States Continental Army, US, Army Schools, 546/290/36/12-/06- Command and General Staff, FT LV, KS, Box 11, 352 “Common Subjects Letter for Academic Year 54-55,” 74-75 and 78.
317 Masland and Radway, Soldiers and Scholars, viii, xi and 25.
318 Ibid., vii-viii.
General Almond represented, advocating that senior officers needed to study more than just military topics.\(^{319}\) Students could study the troop information and the public information programs under both headings, military and non-military, because both were conducted during wartime and peacetime.

The Army was not alone in educating its future leaders to conduct public relations. Each service in the armed forces included a few topics about public relations in the curriculum of its equivalent to the Army’s “Command and General Staff School” (CGSS)\(^{320}\) and in that of its War College. Students attending each CGSS, according to Masland and Radway, studied certain topics such as how to integrate the branches or combat functions of that service. They also learned about “troop information and education” and “the problems of community and public relations and how to meet them.”\(^{321}\) As a means to help broaden the students’ knowledge after World War II, each service had increased the coverage of non-military topics in the curriculum of its War College.\(^{322}\) For example, the developers of the curriculum at the Army War College, they reported, allotted about two weeks early in each academic year for students to study the main actors who create national policy such as “the Presidency, the Department of State, the National Security Council, Congress, and so forth. This same course also examines certain selected domestic factors that influence policy formulation, such as public opinion.” Masland and Radway portray this instruction as “more descriptive than analytical,” which suggests a weakness in the education.\(^{323}\) This phrase accurately describes most of the instruction about public relations at the War College for the period of the Cold War.

There was some evidence outside the school system itself of the importance Army leaders gave to public affairs. The following four articles will demonstrate. LTC Richard W. Whitney, an instructor at CGSC, described public opinion in America as “a hulking giant” that was “moody, fickle, excitable, gullible, but above all, independent and invincible when


\(^{320}\) This is a generic name to represent all the intermediate level courses, because the actual name of the school for each service is different.

\(^{321}\) Masland and Radway, *Soldiers and Scholars*, 279-301. Quotation was from pages 284 and 301.

\(^{322}\) Ibid., 354.

\(^{323}\) Ibid., 361-362.
aroused.” In an article in the March 1951 edition of *Military Review*, Whitney argued that the government had “failed to provide this giant with the fundamentals of a sound and thorough education. . . . Specifically, we have neglected his education in the important fields of foreign and military policy.” Although his article focused on national policy, its main points also applied to the Army. There were three key items, Whitney determined, hindering the ability of the government to educate the public on national security, but only two will be described here. First, the government, Whitney asserted, usually classified its “information and intelligence (Information – the mere facts: Intelligence – the significance of those facts and the conclusions drawn therefrom).” He warned that “a blind and ruthless application of security to information or intelligence can deprive us of much of its value.” Whitney’s definition of information was similar to those used by Collins and Eddy. Second, the tendency of the government was “to ignore the value and need of united public support except in time of war.” This statement implied that there had been no consistent effort by the government or the Army to explain its actions to the public. That might have been true for the pre-World War II era, but the content of the curriculum at CGSC between AYs 1947 and 1950 suggest otherwise. Whitney also argued that “[t]he basic factors which have an adverse effect upon public opinion are: 1. Lack of adequate information. 2. Misinformation. 3. Confusion resulting from too much or contradictory information. 4. Ignorance[, and] 5. Prejudice.” The plan of the government, and the Army, must address how it would correct these noted deficiencies.

The government, Whitney suggested, should take three steps, only two of which will be described here, to facilitate the public’s understanding of the military. First, within established security protocols, the government should release all information that the American people needed to participate in discussions about both foreign and military policies. This resembled the

325 Ibid., 24.
326 Ibid., 25. Italics in original text.
329 Ibid., 27.
public information portion of AIP.\textsuperscript{330} This proposal seems to have been directed toward correcting the “[l]ack of information, [and] [m]isinformation.” Second, the government had to ensure that “our Nation’s leaders and policy-makers” do not make public statements on military policy that contradict each other.\textsuperscript{331} This seemed to target the third factor. The following example was not used by Whitney, but it effectively shows the “contradictory information” of which Whitney warned. An assertion by many senior defense leaders including Secretary of Defense Forrestal, which was part of the curriculum at CGSC for AY 1949 and AY 1950, in March 1948 to the Senate Armed Services Committee claimed that “the role of the Army has in fact become secondary.” But this conflicted with the statement that Forrestal made in an article written in 1949 in which he argued the Army was a very important part of the defense team.\textsuperscript{332} If the government adopted his suggestions, Whitney claimed, the gap between the knowledge of the public and the military about issues of national security might be decreased.\textsuperscript{333} Closing this gap could result in the public having a better understand of what the leaders of the Army were asking for and why it was needed.

The three Chiefs of Staff of the Army who served in the 1950s wrote about how to improve the effort of the Army to inform the American people. In the October 1952 edition of \textit{Army Information Digest}, General J. Lawton Collins, the Army Chief of Staff, published an article titled “Why Must We Inform Others?” that expressed the connections, in his opinion, between the Army’s task to inform the public, gaining support of the American people, and getting funding for the Army’s policies and programs. He argued that in a democracy both the military and civilians shared the responsibility for national security. He also stated that the Army must consider how the public might react in their planning efforts. Lastly, commanders must ensure that troops were informed since they were key “spokesmen” for the Army. “From the rawest recruits to the highest commanders,” Collins claimed, “this task of informing others is an

\textsuperscript{330} Ibid., 28-31.
\textsuperscript{331} Ibid., 27-32.
\textsuperscript{333} Whitney, “Mobilizing Public Opinion,” 31-32.
important responsibility which all of us must shoulder well."”

General Matthew B. Ridgway, the Army Chief of Staff between 1953 and 1955, added his own words to the other actions of the Army that explained to the officer corps why it needed to communicate with the public. In the August 1954 edition of the *Army Information Digest*, he wrote an article, based on a note that he had written to his senior commanders, which described his vision of how the Army would gain public support. Ridgway wanted all officers, especially commanders, to help him:

> . . . modify the philosophy which has for years guided the Army’s action in the field of public relations. This philosophy has influenced officers to remain aloof from the public and reticent on their few public appearances. We must become more articulate and develop a positive public relations attitude throughout the Army. Too many officers look upon public relations as a defensive operation rather than a living, dynamic one."

It is noteworthy that this article did not appear in any of the curricular documents at either school in the 1950s. He reiterated two key points of the program. First, commanders had to ensure that both their troop information and public information programs were effectively implemented, which would contribute “to [informing] the American public fully of [the Army’s] activities and accomplishments.” The intent of these programs, Ridgway stated, was for the public to have “confidence in Army personnel, policies and management, and to widen public understanding that the Army is performing loyally and intelligently in support of national aims and public interest.”

Ridgway wanted each commander to consider how to conduct both programs as a part of their decision-making process. Second, the system that educates Army officers must help each student learn about his duty to assist his commander to effectively conduct both

337 Ibid., 2-5.
information programs. Overall, Ridgway wanted to create “a public relations-conscious Army.” This could be accomplished, he stated, by including lessons “in troop and public information” programs in the curricula of the Army school system that increased in complexity the more senior the school was in the hierarchy. Ridgway’s article was itself an example of troop information for other commanders to emulate.

In an article in the January 1956 edition of The Army Combat Force Journal, BG A.T. McAnsh questioned whether the Army understood its requirement to report to the public. He asked why “two successive Chiefs of Staff,” Generals Matthew Ridgway and Maxwell Taylor, had to send notes directing their subordinates to personally place emphasis on explaining the Army to the public. McAnsh used both Ridgway’s August 1954 note, already described, and excerpts from Taylor’s letter from September 1955 to indicate that the most senior military officer in the Army, at that time, was unsatisfied with how the Army was providing information to the public. Taylor told his subordinates, as McAnsh reported it, the service had “been slow and relatively inept in discharging the corollary responsibility of making the Army known at its true worth.” He proposed that the Army should follow the example of how the leaders of civilian companies conducted public relations. Leaders tried to convince their workers that they had a quality product, and then both the company and employees informed the public of that fact. Based on the action of these three CSAs, they were focused on getting the officer corps to accept its duty to keep the American people informed. The articles by Collins and Ridgway suggested that they were not solely relying on the school system to apprise the officer corps about the importance of the information program.

Together these factors set the changing conditions for how the Army was to educate its field-grade officers on their duties. The continued evolution of doctrine would continue throughout the Cold War era. Senior leaders would continue to write and speak about the duty of the Army to keep the public informed on what it was doing.

338 Ibid., 3-5.
339 Ibid., 2-5.
341 Ibid., 22-25.
Command and General Staff College

The re-opening of the Army War College for academic year (AY) 1951 caused a change in the scope of the curriculum at CGSC. Starting in AY 1951 and lasting through AY 1957, the aim of the curriculum at CGSC was constant. For example, as the authors of curricular documents for AYs 1954 through AY 1957 noted, the curriculum at CGSC was “to prepare officers for duty as commanders and general staff officers at division, corps, and army levels, and at comparable levels in the communications zone.” No longer was this curriculum to teach officers to be staff officers at echelons above an army.342 Starting in AY 1958, two additions were made to the statement of purpose that was relevant to this study. The leaders of the College stated that graduates would also learn tasks they would perform during “peace or war” in both tactical and “[non-tactical] headquarters.”343 CONARC was an example of a non-tactical headquarters. The 1958 changes implied an increase in topics to be covered in the curriculum.

In October 1954, the Chief of Army Field Forces told MG Garrison H. Davidson, the Commandant of CGSC, that the Department of the Army (DA) had approved Davidson’s request to have a “Board of Review” examine how CGSC developed its curriculum.344 In 1956, the


343 USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 250-0-1, Command and General Staff Officer Course, Regular Course, 1957-1958, Approved by CG, CONARC, 1 in POI-Command and General Staff Officer Regular Course 250-1-0, CGSC 1958 .

Board, in its “Report of the Educational Survey Commission,” made two main criticisms of the curriculum and proposed changing the instructional methods used by the College. First, the “[classroom environment was] mechanically rigid and often [showed] excessive adherence to the meticulously prepared and detailed lesson plan.” Second, instructional methods were “instructor-subject matter centered.”

“[O]n the whole,” members of the Board concluded, “the present College classroom methods are more suited to the branch schools and undergraduate training than to the best graduate schools.” A key recommendation of the Board was: “Instructional units [should] be planned, in general, for the learning of principles and the application of them in problem situations, rather than for the mastering of information and skills.” This aligns with the emphasis on application as a method of instruction, which represents active learning.

The curriculum at CGSC underwent a major revision for AY1958. MG Lionel C. McGarr, the Commandant of CGSC, had directed a “reasoned revolutionary approach” to educating officers versus an “evolutionary approach” in his April 1957 article titled “Keep Pace With the Future.” The students, McGarr ordered, were to study how to employ the Army across a “vast panorama of possible battlefields. These may well stretch from the cold war to the unlimited nuclear holocaust.”

The curriculum would be based on the new divisional organization, Pentomic, designed to fight in an atomic environment. A. J. Bacevich in The Pentomic Era says that each formation from company to division was based on having five subordinate units, where previously there had been three – for example, five platoons per infantry company. Battalions or battlegroups would be the headquarters organization between the

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345 Ibid., 18-20 and 22.

346 Ibid., 5.

347 Ibid., 17.


This new structure removed an echelon of command – the regiment or brigade that had been between the battalion and the division. The new structure increased the span of control of a division commander, from three subordinates to five, which meant that he would have to rely more heavily on his staff officers to understand what was going on. McGarr accepted some of the suggestions of the 1956 educational survey such as for the students to learn principles to help them make decisions.

Between AY 1951 and AY 1958, there was a trend to decrease the total number of hours given for the curriculum. For example, for AY 1951 and AY 1952 the average was 1240, which was an increase of about 40 from previous two years. The average total hours for the curriculum for the period AY 1955 and AY 1956 was about 1230, which represents a drop of ten hours compared to AYs 1951 and 1952. The developers of the curriculum for AY 1958 decreased the number of hours for the curriculum, which had 1172 hours in the curriculum, about 60 hours when compared to AYs 1955 and 1956. It is interesting that the number of hours declined, but what the leaders expected the students to learn increased.

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352 McGarr, “USA Command and General Staff College: Keeping Pace with the Future,” 5-7.
The number of hours that the developers of the curriculum allotted to teach public relations also continued to decline. This seems counter to Ridgway’s and Taylor’s desires.\textsuperscript{356} Eleven hours were given to teach about public relations in AY 1951, and six hours in AY 1952.\textsuperscript{357} For the period AY 1954 and AY 1955 there were four hours given to teach this subject, then in AYs 1956 and AY 1957 there were only two hours.\textsuperscript{358} The reason for the decline in hours between AY 1955 and AY 1956 was those deciding on the curriculum chose not to have the students study about public information, which broke a trend that began in AY 1947. In a curricular document for AY 1956 the lesson titled “Public Information” was listed as “[r]etired.” But there was no explanation of why it was discontinued.\textsuperscript{359} From AYs 1954 through AY 1957, the only constant related to public relations was that a two-hour lesson on TI&E was part of the curriculum.\textsuperscript{360} For AY 1958, the developers allotted three hours.\textsuperscript{361} From AY 1951 through AY 1958 was another example, for the most part, of developers of the curriculum giving students less time to learn about conducting the information program of the Army.

Between AY 1951 and AY 1955, the authors of the lessons about informing the public were consistent in what they wanted students to learn. For example, the authors for AYs 1953 through AY 1955, resembling those of AY 1949 and AY 1950, wrote, in the advance sheet, that the students would study the “purpose, scope, and methods” of the program “particularly in

\begin{footnotes}
\item[357] USACGSC, \textit{Program of Instruction for Regular Course}, (AY 1951), 3, 7, 19 and 109. USACGSC, \textit{Schedule, Regular Course}, (AY 1952), 25-27, and 33. USACGSC, \textit{Summary of the Regular Course, The Command and General Staff College}, (AY 1953), inclosure 1, 1 and 5. The eight hours is based on having two lectures, each of two hours, and a two hour lesson on each public information and troop information.
\item[361] USACGSC, \textit{Program of Instruction for Command and General Staff Course, Regular Course} (AY 1958), 44.
\end{footnotes}
combat.”\textsuperscript{362} The developers of the curriculum for AY 1951 used two lessons for students to learn about informing the public, just as in AY 1950. One was titled “Public Information” and another “Public and Troop Information in Wartime.”\textsuperscript{363} For AY 1953 through AY 1955, students learned about the public information program in a single lesson covering both wartime and peacetime.\textsuperscript{364} The authors typically had students read both the advance sheet and one other document. The readings from AYs 1953 through AY 1955 will illustrate. The students for these three years read both the supplemental material in the advance sheet and parts of Army Regulation (AR) 360-5, \textit{Public Information}, which the Army Chief of Staff authorized.\textsuperscript{365} For these three years the material in the advance sheet was divided into two parts: “Part One: The Public Information Program” and “Part Two: Public Information Program in Wartime.”\textsuperscript{366} Having a program to inform the public of its actions was not a new concept for the Army after World War II. For example, the authors of the supplemental material for AY 1951 and AY 1953 wrote that prior to World War II the leaders of DA “had a policy which called for a public information program. Unfortunately, this policy was rarely translated into action.”\textsuperscript{367} In the post-World War II era, the


\textsuperscript{367} USACGSC, “Public Information,” (AY 1951), 1. USACGSC, “Public Information,” (AY 1953), 1. Italics in the original text.
leaders at DA were actively trying to ensure that their policy for informing the public was known well by the officer corps and was effectively implemented.

Some topics covered in the material for AY 1953 through AY 1955 resembled each other. For example, the authors of the supplemental material for AYs 1953 and 1954, echoing what was included in the Public Information Manual (AY 1949), asserted that the “Estimate of the Public Information Situation” should follow the standard Army estimate format, which used five-paragraphs. Also, the PIO would use this estimate to develop a “public information plan” for his unit. For AY 1955, the paragraph on the estimate was not included. Not discussing this estimate, which, according to the authors of the advance sheet for AY 1953, was the foundation for the public information plan, did not make sense. The authors of the material for AYs 1953 through AY 1955 included a paragraph titled “The Public Information Plan,” which described how the commander wanted to inform the public of the actions of the unit. They claimed that this plan would cover the “objectives” to be achieved, the “means” for accomplishing the objectives, and the amount of time covered by the plan. It is interesting that curricular documents at CGSC explained this estimate and its usage, but field manuals did not. This suggests a gap between what the College was teaching, on the one hand, and doctrine, on the other. This gap needed to be corrected because it could contribute to the confusion of the officer corps about this program.

The second section of the material between AYs 1953 and 1955 described how to conduct this program during wartime. There was a key difference in the aim of a commander’s public information program (PIP) between peacetime and wartime. During peacetime, the authors asserted, a commander focused his public information program on “the community

369 USACGSC, “Public Information,” (AY 1953), 7
where he was stationed,” but in wartime it was focused on the national public. In wartime, a key task for each commander and his staff was to get correspondents to those events they thought were “most newsworthy.” How the unit was to care for the correspondents was to be described in the public information plan. “Troop information programs, augmenting public information,” the authors of the material noted, “ensure that the men respect and have confidence in themselves, their units, and the Army.” Another benefit from informing the public, the authors reported, was that the “fighting effectiveness [of a unit] is greatly enhanced when troops realize that their efforts are appreciated at home.” The authors of this lesson from AY 1953 through AY 1955 inextricably linked public information and troop information.

Showing a degree of consistency with AYs 1949 and 1950, the authors of the advance sheet for the lesson titled “Public Information” between AY 1951 and AY 1955 included a least one sample document concerning public relations to which each student could refer during class and after graduation. For instance, the authors for AY 1950 and AY 1951, included the “Public Information” annex for DA’s “Plan for Expansion of the Army.” The authors of this annex described the aim of public information as getting the support of the American people for expanding the Army, if required, as well as stating the tasks that were assigned to subordinates to achieve this goal. The authors of this annex also made reference to the need to coordinate the actions related to public information with those who talked with the troops. The content of this

annex resembled what was required for a public information plan as listed in the supplemental materials for AY 1953 through AY 1955.\footnote{USACGSC, “Public Information,” (AY 1953), 7. USACGSC, “Public Information,” (AY 1954), 7-8. USACGSC, “Public Information,” (AY 1955), 7-8.} The authors for AY 1953 through AY 1955 also included a list of “Ground Rules for Army Public Information,” which resembled those in the AY 1949 lesson about “Army Organization and Policy for Information.” One example of these rules from AY 1953 and AY 1954 was: “The people are \textit{entitled} to know about their Army. Only legitimate military secrets should be withheld.” Another urged that soldiers “[a]lways adhere to the Army’s basic virtue: \textit{honesty}.”\footnote{USACGSC, “Army Organization and Policy for Information,” (AY 1949), 6-7. Italics in the original. USACGSC, “Public Information,” (AY 1954), 18. USACGSC, “Public Information,” (AY 1955), II-1 to III-6. Italics in the original.} The emphasis on honesty was also seen in the majority of the lessons on public information between AYs 1947 and AY 1953, and it was seen in curricular documents throughout the Cold War.\footnote{USACGSC, “Army Organization and Policy for Information,” (AY 1949), 1-5. USACGSC, “War Department Information Program,” (AY 1947), 12-13. USACGSC, “Public Information,” (AY 1953), AS-2-1. USACGSC, “Army Organization and Policy for Information,” (AY 1949), 6-7. Italics in the original. USACGSC, “Public Information,” (AY 1954), 18. USACGSC, “Public Information,” (AY 1955), III-1 to III-6. Italics in the original.}

Students attending CGSC had opportunities to simulate the application of what they were learning about explaining the actions of the Army to the public during both wartime and peacetime. Examples from AY 1951 and AY 1955 will illustrate. One wartime scenario, used in both years and also in AY 1950, had each student act as the commanding general of a division who had to accept or reject the wording of portions of the public information program proposed to him by his staff or by the public information officer (PIO). For example, in AY 1955 the PIO suggested: “Because the morale and \textit{esprit} of the division depends on its good reputation, correspondents will be denied any information likely to result in unfavorable publicity.” But the staff proposed: “Information which may result in unfavorable publicity will be released only through the PIO.”\footnote{USACGSC, “Public and Troop Information in Wartime,” (AY 1951), I-1. USACGSC, “Public Information,” (AY 1953), II-1. USACGSC, “Public and Troop Information in Wartime,” (AY 1950), I-1. USACGSC, “Public Information,” (AY 1954), II-1. USACGSC, “Public Information,” (AY 1955), II-1.} Another hypothetical wartime scenario, included in both AYs (and in AY 1950 as well), was that a reporter saw a regimental commander strike an enlisted man. The
correspondent told the student, acting as that division’s commander, what had happened and added that he was going to write a story about it. The student had to determine what he would say to the reporter.\textsuperscript{382} In a peacetime scenario from both AY 1951, and between AY 1953 and AY 1955, an “editor of a civilian newspaper in the adjoining community” called the student, who was the Chief of Staff of an installation, about an altercation which resulted in injuries that had taken place at the home of an officer. The student had to determine how to respond and what, if any, information should be released.\textsuperscript{383} All of these situations had students deciding how they would comply with the intent of the leaders at DA for the information program and provide factual information to the press even though it might be unflattering for their unit and the Army. It should also be noticed that in most of these scenarios the student was cast as a commander. This made him take responsibility for his decisions.

From AY 1951 through AY 1957, students also studied how the leaders of the Army wanted them to keep their soldiers informed about what the service was doing. The lessons between AY 1953 and AY 1957 will illustrate. For example, according to the advance sheet for AY 1953 through AY 1955 and AY 1957, this lesson was “to develop the purpose, scope, and methods of troop information and education (TI&E) in peace and in war with emphasis on the commander’s responsibility for this function.”\textsuperscript{384} As evidence of consistency, this purpose resembled that of the lessons included in AY 1949 through AY 1951.\textsuperscript{385} For only AY 1951 and


AY 1953, the authors of this lesson required each student to read the supplemental material, which included extracts from the report of the “President’s Committee on Religion and Welfare in the Armed Forces (Weil Commission),” which was publicly released in December 1949.\textsuperscript{386}

The report of the Weil Commission was important because it outlined ways to fix the problems that had been identified in how the armed forces conducted their TI&E programs. In its report the Commission concluded: “Lack of command support, especially at the operating level, is the most serious handicap to successful implementation of the I&E program. This lack of command support is accentuated by neglect of [this] program in officer training schools and staff colleges.” To correct these problems, the Commission recommended, according to the advance sheet for AY 1951, that the Army school system should educate all officers about the “policies, programs and techniques” of this program.\textsuperscript{387} By this statement the Commission implied two key points. One was that instruction in TI&E was not included in curricula of the system that educated officers which for the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) was not accurate. The other was that the lack of support given by senior commanders for TI&E was due, in part, to them not being convinced of this program’s value or benefits. This had to change to make the program effective.

Although the lesson was titled “Troop Information and Education,” the authors of the material and exercises for AY 1953 thru AY 1955 and AY 1957 emphasized only troop information. The authors used about a third of the nine pages of each version of the supplemental material to describe what they called “Troop Information in Combat.” They wrote: “Each piece of information [given to the soldier in combat] must be meaningful and must serve one or all of the following purposes: To create and sustain the will to fight. . . . To sustain morale. . . . [and] . . . To make combat power effective.” For example, in the section “[t]o sustain morale,” they asserted that a commander could use his troop information program to counter “[r]umors” which


\textsuperscript{387} USACGSC, “Troop Information and Education,” (AY 1951), 1-8. USACGSC, “Troop Information and Education,” (AY 1951), 1-12.

“create uncertainty . . . where in reality none exists.” The authors claimed that in combat a commander typically provided official information to his troops by two primary means. One was directly from “[t]he commander.” The other was in material provided by the chain of command such as “news sheets, periodicals, pictures, handbooks, and radio programs.” These two methods of dissemination show that in order to have a successful program the commander had to be involved.

Exercises concerning TI&E between AY 1951 and AY 1957 included both peacetime and wartime situations. Indicating a degree of continuity, one scenario was included in the majority of the lesson from AY 1951 through AY 1957, and was also used during AY 1950. In this exercise, each student was cast as a newly assigned Chief of Staff of a division that was moving overseas in the near future. A regimental commander told the student, according to the advance sheet from AYs 1953 and 1954, that “we [do not] get the help we need from division headquarters in running the TI&E program.” This commander thought that division should, among other things: “a. Brief company discussion leaders. b. Have a division newspaper. c. Provide TI&E program supplies and materials.” Each student had to state which functions belonged to the division and which were the responsibility of subordinate commanders. This situation provided each student with an occasion to delineate, at least in his own mind, the responsibilities of the commander of both a division and a brigade.

Between AY 1951 and AY 1957, wartime scenarios were used to expose each student to two different perspectives on troop information. The general scenario for many of these exercises was that the nation called “Aggressor,” which was ideologically opposed to the U.S., had gone to war with the nation called “Outland,” a U.S. ally. A couple of Aggressor’s allies had invaded


Outland, and the U.S. mobilized its military.\textsuperscript{391} The first perspective was that of an operations officer (G-3) of a division who, according to FM 101-5 (1950), was the staff officer responsible for TI&E.\textsuperscript{392} In this scenario, the publishers of a newspaper \textit{The World Citizen}, who supported the claims of the leaders of Aggressor, depicted the “[p]olicies of the [U.S.] Army . . . as deliberately militaristic and unjust” that were “aimed at enslaving the soldier.” Many of the soldiers in his division, the student learned, had accepted this as true. He had to propose options to his commander to refute the paper’s claims.\textsuperscript{393} This situation provided the student with a chance to consider how to mentally prepare his soldiers to resist propaganda, while also complying with freedom of the press. Both of these aims were critical to the success of AIP.

The other point of view was that of the commanding general of a division who had been in combat for some time in Outland. In this situation each student, cast as the division commander, was told that some of his forces had witnessed twenty men from their division being executed by the enemy. The student had to choose between four options for responding to this incident and then justify his choice. The G-3 of the division recommended that his commander should disseminate all of the facts that they knew about the shooting. The options presented were: “a. Approve the action recommended by the G3. b. Withhold this information since the facts will spread quickly without command action. c. Disseminate the facts, but caution the command against reprisals in kind. d. Withhold this information because dissemination will serve no useful purpose.”\textsuperscript{394} Apart from forcing each student to determine what the solution he


\textsuperscript{392} DA, FM 101-5, (1950), 12.


thought best for his mission, his unit, and his soldiers, this exercise also provided him with an opportunity to develop a plan to explain his decision to both his soldiers and the American people. Through the exercises, the authors of these lessons helped their students learn about the purpose and scope of the TI&E program. They also, in some ways, reinforced the connections between informing the troops and the public.

The curriculum for academic year (AY) 1958 was significantly different from that of previous years because there was no lesson on either the public information or the troop information programs. Only one lesson, “The Airborne Division . . . in Peacetime: Community Relations,” covered any part of AIP in the curriculum. This lesson was three hours long and consisted of a lecture and practical exercises. This was the first time in the post-World War II period when a lesson focused solely on how to conduct community relations was in the core curriculum. The scope of this lesson, according to the POI for AY 1958, was for students to study about how the “[p]lanning and execution of a comprehensive community relations program” could “ease tensions and disagreements causing poor community relations.” No reason was found to explain why the developers of this lesson used an airborne division, in particular, as the focus of instruction. One possible reason was to have the student plan to deal with expected complaints from civilians about the noise made by the aircraft needed to support that kind of unit.

The number of hours that the developers of the curriculum allocated for students to study the information program continued to vary, as seen in the previous chapter. But the content of the instruction on public information and TI&E represented a degree of continuity within these eight years and with a few of the previous academic years. For example, there were similarities in the assigned readings, such as learning about the “Estimate of the Public Information Situation.” Also there were similarities in use of certain practical exercises. The content of these lessons reinforced two key points. First, commanders were responsible for their information programs. Second, commanders relied on the advice of their staff officers. Even though these lessons were, for the most part, taught separately, the developers of these lessons wanted each student to understand both so that their effects would interact. By keeping the public informed and showing

395 USACGSC, Program of Instruction for Command and General Staff Course, Regular Course (AY 1958), 44.
396 USACGSC, Program of Instruction for Command and General Staff Course, Regular Course (AY 1958), 44.
that the service was honest, the leaders of DA hoped, the American people would help them keep the Army as a key part of DoD.

**Army War College**

In the October 1950 edition of *Army Information Digest*, MG Joseph M. Swing, who was the Commandant of the War College in 1950, described his vision of the educational methodology for this college. The aim of the curriculum, Swing said, was for each student to gain “a broad understanding of our national security problems, the Army’s peacetime problems and the problems of war planning.”

“Guest lecturers,” he stated would, “provide basic information on subjects under study. The analyses and conclusions presented by these lecturers afford important source material for the students in their studies.” Also, “[t]he basic method of instruction is through the solution of problems in committees, followed by the presentation of committee solutions for class-wide discussion.” “Each committee,” Swing asserted, “will normally consist of from six to eight students assisted by a faculty representative.” Just as at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), the developers of the curriculum at the War College gave students opportunities to apply what they were learning from the readings and lecture within a scenario. Each student, he noted, would also write “one individual thesis and will make [an] oral presentation to all or a portion of the class.” In short, Swing wanted to create an environment where each student would actively participate in his education; this was adult education.

The statements of the mission in the curriculum at the War College for AY 1951 and AY 1952 were similar. Using language resembling what had been recommended by the Eddy Board, the authors of the pamphlet that described the curriculum for AY 1952 wrote:

The mission of the Army War College is to prepare officers for duty as commanders and as general staff officers within the headquarters of the army group, corresponding communications zone activities, theater Army, theater, zone

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of interior army, and the Department of the Army, with emphasis on the Army Staff.\textsuperscript{400}

This statement of purpose was similar to that of CGSC for AYs 1951 through AY 1957, which was to prepare commanders and staff officers, but the echelons were complementary.\textsuperscript{401}

LTG Edward M. Almond, who was the Commandant of the Army War College from August 1951 to December 1952, invited a “Civilian Advisory Group” to examine the conduct of the curriculum and to suggest ways to improve it during a three-day meeting in January 1952.\textsuperscript{402}

The authors of “Report on the Army War College, by the Civilian Advisory Group” stated “that the College is fulfilling its mission.”\textsuperscript{403} The group also endorsed the educational methods the College used.\textsuperscript{404}

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\textsuperscript{403} “Report on the Army War College, by the Civilian Advisory Group,” (January 1952), 1.

\textsuperscript{404} Ibid., 1-2.
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The report did contain a few specific recommendations. One proposal was to increase the number of hours allocated in the curriculum to “non-military subjects.”\textsuperscript{405} The group also suggested a few non-military topics, according to the report, the students should study such as “the whole complex of problems that bear upon the relationship between the armed services and the civilian population both at home and abroad.”\textsuperscript{406} Also, the group thought that each senior Army officer must have:

an understanding of the potential stresses and strains involved in partial mobilization and preparedness in peacetime for a possibly protracted period of stalemate. The impact on the Army, budget-wise and in terms of morale, is obvious and wise public relations may assume an even greater significance during such periods than in periods of heightened tension.\textsuperscript{407}

The group thus explicitly noted that the need for each student to learn why the Army developed its information program, what the components of this program were, and how to successful conduct it. Almond used this group’s findings, Ball argues, to support his request for a change in the statement of the mission for the College.\textsuperscript{408}

There were two schools of thought on what subjects should be included in the formal education of a senior military officer. Harry Ball says that “there was what might be called the philosophical dimension; that is, just what knowledge and capabilities were necessary for senior professional military officers?” Generals Manton Eddy and Mark Clark, acting for one school of thought, advocated that the education of senior officers should focus on ways to employ military forces to achieve a military objective. The statement of the mission of the curriculum at the War College for AYs 1951 and 1952 represented this school.\textsuperscript{409} Ball asserts that General Almond,


\textsuperscript{407} Ibid., 3.


acting for the other school, believed that senior officers should learn about “the broader political, economic, and social contexts in which armed forces are employed” in addition to the necessary military skills.\footnote{Ball, \textit{Of Responsible Command}, 301-302.} Almond officially requested permission to change the statement of the mission for the school in February 1952. In his letter to the Army Chief of Staff, Almond argued that he wanted this statement, Ball notes, to reflect that each student would examine broad topics such as “national policy, national security organization, strategic planning and employment of the Armed Forces . . . with emphasis on the Army.”\footnote{Ibid., 294, 298-300 and 307.} General Mark Clark, Almond’s superior, passed Almond’s request to the Department of the Army (DA), but also included his own recommendation. Clark wanted the curriculum, Ball reports, to focus on “the application of military power on land” and limit the number of topics “that are not primarily United States Army affairs.”\footnote{Ibid., 299-300.} In the end, General John Hull, the Vice Chief of Staff, approved a modified version of Clark’s suggestion. The authors of the pamphlet that described the curriculum at the War College for AY 1953 wrote:

> to prepare selected Army officers for duty as commanders and as general staff officers at the highest United States Army levels through courses of instruction not included in army schools of a lower category.\footnote{AY, Curriculum Guide and Reference Course 1, National Policy and Security, Part 1, Strategic Intelligence, to Course III, War Planning, Part 3, Theater Planning, 22 June 52-June 53, Box 1952/1953-1, Folder – Secretariat, Curriculum Pamphlet, AY 1953, 1. Ball, \textit{Of Responsible Command}, 299-302.}

This debate reflected the tension that existed among those who determined the content of the curriculum at the War College, to include whether to teach public relations, well into the future. Public relations was among the subjects that some developers of the curriculum would not want to include at the War College but others would.

greater attention to preparing students for positions outside of the Army. For example, the curriculum had to prepare the students not only “for the highest command and general staff positions within the Army” but also for similar “positions within the Department of Defense or other governmental agencies.” These changes indicated a trend. The curriculum at the War College increasingly focused on educating the students about how the Army operated within Defense rather than about internal issues in the Army.

MG James E. Moore, who was the Commandant of the Army War College in 1954, invited another civilian advisory group, the authors of “A Review of the Army School System” (1955) reported, “to examine all aspects of the College for the purpose of making recommendations for the improvement of the College.” The object of this group resembled that given to a similarly purposed advisory group that had operated in 1952. In its report, the advisory group of 1954, echoing a conclusion of the 1952 advisory group, endorsed both “the use of the committee system as a principal means of instruction” and the requirement for each student to write an individual paper. The 1954 group also “concluded that the degree of emphasis placed on national and international affairs, policy formulation, and joint and strategic war plans is about in the right proportion.” It was through studying of national affairs that


students had chances to learn how the Army could, to the best effect, describe its actions and achievements to the American people.

Between AY 1951 and AY 1958, the curriculum at the War College reflected the desire of MG Swing to have a mixture of guest speakers, committee work, and individual study. At the War College, the usual sequence of events which occurred in the conduct of each course was that the students would listen to at least one lecturer and then the faculty assigned students to committees to work on their given problems. Annually the War College issued a document that described the curriculum, which was similar to the “Program of Instruction” at CGSC. During this period, lectures about public relations were usually included in the first three courses of the curriculum. The length of time allotted for each lecture was not specified in curricular documents; however, in his October 1950 article, Swing stated that “lectures are approximately fifty minutes in length, followed by a break, after which a discussion period is conducted.”

It is worth noting that the lack of consistency that marked the curriculum at CGSC about students studying public relations was also seen at the War College. For example, the Chief of Information (COI) at DA was either scheduled to talk to a class or lecture notes were found of that address only for the classes of AY 1951, AY 1953, AY 1955 and AY 1958. The following will examine the content of lectures by both a few civilians and the COI.

