

FROM CRISIS TO WAR: PROPHETIC DUALISM IN  
PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH'S SEPTEMBER 20, 2001 ADDRESS

by

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## **Abstract**

President George W. Bush's September 20, 2001 televised primetime address to a Joint Session of Congress stands in history as his Administration's first deliberate official rhetorical response to the events of 9/11 and the first instance of the "Bush Doctrine." Although 9/11 has become an increasing topic of scholarly review and this speech is the first presidential policy response, few have explored Bush's choice of metaphors in this speech. Metaphors are a powerful tool of rhetoric, especially in political rhetoric, because metaphors are uniquely adept at simplifying complex topics, and a study of metaphor can reveal a speaker's underlying worldview and beliefs. Through metaphorical analysis, this study identifies nine clusters of metaphor in Bush's September 20, 2001 address: FORCE/WAR, BODY, FEAR, LIGHT/DARK, NEAR/FAR, UNITY, FAITH/FATE, GOOD/EVIL and SAVAGE. This study contrasts metaphor clusters to "prophetic dualism," a worldview that defines foreign policy within the context of a specific set of moral beliefs, and concludes that the artifact meets all tenets of prophetic dualism as well as the core characteristics of presidential crisis rhetoric and civil religion (although the artifact does not meet all characteristics of presidential war rhetoric). The study closes with a discussion of practical, rhetorical and methodological implications that may be useful to scholars of rhetoric and political science, including suggestions for future research of prophetic dualism and presidential war rhetoric.

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## Chapter 1 - Introduction

On the morning of September 11, 2001, nineteen members of an Islamist religious sect known as al Qaeda boarded four airplanes departing from three northeastern United States cities: Boston, Massachusetts; Newark, New Jersey; and Washington, D.C. They hijacked each plane by forcefully wresting navigation controls and killing pilots and some flight crew. At 8:46 a.m., members of al Qaeda flew the first airplane, U.S. Flight 11, into the North Tower of the World Trade Center, an office building complex located in the financial district of New York City. The airplane struck between the North Tower's 93rd and 99th floors. The crash killed all flight passengers and launched a massive fire, bolstered by full tanks of volatile jet fuel, that quickly blocked all building fire escapes and trapped over 1,350 people above the building's 99th floor. At 9:03 a.m., the next airplane, U.S. Flight 175, crashed into the World Trade Center's South Tower between the 77th and 85th floors. The crash killed more than 650 people and sparked another large fire, but a single fire escape remained intact for evacuation. More than 10,000 people evacuated both buildings while fire slowly melted the towers' steel superstructures. At 9:37 a.m., the third airplane, U.S. Flight 77, struck the Pentagon, instantly killing all flight passengers. After hijackers took control of Flight 93, passengers and remaining crew learned about the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks through cell phone communication and attempted to retake control of the plane, and al Qaeda members crashed the plane in an open field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania. Later investigations determined intended targets were either the White House or the Capitol building. The World Trade Center's North Tower and South Tower collapsed at 9:59 a.m. and 10:28 a.m., respectively. Enflamed collapse debris sparked fires in nearby World Trade Center buildings, and led to the collapse of an adjacent office building. Airborne ash and debris spread through New York streets in a fog of grey smoke. The combined attacks killed 2,996 people and injured roughly 7,000, including 372 foreign nationals (Lansford, 2012).

The details of that day are now commonly referred to as "9/11." The name itself is rhetorically significant:

We now shorthand September 11 by reference to its date; it is simply 9/11 and it joins December 7, 1941, November 22, 1963, and April 19, 1995 as among those moments that we teach our children and our students, that we remember

permanently, that we relive in anniversaries and memorials year after year (Parry-Giles & Parry-Giles, 2004, p. 543).

These events, and the media coverage that followed, were largely a shared experience simultaneously seen by Americans and others around the world. The events were mediated by television, print and radio mass media over the ensuing weeks and months, culminating in a rhetorical situation that cannot be understated.

### **Immediate Reactions to 9/11**

The events of 9/11 are now considered so pivotal as to have changed America permanently and in diverse ways yet to be fully understood. Yet more than ten years after the events, scholars can evaluate immediate American reactions with somewhat greater clarity, thus providing us a better perspective of the rhetorical situation. In the ensuing weeks and months after 9/11, national stress levels, mass media patterns, consumer preferences, gross domestic product, popular trends, Federal laws and bureaucracies, and even public eating habits shifted to a measurable degree. A brief review of American responses to the rhetorical situation is warranted to provide better understanding of the scope and severity of this event.

In terms of direct economic impact, 9/11 cost the United States approximately \$100 billion, equivalent to 1 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Overall, 9/11 cost roughly \$1 trillion in direct and indirect economic loss and reduction in U.S. stock market value. Worldwide, 9/11 cost about \$300 billion in direct losses to other countries. American insurance companies increased premiums by an average of 5 percent across all policy holders, directly affecting individual and family expenses. The hardest-hit American economic sectors were travel and tourism. U.S. airline industry revenues dropped by 20 percent; foreign tourism dropped by 12 percent (Lansford, 2012). 9/11 also short-circuited individual spending and consumer confidence, with economists warning of "influenza," "mall-aria," and "a sudden attack of prudence" (Scanlon, 2005, p. 174).

In terms of socio-psychological impact, 9/11 stands "unparalleled as a cultural trauma that demanded response" (Parry-Giles & Parry-Giles, 2004, p. 544). In the immediate weeks following 9/11, reported levels of stress and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) remained remarkably high. In a nationwide U.S. survey conducted after 9/11, 71 percent of survey respondents said they were highly depressed by the terrorist attacks two days after the attacks,



and 44 percent experienced at least one of five PTSD symptoms to a severe degree up to five days after 9/11. Three months later, reported PTSD symptoms remained seven times higher than normal (Snyder & Park, 2002). Of 1,008 surveyed in New York City one month after the attacks, 7.5 percent reported symptoms consistent with a clinical diagnosis of PTSD. Among respondents who lived closest to the World Trade Center, that number rose to 20 percent (Galea, Ahern, Resnick, Kilpatrick, Bucuvala, Gould & Vlahov, 2002). Terror Management Theory (TMT) holds that when a person is faced with reminders of death, the person demonstrates “an exaggeration of preexisting ideological preferences and attitudes” (Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S. & Greenberg, J., 2003, p. 99). An example of "preexisting preferences" could be comfort food, as a calorie-rich tool for easing anxiety. The American Institute of Cancer Research (AICR) found that 20 percent of Americans increased their intake of comfort foods after 9/11, and in response, the AICR issued a series of pamphlets that warned of the ill effects of too much comfort food and included healthy recipes for mashed potatoes, beef stew and other comfort food classics (Lofshult, 2003). Three years later, in the height of the 2004 presidential campaign, anxiety remained a feature of the race. 9/11-fueled anxiety functioned as a rhetorical "backdrop" (Parry-Giles & Parry-Giles, 2004, p. 544). Presidential candidates employed patriotic (and possibly nationalistic) language that upheld American myths of exceptionalism and high moral ground that reinforced "ideological comforts that citizens long for in a wartime context as well as those ideologically contested moments that citizens toil to forget" (Parry-Giles & Parry-Giles, 2004, p. 544).

9/11 stands as a shared, mediated experience highly covered by the media and highly consumed by audiences. After 9/11, television was starring in “its biggest role since the Kennedy assassination” (Morgensen, Lindsay, Li, Perkins & Beardsley, 2002, p. 102). Eighty-one percent of Americans watched television on September 11 and consumed a mean of 7.5 hours (Snyder & Park, 2002). Of those who watched television, 18 percent consumed upwards of 13 hours that day (Coleman and &, 2011). This “starring role” continued for weeks. Through October 2001 major American networks ABC, CBS and NBC doubled the amount of news coverage in their nightly news broadcasts (Lynch, 2001).

This event stands unique in that it did not fit the typical mold of formal military action. There was not an obvious aggressor, and no clear purpose. 9/11 left many questions in the public eye and Americans sought reassurance and information about the event: what happened, who the

attackers were, why the attacks happened, and if more attacks would come (Perkins & Li, 2011). The seemingly meaningless (and ownerless) actions left Americans unsure of appropriate response. News media often provided the critical consolation that people needed, regardless of whether journalists intended to provide consolation or not (Izard & Perkins, 2011). Perkins and Li (2011) examined news coverage by major broadcast networks to see which functions it served on September 11:

During the first stage, from 8:45 a.m. to 11 a.m., the key issues identified were description of the incident (30.6 percent), severity of disaster (17.9 percent), terrorism (15.6 percent), safety concerns (12.9 percent), and U.S. government reaction (10 percent). During the second stage of the coverage, from 11 a.m. to 3 p.m., descriptions of the incident declined dramatically (11.3 percent) while severity of disaster (18.5 percent) and safety concerns (11.3 percent) remained the same. The issue of terrorism increased somewhat (17.1 percent), while U.S. government reaction (17.5 percent) and rescue efforts (10.1 percent) increased significantly. After 3 p.m., descriptions of the disaster decreased significantly and were no longer an issue (p. 39).

As the day wore on, television coverage's functions evolved. Early coverage that provided definition of the event - what was happening - led way to a discussion of reaction - how the rescue mission was working, and how the government was officially reacting. By the late afternoon of September 11, the media and public were already looking to the government for explanations and leadership. The public, government and media employed a variety of responses to 9/11 that can be characterized as either patriotic or nationalistic.

### ***Patriotism and Nationalism***

In the weeks and months following 9/11, both the public and press exhibited a mixture of patriotism and nationalism. Patriotism and nationalism are different forms of pride for one's nation; each form of pride leads to a different form of action. Patriotism is defined as a generally positive state of pride and love for country and it is expressed through faith in the nation, love for other citizens, and respect for one's country. Nationalism connotes arrogant pride and a desire for dominance (Li & Brewer, 2004). Nationalism is marked by "chauvinistic tones" that "lead to a

narrow definition of who and what may be considered 'American' and the rejection of out-groups who may not fit traditional American characteristics" (Davis & Silver, 2002, p. 7). Patriotism is a positive, uplifting action; nationalism is a negative, exclusionary or aggressive action.

Many scholars have identified a variety of expressions of patriotism in the weeks following 9/11. Both the public and the press exhibited patriotism in a variety of ways. One of the most-played songs on the radio in 2001 was Lee Greenwood's 1991 single "God Bless the USA." Charitable giving, blood donations, and voluntary U.S. military enlistments rose significantly (Lansford, 2012). Between 74 percent and 82 percent of Americans displayed American flags on their home, car, or person, which is understood as a public expression of patriotism, of "love of country" and American "identity, and a desire to affirm cultural standards of value" (Skitka, 2005, p. 2009). 9/11 memorabilia became a lucrative business and included a wide range of products such as statues, CD-ROM compilations, posters, "2002" dollar bills, commemorative coins and trading cards. They were so pervasive that New York City's Chief Attorney Michael Cardozo distributed a cease and desist letter to Ebay in February 2002 in an attempt to stem the tide of memorabilia sales, arguing they were "blatant attempts to profit from mass murder" (Broderick & Gibson, 2005, p. 202).

Journalism, known for its objective and neutral position, was not immune in the aftermath of 9/11. Many scholars have identified an increase in biased journalism after 9/11 wherein news media were explicitly or implicitly supportive of America and U.S. foreign policy. Some argue this is because journalists could not be objective observers; they were Americans (and in many cases, New Yorkers) embedded in an unsettling attack. Many major cable network television news stations were headquartered in New York City. Their employees - New York residents whose friends and family were in the midst of the attacks - researched and reported the news, and journalists often revealed emotions in both facial expression and in words (Coleman & Wu, 2011). "It would be easy to argue that reporters connected with their audience because both were united in opposition to a common enemy. The United States had been attacked - and journalists on the scene and viewers/readers in their living rooms were affected similarly," observe IZARD and PERKINS (2011, p. 2). Often, news media didn't objectively report the facts, they assumed a point of view where they would offer suggestions and answers to problems, and challenge government to solve problems (IZARD & PERKINS, 2011). This media bias was received with widespread public support. The number of people who perceived a media bias dropped

from 59 to 47 percent, and at the same time, the number of people who believed the press was pro-American rose from 43 to 69 percent. By the end of 2001, Fox News became the most-watched news network (Lansford, 2012).

Following an event as painful as 9/11, it seems reasonable that nationalism could emerge as another societal reaction. Some Americans responded to 9/11 with anger and, in some cases, acts of vengeance. Possibly summarizing these feelings in his 2002 hit single *Courtesy of the Red White and Blue*, country music singer Toby Keith sang “We’ll stick a boot in your ass / It’s the American way.” The aggressors were foreign nationals, strangers to the public eye. Hate crimes against Arabs, Muslims and others rose significantly; a U.S. citizen in Arizona killed a Sikh Indian immigrant out of revenge for 9/11, mistakenly thinking he was “Arab” (Akram & Johnson, 2002). In a study comparing rhetoric among the public, media and elites between Pearl Harbor attacks and 9/11, Schildkraut (2002) finds similar rhetorical responses of national identity. In both situations the public galvanized in patriotic support of nation and more vocally discussed what it means to be “American,” yet Schildkraut (2002) points out that compared to the Japanese encampments after Pearl Harbor, the events of 9/11 did not lead to as severe government-sponsored encampments of foreign nationals and citizens of foreign descent.

Although hate crimes were on the rise, nationalism seems to have been most commonly visible through acts of silence. Individuals who expressed concern about post-9/11 policies were often treated as “unAmerican” and “traitorous” in a wide range of public forums, including federal and state government, municipalities, universities, churches and news media. Bird and Brandt (2002) found documented instances where dissenting politicians, political organizations, political analysts, media figures, school teachers and preachers who publicly dissented with Bush’s foreign policy were ostracized, fired, cited or harassed. Attorney General John Ashcroft said any member of Congress who opposed the USA PATRIOT Act should be blamed for future terrorist attacks (Cassell, 2004). Some higher education institutions disciplined or harassed faculty that publicly challenged the war on terrorism and the Iraq War. Sixty-two members of U.S. Congress petitioned Columbia university to fire Nicholas de Genova, a professor of anthropology, for publicly speaking out against the Iraq War at an anti-war event. Louisiana State University fired Dr. Steven J. Hatfill after he was publicly investigated as a “person of interest” (though never charged with a crime) for a 2002 anthrax scare (Cole, 2005). News media also self-censored or actively rejected perspectives that seemed “anti-American.” *Harper’s*

*Magazine* editor Lewis Lapham described the post-9/11 news media as "propagandists;" he reported on numerous instances when experts and columnists critical of the war on terrorism refused to publicly voice their concerns for fear of appearing seditious (Lapham, 2002). Major television networks refused to air paid advertisements from the American Civil Liberty Union protesting the PATRIOT Act. Perhaps the press rarely dissented against Bush's proposed policies because they agreed with, and participated in, the narrative that Bush constructed to explain the circumstances of 9/11 (Warner, 2008).

### ***The PATRIOT Act and Other Federal Responses***

By October 2001, the Bush Administration initiated new laws designed to respond to 9/11. Some policies were in development within a few days of 9/11. Congress passed the United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, or the USA PATRIOT Act, in October 2001 as a large-scale and immediate response to 9/11. Congress spent 18 hours deliberating the PATRIOT Act before final passage (Bird & Brandt, 2002), and compared to legislation of similar size, the PATRIOT Act and the Homeland Security Act, passed in 2002, were "enacted with alacrity; meaningful debate was abandoned as lawmakers rushed to legislate ways of preventing future attacks" (Cassell, 2004, p. 9). The Act was nearly unanimously passed; dissenting Congressional voters were chastised as traitors by the Bush Administration (Cassell, 2004). The Act established new laws across a range of federal agencies. It gave federal authorities the right to track and intercept communications; it granted the Secretary of the Treasury with new regulatory powers designed to find and combat money laundering in U.S. financial institutions; it increased efforts to close borders and detain and remove foreign nationals; it created new crimes and new penalties for certain actions; and it established new procedures for handling domestic and international terrorists (Doyle, 2002). These changes allow the government to search homes and businesses without prior notice, to use roving wiretaps to listen to phone conversations, monitor computers and email, and eavesdrop and attorney/client conversations (Whitehead and Aden, 2002).

In the early aftermath of 9/11, while public fears loomed, Americans felt comfortable accepting new laws that tightened national security even if those laws restricted rights of fellow citizens or foreign nationals (Akram & Johnson, 2002). However, the PATRIOT Act has since received criticism from scholars and political activists for its potentially negative and possibly

unforeseen consequences. Davis and Silver (2002) explain that the significance of curtailed civil liberties may have seemed less important at the time, due to the intangible nature of civil liberties themselves: "For ordinary citizens during ordinary times, civil liberties issues are likely to be remote from everyday experiences; but in certain contexts civil liberties issues assume an immediacy that has direct implications for peoples sense of freedom and well-being" (Davis & Silver 2002, p. 2). Civil liberties are fundamental to the Bill of Rights, which asserts that citizens' rights should be protected from the government. While alterations to civil liberties may seem invisible to most citizens at first, "even small infringements, over time, may become major compromises that alter this country's way of life" (Whitehead & Aden, 2002, p. 1084).

Perhaps because "terrorism risks are highly imprecise and difficult to predict" (Viscusi & Zeckhauser, 2003, p. 3), scholars have researched several areas in which the PATRIOT Act does not serve its intended outcome either by failing to improve national security or by producing unforeseen negative consequences. One unintended consequence of the PATRIOT Act is immigration enforcement. "The centralization of immigration power in the hands of the federal government in certain circumstances may exacerbate the negative civil rights impacts of the enforcement of the immigration laws." That the reaction was federal in nature - and thus national in scope as well as uniform in design and impact, and faced precious few legal constraints - increased the severity of the impacts" (Akram & Johnson, 2002, p. 297). Although the PATRIOT Act was designed to prevent money laundering and obstruct funding to terrorists, its provisions may not disrupt terrorist financing for several reasons. Terrorist attacks are not expensive to fund, sources of funding remain hard to identify, and terrorists move money through non-bank channels (Gouvin, 2003). The Justice Department has detained several hundred foreign nationals without convicting them or charging them with a crime, and has refused requests to publicly identify them. They are jailed not for what they have done but because they fit within a defined class of people of which some may pose danger. The Bush administration declared in November 2001 that non-US citizens declared suspected terrorists could be tried by secret military tribunal instead of criminal court. The tribunals could be held according to rules declared by the Secretary of Defense, with attorneys who were selected by the Secretary of Defense, and tribunal panels could determine guilt or innocence by a two-thirds vote instead of unanimous decision, as is customary in U.S. criminal court (Dworkin, 2002).

The PATRIOT Act and other federal actions significantly impacted education in America. Higher education is commonly regarded as a source of cultural and economic growth. It serves as a nesting ground for new ideas, thus making academic freedom crucial for any vibrant higher education system. "Critics of higher education sometimes denigrate the 'ivory tower' mentality of these institutions, yet it is this very insularity that enables scientific, political and artistic ideas to form, evolve and win acceptance without being unduly influenced by economic necessity and popular opinion," note Bird and Brandt (2002, p. 432). Yet after 9/11, "academic freedom in the United States [faced] its most important threat since the McCarthy era of the 1950s" (Doumani, 2005, p. 22). Not only did many universities independently release faculty in the wake of 9/11 for "unpatriotic" actions, Bush administration policies including the PATRIOT Act impacted freedom of speech and university research in a variety of ways:

Consider just a few examples: Foreign students and scholars from 'suspect' nations are harassed and even denied entry into the United States without evidence they are security risks. American professors are prevented from working with gifted foreign scientists and students. Open scholarly communication is impeded by policies designed to isolate nations supporting terrorism; library and computer records are searched; political litmus tests are used by the Bush administration to decide who will serve on scientific advisory committees; and scientific reports whose content is inconsistent with the Bush administration's ideology have been altered (Cole, 2005, p. 9).

The U.S. House of Representatives unanimously passed a bill establishing a federal "Advisory Board" that would monitor university "area studies" centers and classroom lectures to ensure they "advance the national interest," which would "effectively replace professional academic standards with arbitrary political criteria" (Doumani, 2005, p. 22).

The U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control declared that publishers would face fines of up to a million dollars and up to ten years in jail if they edited scholarly articles by people who reside in Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Libya and Cuba (Doumani, 2005). Universities engaged in bioterrorism research were often heavily curtailed by new PATRIOT Act regulations, possibly barring researchers from finding cures to the world's most fatal pathogens. For example, Cornell University's bioterrorism research lab, which researches lethal biological materials such as anthrax and West Nile

virus and searches for vaccinations against them, reduced its laboratory staff from 36 to 2 per new PATRIOT Act guidelines regulating who may be allowed to work directly with lethal biological materials (Cole, 2005). The effects of 9/11 upon policy and institutions seem widespread, affecting higher education, immigration, financial regulatory agencies, civil liberties and freedom of speech. One must wonder where these effects stem from, and what worldview or belief system could have fostered them.

### **Leading During Crisis: President George W. Bush**

The September 11 attacks occurred less than one year after President George W. Bush was re-elected to his second term in office. A few months before 9/11, in summer of 2001, Bush's approval ratings were already beginning to drop to 51 percent, the poorest mark for any modern president within one year of re-election (Kuypers, 2006). Yet after 9/11, Bush's popularity skyrocketed. "Once the butt of late night jokes, ridiculed for his twisted syntax and lack of knowledge about foreign affairs, Bush emerged as the commander-in-chief of a nation committed to defeating international terrorism" (Martin, 2002, p. 1A). Bush's newfound popularity continued for years after 9/11. His popularity started at its highest point and slowly lowered into a plateau of high approval, before steeply dropping several years after 9/11. Immediately after 9/11, Bush rivaled Franklin D. Roosevelt's sustained wartime popularity ratings (Cook, 2002a). Sixty-four percent of Americans who were surveyed supported granting the president authority to change the U.S. Constitution (Pyszczynski et. al, 2003). Two years after 9/11, Bush continued to receive favorably-biased press coverage (Kuypers, 2006) and high public approval ratings (Secunda & Moran, 2006). This sustained support continued into May 2003, when Bush landed on aircraft carrier *USS Abraham Lincoln* beside a large banner declaring "Mission Accomplished", where he announced the Iraq War a success. In coverage of this event, only one-third of news sources discussed the possibility for a prolonged battle or mentioned any criticism that the event seemed staged (Kuypers, 2006). It wasn't until after the "Mission Accomplished" event, when Iraq leader Saddam Hussein's opposition forces mushroomed and U.S. casualties escalated, that Bush's approval ratings began to fall and media coverage became more critical (Secunda & Moran, 2006).

