

RECOGNITION OF DISCRIMINATION: MERITOCRACY AND EGALITARIAN PRIMES
AND THEIR EFFECTS ON FEMINIST SELF-IDENTIFICATION

by

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Abstract

Research has shown that a disconnect exists between individuals' belief in feminist ideology and their willingness to identify as a feminist. Based on this incongruence, research on feminist identification has focused on social-demographic predictors and the thought processes that lead to self-identification. However, not much is known about how the recognition of discrimination is related to feminist self-identification. Research has suggested that part of identifying as a feminist involves the recognition of discrimination. Further, it is suggested that system-justifying ideologies (e.g., meritocracy beliefs) are used to deny the presence of discrimination. The current study further explored this relationship by looking at meritocracy and egalitarian beliefs and how they affected perceptions of discrimination, belief in feminist ideology and identifying as a feminist. Results revealed that participants' meritocracy and egalitarian beliefs had relatively no effect on their levels of perceived discrimination, belief in feminist ideology or identifying as a feminist.

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Feminism advocates equal social, political, and economic rights for both men and women (American Heritage Dictionary, 2005), and since the beginning of the feminist movement there have been enormous strides toward equality for women (Rudman & Fairchild, 2007). However, obstacles, both cultural and psychological, may prevent many women from capitalizing on the enormous strides that have been made (Rudman & Fairchild, 2007). One possible obstacle is that although women express support for the goals of feminism, many women still do not self-identify with the term “feminist.” A common finding among feminist identification research is that many women have pro-feminist beliefs yet will not label themselves as feminists (Alexander & Ryan, 1997; Williams & Wittig, 1997). This lack of identification keeps women from joining the feminist movement and blocks collective action at a societal level. Alexander and Ryan (1997) found that out of the 36 undergraduate students interviewed, only one woman identified herself as a feminist without qualifying what she meant by that. The larger portion of the sample was reluctant to completely commit to being called a feminist. Although many of these women seemed to support feminist ideology, most of the women qualified their responses by saying things such as: “I’m a feminist, but I come from a traditional family,” “I’m a feminist but I am not radical,” or “I’m not a feminist because men don’t like it.” Further, Williams and Wittig (1997) found that 89 of their participants (63%) supported feminist goals, but would not identify as feminist, while only 35 participants (25%) would self-identify as a feminist.

This lack of feminist self-identification may be due to many factors. It may be due to confusion about what feminism actually is (Budgeon, 2001; Liss, Hoffner & Crawford, 2000), or it may be that the word “feminist” carries with it many connotations. The term “feminist” carries with it many associations, such as “feminazi,” “manhater,” and “lesbian.” Research has found that the terminology used affects support for feminism (Breinlinger & Kelly, 1994). For

example, Buschman and Lenart (1996) found that generally individuals respond more negatively to the term “feminist” than to “woman’s movement,” even if they are supportive of the ideas of feminism. Further, because of the backlash to the feminist movement over the last 20 years (Faludi, 1991), it seems that much of the U.S. public equates feminism as “radical” in thinking. This begs the question, what keeps women, or men, from identifying as feminists and conversely, what are the correlates associated with women and men identifying as feminists?

Importance of Group Identification

Groups are a fact of social life. Physical as well as social well-being depends on human interactions within and between groups (Lücken & Simon, 2005). Group identity is the degree to which the ingroup is included in the self. For some, their group is a central focus of their identity while for others, their group is less of a central focus of their identity (Tropp & Wright, 2001). Group identification can either be a source of strength or a source of vulnerability (Major & O’Brien, 2005). Allport (1954/1979) in his book *The Nature of Prejudice* suggested that increased group identification can be a source of coping with threats, and also a form of social support. Prior research has also demonstrated that an individual’s membership can have effects on many important social psychological factors (Simon, Aufderheide, & Kampmeier, 2001). For example, having a majority group membership includes having greater access to goods, such as money and food, but also to political authority, power, and respect.

Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) predicts that a person is more likely to identify with a group if he or she perceives the group as able to contribute positively to the individual’s self-concept. It is defined as the individual’s knowledge that he/she belongs to a certain social group and there is some type of value significance to him/her based on his/her group membership (Tajfel, 1972). Further, belonging to positively valued groups is important for a member’s self-image (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Tajfel (1978) argued that ingroups and

outgroups are evaluated through social comparisons. When favorable comparison are made between the ingroup and outgroup, ingroup members are provided with a positive self identity. However, when unfavorable negative comparisons are made between the ingroup and outgroup, members of the ingroup are provided with a negative social identity. Thus, when the ingroup's image is threatened by an outgroup an individual may disidentify or leave the ingroup in order to gain membership of a higher status group in order to restore his or her positive social identity.

Further, research has suggested that group membership can affect individuals negatively. For example, Lücken and Simon (2005) compared members of majority groups and minority groups and found that minority members were more preoccupied with their group membership and also reported less positive affect than did majority members overall. These effects are also seen in children as young as 5 and 6 years of age. For children, if social groups are present, children seek to be a part of those social groups, however, children prefer to be members of higher rather than lower status groups. Further, when children believe that there is a possibility to change groups, children in low status groups wish to change groups more than do children in high status groups (Nesdale & Flessner, 2001). This past research implies that individuals, even children, understand the differences between lower and higher status groups, and prefer groups that provide a positive social identity. However, as suggested earlier, certain groups are not evaluated positively. One of these groups is feminists.

Stereotypes and Feminist Self-Identification

Past research has shown that there are many stereotypes associated with being a feminist. Berryman-Fink and Verderber (1985) factor analyzed responses to 94 items to assess individuals' attributions of the term "feminist." They found that 54 semantic differential items loaded onto 5 factors. The first factor included general evaluations about feminists' character and

abilities (e.g., intelligent, beautiful). The second factor was a behavioral dimension and included attributions of specific behaviors and activities (e.g., aggressive, ambitious). The third factor assessed the political orientation of feminists (e.g., for equal rights, for reform). The fourth factor was a sexual preference dimension (e.g., homosexual, straight). The fifth factor was labeled gender and assessed gender attributions (e.g., male, female). Results indicated that although participants (both men and women) in the study generally evaluated (first factor) feminists to be “good” and “knowledgeable,” participants also saw feminists as “domineering” and “aggressive,” when rating feminists specific behaviors (second factor). Twenge and Zucker (1999) found that the most salient stereotypes of feminists were that feminists have liberal political orientations and assertive and career-oriented personalities. However, they also found that many of the participants, both male and female, in their study saw feminists as angry, tense, egotistical, and stubborn. Twenge and Zucker also noted that compared to women in general, feminists were rated more negatively. Further, the majority of the participants in their study also rated feminists as being “not like me.” Rudman and Fairchild (2007) found that male and female participants stereotyped feminists as being unattractive and rated plain women as more likely to be feminists than attractive women.

Social identity theory also suggests that individuals’ self-concepts include both a personal identity and a social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Considering yourself a feminist privately and calling yourself a feminist publicly are seen as necessary by social identity theory for identifying as a feminist. Individuals who privately self-label but do not publicly identify may harbor different levels of beliefs in the acceptability of the term “feminist” and the ideas and stigma attached to it (Alexander & Ryan, 1997; Myaskovsky & Wittig, 1997; Williams & Wittig, 1997). Roy, Weibust, and Miller (2007) exposed female participants to one of three conditions:

positive stereotypes condition about feminists, negative stereotypes condition about feminists, or the control condition where they were not exposed to any stereotypes about feminists. They found that women who were exposed to the positive stereotypes condition were twice as likely to identify as feminists than those women in the control condition or those in the negative stereotype condition. Further, those in the control condition were more likely to identify when compared to the negative stereotype condition. These negative stereotypes could inhibit women from self-identifying as feminists because it is difficult to subscribe to negative stereotypes about a group and at the same time perceive that group positively.

Other research on feminism has suggested that women believe that other people hold negative stereotypes toward feminists (Twenge & Zucker, 1999). Alexander and Ryan (1997) found that women did not identify as feminists because they believed that men did not like feminists. Further, Haddock and Zanna (1994) asked male participants to report their feelings about feminists. The most typical responses were anger, then disgust and annoyance. The men in the study also felt that feminism did not promote gender equality and that feminists did not believe in traditional family values. Thus, women may not self-identify as feminists, not because of the beliefs they have, but because they assume that others have negative views of feminists (Roy, Weibust, & Miller, 2007). Thus, the stigma attached to being a feminist, may keep women from self-identifying.

Recognition of Discrimination

Research has suggested that identifying as a feminist involves the recognition that discrimination exists (Rickard, 1989), however many women do not recognize this discrimination. For example, research has shown that even when sex discrimination is present in the workplace, women still feel extremely positive, if not as positive as the men, about their jobs

(Crosby, 1984). One explanation for this may come from system-justifying ideologies. System-justifying ideologies include ideologies such as meritocracy beliefs (e.g., belief in a just world) and are used by individuals to justify the status quo (Jost & Hunyady, 2005). Researchers suggest that individuals are committed to their own understandings of the world, which leads to an internal representation of the way the world ought to be. Thus, individuals believe that their understanding of the social world is true, and any adjustment to this understanding of the world is considered aversive and represents a change to the status quo, even when those individuals are on the low end of the social hierarchy (O'Brien & Crandall, 2005). Further, when the status quo is threatened system-justifying beliefs are enhanced (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). Jost and Hunyady (2002) showed that threats to the status quo increased the use of stereotypes among participants in order to justify inequality between groups. Thus, arrangements already in place, such as economic and social, are seen as fair and legitimate, and are justified through a set of system-justifying ideologies (Jost & Hunyady, 2005).