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The content of lectures concerning public opinion varied. The following five lectures will illustrate. Journalist Wallace R. Deuel spoke to the class of AY 1952 about “Public Opinion as a Factor in the Formulation of Foreign Policy.”422 In his speech, Deuel drew on Rudyard Kipling’s poem about how the British public viewed the soldier in an effort to explain the wide variation in public opinion that these future leaders might have to contend with – “[w]hen he’s wanted he’s the darling of everybody’s eye and heart, and when he’s not wanted he’s scum.”423 In a crisis, Kipling thought, the public, loved soldiers. Yet when the public did not see a crisis, the soldier was taken as a drain on society. These views, Deuel implied, were also applicable in America in the 1950s.424 Agreeing with LTC Whitney’s proposals, Deuel implied that the Army had to explain, clearly and concisely, its action to the American people to obtain their support.425 The support of the public was needed to prevent the Army from becoming a back-up force to the other services.

The next year, Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr. told the class at the War College that, in his opinion, the requirements that had been placed on senior officers were more than those placed on their pre–World War II predecessors. In his lecture titled “Problems and Developments of the Army Today,” he justified this assertion by stating, “added to your old requirement of having to plan for and fight a war when it comes, you are now likewise charged with the greater and more important responsibility of preventing a war.”426 The skills that an officer needed, he believed, were divided into two broad areas: international and domestic.427 The following will address only the domestic situation.

424 Ibid., 11-17.
427 Pace, “Problems and Developments of the Army Today,” 2-3.
In the domestic arena, Pace claimed, an officer must understand the “political strengths and limitations of [the American] democracy.” The government, he argued, must explain to the public, in language it can understand, the reasons for each defense program being discussed. If the public did not understand what each program either prevented or enabled the Army was less likely to get it funded.\(^\text{428}\) Pace’s claim resembled what Whitney had argued the Army needed to do in his 1951 article and Deuel in his 1952 lecture.\(^\text{429}\) Agreeing with the Civilian Advisory Group that visited the War College in 1952, Pace also said that senior officers had to understand the cost of preparedness to the other national priorities.\(^\text{430}\) Pace was trying to persuade the students why they, as senior leaders, had to explain the Army to the public. In short, these future leaders had to show the American people why it was in their interest to support each program. What he did not emphasize was the need to communicate these messages to those in the service.

The next three lectures concentrated on helping the students to see connections between the opinion of the public and the development of national policy. Journalist Mark S. Watson spoke to the class of AY 1954 about why each student, as a future leader, had to help the leaders of the service to gain the support of the American people. “[T]he Army has a measure of responsibility,” Watson argued, “active as well as passive – that is, not merely in explaining an embarrassing fact that is pointed out, but in actively and of its own initiative presenting a fact of proper public interest.”\(^\text{431}\) In his lecture titled “The Role of Public Opinion and Minority Groups in Government and in National Policy Formulation” he introduced the students to the amount of ambiguity that existed in public opinion. As a reporter who had previously covered DA, he understood that the military wanted, according to his lecture notes, “information of a positive and fixed nature, and for judgments which are absolute rather than relative.” This expectation, he asserted, was unrealistic, especially when it came to public opinion. He told the students, “the public is not a single body” but was composed of many “pressure groups” which might have

\(^{428}\) Pace, “Problems and Developments of the Army Today,” 6-7.
conflicting opinions on a subject. As a result, public opinion was fluid and could change rapidly. He also warned the class:

a hostile public opinion will defeat a program, either quickly or in time, and at whatever of these several stages the program may be. I will go further, and suggest that in many instances there must be a positively friendly public opinion, for apathy can be as menacing as hostility.

The leaders of DA needed, he proposed, to develop and execute a plan to “cultivate” public opinion to support its programs and actions. Watson’s advice for a plan resembled that of the Haislip Board (1947). AIP was the Army’s plan to obtain friendly public opinion. The messages of the Army must aim at both those people who supported the position of the Army and those then against it. Not addressing both implied that the opinions of those who were not favorably inclined were immutable. Watson justified why the Army’s effort in public relations had to be effective, but did not address how the Army explained its actions to the troops.

Gabriel A. Almond, a Professor of Public and International Affairs at Princeton, spoke at the College on 4 January 1956 about “Public Opinion, Mass Communications and the Formulation of National Security Policy.” The scope of his address, the directive for the course “National Security Policy Formulation” listed, was:

A broad treatment of the role of the American public and media of mass communication in the development of national security policy, and an assessment of the effectiveness of media of mass communication in their role of insuring accurate and complete two-way communication between policy makers and the citizenry.


Using this speech as its basis, Almond wrote the article “Public Opinion and National Security Policy,” which was published that summer in *Public Opinion Quarterly*.437

In his article, Almond described connections between how the public viewed the Army and national policy. “National security policy,” Almond noted, “is that part of a nation’s foreign policy which is concerned with the allocation of resources for the production, deployment, and employment” of military forces.438 “[T]he relation of public opinion and national security policy,” Almond said, was difficult to determine exactly. This was due to “the highly technical nature of most of the issues of security policy,” the need for “secrecy in the handling of security policy information,” and risks that the leaders had to accept in developing and executing security policy.439 Furthermore, he argued that:

Any thoroughgoing analysis of the process by means of which national security policy is made will have to cover five elements – (a) the formal governmental agencies including the Executive and the Congress, (b) the media of communication, (c) interest groups, (d) the attentive public, and (e) the mass public.440

Any information plan concerning national defense, Almond argued, should “have as its main aim the creation of an attentive public competent to handle the issues of national security policy.” He defined the “attentive public” as “a stratum of public opinion which is more analytically oriented to problems of public affairs, which is regularly informed on these issues, and which constitutes a critical audience for the discussion of public issues.”441

He proposed four methods for increasing the number of people who were in this “attentive public,” but DA was able to influence only two of them. First, the Army needed to have “specialists [who were competent] in the media of communication to ensure that the issues of security policy will be rapidly and accurately transmitted throughout the significant strata of the population.”442 This was the information officer. However, if the leaders could not integrate the work of this officer into the planning process, then having that capability was not relevant.

438 Ibid., 371.
439 Ibid., 371-372.
440 Ibid., 373.
441 Ibid., 377.
442 Ibid., 377.
Second, and, more importantly, DA required a certain number of its senior leaders who were “capable of organizing” the views of DA on topics of national security policy and then explaining them to the public. If the leaders of DA wanted the support of the American public, he argued, then they and the rest of the Army, especially senior officers, had to share their views concerning “military and security problems in their relation to foreign policy and other aspect of public policy” with the American people. This resembled the position taken by General Ridgway in his 1954 article. Graduates from the War College were a means to integrate the first requirement and to fulfill the second.

On 3 December 1957, Frank R. Barnett of the Richardson Foundation told the class of academic year (AY) 1958, according to his lecture notes, that “the Army must now invade the ‘fourth dimension’ of symbols, myths, behavior and opinion-formation if it is to have sufficient freedom of action to perform its classical missions.” Failing to do so could neutralize the other dimensions of warfare – land, sea, and air power. For example, he claimed that “public opinion” had been a force against expanding the war in Korea. In the context of the late 1950s, the Army’s good deeds were not enough in themselves, he said, “[m]ore often they need interpretation, packaging, [and] a stage setting.”

Resembling Watson’s assertion, Barnett implied that officers had to have the skills to recognize the ever changing nature of public opinion. AIP – public information, troop information, and community relations – had to address “the ‘realities’ of the social and political

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443 Ibid., 377-378.
444 Ibid., 378.
446 This is now the Smith Richardson Foundation. “The mission of the Smith Richardson Foundation is to contribute to important public debates and to help address serious public policy challenges facing the United States. The Foundation seeks to help ensure the vitality of our social, economic, and governmental institutions. It also seeks to assist with the development of effective policies to compete internationally and to advance U.S. interests and values abroad.” Website is [http://www.srf.org/mission/index.php](http://www.srf.org/mission/index.php) (accessed 28 July 2010).
448 Ibid., 5-7.
449 Ibid., 2-3.
framework” in America.450 One of those realities, Barnett warned, was that only a small percentage of the American public was well informed about national security and this fact “reflects a towering apathy on the part of the majority of citizens” towards their own protection.451 He implied that the Army had to increase what Almond had called the “attentive public.”452 If senior officers were to know how to conduct AIP effectively, then the leaders of the Department of the Army (DA) needed to ensure that the curricula at the senior schools included that topic. Without public support the ability of the Army to conduct its missions might be reduced.

Three lectures that were given by the Chief of Information between AY 1951 and AY 1958 will illustrate what the students heard about how the leaders of the Army wanted to conduct the information program. In AY 1953, MG Floyd Parks spoke about “Public Relations, a Commander’s Responsibility.” He asserted that “successful commanders . . . know how to handle their news media and press.”453 Parks also said that “public relations is nothing but human relations.” He reiterated the claims of others, such as Collins, the Haislip Board and Barnett of the need to provide facts of an incident and interprets them to both the troops and the public in a timely fashion.454 Commanders should prioritize troop information, Parks believed, over the public information and community relations. The reason for this, he thought, was that soldiers affected public opinion by two means. First was by their conduct in public. If they act properly that would have a positive effect, but the opposite was also true. The other means was through their communications with family and friends, which Park claimed was not often emphasized by commanders. “If you’ve got troops that are satisfied, know their job, and are interested in their

job and know why,” he said, they will tell that to their family and friends. He ranked “[educating] officers and [teaching] them how to use the news media” as secondary in importance when compared to conducting troop information. Parks closed his address with the following quotation from an address of then Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray to West Point:

> If two wars proved anything, they proved that the dividing line between the soldier and the civilian is growing less and less capable of definition. . . . This fact imposes upon the professional soldier, a completely new awareness of an old responsibility – the responsibility of understanding the civilian and, what is more important, the responsibility of allowing the civilian to understand him, the soldier. . . . You, not the civilian members of the public, have the responsibility of creating public understanding of your profession.

Parks echoed many of the same points that civilian lecturers had made. The key point that Parks made was explicitly stating that these officers had to duty to ensure that both the troops and the public understood what the Army was doing. In order to help these officers perform that duty the Army had to show him the way.

MG G. C. Mudgett provided an overview of “Public Information – Troop Information and Education” to the class of AY 1955. Prior to assuming his current position, Mudgett said that he had not been a fan of either sub-program. He made a few conclusions after reflecting on why he, and potentially others, had not supported these programs. The Army had a superb system for educating officers “up to a division commander level.” Yet that same system failed to require officers to study about these programs which, in his view, directly contributed to the dearth of staff officers and commanders in the field being able to effectively conduct AIP. The officer corps, he claimed, knows how to plan “in every field of endeavor except the Information field, and as a result we find ourselves on the defense all the time.” Now he was trying to correct this.

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455 Parks, “The Army’s Relationship with the Public,” 5-7 and 9.
456 Ibid., 7-9.
457 Ibid., 29.
459 Ibid., 4-6.
The Troop Information Program (TIP), Mudgett asserted, was “by far the most important, and I know it’s the least understood” part of AIP. Covering TIP first of all the sub-programs of the information program reinforced his statement. Each commander should use his TIP to convince his soldiers, over half of whom were not volunteers, that they were critical not only to the success or failure of the Army but also to that of the nation as well. The Army, Mudgett also pointed out, had not followed the lead of industry when it came to the “employer, employee relationship.” Making a comparison, he told the students that most of the senior leaders in a business were actively involved in communicating with their employees. Conversely, in the Army many commanders, contrary to what the leaders of DA wanted, handed over their TIP to specialists and then provided minimal, if any, direction or oversight. This warning resembled that of BG McAnsh in his January 1956 article. He strongly argued this must change. He also linked conducting TIP with informing the public. If each leader in the Army ensured that his soldiers were well-informed about his unit and why it was doing certain tasks, they would pass on that information to their relatives. Mudgett stated that almost every soldier had about eight people – relatives and friends – who were concerned about him – thus informing the public. His comment on the importance of TIP resembled a position of General Parks, and some the content of the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) curriculum between AY 1954 and AY 1957.

If the public information program of DA was to succeed, Mudgett argued, all officers had to change their outlook and not “remain aloof from the public.” The words he used to describe the perspective of many officers were every similar to that of General Ridgway in his August 1954 article. All officers, not just generals, should talk with the public about their experience.

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460 Ibid., 8.
461 Ibid., 8-11.
462 Ibid., 6-7.
Each officer should answer a reporter’s questions, within the limits of military security, because this could reduce the chance of inaccurate information, especially if it was unflattering, being published. Mudgett warned the students that, if they did not help the reporter get the material he needed for his story, he would go elsewhere, and that might be counterproductive in the long run. Mudgett claimed, “we just have to present it, and we just have to present our problems and what we’re doing to solve them.” His statement captured, in essence, the objective of the public information program. As an aside, the issue of “selling” conflicted with the intent the leaders of DA, as asserted in the Army regulation on public information (1950), to “report fully” to the public. Some people, it seems, thought that “selling” implied not being entirely truthful, which was not what the leaders wanted. Mudgett’s closed, saying:

> when the Army can and does explain its actions satisfactorily to the troops, and to the public, we’re going to have satisfied men and women in uniform, and we’re going to have an understanding public, and when that time comes, gentlemen, you’re going to be living in Utopia, so let’s try and get the thing on track.

His lecture was another example of discussing why each sub-program was important, but not providing the means to conduct them.

MG Harry P. Storke spoke to the class of AY 1958 about issues related to public relations. The timing of this lecture, 16 June 1958, coming a few weeks before graduation, denied the students any chance to apply what they might have learned from the speech in an academic setting. The title of Storke’s address was “The Army Information Program” (AIP). Mirroring both Parks and Mudgett, he argued that senior leaders had to understand why the Army needed to effectively communicate with those in the service and the public. Resembling Mudgett, Storke warned that if senior leaders did not provide the public and the press with facts

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468 Ibid., 14-15.
and their interpretation, then others would, and they would only have themselves to blame for any negative results.\textsuperscript{472}

The leaders of the Department of the Army (DA), Storke argued, wanted “to create in the minds of the American public, a true, realistic, factual, accurate image of the Army.”\textsuperscript{473} To do this, the leaders had to change the perspective of many officers that “Army Public Relations” was some sort of “harassment.” Informing the public was, in fact, a duty of the professional officer.\textsuperscript{474} Storke’s emphasis on accurate reporting resembled Ridgway’s position in his 1954 article.\textsuperscript{475} Only when the officer corps changed its view will the Army as a whole begin to effectively conduct the information program, which mirrored the position of Mudgett.\textsuperscript{476}

If officers informed the troops then they could also carry the messages of the Army to both the national public and the local community, which surrounded each military installation. Echoing Parks and Mudgett, Storke insisted that “[g]reater emphasis and command support for the Troop Information Program” were required. If all members of the Army, uniformed and civilian, were well informed about the actions and policies of the Army, then they could assist in telling the public what the Army was doing.\textsuperscript{477} Community relations, Storke noted, was another key part of AIP. A goal of community relations from the Army’s standpoint was, he asserted, to cultivate “friendly relations with local media and community representatives” to reduce the chance of one side misinterpreting the actions of another.\textsuperscript{478}

Storke concluded his address by summarizing a few key points. First, he told the officers: “You must get yourself into the frame of mind that enables you to think automatically in public relations terms.” Second, as senior officers, they must ensure that their information officers were part of all decision-making events. The reason for including the information officer into planning

\textsuperscript{473} AWC, Lectures, Storke, “The Army Information Program,” 7-8
\textsuperscript{474} Ibid., 10-14.
\textsuperscript{475} Ridgway, “Army Troop and Public Relations,” 2-5.
\textsuperscript{478} AWC, Lectures, Storke, “The Army Information Program,” 18.
sessions was that it was his job to ensure that possible reactions of the troops and the public were considered during the process and that the staff developed a plan to address these possibilities.  

All three generals focused on trying to convince the students that conducting AIP effectively was important to the future of the Army. This was tied to getting the public to see the Army as a key part of the defense team. All believed that ensuring commanders communicated the Army’s messages to the troops would also help inform the public. A key means to convince officers about the importance of AIP was through education. What was missing from all three lectures was a clear example of how to implement what they were advocating. 

The developers of the curriculum provided chances for students to examine some of the domestic influences on the development of national policies. The aim of the course on “National Policy” for AY 1951 and AY 1952, the authors of the directive for this course noted, was to provide the students with “background knowledge” on domestic factors that affected the creation of national policies. The authors of the directive for AY 1951 quoted from FM 101-51 “Department of the Army Planning System”: “The strategy of the United States is shaped by political, economic, psychological, and military realities. Military planning is sound only when it takes into account these basic considerations.” This statement of doctrine affirmed that the leaders of DA recognized that these other factors had an impact on the use of military power. It also supported the school of thought, which Almond represented, which said that senior officers needed to study more than just military related topics. A required reading for this course for AY 1951 was Francis H. Russell’s article “The Function of Public-Opinion Analysis in the Formulation of Foreign Policy.” This article was from the magazine titled Officers’ Call, which DA published. This magazine, the editors claimed, was intended to “[inform] all officers on significant military matters and national and international events.” Russell, who was the

481 WAC Curriculum, AY 1951-1952, Special Text and Course 1, Box 1951/1952-2, Folder 5 – Course 1, National Policy, Part I, Directive, 1.  
482 Ball, Of Responsible Command, 299-302.  
Director of Public Affairs for the Department of State (DoS), asserted that the DoS used polls, “[p]ublic opinion surveys,” and analysis of “[e]ditorials and periodical comment” to gauge what Americans thought about topics such as “the European Recovery Program.” DA could also use these methods.\(^{484}\) Russell suggested analysis of public opinion was similar to the content and purpose of the “Estimate of the Public Relations Situation,” which was also included in the curriculum at CGSC for AY 1947, AY 1949, and AY 1953.\(^{485}\) This was one of the very few tangible examples of how to conduct AIP that the students at the War College received.

Based on Swing’s description of the curriculum, much of the learning occurred during the examination of problems by students grouped together as committees. The developers of the curriculum would provide each committee with both a description of the problem and a list of topics to consider during its analysis. Some of these topics were related to the public. For example, during the course on “National Security Organization” for AYs 1951 and 1952, some students were to determine whether the organization of DA suited its mission, especially in wartime. The authors of the problem titled “Analysis of Department of the Army Structure” for AY 1951 suggested that the committee should think about the “[p]olitical and public opinion considerations that affect Army organization.”\(^{486}\) By including considerations such as these, the authors of this problem implied that students needed to grasp that public opinion could influence, for example, the structure of the Army. Not included in this problem, was an example of the


impact of the public had, for example, the Haislip Board (1947) believed that in peacetime the public wanted a small regular Army, as compared to the force the Army believed it needed when war broke out, which was supported by a large reserve force.\(^{487}\)

In the course “National Policy Formulation” for academic year (AY) 1954, students were assigned to investigate a wide variety of problems. One example was titled “[m]ajor factors other than military and economic that influence foreign policy.” The authors of this problem provided the students six “considerations.” One consideration will illustrate. It was the “[e]ffects of public opinion; the problem of securing an adequate public understanding of foreign policy; the role of the press, radio, and other information media; [and] foreign propaganda.”\(^{488}\) This course in AY 1955 had a similarly worded problem. The authors for AY 1955 added two phrases to the wording of the issue highlighted for AY 1954, but only one will be discussed. The addition of “public apathy” after “effects of public opinion” suggests that the public might not even be thinking about the Army. If the public had lost interest in the service, then the Army should question the effectiveness of its public relations effort.\(^{489}\) The issue of the potential apathy of the public resembled the comments that Barnett made in his 1957 speech to the College.\(^{490}\) Considerations such as these continue the trend, in certain problems, of showing the students the broad impact that public opinion could have on the development of policy. The focus on this course was on gaining support of the public for foreign policy, yet the developers implied that policies of the Army would also require similar support.

As one of the final requirements, each student at the War College wrote an individual research paper. Each year, the authors of the directive for this requirement provided a list of suggested topics. The developers for both AYs 1951 and 1952 did not suggest any topic linked to

\(^{487}\) Haislip Report, 5.

The number of students at the War College who wrote their individual papers about topics related to public relations was an indicator of the value of the curriculum in showing the relevance of the information function. COL Guy C. Lothrop and LTC Gardner A. Williams were the two students from the class of AY 1953 to write their theses on public relations since the reopening of the War College for AY 1951. COL Guy C. Lothrop’s study was titled “Public Opinion: A Factor Shaping National Security.” Military planners, he argued, had to consider the connection between “public opinion and security planning.”\footnote{US Army War College, Student Papers, 1952/1953, Lothrop to Oden. Lothrop, Guy C. “Public Opinion: A Factor Shaping National Security,” 01 April 1953, 1.} According to Lothrop, FM 101-52 tasked the Chief of Information (COI) at the DA “with the responsibility of ‘insuring full
consideration of the impact of Army plans and policies upon the public and the troops.\[^{495}\]

Although his study focused on DA, Lothrop’s recommendations also seem to apply to other echelons.\[^{496}\]

In order for the Army to be effective in conducting its information program, planners at all echelons had to anticipate how the public might react to certain future actions and then develop plans to deal with those possibilities. Public opinion, Lothrop asserted, represented a combination of the views of both individuals and groups and that it was not static.\[^{497}\] Planners needed to understand how public opinion was formed and what it was when they were developing options for two key reasons. First, this knowledge would help them make realistic assumptions about how the public might react, either favorably or unfavorably, to an action or policy. Second, the expected public reaction then shaped how planners could develop a plan to achieve all information objectives.\[^{498}\] One possibility not raised by Lothrop might have been to explain both how a program enabled national security and what risks the public assumed if they choose not to support the program. Notably, Lothrop focused on countering negative reactions of the public. This was seen, for example, when he argued: “No security planning can be valid which does not make realistic assumptions with respect to public opinion, reason out the focal points of opposition to the critical features of the projected plan, and seek positive action to remove the significance of these focal points.”\[^{499}\] Leaving out of the plan those people who supported the Army would be a significant missed opportunity. Since most planners were officers, Lothrop’s conclusions were important for the system that educated officers. If those who made decisions about the content of the curriculum at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and the War College wanted to continue to emphasize countering criticism instead of garnering support, then no change was needed. Just like the authors of FM 101-51,

\[^{495}\] Ibid., 18.
\[^{496}\] Ibid., 21-22.
\[^{497}\] Ibid., 1-7.
\[^{498}\] Ibid., 18-21 and 27.
\[^{499}\] Ibid., 27.
Lothrop advocated that planning for public relations should occur parallel with the planning for the conduct of the operation.\textsuperscript{500}

LTC Gardner A. Williams, the other student, argued “that public opinion is the all-important force in all military matters and must be accorded its rightful place in military deliberations and actions.”\textsuperscript{501} He found numerous works on the effect that public opinion had on “foreign policy and commercial advertising.” But he did not find anything on the relationship between public opinion and the armed forces.\textsuperscript{502} The Army incorrectly, Williams argued, placed priority on both “public ‘relations’ (a good press, avoiding unfavorable publicity, etc.) and public ‘information’ (getting factual news to the public).” Instead, he advocated, the focus of the Army should have been on understanding “the power [that] public opinion [had] over military plans and decisions.”\textsuperscript{503}

The military services, Williams suggested, should take numerous actions to fix its problem with prioritization, but only two will be addressed here. First, the armed forces must “inform and educate the public to the end of reciprocal appreciation of the problems and needs of the services.” Included in this work to “inform and educate” was how each proposal of the services fit into the concept of the defense strategy. Armed with this information, each American could then determine whether to support the plan. This was a critical means to show that the Army remained a relevant force. Second, each person in the armed forces had to realize that public opinion had an effect on all military operations.\textsuperscript{504} This second challenge, Williams proposed, could be met if:

From top to bottom – from the JCS and their strategic planners to the smallest operational unit – there must exist this acute, ingrained consciousness of the


\textsuperscript{502} Ibid., 1-2.

\textsuperscript{503} Ibid., 1-2.

\textsuperscript{504} Ibid., 23-24.
influence and characteristics of public opinion. Considerations of public opinion in all planning and operations can and must be automatic.\(^{505}\)

Williams’ assertion was similar to the main points of Lothrop’s thesis.\(^{506}\) To be comprehensive, the military had to educate both its own members and the general public about its policies and actions. Williams questioned the efficacy of the education given to officers about the information function because some officers believed that informing the public was “imposed frills, concessions which ‘have to be made’” rather than understanding that it “[constitutes] the primary link with the most decisive factor – public opinion.”\(^{507}\) He summarized his points succinctly when he noted, “[T]he services bear a heavy responsibility – almost completely for [changing the perspective of] their own personnel and to significant degree for the American public.”\(^{508}\) The senior leaders of the Army saw that it was crucial to court public opinion and to inform the public, but this understanding had not been inculcated throughout the service. In fact, Williams found “little evidence” that the leaders of the DA were actively “indoctrinating military personnel to accept and analyze public opinion.”\(^{509}\) By raising the need to educate officers about public relations, both Williams and Lothrop implied that what was currently being done was insufficient.

The number of student papers about public relations produced at the War College between AYs 1954 and 1958 varied. COL James E. Harper was the only student in the class of AY 1954 who wrote his paper about the Army and public relations.\(^{510}\) Six students out of approximately four hundred who attended during AY 1955 and AY 1957 wrote their individual papers on topics related to public relations and both the Army and national topics.\(^{511}\) The fact

\(^{505}\) Ibid., 24.
\(^{508}\) Ibid., 29.
\(^{509}\) Ibid., 27-29.
\(^{511}\) AWC, Curriculum, AY 1954-1955, Course 12, Individual Studies, 10 Sep 1954 – 01 March 1955 Folder 3 – Course 12, Individual Study Preparation, Individual Studies, List by Field and Title, Student and Army War College Log Number, 1. The names and titles of the paper were: COL John G. Turner’s “The Army Station and the Civilian Community,” COL K. I. Curtis’ “The Anti-aircraft Units Defending the United States and the Civilian Community,”
that some students wrote their papers on public relations indicated that at least a few officers grasped its importance.

James E. Harper, Jr.’s “Public Opinion and the Army” is another good example of the content of papers about public relations and the Army at the War College. As a result of conducting this study, Harper went from having “a highly critical attitude of the Army’s public information program” to having a greater “appreciation of the magnitude of the Army’s public relations problem.”512 This change in Harper’s opinion was a positive example of what could occur when the College had students study about how to conduct AIP. The public criticized the Army because of a perceived lack of sophistication, Harper argued, in both the equipment used by the Army and how the service conducted its operations as compared to the other two services.513 One way to shape what the public knew about the Army was for service members to explain the capabilities of their equipment and the complexities of their operations to the public, which were goals of AIP. This was public information and community relations.

The Army affected the opinion of the public in many ways, and two will be explored here. Resembling Parks, Harper noted that how Army personnel conducted themselves in their local communities shaped how the public viewed the Army. For example, if a majority of the soldiers talked in a derogatory fashion about their experience in the Army, this would have a negative impact on the way the people in that community saw the service. The Army was developing a plan, Harper reported, to establish a few “permanent home stations for a number of large Army units” in an effort to increase “public consciousness” of certain local communities. The leaders at DA expected that, once a bond was formed between a local community and each unit, both would get to know each other, and this would likely increase the understanding of each other’s needs and problems.514 To create this bond, Harper asserted, repeating what Collins

513 Ibid., 1-3.
claimed in his speech to the class of 1947 at CGSC, that each commander could use his troop
information program to indirectly shape the opinion of the public by “[making] every soldier a
good public relations agent.”

Second, during each decision-making process each commander
and his staff should consider how their actions might impact on the public and then develop a
plan to explain his reasoning at the earliest possible moment. For example, Harper asserted that
at DA “every action paper that goes forward for approval will have a public information
statement.” The paper was to note either that this action “has no public information aspects” or
else it was to describe the plan to inform both the troops and the American people about the
decision. This was a way to mandate the integration of public relations into decision-making.

Harper recommended two ways for DA to improve its education of officers “to secure
better public opinion.” First, the system that educates officers had to help them recognize that
“public information and TI&E activities” were both critical subjects for the long-term success of
the Army. This meant having troops who understood what they were doing and why, and a
public who looked favorably upon the Army. Second, he advocated teaching senior officers
about ways in which the media operated and why the Army had to respond quickly to the
inquiries from the press. “Three-quarters of [the] Department of the Army problems on public
information,” Harper noted, “are the result of delay” in responding to an inquiry of the press.
Those determining the curricula of the Army school system had the ability to put Harper’s
proposals into action.

Harper’s conclusions were much like those espoused by MG Mudgett in his lecture
during AY 1955. First, both had been initially skeptical, but after realizing their mistakes they
supported the information program. Second, both concluded that commanders and their staffs
had to consider probable reactions of the public and the troops when they decided what action to
take; this resembled one of Williams’ positions. Lastly, education was a key mechanism to

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517 Ibid., 34-35.
518 Ibid., 32 and 34.
influence future leaders of the Army about the importance of AIP and how to conduct it, which resembled another point LTC Williams (AY 1955) made in his paper.\textsuperscript{519}

Starting in AY 1955, the Army War College began holding a “National Strategy Seminar,” which could be considered as part of its public information effort. The idea for this seminar came from the Naval War College. In 1949, the leaders of the Naval War College for the first time invited reserve officers and civilian guests to participate in a week-long study, as Masland and Radway noted, on the formulation of “a global strategy for the United States.”\textsuperscript{520}

The “National Strategy Seminar,” according to curricular documents at the Army War College from AYs 1956 and 1957, “serves as the culmination of the academic year and promotes mutual understanding between the Seminar guests and the students of the Army War College in the various aspects of national strategy.”\textsuperscript{521} The Commandant of the Army War College, Ball says, would annually invite civic leaders from around the country to take part in a three- to four-day gathering to interact with students as they finalized their committees’ recommendations for “national strategies and military programs.”\textsuperscript{522} The intent of this seminar resembled the aim of the “Army Orientation Course” (AOC) that was conducted at Fort Leavenworth during World War II.\textsuperscript{523} The College increased the number of guests from about fifty in AY 1955 to seventy five in AY 1958.\textsuperscript{524} The growth in number of people invited suggested that the leaders of the College believed the conference was achieving its goal.

\textsuperscript{523} Sweeney, “Civilians Learn at Leavenworth,” 56-57.
A certain theme appeared consistently in lessons concerning public relations in these two schools and in the articles mentioned. This theme was that the leaders of DA were trying to convince the officer corps of the importance of explaining the Army to the both the troops and the public to prevent the service from becoming a secondary force. The developers of the instruction about public relations were trying to get students to study the aim, objectives, and methods of the public and troop information programs. At CGSC, students consistently studied the importance of each program, and how conducting AIP effectively helped a commander accomplish his mission. They also, for the most part, practiced determining how to communicate and interpret those facts to both the troops and the public. Meanwhile at the War College, lectures and committee problems helped students think about how the opinions of the public impacted on the development of national policies. What was not always present in the instruction on public relations at both schools was two-fold. First, students, primarily at the War College, did not always get opportunities to apply what they were learning. Second, the authors of the lessons did not always provide examples of how to perform the tasks being investigated that students could use both in class and after graduation. Between AY 1954 and AY 1958, there was a discernible decrease in the number of hours allotted for students to study public relations at both schools. This decrease came about when the executive branch was emphasizing the nuclear capabilities of other services. The decline created a risk that students would not fully grasp how their conduct of AIP as a means to influence the opinion of the public about the service, which could impact the status of the Army. This was contrary to the stated desires of the leaders of DA. The effort put forth by the developers of the curriculum at both schools about having the students study the conduct of public relations did not match the words of the leader of the Army. The period between AY 1951 and AY 1958 ranks second out of five in providing the students at the two senior Army school with the best education about public relations. This is due to the decrease in both the number of hours allocated to the topic and the ability of the students to apply what they were learning as compared to between AY 1947 and AY 1950.

Chapter 4 - Integration of Lessons Concerning the Army Information Program (AYs 1959-1967)

Two key factors shaped the development of the curriculum related to public affairs at both the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and the War College between academic year (AY) 1959 and AY 1967. In 1957, the leaders of the Department of the Army (DA) decided to establish another board to examine the curricula in the system to educate officers, subsequently known as the Williams Board. The Board published its recommendations in a document titled the “Report of the Department of the Army Officer Education and Training Review Board.” Resembling that of the Eddy Board, the aim of the Williams Board was to determine whether the “officer education and training from the time of commissioning to completion of senior service college” that then existed was able to produce graduates to meet the challenges of the next decade. Between 1958 and 1960, the leaders of DA updated both a circular about its information program and FM 101-5, *Staff Organization and Procedure* which announced changes to the ways in which they wanted the Army to conduct public relations.

The current system of officer education, the Williams Board concluded in 1958, was “adequate to meet the needs of the Army from [1958] to 1970.” In December 1957, Secretary of the Army Wilber M. Brucker appointed LTG Edward T. Williams, then the Deputy CG of CONARC, to lead the “[DA] Board to Review the System of Officer Education and Training.” In its analysis, the Board assumed the continuation of the following: the Cold War environment, an increasing number of civilians interested in military policy, and the blurring of the delineation of the duties between senior military officers and civilians at DA. The Board submitted its report to DA on 1 July 1958. DA did not release the Secretary’s decisions concerning the

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527 Williams Report, 6 - 9.
528 Ibid., 59-66.
529 Ibid., 5-8.
recommendations of the Board until 22 July 1960. No explanation for the delay was found.\textsuperscript{530}

The Board did not propose any change in the overall goal of the school system, but it did recommend two key modifications. “The objective of the Army school system,” the authors of the report said, “is to prepare selected individuals of all components of the Army to perform those duties which they may be called upon to perform in war. The emphasis is on the art of command.”\textsuperscript{531} This aim resembled that included in both the Gerow and the Eddy Boards.\textsuperscript{532} The Williams Board advocated keeping the focus of the curricula within the school system on wartime tasks, but it also suggested that a few non-wartime topics be included. For example, the Board wanted each senior officer to study the process of developing and executing military policy. A senior officer needed this knowledge so that he could effectively explain this process to those civilians who were appointed to key positions with the Department to Defense (DoD).\textsuperscript{533} If each senior officer had the ability to explain to a civilian superior how military policy was created and executed, it seems reasonable that this skill should also sharpen his ability to explain this process to both the troops and the public.

A concern of the Board was the large number of subjects that officers were expected to learn while attending each school. Since 1945, the Board believed, the leaders of DA had expected the curricula in the school system to cover all subjects that the students needed to know to be effective at their particular ranks. As a result, the Board asserted, “the school system loses its focus on fundamentals.”\textsuperscript{534} To maximize the effective use of the time spent taking resident instruction, the Board proposed, student learning “should be focused on essentials, the curriculum should contain only those subjects which cannot be adequately learned elsewhere, and ‘nice-to-know’ subjects should be acquired by individual study on a nonresident basis.”\textsuperscript{535} This implied that including a topic in the curriculum for resident instruction represented what decision-makers thought was “essential.” Lastly, the Board agreed with the leaders of CGCS

\textsuperscript{530} Williams Report, DA approval letter, 1.
\textsuperscript{531} Williams Report, 43.
\textsuperscript{532} Eddy Report, 1. Gerow Report, 5.
\textsuperscript{533} Williams Report, 7 and 9-11.
\textsuperscript{534} Ibid., 11.
\textsuperscript{535} Ibid., 46-47.
who balanced “education, with emphasis on principles and their application in solving problems,” with “training in acquisition of skills.”

Secretary Brucker approved some of the Board’s recommendations. For example, he appointed the CG of CONARC “as the Director of the Army Service School System.” The CG would be responsible to “direct, control, and approve curricula and instruction in all Army service schools in accordance with DA policy except the following: (1) Army War College . . . [and] (11) The Army Information School.” This decision represented a change. From then on the CG of CONARC would only control the curriculum at CGSC. Brucker’s decision implied that DA would control the curriculum of the War College. He endorsed the Board’s proposal about common subjects, namely, the “[e]limination of marginal subjects” and the “[r]eduction of coverage of essential subjects to minimum number of hours.” Brucker authorized decision-makers at each school to determine for themselves how to cover common subjects, which in AY 1955 included public information and troop information. Of note, neither the Board nor the Secretary defined which subjects were marginal and which were essential. By not prescribing what topics were to be covered, the leaders of DA enabled the future decline in coverage of public information and troop information.

