

**POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION IN AFRICA:
THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY**

By

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B.A., University of Nairobi, 2000
M.A., University of Nairobi, 2004

AN ABSTRACT OF A DISSERTATION

submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

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School of Security Studies
College of Arts and Sciences

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Manhattan, Kansas

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Abstract

This dissertation analyzes the role that the international community has played in African states' post-conflict reconstruction. It thus intends to answer three questions: How does the presence or the absence of coordination among international and local actors contribute to the success or failure of post-conflict reconstruction? How does the international community's coordination influence the architecture of post-conflict state reconstruction in Africa? How do actors, leadership, and power within a coordination network structure affect post-conflict reconstruction? The study argues that lack of coordination between the international and local actors is a critical factor explaining the failure of rebuilding states after civil wars. It develops a new theoretical framework (*Hybridized model*) that combines market, hierarchical, and network models of coordination. This coordination theory shows how actors, leadership, and power influence coordination network structure to enhance post-conflict reconstruction efforts. This theory postulates that a small number of actors, as well as the presence of a legitimate leadership and a powerful actor in a coordination network tends to enhance post-conflict coordination. The dissertation tests this theory using quantitative method which combines 26 African countries that have experienced repeated state building after civil war from 1970 to 2009 and qualitative method, especially structured focused comparison and process tracing, of four post-conflict countries that include Kenya, Sudan, Namibia, and Rwanda. The findings support the theoretical argument.

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Dedication

I dedicate this work to my loving mother, Elizabeth Nyambura, for teaching me how to keep my head even when all those around me are losing theirs. You are the greatest woman, Mummy.

Chapter 1 - Disentangling the Puzzle of Post-conflict Reconstruction

1.1 The Puzzle, Purpose, and Definitions

How does the presence or the absence of coordination among international and local actors contribute to the success or failure of post-conflict reconstruction? How does the international community's coordination influence the architecture of post-conflict state reconstruction in Africa? How do actors, leadership, and power within a coordination network structure affect post-conflict reconstruction?

This research seeks to answer these questions by arguing that a more effective coordination among international and local actors is needed to build or rebuild post-conflict states. Reconstruction of post-conflict states has become a key priority of the international community, especially in Africa where a large number of civil wars have occurred since the 1960s. If a civil war refers to an internal conflict between two political organizations with at least 1,000 deaths (Small and Singer 1982; Levy and Thompson 2010), then Africa has experienced 74 out of 167 civil wars or 44% of the total world's civil wars in 1960-2006 period with most of them occurring in the post- Cold War period (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000; Hoeffler 2006).

Given this high number of societies emerging from civil wars within the past two decades, international post-conflict reconstruction efforts have significantly increased. For example, since the end of the Cold War, the international community has exercised major reconstruction roles in post-conflict societies in a number of countries including Cambodia, Guatemala, Sri Lanka, Namibia, Angola, Liberia, Sudan, Somalia, Kenya,

Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Afghanistan (Doyle and Sambanis 2006). The costs of failing to build peace and reconstruct the state are grave. Collier (2009) and Stedman, Rothchild and Cousens (2002) have shown that a significant number of post-conflict societies relapse into war a few years after concluding a peace agreement. Moreover, many new wars re-occur in countries that have failed to facilitate post-conflict reconstruction.

Countries emerging from civil war attract the attention of the international community because post-conflict societies inherit very poor or no political, economic and social-cultural structures and institutions, which were destroyed during the war. In helping reconstruct post-conflict societies the members of the international community simultaneously work with domestic actors to (re)construct the institutional and human capacity of the state apparatus. International attempts to construct well functioning states and democratic political systems as well as laying the foundations for peace in post-conflict countries has become one of the most important agenda of the United Nations (UN) and other international and regional organizations since the end of the Cold War. In fact, the UN has expanded its international security agenda from the traditional peacekeeping to a broader mandate like national and state building, peacebuilding, and democratization of post-conflict societies. The fundamental goal of post-conflict reconstruction is to build a politically, economically, and social-culturally stable and peaceful society.

A successful post-conflict reconstruction requires effective coordination, however. Lipson (2005) views coordination as the degree to which organizations endeavor to ensure that their actions take into account those of other organizations in

terms of the following elements: central coordination, agreement of responsibilities, compatible or shared communication, and regular and frequent contact. Provan and Milward (1995) view coordination as a process by which a system supposedly minimizes duplication of activities and services by multiple providers and agencies while at the same time raising the prospect that all critical services are provided.

In this dissertation the term *coordination* is used broadly to include information sharing, collaborative analysis and strategizing, resource sharing, formal partnerships, and other means of synchronizing and/or integrating activities among international actors like the United Nations (UN), regional and sub-regional inter-governmental organizations, and great powers in post-conflict reconstruction (Nan 2003; Nan and Strimling 2006).

A considerable debate exists on the actual meaning of the concept *post-conflict*. However, this research adopts Nkurunziza's (2008) definition. He distinguishes two vital events that potentially mark the beginning of a post-conflict period. The first is the immediate period following a clear victory by either of the warring parties. The second is the date of signature of a comprehensive agreement between the warring parties to determine the official end of a war. Considerable scholarly debate also surrounds the actual meaning of the concept of *post-conflict reconstruction* ever since the term was introduced to public usage by then the UN Secretary-General Boutros Ghali (1992). Herrhausen (2007) argues that practitioners and scholars often use the term post-conflict reconstruction while referring to a confusing and overlapping mix of goals, activities, timelines, and contexts. She adds that operational struggles within the UN system and in governments have further fueled terminological inflation and operational confusion.

Boutros-Ghali (1992, 1995) initially defined *post-conflict reconstruction* as peacebuilding in relation to a conflict continuum from pre-conflict prevention to peacemaking and peacekeeping. He views peacebuilding as involving actions to identify and support structures that would strengthen and solidify peace to avoid a relapse into conflict. Moreover, Call and Cousens (2008) view peacebuilding as actions undertaken by international or national actors to institutionalize not only peace but also a modicum of participatory politics that can be sustained in the absence of an international peace operation.

This narrow conceptualizing of post-conflict reconstruction may be limiting in terms of explaining post-conflict reconstruction success or failure. Griffin and Jones (2000) argue that the challenge lies in how to account for successful post-conflict reconstruction and that the most ambitious measures are those that expect to redress the root causes of conflict. The UN Security Council views successful post-conflict reconstruction as requiring short and long-term actions tailored to address the particular needs of societies sliding into conflict or emerging from it. These actions should focus on fostering sustainable development, the eradication of poverty and inequalities, transparent and accountable governance, the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law, and the promotion of a culture of peace and nonviolence (UN Security Council 2001). Paris (2004) adopts a similar standard and declares that only two of the major UN peacebuilding operations from 1989 to 2002 have been a success, Namibia and Croatia.

Kanbur (2007) asserts that three fundamental problems exist with any ambitious standard of defining and measuring post-conflict success or failure. First, the focus on

removing the root causes tends to reinforce simplistic understandings of why specific conflicts occur. Second, while these underlying factors almost certainly increase a society's vulnerability to armed conflict, they are less remediable by the actions of international third parties, especially over relatively short time frames. Third, such standards also fail to differentiate among very different types and degrees of failure or to acknowledge the value of more modest goals, let alone capture a sense of meaningful difference among specific contexts.

There is also a minimalist standard that emphasizes no renewed violent conflict. This standard represents the most readily visible indicator of success for efforts to consolidate peace and security. Significant evidence shows that peace operations work to keep the peace in the short term, whereas the record is more mixed in the medium and long term (Call and Cousens 2008). Moreover, war recurrence also accounts for a good portion of the world's new wars. For example, seven of the nine armed conflicts that broke out in 2005 represented renewed fighting between previous foes (Call and Cousens 2008). This record suggests that peace operations have yet to succeed in establishing the conditions necessary for the prevention of war recurrence in the medium term (Chesterman 2004).

Lederach (1995) provides another definition he calls the moderate standard. This standard measures post-conflict reconstruction as no renewed warfare plus decent governance. Post-conflict reconstruction's success is thus defined by looking at both war recurrence and the quality of post-war governance, which also shows a mixed record of outcomes.

Doyle and Sambanis (2006), on the other hand, view post-conflict reconstruction as activities undertaken in post war societies that are geared toward economic and social cooperation with an aim of building confidence, developing the social, political, and economic infrastructure to prevent future violence, and laying the foundation for a durable peace (see also Marten 2004).

In this study, the term post-conflict reconstruction refers to post-conflict state building. *State building* means the (re)establishment of a state's full monopoly over the means of violence and the building of institutional capacities that penetrates society while simultaneously remaining autonomous from societal actors (Bennett 1992; Kisangani and Pickering 2010), as well as the exercise of domestic authority through effective governance, and the provision of the rule of law (Woodward 2005; Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2010). In this sense state-building is likely to forge a sense of common nationhood, often in an effort to overcome ethnic, sectarian, or communal differences and to counter alternate sources of identity and loyalty in multi-ethnic African societies.

1.2 Significance and Argument

The literature on post-conflict reconstruction is immense. One group of scholars emphasizes the role of the UN mandate, mission, and impact on peace operations, as well as the role of the UN in acting as a transitional authority and international economic support in post-conflict countries (Chesterman 2002, 2004, 2005; Collier 2009; Dobbins et.al 2005; Doyle & Sambanis 2000, 2006; Kisangani 2007; Sambanis 2008; Stedman, Rothchild & Cousens 2002). Other scholars have examined state building and democratization in post-conflict societies (Barnes 2001; Barnett 2006; Paris 2004).

One major issue emerging from this literature is that the lack of coordination among the members of the international system is a critical factor explaining the failure of rebuilding states after civil wars. Scholars and policy makers have noted that international actors have in most cases been working at cross-purposes, duplicating activities, and not knowing what other actors are doing in the field. This has intensified calls for more international coordination in post-conflict reconstruction (Annan 2006; Herrhausen 2009; Jeong 2005; Jones 2002; Lipson 2004; Paris 2006; Zurn & Herrhausen, 2008).

Despite these calls for better coordination, prior research on post-conflict reconstruction has mostly focused on the UN leaving out domestic actors and external players involved in this process. This is a major theoretical omission in extant literature that this dissertation intends to remedy. First, local actors remain key ingredients in post-conflict reconstruction as conflict among warlords and peace spoilers¹ at the local level may derail any effort at the post-conflict state building. Second, characteristics of external actors such as their number, leadership, and power play a major role in coordinating efforts to build post-conflict states.

Another major weakness in extant literature on post-conflict reconstruction is methodological. Research in this area remains largely qualitative. The focus has been on single or a few case studies. Case study approach is a useful data collection technique

¹Spoilers are actors that view post-conflict reconstruction activities as threatening their power and interest and hence may result to use of violence or non-violent tactics in their attempts to undermine successful post conflict reconstruction (For more details on spoilers see Newman and Richmond 2006; Stedman, Rothchild and Cousens 2002).

especially in situations where the area to be researched is unsafe, when recourses are limited, and when detailed information on a particular case is needed (Mahoney & Goertz 2006). While the qualitative approach in post-conflict reconstruction research has provided a lot of information on single case studies, its major weakness is the inability to generalize because it is oriented towards positive cases on the dependent variable and adopts a narrow scope to avoid heterogeneity (King, Keohane and Verba 1994; Mahoney and Goertz 2006). Unlike quantitative research, qualitative research does not allow a thorough multivariate analysis of the independent variables identified in the data.