As stated before, system-justifying ideologies include such concepts as meritocratic ideology (e.g., Protestant work ethic and belief in a just world) and social dominance orientation. Protestant work ethic is the belief that hard work is reward in itself, and if individuals work hard enough they will get ahead in life (Jost & Hunyady, 2002). A belief in a just world is the idea that everyone gets what they deserve and that the world is a just place (Jost & Burgess, 2000). Social dominance theory (SDT) suggests that our society is based on a structure of group-based social hierarchies (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). SDT argues that there is a human drive to have group based inequality which is known as social dominance orientation. Social dominance orientation (SDO) is the belief that people support a group-based hierarchy and the domination of low status groups by high status groups (O'Brien & Crandall, 2005).

These ideologies are then adopted by many individuals to justify inequality among social groups. For example, McCoy and Major (2006) found that when meritocracy beliefs (i.e. beliefs that anyone can get ahead regardless of their group membership) were primed before reading an article on prejudice towards women, women were more likely to justify this prejudice by minimizing sexism, self-stereotyping, and by endorsing stereotypes that justified women's inferior status to men. Thus, instead of recognizing the discrimination within the article, the priming of meritocracy lead the women to psychologically justify the sexism, and also justify their subordinate status. More specifically, the priming of meritocracy prompted the women to engage in system-justifying beliefs.

Thus, it may be that individuals engage in these system-justifying beliefs in order to rationalize social inequality and the status quo. Further, these system-justifying beliefs may then lead some individuals to deny the recognition of personal discrimination. This may mean that these beliefs hinder the ability for some individuals to recognize the existence of personal discrimination and may subsequently keep them from identifying as feminists.

Feminists as a Perceived Threat

Threat as defined by the American Heritage Dictionary is "an expression of an intention to inflict pain, injury, evil, or punishment." Individuals may think that open identification with feminism may pose a threat to traditional gender role attitudes or to individuals' morals or values. Williams and Wittig (1997) have argued that the feminist label is associated with images of radical women. Media images about feminists may have distorted the public's view, such that individuals see images of feminists as looking or behaving in unfeminine or masculine ways and challenging traditional gender role attitudes (Alexander & Ryan, 1997). Research has also shown that feminists are frequently seen as being unfeminine (Alexander & Ryan, 1997). In a study of

college women who already identified as feminists, Bullock and Fernald (2003) found that these women responded more favorably to a feminist message when it was delivered by a woman with a more feminine appearance than a feminist message delivered by a woman with a more masculine appearance. Further, research has revealed that women who view femininity as the most important aspect to their identity agreed more with statements that indicated covert (i.e., just agreeing with feminist ideology) rather than overt (i.e., self-identification) feminism (Burn, Aboud, & Moyles, 2000). More specifically, these women were more willing to agree with feminist ideology than to identify as feminists. This research suggests that many women might not consider themselves feminists because the characteristics of feminism are inconsistent with their gender role identity. Further, because feminism may be seen as unfeminine, identifying as a feminist may pose a threat to traditional gender role attitudes and the ideas about masculinity and femininity. Feminists being perceived as a threat may also be explained by symbolic racism theory.

Symbolic racism theory suggests that racism results from conflicting values and beliefs among individuals rather than from competition of competing goals between individuals (Kinder & Sears, 1981). Symbolic racism suggests that racial bias is no longer due to Whites believing that Blacks are inferior to Whites, but rather to Whites believing that Blacks threaten the values that Whites hold to be important (Sears, 1988). For example, Whites may believe that prejudice against Blacks is no longer present in our society, and thus, may see affirmative action as breaching the equality between Whites and Blacks by giving an unfair advantage to Blacks. Similarly, other research has shown that when Blacks were not perceived to share the same values as their White counterparts, Whites had more negative evaluations of Blacks than those Whites who felt Blacks shared their values (Biernat, Vescio, & Theno, 1996). Further, a meta-

analysis conducted by Riek, Mania, and Gaertner (2006) found that as perceptions of intergroup competition, value violations, levels of intergroup anxiety, group esteem threats, and endorsements of negative stereotypes increased, then negative attitudes toward the outgroup increased. This suggests that different types of threat are associated with more negative attitudes toward outgroups. Even though symbolic racism was originally formed to explain Black and White relations, the relationship between symbolic threat and intergroup bias has also been seen when examining other ingroups and outgroups.

This includes prejudice against homosexuals. Haddock, Zanna and Esses (1993) found that participants who saw homosexuals as violating important values (e.g., homosexuality endangers the institution of the family) expressed more negative attitudes toward homosexuals than those individuals who did not perceive homosexuals as violating important values. Thus, by extension, individuals who see feminists as violating important values such as traditional gender role attitudes may tend to have more negative attitudes toward feminists. Further, this perceived threat may then keep individuals from identifying as feminists.

Individuals may also be threatened by the idea that feminists represent female authority in society. Because the social system of hierarchies is seen by many as legitimate, many groups strive to maintain the power structure, regardless of whether they hold a high or low status within the system. However, feminists understand this power structure, and many fight to change this idea of social dominance, and thus may be seen as a threat by groups who try to maintain the status quo. Authority is a responsibility given mostly to men (Johnson, 1976). This gender gap in authority is a reflection of the differences in power between men and women. Further, this difference in authority may exist from the labor divisions assigned to men (i.e., occupational

roles) and women (i.e., domestic roles). Thus, those women that hold authority positions may be looked upon negatively.

Rudman and Kilianski (2000) wanted to understand why men were more accepted in powerful positions than women. In order to examine this they used an IAT procedure to prime participants with images of men and women who held both high authority occupations (e.g., doctor, professor, scientist) and low authority occupations (e.g., cook, nurse, server). After participants were primed they were then asked to press a key labeled “good” or a key labeled “bad” to indicate the valence of 24 adjectives (e.g., healthy, intelligent, dishonest, bossy). Results showed that implicit attitudes (i.e., specific contrasts between negative and positive facilitation for female authority primes) toward female authorities were similar for female and male participants. Both men and women reported more negative attitudes toward females in high authority occupations than all other primes (i.e., male authorities, low-authority females, low-authority males). More specifically, participants were more likely to associate men with high authority positions (e.g., doctor, professor, scientist) and women with low authority positions (e.g., cook, nurse, server). This suggests that negative attitudes toward female authority may stem from the belief that there is a natural prototype for males leaders, and it may be seen as more natural for men to take control. Further, it may also be that individuals are used to seeing males as authority figures and females in non-authority positions. Individuals who see women in leadership positions may express more negative attitudes towards them, because they are now occupying powerful roles usually held by men. Thus, because individuals may perceive feminists as representing female authority, they may find this threatening and express more negative attitudes towards feminists. But why do individuals feel justified to express this prejudice toward feminists?

Justification-Suppression Model

Through the years, expression of prejudice towards some minority groups has decreased, but not toward all groups. Individuals appear to inhibit the expression of prejudice toward others when the prejudice is based on such factors as race or gender, but appear less likely to inhibit the expression of prejudice toward other groups, including homosexuals and feminists. According to the justification-suppression model (JSM) (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003), individuals will be more likely express prejudice when they feel it is justified to do so. Crandall and Eshleman (2003) argue that individuals are more likely to express prejudice when justifications are available that would allow them to express their prejudice; however, many factors help to suppress this expression of prejudice including social norms, personal standards, and values (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). Much research has shown that the motivation to control prejudice stems from both internal standards such as egalitarian values and beliefs, and external factors, such as social norms that prohibit the expression of prejudice and also the desire to avoid social conflict or social punishment that would follow the expression of prejudice (Plant & Devine, 1998).

The JSM provides an explanation for the higher levels of expressed prejudice towards homosexuals or feminists than prejudice based on other factors, such as race or gender. According to this model, individuals may have some actual negativity toward the members of another social group referred to as genuine prejudice. This genuine prejudice includes pure and unadulterated negative feelings toward those who hold membership in low status groups. However, the level of expressed prejudice is rarely a true reflection of that genuine prejudice. Rather, suppression factors, such as egalitarian beliefs or social norms vilifying prejudice, serve to inhibit the expression of prejudice.

Conversely, justification factors may disinhibit the expression of prejudice. That is, if some reasonable rationale exists for the expression of genuine prejudice it is more likely to be expressed. For instance, individuals inhibited the expression of negativity toward Blacks, but did not inhibit the expression of negativity toward child molesters and rapists. This presumably occurred because the individuals could not justify negativity toward Blacks, who are protected by social norms of equality and certainly did not choose to be Black, but could justify their negativity toward child molesters and rapists, who committed antisocial behaviors and that were the products of their own choices. This evaluation of group membership can then also function as a justification for prejudice against poor people, those who are overweight, and homosexuals (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003).

Thus, while individuals may have genuine prejudice toward Blacks, child molesters, and rapists, and devalue all three groups, they may only justify expressing that prejudice toward the child molesters and rapists; those two groups chose to be child molesters and rapists and therefore deserve the negativity expressed at them. By extension, it is possible that higher levels of expressed prejudice toward feminists may be seen as “justified” if individuals believe that their membership in a devalued social group is the product of their own choices; if they chose to be a feminist, then they deserve the prejudice directed at them. Thus, since being a feminist is seen by many as a choice, individuals may feel more justified to express prejudice towards them. However, despite this possible expressed prejudice toward feminists, many individuals still choose to be feminist.