The other key factor was that the leaders of DA published two documents that changed how the Army was to conduct the information program. Secretary Brucker and Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) General Maxwell Taylor published Army Circular 11-1, Army Information Program on 29 October 1958. About eighteen months later, Brucker and the new CSA General Lyman L. Lemnitzer updated FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Procedure. The authors of Circular 11-1 wrote that the document “outlines the basis for an Army-wide Information Program, and establishes basic guidance for commanders and information officers to assist them

536 Ibid., 179.
537 Williams Report, Approval letter, inclosure 1, 1-2.
538 Williams Report, 5-8, 44 and 188. Approval letter, inclosure 1, 1.
539 Williams Report, Approval letter, inclosure 1, 5.
540 RG 546 Records of the United States Continental Army, US, Army Schools, 546/290/36/12/- 06- Command and General Staff, FT LV, KS, Box 11, 352 “Common Subjects Letter for Academic Year 54-55,” 74-75 and 77-78.
541 Bell, Secretaries of War and Secretaries of the Army, 140. Bell, Commanding Generals and Chief of Staff 1775–2010, 134 and 136.
in programing information activities designed to attain troop and public support of the Army’s role in a sound National military program.” DA would, the authors reported, provide its subordinates “a detailed Information Program, covering both troop and public information,” to achieve the goals listed in the curricular. The specific goals stated in this curricular were: “1. Recognition of the scope and importance of the Army mission,” “2. Esteem and respect for the Army and Army personnel,” and “3. Confidence in the Army’s ability to execute its mission now and in the future.” These goals resembled those set by General Ridgway in his 1954 article. Included in the circular was a graphical depiction of the connection among certain informational “activities” or “subjects,” “implications,” and “goals” of the Army Information Program (AIP). Most of the activities were focused on gaining the support of the public. In the circular, an “[i]mplication” was defined as “the editorial and inferential emphasis necessary to attain” goals of the program. This graphic listed 92 activities that were connected to five implications, which led to the three goals of the program. The Office of the COI (OCINFO) at DA would produce an “Informational Data [Sheet]” for each activity. This sheet, the authors of the Curricular said, would “indicate the Army’s current policies, plans, and operational concepts” for each activity and the “implication” it was connected to. For example, the two activities “Adaptability of Army Forces to all Types of Terrain and Climate” and “Trends Opposing General War” were linked to the implication described as “[t]he nature and importance of the Army’s role in connection with deterring and winning limited wars,” which contributed to attaining the goal of “Recognition of the scope and importance of the Army mission.” As seen since 1946, DA held commanders responsible for creating their own programs to achieve the stated goals and implications set by their superiors. DA published this circular in October 1958, but it did not become effective until 1 July 1959 and was in force only until 1 July 1961.

The nine-month delay suggested that DA had provided time for subordinates to develop their plans. DA updated this circular about every two years.\(^{548}\)

The Department of the Army released an updated version of the FM 101-5, *Staff Organization and Procedure* in 1960. A key change made in the manual which is important for this study was the combining of the duties of the “chief of information,” “public information officer,” and “troop information officer” and assigning all of them to the “information officer.” An information officer, the authors of the manual reported, was to “serve as a member of the personal staff” of the commander. An example of a duty of an information officer was to “[prepare] the public information and troop information portions of standing operating procedures and of operation plans and orders.”\(^{549}\) No specific reason was found for this change. One potential reason was to ensure that the conduct of both the public information and the troop information programs were integrated at all echelons of command above division. This might have been one of the effects of Vice Chief of Staff General Palmer deciding to merge the staff responsible for troop information with the group coordinating public information.\(^{550}\)

President John F. Kennedy’s adoption of a defense strategy called “Flexible Response” mitigated some concerns that the leaders of the Department of the Army (DA) had about the long-term importance of the Army. When Kennedy adopted this strategy, Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski argue, he “meant that the United States would meet Communist military threats with an appropriate level of matching force.”\(^{551}\) “At the center of ‘flexible response’ theory,” they assert, “was the assumption that deterring and fighting with nonnuclear forces would reduce the likelihood of nuclear escalation.”\(^{552}\) The change in defense strategy from “Massive Retaliation” to “Flexible Response” implied that the leaders of the Kennedy Administration would be more willing than the leaders of the Eisenhower Administration to use conventional forces, especially the Army, to counter military actions by the Soviet Union. With this change in strategy, the Army returned to a more prominent standing with DoD and the leaders of DA


\(^{550}\) Palmer, “A Fresh Start for Troop Information,” 2-4.

\(^{551}\) Millett and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, 553.

\(^{552}\) Ibid., 553-560. Quotation from 558.
should have expected an increased amount of scrutiny by the press and the public. A key factor in gaining and maintaining the public’s support for the Army was its ability to clearly describe ways in which the service’s capabilities supported the intent of “Flexible Response.” To do this, the leaders of DA had to ensure that field-grade officers knew how to conduct the information program of the Army, which had the aim of explaining the actions and policies of the Army to all Americans.  

This chapter covers from academic year (AY) 1959 through AY 1967. The thesis of this chapter is that developers of the curriculum at both CGSC and the War College from AY 1959 through AY 1967 moved towards an integrated lesson for teaching about AIP, because the leaders realized that the students needed to be able to effectively explain the Army to all Americans in a holistic fashion – using public information, troop information, and community relations – how the Army supported flexible response. Typically the developers of the lesson in public relations at each college gave students a few chances to apply what they were learning to scenarios to help them understand the main concepts of the topic being studied.

Articles written by senior officers continued the effort to remind the officer corps of its duty to explain the Army to the public. Between AY 1959 and AY 1967, two general officers wrote articles about ways in which the Army conducted public relations and how it was part of the profession of arms. In May 1958, BG C. V. Clifton, the Deputy Chief of Information at DA, noted that the leaders of DA directed that all staff studies which required a decision be coordinated with the Office of the Chief of Information (OCINFO). This was not new, since COL Harper, in AY 1955, noted the same requirement in his individual paper at the War College. This integration was necessary, Clifton argued, because “public relations is a tool of management – an instrument of the commander to make his decisions understood and acceptable to the many publics of a Federal agency, [and] responsive to the people.” His assertion resembled those promoted in articles written by Collins (1952) and Ridgway (1954).

556 Clifton, “Public Relations,” 44.
The impression of the Army held by the public, in part, was a direct result of the Army’s effectiveness in conducting AIP. “Public opinion of the Army is,” Clifton said, “to a large extent, dependent upon what people read . . . see on television . . . see at shows, at fairs, [and at] expositions.” Resembling Parks, Mudgett, and Stroke, Clifton struck a familiar tone about the criticality of ensuring that the troops were informed. The constant reiteration in lectures, lessons, and articles of the need to inform the troops could be seen as an attempt to express two supporting ideas. First was that those familiar with the requirements of the information program were not convinced that the officer corps had the same understanding that they did. Second was an apparent effort to remind commanders and staff officers that well-informed troops were another critical means for explaining the Army to the public. If the process Clifton described was followed and the proposal was approved, then a strategy to get the Army’s message out in a proactive manner should have been already developed.

In two articles published in two different magazines in 1959, MG Harry P. Storke, who was then COI at DA, made an argument much like that in his lecture at the War College in AY 1958 that all members of the Army had a duty to explain the Army to the public. In his article “Image of the Army,” Storke tried to get soldiers to talk to the public about the Army in an effort to “create in the public mind the true image of the Army . . . of such positive accomplishment and vital significance in the national defense structure that occasional missteps and isolated personal boners cannot distort that Image.” The leaders of the Army, he argued, wanted to “[establish] good relations through our friendly contacts, as individuals, with people in and outside the Army.” The status of the relationship between the Army and the public would fluctuate based on the efforts of the Army to provide a good product and communicate

558 Clifton, “Public Relations,” 44-45.
560 Clifton, “Public Relations,” 45.
562 Storke, “Image of the Army,” 44. Italics in the original.
563 Ibid., 44. Italics in the original.
effectively with the public. Storke advocated in “Image of the Army” and in his speech to the Army War College that a key method to foster effective public relations was through what he called “grass-roots” efforts. If the grassroots effort was effective, then, some of these civilians, as individuals or in groups, might become what he called to be “Army boosters.” Examples of boosters, he wrote, were the “Civilian Aides to the Secretary of the Army; members of AUSA . . . and the veterans’ organizations.” The arguments of both Clifton and Storke largely reiterated topics which were being taught about public relations at both senior schools.

COL Gordon A. Moon wrote an article in the December 1967 edition of Army which warned the service to keep materials used for internal audiences and external audiences separate and distinct. Moon, an Information Officer at Headquarters, U.S. Fifth Army, stated that products developed for informing those in the military “speak from a position of considerable bias.” For example, Moon noted that historian Henry Steele Commager, in the April 1967 edition of The Saturday Review, regarded “the Defense Department film Why Vietnam? as ‘propaganda, naked and unashamed.’” He disagreed with Commager’s characterization because “that the film was produced for our servicemen . . . and not for the general public” and as such “[presented] the official view of the war in Vietnam.” Using this “bias” was acceptable because, Moon stated, the film was trying “to explain why it is essential that [the soldier in Vietnam] must be prepared to give his life, if necessary, for his country; and to motivate him.” In other words, Moon agreed with General Collins’ assertion in his 1947 article that officers should provide “factual information” to the public meanwhile “[indoctrinating]” soldiers to the Army’s view. In short, it was acceptable for the Army to provide its soldiers only one point of view when it came to describing official policy. But when it came to informing the public, Moon stated that the Army had to provide all of the facts, within security constraints, in an effort to

564 Storke, “Image of the Army,” 45 and “Speak up for the Army,” 6-7.
567 Ibid., 61.
568 Ibid., 61.
569 Ibid., 61-63.
allow the American people determine whether they supported the action.\textsuperscript{571} The difference between how members of the Army were to inform the troops and how they were to inform the public seemed to justify, yet again, educating the service’s officers in how to effectively conduct AIP.

The leaders of the Army continued to adjust the curricula within the system for educating officers so as to include only those topics deemed essential. The leaders of DA were also codifying how they wanted the Army to conduct AIP. Therefore, if a lesson on any part of the information program was included in the curriculum of a school, then the decision makers considered it a lesson critical enough for officers to know. These last three authors were examples of senior leaders continuing an effort to get the word out to officers who were not in the school system or to remind former students of what they should have learned earlier about public relations. However, the number of hours of instruction about public affairs in the curricula at CGSC and the War College did not match the importance of the subject implied by the words of the senior leaders of the service.

It is notable that the curriculum at both CGSC and the War College underwent an external evaluation in 1962. Each panel judged the curriculum that it examined to be achieving its assigned mission.\textsuperscript{572} Each group, in its own way, advocated that the developers of the curriculum closely monitor the balance between military topics and those about “non-military topics”—that is, those not related to combat.\textsuperscript{573} The panel that examined the Command and General Staff College was composed of three retired (ret.) three- or four-star general officers, the President of the A&M College of Texas (who was also a retired major general), and a civilian

\textsuperscript{571} Moon, “Information Officer or Propagandist?,” 61-63.
vice chancellor of a university. GEN (ret.) C. D. Eddleman chaired this group, known as the Eddleman Commission. The Commission asserted: “The curriculum of CGSC . . . is well balanced in regard to kinds of combat operations, relative emphasis on command and staff, operations and logistic functions, and the echelons of higher command.” Meanwhile, a civilian advisory group visited the Army War College in 1962. The final report on this visit included both recommendations of the group and the applicable response from the leaders of the College. A proposal of the group was “that no effort be spared to compress the military subject matter to the minimum compatible with the mission of the College” to create time for what they called “[non-military] subjects.” Students at the War College, the group believed, lacked experience in non-military topics, and these subjects would become increasingly important to these officers as they rose in rank. The group also proposed that the curriculum – at the time of this advisory group there was only the core curriculum – should contain the following non-military topics: “some knowledge of economics, of propaganda and public opinion.” In response, the College claimed it was happy with the existing balance. But the College failed to address specifically whether the curriculum covered the non-military subjects that the group proposed.

The military was losing its voice in the public debate on how to use strategic force. Since the end of World War II, COL Robert N. Ginsburgh argued in his 1964 article titled “The Challenge to Military Professionalism,” civilians, not military officers, had written most of the works published about military strategy. To counter that trend, he urged the leaders at DA to ensure that students studied about ways to advise both elected officials of the national

574 Committee members were General (ret.) C. D. Eddleman, LTGs (ret.) Edward J. O’Neill and E.L. Cummings, and MG (ret.) Earl Rudder, President of A&M College of Texas, and Dr. George B. Smith, Vice Chancellor of the University of Kansas. Eddleman Report, 2.
575 Eddleman Report, 15 and 19.
579 Ibid., 7.
government and the public on how best to use the Army. One way to inform the public was to write.\textsuperscript{581} The curricula of the system that educates Army officers, Ginsburgh argued, needed to produce graduates who were competent in two related functions. First was the application of military force from the strategic to the tactical level. Second, much like a recommendation of the Williams Board, was the ability to communicate the thoughts and ideas of the military to civilian leaders within the government at the strategic level.\textsuperscript{582} Like the information program of the Army, Ginsburgh claimed that the Army must first be competent; then, it must explain its actions to the American people. First deeds, then words.

Those setting the curricula for the system that educated officers had to determine the balance between military and non-military topics. Neither the advisory group nor Ginsburgh explicitly stated that each officer needed to know about the information program of the Army, but they generally favored having students learn how to communicate with the public.

\textbf{Command and General Staff College}

The stated purpose of the curriculum at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) continued to adapt. While attending this College, students continued to study how to be “commanders and general staff officers at division” through field army levels. Two changes were made to this statement of purpose between academic year (AY) 1959 and AY 1967 that were relevant to this study. Started in AY 1959, the developers of the curriculum added to the aim the need to cover “the joint aspects” of being commanders and general staff officers.\textsuperscript{583} The other relevant change occurred between AY 1962 and AY 1967. The statement of purpose for the curriculum found in the \textit{Program of Instruction} (POI) for AY 1963 represents a slight variation when compared to that for AY 1959. For the first time, the new statement of purpose included the phrase that students would obtain “a working knowledge,” which aligned with Bloom’s definition of “comprehension” which meant “[demonstrating] an understanding of the meaning or purpose of previously learned information.” This was the second lowest level of learning in Bloom’s hierarchy. The authors of the POI for AY 1963 said that the curriculum was:

\textsuperscript{581} Ibid., 256 and 265.
To provide officers with a working knowledge for wartime and peacetime duty, to include the joint aspects thereof, as commanders and general staff officers at division, corps, field army, army group, including their combat service support systems . . . to provide a basis for satisfactory performance in a wide variety of field grade staff positions at [non-tactical] headquarters; to provide the basis for future development for progression to higher command and staff responsibilities.  

The statement of purpose for AY 1964 through AY 1967 used different wording but the intent seemed to be similar to that for AY 1963.  

The total number of hours for the curriculum continued to decline. The number of hours for the curriculum for AY 1959 was 1146. This was a decrease of about 80 hours as compared to between AY 1955 and AY 1956. The number of hours for the curriculum between AY 1963 and AY 1966 averaged about 1145, but for some unknown reason in AY 1967 it jumped to 1340. The trend from AY 1951 through AY 1966 was a constant decrease in number of hours

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586 USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 250-A-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1959), 4-5.

587 USACGSC, Program of Instruction for Regular Course, (AY 1955), 2. USACGSC, Program of Instruction for Regular Course, (AY 1956), 2.

for the curriculum.\textsuperscript{589} In short, the scope of the curriculum expanded while the number of hours decreased, something had to give.

On 15 November 1957, McGarr issued his “guidance and decisions” for developing the curriculum for AY 1959. He wanted the curriculum to emphasize how a commander looked at problems.\textsuperscript{590} McGarr tasked the “Department of Staff and Educational Subjects (DSE)” to educate students about the “vital and essential [tools] of command” such as “the [decision-making] process of command, of staff theory, and of pertinent staff systems.”\textsuperscript{591} In his 1957 article, McGarr asserted that “[t]he purpose of educational subjects is the long-term development of values, standards, and theoretical knowledge of the professional soldier.”\textsuperscript{592} In his guidance for AY 1959, the Commandant told DSE to give:

> strong emphasis to public information and community relations, designed to make every student thoroughly conscious of his responsibility as a spokesman for the Army and for his relations with the civilian community.\textsuperscript{593}

For some unknown reason, McGarr’s guidance did not cover troop information. McGarr’s lack of emphasis on troop information was contrary to what other general officers, such as Mudgett and McAnsh, were advocating. Mudgett and McAnsh thought that the priority should be on


\textsuperscript{592} McGarr, “USA Command and General Staff College: Keeping Pace with the Future,” 10.

explaining to the troops first and then to the public.\textsuperscript{594} McGarr’s failure to cover troop information indicated that not all senior officers agreed on the best approach for conducting AIP.

The term “Command Information” was first seen in the curriculum at CGSC for AY 1959. This new term might have come about when the CG of CONARC, in 1958, answered an inquiry from DA’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations about how public information was being taught at both CGSC and the Army War College. In his response, the CG of CONARC recommended that the Army move away “from ‘public information’ to ‘information’ and cover all aspects of this command activity, to include public information, troop information, civil liaison and community relations.”\textsuperscript{595} If the instruction focused on a comprehensive use of “information,” he asserted, which was expected to assist each officer to understand ways in which the Army wanted him to conduct an integrated program instead of the specific sub-programs.\textsuperscript{596} The first indication that the Department of the Army (DA) had accepted his proposal was seen in the \textit{Program of Instruction} for AY 1959 at CGSC. The developers of the curriculum allotted six hours, conducted in two segments each lasting three hours, to lessons called “Command Information.” Each segment included a one-hour session for both discussions and conducting practical exercises, and then there was a guest speaker who had two hours.\textsuperscript{597} The use of the new term implied that DA changed the title to emphasize two key points. First

\textsuperscript{594} AW\textit{C}, Lecture, Mudgett, “Public Information – Troop Information and Education,” 8.


\textsuperscript{597} USACGSC, \textit{Program of Instruction, for Command and General Staff Officer, Regular Course} (AY 1959), 5-6.
was the need for command support. Second was an attempt to integrate instruction that previously had been separate.

Starting in AY 1965 the title of the lesson about the information program changed again. The title, which from AY 1959 had been “Command Information,” returned to “The Army Information Program” (AIP). The developers of this lesson changed the title to align with the change that DA made to the title its program. The author of this lesson for AY 1966 wrote in the script for his lecture that in 1964 the leaders of DA had changed only the title of the overall program and a sub-program. The overall title returned to “The Army Information Program.” The name of the sub-program changed from the “troop information program” to the “command information program.” There were no substantive changes to either the purpose or how the leaders of DA wanted this sub-program to be conducted. This chapter will use “The Army Information Program” and “command information program” for the sake of consistency. No explanation why the leaders of DA made these changes was found. As previously stated, General Williston B. Palmer, who was the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army in 1955, provided possible insight when he claimed that there were some leaders in the Army, especially below the division level, who had a poor opinion of the troop program. Changing the name of the sub-program might have been a way for the Army to start anew to gain the benefits from informing the troops, while ridding itself of a name that evoked such as negative reaction from some leaders.

The instruction in command information for AY 1959 through AY 1961 was divided into two lessons. The first lesson had the title “The Army in Peacetime – Command Information – I,” which seemed to focus on public information. The aim of this lesson was worded similarly for each year. For example, the authors of the advance sheet for this lesson in AYs 1960 and 1961 wrote that students would be able to learn about “the principles of public [information] and mass


600 Palmer, “A Fresh Start for Troop Information,” 2-5.
communication media in general, and to emphasize the need for commanders and general staff officers to understand the basic considerations affecting public [information] and the use of mass communication media.” The first hour, the developers of this lesson reported in each advance sheet for AY 1959 through AY 1960, was to introduce students to “theories of public [information], public opinion and mass communication.” There were no scenarios provided in the advance sheet. For the remaining two hours, the authors noted, students listened to “a guest speaker from the Chief of Information, [DA], who will discuss the Army’s information task.” The notes from these lectures were not found. The authors of the supplemental material included a list of factors “which should be considered [when attempting to influence public] opinion.” For example, what was done was more important than what was said. The description of public information, which was to achieve friendly interaction between the Army and the local and the national public, and how to affect public opinion for AY 1959 through AY 1961 resembled those included in the “Public Information” lesson for AY 1954 and AY 1955.

The second lesson was titled “The Army in Peacetime – Command Information – II.” The aim of this lesson, the authors of the advance sheet for AY 1961 wrote, was for students “to develop an understanding of command and staff responsibilities in the support and development of the command information program.” The only difference in the wording of the statement of purpose for this lesson in both AYs 1959 and 1960 instead of AY 1961 was the title of the

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information program: the “Army information program” rather than the “command information program.” The level of learning that the authors of this lesson wanted students to achieve was “understanding,” which aligned with Bloom’s application. Bloom defined application as “[u]se previously learned information in novel and concrete situations.” The conduct of this lesson for both AYs 1959 and 1960 resembled the sequence of Command Information I. The first hour was “to acquaint [each student] with [the] command and staff responsibilities for the Army information program,” which was composed of “troop information, public information, and community relations.” The other two hours, according to the advance sheet of AY 1959 and AY 1960, were for a guest speaker from COI at DA to “discuss the content and preparation of the Army information program.” It is not clear how this lesson would cover all three sub-programs in three hours when four hours were needed in AY 1954 and AY 1955, and that only covered both public and troop information. Based on the aim of the lesson, it is reasonable to expect that the lecturer would describe both the key duties of a commander and a general staff officer had to perform to effectively conduct AIP.

The same two exercises for “Command Information – II” were included in the advance sheet of AY 1959 and AY 1960. The first scenario had each student portray a division Chief of Staff who had to “brief the newly assigned information officer” on his duties. This new officer had no experience in how to perform the information function, and he did not know what his


duties were and how he was to interact with the rest of staff. This scenario gave each student a chance to think about what he believed to be most important about how a division should conduct two tasks. First was how this officer was to help run an integrated information program. Second was how to integrate an information officer (IO) into all staff processes such as decision-making. The authors of each advance sheet provided each instructor with a few examples of duties of an information officer, which resembled what was contained in FM 101-5 (1960). For example, the IO was to counsel his commander on how to integrate all three sub-programs.

The other exercise involved a division which was moving to a location where the relationship between members of the previous unit and local civilians had been poor. According to the scenario for AY 1959, “there is no evidence that the previous division had a positive public [information] program which functioned effectively.” Cast as a key staff officer – Chief of Staff, information officer, and G1 through G4 – each student was to provide “recommendations to the commanding general for immediate action on troop information, public information, and community relations . . . aspects of the division’s move to Fort Ready.” This gave the student a chance to develop an integrated plan for the commander to create an effective information program. Based on the time limit, only one hour, it is questionable whether students could conduct and then discuss their proposed solutions for both exercises. It was through the discussion that students would be able to help each other learn.

The authors of lesson “The Army in Peacetime – Command Information– II” for academic year (AY) 1961 changed the format of the instruction. The key difference was that there was no guest speaker. All three hours were for the students to apply what they had learned. Students were required to read a chapter titled “Command Information” and an

appendix titled “Staff Procedures in Selected Command Information Activities” of a CGSC-produced reference book which described many functions of the staff including the information program and its three sub-programs. The descriptions of the overall program and three sub-programs in this chapter were similar to those in the supplemental material that was part of the curriculum at the Command and General Staff College for AY 1954, AY 1955 and AY 1959. This appendix listed the duties that staff officers, such as the information officer and the G1 through G4 had for each of the sub-programs. For example, the G3 was to allocate time on the schedule for the conduct of troop information, and coordinate with the information officer on those training activities which might be of interest to the public. This appendix was a tool that students could use both in class and after graduation. This information provided the students with ways to integrate the actions associated with all three sub-programs.

Scenarios, which were contained in the advance sheet, gave each student a few chances to apply what they were learning about the information program. Two exercises will illustrate. In one exercise each student, portraying a staff officer ranging from a Chief of Staff, an information officer, to a primary staff officer (G1 through G4), had a specific situation in which he had to deal with an information problem that was related to his staff function. For example, the operations officer had to work with local authorities on how best to conduct a three-week exercise that previously had resulted in numerous protests from local civilians, and then he had to determine how to inform the local population. The other scenario involved moving a US infantry division to West Germany. This scenario will be covered in more detail later because it was also included in following academic years. It is noteworthy that an aim of “Command Information – II” for AY 1959 through AY 1961 was to help students learn about the “command

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613 USACGSC, Reference Book, Staff, RB-101, (June 1960), 14-1 to 14-6 in Archives File USACGSC/61
615 USACGSC, Reference Book, Staff, RB-101, (June 1960), 14-8 to 14-11.
617 Ibid., IIA-1.
and staff responsibilities” for the conduct of this program, but they only portrayed staff officers, not a commander, in the scenarios.\textsuperscript{618}

Contrary to AY 1959 through AY 1961, the developers of the curriculum between AY 1962 and AY 1967 did not include a guest speaker who specifically addressed how the leaders of the Department of the Army wanted these students to conduct AIP. In fact, in only one year, AY 1964, did the developers invite guest speakers to share with students their assessment of some of the factors in the domestic environment that impacted how the Army should conduct its information program. For example, in a lecture titled “US Social Order,” students, the authors of the POI for AY 1964 wrote, would gain a general understanding of “the attitudes and sense of values which motivate or delimit actions by American society.”\textsuperscript{619} Another lecturer was to explain the following points, according to the POI, in a lecture titled “Role of the Press:”

The role of the press in a free society. . . . The press as a molder of public opinion. Factors influencing press operations at the national level, to include relationships with the executive branch of the government and with the military, the importance of freedom of the press, censorship or the restriction of information by the government, and problem areas and proposed solutions.\textsuperscript{620}

The press, through its reporting, had an impact on how the American public understood issues related to defense. It was in the best interest of the Army to have each student learn about the operations of the press to gain an awareness of how his actions and those of his future units could influence, either positively or negatively, the opinions of members of the press and through them the American people. If those then responsible for the curriculum at CGSC wanted graduates to


\textsuperscript{620} USACGSC, “Role of the Press,” 28 in USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 250-A-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1964).
shape how Americans felt about the Army, then it was wrong for them not to include a lecturer who would describe AIP and how to implement it.621

The curriculum for AY 1962 through AY 1966, but not AY 1967, included a lesson on how the leaders of the Department of the Army (DA) wanted these students, and the rest of the Army, to conduct AIP.622 The statement of purpose of this lesson changed once between AYs 1962 and 1966. The purpose for AY 1962 and AY 1963, according to each advance sheet, was for students “to develop an understanding of command and general staff responsibilities in the support and development of the [Army] information program.”623 This resembled the purpose for the lesson “The Army in Peacetime – Command Information II” of AY 1959 through AY 1961.624 As previously stated, “understanding” aligned with Bloom’s application, which was to “[u]se previously learned information in novel and concrete situations.”625 In November 1962, COL Wilson M. Hawkins, who was the Director of the Department of Command (DCOM), ordered two modifications to the purpose of this lesson for AY 1964. One change was to replace


the word “understanding” with “general knowledge,” which using Bloom’s taxonomy meant “[r]ecall [of] previously learned information,” reflecting a decrease in the level of learning each student was to reach. This new level of learning was below what the curriculum was to provide, which was “working knowledge.” The other change was to exchange the phrase “support and development” with “development and execution.” This adjustment reflected that the duty of each student went from just helping his commander create the program to also properly conducting it. Overall, the expectations for the students to learn about the information function declined.

The number of hours that the developers of the curriculum allotted changed twice between AY 1962 and AY 1966. This lesson remained three hours of classroom instruction and exercise from AY 1962 to AY 1965, but this was three hours less than in AY 1961. In the “Description of the [196]2 Course of Study – Regular Course,” COL Hawkins said that the decrease in time given to this lesson between AYs 1961 and 1962 was made possible by ending “duplication of material.” He also claimed that the cut could be made “without reduction in the students’ understanding.” COL Hawkins’ conclusion is surprising since in the first three hours of AY 1959 through AY 1961 the students studied why officers needed to know about the media and how they perform its duty. The second three hours to learn about what actions commanders and staffs should take to have an effective AIP. His statement of “duplication” might have meant


USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 250-A-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1964), 1.


the use of a lecture, but, based on the aim of each lesson in the advance sheet, the topics covered in the two sections were different. In January 1965, COL Marvin H. Merchant, who was the Director of DCOM, reduced this lesson for AY 1966 to “a 1-hour lecture in the auditorium.”

Merchant gave no explanation for his decision. His decision implied that he believed that students could achieve “general knowledge” in a one-hour lecture that took three hours which included exercises in the preceding years to accomplish. Next, COL William D. Wise, Jr., Director of DCOM in January 1966, ordered that thirteen lessons were to be dropped for AY 1967, and one of those lessons was the “Army Information Program.” This reduction, he explained, was “due to adjustment in [hours in the curriculum, and a] changed emphasis in instruction on command and general staff functions.” COL Wise’s decision to remove this subject from the curriculum implied that he wanted to allocate time for other subjects that he believed were of higher value. Wise’s decision was an example of what could happen when the leaders at DA did not clearly establish priority that conducting AIP was important.

These officers’ decisions are interesting considering that from academic year (AY) 1963 to AY 1965 the College increased the amount of time allotted to DCOM from 268 to 317 hours, but the time for students to study about public relations did not change. However, when DCOM experienced any reduction in hours, the instruction in the AIP was impacted. Between AYs 1965 and 1966, the number of hours allotted DCOM was reduced by twelve hours and COL

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631 Department of Command, “[196]6 Regular Course College Directives and Description of Course of Study,” (AY 1966), 1.


Merchant cut the amount of time given for the lesson about AIP by a third. Then DCOM experienced another reduction from 305 hours in AY 1966 to 288 in AY 1967 and stopped teaching about AIP.\textsuperscript{634} Between AYs 1963 and 1967, although the College allotted twenty more hours for DCOM to conduct its instruction, the amount of time that DCOM allotted for students to study public relations decreased from three hours to zero. Therefore, it seems that in the minds of the decision-makers the information program was not a high enough priority. Those setting the curriculum assumed some risk in not including subjects related to public relations. The assumption of this risk seems to suggest that the Army had made significant positive strides in conducting AIP since 1956 when BG McAnsh reported that two previous CSAs, Ridgway and Taylor, had stated the Army’s performance of this program was poor.\textsuperscript{635} The trends were two-fold, but both represented a decrease in emphasis for students to study about AIP. There was, first, a decline in the level of learning that students were to achieve on AIP. Second, there was the decrease the time given for students to learn about the program.

The authors of the lesson on the AIP between AY 1962 and AY 1966 had their students read different works, but the aim remained constant. The aim was to achieve “general knowledge” about the program and its components. One point of consistency for AY 1962 through AY 1965 was that the authors had students read the supplemental material and the exercise scenarios, which were contained in the advance sheet.\textsuperscript{636} For AY 1964 and AY 1965, the authors assigned a total of four readings for this lesson. These readings were: the supplemental materials, students also read portions of two Army regulations and lastly they read


\textsuperscript{635} McAnsh, “A Steady Breeze blows Topside, So Let’s Stand Tall,” 22-25.

a segment from FM 101-5, *Staff Organization and Procedure.* The authors of this lesson for AY 1966 assigned readings which resembled those of AYs 1964 and 1965, but without the supplemental material. They also added a DA Pamphlet and a text produced by the College.

Between AY 1963 and AY 1965, the supplemental material included a general overview of both AIP and all three of its sub-programs. It is striking that the authors who arranged this material used the same order to describe these sub-programs: command information, public information, and community relations. Resembling that used by Generals Mudgett, the sequence implied that when conducting the information function that command information should be the starting point. In each of the supplemental materials, the number of topics included in the description of each sub-program varied and the trend was to include fewer. The treatment of public information will illustrate. The section on public information in the supplemental material for AY 1963 included three paragraphs – one on “Public Opinion,” another on “Communication Media,” and a third on “Press Relations.” Each paragraph explained why the topic was important and why a commander should consider it when determining how he would explain a situation to the public. For example, the authors of the paragraph on public opinion for AY 1963 wrote:

> The success of public information activities is measured in terms of public esteem and support. . . . The Army must seek to understand the nature and temper of public opinion and insure that information about the Army is directed towards filling a real need of the public.

The next year the paragraph about the communication media was removed. The removal meant that each student, after AY 1963, did not read, for example, that the power of the media was growing and the military had no direct control over how the information it gave the media was

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640 USACGSC, “Command Information,” (AY 1963), 4-6.
conveyed to the public. Then in AY 1965 the part about public opinion was discontinued.\textsuperscript{641} The decline in coverage of topics related to public information was not offset by an increase in any other required reading. During these three academic years, the paragraph on “Press Relations” was the only constant related to informing the public. The authors of the paragraph wrote:

Because the Army exercises no authority over the media of public communication, the only means of influencing the treatment of material furnished is by maintaining favorable relations with those who control and contribute to the various media. The essentials of good relations with the communication media are service, honesty, and friendliness.\textsuperscript{642}

Each year, the authors of the advance sheet included a description of the terms “service,” “honesty,” and “friendliness.” For example, they wrote, “Honesty. Nothing but frankness and complete honesty will suffice in dealing with communication media. To the extent that genuine security considerations will permit, the full facts are given without distortion or embellishment.”\textsuperscript{643} The emphasis on honesty resembled what was included in the instruction in the information program for other academic years such as AY 1953 and AY 1955 and AY 1961.\textsuperscript{644} Some of the traits that officers should have that were advocated in the paragraph on “Press Relations” were also found in other publications.

BG Howard S. Wilcox, who was the author of one of those publications, provided “a personal guide list for a commander faced with a major news break” in the August 1961 edition of\textit{Military Review}.\textsuperscript{645} This article was listed as optional reading and an extract of the article was also included in the advance sheet for this lesson from AY 1963 through AY 1965. In 1961,

\textsuperscript{642}USACGSC, “The Army Information Program,” (AY 1965), 7-9.
Wilcox, a National Guard officer, was the Assistant Division Commander for the 38th Infantry Division. His civilian job was as Director of Personnel and Public Relations for the *Indianapolis Star and News* and Director of Public Relations for Central Newspapers, Inc.\(^{646}\) Wilcox’s list contained six key recommendations:

Give factual answers—or say you do not know. . . . Keep yourself as the primary source of information. . . . Do not issue a blanket order forbidding anyone in your command from talking with the press. . . . Try to understand the job confronting the reporters and photographers. . . . Above all, do not lose your temper. . . . do not fight the [newspaper] clippings.\(^{647}\)

He gave a detailed explanation of each of these. For example in order to “[k]eep yourself as the primary source,” he advocated that commanders make themselves available to the press. Members of the press wanted to get their information from the person in charge, which, in military matters, meant the commander. In his conclusion, Wilcox wrote, based on his experience, “[j]ust as the president or board chairman can influence the press in his area directly, you – the senior commander of a United States Army installation – can and should do the same.”\(^{648}\) To have an impact on the press, he strongly suggested, all commanders and certain staff officers had to take the time before, during, and after an incident to establish a relationship with the press. This included, Wilcox said, gaining “an understanding of and an appreciation for the problems facing” the press. Basically, Wilcox claimed that, if “[commanders] have been cooperative and fair with the press, it will have far-reaching effect on the overall situation.”\(^{649}\) He implied that if a commander had a relationship with the media, then, in many cases, the press would work with him. Wilcox’s proposals seemed to be reasonable ways for helping his fellow officers with both their public information and community relations efforts. Since the aim of this


lesson was for each student to gain “general knowledge” about the information program, then BG Wilcox’s article should have been required reading based on his personal experience.