King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) conceptualize quantitative method as one that uses numbers and statistical method as forms of measurements to test causal hypotheses of specific aspects of phenomena that should be replicable. The method has several strengths that include the ability to generalize from a large number of cases following the “effects-of-cause” explanatory approach. This methodology adopts a broad scope to maximize generalization, and examines correlational causes (Mahoney and Goertz, 2006). The major weakness of the quantitative method is that it does not pay attention to important cases and nonsystematic causal factors are treated as errors. The focus is on the macro-dynamics at the expense of the micro-dynamics of the issue under investigation (King et.al. 1994; Mahoney and Goertz 2006).

To benefit from the strengths of quantitative and qualitative methodologies and, overcome the weakness inherent in the two approaches, this dissertation uses both methodologies to test the hypotheses developed in chapter two. By using both methods this study thus attempts to bridge the gap between the two methods because they complement each other. Quantitative method provides net effect of each individual

variable, especially on the effect of coordination, on the dependent variable, post-conflict reconstruction. Qualitative method provides detailed and rich data on the dependent variable, post-conflict reconstruction.

The dissertation thus develops a coordination theory that shows how actors, leadership, and power impact on coordination network structure to enhance post-conflict reconstruction efforts. This is an academic venture that past studies have neglected. The research also develops theoretical models and policy recommendation on how to achieve effective coordination and collaboration among and between international and local actors involved in post-conflict reconstruction. While international and local coordination has been acknowledged as being key to a successful post-conflict reconstruction, efforts by the international community to achieve effective coordination have not yielded the desired results. International coordination is vital in post-conflict reconstruction because it provides a coherent and consistent strategy and framework for both local and international actors involved in post-conflict reconstruction. It further helps prevent duplication and divergent strategies by different groups that may undermine post-conflict reconstruction. Using both quantitative and qualitative methods this dissertation shows that proper international coordination can enhance the viability and effectiveness of the process of post-conflict reconstruction.

1.3 Overview of the Study

This dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on post-conflict reconstruction and develops a “hybridized” theory of coordination network in post-conflict situations. It also argues that past studies on post-conflict reconstruction have failed to identify how international coordination impacts on post-conflict

reconstruction despite the widely held recognition by scholars and policymakers that coordination among key players is critical for a successful post-conflict reconstruction. The proposed “hybridized” theory identifies the role that actors, leadership and power plays in a coordination network. The main argument of this theory is that coordination in post-conflict reconstruction is a political process; hence, it is not immune to power politics at the international and local level.

Chapter 3 investigates empirically conditions under which successful post-conflict reconstruction and coordination are likely to be achieved. Using time series cross sectional data of 26 African countries that have experienced repeated state building after civil war from 1970 to 2009, the chapter statistically analyzes the impact of coordination on post-conflict reconstruction and how actors, leadership and power affects a coordination network.

Chapter 4 describes the qualitative methodology used in this study. It thus develops a structured focused case comparative research design that employs within-case causal narrative to explain the mechanisms at work, while developing case analysis using process tracing. The main purpose of this paired comparison is to demonstrate how a few numbers of actors, legitimate leadership under “friends group” coupled by full support of a powerful actor, the United States in this case, enhances coordination among international and local actors and subsequently contributing to successful post-conflict reconstruction.

Chapters 5, 6, and 7 discuss the positive cases that include post-conflict reconstruction in Kenya, Sudan, and Namibia. Chapter 8 examines post-conflict

reconstruction in Rwanda, as a negative case, using a structured focused comparative analysis and process tracing.

Chapter 9 concludes the study by highlighting the main findings as well as drawing policy implications for an effective post-conflict reconstruction. The chapter also suggests areas for further research.

Chapter 2 - A Theory of Post-Conflict Reconstruction

The contemporary international system has witnessed a high number of societies emerging from intra-state or civil wars since the end of the Cold War. One of the main ways the international community has responded to these conflicts is to rebuild these societies. The African Continent is but one example of an area that has had its political landscape shaken by recurrent civil wars, with human toll amounting to millions of people killed and/or forced to leave their countries, or becoming internally displaced (Englebert and Tull 2008). Furthermore, from a structural perspective, wars destroy both public and private institutions as well as infrastructure. Civil wars can also spread across borders with international security repercussions. Thus, the reconstruction of post-conflict societies has become a key priority of the international community (Herrhausen 2009). Countries emerging from civil war often inherit very poor or no political, economic and socio-cultural structures and institutions, hence the need for external support to help rebuild them.

This chapter includes two sections. The first provides a literature review on post-conflict reconstruction. The second develops a new theoretical argument and derives a set of hypotheses.

2.1 Literature Review

Post-conflict reconstruction refers to state-building. State-building is the ability of state managers to penetrate society and to extract resources while simultaneously retaining their autonomy from societal interests (Kisangani and Pickering 2010). The predominant approach to state-building uses theory gleaned from European state-building process in the sixteenth Century. The most prominent theory is Tilly's (1985, 1992) four-part predatory state building framework. The first component of Tilly's theory is war making, which eliminates external rivals who claim territory the predatory ruler intends to control. Second is state making. This is the process by which rulers eliminate or control internal rivals. Third, predatory rulers must provide for and protect the domestic players that support their rule and are crucial to their political survival. The final component is resource extraction that helps the leader achieve the first three goals (Kisangani and Pickering 2010).

There exists a debate as to whether Tilly's thesis "war made the state and the state made war" can be applied to explain contemporary state-building in Africa. The focus of many scholars examining state-building in Third World has been on post-colonial state building (Thies 2004, 2005, 2007; Taylor and Botea 2008, Kisangani and Pickering 2010). Some scholars argue that state-building in post-colonial countries takes a similar path as that of Europe in the 16th Century. The assumption here is that just like early European countries, African countries face interstate threat and hence they have to extract more resources from their citizens to keep off external threats (Thies 2007). This extraction of resources is seen to promote state-building in order to deter external aggressors.

Extant literature on post-colonial state-building fails to recognize that the contemporary threats to the state are from domestic actors as they compete with the state for power or resources given the sanctity of colonial borders enshrined by the UN Charter (Taylor and Botea 2008, Kisangani and Pickering 2010). Most of the current post-conflict reconstruction taking place in Africa is a result of civil wars that have been fought between governments and domestic non-state actors. Failure to factor domestic actors and other non-state actors makes current post-colonial state building literature inadequate to explain post-conflict reconstruction in Africa. Furthermore, most post-conflict states in Africa today depend on external support from the international community to rebuild their state, a situation not envisioned by post-colonial state-building theorists.

In theorizing on post-conflict reconstruction, some scholars focus on the UN's mandates and missions in post-conflict nations. Peacekeeping has become one of the UN's most distinctive undertakings since the end of the Cold War. The broad and growing mandate of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations covers a large range of activities including ceasefire monitoring, humanitarian assistance, military demobilization, power-sharing arrangements, and support for elections, transitional administration, and operations to strengthen the rule of law and promote economic and social development (Doyle & Sambanis 2006). Former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1995) lays out the UN's ambitious and growing role in peace and security. He foresees the UN carrying out a number of activities rapidly in an evolving international system (Boutros-Ghali 1995). He argues that the UN has an obligation to provide technical assistance for the transformation of deficient national structures and capabilities and for the strengthening of new democratic institutions. He describes the

essential goal of peacebuilding as the creation of structures for the institutionalization of peace. In short, peacebuilding, which he equates with post-conflict reconstruction, aims at nothing less than expanding the capacities of the state and transforming the institutional arena in which a government interacts with its citizens and with other political groups (Boutros-Ghali 1992, 1995).

Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens (2002) examine peace agreement implementation within the UN mandate and contend that the presence of spoilers and neighboring states opposing the peace agreement can derail post-conflict reconstruction efforts. However, they restrict their analysis to short-term outcome indicators like ending violence and terminating self-rekindling conflict. Doyle and Sambanis (2006) also assess how the UN can assist with post-conflict peacebuilding that results in sustainable and participatory peace. They articulate the logic of a “*peacebuilding triangle*” as follows: the deeper the level of hostility between domestic factions and the lower the level of local capacities for reconstruction, the higher the level and degree of international assistance is needed to succeed in establishing a sustainable peace. They conclude from their combination of statistical analysis and case studies that short-term measures of peacebuilding success depend on the level of the international community’s assistance to the reconstruction of post civil war societies. Collier et al. (2008) find that expenditures on peacekeeping significantly and substantially reduce the risk of conflict recurring from 40% to 31%. They argue that post-conflict peace process is typically fragile as nearly half of all civil wars are the result of post-conflict relapses.

However, Doyle and Sambanis (2006) show that two years after war termination, civil wars with any form of UN operation were nearly twice as likely to be successful in

the form of “participatory peacebuilding” as conflicts without the UN presence (13 out of 27, or 48%, compared to 24 out of 94, or 26% of conflicts). They find that UN missions, especially those with multidimensional peacekeeping mandates, significantly reduce the chances of large-scale violence and enhance chances for minimal political democratization. Moreover, Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2005) find that the presence of the UN significantly increases the prospects for successful peacebuilding, in contrast to a more lackluster performance of non-UN operations. The UN has been found to be more effective when compared to United States’ efforts in post-conflict nation-building (Dobbins 2005 et al.; Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 2005). One major issue with peacebuilding is the fact that it tends to minimize state-building efforts.

On the security front, a sustained international military presence that may be deemed essential to peacebuilding can lessen the urgency of building national capacity to control or counter violence (Dobbins et al. 2005). Alternatively, efforts to establish national coercive capacity whether in the form of armies, police, or other forces can empower some segments of the population at the expense of others in a way that militates against political moderation and reconciliation. Conversely, international support for armed parties believed useful for other policy goals can undermine state building, especially when such groups have an interest in resisting state authority politically, economically, or even militarily (Dobbins et al. 2005).

Other scholars have examined democratization and the process of transitional governance as important phases in post-conflict reconstruction. They discuss the international community’s focus on reconstructing the institutional infrastructure of rationalized bureaucracy and electoral democracy as a peacebuilding strategy (Barnett

2006; Caplan 2004; Chesterman 2004; Colin & Roelfsema 2008; Hartzell & Hoddie 2003; Paris 2004). For example, Paris (2004) argues that peacebuilding operations of the past two decades have functioned on the implicit “Wilsonian” notion of promoting political and economic liberalization. Thus, democratization and marketization are seen as the surest path to create the conditions for sustainable peace. Paris examines the fourteen major UN peacebuilding operations launched between 1989 and 1998 in regard to whether the strategy of peacebuilding through liberalization improved the prospects for sustainable peace. He concludes that the Wilsonian formula has been based on overly optimistic assumptions about the effects of political and economic liberalization on the consolidation of post-conflict peace. Paris found that in most cases, the processes of political and economic liberalization actually produced destabilizing side effects that worked against peacebuilding.

Similarly, Colin and Roelfsema (2008) find that democratization and post-conflict elections are associated with higher, not lower, risks while higher post-conflict income and faster growth significantly reduce the risk of civil war relapse, Flores and Nooruddin (2009) and Walter (1999) also note that post-conflict democratization retards recovery and that post-conflict environments resulting from outright military victory by either side is likely to endure peace compared to that resulting from negotiated settlement. Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) test this proposition by examining 38 civil wars resolved through negotiation mechanisms between 1945 and 1998. They conclude that the durability of peace is related to specifications of power sharing among the rival groups in the peace agreement. Walter (1999) and Fortna (2003) assert that effectiveness and durability of post-conflict peace is to be found within mechanisms and content of the agreements.