Factors that Predict Feminist Self-Identification

Williams and Wittig (1997) examined predictors of feminist self identification. They investigated different variables such as the role of support for feminist ideology, belief in collective action, exposure to feminism and recognition of discrimination against women. They found that support for feminist goals and positive evaluations of feminists were the only two variables to predict feminist self-identification. Reid and Purcell (2004) found that previous exposure to the feminist movement contributed to participants' willingness to self identify as a feminist.

Similarly, others have found that there is a link between identifying as a feminist and the degree to which women feel that the feminist movement affects them. For example, some scholars suggest that women do not identify as feminists because they believe they can succeed without the help of the feminist movement (Renzetti, 1987). Further, other researchers have found that women do not identify as feminists because they did not feel that the feminist movement could help them to achieve in both or either their occupational and personal spheres (Alexander & Ryan, 1997). Finally, research has found that individuals who feel feminism is a belief rather than an action are more likely to identify. It is argued that some individuals reject the feminist label because they feel that if they adopt the feminist label it will require activism (Arnold, 2002). Thus, individuals who feel that the feminist movement affects them may be more likely to identify as a feminist.

Research has also revealed a number of characteristics of individuals who identify as feminists. Individuals who self-identify have more liberal beliefs, they have a positive general evaluation of feminists (Myaskovsky & Wittig, 1997), they are more likely to be highly educated (Bargad & Hyde, 1991), have nontraditional gender-role attitudes (Morgan, 1996), and believe in the feminist ideology (Myaskovsky & Wittig, 1997). Further, individuals who identify as

feminists usually have more prior exposure to feminism (Reid & Purcell, 2004), possess more of an awareness of discrimination, and believe in collective action (Henderson-King & Stewart, 1994).

Overview of Current Study

Previous research on feminist identification has focused on social-demographic predictors, the thought processes which lead to self-identification, and the effects of prior exposure to feminism (Reid & Purcell, 2004). Past research has also shown an incongruence in individuals' belief in feminist ideologies and their willingness to call themselves "feminists" (e.g., Henderson-King & Stewart, 1994; Liss, Hoffner, & Crawford, 2000; Renzetti, 1987; Williams & Wittig, 1997; Zucker, 2004). To investigate this disconnect, researchers have examined the effects of feminist stereotypes on self-identification as feminists (Roy et al., 2007). Past research suggests that a possible desire to avoid negative stereotypes associated with the term "feminist", and therefore evade any actual or perceived negative backlash (Williams & Wittig, 1997), may be an underlying reason for why women are unwilling to self-identify as a feminist. Consistent with past research, Smith, Hockett, Zanotti, and Saucier (unpublished), also found that support for feminist ideologies was unrelated to feminist self-identification. Further, they found that participants who scored higher on one feminist ideology were more likely to score higher on other feminist ideologies, and that women who self-identify as feminists had more positive and less negative general evaluations of feminists.

Given this past research however, not much is known about how the recognition of discrimination is related to feminist self-identification. Researchers have suggested that identifying as a feminist involves the recognition that discrimination exists (Rickard, 1989), but that many women do not recognize this discrimination. Renzetti (1987) found that female college

students who saw discrimination in their own life were more aware of gender inequality than those women who did not recognize discrimination. Further, it has been suggested that system-justifying ideologies are used by many individuals to justify the status quo and deny the presence of discrimination. McCoy and Major (2006) even found that when certain system-justifying ideologies were primed before reading an article on prejudice towards women, women were more likely to justify this prejudice by minimizing sexism, self-stereotyping, and by endorsing stereotypes that justified women's inferior status to men. Thus, the priming of these ideologies prompted women to engage in system-justifying beliefs. Thus, it may be that individuals engage in these system-justifying beliefs in order to rationalize social inequality and the status quo. Further, these system-justifying beliefs may then lead some individuals to deny the recognition of personal discrimination. This may mean that these beliefs hinder the ability for some individuals to recognize the existence of personal discrimination and this keeps them from identifying as a feminist.

Based on this past research, the purpose of the current study was to further examine how system-justifying ideologies affected the levels of perceived discrimination and feminist identification. More specifically, we examined whether system-justifying ideologies would hinder the ability for some individuals to recognize the existence of personal discrimination and whether it would keep some individuals from identifying as feminists. Conversely however, we examined whether egalitarian beliefs (the idea that all individuals are equal) would have the opposite effect, and instead heighten the awareness of discrimination. We hypothesized that priming meritocracy beliefs in situations where individuals were discriminated against would lead individuals to engage in system-justifying beliefs and therefore would be less likely to identify as a feminist and would also be less likely to believe in the goals and objectives of

feminism. Conversely, we hypothesized that those who were faced with discrimination and were not primed or were primed with egalitarian beliefs would be more likely to identify as a feminist and believe in the goals and objectives of feminism when compared to the meritocracy prime condition.

Method

Participants

Participants consisted of 339 undergraduate students enrolled in introductory psychology classes at Kansas State University. One hundred fifty-two participants reported that they were male and 187 reported that they were female. The majority of the participants were first year students (72%). Many of the participants reported that they were Republicans (44%) or Democrats (24%), and fewer participants reported that they were Independents (14%). The remaining (18%) of the participants did not indicate their political party affiliations. The average age of the participants was 18.8 ($SD = 1.32$).

Materials

Liberal feminist attitude and ideology scale (LFAIS). This measure developed by Morgan (1996), consisted of three subscales with a total of 40 items (see Appendix A). The three subscales included: attitudes toward gender roles (e.g., *it is insulting to the husband when his wife does not take his last name*), support of feminist global goals (e.g., *access to education is a crucial part of gaining equal rights for women*), and feminist specific goals (e.g., *there are circumstances in which women should be paid less than men for equal work*). Participants indicated their agreement on Likert type scales from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 9 (*strongly agree*). The LFAIS demonstrated high levels of internal consistency ($\alpha = .88$).

Feminist identification. Two different measures were used to assess whether the participants considered themselves to be a feminist (see Appendix B). The first measure assessed the participant's identification with a single item, in which the participant was asked to circle yes or no to the question "*do you consider yourself a feminist?*" Feminist identification was also assessed by having the participants indicate which statement best described them (Myaskovsky & Wittig, 1997). Items in the measure included: "*I do not consider myself a feminist at all, and I believe that feminists are harmful to family life and undermine relations between men and women;*" "*I do not consider myself a feminist;*" "*I agree with some of the objectives of feminist movement but do not call myself a feminist around others;*" "*I call myself a feminist around others;*" "*I call myself a feminist around others and am currently active in the women's movement.*" If participants agreed with the first statement (i.e., *I do not consider myself a feminist at all, and I believe that feminists are harmful to family life and undermine relations between men and women*) they were given a score of one on up to 5 if they indicated the last statement (i.e., *I call myself a feminist around others and am currently active in the women's movement*) as best describing them.

Priming of ideologies. Consistent with the procedure used by McCoy and Major (2006), we used a scramble sentence task to prime meritocracy and egalitarianism beliefs (see Appendix C). Participants were given 8 minutes to unscramble 20 sets of 5 words into 4 word sentences. These sentences unscrambled to describe meritocracy beliefs, or egalitarianism beliefs, and make them salient. For example, in the priming of meritocracy condition participants had to unscramble 20 five word sentences (e.g., *advance can all far individuals*) into 20 four word sentences (e.g., *all individuals can advance*). Participants in the egalitarianism prime unscrambled sentences such as "*equal all human are beings is*" into "*all human beings are*

equal.” The meritocracy and egalitarian condition contained 15 prime sentences and 5 neutral sentences. Finally participants in the neutral condition were asked to unscramble 20 sentences that were unrelated to meritocracy or egalitarian beliefs. For example, participants were asked to unscramble sentences like “*bears polar cold are all*” into “*polar bears are cold.*”

Meritocracy beliefs. Whether or not individuals endorse meritocracy beliefs was assessed using 4 items from Major et al. (2002) (see Appendix D). Items on this measure included: “*America is an open society where all individuals can achieve higher status.*” Participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement on Likert type scales from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 9 (*strongly agree*). The meritocracy beliefs measure demonstrated adequate levels of internal consistency ($\alpha = .73$).

Humanitarianism-egalitarianism scale (HE) (Katz & Hass, 1988). This measure assessed whether or not individuals endorse humanitarianism and egalitarianism (see Appendix E). This scale assessed individuals’ adherence to the democratic ideals of equality, social justice, and concern for others’ well-being. The HE is a ten item scale and participants indicated their levels of agreement on Likert type scales from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 9 (*strongly agree*). Sample items on this scale included: “*a good society is one in which people feel responsible for one another.*” The HE scale demonstrated high levels of internal consistency ($\alpha = .86$).