The developers of the curriculum for academic year (AY) 1962 through AY 1965 allotted three hours for the lesson concerning “[The Army] Information [Program]” (AIP) that provided the students a solid foundation concerning the goals of this program. The way that this instruction was carried out changed between AY 1962 and AY 1963. The developers of the curriculum for AY 1962 only included one lesson titled “The Army in Peacetime – Command Information.” Resembling the one for the second lesson offered between AY 1959 and 1961, the aim of this three-hour lesson, the authors of the advance sheet for AY 1962 wrote, was for students “to develop an understanding of command and staff responsibilities in the support and development of the command information program.” But the conduct of this lesson and the practical exercises in AY 1962 mirrored only that of AY 1961. The lesson used in both AY 1963 and AY 1964 will illustrate how this lesson was conducted. The authors of this lesson had students watch a short nine- to ten-minute address made by a former secretary of the Army or the CSA and then allotted another ten minutes to discuss the main points. The speaker, according to the outline of this lesson, explained four key points that each officer should keep in mind about the proper execution of the information program. First was a short description of each of the three sub-programs of AIP. The next two were that the Department of the Army (DA) and every person who worked for the Army – especially commanders had a duty to provide both


facts of an event or a policy and interpret those facts for the public. Lastly, an information program would be effective only when it described a “sound product.” It is one thing for a leader at DA to talk about the information program, but it another to have the Army match those words with action.

The remaining ten minutes of the introduction was for each instructor to help his students comprehend the overall program. Each lesson plan described the aim of both command information and public information in ways that resembled those found in AY 1959 and AY 1961. The authors for this lesson for AYs 1963 and 1964 provided a list of principles of AIP. Examples of these were:

A sound [Army] information program acts to prevent problems as well as cure or minimize them. . . . The welfare of military personnel is not sacrificed for “pleasant” community relations or the appeasement of special interests. The public (internal and external) must be kept informed. A commander can be his command’s best information officer. Community problems are often best solved through community leaders.

These principles clearly stated that the information program was intended to be a way to prevent, not just react to, problems. Providing the facts to the public early, they implied, could potentially prevent problems from developing. This proactive approach required officers to integrate how to conduct AIP into all planning processes. The rest of the three hours was for students to develop and discuss their solutions to different scenarios. The approach advocated by these authors was not new.

In these practical exercises, each student had chances to apply what he was learning from both readings and classroom discussions. The exercises used between AY 1963 and AY 1965 resembled one another. According to a curricular document from 4 January 1962, COL Hawkins,

then the Director of DCOM, directed that, starting with AY 1963, all instruction in his department, which included the lesson in public relations, would “[emphasize] the Commander and the functions of command.” The authors of this lesson between AYs 1963 and 1965 included two scenarios. Each student portrayed staff officers in one and a commander in the other.

The authors of this lesson about the information program of the Army between AY 1961 and AY 1965 included one scenario involved moving a U.S. division from Fort Polk, Louisiana to Germany. This scenario had two parts. In each segment, the students portrayed each primary staff officer, G1 through G4, and the information officer of that division. In the first part, the Chief of Staff, the authors of the advance sheets for AY 1962 and AY 1963 wrote, tasked each staff officer “to visualize potential problems that could arise” as a result of the impending move that were related to both troop information and community relations in the US and in Germany, and then to develop options to solve them. Each year the authors of this lesson provided some ideas of both potential problems and solutions to discuss with students. An example after the move was the potential for an incident between soldiers and local German gangs. The information contained in each scenario provided the details. Then students, as various staff officers, had to determine what actions they would recommend. In suggesting how to deal with the aftermath of a fight, the authors showed how staff members would be involved in solving this problem. The G2 (or intelligence officer) would gather information about the incident and German gangs. The G5 (or civil affairs officer) or the G1 (personnel officer) would coordinate

with local authorities in an effort to prevent any repeat incidents. This situation provided students with an opportunity to anticipate problems that might occur before and after the move and then develop possible solutions for their commander or, in other words, apply the principles of AIP. It also showed how the entire staff could help their commander conduct his information program.

The other scenario was introduced in AY 1963 and stayed in use through AY 1965. The lead character was Brigadier General S.S. Smith, who had been “recently promoted and placed in command” of an installation, supposedly located in the middle of the country. Students were to determine whether Smith’s actions were aligned with principles of AIP. In the scenario John J. Jones, the secretary of the local Chamber of Commerce, wrote a letter asking BG Smith to reduce the operation of the Post Exchange (PX) during the Christmas season. The reason for Jones’ request was, in essence, to get military personnel to buy their Christmas gifts from local businesses to help reduce their inventories. Reducing inventories was important to the Chamber because the state placed a high tax on inventory that businesses held at the end of the year. Students examined Jones’ letter and Smith’s response. Also provided were examples of both newspaper clippings and Smith’s press releases about this issue. In the post daily bulletin, a form of command information, Smith described the content of Mr. Jones’ letter and his reply. In the bulletin, which included his press releases, Smith stated two key points. First, he believed that the current PX facilities at Fort Bang were “inadequate” and he was trying to expand them to what he considered satisfactory. Second, a local commander does not have the authority to control the operation of the PX. Each student had to also determine whether he thought that Smith’s actions would have been effective in explaining the policies of the Army. These two scenarios gave a few opportunities for students to struggle, as both a commander and as staff officers, with implementing portions of AIP. These scenarios were deep enough to require


students to think about ways in which an integrated information program would be beneficial to a commander, and the Army, in achieving the outcomes of the program.

Due to a reduction in hours allocated from three to one, the method of instruction used for this lesson in AY 1966 was different from those used during the period from AY 1962 through AY 1965. The lecture regarding AIP for AY 1966 was to cover many of the topics seen during the period from AY 1962 through AY 1965. For example, in the outline of this lesson, the authors listed “[t]eaching [p]oints” that described the information program and the sub-programs, which resembled those of AYs 1962 and 1964. For example, when they described public information, the authors used wording similar to that the authors of the supplemental material used during AYs 1963 and 1965. In the notes, they stated that “[t]he essentials of good relations with communication media are service, honesty, and friendliness.” When the developers chose to use only a lecture as the method of instruction, they denied students a chance to apply what they learned. It was through application exercises, such as had been advocated by the 1956 Educational Survey and elsewhere, that student learning was most effective. Therefore, students of the class of AY 1966 received a less effective instruction on AIP than those of the classes of AY 1962 through AY 1965.

One constant in the advance sheet for this lesson between AYs 1962 and 1966 was that each included a few pages summarizing the key points of the instruction. The pages for AYs 1962 and 1965 will illustrate because they resembled each other. The authors of these summary pages reiterated a key goal of AIP, namely, that the public needed to be informed in order for them to make good decisions. They reminded the officer that the American public cared about

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the military because some had relatives who were serving while all taxpayers paid the bill.\textsuperscript{668} With these summary pages, the authors seemed to provide every officer with a guide for conducting the information function not only on the classroom but also for future reference.

The lesson concerning the information program of the Army at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) continued to evolve between AY 1959 and AY 1966. Starting in AY 1959, the instruction about public relations at CGSC emphasized how to conduct an integrated information program. During these eight years both the level of learning and the number of hours allotted to the lesson declined. The leaders of the Department of the Army expected that these students would be able to lead the Army in the future, but they failed to educate them effectively about their duty to explain the Army to both the troops and the public. This failure was especially problematic since civilian leaders and top military officers had publicly stated that it was critical for the Army to communicate effectively what it had been doing and why, both then and into the future, to all members of the service and the public. But the majority of the exercises were oriented on how best to inform the public. This implied that the developers of the curriculum placed less emphasis on informing the troops, which was an indirect approach to the public, than the American people. The authors of this lesson did not provide, in any detail, ways by which these future leaders were to accomplish the goals of AIP. In other words, rhetoric trumped action.

\textbf{Army War College}

The leaders of the Department of the Army (DA) approved three changes of the statement of the mission of the curriculum at the Army War College between AYs 1959 and 1967. There was one change in the aim of the curriculum for academic year (AY) 1961 from that of AYs 1956 through AY 1958. This was for the students to learn to perform the tasks of a commander and a general staff officer in a joint and combined headquarters, which resembled changes in the

The authors of the document describing the curriculum for AY 1961 said that the aim was to:


The statement of the purpose for the curriculum for AYs 1962 and 1963, according to a curricular document for each year, was similar to that of AY 1961, but one task was added. The new task was to prepare all students, officers from all branches of the military and civilians from other governmental departments, for positions equivalent to the Army’s “highest command and general staff.”\footnote{\textit{AY 1955, Curriculum Guide and Part I, The Army, Course 1, World Scene and the Army to Course 3, Logistics and Manpower, Aug-Sep 1955, Box 1955/1956-1, Secretariat, Curriculum Pamphlet, AY1955, 1. AY1956, Curriculum Guide and Part I, The American Tradition and the Communist Threat, to Course 2, International Relations, 01 Aug56 -10 Jan 57, Box 1956/1957-1, Folder – Secretariat, Curriculum Pamphlet, AY 1956, 1. AY 1957, Army War College Curriculum, Box 1957-1958-1, Folder 1, Secretariat, Curriculum, 1. AWC, Curriculum, AY 1960-1961, Curriculum Guide and Part I, National Power and International Relations, Course 1, Orientation, 1 Jul -20 Aug 1960, Box 1960/1961-1, Folder 1- Secretariat, Curriculum Pamphlet, 1. USACGSC, \textit{Program of Instruction, for Command and General Staff Officer, Regular Course} (AY 1959), 1. USACGSC, “College Guidelines for Resident Instruction, 1960-1961, Vol. I to Vol. II, 7.}}

The statement of the mission for AY 1964 through AY 1967 was a condensation of the version used in AY 1963. For example, the authors of the pamphlet that described the curriculum for AY 1967 listed the mission as: “To prepare selected senior officers for command and high level staff duties with emphasis upon Army doctrine and operations and
to advance interdepartmental and interservice understanding.” This change indicated that DA wanted students at the War College to study how the Army operates in an increasingly joint and interagency context.

Lecturers continued to introduce the students to some subjects that were related to AIP such as public opinion. An example of a lecture which discussed American society during the period AY 1963 through AY 1965 was “US Social Order.” For AYs 1966 and 1967, the title of this address was modified to “US Social Order: Element of National Power.” The scope of this lecture, according to curricular documents, stayed much the same from AY 1963 through AY 1967. The authors of the curricular documents for AY 1966 listed the scope as:

To examine the nature, origins, and evolution of the attitudes and sense of values which motivate or delimit actions by the American society. Included is an assessment of the relationship of these attitudes and values to the American national purpose, to the determination of national objectives, to the development and use of national power, to the position of the military in the US society, and to


the American capability as a nation to cope with strategic problems over
approximately the next 15 years.675

The scope of this lecture resembled that of a similarly titled lecture that was part of the
curriculum at CGSC for only AY 1964.676 Starting in AY 1965 and lasting through AY 1967, the
authors of curricular documents used in this lesson developed a list of questions for students to
think about as they prepared for the lecture. One question from AY 1966 was: “What type of
social organizations exerts the most influence on American attitudes and sense of values?”
Another asked: “What are the present and future impacts of a continued high state of military
preparedness on American social values?”677 Through these questions, the authors were trying to
get students to think about some of the non-military factors which influenced the opinions of the American people concerning national security. Officers could use this knowledge to anticipate likely public reactions to a decision and to develop a plan to reduce the risk of the public misunderstanding what the Army was doing.

The curriculum at the War College covered the concept of national power, which was a synthesis of many elements of which the armed forces were only one. The authors of the AY 1963 directive for “Course 2: National Purpose and National Power of the United States and the Soviet Union” commented on national power. It was, they said, composed of “the basic power ingredients – political, military, economic, psychological-sociological, and geographical [—] available to each competitor.” The definition of “psychological-sociological,” according to a curricular document, was the “character of the people as a society . . . their sense of values, patriotism, and morale.” The discussion about a “sense of values” was a way to connect lectures on “US Social Order,” that were conducted at CGCS and the War College, to national power. In AY 1967, the authors of the directive for “Course 1: The World Environment and Sources of Conflict” noted a change in the elements of national power. The updated elements of national power were: “diplomatic / political, economic, cultural, politico-military, and military.” Also in AY 1967, the leaders of the College added a lecture called “Culture as an

the United States and Its Alliances, Directive, 23. The first question was in all three years, but the second question was only in AYs 1966 and 1967.


Element of National Power.” The scope of the lecture on “Culture” was similar to that of the scope of the lecture on “US Social Order,” which was conducted at the Command and General Staff College and the War College. Students could use what they had learned in these lectures when they were developing options for their commanders to explain the actions of the Army to the American public. This would help them to match the Army’s deeds with what its leaders had publicly stated.

After a three year absence, between AYs 1962 and 1966, excluding AY 1965, the Chief of Information at DA again spoke to each class on the Army and its relationship with the public. As evidenced in directives for the relevant courses, the scope of this lecture stayed much the same for AY 1962 through AY 1964. The lecture for AY 1964 was titled “Public
Understanding and the Army Information Program” will illustrate. The scope of this lecture, according to a curricular document for AY 1964, was:

An analysis of the problem of gaining public understanding and support of the role and requirements of the Army. The lecture includes a presentation of major aspects of the Army Information Program designed to produce a favorable Army image and public understanding. Relationships of troop information to public information are discussed . . . Finally, an appreciation of the role of commanders in the information effort is furnished.684

Both the title and the scope of the lecture changed for AY 1966. The title became “Public Opinion and National Security Policy.” The scope, according to a curricular document, was “[a]n examination of the role of public opinion and media of mass communication in the formulation of national security policy. Included is a discussion of what constitutes public opinion, how it is expressed, its effect on national policies, and methods by which it is changed.”685 During AYs 1962 through 1964, the lecture was to emphasize what broad actions members of the Army could take to impact what the public knew about the Army. Whereas, the lecture for AY 1966 seemed to focus on describing the media environment in which these officers would explain the actions of the Army to the public. The difference in the scope of these lectures suggested that those deciding on the curriculum changed what they wanted to the students to learn. The goal went from having the students study how to perform the tasks related to the information program to learn about the information environment in which they would try to explain the Army to the national public.

Between AYs 1962 and 1964, the Chief of Information (COI) at DA spoke to students at the War College about the broad nature of AIP. MG Charles G. Dodge told the class of AY 1962 that the Army had hired a firm “to determine what the people think about the Army, and the reasons why they hold such opinions” in 1958 and 1961. The firm found in 1958, Dodge reported, that the public thought the Army “was at best a second-class” organization and that it would be of “small use in a total war. The Army was regarded as slow, earthbound, and made up of below-average individuals.” However, by 1961 the public attitude towards the Army had improved. The firm claimed, Dodge noted, the change in opinion was the result of perceived advances in “Army efficiency, flexibility, and educational opportunities.” The company’s “analysts feel . . . that three factors are important,” Dodge reported, to explaining this change. These factors were: Kennedy’s adoption of a defense policy known as “Flexible Response,” the rise in “[i]nternational tensions in such areas as Berlin and Vietnam,” and the efforts of the Army to explain to the public what it was doing. This implied that the effort of the Army was having positive dividends. Dodge asserted: “75 per cent of the individuals interviewed in these surveys reported that one major source of their information [about] the Army came from their own service experience and that of friends in [the] service.” This number clearly showed that the conduct of the troop information program would, positively or negatively, have a long-term impact public opinion. A key aim of AIP, Dodge emphasized, was to continue “[c]hanging public opinions and modifying public attitudes” towards a favorable view of the Army. Although advances had been made, he argued there was still much work to do.

Echoing some of what Ridgway had said in his 1954 article, MG George Underwood told the classes of AYs 1963 and 1964 that the service “tends to be its own worst enemy when it comes to getting its story told. Too many officers see the press as a hazard to be avoided at all

687 Ibid., 8-9.
689 Ibid., 12-14.
costs rather than a medium of communication to be utilized for the good of their institution.”

Conceding that some careers had suffered due to working with the press, Underwood argued that the injury was usually a result of the officer not being aware of the proper ways of working with the press. A prime example of this lack of knowledge, he said, was the failure to establish clear “ground rules” for an interview. The ground rules shaped ways in which information from the interview would be used. For example, one must make clear what information was “background or off-the-record,” which meant the reporter could not attribute the comments to the person being interviewed.

There were a few critical points that both COIs made in their lectures. Repeating a point that was found in the instruction of AIP at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) from AY 1953 through AY 1955 and between AY 1963 and 1965, Dodge and Underwood both emphasized the importance of being honest. Underwood stated in his lecture for AYs 1963 and 1964 that “candor is an indispensable ingredient in the Army’s public relations formula.” They also asserted, repeating another consistent theme that commanders must establish an effective working relationship with those individuals in the local area who were the decision-makers for the different media of communication, such as newspapers, radio, and television. The reason why these relationships were important was that it was those individuals, not the local


commander, who determined what was published to the public. Their recommendations about the need for the leaders of the Army to have relationships with leaders of the media and the need for candor resembled those made by BG Wilcox in his 1961 article that was part of the curriculum of CGSC between AYs 1963 and 1965. Educating officers about ways to communicate effectively with both the press and the public was critical to helping them feel confident about their ability to perform this vital task. An officer with this skill would, most likely, be more willing to talk to the press.

Both Dodge and Underwood also insisted that officers should communicate with members of the Army community—that is, pursue the command information program. The conduct of this program for the 1960s had been significantly changed from the centralized program of the 1940s and the 1950s. Even though the leaders at DA still established broad goals for each quarter and suggested subjects to reach these them, both lecturers stated that in the end each commander would choose what subjects he would emphasis to support his program. Dodge and Underwood, only in 1963, described a letter that General George H. Decker, Army Chief of Staff, wrote in March 1962 to his subordinates. Decker reminded them about the purpose and importance of keeping the troops informed, noting also that commanders were accountable for achieving the outcomes desired by their superiors. Dodge and Underwood reported that Decker wrote: “[Command] information is as essential a part of military training as

tactics or marksmanship.” Surely, the example set by the CSA should have helped students grasp the fundamental nature and importance of command information.

The Chiefs of Information clearly explained the components and functions of the Army Information Program. They also described ways in which the conduct of each sub-program contributed to gaining and maintaining public support for the Army. These lectures again focused on the goals to be achieved rather than providing examples how to conduct the program.

The last two requirements for students between academic year (AY) 1959 and AY 1967 remained to turn in their individual research paper and attend a seminar. Between AY 1959 and AY 1961, however, no student wrote about topics related to the Army Information Program. Between AYs 1962 and 1967, five students wrote their individual papers on aspects of public opinion and national security. Then again, none of them specifically addressed ways in which the Army conducted its information effort. An example of these papers was COL Robinson R. Norris, a student in the class of AY 1962, who wrote about “Public Information vs National

 Security.” Norris noted, accepted the notion of “the right of the people to know about the affairs of [the] government.” He also wrote that no government “can act firmly and decisively without the support of public opinion.” “[T]he current government information program, designed,” he asserted, “to chart an equitable course between public information and secrecy, falls short . . . in three important respects.” His conclusions seemed to be valid for both the government and the Army. Resembling the findings of LTC Whitney in his 1951 article, Norris argued that two of these flaws: “public understanding and support of the program is lacking and . . . a capacity for broad public understanding of the issues involved in national security policy and operations does not exist” seems to question whether AIP was conducted effectively. Reaffirming a proposal of the Haislip Board (1947), Norris proposed that the US government should “[initiate] a coordinated program to educate the public and the press concerning the [need] for an information security program and to enlarge the ‘attentive public’ who are competent to consider the factors and issues involved in National security.” His point of enlarging the “attentive public” resembled the arguments of Gabriel Almond (1956) and Frank R. Barnett (AY 1958). Norris’ findings affirmed that the military wanted the public to support its efforts. The conclusions of his study suggest that the government, and the Army, still had a long way to go to have an effective information program. His repeating of the finding of previous writers indicates that those deficiencies had not been corrected.

Continuing a trend that had started in AY 1955, the curriculum at the War College for AY 1959 through AY 1967 concluded with a “National Strategy Seminar.” A document describing the aims of the curriculum for AY 1963 offered wording reminiscent of what had been used in AY 1956 and AY 1957: “[T]he National Strategy Seminar provides [students with]}

702 Norris, “Public Information vs National Security”, iii and 11.
an opportunity to discuss ideas and concepts of national security and strategy with distinguished military and civilian guests.”

For AYs 1966 and AY 1967, the aim of the seminar was changed. The updated goal of the seminar was for “students,” according to curricular documents from AY 1966, to “expose their national strategies and supporting military programs to the critical appraisal of a group of distinguished military and civilian guests.”

Why there was a change from discussing ideas to having guests evaluate students’ program is not clear. The goal of the College’s leaders was clearly to provide students with some experience in being questioned by civilians and military guests about their proposals related to national security. This interaction might have also exposed the students to at least some types of questions that they should expect when, in the future, they briefed senior leaders, civilian and military, at the strategic level. Even though some changes were made, future Army leaders still interacted with key civilians from across the nation, which supported informing the public.

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The leaders of the War College as part of their effort to inform expand the “attentive public” about military policies tried to publish papers written by their students. In September 1965, MG Eugene Salet, the Commandant, “distributed to the Army’s senior leadership, graduates and past faculty of the college, and throughout the school system,” Ball writes, a pamphlet titled “Occasional Papers of the Army War College.” This pamphlet contained two papers written by students. “The reaction [of the audience] to the papers,” Ball said, “was generally favorable.” In April of the next year, Salet produced a document similar to the “Occasional Papers” that was called The United States Army War College Commentary. The Chief of Information at the Department of the Army was against releasing Commentary to the public because he was concerned, Ball writes, about the potential “public relations problems ahead if controversial articles not necessarily in accord with Defense Department or Army policies were published openly.” In the end, Ball asserts, the distribution of Commentary was also “limited to within the Army.” In fact, it could be argued, the leaders of the Department of the Army were sending mixed messages. They wanted these officers to explain the actions and policies of the Army to the public, but they were not allowing their papers to be published. This perpetuated the gap between the words of leaders and their actions.

Between AY 1959 and AY 1967, the developers of the curriculum at CGSC and War College prioritized having students study how to conduct public information over the other two sub-programs of AIP. The curriculum at CGSC continued to focus on describing the benefits, to the officer and the Army, of conducting each sub-program of AIP. At the War College, the emphasis was learning how the effectiveness of the Army’s conducted its AIP potentially would impact the support the public had for the service. What was evident was a decline in the number of hours allocated to this topic at both schools, but especially at CGSC. The decrease in hours meant a reduction in ability for the students to apply what they were learning. It is interesting that even though the leaders of the Army understood the importance of explaining the actions of the service to their soldiers, they still placed more emphasis on teaching the officer corps how to inform the public. Some of this might have been, specifically after 1965, due to America’s involvement in Vietnam. This period is rated third out of five for providing the students with effective educating on the AIP. This rating is due to the continuing decrease in priority assigned

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708 Ball, Of Responsible Command, 378-379.
to teaching the students how to conduct the information program. This decline was seen in two areas: the number of hours and providing opportunities for students to apply what they were learning. The key point is that the continued decline seems to contradict what the senior leaders were saying of the importance of the information program.
Chapter 5 - Addition of elective programs and the continued emphasis on public information (AY 1968-1973)

This chapter will cover changes in the curricula at both the Command and General Staff Course (CGSC) and Army War College that were based on Army Chief of Staff General Harold K. Johnson’s decision to adjust the educational methodology of part of the system that educates officers.\(^{709}\) In May 1965, Secretary of the Army Stephen Ailes appointed LTG Ralph E. Haines, Jr. as the president of a board, which was subsequently called the Haines Board, to determine if the current system that educates officers “from the time of commissioning until retirement” would meet the requirements of the Army in the next decade.\(^{710}\) The Board submitted its report titled “Report of the Department of the Army Board to Review Army Officer Schools” to the Department of the Army (DA) in February 1966.\(^{711}\) In July 1966, Johnson accepted a proposal of the Haines Board to add a program of electives into the curriculum at schools such as CGSC and the War College.\(^{712}\) As a result of Johnson’s decision, the curricula at these schools would consist of two parts. One part was the “core curriculum,” which included those subjects that the leaders of the Army wanted each officer to know at that time in his career. The other part, according to its report, was “an elective program,” which allowed each officer to individualize a part of his education. An elective program would allow each student to take responsibility for his learning and to choose classes which, the Board expected, would be “intellectually challenging” and would support “his educational needs and interests.”\(^{713}\) The Board implied that at that time the curricula within the system were developed to ensure that all officers learned to a certain level rather than challenging each individual to reach his highest potential.\(^{714}\) The

\(^{709}\) Ball, Of Responsible Command, 371.


\(^{711}\) Haines Report, Vol. I, cover page of the report


\(^{714}\) Ibid., 27-28, and 39-40.
specifics of each elective program at CGSC and the War College will be described later. It should be noted that when Johnson added electives to the curriculum he did not increase the length of time that a student spent at these schools. As a result, those who determined the core curriculum, such as the Commandant of each school and others, had fewer hours to ensure that each officer learned those skills which they thought he needed to be successful in positions of greater responsibility.

An elective program was established at each school starting in academic year (AY) 1968. The thesis of this chapter is that, although the leaders of DA continued to speak about the entire Army Information Program (AIP), the instruction about the information program included in the core curriculum at both CGSC and the War College increasingly emphasized public information because decision-makers prioritized gaining the support of the public in the short term, due in part to the Vietnam War, rather than the long term, which was through troop information.

Between 1965 and 1973, while the Army was fighting the Vietnam War, the leaders of DA authorized six studies to look at different aspects of the service and to determine the best ways to improve it. Two studies conducted under the authority of the leaders of DA examined the effectiveness of the system that educates Army officers. The Haines Board, as previously stated, completed its work in 1966 and the other, the Norris Board, was concluded in 1971. The third study, which was conducted between 1968 and 1969, investigated how the Office of the Chief of Information (OCINFO) at DA was conducting AIP. In the first few years of 1970s, Army Chief of Staff General William C. Westmoreland ordered the leaders of the War College to conduct three other studies. These studies will be examined in the order that they were conducted: military professionalism, Army leadership, and tasks that the Army should expect to perform into the future. How the leaders of the Department of the Army used the conclusions

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of each study to influence how officers were educated about AIP or how the Army conducted it will be described below.

The Haines Board conducted a comprehensive investigation of the system that educated Army officers and determined that it needed an adjustment. The Board, according to the directive of the Secretary of the Army, should examine whether “the subject matter being taught” was focused “upon command responsibilities and functions, while meeting the necessary requirements for specialized knowledge.” The authors of the report wrote:

The purpose of the [Haines] Board was to determine the adequacy and appropriateness of the current Army school system and the education and individual school training of Army officers in light of responsibilities which will confront the Military Establishment for the foreseeable future; and to recommend such changes in the direction, structure, or operation of the system or in the academic program during the next decade as will make the greatest contribution to the discharge of those responsibilities.

The aim of this board had many similarities such as looking at the “adequacy” of the system with those of the Eddy (1949) and the Williams Boards (1958). The curricula of the system that educates officers, the authors of the Haines Report noted, was to prepare students to be effective upon graduation and also into the future, which resembled the definition of the aim of the system in the Gerow, Eddy and Williams Boards. By broadening an officer’s knowledge beyond combat-related subjects, the system should be able to educate him about how to share the official positions of the Army with both the troops and the public.

As previously described, a key proposal of the Haines Board was the initiation of a program of elective courses, which individualized a part of the curriculum. Officers, through the use of elective courses, could study some of those subjects the Board considered to be broadening. An elective on public information, the authors of the report stated, was a good

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Decade of the Seventies: Perspectives and Implications for the United States Army,” (US Army War College, Carlisle Barrack, PA, June 1972.), iv.

718 Haines Report, Vol. I. 105-110
719 Ibid., 1-2.
723 Ibid., 39 and 77
example of a subject which should be part of most elective programs. Members of the Haines Board made some assumptions about the future in which the military would operate in order to determine what subjects an officer must know. One assumption was important to this study. The Board wrote: “The next decade could be termed the Era of the Information Explosion. Today the sum of human knowledge is doubling every ten years; by 1970 it will be doubling every five years.” The Board also found that “the time available for military education and training will become increasingly precious.” The increase in knowledge to be learned combined with no increase in the number of hours allotted for education caused the decision-makers of the curriculum at each school to re-prioritize what they thought students had to study in the core curriculum.

The other study of the system that educates officers was conducted by MG Frank Norris. In 1971, General Westmoreland’s charge to Norris resembled those used for the Haines, the Williams, and the Eddy Boards. This was the first review of the system that educated officers since a program of electives had been added to the curriculum of certain schools. Norris, who had been as the Commandant of the Armed Forces Staff College, wrote in his “Review of Army Officer Education System” that his findings were “primarily personal and subjective,” based on numerous interviews with “commandants, faculties, and students” of numerous schools in the Army educational system. Officers serving during the 1970s, Norris claimed, needed to study how to communicate effectively with a public which might not be favorably predisposed toward the military. They also had to teach their soldiers to deal with those who were typically not supporters of the armed forces. His conclusion seems to support the recommendation of the Haines Board that a course in public information should be included in each program of electives. Norris also proposed that the Army should “concentrate on three nonhardware areas

726 Ibid., 6-8. Quotation from page 8.
where the payoff can be great: intelligence, R&D [research and development], and education” to counter the challenges of “[i]ncreased threat, [d]ecreased resources.” He did say that education underpinned the other two fields.731 Norris determined that there were gaps within the system for educating Army officers in the 1970s. The following will focus on a hole which Norris found at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC). The reason for focusing on CGSC, Norris said, was that “the recently [AY 1971] revised War College curriculum is very sound for today’s needs.”732 But the developers of the curriculum of CGSC, he noted, prioritized having students study “the command and operational aspects of the Army in the field.”733 Norris questioned this orientation because, he noted, “the problems of the Army in recent years [implying during the Vietnam War] have not stemmed from [the] conduct of operations. Rather, our major problems and difficulties have been in other staff fields such as personnel, logistics, intelligence, and public information.”734 It is noteworthy that those deciding on the core curriculum between AY 1970 and AY 1972 had allocated about 225 hours for students to study how to use divisions, while giving only three hours for students to study AIP.735 Norris’ recommendation implied that three hours might not be sufficient.

MG Wendell J. Coats, who was the Chief of Information at the Department of the Army between 1967 and 1969, authorized an internal study, according to a letter of instruction he issued on 24 July 1968, “. . . to isolate inadequacies in the current Army Information Program.

and to provide recommendations for solving the problems identified.” Coats directed his deputy, BG Robert B. Smith, to chair this study. In January 1969, the committee finished its report, called “A New Direction for Army Information,” subsequently known as the Smith Report. In this report, members of the Board made four conclusions that were important to show how the leaders of the Office of the Chief of Information (OCINFO) assessed the effectiveness of the Army’s conduct of its information program. First, the priority of OCINFO was on improving the knowledge that the public had of the Army. Second, the office had not consistently been proactive in getting the Army’s story to the public. Third, this office set a poor example in its work to inform the troops, which was one of the three components of AIP. Fourth, the Army did a poor job in educating its officer corps about AIP.

The Board found that the OCINFO, which was responsible for helping the CSA conduct his information program, had focused primarily on informing external audiences rather than internal ones. This conclusion was based on two points. First, the OCINFO, according to the report, had “three objectives.” These were to “gain public understanding of the Army’s role . . . develop public confidence [in the Army, and] . . . obtain public esteem” for it. None of these objectives were specifically oriented on informing internal audiences. Second, the Board asserted, the placement of “undue emphasis on efforts to promote public knowledge and understanding relegates internal information to a secondary role within OCINFO.”

The Board also questioned why the OCINFO was not taking the initiative to release the Army’s story to the American people. People in the OCINFO, the Board noted, answered about “100 inquiries per day” as compared to publishing only “15 or so national press releases each month about [the Army’s] role, requirements, and significant actions.” These facts strongly suggested that the office was reactive. These conclusions implied that the Army still had not been able to effectively publishing its messages in a manner that the public could understand.

737 Smith Report, Inclosure 1, to Chapter II, page II-1-1 to II-1-2, and Cover page of the report.
738 Ibid., IV-1.
739 Ibid., IV-4.
740 Ibid., IV-2 and IV-3.
Another problem the Board identified was that some leaders, just like the OCINFO, did not prioritize ensuring that their soldiers understood what was going on in their units and in the Army as a whole. “Perhaps the major reason why commanders and Information Officers give lip-service to the [command information] program,” the Board argued, “is that the effects [of this program] are so difficult to determine and are so long-range in nature. No one gets hurt immediately if nothing is done.”

In its “Major Conclusions,” the Board noted, “[t]he future image of the Army is largely dependent upon the opinions and attitudes formed by those now serving or who will serve in the Army. Little is being done to win over this critical group.” A similar conclusion had been seen in other places, such as the report of the Haislip Board (1947) and in the notes from lectures of Generals Dodge (1962) and Underwood (1963), when they quoted from the letter that General Decker had written to his commanders. Decker wanted his commanders to emphasize troop information because each soldier directly influenced how the public viewed the Army.

Yet, after more than two decades since the report of the Haislip Board had been issued, this problem still had not been corrected. The leaders of the Department of the Army (DA) had the capability to fix this problem, but for some unknown reason they had not done so.

The Smith Board concluded that the education of officers concerning the information program of the Army was inadequate. “It is entirely possible,” the Board claimed, “for an officer to go all the way through the various levels of Army schooling without ever having received a comprehensive presentation on the importance of the information function.” The following two findings support this conclusion. First, the curriculum used in the advanced course at each branch school, the Board determined, did not effectively prepare their students to perform the information function. Second, the Board stated, “[i]nformation instruction at [CGSC] is minimal, and non-existent at the Army War College.” To correct this deficiency, the Board

741 Ibid., IV-F-1 to IV-F-14 and IX-B-5. Quotation is from pages IV-F-11 to IV-F-12.
742 Ibid., IX-B-3 and IV-2 to IV-4.
745 Ibid., V-F-2.
746 Ibid., V-F-2 and IV-C-4.
suggested gaining the Army Chief of Staff’s consent “to improve Army information program acceptance and incorporation of a formal program of instruction on Army information in service schools.” What the Board did not state clearly was what specifically they wanted to improve. As had been show in previous chapters, the curricula at both schools had included instruction on AIP, but it was not consistent in what topics was covered. The failure of the leaders of DA to ensure that officers, as they progressed through the school system, studied about all three sub-programs of AIP, separately and collectively, casts doubt on whether they considered the information function especially important.

The authors of the Haines Report, the Smith Report, and the Norris Report all concluded that educating the officer corps was critical to the long-term ability of the Army to accomplish its missions. The authors of the reports of all three Boards made specific recommendations to modify the curriculum at certain schools to ensure that students studied about AIP. If education was important and there was a noticeable weakness in the education of officers in AIP, then leaders of the Army only had themselves to blame if they failed to achieve what Ridgway called “a public relations-conscious Army.”

General Westmoreland tasked the leaders of the War College to conduct three studies in the early 1970s, which seemed to be attempts to help him define his vision for the future. The first study, initiated in April 1970, was completed two months later. Titled “Study on Military Professionalism,” the report dealt with relationships among members of various ranks of the officer corps. One conclusion of the study was that “[t]he communication between junior and senior [officers] is inadequate . . . Junior officers believe that lieutenant colonels and colonels in particular do not listen to them; they talk ‘to’ rather than ‘with’ them.” The inability of senior officers to communicate effectively, according to junior officers, implied that the value of their command information program was questionable. If senior leaders had difficulty in sharing

750 Ibid., 30 - 31. Underlining is in the original.
751 Ibid., 30 - 31.
what the Army was doing with others within the service, they would likely have similar problems explaining the Army to the public. Another factor that members of this study noted was that the Army focused its efforts on short-term quantifiable missions rather than on the long-term well-being of the Army.752 This assessment was similar in context to a conclusion of the Smith Board of why the OCINFO focused on public information, seen as short-term, rather than command information, seen as long-term.753 If the Army was trading long-term good for what the leaders perceived to be short-term gain, then that was not in the best interest of the profession, the service, or the nation. This approach may explain why some of the leaders of the Army did not place emphasis on conducting command information effectively.