Fortna argues that mechanisms should be able to help change incentives, reduce uncertainty, and prevent accidental violations by concerned parties.

Another line of analytical inquiry focuses on the machinery and processes of transitional governance in post-conflict societies. This work elaborates and compares the various mechanisms through which the international community has attempted to aid weak, failed, and post-conflict states. Chesterman (2004) details the history of UN transitional administrations and compares their mandates and implementation along various dimensions, including state and democracy building. He also grapples with what he sees as a fundamental paradox of the UN post-conflict transitional governance and wonders how one does help a population prepare for democratic government and the rule of law by imposing a form of benevolent autocracy (see also Chopra 2002).

In undertaking peacebuilding through transitional governance in post-conflict contexts, the UN has adopted an implicit theory of conflict prevention that is predicated on transforming the socio-political roots of conflict. The transitional governance strategy aims to forge sustainable peace by assuming that the international community can help to build the institutional and behavioral foundations for stable, effective, and legitimate government (Boutros-Ghali 1992; Dobbins et al. 2005). Dobbins et al. (2005) observes that peace-making and peace-keeping operations, to be truly successful, must include comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures that will tend to consolidate peace. These may include disarming the previously warring parties and restoring order, destroying weapons, repatriating refugees, providing advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights,

reforming and/or strengthening governmental institutions, and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation (Boutros-Ghali 1992; Dobbins et al. 2005).

As this literature shows, international post-conflict reconstruction efforts have historically tended to neglect state building. However, recent international involvements have increasingly shown that rebuilding or establishing at least a minimally functioning state is essential to post-conflict reconstruction (Paris, 2004). The central argument is that a minimal threshold of nationally recognized, sufficiently effective, and broadly legitimate institutions needs to be in place for peace to endure once foreign troops are withdrawn (Krasner, 2004; Marten 2004; Paris 2004, 2006, 2009; Stedman et al. 2002; Woodward 2005). In other words, any successful efforts to peaceful coexistence after a civil war requires institutions to ensure law, order, and the repression of resurgent violence as well as the establishment of legitimate institutions of decision-making and the foundations for economic recovery in the form of revenue generation, the creation of stable environments for investment, or the capacity to deliver core services to a vulnerable population (Collier 2008).

Focusing more on the multiple dimensions of state capacity, Fukuyama (2004) and Chesterman, Ignatieff, and Thakur (2005) note the problems associated with institution-building in weak states. They discuss the delicate balance that must be struck between local, regional, and international actors in state-building processes. They argue that state capacity is assumed as a given and is not problematized and theorizing in terms of state design, form, or function. However, more recent scholarship criticized this omission, calling for more attention to post-conflict reconstruction (Call 2002; Paris 2004). Several factors have driven this new attention to the state, including learning from

particular cases where state capacity, or its absence, was a particular determinant of post-conflict reconstruction outcomes.

De Soto and Del Castillo (1994) observe that successful state building supports the consolidation of peace in a number of ways. First, it enhances mechanisms for security and conflict resolution at the national level that should carry legitimacy in the eyes of the populace and the outside world. Such mechanisms as justice systems, policing systems, or service delivery agencies provide a credible arena and framework for social groups to express preferences and resolve conflicts nonviolently. If states work mainly to provide public goods rather than engage in corrupt activities, they reduce the incentives for populations and political elites to elicit violence. Second, in post-war societies with an international presence, state building should also accelerate the orderly withdrawal of international troops and civilians, ensuring stability and popular support for an emergent regime (Paris 2004). From the perspective of sustainable economies, functioning and legitimate states also provide the infrastructure for sustainable development with a diminishing role for external actors. All of these factors point to a complementary relationship between peacebuilding and state building, one which exists in many circumstances and should be nourished.

Englebert and Tull (2008) suggest that state building processes can, however, undermine peace. Enhancing the power and institutional reach of the national state may create the perception of insecurity or exclusion among alienated groups. Whereas some external actors channel resources to corrupt and/or predatory central governments in the name of strengthening state institutions, such state-strengthening only advances abusive of authority and fuels resentment and armed resistance. Englebert and Tull add further

that peace-making efforts can undermine the emergence of a responsive and representative state. Aside from measurement problems generated by unclear overarching aims, international actors confront specific problems in measuring progress in building state capacity and, especially, state legitimacy. Given the conceptual abstraction of even the term “*state*,” measuring progress in state building is challenging (Englebert & Tull 2008).

Despite growing international interest in facilitating state building and democratic development in post-conflict countries, the dynamics of international influence are fairly underdeveloped and undertheorized. Dobbins et.al. (2003, 2005) provide two alternatives for post-conflict state building and democratization. The first is co-option, under which the intervening authorities try to work within existing institutions and to deal, more or less impartially, with all social forces and power centers, to redirect their ongoing competition for power and wealth from violent to peaceful channels. The second alternative approach is deconstruction, under which the intervening authorities first dismantle an existing state apparatus and then build a new one, in the process consciously disempowering some elements of society and empowering others.

Dobbins et. al. (2003) explore US-led state building after World War II in Europe and Asia to illustrate their framework. They single out the occupation of German and Japanese as particularly successful cases of state building that set standards for post-conflict transformation that have not since been equaled. They attribute this success to the fact that both Germany and Japan were, even at the end of the war, highly developed states with highly capable state apparatuses. More specifically, Germany and Japan were able to rebuild their politics because they received substantial high level of economic

assistance, and high numbers of troops were deployed for a long period of time. Thus, Dobbins and associates argue that “more” state-building is “better” state-building. They then compare eight US-led missions (Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq) and eight UN-led mission (Congo, Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, Eastern Slavonia, Sierra Leone, and East Timor). They observe that UN-led missions seem to be more successful in providing sustained peace than US-led mission. They find that of the eight UN-led cases, seven are peaceful today, whereas of the eight U.S.-led cases, four are not. Hence, they conclude that “more” state-building is not always “better” state-building.

Paris (2004) examines the outcomes of UN-missions and how war-torn countries that have hosted UN peace operations in the 1990s have fared. Paris finds that few are fully democratic and prosperous. He shows that holding elections prematurely can do more harm than good in the ongoing reconstruction of statehood. Early elections run the risk of being perceived by the parties to the conflict as a “winner-take-all-game”, which increases the risk that the losing party defects from the peace process. He furthermore argues that early liberalization can lead to increased societal stress by deepening economic inequalities (as in Guatemala) or ethnic divisions (as in post-Dayton Bosnia). Paris finds that more intrusive UN operations, including those that temporarily take over a state's administration, have fared better than less intrusive operations, to ensure that liberal democracies can emerge. Paris thus argues in favor of a “institutions first-approach” to post-conflict state building, and against a Wilsonian approach that emphasizes the benefits of less intrusive strategies, early elections, and early exit. Doyle and Sambanis (2000, 2006) test for the effect of UN peace operations. They find that,

while traditional peacekeeping is not significant in enhancing the prospect for a peace-building success, multidimensional peace-keeping operations (missions with extensive civilian functions, economic reconstruction, institutional reforms and election oversight) were extremely significant and positively associated with peace-building success. The mixed results by these scholars call for a further examination of the international influence in post-conflict state building and democratization.

Analysts have also examined several aspects concerning the economic phase of post-conflict reconstruction. Some analysts have criticized neoliberal structural adjustment programs of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank for diminishing state resources precisely when post-conflict societies need to boost depleted state capacity (de Soto & del Castillo 1994; Kisangani 2006). Others call attention to the manner in which aid agencies tend to bypass a state structure, hence, failing to strengthen state capacity and even directly undermine it (Collier et al. 2003). Sometimes, this is driven by legitimate concern about corruption and by donors' requirements to use their own-national contractors or more predictable bureaucratic imperatives toward competition (Collier et al. 2003). In sum, international substitution for a state's service delivery capacity will likely exert a dampening effect on the development of sustainable national capacities. In addition, international organizations offer salaries and status to national employees with which post-conflict states cannot compete. Consequently, the most competent and best-trained personnel are often drawn from the state, weakening already fragile public institutions and agencies (Collier et al. 2003). Collier (2009) calls for distinctive political and economic policies for post-conflict countries. He argues that

appropriate responses in post-conflict societies need to focus on job creation for young people and deep cuts in military spending.

Sambanis (2008) observe that for peace to be self-sustaining, countries must develop institutions and policies that generate economic growth. He asserts that UN peace-building lacks a strategy for fostering self-sustaining economic growth that could connect increased participation with sustainable peace. Elbadawi et al. (2008) support this observation and argue that the international community would benefit from an evolution that uses economic reforms to plug the gap between peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance, on the one hand, and development, on the other.

Davies (2008) examines the relationship between inflation and capital flight in a post-conflict environment arguing that the effect of inflation on capital flight should be particularly strong in post-conflict economies. He goes on to add that after the termination of wars, the public may use the rate of inflation to gauge the political risks of the postwar environment and the likelihood of conflict relapse. Collier et al. (2008) reiterate the same conclusion, arguing that the key implication is that low inflation helps to stem and reverse capital flight flows in post-conflict countries.

Kisangani (2007) investigates the impact of foreign direct investments (FDIs) on the infrastructures of post-conflict reconstruction in Africa's countries emerging from civil wars. He calls for a paradigm shift in the reconstruction of post-conflict societies, where the private sector should play a major role in infrastructure reconstruction. He argues that despite the massive foreign aid channeled to post-conflict African countries, it has not helped in creating viable institutions, but rather has undermined the basic principle of state building. He advocates for private sector driven FDIs in financing and

managing of infrastructure in post-conflict reconstruction, as it has no domestic ethnic or government face and has aspects of sustainability.

Extant research on the role of international actors in post-conflict reconstruction process seems to have solely focused on the activities of the United Nations (UN) without notable attention to other players involved in the process. Beside the UN, other international actors have been active in post-conflict reconstructions, especially in Africa. These include the “Friends Group” of the country emerging from civil war, foreign NGOs, regional organizations like African Union (AU), sub-regional organizations like the Economic Commission of West African States (ECOWAS) and the neighboring countries as well as local actors. Despite the acknowledgement that these actors play a vital role in the success or failure of post-conflict reconstruction, their actual contribution remains under-theorized.

UN Secretary General Kofi Annan (2006) has outlined three challenges the international community needs to confront when responding to post-conflict situations. These include the shortage of funds, a lack of international coordination, and the tendency for international actors to leave the situation too early. Coordination and collaboration between or among international and local actors involved in post-conflict reconstruction is crucial for state building after civil wars (Jones 2001, 2002, Nan and Strimling 2006). There is an increasing recognition of the importance of coordination among and between international and local actors. One example of this international coordination framework is the 2006 formation of the UN PeaceBuilding Commission (PBC) and its related mechanisms, the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and the

PeaceBuilding Fund. The next sub-section briefly discusses the issue of coordination effort in post-conflict reconstruction.