Manipulation of prejudice. The prejudice manipulation was similar to that employed by McCoy and Major (2006) (see Appendix F). Half the participants were asked to read an article suggesting that prejudice towards women is still a problem (sexism condition). The article described a recent survey conducted by the Maine Research Consortium that focused on 5000 current University of Maine students (UM) and 5000 recent UM alumni. Participants learned that according to the survey 50% of current female UM students experience sexual harassment, and

that they are much more likely than men to be targets of derogatory sexist remarks and are treated disrespectfully because of their gender. Further, participants also learned that of the female UM alumni, 25% earn less than the male alumni, and that female alumni are much less likely to hold supervisory positions. At the end of the article, participants read the statement “*the Maine Research Consortium concluded the survey by reporting that 90% of female UM respondents did not recognize the extent to which sexism would cause personal and professional barriers for them.*” The other half of the participants were assigned to the control condition. They read the same article but the target of prejudice was not women, but a less familiar group. The less familiar group in the control condition was the Inuit (i.e., a group of culturally similar indigenous peoples), from Canada. The Inuit were then compared to the majority group members from Canada.

Perceived sexism measure. Consistent with McCoy and Major (2006), participants’ levels of perceived sexism was assessed with a four item measure (See Appendix G). An example item on this measure included “*Women are negatively affected by sexism.*” Participants were asked to indicate their levels of agreement on Likert type scales from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 9 (*strongly agree*). The sexism measure demonstrated adequate levels of internal consistency ($\alpha = .73$).

Modern sexism scale (Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995). This measure assessed individuals’ modern sexist beliefs (see Appendix H). The scale consisted of 8 items that measured three aspects of modern sexism. Items 1-5 assessed how much individuals feel that discrimination toward women is still a problem (e.g., *discrimination against women is no longer a problem in the United States*). Items 6 and 7 assessed attitudes toward women’s demands for equal treatment (e.g., *It is easy to understand the anger of women’s groups in America*). Item 8 assessed individuals’ attitudes about “special favors” for women (e.g., *over the past few years,*

the government and news media have been showing more concern about the treatment of women than is warranted by women's actual experiences). Participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement on Likert type scales from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 9 (*strongly agree*). The modern sexism scale demonstrated adequate levels of internal consistency ($\alpha = .79$).

Protestant ethic scale (PE) (Katz & Hass, 1988). This is an 11 item measure that assessed the extent to which individuals believe in the Protestant ethic (i.e., devotion to work, individual achievement and discipline) (see Appendix I). An example item on this measure was: “*Our society would have fewer problems if people had less leisure time.*” Participants were asked to indicate their levels of agreement on Likert type scales from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 9 (*strongly agree*). The PE scale demonstrated adequate levels of internal consistency ($\alpha = .75$).

Social dominance orientation (SDO) (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). The SDO scale contained 16 items, and assessed how much individuals believe in the appropriateness of a social hierarchy (see Appendix J). An Example item on this measure was: “*inferior groups should stay in their place.*” Participants were asked to indicate their levels of agreement on Likert type scales from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 9 (*strongly agree*). The SDO scale demonstrated high levels of internal consistency ($\alpha = .89$).

Belief in a just world (BJW) (Rubin & Peplau, 1973). This 20 item measure assessed individuals' general belief in a just world (see Appendix K). An example item from this measure was: “*by and large, people deserve what they get.*” Participants indicated their levels of agreement on Likert type scales from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 9 (*strongly agree*). The BJW scale demonstrated low levels of internal consistency ($\alpha = .50$).

Procedure

Participants were assigned to one of 6 conditions: (Prime: neutral, meritocracy, egalitarianism) x (article: sexism condition, control condition), making this study a 3 x 2 between groups design. Procedures were modeled after McCoy and Major (2006). Participants were tested in small groups. Upon arrival it was explained to participants that they were participating in two studies, one of which was not of interest to the primary researcher. However, the study that was of no interest to the primary researcher was actually the priming of the ideologies. In the first study participants were randomly assigned to one of the three priming conditions and then completed the priming of the ideologies. After unscrambling the sentences, participants then completed the meritocracy beliefs measure, and the HE measure. Once completed, participants then completed the second study. For the second study participants read one of the two articles. After reading the article participants then completed the perceived sexism measure, modern sexism scale, the liberal feminist attitude and ideology scale, the feminist identification scale, PE scale, SDO scale, and the belief in a just world scale. Participants completed the measures in approximately an hour.

Results

The purpose of this study was to further examine how system-justifying ideologies and egalitarianism affect levels of perceived discrimination and feminist identification. We hypothesized that participants primed with meritocracy beliefs would perceive less sexism in the article and thus would be less likely to identify as a feminist, and less likely to believe in the goals and objectives of feminism than those in the egalitarian or control condition. Conversely, however, we hypothesized that participants primed with egalitarian beliefs would perceive more sexism in the article and thus be more likely to identify as a feminist, and believe in the goals and

objectives of feminism, than those in the control or meritocracy condition. Finally, we hypothesized that participants in the control condition would fall in between the meritocracy and egalitarian condition on our dependent measures. A breakdown of participants by sentence and article condition can be seen in Tables 1 and 2.

Manipulation Checks

Analyses were conducted to test the manipulations and examine whether priming meritocracy or egalitarian beliefs increased beliefs in meritocracy or egalitarianism. One-way ANOVAS were conducted to compare all three experimental conditions (meritocracy, egalitarian, control) on the meritocracy beliefs measure and also on the HE scale. Results revealed that priming meritocracy was not related to higher scores on the meritocracy beliefs measure, $F(2, 336) = .180, p = .836$, relative to those in the control and egalitarian conditions. Further, priming of egalitarianism was not related to higher scores on the HE scale, $F(2, 337) = .682, p = .506$, relative to those in the control and meritocracy conditions. These results suggest that regardless of what sentence condition participants were in, this was not related to their scores on either the meritocracy beliefs or HE measure. A summary of these results can be seen in Tables 3 and 4.

Effects of Experimental Manipulations on the Dependent Measures

Again, it was hypothesized that those who were primed with meritocracy would perceive less sexism in the article and would then be less likely to identify as a feminist relative to those in the control and egalitarian condition. Conversely, however, it was hypothesized that those primed with egalitarian beliefs would perceive more sexism in the article and be more likely to identify as a feminist than those in the control and meritocracy condition. In order to assess this 2 (article: sexism condition, control condition) x 2 (sex: male, female) x 3 (prime: meritocracy,

egalitarian, control) between groups ANOVAs were conducted to assess the effects of sex and the manipulations on our dependent measures: the perceived sexism measure, feminist identification measure, and the LFAIS.

Perceived sexism measure. Results revealed that there was not a significant main effect for the sentence condition $F(2, 326) = 1.05, p = .349$, on the perceived sexism measure. The sentence condition that participants were in was not related to their scores on the perceived sexism measure. Significant main effects were found for sex of the participant, $F(1, 326) = 49.16, p < .001$, and article condition $F(1, 326) = 9.36, p = .002$. Bonferroni multiple comparisons showed that overall women scored higher than men on the perceived sexism measure. Means and standard deviations for this analysis are listed in Table 5. Bonferroni multiple comparisons also showed that participants who read the sexism article scored higher on the perceived sexism measure than those who read the Inuit article. Means and standard deviations for this analysis are listed in Table 6. There was no interaction between sentence condition and article condition, $F(2, 326) = 1.01, p = .362$, sentence condition and sex $F(2, 326) = .594, p = .553$ or article condition and sex $F(1, 326) = 1.73, p = .189$ on the perceived sexism measure. These results suggest that the sentence condition and sex of the participant, and the article condition and sex of the participant did not interact to predict scores on the perceived sexism measure. Finally, there was no three way interaction between sentence condition, article condition and sex $F(2, 326) = .416, p = .660$, on the perceived sexism measure. The article condition, sentence condition, and sex of the participant did not interact to predict scores on the perceived sexism measure.

The LFAIS. Results showed that there was not a significant main effect of sentence condition, $F(2, 314) = 1.538, p = .216$, or article condition, $F(1, 314) = .336, p = .475$ on the

LFAIS. The sentence and article condition participants were in was not related to their scores on the LFAIS. Analyses did reveal however, that there was a main effect for sex on the LFAIS $F(1, 314) = 94.11, p < .001$. Bonferroni multiple comparisons revealed that women scored higher on the LFAIS than men. Means and standard deviations for this analysis are listed in Table 7. There was no interaction between the sentence and article condition, $F(2, 314) = .271, p = .763$, sentence condition and sex, $F(2, 314) = 1.04, p = .354$, or article condition and sex, $F(1, 314) = .058, p = .809$, on the LFAIS. The sentence and article condition, sentence condition and sex, and article condition and sex did not interact to predict scores on the LFAIS. However, results did reveal a three way interaction between sentence condition, article and sex $F(2, 314) = 3.49, p = .032$ on the LFAIS. We probed the three way interaction by conducting a 2 (article: sexism condition, control condition) \times 3 (prime: meritocracy, egalitarian, control) between groups ANOVA for men and women separately. Analyses revealed that the two way interaction between article and sentence condition was not significant for the men, $F(2, 141) = 1.61, p = .203$. The two way interaction between article and sentence condition was also not significant for women $F(2, 173) = 2.13, p = .121$. This suggests that the sentence and article condition did not interact to predict scores on the LFAIS for men or women. The means for men and women can be seen in Figures 1 and 2.

