

THE UNITED STATES INTERVENTION IN HAITI

by

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PREFACE

Of the twenty Latin American republics, the second smallest is Haiti. The United States was only twenty years old when the people of this little country fought their own war of independence. Haiti has many claims upon the attention of the United States. Its war against France in 1802-1803 was at least a contributing factor in Napoleon's willingness to sell Louisiana to this country; it was the first independent Negro state in the modern world; its foreign policy has long been interwoven with that of the United States. The relations of the United States with the Republic of Haiti since the turn of the century illustrate some interesting and instructive aspects of foreign policy and political science.

In the black republic chronic revolutionary disorder, economic stagnation and financial bankruptcy gained special significance by reason of foreign investments and Haiti's strategic location. With the object of stabilizing the country and thus safeguarding foreign interests, the Government of the United States assumed what was believed to be its peculiar obligation in the Caribbean region. At first the United States Government relied on diplomatic methods. These failed and the situation continued to appear intolerable, American forces were landed in July, 1915, which was followed by an occupation and the formation of a protectorate. This is a study of the methods and motives for the American occupation. Particular emphasis has also been given to the basic causes for the plight of the Haitians.

The principle sources of information were Department of State papers, a Senate inquiry into the intervention and occupation, general works, periodicals and personal recollections of many long and interesting conversations with individuals, both Haitian and American who were present during the intervention and occupation. The writer of this thesis has a particular interest in the Republic of Haiti. During the years 1942 and 1943, he was assigned to the American Embassy as Assistant Attache for Air. Due to the peculiarities of the relationship which existed even at that late date between the United States and Haiti, one of the duties of the Air Attache consisted in acting as air advisor to the Garde d' Haiti. The writer delivered the first aircraft to the armed forces of the republic and organized the air arm in 1942.

I wish to thank and acknowledge my indebtedness to the many people who have assisted in gathering and assembling this data and especially to Dr. A. Bower Sageser of the Department of History, Government, and Philosophy, for his assistance in organizing this material into an acceptable composition.

C H A P T E R I

INTRODUCTION

People, Geography, Politics

In order to obtain a clear knowledge of the problems of Haiti and the reasons for the interest shown by the United States in this country, it is necessary that one have a knowledge of the geography, the location, and the racial, political, and cultural background of the people.

To begin with it is necessary that the term Haiti as it will be used in this study must be defined. The island itself in total area of about 28,000 square miles has been from time to time designated Haiti, Hispaniola, and Santo Domingo. Haiti was the ancient Indian name of the whole island, but after the defeat of the French in 1804, the name was used to designate the western one-third of the island or what had been called the French colony of St. Domingue.¹ Hispaniola was the name given to the island by Columbus, and such is used frequently today on maps. Hispaniola has never been the name of a particular section or state, but only that of the island as a whole. Santo Domingo was used from time to time as the designation of the island on old maps, but more recently came to mean the eastern two-thirds of the island. Still later it came to be known as the Dominican Republic.

¹ Bureau of the American Republic, 52nd Congress, Ex. Doc. 149, Part II, Bulletin No. 62, (1892) p. 1.

This eastern two-thirds of the island of approximately 19,000 square miles contains about one-third of the population. This population is in culture, Spanish, and in race, mulatto. The western one-third which is now called Haiti and is by race and culture Afro-French is the area which forms the back drop of this study. This one-third which contains two-thirds of the population of the island is Afro-French in race and culture and it will necessitate a short study of the history of the country to determine why this is true.

On December 5, 1492, Columbus entered the harbor of Mole St. Nicholas and some days later on the 12th of December erected a cross at the entrance of the harbor of Baie des Maoustiques and took possession in the name of Ferdinand and Isabella.² Columbus, in a report to Ferdinand and Isabella said of the aborigines: "So lovable, so tractable, so peacable are these people that I swear to your Majesties there is not in the world a better nation nor a better land."³ The fact that there exists today not one pure-blooded descendent of this race is eloquent testimony to the unfortunate subsequent history of these "so lovable and tractable" people.⁴

Rapid disappearance of the Indians under the Spanish treatment brought about the importation of Africans. The Indian population of the island in 1492 has been estimated at one million, but by 1508 it was 60,000, and by 1514 only 14,000 natives survived.⁴

²Ibid., p. 14 .

³Ibid. .

⁴Ibid., p. 15 .

Since the Spaniards did not come to the island to labor, it became increasingly important to them that some source of labor be found to take the place of the rapidly disappearing Indians.

It is a matter of record that as early as 1502 Africans were imported to provide a labor supply for the mines and sugar plantations.⁵ As this latter industry developed, the need for labor became a vital consideration and Negroes were imported in increasing numbers.

The Spaniards had come to the island for gold and soon it became apparent, that, while placer deposits were still in evidence such deposits were the accumulation of centuries and could not be depended upon for continuous production. Although sugar had become an extremely profitable export, cultivation of cane and the mechanical processes of producing sugar were not attractive occupations to men to the character of the Spanish adventurers. The most enterprising and ambitious departed for new and more promising fields of endeavor.

The French, however, took a different view of the future importance of the island. The Treaty of Ryswick, signed in 1697, recognized for the first time the right of the French to the western part of the island.⁶ Under the energetic and intelligent administration of the French, the settlements in the western part prospered, and farms and plantations multiplied rapidly. The

⁵Ibid., p. 15.

⁶Ibid., p. 17.

successful cultivation of first indigo and later sugar cane encouraged the establishment of large estates which in turn build up a demand for African slaves. In 1728, 50,000 Negro slaves were employed. This number increased to 172,000 in 1754, and to approximately 480,000 in 1789. At the same time in 1789, the white population was 32,000 and the freedmen, largely mulatto, was 24,000 by 1790.⁷

The aborigines had disappeared, the Spanish insofar as the western part of the island was concerned had also dropped out of sight. The population was disproportionately Negro and what white blood existed was French.

From the middle of the eighteenth century to the French Revolution there was a period of increasing and unexampled prosperity. Coffee and some indigo were grown most successfully in the mountain districts, but the bulk of the wealth of the colony was produced from the marvellously rich alluvial soil of the great Plaine-du Nord, lying east and south of the Cap, the plain of the Artibonite formed by the river of that name, the Cul-de-Sac near Port-au-Prince, and lesser alluvial plains in the south and west. Ruins, which still exist, testify to the former luxury of the colony. The ruins of the irrigation systems alone would indicate the high degree of agricultural science to which this colony attained in the 18th century.

⁷H. P. Davis, Black Democracy, (New York: The Dial Press, 1929) pp. 23, 24.

Although on the brink of disaster in 1790 the material prosperity of the colony is shown by the following list of exports:

Sugar	177,230,000 lbs.
Coffee	73,944,000 lbs.
Cotton	6,820,000 lbs.
Indigo	1,009,000 lbs.
Dyewoods	6,788,634 lbs.
Molasses	29,000 lbs.

The value of these products at 1929 prices would exceed \$50,000,000. The total value of the land, establishments, slaves, and livestock has been estimated at \$193,500,000.⁸

Though the French developed in the western part of the island the richest colony in the world, they, like the Spaniards, disregarded the first principles of humanity and expediency. Just complaints of the French colonists against the home government were finally aggravated to the breaking point by the Jacobin colonial policy of the Estates-General which threatened to deprive them of their chief possessions, the slaves. Dissension between the colonists and the home government, then in the throes of the French Revolution, was seized upon by the mulatto caste as affording an opportunity to better their condition, but armed attempts to obtain recognition of their rights were unsuccessful. Finally the great mass of the blacks, realizing their strength, rose against their masters. They ravaged the island with fire and sword and drove out the whites.⁹

⁸ Ibid., p. 25.

⁹ American Republics, op. cit., pp. 19-20.

The influence of the despotic governments under which the early leaders of the country lived and the French ideals inherited from their former masters may be traced in the careers and politics of the early leaders and of all the subsequent rulers of independent Haiti. Even today the French influence predominates. The official language is French, as is also the culture of the small class which constitutes the elite of Haiti. This French influence is superimposed upon an African background of culture and race. It is estimated that 90 per cent of the population is pure black and 10 percent are of mixed blood. There are no pure white Haitians.¹⁰

Geographically, the importance of Haiti lies in its strategic location among the islands of the Caribbean Sea. This importance has become somewhat less today since the acquisition of the bases from Great Britain in 1940. The island is one of the Greater Antilles lying about 1200 miles due south of New York and 750 miles southeast of Miami. It lies between Cuba and Porto Rico to which it is intermediate in size. It is some 400 miles long and 170 in width, but of very irregular shape. The total area of the whole island is 28,000 square miles and the Haitian one third is the area of which this study deals. As a whole, the island is extremely mountainous, the chains running from the west with a southerly trend with intervening valleys in which rivers are found. The mountain slopes range from steep to precipitous, rising often to more than 3,000 feet, a few peaks

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Carl Kelsey, "The American Intervention in Haiti and San Domingo", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 100:118 (March, May 1922)

reaching 10,000 feet. These ranges constitute serious obstacles to travel and make road building both difficult and expensive. This has been a source of considerable difficulty in maintaining communications and affording excellent opportunities to individuals having revolutionary ambitions.

In the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea there are five great strategical positions: the mouth of the Canal, the mouth of the Mississippi, Cuba, Haiti, and Jamaica. The mouth of the Mississippi necessarily will command the great central valley of the United States, and here is one of the great positions in the trade of the world. From the mouth of the Mississippi to Colon our commerce has a straight course, passing Cape Catoche, the outermost point of Yucatan, and Cape Gracias a Dios on the Mosquito Coast. This route passes the island of Moyer, which is not important, but is within easy striking distance of the great island of Jamaica. The island of Cuba is the great controlling strategical influence in the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico. It lies across the route from North America, and largely commands the route from the mouth of the Mississippi to the eastern opening of the Canal. From the Yucatan Channel and the Strait of Florida to the Windward Passage, Cuba bars the way to maritime traffic for over 500 miles; from the Windward Passage to the Mona Passage for some 400 miles lies Haiti; and east of the Mona Passage in turn, Porto Rico imposes a further barrier about 100 miles long. The passages named therefore are of much greater importance proportionately than the numerous passages among the string of

much smaller islands which, beyond Porto Rico wind away to the east for 200 miles and then drop south for 500 miles to the mainland of South America. These two passages, Windward and Mona, constrain all maritime traffic into themselves, exercising an influence over its courses far beyond their own limits.

Of these passages, the most important as concerns the Caribbean Sea is the Windward Passage. It is the only entrance into that sea to Cape Engano at the east end of the Dominican Republic. Every ship sailing from New York, Philadelphia, Canada, and Baltimore on their routes to the Canal must pass by the island, either through the Windward or Mona Passage.

Four foreign nations in the period 1908 to 1915 held important positions in the Caribbean Sea. First in importance was the island of Jamaica, owned by Great Britain; which is practically at the mouth of the Canal. Of almost equal importance was the island of Curacao, belonging to Holland, which, in the hands of an unfriendly power, would be disastrous in its effect upon the commerce of the Canal. To the east and within striking distance was Martinique, in the hands of France; Santa Lucia owned by England; St. Thomas, owned by Denmark; The Bahamas and the Bermudas, in the hands of England; and Cuba and Haiti, in independent control, neither of which at that time could be utilized by the United States in case of conflict with other nations of the world. It is seen that the Gulf of Mexico and the

Caribbean Sea are encompassed by islands in the control of two great nations of the world, France and England, and by two great islands, Haiti and Cuba, which are so strategically situated that they could largely control the commerce of practically half of the world. In these waters the United States, to which this commerce was vital, controlled with the exception of Guantanamo only the relatively insignificant island of Porto Rico. Beyond those unimportant exceptions, the United States had no right to fortify any of the islands, nor could this country use them as bases from which to protect our commerce and our rights in the Canal.¹¹

It is difficult for an individual today to fully understand the deep interest and alarm which the American people felt concerning the Caribbean and the Canal during this period. Today, the United States is unquestionably supreme in this area, but it was not so in the early 1900's.

The threat of World War I began in 1913 and it was impossible to judge the outcome. In the case of German supremacy, the colonial dependencies of France were believed to surely fall into German hands. If England were successful, a new era might begin, that would do away with the old conditions of rest and quiet which heretofore had surrounded her West Indian dependencies

Under the conditions then present an alliance of two European nations could close the mouth of the Canal, and could practically dominate the Caribbean Sea. It was feared that with the changes

¹¹George F. Eliot, The Ramparts We Watch, (New York; Reynal & Hitchcock, 1939).

brought about by the new alignments of power and the ultimate changes which might occur in the balance of power in the world the European nations might begin an aggressive policy which would endanger our lifeline through the Caribbean. The most fundamental considerations of safety; it was believed, demanded that we should take every step which would give this government complete control of military and commercial conditions in the Caribbean Sea.¹²

Whether or not the above should bear close scrutiny is not the question so much as the fact that this was universally believed by the people of the United States. In such cases as these the beliefs held by the people rather than the true facts will determine the policy and interests of a democracy. The Panama Canal had just been opened and the American people had developed as an almost pathological fear for the safety of our lifeline through the Canal. This pathological fear was to considerable degree increased by the whole series of events which were occurring at that moment throughout the world. The most important being the first World War, the rise of two new world powers, Germany and Japan, and the political unrest in the countries of Latin America, which were causing instability in the whole area south of the Rio Grande River.

The background of Haitian-American relations centered in this small and unstable country at the western end of the island of Hispaniola, Afro-French in culture, its birth due to a slave revol

¹² William A. MacCorkel, The Monroe Doctrine in Its Relation to the Republic of Haiti, (New York: The Neale Publishing Co., 1915), pp. 36-37.

The Indians were gone, the Spanish influence had passed away, and the Haitian people were only a few generations removed from slavery. Although the Haitian people went through the heroic age of the Revolution, the succeeding century brought forth no leader comparable to those of the period 1790-1810. After a terrific burst of energy which characterized the Revolution, the Haitian people succumbed to the languorous life of the tropics. Neither education nor industry made headway. The small group of educated were primarily concerned in acquiring wealth and political power. In such a society neither democracy nor economic progress could live, and in consequence the Haitian Republic degenerated into a series of military dictatorships in which changes of government were effected not by elections but by revolutions.

This unstable situation reached its zenith at the time in the history of the Western Hemisphere when the United States was becoming acutely aware of her destiny and especially insofar as such a strategically located island was concerned.

In order to understand the political developments in Haiti since 1908, it will be useful to survey local conditions as they presented themselves to an observer interested in estimating the social, economic, and political endowments of the republic. Transient visitors have frequently carried away exaggerated impressions of the resources of tropical countries, a fact illustrated by many estimates of the possibilities of development in Haiti. Here, the visitor was prone to conclude, are 10,000

square miles of tropical country whence once came the world's greatest sugar supply.¹³ Coffee, corn, cotton, sisal, fruits, and dyewood can be produced in far greater quantities than now reach the market. Livestock may graze the year around, and labor was plentiful and cheap. Access to the foreign markets from the seacoast was easy.¹⁴ All that was lacking was well-maintained order, capital and enterprise. If the first were obtained, the others would follow and then a neglected and backward republic would become a tropical paradise. Such visions of the future of tropic areas in the Caribbean have even to this day too frequently raised hopes destined to disappointment. The tropics will continue to increase their yield for the world's markets, but the problems of their exploitation are in a large measure still unsolved and the development of their resources is still, as it has been in the past, much more difficult than the development of more temperate regions.

To this generalization Haiti is no exception. Highly fertile spots exist in the island. They give an extraordinary response to cultivation - but they cover only a fraction of the total area.¹⁵ Haiti taken as a whole, is highly mountainous. A very large portion is unsuited to agriculture. In some districts, the land is too irregular to allow cultivation in more than small scattered garden plots; in others rainfall is insufficient, though

¹³L. W. Livingston, "Haiti and the Haitians," Bulletin of the Pan American Union, 40:88, (January-June, 1915).

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 92.

expensive irrigation works might bring good yields under skillful management.¹⁶ Livestock raising, which had fair promise, had always been backward, owing in part, at least, to lack of initiative and to the fact that in a country which suffered from frequent revolutions livestock ownership is precarious since cattle are army supplies which carry themselves.

From what has been said above it must be evident that the Haitians are poor. Only a poor people will work for twenty cents a day, the prevailing wage in 1921. Only a hungry people will pick and deliver coffee for three cents a pound.¹⁷

Haiti won its freedom but in a very real sense it merely traded masters, substituting mulatto for white.¹⁸ Although the Haitian people were of one race and only a few generations removed from slavery, class lines were clearly defined, and the pride of caste existed to an extra-ordinary degree.¹⁹ The great mass of the people were inarticulate. The great mass of the peasants who were 95 per cent illiterate,²⁰ not only had no knowledge of the elements of democracy, but they were completely indifferent to all matters which did not directly and obviously affect their own immediate communities.²¹ A vast majority, due to the extreme

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Kelsey, op. cit., p. 132.

¹⁸ Hearings before a Select Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo, United States Senate, 67th Congress, Pursuant to Senate Resolution 112, Authorizing a special committee to inquire into the occupation and administration of the territories of the Republic of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, Washington, 1922, p. 1247.
Document cited hereinafter referred to as Senate Hearings.

¹⁹ Davis, op. cit., p. 294.

²⁰ Kelsey, op. cit., p. 130

²¹ Senate Hearings, op. cit., p. 1248.

poverty of the country, were concerned only in maintaining their existence. They never had been allowed to think for themselves in terms of politics or given any part in the affairs of their government or voice in the government of their nation.

It was easy for the small ruling oligarchy to inveigle, stampede , or dragoon the peasant into the support of this or that aspirant for political office. Between the politically vocal minority and the great mass of Haitian citizenry there was little in common or sympathy. A prominent Haitian has been quoted as saying that two thousand men controlled Haiti absolutely and that from the beginning of the history of free Haiti the upper class constituted a self-appointed oligarchy.²² The desire to raise the country folk to a higher standard of life, to give them educational facilities, to make them more active in contributing to national wealth, and to bring them to share public duties and responsibilities, which is marked among political leaders and upper classes in a number of other Latin-American countries seemed lacking among the elite Haitians.

As a result of the division of the nominal electorate, political leadership fell to the better educated, class-conscious minority. Had its members developed within their own group a sense of political solidarity, stability in public affairs might have been won. The history of Haitian administration does not show progress in that direction. Rear Admiral H. S. Knapp stated that since the independence of Haiti, January 1, 1804, there had

²²Davis, op. cit., p. 293.

been two Emperors, one King, and twenty-four Presidents. Of these five died in office from natural causes, four were assassinated or killed in action against revolutionists, one suicide, two resigned, one served a full term alive. The rest left office under revolutionary auspices, generally fleeing the country.²³

The ruling class in Haiti has not yet learned that a public office is a public trust. In America trouble has occurred from time to time with individuals who violate this standard, but in Haiti it was expected that the official should graft. Government offices have been looted by outgoing administrations; everything movable in government ships has been carried away. The head of an old business house states that in the old days the real profit came from dodging custom duties. More coffee was always received at Havre than was exported from Haiti.²⁴

The old president, Nord Alexis, in his administration (1903-1908) investigated a series of frauds which had been perpetrated in the consolidation of the floating debt. This investigation disclosed that over a million and a quarter dollars had been stolen from the government and, in spite of the prominence of the guilty parties, the president referred the matter to the courts. After a prolonged inquiry the grand jury indicted the French director of the national bank, two Germans, and several prominent Haitians. Tremendous pressure was brought to bear to prevent their trial but the President

²³H. S. Knapp, Report to the Secretary of the Navy, 1920, pp. 224-225.