Not only did Bush's popularity ratings change after 9/11, his foreign policy stance shifted dramatically. Bush's pre-9/11 foreign policy stance was relatively "humble;" he discouraged



nation-building and spoke cautiously of imposing American might upon other nations. His post-9/11 foreign policy rhetoric became “less humble and more belligerent” (Fraim, 2003, pp. 131, 138). As discussed in the next section, President Bush's post-9/11 foreign policy rhetoric has become an increasing source of scholarly attention.

### ***Bush's Post-9/11 Rhetorical Transformation***

Scholars have examined Bush's post-9/11 rhetoric in a variety of ways, including his use of civil religion, crisis rhetoric, war rhetoric and prophetic dualism (Shogan, 2006; Kaylor, 2011). Bush's foreign policy rhetoric changed dramatically after 9/11, though his rhetoric remained imbued with civil religion and faith. A born-again evangelical Christian, George W. Bush is arguably “the most evangelical president in American history” (Will, 2004). After 9/11, Bush cast himself as a “healing exorcist” bent on removing the “evil” of terrorism (Gunn, 2004). “After almost a decade of presidential rhetoric virtually absent of evangelical themes, the events of 9/11 all but guaranteed their return” (Gunn, 2004, p. 11). Berggren and Rae (2006) contend that Bush's evangelical faith informed his vision of the presidency and U.S. foreign policy. They compare the rhetoric of two seemingly opposite political leaders, President Jimmy Carter and President George W. Bush, finding similarities in leadership and foreign policy which they attribute to each leader's evangelical faith (Berggren & Rae, 2006).

After 9/11, Bush often justified foreign policy by rhetorically linking it to America's foundational myths of exceptionalism, and America as harbinger of freedom (Stuckey and Ritter, 2007). He did so through the use of the ideograph <human rights>. Ideographs are “summary phrases,” or “high-order abstractions,” or loaded phrases that carry with them shared meaning among diverse audiences, which when employed can unify an audience around that shared meaning (Stuckey & Ritter, 2007, p. 648). Bush often paired the ideograph <human rights> with the phrase “free markets,” suggesting, as Stuckey and Ritter (2007) argue, that Bush saw America's “freedoms” as “particular economic ‘rights’ above political ‘rights,’” in particular the neoconservative economic freedoms of “free enterprise, privatization, deregulation, deterritorialization” (p. 647). Bush also utilized myth and archetype. For instance he rhetorically embodied America's “frontier” myth by portraying himself as a modern-day frontier gunslinger: “Bush's challenge to those who seek to harm America could easily have been spoken by Wyatt Earp or ‘Dirty Harry’: ‘Bring ‘em on!’” (Secunda & Moran, 2007, p. 4).

Bush also resurrected verbal certainty; his use of verbal certainty (or resolute language) steadily increased through his first 1,000 days in office (January 20, 2001 through October 16, 2003) (Hart and Childers, 2004). Although situations of international strife typically correlate with an increase a president's verbal certainty, Bush's use of verbal certainty was unusually high when compared to all other modern Presidencies from Truman to Reagan (Hart and Childers, 2004). The reason for his strong use of verbal certainty may lie in a perceived lack of legitimacy. To bolster his legitimacy in the aftermath of 9/11, Bush presented a narrative that cast the public as part of a monumental struggle as epic as World War II, between good and evil forces. This recasting of the situation imparted greater legitimacy and strength to his presidential leadership (Hart & Childers, 2004). Perhaps another reason for Bush's verbal certainty lies in his use of crisis rhetoric. Bush arguably extended crisis rhetoric from 9/11 into the summer of 2002 through heavy and repeated references to external threats, "evil," and 9/11 (John, Domke, Coe and Graham, 2007). By continuously recalling the crisis, he could perpetuate the feelings of crisis among audiences, and this in turn would lend more perceived authority and build more support for his domestic and foreign policy actions. Ivie (2007b), however, contends that the Bush administration's rhetoric of evil in the war on terror and the Iraq War stems from a worldview of aggression:

The nation's shriveled worldview remains rigid - largely unyielding to experience, overly closed to reflection, and mainly habituated to an anxious impudence regardless of (and even because of) any and all recalcitrance encountered along the way to fulfilling its self-proclaimed destiny. Nearly impervious to countervailing experiences and disconfirming consequences, U.S. war culture feeds on self-induced and overinflated expressions of national peril that transcend particular situations and transform specific exigencies into ritualized pretexts for violence (Ivie, 2007b, p. 222).

Regardless of Bush's potential motivations for verbal certainty - whether his rhetoric was motivated by economics, a need for public support, or anger, as scholars have suggested - one must wonder how this worldview was first presented to the public, if it is consistent with any other foreign policy worldviews espoused by past American presidents, and if any such worldview carries practical implications.

### ***First Complete Rhetorical Response: September 20, 2001 Address***

As seen in the Introduction, the events of 9/11 were widely mediated and apparent, but "what these facts meant was anything but obvious" (Zarefsky, 2004b, p. 141). Although a terrorist act, 9/11 was unlike any military action, leaving many Americans unsure of proper U.S. response (Kuypers, 2006). The attackers were unlike any traditional foe. They were not a nation declaring war against another nation, they were not seeking conquer land, and they had no land that the U.S. could retaliate against. Left in confusion, the American public looked to the government for guidance. President Bush's response would become the people's (and the world's) response to 9/11 (Kuypers, 2006). The president could have responded to 9/11 in a variety of ways, with any number of policy positions. For example, other potential rhetorical (and political) responses could have been to declare 9/11 a crime and to seek punishment for the crime, or to describe 9/11 as a lapse in national security, or, as Bush did, to declare 9/11 an act of war, thus requiring the U.S. to go to war against the foe (Zarefsky, 2004b).

President Bush's September 20, 2001 televised address to a Joint Session of Congress stands as a powerful and definitive response to the rhetorical situation. Structured in a question and answer format, the speech literally answered the public's questions about 9/11 while more fundamentally defining Bush's formal response to the terrorist acts and fulfilling the public's need for presidential leadership during a time of crisis (Zarefsky, 2004b). Bush's decision to present the speech when and where he did, to a joint session of Congress during prime time evening hours, established a regal theater that bestowed the speech with authority, surrounded by his political peers from both political parties in one of the greatest halls of American democracy, viewed by millions of Americans in their homes, with their families.

The September 20 speech is a turning point in Bush's earliest responses to 9/11 because it seems to be the first complete and fully prepared rhetorical response. The speech is a departure from several preceding public speeches. Earlier speeches had less preparation and involvement from the president, and explored a variety of ill-received (and not repeated) metaphors such as calling the terrorists "folks," calling the American response a "crusade," and calling the first military operation "Infinite Justice," a term that Muslim faith ascribes solely to Allah. Conversely, Bush worked on the September 20 speech directly with speechwriters and advisors, adding his opinions and participating in speech construction and phrasing (Zarefsky, 2004b). In a book cataloging effects and implications of the USA PATRIOT Act, rhetorical scholar Cassell

(2004) opens with a quote from Bush's September 20 address, implying that this speech was an essential part of the Bush administration's response to 9/11.

Compared to viewership of Bush's other speeches in the weeks and months following 9/11, the September 20 address was the most widely watched and perhaps the most positively received. At the time it was Neilson Media Research's "most-watched presidential speech on record" with 82.1 million viewers, ranking second only to the Super Bowl among all 2001 television ratings (Cook, 2002a). Immediately after the September 20 speech, Bush's approval ratings soared to 91 percent, the highest ever recorded by the Gallop Poll for any president since the Gallop started in the 1930s (Cook, 2002a). In a CNN/Gallup/*USA Today* poll, 87 percent of respondents felt the speech was "excellent" or "good," and 78 percent felt it clearly explained U.S. military goals. Many media columnists declared the speech a success and compared Bush to Abraham Lincoln and Winston Churchill (Zarefsky, 2004b). It was "the speech of President George Bush's life -- and he (and his speech writers) rose to the occasion" (Abrahamson, Jones & Sempa, 2011, online). Clearly, the September 20 speech provided a cathartic release for viewers. Bush successfully explained the events of 9/11 and offered a form of resolution, a new direction that Americans could follow.

### ***Rhetorical Intentions of the September 20, 2001 Address***

Because rhetorical study gains greater insight from an understanding of the rhetor's motives (Burke, 1969; Miller, 1984), this study looks to the Bush administration's work immediately prior to the September 20 address, when several major policies were on the verge of public issuance. It is not uncommon for Presidents in the modern era to use their rhetorical power to gain support for their own agendas. The September 20 address is no different; it is rhetorically and historically significant because it is a cohesive declaration of Bush's proposed response to 9/11. The speech presents a narrative of the situation, and from that narrative stem underlying logical conclusions and arguments to justify recommended policies.

The September 20 address is politically and rhetorically significant because it may be the nucleus for the Bush administration's future, perpetuated narrative about terror and foreign policy. Some scholars and political figures who were intimately involved in policy-making in the Bush administration have claimed President Bush intended military action against Iraq not only within weeks of 9/11, but as early as January 2001 (Secunda & Moran, 2006) and therefore may

have considered war rhetoric a key part of his initial response to 9/11. Bush reportedly said "we are at war" upon hearing of the second plane flying into the World Trade Towers on September 11, and declared to his Cabinet on September 12 that the acts were "acts of war" (Zarefsky, 2004b, p. 139). During preparation for the September 20 address, Bush told presidential adviser Karen P. Hughes, "This is a defining moment. We have an opportunity to restructure the world toward freedom, and we have to get it right" (Zarefsky, 2004b, p. 139). The Bush administration's *National Security Strategy*, released in September 2002 as a detailed outline of what has later become known as the Bush Doctrine, declares President Bush's September 20 address his first speech that embodies it (Record, 2003). Attorney General John Ashcroft's office was already drafting the PATRIOT Act by the time Bush was preparing his September 20 address (Cassell, 2004). The president knew this speech was a rhetorically and politically significant moment, and he participated directly in its development. Bush intended to use this opportunity to advance certain positions that were taking shape at the time, including the PATRIOT Act and the war on terror. However, it serves scholarly understand to ask what worldview underpinned this speech and provided the essential narrative upon which Bush could propose and justify the PATRIOT Act and the war on terror as America's best possible responses to 9/11.

### ***Prophetic Dualism and Metaphor***

Prophetic dualism is a moralistic foreign policy narrative that divides the world into two stark opposing forces of "good" and "evil" and asserts America's God-given superiority over the evil foe (Warner, 2008). The prophetic dualism narrative is a "powerful force of central organizing arguments in shaping American attitudes toward foreign policy" (Hollihan, 1986, p. 369). Prophetic dualism is a complete worldview that defines war as absolutely necessary and defines victory as all-encompassing defeat of one's foe. Inherent in this worldview lie potential long-term consequences, both practical and rhetorical (Wander, 1984). Metaphor emerges as a useful indicator of prophetic dualism's narrative structure. Just as prophetic dualism is a "powerful" rhetorical tool, so too is metaphor. "The consequences of figurative expression, both substantively and methodologically, cannot be minimized" (Stelzner, 1965, p. 52). One can argue that even the terms "good" and "evil" can dance between the realms of literal and figurative.

Zagacki (2007) and Warner (2008) argue President G. W. Bush's Iraq War rhetoric was grounded in prophetic dualism. Warner (2008) concludes that the press also engaged in the rhetoric of prophetic dualism. They not only parroted "the terms of prophetic dualism in their coverage of events, but also [actively sought] out opportunities to reaffirm that they, too, were on the correct side of the dualism" (Warner, 2008, online). This leads us to wonder, then, if President Bush's first cohesive response to 9/11, his September 20, 2001 address, also meets the tenets of prophetic dualism. If this were true, one could explore a variety of implications, both practical and rhetorical, surrounding the evolution of Bush's post-9/11 rhetoric, the rhetorical relationships between the war on terror and the Iraq War, the public's reactions to prophetic dualism and its effects on nationalism, and long-term viability of prophetic dualism as a sustained foreign policy narrative.

### **Research Questions**

Little study exists on the potential existence of prophetic dualism in Bush's earliest post-9/11 rhetoric. One must wonder *when* the prophetic dualism narrative was established and if it could have influenced or informed rhetoric of the Iraq War. Could a prophetic dualism narrative have existed as early as September 20, 2001 as a means to define 9/11 itself and to influence the public's response, or possibly to justify the Bush administration's earliest post-9/11 actions such as the PATRIOT Act and Operation Enduring Freedom, which were launched just weeks after 9/11? Considering that the September 20 address is now considered the first public unveiling of what would later be known as the Bush Doctrine, and that the Bush Doctrine would be a guiding philosophy behind the Bush administration's Iraq War, such early presence (and role) of prophetic dualism may carry serious implications. The success of Bush's post-9/11 rhetoric is not in doubt; his September 20, 2001 address was a rhetorical success. But due to the significant political and rhetorical implications inherent in a prophetic dualism worldview, and especially one espoused as the *first complete reaction* to one of the largest attacks on domestic soil in American history, an examination of this rhetoric is warranted.

Prophetic dualism is a moralistic foreign policy framework dependent on an audience and speaker who summon - and require - a religious dimension in order to act on a proposed foreign policy. Civil religion is intertwined with prophetic dualism. One may argue that if prophetic dualism is present, civil religion must necessarily be present by default. However, this study

seeks to reaffirm if this is necessarily true, and additionally this study seeks to explore the extent and role of civil religion in President Bush's speech. *The first research question: How, if at all, is civil religion present in President Bush's September 20, 2001 address?*

This study looks to President Bush's earliest fully-formed, widely mediated address, his speech to a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001, as the first complete presentation of a prophetic dualism narrative. *The second research question this study poses: Is prophetic dualism evident in President George W. Bush's September 20, 2001 address?*

Prophetic dualism can be unveiled through careful scrutiny of the speaker's metaphorical concepts. Clusters of metaphor, or metaphorical concepts, act as a perspective or founding values from which the simplified narrative of the foreign policy situation is told. Metaphor is a powerfully persuasive tool of language, is unavoidable in practically any form of speech, and is noteworthy in carefully constructed rhetoric such as presidential speeches because one metaphor may carry very different subtexts from another, and the active decision to choose one over another carries implications for the situation and speaker, as well as for the study of rhetoric. *This leads us to consider the final research question: What, if any, metaphors did President Bush use to establish a framework of prophetic dualism?*

## **Preview of Chapters**

This study seeks to understand President Bush's rhetorical narrative in his September 20, 2001 address in the realms of presidential rhetoric, presidential war rhetoric, presidential crisis rhetoric, prophetic dualism and metaphor. Chapter Two begins with a review of scholarly thought on presidential rhetoric. It explores current understanding of the modern rhetorical presidency and the importance and relevance of presidential rhetoric in today's world. The chapter delves into the prevailing scholarly opinion on presidential crisis rhetoric and presidential war rhetoric. In each of these categories I explore the characteristics and purposes of crisis and war rhetoric in the modern era. The review continues with a discussion of scholarly perspectives on civil religion and prophetic dualism including how they function and their relevance in the modern rhetorical presidency.

Chapter Three reviews scholarly work on the rhetorical device of metaphor, which is the key tool necessary to examine the tenets of prophetic dualism. From Aristotle to modern day, I explore scholarly understanding of the roles and influence of metaphor in presidential rhetoric,

with emphasis on metaphor in presidential war rhetoric, civil religion and prophetic dualism. The chapter concludes with a review of the specific analysis to be conducted in this study and an overview of the artifact.

Chapter Four outlines the results of the metaphoric analysis. This process resulted in the following metaphorical concepts. It discusses metaphorical concepts, or clusters of metaphors, which were identified in the text: FORCE/WAR, BODY, FEAR, LIGHT/DARK, NEAR/FAR, UNITY, FAITH/FATE, GOOD/EVIL and SAVAGE. It concludes with a summary of the worldview, or general arguments, presented through the metaphorical concepts. In Chapter Five, I review the extended logical arguments stemming from the metaphoric clusters in order to unearth President Bush's underlying worldview. Chapter Five offers answers to the research questions and explores potential political, rhetorical and methodological implications that may be useful to scholars in rhetoric, sociology and political science.



## **Chapter 2 - Literature Review**

On September 20, 2001, President Bush spoke to an American public seized in the midst of a national crisis. Bush addressed Americans' questions about the events, explained what happened and who committed the actions, and declared war against the attackers. This unique rhetorical situation encompasses research in presidential rhetoric, presidential crisis rhetoric and presidential war rhetoric. Bush's rhetoric, delivered in a time of crisis and war, may also include tenets of civil religion and prophetic dualism. If this study is to identify prophetic dualism in Bush's September 20, 2001 address, and because prophetic dualism is also imbued with civil religion, this chapter concludes with a review of past scholarly work on civil religion and prophetic dualism.

### **The Rhetorical Presidency**

The relationship between politics and rhetoric is an old one. Aristotle (1897) argues rhetoric is a superseding force in human interaction: rhetoric is "conversant not with any one distinct class of subjects, but like logic is of universal applicability; and that it is useful, is evident" (p. 9). Further, Aristotle claims the purpose of rhetoric is persuasion. "Its business is not absolute persuasion, but to consider on every subject what means of persuasion are inherent in it, just as in the case of every other art" (Aristotle, 1847, p. 9-10). As humans, we use our ability of speech to persuade one another on any subject, including matters of state and war (Burke, 1969). The nature of our persuasion and the situation that surrounds the persuasion is worthy of study. "Politics begins with rhetoric: what is being said, who is saying it, and for whom" (Wander, 1996, p. 403). The essential nature of politics, of dividing scarce resources, lies in the choices rhetors make in defining the situation, their audiences, and the situation encompassing both rhetor and audience.

While some critics argue that presidential rhetoric has little to no effect at all, that it essentially falls on deaf ears, (Edwards, 2003), most believe that it influences the direction of a nation and is imbued with the unique authority to both reflect and shape the nation's public values (Stuckey, 1995; Cherwitz, 1987; Dow, 1989; Hogan, 1985; Hollihan, 1986; & Newman, 1975). Presidential rhetoric arguably "defines political reality" in that the president has authority

to establish topics of discussion, define complex situations, and shape the context in which his proposals are heard (Zarefsky, 2004, p. 611).

In the 20th Century, the American presidency has undergone a "true transformation" wherein rhetoric has become a "key tool of governance" (Tulis, 1987, p. 4). In *The Rhetorical Presidency*, Tulis claims that the rhetoric of American presidents shifted in the 20th Century from "the articulation...of presidential policy to the advocacy of particular policy proposals" (Edwards, 1996, p. 202). Modern presidents advocate for their own proposals by "regularly 'go[ing] over the heads' of Congress to the people at large in support of legislation and other initiatives" (Tulis, 1987, p. 4). The power inherent in presidential rhetoric is "enhanced in the modern presidency by the ability of presidents to speak when, where, and on whatever topic they choose, and to a national audience through coverage by the electronic media" (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990, p. 1). Kernell (1997) describes this as "going public," when presidents speak directly to the public for support, and in some cases, presidents rally the public to push Congress to act in the president's favor. The process of "going public" was rarely used by pre-modern presidents but is now used so frequently that it barely registers controversy (Kernell, 1997). In a study of President George W. Bush's first year in office after re-election in 2002, Cook (2002b) concludes Bush's extensive travel and public speaking engagements not only reinforce Tulis' and Kernell's assertions, but also suggests that the "permanent campaign" is a fixture of the modern American presidency.

Modern presidents depend on the mass media to share their message with the public, inadvertently invoking the mass media as a key player in the modern presidency, but mass media - radio and television - did not "cause" the rhetorical presidency. Television and radio existed before and without the rhetorical presidency. At points in history, presidential administrations and broadcasters deliberately justified and sought promotion of presidential speeches to the public (Tulis, 1987). The rhetorical presidency is also marked by a substantial increase in the number of speeches, and the speeches themselves include more members of the public in the audience. Because a president's time is spent more on speechmaking, it can be argued that the president's traditional means of governance has shifted from substantive roles to ceremonial roles (Stuckey & Antczak, 1996).

The rhetorical presidency expands upon current political science paradigms led by scholars such as Richard Neustadt in his book *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership*.

Neustadt's work recognized the president's "power with public opinion" (Windt, 1986, p. 102). In addition to powers granted to the president by the constitution and the president's powers as leader of a political party, the president also has, and must deftly handle, the power of persuasion, Neustadt argued. Based on Neustadt's work, scholars in the fields of history, political science and journalism began to explore how presidents could persuade the public. The rhetorical presidency is a modern extension of the president's power of persuasion. The president's actual constitutional authorities have changed only slightly; modern presidents have all the same political authorities as Alexander Hamilton (Tulis, 1987). It is not outside forces causing the rhetorical presidency, but rather a shift in paradigm established by Woodrow Wilson and expanded in different ways by ensuing presidents (Tulis, 1987). Neustadt's *Presidential Power* may not have widely recognized the rhetorical presidency, or as Kernell (1997) describes it, "going public," because it is a subversive strategy that undermines bargaining as a vehicle of persuasion. "Going public" undermines democratic principles of debate and bargaining. It cuts opportunities for closed-doors compromise and prevents future compromise by disallowing private feedback and discussion. By asking the public to tell their Congressional representatives what to do, the president forces Congress to accept his will (Kernell, 1997). It implies negative consequences for those who disagree: "If targeted representatives are lucky, the president's success may cost them no more than an opportunity at the bargaining table to shape policy or to extract compensation. If unlucky, they may find themselves both capitulating to the president's wishes and suffering the reproach of constituents for having resisted them in the first place" (Kernell, 1997, p. 3).