2.1.1 Coordination in Post-Conflict Reconstruction

The UN system has become at least since the Brahimi Report (UN 2000) aware of the coordination question, and it acknowledges that lack of coordination is a key obstacle for the success of peace operations. Coordination problems as such are, however, not entirely new. Herrhausen (2007) observes that the UN system can be described as an organizational expression of a massive coordination problem. However, the multiplicity of actors involved in post-conflict reconstruction processes has increased, and uncertainty about how successful reconstruction can be realized seems rather growing. While coordination has been identified as a significant issue within domestic actors, the different problems of international coordination in post-conflict reconstruction remain rather under theorized.

In response to a growing recognition that international peacebuilding efforts have lacked overall strategic approach and coherence, world leaders at the 2005 World Summit agreed to establish the UN Peacebuilding Commission. The main challenge now facing the Commission is to maximize its impact on the ground to make the UN peacebuilding architecture an effective instrument of international collaboration in support of countries emerging from conflict. The Commission's future work will need to focus on ensuring that peacebuilding processes remain on track and that challenges and gaps are addressed in a timely and coherent manner by all relevant actors. A number of challenges and outstanding issues need to be addressed in the coming year, including further development of the Commission's working methods and monitoring mechanisms

for the post-conflict reconstruction, enhancing operational relationships with other intergovernmental bodies and regional and sub-regional organizations; and improving interaction with non-state actors involved in post-conflict reconstruction. The commission faces a major challenge of bringing more coherence and impact to the international community's coordination approaches to post-conflict reconstruction.

Jones (2002) notes that recent United Nations (UN) peace missions indicate that strategic coordination is a growing policy challenge for peace implementation. This is due to institutional proliferation at both official and unofficial levels that is also complicated by multiplicity of actors with overlapping mandates, competitive relations and minimum accountability for performance. He further observes that UN lacks a coordination policy structure. In other words, UN's efforts to build post-conflict states are unlikely to succeed unless there is coordination among players involved in the process.

As Jones (2001) indicates that coordination is critical since it can help prevent duplication or significant overlap of peace initiatives and allow participants to develop more informed analyses of the conflict as it changes over time. Coordination also shapes participants specialties through consultations with each other. It also helps participants to behave as gatekeepers by giving advice to other organizations, local and international, which may be exploring the possibilities of starting new projects in the region. Finally, coordination brings participants together by combining their financial, intellectual, and personnel resources to organize events jointly.

Much of theorizing on coordination has focused on conflict resolution and settlement. For example, Lederach (1995) calls for the importance of coordination in conflict resolution to build an overall strategy for conflict transformation. Kriesberg

(1996) further reinforces the need for coordination in conflict resolution, noting both areas of potential complementarity and also areas of potentially contradictory interactive effects. According to Pouligny (2000), the growing attention on coordination in post-conflict reconstruction reflects recognition that the complexity of intrastate conflicts in the post-Cold War period requires new and much more integrated approaches to political and social change because coordination has proved to be difficult to achieve.

A main challenge lies in how to coordinate the myriad of agencies to avoid duplication and contradicting practice, to improve the communication between involved agencies, and to work more efficiently within limited and scarce resources. Pouligny (2003) advances that coordination concerns classical questions of how to organize concerted action under conditions of divergent state interests, but also how to coordinate new actors that in the previous functional differentiation have not been considered as immediately relevant for post-conflict reconstruction processes. This includes actors that have strengthened their role in recent years, such as NGOs, civil society, and activist groups. Chopra and Hohe (2004) assert that while there are significant potential benefits associated with coordination, there are also costs and risks. Moreover, in some situations active coordination is neither feasible nor desirable, especially when effectiveness, credibility and security depend on clearly independent relationships.

Coordination has thus gained recognition as an important factor for a successful post-conflict reconstruction. The assumption is that better coordination increases the probability of success in post-conflict reconstruction (Herrhausen, 2009). Better coordination should improve effectiveness by limiting the opportunities for peace spoilers of the post-conflict reconstruction to exploit weaknesses in reconstruction strategy and

should help ensure that resources are used efficiently (Herrhausen 2009; Paris 2009; Paris and Sisk 2009). Better coordination is also desirable in the context of prudent use of resources and generating local ownership, and can be influenced by international institutional design (Rittberger & Fischer 2008).

In sum, a widely held view among post-conflict scholars, analysts, and practitioners is that the lack of meaningful coordination among international and local post-conflict reconstruction actors is a major cause of unsatisfactory performance (De Coning, 2004). Annan (2006) identified lack of coordination as one of the challenges the international community needs to confront when responding to post-conflict situations. More specifically, coordination and collaboration between international actors like the UN, regional organizations, and non-state actors, is crucial for the success of post-conflict reconstruction (Jones 2001, 2002; Nan & Strimling 2006).

The lack of coordination in previous post-conflict reconstruction has resulted not only from the multitude of actors with overlapping or duplicative mandates but also competition for influence and visibility among some international actors and their general unwillingness to sacrifice autonomy and independence (Cousens 2002; Herrhausen 2009; Paris 2009; Paris & Sisk 2009; Herrhausen, 2009; Woodward, 2005). Paris (2009) and Paris and Sisk (2009) identify four areas related to problems of coordination. The first is within the field between the various local and international actors; that is, between the intervening actors and beneficiaries. Second is an issue within the bureaucracies of major donor governments, where different government departments are pursuing different goals. The third problem is within the UN system especially among its different agencies.

The final issue is within the headquarters-level or coordination problems between all the major international post-conflict actors.

Coordination dilemma and activities of actors can be scrutinized in the light of the actors' strategic or operational dimensions and/or vertical and horizontal links to the overall organizational networks and infrastructures that facilitate coordination (Herrhausen 2009; Jeong 2005; Rittberger & Fischer 2008). While appreciating the importance of coordination, Paris (2009) also warns of the potential dilemmas of too much, too little, or the wrong type of coordination that could do more harm than good as it could compromise a number of issues like flexibility, experimentation, customization, and accountability that are essential for a better coordination.

Many scholars refer to Powell's (1990) early paper to theorize about the best model to explain coordination in post-conflict reconstruction. He draws on organizational theory to analyze the market, hierarchical, and network models in economics. The market model is driven by the principles of supply and demand, prices of commodities, competition, and specialization. It is also open to all new and old actors (Herrhausen 2009; Paris 2009; Powell 1990). Moreover, markets are flexible and offer a variety of choices; information flows easily and is unhindered, and markets offer opportunity to all because price remains the key determinant of exchange (Herrhausen 2009; Paris 2009; Powell 1990). However, the market model has a number of weaknesses that make it unsuitable for post-conflict reconstruction. First, it is too decentralized since actors pursue their individual goals with very little shared common objectives (Powell 1990). Second, bonds are rarely formed in the market since each actor tries to fulfill needs and

goals that have been individually defined. Third, no systems for control and governance exist in a market model (Paris 2009; Powell 1990).

The hierarchy model is characterized by functional centralization with a system of top-down or command and control management (Herrhausen 2009; Paris 2009; Powell 1990). Operations are under standard procedures and the roles are clearly defined with high levels of administration and supervision. There is interdependence among various departments performing various specialized tasks and a clearly outlined reporting mechanism and decision-making framework exists for all (Powell 1990). The accountability of operations, roles, and outcomes exist, and documentation of all activities is high. Paris (2009) argues that creating a hierarchical coordinating organization structure for peacebuilding would not be the desirable solution because it is a top-down framework.

The market and hierarchical models are seen not to be ideal types for the coordination of international actors efforts involved in post-conflict state building (Herrhausen 2009; Paris 2009). Thus, a third coordination variant is the network structure. Network is members driven, in the sense that it thrives on the basis that members share common principles, beliefs, goals and objectives. Relationships among members are highly valued and mutual respect as well as support are key pillars. Members interact freely and decisions are reached through consensus. All members are deemed as equals and partners.

A network structure is seen to facilitate better communication and enhance information sharing among actors (Herrhausen 2009; Paris 2009). The view is that repeated interactions of voluntary self-organizing bring together actors sharing common

goals. The principles of reciprocity, preferences, collectivity, flexibility, and mutually supportive actions characterize transactions and engagements between and among networked actors (Herrhausen 2009; Paris 2009). Exploring the applicability of network theory in the UN's coordination efforts at peacebuilding, Herrhausen (2009) and Lipson (2005) conclude that in respect to network structure, there is significant evidence in the record of inter-organization coordination. What has been achieved was developed through network and informal arrangements developed on an ad hoc basis, some of which were then institutionalized.

Although network model is better than the market and hierarchical models, it largely ignores the role of actors, leadership, and power in network structures of coordination in post-conflict state building. Furthermore, most studies on networks focus on coordination in the UN and overlook other international organizations, regional and sub-regional organizations, "friends or contact groups," and powerful countries like United States, China, France, and the United Kingdom among others. Therefore, this study develops a hybridized coordination network theory. The theory includes all the critical actors and analyzes the role of actors, leadership, and power in coordination network to explain post-conflict reconstruction.

2.2 Theoretical Development: The "Hybridized" Coordination Network Theory

Building on the network theory, this research develops a hybridized network coordination theory. It argues that the integration of network theory into post-conflict reconstruction research is still at a very early stage of development. Some assumptions have been made in developing this theoretical framework. First, international support in

post-conflict state building is given to states that have weak state capacity, hence a top-down focus on the international and local actors' relationship. Second, a hybridized network coordination theory considers the role that actors, leadership, and power play within network structure. Third, it includes key international and local players in designing and implementing goals, objectives, programs, and activities. It also involves local actors for greater ownership and accountability.

The theory conceptualizes actors as international and local entities that are independent, but engage on voluntary patterns of interactions with an aim of building a stable state after a civil war (Kahler 2009; Westerwinter, 2010). Leadership refers to the ability of an actor or actors to influence actions of other actors to voluntarily work towards achieving set goals (Underdal 1994). Power is the capability of an actor or actors to control, either through persuasion or coercion, the actions of other actors with or without resistance (Kahler 2009).


Looking at these three factors within a network structure facilitates the development of a comprehensive understanding of coordination in post-conflict state building. Thus, coordination among and between international and local actors in post-conflict state building is a political process. Hence, the role of leadership and power cannot be ignored as has been the case in the network coordination theory that has focused only on actors.

The hybridized network theory argues that such coordination network needs to have best practices of the market and hierarchy models. This hybridized model includes some elements of the market model like decentralization, specialization, flexibility, and participation of all actors and adds value to the network analysis. For a functioning of an

effective and efficient network, this proposal also borrows elements of the hierarchical model like top-down direction to design strategic thinking and help monitor the performance of the network. This hybrid network structure offers a more balanced and comprehensive coordination framework that facilitates an effective and efficient coordination among international and local actors in post-conflict reconstruction. Thus, the inclusion of elements of market and hierarchy models to network theory brings to focus the role of actors, leadership, and power in a network structure as shown by the hybridized network coordination theory in Figure 2.1. This study identifies actors, leadership, and power as key variables in a network structure that influence coordination in post-conflict reconstruction. In other words, actors, leadership, and power influence a network's agenda setting, strategic thinking, decision-making process, information sharing, goals and objectives.

In their efforts to build a functioning state after war, international and local actors engage in activities that result in relationship and interdependency. This relationship and interdependency lead to the formation of networks through which actors pool their resources and communicate their activities to prevent the recurrence of civil war. This study conceptualizes these networks as groups of interdependent, but operationally autonomous, international and local entities that share the goal of creating a stable and functional state in the aftermath of a civil war. These groups engage in fairly stable voluntary interactions to achieve these objectives and—through constant relational patterns of interactions—form a network structure.