²⁴Senate Hearings, op. cit., p. 1289.

refused to interfere and T. Simon Sam, ex-President of the Republic, Vilbrun Guillaume, Minister of War, Tancrede Auguste, Minister of the Interior, and Cincinnatus Leconte, Minister of Public Works were convicted. The evidence of the lack of interest in public morality was that only one of the above-named men was even arrested and the still more extraordinary fact that the last three were later elected in turn to the presidency of the Republic.²⁵

A prominent Haitian, one of the best educated men on the island, a man who had never been in political life, told Dr. Carl Kelsey in 1920:

Those of us who have been trained have never been trained to work physically. We do not believe in it; we have no respect for it. We have got to go into the government service; that is the only outlet for any large number of us. It does not make any difference whether the lowest type of man gets into office or the highest type in this country; the moment he gets in and appoints his assistants, there are many more disappointed people than satisfied ones. And the disappointed ones immediately begin to counsel together to know how they can get rid of him. That has been true all through our history.²⁶

These contests among the better class Haitians impoverished the country. These are the people to whom Haiti should have been able to look for progress and stability, but until this revolutionary spirit was uprooted from the soil no president of the Republic could be expected to spend in building a road the money he needed to save his own neck.²⁷

²⁵ Davis, op. cit., p. 138.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 292

²⁷ "Turmoil in Haiti", Outlook, 88:663-669, (March 1908).

The operation of the public school system was an example of the lack of integrity among the upper class Haitian. Teachers were found who could not sign their own name or add sums of money up to thirty gourdes; music teachers, who knew no music and could play no instruments. Here too was graft. Rent was paid for school buildings burned years before; a salary paid to a teacher who admitted not having entered the building in years. Although on paper there was a complete system of schools in the country with attendance obligatory and tuition free, there were no publicly owned buildings. The worst aspect of this situation was not the poverty of teaching materials or the inability to pay living wages or to extend the system, but the lack of a genuine interest and belief in education for the masses. Until the dominant group began to take an interest in education and saw that their country was held back by the ignorance of the masses, it was useless to expend money which merely went into the hands of grafting politicians.²⁸

The slave tradition survived the revolution, and to this day the peasants are living to a certain extent under a slave regime. Before the revolution the French masters directed; the slaves did the physical labor. When freedom came, the leaders, usually mulattoes, tried to carry on the old traditions.²⁹ This slavery did not function under the name, theoretically, any individual in Haiti could become president if he had the military

²⁸Kelsey, op. cit., pp. 130-131.

²⁹Ibid., p. 126.

force and personal strength. Practically, the overwhelming mass of Haitians were condemned to poverty with no hope of any way out. In order to ascertain what the average official thought of the welfare of the Haitian people an analysis of the contract-labor trade with Cuba during World War I was very enlightening. It was nothing but a modified slave trade resulting in great financial profit to the upper classes. Thousands of lower class Haitians were shipped to Cuba from the south-western peninsula and the northern coast. These migrants had to have photographs attached to their passports. As photographs were not easily available, the Department of the Interior had a number of pictures on hand which were affixed to the papers, since the only check which was kept was on numbers and no comparison was ever made of the men with the photographs. The passports cost one dollar, but a fee of two dollars was paid to facilitate their issuance while a local official got two dollars for tending to the signature. The captain of the boat had to pay the Haitian consul in Cuba two dollars for each person, one dollar of which was supposed to be used for the upkeep of the consulate, the other to be turned over to the Haitian treasury; however, nothing was received by the treasury, the Haitian consul by a scheme known as "boxes of cigars" divided his receipts with the proper person in Port-au-Prince. This consul in Cuba also visited the factories from time to time on the pretext of supervising living

conditions at which time he received checks of from \$500 to \$1,000 which enabled him to make a favorable report. The laborers having no such sums of money, signed notes bearing high rates of interest, paid as much as \$500 before they were out of debt. The money was generally deducted from their wages. This is a disguised slave trade and illustrates the interest of Haitian officials in the welfare of their poorer countrymen.³⁰

Although funds could not be raised for public welfare and education, an army was maintained which was completely out of proportion to the needs of the country as well as beyond the budgetary expectations of the treasury. The Haitian Army consisted of thirty-eight regiments of the line, four regiments of artillery, four regiments of the president's guard, and a gendarmerie of forty-three companies. The high-ranking officers included over three hundred generals and about fifty colonels.³¹ This would total in the neighborhood of sixty thousand men. The present Garde d' Haiti consists of approximately three thousand men and since the rank of general fell into such disrepute the present military force has no rank assigned beyond that of colonel.

From the foregoing it can be seen the blueprint for revolutions was present in Haiti. The Haitian government except in few instances was shamelessly corrupt and incompetent. Three

³⁰ Ibid., p. 151.

³¹ Davis, op. cit., p. 194

of the presidents to hold office during the six years preceding the American intervention had been convicted of the crime of embezzlement. Public works, sanitation, and schools were neglected. In a few instances in the old days, President F. M. Florvil Hippolyte (1889-1896) and other able executives built bridges and roads and markets which still exist to do them credit, but during most of the history of the country public works although begun were seldom completed because of the disappearance of funds. The customs service was so notoriously riddled with graft that the immensely greater amount of coffee that was received in France, compared with the record of exports from Haitian custom houses, had ceased to cause comment.

The examples of corruption in the school systems in which persons were hired without sufficient educational background in order for them to be able to read or write; the hiring of medical directors who could not name the simplest drugs, and music instructors who could not read a note showed a complete lack of interest in the people and their education. Salaries were low under these administrations, since a large part of the country's revenue was dissipated in corruption. The practice was universal, perennial, and extraordinarily extravagant for a poor country like Haiti.

Even during the worst periods some of the leading families in Haiti continued to live useful and honourable lives uninterrupted by and contemptuous of the prevailing debauch.³²

³² Livingston, op. cit., p. 96

No man in those times ventured on the public roads for fear of being drafted in the revolutionary army or, perhaps, worse a governmental army. They stayed in their hills, and all marketing to the town was and still is done by the women. Numbers were killed in each revolution, towns looted and sections burned, and no life was safe and no justice existed once the government in power marked a man as its enemy and could lay hands upon him. In fact with a knowledge of his country's history before him, how could any man in power afford to let a supposed enemy exist?

What could be greater source of continual instability than an unpaid army of sixty thousand men ready to join any leader who would promise to pay them enough to keep them from starvation?

This cleavage which existed between the lower class Haitian and the upper class caused the upper class to feel that it lived in a world apart and completely independent of the lower class. There were two Haitians, not one, though the geographical boundaries were the same. The first was of Africa, for there is little essential difference between rural Haiti and Africa. The second was of Europe. The first was illiterate, and second educated; one uncouth, and the other polished. An African mass struggling to keep itself alive in abject poverty; and an upper class, who cannot comprehend any connection between themselves and the rest of the people, between themselves as the exploiters and the exploited, and were merely interested in struggling to attain equality with the civilized world, for the mulatto

suffers from the most deep seated inferiority complex in the world. He never feels sure that he can or will be accepted by the rest of the world.

Generally speaking, it may be said that such a system carried within itself the seeds of its own destruction and was bound to fall. There are some who will say that all these things are indicative of the capacity of the Negro. Not so, for they have appeared everywhere on earth when similar theories of government have existed. The fundamental reform needed in Haiti in 1900 as it is to a certain degree, today, was a change in the attitude of the upper groups.

C H A P T E R I I
THE BACKGROUND OF INTERVENTION

To write of the politics of one country in the language of another is almost certain to foster misconceptions. This applies particularly to Haiti. Her political history is endlessly complicated, not only in the sequence of events, but in the intertwining prejudice of color, race, education, and heritage. Writers have concerned themselves more frequently with politics than with any other Haitian subject, and their diagnoses and remedies are familiar to any student of political science. However, theory and practice have consistently diverged, and to treat either in detail would require an endless discussion in a country nine tenths of whose people are normally unconcerned with politics. Nevertheless, it will be necessary to explain briefly how rulers have achieved and lost power, and how they have managed their government.

The weakness of social or class consciousness has already been treated at length. It kept the whole nation divided from top to bottom, setting black against colored, the elite against the peasantry. It meant a perennial civil war, at times latent, but constantly breaking out in new insurrections. Some day a diligent student may try to catalog the revolutions which Haiti had undergone. One writer mentions sixty-nine important ones between 1806 and 1879, but the latter date was merely the beginning of renewed revolutionary activity. There seems to

have been very little pattern in these uprisings, except that they never were a spontaneous revolt of the masses, as the Slave Insurrection of 1791 had been. The peasants were constantly being impressed into service with the army of a general who had presidential ambitions. From the middle years of the nineteenth century certain peasants found fighting a more profitable trade than any other, and began to hire themselves out as mercenaries who were a constant menace to peace.

A revolution directed by a general of real ambition was likely to involve an appeal to foreign powers. Financial intrigue was frequent. By borrowing money from France, Germany, or England, with the promise to revise Haitian financial policy to the benefit of the creditor country, a number of revolutionaries secured funds for arms and the necessary soldiers to effect a coup, and when the financial risk was too great for reputable loan agencies, these revolutions were financed by merchants at exorbitant rates of interest.

The first of these loans which began to bankrupt the country was negotiated during the administration of General Michel Dominique. His tenure of two years was characterized by utter incompetence and flagrant corruption. This loan, floated in France was for 26,000,000 francs.¹

¹H. P. Davis, Black Democracy, (New York: The Dial Press, 1929), pp. 131-132.

Boisrand-Canal, becoming President in 1876, succeeded in adjusting the debt; but in 1879, disturbance forced him and his chief ministers into exile, and Lysius Salomon became President. At the end of his presidential term, then seven years, Salomon was re-elected, but, warned by insurrection, he chose to leave for France. Chaos followed for a time; the north had one government, the west and south another under Legitime, who was recognized by all foreign powers except the United States. Legitime resigned, however, and in 1889 Hippolyte was elected. A new French loan of 50,000,000 francs was floated in 1896; and in the same year Hippolyte died a natural death, an unusual end for a Haitian president.

The inauguration of General T. Simon Sam, who resigned in 1902 ushered in the period which is known in Haiti as the Period of Ephemeral Governments.² He was followed by General Nord Alexis; this old gentleman ruled effectively for seven years not without causing considerable difficulty however, with the foreigners. At one time during his administration the British warship, Indefatigable, sailed into the harbor and fired a few warning shots. Nord Alexis had complained frequently that foreign consulates were protecting conspirators and his summary methods of executing suspects caused a great deal of nervousness among the European residents.³ He departed aboard the French cruiser Duguay Trouin while the U.S.S. Des Moines and Tacoma

²Ibid., p. 143.

³"Turmoil in Haiti", Outlook, Vol. 88:668-669, (March 28, 1908).

afforded him solace with a twenty-one gun salute, solace needed especially since his suitcase containing \$10,000 had been snatched from his hands.⁴ Antoine Simon was elevated by insurrection in 1908 and overthrown in the same manner in 1911 and with his administration the descent to complete political collapse was accelerated rapidly. Leconte, leader of the revolution, who while President was killed by an explosion in the palace, was one of the prominent Haitians convicted in the consolidation scandal, during the administration of Nord Alexis. Leconte was succeeded by Tancrede Auguste, who served until his poisoning in 1913. Thereupon the National Assembly chose Haiti's first civilian President, Michel Orests; but he was forced out after nine months by a gathering insurrection, which resulted in the election of Charles Zamor, who met military defeat at the hands of General Davilmar Theodore about nine months later. The latter, becoming President in November, 1914, lasted only three months and a half; and another revolution originating like most of the others in the north, brought General Vilbrun Guillaume Sam to power March 4, 1915.⁵

Between 1804 and 1915, there were periods of comparative peace and order, notably under Christophe, Petion, and Boyer from 1811 to 1843, and under Hippolyte, Simon Sam, and Nord Alexis from 1889 to 1908. There had also been along certain

⁴Current Literature, Vol. 26:30-32, (January 1909).

⁵Davis, op. cit., pp. 141-160.

lines a measure of constructive achievement. Treaties were negotiated with foreign powers and a concordat was signed with the Holy See. The revolutionary claims of France were funded. A considerable body of law was enacted.⁶ The need of education was recognized and schools were established. Several economic concessions were granted to foreigners and Haitians. Telephones were introduced, cable communications established, telegraph lines constructed and public buildings erected. There were efforts from time to time to combat graft.

Nevertheless, representative government had at no time actually functioned. As a general rule, presidents were made and unmade in rapid succession by means of insurrections headed by military chiefs.⁷ Revolt commonly started in the north; and the revolutionary army was largely made up of conscripted peasants or cacos.⁸ Payment of troops was accomplished by the looting of towns or by drawing on the public treasury. Elections merely registered the results of revolutions.⁹ Once in power, presidents tended to become dictators. Constitutional and

⁶ Spencer St. John, Hayti or the Black Republic, (London, Smith Elder & Co., 1889). p. 305.

⁷ Hearings before a Select Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo, United States Senate, Sixty-seventh Congress, Pursuant to Senate Resolution 112, authorizing a special Committee to inquire into the occupation and administration of the territories of the Republic of Haiti and the Dominican Republic. 1st Session Washington, 1922. Document cited hereafter as Senate Hearings.

⁸ Davis, op. cit., p. 145.

statute law was commonly disregarded. Members of the two-chambered legislature were puppets of the President, and the judiciary was incompetent and for the most part corrupt.¹⁰

It is true that revolution and civil war have played a part in the evolution of more advanced nations, but in Haiti the tendency was for the end of one revolution to mark the beginning of another and the situation instead of growing better became steadily worse, especially after 1900. Politically the country appeared to be drifting steadily toward chaos and complete collapse.

The above recital of insurrections, revolutions, and assassinations had its financial aspects which were reflected in the most extraordinary series of bond issues and hectic financial operations which finally forced the republic into financial bankruptcy. Haiti's foreign loans and the bonds of the National Railroad were held in France; the National Bank of Haiti was originally a French concession, and the French owned a cable monopoly; but traders of this nationality were not numerous and were established principally at Cap Haitien.¹¹ Germans dominated Haitian commerce and shipping.¹² British interests claimed to have obtained the so-called Daniel petroleum concession, and owned part of the stock of the railroad.

¹⁰ Carl Kelsey, *The American Intervention in Haiti and the Dominican Republic*, Annals of American Academy of Political Science, 100:129-130 (1922).

¹¹ Senate Hearings, op. cit., p. 122.

¹² Ibid., p. 110, 112, 122.

The central factor in Haitian finance was the so-called Banque Nationale de la Republique d' Haiti with its central offices in Paris and a branch at Port-au-Prince and another branch in New York City. This institution controlled practically the entire foreign debt (ninety-nine per cent) of Haiti amounting to \$27,000,000 in gold.¹³

According to the report of the minister of finance the total debt on March 21, 1910, was as follows:

Foreign Debt

Loan 1875	\$2,701,507.50	
Amortization in arrears	<u>1,065,307.50</u>	\$ 3,766,815.00
Loan 1896	7,958,906.25	
Amortization in arrears	<u>622,875.00</u>	<u>8,581,781.25</u>
		\$12,348,596.25

Interior Debt

2½ per cent treasury bonds (pink)	\$ 2,758,047.57
2½ per cent treasury bonds (blue)	2,297,135.33
6 per cent consolidated bonds	3,869,880.60
3 per cent consolidated bonds	1,379,793.65
6 per cent united loans	<u>2,087,994.88</u>
	\$12,372,852.03
Interest in arrears	25,604.75
Total interior debt	12,398,456.78
Special bonds and obligations	<u>1,589,794.13</u>
Total Gold Debt	\$26,336,794.16 ¹⁴

¹³ "Extending U. S. Protectorate Under the Monroe Doctrine", Current Opinion, 59:223-225 (October, 1915).

¹⁴ Bulletin Pan American Union, 33:282-97 (August 1911).

Fifty per cent of the bank's stock was held by the French interest, forty per cent by nominal American stockholders, and ten per cent by the German Disconto Gesellschaft of Berlin.¹⁵ Scattered sporadically throughout this list of stockholders were about twenty or thirty Haitians, each one of them owning a small amount.

Up until 1910 this institution was entirely French, under the name of La Banque Nationale d' Haiti, originally established in 1881.¹⁶ It was a badly managed affair and in 1910 as a result of the scandals mentioned in Chapter I, it was thoroughly reorganized with the two central ideas of establishing monetary reform in the Republic and of obtaining joint administration of its customs.¹⁷ With those ends in view it was deemed advisable to admit German participation and, as a political safeguard to the reorganized bank, it was considered wise to also include American investment.

The transactions incident to this reorganization were exceedingly interesting. In 1910 a Haitian commission went to Paris to assist in the reorganization of the bank at its central offices. At the same time some other interested Haitians went into conclave with German mercantile interest at Port-au-Prince, and made emphatic representations through the Haitian agent of Thalmann and Company, which had a branch office in Paris. The

¹⁵Davis, op. cit., p. 144.

¹⁶Senate Hearings, op. cit., p. 1311.

¹⁷Ibid.

New York office of this German Banking Company was Ladenburg, Thalmann and Company.¹⁸

The German-Haitian group did not at first want the American participation. Whatever the French stockholders might have done in the exigency was defeated by the emphatic attitude of the French Government in not allowing German participation without the inclusion of American capital. This fact throws an interesting light upon that phase of the Monroe Doctrine which was being staged in the Caribbean.

As was presently constituted, then, there were not German individual shareholders in the National Bank of Haiti, the German block of stock, only about two thousand five hundred out of a total of forty thousand shares, being all held by the Disconte Gesellschaft.¹⁹ The individual shareholders were all Frenchmen, Americans, and Haitians, but the character of some of the American shareholders would throw some interpretative light upon the small proportion of the total stock held in Germany. The chief American shareholders were Ladenburg, Thalmann and Company, firms Germanic in their affiliations, and the National City Bank.

According to the regulations of the bank, the board of directors should normally have twelve members. The German representative resigned at the beginning of the war. The New York directors met in New York separately from their Paris colleagues in order to handle such business as was left to the

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 1309.

¹⁹ Davis, op. cit., p. 144.

bank.