Presidential speeches have gained significant power under the rhetorical presidency, and if a president is a particularly skilled orator, that power is further enhanced. Through research of a database of more than 10,000 presidential speeches between the Truman administration and late 1985, Hart concludes rhetoric is a powerful tool of presidential leadership and potentially too powerful because it may overpower Congress (Hart, 1987). Several scholars concur that the rhetorical skill of a president can substantially impact the president's ability to make change. Presidential speeches alter public perceptions of policy and the president (Stuckey & Antczak, 1996) and they focus the public's attention on certain issues. Stuckey contends, "it is often the president's rhetoric that ... defines [a situation] in such a way that the nation's response is clearly implied" (1992, p. 246). A president's rhetorical skill - his or her rhetorical presidency - is a

power in itself. Ronald Reagan, a shining example of a strong rhetorical presidency and known as the "Great Communicator," used his rhetorical skill to successfully establish the "Star Wars" defense program, pass tax reform, and cut the national budget (Tulis, 1987). Although scholars generally agree with Neustadt's assertion that presidents now require strong rhetorical skill in order to successfully wield the "power to persuade," only five modern presidents are known for that skill: Theodore and Franklin Roosevelt, Kennedy, Reagan and Clinton (Berggren & Rae, 2006). Presidents do not always successfully persuade their audiences; rhetorical criticism is a valuable tool for understanding how presidents are (or aren't) rhetorically successful.

The rhetorical presidency can be traced to President Woodrow Wilson (Tulis, 1987). During his more than thirty years in politics, Wilson advocated a plethora of changes to national governance, such as allowing the president to select Cabinet members from Congress and synchronizing the dates of terms served by the president and Congressional representatives, through a series of public speeches and essays. Wilson's constant advocacy was motivated by a set of underlying beliefs that would eventually form the rhetorical presidency. First, Wilson believed presidents could - and should - proactively make policy by exerting stronger leadership roles in the public realm. Presidents could "interpret" the will of the masses and create policy that fulfill the public's wishes. This "interpretation," however, is not the same as following public opinion polls (Tulis, 1987). Wilson believed that the Constitution's separation of powers prevented the executive from leading Congress toward proactive policymaking and instead, the president could only negate bad policies proposed by Congress. Second, Wilson believed the separation of powers prevented effective deliberation in Congress. He believed good deliberation should be powerful enough to rouse the interest of the public; it should constantly address fundamental issues such as identity or principles. Detailed discussions of minute details were only interesting to vested factions, and Congressional committees were "hidden away" from the public eye:

"The ordinary citizen cannot be induced to pay much heed to the details, or even the main principles of lawmaking," Wilson wrote, "unless something else more interesting than the law itself be involved in the pending decision of the lawmakers." For the founders this would not have been disturbing, but for Wilson the very heart of representative government was the principle of publicity: "The informing function of Congress should be preferred even to its legislative

function." The informing function was to be preferred both as an end in itself and because the accountability of public officials required policies that were connected with one another and explained to the people. Argument from 'principle' would connect policy and present constellations of policies as coherent wholes to be approved or disapproved by the people (Tulis, 1987, p. 127)

"The rhetorical presidency is not simply good or bad, but rather both," notes Tulis (1996, p. 3). Because the rhetorical presidency "transforms crisis politics into normal politics" (Crockett, 2009, p. 933), it is a more appropriate strategy when used in times of actual crisis. However, in normal times a president can distort relatively mundane issues when presenting them within a context of identity and principles (Tulis, 1996).

Tulis' rhetorical presidency has been questioned by scholars; responding refutations have further elucidated and refined it. For instance, some disagree with Tulis outright, contending that pre-modern presidents engaged in rhetorical tactics many times and used vibrant public appeals and communications, citing William McKinley and Abraham Lincoln as examples. However, scholars have responded to such claims by noting that McKinley worked in the same time as Wilson and could have been influenced by Wilson's actions and philosophy, while Lincoln faced the largest crisis in our nation's history and was rightfully compelled to speak to the public (Crockett, 2009). Another challenge made against the rhetorical presidency is that pre-modern presidents often "spoke" to the public through open letters. However, some see differences between the written form and the spoken form:

Mode is important. If one has only a written text to engage, one is forced to wrestle with the printed words - the quality of the argument. When watching or listening to a speech, personal qualities such as emotion and temper and charisma can affect reception (Crockett, 2009, p. 934).

Furthermore, open letters do not "go over the heads of Congress" in the same way Tulis describes presidential rhetoric. Letters are tempered written arguments, part of the deliberative process, and lack the charisma and emotion necessary for rousing the public (Crockett, 2009).

Another element of the rhetorical presidency is its ability to cement certain issues in the public agenda that may outlast a single president. In effect, the rhetorical presidency can create "legacy" issues which succeeding presidents must face. If a president introduces bold, new directions in his or her term, future presidents may adopt the underlying premises of those

concepts and enact policies to support those premises. Rhetoric is a "determinative force:" "if a person feels required to make a certain statement, he or she will act differently as a result" (Hart, 2006, p. 256), and this logic also applies to presidential rhetoric. For example, by the time Eisenhower entered the presidency, Franklin Roosevelt's rhetorical legacy of social security had become a political legacy. The "Social Security system - probably the single most popular piece of legislation ever enacted in U.S. History - had been drawn tightly to the nation's bosom" (Hart, 2006, p. 259). In turn, Kennedy inherited Eisenhower's Cold War rhetoric. Eisenhower's Crusade for Freedom, a years-long persuasive campaign, "represents some of the essential features of Cold War discourse" (Hart, 1987, p. 646).

As history unfolds, as new legislative arrangements are worked out, as new compromises are effected and then translated into new orthodoxies, an attendant rhetoric develops to superintend them. That is, history is constantly being performed in politics, and its performers are frequently collusive. These processes often stand partisanship on its head as fresh alliances are formed, alliances that no single leader may fully embrace but that none dares abandon (2006, p. 259-260).

With this in mind, this study draws parallels in the presidency of George W. Bush. John, Domke, Coe and Graham (2007) quantitatively studied the use of "evil" language, external threats and references to 9/11 in presidential public communications from June 6 to November 5, 2002, and found that in all categories, Bush "heavily emphasized the themes and did so with remarkable consistency" (2007, p. 204). They conclude that, through constant public communications on domestic "homeland" security and the war on terror, Bush "extended the sense of national crisis from September 11 to Saddam and Iraq in a manner that significantly shaped U.S. New coverage, benefited the Republican Party, and set the nation on a course toward the Iraq war" (John, Domke, Coe and Graham, 2007, p. 197). The U.S. intervention in Iraq was subsequently rhetorically framed by Republican 2008 presidential candidates as a "battlefield in the global war against radical Islam" (Bostdorff, 2009, p. 230). 2008 Presidential candidates Romney, Tancredo, Brownback, Giuliani, and McCain said they perceived the war to be part of a larger effort to defeat violent jihad and radical Islam in various parts of the world, and to create what Giuliani described as "an Iraq that will act as an ally for us in the Islamic terrorist war against us" (Bostdorff, 2009, p. 231) The lone dissenting perspective was Ron Paul's. Paul "did his best to dissociate Iraq from 9/11 specifically and the fight against terrorism generally" (Bostdorff, 2009,

p. 231). If Hart's "determinative force" is accurate, one could argue that Bush's rhetoric had a "determinative force," in that his post-9/11 foreign policy agenda was later continued by Republican presidential candidates in subsequent campaigns.

Presidential rhetoric has the power to shape public values, define political reality, and imply the nation's response to a given situation. Although presidential rhetoric is arguably most appropriately used in times of crisis, the "rhetorical presidency" is now an everyday fixture of American politics. In the modern era, presidential rhetoric has evolved into a necessary tool of leadership and governance wherein presidents are engaged in a "perpetual campaign" for their policies. They now regularly go "over the heads of Congress" to appeal their policies, values, and important issues directly to the public. Furthermore, once a president introduces a new and compelling idea to the public, the idea may outlast the president's stay in office and become embedded in the national agenda. The modern rhetorical presidency is best suited to times of crisis, as some have argued, due to the nature of presidential rhetoric to reflect and shape public values, which can quickly calm the public. Considering the nature of 9/11 as one of the most immediate cultural crises in modern American history, a more detailed discussion of presidential crisis rhetoric is warranted.

### **Presidential Crisis Rhetoric**

Theodore Windt, one of the first scholars to study presidential crisis rhetoric, identified three aspects of crisis rhetoric that distinguish it from other forms of presidential rhetoric:

First, there is the obligatory statement of facts. Second, there is the establishment of a "melodrama" between good (the United States) and evil (traditionally the Soviets). Third, the policy announced by the president and the asked-for support are framed as moral acts (Kuypers, 1997, p.18).

Scholars have applied these elements to both Cold War and post-Cold War rhetoric. Windt examined them in Kennedy's rhetorical responses to the Cuban Missile Crisis and Nixon's announcement of sending troops into Cambodia. Others have found these same elements in post-Cold War rhetoric employed by G. W. Bush and Clinton regarding international crises in Haiti and Bosnia, respectively (Kuypers, 1997).

What actually constitutes a crisis and the types of responses a president can make to a crisis can vary. Public crises are "natural or manmade events that pose an immediate and serious

threat to the lives and property or to the peace of mind of large numbers of citizens” (Graber, 1980, p. 225). "Rhetoric plays an important role in framing national responses to international emergencies. In fact, it is widely held that international crises are rhetorical artifacts: events become crises, not because of unique sets of situational exigencies, but by virtue of discourse used to describe them" (Cherwitz & Zagacki, 1986, p. 307). The way a president describes the crisis - establishes the "facts" - can distort the situation and in turn, this gives the president leeway to exaggerate or minimize a given situation. However, much of this scholarly work applies to international situations that do not include direct military attacks upon the United States. In cases of military strike, the president has less leeway to choose whether or not to define the situation as a crisis: it *is* a crisis.

Times of international crisis are created by the president, or "promoted," because presidents "advance a specific claim and bring it to the attention to others" (Bostdorff, 1994, p. 1). "Promote" does not mean "concoct," although a president can promote a crisis whether they perceive it to be legitimate or just "politically expedient" (Bostdorff, 1994, p. 2). Promotion is of necessity: foreign locales and peoples, often the sources of crises, are remote to American audiences and presidents must persuasively present claims of crisis in order to achieve related policy goals. Presidents have sensitive information that others do not, and are responsible for presenting this information in order to justify a response.

Crisis rhetoric is as important, if not more important, than policy for successful crisis management. A president's "words perform acts significant to the management of crises. In a sense, presidents 'do by saying' when responding to international crises" (Cherwitz & Zagacki, 1986, p. 308). Upon recognizing a crisis, the president must respond with decisiveness, immediacy and urgency (Kuypers, 1997). Times of crisis are not times of discussion and debate. "By announcing the crisis, the president asks for his decision to be supported, not for debate upon what should be done" (Kuypers, 1997, p. 17).

Presidents can handle foreign powers and response to international crises in a variety of ways, and much attention has been given to various genres and categorizations of crisis rhetoric. Presidential crisis rhetoric can be divided into deliberative and epideictic genres, though epideictic and deliberative rhetoric can coexist in a single speech because a president must both define the crisis and suggest a response to it (Dow, 1989). Presidential crisis rhetoric can also be categorized as either consummatory and justificatory rhetoric (Cherwitz & Zagacki, 1986).



Consummatory rhetoric seeks to swiftly close the crisis at hand while simultaneously stressing "the importance of caution, patience, resolve and inner strength in reaction to wrongful deeds" (Cherwitz & Zagacki, 1986, p. 310). It calls for "the perpetrators to carry out certain (U.S. prescribed) actions to close the crisis. ... It demands, it seeks to effect a change or induce action" (Kuypers, 1997, p. 20). Cherwitz and Zagacki (1986) review Reagan's response to the downing of commercial jetliner 007 as an example of consummatory rhetoric. Reagan stated: "With our horror and sorrow, there is a righteous and terrible anger. It would be easy to think in terms of vengeance, but that is not the proper answer. We want justice and action to see that this never happens again" (cited in Cherwitz and Zagacki, 1986, p. 310). Reagan's reaction confines the crisis as a one-time event and prescribes the most appropriate emotional response as a relatively conservative action to prevent any future incidents. In contrast, justificatory rhetoric is a declaration and rationalization of a *responsive action* to "unprovoked, aggressive and hostile offenses perpetrated by ruthless, savaged and uncivilized enemies" (Cherwitz & Zagacki, 1986, p. 309). It is "irrevocable, direct and decisive, announcing concrete, definitive, military moves taken in response to malevolent actions of foreign nations" (Cherwitz & Zagacki, 1986, p. 310). It is so definitive that it "initially constitutes the government's official reply" to the crisis (Kuypers, 1997, p. 20). An example of justificatory crisis rhetoric may be President Ford's response to the seizure of U.S.S. Mayaguez, when he stated, "in view of this illegal and dangerous act, I ordered ... United States military forces to conduct the necessary reconnaissance and to be ready to respond if diplomatic efforts ... were not successful" (Cherwitz & Zagacki, 1986, p. 310). However, some scholars caution against classifying crisis rhetoric as a method for interpreting speech. Classifications may create a narrow perspective or either-or perspective of the president as actor or reactor, as defining action or justifying action. Any research that follows a category may overlook potentially important information, if that information runs contrary to the category. Crisis rhetoric genres could instead be used as a means to greater understanding, or as a starting point for analysis, but not necessarily as a narrowed interpretation of events. Crises are uniquely complex and fast-paced moments, and classification could oversimplify them. The classification of "fluid events" such as crises could "lead to a limited view of the range of possible communication practices" (Kuypers, 1997, p. 24). To avoid potential oversimplification or narrow classification of presidential crisis rhetoric, a critic could also analyze public knowledge along with presidential rhetoric. The public authorizes the president to act on its

behalf, and therefore any president experiencing a foreign policy crisis situation must, through rhetoric, gain authorization from the public to respond to the crisis. Examination of media coverage and public responses offers insight into how the issue is seen from the eyes of the people. This form of critical lens is especially useful for crises that do not involve military attack against the United States or for crises that evolve slowly over a period of time (Kuypers, 1997).

Many scholars concur that during times of crisis, Americans seek reassurance and comfort from the president (John, Domke, Coe & Graham, 2007; Kuypers, 1997; Parry-Giles & Parry-Giles, 2004). "During a crisis, it is seen as almost unpatriotic to criticize the president or cast doubt on the country's future," explains Cook (2002a, p. 237). In the immediate wake of a public crisis "the major task, individually and collectively, is that of integrating the traumatic event into the fabric of social life in order to make it less threatening" (Neal, 1998, pp. 9-12). Presidential leadership is comforting and clarifying. To provide comfort, presidents sometimes employ patriotic language that is rooted in the myths of American exceptionalism. Such language reinforces traditionally held myths that America is a morally superior and united group (Parry-Giles & Parry-Giles, 2004). The crisis is abated through a return to nation, a sense of national pride, and a confidence in America's institutions. The oft-noted tendency for the public to "rally 'round the flag" in times of crisis is dubbed the *rally effect* (Stuckey & Antczak, 1996). Attitudes toward the nation become stronger and the public expresses various tones of support, though it must be noted, the rally effect also depends on favorable media coverage as well as bipartisan policy support (Stucky & Antczak, 1996).

When the public experiences a crisis (when they sense a threat to their lives, property or peace of mind), they look to the president for guidance. Presidential crisis rhetoric re-knits the country and launches the public toward appropriate response. In times of crisis, words are more important than policy. Typically, presidential crisis rhetoric will state the facts, establish a "melodrama" narrative of the situation, propose policy response, and ask for the public's support. Both the proposed policy and requested support are framed as morally good responses to the crisis. Presidential crisis rhetoric is most successful when the president responds immediately and decisively when the crisis emerges. Furthermore, presidents typically choose between two major types of response: consummatory, or a cautious response that seeks to close the crisis; or justificatory, which seeks irrevocable, decisive and responsive action.

On occasion national crises are entangled with war. Military strikes on American soil or instigating attacks against American allies, have prompted presidents to declare war as the best response to the crisis. In these instances, presidential war rhetoric is often employed along with presidential crisis rhetoric. In this study, President Bush's September 20, 2001 address is an example of both presidential crisis rhetoric and presidential war rhetoric. President Bush explains the crisis and responds to it by declaring a war on terror. Because Bush's speech called for public approval and authority for the war on terror, a review of war rhetoric is warranted.

### **Presidential War Rhetoric**

In response to a crisis, a president may call America to war against a foreign foe. In these cases, presidents employ "war rhetoric," a genre of presidential rhetoric that legitimizes the president's use of war powers. The purpose of presidential war rhetoric is to persuade the nation to support the president's proposed war strategy (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990, p. 101). "Presidents have a significant advantage in exercising military power independent of the legislature" (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990, p. 102), and a simple look at past U.S. military action can verify this. Although the U.S. Constitution assigns Congress the sole authority to declare war and Congress has only officially declared war five times in American history, U.S. presidents have issued orders for more than 220 military ventures (Secunda & Moran, 2007).

Presidential war rhetoric merits its own genre of rhetorical study because it has distinguishable and repeated categories of speech. Over time, U.S. presidents, both pre-modern and modern, have repeated the same patterns of argument to justify war. This is arguably because war itself has recognizable patterns of participants and circumstances. "Even the perceived likelihood of war is an identifiable historical situation which usually calls forth many rhetorical endeavors addressed to various audiences and propounding various points of view relating to war" (Reid, 1976, p. 259).

War is embedded in the human psyche, laden with mythic acts and players. It is an "exercise in ritual, a sacrament of symbolism, and an enactment of tragic theatre" (Ivie, 2007a, p. 2). It is a force that gives purpose to its people. It suspends negative criticism of the establishment and it helps make an "us-versus-them" world seem easier to understand. The call to war can be a seductive one. War itself is a "guilty pleasure" and the "deep yearning to prove one's nobility under fire" is a "powerful narcotic" (Ivie, 2007a, p. 2). If the public has already

accepted narrative arguments in favor of war, they will be ready and possibly eager to fight when the president calls them to action.

Presidential war rhetoric typically has five characteristics (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990). First, war rhetoric proclaims that war is a deliberate choice that was reached through careful consideration. For example, prior to war against Spain, President McKinley said of Spain's sinking of the *U.S.S. Maine* in Havana harbor, "The appalling calamity fell upon the people of our country with crushing force, and for a brief time an intense excitement prevailed ... This spirit, however, soon gave way to the calmer processes of reason and to the resolve to investigate the facts" (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990, p. 106).

Second, war rhetoric establishes a narrative form of the situation and utilizes the narrative to establish supporting arguments in favor of war. The rhetor creates a compelling story from which the rhetor draws persuasive arguments. The narrative is a dramatized yet simple re-telling of the facts that portrays the enemy as an aggressor and the president's proposed actions as the best means of defense. The enhanced narrative also pits the enemy against "the sorts of cherished national values rehearsed and reinvigorated in presidential inaugural addresses ... in order to rebuff implications of self-interest" (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990, p. 107). Although this characteristic seems to contradict the reasoned and logical approach of the first characteristic of war rhetoric, the narrative is not a reasoned and logical re-telling of events, and the first characteristic is not, either; the first characteristic simply is the rhetor's statement that he or she underwent careful, but private, deliberation. Narratives are "powerful elements" of persuasion (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990, p. 111). The narrative provides a basis for arguments in favor of war. This characteristic is a form of justificatory rhetoric in that the narrative and ensuing arguments prove that "a threat imperils the nation, indeed, civilization itself, which emanates from the acts of an identifiable enemy and which, despite patient search for an alternative, necessitates forceful, immediate response" (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990, p. 107). Ivie (1982) explores this characteristic in critical study of the War of 1812, contending that through the use of metaphor, the pro-war Republican party successfully established a consistent narrative and subsequent arguments of British barbarity so savage it could cause "the ruination of American independence" (1982, p. 241). Additionally, George H. W. Bush's rhetoric successfully established a narrative "vision of the past" that recalled the glory of World War II, which helped garner favorable public opinion of the Persian Gulf War and of Bush's leadership. Leading up to

the Persian Gulf conflict, after Bush had already declared hostilities against Iraq, the media and the public weighed involvement as a potential disaster reminiscent of the Vietnam conflict. Without Bush's decision to create a powerful narrative and justificatory rhetoric to frame the Persian Gulf as "a return to World War II," the war would probably not have been supported (German, 1995, p. 293). Bush's strong narrative and justificatory rhetoric turned public support and garnered the necessary political power to go to war. Presidents who choose not to engage in war rhetoric will likely fail, but if a president is unable to construct a persuasive and engaging narrative, the president's war rhetoric may also fail.

Third, war rhetoric calls upon the audience for unanimous support and full commitment to the cause. This characteristic is typically most evident immediately after war has been declared. This argument stems from the narrative. The narrative "constitutes the audience as a united community of patriots that is urged to repulse the threat with all available resources" (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990, p. 111). This characteristic is also more perfunctory than other characteristics of war rhetoric and is not necessarily the fulcrum of war rhetoric's success. Both Presidents Polk and Madison used nearly identical calls to action in their presidential proclamations following congressional declarations of war. Madison stated, "I do specially enjoin on all persons holding offices, civil or military, under the authority of the United States that they be vigilant and zealous in discharging the duties respectively incident thereto" (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990, p. 112). Similarly, President Johnson called upon democrats to support the Vietnam war: "Put away all the childish divisive things, if you want the maturity and the unity that is the mortar of a nation's greatness" (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990, p. 112).

Fourth, war rhetoric legitimizes the president as commander in chief. The narrative is a critical tool in creating arguments that prove the president has "carefully gathered the requisite information and deliberated about whether conditions require war" (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990, p. 112). Arguments often imply immediacy and urgency; that the U.S. should take action immediately if the president is to take charge of the situation. Because presidents are not granted Constitutional authority to declare war, presidents have employed a variety of tactics to instigate war. From a rhetorical perspective this supports Neustadt's (and later Tulis') arguments that presidents are imbued with the power of leadership and they are responsible for leading in times of crisis. Campbell and Jamieson (1990) cite historian Abbot Smith's review of President Madison for an interesting comparison of what happens when presidents choose not to utilize

their power of leadership. Unlike most presidents, Madison strictly followed the constitution's separation of powers and generally refused to proactively and independently lead foreign policy issues, with what many historians consider to be disastrous results: Madison weakened his own reputation and the reputation the executive branch. The War of 1812, initiated by a split vote in Congress during Madison's tenure, is arguably the least popular war in American history. Despite Madison's efforts to "uphold the Constitution to the best of his ability," "despite all the tenets of pristine republicanism, the country wanted then, and has always wanted since, to follow a strong leader in times of crisis," notes historian Abbot (cited in Campbell & Jamieson, 1990, p. 114). Madison refused leadership - an entailment of the role of commander in chief - because it was not expressly stated in the Constitution.