Feminist identification measure. Results showed that there was not a significant main effect of sentence condition, $F(2, 317) = 1.24, p = .289$, or article condition, $F(1, 317) = 2.38, p = .124$, on the feminist identification measure. The sentence and article condition that participants were in was not related to their scores on the feminist identification measure. Analyses did reveal however, a main effect for sex, $F(1, 317) = 57.130, p < .001$, on the feminist identification measure. Bonferroni multiple comparisons showed that women scored higher on

the feminist identification measure than men. Means and standard deviations for this analysis are listed in Table 8. There were no interactions between the sentence and article condition, $F(2, 317) = 1.94, p = .144$, sentence condition and sex, $F(2, 317) = .017, p = .983$, and article condition and sex, $F(1, 317) = .031, p = .861$, on the feminist identification measure. The sentence and article condition, sentence condition and sex, and article condition and sex, did not interact to predict scores on the feminist identification measure. Finally, no three-way interaction was found between sentence condition, article condition and sex on the feminist identification measure, $F(2, 317) = .552, p = .576$. This suggests that the sentence condition, article condition and sex of the participant did not interact to predict scores on the feminist identification measure.

Summary of results for primary hypotheses. Contrary to our predictions the manipulations had relatively no effect on our dependent measures. Univariate analyses of variance for the dependent variables showed a significant main effect for article condition and sex on the sexism measure. Bonferroni multiple comparisons showed that participants who read the sexism article scored higher on the sexism measure compared to participants who read the Inuit article. Further, women scored higher overall on the sexism measure than men. However, contrary to our hypotheses, the sentence condition had no effect on how much sexism was perceived in the article. Thus, participants primed with meritocracy beliefs perceived just as much discrimination in the article than those first primed with egalitarian beliefs or the control. Analyses also revealed that there was a main effect for sex on the LFAIS and feminist identification measure. Bonferroni multiple comparisons showed that women scored higher on the LFAIS and were also more likely to identify as a feminist than were men. However, contrary to our hypotheses, the sentence and article condition did not affect their levels of ideology beliefs or whether or not participants identified as a feminist.

Effects of Feminist Identification on the Dependent Measures

Again, contrary to our predictions, the sentence and article manipulation did not affect levels of ideology beliefs or identification as a feminist. More specifically, participants primed with meritocracy perceived the same level of discrimination in the article and were also just as likely to identify as feminists and believe in the goals and objectives of feminism when compared to the egalitarianism and control condition. Analyses revealed that overall 34 participants identified as feminists while 286 did not identify as feminists on the single item identification measure. A chi-square test of independence revealed that the distributions of participants who identified as feminists were not different across conditions, $\chi^2(2) = 1.47, p = .480$. More specifically, feminist identification did not differ by sentence condition. For a summary of these results see Table 9. On the five item feminist identification measure, 36 participants indicated that they do not consider themselves a feminist at all, and believe that feminists are harmful to family life and undermine relations between men and women. One hundred thirty-seven participants did not consider themselves a feminist. One hundred thirty-eight participants indicated that they agree with some of the objectives of the feminist movement but do not call themselves feminists around others. Fifteen participants reported that they call themselves a feminist around others, and 3 participants indicated that they call themselves a feminist around others and are currently active in the women's movement.

We evaluated whether the single item feminist identification measure was related to our dependent measures (perceived sexism measure, LFAIS) and also our individual difference measures including: the modern sexism scale, PE scale, SDO scale and a belief in a just world. Independent sample *t*-tests revealed that identifying as a feminist was related to scores on the LFAIS, $t(318) = 6.09, p < .001$. Participants who identified as feminists scored higher on the

LFAIS than participants who did not identify as a feminist. This suggests that support for feminist ideology and identification as a feminist is not independent, as previous literature has found. Independent sample *t*-tests also revealed that participants who identified as feminists scored higher on the perceived sexism measure, $t(327) = 6.53, p < .001$, and lower on the modern sexism scale, $t(327) = -5.48, p < .001$, SDO scale, $t(323) = -3.522, p < .001$, and a belief in a just world scale, $t(325) = -3.16, p < .002$, when compared to participants who did not identify as feminists. This suggests that identifying as feminist was related to higher scores on the perceived sexism scale, and lower scores on modern sexism scale and a belief in a just world scale when compared to participants who did not identify as feminists. However, no differences were found between participants who identified as feminists versus those who did not identify as feminists on the PE scale, $t(325) = -1.66, p = .096$. This suggests that whether or not the participant identified as a feminist was not related to their scores on the PE scale. The means and standard deviations are listed in Table 10.

Effects of Individual Difference Measures on the Dependent Measures

One-way ANOVAS were conducted in order to examine the effects of class year (first year, second year, third year, fourth year) and political affiliation (republican, democrat, independent, none) on our dependent variables. Results revealed that class year was not related to scores on the perceived sexism measure, $F(3, 333) = 1.95, p = .121$, or the LFAIS, $F(3, 321) = 1.41, p = .172$. These results suggest that the participants' class year did not relate to their scores on the perceived sexism measure or the LFAIS. However, class year was related to scores on the five item feminist identification measure, $F(3, 324) = 5.17, p < .002$. Bonferroni multiple comparisons revealed that second year students were more likely to identify as feminists overall when compared to first, third, fourth and fifth year students. Means and standard deviations are

listed in Table 11. Analyses also revealed that political affiliation were related to scores on the perceived sexism measure, $F(3, 334) = 4.76, p = .003$, the LFAIS, $F(3, 322) = 18.83, p < .001$, and the five-item feminist identification measure, $F(3, 313) = 5.32, p = .001$. Bonferroni multiple comparisons showed that Democrats scored higher on the LFAIS and the perceived sexism measure and were more likely to identify as feminists when compared to participants who indicated other political affiliations. Means and standard deviations are listed in Table 12.

We expected that our dependent measures might be related to the other individual difference measures used in the study including: age, the modern sexism scale, PE scale, SDO scale, and belief in a just world scale. Correlational analyses indicated that our individual difference measures were intercorrelated. Significant positive relationships were found between the modern sexism scale, PE scale, SDO and the belief in a just world scale. This suggests that higher levels of modern sexism were related to higher levels of PE, SDO, and belief in a just world. However, a non-significant positive relationship was found between the SDO and belief in a just world scale. Thus, higher levels of SDO were not related to higher levels of belief in a just world. Each of these individual difference measures also indicated significant negative relationships with the perceived sexism measure and the LFAIS. More specifically, higher levels of SDO, PE, modern sexism, and belief in a just world were related lower levels of perceived sexism, and feminist ideology. The perceived sexism measure, LFAIS and feminist identification measure were all significantly positively related. Higher levels of feminist ideology were related to higher levels of perceived sexism and feminist identification. The correlation coefficients are listed in Table 13.

We wanted to evaluate whether men and women would show different patterns of relationships between the dependent measures and other individual difference used in the study.

Correlational analyses examining only men, indicated that the individual difference measures were intercorrelated. Significant positive relationships were found between the individual difference measures except between the SDO and belief in a just world scale. This suggests that higher levels of modern sexism, were related to higher levels of SDO, PE, and belief in a just world. However, higher levels of SDO were not related to higher levels of belief in a just world. Each of these individual difference measures also indicated significant negative relationships with the LFAIS. This suggests that higher levels of SDO, PE, modern sexism, and belief in a just world were related to lower levels of feminist ideology. Non-significant negative relationships were found between the perceived sexism, PE and belief in a just world scale, and also between the feminist identification measure, the PE, SDO and belief in a just world scale. More specifically, levels of perceived sexism were not related to levels of PE and belief in a just world. Further, levels of feminist identification were not related to levels PE, SDO and belief in a just world. The LFAIS, perceived sexism measure and feminist identification measure were all significantly positively correlated. Higher levels of feminist ideology were related to higher levels of perceived sexism and feminist identification. The correlation coefficients are listed in table 14.

Correlational analyses focused only on women, showed again that the individual difference measures were intercorrelated. Significant positive relationships were found between the individual difference measures except between the SDO and belief in a just world scale. This suggests that higher levels of modern sexism were related to higher levels of SDO, PE, and belief in a just world. However, levels of SDO were not related to levels of belief in a just world. All the individual difference measures showed significant negative relationships with the feminist identification measure. This suggests that higher levels of SDO, PE, modern sexism, and belief

in a just world were related to lower levels of feminist identification. Non-significant negative relationships were found between the perceived sexism measure and the PE scale and also the LFAIS and belief in a just world scale. More specifically, levels of perceived sexism were not related to levels PE. Further, levels of feminist ideology were not related to levels of belief in a just world. The LFAIS, perceived sexism measure, and feminist identification measure were all significantly positively related. Higher levels of feminist ideology were related to higher levels of perceived sexism and feminist identification. Correlation coefficients are listed in Table 15.

Results revealed that the patterns of relationships between the dependent measures and other individual difference measures for men and women were similar. Generally we found that the individual difference measures were positively correlated with each other for both men and women. Correlational analyses did reveal however, that for men there was only a significant negative relationship between all the individual difference measures and the LFAIS. Women however, showed only a significant negative relationship between all the individual difference measures and the feminist identification measure. These results suggest that for men, levels of SDO, PE, modern sexism, and belief in a just world were related to beliefs in the feminist ideology. For women, levels of SDO, PE, modern sexism, and belief in a just world were related to levels of feminist identification. Finally, correlational analyses revealed that the dependent measures were all significantly positively related for both men and women. Higher levels of belief in the feminist ideology were related to higher levels of beliefs of perceived sexism and feminist identification.