Figure 2.1 Hybridized Coordination Model of Post-Conflict State Building Model



This network structure thus shapes, defines, enables, and constrains how these international and local entities coordinate post-conflict state building (Kahler 2009; Westerwinter 2010). A major criticism of international interventions is their failure to involve local beneficiaries in the planning and implementation of post-conflict state building strategies, activities, and programs. Some international actors assume a “know it all” attitude and seek little or no local involvement. This research argues that coordination between international and local actors may be vital as it seeks and adopts strategies, views, and interests of the targeted and intervening actors promoting local ownership of the post-conflict state building process. International actors involved in post-conflict state building, despite being endowed with financial and expertise resources, find themselves in a new, foreign, and challenging environment in which they do not understand the local dynamics and needs. Local actors lack capacity to build their state

after civil war; however, they are endowed with the understanding of local needs and cultural dynamics and the presence of spoils and other local alliances. What needs to be appreciated is the fact that a collaboration that is characterized by a good integration of international and local actors will enhance coordination.

A coordination network can have several types of actors participating in the activities of the network. These actors can be external, that is, those who come from outside the borders of the state; they can be local, those within the boundary of the state being built. Conversely, actors can be state or non state actors. They can range from complete homogeneous (politically, economically, and socially) to heterogeneous when all actors are different. However, the most critical factor to shape coordination is the number of actors, from one to many. Olson (1966) advances a theory of collective action in which he argues that large groups have problems providing common goods for three reasons. First, each group member has a lower share of the benefits. Second, it is less likely that anybody's benefits of helping to provide the good exceed the costs. Third, organizational costs rise with group size. In contrast to the traditional theory, the group size plays a decisive role in Olson's theory. To him the smaller the group the more able it is to provide optimal public goods. He adds that large groups often fail to provide themselves with a collective good at all. This means that larger groups are less efficient. In large group each individual has an interest in not joining but still receiving the benefits thus becoming a 'free-rider.' (Olson 1966).

A network with few actors is likely to have positive effects on coordination. Here actors may be more cohesive and work more coherently, promoting information flow and expertise among members of the network. It may be easier to arrive at common

coordination strategies, decision making, goals, objectives, and interests. On the other hand, a network that has multiplicity of actors is likely to have a negative effective on coordination, as it may take a long time to agree on strategies and decisions. The first hypothesis is

H1: A network that is characterized by few actors is likely to enhance coordination.

Leadership within a network may influence network interactions and impact. Underdal (1994) sees leadership as an asymmetrical relationship of influence where one or more actors guide and/or direct the actions of others toward achieving certain objectives or goals. However, belligerents and members of a network are more likely to respond positively to a leadership they perceive to be legitimate and neutral. Legitimacy emerges from acceptance of validity of a given leadership as being legitimate through being elected and /or in conformity with agreed rules authorizing a person and/or entity to act as a leader (Underdal 1994). Neutrality emerges when a person or an entity is perceived by others as being impersonal, that is, having no preferences and taking no side with any faction or group in a network (Underdal 1994). Thus, a leadership that is both legitimate and neutral in a network is crucial because it facilitates deliberations on strategies, objectives, goals, and decision making. Leadership also guides and directs members in a network toward coherence, consistence, integration, and togetherness in the coordination of post-conflict reconstruction. A leader in a network offers direction to members in designing mechanisms that can help articulate a common understanding of the post-conflict reconstruction and identify the main challenges, needs, and prioritized activities, programs, and goals. Leadership is thus a key in initiating strategic thinking

and operational steps that help coordinate various activities. At the same time, leadership marshals support and consensus of members to agree on implementation frameworks, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, as well as indicators and benchmarks for measuring success. The second hypothesis is

H2: A leadership that is perceived as legitimate and/or “neutral” is likely to facilitate and enhance coordination among members of a network.

In contrast to extant network analyses of coordination in post-conflict state building, this study recognizes the role that power plays in coordination among various network members. It contends that coordination in post-conflict state building is a political process; hence the aspect of power is crucial in enabling or constraining coordination within any given network in post-conflict state building. A powerful actor in the network can influence events, activities, allocation of resources, strategic thinking, and operational and decision-making processes.

The general assumption in extant network theories is that all members are equal and have horizontal attributes (Herrhausen 2009; Paris 2009). However, the presence in a network that includes a major power, such as the United States, which is the sole hegemonic power in the international system, can change the matrix of power within a coordination network. The United States does not have to be the leader in a network, a group of countries such as the European Union (EU) may play such a role. Kahler (2009) and Hafner-Burton and Montgomery (2009) identify four types of power that the members of post-conflict state building networks may have at their disposal. First is material power such as financial resources. A single network member may control certain resources that are indispensable for achieving the network’s goals. Second is network or

social power, when a player occupies a central or prestigious position within the network. The third, productive power, is power to constitute social subjects and shape the discourses that evolve among network members. Fourth is exit power, when the actor has the power to exit the network, which may lead to network collapse. The study therefore hypothesizes that

H3: The presence of an actor with material power, network/social power, production power, and exit power is likely to enhance the chances of better coordination among network members.

Although the problem of international coordination in post-conflict reconstruction has been widely recognized as well as analyzed to a considerable extent, little progress in ameliorating the problem has been achieved. Better international coordination should result into effective post-conflict reconstruction by limiting the opportunities for spoilers in the post-conflict reconstruction. It should bring more coherence and consistence in post-conflict state reconstruction. Better international coordination is also one in which all international actors (UN, international organizations, regional and sub-regional organizations, neighboring countries, “friends or contact groups,” and powerful countries) involved in post-conflict reconstruction are included in any institutional/mechanism or framework designed for the purpose of coordination. A successful post-conflict state building should be where there is (re)establishment of a state’s full monopoly over the means of violence and building of institutional capacities that penetrate society, exercise domestic authority through effective governance, provide security, and provide the rule of law The study therefore hypothesizes that

H4: *The higher the level of coordination among network actors, the higher the probability for a successful post-conflict reconstruction.*

Chapter 3 - Quantitative Analysis

This chapter uses statistical method to analyze how actors, leadership, and power in coordination network influence post-conflict reconstruction or state-building in Africa. State building is a key phase in post-conflict situation because its successful achievement is essential in guaranteeing peace, stability, and economic growth in a society emerging from civil war. Since extant research on post-conflict reconstruction is largely qualitative, this chapter addresses this methodological gap.

This chapter is organized as follows. The first section gives an overview of the research design and operationalizes variables highlighted in figure 2.1. It also provides a few methodological issues. The second section analyzes the data and discusses the statistical findings. A brief summary follows.

3.1 Research Design and Methods

The study uses time series cross sectional data of 26 African countries that have experienced repeated state building after civil war from 1970 to 2009. The list of countries and data years used in this dissertation is in Appendix A. The time frame is based on data availability on key indicators of state-building such as tax ratio and tax structure. Second, most international efforts in support of Africa's post-conflict state building have taken place during this period. Third, most scholars use three years period to investigate successful post-conflict reconstruction. They justify this period as being the most appropriate in investigating if a post society slides back into conflict or is able to consolidate peace. Their focus is therefore on presence or absence of renewed conflict.

While most scholars like Doyle and Sambanis (2006) have examined post-conflict reconstruction for a period of three years, this research investigates post-conflict reconstruction for a period of six years. The six year period is deemed desirable to facilitate a clear understanding of dynamics at play in a long term period during post-conflict reconstruction. Post-conflict reconstruction is a long-term and complex process. Given that data some key indicators of state-building such as taxes, government effectiveness, and rule of law are limited to 1972 to 2002 or 1996-2009; the study extrapolates the data by using moving average to extend the data to 2003-2009. The same rule applies to operational definition of government effectiveness and rule of law because the data are available from 1996-2009. Estimates were generated on *Stata 11* running on Windows XP.

3.1.1 Operational Definitions of Variables

This dissertation analyzes the impact that actors, leadership, and power have on a coordination network and how coordination influences post-conflict reconstruction. The dependent variable is post-conflict reconstruction and the intervening variable is coordination, while actors, leadership and power are the independent variables.

(a) **Dependent Variable.** The dependent variable is post-conflict reconstruction. The concept post-conflict reconstruction refers to *state-building* in post-conflict situations. As pointed out in the introduction, the term post-conflict reconstruction refers to post-conflict state building. *State building* means the (re)establishment of a state's full monopoly over the means of violence and the building of institutional capacities that penetrates society while simultaneously remaining autonomous from societal actors (Bennett 1992; Kisangani and Pickering 2010), as well as the exercise of domestic

authority through effective governance, and the provision of the rule of law (Woodward 2005; Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2010). A number of indicators operationalize state-building. The first indicator is borrowed from predatory theories of state-building that highlight state's capacity to penetrate society while simultaneously remaining autonomous from state players (Kisangani and Pickering 2010). Following a number of studies on state-building, this study operationalizes state-building by using tax extraction and non-tax revenues (Kisangani and Pickering 2010).

The first measure of tax extraction is the *tax ratio*, which is the sum of all taxes as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). The tax ratio is the standard measure of state-building in the literature on predatory theories of state-building (Levi 1981; Tilly 1985). This research also examines direct and indirect taxes, which represent different forms of revenue generation within a state's overall tax structure. *Direct taxes* consist of income taxes, taxes on wealth and property, and corporate taxes as a percentage of total revenue (Kisangani and Pickering 2010). Direct taxes capture the amount of revenue the government obtains from the most powerful groups in society, such as the owners of labor and capital, as well as ordinary citizens (Kisangani and Pickering 2010). The more direct the tax structure is, the greater the degree of the state penetration (Snider 1988; Kisangani and Pickering 2010). Conversely, if a state relies heavily on *indirect taxes*, it is less able to penetrate society because it is relatively weak vis-à-vis domestic groups (Kisangani and Pickering 2010). Indirect taxes combine duties on goods, services, and international trade. They represent a percentage of total revenue. Although there can be challenges to collecting indirect taxes in the late state-building countries, their

administration typically requires a less elaborate and institutionalized bureaucracy than direct taxes (Kisangani and Pickering 2010).

The other requirement of successful state-building is state autonomy. State leaders gain when they generate revenues from sources other than society. Steady or raising levels of indirect or direct taxes are dependent upon implicit and explicit bargains with societal groups or, in the case of tariffs, external actors (Kisangani and Pickering 2010). They also vary depending upon the health of the national economy. To gain autonomy from external societal and external forces, state managers must develop sources of *non-tax revenue*, which for post-conflict African states typically consists of administrative fees and profits from state-owned enterprise (Kisangani and Pickering 2010). Non-tax revenue as a percentage of total revenue thus operationalize state autonomy. Data on tax ratio and non-tax revenue are from International Monetary Fund (IMF 2006) and Kisangani and Pickering (2010).

The two other indicators of state-building rely on governance. Though there exist no consensus on the actual meaning of this concept, this study adopts a definition given by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010,4) who see governance as “the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes (a) the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; (b) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and (c) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.”