Another study Westmoreland ordered the leaders of the Army War College to conduct was to examine whether the “current leadership principles and techniques” should be maintained during the transition of the Army from a draft-based to an all-volunteer force or whether new ones had to be created. The study started in January 1971 and was completed in October of that year.754 The authors of the report, titled “Leadership for the 1970’s,” noted that the “leadership principles” of the Army were suitable for both the draft-based Army and the all-volunteer force.755 Two of these “principles” were linked to ways in which commanders and staff officers carried out their duties related to AIP. They were to “Keep your men informed” and to “Set the example.” “[L]eadership deficiencies [that existed in the Army] derived not from the principles,” the authors asserted, “but from the manner in which these principles were applied.”756 This conclusion seems to reinforce the need to include practical exercises in the curricula in the school system, especially when it came to topics related to the actions of leaders, such as

752 Ibid., 31.
753 Smith Report, IV-2 to IV-4.
755 Ball, Of Responsible Command, 413. USAWC, “Leadership for the 1970s,” vii –viii and 18. These were: “be technically and tactically proficient, know yourself and seek self-improvement, know your men and look out for their welfare, keep your men informed, set the example, insure the task is understood, supervised, and accomplished, train your men as a team, make sound and timely decisions, develop a sense of responsibility among subordinates, employ your command in accordance with its capabilities, seek responsibility and take responsibility for your actions.”
conducting AIP. Before the leaders of DA could expect the public to have confidence in the Army and support it, members of the Army must trust each other. One means to achieve this was to correct the gaps that were listed in the studies on professionalism and leadership. The authors of these studies strongly implied that the officer corps had to fix these issues to maintain a level of trust between the Army and both the troops and the public. It would require ensuring that the deeds of the service matched the words of the leaders.

Westmoreland directed the leaders of the War College to determine “the tasks that the Army will be asked to undertake in support of the nation in the decade ahead.” This was the third study that Westmoreland had ordered the leaders of the War College to conduct. Completed in June 1972, the title of this report was “Army Tasks for the Seventies. The Decade of the Seventies: Perspectives and Implications for the United States Army.” In the foreword of this report, MG Franklin M. Davis, Jr., the Commandant of War College, wrote: “The decade of the 1970’s affords the United States Army a challenge unparalleled in nearly two hundred years.” This challenge was due, he claimed, to the “[c]omplex social, political, and economic changes [that] are taking place in the United States and in the rest of the world. . . . the Army must understand the nature of these changes. [The Army] must also prepare coherent plans and programs, coordinated with related efforts within and without the government.” The Army, Davis implied, had to gain the support of the troops and the public for its “plans and programs” if the service was to successfully meet the challenges described above.

Partly as a result of the war in Vietnam, the authors of the study “Army Tasks for the Seventies” claimed, Americans wanted to focus on domestic issues. The authors used public survey data showing an upward trend from 55% of the people in 1964 to 77% in 1971 in the number of Americans who wanted their government to spend more money domestic programs, such as “education” and “unemployment,” rather than on those tied to foreign policy. How

758 USAWC, “Army Tasks for the Seventies,” cover page and iv.
759 Ibid., iii.
760 Ibid., 18-22, and 27.
Americans viewed the Army, they implied, would shape how the information program of the Army was implemented. They wrote:

The legitimacy and credibility of public institutions and policies will continue to be questioned . . . More extensive public participation in policymaking and candor on the part of public officials may help reduce the suspicions which now plague governmental agencies and policies. 761

To maintain legitimacy in the eye of the public, the Army had to be honest in its public statements. Echoing a finding of General Norris, the authors of this study warned of a “[l]ack of concern and general indifference will characterize public attitudes towards defense problems in general and towards the Army and its role in society in particular.” 762 Officers had to do what they could to improve the opinions that the public had of the Army. They thought it would be an uphill climb.

The Army should expect to be asked by the government to perform three domestic tasks: “Societal Relations, Domestic Action, and Domestic Tranquility.” 763 Only the first task will be addressed below. The authors divided “Societal Relations” into two segments: “Community Relations” and “National Relations.” 764 The authors summarized “societal relations” as the ability “for the Army and the broader civilian community to ‘live together’ in reasonable harmony.” If the Army conducted “societal relations” effectively, the Board argued, it could be a means for “[enhancing] the Army’s image in the nation.” 765 This sounds very much like how the authors of the curriculum at CGSC from academic year 1962 through academic year 1965 had described community relations. 766 Agreeing with BG Wilcox, the authors of the report determined that officers needed to “[understand] American society, including a thorough knowledge of the role of the press and other media” because the Army, for the most part,

761 Ibid., 30-31.
764 Ibid., 96-100. Underline in original document.
765 Ibid., 105.
communicated with the public through the press.\textsuperscript{767} This sounds like public information. So DA could affect, to some degree, how the public viewed the Army by ensuring that officers had the means, methods, and materials to effectively convey the Army’s positions to the press.

Related to the ability to effectively employ military power, senior officers should study how to explain to both the executive and legislative branches of the US government the recommendations of the leaders of DA on how to use the service. If the Army was effectively employed, the authors claimed, it would “[improve the] image and [enhance the] credibility” of the service. “In short,” authors noted, “it is primarily through its actions rather than its rhetoric that the Army” will show that it was “an effective [and] necessary institution.”\textsuperscript{768} Many conclusions reached by the members of this study, such as the need to improve how the public viewed the Army, resembled aims of AIP. The study also seemed to emphasize informing the public rather than those in the service.

All of these six studies conducted between 1965 and 1972 commented, to some degree, on problems the Army had explaining its actions to the American people. Many reports illuminated that the Army should anticipate that the public might not be favorably inclined to support the desires of the service. A desire to correct the anticipated poor image that the public might have of the Army could explain why the leaders of the OCINFO prioritized informing the public. However, this emphasis did not excuse, as the authors of the Leadership study wrote, leaders not “[keeping] your men informed.”\textsuperscript{769} If leaders of DA expected field-grade officers to effectively conduct AIP, they needed to ensure that they studied and practiced how to perform the entire program in the curriculum at both CGSC and the War College. The poor image that the public had of the Army was identified, but what had not been clearly stated in these studies was how the Army could change it. Effectively implementing AIP might have helped.

In April 1969, MG John H. Hay, the Commandant of the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), argued that the Army had to convince the public that it was a professional organization that deserved the trust and support of the American people.\textsuperscript{770} He suggested a new

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{767} USAWC, “Army Tasks for the Seventies,” 100.
\item \textsuperscript{768} USAWC, “Army Tasks for the Seventies,” 166-168.
\item \textsuperscript{769} USAWC, “Leadership for the 1970s,” vii and 17-19.
\end{itemize}
approach. The public viewed an Army officer, Hay wrote in the April 1969 edition of *Army*, “as a technician of destruction cast in a mold of rigid conformity and anti-intellectualism.” By that assessment, the public did not believe that officers needed to be educated beyond how to conduct, in his words, “close-order drill.” But if the public accepted that “the ordered application of force in the resolution of social problems” was a “scholastic discipline,” then, he expected, the public might view the military as a profession.\(^{771}\) Being seen as a profession with a “scholastic discipline,” Hay thought, could facilitate the Army being seen by the public as a legitimate institution, which might help gain it support. Congress, he argued, should approve the “draft legislation” the Department of the Army had proposed that “would authorize [CGSC] to award [a Master of Military Art and Science degree] to successful candidates.”\(^{772}\) Students in this program, Hay asserted, would study:

the development, operation and support of military forces in peace and in war and the interrelationships of military, economic, political and social factors when military force is used as an instrument of national power.\(^{773}\)

For the Army, the benefits of a masters’ program would be three-fold. First, offering a master’s degree, Hay wrote, would be a way to “stimulate the growth of military scholarship.” Although not directly addressed by Hay, the expected increase in military scholarship might contribute to closing the gap, about which COL Ginsburgh had written, between the numbers of works related to military strategy published by civilian versus those by military authors.\(^{774}\) Second, the theses produced by graduates of this program, if publicly available, might convince the public that officers were thinking about more than only the application of military force. Third, this program might contribute to gaining acceptance by the academic community that the military had a scholastic discipline.\(^{775}\) What Hay advocated was another means for the Army to contribute to the debate on military policy while also informing the military and the public.


\(^{772}\) Hay, “A Profession of Arms Comes of Age,” 46-49.

\(^{773}\) Ibid., 46.


\(^{775}\) Hay, “A Profession of Arms Comes of Age,” 46-49.
Hay and the authors of the “Study on Military Professionalism” wrote about “professionalism” but from different perspectives. Hay wrote about ways for the Army to demonstrate its professionalism to the public. By contrast, the “Study on Military Professionalism” focused on what the term “professional” meant to the officer corps of the Army. Their findings were not contradictory.\footnote{Hay, “A Profession of Arms Comes of Age,” 45-48. USAWC, “Study on Military Professionalism,” i.}

**Command and General Staff College**

As previously stated, starting in academic year (AY) 1968, General Johnson directed that the curriculum at CGSC be divided into two segments. The first was the core curriculum, which every student took. The other was a program of elective courses, from which each student could choose to support his individual needs.\footnote{USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1968), 3. USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1969), 3. USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1970), 3. USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1971), 3. USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1972), 3. USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1973), 2-3. USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 250-A-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1963), 1. USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 250-A-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1964), 1. USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 250-A-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1965), 1. USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2 (Formerly 250-A-C2), Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1966) 1. USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1967), 1. USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1968), 1. USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1969), 1.USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1970), 1. USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1971) 1. USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1972) 1. USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1973), 1.}

\footnote{Showing consistency, the aim of the curriculum listed in the Program of Instruction (POI) from AY 1963 through AY 1973 was essentially the same over these years even though the wording was different and there were a few additional tasks. An example of an extra task from AY 1970 through AY 1973 was that the curriculum was to prepare the students to be “Military Assistance Advisors (less language and area orientation).”\footnote{USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1968), 3. USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1969), 3. USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1970), 3. USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1971), 3. USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1972), 3. USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1973), 2-3. USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 250-A-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1963), 1. USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 250-A-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1964), 1. USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 250-A-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1965), 1. USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2 (Formerly 250-A-C2), Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1966) 1. USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1967), 1. USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1968), 1. USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1969), 1.USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1970), 1. USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1971) 1. USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1972) 1. USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1973), 1.}
the number of academic hours allotted per year declined from 1412 in AY 1968 to 1141 in AY 1970, and then finally to 1076 in AY 1973. The total number of hours in the curriculum for AY 1973 represented a 64-hour decrease compared to the average between AY 1963 and AY 1967. It seems internally contradictory that the leaders of the College would add tasks to the aim of the curriculum while simultaneously decreasing the total number of hours in the curriculum, core and elective. Something had to give.

The developers of the curriculum continued to use guest speakers to supplement lessons. Starting in AY 1968, each guest speaker was allotted one and one-half hours rather than two hours, as had been given in AY 1967. The authors of the POI for AY 1970 listed two lectures that specifically addressed ways in which a commander should interact with the media. The first was “Press Relations.” This lecture, the authors of the POI said, was to examine the “[p]roblem areas and the relations of [the] commander with the press media both in combat and during civil disturbances.” The title of this speech, according to the POIs for AY 1971 and AY 1972, was changed to “Press Relations in a Combat Environment,” examining the commander-press interaction only “in combat areas.” It is not clear why the focus of this lecture was narrowed.

779 USACGSC, *Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course*, (AY 1968) 3.
The total numbers of academic hours for AY 1973 was 1430, but 354 were for individual research and study, and not contact hours found on page 2.

USACGSC, *Program of Instruction for 250-A-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course*, (AY 1965), 5


782 USACGSC, *Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course*, (AY 1970), 27.

783 USACGSC, *Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course*, (AY 1971), 25.
USACGSC, *Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course*, (AY 1972), 18.
One reason could have been to focus the lecturer on information that many students who were deploying to Vietnam could use in the next few years. “The Press-Military Relationship in the Field” was the other lecture included in the POIs for only AY 1970 and AY 1971. The authors of the POI for both years listed the scope of this lecture as the “[r]elations of the Commander with the press in combat.” The scope of both lectures seems to have covered the same topic, how a commander communicated with the press. It is not clear from the POIs whether these lecturers also addressed ways in which the staff prepared their commander for his meetings with the press. It is arguable that the effectiveness of a commander’s interaction with the press depended, in part, on his staff’s ability to prepare him for the meeting. Although not described in the POI, one possible example of how the staff, primarily the information officer, could help his commander get ready for the meeting was to ensure that the press understood the ground rules for the interview, which described how the information from the interview would be used. Since the aim of the curriculum at CGSC was to have the students study to become both commanders and staff members, focusing these lectures only on the actions and requirements of a commander seems inappropriate.

Each year between AY 1968 and AY 1973, except AY 1969, the core curriculum at CGSC included a lesson on the Army Information Program (AIP). The number of hours assigned to it and the wording of the purpose of this lesson varied across these years. The developers of the core curriculum for AY 1968 allotted one hour for this lesson, which was a lecture in the auditorium. Students, the authors of this lesson wrote, would gain “a general knowledge of the principles and objectives of the Army information effort.” The only significant difference from the statement of purpose of this lesson in AY 1966 was that the authors of AY 1968 added the requirement for the students to learn about the “objectives” of the program. The outline of this lesson for AY 1968 listed nine key points that students should learn. Four of these points were

784 USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1970), 27. USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1971), 25.
the definitions of information program and its three sub-programs. Consistent with the order in the supplemental material from AY 1963 through AY 1965, the sub-programs were listed in the following sequence: command information, public information, and community relations. Repeating a point that was made in previous years such as AY 1962 through AY 1966, one of the “instructional points” the authors of this lesson in AY 1968 had was to clearly connect command information and public information. He did this by writing in the outline of the lesson: “The ultimate burden of a good Army image rests squarely on the shoulders of its members.” This implied two key points. First, it was up to members of the Army to represent the service in public in a positive manner. Second, members of the Army had a duty to explain the actions of the service to both the troops and the public. If these two tasks were not performed effectively the image of the Army in the minds of the public would probably suffer. On 7 March 1968, COL Ronald A. Kapp, Director of DCOM, directed dropping the lesson concerning the information program from the curriculum for AY 1969. He directed that the content of this lesson be integrated into a lesson titled “Leadership.” However, the lesson on “Leadership” also suffered a reduction of two hours compared to the time allotted to it in AY 1968. Kapp’s decision to combine these lessons leads a person to question whether the students would gain a similar amount of knowledge of information program in the “Leadership” lesson as they were expected to gain in a separate class such as during AY 1968. On a positive note, merging these lessons might have helped the students to make the connection between leadership and conducting the information program.

The developers of the curriculum from AY 1970 through AY 1973 made changes to how the lesson titled “Army Information Program” was conducted. From AY 1970 through AY 1972,


they allocated three hours to this lesson. A reason why this lesson was allotted three hours, according to a curricular document, was that the “[s]ubject cannot be sufficiently developed in 1 hour.” This was an indictment of how this lesson had been conducted for AY 1966 and AY 1968. Between AYs 1970 and 1972 the purpose of this lesson was stable. For example, the authors of this lesson for AY 1970 wrote of their purpose:

- to develop a general knowledge of command, general staff, and information officer responsibilities in the development and execution of the Army Information Program and to provide proficiency in the understanding of the communication process. Further, it is to provide proficiency in the understanding and application of techniques for recognizing and isolating the critical issues in information problems prior to making an information estimate and decision.

The topics listed in this purpose seemed to go beyond what was listed in the advance sheet for AY 1968, thus justifying the increase in hours. For AY 1970 through AY 1973, the lesson on the information program was conducted in classrooms rather than in the lecture hall. The authors of the advance sheet for this lesson for AY 1973 said the aim of this two-hour block of instruction was to educate:

- future commanders and staff officers of divisions and larger units, the students will have a general knowledge of the importance, principles, and objectives of the Army Information Program – command information, public information, and community relations – and of the normal command and staff responsibilities for these subprograms.

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794 USACGSC, “Army Information Program,” 1 in USCCGC/73. USACGSC, Program of Instruction (AY 1973), 21.
The emphasis on application seems to have been missing from the aim of AY 1973 compared to AY 1970 through AY 1972. This might account for the reduction in hours. The focus of the instruction for AY 1970 through AY 1973 appeared to have the students study the fundamental characteristics, principles, and objectives of the information program. Showing a high degree of consistency, “general knowledge” was the level of learning for this lesson not only between AY 1968 and AY 1973, but as far back as AY 1964.795

Other examples of consistency between AY 1968 and AY 1973 and AY 1962 through AY 1966 was the use of a summary page for the lesson titled “Army Information Program.” A summary page was included in the advance sheet between AYs 1968 and 1973, which resembled what was included in the advance sheet for this lesson in AY 1966. For example, the authors described the three sub-programs of the information program, and also listed seven “Army information principles.”796 It should be noted that the summary pages for AY 1962 through AY 1965 covered different topics such as the American people carried about the Army because they had relatives in the service and they paid the bills.797 The authors of this page, from AY 1962

795 http://litre.ncsu.edu/sltoolkit/Bloom.htm (accessed 29 June 2013)


through AY 1973, provided students with a quick reference guide regarding AIP both for use in class and for the future. Why the difference in the content of this page is not known.

Practical exercises remained the primary means of application for this lesson from AY 1970 through AY 1973. There were no exercises listed in the advance sheet for AY 1968 due to only having one hour. Each advance sheet for this lesson between AY 1970 and AY 1972 contained the same three scenarios. One scenario, which had also been included between AYs 1963 and AY 1965, cast each student as a brigadier general who was in a command of Fort Bang. This exercise had the students evaluate the responses of a Commander of an Army post in the United States to the request of a local Chambers of Commerce to cut back the hours of operation of the Post Exchange. In this exercise, the students had a chance to wrestle with how they would have conducted all three sub-programs of AIP. The next two scenarios were new in AY 1970 and continued to be included through AY 1972, and both had each student portray a commanding general (CG) of a division in wartime. In the first scenario, the staff told the CG that “an accredited correspondent” had been asking questions about an impending operation. The G-2, intelligence officer, suggested to the CG that the reporter’s questions indicated the upcoming operation might have been “compromised.” The G-2 recommended that the commander should have the reporter “removed from the division area and . . . disaccredited.” Conversely, the commander’s information officer thought that the reporter should be told – “off the record – of the operation and invited to accompany the unit” when and if the operation was conducted. If the student accepted the proposal of the information officer, he could accomplish two actions. First, his actions would resemble those of General Eisenhower, when he told the press about the upcoming invasion of Sicily in an effort to stop speculation. The other was that each student could use this opportunity as a means of building a relationship with the reporter, if

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801 Eisenhower, Crusade In Europe, 169-170.
he thought the reporter deserved this trust. This scenario provided students with a chance to consider how best to bridge the gap between freedom of the press and the need for secrecy. As future leaders, officers had to be able to resolve this dilemma, at least in their own minds.

In the final scenario, two brigade commanders informed the student, acting as a division commander, about two different incidents which, if made public, would reflect poorly on his unit. The first situation involved U.S. soldiers mutilating enemy remains. A brigade commander told the Commander that representatives of the media had filmed the incident and that they had already left the division area. The second incident was based on an internal report that U.S soldiers had killed many civilians during a search of a hamlet. The press did not witness this event. The second scenario resembled the My Lai massacre. Just as in the other scenarios, each student had a chance to consider how he would solve realistic situations using both principles and objectives of AIP, which were listed on the summary page of the advance sheet, as a guide. Through these exercises, the students would study about ways to demonstrate how they would fulfill their duty to report fully to the troops and the public.

The lesson for academic year 1973 used only two practical exercises, and this is probably why it was allotted only two hours. In the first scenario which was introduced in academic year (AY) 1973, students portrayed an information officer for an installation in two separate situations that occurred in peacetime. In one instance, each student had to determine the best way to help a company commander correct the deficiencies in how he conducted his command information program. The main issue embedded in the scenario was that the commander did not see the value of this program. The other instance had each student offer ideas to the post commander on how to address complaints by military personnel about a local community targeting them in speed traps. Each student’s recommendations were to pertain to both community relations and command information. The second scenario was the same as had been used in the previous three years. In it, a division commander had to determine the best way to deal with a reporter who was asking questions about an upcoming operation. The practical exercises contained in this lesson from AY 1970 to AY 1972 had each student examine public relations issues as a

commander. Then in AY 1973, the exercises had each student look at a problem from the standpoint of both an information officer and a commander. In these scenarios for AY 1973, each student had to work through problems related to AIP in both peacetime and wartime. The difference in the number of hours and what the authors of the lesson wanted the students to practice suggests that leaders of the College were still trying to determine what students needed to know about conducting AIP.

Starting in AY 1968, the curriculum at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) included an elective program. It is noteworthy that the College did not offer any elective on the Army’s information program between AY 1968 and AY 1973. The description of the elective program in the POIs at CGSC was similar in AY 1968 and AY 1972. The authors of the POI for AY 1971 said that the elective program was:

- designed to accomplish one or more of the following purposes: extend the depth of coverage in selected areas of the curriculum; [round-out] previous schooling or experience; assist in development of a specialty; further the student’s branch qualification; . . . and stimulate intellectual endeavor.

For AY 1973, the developers of the curriculum created two types of elective program, associate and professional. It is arguable that if you combine the goals of each of these two programs it

805 USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1968), 26-31.
806 USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1968), 26-31. USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1969), 86-91. USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1970), 107-117. USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1971), 81-89. USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1972), 85-100. USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1973), 70-93.
807 USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1968), 26. USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1969), 86. USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1970), 107. USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1971), 81. USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1972), 85.
808 USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1973), 70 and 86.
would be similar to the aim of the single elective program for AY 1968 through AY 1972. Between AY 1968 and AY 1970, each student needed to take one elective, lasting 40 hours. For example, in AY 1970, those determining the curriculum gave electives about 3.5% of the hours in the whole curriculum. However, for AYs 1971 and 1972, the requirement increased to two electives for a total of 90 hours, about 8% of curriculum hours. By AY 1973, the elective program used 304 hours – about 28% of the curriculum. This sharp increase in the percentage of time allotted to the elective program is noteworthy considering that simultaneously the total number of hours in the curriculum declined from 1412 to 1076 between AY 1968 and AY 1973, respectively. This reduction in the number of hours allowed for the core curriculum only increased the pressure on those determining what subjects should be included. This implied that either some subjects would be given fewer hours or cease being taught.

Between AYs 1968 and 1973, three students wrote their master’s theses assessing parts of the Army’s effort to conduct AIP and each illuminated a weakness. The first two wrote about how effective the Army had been in parts of its public information and command information programs. Their observations were not directly tied to the curriculum. The third was about the curriculum. In his study, LTC E. A. Wilhelm, who attended the Command and General Staff College in AY 1971, accepted that the military needed the support of the public to achieve its assigned tasks. Wilhelm wrote: “Public Information [efforts of the Army] did not receive very

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810 USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1973), 2.

811 USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1968) 3. USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1968) 3. USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1970), 3. USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, (AY 1973), 2-3. The total numbers of academic hours was 1430, but 354 were for individual research and study, and not contact hours found on page 2.

much magazine coverage but all that it did receive was unfavorable. Some observers viewed any activity of the military to advertise or promote itself as propaganda.”813 This indicated that the Army had not been successful in reminding the public that it had a duty to inform, and that it was the intent of the leaders of the service that it would be done honestly. Wilhelm’s conclusions challenged two concepts. First, the press would support the Army’s effort to inform it and the public. Second, it questioned the validity of COL Ginsburgh’s argument, which implied that if officers wrote more, then their work would be published.814 Wilhelm appears to be perpetuating a line of thought that blamed the press for the public’s low opinion of the Army instead of determining what the Army could do to change that assessment.

In his thesis, MAJ William R. Arbogast, class of academic year 1971, argued that the command information program of the Army had not been successful, because it had failed to address dissent.815 He recognized that there was a large amount of “dissent and criticism of the Army” in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The leaders of the Department of the Army (DA), he argued, did not effectively use the magazine “the [Army Digest]” to address “dissent and criticism of the Army.”816 Since the effectiveness of command information, which was to explain the official policies of the Army to the soldier, does affect the long-term view of the public, as Dodge pointed out, then not dealing with issues such as dissent internally was problematic.817

MAJ Frederic H. Leigh, who was a student at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) during AY 1973, concluded that the amount of “public affairs participation in policymaking is a function of the [decision-maker’s] experiences, learning and past behavior.”818 Although Leigh focused on the Defense Department, his findings also seem applicable to the Army in particular. In 1972, he reported, the Chief of Staff of the Army had issued a regulation that required all staff sections at DA to coordinate with the OCINFO on any planning that might

813 Ibid., 62.
816 Ibid., 1.
“have public information implications.” Leigh did not mention it but this requirement was not new. In 1955, COL Harper, in his individual paper at the War College, had described a similar requirement. Also, in his 1958 article BG Clifton had reiterated this prerequisite. The fact that there was still a need for this regulation showed that the guidance given in the mid-1950s by Generals Ridgway and Taylor to integrate public relations into planning at DA had either not come to fruition or, if ever in practice, had not been continued. As an example of learning, Leigh judged the lesson on “Army Information Program” to be “inadequate.” Officers attending this lesson, he stated, were not positively impressed: “The general reaction observed was that this was offered to fill two hours in the schedule. One student defined the Information Officer (IO) as ‘the person who lies after [we have] screwed up.’” Contrary to the aim of this lesson, Leigh concluded that the lack of understanding by field-grade officers led them to not accept the need to integrate public relations into all staff work. MAJs Wilhelm, Arbogast, and Leigh had made some critical comments about the ineffectiveness of both the education and the conduct of AIP. Leaders at CGSC had the ability to attempt to correct the flaws in the curriculum that Leigh described.

The leaders of CGSC continued to modify the part of the curriculum devoted to AIP between AYs 1968 and 1973. From academic year 1968 through academic year 1973, students studied more about public information than the other two sub-programs. If AIP was to be effectively conducted, the officer corps had understand the reasons for the program, integrate this subjects into all planning, and then to show candor when explaining the actions of the Army to the public. The education that students were then getting in public affairs at CGSC was apparently insufficient to cause a change in students’ understanding of AIP. Not including a course on public information in the elective was contrary to the recommendation of the Haines

819 Ibid., 84.
822 Leigh, “Variable Affecting the Integration of Public Affairs in Defense Department Policymaking,” 139.
Board. These issues implied that the decision-makers on the curriculum at CGSC were not convinced of the necessity for students to study how to conduct AIP; and when the instruction was provided, its value was questionable.

**Army War College**

Adding an elective program was an important change to the curriculum at the Army War College during the academic years 1968 to 1973. Before examining the curriculum, it is important to know the findings of a study which compared the topics students learned at the War College with the tasks performed by general officers.

In October 1971, Colonel John B. B. Trussell, Jr. proposed changes to the curriculum at the War College in the report titled “‘Professional Generalship’ and the [US Army War College] Curriculum.” Trussell wrote: “Of nine broad types of activities identified by the study as common to all general officers . . . the [United States Army War College] curriculum addresses five with apparent adequacy, but the remaining four are covered either inadequately or not at all.” In this report, Trussell recommended four changes to the curriculum, one of which was related to the information function of the Army. This adjustment, he wrote, was to add to the curriculum “[a] panel from the Office of the Chief of Information on the subject of relations with the information media.”

Since academic year (AY) 1951, the curriculum at the War College had periodically included a lecture by a representative of this office, but a lecture had not been included since the mid-1960s. “[G]eneral officers are the Army’s most influential public spokesmen,” Trussell asserted; it only made sense to educate the students studying at the War College, who, DA thought, had the potential to be general officers or would serve in a staff of a general, on ways to interact with the media. The curriculum for AY 1971, he said, included a panel where members of the press presented their views to students about how effective the Army had been in explaining its actions to the public. Yet, he continued, the forum did “not present the viewpoint of the Army or address the question of techniques and principles

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826 Ibid., cover page and 9.
involved.”\textsuperscript{827} Trussell’s conclusion that there was a lack of education about public information seems to conflict with General Norris’ findings. Norris wrote in his report that the curriculum for AY 1971 at the War College was effective. But he also argued that the curriculum at the Command and General Staff College was not sufficient because it failed to educate officers effectively on topics such as public information.\textsuperscript{828} Somehow these two officers came to different conclusions after examining the same curriculum. By not covering how to conduct the information function, the developers of the curriculum at the War College were implying that the students either already knew how to explain the Army to the troops and the public, they thought it was easy, or they gave it too little priority. Combining the findings contained in Trussell’s report with those in the Smith Report about the failure to provide broad education about public relations casts significant doubt on whether the leaders of DA were preparing future leaders to conduct AIP effectively.

The aim of the curriculum at the War College remained constant from AY 1968 through AY 1973 and it resembled that of AY 1967. For example, the authors of the pamphlet that described the curriculum for AY 1968 and AY 1972 listed goals of the curriculum as:

\begin{itemize}
\item[a.] To enhance the competence of selected officers, with high general officer potential, to assume command responsibilities and to function in key staff assignments in major Army, joint, and combined headquarters and in planning and policymaking positions at that seat of Government.
\item[b.] To stress Army doctrine, higher tactics, and operations against an appropriate background of national strategy and the joint and international environment.
\item[c.] To provide intellectual challenge and an opportunity for individual contribution to the advancement of the art and science of land warfare through students research.\textsuperscript{829}
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{827} Ibid., 9 and 11. Quotation from page 11.

\textsuperscript{828} Norris Report, Vol. II, 3-2 to 3-5, 6-2, and 7-1 to 7-2. Trussell, “‘Professional Generalship’ and the USAWC Curriculum,” 9 and 11.

Those in charge of the curriculum continued to prioritize having the students study ways in which the Army contributed to accomplishing the missions assigned to DoD rather than focus on internal issues of the Army.

Between AYs 1969 and 1973, the developers of the curriculum at the War College used two methods to educate the students in public relations – a panel and a guest speaker. Indicating a change in approach during this period, the documents articulating the curriculum show that no senior officer from the Department of the Army (DA) talked to the students about how to conduct AIP, contrary to what had occurred annually between AYs 1962 and 1964. If the leaders of the College had accepted Trussell’s proposal, this might have been corrected. Those determining the curriculum between AY 1969 and AY 1972 typically used a panel, titled “The Role of the News Media and National Security Affairs,” to facilitate a dialogue between representatives of the media and the students. The format of this panel was for the moderator and media representatives to present some opening comments and then for the students to ask questions of the panelists. The aim of the panel for each of these years was similar. For example, the authors of this lesson for AY 1969 stated that the panel would inquire into “the role and responsibility of the news media” as they covered stories related to national security. Usually


831 Trussell, “‘Professional Generalship’ and the USAWC Curriculum,” 1-2.
lasting between two and three hours, the panel would also cover topics such as “[t]he right of the public to ‘know’ versus the need for safeguarding information,” and “[o]bjectivity and whole truth versus sensationalism and ‘taking out of context.’” These goals strongly suggest that the focus was on informing the public.

The author of this lesson for AY 1973 returned to using a guest speaker to cover the subject of informing the public. Mr. George A. Heinemann, Vice President of NBC TV and a retired Naval Reserve officer, addressed the class. The purpose of this lecture, according to a curricular document, was similar to that of the panel for AYs 1969 through AY 1972. If the aim of the instruction in public affairs was to provide both sides of pertinent issues, then Trussell’s proposal to include a panel composed of representatives from DA to discuss ways in


which the students might conduct AIP should have been adopted.\textsuperscript{834} This panel was not in lieu of the media panel but in addition to it.

In academic year 1968, those determining the curriculum at the War College started offering electives. Just as at CGSC, none of these new courses offered between AYs 1968 and 1973 explicitly focused on public relations and the Army. For the first two years, the same eight electives were offered.\textsuperscript{835} By academic year 1973, a total of twenty-six courses were offered in the elective program. The preponderance were about non-military topics such as economics.\textsuperscript{836}

The National Strategy Seminar continued to be the last course in curriculum at the College. The conduct of this seminar between AYs 1968 and 1973 resembled what had been done in the previous period. During academic year (AY) 1973, for example, the authors of a curricular document said that civilian and military guests would questioned the conclusions of the students that were stated in their “committee position papers on those key domestic, international, and defense issues that impact on our US national security.”\textsuperscript{837} This seminar gave the students a chance to have forthright discussions with guests, both civilian and military, about issues which were presumably shaping the future defense environment. It should also have been a forum for representatives of both the military and civilian sector to get to learn about the opinions and concerns of those of the other side.

\textsuperscript{834} Trussell, Jr. “‘Professional Generalship’ and the USAWC Curriculum,” 1-2.


The requirement to produce an individual research paper continued to be a critical part of each student’s experience between AYs 1968 and 1973. In AYs 1970 and AY 1971, the authors of the directive for the student research program listed at least one topic which was related to public relations. For example, in AY 1970 the authors listed the “Role of the Mass Communications Media in the Formulation of Public Opinion and National Policy (or on the Formulation of US Military Strategy.” The authors of the directive for AY 1971 listed four topics, but only two will be addressed. One was “The effect of news reporting on the minds of the American soldier.” The second was “Influence of dissident publications on Army installations.” These examples describe the range of topics that a student at the War College could research if he was interested in the information function. It is noteworthy that these studies were oriented toward the public aspect of the information program rather than communicating internally.

LTC Donald E. Gelke, a student in the class of AY 1972, proposed ways for the Army to change how the public viewed the service. He wrote that “[t]he Army currently suffers from a poor public image.” Reflecting the importance of the information program, he proposed that the Army might have a positive influence on public opinion if it could get more soldiers to talk with the public. The image the public had of the Army, he believed, was “a direct reflection of how well the public believes the Army is doing its job and how willing the public is to support the Army’s efforts.” He also presented a formula – “PR [public relations] = Performance + Reporting” – as a means to correct this deficiency. What was missing in the Army’s execution of this formula, he asserted, was the reporting. It was imperative to convince every person in the Army that he had a duty to explain to the local and national public what the Army was doing and why. Gelke’s idea was not new. For example, the authors of the supplemental material for the

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840 LTC Donald E. Gelke, “PR is Everybody’s Business” (research paper, Army War College, 1972), Abstract and 3.
841 Ibid., Abstract and 3.
842 Ibid., 5-7.
843 Ibid., 6-7.
lesson on “Public Information” in the curriculum at CGSC for AY 1953 and AY 1954 said: “The Army must first merit, then gain, public esteem” meaning that the Army must first be able to perform its function. These authors also wrote: “Good performance publicly appreciated is good public relations.” This indicated that they understood that they must tell the public about what the Army was doing.\textsuperscript{844} This should have been a point of emphasis of DA for talking both externally and internally.

The leaders of DA needed members of the Army family – current soldiers, veterans, and supporters – to help explain the actions of the Army to the American people. Opinions held by each service member had significant influence on the opinions of his family and friends.\textsuperscript{845} His finding on the importance of the opinions of service members resembled what, for example, General Dodge told the 1962 class at the War College.\textsuperscript{846} When service members share their favorable opinions about the Army with their families it could accomplish two goals. First, it would contribute to countering unsubstantiated criticism of the Army; second, it would also help the Army to present its side of the story to the public. The opposite was also true. The picture that the public had of the Army, he argued, was, in part, the result not only of “misinformation but also [the] lack of information.”\textsuperscript{847} This conclusion resembled that of Whitney in 1951.\textsuperscript{848} “What we must do, each and every one of us in the Army community,” Gelke wrote, “is to become ardent public relations (PR) practitioners on the Army’s behalf.”\textsuperscript{849} To get soldiers to be advocates of the Army, commanders must place emphasis on their information program. It was through this program that the Army was able to present its side of the story to soldiers.\textsuperscript{850}

Gelke suggested four principles for any member of the Army to use in dealing with the media that would help the Army achieve effective relations with the press. The “overall goal” of press relations for the Army, he said, was to use facts “to correct misunderstanding, educate

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\textsuperscript{844} USACGSC, “Public Information” (AY 1953) 3-5. USACGSC, “Public Information,” (AY 1954), 4-5.
\textsuperscript{845} Gelke, “PR is Everybody’s Business,” 4-17.
\textsuperscript{846} Dodge, “Public Understanding and the Army Information Program,” 10-11.
\textsuperscript{847} Gelke, “PR is Everybody’s Business,” 4-5.
\textsuperscript{848} Whitney, “Mobilizing Public Opinion,” 27-32.
\textsuperscript{849} Gelke, “PR is Everybody’s Business,” 4.
\textsuperscript{850} Ibid., 5-17.
\end{flushright}
where there is a lack of understanding, and in general clear up confusion.”