Discussion

The purpose of this study was to more closely examine how system-justifying ideologies and egalitarianism affect levels of perceived discrimination and feminist identification. We

hypothesized that those individuals who were first primed with meritocracy beliefs would be less likely to identify as a feminist and would be less likely to agree with goals and objectives of feminism because of their decreased perception of sexism and their engagement in system-justifying beliefs. Conversely, we hypothesized that participants who were primed with egalitarian beliefs would be more likely to identify as a feminist and would be more likely to agree with the goals and objectives of feminism when compared to the control and meritocracy condition because they would perceive significantly more sexism in the article.

However, contrary to our hypotheses, results showed that the manipulations had relatively no effect on increasing beliefs in meritocracy and egalitarianism, on the participants' perception of discrimination, or on the participants' beliefs in feminist ideology or feminist identification. More specifically, priming participants did not increase beliefs in meritocracy or egalitarianism. Further, participants primed with meritocracy beliefs perceived just as much discrimination in the article than those primed with egalitarian beliefs or the control. Finally, neither the sentence nor article condition affected participants' levels of ideology beliefs and whether or not participants identified as a feminist.

The findings of the current study are contrary to past research. Past research has shown that system-justifying ideologies have reduced individuals' perceptions of sexism when present. Using the same paradigm employed in the current study, McCoy and Major (2006) found that priming meritocracy by having students unscramble sentences increased beliefs in meritocracy. The researchers also found that priming meritocracy in female participants, before having them read an article on prejudice towards women, the female participants were more likely to justify this prejudice by minimizing sexism, self-stereotyping, and by endorsing stereotypes that justified women's inferior status to men. However, these effects were not seen in the current

study. Further, it has been suggested that identifying as a feminist involves the recognition that discrimination exists (Rickard, 1989), however participants in our study who were first primed with egalitarianism did not perceive more sexism in the article, and were not more likely to identify as feminists than those first primed with meritocracy beliefs or the control. Analyses in our study did reveal however, that perception of sexism was related to identification as a feminist, $r = .36, p < .001$.

Some reasons why this may have occurred include the regional differences of the participants in the McCoy and Major (2006) study versus the participants in the current study. Participants' in the McCoy and Major study were recruited from the University of California, Santa Barbara. Participants in the current study were recruited from Kansas State University. Thus, it may be that the University of California had more liberal participants versus participants at Kansas State University who are generally more conservative and have more conservative ideologies. This suggests that participants in both studies may have started with baseline differences in their levels of meritocracy and egalitarian beliefs which may have affected their reactions to the meritocracy and egalitarian primes. More specifically, because participants may have started with baseline differences in their meritocracy beliefs, this may mean that after priming they were still at different levels of meritocracy beliefs. However, McCoy and Major did not provide the means for the meritocracy beliefs of the participants in their study thus not allowing us to compare means. Thus, although speculative, given the political differences of the two samples, differences in the baseline levels of meritocracy beliefs before being primed may have resulted in different baseline differences even after being primed with meritocracy beliefs, which could have affected the results of the study.

Another reason for the null effects of the study may be the ideology prime. Although our ideology prime was used in previous research successfully, students in our study found it difficult to unscramble the sentences from the ideology prime in the time allotted. However, this should be interpreted with some caution. Correlations were conducted to examine the relationship between sentences completed and increased beliefs in meritocracy and egalitarianism. These results revealed that the number of sentences completed was not related to increased beliefs in meritocracy and egalitarianism. This could indicate that participants may not have perceived the meritocracy or egalitarian cues present in the sentence primes.

Another possible reason for the null effects in our study is the article manipulation. The article was intended to look like an article from a newspaper. Manipulation checks revealed that the participants overall did find the articles to be credible ($M = 6.37, SD = 1.67$), convincing ($M = 6.12, SD = 1.75$), and persuasive ($M = 5.52, SD = 1.98$). However, manipulation checks also revealed that participants may have felt that the articles were “whiny” ($M = 4.11, SD = 2.24$), and biased ($M = 5.25, SD = 2.12$). This finding would be consistent with past research that has found that when targets of discrimination come forward to report instances of discrimination, they are perceived as “troublemakers” and are targeted for retaliation (Feagin & Sikes, 1994; Kaiser & Miller, 2001). For example, Kaiser and Miller (2001) had White participants read a vignette about a Black man who received a failing test grade. Participants then read that the Black individual attributed his failing grade either to discrimination, to his inability to answer the test questions correctly, or to the difficulty of the test. Results revealed that when the Black individual attributed his failing grade to discrimination, he was perceived as irritating and as a complainer to a greater extent than when the Black individual attributed his grade to his inability to answer the test questions or the difficulty of the exam. Thus, based on this past research,

because the participants may have found the article to be “whiny” or biased this may have kept participants from wanting to identify as a feminist. Finally, since we were using self report measures it is possible that we had a self-report bias, or the measures were not sensitive enough. The use of self report measures means that we measured explicit attitudes. This suggests that individuals were able to consider their responses and weigh the costs and benefits and reflect on their attitudes when responding to items on the measures. Thus, we cannot be completely sure that participants responded naturally and honestly which could have affected the results of our study. It should be noted that past studies have used these measures and found them to be valid.

Despite these issues however, the current study still addressed an interesting research question. In the current study we expected our results to show that recognition of discrimination may be a factor involved in feminist self-identification. Further, we expected our results to show that when meritocracy cues were made salient, participants would deny the recognition of discrimination and this may prevent them from identifying as feminists. This lack of recognition of personal discrimination has many implications.

Research has suggested that identifying as a feminist involves the recognition that discrimination exists (Rickard, 1989). However, according to the theory of system-justification ideologies, individuals are motivated to justify and rationalize the status quo and that when the status quo is threatened system-justifying beliefs are enhanced (Jost, Glasser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). These system-justifying ideologies including meritocracy beliefs, help to justify inequality between groups, making the social, economic, and political arrangements be seen as fair (Jost & Hunyady, 2005). Because the social, economic, and political arrangements are seen as fair, members of minority groups may see personal disadvantage as deserved and not due to discrimination. Research has shown that belief in meritocracy encourages many women to

blame themselves for their status in life (Jost & Banaji, 1994), and may blame discrimination against women on their own inabilities rather than on an unfair system. Thus, it may be that by engaging in system-justifying beliefs individuals rationalize social inequality. These beliefs may then lead some individuals to deny the recognition of discrimination. Further, by not recognizing the existence of personal discrimination this may then keep individuals from identifying as feminists.

Future research should focus on possibly changing the paradigm of the study to further examine how system-justifying ideologies and egalitarianism affect levels of perceived discrimination and beliefs in feminist ideology and feminist self-identification. For example, future research could make the priming sentences easier for participants to unscramble or change the prime manipulation to make the egalitarian and meritocracy cues more salient to the participants. For example, instead of having participants unscramble sentences, future studies could have participants read vignettes with meritocracy or egalitarianism cues present. Future paradigms could include having participants read about women or women of color (e.g., Oprah) who have lived the “American Dream.” More specifically, reading vignettes about women or women of color who have overcome institutional racism and sexism to achieve career and financial success might make the meritocracy cues more salient to the participants. Conversely then, reading about women or women of color (e.g., Rosa Parks) who fought for equal rights might make egalitarianism cues more salient. Thus, reading vignettes that provide examples of individuals may better prime meritocracy and egalitarianism than having participants unscramble sentences. Future research should also utilize participants from other departments such as women studies where more participants may be more likely to identify as feminists. Because we are interested in the processes of feminist self-identification, by utilizing a sample that is more

likely to identify as feminists, we can better understand these processes. Further, it would also be theoretically important to examine in what instances women who have already self-identified as feminists will not identify as feminists.

Finally, future research should examine the attitudes of women of color toward feminist self-identification and how feminist self-identification is affected by system-justifying beliefs. Past research has shown that other minority groups experience different forms of discrimination (e.g., severity of discrimination) than White women (McCoy & Major, 2006). Thus, because minority groups experience different forms of discrimination, this may mean that minority women have different beliefs about the political, economic, and social systems and about perceived discrimination (Foster & Tsarfati, 2005), which could influence their reaction to a meritocracy prime. More specifically, the blatant discrimination that women of color have received may have led them to have an internalized belief that the political, economic, and social systems are unfair (McCoy & Major, 2006). Due to this internalized belief that the systems are unfair, priming meritocracy among Black individuals may actually increase their perceptions of discrimination. Consistent with this, the processes by which minority women self-identify as feminists may also be different. Some of the goals of American feminism may be of more relevance to White women, than to Black or other minority women (Williams & Wittig, 1997). Further, many women of color may feel that the feminist movement has been defined by White women (Lessane, 2007). Feminist scholar bell hooks reflects this same sentiment in her writings: “As many Black women/women of color saw White women from privileged classes benefiting economically more than other groups from reformist gains, from gender being tacked on to racial affirmative action, it simply reaffirmed their fear that feminism was really about increasing

White power,” (hooks, 2000, p. 42). Thus, women of color may be more hesitant to identify as feminists because they may see the goals of feminism as not relevant to them.

The current study was an attempt to further understand how system-justifying ideologies and egalitarianism affect the recognition of discrimination and feminist self-identification. Future research should further examine how recognition of discrimination is a factor involved in identifying as a feminist and how it is affected by system-justifying ideologies. Because the feminist movement has been instrumental in progressing rights for women, understanding this relationship can lead to a better understanding of the processes that lead to feminist self identification.