Except for this international establishment there was no direct foreign banking organization in the republic, however, a large amount of the financial obligations of successive administrations was negotiated through German mercantile agents of German banks, each transaction was apparently purely a private one but the inference was somewhat more than that.²⁰

These private loans negotiated between the Haitian officials, as they moved their uneasy way towards collapse, and the German mercantile agents bore ruinous rates of interest, so ruinous that the transactions, so far from helping matters, only plunged the exchequer into further difficulties. For example in June, 1914, the Zamor Government negotiated two loans with local German bankers at Port-au-Prince. The first one was for \$500,000 which was so discounted as to net 59.4 per cent. This was bad enough.²¹ The next was much worse. By the terms of the second loan negotiated in the same month the Zamor Government got only fifty six cents for every dollar obligated. In other words, within one year, the government paid approximately \$500,000 for the original \$175,000 actually advanced.²²

One of the chief objects of the reorganization of the National Bank of Haiti was in order to rehabilitate the currency of the nation. The monetary reform contemplated calling in all unsecured paper from circulation and the substitution therefore

²⁰ Ibid., p. 150.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Senate Hearings, op. cit., p. 1309

of a guaranteed currency, an operation that would have to eventually precede any healthy commercial and financial change in Haiti. Repeated efforts to accomplish this reform were met with the same success as similar attempts made in other countries lacking fiscal rectitude. The chief unit in the Haitian currency is the gourde, of a nominal par value about equal at that time to the American dollar. It had never realized par. Its exchange value fluctuated from about two cents to twenty cents.²³

On January 15, 1915, President Theodore, who had succeeded Samor, issued by decree 12,000,000 gourdes in treasury bonds of one, two and five gourde bills, guaranteed by the acceptance of these bills up to the amount of twenty per cent in payment of forty per cent surtax in gold on imports at the rate of five gourdes for one dollar gold. This frenzied finance was handed to a certain German firm which took it at an outrageous discount. Theodore took this step despite representations by the United States Government that the issue was not based on any security which it could regard as satisfactory. Two weeks before the issue our Minister, Blanchard, told President Theodore that the United States would refuse to regard as legal any such issues as that contemplated. The French and German ambassadors in Washington were at the same time informed to the same effect. Nevertheless Theodore went ahead and made the issue.²⁴

²³Ibid.

²⁴Department of State Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1914, Government Printing Office, 1924, p. 365. Document cited is hereinafter referred to as Foreign Relations.

The first bonds issued rapidly, but on account of the war the imports had fallen to so small a figure that they could not be employed for the purpose designated. As a consequence the rate coasted down rapidly until fifty gourdes could be bought for one dollar gold. When the government tried to force acceptance at par all the larger Haitian and foreign business houses closed.

In making the loan of 1910 the Haitian Government agreed that the money pledged for its security should be handled by the Banque Nationale and the 10,000,000 francs of this loan should be devoted toward retirement of all the then issued paper and nickel money.²⁵ This agreed with the charter given the bank which made it a bank of issue, the government agreeing to withdraw its paper. This charter also made the bank the collector and disbursing officer of the moneys of the government and as such it functioned until the occupation took place. The bank had entered into the most solemn pledge not to permit funds to be used except for the specific purpose provided by law. From 1911 to 1915 several efforts were made by the parties who chanced to be in power to get hold of these trust funds and divert them to other channels.

The Theodore government was in desperate straits. Its Davilmar notes were worthless. In the north, in order to combat the growing revolt under Guillaume Sam, Theodore declared

²⁵Davis, op. cit., p. 144.

a blockade of the ports of northern Haiti, but was unable to enforce the blockade as his naval vessels had no coal. The American schooner, Alice Pendleton, of New York, was in the harbor alongside the wharf with six hundred tons of coal contracted for by the Haitian Government. It was known that the Government's financial situation was at a low state and that it had not been able to obtain money for the purchase of the coal. The Haitian Government had made attempts to obtain money from the Banque Nationale, and upon the refusal of the Management of this bank to deliver the money it was rumored that the Government had made threats to seize the money by force. It was these pledged funds to the amount of \$500,000 which were the objectives of Theodore and were absolutely necessary if he were to remain in office. At this juncture the United States was asked to help and the S. S. Machias was sent for the money. The Haitian Government demanded the money. The French director, thoroughly frightened, wanted to yield, but a young American assistant shut the vault and defied the officials. The \$500,000 was placed aboard the Machias and safely stowed away in the Bankers' Trust Company in New York, where it was infinitely safer and just as much at the disposal of legitimate Governmental demands as it could have been in Port-au-Prince.²⁶

²⁶ Foreign Relations, 1914, op. cit., pp. 336, 369, 370.

Theodore and his counselors protested that the high-handed action on the part of the local officers of the bank was a blow to their prestige and reputation for honesty.²⁷ It is entirely possible that he was perfectly right.

The Zamor and Theodore financial deals were only the worst in a whole series of loan shark operation carried on by these officials since shortly before the turn of the century.

The loan of 1896 was arranged with the National Bank of Haiti. Bonds with a face value of five hundred francs were issued at four hundred to the bank which sold them at four hundred fifty. Some of the bonds were reserved by the government and issued on the basis of a five hundred franc bond for each four hundred of certain existing internal and floating obligations, some of which were bearing eighteen per cent interest. This interest was secured by a tax of \$1.20 on each hundred pounds of coffee exported.²⁸

The loan of 1910 was contracted with the Bank of the Parisian Union, Paris, Hallgarten and Company, Ladenburg, Thalmann and Company of New York, and the Berliner Haendels-gesellschaft of Berlin. The loan was for 65,000,000 francs and the banks paid 47,000,000 francs or 72.3 per cent of face value.²⁹

At the close of 1914, the Haitian Government, executing a court judgment rendered two months previously by default, took from the bank vaults about \$67,000 in gold, sealed the safes

²⁷ Ibid., 1914, pp. 371-372, 337-378.

²⁸ Senate Hearings, op. cit., p. 1309.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 1309

containing what was thought to be the balance of the "fonds du retrait" and passed a law authorizing the creation of new government bank notes and the flotation of an internal loan to be guaranteed by all free duties.³⁰ In January, 1915, there were rumors of threats against the French manager of the bank,³¹ which turned out to be untrue, fears of an attempt by the Haitian authorities to remove additional funds³² and repeated protests by the American legation;³³ also the printing of the new note issue was begun.³⁴ Early in February of 1915, the Haitian Government transferred the treasury service from the bank to various merchants designated by the Government,³⁵ an action which was promptly protested by the American minister.³⁶

Haitian authorities offered without result to submit all differences to arbitration in accordance with the banks contracts.³⁷ Thereafter, until the intervention, the operation of the concession was to all intents and purposes suspended.

The expensive involvement of the Haitian Government in the National Railroad dated from July 18, 1904, when a concession was granted under dubious circumstances to a Rodolphe Gardere, who sold the control to American interests. Several other contracts and agreements were concluded subsequently. The final contract, which was signed on August 5, 1910, provided that

³⁰ Foreign Relations, 1914, op. cit., pp. 381-382.

³¹ Ibid., 1915, p. 502.

³² Senate Hearings, op. cit., pp. 291-293.

³³ Ibid., p. 292.

³⁴ Foreign Relations, 1915, op. cit., p. 505.

³⁵ Ibid., 1915, pp. 510-511

³⁶ Ibid., 1915, p. 511.

³⁷ Ibid., 1915, pp. 512-514.

two unfinished lines of railroad, one from Cap Haitien to Port-au-Prince and Arcahaie, and one from Gonaives to Hinche and Gros Morne, should be consolidated into one system. It also extended the term of both concessions to fifty years. The new concession provided that the railroad company should issue bonds at the rate of \$20,000 per kilometer of constructed track. The Haitian Government guaranteed payment of six per cent interest on these bonds and, from January 1, 1915, a payment also of one per cent on account of sinking fund. The Government was to make these payments only when the railroad, after meeting costs of operations and maintenance, was unable to pay all of the interest and sinking fund charges. When profits reached twelve per cent or more the state was to receive one-sixth of all profits. The railroad property was to revert to the state on the expiration of the concession. From the financial point of view, participation by the Haitian Government in the National Railroad of Haiti was one of the most disastrous ventures in the history of the government. The railroad was a failure from the beginning; misfortune and mismanagement added to the difficulties both of the Government and of the individuals interested in the project. Foreclosure proceedings were initiated by the Haitian Government against the railroad on September 9, 1914, but on the intercession of Secretary Bryan proceedings were postponed and actual foreclosure never took place.³⁸

³⁸Ibid., 1915, pp. 538-548.

So much for the political and financial troubles which had by the middle of July, 1915, forced the government into a state of political and financial bankruptcy. This fact was brought forcibly to the attention of the United States Government from time to time and with increasing pressure beginning with the year of 1914. The French and German Governments were more forceful and it was through their continued representations that the United States was jarred out of its lethargy.³⁹

In 1914, the French made representations at Washington of their desire to participate in the regulation of the Haitian customs, the State Department advised the French Ambassador in a written dispatch that it was natural and desirable that one of the three officials in charge should be a Frenchman. It was apparent that unless something drastic occurred in the immediate future that the United States would be forced to take some action whether or not she was so inclined.

Although the State Department promptly repudiated this statement as having no authority, still, in July, 1914, the French Charge d' Affaires, maintained that the French had some right to join in a control of the Haitian customs because of the magnitude of French investments in that country, and he further stated that neither the United States nor any other country

³⁹"Chronic Revolution in Haiti", The American Review of Reviews, 52:272-274, (September, 1915).

ought to be accorded preferential treatment.⁴⁰

In the same month, July 1914, Germany also made a proposition for customs control in order to protect these funds from the revolutionists. In this case, the note from the German Embassy pointed out that even though the American Government believed it inadvisable to have interested European Powers participate in the control of Haitian customs, nevertheless, the Imperial Government must give heed to public opinion in Germany. The German note went even so far as to state that the simplest solution of the difficulty would be to include Germany, and that Germany would not understand any other arrangement that might be made.⁴¹

This interest in the customs was due to the fact that the aim of all these insurrectionists was control of the customs revenue, a matter of nearly \$5,000,000 annually. More than half of this money was paid out as interest on the public debt which was held by these European Powers. The remaining \$2,000,000 was under control of the executive. On separate occasions in 1914, German French, and British warships reminded Haiti of her financial obligations.⁴²

The Department very emphatically answered the German representations and defined its position in regard to these drastic German demands. In the most unequivocal terms it stated

⁴⁰Foreign Relations, 1915, op. cit., pp. 514-515.

⁴¹Ibid., 1915, p. 515.

⁴²"Chronic Revolution in Haiti", The American Review of Reviews, 52:272-274 (September, 1915).

that its policy was not subject to any variation; that neither foreign mercantile interest nor any other interests proceeding from outside of the American hemisphere could be so extended as even to constitute a joint control in whole or in part of the government or administration of any independent American state.⁴³

The interchange of notes between the United States and the French and German governments illustrated the characteristic differences in the diplomacy of the two European nations. The French Government in February, 1915, renewed its representations and made it clear that France would like to be taken into partnership in determining the action taken to rehabilitate Haitian finances, on the ground of the extensive Haitian securities held in France. The French Government assured the Department of State that all negotiations in Haiti on the part of the National Bank which were seconded by the French Government were only for the legitimate protection of private interests. The United States in its last communications to the French Government assured it that no discrimination was contemplated against France, most cordially explained its appreciation of the French Government's position, although at the same time emphasized that the Monroe Doctrine prohibited any active partnership on the part of any European Nation.

⁴³ Foreign Relations, 1915, op. cit., p. 515.

On June 18, 1915, the revolutionary efforts of Dr. Ronsalvo Bobo becoming more and more disorderly, and since no one else apparently was disposed to do anything about it, the French armored cruiser Descartes, part of the allied Caribbean fleet, happened along and put marines ashore at Cap Haitien on June 19, 1915.⁴⁴ This seemed to have awakened the State Department and a few days later the Washington under Admiral Caperton, arrived at the Cap and took charge of the situation.⁴⁵

⁴⁴Ibid., 1915, p. 473.

⁴⁵Ibid., 1915, p. 474.

CHAPTER III
GROPING TOWARDS A POLICY

The United States did not recognize the Republic of Haiti until 1864, when a commercial treaty was signed and ministers were exchanged.¹ Intervention before 1915 had not been infrequent.² A memorandum of the Navy Department prepared for The Senate committee investigating the American occupation in Haiti in 1921, after reviewing several incidents prior to 1866, stated that reports showed that naval vessels visited Haiti in 1866 because of revolutionary movements and civil disturbances threatened to place in jeopardy the lives and property of American residents. In the next year the Secretary reported that naval vessels had visited Haiti which was a country afflicted with perpetual discontent and revolution. Then followed visits in 1868, 1869, 1876, 1888, 1889, 1892, 1902, 1903, 1905, 1906, 1907, 1908, 1911, 1912, and 1913. Returning to Port-au-Prince on March 8, 1914, because of political disturbances, the U. S. S. South Carolina, found it imperatively necessary to remain in that port until April 14, 1914.³ In January, 1914, marines were landed to cooperate

¹H. P. Davis, Black Democracy, (New York, The Dial Press, 1929) pp. 115.

²Davis, Op. cit., pp. 123-124, 130-131, 314-318.

³Hearings before a Select Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo, United States Senate, 67th Congress, Pursuant to Senate Resolution 112, authorizing a special committee to inquire into the occupation and administration of the territories of the Republic of Haiti and the Dominican Republic Washington, 1922, p. 63. Document cited hereinafter referred to as Senate Hearings.

with forces from British, French and German vessels in the protection of foreign interests.⁴

As a problem in American foreign relations, Haiti was by no means an isolated or an unprecedented case. Qualified principles of intervention were already embodied in international law.⁵ In the Caribbean area there had been the Platt amendment, the Panama revolution, an intervention in Nicaragua, and an intervention in the Dominican Republic, with occupation and customs control under a treaty. The apparent success of intervention in the Dominican Republic was an important influence in the development of the policy toward Haiti.⁶

In 1905, President Roosevelt announced the following corollary to the Monroe Doctrine:

An aggrieved nation can without interfering with the Monroe Doctrine take what action it sees fit in the adjustment of its disputes with American States, provided that action does not take the shape of interference with their form of government or of the despoilment of their territory under any disguise. But, short of this, when the question is one of a money claim, the only way which remains, finally, to collect it is a blockade, or bombardment, or the seizure of the customhouses, and this means what is in effect a possession, were though only a temporary possession, of territory. The United States then becomes a party in interest, because under the Monroe Doctrine it cannot see any European power seize and permanently occupy the territory of one of these republics; and yet such seizure of territory, disguised or undisguised, may eventually offer the only way in which the power in question can collect any debts, unless there is interference on the part of the United States.⁷

⁴Ibid.

⁵L. F. Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. 1, pp. 183, 184.

⁶Department of State Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Government Printing Office, 1924, p. 348, 367, 371. Document cited hereinafter referred to as Foreign Relations.

⁷Ibid., 1905, pp. 334-335.

A week after his inauguration, President Wilson issued a statement declaring that international cooperation in the Western Hemisphere demanded orderly processes of just government, based upon law, not upon arbitrary or irregular force. His Caribbean policy apparently comprehended three elements: (1) The Monroe Doctrine as interpreted for a quarter of a century by preceding administrations, seemed to impose upon the United States the responsibility of compelling the small states of the western hemisphere at least to meet their international obligations. (2) The preponderance of American interest in the industry and trade of all the countries adjacent to the Caribbean Sea, seemed to require that the United States pay a great deal of attention to the maintenance of stable governments in those countries. (3) The obligations of the United States respecting the Panama Canal seemed to force it to forestall any possible chance of interference by other powers with its control of the Canal. Apparently all three of these elements were present in the relations of the United States in the case of Haiti.⁸

On January 25, 1914, Secretary of State Bryan instructed the American Minister in Haiti, A. Bailly Blanchard, to impress upon the revolutionary leaders the President's policy as set forth in the statement of March 12, 1913, and insist upon constitutional methods for reform of any abuses.⁹

⁸ Edgar E. Robinson and Victor J. West, The Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, 1913-1917, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1918) pp. 115-119.

⁹ Foreign Relations, 1914, p. 336.

The support given by the Department of State to American interests in Haiti, especially to the National City Bank, appeared at the time to motivate our Haitian policy, which in the minds of many people became one of imperialism or dollar diplomacy. There is no evidence, however, that President Wilson, Secretary Bryan, Secretary Lansing, or Secretary of the Navy, Daniels, favored unduly American capitalistic enterprises in foreign countries. The American Minister Blanchard received the following telegram from Secretary Bryan on December 19, 1915:

Counter proposition seems based upon a misunderstanding of this government's position. While we desire to encourage in every proper way American investments in Haiti, we believe that this can be better done by contributing to stability and order than by favoring special concessions to Americans. American capital will gladly avail itself of business opportunities in Haiti when assured of the peace and quiet necessary for profitable production. Capital will not flow into Haiti except upon exorbitant terms and for speculative profits unless there is an assurance of peace and orderly government. If United States can, as a neighbor and friend, assist the Government and people of Haiti as it had assisted the Government and people of Santo Domingo, it will gladly do so provided that assistance is desired; but, as stated in our telegram December 12, 5 p.m., this Government does not care to assume these responsibilities except on request of the Haitian Government. The Government of the United States does not deem it proper to enter into such arrangements as those outlined in the proposition just submitted. The counter-proposition does not give any assurance that the Government of Haiti is stable or any promise of a reign of peace and prosperity. When American investors seek to secure concessions we should be informed of the name and address of such Americans and of the terms or advantages asked, so that we may acquaint ourselves with the whole subject. Our obligation to the American people required that we shall give all legitimate assistance to American investors in Haiti, but we are under obligations just as binding to protect Haiti, as far as our influence goes, from injustice or exploitation at the hands of Americans. Therefore, in order to perform our duty completely we must be fully informed as to the facts in each case.¹⁰

(Signed) Bryan

¹⁰Ibid., 1914, pp. 370-371.

The aggravated nature of the bank controversy, as well as the situation of the National Railroad, jarred officials who were reluctant to intervene. Haiti did not loom large on the diplomatic horizon of the United States. It is not apparent that even in the spring of 1915 that Washington had a full and accurate understanding of the republic. Complaints raised by American interests contributed to an understanding of general conditions of the situation and probably accelerated action, particularly when they brought the reminder that French and German nations were interested in the bank and the debt; and the French and British in the railroad.

The fact that customs revenues were pledged for the service of Haiti's foreign debt and were to be deposited in the National Bank gave the United States Government, from two points of view, concern in the proper administration of the Haitian customs service: First, to insure service of the debt, and thus preclude the possibility of complications with Europe. Second, to safeguard the rights of the bank in which Americans were a minority, and the French majority stockholders. American representatives in Haiti were instructed in January, 1914, to protest the seizure of customs houses by revolutionists and to impress upon the de facto authorities the necessity of complying with national obligations with respect to assignment of customs funds for the payment of definite debts.¹¹ During

¹¹Ibid., 1914, pp. 336-337.

the following month, the Department of State telegraphed minister Blanchard to make the following suggestion to the Haitian minister for foreign affairs:

...In your conference with the minister for foreign affairs you will suggest to him that the United States is, as is natural, on account of the vested interests of American citizens in the Republic of Haiti, interested in the proper administration and collection of customs, and would be well disposed toward lending its aid in any practical way to the Government of Haiti if such were desired.