The final characteristic of war rhetoric is "strategic misrepresentation" of the situation (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990, p. 118). In order to "stifle dissent and unify the nation for immediate and sustained action" (p. 118), and to call upon Congress and the public to imbue the president with authority to lead a war, the president ascends the dramatic narrative to "melodrama" (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990, p. 119). A melodramatic recasting of the situation can be extremely persuasive and possibly the crux of successful war rhetoric: "It is difficult to imagine a more powerful call to arms than one based on the image of savagery" (Ivie, 1982, p. 241). Distortion of fact is not to be confused with character fault or unethical tactics. It is a strategy that is demanded of the president by the situation. The president claims he or she has undergone careful deliberation, but the president does not publicly discuss the issue in extreme detail because a deliberative rhetorical approach would not rouse strongly felt and unanimous support. In a democracy, unanimous support is rare, but in times of crisis and war, unanimous support becomes critical for success. "Because they claim extraordinary powers as commanders in chief, presidents seek an extraordinary mandate" (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990, p. 122). The roots of this war rhetoric characteristic may rest in Kenneth Burke's "victimage ritual." The assumption that war is always a "matter of last resort" forces the rhetor to argue the United States is going to war because it is a "victim" of some other force. The victimage ritual requires that the rhetor define this other force in a way that fits the narrative and if necessary, project our own faults onto it as well (Ivie, 1980, p. 280). Ivie (1980) uses this approach to critically examine President Johnson's war rhetoric and finds that Johnson successfully recasts the situation in Vietnam by employing imagery that portrays enemy as a savage aggressor and the United States

as a rational and peaceful nation. No single speech, or even a detailed debate, can reveal the entire truth of a situation. However, even when taking this into account, the truths of the situation are still distorted. Campbell and Jamieson (1990) cite Presidents Polk, McKinley, Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt of as examples of presidents who have distorted the situation to their advantage, and cite a 1797 speech by President Adams, to which Adams' contemporaries Jefferson and Madison remarked that he "selectively disclosed facts" to imply that France was America's "only enemy of significance" (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990, p. 120).

Interestingly, presidents may have the ability to establish long-term foreign policy through select strategic war rhetoric speeches. For example, President Eisenhower's September 4, 1950 "Crusade for Freedom" speech, which Eisenhower and associates spent weeks crafting and promoting, is perhaps the genesis of Cold War rhetoric; it contains elements of all key archetypes present in Cold War rhetoric and it successfully established a nearly 30-year marketing campaign that was later sustained by Truman, Kennedy and Johnson (Medhurst, 1997).

Throughout American history, presidents have repeatedly employed the tenets of war rhetoric to engage in military conflicts. War rhetoric helps legitimize war, and logically, if the public accepts a president's arguments for war, the public will support going to war. Presidential war rhetoric often argues that war is a deliberated, calculated decision. Presidents portray the situation through a (not necessarily logical or factual) narrative that pits the enemy against America and its cherished national values. War rhetoric calls for unanimous support, and portrays the president as the nation's leader and military commander-in-chief, worthy of support and capable of victory. One can argue that President Bush, like other presidents before him, needed to fulfill each of element of war rhetoric in order to rally support for Operation Enduring Freedom, the war on terror. This study will explore how (or if) prophetic dualism, a type of foreign policy narrative, played a role in shaping President Bush's war rhetoric. Prophetic dualism is uniquely rich with civil religion, nondenominational social values that influence and shape the political realm. Before exploring prophetic dualism in closer detail, it is important to examine the underlying civil religious social values that shape it.

## Civil Religion in Presidential Rhetoric

Civil religion has long been part of American politics. The political realm is infused with a nonspecific and nondenominational religious dimension that functions as a common denominator for our most cherished social values (Bellah, 1970). The term "civil religion" refers to a "religious dimension, found I think in the life of everyday people, through which it interprets its historical experience in the light of transcendent reality" (Bellah, 1975, p. 3). Civil religion stems from millennial-old social structures. Religious understandings of "right and wrong" form the basis of society's morals, help a society define itself, and help define other societies in relation to one's own. Civil religion can be defined as "the collection of beliefs, values, rites, ceremonies, and symbols which together give sacred meaning to the ongoing political life of the community and provide it with an overarching sense of unity above and beyond all internal conflicts and differences" (Pierard & Linder, 1988, p. 23). Put another way, civil religion is not mere boosterism or patriotism; it is the spark that ignites a burning love for country. It is a powerfully persuasive "quasi-religious secular faith" that instigates national unity and mobilizes the public to work toward shared, national goals (Calhoun, 1993, p. 651). Civil religion offers a lens to see the world: it helps create a shared understanding and perspective of our society, our leaders, and societal-level decisions deliberated the political realm. Civil religion is not the worship of a nation, and it is not a religion; it is characterized by religious assertions within social values and it recognizes those assertions in political rhetoric (Kaylor, 2011).

Civil religion rests on four notions: First, there must exist a God; second, God's will is known and fulfilled through government; third, America is God's primary agent; and fourth, citizens should identify with their nation in a political and religious sense (Pierard & Linder, 1998). Civil religion in America is imbued with Judeo-Christian Biblical archetypes of "Exodus, Chosen People, Promised Land, New Jerusalem, Sacrificial Death and Rebirth" (Daughton, 1993, p. 428), which serve to shape national values and self identity. They may also provide root for America's "frontier" myth. The frontier myth stems from America's hard-fought perennial rebirth in new frontier lands, underscored by the implied assumption that "some men need killing" and "some nations need defeating" if America is to create a peaceful and just world (Secunda & Moran, 2007, p. 4).

Political leaders have invoked civil religion to various degrees throughout American history. The founding fathers, wanting to maintain a separation between church and state and



wanting to respect diverse religious perspectives (including deism, notes Bellah), rarely used the word "God" in their rhetoric, instead referring to "Providence," "that Being in whose hands we are," and similar phrases (Bellah, 1975, p. 45). One hundred years after Washington served as America's first president he had become part of civil religion, "a quasi-deity in American civil religion" and a "virtual Moses who had led the American Israel to the promised land" (Calhoun, 1993, p. 651). Harrison described Washington at the centenary celebration of Washington's presidency in terms of his civil religious impact: "To elevate the morals of our people; to hold up the law as that sacred thing which, like the ark of Gold of old, may not be touched by irreverent hands" (in Calhoun, 1993, p. 651). Through the pre-modern presidency, presidents used civil religion in their rhetoric, but few professed that God or their faith directly influenced their decision-making. During the rise of the rhetorical presidency in the 20th century, the role of God again changed from that of a private belief to policymaking tool. In the 1960 presidential campaign John F. Kennedy countered charges that he would allow the Pope to dictate his political decisions, saying: "I believe in an American where the separation of church and state is absolute; where no Catholic prelate would tell the president - should he be Catholic - how to act, and no Protestant minister would tell his parishioners for whom to vote" (Kaylor, 2011, p. 3). Comparatively, protestant presidential candidates Bob Dole and George W. Bush publicly stated they would seek the Pope's advice on policy issues. Kaylor concludes "presidential campaign rhetoric has been publicly baptized, with religion becoming a key feature of campaign communication and an important voting criterion for a significant portion of the electorate" (2011, p. 4). Recent scholars extend the relationship between civil religion and the presidency to consider the president a "principal prophet, high priest, first preacher, and chief pastor of the American nation" (Pierard and Lindner, 1988, p. 25), though Hart caveats that the president could just as easily be called a "First Acolyte or First Citizen" because a president walks a delicate tightrope of both leading the public and listening to it (Hart, 2004, p. 516).

As of his 1975 book *Broken Covenant*, Bellah (1975) expressed deep concern about the possible demise of American civil religion. He acknowledged that America's core civil religious values were still present, but he asserted America had strayed too far from its civil religious "myths," or interpretations of reality that create shared meaning, in favor of a science-based utilitarian society. However, several scholars point out that much has changed since *Broken Covenant*, including the neoconservative movement and the rise of the Moral Majority, and that

civil religion is more active in the political realm than ever before (Daughton, 1993; Kaylor, 2011; Zagacki, 1996). For example, in his critical analysis of a 1993 essay written by evangelical leader James Dobson to two million members of Focus on the Family regarding the Fetal Tissue Research Initiative that had been recently signed by President Clinton under the National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act, Kuypers (2000) identifies unusual rhetoric unlike typical doctrinal language and speaker-audience simpatico one would expect of this situation. Before cases such as this letter by Dobson, far-right and far-left leaders primarily used extremist doctrinal language when speaking to their audiences. The extremist language helped audiences feel connected to the rhetoric because both audience and rhetor would "[jump] to the same conclusions" (Kuypers, 2000, p. 146). However, by 1993, Dobson was experimenting with new rhetorical strategies, and in this artifact, Dobson also used descriptive statements and source citations, a combination of scientific and moral arguments, which Kuypers argues were evidence of Dobson's attempts to reach beyond Focus on the Family and persuade a wider audience.

The same president credited for the rise of the rhetorical presidency, Woodrow Wilson, is also credited as one of the most overtly religious of all pre-modern presidents. He regularly saw political decisions in moralistic terms and believed that the way to understand a person was to know his or her religious beliefs. His religious perspective influenced matters of foreign policy, where he often used moralistic language, he portrayed politics as a religious calling, he leaned toward unilateralism and uncompromising positions, and sought to "convert" others to democracy. Scholars have since dubbed similar foreign policy approaches as "Wilsonian" (Berggren & Rae, 2006). Wilson's approach is described as "evangelical" leadership, marked by "open professions of religious faith and moralizing rhetoric" and "disdain for political bargaining" (Berggren & Rae, 2006, p. 609). Evangelical presidents "find compromise difficult and are more inclined to try to short-circuit the Washington political process and make direct appeals to the public" (Berggren & Rae, 2006, p. 609). As noted earlier, President George W. Bush and President Carter had evangelical faiths, and despite their opposing political viewpoints, they shared many attributes that have been ascribed to evangelicalism. It is possible that their rhetoric may have been similarly influenced by the nature of their faiths (Berggren & Rae, 2006).

Civil religion is an effective persuasive rhetorical tool for uniting a people and leading them to enact shared goals. It rests on four tenets: There is a God; God's will is known and enacted through government; America is God's agent; and citizens should identify with their

country in a religious sense. Civil religion has been part of American political rhetoric since its founding to various degree, but since the late 20th century it has played an increasingly large role in presidential rhetoric. Presidents often serve as the high priest of American civil religion, capable of invoking civil religion and imbuing themselves as the leaders and focal points of American social values. In turn, social values and religious archetypes are pivotal aspects of prophetic dualism, a type of foreign policy rhetoric employed by presidents during times of crisis and war. Prophetic dualism relies on the public's acceptance of moral values and God as a central player in American might.

### **Prophetic Dualism**

Prophetic dualism, a term coined by Wander (1984), is a foreign policy narrative used in presidential rhetoric that divides the world into two camps of "good" and "evil." Prophetic dualism's two worlds of "good" and "evil" must be opposed to one another due to their inherent values. One side is defined as morally "good." The speaker associates the "good" side with mythic American archetypes of religious faith, a militant God, and freedom. The "good" side must oppose the evil foe in accordance with God's will. The enemy, by comparison, is demonized as "evil" and in complete moral opposition; it is "fetishized as everything 'we' are not" (Warner, 2008).

The second characteristic of prophetic dualism is that "God dampens public debate. ... While a 'crisis' may argue for an end to debate, spiritual imperatives close it down" (Wander, 1984, p. 344). Compared to the *rally effect*, which depends on favorable media coverage as well as bipartisan policy support (Stucky & Antczak, 1996), prophetic dualism creates deeper, self-sustained censorship. Political dissent of any kind is not well received due to the worldview framework in which the dissent is heard. One cannot argue against a country that is acting in accordance with God's will.

Third, prophetic dualism erodes the middle ground of compromise. Neutrality "may be treated as a delusion, compromise appeasement, and negotiation a call for surrender" (Wander, 1984, p. 342). The speaker portrays the country as locked in a permanent battle. This worldview implies that there is no reasonable alternative other than to fight. The nation must fight and must win, because neither failure nor neutrality are acceptable.

Prophetic dualism carries severe practical consequences. First, it legitimizes and possibly exacerbates nationalism. Prophetic dualism forces those who accept it to necessarily choose “good” over “evil.” Because it posits a “life-and-death struggle” (Wander, 1984, p. 345), the public is compelled to side with its nation. Because a president's response to crisis implies the nation's response (Cherwitz & Zagacki, 1986), a president's use of prophetic dualism may reinforce or perpetuate the public's expressions of nationalism. Second, a world without compromise may become disadvantageous. Wander (1984) cautions those who employ prophetic dualism's inflexible stance. Foreign policy can change quickly and compromise may later become the best course of action regarding the enemy. Once prophetic dualism takes hold however, compromise is affiliated in the public mind with “failure” and is therefore is a very tough sell. A leader who later advocates for compromise or neutrality will have a difficult time convincing audiences to accept that it is the right course of action.

Prophetic dualism's tenets are rooted in rhetorical study of the modern rhetorical presidency, presidential crisis rhetoric, war rhetoric and civil religion. Tulis (1987) argues the modern president must appeal to the public directly for support. Similarly, John Foster Dulles defended prophetic dualism as a necessary rhetorical approach because it was an effective, simple way to persuade the public to adopt foreign policy. As discussed earlier in this chapter, war rhetoric does not need to be logical to be persuasive. Political reality is created by images conveyed through political rhetoric (Graber, 1980). Audiences respond to narratives that “misrepresent the facts” and narratives that invoke archetypal myths and civil religion. Wander (1984), who developed the definition and tenets of prophetic dualism, somewhat darkly reiterates the scholarly assertion that moral arguments do not need to be factual to be persuasive: “the rhetoric of American foreign policy lends itself to cynical and bitter commentaries on lies, half-truths, and macabre scenarios” (1984, p. 357). Stuckey echoes Wander's notion of “fact” when she notes “People do not respond to ‘objective facts,’ but to their images of situations” (1984, p. 246). It is not literally possible for two nations to be diametrically opposed as “good” and “evil,” yet presidents have successfully used this narrative to gain support for their policies. Prophetic dualism is a “powerful force of central organizing arguments in shaping American attitudes toward foreign policy” (Hollihan, 1986, p. 369). Wander's conclusions are informed by two perspectives. First is “individualism,” or the belief that individuals can overcome any circumstances to shape their own destinies. Second is the notion of “quest,” that America is

naturally a "special" nation engaging in a permanent and dangerous crusade against evil in the world (Zagacki, 1992, p. 375). Prophetic dualism may have roots in Kenneth Burke's "frames of acceptance and rejection," wherein a person uses modes of thinking to evaluate a situation and place his or her role within it (Zagacki, 1992).

Prophetic dualism invokes God in the way Pierard and Linder (1998) prescribe, but for a more nationalistic purpose. Eisenhower and Dulles, who enacted prophetic dualism in their narrative of the Cold War, saw God as Bellah defined it: God "chose" America for this land and purpose (Wander, 1984). Within the prophetic dualism framework, God is on the side of America, His will is known, and Americans should act in accordance to His will (Wander, 1984), which is similar to the core tenets of civil religion (Pierard & Linder, 1998). There is a unique distinction, however, between the God of civil religion and the God of prophetic dualism. A person can invoke God through civil religion to simply feel pride one's country, but a person invoking God through prophetic dualism focuses on God's militant authority for justificatory and possibly vengeful purposes. Prophetic dualism's God not only "presided over the founding of America," He also served as "co-pilot" in World War II, "...abhorred atheists" and "... loathed communist slavery" (Wander, 1984, p. 344). The God of prophetic dualism wields a sword. He is actively engaged in America's militant action and wills America to victory in battle.

Wander outlines prophetic dualism through a study of the Eisenhower administration's narrative of, and justification for, the Cold War. A State Department official from the Eisenhower administration argues "...policies merely based on carefully calculated expediency could never be explained and would never be understood" (1984, p. 344). Eisenhower defined America's role in the world as a "moral lighthouse" that would not willingly use nuclear power, but was forced to have it in the face of Russian threat. Any compromising policy or appeasement could have invited nuclear war. "...The surest way to avoid war is to let it be known in advance that we are prepared to defend these principles if need be by life itself," said Eisenhower's Secretary of State Dulles (Wander, 1984, p. 345).

In a study of George H. W. Bush's hybrid form of prophetic dualism, Stuckey (1995) doubted prophetic dualism would ever return from its days in the Eisenhower White House. George H. W. Bush used prophetic dualism in a "hybrid form" along with other communication strategies in speeches about the Persian Gulf War, the Panama invasion, the liberation of Eastern Europe, and the fall of the Berlin Wall. Stuckey (1995) concludes this "hybrid" form did not

successfully persuade the public to support his foreign policy initiatives, and furthermore, that any hybrid form of prophetic dualism would fail. She concluded that prophetic dualism would fail in the future because American audiences lacked a unifying *orientational metaphor* from which to understand and accept a prophetic dualism worldview. An orientational metaphor would provide the necessary shared meaning from which to understand and agree with the narrow tenets of prophetic dualism; shared orientational metaphor would glue together prophetic dualism's system of metaphors.

Zagacki (2007) and Warner (2008) argue President George W. Bush's Iraq War rhetoric was grounded in prophetic dualism. In his study of Bush's speeches issued between late 2002 and into 2007, Zagacki (2007) argues that Bush regularly employed prophetic dualism to enact "constitutive rhetoric" which calls "a common, collective identity into existence" (p. 272). Through prophetic dualism, Bush called into being a unified and democratic Iraqi people who would in turn legitimize and participate in a new democratic sovereign Iraqi state. He individualized the Iraq state as capable of uniting and overseeing its own transformation. However, Zagacki contends Bush's rhetoric is failed constitutive rhetoric in that it could not overcome pre-existing generations-long ideological identities (and subsequent disputes between) Iraq's Shiite and Sunni communities. Bush defined democracy as something "given" to Iraq by America; however, Iraq would not "accept the gift" because Iraq could not; it was not a collective, single identity capable of assuming the identity that Bush presumed it was (Zagacki, 2007). Warner (2008) concludes that the American press also engaged in the rhetoric of prophetic dualism. He argues they not only parroted "the terms of prophetic dualism in their coverage of events, but also [actively sought] out opportunities to reaffirm that they, too, were on the correct side of the dualism" (2008, online).

## **Conclusion**

The events of 9/11 created a rhetorical situation that all but required presidential rhetoric. Scholars concur that presidential rhetoric in times of crisis is required in order to quell public concerns, reduce fear, and lead the nation toward a course of action. War rhetoric, which may emerge as a possible response to a crisis, carries its own unique demands; it requires the president to present a compelling (though not necessarily logical, and usually strategically inaccurate) narrative of the situation, a narrative from which the president portrays himself (or

herself) as a qualified commander in chief, calls for united support, and declares that the decision to go to war was a carefully deliberated decision. Since the late 20th century, presidents have increasingly invoked civil religion in national discourse. Civil religion is an especially powerful persuasive device that portrays America as morally "good," as God's agent; and persuades the public to identify with their country in a religious sense. Some presidents have also invoked prophetic dualism, a more nationalistic foreign policy perspective that is empowered with civil religion to justify foreign policy actions. This study examines President Bush's September 20, 2001 address to see how (if at all) President Bush employed civil religion, prophetic dualism and metaphor. Before exploring this in more detail, it is important to expand on the method of research, its relevance, and past scholarly work.

## Chapter 3 - Methodology

### Metaphoric Criticism

Rhetorical study can examine presidential rhetoric from a complex range of perspectives. Critics can empirically study the relationship between messages and audiences, as Edwards (2003) did; one can conduct content analysis to unveil the speaker's motives; or one can dissect text, "unpack it," as one would a piece of literature or performance art, including both the text itself and the entirety of the performance (Zarefsky, 2004a, p. 610). Each approach offers a different set of questions to ask, items to consider, and implications to conclude, all resulting from the same artifact of study. Different readings of the same artifact reveal different levels of meaning and significance. Although a combination of approaches provide a more complete appreciation for the rhetorical situation, it is this last approach that is the interest of this study. Zarefsky (2004a) and Smith (1999) build upon Aristotle's (1887) assertion that the study of rhetoric is the examination of the uses of persuasion in a given situation. Although each rhetorical situation has unique circumstances that may never be repeated again, one finds genres and patterns of persuasion in different situations. Each study of a situation can offer new insight as well as reinforce scholarly study of the genre in which that situation resides. "Rhetorical masterpieces can be studied in the same way that great works of literature are studied: with an eye both to offering new perspective on the case at hand and to suggesting broader principles that will help to explain rhetorical practice more generally" (Zarefsky, 2004a, p. 611).

In *Poetics*, Aristotle defines metaphor as "the application of an alien name by transference" from one item to another (1902, p. 79). Aristotle expands on the purpose of metaphor in *Rhetoric*, where he sees it as an appealing device because it is something "all persons employ; for everybody carries on conversation by means of metaphors" (1887, p. 209), but it is nothing more than a decorative aide or "ornament" (1887, p. 210). As Aristotle saw it, metaphor does not affect the core substance of a speech. Metaphor is flair, useful for helping emphasize a specific point. However, Aristotle's observation that "everybody carries on conversation by means of metaphors" may have more meaning and significance than originally intended. Also in *Rhetoric*, Aristotle (1887) defines rhetorical study as "the science of social life." In other words, *reality* and our *language of it* are two separate things; compared to the study of logic, the study



of rhetoric examines how we *perceive* logic. Aristotle (1887) calls rhetoric a "portraiture" of logic (p. 13).