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5 _____ Boys and girls should be able to be whatever they want to be provided that they have the skills and training the job demands.

6 _____ Equality between the sexes is a worthwhile goal.

7 _____ Men should respect women more than they currently do.

8 _____ Stereotypes of men and women hurt everyone.

9 _____ Men and women should be able to freely make choices about their lives without being restricted by their gender.

10 _____ Childrearing, whether done by men or women, needs to be valued more by society.

Specific Political Agendas

1 _____ There are circumstances in which women should be paid less than men for equal work.

2 _____ Many women in the work force are taking jobs away from men who need the jobs more.

3 _____ Homemakers deserve to earn social security benefits for their work in the home.

4 _____ The government has not given enough attention to providing quality low-cost daycare to parents.

5 _____ It is our society's responsibility to provide good daycare for children.

6 _____ Abortion is an issue of women's rights.

7 _____ A woman should not have to get permission from important people in her life in order to get an abortion.

8 _____ Doctors need to take women's health concerns more seriously.

9 _____ If men were the sex who got pregnant, more reliable and convenient birth control would be available.

10 _____ Legislation is needed to insure that a woman can keep her job after she has a baby.

11 _____ America should pass the Equal Rights Amendment.

12 _____ There are too few admirable roles for women on T.V.

13 _____ It is reasonable to boycott a company's product if you think that their commercials are sexist.

14 _____ Violence against women is not taken seriously enough.

15 _____ There is no such thing as rape between a man and his wife.

- 16 _____ Sexual harassment is a serious problem in America's workplaces.
- 17 _____ The prior sexual conduct of a rape victim should be admissible as evidence in court.
- 18 _____ Gay and lesbian couples should be able to publicly show their affection for one another, for instance by holding hands while walking.
- 19 _____ Gay and lesbian couples should be provided with "spousal privileges" such as the extension of medical insurance to one's partner.
- 20 _____ A woman who has many sexual partners is not necessarily a slut.

Appendix B
Feminist Identification

Do you consider yourself to be a feminist? Yes No

Please choose the statement that best applies:

1. I do not consider myself a feminist at all, and I believe that feminists are harmful to family life and undermine relations between men and women.
2. I do not consider myself a feminist.
3. I agree with some of the objectives of feminist movement but do not call myself a feminist around others.
4. I call myself a feminist around others.
5. I call myself a feminist around others and am currently active in the women's movement.

Appendix C

Priming of Ideologies

Please unscramble the following phrases into **four word** sentences. You will have **five minutes** to complete the task.

1. Effort positive prosperity leads to _____
2. Success deservingness personal positive indicates _____
3. People are merit judge on _____
4. Ability society rewards well individual _____
5. Deserve people rich house it _____
6. A positive time calculator saves _____
7. Talent based are responsibilities on _____
8. Workers society hard rewards will _____
9. Leads will motivation success to _____
10. Advance can all far individuals _____
11. By college goes quickly every _____
12. Ability individual is optimistic rewarded _____
13. Will motivation society is reward _____
14. Cakes she fluffy likes cats _____
15. Talent will reward was society _____
16. Poor are people lazy is _____
17. Likes he exercise to almost _____
18. Hard people successful work really _____
19. It deserve people do successful _____
20. Bears going polar are cold _____

Please unscramble the following phrases into **four word** sentences. You will have **five minutes** to complete the task.

1. Individuals equal all are really
2. As everyone treat positive equals
3. Kind should be everyone all
4. Rights everyone is equal for
5. Fortunate help less people are
6. A positive time calculator saves
7. All rights equal promote political
8. Help to remember again others
9. Everyone civil everywhere rights for
10. Beings all human extremely are
11. By college goes quickly time
12. Protect of interests obligation others
13. Responsible others for feel is
14. Cakes she fluffy likes cats
15. Others of rights protect act
16. Wellbeing about care others is
17. Likes he exercise to almost
18. Equal important chance everyone is
19. Important say equal an is
20. Bears going polar are cold

Please unscramble the following phrases into **four word** sentences. You will have **five minutes** to complete the task.

1. A positive time calculator saves

2. By college goes quickly time

3. Cakes she fluffy likes cats

4. Likes he exercise to almost

5. Bears is polar are cold

6. Today blue sky is the

7. Red signs stop are big

8. Like sleep to cats everywhere

9. People many chips like chocolate

10. Very cream cold ice is

11. Time video games are fun

12. Wildcats Kansas the best are

13. During pretty spring flowers bloom

14. Mirror cars four have wheels

15. Kids outside summer playing enjoy

16. Penguins life for cold mate

17. Send communicating easier make computers

18. Hydrants most fire like dogs

19. Vegetables variety eating healthy is

20. Iowa grows state corn in

Appendix D

Meritocracy Beliefs

Please use the 9 point scale below to indicate your agreement with each statement.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Strongly Disagree **Strongly Agree**

1. _____ America is an open society where all individuals can achieve higher status.
2. _____ Individual members of certain groups are often unable to advance in American society.
3. _____ Most people who do not get ahead should not blame the system; they really have only themselves to blame.
4. _____ Individual members of certain groups have difficulty achieving higher status.

Appendix E

Humanitarianism-Egalitarianism Scale

Please use the 9 point scale below to indicate your agreement with each statement.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Strongly Disagree **Strongly Agree**

1. _____ One should be kind to all people.
2. _____ One should find ways to help others less fortunate than oneself.
3. _____ A person should be concerned about the well-being of others.
4. _____ There should be equality for everyone- because we are all human beings
5. _____ Those who are unable to provide for their basic needs should be helped by others.
6. _____ A good society is one in which people feel responsible for one another.
7. _____ Everyone should have an equal chance and an equal say in most things.
8. _____ Acting to protect the rights and interests of other members of the community is a major obligation for all persons.
9. _____ In dealing with criminals the courts should recognize that many are victims of circumstances.
10. _____ Prosperous nations have a moral obligation to share some of their wealth with poor nations.

Appendix F

Sexism Condition Article

According to a recent survey, discrimination against women is a persistent and an ongoing problem in the United States. Research conducted by the Maine Research Consortium were based on a survey of 5000 current University of Maine students (UM) and 5000 recent UM alumni. Their results showed that women are still the targets of sexual harassment, derogatory comments, and report being treated disrespectfully because of their gender.

According to the Maine Research Consortium, 50% of female UM students surveyed had experienced sexual harassment. "Of course," reported one woman, "I can't go out without being honked at." "Yup," reported another, "got my butt slapped at a club just the other day." Further, female students were eight times more likely than male students to report hearing sexist assumptions made about their personal and academic interests, to be the target of derogatory sexist remarks, and to be treated disrespectfully because of their gender.

Of the female UM alumni surveyed, 25% earned less than the male alumni, and female alumni were considerably less likely than male alumni to hold supervisory and leadership positions. This is consistent with a previous survey done by CNN Money in 2006, which reported that there were only 10 women running Fortune 500 companies, and only 20 in the top 1,000. With more and more women entering the workforce, many people might feel as though the wage gap from decades ago is a thing of the past, however according to the Consortium's recent survey this is not the case. Additionally, the Maine Research Consortium also reported that many of the male respondents who were surveyed held sexist stereotypes towards women concerning their skills, competencies, knowledge, achievements and potential. Men also reported that if given the opportunity they would discriminate against women.

The Maine Research Consortium concluded the survey by reporting that 90% of female UM respondents did not recognize the extent to which sexism would cause personal and professional barriers for them.

Inuit Condition Article

According to a recent survey, discrimination against the Inuit in Canada is a persistent and an ongoing problem in the United States. The Inuit is a group of culturally similar indigenous people that live in Canada. Research conducted by the Toronto Research Consortium was based on a survey of 5000 current University of Toronto students (UT) and 5000 recent UT alumni. Their results showed that the Inuit are still the targets of harassment, derogatory comments, and report being treated disrespectfully because of their group membership.

According to the Toronto Research Consortium, 50% of Inuit UT students surveyed had experienced harassment. "Of course," reported one Inuit individual, "I can't go out without being harassed." "Yup," reported another, "discrimination against our people is still a problem." Further, Inuit students were eight times more likely than other students to report hearing assumptions made about their personal and academic interests, to be the target of derogatory remarks, and to be treated disrespectfully.

Of the Inuit UT alumni surveyed, 25% earned less than other alumni, and Inuit alumni were considerably less likely than other alumni to hold supervisory and leadership positions. With more and more Inuit entering the Canadian workforce, many people might feel as though the discrimination present from decades ago is a thing of the past, however according to the Consortium's recent survey this is not the case. Additionally, the Toronto Research Consortium also reported that many of the respondents who were surveyed held stereotypes towards the Inuit concerning their skills, competencies, knowledge, achievements and potential. Many also reported that if given the opportunity they would discriminate against the Inuit.

The Toronto Research Consortium concluded the survey by reporting that 90% of the Inuit UT respondents did not recognize the extent to which discrimination would cause personal and professional barriers for them.

Appendix G

Perceived Sexism Measure

Please use the 9 point scale below to indicate your agreement with each statement.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Strongly Disagree **Strongly Agree**

1. _____ Women as a group face a good deal of sexism.
2. _____ Women are negatively affected by sexism.
3. _____ Sexism will have a negative impact on my future.
4. _____ Sexism will block me from reaching my goals.