Further that on account of the opening of the Panama Canal, the United States is interested in the proper location of lighthouses along the coast of the different countries and islands by which the traffic will pass to enter the Panama Canal. In this connection this Government would be most willing to lend any expert assistance to the Government of Haiti in aiding her to determine the points most for lighthouses.

At the time of the visit of Mr. Osborne, assistant secretary of state, to Haiti in 1913, the matter of the Mole St. Nicholas as a naval station was under discussion. Different views were exchanged and an understanding was arrived at by which it was promised that no other power than the United States should gain a foothold in that section of the republic. In presenting this last matter to the minister for foreign affairs, you will use your utmost tact and discretion in conveying to him the idea that while this Government has, for the present, no intention of entering into negotiations regarding Mole St. Nicholas, it nevertheless desires that the understanding between President Oreste and the assistant secretary of state remain undisturbed.

You are instructed to cable immediately whatever reply is made by the minister for foreign affairs to these suggestions, and the department will instruct you as to recognition.¹²

(Signed) Bryan

¹² Ibid., 1914, pp. 339-340.

In June, 1914, the American minister expressed the opinion that the suspension by the bank of its monthly advances to the Government most likely would bring the Government to a condition where it could not operate. The minister stated it was this condition which the bank desired so that the Haitian Government when confronted by such a crisis would be forced to ask the assistance of the United States in adjusting its hopelessly snarled financial affairs and that American supervision of customs would result.¹³

The Department of State transmitted to Minister Blanchard on July 2, 1914, a draft of a proposed convention between the United States and Haiti, modeled on the Dominican treaty of 1907, providing for a customs control under an American general receiver, and for an American financial advisor who in addition to certain defined duties, should generally exercise the functions of a comptroller of accounts.¹⁴

It was reported to the State Department on July 30, 1914, that financial distress and inability to borrow sufficient funds to complete the military campaign might eventually cause the downfall of the Zamor Government, and that the political situation was subordinate to and embodied in the financial situation.¹⁵

¹³ Ibid., 1914, pp. 345-346.

¹⁴ Ibid., 1914, pp. 347-350.

¹⁵ Ibid., 1914, pp. 351-352.

In October 1914, the Secretary of State wrote to President Wilson, expressing the opinion that the naval force in Haitian water should be increased at once, not only for the purpose of protecting foreign interests but also as evidence of the earnest intention of this Government to settle the unsatisfactory state of affairs which exists. Accordingly the Hancock was sent to Port-au-Prince with eight hundred marines, with orders to land men and take charge of the city, should Minister Blanchard so request.¹⁶

The text of the telegram was as follows:

Upon arrival of the Hancock you will at your discretion request commanding officer to take charge of Port-au-Prince and will restore Charles Zamor to his cabinet functions.¹⁷

(Signed) Lansing

In November, at the time when Oreste Zamor was falling before the revolt headed by Davilmar Theodore, the Department of State was considering a plan for holding an election in Haiti under American supervision, as had been done previously in the Dominican Republic, and Acting Secretary of State Lansing believed such procedure to be as important as the negotiation of a customs convention. The text of the communication to Minister Blanchard was as follows:

¹⁶ Senate Hearings, op. cit., p. 338.

¹⁷ Foreign Relations, 1914, p. 355.

Sir:

The attached memorandum regarding the establishment of constitutional government in the Republic of Haiti as a result of fair elections is sent to you for your information. Affairs in Haiti have reached such a state of confusion that the department believes that only some arrangement similar to that outlined in the memorandum will insure the maintenance of public order in the future and permit recuperation from the losses sustained through revolutionary disturbances.

The department regards the matter of holding elections under the supervision of the United States as of equal importance with the negotiations of the customs convention, draft of which was contained in the department instruction of July 2, 1914. The plan given in the memorandum attached hereto is the same as that successfully put into operation in the Dominican Republic by the American commissioners in October, 1914.¹⁸

(Signed) Robert Lansing

After the downfall of the Oreste Zamor administration, the United States took the position that it would recognize Davilmar Theodore as provisional president when the Haitian Government demonstrated its willingness to negotiate conventions which would provide for the following: American fiscal control as proposed; settlement of the railroad and bank controversies; agreements by Haiti to give full protection to all foreign interests in the republic; never to lease any Haitian territory at Mole St. Nicholas or anywhere else in the country to any European Government for use as a naval or coaling station; and finally, settlement by arbitration of

¹⁸ Ibid., 1914, pp. 357-358

American claims against Haiti.¹⁹ As a special inducement, the Department of State offered to use its good offices with the bank to procure the traveling expenses of the Haitian commission, and, as soon as the commission should be furnished with satisfactory credentials, a further loan to take care of the running expenses of the Government during the time that the commission was in session.²⁰

The Haitian Government refused to negotiate on the subject of customs control, and in the Haitian Senate the minister for foreign affairs was denounced and accused of endeavoring to sell the country to the United States.²¹ Haiti accepted the proposal relative to the lease of territory and the protection of foreign interests and suggested settlement by arbitration not only of American claims but of all outstanding disputes. In addition proposed the modification of the bank contract, and suggested the grant to American citizens of certain economic privileges and preferences, and assistance by the United States in obtaining a loan for Haiti.²²

Apparently before the receipt of the Haitian counter-proposals, Bryan shifted suddenly from these demands. Minister Blanchard was not instructed to say that the United States had altered its policy. Minister Blanchard was to advise the Haitian Government that the United States had no desire to

¹⁹Ibid., 1914, p. 359. Text of a telegram from Secretary Bryan to Minister Blanchard, November 12, 1914.

²⁰Ibid., 1914, p. 362.

²¹Ibid., 1914, p. 363.

²²Ibid., 1914, pp. 363, 376-369

assume responsibilities in regard to Haiti's fiscal system except in accordance with the wishes of the Haitian Government. Recognition was no longer to be conditioned on treaty negotiations but would be considered on its merits. Recognition would be granted whenever the Government of the United States was satisfied that there was in Haiti a government capable of maintaining order and meeting the country's obligations to outside nations. Such a government was impossible, however, unless it rested upon the consent of the governed and gave expression to the will of the people. This was the sum and substance of the wire sent to Minister Blanchard by Secretary Bryan on December 12, 1914.²³ A week later Secretary Bryan pronounced the Haitian counter-proposition unacceptable as the Government of the United States desired to encourage American investments in Haiti by contributing to stability and order rather than by favoring special concessions to Americans.²⁴

When the revolution of General Vilbrun Guillaume Sam was attaining serious proportions in the north of Haiti in January, 1915, Admiral William B. Caperton entered the scene and engaged in possibly one of the most novel methods of intervention ever employed in history. Admiral Caperton aboard the Washington was in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, when he received

²³ Ibid., 1914, p. 367.

²⁴ Ibid., 1914, pp. 370-371.

the following orders:

TO: Commander Cruiser Squadron,
United States Fleet, U. S. S.
Washington, flagship, via Com-
mander-in-chief United States
Atlantic Fleet.

SUBJECT: Movement orders -- Washington

1. On January 10, or as soon thereafter as is practicable, proceed with the Washington to San Domingo City, S. D., stopping at such ports en route as may be necessary for coal and men.

2. Upon arrival at San Domingo, S. D., communicate with the diplomatic representative of the United States and acquaint yourself with the political conditions in San Domingo.

3. After such length of stay at San Domingo City as you may deem necessary for the purpose indicated, proceed to Port-au-Prince, Haiti; where you will also communicate with the American minister and acquaint yourself with the political conditions in Haiti. After such length of stay at Port-au-Prince as you may consider advisable, proceed to Habana, Cuba, via Guantanamo, for coal and stores, at discretion.

4. Upon arrival at Habana, communicate with the American minister and acquaint yourself with the political conditions existing in Cuba.

5. After such length of stay at Habana as you may consider necessary for the purpose, proceed with the Washington to Vera Cruz, via Tampico and Tuxpam, acquainting yourself in each locality with the political conditions in Mexico.

6. The department desired that you conduct a military inspection of such units of your command as the Washington may fall in with from time to time and as opportunity offers.

7. The department will be pleased to receive any suggestions or recommendations you may consider it necessary to make in connection with the political situation in West Indian and Mexican waters.²⁵

(Signed) Josephus Daniels

²⁵Senate Hearings, op. cit., pp. 285-286.

While at sea Admiral Caperton received the following message on January 19, 1915:

Rush. Ten p.m. Tuesday. Department directs you proceed Cap Haitien, Haiti, without delay to report conditions. Under what orders did you sail today for Guacanayabo, Gulf of Cuba.²⁶

(Signed) Fletcher

In compliance with these instructions the Washington arrived at Cap Haitien on January 23, 1915, and anchored off Picolet Point, in order to report conditions as stated in the orders, although Secretary Bryan informed Minister Blanchard that the presence of the cruiser was for the purpose of protecting Americans and other foreigners.²⁷

The Admiral sent a staff officer ashore who met the consul, and since there was no disturbance ashore it was decided not to land any armed personnel. Since General Sam was en route to Port-au-Prince via the usual invasion route, through Gonaive and San Marc, and since Admiral Caperton had doubts as to General Sam's desires or ability to control his army, the admiral decided to follow the general by putting in at the various seaports along the route.²⁸ Admiral Caperton as he moved around the coast left gunboats in the various ports in order to enforce rules of civilized warfare on the Haitian General Sam as he proceeded toward Port-au-Prince on his "electioneering" campaign to the Presidency of Haiti. The officers in command of the gunboats would meet the general

²⁶ Ibid., p. 286.

²⁷ Foreign Relations, 1915, p. 461

²⁸ Senate Hearings, op. cit., pp. 288-289

outside the cities and extract a promise from him that he would not loot or burn down the cities along the route. General Sam states: "I do not see how you know where I am going. Everytime I go to enter a city I find your representative outside with some question, asking me to behave myself."²⁹ This is perhaps the first instance in United States history in which an officer of the armed services personally conducted a rebel leader on his revolutionary way of power.

On January 28, 1915, Admiral Caperton received a message from the Secretary of the Navy, in reply to a request for immediate instructions relative to the protection of bank property at Port-au-Prince which advised:

State to the Government of Haiti that the Government of the United States of America cannot consent to the removal of funds that belong to the bank if such removal will make it impossible for the bank to comply with contracted obligations it has assumed. You will issue to that Government a warning that any attempt to remove the funds will compel you to take into consideration means to prevent such violation of foreign stockholders rights.³⁰

Shortly thereafter instructions were received from the Navy Department to land marines and sailors if deemed necessary. With the occupation of Port-au-Prince by the revolutionary forces on February 23, 1915, however, the country became at the moment comparatively quiet; and after the inauguration of General Sam, Admiral Caperton, who had refrained from landing forces, department on the Washington, leaving one vessel at Port-au-Prince.³¹

²⁹ Ibid., p. 290.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 292.

³¹ Ibid., p. 295-299.

When the administration of Davilmar Theodore was tottering in February 1915, and the United States was still considering its recognition, President Wilson decided to negotiate through a commission composed of Ex-Governor J. Franklin Fort, Charles C. Smith, and Minister Blanchard³² but after presenting itself to the Sam Government, which was installed on March 4, 1915, the commission abandoned its attempt and departed March 15, 1915.³³

About two months later Paul Fuller, accredited as special agent and minister plenipotentiary, arrived at Port-au-Prince and presented to the Haitian Minister for foreign affairs a draft treaty which proposed the armed intervention whenever necessary to protect the Republic of Haiti from outside attack and from the aggression of any foreign power, and to aid the Government of Haiti to suppress insurrection from within. The Government of Haiti would obligate itself in return not to grant in any manner whatsoever any rights, privileges or facilities concerning the occupation or use of Mole St. Nicholas to any foreign government, and to enter into an arbitration agreement for the settlement of foreign claims. Such an arbitration agreement would provide for the equal treatment of all foreigners to the end that is the people of Haiti may have the benefit of competition between the nationals of all countries.³⁴

³²Foreign Relations, 1915, pp. 464-467.

³³Ibid., 1915, pp. 464-468.

³⁴Senate Hearings, op. cit., pp. 35-36.

To the Fuller proposals, the Haitian Government offered a counterproject, accepting the armed intervention of the United States to prevent the intrusion of any foreign power in the affairs of Haiti and to repulse any act of aggression attempted against Haiti. It also accepted the American proposal regarding Mole St. Nicholas. It was further proposed that the United States should facilitate the entrance into Haiti of sufficient capital to assure the full economic development of the country, to improve its financial situation, to unify the debt and to reform the currency. The Haitian Government was willing to agree to employ in the customs houses only Haitian officials whose morality and capability were well known, and the creditors might be consulted regarding the choice of the higher customs officials. The Haitian Government further agreed to organize a rural horse-guard, and in the meantime resort might be had to obtain the aid of the American Government to check disorders and serious troubles. In such cases, however, the American forces must be withdrawn from Haitian territory at the first demand of the constitutional authorities.³⁵

There is some reason to believe that the failure of the Fort Commission and the Fuller Mission could be attributed to a piece of correspondence between Secretary Bryan and Mr. Walter Vick, the American receiver of customs in San Domingo,

³⁵Ibid., pp. 36-37.

and the character of our representatives in the adjoining republic. The letter in part stated that the State Department desired a list of the positions open and at the disposal of the receiver which might be awarded to deserving Democrats. The letter further stated that whenever the receiver desired a suggestion from the Secretary of State for the filling of a position to be sure to acquaint Secretary Bryan with the facts. The letter stated: "You have had enough experience in politics to know how valuable workers are when the campaign is on, and how difficult it is to find suitable rewards for all the deserving."³⁶ Mr. Vick did not remove any of his fourteen competent Americans whose salaries were paid by the Dominican Government, but after his resignation several of them were displaced by "deserving" workers. The disgust and hostility existed by this indication of the State Department's policy concerning the administration of our fiscal protectorate in Santo Domingo was one reason why Haiti turned her back on these missions.

In order to follow the step by step movements which led to the events that occurred at the end of July, it is necessary that the movements of Admiral Caperton be charted after the inauguration of President Sam.

³⁶"An Unfortunate Letter", The Independent, May 24, 1915.

Since the situation at the beginning of March, 1915, had become tranquil, and since a constitutional government had become established which was maintaining order and gaining the confidence of the people, Admiral Caperton withdrew in order to engage in target practice at Guantanamo. He left Port-au-Prince on March 8, 1915, but when he reached Guantanamo the Commander-in-chief of the Atlantic fleet informed him that conditions were unsettled at Vera Cruz so he sailed immediately for that port. On July 1, 1915, in accordance with orders from the Navy Department, stating that French marines had landed at Cap Haitien, the Washington was directed to proceed there and thank the French commander and take the necessary steps to protect property and preserve order.³⁷ Admiral Caperton arrived with the Washington on the following Thursday. In order to obtain a better estimate of the situation at Cap Haitien and to get in touch with the general situation in the Haitien Republic, the gunboat, Eagle, was sent to Port-au-Prince. The cruiser Descartes, was found anchored in the harbor of Cap Haitien and the commanding officer of the French cruiser, Captain Lafrogne, paid an official call on Admiral Caperton. Captain Lafrogne stated that he had arrived at Cap Haitien, coming from Jamaica via Port-au-Prince, on the morning of June 19, 1914, at the direction of the French minister at Port-au-Prince; and at that time a revolutionary force under Dr. Ronsolve

³⁷ Senate Hearings, op. cit., p. 299.

Bobo, minister of the interior in former President Davilmar Theodore's cabinet, was in charge of the town; that at noon on that day the revolutionary troops under Bobo had evacuated the town, and the government troops had reentered. The Descartes had landed a force of about fifty men who were stationed in the French consulate, the French monastery, and the bank. Commander Lafrogne further stated that he had kept these men ashore until June 24, 1915, guarding foreign interests and otherwise aiding foreigners. Lafrogne advised that he had sent some flour ashore for the use of the French citizens. The French commander stated that when he arrived in Haitian waters the French minister at Port-au-Prince had received an official protest from the Haitian Government against the Descartes remaining in Haitian waters on account of the violation of neutrality. The German minister had likewise protested to the commander and at the same time to the Haitian Government. The French commander placed himself at the disposal of the American admiral while at Cap Haitien for the protection of foreign interests although, he would have to leave shortly for coal.³⁸

The town of Cap Haitien was also blockaded by the Haitian gunboats, Nord Alexis and the Pacifique, which fired occasionally into the town. A General Probus Blot was in charge of the government forces arrayed against Dr. Bobo who was protesting against the French giving asylum aboard the Descartes to some

³⁸ Ibid., p. 300

government refugees. It is rather important to examine the relations of Admiral Caperton with General Blot who commanded the Sam forces and General Bobo who commanded the revolutionary forces.

The city of Cap Haitien is so situated that it is very easily protected from the outskirts of the city. That is to say, a vessel in the harbor is able to interdict a small neck of land over which troops have to pass in order to enter the town. Admiral Caperton because of his success in personally conducting a civilized revolution during the "electioneering" campaign of General Sam in February 1915, decided that the same tactics would prevent undue hardship in this campaign. He decided after a consultation with General Blot and the American consul that he would not permit any fighting within the city walls. He drew up an order which he presented to General Blot and sent his chief of staff into the jungle to find General Bobo and present that general with the same order.

The directive to the contending parties stated:

The admiral desires to state frankly the purpose of his visit here. The statement is made with kind feeling and without any desire to appear as a threat but it is made so that you may know exactly what to expect of him. The admiral is here to protect the lives of foreigners. This he will do if necessary, but he sincerely hopes and believes that there will not be occasion for him to do anything. The admiral knows that there are armed revolutionists near Cap Haitien, and there is a possibility of a conflict between these revolutionists

and the government forces. The admiral believes that the lives and property of foreigners residing in Cap Haitien will be threatened and insecure should there be fighting in the city itself or near the city. Therefore the admiral states that there must be no fighting in the city or near it, or he will have to take means to protect the lives of foreigners. He, therefore, suggests that all fighting must take place at a reasonable distance from the city, and that under no circumstances shall foreigners be endangered in life or property.³⁹

Afterwards, Admiral Caperton wishing to confirm this wrote letters to General Blot and General Bobo stating in sum and substance the same thing to which they agreed. Just to make his position completely clear, that he was the self-appointed referee in this contest, the Admiral advised the contestants that if they would go out on the plains outside the city and fight it out, he, Admiral Caperton, would recognize the winner and personally see that the successful contestant occupied the city.⁴⁰ He was merely establishing the rules of the Marquis of Queensbury to Caribbean revolutions - a rather unique role for an admiral of the United States Navy.

On July 9, 1915, Admiral Caperton decided to land an outpost detachment officer of his staff to see General Blot and advise him of the fact. General Blot withheld consent since the revolutionist propaganda was stressing the fact that the United States was aiding the government forces and such a landing would give credence to this propaganda,⁴¹ however, events were moving forward at Port-au-Prince which were destined to change the history of Haiti, and which would finally

³⁹Ibid., p. 301.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 303.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 304.

bring to the attention of the United States Government that something in the way of a positive policy must be shaped. The decision, whether or not to intervene in Haitian affairs after July 27, 1915, was not to be decided by either ordinary or extraordinary diplomatic methods.