Aristotle's notions of *reality* and *language* apply more to the study of metaphor in today's scholarly environment than Aristotle's own notion of metaphor did in his *Rhetoric*. Metaphor is no longer viewed as a peripheral handy skill that cannot be taught, but rather a fundamental and pervasive tool we all use to subtly color our "portraits" of reality. Reality is "whatever we describe it as" (Foss, 1996, p. 358), and metaphor may arguably be one of the premier tools we use to describe it. Put another way, Aristotle's perspective lacks "adequacy" (Osborn & Ehninger, 1965, p. 225). Metaphor is a tool that adds meaning to a message, but historically it has lacked respect for its fundamental role: "[T]he *pragmatic* definition of metaphor necessary for the *pragmatic* work of the rhetorician has seldom emerged" (Osborn & Ehninger, 1965, p. 225). The fact that each person has his or her own perspective of reality requires persuasion to exist. We need not persuade others (a core function of rhetoric, per Aristotle) if we all share the exact same understanding of reality. Metaphor creates new ways to reach shared understanding. "The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another" (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p. 5). It can "remedy a gap in the vocabulary" by offering new "words" to explain the world around us (Sapir, 1977). Placing words within context of other words creates a new, third meaning that we not only agree on in a culture, but a meaning that we act on and *live by* (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Or as Osborn and Ehninger (1965) describe it, "metaphor is both communicative stimulus and mental response" (p. 226). Therefore, a study of metaphor can reveal a person's or society's underlying values and beliefs. Metaphor is both a tool for constructing reality, and a basis for reacting to the reality we've constructed. Metaphor is a commonplace and widely used tool in speech because it is first a tool of *thought*, used to define new things that lack some aspect of definition by defining them in relation to other things we already know. We use metaphor to create linkages between new objects, concepts and events. It is a reference point upon which we first identify, classify, and begin to understand new things. Metaphoric thought patterns provide the basis from which we speak and act.

Metaphor is so deeply rooted in our language that at times we aren't even aware of it (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Richards, 1936). For example, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) examine the metaphor *argument is war*: we (Americans or western culture) tend to believe and think of arguments in terms of war, and we speak about arguments using terms of warfare. Common

phrases like "Your claims are *indefensible*;" "I *demolished* his argument;" "You disagree? Okay, *shoot*" demonstrate that the metaphor *argument is war* is more deeply rooted in our culture than it may at first seem:

The metaphor is not merely in the words we use - it is in our very concept of an argument. The language of argument is not poetic, fanciful, or rhetorical; it is literal. We talk about arguments that way because we conceive of them that way - and we act according to the way we conceive of things (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 5).

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) define metaphors like *argument is war* as *metaphorical concepts*, or core associative beliefs that we assume to be true and that influence how we make decisions and act. Metaphorical concepts are powerful framing devices in that they can convince a person to act without logic or reason. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) explain, "The concepts that govern our thought are not just matters of the intellect. They also govern our everyday functioning, down to the most mundane details" (p. 3). Metaphorical concepts are so common they are *systematic*: they follow patterns that one can study, and they exist as a mediated, shared aspect of a culture's reality. Scholars can identify metaphorical concepts and explore how they interact with rhetorical situations. "One could study the speeches of a certain type, or the public address of different ages, in order to determine preferred patterns of imagery or to trace the evolution of a particular image" (Osborn, 1967, p. 115). In the example of *argument is war*, when we perceive arguments in terms of war we take certain actions, speak in certain ways, or adopt certain behaviors to *win* or *lose*, to *concede* or *challenge*, and react to arguments and perceive the entire conversation within a context of war. If instead we perceived arguments in terms of dance, we would follow an entirely different system of thought and ensuing pattern of behavior: we would strive perhaps to *intertwine*, to *show*, to display *beauty*, or create a mutual *balance* (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Each argument would look very different. The metaphors we choose create patterns of action; by studying patterns of metaphor, we can trace patterns of action. Such tracing can be done for just one speech, or the speeches of one person; or across a culture, or generations.

Metaphorical concepts shape reality in a variety of ways. Metaphor can exaggerate a situation, person, place or thing; it can serve as comparison or classification; it can connote new meaning; and it can create interaction between two disparate concepts by symbolically fusing the two concepts or items (Mooij, 1976). Metaphor communicates complicated concepts quickly and

clearly (Stuckey & Antczak, 1996). However, metaphors are not literal and not necessarily "true." For example, in the metaphor *argument as war*, arguments adopt aspects of war, but arguments are not literal warfare (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Moreover, some metaphor may be culturally bound or experience-bound. Metaphor relies on past images in order to effectively reframe new situations or things, and if the audience is not aware of those past images, the audience will not be able to make the association necessary to glean meaning from the metaphor (Stuckey, 1995; Parry-Giles, 2002). This is not to mean however that metaphors are bound by cultures or centuries. Some metaphors are so fundamental to human nature that they transcend geography and generations, and can be understood by diverse audiences (Bates, 2004).

Based on physical and social understanding, some metaphorical concepts assign spatial relationships like *up-down*, *on-off*, *center-periphery* and *front-back* between two items compared in a metaphor, even in technical scientific language like "high-energy physics" (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 19). These are called *orientational metaphors*. They orient one item in spatial relation to another. They are usually tied to our physical understanding of the world around us. For instance, the *happy is up* metaphorical concept is tied to our physical actions when we experience emotions: we droop when sad and we are upright when happy and confident. This translates into common phrases like: "I'm feeling *up*." "That *boosted* my spirits." "My spirits *rose*." "I'm feeling *down*." "I'm *depressed*." "I *fell* into a depression." (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 15). Another metaphorical concept, *high status is up; low status is down*, imparts meaning from the core notion that "status is correlated with power and (physical) power is up." This is exemplified in phrases like: "He has a *lofty* position." "She'll *rise* to the *top*." "He's at the *peak* of his career." "He's *climbing* the ladder." (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 16).

Metaphors can also be categorized as *ontological*, or as "ways of viewing events, activities, emotions, ideas, etc., as entities and substances" (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 25). They make it possible for us to deal with complex issues and are so fundamental to our notions of reality that they could be accepted as literal. For example, the metaphor *the mind is a brittle object* leads us to say "he *cracked* under pressure," "he *broke down*," "she is *easily crushed*," etc. (p. 28). Lakoff and Johnson (1980) also identify *container* metaphors ("There's a lot of land *in* Kansas), *visual field* metaphors ("The ship is *coming into view*"), *events*, *actions*, *activities* and *states* metaphors ("The *finish* of the race was really exciting") and personification metaphors ("Life has *cheated* me") (pp. 30-33). Another major category of metaphor is *metonymy*, wherein

"one object refers to another that is related to it" (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 35). For example in the phrase "he's in *dance*," dance refers to the dancing profession. In the phrase "*acrylic* has taken over the art world," acrylic is metaphor for the use of acrylic paint. *Synecdoche* fits within this category. Synecdoche refers to metaphors where the part represents the whole, as in "the automobile is clogging our highways," where "the automobile" is metaphor for "automobiles" (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 36).

At its core, metaphor is comprised of two parts: a *tenor* and a *vehicle*. They are interpretants, or the parts of the metaphor used to construct the metaphorical concept. For example, in the metaphor *argument is war*, the tenor and vehicle are *argument* and *war*. The tenor is the subject of the metaphor (*argument*). The vehicle is the stimulus for the metaphor. The interaction between the tenor and vehicle creates the metaphor's meaning (Osborn & Ehninger, 1965; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Metaphors are sometimes influenced or directed by a third element called a *qualifier*. There are four types of qualifiers: Contextual qualifiers, communal qualifiers, private qualifiers and archetypal qualifiers. Contextual qualifiers extend the metaphor, placing it within a larger context. For example the phrase "he was a lion in combat" creates a metaphor for the man as a lion, and the contextual qualifier "in combat" narrows the meaning to relate it specifically to war (Osborn & Ehninger, 1965, p. 228). Contextual qualifiers can apply to a specific metaphor as the example above does, or to an entire speech as an underlying motif or theme. Communal qualifiers are applied by society or culture at large, in a pre-determined way, as conventional wisdom. For example, as a society we approve the metaphor "vein of satire" but may be confused by "artery of satire." After long use, communal qualifiers sometimes seem to blend into language as invisible metaphors or morph into "dead metaphors" such as "leg of the table" or "arm of the chair" (Osborn & Ehninger, 1965, p. 229). Private qualifiers are applied by the individual recipient of a metaphor. The reader or listener imparts his or her own unique associations to any metaphors, but this is most likely to occur with "'radical' metaphors - i.e., stimuli which assert unusual or unexpected relationships" (Osborn & Ehninger, 1965, p. 230).

Archetypal qualifiers, however, are "pervasive and generic" concepts "that extend beyond the limits of a given time or culture and depend on experiences common to men of many races and ages - experiences relived by each generation anew." Examples are "light and darkness, war and peace, the land and sea." Unlike communal qualifiers, archetypal qualifiers emerge "out of

situations that move men deeply and which, consequently, exert a strong control over how they think and feel." Archetypal metaphor qualifiers retain their persuasive power over time; they are "like investments in gold, the stable value of which can be relied upon by the long-term speculator" (Osborn & Ehninger, 1965, p. 229-230). Archetypal metaphors stand out as particularly strong: "Such stimuli are the most powerful the speaker can summon, since they not only enhance the emotional impact of a speech, but identify the audience strongly with the speaker's purpose and align them against what he opposes" (Osborn & Ehninger, 1965, p. 233). Archetypal metaphor can have a double meaning in that it is tied to both the metaphor at hand, and the id of human existence. "The subject (of the metaphor) is associated with a prominent feature of experience, which has already become associated with basic human motivations" (Osborn, 1967, p. 116). Archetypal metaphor draws this "basic human motivation" from an underlying Western culture axiom that *material conditions follow from moral causes*. In other words, archetypes associate moral character with concepts, objects and cultures. For example, *light-dark* metaphors reinforce a two-value moral perspective: *Dark* places have *evil* hosts; *bright* places have *good* hosts (Osborn, 1967). This is reminiscent of civil religion, a morally-imbued aspect of political rhetoric. Audiences easily recognize archetypal metaphors; they can calm during crises because they reorient audiences with familiar, unchanging concepts. Carpenter (1990) explores frontier archetype metaphor in twentieth-century war rhetoric, finding it spread across a plethora of communication materials including speeches, pamphlets, letters, and news articles. For example, he finds Theodore Roosevelt compared Filipinos to Native American tribes in pro-war rhetoric against the Spanish-controlled Philippine Islands, calling Americans to view the war in the Philippines as a battle for new frontier. Carpenter (1990) seems to concur with Osborn, noting that in cases such as this, metaphor is a critical tool because it binds the past and future to reassure and stabilize societies during periods of rapid transition, especially war (Carpenter, 1990).

Despite its pervasiveness, metaphor can be a tricky scholarly subject. Metaphors are difficult to study because "a metaphor may work admirably without our being able with any confidence to say how it works" and "a word may be simultaneously both literal and metaphoric" (Richards, 1936, pp. 117-118). Meta-language available to describe how metaphor functions is scarce. We have one term, "metaphor," to describe an instantaneous synthesis of three or more parts of speech: the tenor, or object of the metaphor; the vehicle, or the new meaning ascribed to

the object; and the combination of tenor and vehicle, which results in a new meaning (Richards, 1936). Language to ascribe to a metaphor's success, or objective tools to measure a metaphor's efficacy, seem limited. Perhaps this is due to the meta nature of metaphors. It is impossible to escape metaphors when using language, including language that analyzes metaphors. Despite these limitations however, metaphor has become an increasing topic of interest in scholarly thought.

Metaphor's persuasive potency, its uniquely powerful ability to persuade, has been studied by many scholars. Ivie contends metaphor is "the linguistic origin of our most compelling arguments" (1982, p. 240) and Osborn concludes metaphor can be found "at the most critical junctures in a speech" and that any smart rhetor will "choose them when he wishes to effect crucial changes in societal attitude, to speak to audiences beyond his own people, or to be remembered for a speech beyond his lifetime" (1967, p. 117). Some metaphors seem to have more "metaphoricalness" than other metaphors due in part to the qualifier and the stimulus. Personal and archetypal metaphor qualifiers "provoke profound emotional and intellectual experiences" due to their persuasive nature; they are intended to persuade more than contextual and communal qualifiers. The stimulus also offers a degree persuasiveness. Some metaphor vehicles are more unusual than others, and if a metaphor can successfully drive home the meaning of an unusual metaphor vehicle, "the metaphor, like a taut bow string, drives the arrow of its meaning deep" (Osborn & Ehninger, 1965, p. 232). Although metaphor creates meaning "more efficiently and comprehensively" than logical discussion, and sometimes without reason at all, the meaning created by metaphor can be perceived as valid enough to judge a situation (Foss, 1996, p. 361). For example, a neighborhood could be described as "blighted" or as a "folk community." Each metaphor could apply to the same neighborhood, but implies opposite action: we remove "blight," but preserve "folk community" (Foss, 1996, p. 360). This notion applies both to neighborhoods and nations. Perry, remarking that historians have often ascribed the successful rise of twentieth-century fascism to the "quasi-mystical personal qualities" of fascist leaders, finds that metaphor plays a much larger role than many previous scholars had seen. Metaphor, not reasoned discourse, formed Hitler's justification for war and the holocaust: "Hitler's critique of the Jew's status as a cultural being, for example, is not *illustrated* by the metaphor of parasitism; it is *constituted* by this metaphor and the figurative entailments it carries" (Perry, 1983, p. 230). Though fascist rhetoric lacked reason, Hitler's *infestation-remedy*

metaphor (and minor metaphors established through it) was eventually accepted as valid justification for his proposed action.

### ***Metaphor in War Rhetoric and Civil Religion***

Although metaphor is not literally true, "nowhere is the temptation to literalize a fertile metaphor any stronger or more consequential than in deliberations about war and peace" (Ivie, 1982, p. 240). War rhetoric requires political leaders to paint an image of the situation worthy of immediate and fierce action, and imagery imparted through metaphor is one of the major elements in both shaping and justifying war rhetoric (Ivie, 1974). Metaphor's ability to construct reality, mixed with an added persuasive potency of metaphor's dual meaning, offers an expedient option for rhetors seeking immediate foreign policy action. For example, Ivie researched the metaphor *freedom is fragile* and demonstrated its power when citing Eisenhower administration Secretary of State John Foster Dulles: "securing the 'blessings of liberty for ourselves and our posterity'" has become "a realistic concept of the national interest.'" (Ivie, 1987b, p.27). In war rhetoric, metaphors "reshape public perceptions of the enemy so that there is no alternative to war" (Bates, 2004, p. 451). Forty years later in a post-cold war climate, George H. W. Bush employed metaphors of *savagery* and *civilization* to define Saddam Hussein and United States respectively, before rousing and leading an international coalition in the Persian Gulf War (Bates, 2004).

Civil religion rests at a crossroads between metaphor and myth. The relationship between civil religion and metaphor is discussed by Daughton (1993), who argues that metaphoric criticism is a good way to examine a rhetor's use of civil religion because at times, civil religion "becomes, itself, a metaphor, for it is a way of seeing certain political behaviors and persons in the terms, contexts, and roles normally associated with the religious realm" (p. 428). Civil religion is comprised of archetypal myths and therefore can recall the same powerful potency ascribed to archetypal metaphor by other scholars.

### ***Metaphor in Prophetic Dualism***

Prophetic dualism is meant to be "understood as part of the cluster of images, themes, grammatical forms, and emotions making up the culture of war in the twentieth century" (Wander, 1984, p. 347). Wander's "images, themes, grammatical forms and emotions" are used to constitute metaphoric arguments that construct a rhetor's overarching moral perspective.

“Images, themes, grammatical forms and emotions” reflect the physical world without fully and factually representing it. They are subject to the rhetor’s interpretation and can be combined in different ways to create a worldview.

Metaphoric criticism emerges as a useful approach for identifying and understanding Wander’s “imagery, themes and grammatical forms.” It has been used to study prophetic dualism (Stuckey, 1995), and metaphor is a common tool used by speakers to create or explain “facts” or complex topics. Metaphoric clusters can reveal a speakers’ underlying beliefs. “Recurrent patterns observable in the surface language reveal deeper rhetorical consistencies” (Jamieson, 1980, p. 51).

### **Method of Study: Metaphorical Concepts**

This study follows a methodological process discussed by Ivie (1987b) in his analysis of metaphorical concepts, wherein the critic groups metaphors into clusters and analyzes each cluster as a whole. This “clustering” approach reveals *metaphorical concepts*, or clusters of metaphor that demonstrate a pattern of vehicles. These patterns can better direct the critic to the rhetor’s “master metaphors, which more often than not are the essential terms of the speaker’s ‘terministic screen’” (Ivie, 1987b, p. 29). This study will not discuss each individual metaphor in the artifact. The intention of this study is to analyze overarching patterns of metaphor that reveal the speaker’s framework.

This approach involves five steps (Ivie, 1987b). In the first step, the critic conducts a detailed contextual examination of the speaker’s environment. In Chapter One, I explored the rhetorical situation, including the specific events of 9/11, how the public and the media reacted, and how President Bush and his administration reacted. In the case of President Bush's September 20, 2001 address, the physical contexts of the speech can be interpreted as well. The speech carried timely political significance because it is a point of first persuasion, a rhetorical and political launchpad for a series of upcoming actions including the war on terror and the PATRIOT Act. If this speech were to fail, it could spur a cascading domino effect against Bush's future proposed policies. Additionally, the physical environment of the speech itself contains nonverbal communication that enhances the President's words. During the speech, President Bush spoke from a physically elevated position of authority, in the most sacred of American political cities, to the most esteemed leaders of American politics, in a regal room. The speech is



broadcast nationwide on major television networks, interrupting regular primetime programming, which implies that the president's message is extremely important for the public to see and hear. The speech is simultaneously presented to both Congress and to the public; both Congress and the public react to the speech at the same time. However, because the entire room is televised, the public has a more omnipresent role, because the public can also observe members of Congress react to the speech.

In the second step of metaphoric criticism, the critic selects text(s) for study, and identifies all vehicles and correlated tenors in the selected text(s). The *vehicle* is the way an item (or the *tenor*) is being discussed. The relationship between tenor and vehicle can be one-directional (the vehicle affects the tenor) or bi-directional, wherein tenor and vehicle are “simultaneously entertained” (Sapir, 1977, p.8). Interestingly, the vehicle can be interpreted as literal or metaphorical and in these cases, the metaphorical meaning should be considered (Richards, 1936). In this study, I identify all metaphor vehicles in President Bush's September 20, 2001 address, which is arguably Bush's earliest cohesive and official response to 9/11 and therefore the foundation of the Bush administration's first major policy response to 9/11. In this step Ivie (1987b) recommends using word processing tools to "reduce the original text to an abridged version that comprises only marked vehicles and their immediate contexts" (p. 167). The text is stripped of everything but its metaphors.

In Ivie's (1987b) third step, the critic divides the text's metaphors based on their meanings (or "similar 'entailments'") into subgroups (p. 167). These subgroups are, arguably, the speaker's *metaphorical concepts*. Each metaphorical concept contributes to the speaker's worldview, perspective, or assumptions about the situation at hand; the concepts can portray a person, situation, or proposed action; it can compare or classify; and it could connote new meaning. In turn these assumptions contribute to the speakers' complete argument and overall persuasive power (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Mooji, 1976)

In the fourth step, the critic expands upon each metaphorical concept. The critic returns to the abridged text and goes back through it to identify any additional applications of vehicles that contribute to each metaphorical concept. The finished version of each metaphorical concept file ideally includes all the speakers' various incarnations of that metaphorical concept.

Lastly the critic reviews each file of metaphorical concepts one by one. The critic looks for patterns of usage both within and between the clusters. The critic prioritizes prevailing

patterns and does not focus on outlier vehicles. Outlier vehicles, or vehicles that are not used often and not part of any recognizable pattern, may distort the analysis because "the critic may have inaccurately assigned a few of the vehicles in each cluster and ... the speaker may have drawn upon certain vehicles in isolated instances to meet special purposes" (Ivie, 1987b, p. 168).

Once this process is completed, the critic is prepared to assess the speaker's system of metaphors: What do the metaphorical concepts reveal about the speaker's narrative? About the speaker's portrayal of the situation, its meaning, and its players? As Ivie (1987b) contends, understanding a pattern of vehicles can better direct the critic to the rhetor's "master metaphors, which more often than not are the essential terms" of the speaker's framework (p. 29).

### **Artifact**

This analysis reviews the CNN transcript of President George W. Bush's televised address to a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001. This speech was chosen because it can be reasonably assumed it is the speaker's complete response to the crisis, the speaker's efforts to speak directly to the public, and the speaker's proposal for official crisis response.

## Chapter 4 - Analysis

This chapter explores metaphorical concepts in President George W. Bush's September 20, 2001 televised address to a joint session of Congress. As the first cohesive publicly mediated presidential response to 9/11, this speech is a rhetorical and political landmark event. The response President Bush chose to present in this speech would stand as the president's perspective of 9/11 and as the official American response. The speech is an example of presidential rhetoric, presidential crisis rhetoric and presidential war rhetoric. Metaphors are powerful tools of speech that improve a speaker's persuasiveness, and are especially powerful tools in war rhetoric. The metaphors presidents choose to use can enhance or hinder their policies. The purpose of this metaphoric criticism is to compare President Bush's metaphorical concepts to the tenets of prophetic dualism. Prophetic dualism is best revealed and studied through figurative speech such as metaphor. If prophetic dualism was used in this speech, the first official response to 9/11, this study can reach implications that may be useful for scholars in rhetorical studies and political science.

As I. A. Richards (1936) reminds us, "our pretense to do without metaphor is never more than a bluff waiting to be called...we cannot get through three sentences of ordinary fluid discourse without it" (p. 92). Metaphor is embedded in language so deeply and so often that we regularly "live by" metaphors without realizing it (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Similarly, President Bush's September 20, 2001 address could not avoid metaphor. His metaphors could arguably reveal his underlying narrative of 9/11, and his narrative is a crucial backbone for further arguments in favor of war. Which metaphors he chooses to employ, and the meaning of those metaphors, is the focus of this analysis.

This study followed the five-step process outlined by Ivie (1987b). First, using word processing equipment, I stripped President Bush's September 20, 2001 address of all terms except metaphors and their contexts. I arranged the existing metaphors into groups of similar meaning and purpose. Next, each cluster was reviewed against the original transcript and other clusters for additional metaphors, cross-referenced metaphors, and supportive clusters. This process resulted in the following metaphorical concepts: FORCE/WAR, BODY, FEAR, LIGHT/DARK, NEAR/FAR, UNITY, FAITH/FATE, GOOD/EVIL and SAVAGE. Each cluster

is discussed in more detail below along with the proposed meaning and extended logical claims behind each metaphorical concept.

## **FORCE/WAR**

As Zarefsky (2004b) has argued, President Bush had several options in deciding how to interpret - and respond to - 9/11. Bush could have interpreted the events as a crime of horrific proportions, or perhaps as an unfortunate lapse in security, but instead, Bush chose to interpret 9/11 as a call to war. Bush's interpretation is reinforced through metaphors related to the concepts of FORCE and WAR.