Appendix H

Modern Sexism Scale

Please use the 9 point scale below to indicate your agreement with each statement.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Strongly Disagree **Strongly Agree**

1. _____ Discrimination against women is no longer a problem in the United States.
2. _____ Women often miss out on good jobs due to sexual discrimination.
3. _____ It is rare to see women treated in a sexist manner on television.
4. _____ On average, people in our society treat husbands and wives equally.
5. _____ Society has reached the point where women and men have equal opportunities for achievement.
6. _____ It is easy to understand the anger of women's groups in America.
7. _____ It is easy to understand why women's groups are still concerned about societal limitations of women's opportunities.
8. _____ Over the past few years, the government and news media have been showing more concern about the treatment of women than is warranted by women's actual experiences.

Appendix I

Protestant Ethic

Please use the 9 point scale below to indicate your agreement with each statement.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Strongly Disagree **Strongly Agree**

1. _____ Most people spend too much time in unprofitable amusements.
2. _____ Our society would have fewer problems if people had less leisure time.
3. _____ Money acquired easily is usually spent unwisely.
4. _____ Most people who do not succeed in life are just plain lazy.
5. _____ Anyone who is willing and able to work hard has a good chance of succeeding.
6. _____ People who fail at a job have usually not tried hard enough.
7. _____ Life would have very little meaning if we never had to suffer.
8. _____ The person who can approach an unpleasant task with enthusiasm is the person who gets ahead.
9. _____ If people work hard enough they are likely to make a good life for themselves.
10. _____ I feel uneasy when there is little work for me to do.
11. _____ A distaste for hard work usually reflects a weakness of character.

Appendix J

Social Dominance Orientation

Please use the 9 point scale below to indicate your agreement with each statement.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Strongly Disagree **Strongly Agree**

1. _____ Group equality is not a worthwhile ideal.
2. _____ Increased social equality would be a bad thing.
3. _____ It would be good if all groups could be equal.
4. _____ Superior groups should not seek to dominate inferior groups.
5. _____ Treating different groups more equally would create more problems that it would solve.
6. _____ No one group should dominate in society.
7. _____ There is no point in trying to make incomes more equal.
8. _____ All groups should be given an equal chance in life.
9. _____ If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems.
10. _____ Inferior groups should stay in their place.
11. _____ It's a real problem that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom.
12. _____ No group of people is more worthy than any other.
13. _____ In getting what your own group wants, it should never be necessary to use force against other groups.
14. _____ Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.
15. _____ We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.
16. _____ To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.

Appendix K

Belief in a Just World

Please use the 9 point scale below to indicate your agreement with each statement.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Strongly Disagree **Strongly Agree**

1. _____ I've found that a person rarely deserved the reputation he has.
2. _____ Basically, the world is a just place.
3. _____ People who get "lucky breaks" have usually earned their good fortune.
4. _____ Careful drivers are just as likely to get hurt in traffic accidents as careless once.
5. _____ It is a common occurrence for a guilty person to get off free in American courts.
6. _____ Students almost always deserve the grades they receive in school.
7. _____ Men who keep in shape have little chance of suffering a heart attack.
8. _____ The political candidate who sticks up for his principles rarely get elected.
9. _____ It is rare for an innocent man to be wrongly sent to jail.
10. _____ In professional sports, many fouls and infractions never get called by the referee.
11. _____ By and large, people deserve what they get.
12. _____ When parents punish their children, it is almost always for good reasons.
13. _____ Good deeds often go unnoticed and unrewarded.
14. _____ Although evil men may hold political power for a while, in the general course of history good wins out.
15. _____ In almost any business or profession, people who do their job well rise to the top.
16. _____ American parents tend to overlook the things most to be admired in their children.
17. _____ It is often impossible for a person to receive a fair trial in the USA.
18. _____ People who meet with misfortune have often brought it on themselves.
19. _____ Crime doesn't pay.
20. _____ Many people suffer through absolutely no fault of their own.

Table 1

Breakdown of the Number of Participants in Each Condition

Condition	Inuit Article	Sexism Article
Meritocracy	44	57
Egalitarianism	49	55
Control	45	89

Table 2

Breakdown of the Number of Men and Women in Each Condition

Condition	Men	Women
Meritocracy	48	53
Egalitarianism	44	60
Control	60	74

Table 3

Mean Differences Between Sentence Conditions on Meritocracy Beliefs

Sentence condition	N	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Meritocracy	100	5.22	1.42
Egalitarianism	104	5.10	1.50
Control	133	5.15	1.50

Table 4

Mean Differences between Sentence Conditions on the Humanitarian-Egalitarianism scale

Sentence condition	N	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Meritocracy	100	7.01	1.12
Egalitarianism	104	7.16	1.19
Control	134	7.00	1.10

Table 5

Means and Standard Deviations of Sex on the Perceived Sexism Measure by Sentence Condition

Condition	Men	Women
Meritocracy	4.10 (1.04)	5.29 (1.61)
Egalitarian	4.17 (1.19)	5.01 (1.42)
Control	4.27 (1.20)	5.57 (1.45)
Total	4.19 (1.14)	5.31 (1.50)

Table 6

Means and Standard Deviations of Article Condition on the Perceived Sexism Measure by Sentence Condition

Condition	Sexism Article	Inuit Article
Meritocracy	5.03 (1.52)	3.79 (.70)
Egalitarianism	4.75 (1.20)	4.54 (1.57)
Control	5.17 (1.57)	4.62 (1.25)
Total	5.02 (1.46)	4.50 (1.40)

Table 7

Means and Standard Deviations of Sex on the LFAIS by Sentence Condition

Condition	Men	Women
Meritocracy	5.85 (.94)	6.76 (.79)
Egalitarianism	6.01 (.86)	6.76 (.68)
Control	5.72 (.87)	6.72 (.74)
Total	5.84 (.89)	6.74 (.73)

Table 8

*Means and Standard Deviations of Sex on the Feminist Identification Measure by Sentence**Condition*

Condition	Men	Women
Meritocracy	2.02 (.75)	2.63(.74)
Egalitarianism	2.14 (.61)	2.78 (.72)
Control	2.10 (.74)	2.67 (.72)
Total	2.08 (.71)	2.69 (.72)

Table 9

Breakdown by Sentence Condition for Feminist Identification

Sentence Condition	Identified as Feminists	Did not Identify as Feminists
Meritocracy	11	89
Egalitarianism	13	85
Control	11	121

Table 10

Means and Standard Deviations between Feminist Identification and Individual Difference Measures

Measure	Identified as Feminists	Did Not Identify as Feminists
LFAIS	7.20 (.60)	6.23 (.90)
Perceived sexism measure	6.22 (1.23)	4.61 (1.38)
Modern Sexism	3.21 (1.14)	4.35 (1.17)
PE	5.75 (1.17)	6.06 (1.04)
SDO	2.94 (1.01)	3.68 (1.17)
Belief in a just world	4.89 (.53)	5.24 (.62)

Table 11

Means and Standard Deviations between Class Year and the Dependent Measures

Measure	First year	Second year	Third year	Fourth year
Sexism measure	4.85 (1.44)	4.68 (1.50)	4.97 (1.48)	3.50 (1.34)
LFAIS	6.38 (.91)	6.31 (.89)	6.00 (.98)	5.93 (.96)
Feminist ID	2.46 (.75)	2.50 (.76)	1.91 (.77)	1.80 (.83)

Table 12

Means and Standard Deviations between Political Affiliation and the Dependent Measures

Measure	Republican	Democrat	Independent	None
Sexism measure	4.62 (1.27)	5.32 (1.53)	4.68 (1.77)	4.68 (1.39)
LFAIS	6.01 (.86)	6.91 (.77)	6.36 (1.04)	6.36 (.78)
Feminist ID	2.28 (.79)	2.71 (.71)	2.39 (.77)	2.41 (.76)

Table 13

Correlations between Individual Difference Measures and Dependent Measures

Measure	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Sexism measure	--						
LFAIS	.44**	--					
Feminist ID	.36**	.46**	--				
Modern sexism	-.55**	-.56**	-.39**	--			
PE scale	-.12*	-.23**	-.09	.23**	--		
SDO	-.25**	-.59**	-.23**	.38**	.27**	--	
Belief in a just world	-.22**	-.12*	-.09	.28**	.28**	.06	--

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .001$

Table 14

Correlations between Individual Difference Measures and Dependent Measures for Men

Measure	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Sexism measure	--						
LFAIS	.27**	--					
Feminist ID	.17*	.31**	--				
Modern sexism	-.43**	-.50**	-.28**	--			
PE scale	-.01	-.26**	-.08	.16*	--		
SDO	-.18*	-.57**	-.16	.36**	.29**	--	
Belief in a just world	-.11	-.18*	-.15	.25**	.33**	.05	--

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .001$

Table 15

Correlations between Individual Difference Measures and Dependent Measures for Women

Measure	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Sexism Measure	--						
LFAIS	.36**	--					
Feminist ID	.29**	.38**	--				
Modern Sexism	-.56**	-.53**	-.36**	--			
PE scale	-.13	-.15*	-.53**	.25**	--		
SDO	-.16*	-.54**	-.15*	.31**	.22**	--	
Belief in a just world	-.33**	-.07	-.54**	.32**	.23*	.07	--

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .001$

Figure 1




Figure 2