This policy or rather lack of a definite policy seems to have consisted of adjusting difficulties whenever they arose. It seems to have operated on an opportunistic or ad hoc basis and was compounded of many different ideas on what should have been the basis of our diplomatic approach.

Theodore Roosevelt confused the Latin American Policy of the United States by identifying intervention in this area with the Monroe Doctrine thus making that Doctrine, which had said "hands off" to Europe, seem to say "hands on" for the United States. Actually, as many a responsible statesman had pointed out since Woodrow Wilson's time, the Monroe Doctrine did not give to, nor did it withhold from the United States a right or policy of intervention. But President Roosevelt honestly and resolutely thought that because the Monroe Doctrine prohibited European intervention to secure justice, it ought to follow as a logical corollary that it sanctioned intervention by the United States in order to prevent it by Europe. Many people have wondered why it never occurred to Roosevelt to let all alien investors shift for themselves.

The obvious answer to this question is that the other great powers would not renounce the right of intervention to secure justice including contract debts. The European powers had intervened in Venezuela, and the Hague Court had put a sanction of international law on the justice of their use of force.⁴²

The Roosevelt approach was succeeded by the "dollar diplomacy" of President Taft and Secretary of State Knox. Critics used the phrase to suggest a deliberate design by the United States to dominate these republics for the private profit of the nation's big bankers. Dollar diplomacy was a glib phrase that easily lent itself to propaganda and an exaggerated Yankee phobia. Taft and Knox were merely following the instinct and traditions of continental security rather than the lead of selfish private interests. Haiti was one of the states of the Western Hemisphere where the least American capital was invested. It was a well known fact that before World War I capital found more lucrative fields in the United States than outside its boundaries, and that it was only with difficulty that the Department of State was able to persuade bankers to invest their funds for political purposes in this type of a foreign country. The larger holdings of capital invested abroad were in Cuba where big business had opposed intervention in 1898; in Mexico, where the United States

⁴² Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United States, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1943), pp. 157-158.

Government and public opinion had been averse to intervention; in Canada, and in the larger and more stable republics of South America. It seems to be an historical fact that the more capital a country of the New World has accepted from private investors in the United States the less the danger there has been of intervention. Such investments have brought a wealth of good to the Latin American countries, but it is doubtful whether they have been profitable to the economy of the United States, not to mention the investors. American diplomacy has always been sensitive to the strategical requirements of continental security. This, and not selfish private interests, really explains both the policy of Roosevelt and the dollar diplomacy of Taft. It also explains in a large measure the Caribbean policy of Woodrow Wilson.⁴³

Wilson and Bryan strove to strengthen our influence and control in this region in order to remove further than ever justification for any European intervention. They did not let their professed dislike for dollar diplomacy conflict with strategic demands; however, by this time, something new had been added. Wilson was going to be the savior of these people from bad government, tyranny, and economic exploitation in order that they might be made fit and stable for self-government, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness under the protection of the United States as in the case of Cuba. In any close examination of our desires to intervene in the affairs of Haiti

⁴³Ibid., pp. 165-166.

after the inauguration of Wilson this last addition must be given the greatest weight.⁴⁴

In the published material regarding these negotiations which occurred after 1913, references to the Monroe Doctrine are significantly rare, and it may be doubted whether there was any serious danger in 1914 or 1915 of European intervention in Haiti. The French legation in Port-au-Prince had, of course, lent its support to the bank, and in February 1915, the French embassy in Washington requested that, in the event of a financial reorganization of Haiti by the United States, "France should naturally be taken into partnership in those measures." Germany demanded participation in customs control, or failing that, maintenance of the status quo.

Writing on May 2, 1922, Ex-Secretary Lansing stated that there was good reason to believe that in the years 1913-1914 Germany was ready to go to great lengths to secure the exclusive customs control of Haiti; and also to secure a coaling station at Mole St. Nicholas.⁴⁵ With respect to customs control, Mr. Lansing cited the landing of a number of boatloads of armed German sailors at Port-au-Prince on July 31, 1914, and believed that the local situation was, by the outbreak of World War I, relieved of a conflict of interests, which might have caused serious embarrassment.⁴⁶


⁴⁵ Inquiry into Occupation and Administration of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, 67th Congress, Senate Report No. 794,
p. 32.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 35.

The German attempts to obtain a foothold at Mole St. Nicholas cited by Mr. Lansing appear to have been made by German shipping interests rather than by the German government. Whether that distinction was important or not, the United States was evidently concerned only with preventing the acquisition of a base on the Haitian coast by a European Government. It is also clear that as early as the spring of 1915, American officials were no longer interested in obtaining for the United States the lease or cession of Mole St. Nicholas or any other Haitian territory.

Neither did American policy directly aim at specific concessions or exclusive economic privileges. Prior to July 1915, the Government of the United States seems to have made it known to the German, French and probably other foreign Governments that the United States proposed to maintain in Haiti a regime of equality of economic opportunity.

American policy toward Haiti, so far as it has been comprehended in this chapter, was a product of various motives and viewpoints; but dated from the Wilson statement of March 11, 1913, outlining his administrations attitude toward Latin America, the basic purpose was the creation of stable conditions in the republic.



Haiti and Its Position in the Caribbean

CHAPTER IV

ACQUIRING A PROTECTORATE

Guillaume Sam, the third President of Haiti, who had been convicted of embezzlement in the bank scandal, had taken over the administration in March 1915. For four months he had been maintaining his position with increasing difficulty. The revolutionary party of Dr. Ronsolve Bobo was smoldering with revolt in the south of the island; in the north, Bobo himself was at the head of a ragged army which had broken out into open brigandage.¹ The legations of Port-au-Prince, all except the American Legation, which would not receive them, were full of political refugees, actually members of the Bobo faction or sympathizers with the preceding administration of Davilmar Theodore, whom Guillaume Sam had driven into exile in San Domingo.²

In addition to these interned patriots the Sam faction, becoming more apprehensive and panicky as the revolution slowly spread, had arrested one hundred seventy-five political suspects and packed them into the city jail.³ They were jammed by groups into close cells or barricaded in a corral. Among the prisoners were Oreste Zamor, an ex-president of the Republic, two ex-cabinet members, and three young sons of General Polynice, one of the best known and respected citizens of the capital.

¹H. P. Davis, Black Democracy, (New York: The Dial Press, 1929) p. 162.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 164.

It was known that conspiracies against Sam were coming to a head, and the President, anticipating an attack, spent the night of July 26, 1915, on the porch of the palace, surrounded by his aides and bodyguard. The palace guards had been honeycombed with sedition and when the conspirators who had been interned in the legations began to attack the palace, these soldiers deserted Sam. A skirmish took place and then these loyal members of the Sam bodyguard abandoned the President. However, enough found refuge with the President in the palace which they barricaded and held for a time against the fire of the revolutionists. The anti-Sam revolution led by the Bobo faction and the ex-presidential factions of Samor and Theodore was on full blast. Upon to this point about sixty Haitians had been killed and the President was completely terror-stricken.⁴

Here was the key to the atrocities which followed. During the night of the twenty-sixth, being warned of the possibilities of an outbreak, Guillaume Sam sent a letter to General Oscar, the officer in charge of the political suspects in the city prison. This letter was located and authenticated. The letter stated that if in the morning Sam was unable to hold the palace, General Oscar was to do at once that which he (Oscar)

⁴Ibid., pp. 162-163.

had promised he would do.⁵

The first attack on the palace was abandoned early in the morning of the twenty-seventh. Sometime later, the President with his family made a break from the palace across the garden and scaled the walls of the French Legation where he and his family took sanctuary. The escape was not made unnoticed and several shots were fired, one of them hitting the President in the leg.

About eleven o'clock on the morning of the twenty-seventh a man ran into the American Legation and told the personnel there that General Oscar had murdered all the political hostages in the city prison. He further stated that General Oscar had run to the Dominican Legation for sanctuary after completing the massacre. Charge d' Affaires Robert B. Davis of the Legation left immediately for the Dominican Legation and on arriving there he found General Oscar dead in the street. The General had carried out the promise made to President Sam. He and his jailers had gone into the prison and killed one hundred sixty-eight of the one hundred seventy-five defenseless prisoners. When Oscar had finished his assignment, he had run to the Dominican legation. General Polynice who had lost his three sons in the massacre rode inside and smashing Oscar over

⁵Hearings before a Select Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo, United States Senate, Sixty-seventh Congress, Pursuant to Senate Resolution 112, authorizing a special committee to inquire into the occupation and administration of the territories of the Republic of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, 1st Session, Washington, 1922, p. 306. Document cited hereinafter referred to as Senate Hearings.

the head with his cane, dragged him outside the Legation area and shot him.⁶

Davis ran down to the prison and verified the fact of the butchery. He then made his way to the American Legation and telegraphed to Admiral Caperton on board the Washington at Cap Haitien to come at once to Port-au-Prince.⁷

Late in the afternoon of the twenty-seventh a note was dispatched on the stationery of the French Minister from Mr. Kohan, the British Charge d' Affaires. The President, Mr. Kohan wrote, had taken refuge in the French Legation, where he himself then was. Both he and the French Minister wanted the American Charge d' Affaires to join them at the French Legation so that they might act together in meeting the difficulties and dangers of the situation.

Mr. Davis at once complied with this request. He spent the afternoon of the twenty-seventh and all that night in the French Legation.

When Charles Zamor had seen what had happened to his brother in the massacre, he returned to the French Legation with a machete in his hands and attempted to find Guillaume Sam. However, Alice Gerard, the daughter of the French Minister, stopped him. She reminded him of the months her family had sheltered him from death at the hands of his enemies and of his ingratitude in seeking to violate their hospitality. She

⁶Ibid., p. 307.

⁷Ibid., p. 305.

saved the President that time. Zamor walked out of the house, not to return, but he was active in the occurrences which followed.⁸

This is important as it accounts for the actions taken by important individuals in the few hours succeeding this affair. The French Minister and his family, the British Charge d' Affaires, and the American Charge d' Affaires were in the French Legation until daybreak on the twenty-eighth expecting an attack at any time. The sanctuary they were giving President Sam and his followers might involve them in the growing frenzy of the mob and also in the retribution which they knew the mob must eventually seek. Both Kohan and Davis were unarmed and there was no possible way of defending the gardens or the house from an attack. Their only defense lay in what protection the French flag afforded and the traditionally inviolable premises of a foreign power.⁹

At about nine o'clock the American Charge d' Affaires left the French Legation to go to his own office for dispatches. No attack having been made on the French Legation, it was safe to conclude it might be postponed until the following night and by then the Washington would arrive and save them all. At the American Legation he found a dispatch from Admiral Caperton advising him of his immediate departure from the Cap. Looking toward the sea Davis saw the smoke of

⁸ Ibid., p. 307

⁹ Department of State Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1916, Government Printing Office, 1924, pp. 314-317. Document cited hereinafter referred to as Foreign Relations.

a steamer about twenty miles away and assumed it was the Washington.

Mr. Davis stated that it must have been about an hour later that he heard a yell, and assumed that the mob had stormed the French Legation. He ran down towards the town noticing at the same time that the ship appeared to be white and therefore could not be the Washington. As a matter of fact it was the Washington, but because of the heavy black smoke behind and the terrific bow wave due to the forced draft speed at which she was steaming, she appeared to be white from a distance, however, the ship had arrived about an hour too late as far as Guillaume Sam was concerned.¹⁰

The crowd, seeing the smoke and aware that if it were a foreign naval vessel it would be balked of its revenge, had attacked the French legation. Guillaume Sam was removed from the Legation, thrown over the fence, and cut to pieces and paraded about the town.

When Davis returned to the American legation on foot he was insulted and threatened. Upon his arrival, he found four officers of the Washington awaiting him. The situation was briefly explained and then Davis, with Kohan, and the French Minister, went down to the pier and boarded the Washington.¹¹

¹⁰ Senate Hearings, pp. 305-307.

¹¹ Foreign Relations, 1916, op. cit., pp. 314-317.

Once aboard, they were received by Admiral Caperton to whom they gave, as an eye witness, a brief account of the preceding forty-eight hours. All three of the diplomatic representatives, thoroughly frightened by prospect of mob rule, advised a landing in force as a means of restoring order and protecting lives and property of foreigners.¹² Admiral Caperton, after a staff conference, announced that he would land marines and sailors that afternoon. Then with Captain E. L. Beach and the three diplomats the Admiral went ashore. By this time the waterfront was crowded with highly excited Haitians. The four men, after viewing the situation at the waterfront, drove up to the Place Dessalines where the revolutionary committee had its temporary headquarters.

The French minister, by this time in a highly nervous state, pushed his way through the crowd to his house and his wife and daughters. The American Charge d' Affaires, Captain Beach, and the Admiral then announced to the committee that marines and sailors from the Washington were about to be sent ashore under cover of the ship's guns to protect foreign lives and property in Port-au-Prince. The revolutionary committee concurred with the action of the diplomats and naval officers.¹³

¹²Senate Hearings, op. cit., p. 308.

¹³Ibid.

In the meantime at three o'clock, P.M. on July 28th, the acting Secretary of the Navy sent the following message to Admiral Caperton in Port-au-Prince:

State Department desires that American forces be landed at Port-au-Prince and that American and foreign interests be protected; that representatives of England and France be informed of this intention - informed that their interests will be protected and they be requested not to land. In acting on this request be guided by your knowledge of present conditions in Port-au-Prince and act at discretion. Department had ordered Jason, with marines at Guantanamo Bay, to proceed immediately to Port-au-Prince. If more forces are absolutely necessary, wire immediately.¹⁴

(Signed) Benson, acting

On the way down from Cap Haitien the Admiral had made all the preparations for a landing. In view of the instructions from the Navy Department, and in cooperation with the State Department, Admiral Caperton landed a provisional regiment of marines under the command of Captain Orden at Port-au-Prince on the afternoon of July 28, 1915, and occupied the city.¹⁵

This operation is described in the following radiogram sent by Admiral Caperton to the Secretary on July 28, 1915:

Landing at Port-au-Prince decided on after consulting with American Charge d' Affaires, and British Charge d' Affaires. Informed General Polynice and three others, who seemed to be leaders ashore, of my intention to land and protect lives and property and preserve order. They assented to this landing, but said they could not guarantee peaceful entry, but would do all they could to explain our intentions to the populace and prevent disturbance and would cooperate with us. Descartes

¹⁴Ibid., p. 307.

¹⁵Ibid.

(French warship) expected tonight. No foreign men-of-war in harbor excepting Washington at present. Consider immediate landing necessary. Landing made at Bizoton with two companies of marines and three companies of seamen at 5:30 p.m. U. S. S. Eagle reports conditions at Cap Haitien quiet. Eagle had landed twenty men Cap Haitien to protect French consulate for fear of attack on refugees there. Landing made at request of French consul.¹⁶

(Signed) Caperton

In order to acquaint the Charge d' Affaires of his intentions the Admiral wrote the following letter:

I have the honor to state that it appears that rioting and disorder in Port-au-Prince have gotten beyond control and the situation to have become such as to endanger the lives and property of Americans and other foreigners who are left without protection. As a result of our conference a naval force will land and afford such protection. To facilitate this you are respectfully requested to notify all Americans and all foreign diplomats, representatives, consuls, and others who desire protection to keep within doors, to hoist the flag of their nationality, and to refrain from all actions which could possibly be interpreted as a hostile demonstration against the naval force.¹⁷

(Signed) Caperton

The Admiral stated, before the committee, that he was moved especially by the intense feeling and desire with which the French minister and the British Charge d' Affaires insisted upon his landing immediately. The French minister said, speaking of his family, "They are there at the legation with no one to protect them. Now, you see what is going on in the city."

¹⁶Ibid., p. 308.

¹⁷Ibid.

The marines and seamen were put in the French legation garden, detachments were stationed at the American Hotel, in the market, at the bank, and at other strategic points. Headquarters was established at the American legation, with Captain Beach, as the Admiral's representative, in command ashore. The situation being entirely a military one and the city under martial law, the diplomatic corps naturally handed over all local jurisdiction to the United States Navy. At a quarter before nine a.m. July 28, 1915, Villbrun Guillaume Sam had been the President of Haiti; at a quarter before nine p.m. on the same day, Admiral Caperton was the ruler of Haiti.

During the following week it appeared that Haitians in general, with the exception of politicians, soldiers and bandits felt relief at the presence of American troops; but there was quite an undercurrent of excitement and unrest heightened by a fear that the United States had designs on Haitian independence.¹⁸ Admiral Caperton reported that a large number of bandits were in the city demanding the election of Dr. Bobo as President, that the members of the National Assembly were terrorized, that stable government was not possible until these bandits were disbanded and their power broken, and that such action seemed imperative if the United States desired to negotiate a treaty for the financial control of Haiti.¹⁹ The Admiral

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 308, 313.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 313.

expressed the opinion that the United States must expect to remain in Haiti until native government was self-sustaining and the people educated to respect the laws and abide by them.²⁰

On August 5, 1915, Admiral Caperton put Captain Beach in charge of such civilian matters and negotiations as would grow out of military control.²¹ Two days later the Admiral reported that because it did not keep faith he had curtailed the power of the revolutionary committee, and that his orders were gladly accepted and executed by the civil officials of the late Government.²² In the meantime, the marines were beginning to disperse and arrest the bandits in Port-au-Prince.

The National Bank, reminding the Secretary of State that American authorities had taken over the customs services at Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien, now requested that money collected at these ports should be turned over to the bank. It was also pointed out that there was no longer any government at ports that were not occupied by the forces of the United States, and revenues collected by local authorities were being used for the subsidizing of revolutionists and that an undetermined amount of paper money had been put into circulation.²³ Admiral Caperton confirmed this information in his reports, and, on account of military necessity, returned the treasury service at Port-au-Prince to the bank, and arranged for certain payments

²¹Ibid., p. 334.

²²Foreign Relations, 1915, on. cit., pp. 478-479.

²³Ibid., 1915, pp. 515-516.

to disarmed Haitian soldiers.²⁴ Charge d' Affaires Davis was instructed on August 12, 1915, to consult with Admiral Caperton and arrange for the seizure of any consignments of paper money that might arrive from New York.²⁵

In response to the Admiral's request for a statement of policy, the Navy Department instructed him to conciliate Haitians to the fullest extent consistent with maintaining order and firm control of the situation and to issue a proclamation assuring the people that the only object of the United States was to insure, establish, and help to maintain Haitian independence and the establishment of a stable and firm government by the Haitian people. American forces would be kept in Haiti only so long as would be necessary for this purpose.²⁶

With the election of a President impending, on August 2, 1915, the admiral believed that in spite of the insurrectionary attitude on the part of some of the inhabitants he could control the National Assembly. This was necessary since the National Assembly elected the President under the then existing Haitien Constitution. The election, set for the following Sunday, was postponed at his request, although he stated that the people were anxious for an election because at that time there was no central government except as directed by him.²⁷ After further observation he believed that Senator Sudre Dartiguenave would

²⁴Ibid., 1915, pp. 519-520.

²⁵Senate Hearings, on. cit., p. 517.

²⁶Foreign Relations, 1915, on. cit., p. 481.