Two indicators operationalize governance. The first is *government effectiveness*. That is the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service, and the degree of its

independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies (Woodward 2005; Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2010). The aggregate government effectiveness indicator is measured in percentile rank terms ranging from 0% (lowest) to 100% (highest) among all countries worldwide. Data are from the World Bank (2010). The second indicator is the *rule of law*. That is the extent to which citizens have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular, the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence (Woodward 2005; Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2010). The aggregate rule of law indicator is measured in percentile rank terms ranging from 0% (lowest) to 100% (highest) among all countries worldwide. The rule of law is measured using data from the World Bank (2010). Data are available from 1996 to 2009.

(b) **Intervening Variable.** *Coordination* is the intervening variable. Coordination is a dummy variable, where 1 represents successful coordination and 0 otherwise. For purposes of this study, the term *coordination* is used broadly to include information sharing, collaborative analysis and strategizing, resource sharing, formal partnerships, and other means of synchronizing and/or integrating activities. Other key elements include interaction among a variety of players (international organizations, governments, NGOs, civil society actors), delegation of tasks and allocation of resources among players, the search for common ground to focus on core problem or shared purpose, development of problem-solving mechanism, maintenance of appropriate levels of autonomy and flexibility (Nan 2003). The data on coordination are from Doyle and Sambanis (2006).

(c) **Independent Variables.** As figure 2.1 indicates, this study views coordination as a function of *actors*, *leadership*, and *power*. It conceptualizes *actors* as international and local entities that are independent, but engage in voluntary patterns of interactions with an aim to build a stable state after a civil war (Kahler 2009 and Westerwinter 2010). The number of actors is critical in a coordination network. A coordination network with few actors is likely to be more cohesive and promoting information flow and expertise among members of the network. On the other hand, a network that has many actors is likely to take a long time to agree on strategies and decisions. The variable actor is an interval ratio dataset that counts the number of players in the post-conflict reconstruction as 1, 2, 3, ...N. The data on number of actors in each case are from Doyle and Sambanis (2006) and were expanded to 2008.

The second independent variable is *leadership*. It refers to the ability of an actor or actors to influence actions of other actors to voluntarily work towards achieving set goals (Underdal 1994). The literature on post-conflict reconstruction demonstrates that leadership by the United Nations (UN) and/or “Contact Groups” also referred to as “Friends of the Country” tends to be seen as legitimate, “neutral”, and acceptable. “Friends of a country” is an ad hoc group of countries usually with few members that come together with an aim to mobilize and provide active support and advice to a country emerging from civil war. This group takes the role of overseeing and monitoring post-conflict reconstruction. The assumption is that a leadership that is legitimate, neutral, and acceptable in a network is crucial because it facilitates deliberations on strategies, objectives, goals, and decision making. Leadership is a dummy variable where the

leadership by UN and or “Contact Group” is represented by a value 1 and value 0 otherwise. The data are from Doyle and Sambanis (2006) and were expanded to 2008.

The third independent variable is power. It refers to the capability of an actor or actors to control, either through persuasion or coercion the actions of other actors with or without resistance in a coordination network (Kahler 2009). There are no data that systematically operationalize the impact that power has on a coordination network. Power was operationalized in two steps, the focus being on financial resources within a coordination network or the ability to use “carrot and stick” in the network. First, was to assess foreign aid from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) - Development Co-operation Directorate (DCD-DAC), and the World Bank. Second, the country with the highest foreign aid as a percentage of GDP of recipient countries was given the value of 1, otherwise 0. It turned out that the United States of America as the sole hegemonic power within the international system provided more aid than other DAC members. Power is thus a dummy variable with 1 representing the presence of the USA and 0 otherwise.

(d) **Control Variables.** From extant literature on state-building the study draws eleven control variables that explain post-conflict reconstruction (Kisangani and Pickering 2010). These variables are *strategic (interstate) rivalry*, *internal rivalry*, *foreign aid* as a percentage of GDP, *foreign debt* as a percentage of GDP, *gross domestic products (GDP) per capita*, *age*, *democracy*, *trade openness*, *leadership turnover (eliteout)*, *agricultural production (agriculture)* as a percentage of GDP, and *minerals* as a percentage of GDP. *Strategic rivalries* is conceptualized as when states view each other “as (a) competitors, (b) the source of actual or latent threats that pose some possibility of

becoming militarized, and (c) enemies” (Thompson 2001:560). Strategic rivalry is taken as a dummy variable with 1 representing its presence and 0 otherwise. The expectation in extant literature is that external rivalry should pose the type of foreign threat that enhances the bargaining power of state managers in the political process and, by extension, their ability to pursue state building activities. Data on strategic rivalry are from Thompson (2001).

Internal rivalry is conceptualized as incidences of violent conflict between state and ethnic group(s) in which the challengers seek major changes in their status (Marshall & Gurr 2005). Internal rivalry can erode state building efforts as it may lead to renewed conflict. Internal rivals engaged in combat with the state should decrease both state managers’ bargaining power and levels of extraction from the society (Kisangani & Pickering 2010). Similar to Kisangani and Pickering (2010) and Thies (2004, 2007) the study employs a dummy variable combining ethnic wars and revolutionary wars from the State Failure Task Force data collection to operationalize internal rivalry. Data are from the State Failure Task Force (Marshall & Gurr 2005). The third and fourth indicators are *foreign aid* as a percentage of GDP and public and publicly guaranteed *foreign debt* as a percentage of GDP. Foreign aid tends to reduce leaders’ need to bargain with domestic groups over resources (Bates 2001). Since debts to bank and foreign governments require repayment and have deadlines, they are a potential source of leverage that state managers can use to augment their bargaining power with societal actors and to increase extraction (Bates 2001). Data are from the World Bank (2009) and Kisangani and Pickering (2010).

Fifth is *GDP per capita* that is transformed into its natural logarithm and it provides proxy for the availability of resources to be taxed and the existence of

administration capability to collect taxes. A number of econometricians recommend this transformation to remove significant variance between cross-sectional units and time points (Hsiao 2004). Thies (2007) argues that the relationship between wealth and the state's ability to tax all its citizens usually takes a non-linear form. At low level of wealth, the states tend to have difficulty extracting resources from society. As levels of societal wealth increase, transaction costs should decline and extraction should become easier. The square of GDP per capital is included in the statistical analysis to account for this non-linear relationship. The data are from the World Bank (2009).

The sixth control variable, which is taken from COW captures leaders' bargaining power, is state *age*. It is an interval/ratio variable that counts the number of years since a state's independence or creation. Jackman (1993) maintains that older states organizations have proven their effectiveness by surviving. They have also earned some degree of societal legitimacy. The relationship between state age and bargaining power/extractive capacity should be non-linear (Jackman 1993; Thies 2007). To capture the non-linear relationship between age and bargaining power age is squared (Thies 2007; Kisangani and Pickering 2010).

Seventh is *democracy*. Predatory theories presume that increasing democracy empowers societal groups and reduces state managers' bargaining power (Tilly 1985; Olson 1995), but Thies (2005) suggests that democratic regimes' legitimacy grants them more bargaining power and thus more extractive capacity than autocratic governments. Empirical studies analyzing the democratic-extraction relationship in developing countries have produced mixed results (Cheibub 1998; Thies 2004, 2005). Data are from Polity IV data set.

Trade openness is the eighth control variable. It is the sum of imports and exports as a percentage of GDP. Trade openness should reduce transaction costs since international trade tends to flow through a handful of ports and is typically easily taxed (Adsera and Boix 2002; Kisangani and Pickering 2010). Data are from World Bank (2009). The ninth control variable is elite turnover, *eliteout* that measures the length of tenure in office of state managers. This is calculated as a 'hazard rate' derived from Weibull (1991) distribution model of the survival of chief executives in office. Data are from Kisangani and Pickering (2010). The last two control variables are agriculture production (*agriculture*) and mining exports (*minerals*) as separate percentages of GDP. The conventional argument is that transaction costs are higher for traditional sectors of the economy like agriculture than they are for modern sectors like mining. Although a large agriculture sector is commonly found to reduce tax income, empirical results on the impact that minerals export have on taxation are mixed (Cheibub 1998; Thies 2004). This is partly because mineral export receipts may be classified as non-tax revenue and used as rents by state leaders. Data are from World Bank (2009) and Kisangani and Pickering (2010).

Finally, the literature also highlighted the fact that some of the control variables explaining state-building process usually explain coordination. Three of these variables have been hypothesized to lower the chance of coordination. They include internal rivalry, agriculture production as a percentage of GDP, and mineral exports as a percentage of GDP.

3.1.2 A Few Methodological Issues

The statistical analysis employs a time series cross sectional (TSCS) design of 26 African countries from 1970 to 2009, with temporal boundaries determined by data availability. The panel data are unbalanced. Appendix A provides countries names, civil war years as well as data on post-conflict reconstruction period. The research uses panel corrected standard error (PCSE) method of analysis. A number of econometricians contend that when the number of cross-sectional units (N) is larger than the number of years (T) or $N > T$, PCSE produce efficient and consistent estimates than any other method (Hsiao 2004). Estimates are generated on *stata 11* running on windows XP.

The research design raises a few methodological issues. The first is endogeneity between the dependent variable (tax ratio and tax structure) and the intervening variable. Since weak exogeneity may nonetheless be a concern most variables are lagged (Gujarati 2002). The second issue is multicollinearity. To determine if multicollinearity was affecting the estimates, all models were assessed with Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) tests. All means VIF remained below the threshold of 10. Third is the potential for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in TSCS designs. Robust panel corrected standard error (PCSE) method is employed to account for both issues.

3.2 Empirical Analysis

Table 3.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables. Some countries that registered minimum tax ratio include Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2002, Kenya in 1989, Mozambique in 1998, and Nigeria in 1981. Namibia in 1980 and South Africa in 1994 recorded maximum tax ratio. South Africa in 1994 achieved maximum direct taxes. Angola listed minimum indirect taxes in 1992. DRC and Liberia in 2002 and

1999 respectively witnessed minimum non-tax revenue. Minimum score for government effectiveness and rule of law were recorded for Somalia from 1996 to 2008. South Africa and Egypt achieved maximum score for government effectiveness in 1996 and 1998 respectively, while South Africa had a maximum score for the rule of law in 1998. The countries that recorded a score of 1 on coordination include Algeria in 2002-2004, Angola in 1991-1993 and 2002-2004, DRC in 1978-1980, Djibouti 1994-1996, Egypt 1997-1999, Ethiopia 1988-1990, Kenya in 1993-1995, Morocco in 1991-1993, Mozambique in 1992-1994, Namibia in 1989-1991, Nigeria in 1970-1972, Senegal in 1999-2001, Sudan in 2005-2008, and Zimbabwe 1979-1981.

Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics

Variables	Obs	Mean	Std.Dev	Min	Max
Tax Ratio	284	.168	.092	.000	.556
Direct Taxes	284	.269	.114	.074	.533
Indirect Taxes	284	.506	.150	.130	.855
Non-TaxRevenue	284	.157	.250	.013	3.81
GovernmentEffectiveness	284	.265	.207	0.1	.770
Rule of Law	284	.234	.183	0.1	.590
Coordination	165	.627	.485	0.0	1.0
Actors	284	8.775	4.464	3.0	18.0
Leadership	284	.676	.469	0.0	1.0
Power	284	.609	.489	0.0	1.0
Strategic Rivalry	284	.095	.294	0.0	1.0
Internal Rivalry	284	.426	.495	0.0	1.0
Aidgdp	284	.199	.369	-.513	1.977
Debtgdp	284	.753	.705	.026	4.838
GDP per Capita	284	1868.398	1434.065	308.919	7847.956
Age	284	36.958	21.503	0.0	97.000
Polity	284	-4.817	4.232	-9.00	9.000
Tradegdp	284	.822	.439	.128	1.720
Eliteout	283	9.459	1.570	6.974	14.817
Agriculture	283	.307	.185	.320	7.860
Minerals	283	.340	.448	0.000	2.205

3.2.1 Statistical Analysis

Tables 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 present the study's empirical outcomes. Table 3.2 outlines the findings of coordination model after civil war. Given that the dependent variable, coordination, in this model is a dummy variable logit analysis is used. The model explains how actors, leadership, and power impact on coordination. The estimates fits very well as indicated by a highly statistically significant Wald χ^2 test. The negative sign on actors demonstrates that as the number of actors increases by one unit the odds ratio for a successful coordination decreases by 0.250 holding all other variables constant. This is statistically significant at 10% level. Taking the antilog of .250 or $e^{-.250}$ gives the value of .821. Subtracting one from it gives the value of .179 or $(e^{-.250} - 1)$. Multiplying this value by 100% gives a percentage change. Thus, for one unit increase in the number of actors, the percentage change in the odds for a successful coordination decline by 18%, holding other factors constant. This result is consistent with the study's first hypothesis that a *network characterized by few actors is likely to enhance coordination*.

The positive sign on leadership indicate that the presence of legitimate leadership increases the odds ratio for a successful coordination by 5.451 holding all other variables constant. This is statistically significant at 1% level. This finding strongly supports the study's second hypothesis stating that *leadership that is perceived as legitimate is likely to facilitate and enhance coordination among members of a network*.

The positive sign on power illustrates that the presence of a powerful actor increases the odds ratio for a successful coordination by 3.795 units holding all other variables constant. This is statistically significant at 1% level. This result also supports the research's third hypothesis that *the presence of a powerful actor with material power,*

network/social power, production power, and exit power is likely to enhance the chances of better coordination among network members.

The control variables results show that the presence of internal rivalry decreases the odds ratio for a successful coordination by 2. 544 and this is statistically significant at 10% level. The finds also show that an increase in agriculture decreases the odds ratio for a successful coordination by 0.076. This is statistically significant at 1% level. Although minerals resources tend to increase the chances of successful coordination, it is not statistically different from zero.

Table 3.2 A Logit Model of Coordination after Civil War

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Coefficients (Standard Errors)</i>
Intercept	1.478 (2.226)
Actors	-.250* (.176)
Leadership	5.451*** (1.212)
Power	3.795*** (1.219)
Internal Rivalry	-2.545* (1.715)
Agriculture	-.076*** (.031)
Minerals	.000 (.001)
Wald χ^2	29.490**
Log likelihood	-49.001
Rho	.833
Mean VIF	1.30
N	283

Note * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 one tailed test. Robust Standard Errors are below the estimates.

Table 3.3 presents the results for the models of state building based on predatory theories. Estimates for the standard aggregate measure of *tax ratio* are presented in the

second column while distinct sources of state revenues are presented in the third, fourth and fifth columns. The models fit the data well as shown by statistically significant Wald χ^2 . Although coordination tends to increase tax *ratio* and *indirect taxes*, the two coefficients are not statistically different from zero.

The estimates in *direct taxes* model and *non-tax revenue* model contradict predatory theory and are contrary to conventional expectations on the role of coordination in state-building process after civil war. The negative sign of coordination on direct taxes indicates that the level of direct taxes decreases by 2% holding all other variables constant in face of coordination. This is statistically significant at 5% level. The findings on non-tax revenue show that non- tax revenue decreases by 3% in the presence of coordination holding all other variables constant. This is statistically significant at 10% level. These empirical outcomes contradict the study's fourth hypothesis stating that *the higher the level of coordination among network actors, the higher the probability for a successful post-conflict reconstruction*. The results reveal that the level of direct taxes decrease when coordination is present in post-conflict state building situations. The negative results on direct taxes and non-tax revenue may be attributed to the fact that coordination is a short-term indicator, while state-building is a long term process that consists of building strong and functional institutions that can effectively enable and facilitate tax extraction. Building strong institutions and structures is a long term undertaking and not a short-term process.

Most control variables in these models offer further evidence and support to extant research on state-building. However, *strategic rivalry* is statistically significant in estimates on tax ratio and direct taxes at 1% level and 1% level respectively. The

negative signs in both cases indicate that the presence of strategic rivalry is likely to lower the chances of state-building. . Estimates on *internal rivalry* shows that the presence of internal rivalry decreases tax ratio by 3.7%, direct taxes by 2.5% and non-tax revenue by 1.5%. These finds on strategic and internal rivalry goes against extant literature on predatory theories that leaders extract more in the face of external or internal threat.

GDP per capita increase in a non-linear manner this is because as a society grows wealthier taxes tend to increase up to a point, after which the revenue from direct taxes levels off. On the other hand the relation with indirect taxes is a normal U-shape curve. As GDP per capita increases, indirect taxes tend to decline up to a point after which they begin to increase as GDP per capita continues to grow. The results on age show that younger nations tend to extract less tax, but more non-tax revenue. The results on democracy (*polity*) are mixed and show that democratic level *decreases* the level of tax ratio, but also increases the level of non-tax revenue. The outcome on *eliteout* illustrate that leaders are less willing to extract from society and depend on indirect taxes.

Table 3.3 PCSE Models of State Building Based on Predatory Theories

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Tax Ratio</i>	<i>Direct Taxes</i>	<i>Indirect Taxes</i>	<i>Non-Tax Revenue</i>
Intercept	.224*** (.051)	.622*** (.061)	.144** (.065)	.550*** (.143)
Coordination	.002 (.013)	-.023** (.013)	.010 (.016)	-.030* (.023)
StrategicRivalry	-.048*** (.018)	-.047** (.015)	.031* (.019)	.135* (.100)
Internal Rivalry	-.037*** (.009)	-.025** (.014)	.049*** (.015)	-.015 (.034)
Aidgdp	-.008 (.011)	-.021 (.021)	.050*** (.020)	-.053* (.034)
Debtgdp	.010* (.007)	.030*** (.012)	-.043*** (.014)	.019 (.020)
GDP perCapita	-3.81e-06 (3.74e-06)	-1.36e-06 (5.00e-06)	3.41e-07 (5.43e-06)	-8.84e-06* (5.47e-06)
GDPpercapita ²	-.024 (.033)	-.106*** (.037)	.432*** (.063)	-.332*** (.067)
Age	-.001 (.001)	-.004*** (.002)	.000 (.001)	-.004 (.004)
Age Squared	.0000*** (7.91e-06)	.000*** (.000)	-7.86e-06 (8.68e-06)	.000 (.000)
Polity	.001 (.001)	.008*** (.002)	-.003*** (.001)	-.001 (.002)
Tradegdp	.000** (.000)	-.001*** (.000)	.000** (.000)	-.001*** (.000)
Eliteout	-.001 (.004)	-.013** (.004)	.016*** (.006)	-.014 (.007)
Agriculture	-.002*** (.000)	-.002*** (.000)	.002*** (.000)	-.002*** (.000)
Minerals	-2.65e-06 (.000)	-1.33e-06 (.000)	2.28e-06 (.000)	- (.000)
R ²	.267	.270	.306	.117
Wald χ^2	213.810***	182.910***	126.160***	47.540***
Mean VIF	1.470	1.470	1.470	1.440
N	283	283	283	283

Note: * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01, on one tail test, Robust Standard Errors are below the estimates.

Table 3.4 presents the models of state building based on governance. Its indicators are *government effectiveness* and *rule of law*. All the estimates fit the data quite well as

the Wald χ^2 results indicate. In the first model, on government effectiveness, the positive sign of coordination indicates that the presence of coordination increases government effectiveness and the result is statistically significant at 1% level. In the second model, on the rule of law, the presence of coordination tends to increase the rule of law and it is statistically significant at 1% level. These findings support the study's hypothesis four stating that *the higher the level of coordination among network actors, the higher the probability for a successful post-conflict reconstruction.*

Most statistically significant control variables behave as predicted by extant research with the exception of *trade openness*, which has a negative sign. This is an issue that needs further investigation given that trade openness ideally is expected to increase government effectiveness and the rule of law.

Table 3.4 PCSE Models of State Building Based on Governance

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Government Effectiveness</i>	<i>Rule of Law</i>
Intercept	45.346 ^{***} (6.500)	31.228 ^{***} (7.437)
Coordination	24.250 ^{***} (1.990)	21.679 ^{***} (2.067)
Strategic Rivalry	11.011 ^{***} (2.760)	8.305 ^{***} (1.616)
Internal Rivalry	-3.100 ^{***} (1.140)	-2.058 [*] (1.291)
Aidgdp	-1.460 (2.419)	-.585 (2.241)
Debtgdp	-4.185 ^{***} (1.699)	-2.767 ^{**} (1.533)
GDP per Capita	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)
GDP per capita squared	8.282 ^{**} (4.940)	5.417 (4.847)
Age	-.408 ^{***} (.100)	-.257 ^{***} (.086)
Age Squared	.004 ^{***} (.001)	.003 ^{**} (.001)
Polity	1.312 ^{***} (.171)	1.080 ^{***} (.169)
Tradegdp	-.057 ^{***} (.016)	-.032 ^{**} (.020)
Eliteout	-1.562 ^{***} (.463)	-.844 ^{**} (.462)
Agriculture	-.078 ^{**} (.043)	-.064 [*] (.044)
Minerals	.009 ^{***} (.001)	.005 ^{***} (.002)
R ²	.715	.623
Wald χ^2	3666.640 ^{***}	2496.520 ^{***}
Mean VIF	1.470	1.470
N	283	283

Note: * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01, one tail test, Robust Standard Errors are below the estimates.

3.3 Summary

The results point to some theoretical conclusions. Theoretically, the study highlights three important issues. First, is the significance of examining the role of actors, leadership, and power in a coordination network during post-conflict state-building. This is an omission that characterizes extant literature on post-conflict state building. As the findings reveal these three factors are crucial determinants of a successful coordination in post-conflict reconstruction. Second, is the importance of analyzing state's sources of revenue as well as governance in order to fully understand post-conflict state-building. This analysis allows gaining both explicit and implicit understanding of state penetration of society, state autonomy, and good governance. Third, by incorporating government effectiveness and rule of law this study goes beyond the conventional predatory theory of state building. The results strongly indicate the significance of governance indicators in understanding post-conflict reconstruction.

The results also suggest the paramount importance of coordination in post-conflict reconstruction. Coordination facilitates effective use of resources, clarity and coherence in designing and executing post-conflict reconstruction strategies. It is important to ensure that the many agencies involved in post-conflict reconstruction be coordinated by improving and having well established communication channels and structures for effective resources use. This can help to avoid duplication of activities and contradictory policies and strategies and hence increase the chance of post-conflict reconstruction.

Chapter 4 - The Qualitative Approach in the Study

Chapter two developed four hypotheses on post-conflict reconstruction. As argued in chapter two, and demonstrated statistically in the quantitative chapter, leadership, power, and actors have a significant role to play in a coordination network structure. Consequently, the higher the level of coordination among network actors, the higher the probability for a successful post-conflict reconstruction. This has a significant impact on the outcome of post-conflict reconstruction undertaken by local and international actors. This chapter develops qualitative approach that is used in subsequent chapters to examine the micro-level factors that explain how leadership, power, and actors impact on coordination and how coordination influences post-conflict reconstruction. A case comparative design is employed to test this research's hypotheses developed in chapter two and to assess the findings of the quantitative analysis. This chapter contains two sections. First is an overview of qualitative approach. The second is a brief summary.