He captured these ideas in four principles, which have been seen before, in his own words: “USE CANDOR . . . COOPERATION . . . DON’T COMPLAIN . . . [AND] COURTESY.” These concepts resembled those BG Wilcox had used in his article that was published in 1961, which was part of the curriculum at CGSC from AY 1963 through AY 1965. First and foremost, Gelke stated, was that “‘honesty is the best policy’ in dealing with the press.” Report all of the facts regardless of whether they appear to put the Army in a favorable light. Second was to help correspondents get the necessary information for their stories in a timely fashion. As part of this effort, he wrote, members of the Army had to realize: “News is highly perishable. Deadlines must be met.”

If the Army cooperated with the press, then it could help correct any “misinformation [or] lack of information.” Third, “do not complain” to a correspondent “about a story that was not published.” He also asserted: “If a newsman extends the courtesy to you of having you review a story prior to publication, comment on it factually.” Lastly, he wrote: “Just tell your story directly in plain language, using simple facts and words.”

In the end, he thought, people in the Army had to stop arguing about whom to blame for the low opinion the public had of the Army. Instead, each member should just talk with internal and external audiences about what they knew of the Army. The fact that Gelke repeated the comments of others suggests that not much had been improved in the last decade.

So, then, over the period from academic year 1968 to academic year 1973, the developers of the curriculum at the War College used several means to educate the students concerning public relations. The content of these lessons focused on the relationship between representatives of both the military and the media. The weakness of the curriculum lay in not discussing ways in which DA wanted these officers to interact directly with members of the Army and the public.

851 Ibid., 17-18.
854 Ibid., 5.
855 Ibid., 20.
856 Ibid., 21.
In December 1970, DA finally authorized the War College to publish its own professional journal and circulate it to both internal and external audiences. Ball notes that the first edition of the journal, called *Parameters*, was published “in the spring of 1971.”857 LTC William L. Hauser, who graduated from the War College in the class of AY 1972, warned the Army, in an article published in the winter 1972 edition of *Parameters*, that the following decade would be characterized by “public indifference to military concerns.”858 In his view, there were four significant changes in the U.S. domestic environment in 1972 that would make it more difficult for the Army to get resources in the 1970s than in the 1960s. Only three of these will be discussed. For one thing, he believed, “the perception of the American people” was that the involvement in Vietnam had not been worth the cost. Second, the “emphasis has shifted from foreign policy matters to domestic problems.” Finally, he claimed, “the older generation” no longer believed that serving in the military was “wholesome.”859 These findings reinforced the notion that the public had a poor image of the Army. Two of Hauser’s impressions, public indifference towards the military and shift in focus towards domestic priorities, had also been noted in the “Army Tasks for the Seventies.”860 If the leaders of DA wanted to start to regain the public’s trust and support, Hauser argued, they first had to show the public that they understood the changes in the milieu. For example, they had to demonstrate that they had taken steps to correct problems such as the “unethical behavior . . . in the Army.”861 This might convince some of the public that serving in the Army was again honorable. Hauser argued that the Army clearly had a long way to go to regain the trust and the support it had lost. The onus was on the Army to show that it was performing in a manner that was acceptable to the American people. If the Army failed to report to the public, as Gelke advocated, then it had only itself to blame for a lack of public support.862

Informing the public was a discernible emphasis in the curriculum on AIP at both schools. At CGSC, the trend was to increase the coverage of how to inform the public. The

859 Ibid., 9-10.
curriculum at the War College emphasized how members of the military should maintain a relationship with the people in the media as a means to explain the Army to the American people. A constant during these years was that neither College offered a course in the elective program on how to conduct AIP. All of this suggests that those setting the curriculum at either school had not come to any consensus on what they wanted the students to know about conducting public affairs. The emphasis of the curriculum on helping the students to learn how to inform the public about the actions of the service, in some ways, made sense especially since the Army was fighting the Vietnam War. However, the continuing failure to recognize, as had been seen previously, about the need to keep the troops informed suggested that the leaders of the Army were more concerned about short-term issues of public opinion rather than long-term benefits of command information. This problem continued to exist even though numerous officers, such as Mudgett in 1955, Dodge in 1962, and Gelke in 1972 had warned of the criticality of keeping the troops informed.\textsuperscript{863} This failure was inexcusable. Between AYs 1969 and 1973 was the fourth, out of five, most effective period in providing effective education to the students at CGSC and the War College on how to conduct the information function. This ranking is most due to the focus on the lack of emphasis on teaching students on the importance of keeping the troops informed. Also, the decline in the number of hours allocated to this instruction.

Chapter 6 - Decline of Instruction in Public Affairs (AYs 1974-1989)

Generals William C. Westmoreland and Creighton W. Abrams were the two Army Chiefs of Staff (CSA) between 1968 and 1974, a time when, as Richard Stewart has asserted, the “[p]ublic trust in the Army was at a low point, with many [people] blaming the military for the [Vietnam] war as much as they blamed the civilian policymakers.” Since 1946, CSAs such as Collins and Ridgway believed that a way to gain some measure of public confidence in the service was for officers to explain the actions and the policies of the Army to both others in the service and the public. A key means to perform this task was for officers to conduct the information function, which consisted of a three-part information program. Between academic year 1976 and academic year 1977, the leaders of the Department of the Army (DA) made two important changes concerning this function. First, they changed the title of the information program from the Army Information Program (AIP) to the Army Public Affairs Program (APAP). Second, they changed the title of the office at DA that coordinated this program from the Chief of Information to the Chief of Public Affairs. No explanation was found for either adjustment. For consistency, this chapter will use the terms the Army Public Affairs Program and the Office of the Chief of Public Affairs (OCPA). Each sub-program of APAP, as had been the case with AIP, focused on informing a certain group of people. For example, the command information program was to explain actions of the Army to those who worked for the Army. The public information program was how the Army would communicate with the national public. Last, but not least, the community relations program was a way to foster mutual understanding between each installation of the Army and its local community. Each commander was accountable to his superior for effectively conducting his own program to achieve specified

867 Department of the Army, Soldiers, Vol. 31, No. 6 (June 1976), index. Department of the Army, Soldiers, Vol. 31, No. 7 (July 1976), index. The official U.S. Army Magazine for June 1976 stated that the Army Chief of Information published the document. In July the magazine was published by the Army Chief of Public Affairs.
goals. As seen previously, the leaders of DA believed that securing the support of the public was a prerequisite to gaining the resources the Army needed to accomplish its missions.

In the early 1970s, the leaders of DA had to find ways to improve the public’s opinion of the service. For example, General Abrams, Stewart says, wanted to “[integrate] the reserve components [National Guard and Army Reserve] into the active forces [as a means to] strengthen the Army’s ties with the states, the Congress, and the public.” Abrams made this proposal, COL (ret.) Harry G. Summers, Jr. said, to have “the citizen-soldier” become a means for “the restoration of the traditional linkage between the [A]rmy and the American people.” As previously seen in documents for example the lecture notes of General Dodge and the report of the Smith Board, the leaders of DA believed that if command information was effectively conducted throughout the Army it would contribute to influencing the opinions of the soldiers about the service who would then shape the knowledge of the public. A prerequisite to effectively conducting this sub-program was that senior officers – field-grade and above – needed to know not only the objectives of APAP and each sub-program but also know concrete means for achieving those goals. The thesis of this chapter is that from academic year (AY) 1974 through AY 1989 those making the decisions about the core curriculum at both the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and the War College prioritized having students study how they were to interact with representatives of media. This emphasis was made in an attempt to potentially reduce some of the antagonism between members of both institutions. It was this animosity which hindered the ability of the Army to effectively communicate with the public that caused the leaders at DA to prioritize this effort rather than ways to explain the Army to other members of the service and to the local public. A clear weakness in their approach was that they frequently chose methods of instruction that did not include having students apply what they had

learned about public affairs. Before examining the core curriculum at these two schools, it is important to consider a change in the structure of the Army that affected which organization was responsible for approving the curriculum at CGSC.

During the 1970s, the leaders of DA reorganized the command structure immediately below them. In 1972, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird authorized the leaders of DA to establish two commands to assume roles that Continental Army Command (CONARC) was then performing. Both organizations were established in July 1973. Stewart reports, one new organization was called Forces Command (FORSCOM), which “assumed command of all active and reserve Army forces in CONUS [Continental United States] and consolidated existing armies into three Continental U.S. Armies.” The other new entity was called Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), which assumed the supervision of the majority of the Army schools. The Command and General Staff College was one of these schools.872 The leaders at DA retained control of the curriculum at Army War College.873 The leaders of TRADOC were important to this dissertation for two primary reasons. First, as Harry Summers asserts, they were “responsible for developing and publishing all [A]rmy instructional and doctrinal manuals,” which officers attending both schools studied.874 Second, the leaders of TRADOC, like the leaders of CONARC before them, approved the curriculum at CGSC. Leaders such as the Commandant of a school, either CGSC or the War College, and the person in charge of the supervisory agency, such as the Commander of TRADOC for CGSC, were examples of those who had authority to approve changes in the curriculum.875

The leaders responsible for either CGSC or the Army War College continually re-examined the curricula of their schools. For example, in his history of the Army War College, COL (ret.) Harry Ball asserts that LTG DeWitt Smith, who was the Commandant at the Army War College for five of the six years between July 1974 and July 1980, changed the curriculum.

Smith wanted, Ball argues, to correct deficiencies in the curriculum that he had experienced in academic year 1966. One example of what Smith desired to revise, Ball asserts, was the failure to require each student to study “the social problems within the United States that had affected the Army so profoundly.” Ball implies that Smith did not think that senior leaders of the Army were prepared to react to the domestic social turmoil of the 1960s and early 1970s. As a result, Smith wanted students to study how to lead the Army as a whole institution and not just as a combat force. Ball says that Smith was worried:

The nation’s leadership – its elected and appointed officials and its opinion-setting sector – could lose confidence in its Army, a much more profound problem than one of mere public image. Conversely, the Army’s officer corps could lose confidence in the nation’s institutions, public and private, and their ability to respond resolutely whatever the threat to the nation’s interests and safety. If the result was not alienation of the officer corps from the larger society, it might well be intellectual isolation if the officer corps turned inward, concerning itself only with the technical facets of its profession.

It is possible to argue that most of these concerns could, to some degree, be mitigated if the Army effectively conducted its information program. For example, through command information the leaders of the Department of the Army (DA) could inform the officer corps of both their views and those of national leaders about what level of security they deemed sufficient. By explaining the similarities and difference between the views of both sides that could contribute to showing the officer corps that even though there may be different perspectives the leaders of the nation were still concerned about national security. To mitigate some of these potential issues, Smith thought that the students needed to examine issues related to national security from multiple perspectives, not just the view of the military. A way to accomplish this, although not mentioned by Ball, might have been for students to examine the opinions of many groups in the public, leaders in both Congress and Executive Branch, and the perspectives of leaders of DA about the effectiveness of the all-volunteer force. If students understood some of the concerns of both the public and national leaders as they related to the Army, then, in their conduct of public affairs, they might have a better chance to effectively explain the positions of the Army, which might assuage some of those anxieties.

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876 Ball, Of Responsible Command, 455-456.
877 Ibid., 456 - 457.
878 Ibid., 455-458.
graduates ability to convey the view of the Army, Ball reports, Smith “believed that officers should leave Carlisle with a better understanding of two institutions which . . . had great influence on America’s military policy – the Congress and the media.” Smith wanted to ensure that the American people had trust in their Army. To achieve that he wanted to ensure that future Army leaders had the ability to grasp what the public wanted in the interconnected areas of politics, the economy, and military affairs, to name a few. Smith seemed to agree with LTC Williams, who wrote in AY 1955, that the Army had to understand how the opinions of the public influenced its actions and not just that it had a duty to inform the public.

Among the works published between 1976 and 1977 were three articles written by two general officers about why the Army had to inform the public. These articles are especially useful in illustrating how these authors, as representatives of three- and four-star Army generals, understood the importance of members of the service explaining actions of the Army to the public. General Fred C. Weyand, who retired as the Army as the Chief of Staff in September 1976, and LTC Harry G. Summers, Jr. argued in the December 1976 edition of Military Review that military officers in 1976 were facing a problem similar to what Army officers had faced in 1776 – namely, “the necessity to convince the American people and the Congress of the need for adequate funds for the national defense.” This conclusion resembled that found in both the Norris Report and in the study “Army Tasks of the Seventies.” Officers, Weyand and Summers claimed, had a duty to inform the American people “in terms they can understand . . . by cool, clearheaded explanations of the realities of today’s imperfect world” why the nation needed a strong military. They also noted that “[a]ttitudes [of people] can and do change overnight.” Because these shifts cannot be predicted, the leaders of the Army had to constantly

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879 Ibid., 461.
ensure that the service continued to describe to the public and the troops the need for military power.\textsuperscript{884} This required constant and steady commitment if it was to succeed.

In 1977, General DeWitt Smith asserted in “Free Men and Soldiers” and “From Yesterday’s Fears to Today’s Realities” that the public in a free society such as in America had the right question any governmental agency, including the military.\textsuperscript{885} In both articles, Smith stated that service members had two duties related to the public. First, they, as servants of the public, were required to explain and interpret actions of the military to the public. Like Weyand and Summers, Smith said that officers should use facts and clear logic when communicating with the public.\textsuperscript{886} Second, the leaders of the Army had to understand what the public wanted as it related to matters of defense rather than the other way around.\textsuperscript{887} For example, in “Free Men and Soldiers,” Smith “[stressed] the need for military leaders to understand the currents of thought which run through their societies with respect to [the military].”\textsuperscript{888} The military had the burden of proof to convince the public that its recommendations were sound. Weyand and Summers and Smith did not use the term the Army Public Affairs Program but, in fact, their arguments can be seen as championing the public information program. Notably absent from their essays was the need to explain the Army to the troops.

A recommendation in a study of the Army’s educational system that was conducted between 1977 and 1978 was that each Army officer needed more instruction in public affairs, which supported the conclusions of Generals Smith and Weyand. General Bernard W. Rogers, Army Chief of Staff from October 1976 to June 1979, tasked BG Benjamin Harrison, on 31 August 1977, to lead a Board to examine officer education. Harrison and his group, according to the authorizing directive, were to examine the system that educates officers and to make recommendations for improving “training and education policies and programs,” which was much the same charge given to previous study groups established by DA. What was new for this board was that these policies and programs had to be able to be accomplished “in a

\textsuperscript{884} Weyand, “Serving the People,” 13.


\textsuperscript{888} Smith, “From Yesterday’s Fears to Today’s Realities,” 90. Smith, “Free Men and Soldiers,” 89-92.

The Board found that officers had two key responsibilities that were related to public affairs. These duties were, the authors of the report wrote, maintaining the Army as a “national institution” while also upholding the ideals of the profession of arms. An example of preserving the Army as a national institution, the authors of the report claimed, was for officers, as public servants, to:

> [conduct] themselves in a manner that will build and sustain strong bonds of mutual trust and confidence between the Army and the public it serves. If officers are to expect the citizens to give over their sons and daughters, their wealth, and their security to the Army, then those with commissions must earn their respect for competence and fidelity.\footnote{Ibid., III-1 to III-2. The underline is in the original.}

This resembled a point that General Smith argued in his articles.\footnote{Smith, “From Yesterday’s Fears to Today’s Realities,” 90-94. Smith, “Free Men and Soldiers,” 87-93.} To achieve this goal, a commander could use his command information program to convey to his subordinates the importance of the relationship between the public and the military. Then, leaders could gauge the status of the bonds between each community and the Army as part of their community relations program. These statements show that the conduct of each sub-program of APAP depended partly on the effectiveness of the others. The above statement from RETO reflected two of three aims of the information program found in the Smith Report (1969), which were to “develop public confidence” and to “obtain public esteem.”\footnote{Smith Report, IV-1. RETO, Vol. 1, III-1 to III-2.} If officers conducted themselves in a manner that the public respected, then the leaders of the Army expected the public would see the service as a legitimate institution. But if officers failed to achieve those standards, opinions of the public about the Army could take a negative path. A way to educate officers on these duties was for them to learn about the information program in Army schools.
Students attended schools in the Army system as part of the effort to prepare them for their future duties. For example, when an officer was selected for promoted to major, he was eligible for selection to attend CGSC. At CGSC, he would learn the critical skills and functions of a field-grade officer. The duties of a field-grade officer included but were not limited to planning both operations and how to explain those actions to the troops and the public. Majors and lieutenant colonels, the authors of the report wrote, dealt with issues that “involve more intellectual processes such as problem solving and reactions to all kinds of military, economic, political and social situations.” By contrast, lieutenants and captains studied technical skills such as “weapons employment” in their schooling. By referring to “political and social situations,” the authors of RETO supported the school of thought that claimed that a field-grade officer needed to study topics that were not limited to military fields. If officers understood those broader topics then they might be more effective in predicting possible reaction of the public to the actions of the Army. As further evidence of the need to educate officers about public affairs, 38 of 54 general officers (GOs) who were interviewed as part of this study called “for a program of continuing education for GOs.” “Possible subject areas for such education / training,” the authors of the report noted, “most often mentioned were: . . . community relations . . . [and] media and public relations.” Since field-grade officers helped generals to analyze problems, it was logical that they should also be required to study these topics. The authors of both RETO and the articles described above reiterate that the Army needed officers who could effectively implement the entire information program.

The authors of this report were the first of any board that investigated the Army school system during the Cold War to include an annex that described its plan to explain its recommendations to both internal and external audiences. Contrary to the trend of the Army to concentrate on informing the public, the focus of this plan was to inform “internal audiences” meaning the officer corps (active and reserve), certain retired officers, and candidates to be officers. DA would focus its efforts on issuing press releases and responding to questions from the press and would inform “the retired community and the public external to the Army when

warranted.” It is arguable that DA’s publishing such an annex was about 30 years in the making. In the 1950s, COL Harper and BG Clifton had asserted that it was a requirement to ensure that any recommendation going for a decision at DA that would affect the public or the troops had to have an information plan. Yet it took until 1978 to get such a plan into a study of the educational system of the Army. This is another example of a gap between words and deeds.

**Command and General Staff College**

For academic year (AY) 1975, there were two major changes to the curriculum at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) relevant to this study. Dr. Ivan J. Birrer, who was the educational advisor to the Commandant at CGSC, wrote about these changes. One was to adjust the educational methodology. “The classic military classroom [was] dominated by an ‘expert,’” Birrer noted in his January 1974 article, where the student was “a relatively passive receiver of information.” But in the new approach the instructor would “guide” students through the curriculum. Like in most graduate schools, he argued, each student would be responsible for his own learning by becoming “an active pursuer of ideas and concepts.”

This modification resembled some of the recommendations contained in the 1956 educational survey of CGSC. The second adjustment that the leaders made was to divide the curriculum into three segments to help students achieve three qualifications. Birrer explained the three qualifications. First, each student would achieve through the core curriculum, which used about 55% of the hours in the program, “a working competence with the traditional curriculum – orders, estimates . . . and the fundamentals of tactics.” Students would earn the other two qualifications during the elective program, which had the other 45% of the hours. For the second qualification, students were to study in greater detail some subjects that were covered in the core curriculum. Examples of these courses were “Advanced Tactics” and “Logistics for Commanders.”

The last competency, he reported, was that each student was required to “have a secondary skill” and

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CGSC was where he could “acquire or enhance his chosen specialty.” It is possible that, although Birrer mentioned this in his article, no course titled “Public Information” was listed in the *Catalog* for AY 1975. The *Catalog* had similar information to the *Program of Instruction* (POI).

There was one change in the aim of the curriculum at CGSC, but the number of hours allocated to the curriculum remained fairly constant during this period. Showing this consistency, the aim of the curriculum for AYs 1974 and 1975 resembled that of AYs 1959 through 1973. The focus was on preparing students to be commanders and general staff officers at echelons between the division and army group, including joint facets of these. Between AY 1978 and AY 1983, the aim of the curriculum changed. The focus during these years was to prepare students to be commanders and “principal staff officers” starting at the brigade.

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903 Ibid., 78-80.
904 Ibid., 80.
that one reason for the decrease in coverage of public affairs was the alteration of the aim of the curriculum. The average number of hours for AY 1974 through AY 1983 was 1075, which was very similar to those of AY 1970 and AY 1973.  

This represented a continuation of the trend to do more with the same amount of time or less.

Between AY 1974 and AY 1983, the decision-makers continued a trend of increasing allocated more time to the elective program, which reduced the time in the core curriculum. As previously described, in academic year 1968, those developing the curriculum allotted only 2% of the hours in the curriculum to electives; by AY 1973 it was 28%, and in AY 1975 the elective program used about 35% of the hours in the curriculum. By academic year 1983, the percentage of hours given to the elective program had dropped to about 23%. This fluctuation implied that the leaders were still trying to determine an effective balance between the two parts of the curriculum.

The developers of the core curriculum at CGSC included a lesson about the “Public Affairs Program” for six of the ten academic years between AY 1974 and AY 1983. The Army Public Affairs Program (APAP), just like its predecessor the Army Information Program, was the

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official plan by which the Army explains what it was doing and why to those in the service and to the public, both local and national. The four years when there was no lesson regarding public affairs in the core curriculum were AY 1978 and between AYs 1981 and 1983. During the other six years, the aim of this lesson listed in curricular documents showed a lack of consistency. What seemed evident was a continuation of a trend that started between AY 1970 and AY 1973, to focus the instruction on public information rather than the entire program.

Those determining the core curriculum for AY 1974 set aside two hours for students to study about public affairs. Resembling the goal of the lesson on public affairs in the curriculum

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between AY 1970 and AY 1973, the aim of the lesson for academic year 1974, according to the advance sheet, was to provide each student with “general knowledge of the importance, principles, and objectives of the [Public Affairs Program] – command information, public information, and community relations – and of the normal command and staff responsibilities for these [sub-programs].”\textsuperscript{915} The continuation of “general knowledge,” which means the ability to “[r]ecall previously learned information,” suggested that officers did not need to apply what they were learning to grasp the concepts. But in this case that would be inaccurate.\textsuperscript{916}

Students faced a range of situations in exercises included in this lesson for academic year 1974, which resembled those used in AY 1973. Two scenarios will illustrate. The first scenario had two situations. The first gave the students, acting as information officers, a chance to consider how they would convince a company commander of the benefits of command information. The second scenario presented a situation where soldiers had complained about being targeted by local police in speed traps as they left post. Each student was to recommend possible actions to the installation commander to solve this problem.\textsuperscript{917} As seen in previous years, the author of this lesson provided possible topics to discuss with students about the issue of speed traps.\textsuperscript{918} These situations gave the students the ability to look at peacetime problems that involved two out of three parts – community relations and command information – of APAP.

Repeating a wartime scenario that was used between AY 1970 and AY 1973, each student, cast as a division commander, had to determine how he would respond to concerns of two members of his staff about a correspondent who had been asking about future operations which were still classified. One staff officer suggested that the CG have the reporter “physically removed from the division area . . . and [requests] that [he] be disaccredited.” The PAO proposed letting the reporter know that if such an operation occurred he would be invited to join that

\textsuperscript{915} USACGSC “Army Information Program,” 1-2 in USACGSC, Course 2 Leadership and Management, R2005/4

Army Information Program, School Year 1973-74. USACGSC, Program of Instruction, (AY1974), 5.

\textsuperscript{916} \url{http://litre.ncsu.edu/sltoolkit/Bloom.htm} (accessed 29 June 2013).


\textsuperscript{918} USACGSC, “Army Information Program, (AY 1974), IV-1.
These two scenarios gave each student an opportunity, as a commander or staff officer, to apply each sub-program to a realistic situation.

Continuing a trend that started in AY 1962, the authors of the advance sheet for AY 1974 also included a summary page which resembled the one included in the advance sheet of this lesson since AY 1968. In this page, they provided a description of each sub-program of APAP and a list of “Army information principles.” For example, they said, “A sound information program acts to prevent and to minimize problems.” Also, “The internal and external publics must be kept informed.” Students could use this sheet as a guide to help them during both discussions in the classroom and actual situations. The authors of this summary also showed, to a degree, how each sub-program, in part, depended on the other parts.

For unknown reasons, the developers of the core curriculum for academic year (AY) 1975 dramatically increased the time allotted to instruction on public relations to 10 hours. This was the largest number of hours since AY 1949, which had fourteen hours. The authors of the POI for AY 1975 listed a guest speaker who, in two hours, was “[t]o discuss the influence

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922 USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course, Approved by CG, CONARC, 7, 50-51, and 55 in POI CGSC, USACGSC/75.

923 USACGSC, Program of Instruction for Regular Course, (AY 1949), 5 and 22.
of the media on the development of public opinion as an element of national power.” No notes from the lecture were found. The lecturer was to focus his comments on how the media functioned rather than how the Army could shape public opinion. The lesson was titled “The Army and the Public.” The authors of the POI for AY 1975 described the objective of this lesson:

The student will be able to recognize the relationships between soldiers and civilians both at the individual and organization levels; to acquire information on the community relations and public information programs of the Army [Public Affairs] Program which seeks to gain the public understanding and cooperation.

The authors divided this lesson into four two-hour meetings. They allotted one meeting, which consisted of both a lecture and an application exercise, for each of three sub-programs of APAP. During each of these three meetings, the lecturer was to explain the policies of the Department of the Army for the conduct of the sub-program and why it was important. The description that these authors gave of each sub-program resembled those found in the summary pages of this lesson between AY 1968 and AY 1974.

The first sub-program that students examined was command information. A reason for treating this subject first was that, for a commander to have an effective program for both community relations and public information, he first had to ensure that those in his command understood what their unit was doing and why. Then each commander and his soldiers could explain their actions to the public, either local or national. This approach – ensuring that

924 USACGSC, *Program of Instruction*, (AY 1975), 55.
troops were informed first – resembled what BG McAnsh proposed in his 1956 article. It was also seen in the supplemental material for academic year 1963 through academic year 1965.\footnote{McAnsh, “A Steady Breeze blows Topside, So Let’s Stand Tall,” 22-25. USACGSC, “Command Information,” (AY 1963), 1-11. USACGSC, “Command Information,” (AY 1964), 2-11. USACGSC, “The Army Information Program,” (1965), 3-13.}

LTC Paul Parham, the author of the primary reading for this lesson, argued that “command information is at best misunderstood.”\footnote{LTC Paul Parham, “Command Information the Unused tool of Leadership,” Military Review (June 1973): 35-36.} Parham, who was assigned to the Command Information Division in OCPA, wrote an article titled “Command Information: the unused tool of LEADERSHIP” that was published in the June 1973 edition of Military Review.\footnote{Ibid., 35-45.} Officers do not comprehend the aim of this program, Parham asserted, because, in part, “[f]ormal instruction in command information principles at the service schools is below effective level and is not tested.” A weakness in his argument was his failure to describe what he considered sufficient.\footnote{Ibid., 44.}

Command information was a way for leaders to present to their subordinates the official view of the Army or, more particularly, of their commander about any issue in an effort to accomplish certain tasks. For instance a commander could use his command information program to keep his troops informed while also countering rumors. An example of this, Parham noted, was when the Commandant of CGSC had “a general officer from the DA Staff” brief his students on DA’s assessment of the Tet offensive immediately after it ended. After listening to the speaker and reading what the press had reported, students could determine what they thought was the truth.\footnote{Ibid., 40-42.}

Repeating a claim made by the Haislip Board (1947) and General Mudgett’s lecture to the War College in AY 1955, Parham said that having an effective program would enable solders to explain the Army’s position to their friends and family. He also advocated that students in service schools should study the connections between command information and leadership. If students learned these links, he believed, future commanders would place more emphasis on their command information programs than commanders in the early 1970s did.\footnote{Parham, “Command Information the Unused tool of Leadership,” 43-45. USACGSC, “The Army Information Program,” (AY 1973-74), 98-111. USACGSC, “The Army Public Affairs Program,” 3-2 to 3-12 in USACGSC.}
assertion that officers misjudged both the intent and goal of command information resembled the conclusions of GEN Williston B. Palmer in his 1955 article. The statements by these two authors, writing almost seventeen years apart, suggest that the leaders of the Department of the Army (DA) had been unable to make any major improvement in getting the officer corps to accept the value of command information. Poor education on this subject might have been why the officer corps still was not convinced.

The topic of the Army’s relations with local communities, or “community relations,” was covered in the next two-hour meeting. This was the first lesson dedicated to this topic since AY 1958. Each student would learn, the authors of the advance sheet wrote, what actions he and his unit could take “to earn public understanding and acceptance” in his local community. In the first hour, the authors said, students would discuss the “fundamental community relations policies and review the variety of programs available to the commander.” Then students would be given an application exercise, but no specifics about the scenario were found.

The sub-program called “Public Information” was the subject of the last meeting. The aim of this program was to enable the Army to communicate effectively with the national audience, primarily through the media. In the advance sheet, the authors listed six objectives for this meeting, three of which illustrate well the content of the instruction. Resembling the aim of the lesson on command information of the same year, the goal of this instruction was for each student was to demonstrate that he understood the following: “The integral relationship which exists among Command Information, Community Relations, and Public Information. . . . The traditional attitudes of journalists towards their role in American society. . . . [and] The considerations peculiar to military-media relationships in the combat zone.” During the first hour, just as in the other two meetings, a speaker would describe the policies of DA for

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\[\text{935 Palmer, “A Fresh Start for Troop Information,” (AY 1955), 2-5.}
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\[\text{936 USACGSC, “The Army and the Public, 9003-3,” 1 in USACGSC, Regular Course 1974-1975, Subjects 9001 thru 9630, Vol. 10, U415, A3, C1, 1974/75, V.10. USACGSC, Program of Instruction for Command and General Staff Course, Regular Course (AY 1958), 44.}
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\[\text{937 USACGSC, “The Army and the Public, 9003-3,” (AY 1975), 1}
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\[\text{938 USACGSC, “The Army and the Public, 9003-4,” (AY 1975), P4-1. USACGSC, “The Army and the Public,” (AY 1975), P2- 1.}
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explaining the Army to the public. In the second hour, students would discuss an article that was published in the September 1974 edition of Army written by MG Franklin M. Davis Jr., who retired in 1974 as the Commandant of the Army War College and then became a reporter.  

Davis’ main point was that “central to the issue of the military-media relationship is the basic fact” that neither “the average officer” nor an average reporter trusts a representative of the other side. The Army could take three actions to improve the amount of trust that people of each organization had for the other. One option to increase the interaction of people from both organizations was to allow reporters to attend military-media symposia at service schools, which the developers of the curriculum at the War College had done between AYs 1968 and 1972. Second, he also advocated that senior representatives from both the Army and the media should come together to discuss ways to improve the interaction of their organizations for the benefit of the public. The military, he advised, should allow a few reporters to attend one of the “senior service colleges” in an effort to help that reporter understand some of the burdens placed on military officers, such as the weight of command and how the military functioned. Those reporters, Davis implied, would then share with other correspondents what he had learned about the perspectives of his fellow students on more issues than just interaction with the media. Lastly, the official policy of DA for public information, Davis noted, was “maximum disclosure

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943 Ibid., 16-19.
with minimum delay.” However, actions of the Army as an institution had failed to match the words of its policy. He claimed that much of the problem was the result of how individuals on both sides interpreted the policy. One possible way, not one of Davis’ article, to correct the understanding of the officer corps was through effective command information. Davis offered a reasonable approach that the Army’s top leaders could take to achieve an increase in the amount of cooperation and understanding between these organizations. To achieve real success, his proposals required the active participation and support of each officer. During the Cold War, AY 1975 was the last year in which the developers of the core curriculum included a lesson that covered all three sub-programs of information program.

The approach of those developing the core curriculum for public affairs for AYs 1976 and 1977 was different from the one taken in AY 1975, in part, because they allocated only a six-hour lesson for that instruction. Also, the scope listed in the advance sheets for AY 1976 and AY 1977 were different not only from each other but also from what had been allowed for AY 1975. “This lesson,” the author of the advance sheet for AY 1976 said, “intends to improve the officer’s ability to deal with representatives of the news media by broadening his understanding of the traditions of journalism, the attitudes and behavior of journalists, the functions of an Army public affairs officer, and the requirements of the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act.” This lesson saw the return of a provision for students to study about the duties of Public Affairs Officer (PAO) for the first time since academic year 1966. On the other hand, the authors for AY 1977 said: “This lesson intends to improve the officer’s ability to deal with Public Affairs matters by broadening his understanding of the Army Public Affairs Program and its objectives, the functions of the Public Affairs Officer, and the role of the news media.” This resembled what was stated in the advance sheets for academic year 1968 through academic year

944 Ibid., 18.
Neither the advance sheet for this lesson for AY 1976 nor the one for AY 1977 included practical exercises. If the leaders at the Command and General Staff College wanted officers to accept the importance of information program, then they had to teach them two key things. First, students had to study what benefits – for themselves, their unit, and the Army – could be gained from conducting APAP effectively. Second, students had to study practical methods for achieving the objectives of public affairs. Since the goal of each lesson was to improve the officer’s ability in public affairs, not having him apply what he was learning was flawed.

The authors of this lesson in public affairs for AYs 1976 and 1977 had each student read at least five documents. One document that was used in both academic years was “The Role of the Communications Media in a Democratic Society” by Barry Zorthian. Between 1964 and 1968, Zorthian had served as Director of the Joint US Public Affairs Office Saigon in the Republic of Vietnam. This article was based on a lecture he had given at the Naval War College in 1972 when he was the President of Time-Life Broadcasting. These two positions gave Zorthian a unique perspective on issues related to public affairs which made what he had to say worthy of substantial consideration. Based on his wartime experience, Zorthian concluded that some people in the government, including senior officers of the U.S. military, either did not understand or did not accept that they had a duty to keep the public informed. His conclusion makes a person question the effectiveness of the instruction in public affairs that was conducted at the Command and General Staff College and the War College. To reduce the possibility of that occurring in the future, he asserted, senior officers of all branches of the armed forces had to understand what goals the leaders of their service had set for their information program. Each officer, he claimed, had to help the public connect the actions of the Army to a policy objective.

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of the government. The desire to increase the size of the “enlightened public” echoes what many people, such as Gabriel Almond told the War College in AY 1956, had advocated.

To help officers grasp how to implement a policy on information that was to create and maintain an informed public, Zorthian advocated ten principles. Since there was “no press relations doctrine in the armed services,” he argued, officers could use his principles as a guide when they were either planning to explain, or actually were explaining, the military to the public. One principle he stated was that officers should focus on providing what he called “information,” which was “the provision of facts.” When communicating with the press, each officer should provide within security protocols all of the facts of a situation and his interpretation of those facts. The presentation of information would, inevitably, have been structured and thus will have some bias. The press would, it was expected, conduct its own analysis of all of the facts and the officer’s interpretation. Then the press would, Zorthian argued, “[transmit] both the information and [its] judgment [on the information] to the public.” This point was not new. This principle was explicitly linked with other points he advocated.

Officers, Zorthian argued, had to “Take the Initiative” and “Be Candid” by releasing all information, within security requirement, even if it put the military in bad light. He stated: “it is far less damaging if the military takes the initiative, reveals that it knows of the situation, is taking steps to remedy whatever problems exist, and is seeking to punish anyone that is guilty.” Being honest – showing “candor” – was also connected to getting the Army’s story out to the public. By releasing the information on its own initiative the Army might counter those

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who argued that the military used national security to hide embarrassing facts. It should be noted that Zorthian’s proposals resembled those of MGs Dodge and Underwood, who had previously made similar recommendations in their lectures at the Army War College in AY 1962 and AY 1964, respectively. The emphasis on honesty also resembled views expressed in supplemental material used at CGSC between AY 1963 and AY 1965.