²⁷Senate Hearings, on. cit., p. 312.

be elected to the presidency, and he reported that this presidential aspirant realized that Haiti must agree to any terms laid down by the United States.²⁸ But Dr. Bobo, resigning the chief executive power now had arrived on the scene. Admiral Caperton, personally or through his naval officers, was having daily conferences with the president of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, with senators, deputies, ex-cabinet ministers, and many leading Haitians, and reported that, according to Senator Dartiguenave, members of the legislature were willing to cede outright, without restriction, St. Nicholas Mole, granting us the right to intervene when necessary, custom-house control, and any other terms. He now stated that unless otherwise directed, he would permit the National Assembly to elect a President.²⁹

At a conference held at the American Legation on August 8, 1916, attended by both Dartiguenave and Bobo, the admiral's chief of staff, Captain Edward L. Beach, addressed the two candidates as follows:

Gentlemen, it seems likely that one of you will be elected President of Haiti. Haiti is in great trouble; she has suffered much. The United States has come to Haiti as a good friend, interested only in Haiti's welfare, in her happiness, in her prosperity. The United States has determined that revolution and disorder and anarchy must cease in Haiti; that unselfish and devoted patriotism must characterize hereafter the acts of the Haitian Government. Senator Dartiguenave and Dr. Bobo, realizing this momentous crisis in Haitian history, with

²⁸ Foreign Relations, 1915, op. cit., p. 478.

²⁹ Ibid., 1915, pp. 478-479.

the eyes of Haiti and of the United States upon you, do you promise that if elected President of Haiti you will in your official acts be guided solely by earnest devotion to Haiti's honor and welfare?

"I will so promise," replied Dartiguenave. "I have no other ambition than to be of service to my country."

"I promise," exclaimed Dr. Bobo, rather theatrically. "I would be happy to lay down my life for my beloved country."

"Senator Dartiguenave, in case Dr. Bobo should be elected will you promise that you will exert every influence in your power to assist him for Haiti's good; that you will join with him heartily and helpfully and loyally?"

"If Dr. Bobo is elected President I will give him the most loyal, earnest support in every effort he may make for Haiti's welfare," replied Dartiguenave.

"Dr. Bobo, if Senator Dartiguenave is elected President, will you help him loyally and earnestly in his efforts to benefit Haiti?"

"No, I will not!" shouted Bobo. "If Senator Dartiguenave is elected President I will not help him. I will go away and leave Haiti to her fate. I alone am fit to be President of Haiti; I alone understand Haiti's aspirations, no one is fit to be President but me; there is no patriotism in Haiti to be compared with mine; the Haitians love no one as they love me."³⁰

This seemed to have been Dr. Bobo's swan song since on the next day the Navy Department instructed Admiral Caperton to allow the election to take place whenever the Haitians wished and informed him that the United States preferred the election of Dartiguenave.³¹ The Secretary of State referred to the fact that the Navy Department had authorized Admiral Caperton to permit the Presidential election to take place, instructed the charge d' affaires in cooperation with the Admiral to make

³⁰ Senate Hearings, op. cit., p. 316.

³¹ Ibid., p. 315.

clear to the congress that the Government of the United States intended to uphold it, but that it could not recognize action which did not establish in charge of Haitian affairs those whose abilities and dispositions gave assurance of putting an end to factional disorders; and it should be made perfectly clear to candidates as soon as possible and in advance of their election, that the United States expected to be intrusted with the practical control of the customs and such financial control over the affairs of the Republic of Haiti as the United States might deem necessary for an efficient administration. The telegram concluded with a brief but clear statement of policy and purpose: that the United States meant to assist in establishing a constitutional government and to support it as long as necessity might require, and that the United States had no design upon the political or territorial integrity of Haiti, but on the contrary, what had been done, as well as what would be done, was conceived in an effort to aid the people of Haiti in establishing a stable government and in maintaining domestic peace throughout the republic.³²

Under the Bobo faction, the revolutionary committee, foreseeing the defeat of their candidate in the election, ordered the dissolution of the National Assembly and was prevented by marines from sealing the door of the Chamber of Deputies. Thereupon, Admiral Caperton directed the revolutionary

³²Foreign Relations, 1915, op. cit., pp. 479-480.

committee to resign.³³ Charge d' Affaires Davis and Captain Beach communicated the views of the Department of State to the senators, deputies, and candidates; and on August 12, 1915, Dartiguenave was chosen President in an election held under protection of marines. The President-elect expressed his gratitude for the protection afforded which alone made an election with any degree of freedom possible.³⁴

While there is no proof that the members of the National Assembly were directly coerced into voting for Dartiguenave,³⁵ his election was evidently attributed to the American intervention. Had matters taken a more precipitate, and, in Haiti, a more natural course, Dr. Bobo apparently would have been elected by a revolutionist dominated Assembly.

In the minds of American officials, military intervention and the presidential election were closely related to the conclusion of a treaty and the Department of State took up this question with President Dartiguenave immediately after his inauguration.

The Secretary of State telegraphed the American minister that the Haitian Government had been familiar with the terms of the treaty contained in the Department's instructions of July 2, 1914, to which they had already expressed their agreement regarding its principal parts. However, assurances

³³ Senate Hearings, op. cit., pp. 315-316.

³⁴ Foreign Relations, 1915, op. cit., p. 480.

³⁵ Senate Hearings, op. cit., pp. 317, 362-364.

had been received that Haitian authorities were willing to go farther than before, including cession to the United States of Mole St. Nicholas. In view of the friendly attitude of the Haitian Government as shown by these proposals, the minister was instructed to draft a treaty as outlined in the telegram, submit it informally to the President, and request him to have the legislative body pass a resolution authorizing him to conclude, without modification, the treaty submitted by the minister. When officially notified that such a resolution had been passed, the minister was to extend recognition to the President.³⁶

The treaty as projected by the Department was broader in scope and stricter in supervision than that contemplated in the draft of July 2, 1914; since, in addition to clearly specified financial control, new articles were now proposed, including one for a Haitian constabulary to be organized and officered by Americans designated by the President of the United States. An additional article sought to bind the Haitian Government not to surrender any of the territory of the Republic of Haiti by sale, lease, or otherwise, or jurisdiction over such territory, to any foreign Government or power except to the United States, nor to enter into any treaty or contract with any foreign power or powers that would impair, or tend to impair, the independence of Haiti. A protocol was

³⁶Ibid., pp. 327-328.

to be executed for the settlement of foreign claims; and since Haiti was desirous of furthering the development of its natural resources, the Haitian Government was to undertake and execute such measures as in the opinion of the United States would be necessary for the sanitation and public improvement of the republic under the supervision of American engineers. Finally, the United States was to have authority to prevent any and all interference with the attainment of any of the objects comprehended in the convention, as well as the right to intervene for the preservation of Haitian independence and the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty.³⁷

Charge d' Affaires Davis was informed on August 12, 1915, that the Department expected prompt ratification by Haiti of this treaty.

At the same time the Navy Department, on the request of Secretary Lansing instructed Admiral Caperton to take charge of the customs houses at all of the important seaports, and to deposit the receipts with the National Bank.³⁸ In reply, the Admiral on August 19, 1915, telegraphed that the United States had now actually accomplished a military intervention in the affairs of another nation. After pointing out that his force at the time was sufficient only for holding the capital and two other seaports then occupied, he explained that taking charge of seven other custom houses meant practically the

³⁷Foreign Relations, 1915, op. cit., pp. 431-434.

³⁸Senate Hearings, op. cit., p. 333.

military occupation of the entire seacoast of Haiti. Such an occupation would require considerable reinforcements, and the admiral considered it imperative that these contemplated operations be kept secret, he stated that secrecy was extremely important pending the treaty negotiations.³⁹ Nevertheless he proceeded with the seizure of the custom houses, appointed a naval officer administrator of customs for the entire coast of Haiti; issued general instructions relative to customs organization and other civil matters, and deposited all collections with the National Bank.⁴⁰

Charge d' Affaires Davis was now informed by the State Department that it contemplated using its unofficial good offices, as soon as possible after ratification of the treaty, to obtain the immediate renewal of railroad construction so as to furnish a means of livelihood for the unemployed. In the meantime, the Charge d' Affaires was to confer with Admiral Caperton to the end that, under the latter's direction, such public works might be conducted as would relieve unemployment and discourage factional strife. The Charge d' Affaires was also to confer with the Catholic Archbishop Conan with a view to the issue of a proclamation to the natives through the clergy so that they would be protected from interference in their rights to barter and sell their products and to enjoy the fruits of their labors.⁴¹

³⁹ Ibid., p. 335.

⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 339-341.

⁴¹ Foreign Relations, 1915, op. cit., pp. 434-435.

Shortly afterwards, the Department of State sent to Charge d' Affaires Davis a statement of the views and purposes of the Government of the United States. In order to establish a stable government and a lasting peace, it was argued, the treaty as submitted should be ratified immediately, and at the same time a modus vivendi should be concluded to operate until ratification of the treaty by the United States Senate. As an inducement to the Haitian Government to request a modus vivendi, the Charge d' Affaires was authorized to express the conviction that the Haitian Government would not find the State Department unsympathetic towards any proper effort which might be made to place the Haitian finances on a sound basis so that the Haitian Government might be able to pay promptly, adequate salaries to its officials, establish a good school system, construct roads and various other public works, and furnish employment to the people and afford them opportunities to improve their industrial and intellectual conditions.⁴²

These altruistic and somewhat remote inducements did not stimulate the Haitian Government to act as promptly as the State Department wished. The Charge d' Affaires reported that if the Department insisted on a resolution of the chambers authorizing the executive to conclude the treaty without modification, the President and cabinet would be forced to

⁴²Ibid., pp. 435-436.

resign. Charge d' Affaires Davis expressed the opinion that the Haitian Government desired to avoid yielding customs control.⁴³ Thereupon, American tactics became less impersonal and shifted from vague promises to guarded threats. Charge d' Affaires Davis was now informed that, unless the treaty were promptly ratified, the Government of the United States would be compelled to consider the establishment in Haiti of a military government until honest elections could be held, or, it would permit the control of the Government to pass to some other political faction representative of the best elements in Haiti whose members would be willing to join in the prompt reestablishment of a stable government and permanent domestic peace.⁴⁴

As the discussion of the treaty continued, the elements of the Haitian people which had profited from the old regime set themselves to creating unrest and influencing opinion against the Government and the Americans. In order to give the agitators fewer pretexts for their propaganda, the Charge d' Affaires suggested that no steps should be taken which would arouse public opinion except those dictated by military necessity; and Admiral Caperton simultaneously informed his Department that he would defer the seizure of the customs houses, and would conduct no further military operations except those necessary for preserving peace and order or for other important military reasons.⁴⁵

⁴³Senate Hearings, op. cit., p. 337

⁴⁴Foreign Relations, 1915, op. cit., pp. 437-438.

⁴⁵Senate Hearings, op. cit., p. 338

The Department of State proposed to bring further pressure on the Haitian Government; but, instead of doing so, it received and considered various modifications of the draft treaty which were proposed on August 29, 1915, by President Dartiguenave and his Cabinet.⁴⁶

In the meantime the Haitian Government was receiving no funds from the American authorities for current expenses, and was making its pecuniary embarrassment known to Admiral Caperton and the legation.⁴⁷ On the arrival of a consignment of paper money from New York, the Department instructed Charge d' Affaires Davis to confer with Admiral Caperton and arrange that the paper money be held for the time being. He was also instructed to obtain the consent of President Dartiguenave to such retention, as the Department had consented to use its good offices to arrange for the temporary loan desired by the Haitian Government for \$1,500,000 on the express understanding that there would be no further emission of paper money.⁴⁸ The Charge d' Affaires, however, was of the opinion that the paper money should be placed in circulation, as the withholding of it was embarrassing the Haitian Government and was being used by the opposition to prevent ratification of the treaty. Admiral Caperton, who had no knowledge of the Charge d' Affaires' dispatch, had worked out a plan with the bank whereby the

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 344.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 341-342.

⁴⁸ Foreign Relations, 1915, op. cit., p. 521.

notes would be put into circulation immediately after the ratification of the treaty.⁴⁹ The Department of State approved Admiral Caperton's plan in principle and so instructed the legation; but the Haitian Government objected. Thereupon, Davis recommended an immediate loan of \$100,000 or the payment of that amount by the customs officials; and Admiral Caperton asked for permission to make the payments.⁵⁰ Permission, however, was delayed.

Instead, Secretary Lansing pointed out to the Charge d' Affaires that the proposed convention was necessary to make peace permanent and to give Haiti a new basis of credit. The next concern of the United States was to see prosperity throughout the republic. Haiti, he said, should appreciate that means for economic and industrial development could not come from within and that foreign capital must be sought and secured, and this could not be expected unless there was reasonable assurance against internal dissensions. Not until the proposed convention was ratified and those in authority had manifested a desire to pursue a progressive policy for the development of Haiti could foreign capital be expected.⁵¹

⁴⁹ Senate Hearings, op. cit., pp. 379-380.

⁵⁰ Foreign Relations, 1915, op. cit., pp. 524-525.

⁵¹ Ibid., 1915, p. 441.

Admiral Caperton on September 2, 1915, took over the administration of the customs house at Port-au-Prince, thus completing American military control of the Haitian customs service and on the following day he issued a proclamation of martial law applicable to Port-au-Prince, and imposed certain restrictions on the press.⁵²

Revolutionary activity was increasing in the north and Admiral Caperton believed that resumption of railroad construction might induce many of the banditti to desert their chiefs and go to work.⁵³ The Department of State, however, informed the legation that the persons connected with the financing of the railway had indicated that if the treaty was ratified those matters could be adjusted and the work renewed with a clear understanding regarding the extension of time which would be granted in which construction under concession would be terminated. The Department expressed its regrets that customs revenues would not suffice to provide employment and thus stop disorders in the north; and stated that, should this condition persist, it would endeavor to arrange with bankers for an advance sufficient to employ the hungry and indigent citizens.⁵⁴

The Admiral stated on September 4, 1915, that, if measures such as railroad construction were not promptly undertaken, he would be forced very soon to consider offensive operations

⁵² Senate Hearings, op. cit., pp. 65-70.

⁵³ Ibid., pp. 349-352.

⁵⁴ Foreign Relations, 1915, op. cit., p. 549.

against the north. This brought prompt instructions from Secretary Daniels to take no offensive action against Haitians without first consulting the Navy Department unless absolutely necessary to prevent loss of life or property.⁵⁵

Although President Dartiguenave expressed the opinion that the declaration of martial law had greatly strengthened his position, certain members of the Cabinet were opposed to signing the treaty, and on September 7, 1915, the minister for foreign affairs and the minister of public works refused to accept that part which related to the financial advisor, whereupon the President requested and accepted the immediate resignation of those officials. The Haitian executive then discussed with Davis the filling of the two Cabinet vacancies; and on September 9, 1915, Louis Borno was appointed minister for foreign affairs and Paul Solomon minister of public works.⁵⁶ Nevertheless, Minister Borno assured the American Charge d' Affaires that he too would resign if the United States Government insisted on the original draft of the treaty. He also proposed various changes in the treaty which he declared were made in the attempt to concede to all the United States demands but to do so in a manner less humiliating to the Haitian people, and to avoid certain points which in the opinion of the Government were not possible under the Haitian Constitution.⁵⁷

⁵⁵Senate Hearings, op. cit., pp. 349-350.

⁵⁶Foreign Relations, 1915, op. cit., pp. 442-443.

⁵⁷Ibid.

During the Cabinet crisis, Admiral Caperton stated in a dispatch to the commanding officer of the Connecticut:

Successful negotiation of treaty is predominate part present mission. After encountering many difficulties treaty situation at present looks more favorable than usual. This has been effected by exercising military pressure at propitious moments in negotiations. At present am holding up offensive operations and allowing President time to complete Cabinet and try again. Am therefore not yet ready to begin offensive operations at Cap Haitien but will hold them in abeyance as additional pressure.⁵⁸

The Department of State of September 12, 1915, accepted a number of the changes proposed by Minister Borno, and the latter assured Davis that the Haitian Government was now ready to sign the treaty and enter into a modus vivendi and submit the treaty for immediate ratification. At the same time, the Haitian Government pointed out that it had only 600,000 gourdes with which to meet current expenses and pay arrears of salaries; and it desired assurances that the United States would use its good offices in obtaining for Haiti a temporary loan. The United States gave assurances, that upon ratification of the treaty it would lend its good offices for obtaining such loans as might be necessary and would also take the necessary steps to obtain an advance of \$100,000 by the National Bank of Haiti in order to meet pressing needs. The treaty was signed by Charge d' Affaires Davis and Minister Borno on September 16, 1915, and at the same time the Dartiguenave

⁵⁸ Senate Hearings, op. cit., p. 353.

Government was formally recognized by the United States.⁵⁹

The Chamber of Deputies voted ratification of the treaty on October 6, 1915, but there was opposition in the Senate and a desire in that body to reopen negotiations. Charge d'Affaires Davis, however, informed Minister Borno that the Government of the United States would expect definite action on the treaty as signed within a few days.⁶⁰

A day before the deputies ratified the treaty, authorization came from Washington to furnish the Haitian Government sufficient amounts weekly to meet current expenses out of the customs receipts. On October 12, 1915, Admiral Caperton was authorized to establish a weekly allowance of \$25,000, and about a week later he paid the current salaries of senators and deputies. He reported to the Secretary of the Navy that inasmuch as he had received continued assurance that the majority in the Senate favored the treaty, he had refrained from taking any steps which might appear as using force to secure ratification. He believed it best that the treaty be ratified after full discussion following the Haitian rules of procedure.⁶¹

The Department of State became at this time apprehensive lest elements lobbying at Port-au-Prince might defeat ratification of the treaty. The Secretary expressed the

⁶⁰Ibid., 1915, pp. 452-453.

⁶¹Senate Hearings, op. cit., pp. 383-387.

conviction that certain of the senators were endeavoring to prevent action by the Haitian Senate until after the United States Senate would meet, with the idea of conducting a lobby at Washington in the hope of producing a political situation in the United States which would result in the withdrawal of the marines from Haiti.⁶² Admiral Caperton called on President Dartiguenave on November 3, 1915. He explained that he had given Captain Beach orders to do everything in his power to get the treaty ratified and that Captain Beach had repeatedly seen different members of the Senate treaty committee, as well as other prominent Haitians and had argued for the ratification of the treaty. The Admiral then requested the names of any Haitian senators whose attitude toward the treaty was doubtful, in order that his arguments could be presented to them. Failure to ratify the treaty the Admiral advised would delay regeneration, and tens of thousands who were crying for food would become hungrier. He further stated that it must be clearly understood that the outside world would not invest money nor start business enterprises in Haiti until Haiti's relations with the United States were settled. The Admiral declared that it was his plan, as soon as the treaty had been ratified, to institute systematic methods to inform the people of Haiti of the benevolent, unselfish, and helpful purposes of the United

⁶²Foreign Relations, 1915, op. cit., pp. 456-457.