The FORCE cluster is comprised of metaphors such as "define," "demands," "track down," "pursue," "stop," "eliminate," "destroy," "strike," "act," "lift," "direct," "destruction," "defeat," "effort," "rally," "unpunished," "unanswered," "hijack," "commands," "dictate," "anger," "retreating," "forsaking," "tire," "falter," "fail," "decisive," "conclusion," "retaliation," "strikes," "face," "task," "rest," "relent," "waging," "struggle." Metaphors of FORCE imply a fight for control. The enemy is trying to exert control over America, and America must physically respond in order to maintain its own independence and might: "they stand against us because we stand in their way," "the terrorists' directive commands," "we face new and sudden challenges," "there are struggles ahead and dangers to face." (Bush, 2001). The enemy would be victorious if America relinquishes physical dominance, if "America grows fearful, retreating from the world and forsaking our friends," or if America "tire[s]," falter[s]," or "fail[s]."

As President Bush suggests, the enemy's forcefulness requires the United States to respond with equal ferocity for purposes of self-preservation. The U.S. is not the first aggressor, but the U.S. will use force as necessary to protect itself: "this country will define our times, not be defined by them." "America will act." And the way to protect itself is to destroy the aggressor in totality: "if this terror goes unpunished...their own citizens may be next." "Terror unanswered can not only bring down buildings..."; "we will pursue nations that provide aid," "track down terror," "lift the dark threat of violence," "find them before they strike." In other words, President Bush suggests the best defense is a good offense.

FORCE metaphors and BODY metaphors could be considered *personification metaphors* because they orient action in terms of physical movement. The FORCE cluster is often intermingled and reinforced with BODY metaphors. The U.S. will stop at nothing to win, even

physical exhaustion: "our grief has turned to anger and anger to resolution;" "we face new ... challenges," "I will not rest, I will not relent," "we will not tire." FORCE is personalized, anthropomorphized, into acts on an individual scale. The FORCE cluster is also reinforced with RESOLVE. The battle will be long and the US needs resolve to ensure its success. The battle will not be "swift," "decisive," "instant retaliation," or waged through "isolated strikes." The nation should prepare for a "lengthy campaign" and its "resolve must not pass." Bush repeats "patience," saying "I ask for your patience" and "for your patience in" the battle ahead.

The WAR cluster refers to the response America will take to 9/11. Metaphors in this cluster are "war," "war on terror," "justice," "weapon of war," "defeat," "destruction," "fight," "struggle," "conflict," "attacks," "enemies," "under attack," "act of war," "retaliation." Zarefsky (2004b) agrees President Bush uses metaphors of war in this speech, and this study concurs. Bush describes the U.S. foreign policy response to 9/11 as a "war on terror," as "America's fight." WAR and FORCE dovetail as similar purposes. In this speech, WAR is the necessary expression of FORCE. The United States wages war only because it has been attacked first by an enemy, and if the U.S. does not respond with adequate force (in this case, war), the enemy will continue to attack. By using "only" when saying "terror unpunished can only bring down buildings," Bush implies that there is one realistic solution to terror: to punish it with equal physical strength. Bush suggests that no other alternative exists.

"Justice" emerges as a key metaphor in WAR. "Justice" is Bush's notion for victory; the war is over and accomplished when "justice" is achieved. Justice is a metaphor for the victory Americans should achieve and deserve to achieve. Bush does not allude to or describe justice in terms of legal rights or any form of legal system activity, but rather, as an aggressive, resolute, and as a righteous act: "whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done." The metaphor "justice" is portrayed as a physical thing: It is carried over distances and it is something we "bring to" others. This implies a relationship between justice and force, both described as items of physicality: perhaps justice is the result of physical force. This perspective of the war also helps dissolve any reasonable room for compromise, neutrality or any middle ground. Justice is achieved through force and war, not discussion. An implied logical extension of this argument is that the enemy is unworthy of compromise and America must be victorious over this dangerous inhuman foe by achieving "justice" through physical defeat of the enemy, in any physical place necessary. Lastly, justice is portrayed as a core

American belief imbued with a religious dimension: "freedom and justice, cruelty and fear, have always been at war, and God is not neutral between them" (2001). This statement implies that God supports the war, God supports and America, and because God supports the war and America, America will be victorious in a war against the enemy.

Although Ivie's methodology followed here (1987b) discusses metaphor of language, Bush also employs visual metaphors of FORCE to a notable degree when he raises a police shield in his hand near the end of his speech, displays it before the audience, and states: "And I will carry this. It is the police shield of a man named George Howard" (2001). The shield is arguably a visual embodiment of FORCE. It could be a form of a *metonymy*, a type of metaphor wherein one object refers to another that is related to it (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). The shield can be interpreted as metonymy for a variety of subjects. The police shield represents not only the single officer who had it, but all police officers, or even the act of policing, of enforcing rules by force, of physically "bringing" unlawful people "to justice." The police shield acts as a metaphor for Bush's response to 9/11. Bush associates himself with police and policing. Like the police, Bush is tasked with bringing the enemy to justice. Furthermore, the police shield may also symbolize American values of sacrifice, duty and honor. Bush intentionally includes the context when he says George Howard, former owner of the shield, "died at the World Trade Center trying to save others. It was given to me by his mom, Arlene, as a proud memorial to her son. It is my reminder of lives that ended and a task that does not end" (2001). In this moment, the shield is a visual metaphor that encourages audiences to unite under Bush's leadership, to sacrifice themselves to the greater cause of war. The shield simultaneously combines the brute FORCE metaphor of "justice" with deeply held American values synonymous with WAR, sacrifice, duty, and honor. The shield metaphor coincides with RESOLVE when Bush closes his speech with what is arguably his most powerful rhetoric: "I will not forget the wound to our country and those who inflicted it. I will not yield, I will not rest, I will not relent in waging this struggle for freedom and security for the American people. The course of this conflict is not known, yet its outcome is certain. Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral between them" (Bush, 2001). This small section of the speech employs every cluster of metaphorical concept, but heavily implies that justice is honorable, the war is honorable, and sacrifice is honorable, and that the war should be fought at all costs. By displaying his only visual aid in the speech right before stating this section of the

text, he re-draws audiences back into the speech. The shield heightens the emotional drama of the moment and links that emotion to nearly all of the narrative's metaphorical concepts.

## **BODY**

President Bush refers to the United States and its enemies in terms of the human body. BODY metaphors include "wound," "inflicted," "immune," "defensive measures," "protect," "grows," "unmarked grave," "forsaking friends," "strengthen us," "face," "stand," "hand over," "strike," "tire," "touched," "sing," "comforted." President Bush speaks of America, and of the terrorists, as single bodies: "I will not forget the wound to our country and those who inflicted it;" "All of America was touched;" "the entire world has seen for itself the state of the union;" "we face;" "dangers to face;" "they will follow that path all the way to where it ends in history's unmarked grave of discarded lies."

These metaphors create the impression that the United States is a single organism and that the terrorist enemies are a separate, distinct single organism. When one extrapolates the entailments of this perspective, one can conclude the two opposing forces are wholly separate beings with separate minds and intentions. They are whole bodies who can not physically co-exist in one space. This also underscores a notion that the two sides can not "co-mingle" and cannot easily compromise. In particular, these two bodies are mortal enemies, locked in battle to the death. Bush uses physical exhaustion metaphors with vivid imagery and repetitive syntax to reinforce the decision to stay in the battle at any cost, lest we fall victim to the opposing body. "We will not tire, we will not falter, we will not fail ... I will not yield; I will not rest; I will not relent in waging this struggle for freedom ... This is ... a task that does not end." The repetitive syntax of "we will not" also reinforces the UNITY cluster. As a nation, the entire country will work beyond physical exhaustion. The BODY cluster is often intermingled with UNITY metaphors and GOOD/EVIL metaphors, implying that each side in this battle is like a single being, with its own complete soul. For instance, Great Britain is described as a "friend;" and America would lose the war on terror if it "forsakes our friends."

## **FEAR**

FEAR is a pervasive metaphoric concept in this artifact. The FEAR cluster includes the metaphors "terror," "evil," "fear," "threat," and "fearful." FEAR is America's future if the enemy is not defeated: America is on the verge of a new "age of terror;" "it is natural to wonder if

America's future is one of fear;" "they...plot evil and destruction;" "trained in the tactics of terror;" "they hope America grows fearful." "Terror" is a key metaphor in this study; it is repeated 36 times in various forms ("terror," "terrorist," "terrorists"), more than any other single metaphor. "Terror" is a paralyzing, wreaking emotion and is arguably the ultimate form of fear. By choosing to call the enemy "terrorists," Bush portrays the enemy as an embodiment of FEAR itself. America is to be engaged in a "war on terror;" those who died in 9/11 are described as "victims of terror."

President Bush often juxtaposes FEAR with GOOD/EVIL and FORCE/WAR metaphorical concepts, especially the specific metaphors "freedom" and "war." He states, "freedom and fear are at war;" "freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war." In these statements, "freedom" is positioned as the opposite to FEAR. This repeated juxtaposition implies that the enemy produces fear and America produces freedom. These two values are diametrically opposed and moreover, cannot coexist; they must engage in war against each other necessarily due to their inherent values and meanings. The terrorists naturally would wage war against America due their embodiment of FEAR and FEAR's eternal antagonistic relationship with "freedom." American must, in turn, return with warfare in order to protect and preserve "freedom" from destruction at the hands of FEAR.

## **LIGHT/DARK**

Bush's world of light and dark emerges through the metaphors "night fell," "sent to hide," "grave," "discarded," "secret," "track down," "refuge," "tonight," "morning," "died," "dark threat," "retreating," "highest level," "watch over," "uphold," "deceived," and "awakened." The enemy is connected to metaphors of darkness, and America is correlated with metaphors of lightness. This is also an orientational metaphorical concept: *light is up* and *dark is down*. The enemy is portrayed as hiding out of sight, using the cover of darkness and dark hiding places to achieve its aims: "night fell on a different world," where a "dark threat of violence" has covered America. Terrorists are "sent to hide in countries" and plot their attacks. By comparison, America was attacked "on a peaceful morning," "awakened to danger." As the battle ensues, America must "uphold values" while going into a place of darkness to preemptively seek out and remove the enemy: "drive [terrorists] from place to place until there is no refuge," "destroy



[terrorism] where it grows," "track down terror," and fight any nation that "harbors" or gives "safe haven" to terrorists.

The LIGHT/DARK cluster emphasizes dark metaphors more than light metaphors. The enemy and their deeds are often associated with darkness. Also, metaphors of darkness are often correlated with SAVAGE metaphors, implying that the enemy is a savage who hides in darkness, perhaps because savage beings always reside in places of darkness. Metaphors of lightness are usually correlated with metaphors of FAITH like "watch over." War operations will be "coordinated at the highest level," and above all, "may God watch over us." This implies that America is affiliated with lightness, and America earns its lightness from its leadership but most importantly from its faith in God. Also, the metaphors of lightness suggest that America was already a country of lightness, values and peace before the enemy struck; that the enemy brings its darkness to our shores and around the world.

### **NEAR/FAR**

President Bush employs a pattern of metaphors related to spatial relationships, closeness and distance; these metaphors comprise the NEAR/FAR cluster. The NEAR/FAR cluster includes "fringe," "extremism," "homeland," "network," "global," "reach," "found," "drive," "out," "vast," "retreating," "central," "source," "one," "all," "singled out," "crossed ocean," "center," "find," "with," "world."

The enemy is described as FAR: they are "a fringe form of Islamic extremism," "a fringe movement," "a radical network of terrorists." Their goal is to cause more distance between themselves and others of different belief; they "want to drive Israel out," "drive Christians and Jews out of vast regions." America's war against them will not end until they cannot reach so far, until "every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated." If the enemy wins, America will become FAR: "they hope America grows fearful, retreating from the world."

The attacks are NEAR: "Terrorists attacked a symbol of American prosperity; they did not touch its source." They impacted "homeland security" by attacking "the center of a great city on a peaceful morning." America is described as NEAR, and coming closer together as a response to 9/11: "We will come together to take active steps." America's allies are also NEAR: British Prime Minister Tony Blair "has crossed an ocean to show his unity with America," "we are joined together in a great cause." At the center of this "nearness" rests American ideals and

the President himself: his administration established "a central source of information" about 9/11.

There is no open space or neutrality between who is NEAR and who is FAR: "Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists." However, Bush portrays the civilized world as on America's side: "An attack on one is an attack on all. The civilized world is rallying to America's side." "We will rally the world to this cause by our efforts." And lastly, Bush portrays that eventually, the terrorists will lose and "This will be an age of liberty here and across the world." The NEAR/FAR cluster co-mingles with the BODY cluster. The body, one's person, is as close as one can be; when America is described as a single body, we are all close to one another; this perpetuates a worldview of unity, of united country and a united world. The new leader of "homeland security" is a "trusted friend;" "America has no truer friend than Great Britain."

## UNITY

Bush repeats various metaphors that argue that America has united together after 9/11, and that America must remain united in the war ahead. These metaphors are grouped in the UNITY Cluster. Metaphors include "we," "we've," "union," "we are," "joined together," "all of," "America will," "joined," "our," "Americans," "United States of America," "us," "come together," "fellow."

The speech is organized around a series of hypothetical questions which Bush then answers. Each question is phrased as a question asked by Americans. Bush states "Americans have many questions tonight. Americans are asking, 'Who attacked our country?' ... Americans are asking, 'How will we fight and win this war?' ... Americans are asking, 'What is expected of us?' In his answers, Bush refers to America as a single entity.

Bush also speaks directly to America as if it were a single person: "I ask you to live your lives;" "I ask you to uphold the values of America;" "I ask you to continue to support the victims;" "I ask your continued participation and confidence."

In this cluster, many metaphors are repeated for extra effect. Bush repeats the phrase "we will not forget" three times, preceded by "America will never forget." Bush later repeats "we will come together" five times, saying "We will come together to improve air safety;" "We will come together to promote stability;" "We will come together to give;" "We will come together to strengthen;" "We will come together to take active steps." Not only are America's residents

uniting, Bush observes that "Republicans and Democrats joined together on the steps of the Capitol."

The UNITY cluster also dovetails with the NEAR/FAR cluster. Americans must be united, and racial violence or other acts of nationalism are a form of FAR. Americans must not treat one another as FAR apart. Americans must remain united: "no one should be singled out for unfair treatment or unkind words because of background or religious faith." The UNITY metaphoric cluster helps define the "victim" of 9/11 as America; "terrorists attacked America" (Sept. 20). Instead of defining the victims literally as those in New York, Pennsylvania and Washington, D.C., Bush groups the entire nation together as the victim. Bush also calls on the country to remain united in the future.

### **FAITH/FATE**

Metaphors regarding religion, God, and divine power are grouped in the FAITH Cluster. President Bush uses metaphors such as "called," "mission," "awakened," "God," "bless," "grace," "prayer," "journey," "justice," "rightness," "cause," "grant," "watch over," "hope," "spirit," and "victories;" and "blaspheme," "piety," "teachings," and "extremist."

Bush associates God with America: "God bless America." "may God grant us wisdom and may He watch over the United States of America." Bush welcomes "two leaders who embody the extraordinary spirit of all New Yorkers." Furthermore, Bush's invocations of God argue that God is on America's side, and with God's divine support, America is fated to win the war on terror: "In our grief and anger we have found our mission;" "Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know God is not neutral between them." "The course of this conflict is not known, yet its outcome is certain." "We'll meet violence with patient justice, assured of the rightness of our cause." This association portrays America's God as a militant divine power, supporting His chosen nation. Bush also describes the war itself as a mission and calling. "We have found our mission." "Tonight we are a country ... called to defend freedom." *Mission* has meaning both as an assigned military act and a call from God to serve. The two combined further suggest that God requires the war as a necessary and moral act. *Calling* also has a meaning similar to *mission*; it can refer to an inspired command from a higher power.

Bush encourages Americans to continue invoking God through prayer. Metaphors related to prayer suggest that America is best supported through its faith and connection with God, specifically the act of prayer. Metaphors frame prayer as a source of strength. We are stronger if we pray, and we strengthen others with our prayer. We will heal eventually if we "continue praying for the victims" because "grief recedes with time and grace;" "prayer has comforted us in sorrow and will help strengthen us for the journey." Conversely, Bush portrays the enemy as faithless. If prayer is a source of power, and the enemy rejects faith, the enemy is powerless. The terrorists are "a fringe movement that perverts the peaceful teachings of Islam;" "those who commit evil in the name of Allah blaspheme the name of Allah." "The terrorists are traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself." "We're not deceived by their pretenses to piety." The enemy is Godless, has rejected God, and therefore lacks the inevitable divine strength that comes from prayer and faith.

Metaphors of FATE reinforce Bush's arguments of FAITH. Metaphors of FATE include "follow," "path," "ends," "lies," "before," "journey," "outcome," "course," "neutral," "future," "define," "age," "determined." Metaphors of FATE imply that the war is predetermined and the outcome is known. This reinforces metaphors of FAITH which claim God supports the war and God will help America win the war. The FATE of both the enemy and America is known. The enemy "follow in the path of fascism, Nazism and totalitarianism. And they follow that path all the way to where it ends in history's unmarked grave of discarded lies." "this will not be an age of terror. This will be an age of liberty." Thanks to support from God, America's "outcome is certain;" "in all that lies before us, may God grant us wisdom;" "Prayer ... will help strengthen us for the journey ahead."

## **GOOD/EVIL**

President Bush often uses metaphors for values. These metaphors are grouped into the GOOD/EVIL Cluster. Such metaphors are "freedom," "patriot," "friend," "grateful," "values," "principles," "cooperation," "give," "decency," "loving," "thanks," "giving," "give," "prosperity," "successful," "hard work," "creativity," "enterprise," "strengths," "welcome," "spirit," "determined," "strong," "liberty," "rally," "courage," "hope," "normal," "routines," "good," "peaceful," "evil," "terror," "hate," "deceived," "pretenses," "traitors," "plot."

Bush metaphorically ascribes America and ally nations as GOOD. America is imbued with morally righteous and financially strong qualities. America is described as a naturally peaceful nation. Its moral strengths, combined with its economic power, make it a GOOD nation: "America is successful because of the hard work and creativity and enterprise of our people. These were the true strengths of our economy before September 11 and those are our strengths today." "We have seen the decency of a loving and giving people;" "the United States of America is determined and strong."

Bush encourages American audiences to continue these qualities of goodness, especially of giving, patience, and cooperation: "the United States is grateful;" "uphold the values of America;" "may need your cooperation, and I ask you to give it;" "we welcome;" America is likely to be victorious in the war on terror in part because of its GOOD attributes: "this will be an age of liberty;" "we will rally the world by our efforts, our courage." America is persuaded to believe that its culture and values are at risk of destruction. The metaphoric cluster FREEDOM is arguably the most important principle at stake.

In his September 20 speech, Bush said "freedom" 14 times, often using it as a metaphor for what must be defended, what was attacked, and how the victim differs from the aggressor: "Tonight we are a country awakened to danger and called to defend freedom;" "A world where freedom itself is under attack" "They hate our freedoms;" "This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom;" "Freedom and fear are at war." "The advance of human freedom – the great achievement of our time, and the great hope of every time – now depends on us."

Bush often juxtaposes freedom with fear: "freedom and fear" are "at war." "Freedom and fear...have always been at war." "They hate our freedoms." This suggests that "freedom" may be the most important aspect of GOOD and it is pitted against "fear," the most important aspect of EVIL. Bush moralizes the opposing forces throughout his address. By arguing that we are in a "war" for our value of "freedom" and we oppose the enemy's value of "fear," Bush moralizes both sides of the conflict as shades of "good" and "evil." He defines freedom as America's most important cultural value. It was created and is now possessed by America. Like a valued treasure, it is the single thing most at risk of destruction. He argues that terrorists were trying to destroy freedom when they attacked America. Bush defines what the war is for, and what we risk losing if we are defeated: "We are in a war for our principles."

The enemy opposes America's values and its financial might: "Terrorists attacked a symbol of American prosperity;" "We're in a fight for our principles;" "Americans are asking, 'Why do they hate us?'" The terrorists are also associated with negative or EVIL attributes. They are "terrorists," invoking terror; they are "traitors," they "plot evil" and "commit evil." They are also affiliated with SAVAGE metaphors, and portrayed as lacking FAITH. Bush defines the battle as a war on terrorism, or a war on FEAR. The war is not against real people; it is against a moral value. This implies that freedom and fear are the two principles that are at war. Bush deepens the divide into literal conflict at times, suggesting these two principles exist in a natural eternal struggle. Based on this metaphor, one can conclude the enemy must create fear specifically by attacking freedom, specifically because the enemy loathes freedom.

## SAVAGE

President Bush regularly used certain metaphors to describe the enemy and their actions. These metaphors are grouped into the SAVAGE cluster, and include "plot," "evil," "murderers," "collection," "turn," "them," "where it grows," "track down," "abetting murder," "training camps," "traitors," "their kind," "sacrificing," "abandoning," "regime," "hate," "overthrow." President Bush states "Al Qaeda is to terror what the Mafia is to crime" and "they hate us."

In a closer scrutiny of the entailments and implied logic of this metaphoric cluster, one can see how the enemy is portrayed as the *opposite of America*. First, by describing the enemy as "evil" and "murderers," Bush dehumanizes the enemy. Evil is the utmost negative state of being; a person is hardly a person at all if he or she is "evil." This contrasts to the BODY metaphors found elsewhere in the text. The United States is a single, unified body, and the enemy is also a body, but the enemy is not quite *human*; it is a savage *thing*. Second, through the intermingling of SAVAGE and FAITH/FATE metaphors, the terrorists are particularly savage because they are without faith, godless and valueless. This is in sharp contrast to the United States. "The terrorists are traitors to their own faith;" they have "[abandoned] every value except the will to power." The underlying implication is that any culture lacking genuine faith is savage. Third, the SAVAGE nature of the "evil" enemy is in sharp contrast to America's "civilized" nature: "the civilized world is rallying to America's side." "This is the world's fight. This is civilization's fight." "They hate our freedoms;" "they stand against us because we stand in their way." These metaphors and juxtapositions imply that any savage culture would naturally, and by necessity,

hate and oppose a "civilized" culture such as the United States. Fourth, Bush uses LIGHT/DARK metaphors to paint a portrait in sharp relief. The enemy is "dark" and America is "light." This type of contrast leaves little grey from which to find a middle ground or shared perspective. Last, the terrorists' far-flung homes and hideaways contrast against America's open unity and central status. In the NEAR/FAR metaphoric cluster, the enemy is FAR and America (and her allies) are NEAR.