The developers of the core curriculum for AYs 1979 and 1980 brought back the lesson called “The Army Public Affairs Program,” after a one-year absence. The scope of the lesson for AYs 1979 and 1980 resembled that of the lesson in AY 1976, which had the students learn about the press rather than the information program of the Army. In AYs 1979 and 1980, this lesson was allotted three hours, divided into three one-hour segments, which was half the time allotted to this instruction for AYs 1976 and 1977. It is not clear how those who approved the curriculum could expect students to achieve the same learning in three hours which had previously needed six. The first hour was for students, without any contact with the instructor, to complete required readings and take a test.

The authors of this lesson for academic year (AY) 1979 and AY 1980 had students read six articles. Two will illustrate. One of these readings had also been used in both AYs 1976 and 1977 – Zorthian’s “The Role of the Communications Media in a Democratic Society” – so

there was some consistency in the required readings. A new article included in AY 1979 and AY 1980 was called “Military Public Affairs.” The authors of the document, who are unknown, distinguished between public affairs in a civilian or corporate setting and public affairs as practiced by the military. He argued:

> Commercial, corporate, and institutional public relations are based on the free enterprise concepts of marketing a product or service for a private organization. Military public affairs programs exist to provide information and maintain an awareness and concern for public opinion regarding an organization that is owned and operated by and for the American people.  

This statement resembled the distinction that Zorthian, and others before him, had made between information and publicity.

The examination consisted of ten questions, which, the authors of the advance sheet for both AYs noted, were “related to the fundamentals of the Army Public Affairs Program and its application to U.S. Army military officers.” A passing grade was 80%. The questions borrowed from the wording of the objectives of this lesson listed on the first two pages of the advance sheet for both years. To illustrate, one question, worth 30% of the grade, asked the student to “identify three main activities of the Army’s Public Affairs Program.” One learning objective, the authors of the advance sheet wrote, was: “Identify three main activities of the Army’s Public Affairs Program” based on a document titled “Commander’s Guide to Army Information.” The authors of “Commander’s Guide” effectively described, on the first two pages, that the major activities of this program were: “Public Information . . . Command Information . . . Community Relations.”

The lack of rigor of this test supports Parham’s assertion that the testing of students’ knowledge in public affairs at service schools was poor in

quality. During the second hour, the Chief of Public Affairs at DA spoke to students and the third hour was for questions and answers. No lecture notes were found to show what topics were to be discussed. On a positive note, this was the first time since AY 1961 that a senior officer from DA spoke to a class at CGSC about public affairs. As stated earlier, those determining the core curriculum at CGSC for AY 1981 through AY 1983 did not include a lesson about public affairs; no reason for this was found.

Besides this lesson in the core, students could also study public affairs during the elective program, which was the other part of the curriculum. The first year that a course on the information program was offered was AY 1974. This is interesting especially since the Haines Board (1965) had specifically stated that an elective on public information would be suitable for an elective program. One key change to the elective program between AY 1974 and AY 1983 was in the number of hours given to each course. For example, the authors of the *Catalog* for AY 1974 wrote that courses listed in the elective program were divided into two types, “Professional” and “Associate,” which were allotted 56 and 40 hours, respectively. Starting in AY 1979 and lasting through AY 1983, the developers of the curriculum allocated only 30 hours for each course in the elective program. The decrease in hours would affect either the depth or the breadth of the discussion on the subject.

967 Parham, “Command Information the Unused tool of Leadership,” 44.
971 The intent of Professional Elective Program, according to the author of the Catalog for AY 1974, was “to add depth to and extend the coverage of selected areas of the common curriculum. . . . the program offers an obvious opportunity to develop increased proficiency and experience in areas of individual interest or specialty.” Associate Electives allows each student “to structure a portion of the curriculum according to his own professional and personal academic needs.” Found in USACGSC, Catalog Academic Year 1973-1974, Fort Leavenworth, KS, II-2, IV-2, IV-6, IV-20 to IV-21.
Between AY 1974 and AY 1983, the developers of the elective program at CGSC included a course about public affairs in six of the ten years. This course was offered between AY 1974 and AY 1977 and then again in AY 1980 and AY 1981. During AYs 1978 and 1979 and AYs 1982 and 1983 there was no course about public affairs in the elective program. No explanation was found for why they included a course in one year, but not the next. Resembling the scope of this lesson in the core curriculum of that AY, the authors of the advance sheet for the course in AY 1974 described its scope:

Students will analyze the need for a positive, aggressive, and farsighted Army public affairs effort and, in the course of this analysis, will develop the basic tenents underlying the objectives, policies, and specific programs of Command Information, Community Relations, and Public Information – the basic elements of the Army [Public Affairs] Program.

Between AY 1975 and AY 1977, the scope of this course, according to curricular documents, changed little. The authors of the advance sheet for AY 1977 said the scope of this lesson resembled the scope set for AY 1974 but added:

Related issues include the first amendment freedoms, the role of the press, the Freedom of Information Act, the Privacy Act, and journalistic techniques as reflected in newspapers, TV, magazines, and books.

For AY 1974 and AY 1977, the authors of this course provided students with opportunities to study all three sub-programs of the Army Public Affairs Program.
For AY 1980 and AY 1981, the title of this course changed to “Public Affairs for the Commander.” The authors of the Catalog for AY 1980 and AY 1981 wrote that the scope of the course was to “[prepare] future commanders for forthcoming interrelations with members of the press...the entire spectrum of communication responsibilities for internal and external audiences... Key to this course is the requirement for each student to face television reporters in three live news interview situations.”

As in the core curriculum, the difference in the scope of the elective course on public affairs for AY 1974 and AY 1977 and AYs 1980 and 1981 represents a tension between prioritizing informing the public or covering the entire program. The content for academic year 1974 and academic year 1977 will illustrate what topics were covered as a part of the course.

The authors of the course in public affairs in the elective program for AY 1974 and AY 1977, according to the advance sheet for each year, listed three objectives that resembled each other. The goals listed in the advance sheet for academic year (AY) 1977 were to:

1. Develop an appreciation of the commander’s need to communicate with his external and internal publics and of his staff’s responsibility to anticipate the needs and possible reactions of these publics. 2. Explain the essential public relations concepts, the complexities of the communications media...so the potential commander and staff officer can plan and implement effective programs involving command information, public information and community relations. 3. Know how the public affairs officer (PAO) can assist the commander in accomplishing his mission, so the commander and his staff can completely and effectively use the PAO throughout all stages of a project’s planning and execution.

In AY 1974, the developers of the curriculum allotted 56 hours (14 meetings of 4 hours) for the course, but those in AY 1977 gave only 36 hours (12 meetings of 3 hours). Expecting to achieve the same scope and objectives with less time seems questionable.

There were similarities as well as differences in the topics of meetings between AY 1974 and AY 1977 to reach the stated objectives. Five similarities will illustrate. First, each year

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students studied the print media. Students would learn, the authors of the advance sheet for AY 1974 wrote, about “attitudes and approaches peculiar to newspaper journalism” to help them “determine to what extent the ‘arrogant and aggressive’ reporter stereotype conforms to reality.”

There was a risk in this approach. It was possible that some students, but not necessarily all, could accept the stereotype and continue to blame the press, while absolving the military of any responsibility, for poor coverage of the Army. That did not seem to be the intention of the authors. Second, a separate meeting had students examine the operation of electronic media. During this meeting in AY 1974, students investigated only TV, but both TV and radio were examined during AY 1977. The objective of this meeting, which was to learn how the media operate to be more effective in facilitating their coverage, was similar in both academic years. For example, the author of the advance sheet for AY 1974 wrote that the students were to “learn the complexities and potential of this medium so they can confidently invite television outlets to cover activities of interest to the outside public and they can effectively prepare for that coverage.”

So students in the class of AY 1977 were to learn about more types of journalists in less time as compared to AY 1974. The authors of the meeting on electronic media, in either year, did not label broadcast journalists as “arrogant and aggressive” as had been done by the author of the meeting on newspaper journalists. One has to question why the authors of this elective course would allow a negative phrase, which represented such a clear bias, about journalists at all. The other three meetings were on the three sub-programs.

In both academic years, the authors of this course allotted one meeting to each sub-program of the Army Public Affairs Program. The sequence in which students studied each sub-program differed between AY 1974 and AY 1977. In AY 1974 the authors used the order: public information, command information and community relations. The authors of AY 1977, however, used the sequence: command information, community relations, and public information.

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order was important because the authors implied which sub-program was first among equals. The instruction on command information and public information will illustrate what was covered.

The wording of the goal of the meeting about the command information program was nearly identical for both AY 1974 and AY 1977. Students, the authors of AY 1977 wrote, would “learn the pivotal nature of command information (CI) – why effective public information (PI) and community relations (CR) programs are hinged to a thorough orientation of internal publics. Students will also become acquainted with various media used to inform members of a command.”

The authors of the lesson on public affairs that was included in the core curriculum for AY 1975 used similar wording to describe the linkage. This statement suggests that the authors for all three AYs agreed that command information was the foundation for the other two sub-programs. Besides their soldiers there were other people – such as retirees, members of reserve forces, and also the civilians working for the Army – whom the students should consider to be part of the “internal public.” In both AYs, students read an article by LTC Paul Parham, who, in 1973, argued that officers did not understand the aim of the command information program. As a result, they did not keep their troops effectively informed. Education about the connections between command information and leadership, he asserted, was a means to fix this problem. Students of the class of AY 1975 also read this article during the core curriculum.

For the meeting on the public information program held in both AYs, students were to read a transcript of an address that Arthur W. Page, who had been a vice-president in charge of
public relations of AT&T until 1946, had given to the National War College in 1947. Page had focused on actions of the staff section that was responsible for public relations at the Department of the Army (DA), but his comments also applied at all echelons of command. The authors of this course in both years explained the relevance of Page’s lecture which was nearly identical. The authors for academic year 1977 said that it “discusses circumstances strikingly similar to those of today and stresses the need for an organized public [affairs] effort of the Army.” One possible reason for this statement was that after Vietnam the public supposedly reverted to focusing on domestic issues – as it had after World War II. Public support, Page asserted, was a must for getting Congress to provide both the “money and manpower” the Army needed to accomplish its missions. Everyone in the Army, he argued, had a duty “to create public understanding of our motives and mission of providing for the national security.” Page, like Zorthian and the authors of a few supplemental materials that cover DA’s information program at the Command and General Staff College, asserted that each spokesman for the Army must have “[a] reputation for honesty” if he was to be effective in explaining a message from the Army to the public. He was telling the students to just report the truth to the public and not try to spin the information. This was sage advice that should have been consistently expressed in each lesson on conducting public affairs, but sadly was not.

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The leaders of DA should focus their effort on three key means to get the support of the public. First, the Army, Page argued, had to start with the internal audiences, thus echoing the argument made during the meeting about command information. He argued that, once you convinced the soldiers of the validity of the positions of the Army, they could help you get the word out. Next in priority was the national public. Press releases were the primary means the Army used to explain its actions to the public. Each document released to the press should include both detailed information on the topic, an interpretation, and an explanation of why this topic was important. The public affairs staff at DA gave these releases both to the press and to subordinate commands of the Army. Subordinate commanders used data from these releases as part of their efforts to update local media and the local public, which was the third means. Page showed that, when the Army conducted all three sub-programs effectively, the benefits received were more than the sum of the parts.

In order for a commander to have an effective information program, his staff, especially his planners, had to consider public affairs during all decision-making processes. Page used an example of what happened when public affairs specialists were not involved in planning to make his point. For example, he wrote, newspapers had reported that “the Army proposed to seize meat from the various packers at a time when civilian meat shortages were acute.” Seizing meat from the public in peacetime during a shortage – or even considering doing so – would have had significant long-term negative impact on the image of the Army. Officers who had studied the goals of the information program were expected to prevent even the discussion of such an option. Many of the points Page made in AY 1947 remained valid for the mid-1970s.

There were differences in the content of this course on public affairs between academic year (AY) 1974 and AY 1977. Five meetings that were included in AY 1974 but were not part of the course for AY 1977 will illustrate. In AY 1974, the authors of the course allocated one
meeting for students to conduct research for a paper. Also, they set aside two meetings for the students to examine two different case studies of how others in the Army conducted public affairs. For example, one case study involved how the Army facilitated the media’s coverage of the trial of LT William L. Calley, Jr. for My Lai. The last two meetings were for guest speakers. One speaker, according to the advance sheet, was a representative from the Office of the Chief of Public Affairs at DA. The other provided the students an opportunity to discuss with a previous Commander of an installation how he had conducted public affairs. No lecture notes were found for either speaker. No reason was found for not continuing to use guest speakers.

The authors of this course in both AYs provided the students chances to study two key ideas. First, the students learned about each sub-program: command information, public information, and community relations and how they were connected. Students also studied how their conduct of each sub-program influenced the ability of the Army to gain the support of the public. The amount of public support influenced the extent of resources that Congress might allocate to the Army. Second, students learned how the press – print and electronic – operated. The leaders at DA expected that officers who understood how the media functioned would be more effective conveying the Army’s message through the press to the public. Students who learned these two key points should have had the necessary skills to assist their commanders in accomplishing their information tasks. This course covered some of the same topics as were covered in the core, but in more detail.

The number of students choosing to write about public affairs in their masters’ theses suggests whether the instruction had convinced them of the importance of the subject. MAJ John F. Carney’s thesis will illustrate. In 1980, Carney noted in his thesis that the number of Americans who had a favorable opinion of the military had declined between the end of World War II and 1972. The decline was caused, he claimed, mainly by “unpopular wars.” It is striking that Carney implied that the Army was not the main reason for the decline. He almost absolved the Army of any responsibility for the poor amount of public support. Another factor

995 Ibid., 115-135.
996 Ibid., 114 and 137.
that potentially influenced the decline in public opinion, Carney asserted, was that members of
the Army were separated, physically and socially, from the society they served. Physical
isolation, he reported, was sharpened because many members of the military lived on “self-
contained” installations. “Another cause of isolation,” he claimed, “[was] that members of the
military [were] often culturally and racially different from the local populace.”998 He concluded
that “the effects of isolation tend to diminish the interface between the civilian and military
communities and to add fuel to the negative military stereotype.”999 Carney did not use the term
“community relations.” His argument clearly indicates that he advocated the goals of that
program but determined that the Army had failed to conduct it effectively. In his conclusion,
Carney advocated that “[m]ilitary and civilian [leaders] must recognize that the image of the
military is in need of improvement, and they must set out to develop programs to uplift that
image.”1000 Surprisingly, Carney never mentioned the Army Public Affairs Program. In AY
1980, there was a three-hour lesson on public affairs in the core curriculum. As a reminder, the
aim of this lesson was more focused on having the students learn about the news media and
journalism rather than the Army’s program. The structure of the lesson was the first hour was for
a test and the other two hours was for a guest speaker and then a question and answer period.1001
The failure of Carney to mention this program might have been due to the focus of this lesson.
The fact that he did not discuss or even describe this program makes one wonder if the
instruction was effective in accomplishing its aim.

Between AY 1974 and AY 1983, those determining the curriculum at the Command and
General Staff College frequently failed to have students study how to effectively perform their
duty to inform the troops and the public about of the Army. For example, there were three years
– AY 1978, AY 1982, and AY 1983 – in which there was no instruction on public affairs
anywhere in the curriculum.1002 When a lesson was included in the core there were significant
variations in the number of hours allocated and in the topics covered. The authors of this lesson

998 Ibid., 38-39
999 Ibid., 37-40.
1000 Ibid., 44.
1002 USACGCS, Catalog, Academic Year, 1977-1978, Fort Leavenworth, KS. USACGCS, Catalog, Academic Year,
in the core curriculum, when it was included, seemed to emphasize having students study the best ways to inform the public. This prioritization came at the cost of teaching students ways to keep their soldiers updated, which indirectly contributed to informing the public. Also, only those students in the classes of AY 1974 and AY 1975 were given the chance to apply what they had learned. If the leaders of DA wanted future leaders to effectively explain the actions of the Army to the American people, then not having them learn and practice how to conduct Army public affairs was a significant mistake.

Army War College

The developers of the curriculum at the War College from academic year (AY) 1974 through AY 1983, except for AY 1975, included instruction on public affairs either in the core or in the elective program, but not always both. The aim of the curriculum between AY 1975 and AY 1983 resembled the aims set in previous years, although the wording continued to change.1003 Those deciding what went into the core curriculum included a lesson about public

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affairs in only seven of these ten years: in AY 1974, in AY 1977 through AY 1981, and in AY 1983. The authors of the core curriculum for AY 1974 included a three and one-half hour seminar that was titled “The Military in US Society.” Students would study, the authors of the advance sheet for this seminar wrote, “the role of the military in US society to include the interactions between domestic policy, foreign policy, and military policy.” As future leaders of the military who would contribute to the development of military policy, these students needed to comprehend the relationship between the military and the American society as viewed by members of both sides. An example of a question listed in the advance sheet was whether “the American military is a mirror image of the society it serves. . . . should it be or should it not be?” After discussing this concept, the authors implied, students should be able to state whether they considered a proposed military policy acceptable to American society. Students with this capacity for understanding were expected to be more effective explaining recommendations of the Army to the troops and the public, which is conducting Army public affairs.

From AY 1977 through AY 1983, except AY 1982, students learned about the media and how they influenced the American society during the core curriculum. Students studied the operations of the media, rather than the Army Public Affairs Program (APAP), suggesting that those who approved the curriculum thought it was more important for students to learn ways to inform the public rather than members of the Army. The Army, after all, did not rely mostly on public media in communicating with its own personnel. In choosing to emphasize the media, the leaders of the War College indicated that they did not accept Trussell’s recommendation that students at the War College should study how the Army was to convey its messages to the public. The developers of this lesson used both lectures and panels, which meant that, for the most part, students were passive and were not required to apply what they were learning. For AY 1977 and AY 1978, a lecture titled “The Media in National Life” was part of the curriculum.


Trussell, “‘Professional Generalship’ and the USAWC Curriculum,” 9.
Much like the goals for the instruction between AYs 1969 and AY 1973, the aim of this lecture, the authors of the advance sheet for each academic year wrote, was for students: “[t]o understand the role of the media as a national institution.” Also, the lecturer was to explain: “(1) The functions of a free press in the United States. (2) The interrelationships between the media and other elements of US society. (3) The arguments pro and con on the media’s unrestricted right to access and release of all-source information. (4) The status of the American media in the decade ahead.”

For AY 1979 the title of the lecture changed to “The Media in US Society,” but the aim and scope resembled those of AYs 1977 and 1978. The goal of these lectures focused on describing the views of the media. Since reports of previous boards such as the Smith Board and

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RETO had found that members of the Army needed more education in how to inform the public, it seems odd that a lesson on that ability was not included in the curriculum.

Between AY 1980 and AY 1983, the developers of the core curriculum changed the method of instruction for the lesson about public affairs from a lecture to a panel. Showing a degree of consistency, the objectives and scope of this lesson for AY 1980 and AY 1981 resembled those for the previous three years, with one exception. The authors replaced the phrase “[t]he status of the American media in the decade ahead” in the description of the lesson’s scope with the wording, in the advance sheet for AY 1981, “[t]he conflict between the secrecy required by national security, the public’s right to know, and the media’s role in defining defense policy issues.” Those developing the core curriculum for AY 1983 allotted three hours for a panel titled “The Military and the Media.” The objectives for the lesson in AY 1983, according to the curricular material, were similar to those of AYs 1980 and 1981. After the panel, students were to continue to discuss the topic in their seminar rooms. Even though the authors of this

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lesson had changed the method of instruction, there was a degree of consistency between AY 1977 and AY 1983 in what the authors wanted students to learn, as shown in both the statement of objectives and the scope of this lesson.

Two examples, which cover separate topics, will illustrate other instruction about public affairs that the developers of the core curriculum included between AY 1974 and AY 1983. Those determining the core curriculum for AY 1979 allotted three hours to discussing the Army’s duty to explain its action to the public. Included in these three hours was a lecture titled “Informed Public Opinion – The Army’s Role,” which was followed by a question and answer period. After the lecture, students moved to their seminar rooms and continued to discuss this topic. The author of the directive said the objectives for this lesson were:

(1) To persuade the students that [an] informed public opinion is essential to maintaining an adequate national defense. (2) To discuss the role of the various players in Army public affairs, the internal audiences, the commander, the Public Affairs Officers, the press, and civilian influencers. (3) To reemphasize the importance of speaking up and speaking out.\footnote{AWC, Curriculum, AY 1979, Strategic Military Studies to Advance Courses, Business Management Advance Course, 16 Feb 1978 – 29 June 1979, 1979-6, Folder 9 – Directive, Command and Management, 14 and 61.}


What is striking is that lectures such as these were only offered at most twice during these ten years.

Continuing a trend started in the late 1960s at the War College, those who approved the core curriculum between AY 1974 and AY 1983 made students learn about how the media operated rather than how they, as representatives of the Army, could best explain the actions of the service to the public. Military leaders usually gave priority to those tasks that they thought were most important. The lack of instruction in how officers were to communicate with the troops and through the press with the national and local public raises doubt that those governing the curriculum thought public affairs was really important. Since students did not always study public affairs at the War College, it is unclear how the leaders of the Department of the Army expected them to be able to accomplish two goals. First, how these officers were to effectively express the views of the Army to both their soldiers and the society they served. Second, how they were to convince others in the service that they had to consider how public opinion would impact military planning.

Between AY 1976 and AY 1983, the leaders of the War College offered in the elective program a course that examined the relationship between the military and the media; however, no instruction was offered in this subject for AYs 1974 and 1975.1016 Between AY 1976 and AY 1981, the course was called “The Media and the Military in a Free Society.”1017 Starting in AY 1982 and lasting through AY 1989, the course was re-named “The Military Officer and the Media.”1018 The content of this course conducted between AYs 1976 and 1978 will illustrate. The scope of this lesson, the authors of the syllabus for each of these three years said, was:

1016 AWC, Curriculum, AY 1974, Box 1974-1, Folder 1, Curriculum Pamphlet, iii and iv. AWC, Curriculum, AY 1975, Box 1975-1, Folder 1, Curriculum Pamphlet, 14-21.
to give students an understanding of the theoretical and practical correlation of the press and Armed Forces in the American context. It will include a critical examination of the press and electronic media as democratic institutions, the public information programs of the military services, and discussions of positive and negative interrelations.\textsuperscript{1019}

Differing from the course on public affairs in the elective program at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) for AY 1974 and AY 1977, students at the War College taking this course studied the conduct of only the public information element of APAP, not that of the other two sub-programs – command information and community relations.\textsuperscript{1020}


There were similarities and differences in the content of this course during these three years. Each year the developers of the curriculum allocated twelve meetings for the course. Many of the same topics were covered each year. The following from AY 1976 will illustrate similarities of the titles of these meetings. In the syllabus for each year, the authors allotted one meeting to each of these subjects: “Introduction, Press History, First Amendment and Constitutional Guarantees, Press Theory”; “Press Rights, Responsibilities, Theory, and Philosophy”; “Organization, Ownership, and Function of the American Mass Media; The Character of [the]News”; “The Media and the Military in Vietnam”; “Public Information Concepts, Objectives, and Operations of DOD and the Military Service”; and a “Summary Session.” They also set aside two meetings to cover each of the following “Press Issues, Concepts, Operations, and Problems”; “Television and the News”; and “Government and the Media: Current Issues.”

One difference, however, was in the readings that the authors assigned for each meeting. To illustrate, the authors of this course for only academic year (AY) 1976 and AY 1977 had students read LTC Donald S. Mahlberg’s thesis titled “The Military and the Media: A Problem of Perception” for the first meeting. During this meeting, the students and the instructor would discuss “the history and theory of the American press.” Mahlberg, a student in the War

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College class of AY 1974, wrote in the abstract of his paper that a strong American democracy required both a strong military and a free press. However, he also stated: “This generation of military officers displays considerable vocal hostility toward” the media. This hostility, he asserted, had arisen, in part, because of “the average military officer’s failure to properly perceive one of the media’s important roles in a democratic society: adversary to the government.” Anger of these officers towards the press, he claimed, was counterproductive.1023 Mahlberg’s comments were very similar to MG (ret.) Davis’ conclusion in his 1974 article.1024 “One of the most neglected areas in military education,” Mahlberg claimed, “is the development in the professional officer of an understanding of the role of mass communications.”1025 That had to be corrected.

While attending service schools, officers had to study the role of the press in American democracy. He used a quotation from a paper written by Justice B. King, a student in the War College class of 1970, as evidence of benefits that could come from having officers talk with the press. “The accuracy and completeness of reporting on military matters are,” King concluded, “a function of the reporter’s energy and trustworthiness, news deadlines, and the accessibility of the source. If the commander and his staff representatives are uncommunicative, the reporter relies on lesser sources.”1026 In the end, if commanders did not talk to the press, which Mahlberg argued was “self-defeating,” then they had only themselves to blame for any potential inaccuracies in a reporter’s story.1027 “The next generation of officers,” Mahlberg concluded, “should be trained at all levels of military education in the areas of press history, journalistic concepts and media operations so that [they] can effectively communicate with the press.” He claimed that, if officers studied these topics, then one probable outcome would be that “better press-military relations [would] be obtained and, in turn, the public [would] be better informed and better served.”1028 Here Mahlberg’s assessment resembles those of Zorthian (1972) and

1026 Ibid., 48 and 50.
1027 Ibid., 45-48.
1028 Ibid., 49.
Wilcox (1961). In this elective, the students would study many of the topics Mahlberg had mentioned. Reporters were going to publish stories about the military with or without cooperation from officers. So it was in the best interest of the Army to ensure that officers had skills necessary to effectively explain the Army’s actions, facts and interpretation, to the media.

As previously stated, for AY 1982 and AY 1983 those in authority to make decisions regarding the curriculum changed the title of the course in the elective program to “The Military Officer and the Media.” No reason was found for changing the title. The goals of this course were much the same in these two years. According to the syllabus for AY 1983, the goals were:

a. To increase the confidence of the student in his/her ability to meet and communicate effectively with media representatives. b. To examine in depth how the media operates and why it operates the way it does. c. To enable the student in subsequent assignments as a commander or staff officer to facilitate successful media relations through the command Public Affairs Officer and through personal contact with media representatives.

One similarity in the conduct of this lesson between AY 1982 and AY 1983 was that the authors listed in the syllabus at least two guest speakers who would address the class. One speaker was the Army Chief of Public Affairs, but no specifics on what he would cover were stated in the syllabus. The other speaker was to be a journalist chosen to explain “the role of the press in

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American society.” There were significant differences in the content of this course during AY 1982 and AY 1983 and those between AY 1976 and AY 1981. For example, AYs 1982 and 1983 had only ten versus twelve meetings. Another change was that the authors of the course for AY 1982 and AY 1983 allocated two meetings to help the students prepare for an interview, which was not included in earlier courses. In one meeting, half of the students went to “a TV interview workshop.” The other half of the students attended instruction on how to prepare for and conduct interviews with representatives of both television and the print media. At the next class meeting, students went to the other instruction. Between AY 1976 and AY 1983, this course seemed to accomplish some of Mahlberg’s recommendations for educating officers about the importance of the press. For example, the students learned how to interact with representatives of the media as part of a public information program. But a weakness was that the students did not study the other two sub-programs: command information and community relations.

After completion of the elective program, students still had to attend the National Security Seminar and turn in their individual thesis. The final event in the curriculum between AY 1974 and AY 1983 was, in part, another example of the College conducting it public information program. Showing consistency with the goal of the seminar held in AY 1962 to AY 1973, an aim remained to facilitate a discussion about national strategy between students, senior military leaders and civilian guests who were representative of America society. The name of

this seminar which had been the “National Strategy Seminar” between AY 1955 and AY 1973, George Ball noted, “became [in AY 1974] the National Security Seminar.”

No reason for the change was found. One possible explanation was that since the leaders of the Department of the Army (DA) expected graduates of the College would be able to help integrate military programs into the broad concept of security it made sense to focus to expand the bounds of the seminar.

In their individual papers, a few students mirrored the emphasis that the leaders of DA had placed on public affairs. In his thesis, LTC Clyde A. Hennies described a contradiction that students at the War College had about studying public affairs. Hennies asserted that he and his fellow students at the War College in AY 1983 who participated in his study, about 72% of the student body, had a “unanimous opinion that the officer corps should receive training and education in press related subjects.”

But fewer than five percent of the officers took the opportunity to study public affairs in more depth when it was offered in the elective program. Hennies, like Mahlberg and many others, claimed that there was “an undeniable logic in the military taking the initiative to improve [its] image and relationship with the press.” One way to accomplish that goal was for officers to understand how the press operated in order for them to effectively share the Army’s messages with the public, which was similar to the objectives of the panel on public affairs in the core curriculum since AY 1977.

Based on his research, Hennies

1034 Ball, Of Responsible Command, 449-450. Italics in the original document.

1035 Clyde A. Hennies, “Public Affairs Training for the Army’s Officers Corps: Need or Neglect?” (Unpublished Student Research Paper, United States Army War College 1983), ii.

1036 Ibid., 20.

found that many officers believed that they were “‘inadequately prepared’” for their interactions with the press. One reason for their concern, he noted, was that DA had “no official formalized media training program . . . for officers, lieutenant colonel and colonel, preparing to occupy positions of greater responsibility which have potential for frequent contact with and exposure to the media.”

Hennies used quotations from Zorthian’s lecture at the Naval War College and from LTC Mahlberg’s thesis to support the belief that many officers had of being ill-equipped for interacting with the media. His conclusion is striking because for the majority of the years since academic year 1947 the developers of the curriculum at the Command and General Staff College and at the Army War College had included a lesson about public affairs. His assertion would lead one to consider whether the effectiveness of the lesson.

One reason that many students gave for not taking the elective was the problem of prioritization. Some of the written responses to the survey that Hennies developed explained why officers did not take the course on public affairs. One student-officer wrote that only PAOs should talk to the press. This response showed that that student had a fundamental misunderstanding of the Army Public Affairs Program and of his duty as a public servant. This officer’s statement might have been due to the fact that in the core curriculum he listened to a panel describe the functions of the media rather than study how the Army was to communicate with both internal and external audiences. Another claimed that he could not take the course due to scheduling conflicts with other courses that he considered more important, but the student did

1038 Hennies, “Public Affairs Training for the Army’s Officers Corps: Need or Neglect?” 5. Underline in the original.
1039 Ibid., 5-7.
not mention which courses they were. The issue of priority is one that might be corrected if the leaders of the Army matched their words about the importance of APAP with deeds.

Students who attended the War College between academic year (AY) 1974 and AY 1983 were exposed to the perspectives of the press and to those of the American people. Only in the core curriculum of AY 1979 did all students hear about the program the leaders of DA had to convey the messages of the Army to the American people. If the Army wanted to take the initiative and, as Abrams wished, to re-establish the bonds between the service and the public then not focusing on what the Army was going to do seemed odd. In the elective program, students infrequently took the course on public affairs, in part, due to students believing that other courses were of higher priority. If leaders wanted to influence the public through its information program, but could not influence their own future leaders to study how to implement that program, then the chance of success seemed poor.

Between AY 1974 and AY 1983, the developers of the core curriculum at both institutions failed to consistently provide opportunities for their students to develop the skills, knowledge, and experience these future leaders would need to help the Army gain the support of the public – a key goal of the Army Public Affairs Program.

**AY 1984 through AY 1989: From Grenada to the End of the Cold War**

The fallout from the decision of the leaders of Department of Defense (DoD) to deny representatives of the media permission to accompany units that invaded the island of Grenada in October 1983 impacted how the Army educated its officers. In an article in the February 1985 edition of *Army*, MG (ret.) Winant Sidle noted that “[m]embers of the news media raised considerable furor [in 1983] over being barred from covering the operation.” In November 1983 in reaction to the uproar, General John W. Vessey, Jr, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), asked General Sidle, according to an official document, to:

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convene a panel of experts to make recommendations to him on[:,] ‘How . . . [to] conduct military operations in a manner that safeguards the lives of our military and protects the security of the operation while keeping the American public informed through the media?’ 

The panel consisted of fourteen members. Eight members represented the military – one panel member from each service, three members from DoD or the JCS, and General Sidle as both the last military member and the chairman – and the other six members represented the media. On 23 August 1984, Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, according to a DoD document, released the panel’s findings, titled the “Report by CJCS Media-Military Relations Panel (Sidle Panel).” He also ordered the “[implementation of] those portions of the final report which meet the Panel’s criteria of providing maximum news media coverage of U.S. military operations ‘consistent with military security and the safety of U.S. forces.’” But no specific steps were mentioned.

In its report, the Sidle Panel made eight recommendations, but only two will be explored here. These two proposals were related to the education of officers rather than to how the military and media would interact during future operations. One recommendation, the authors of the report wrote, was to ensure “[t]hat public affairs planning for military operations be conducted concurrently with operational planning.” The panel claimed: “Under the current system of planning for military operations, provisions exist to include public affairs planning but it is neither mandatory nor certain that current joint planning documents are adequate from a


1045 OSD (PA), Statement by the Secretary of Defense, 1 and page 1 of the actual report.

1046 OSD (PA), Statement by the Secretary of Defense, 1.
This was not the first time that the issue of integrating public affairs with operational planning had been raised. For example, both Generals Matthew Ridgway and Maxwell Taylor, when each was CSA in the 1950s, ordered the staff at DA to incorporate public affairs into its planning process. Furthermore, since 1950 each edition of the *Staff Organization and Procedures* that DA had published required that each operations order include an annex describing how the unit was going to inform the public. For example, the information officer, the authors of the 1960 edition of the manual noted, was responsible to produce “the public information and [command] information portions” of orders. In its report, the panel implied that commanders and staff officers had not produced these annexes for orders at numerous echelons related to the invasion of Grenada. Although the invasion was a joint operation, which involved two or more services, the conduct of a land campaign was the responsibility of the Army. One possible reason why the officer corps might not have accepted the need for giving priority to public affairs might well have been the equivocal position that the leaders of the Army had given it.

The other proposal of the panel was to improve the relationship between members of both the military and the media. One step, the authors of the report stated, was to increase the interaction between the “top military public affairs representatives” at DoD and the leaders of news organizations. A goal of this interaction was to have honest and forthright discussions with the leaders of these organization about critical issues related to public affairs that could contribute to reducing the “actual or perceived lack of mutual understanding and cooperation.”

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1047 OSD (PA), *Statement by the Secretary of Defense* and release of CJSC Media Military Relations Panel (Sidle Panel), 4 - 8.


1050 OSD (PA), *Statement by the Secretary of Defense* and release of CJSC Media Military Relations Panel (Sidle Panel), 5-6 and 14-16.
in August 1961, and General Davis, in 1974.\textsuperscript{1051} The panel praised ongoing actions of the military “to reinsert meaningful public affairs instruction in service schools and colleges.” However, it did not clearly state what criteria should be used to determine whether a lesson reached the level of “meaningful public affairs instruction.”\textsuperscript{1052} Resembling the comments by the Smith Board, this comment by the Sidle Panel implied that instruction in public affairs at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and the War College had not been effective.\textsuperscript{1053}

Four months before Weinberger released the findings of the Sidle Panel, DA established another board that was to examine the system to educate officers and also develop a list of duties that officers, at different ranks, needed to be able to perform for the foreseeable future. Some of the tasks determined by this Board were related to public affairs. On 30 May 1984, Gen. John A. Wickham, Jr., the Army Chief of Staff, ordered LTG Charles W. Bagnal to chair the “Professional Development of Officers Study” (PDOS), which was also the title of the report.\textsuperscript{1054} The aim of this study resembled those of previous boards such as the Haines Board.\textsuperscript{1055} On 21 February 1985, the Board, Bagnal wrote, concluded: “the officer professional development system is not in need of major overhaul, [but] it must be transitioned to an education and training strategy which will more effectively meet tomorrow’s challenges.”\textsuperscript{1056}

In its report, the Bagnal Board noted that there were seven development periods between pre-commissioning and achieving the rank of LTG or GEN. Two of these periods were: major and lieutenant colonel, and colonel.\textsuperscript{1057} The authors of the report stated: “that each development period consists of the appropriate transitional school experience, frame of reference, follow-on


\textsuperscript{1052} OSD (PA), \textit{CJSC Media Military Relations Panel (Sidle Panel)}, 5-6, and 15-16.