States Government, and that he intended to visit the ports of Haiti for the purpose of meeting Haitians of all classes and explain to them the friendly intentions of the United States.⁶³

The treaty remaining unratified, the Secretary of the Navy on November 10, 1915, instructed Admiral Caperton to appear at a meeting of the Haitian Cabinet. He was to state on his own authority that he was confident that if the treaty failed of ratification that the United States Government had the intentions to retain control in Haiti until the desired end would be accomplished. The United States forces would then proceed to the complete pacification of the country so as to insure internal tranquillity necessary to the development of Haiti and its industry, and to afford relief to the starving populace then unemployed. The Dartiguenave Government would be supported by the United States in the effort to secure stable conditions and lasting peace in Haiti; however, those offering opposition could only expect such treatment as their conduct merited. The Admiral was further to advise the Cabinet that the United States Government was particularly anxious for immediate ratification by the present Senate of this treaty, which was drawn up with the full intention of employing as many Haitians as possible to aid in giving effect to its provisions, so that suffering might be relieved at the earliest possible date. This action proved effective and the treaty was ratified

⁶³Senate Hearings, op. cit., pp. 391-392.

by the Haitian Senate on November 11, 1915.⁶⁴

The State Department had endeavored to effect an arrangement with the New York representative of the National Bank for meeting the urgent demands of the financial situation. Admiral Caperton on November 19, 1915, recommended that the loan to the Haitian Government of \$1,500,000 which the State Department had mentioned in its dispatch to the legation and of which the Haitian Government had been informed, be made immediately available after signing the modus vivendi, and that the \$100,000 promised upon ratification of the treaty should be cabled at once. The Admiral considered that American prestige was involved in the matter. A week later Secretary Lansing informed the legation that should the impression prevail that this Government's good faith was involved, the Admiral could make an immediate payment of \$100,000 out of the funds at hand. Minister Blanchard, who had arrived at Port-au-Prince on November 10, 1915, signed on the 29th the modus vivendi embodying the exact terms of the treaty; and immediately thereafter Admiral Caperton paid the Haitian Government \$100,000 out of customs receipts.⁶⁵

When questioned in 1921 about the character of the military pressure which he used during the treaty discussions, Admiral

⁶⁴Ibid., pp. 394-395.

⁶⁵Ibid., pp. 395, 397, 399.

Caperton said that the pressure, as he recalled it, was "more moral than military" and that there had been no actual military movement made against the Congress. The Senate Committee of Inquiry in 1922 reported that the American representatives exercised pressure to induce the ratification by Haiti of the convention in September 1915, precisely as the United States had exercised pressure to induce the incorporation of the Platt Amendment in the Cuban Constitution.

From the available evidence it must be assumed that President Wilson was kept conversant with what were believed to be the most important developments in the Haitian situation. War in Europe, however, was the overshadowing international problem and events in Haiti must have seemed of minor significance. President Wilson was undoubtedly frequently consulted on affairs touching the republic, but no special organization seemed to have been established at Washington to handle the Haitian intervention. Navy opinion must have influenced State Department officials; but decisions in Washington in 1915, particularly with regard to the treaty, had been determined in main during the previous year. Intervention occurred when it did because of events in Haiti, regarding which, there could have been among responsible American officials no marked divergency of interpretation. Subsequent developments in Haiti, particularly with respect to American procedure in carrying out basic purposes, was under the control and direction of the departments at Washington; but this control

and direction was necessarily dependent to a great extent on information received by the departments from Admiral Caperton, from the legation, and from the National City Bank. The most weight was evidently given to the reports communicated by Admiral Caperton.

One may wonder why during the crucial period of intervention and treaty negotiation the Department of State should have been represented in Haiti only by a charge d' affaires.

After the landing of marines, Admiral Caperton was recognized as the ranking American official in Haiti. He and the head of the legation were instructed by their respective departments to act in consultation and cooperation; and for the most part they seemed to have so acted. It appears, however, that the treaty negotiations, directed by the Department of State, were largely handled by the Charge d' Affaires. Admiral Caperton remarked, relative to the treaty negotiations:

Well, I do not know everything the charge d' affaires did, but in running my work I cooperated with him and Captain Beach. The charge d' affaires of course, conducted it, you know; but I assisted him.⁶⁶

While the United States did not use military force directly and openly to overawe or coerce the Haitian Government or legislature and while Haitian officials were at times by delay and skillful tactics able to obtain in part their own way, the circumstances, nevertheless, were such that the

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 367.

Haitian authorities did not in fact function as an independent government. Nor was the legislative body free from strong American influence. Representatives of the United States in Haiti were instructed on many occasions to obtain the consent of President Dartiguenave before adopting some new line of action. His consent was usually forthcoming, and some of the measures taken by Admiral Caperton were on the President's request. In many cases, his request or consent could have been only a formality; in some cases not given; and the American seizure of the customs houses was publicly protested by the Haitian President.⁶⁷

It became clear that American action in the summer of 1915, particularly, in its manifestation during and after the presidential election, was considerably more than an intervention for the protection of American lives and property. It speedily became a political intervention and a military occupation, intended not only to put an end to a situation which had become intolerable, but also to create in Haiti the conditions essential to permanent stability.

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 69, 368-369.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

The interventions of the United States in Haitian affairs during this period were not faultlessly carried out, but the dominating motive of these interventions was not the exercise of dominion over alien people nor their exploitation by an economic imperialism; it was to foster their political and economic stability so that there could be no justification, or pretext for European intervention in such a vitally strategic area of the New World. In addition, the occasion which brought about the intervention at the end of July in 1915 was to protect foreign citizens, including those of the United States, during a complete collapse of law and order, and was only the final act in a series of these affairs which dated back to the middle of the 19th century.

For foreigners the situation in July 28, 1915, was extremely critical. The foreign legations up to this time had never been invaded, but the invasion of the Dominican Legation, where General Oscar had taken refuge, followed the next day by the invasion of the French, took away this last safeguard against violence from the natives. The ignorant classes, having seen these Legations violated with apparently no evil results to the invader, could not be expected to respect their inviolability as they had in the past; and as a result there remained no place of safety, nor was there any Haitian authority which

could be looked to for protection. At the time of the arrival of Admiral Caperton aboard the Washington, the head of President Sam was being carried on a pole through the city and what remained of his body was being dragged through the streets by a mob. During the thirty-six hours preceding the arrival of the American warship, two Presidents had been murdered, ex-President Zamor having been one of the victims of the massacre in the prison. There was no authority to which one could look for protection save a self-appointed revolutionary committee whose powers were simply nominal.

There was no immediate prospect of a change in these conditions. The leaders of the outbreak at Port-au-Prince had declared themselves to be adherents of Dr. Bobo, who at that time was in the vicinity of Cap Haitien, in the extreme north of the island, and who could not be expected to arrive for some time at the capital to assume in person the reins of government and to attempt with the assistance of his revolutionary army to produce some semblance of order out of existing chaotic conditions.

Each hour which elapsed with the mob rule unchecked added to the danger for Americans and foreigners and largely increased the chance that property would be destroyed and looting begun by the half-starved natives. Under these conditions, it was believed that for the protection of life and property and the maintenance of law and order, in the absence of constituted

authority, it was an absolute necessity that the American forces be immediately landed to assume control of the city until such a time as there should be formed a constitutional government capable of maintaining itself and of affording protection to Haitian and foreign life and property.

The right of a state to protect by force its citizens living in a foreign country when sudden disturbances in the foreign state threaten the safety of their lives and property, and when the government under whose jurisdiction they reside has shown itself unable to unwilling to afford them reasonable protection has been the subject of writers on international law. The consensus of opinion of these writers is that it is not only a right, but a duty; and the state against which such force is used may not justly consider itself aggrieved.

Oppenheim declares:

The right of protection over its citizens abroad, which a State holds, may cause an intervention by right to which the other party is bound to submit.

Admitting that sanction may be found for the act of a state in protecting by armed force its citizens abroad, the question arises, in the special case of the United States, whether or not the President as commander-in-chief of the army and navy, the possessing in great measure the control of foreign affairs, possesses the power, upon his own authority and without the concurrence of Congress, to use the armed forces of this country for that purpose. Congress alone, of course, has the power to declare war under the Constitution,

but intervention may easily lead to war, in the experience of the United States it has seldom done so. So long as the use of the army and navy of the United States for the protection of citizens resident in foreign countries did not amount to a recognized act of war, it seems to be an established fact that the President does, constitutionally, possess the power to make such use of these forces.

Granting to the President and the power specified, it follows logically that as international law is declared to be a part of the law of the United States as set forth in the opinion of the Supreme Court in the case, The Paquet Habana and The Lola, and as one principle of international law permits a state to use force for the protection of its citizens living in another state, the President has, by his constitutional right and duty to use the armed forces of the United States for the protection of its citizens abroad.

Since human limitations prevent the President from personally performing all the acts required of him the courts have recognized that he may delegate his powers to the heads of departments. Consequently, an order issued by the Secretary of the Navy to the commanding officer of a ship or squadron has the authority of a direct order from the President and must involve the latter in its consequences. Actually, what happened was that the naval officer on foreign station in the Caribbean took such action as he believed necessary for the protection of lives and property, and reported his action to

the Secretary of the Navy after the United States had been committed to his procedure.

The authority by which, in an emergency and without consulting the Navy Department, Admiral Caperton landed forces for the protection of citizens in Haiti is found in the general order issued to all commanders by the Secretary of the Navy on assuming their command. The Naval Regulations which are in the nature of general orders to all commissioned officers in the service, and which are approved, as issued, by the President, recognized that the decision on the necessity of landing forces for the protection of citizens abroad cannot, generally, be made from Washington, but must be left to the sound judgement of responsible officers, who are in sufficiently close touch with the situation to be able to judge whether events make a landing imperative.

So much for the armed landing by the Navy, the question remains: Why did we stay?

The basic reason for the interference in the political concern of the Haitian Republic and the organization of the protectorate which followed the armed intervention of July 28th will be found in the Wilsonian policy of forcing good government of these people and saving them from tyranny and economic exploitation. Secretary Lansing stated that the dominating idea was to terminate the appalling conditions of anarchy savagery and oppression which had been prevalent in Haiti for decades, and to undertake the establishment of domestic peace in the republic in order that the great bulk of the population

who had been down trodden by dictators, and the innocent victims of repeated revolutions could enjoy a prosperity and an economic and industrial development to which every people of an American nation were entitled.

During the period which elapsed between July 28, 1915, the day on which the President Dartiguenave was elected, there was no Government of any description, as the death of the President dissolved his Government. There was the self-appointed revolutionary committee with whose consent the American forces had been landed and with whom, for a time, Admiral Caperton cooperated in maintaining order and carrying on the affairs of the Government.

However, when this committee arbitrarily declared the Senate and Chamber dissolved, its action could neither be approved nor permitted to be effective, since it could not be admitted that a band of professional revolutionists had either the right or power to arbitrarily dissolve these bodies.

It was known that the action of the committee was taken as a result of its fear that these bodies would elect some other than Dr. Bobo to the Presidency. Knowing that he would not be allowed to lead his army through the country and into the capital and force the Legislative Bodies to name him President, and fearing the action they might take unless so coerced the revolutionary committee issued a proclamation declaring the Legislature dissolved.

The members of the Legislature were notified shortly after the appearance of the proclamation that the action on the part of the committee was not recognized by the United States, and the assurance was given that they should convene and elect a President according to the laws of Haiti. This promised protection was accorded and on August 12, 1915, Sudre Dartiguenave was elected President of the Republic. This election could not and would not have been held unless the members had been protected when they met for the purpose of choosing a President. It was only the presence of the United States marines on guard throughout the city which prevented the outbreak of a new regime of lawlessness.

After the Haitian Congress had met and under the protection of the American forces held an election for the Presidency, possibly for the first time exercising the right freely and not as some chief backed by his army dictated, it was seen that it was impossible for this Government, regularly and freely elected to sustain itself unaided.

Although a general disarmament had been undertaken there were still forces under arms in the island. The new Government had no military strength. The President was not from the military class and had no army to enforce his authority. Doctor Bobo and his adherents were very much dissatisfied that he had not been the choice of the Congress in its election of a President. A withdrawal of the armed support of the United States would immediately have resulted in the overthrow

of the Dartiguenave Government, probably with the repetition of the outrages which accomplished the overthrow of the preceding President. That its existence was dependent upon the support of the United States was an accepted fact by the members of the Government; and it was realized that the withdrawal of this support would be tantamount to signing the death warrant of the President and members of his Government.

Aside from the necessity of supporting the new Government temporarily until it became sufficiently strong to maintain itself, it was incumbent from a humanitarian viewpoint to aid the Haitian people to free themselves from the hopeless conditions which continued revolution and a policy of despotic militarism had produced. In a large portion of the Island agriculture was practically abandoned and in those sections through which successive revolutionary and Governmental armies had passed the country was devastated. Since 1908 not one year's crop in the areas, Cap Haitien - Gonaive - San Marc-Port-au-Prince, had been harvested. The armies lived on the country as they marched.

Before it could be expected that orderly conditions could prevail and a Government possess any degree of stability in Haiti, it was necessary to discover a means of permanently putting an end to revolutionary uprisings. If this was to be accomplished it was essential that militarism be abolished, that the funds from the customs be in some way safeguarded, and their expenditure for the payment of debts contracted by revolutionary chiefs in the prosecution of a revolutionary operation be made impossible.

As has already been pointed out, certain groups of foreigners had financed some of the Haitian revolutions, advancing the money for their prosecution at exorbitant interest rates with the assurance that these loans would be regarded as Government obligations and provision made for their payment out of levies against imports and exports. Naturally if a means could be found to make such procedures impossible, the procuring of funds for the prosecution of revolutions would no longer be a thing so easily accomplished and without funds no revolution can succeed.

The treaty which was signed contained articles which the Administration in Washington hoped would bring about the stability and freedom from tyranny and economic oppression. The article of the treaty which abolished the army and established a constabulary presented a plan which did put an end to the militarism which had been productive of so much unrest and suffering in the Island. The article of the treaty which placed custom control under the United States put an effective end to the use of Government revenues for the payment of revolutionary obligations, and gave the assurance that they would be expended only for legitimate demands.

In the light of all the facts and under the then existing conditions it is considered that any action short of that taken could have been but temporary in effect and could neither have produced lasting results nor offer any solution of the questions involved.

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APPENDIX

APPENDIX A

RULERS OF HAITI

Jean Jacques Dessalines, Jan. 1, 1805-Oct. 17, 1806; (Dictator) Governor General for life Oct. 8, 1804. Emperor Jacques 1st, Black; Assassinated.

Henri Christophe, Feb. 17, 1807-Oct. 8, 1820; President; "State of Haiti" (the North of Haiti) June 2, 1811; King of Haiti; Henri 1st; Black; Shot himself.

PRESIDENTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF HAITI - 1807-1928

	<u>Held Office</u>			<u>Remarks</u>
	<u>Yr.</u>	<u>Mo.</u>	<u>Days</u>	
1. Alexandre Petion	11	--	20	Died in Office
2. Jean Pierre Boyer	25	less	17	Deposed by Revolution
3. Charles Herard	--	4	3	Deposed by Revolution
4. Philippe Guerrier	--	11	12	Died in Office
5. Jean Louis Pierrot	--	10	12	Deposed by Revolution
6. Jean Baptiste Riche	--	11	26	Died in Office
7. Faustin Soulouque	11	10	15	President to Aug. 1849
8. Fabre Geffrard	8	2	20	Deposed by Revolution
9. Sylvain Salnave	2	6	4	Deposed by Revolution
10. Nissage Saget	4	1	24	Retired at end of term
11. Michel Domingue	1	10	4	Deposed by Revolution
12. Boisronde-Canal	3	--	--	Deposed by Revolution
13. Etienne Felicite Salomon	8	9	18	Deposed by Revolution
14. F. Deus Legitime	--	8	7	Deposed by Revolution
15. F.M. Florvil Hippolyte	6	4	14	Died in Office
16. P.A. Tiresias Simon Sam	6	1	15	Retired
17. Nord Alexis	5	11	12	Deposed by Revolution
18. F. Antoine Simon	2	7	16	Deposed by Revolution
19. Michel Cincinnatus Leconte	--	11	24	Blown up in his Palace
20. Tancrede Auguste	--	8	24	Died by poison
21. Michel Oreste	--	8	23	Deposed by Revolution
22. Oreste Zamor	--	8	20	Deposed by Revolution
23. Joseph Davilmar Theodore	--	3	15	Deposed by Revolution
24. Jean Vilbrun Guillaume Sam	--	4	23	Murdered by Mob
25. Philippe Sudre Dartiguenave	6	9	4	Retired at end of Term
26. Joseph Louis Borno	4	--	--	Served first term and re-elected

APPENDIX B

TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND HAITI RELATING TO THE FINANCES, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND TRANQUILLITY OF HAITI¹

Signed at Port-au-Prince, September 16, 1915; ratification advised by the Senate, February 28, 1916; ratified by the President, March 20, 1916; ratified by Haiti, September 17, 1915; ratifications exchanged at Washington, May 3, 1916; proclaimed, May 3, 1916.

By The President Of The United States of America

A PROCLAMATION

Whereas a Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Haiti having for its objects the strengthening of the amity existing between the two countries, the remedying of the present condition of the revenues and finances of Haiti, the maintenance of the tranquillity of that Republic, and the carrying out of plans for its economic development and prosperity, was concluded and signed by their respective Plenipotentiaries at Port-au-Prince, on the sixteenth day of September, one thousand nine hundred and fifteen, the original of which treaty, being in the English and French languages, is word for word as follows:

Preamble

The United States and the Republic of Haiti desiring to confirm and strengthen the amity existing between them by the most cordial cooperation in measures for their common advantage;

And the Republic of Haiti desiring to remedy the present condition of its revenues and finances to maintain the tranquillity of the Republic, to carry out plans for the economic development and prosperity of the Republic and its people;

And the United States being in full sympathy with all of these aims and objects and desiring to contribute in all proper ways to their accomplishment;

The United States and the Republic of Haiti have resolved to conclude a Convention with these objects in view, and have appointed for that purpose, Plenipotentiaries,

¹Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1916. p. 328-332.

The President of the United States, Robert Beale Davis, Junior, Charge d' Affaires of the United States;

And the President of the Republic of Haiti, Louis Borno, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Public Instruction, who, having exhibited to each other their respective powers, which are seen to be full in good and true form, have agreed as follows: --

Article I

The Government of the United States will, by its good offices, aid the Haitian Government in the proper and efficient development of its agricultural, mineral and commercial resources and in the establishment of the finances of Haiti on a firm and solid basis.

Article II

The President of Haiti shall appoint, upon nomination by the President of the United States, a General Receiver and such aids and employees as may be necessary, who shall collect, receive, and apply all customs duties on imports and exports accruing at the several custom houses and ports of entry of the Republic of Haiti.

The President of Haiti shall appoint, upon nomination by the President of the United States, a Financial Adviser, who shall be an officer attached to the Ministry of Finance to give effect to whose proposals and labors the Minister will lend efficient aid. The Financial Adviser shall devise an adequate system of public accounting, aid in increasing the revenues and adjusting them to the expenses, inquire into the validity of the debts of the Republic, enlighten both Governments with reference to all eventual debts, recommend improved methods of collecting and applying the revenues, and make such other recommendations to the Minister of Finance as may be deemed necessary for the welfare and prosperity of Haiti.