President Bush's metaphors illustrate a compelling narrative of peaceful good and far-flung evil, of civilized freedom and savage fear, forever opposed and now locked in battle to the death. His metaphors portray the enemy and America as rightfully and naturally opposed to one another. War and force are a natural part of this permanent divide between good and evil; war is portrayed as the only reasonable response to the enemy because if America does not go to war, the enemy will continue to wage its own brand of fear against America and the rest of the world. This argument also implies that compromise with the enemy is simply impossible; the enemy wants to destroy America and will oppose freedom at any cost. However, Bush adds that God is on America's side, God will grant America a righteous victory, and America is empowered through its relationship with God. The enemy, however, does not have divine grace because the enemy has chosen to forsake its faith. The enemy does not deserve victory because the enemy's actions are evil, and the enemy lacks any redeeming good value. America should go to war to defeat the enemy at any cost, while also continuing its path of goodness, by spending money and supporting the economy, by having patience, and cooperating with Bush's policies. These are the arguments that shine through Bush's metaphorical concepts and it is these arguments which are of interest in our conclusions.

## **Chapter 5 - Conclusions and Discussion**

President Bush's September 20, 2001 landmark televised address, delivered in response to one of the largest attacks on domestic soil in American history, is rich with metaphor about the nature of America, the enemy, and action. The metaphorical concepts FORCE/WAR, BODY, FEAR, LIGHT/DARK, NEAR/FAR, UNITY, FAITH/FATE, GOOD/EVIL and SAVAGE weave a compelling narrative that successfully persuaded the public and the press. Because this speech arguably prepared audiences for upcoming policies such as the PATRIOT Act and the war on terror as well as a new foreign policy approach called the Bush Doctrine (which also framed the Bush administration's justification for the Iraq War), this speech stands as a rhetorically and politically significant artifact. Specifically the purpose of this study is to determine if Bush's speech fulfills the tenets of prophetic dualism, a unique foreign policy framework with political and rhetorical implications for anyone who chooses to use it. Prophetic dualism can be revealed through a study of metaphor, and the metaphorical concepts found in this speech are now ready to be compared to prophetic dualism. This study generates rhetorical implications regarding presidential rhetoric, the modern rhetorical presidency, presidential crisis rhetoric, presidential war rhetoric, civil religion and prophetic dualism. Due to the nature of prophetic dualism itself, this study also generates practical implications that may be of interest to political science scholars, as well as practical implications of the president's decision to use war rhetoric, crisis rhetoric and civil religion as responses to 9/11. Methodologically, this study suggests implications for metaphoric criticism and metaphorical concepts.

### **Rhetorical Implications**

The purpose of this study was to explore how, if at all, President Bush's September 20, 2001 address stands as an example of prophetic dualism. In order to reach that conclusion, this study explored President Bush's speech within current scholarly understanding of presidential rhetoric, presidential crisis rhetoric and war rhetoric. This study finds that President Bush's speech fits the tenets of the modern rhetorical presidency and presidential crisis rhetoric, though it may not fit all characteristics of presidential war rhetoric. Finally, President Bush's speech illustrates all major tenets of civil religion and prophetic dualism.



Tulis' (1987) notion of the modern rhetorical presidency seems to be reflected in this artifact, as it has been in many others; this speech could stand as an example of presidents who have appeal directly to the public. In this setting, in a joint session to Congress, President Bush both literally and figuratively speaks "over the heads of Congress." He speaks through teleprompters to television cameras and to families watching in their homes after dinner. He implies war as a necessary, natural response to the situation (the narrative), although Congress (not the public) must vote whether or not to support war. Members of Congress were hearing the speech at the same time as the public, but they were not given the luxury of expressing their true feelings; any wayward facial expression could be captured on cameras and misinterpreted by millions of people. After the speech, if Members of Congress wanted to express disagreement with Bush's proposals, they would have had to directly oppose public support of the speech while simultaneously presenting their own alternative viewpoints. Considering that the public's and the press' reaction to the speech were positive, one has to wonder if Members of Congress stood a reasonable chance of persuasively opposing Bush's narrative or the policies which emerged from his narrative, or even of putting their own chances of reelection at risk if they were to publicly oppose his narrative and policies.

This study supports current understanding of presidential crisis rhetoric. Crisis rhetoric must state the facts of the crisis, establish a melodrama of "good" and "evil," and present a policy solution to the crisis. The solution must be presented by the president and it should be framed as a moral act (Kuypers, 1997, p. 18). This speech appears to meet all these tenets. Bush's metaphorical concepts created a dichotomy of "good" and "evil," and presented these two sides in terms of their morals - their faiths. The president's proposed solution - to eradicate evil - is posited as a moral act. President Bush responded with *justificatory crisis rhetoric*, wherein he called for military action against terrorists, a vigilant war against terror, and declared the terrorists evil foes. 9/11 was perceived to be a large-scale and significant national crisis, and this speech seemed to confront the nation's fears. His September 20, 2001 address may have provided a decisive response that the public sought; it was widely watched and positively received.

This speech is a good example of all but one of the tenets of presidential war rhetoric. Typically, five arguments codify presidential war rhetoric (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990). The first characteristic is a dramatized narrative of the situation. Cutting away the details, a speech summarizes what seem to be the most important aspects of a situation, boiling a complex

situation to its core narrative of "what happened." Similarly, President Bush's September 20, 2001 speech is structured around a series of hypothetical questions about 9/11. The speech seeks to answer the most common questions about 9/11. The questions focus attention around basic elements of the narrative, such as "who attacked us," and "what should we do." President Bush defines the events surrounding 9/11 and creates a framework for defining the victim, the enemy and the attacks. He prescribes a proper reaction to the crisis (war) and he instructs Americans to unite and remain resolved and patient for upcoming actions.

The second characteristic of war rhetoric is a "strategic misrepresentation" of the narrative (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990, p. 118). While the narrative is a "story" of the situation, the strategic misrepresentation refers to the compelling and persuasive elements that draw in the audience and lend support to the president as commander in chief. Typically, this portrays the enemy as an aggressor, pits the enemy against the nation's most cherished values, and positions the president's proposed actions as the best means of defense. Similarly, President Bush establishes a compelling narrative rich vivid imagery. The enemy is one who, by virtue of his sheer lack of faith, hates America and in particular, America's freedoms (as some have argued, economic freedoms). The enemy will stop at nothing to destroy others around the world and it will always seek to destroy America because America "stands in [its] way" (Bush, 2001). Therefore, because of this situation, Bush's proposal aims to seek out and destroy the enemy. This policy proposal - war - is presented as a morally correct solution and more specifically as the *only possible* solution. If the narrative were true, there would be no reasonable alternative other than to confront and preemptively destroy the enemy, before the enemy *will attack again*. One can argue that each of these claims seem overly simplistic when examined on their own (for example, one could ask how an enemy can "hate our freedoms"), but each claim is persuasive nonetheless. President Bush succeeds at strategically misrepresenting the situation. Any "misrepresented" aspect dovetails with other aspects of the situation. President Bush ultimately blends each aspect of the situation, tightly weaving a cohesive narrative that, overall, is powerfully persuasive.

A third tenet of war rhetoric occurs when the speaker claims that the decision to go to war was achieved through careful deliberation (Campbell and Jamieson, 1990). Based on the analysis, President Bush arguably did not fulfill this tenet of presidential war rhetoric in this artifact. Bush never claims that he carefully deliberated war; instead, he bluntly calls for

immediate, forceful action. For instance, he states "America must act" because "terror unanswered can only bring down buildings." Bush states America is not a war-faring nation. He claims that America is a "peaceful" nation and he implies that America does not seek out war. But this is not quite the same as saying that he deliberated his decision to call for war. He does not imply, but instead directly states that America should go to war when provoked. Additionally, he declares that the nation's "grief has [turned into] resolve." He transforms grief into acceptance and action. Perhaps the "grief/resolve" metaphor implies that the pain and fear caused by the tragedy is reason itself to go to war; no exacting logic or careful calculation is needed. There are several possible explanations behind this finding. First, perhaps this particular rhetorical situation did not require this tenet of war rhetoric; the events of 9/11 were so jarring that the public would not *want* careful deliberation. Second, this study may reinforce the work done by Hart and Childers (2004), who found that Bush resurrected and increasingly used verbal certainty, or resolute language, during first 1,000 days in office in his second term, and verbal certainty operates in direct opposition to careful deliberation. President Bush was not the kind of person who "carefully deliberated." Lastly, this particular tenet of war rhetoric is contrary to the rhetorical constructs of prophetic dualism. If a rhetor utilizes prophetic dualism, the rhetor may abandon this tenet of war rhetoric as an incongruous element. The fact that this tenet is less pronounced in this speech may offer some justification that this artifact is an example of prophetic dualism.

A fourth tenet of war rhetoric occurs when the speaker seeks to unify the audience in preparation for battles ahead (Campbell and Jamieson, 1990). Similarly, Bush's UNITY metaphors strive repeatedly throughout the speech to express unity, call for unity, and demonstrate unity. He speaks of America as "us," "we," "our," as if the nation is a single group; even Republicans and Democrats in Congress are "joined together." The last remaining tenet of war rhetoric occurs when the speaker portrays him/herself as the leader, the Commander in Chief who is fully capable and ready to accept the heavy mantle of war. Bush may be enacting this tenet when he speaks directly to the audience from an I/you perspective. He commands the nation four times with the phrase "I ask you [to]," as his own response to a question he posits: "Americans are asking, 'What is expected of us?'" The police shield also reinforces Bush as commander in chief. Because he "carries" the shield with him as a "reminder" of all the shield symbolizes, he holds near the "common man." This implies that he is not regularly tied to the

common man; that he is apart from the public. He chooses to bring this singular aspect of the public close to him perhaps because it represents who he is and his leadership, or it represents the narrative of the situation, or it represents American values (or all of the above). Bush positions himself as the commander in chief, giving the first cohesive answers, leading and directing Americans to act in certain ways for the good of the nation. Overall, President Bush's speech seems to meet all the tenets of war rhetoric except in the case of demonstrating that the decision to go to war was carefully debated and weighed.

These conclusions lead to three important questions for further research on the nature of crisis rhetoric and war rhetoric. First, this study questions whether crisis rhetoric should not be overly compartmentalized and categorized. As this situation indicates, on occasion, crisis rhetoric may warrant unique patterns of rhetorical action which are not fully reflected in the current literature. Some forms of crisis rhetoric, such as the artifact in this study, respond to actual physical attacks on home soil and attacks from non-nations, such as ethnic groups or religious groups. Rhetorical situations with a non-national enemy may require a different form of war rhetoric and crisis rhetoric. Second, this study raises questions for a potential sub-genre of war rhetoric or crisis rhetoric called "anticipatory rhetoric," or rhetoric which establishes a perceived need for prolonged, pervasive military response. As in this study, rhetors may use different tactics for preparing audiences to accept continuous wars (such as the war on terror), such as defining the enemy differently or presenting U.S. intentions differently. Critics can explore how rhetors prepare their audiences for continuous war, if at all. Perhaps, by comparison, rhetors cannot truly prepare their audiences for continuous war, as subsequent anti-war sentiments against the Iraq War and Vietnam War have indicated. This area is worthy of further discussion. Last, this study raises the issue of "proportionality." Perhaps President Bush's response to 9/11 was not proportional to the rhetorical situation. The events of 9/11 were horrendous acts of violence, but perhaps they did they warrant one of the longest prolonged wars in United States history. This is interesting because Bush's speech was received with glowing support in the immediate aftermath, but as the war extended from months to years, and anti-war sentiments expanded, perhaps Bush's initial response was an inaccurate policy response. It successfully galvanized public opinion and was emotionally received, but perhaps the long-term implications of the policies that were promoted in the speech were not as well received. This leads to further implications for anyone who uses prophetic dualism as justification for

prolonged war. Perhaps prophetic dualism does not work if the enemy is not defined (as in the case of the war on terror) or the image of victory is not apparent.

The next area of study, civil religion, recalls the first research question: *How, if at all, is civil religion present in President Bush's September 20, 2001 address?* Civil religious rhetoric summons ages-old notions of right and wrong and it is these notions upon which a society bases its moral values (Bellah, 1970). Civil religious rhetoric is a powerfully persuasive tool for uniting a people via shared values to shared perspectives and goals. It reasserts long-held values and reorients us under a shared framework. Civil religious rhetoric typically communicates four beliefs: There is a God; God's will is known and enacted through government; America is God's agent; and citizens should identify with their country in a religious sense (Pierard & Linder, 1998). Because God's will is enacted through government, presidents reign as de facto "high priests" of American civil religion, imbued with the authority to declare American beliefs and unify the nation through them (Pierard and Lindner, 1988, p. 25).

In his September 20, 2001 speech, President Bush invoked Pierard and Lindner's (1988) four characteristics of civil religion. President Bush's use of civil religion is widespread in the artifact and is most often exemplified through the FAITH/FATE metaphorical concept. First, Bush implies there is a God when he refers to God directly, as in "God bless America." He also implies that America is God's agent and God's chosen nation. For instance, he states "may God grant us wisdom and may He watch over the United States of America." This suggests that God devotes His attention and wisdom to America, and that America receives protection through God. Second, through metaphors of FAITH and FATE, Bush implies that God's will is known and enacted through the government. For example, when he states, "In our grief and anger we have found our mission," he implies with the metaphor "mission" ("mission" is also a term for religious journeys that have been taken in order to serve God, or journeys that God asks His subjects to take) that the act of going to war is a directive from God. God's will is known (the mission is God's will) and God's will is fulfilled through enactment of the mission. Third, President Bush implies that America is God's chosen agent. For example, Bush suggests that with help from God, America is destined for victory: "The course of this conflict is not known, yet its outcome is certain." "We'll meet violence with patient justice, assured of the rightness of our cause." These metaphors imply that America is assured victory because its cause is "righteous," or Godly. Additionally, President Bush suggests that God supports America

specifically because America is the harbinger of freedom and justice: "Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know God is not neutral between them." Lastly, President Bush fulfills the final remaining tenet of civil religion, that Americans should identify with their nation in a religious sense. Not only do all preceding tenets of civil religion generate a stronger affiliation between religious values and nation (for example, the U.S. is enacting a "mission" which is a "righteous cause"), Bush also encourages Americans to take action in support of the war on terror by praying: "continue praying for the victims;" "prayer has comforted us in sorrow and will help strengthen us." Prayer will help fulfill the mission ahead. He implies that, with God's help, the nation can move forward: "grief recedes with time and grace." These statements suggest that prayer invites grace from God, and this grace is both healing and empowering.

The logical extensions of Bush's FAITH/FATE metaphorical concepts generate several conclusions about his larger worldview. During this time of intense national crisis and widespread fear, civil religion offered a form of eulogy, a source for American unity, and mortification: through our prayer with God, we could mourn and move on. We could reknit as a community through our shared faith in God and our faith in the semi-religious American values of freedom and justice. God's will is to protect freedom and justice, the core values of America, for all eternity. The God that President Bush recalls is soothing yet militant. This God is committed to righting wrongs that have been committed against His faithful followers; justice is "righteous," and war is a "calling" and a "mission;" the way "calling" and "mission" are used, they could imply that they come from God because Bush declares the entire nation is "called" to go to war; there must be an outside force that calls President Bush and the nation to act. Similarly, Bush positions patriotism as both a means of healing and war. Through civil religion – through God and Country – we can find our better selves, recover emotionally from our fears, and move on. We are encouraged to adopt this worldview in order to overcome our grief and fear. Patriotism is a reason for sacrifice and war. As Marvin (2002) reminds us, patriotism carries a Godliness; like God, patriotism is imbued with authority to declare life or death to loyal patriots or to traitors, and carries authority to demand sacrifice of a loyal nation.

The next research question is: "*Is prophetic dualism evident in President Bush's September 20, 2001 address?*" From the extrapolated arguments and meanings entailed in Bush's metaphorical concepts, discussed in Chapter Four, this study concludes that the proposed

worldview in this artifact correlates with the tenets of prophetic dualism. In understanding how the artifact stands as an example of prophetic dualism, we approach the last research question: *What, if any, metaphors did President Bush use to establish a framework of prophetic dualism?* It is through metaphor that I will see how Bush evokes prophetic dualism; both questions are simultaneously explored here in more detail.

The first characteristic of prophetic dualism occurs when a speaker encourages audiences to choose between *good* and *evil*. Prophetic dualism posits a worldview of direct life-and-death struggle between two eternally opposed foes. The division between these two camps is based on values; each side's distinct morals and values lead to their natural and irrevocable split. Because their values are opposed, the two sides are also, naturally, opposed to one another. The speaker associates the "good" side with religious faith, a militant God, and freedom. The "evil" side is in direct moral opposition to "good;" it is the opposite of whatever "good" may be. Similarly, President Bush establishes a GOOD/EVIL metaphorical concept wherein America is "good" and the enemy is "evil." America's goodness has been earned and is exemplified through its values of freedom and justice, its peacefulness, its economy, its unity, and its faith in God. The enemy is presented as "evil;" they hides in dark places, comprise a loose network on the fringes of the world. Not only have they abandoned their faith, they are traitors to Allah. In this metaphorical construct, "good" is imbued with Godliness, prayer, economic might and unity. "Evil" is godlessness, darkness, a dissipated people, traitorousness, and fear itself. President Bush's metaphorical clusters work together to portray two naturally, diametrically opposed forces. Combined with the NEAR/FAR cluster and the FORCE/WAR cluster, the GOOD/EVIL cluster positions America squarely, permanently, and utterly opposed to the "evil" enemy. The LIGHT/DARK cluster further details the ways in which America and the enemy are naturally opposed: America is *light* and *up*, the enemy is *dark* and *down*. "Night fell on a different world," America has been "awakened to danger" and must "uphold values" by "lifting a dark threat of danger," "track down terror," and "destroy it where it grows." Although the enemy resides far away in hidden places, Bush implies that it will continue to strike out against America and the world because it hates America's freedom, it hates America's strength, and it will always look for ways to harm America. Furthermore, Bush's metaphors imply that America could never become like the enemy; the enemy is the opposite of America in every meaningful way. In fact the enemy is hardly human; through SAVAGE metaphors, Bush portrays the enemy as a sub-human

embodiment of fear itself, destined for an "unmarked grave." Based on this narrative of the situation, a rational, logical action would be to oppose the enemy at all costs, and to battle them immediately, before they could strike again (and according to this narrative, they will, because they "plot evil"). This tenet of prophetic dualism argues that the "good" side must oppose and battle the "evil" side in order to *fulfill God's will*. God's will is known, and God commands America to oppose the enemy. As discussed in the preceding section on civil religion, President Bush's metaphors fulfill this sub-tenet as well. Bush implies that God's will is known and God's will is to fight the enemy. Justice is "righteous," and war is a "calling" and a "mission" from our higher power.

The second tenet of prophetic dualism is an absence of public dissent. The religious dimension of prophetic dualism's worldview allows a logical extension of Wander's (1984) assertion that God closes out debate: If America is "good" and its people are "good," then they have faith in God. A "good" American can't argue against God's will, and God's will is to battle the enemy at any cost. Anyone who opposes the war in any form, including questioning it or engaging in debate, is "not good." Therefore, Americans must support the war. The sort of national pride and self-sacrifice resultant from prophetic dualism is pervasive, deeply felt, and long lasting. A speaker utilizing prophetic dualism doesn't advocate just for patriotism, but for absolute support. Looking at the speech's metaphorical concepts, one finds many instances where the speaker subtly argues against dissent. Although President Bush rarely discourages dissent outright or literally, directly says "do not disagree with one another," he places relatively significant time and effort encouraging unity, which could be interpreted as *the opposite of dissent*. More than any other metaphoric cluster, he repeats UNITY. The speech contains several instances of repetition, and in these cases, Bush is repeating terms of UNITY. For instance he repeats the phrase "we will come together" five times in rapid succession, reinforcing the point and creating stronger, more persuasive and lasting imagery in the minds of his audience. Not only is the country united, it is united in ideology: "Republicans and Democrats joined together on the steps of the Capitol." Extending the logic of the UNITY cluster, one can argue President Bush is discouraging debate. If "we come together," we are less likely to disagree and debate policy issues. To "come together" is to act as one, to be of one mind; and if a group is united, the group does not debate issues internally. Bush also creates visual imagery of the nation "as one" through BODY metaphors. The nation is presented as a single body of flesh which has been



wounded and is not immune from attack: "I will not forget the wound to our country and those who inflicted it." The body must take defensive measures for protection. By logical extension, this argument implies that defensive measures will not protect all areas of the "body" if the "body" splinters into factions. Portraying the country as a single body allows for more vivid imagery and persuasive potency; we are figuratively one being, and a being only has one mind with which to think, and one course of action. Bush combines UNITY with FORCE/WAR and FAITH/FATE to reiterate that God plays a pivotal role in our unity. God (and his people) oppose the enemy, and will always do so: "freedom and justice, cruelty and fear, have always been at war, and God is not neutral between them." If the "good" audience follows God's will, the audience must unite together behind God's mission and therefore the audience must, as one nation under God, follow the proposed course of action. This further implies that anyone who opposes the war actually opposes God's will.