\textsuperscript{1053} Smith, IV-C-4, and V-F-2.

\textsuperscript{1054} Department of the Army, \textit{Professional Development of Officer Study}, Volumes I – VI (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1985), Vol. 1, v-vi and ix. The Report only stated that the Chief of Staff tasked LTC Bagnal, and using the history website found it was General John A. Wickham, Jr.


\textsuperscript{1056} PDOS, Vol. I, iii.

\textsuperscript{1057} Ibid., 55-71. These Development periods were “Pre-commissioning . . . Lieutenant, Captain, Major and Lieutenant Colonel, Colonel, Brigadier and Major General, and senior General Officer.”
assignments and learning experiences.”\textsuperscript{1058} Education was critical to help each officer to develop a new frame of reference as he continued his career and advanced in rank. Each officer, the Board advocated, should attend the appropriate school “at the beginning of each [development] period.”\textsuperscript{1059} “[A]n officer’s frame of reference,” the Board asserted, was “the mental perspective the officer uses to make sense of the situation, to understand what causes what in the flow of events, and to know how to impact on or gain control of events.”\textsuperscript{1060} For example, majors and lieutenant colonels (LTC) needed to have a frame of reference, the Board argued, which enables them to contribute “from [the] battalion or equivalent level through any level within Department of Defense.”\textsuperscript{1061} Each colonel, the Board advised, was to “serve as role [model] for the Army at large and represent the Army at organizations outside the Army.”\textsuperscript{1062} The Board also wrote: “Senior generals [lieutenant generals and full generals] must speak for the Army to the public, Congress, other services and to other nations and often rely on the art of persuasion to mobilize consensus behind their priorities.”\textsuperscript{1063} Also, to have effective education, the Board argued, schools had to have their students apply what they were learning “to gain practical experience on the job and to digest and internalize the subject matter.”\textsuperscript{1064} The higher the rank an officer achieved, the greater the expectation was that he represented the Army, which meant that he had to be prepared to speak for the service to both the troops and the public.

In December 1984, Chief of Staff of the Army General John A. Wickham approved many of the recommendations of the Bagnal Board.\textsuperscript{1065} One such recommendation was that field-grade officers and above needed to know that they had a duty to explain the Army to the public.\textsuperscript{1066} For example, continuing a trend started with RETO, this Board included in its report a “Public Affairs Plan.” The plan in PDOS explained how leaders of the Department of the Army could inform both internal and external audiences about decisions made to implement any and all

\begin{footnotes}
\item[1058] Ibid., xxix and 55.
\item[1059] Ibid., xxix.
\item[1060] Ibid., xxviii.
\item[1061] Ibid., 62-63.
\item[1062] Ibid., 65.
\item[1063] Ibid., 71.
\item[1064] Ibid., xxviii.
\end{footnotes}
changes, whereas the plan in RETO focused on internal audiences.\textsuperscript{1067} Showing some consistency with the authors of RETO, the authors of PDOS implied that a successful implementation of these changes depended on gaining the support of those people in the Army, “internal audiences,” before placing priority on those outside of it.\textsuperscript{1068} The inclusion of the Public Affairs Plan suggests that some officers had learned that integrating public affairs into other planning was important to being proactive in getting its messages out to all audiences.

The leaders of the Department of the Army (DA) had numerous warnings that the education they provided future leaders on public affairs needed to be improved. The Sidle Panel questioned the effectiveness of the instruction on public affairs that had been conducted in the past. The approval of the findings related to public affairs of both the Sidle Panel and the Bagnal Board clearly established a requirement for those in charge of the core curriculum at both CGSC and the War College to ensure students studied public affairs. Decision-makers at either school did not always conform to the instructions from their superiors.

The leaders at CGSC failed to comply with either directive from their superiors when it came to teaching public affairs. The developers of the curriculum at CGSC did not include a lesson explicitly concerning public affairs in the core curriculum from academic year (AY) 1984 through AY 1989. This was surprising especially after Secretary Weinberger’s and General Wickham’s directives to educate officers in public affairs.\textsuperscript{1069} Also, only between AY 1987 and AY 1989 did the developers of the elective program include a course related to public affairs, which was titled the “Media and the Commander.” The only information found on this course

\textsuperscript{1068} PDOS, Vol. 1, 107 and Vol., II, E-3-1 to E-3-B-12.
was in the annual *Catalog*. The staff of the journal *Military Review*, the authors of the *Catalog* from AY 1987 through AY 1989 noted, was responsible for facilitating this course. The scope of this course that was included in the *Catalog* was:

[prepare] future commanders and primary staff officers for forthcoming contacts with members of the civilian mass news media. It addresses real world relationships from the news media, military and public perspectives. The course will emphasize student practical exercises, use lectures, class discussions, assigned and suggested readings, and guest speakers from government and civilian sectors to help the officer understand how to foster a cooperative, mutually beneficial relationship with the news media.\(^\text{1070}\)

It is not clear whether this course met the intent of Wickham’s guidance for students learning about public affairs. However, one could argue that it complied with recommendation of the Sidle Panel to improve the relationship with the media.\(^\text{1071}\) Based on the scope, students would primarily study how to conduct public information. Not having students learn about the broader public affairs program was another example of the deeds of the Army not matching its words, which might have hurt the standing of the leaders of the Army in the minds of their subordinates and which may also have translated into to a loss of public support. This was the opposite of the effect that the leaders wanted.

Those responsible for the curriculum at the Army War College did have students study about public affairs. Yet the instruction in public affairs in both the core curriculum and elective program continued to focus on students learning how to explain the Army to the national public. There was no lesson on public affairs in the core curriculum for either AY 1984 or AY 1985. From AY 1986 through AY 1989 in a course titled “War, National Policy, and Strategy,” the developers of the core curriculum scheduled a panel to provide the students an opportunity to learn about public affairs. The aim of this lesson was similar between AY 1986 and AY 1989. The objective of the lesson, according to the directive for the course for AY 1988 and AY 1989, was to help students:

a. Understand the role of the news media and of public opinion in national security process. b. Gain an appreciation of the constraints inherent in a democratic society (with a free press) in any consideration of the use of the


military instrument of power, and of the problems of public support for the use of force in future conflict given the increasing capabilities of the electronic media. c. Assess the principal issues involving the press and defense: military-media relations; secrecy versus the public’s right to know; [and] wartime censorship. 1072

This aim resembled that of the instruction that was conducted as part of the curriculum from AY 1977 through AY 1983. 1073 The lesson was conducted in two parts, just as in AY 1983. First was a panel discussion. After the panel, students moved back to their seminar rooms and continued to discuss topics raised during the panel. The time allotted for this lesson increased from three and one-half hours in AY 1986 to five and one-half hours by AY 1989. For the most part, the increase in hours was for the discussion in the classroom after the panel. 1074


The authors of the directive for this lesson for AYs 1986, 1988, and 1989 noted that many people and groups try to “create news” as a means of influencing the public. Examples of these people and groups, they wrote, were: “special interest groups, government officials, and politicians.” It seems logical to include representatives of the Army as government officials.\textsuperscript{1075} The assertion of the authors that government officials were to “create news” seems problematic for the military. The Army was to report what happened. By using the term “create” that implied that the intent was to “spin” the information, which was contrary to the intent of the leaders of DA. In this course, students studied how the media operated, so that the officers could effectively convey messages from the Army to the American people through the press.\textsuperscript{1076}

In the elective program, students also had an opportunity to learn about informing the public through the media. From AY 1984 through AY 1989, a course that was titled “The Military Officer and the Media” was offered, using the same name as for an elective in AYs 1982 and 1983. The objective of this lesson from AY 1984 through AY 1989 resembled those of this lesson for AY 1982 and AY 1983. For example, the authors of the syllabus for AY 1985 and AY 1986 noted that the objectives of the course were: “a. To prepare the student to plan for and accommodate legitimate media interest in military affairs; b. To increase the confidence of the


student in his/her ability to meet and [to] communicate effectively with media correspondents; and c. To maintain successful media relations through the military public affairs structure.”

It is interesting that this course during AYs 1985 and 1986 had ten meetings whereas from 1987 onward there were only nine. If the goals were similar but the number of meetings was reduced, the leaders of the College might have believed that the instruction conducted between AY 1987 and AY 1989 was more efficient, or, alternatively, the range of topics covered may have been decreased. Students who took this course would learn means by which to interact with the media.

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In this course, students were able to study a wide range of topics that they could use when they worked with the media. Starting in AY 1985 and lasting through AY 1989, the first lesson of this course included an “introduction to the objectives, structure and operations of the military public affairs agencies.” These topics were also part of the curriculum for this lesson between AY 1976 and AY 1977. Only during AYs 1985 and 1986 did students “[discuss] DoD decision to initially exclude newsmen from coverage of the Grenada operation and the aftermath of that decision.” For those discussions, General Sidle, who had led the Panel that reviewed the event and its consequences, was a guest speaker. The operation of a regional press was the topic for one meeting included in the syllabus for AYs 1985, 1987, and 1988. For example, the authors of the syllabus for AY 1988 noted that Henry Young, Executive Editor of The Patriot-News, was to present his view on “the role of local and regional media in covering national security issues.” It was through this meeting that students might grasp connections between public information and community relations. Starting in AY 1987 and continuing through AY

AWC, Curriculum, AY 1985, Advanced Courses Program, Folder 32 - The Military Officer and the Media, 5.
AWC, Curriculum, AY 1988, Advanced Courses Program, Term II, Folder 6 – Military Officer and the Media, 5.
AWC, Curriculum, AY 1989, Advanced Courses Program, Term II, Folder 5 - Military and the Media, 5-6.
1989 the authors of this course allotted a meeting for a general officer from the Office of the Chief of Army Public Affairs to talk with students. The general was to “discuss the role of senior officers in forming and sustaining favorable public opinion and offer advice on personal and professional relationships with newsmen.” Over these years the intent of this course remained oriented on having students study ways in which the media functioned, while also providing some techniques to help them interact with the media. What continued to be missing was discussing how these officers were to update the troops – that is, to conduct command information.

The National Security Seminar continued to make possible candid discussions on national security between students, civilians and military leaders, and representative from the American public. The seminar allowed civilians from across the nation to meet potential future leaders of the armed forces in an effort to help both groups understand the points of view of the other. This goal had been the trend from AY 1962 through AY 1989. Journalist Charles

Reese, who attended this seminar in 1984, wrote about his experience in June 1984. He praised the students for their efforts. In an effort to alleviate any fear from his readers about the military, he stated that “the Army is merely a reflection of the society from which it is drawn.” This was an example of favorable impressions that the leaders of the Army were expecting to get from civilians attending this seminar.

Between AYs 1984 and 1989, the curriculum, core and elective, continued the trend of focusing the students’ learning on how best to inform the public. One trend that was evident was a constant decrease in the number of meetings for the course in the elective program from twelve in AY 1976 to nine in AY 1989.

Instruction in public affairs, when included in the curriculum at CGCC and the War College between AY 1974 and AY 1989, was increasingly oriented towards teaching students how to talk with the public through the press rather than with people in the Army. Also, the lack of practical exercises as part of the instruction in both schools ran contrary to the recommendation of the PDOS Report, which had argued for more application exercises to help
students grasp the concept. Furthermore, many senior officers such as LTCs Mahlberg and Hennies and the reports of DA’s own studies argued that all future senior leaders of the Army needed to know how to conduct public affairs to avoid some of the mistakes made by their predecessors. It is also questionable whether the leaders of CGSC complied with either Weinberger’s or Wickham’s directives to include public affairs – the dearth of coverage of this topic in the curricula between AY 1981 and AY 1989 strongly suggested otherwise. One could argue that the leaders of the War College made a good faith effort to comply with those directives. When compared to the other periods covered in this dissertation, the developers of the curriculum from AY 1974 through AY 1989 provided the lowest level of education in public affairs to their students of all periods under review. This included the lowest number of hours and the fewest opportunities for the students to apply what they were learning. In short, the leaders of the Army again were guilty, again, of not matching their deeds to their words when it came to educating future leaders in public affairs at the top schools of the service.

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1088 PDOS, Vol. 1, xxviii.
Chapter 7 - The Gap Between Words and Deeds

Often between academic year 1947 and academic year 1989, the decision-makers at both the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and the War College modified the content of the curricula at the schools to meet the anticipated challenges of the future. For example, Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr. described one such change during his speech to the War College during academic year (AY) 1953. He told the students that, “added to your old requirement of having to plan for and fight a war when it comes, you are now likewise charged with the greater and more important responsibility of preventing a war.”¹⁰⁸⁹ This and other changes like it caused those setting the curricula for educating officers to make adjustments. An example of an adjustment was changing what subjects were to be included in the core curriculum, which every student took. One subject that the leaders of the Department of the Army (DA) seemed to want included in the core curricula was public affairs. The leaders of the Army had experienced the benefits of informing the public about their actions during World War II, and they wanted to continue this effort in the postwar era. They wanted to include instruction about public affairs in the curricula so that future leaders would understand those benefits and know how to conduct the information program. As part of this education, the leaders of the Army expected that the officer corps would inform the American people about how the service was performing its many missions. When officers spoke to the public, the leaders at DA wanted them to do so in an honest, forthright manner within the bounds of security requirements. These security protocols were established to protect information such as the timing and the location of future military operations. These protocols were not intended to prevent embarrassing information from being released.

Those officers determining the content of the core curricula at CGSC and the War College were typically confronting a three-fold problem. One was the subjects that the leaders at DA wanted each student to know when he graduated from each school. Second was the demand of the leaders of the Army to increase number of subjects included in the curricula. The last was a reduction in number of hours available in the program. The instruction about public affairs

¹⁰⁸⁹ Pace, “Problems and Developments of the Army Today,” (AY 1953), 1-2.
seems to have been one of those subjects that was often, especially during the 1980s at CGSC, considered expendable. This claim is based on a decline in the number of hours allotted to it as those developing the curricula at CGSC and the War College took hours away from it to give more to other subjects. This conclusion is based on the following three trends. First, there was a decline in the number of hours given to public affairs in the curriculum, especially at CGSC, combined with an increase in the number of subjects that students were to study. General Johnson’s decision in 1966 to initiate an elective program at certain schools made this situation even more problematic because there was even less time for the core curriculum.1090 Second, there was a decrease in the number of hours or the number of lectures allotted to public relations, especially at the War College. Typically, a decline in the number of hours meant that the students were not always able to apply what they were learning about public affairs, that not all components of the information program were covered, or both. The decrease in number of lectures meant that the students did not learn about either the impact of failing to inform the public or about how the leaders of the service wanted them to conduct the information program. Another possible outcome when the number of hours decreased was that the developers of the instruction in public affairs would use only lectures, which meant students were passive learner.

The last trend was that the developers of the curriculum seemed to emphasize having the students study only how to apprise the public rather than those in the service and the local community. The information program of the Army was created to inform all three audiences.1091 This last trend seemed to increase as part of the reaction of the leaders of the Army to the Vietnam War, but it did not occur during the Korean War. Meanwhile, the authors of the “Study on Military Professionalism” (1970) noted that the Army had become increasingly focused on conducting short-term tangible actions, which could include informing the public, instead of actions which would help the Army in the long-term, which was informing those in the service.1092 This emphasis on informing the public, at the expense of informing the troops, seemed to ignore a critical part of the program. It should be noted that the authors of many studies and lectures asserted that the soldier was a critical part of getting the Army’s messages to the public. For example, MG Parks wrote in the notes for his AY 1953 lecture to the War

College: “The [Army is] going to be right or wrong in the eyes of the public by the way that [the soldier] writes his letters back home.”\textsuperscript{1093} Not including how the students were to explain the Army to the internal audience was a significant failure. Basically, this approach resembled a boxer who intended to fight with one hand tied behind his back. This did not make sense.

No document was found that formally announced a decision to reduce the priority being placed on public affairs. The decision by Secretary Brucker in July 1960 to accept some of the recommendations of the Williams Board set the conditions for this to occur.\textsuperscript{1094} One of the key decisions was to split the oversight of the curriculum of CGSC and the War College between CONARC and DA, respectively.\textsuperscript{1095} The other key decision was to reduce the requirement for the Commandant of the different schools to teach common subjects.\textsuperscript{1096} Brucker’s decision did not clarify what subjects which were still to be taught in the curricula of the system that educates officers. This oversight, unintentionally, combined with the increase in topics and decrease in hours in the curricula created the conditions for the decrease in emphasis on teaching public relations. This is not to excuse the failure of the leaders at DA to provide clarification on what was to be included and what could be excluded. Establishing clear priorities is a function of being a leader in any organization. It was here that the leaders failed.

The leaders at the Department of the Army (DA) such as the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff influenced the content of the curricula in the system that educated officers when they accepted or rejected proposals of boards that they had established to investigate how officers were educated. For example, the reports of three different studies of the educational system of the Army – the “Report of the Department of the Army Board to Review Army Officer Schools” (1965), the “Review of Education and Training for Officers” (1977), and the “Professional Development of Officers Study” (1986) – noted that, the more senior in rank an officer became, the broader were the topics about which he needed to know.\textsuperscript{1097} When the leaders at DA, for example, accepted part of the report of the PDOS, they accepted that officers who held the following rank were expected to perform certain tasks that were related to

\textsuperscript{1094} Williams Board, Approval letter, inclosure 1, 1-5.
\textsuperscript{1095} Ibid., 1-2.
\textsuperscript{1096} Ibid., 5.
information function. First, majors and lieutenant colonels had to understand that public opinion had an impact on the actions of the Army. Next, from a colonel through a major general had to be able to explain “military subjects” to the public. Lastly, each three- and four-star general had to be prepared to speak for the Army to all audiences. Since the leaders at DA approved these requirements, those who approved the curricula at CGSC and at the War College should have ensured that they provided opportunities for their students to learn the skills needed to fulfill those requirements. This was particularly important since the curriculum at each school was a critical means that the leaders of the Army had for preparing the officers to function at those ranks. If graduates of these schools did not acquire these skills, then a gap would open between the words of the leaders of DA and deeds of leaders of these schools.

Those who determined the curricula at CGSC and at the Army War College from academic year (AY) 1947 through AY 1989 placed a decreasing emphasis on having the students study about public affairs. This was due, in part, to the combined impact of a decrease in time available to teach core material and a need to have students study more topics. The decline was also the result of leaders at DA just talked about the importance of the information program of the Army, when, in fact, they did not make it a clear priority. If a leader really wanted to place emphasis on something, he did that by ensuring subordinates understood what he wanted. Then he supervised them to ensure they complied with his orders. Often a leader says everything is important, but a true measure of importance is what he checks on. The leaders at DA could have directed that public affairs be included, but that did not occur. Even though more subjects were added to the curricula that did not mean that the instruction in public affairs had to be reduced. Those setting the curricula prioritized based on their understanding of what had to be included. But when the number of hours allotted to public relations was reduced then that clearly indicates that the developers of the curriculum considered these other subjects to be more important. If teaching the students about public affairs had really been a priority, the leaders of DA would have made sure that those they held responsible for the curricula of the system that educates the officer corps understood that fact. Leaders at DA not confirming that public affairs was included in the curricula speak volumes.

Command and General Staff College

The aim of the curriculum at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) changed a few times between AY 1947 and AY 1989, which represents the period of the Cold War. Even among those changes there was a degree of consistency. The curriculum at CGSC constantly focused, at a minimum, on preparing officers to be commanders and staff officers to conduct their wartime functions at the echelons of division through army. Additionally, the curriculum at CGSC from AY 1947 through AY 1950 was to educate each student to be a general staff officer in one staff section from the army group through DA level. With the opening of the Army War College in AY 1951 and lasting through AY 1957, the purpose of the curriculum at CGSC was to prepare the students to be commanders and staff officers from the division through army echelon. Between AY 1958 and AY 1959, the decision-makers made three modifications to the purpose of the curriculum. For AY 1958, the leaders of the College added two requirements to the aim of the curriculum from AY 1951 through AY 1957. They added that peacetime duties of commanders and general staff officers were also to be covered. The other task was for the students to learn to perform their duties in “[non-tactical] headquarters” such as CONARC. The next year, the leaders of the Army added that the curriculum must also include how to perform these functions in a joint headquarters. These changes represent a significant expansion of what the students were to learn. Then from AY 1959 through AY 1970 and from AYs 1984 through 1989 the purpose of the curriculum remained fairly constant. The focus remained preparing students to be commanders and general staff officers at echelons between the division and army, including joint facets of these. Between AYs 1970 and 1973, the decision-


1101 USACGSC, Program of Instruction for 250-0-1, (AY 1958), 1.

1102 USACGSC, Program of Instruction, for Command and General Staff Officer, Regular Course (AY 1959), 1.
makers added a task to the curriculum to prepare the students learn to be military advisors.\textsuperscript{1103} The last change occurred between AY 1978 and AY 1983, when the curriculum was expanded to include having the students learn to be commanders and staff officers from a brigade through army echelon.\textsuperscript{1104} It is very interesting that the aim of the curriculum did not change in academic year 1968 when an elective program was added. During the period of the Cold War, a trend was visible that the leaders of the Army had increased what they expected the students to learn from their year at CGSC.

At CGSC, the decision-makers constantly included in documents that described the school’s program a listing of the number of hours for each lesson and the curriculum as a whole. From AY 1947 through AY 1950, the total number of hours in the curriculum averaged about 1300. Included in this total was the number of hours that were given for students to learn how to function in one of the four staff sections between army group and DA. For example, the

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{1103} USACGSC, \textit{Program of Instruction for, Command and General Staff Officer Course}, (16 July 1973), 1-3.
\bibitem{1104} USACGSC, \textit{Program of Instruction for Command and General Staff Officer Course}, (October 1974), 1-3.
\bibitem{1106} USACGSC, \textit{Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course}, (AY 1968), 1.
\bibitem{1107} USACGSC, \textit{Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course}, (AY 1969), 1.
\bibitem{1108} USACGSC, \textit{Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course}, (AY 1970), 1.
\bibitem{1109} USACGSC, \textit{Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course}, (AY 1972) 1.
\bibitem{1110} USACGSC, \textit{Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course}, (AY 1973), 1.
\bibitem{1114} USACGSC, \textit{Catalog of Resident Courses Academic Year 1979-[19]80}, 4-2. USACGSC, \textit{Catalog of Resident Courses Academic Year 1981}, 4-1 to 4-2 USACGSC, \textit{Catalog of Resident Courses Academic Year 1982}, 4-1.
\end{thebibliography}
developers for AY 1949 allocated 282 hours for this instruction.\textsuperscript{1105} This meant that the core curriculum had about 1000 hours. By AY 1958, the developers had increased the number of hours in the curriculum to 1172.\textsuperscript{1106} After AY 1958, the trend was to see fewer hours. The average number of hours for AY 1970 through AY 1983 was approximately 1075.\textsuperscript{1107} The last adjustment started in AY 1984 and lasted through AY 1989, and the number of hours for the total curriculum dropped to around 960.\textsuperscript{1108} Starting in AY 1968, the curriculum at CGSC included an elective program. For example, from AY 1987 through AY 1989 the decision-makers gave the elective program 210 of the approximate 960 hours allotted to the entire curriculum.\textsuperscript{1109} Basically, from the first few classes at CGSC after World War II to the end of the Cold War, the number of hours for the core curriculum decreased by 250 hours or about one-quarter.

During the Cold War, those determining the program at CGSC had to balance the demand to increase the number of topics included in the curriculum while the number of hours...


\textsuperscript{1106} USACGSC, \textit{Program of Instruction for 250-0-1, Command and General Staff Officer Course}, (AY 1958), 4.

\textsuperscript{1107} USACGSC, \textit{Program of Instruction for, Command and General Staff Officer Course}, (16 July 1973), 1-3. USACGSC, \textit{Program of Instruction for Command and General Staff Officer Course}, (October 1974), 1-3.


decreased. This meant that they had to constantly re-evaluate what they believed had to be included in the curriculum – in other words, what was truly essential. This meant that what might have been considered essential between AY 1947 and AY 1950 might not have been vital in the decade of the 1980s. This is what happened to teaching about public affairs.

The number of hours that the developers of a school’s curriculum allocated to a subject implied its level of importance. Each year between AY 1947 and AY 1950, the developers of the curriculum at CGSC had students study about public affairs. The fewest number of hours allocated to teaching public affairs during this period was five and the largest was 14, which represents the most hours given to this subject during the Cold War. This meant that the average for the core curriculum, during this period, was about eight and a half hours to instruction on public relations. Then between AY 1951 and AY 1958, the developers allotted an average of about four hours per year, as compared to eight between AY 1947 and AY 1950, for students to learn about public affairs. From AY 1951 through AY 1958, the number of hours annually allocated to public affairs varied from two to eight. It should be noted that between AY 1947 and AY 1955, the students at CGSC had opportunities to learn about two of the three sub-programs, troop information and public information. Then, however, for the next three years


the developers provided the students with a single lesson that covered only one of the three sub-programs of the information program. For example, during AYs 1956 and 1957 the lesson was on troop information and AY 1958 it was on community relations. There were two firsts that were related to studying public affairs between AY 1959 and AY 1967. The curriculum in AY 1966 was the first that gave no time for students to apply what they were learning. The other significant event came the next year. In AY 1967 was the first year since classes at CGSC began in the post-war period in which there was no instruction on any aspect of public affairs in the curriculum at CGSC. Between AY 1959 and AY 1967, the developers of the curriculum allotted, on average, about 3.9 hours for the students to learn about public relations. They allotted between one and six hours for teaching about this subject. The content of the instruction suggested that the authors increasingly prioritized having the students learn how to conduct public information over informing the troops and local community. From AY 1968 through


AY 1973 except AY 1969 the developers of the curriculum allotted about three and a half hours for students to learn about this topic. There was no instruction about public relations in the curriculum for AY 1969.\textsuperscript{1116} The fluctuation in the number of hours between AYs 1968-1973 resembled the variation of hours allotted from AY 1959 through AY 1967. Just as for AY 1966, the lesson about the information program of the Army for AY 1968 was given only one hour and included no exercises. The emphasis of the instruction during these years focused largely on having the students learn about informing the public.\textsuperscript{1117}

It is interesting that from AY 1966 through AY 1969, when the Army increased its effort in Vietnam, the curriculum at CGSC had the fewest hours, to date, for teaching about public relations. If the leaders of the Department of the Army wanted to ensure that the public understood their views on the war in Vietnam, then it would seem logical that they would ensure that the students at CGSC would learn about how to conduct public relations. The lack of emphasis meant that when it came to teaching critical subjects during a war, public relations was not considered to be essential.\textsuperscript{1118}

The developers between academic year (AY) 1974 and AY 1980, except AY 1978 maintained the priority on explaining the Army to the public. The average number of hours

\begin{itemize}
\item USACGSC, \textit{Program of Instruction for 250-A-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course}, (AY 1964), 32.
\item USACGSC, \textit{Program of Instruction for 250-A-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course}, (AY 1965), 31.
\item USACGSC, \textit{Program of Instruction for 1-250-C2 (Formerly 250-A-C2), Command and General Staff Officer Course}, (AY 1966), 9.
\item Department of Command, “[196]6 Regular Course College Directives and Description of Course of Study,” (AY 1966), 1.
\end{itemize}


\textsuperscript{1117} USACGSC, \textit{Program of Instruction} (AY 1971), 7 and 28. USACGSC, \textit{Program of Instruction} (AY 1972), 18 and 35.


allocated for this lesson was four. This number excluded academic year 1975 which had 10 hours, which was the largest number of hours allocated during the Cold War to this topic. The reason that the number of hours for teaching public affairs in AY 1975 was excluded is because it seems to be an anomaly. No reason was found to explain the significant change during this period. It should also be noted that after AY 1975 the developers of the lesson about public affairs no longer included any scenarios in the advance sheet for this lesson. Also, the core curriculum at the Command and General Staff College for AY 1978 and from AY 1981 through AY 1989 did not include any instruction about public affairs. The well-defined reduction in the effort to teach about public affairs strongly suggests that over time, especially after AY 1966, the decision-makers believed teaching public affairs had become less important.

A decrease in the number of hours allocated for students at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) to study public affairs between AY 1947 and AY 1989 is clearly evident. The leaders of the Army constantly reiterated the importance of having the Army report to the public. If teaching the students about the information program was truly critical then the leaders would have made sure that the curriculum at CGSC would have had the students learn how to perform that function. It is at the Command and General Staff College that the gap between the words of the leaders of the service about the importance of public affairs and the content of the curriculum was most clear-cut.


Army War College

Unlike those responsible for curricular planning at CGSC, the developers of the curriculum at the War College did not consistently provide a breakdown of the number of hours for each lesson or the curriculum as a whole. From academic year (AY) 1951 through AY 1989, the curriculum at the War College consistently focused on preparing the students to be commanders and general staff officers from the army group through at least the Department of the Army (DA) level. Another key constant was that starting in AY 1955 and lasting through

AY 1989 a seminar was conducted at the end of the curriculum. One of the main goals of this seminar was to provide opportunities for future senior leaders of the Army to interact with selected representatives from across America. Ball claims that a change occurred in who was invited to the seminar. Initially the people represented “distinguished men from various sectors – government, business . . . [and] journalism.” Later the members of the group broaden, Ball states, to include “graduate students.” The key point was the seminar was a means for the

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1122 Ball, Of Responsible Command, 474.
Army to allow the future leaders of the Army discussing about topics on national security with civilians.

Another trend was that the students at the War College were mostly passive in their education about public affairs.\(^{1123}\) Exercises in public affairs were found only in the curriculum

of the early 1950s. Not providing practical exercises in conducting public affairs seems contrary to the belief that many leaders of the Army had that learning was more effectively when the students apply what they are studying. Lectures were the primary means for having the students at the War College learn about public affairs for almost two decades. Then in the late 1960s through academic year 1989 a panel was the typical method of instruction. In both

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situations the students typically were passive in their learning. A lecturer typically was able to provide the students a more comprehensive description of public affairs. Such as when the Chief of Information spoke to the students he typically covered the entire information program and how these officers should interact with the media. A panel created an opportunity for the students to hear the views of different people. In the end, it seems that the main difference was the aim of the lesson. Lecturers provided the students a description of either the information program or how public opinion influenced national policies. Panels were usually focused on helping the students understand how the media operates. This was important because the Army communicated with the public through the press. Panels became a venue to potentially help overcome the lack of trust between members of the press and the military that General Davis described in his 1974 article. Or it could have solidified the viewpoint of members of either group.\footnote{Davis, “The Military and the Media: A Proposal for a Cease-Fire,” 16-20. AWC, Curriculum, AY 1969, Course 5, Stability Operations, to Course 7, US National Strategy and a Supporting Military program, Box 1969-11, Folder 13 - Course 7, US National Strategy and a Supporting Military program, Directive, 45-6. AWC, Curriculum, AY 1970, Curriculum Guides, Manuals and Course 1, The United States in the International Environment, Box 1970-1,}
Lecturers provided the students with a wide variety of opinions about what public relations was and how it affected what the American people thought about the Army. How the public felt about a topic might influence the development of national policies. Typically each guest speaker who talked to the class at the War College about public affairs represented one of two broad groups. One group included civilians who usually tried to explain convey two key points. First, how the opinion of the public would influence what military options might be considered acceptable to the political leaders and the American people. Second, each speaker typically provided his assessment on how effective the Army had been in presenting its side of a story to the public. Typically, they also provided their assessment of how the service could influence the opinion of the public.\footnote{Almond, “Public Opinion and National Security Policy,” 371-378. Deuel, “Public Opinion as a factor in the formulation of Foreign Policy,” (AY 1952), 1 -19. AWC, Lectures, Barnett, “Strategy, Policy and Public Opinion,” 1-26. Watson, “The Role of Public Opinion and Minority Groups in Government and in National Policy Formulation,” 1-17.} The other group was composed of both civilian and
uniformed members of the U.S. military. The general officer who held the position of Chief of Information at DA was typical of speakers on public affairs at the War College. Each of them did his best to explain what the leaders at DA expected from the Army’s conduct of all three subprograms of the information program of the Army, informing the troops and the public – national and local. It was usually through this lecture that the students received the most comprehensive description of what the leaders of the service were trying to accomplish through the conduct of this program. What most lecturers, civilian and military, did not habitually provide were clear examples of how these officers were to perform the information function. Except for speeches by leaders of the Army, the topic of explaining the Army to the troops was almost non-existent.

Another way of looking at the priority that the leaders of the Army assigned to public affairs is to compare the approximate number of hours at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and the War College that were allocated to this subject during periods of conflict. It was during periods of conflict that one would expect that developers of the curriculum would include only those subjects that were essential. The three period of conflict that occurred between AY 1947 and AY 1989 were the Korean War (AYs 1951-1952), the Vietnam War (AYs 1966-1973), and the period after invasion of Grenada (AYs 1984-1989). During the period of the Korean War, the developers of the curriculum at CGSC allocated, on average, about eight and one-half hours. The number of hours given for public affairs at the War College was approximately two hours. This was primarily for a guest speaker. During the Vietnam War, the curriculum at CGSC included an average of one and one-half hours for teaching about public affairs.

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affairs. At the War College, the curriculum included two events that were included in teaching the students about public affairs. One was a panel that lasted for about two hours. The other was the “National Strategy Seminar,” which was between three and five days.\textsuperscript{1132} The period from

AY 1984 through AY 1989, shows a continuation of the decrease in emphasis on public relation. There were no lessons in the core curriculum at CGSC.\textsuperscript{1133} The curriculum at the War College had on average about two and one-half hours of lessons and it also included the "National Strategy Seminar."\textsuperscript{1134} The amount of emphasis at both schools seems to go in different directions. A clear decline in the priority assigned to public affairs was evident at CGCS, where students typically would have the ability to apply what they were learning. Meanwhile at the War College, the developers of the curriculum seeming increased the emphasis placed on public affairs, although the students were primarily passive in their learning. However, if you remove the time of the seminar then there was no significant adjustment in the number of hours. What this shows is that those setting the curriculum at CGSC especially during periods of conflict between AY 1947 and AY 1989 placed a decrease in emphasis in preparing their students to conduct the information program of the Army. However, at the War College there was no significant change in priority about public affairs.

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There was a gap between, on the one hand, statements of senior leaders of the Army and recommendations of Boards authorized by DA about educating officers concerning public affairs and, on the other hand, what was actually included in the core curriculum at the top two Army schools. Officers had a duty to explain the policies and programs of the Army for national security to both the American people and those in the service. To accomplish this, the officer corps needed to be educated about the information program of the Department of the Army (DA) – why effectively conducting this program was important to the Army and the nation, and the best ways to execute it. Over the more than forty years covered in this study, especially the last two decades, the developers of the core curriculum of both schools had students study mostly how to explain the Army to the public but not to the troops. The failure of the leaders of DA to require these schools to educate officers to keep the troops informed is disconcerting. This is especially so since both the Haislip Board of 1947 and the Smith Board of 1969 had strongly asserted that updating internal audiences was crucial to the success of both the overall information program and informing the public. But this aim was left unfulfilled.\textsuperscript{1135}

Between academic year 1947 and academic year 1989, the leaders of the Army failed to ensure that each student who attended either the CGSC or the War College studied about the information function of the Army. This lack of instruction was due to the leaders at DA not clearly prioritizing public affairs. Two key factors also influenced the prioritization of the curricula. These were the ever increasing amount of knowledge that the leaders of the Army wanted each officer to have and the limited amount of time available in the core curriculum at both colleges. These two factors caused decision-makers on the curricula to prioritize some subjects over others. Still, merely saying that something was important was empty. In the end, the greatest test of perceived importance of a subject to the leaders of the Army was inclusion within the core curriculum. The words that came from either senior leaders of the Army or from Boards about the importance of public affairs were not matched by the deeds, including comprehensive instruction concerning the information plan of DA in the curriculum of both the CGSC and the War College. As previously stated, credibility is achieved when deeds match words, and that is where the leaders of the Army fell short.

\textsuperscript{1135} Haislip Board, 61. Smith Report, IV-2 to IV-4 and IV-C-2 to IV-C-4. PDOS, Vol. II, E-3-3.
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