Article III

The Government of the Republic of Haiti will provide by law or appropriate decrees for the payment of all customs duties to the General Receiver, and will extend to the Receivership, and to the Financial Advisor, all needful aid and full protection in the execution of the powers conferred and duties imposed herein; and the United States on its part will extend like aid and protections.

Article IV

Upon the appointment of the Financial Adviser, the Government of the Republic of Haiti, in cooperation with the Financial Adviser, shall collate, classify, arrange, and make full statement of all the debts of the Republic, the amounts, character, maturity and condition thereof, and the interest accruing and the sinking fund requisite to their final discharge.

Article V

All sums collected and received by the General Receiver shall be applied, first, to the payment of the salaries and allowances of the General Receiver, his assistants and employees and expenses of the Receivership, including the salary and expenses of the Financial Adviser, which salaries will be determined by previous assessment; second, to the interest and sinking fund of the public debt of the Republic of Haiti; and third, to the maintenance of the constabulary referred to in Article X, and then the remainder to the Haitian Government for purposes of current expense.

In making these applications the General Receiver will proceed to pay salaries and allowances monthly and expenses as they arise, and on the first of each calendar month, will set aside in a separate fund the quantum of the collection and receipts of previous months.

Article VI

The expenses of the Receivership, including salaries and allowances of the General Receiver, his assistants and employees, and the salary and expenses of the Financial Adviser, shall not exceed five per centum of the collections and receipts from customs duties, unless by agreement by the two Governments.

Article VII

The General Receiver shall make monthly reports of all collections, receipts and disbursements to the appropriate officer of the Republic of Haiti and to the Department of State of the United States, which reports shall be open to inspection and verification at all times by the appropriate authorities of each of the said Governments.

Article VIII

The Republic of Haiti shall not increase its public debt except by previous agreement with the President of the United States, and shall not contract any debt or assume any financial obligation unless the ordinary revenues of the Republic available for that purpose, after defraying the expenses of the Government, shall be adequate to pay the interest and provide a sinking fund for the final discharge of such debt.

Article IX

The Republic of Haiti will not without a previous agreement with the President of the United States, modify the customs duties in a manner to reduce the revenues therefrom; and in order that the revenues of the Republic may be adequate to meet the public debt and the expenses of the Government, to preserve tranquillity and to promote material prosperity, the Republic of Haiti will cooperate with the Financial Adviser in his recommendations for improvement in the methods of collecting and disbursing the revenues and for new sources of needed income.

Article X

The Haitian Government obligates itself, for the preservation of domestic peace, the security of individual rights and full observance of the provisions of this treaty to create without delay an efficient constabulary, urban and rural, composed of native Haitians. This constabulary shall be organized and officered by Americans, appointed by the President of Haiti, upon nomination by the President of the United States. The Haitian Government shall clothe these officers with the proper and necessary authority and uphold them in the performance of their functions. These officers will be replaced by Haitians as they, by examination conducted under direction of a board to be selected by the senior American officer of this constabulary and in the presence of a representative of the Haitian Government, are found to be qualified to assume such duties. The constabulary herein provided for, shall, under the direction of the Haitian Government, have supervision and control of arms and ammunition, military supplies, and traffic therein throughout the country. The high contracting parties agree that the stipulations in this Article are necessary to prevent factional strife and disturbances.

Article XI

The Government of Haiti agrees not to surrender any of the territory of the Republic of Haiti by sale, lease, or otherwise, or jurisdiction over such territory, to any foreign government or power, nor to enter into any treaty or contract with any foreign power or powers that will impair or tend to impair the independence of Haiti.

Article XII

The Haitian Government agrees to execute with the United States a protocol for the settlement, by arbitration or otherwise, of all pending pecuniary claims of foreign corporations, companies, citizens or subjects against Haiti

Article XIII

The Republic of Haiti, being desirous to further the development of its natural resources, agrees to undertake and execute such measures as in the opinion of the high contracting parties may be necessary for the sanitation and public improvement of the Republic, under the supervision and direction of an engineer or engineers, to be appointed by the President of Haiti upon nomination by the President of the United States, and authorized for that purpose by the Government of Haiti.

Article XIV

The high contracting parties shall have authority to take such steps as may be necessary to insure the complete attainment of any of the objects comprehended in this treaty; and, should the necessity occur, the United States will lend an efficient aid for the preservation of Haitian Independence and the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property and individual liberty

Article XV

The present treaty shall be approved and ratified by the high contracting parties in conformity with their respective laws, and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged in the City of Washington as soon as may be possible.

Article XVI

The present treaty shall remain in full force and virtue for the term of ten years, to be counted from the day of exchange of ratifications, and further for another term of ten years if, for specific reasons presented by either of the high contracting parties, the purpose of this treaty has not been fully accomplished.

In faith whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Convention in duplicate, in the English and French languages, and have thereunto affixed their seals.

Done at Port au Prince, Haiti, the 16th day of September in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and fifteen.

Robert Beale Davis, Jr. (Seal)
Charge D' Affaires of the United States
 Louis Borno (Seal)
Secrétaire d'Etat des Relations Exterieures et
de l'Instruction Publique

And whereas, the said Treaty has been duly ratified on both parts, and the ratifications of the two governments were exchanged in the City of Washington; on the third day of May, one thousand nine hundred and sixteen;

Now therefore, be it known that I, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States of America, have caused the said treaty to be made public, to the end that the same and every article and clause thereof may be observed and fulfilled with good faith by the United States and the citizens thereof.

In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the City of Washington this third day of May
 (Seal) in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and sixteen, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and fortieth.

By the President:

WOODROW WILSON

Robert Lansing,
Secretary of State

APPENDIX C

The Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of State.²

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Washington, September 23, 1915

SIR: I have the honor to forward herewith copy of letter of instructions, customs and civil administration, from Commander, Cruiser Squadron, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, commanding United States forces in Haiti and Haitian waters.

Very sincerely yours,
JOSEPHUS DANIELS

(Inclosure.)

Admiral Caperton to the American Forces in Haiti.

Port Au Prince, September 6, 1915.

Letter of Instructions: Customs and Civil Administration.

1. In order to relieve the detachment commanders from the duty of disbursing funds, and in view of the fact that the Navy Department has detailed sufficient bonded disbursing officers for duty with the forces in Haiti and Haitian waters to provide one for each port occupied, the following instructions are substituted for those contained in reference (b) (Issued August 24, 1915).

Customs Administration.

2. The Squadron Commander will administer the customs through an administrator of customs, who will be established at Port au Prince. The administrator of customs will have general charge of the collection of customs duties at all ports and the depositing of receipts, in accordance with instructions given by the Squadron Commander and in accordance with the Haitian law not inconsistent with these instructions. For the purpose of insuring uniformity of administration, the administrator of customs is authorized to issue directly to the local collectors such detailed instructions as may be necessary relative to the customs collection, depositing of receipts, keeping of accounts, rendition of returns, and such other administrative matters as come within his province.

²Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915, pp. 521-522.

3. The collector of customs at each port will administer the customhouse and captain of the port's office at the port where he is stationed, under instructions from the administrator of customs. He will also act as disbursing officer for all payments made at the port where he is stationed.

Civil Administration

4. Detachment commanders will have charge of such other civil affairs as may be assumed within the limits of their respective commands, and will control the disbursements of funds allotted by the Squadron Commander to meet obligations incurred thereby.

Disbursements

5. Disbursements will be made under the following heads:

Constabulary: for the organization and maintenance of an efficient constabulary.

Public Works: for conducting such temporary public works as will afford an immediate relief through employment for the starving populace and discharged soldiers.

Military and Civil Government: for the maintenance of such military and civil governments as the United States may establish.

Customs Service: for expenses of maintaining the customs service, including captain of the ports' offices.

6. Detachment commanders will submit to the Squadron Commander by radio not later than the 25th of each month, confirmed by letter, estimates covering the funds desired under each head for each town for the coming calendar month. Collectors of customs will furnish detachment commanders with estimates for customs service to be included in above mentioned radio message.

7. Funds will then be allotted by the Squadron Commander from the funds on deposit in the local branch of the National Bank of Haiti in each town; and the funds so allotted will be placed to the credit of the collectors of customs in those local banks.

W. B. Caperton

APPENDIX D

The Acting Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of State³

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Washington, August 24, 1915

SIR: I have the honor to forward herewith, for your information, a copy of a report, dated August 13, 1915, received from the Commander of the Cruiser Squadron, Atlantic Fleet, relative to conditions in Haitian Waters from August 7 to 12 inclusive.

Very sincerely yours,

W. S. Benson

(Inclosure-Extract)

Admiral Caperton to the Secretary of the Navy

Port Au Prince, August 9, 1915

43. Last January the Treasury service, by an arbitrary act, was taken from the National Bank of Haiti, the National Treasury, and given to private banking firms, the principal one of which is Simmond Freres. Simmond Freres is under no control that will safeguard public interests. They merely make collections of the revenues, receive a certain percentage as their fee, and turn the rest over to whomsoever may exercise sufficient force or persuasion in the name of a government or revolution to obtain it. The result is that considerable money is being thus forced from Simmond Freres by the so-called revolutionary committees in various towns, and this money is being used to actively support revolutionary activity. On account of military necessity, therefore, I this day informed the committee in Port au Prince Simmond Freres, and the National Bank of Haiti, that the Treasury service would be resumed by the National Bank of Haiti. This bank is under legal and exacting contract for the handling of the Treasury service for the country.

August 10, 1915.

54. I made arrangements this day with the National Bank of Haiti for the payment of ten gourdes to each soldier and one hundred gourdes to each chief disarmed and dismissed in the north.

³Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915, pp. 519-520.

55. I informed the commanding officer of the Connecticut that the National Bank of Haiti had resumed the Treasury service and had issued instructions to its representatives of Cap Haitien to pay the soldiers disarmed at that place. I directed the Connecticut to get in touch with the representatives of the Bank of Cape Haitien, make necessary arrangements for paying these troops, and supervise the payment himself.

APPENDIX E

The National Bank of the Republic of Haiti to the Secretary of State⁴

(Translation)

Washington, August 7, 1915

Mr. Secretary of State: According to reports published in the press of the United States, the American authorities have taken over the several public services of the Republic of Haiti at Port au Prince and Cape Haitien, in particular the collection of customs duties.

Now the terms of Article 14 of the concession contract of the National Bank of the Republic of Haiti explicitly state the rights and duties of that institution in respect to the collection and distribution of the said duties; it reads as follows:

The Bank will have exclusive charge of the service of the State Treasury both at home and abroad. Under that head it shall receive all moneys due the State when collected and in particular the customs duties on imports and exports. Likewise it shall effect, within the limits set forth in Article 15 hereinbelow, all payments for the account of the State including the service of interest and amortization of the public debt.

The greater part of customs duties have been pledged to holders of foreign and domestic bonds and also to the beneficiaries of certain debts incurred by the Republic in connection with railway, electric lighting, public works and other contracts.

In addition, most of the agreements between the Haitian State and its creditors provide that it will be the Bank's duty to pay over to those entitled thereto the part of the duties that is their due; for instance, in the case of the 1910 loan, by far the most important, Article 19 says:

During the whole life of the loan the duties hereinabove pledged shall be directly collected for the account of whom it may concern by the attorney of the national Bank of the Republic of Haiti designated by the Bankers as their representative to that effect.

Article 4 of the 1912 loan and Article 5 of the 1913 loan, which are identical, provide that:

⁴Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915, pp. 515-516.

The National Bank of the Republic of Haiti shall ex-officio, upon a mere notice to the Department of Finance, distribute the proceeds thereof which will be used first for the payment of interest and next for the amortization of the capital.

Under the conditions and for the protection of the interests involved I have the honor to bespeak your high intercession, Mr. Secretary of State, with a view to having the requisite orders issued to turn over at our treasury all moneys collected on customs receipts, in accordance with the contracts and conventions.

Again, permit me to draw your attention to the particularly grave turn for the creditors of the State taken by the situation since the late events that have taken place in Haiti.

There is no longer any government at ports that are not occupied by the forces of the United States; customs duties are collected by the local authorities; since those moneys have ceased being turned over to us in violation of the pledges which I have had the honor to recite to your excellency the said authorities use them as they see fit and avail themselves of them to subsidize revolutionists whose access to power they are interested in favoring.

Such a condition of affairs not only injures the interests of the National Bank of the Republic of Haiti, it also, as I have just had the honor to explain to your excellency, is very harmful to the other creditors of the Haitian State.

I beg (etc.)

BANQUE NATIONALE DE LA REPUBLIQUE d'
HAITI CASENAVE, President.

APPENDIX F

Proclamation of the United States.⁵

U. S. S. "Washington," flagship
Port au Prince, Haiti, August 9, 1915

I am directed by the United States Government to assure the Haitian people that the United States has no object in view except to insure, to establish, and to help maintain Haitian independence and the establishment of a stable and firm government by the Haitian people.

Every assistance will be given to the Haitian people in their attempt to secure those ends. It is the intention to retain the United States forces in Haiti only so long as will be necessary for the purpose.

W. B. Caperton,
Rear Admiral, United States Navy
Commanding U.S. Forces in Haitian Waters.

⁵Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915, p. 481.

THE UNITED STATES INTERVENTION IN HAITI

An Abstract of a Thesis

BY

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Haiti won its freedom from France in 1804, becoming thus the second independent state in the Western Hemisphere. It had been during the eighteenth century France's most prosperous colony, its wealth depending on slavery and the plantation system. With the whites driven out, social distinctions which actually had their roots in colonial times began immediately to develop among the people, all of whom had some proportion of African blood in their veins. During the course of the next century the criteria for aristocracy assumed recognizable form, so that now even the most casual observer is aware that Haiti is not by any means a democratic country. The two castes are the elite and the masses. They are as different as day from night, as nobleman from peasant; and they are as separate as oil and water. The elite are generally reckoned to compose at the outside not more than three percent of the population.

Contacts of the Haitian people with the outside world between 1805 and 1915 were meagre. The slaughter of the whites by Dessalines, the economic decline of the country, the unwillingness of the white nations to treat with a Negro state, restrictive legislation against white foreigners, and the general illiteracy of the people - all these shut Haiti off from the world. For a century Haiti saw no foreigners except the few traders at sea-ports, a limited number of consuls, and, after 1860, Catholic priests and sisters. For the peasants there ceased to be any knowledge of the world outside of Haiti; for the elite, France once more became the center of social world.

Foreign relations, in the political sense, revolved during most of the nineteenth century about loans and insurrections. Revolutionary leaders sometimes promised as bait for foreign assistance either tariff preferences or the cession of the Mole St. Nicholas for a naval base; if successful they might fulfill the first promise, but because of the Monroe Doctrine and the jealousy of the big powers, the Mole was never ceded. Of all the social institutions which the Haitian people had to devise after 1804, the one for which they seemed least prepared was government. The revolution had brought to the front men of military experience, and seemed to have driven out or killed every single person of experience in civil government. The only authority of any significance was military. Consequently the new state was built upon army control and directed by army officers, and a succession of ignorant black generals succeeded to the presidency. These generals, on the whole, had no interest in the country other than to maintain their power and seize what funds were available against the day when they would be driven from power. As a result of this attitude on the part of persons who should have been striving for the welfare of their country, the educational and economic needs of the people were completely disregarded.

After a century of independence from seventy-five to ninety-five per cent of the people were illiterate. In the twenty years following the election of 1886 no president had served out a full term.

One did serve nearly seven years and died in office, but of the rest, four were killed in office and five were overthrown. Such government as existed was dictatorial in fact while the finances of the republic were a series of loan shark operations and gambling speculations and graft was expected as a matter of course. In the period 1908 to 1915 the descent into political chaos was greatly accelerated. Within this period seven presidents were elected and deposed. Of these seven, one was blown up in the national palace; one died, it is said by poison; and of the other five, all of whom were deposed by revolutions, one was butchered in a massacre of political prisoners, and another was torn to pieces by a mob.

It was finally the combination of complicated financial affairs and political collapse which produced the Occupation of 1915. In the preceding year both France and Germany threatened to send warships to collect loans due them, and were stopped only by the outbreak of World War I. An American bank held as its subsidiary the Bank of Haiti, in which the government deposited its funds; when in 1914-15 the presidents followed each other in rapid succession, the bank on instructions from New York refused to allow the government to withdraw its funds, which were obligated for the purpose of retiring the public debt. Haiti in retaliation threatened to seize its deposits by force, but the New York bank persuaded the United States Government to send a ship to transfer the gold from Port-au-Prince to New York. The Haitian Government protested this removal of funds; however Secretary Bryan insisted that this was for the protection of funds.

By the end of July, 1915, a threatened revolution broke. President Guillaume Sam had given orders that a number of political prisoners estimated at 170, be shot by their guards if fighting broke out. These orders were carried out so completely that only five prospective victims escaped. With his government in collapse, the President took refuge in the French Legation. There he was seized by a mob and his body torn to pieces. Admiral Caperton, who had been intervening in Haitian affairs for some time, notified Washington that the British, French, and United States diplomatic agents urged intervention so he landed marines and seamen on July 28, 1915. There was no serious local opposition to the Admiral's action and it was agreed that the better class of Haitians were glad of what had been done.

For the week following the intervention Admiral Caperton was busy considering possibilities for the president's office. On August 10, 1915, the Navy Department sent word to allow the election whenever the Haitians wished and on August 12th, the Admiral, being reassured regarding his sentiments toward the United States, permitted Senator Sudre Dartiguenave to be elected to the office. The new President was then informed that he would be recognized when the Haitian Congress authorized him to sign a treaty allowing United States control of the customs houses and gendarmerie.

The Chamber of Deputies approved the treaty with reasonable alacrity; but the Senate balked, so conditions remained deadlocked until November 10, 1915, when the Secretary of the Navy notified

Admiral Caperton that he was to have President Dartiguenave call a cabinet session with the Admiral present. The Admiral was then to state that if the treaty failed of ratification the United States Government would proceed actively with the pacification of the country and would be forced to retain control while it supported the Dartiguenave administration. The instructions closed with the veiled threat that it was expected that this would be made sufficiently clear so as to remove all opposition and secure immediate ratification. The cabinet meeting was held the next morning and so persuasive was the Admiral's presentation that the vote in the Senate was 25 for and 9 against ratification.

Secretary of State Lansing frankly recognized that the course of the United States was high handed and an invasion of Haitian independence, but he was clearly appalled at the developments reported. He later stated that the two reasons for the intervention were the wish to terminate the terrible conditions of anarchy, savagery, and oppression in the republic and to forestall foreign efforts to establish customs control or a seizure of territory.

Some persons have criticized our policy in this matter, believing that on the whole it created more problems than it solved. As in all situations of this type, the appearance of a strong nation bullying a weak, ill becomes our country which has posed as the great defender of freedom and democracy. However, it seems to the writer that under the then existing conditions any action short of that taken could have been but temporary in effect and could neither have produced lasting results nor offer any solution of the questions involved.