The final characteristic of prophetic dualism is the belief that compromise and neutrality are unacceptable; they equivalent to surrender and failure. The nation must fight and must win because neither failure nor neutrality are acceptable. President Bush's speech repeatedly implies or directly states a similar perspective, advocating against compromise for a variety of reasons. First, through metaphors of FORCE/WAR, Bush declares that if America fails to act, the enemy wins: if "America grows fearful, retreating from the world and forsaking our friends" and "if terror goes unpunished ... [Afghanistan's] own citizens may be next." To *not* strike the enemy would be tantamount to failure. Bush combines FORCE/WAR with metaphors of RESOLVE, encouraging the public to prepare for a long and challenging road ahead, a "lengthy campaign," that requires "patience" and "resolve." The war may be challenging, but any other path would not work; therefore, the public must stay committed to the challenge. Bush also employs metaphors of BODY to reiterate RESOLVE: "I will not rest, I will not relent;" "we will not tire, we will not falter, we will not fail." These metaphors could be used interchangeably and are presented as equivalent terms: to *relent* is to *rest*; to *rest* is to *falter*; to *falter* is to *fail*. By logical extension, to *relent* is to *fail*. Lastly, Bush employs metaphors of NEAR/FAR to imply that there is no open space or neutrality between America and the enemy. The enemy, who is FAR, brought the attacks (as well as FEAR) NEAR; we "face dangers." However, there is a gap in space between NEAR and FAR that cannot be occupied: "either you are with us or you are with the terrorists;" "the civilized world is rallying to America's side." This further perpetuates an underlying

argument that neutrality, common ground, compromise, appeasement and discussions are logically impossible. If Bush's metaphors are accepted as truth, then by logical extension, neutrality and compromise are not only unreasonable, they are dangerous, because the savage enemy will surely attack if allowed any leeway.

President Bush's September 20, 2001 speech is a reflection of the modern rhetorical presidency and justificatory crisis rhetoric, prophetic dualism and civil religion, but it is an unusual example of presidential war rhetoric. Perhaps this artifact could not fulfill all tenets of war rhetoric because prophetic dualism, present in this artifact, runs in direct opposition to one characteristic of traditional war rhetoric: careful deliberation. If this artifact is an example of prophetic dualism, the artifact is also subject to a series of political implications that correlate with prophetic dualism. This particular locus of study may further reinforce the genre's known implications.

### **Political Implications**

President Bush's rhetoric served a crucial role in the aftermath of 9/11. The public was seized in fear, experiencing a crisis on massive scale. The public needed his leadership, and he needed to calm the public and to recommend future course of action. Based on the public and press' positive reactions to his September 20, 2001 address, one can conclude that the speech successfully confronted the crisis and directed the country toward a resolution. This study finds that Bush's speech fits the tenets of prophetic dualism, suggesting that prophetic dualism may have repeatedly existed as part of Bush's rhetorical patterns from the beginning of 9/11 until (at least) the Iraq War. However, by utilizing prophetic dualism well into his second term, Bush may have perpetuated the crisis as much as he abated it. The metaphorical concept of FEAR is a worldview framework from which to perpetuate and summon feelings of fear for persuasive purposes. By constantly reminding audiences of the negative feelings associated with 9/11, of recalling the FEAR metaphorical concept - by establishing the war on terror and using the word "terrorism" extensively in future rhetoric - he could recall the sensations we know to be associated with crisis, specifically of some external threat to one's personhood or home. This conclusion is consistent with other research which concludes that Bush extended crisis rhetoric from 9/11 through the summer of 2002 through heavy and repeated references to "evil," 9/11, and external threats (John, Domke, Coe and Graham, 2007). The pattern of FEAR began

immediately after 9/11, as this study suggests, aided by a prophetic dualism framework which emphasizes the enemy's negative attributes and threatening actions.

Wander (1984) proposed two practical implications to prophetic dualism. First, prophetic dualism may "allow" or exacerbate nationalism. If a war is a life or death struggle and the enemy is truly "evil," the public may perceive that a nationalistic approach may be acceptable: If the enemy is "evil," it therefore seems reasonable to treat the enemy as a savage being, a traitor to God, and "evil." This study finds numerous instances where President Bush portrays the enemy as EVIL and SAVAGE, which fits Wander's requirements for this practical implication to be fulfilled, and this study also finds numerous instances of nationalistic behavior among American political leaders, the media and the public after 9/11. This study does not necessarily prove a correlation between President Bush's prophetic dualism and subsequent acts of nationalism in the U.S., but based on Wander's assertions, it is possible that a correlation could exist. In his speech, President Bush discourages hate crimes by asking the public not to "single out" anyone for their faith, but in the months following 9/11, hate crimes against Arab Americans and Muslim Americans continued (Akram & Johnson, 2002).

Wander's (1984) second political implication asserts that if a speaker publicly banishes neutrality and compromise, the speaker puts him or herself at a policymaking disadvantage in two ways. First, if the speaker's narrative is accepted as literally true, the nation must pay any cost, no matter how high, to defeat the enemy. If the public perceives those costs to be too high, this creates a fissure in the logic of a prophetic dualism narrative because prophetic dualism asserts that absolute victory must be achieved at any cost, no matter how unpopular or challenging. From a foreign policy perspective, the rhetor faces increasingly difficult challenges to maintain the logic of a prophetic dualism worldview if the public perceives the costs of war to be too high. The second policymaking disadvantage occurs when (or if) the political situation evolves into a valid opportunity for neutrality or compromise. If this happens, the speaker again faces significant hurdles in persuading the public to accept this divergent course of action. The public has already accepted a worldview that strictly defines neutrality as failure. When comparing Wander's assertions to this study of President Bush's use of prophetic dualism and other scholarly research of President Bush's Iraq War rhetoric, one can arguably identify these implications of prophetic dualism in the political realm. Public debate and discussion of ending or scaling down U.S. troop presence in the war on terror and the Iraq War (which could be

interpreted as "neutrality" or "compromise" in the war on terror and the Iraq War) have been controversial and hotly debated political topics. The country's worldview has remained "shriveled," "rigid," "impudent" and "impervious to countervailing experiences and disconfirming consequences" (Ivie, 2007b, p. 222). This could lend credence to Wander's assertions about the political implications of prophetic dualism. Perhaps if President Bush had used another approach to explaining 9/11, for instance as a terrible crime or lapse in national security, the nation would not have accepted a long-term commitment to fighting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

This leads us to a potentially interesting interplay between presidential war rhetoric and prophetic dualism. A characteristic of war rhetoric involves a speaker's claim that he or she carefully deliberated the decision to go to war. Throughout American history, presidents have repeatedly included this claim when declaring war (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990). However, prophetic dualism short-circuits deliberation, both in the speaker's narrative and, arguably, in the public's response. Any speaker who uses prophetic dualism to declare war will likely not fulfill this particular tenet of presidential war rhetoric. Not only does this lead scholars to consider this and possibly other caveats in presidential war rhetoric research, this leads a scholar to consider the practical implications of a war that is *not* carefully deliberated. Perhaps, in this situation and other high-conflict scenarios such as the Cold War and its ever-present fear of nuclear annihilation, this tenet of presidential war rhetoric was not necessary because the nation believed war was necessary. The public didn't need reassurance that there could have existed a slim chance that war wasn't necessary, and careful deliberation had weighed war as requisite. However, in situations without a palpable public crisis, a quick decision could be perceived as brash or reckless. Perhaps if President Bush had not adopted prophetic dualism and instead had fulfilled all tenets of war rhetoric - if he had demonstrated that the choice to go to war had been a deliberative, carefully weighed decision - this may have led to a different narrative of the situation that would have been less "rigid" and, possibly, this could have resulted in different foreign policy outcomes. Lastly, if a president declares he or she conducts deliberative action, it implies that deliberation is a proper mode of action; ergo, deliberation leads to good action. A resolute action implies that deliberation is unnecessary, or perhaps foolish. If President Bush had portrayed the decision to go to war as carefully deliberated, instead of a "righteous cause," a "mission" or a "calling," the narrative could have remained somewhat more flexible, and that

flexibility could have left more room for more debate and deliberation about the nature and timing of conclusion to the war on terror and, possibly, the Iraq War.

This study finds that a prophetic dualism narrative may also generate foreign policy implications for victory and peace. A prophetic dualism worldview asserts that the enemy is pure evil and should not exist. Therefore, by logical extension, victory realistically translates to complete annihilation of the enemy - or annihilation of the enemy's beliefs. Prophetic dualism's stated goal is to fight the enemy's values because the enemy is "evil," but in the real world, an enemy's beliefs are not eradicated by force (aside from total genocide). History tends to show that it is impossible to change an enemy's beliefs through sheer force, and Americans don't seem to accept the alternative, genocide, as a "good" value. If the enemy can't be eradicated and the enemy's beliefs can't be forcibly changed, then according to the narrative of prophetic dualism, there is no victory and no peace. Prophetic dualism is possibly a "no win" scenario because if one literally follows the rules of prophetic dualism, peace is unattainable. Furthermore, a scenario for future peace, along with any entailments and imagery, is conspicuously absent in the prophetic dualism framework. In President Bush's narrative, peace is absent for now and possibly for all eternity because "freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have *always* been at war." Prophetic dualism's narrow definitions of enemy and justice leave no room for a post-war world. Considering that future presidents may continue this narrative because the narrative has become part of the national agenda, and the fact that this narrative does not offer a "conclusion" to war, this study suggests that any president who wishes to conclude a war that started with prophetic dualism might best be served by actively abandoning the prophetic dualism narrative. It is not enough to finish the narrative by declaring "Mission Accomplished" within the prophetic dualism framework, as President Bush attempted to do in 2003, nearly a decade before the U.S. announced it would begin scaling down U.S. troop involvement in Iraq. Presidents who seek to end war should publicly reject the narrative of prophetic dualism as unrealistic, construct a new narrative that contains imagery and supporting archetypes that portray a conclusion to conflict, and shift the national agenda to policies that reflect the new narrative. The possibility of enacting a new narrative around 9/11, however, seems to be a daunting task in the face of the "determinative force" in presidential rhetoric (Hart, 2006). If a president introduces a bold new policy, or a new course of action, the rhetoric of that policy remains a part of the national agenda long after that president's term has concluded. Bush firmly established the "war on terrorism" in

the national agenda; it has become an unavoidable topic and is something national political leaders have continued to discuss, often regardless of other national issues or the leaders' own priorities (John, Domke, Coe and Graham, 2007; Bostdorff, 2009). While any president seeking peace could attempt to abandon Bush's narrative of 9/11 in favor of a new one that is inclusive of closure and peace, a new narrative may pale in prophetic dualism's shadow.

This study also raises a question regarding the social context of prophetic dualism. Prophetic dualism may be situational; it may require certain conditions to pre-exist in the rhetorical situation. Prophetic dualism is a moral framework that reinforces and justifies specific foreign policy actions. But it may be possible that other domestic social conditions, beyond a shared orientational metaphor, might be necessary for prophetic dualism to successfully shape foreign policy. In scholarly research, rhetorically successful instances of prophetic dualism emerge from only two foreign policy events, the Cold War and the Iraq War. At first glance, both events carry similar domestic conditions. This includes widespread public fear of immediate and severe bodily harm; a foreign foe with different religious faith; a desire on the part of the president to preempt danger; and a seeming lack of self-evident or beneficial compromise. Further research regarding the social contexts of prophetic dualism are worth exploration.

The practical implications of prophetic dualism imply a frightening future of war without end. Prophetic dualism constructs a specific narrative of war and enemy that America seems to have accepted and, more than a decade later, continues to reflect. Perhaps some in the United States remain dedicated to war (and to the sacrifices entailed with war, including loss of life and civil liberties) because this scenario was first defined - to the public and to Congress - as *the only logical response to 9/11*. Without another narrative of 9/11 to replace prophetic dualism, America may remain committed to this path in perpetuity, or at least until this issue falls from the national agenda. However, prophetic dualism requires more research. It may require specific conditions to exist if it is to persuade audiences effectively.

### **Methodological Implications**

The critical analysis in Chapter Four raises several methodological considerations. The process of studying metaphor in this artifact - and the decision to follow Ivie's (1987b) process to study metaphor - has proven an insightful means for uncovering layers of argument within

Bush's speech. It has also generated further questions and potential implications in the areas of visual and textual metaphor, archetypal metaphor, and orientational metaphor.

In this artifact, metaphor appears to be "the linguistic origin" of many arguments (Ivie, 1982, p. 240), and metaphorical criticism proved a useful technique for rooting out the underlying worldview that knits those arguments together. This study unearthed specific meanings, area of emphasis, and extrapolated logic through an examination of metaphors in President Bush's speech. Ivie's technique of locating and extract metaphors (and their contexts) from the original text and then dividing them into areas of related meanings proved an efficient process that clarified metaphors and helped reveal patterns of metaphor across the full text. However, Ivie's approach seems to focus on textual metaphors and therefore does not take into account visual metaphors. Because the intention of this study was to focus primarily on textual metaphors, this approach serves the purpose of this study. However, a metaphoric criticism that includes visual metaphors may have also functioned in this artifact because this artifact contained a vivid moment of visual metaphor - when President Bush held aloft the police shield of a man who died in the World Trade Center - and this artifact was set in a visually significant place, and also televised to audiences (both seen and heard). One can argue this speech was meant to be both seen and heard, thus making it worth scholarly review in a visual context. Though this criticism functioned offered a useful lens for investigating the rhetor's underlying beliefs and overarching narrative, perhaps future research of President Bush's nonverbal communication is worth exploring.

It is not uncommon for clusters to intermingle, and that is the case in this artifact. A single sentence can contain four or more metaphors from different clusters. In such instances, the juxtaposition of metaphors from different clusters implies another layer of meaning. For instance, the NEAR/FAR metaphors and FORCE/WAR metaphors often intermingled with BODY, which creates visual imagery of two bodies who have come together to physically, literally lock in battle until one of the bodies is defeated. Co-mingling clusters build upon each other to strengthen overall framing of various aspects of the rhetorical claims.

Archetypal metaphor may have enhanced President Bush's persuasiveness in this artifact. Archetypal metaphors, such as light/dark metaphors, "express intense value judgements and may thus be expected to elicit significant value responses from an audience" (Osborn, 1967). Bush's light/dark metaphors similarly add weight and imperative. The LIGHT/DARK metaphorical

concept, with its supportive orientational metaphors *light is up* and *dark is down*, seem to intensely reinforce the GOOD/EVIL metaphorical concept by conjuring vivid imagery of America's bright values confronting the dark depths of terror itself. America and the enemy are described as literally being "light" or "dark" (Bush, 2001). Furthermore, the LIGHT/DARK metaphorical concept in particular may accentuate the stark two-sided worldview of prophetic dualism. As Osborn (1967) notes, "[Light/dark metaphors] perpetuate the simplistic, two-valued, black/white attitudes which rhetoricians and their audiences seem so often to prefer." Based on Osborn's claims, one can conclude that these archetypal metaphors reinforce Bush's overarching argument that the world can be – and perhaps should be – divided into two distinct camps. The archetypal metaphors may also help persuade audiences to take action.

This research lends support to Stuckey's (1995) conclusion that an *orientational metaphor* is required for prophetic dualism to take hold among audiences. Stucky (1995) found that audiences did not accept George H. W. Bush's prophetic dualism narrative, constructed to lend support for the 1993 Persian Gulf War. This study finds several instances of orientational metaphor in President George W. Bush's September 20 address. The NEAR/FAR cluster spatially orients the United States to its enemy (it was far, now it is near), orients America to the civilized world (it is near, "rallying to our side"), and orients the enemy to the world (on the "fringe" of the world, far from the civilized world) (Bush, 2001). The LIGHT/DARK cluster contains supportive orientational metaphors portraying *light as up* and *dark as down*. In this spatial hierarchy, God is at the very top "watch[ing] over us," while the enemy is at the bottom. After America "track[s] down" the enemy, it will drop even lower into an "unmarked grave" (Bush, 2001). The orientational metaphors help the audience understand the narrative visually and also help the audience understand abstract notions of authority, strength and leadership spatially in terms of "up" and "down." These metaphors strengthen Bush's arguments and narrative by making them easier to understand. Audiences are enabled to independently fill gaps in the logic, concur with the narrative, and maintain their own portrait of the situation.

Metaphor stands as a powerful rhetorical device. It is a seemingly innocent means of concocting new meaning, yet it is so pervasive that no meta-discussion can occur without employing metaphor; none of us has the power to avoid it. President Bush used metaphor repeatedly in his speech and the metaphor appears to be a critically persuasive aspect of the speech. The archetypal metaphors raised in his speech elevated the narrative to mythic levels,



and in turn, perhaps emotionally compelled audiences to support it. Bush successfully used both orientational metaphor and archetypal metaphor.

## Conclusion

The events of 9/11 created an immediate and salient crisis; it was a rhetorical situation that demanded response. A major attack on domestic soil, 9/11 left Americans confused and frightened, unsure of who issued the attacks, and if more attacks would occur. Americans (including American media) seem to have experienced nationwide trauma, stress, and fear for domestic safety. Patriotism and nationalism reached new heights; patriotism expressed through 9/11 memorabilia sales and flag-waving; nationalism in the form of hate crimes and violence against Muslim Americans and in the vilification of private and public individuals who dissented against U.S.-led policy responses to 9/11, both foreign and domestic. President Bush needed to lead the country out of this crisis and toward a resolution. His September 20, 2001 address stands out as possibly the turning point in his rhetorical presidency. A holistic and detailed speech that answered a series of hypothetical questions, the speech was carefully planned with the president's involvement and was presented to a global audience. It was received with high regard in the press and the polls; his support reached as high as 91 percent in some polls (Cook, 2002a). Bush's response to the rhetorical situation was publicly successful, but the content of the speech - how it framed the situation, what it proposed, and the possible ensuing implications of such choices - forms the basis of this study. Scholars have noted that Bush used prophetic dualism later in his second administration, during the lead up to the Iraq War (Zagacki, 2007; Warner, 2008). Prophetic dualism, a morals-based foreign policy worldview that creates a stark perspective of friend and foe that does not allow for neutrality or compromise, has significant consequences for nations that chose to follow it. This study posed three questions of the artifact: *How, if at all, is civil religion present in President Bush's September 20, 2001 address? Is prophetic dualism evident in President George W. Bush's September 20, 2001 address? What, if any, metaphors did President Bush use to establish a framework of prophetic dualism?*

Before beginning analysis of the artifact, this study explored scholarly work in the genres of presidential rhetoric, the modern rhetorical presidency, presidential crisis rhetoric, presidential war rhetoric, civil religion and prophetic dualism. Presidential rhetoric has the power to shape public values and define political reality. During times of crisis especially, the public looks to the

president for leadership and guidance. Presidents typically respond to crises by stating the facts of the situation, establishing a melodrama of good and evil, and recommending a course of action out of the crisis (Kuypers, 1997). But in times of war, presidents have greater rhetorical responsibility. Presidents are not constitutionally authorized to declare war on behalf of the nation, but they have repeatedly exercised the power to launch military actions without Congressional approval over the course of American history. In such cases, presidents typically will claim that the decision to go to war is a delicate, carefully made choice; they will establish a narrative of the situation; they call for unanimous support for war; they legitimize themselves as Commander-in-Chief; and they strategically misrepresent the situation in order to enhance their overall persuasiveness (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990). Presidents may use civil religion as part of their rhetoric; civil religious rhetoric is powerfully persuasive as it recalls religiously-derived morals that define a society's values, and recognizes those morals in the political realm. It is a lens to see the world through shared values and morals, and in 21st century, it has become an increasingly utilized tool in the rhetorical presidency (Kaylor, 2011). Typically, civil religion occurs when a speaker notes that there must exist a God; God's will is known and fulfilled through government; America is God's agent; and citizens should identify with God (Pierard & Linder, 1998). Prophetic dualism is a more narrow worldview that heavily pulls from civil religion in order to construct a morals-based foreign policy that portrays the enemy as "evil" and America as "good." Those who employ prophetic dualism claim God wills America to battle the enemy and claim that compromise and neutrality are equivalent to failure.

This study explored the possible extent of civil religion and prophetic dualism in President Bush's September 20, 2001 address through an examination of the speech's metaphorical concepts. To uncover metaphorical concepts, the analysis followed a process identified by Ivie (1987b) wherein the scholar identifies the metaphors, groups them into categories of similar vehicle meaning and entailments, and analyzes each group, or cluster, one by one. During analysis of each cluster, the rhetor will often go back to the original text to look for additional metaphors and the juxtaposition of metaphors from other clusters. This process results in nine clusters of metaphorical concepts: FORCE/WAR, BODY, FEAR, LIGHT/DARK, NEAR/FAR, UNITY, FAITH/FATE, GOOD/EVIL and SAVAGE. Combined together, the clusters paint a picture of 9/11 as an act of war waged by a dark fringe network of evildoers upon a peaceful and religious nation. God is invoked repeatedly as a righteous and willful figure who

supports America and who bestows victory - or defeat - depending on how much the nation relies on Him.

This analysis leads to several rhetorical, political and methodological implications. In terms of rhetorical implications, this analysis seems to uphold most scholarly understandings of the modern rhetorical presidency, presidential crisis rhetoric, civil religion and prophetic dualism. The speech contains the tenets of civil religion and prophetic dualism, leading us to conclude that President Bush successfully enacted civil religion and prophetic dualism in this speech. Interestingly, this artifact contains all but one of the tenets of presidential war rhetoric. This missing aspect - that the rhetor carefully deliberated whether or not to go to war - could be absent for situational reasons (the audience craved a strong response to the rhetorical situation, and careful deliberation would not meet audience expectation), or arguably because a prophetic dualism worldview would necessarily reject careful deliberation. Politically, the decision to use prophetic dualism leads to practical implications for the United States. Prophetic dualism can exacerbate nationalism because the president, speaking on behalf of the United States, asserts that the enemy is "evil" and sub-human. Such a perspective leaves little room for empathy, understanding or cultural respect, and Americans may perceive this as open room for individual hostility against people that they perceive to be the "enemy." Prophetic dualism also banishes neutrality and compromise as forms of failure. This can lead to negative consequences in the future. If neutrality were to later arise as the best course of action, presidents could have difficulty persuading the public to instead view neutrality as success. Lastly, prophetic dualism can be a "no win" foreign policy. If it frames the enemy as the embodiment of "evil," then by logical extension, victory means either the eradication of the enemy, or the forcible change of the enemy's values. In the real world, neither of these approaches typically yields success. By using a prophetic dualism worldview, President Bush may have forced the United States into a permanent war on terror; a war without end. Methodologically, this study lends support to scholarly understanding of metaphor. It emerges in this artifact as a powerfully persuasive tool of speech. It emerged as a useful guidepost to underlying values, which under scrutiny, reveal implicit logical extensions of reasoning. In this artifact, archetypal metaphor was used to exaggerate the situation and imbue it with lofty American values and civil religion. This study also upholds Stuckey's (1995) argument that orientational metaphor may be necessary for prophetic dualism to succeed. President Bush's speech successfully used metaphor to build a

vivid physical world of good and evil, light and dark, savage and civil, which added a powerfully persuasive aspect to his narrative.

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