4.1 An Overview of Qualitative Approach

King, Keohane and Verba (1994) define qualitative method as one that does not use numbers as a form of measurement. The source of data is usually through in-depth analysis of historical materials and/or intensive interviews. It focuses on single or small cases and adopts a "causes-of-effect" explanation approach (Mahoney and Goertz 2006). However, its major weakness is the inability to generalize for a large number of cases, as it is oriented towards positive cases on the dependent variable and adopts a narrow scope to avoid heterogeneity (King, Keohane and Verba 1994; Mahoney and Goertz 2006). The strengths of qualitative method are its ability to give huge amount of information and

details on a single case, to explain individual cases through causes of an effect approach, to draw attention to specific cases, and to rely on non-conforming cases (Mahoney and Goertz 2006). In order to unfold the process that connects causes and outcomes, small-N comparisons provide much more explanatory leverage than has conventionally been recognized by the comparative method (Hall 2003). Small-N comparisons also allow scholars to assess more complex causal processes in a much richer set of observations. Therefore, a systematic comparison process and analysis is the most promising and fruitful venue to achieve an understanding of causal complexity (Hall 2003).

Overall, qualitative methods and, in particular, the case study approach has historically been the method of choice for most researchers in the field of post-conflict reconstruction (Gerring 2001).² There are two major reasons to prefer qualitative approaches. The first lies in the unavailability of data. More specifically, data on post-conflict reconstruction in Africa are generally unavailable to researchers for a number of years. The second reason is the widely held belief by many within the field that qualitative approaches provide more in-depth explanation about the impetus and internal dynamics at play in post-conflict reconstruction (Paris and Sisk 2009; Paris 2004, 2006; Herrhausen 2009). In addition, there is some concern that in complex dynamics such as what prevails in post-conflict reconstruction, many of the volatile interactions cannot be meaningfully formulated in ways that permit statistical testing (Paris 2004). In essence, the argument follows that statistical modeling cannot adequately capture certain micro features of post-conflict reconstruction.

²The exception is Doyle and Sambanis (2000, 2006) who have attempted to quantitatively analyze international peacebuilding with a focus on United Nations efforts.

However, what is noteworthy about this trend is that a large number of qualitative studies have been largely descriptive accounts of post-conflict reconstruction and subsequent activities (Paris and Sisk 2009; Paris 2004, 2006; Herrhausen 2009; Stedman et.al. 2002). There is little evidence of qualitative studies that attempt to uncover the causal relationships that explain factors contributing to successful post-conflict reconstruction. Most of the post-conflict reconstruction research using qualitative approach has been marked by theoretical generalizations that are not based on systematic methodological investigation (Doyle and Sambanis 2006).

In addition, even where extant qualitative studies have followed some elements of methodological practices, these studies often focus disproportionately on specific types of post-conflict reconstruction. The most frequent areas of research utilizing case studies have been on peacebuilding through UN. While these studies have been rich in details, they have frequently given a biased view and failed to clearly establish testable causal link between coordination and post-conflict reconstruction. Some frequent problems evident in various qualitative works in the field of post-conflict reconstruction are a range of methodological problems that include tautology, circularity, and endogeneity (Gerring 2007).

Despite the aforementioned methodological weaknesses in relation to the proper utilization of the case study approach, many scholars in the post-conflict reconstruction research program maintain that qualitative approaches offers more robust than other approaches in understanding the complex dynamics at play in the field of post-conflict reconstruction (Gerring 2007). Advocates of qualitative approaches within the field argue that, because of micro-dynamics in post-conflict reconstruction, case studies and

comparative approaches, especially those that utilize process-tracing, are critical in providing greater insights (George and Bennett 2005). As pointed out in the theoretical chapter, post-conflict reconstruction is a complex process and hence, there is a need to assess it at the micro-level as well as assess causal factors at work by applying rigorous qualitative methods to assess causality. Structural focused comparison and process tracing are two of the best qualitative methods to achieve it.

4.1.1 Structured Focused Comparison

The epistemological logic of structured focused comparison is that a set of questions that relates to the study's theoretical framework and hypothesis are formulated. Subsequently, these questions are posed to each of the case studies under investigation (George and Bennett 2005). By doing so this helps to guide and standardize data collection by facilitating a systematic comparison and accumulation of the cases findings. In systematically exploring similarities and differences, a comparison approach research is used as a control, at the same time putting greater emphasis on the criteria for comparability as the force driving case selection (George and Bennett 2005). Qualitative methodologists agree that comparative case study research should aim at generalizations and causal inference (Collier, Brady and Seawright 2004; Mahoney and Goertz 2006).

Structured focused comparison is useful because it permits the examination of causal mechanisms and the building of theoretical generalizations on the relatively small universe of cases (George and Bennett 2005). This research thus uses the structured focused comparison to study historical events in order to yield valuable knowledge on how to achieve a successful post-conflict reconstruction. The aim is to draw explanations in each case study in relation to post-conflict reconstruction within the context of the

theoretical framework developed in chapter two. The advantage of structured focused comparison is that it advances validity and reliability by allowing the variables to be examined across cases (George and Bennett 2005).

The questions formulated for structured comparison in this study emphasizes four issues relevant to the study's theoretical framework and hypotheses. First is the role of leadership in coordination of post-conflict reconstruction. The theoretical and the quantitative chapters illustrate that leadership play a critical role in post-conflict reconstruction. However, extant literature does not give much attention to leadership and its significance in successful coordination in post-conflict reconstruction. The second theme is the role of power in coordination of post-conflict reconstruction. Extant literature also omits the role of power in coordination of post-conflict reconstruction. As was illustrated in chapter three, power is positively and statistically significant indicator that explains coordination in post-conflict reconstruction. Based on this finding, it is critical that questions are geared towards investigating this particular theme. The third theme is the role of actors in coordination of post-conflict reconstruction. This research examines the role of actors to ascertain whether they explain the connection between coordination and successful post-conflict reconstruction. The final question relates to the impact of coordination among international and local actors on successful post-conflict reconstruction. The quantitative chapter shows that coordination impacts positively on post-conflict reconstruction. The following questions provide guidelines to structured focus comparison used in this study:

- Did the post-conflict reconstruction process in the case study have a coordination network?

- Who were the members of the network?
- How many actors were in the network and how did their numbers impact on coordination?
- Who offered leadership in the network and how did this leadership impact on coordination?
- Was there a major power within the network and how did it influence coordination?
- How did interactions within the international community and between this community and domestic players influence coordination?
- What was the impact of coordination on post-conflict reconstruction?

4.1.2 Process-Tracing/Historical Causation.

Process tracing is an important process for investigating causal progression. George and McKeown (1985) offer one of the earliest definitions of process-tracing, where they view it as a method of within-case analysis aims to evaluate causal processes. They argue that this method does not solely rely on comparison of variations across variables in each case, but also investigates and explains the decision process by which various initial conditions are translated into outcomes. They further add that “process-tracing approach attempts to uncover what stimuli the actors attend to; the decision process that makes use of these stimuli to arrive at decisions; the actual behavior that occurs; the effect of various institutional arrangements on attention, processing, and behavior; and the effect of other variables of interest on attention, processing, and behavior” (George and McKeown 1985, 35). Process tracing attempts to uncover the micro-foundations that connect hypothesized causes and outcomes and to reduce the

difficulties associated with unobserved contextual variables (Brady et.al. 2006). Brady et.al. (2006) observe that process tracing can be conceptualized as a method that not only permits the testing of hypotheses but also, unlike the statistical method, the generation of hypotheses.

George and Bennett (2005, 206) defined process-tracing as the “method that attempts to identify the intervening causal process - the causal chain and causal mechanism - between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable.” Accordingly, the main ontological difference between the statistical method and the method of process-tracing is that while the former attempts to define causal effects, the latter identifies the causal mechanisms that connect causes and effects. George and Bennett define causal mechanisms as “ultimately unobservable physical, social, or psychological processes through which agents with causal capacities operate, but only in specific contexts or conditions, to transfer energy, information, or matter to other entities” (George & Bennett 2005, 137).

Process tracing is appropriate for uncovering causal mechanisms in this research. It is used in this study to examine histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal process in the theory hypothesized is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the variables in the case studies. The process tracing method also attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism -- between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome or the dependent variable (Seawright and Gerring 2008). As George and Bennett (2005) point out, the process tracing method requires enormous amounts of data in order for causal mechanisms to be identified at every step of the process of interest.

It is thus important that most data collection options are considered, and that their strengths, weaknesses and uses are explored in detail (George and Bennett 2005). Process tracing also provides a crucial method for the analysis of complex political phenomena, and rightly places an emphasis on uncovering the causal mechanisms that connect independent to dependent variables (Mahoney 2010). By prioritizing fine-grained research that seeks to identify the critical steps and stages of political processes, the process tracing method allows scholars to both generate and assess critical data, and thus to enhance their efforts both at theory development and at theory testing (Gerring 2007).

The validation of causal paths through process tracing, like the use of case study or statistical methods to establish covariation, must also address the demanding standards of internal and external validity (Brady and Collier 2004). Process tracing is no guarantee that a study can establish internal validity, or that it will uncover only relationships that are truly causal. Despite this, process tracing is a useful method for generating and analyzing data on causal mechanisms. It can be used in studies of a single case and those involving many cases whose processes can be traced individually (Goertz 2006).

Process tracing identifies a causal chain that links independent and dependent variables. Methodologically, process tracing provides the how-we-come-to-know nuts and bolts for mechanism-based accounts of social change (Goertz 2006). But it also directs one to trace the process in a very specific, theoretically informed way. In sum, process tracing means to trace the operation of the causal mechanism(s) at work in a given situation. One carefully maps the process, exploring the extent to which it coincides with prior, theoretically derived expectations about the workings of the mechanism (Bennett & George 2005). Theory-guided process-tracing has utility to

explain the outcomes of interest by going back in time and identifying the key events, processes, or decisions that link the hypothesized cause or causes with the outcomes (Seawright & Gerring 2008).

Process tracing in this dissertation uses by Slater and Simmons' (2010) *critical antecedents* framework that captures in a systematic technique through historical analysis causal factors in war prone societies. Slater and Simmons (2010) advance that critical antecedents, that is, factors or conditions preceding a *critical juncture* that combine in a causal sequence with factors during a critical juncture to produce *divergent long-term outcomes*. The critical antecedents significantly shape the choices and changes that emerge during critical junctures (Slater and Simmons 2010: 887). They conceptualize *critical antecedents* as “factors or conditions preceding a critical juncture that combine with causal forces during a critical juncture to produce long-term divergence in outcomes” (Slater and Simmons 2010:889). Critical antecedents entail antecedent variation or divergence: across cases in a cross-case analysis or across time in a single case. This study incorporate critical antecedents or historical factors and phenomena in order to clarify and uncover the powerful yet underspecified importance of long-term causal factors in post-conflict reconstruction. Through critical and analytical review of a wide range of historically oriented works on post-conflict reconstruction this research reaps tangible benefits of incorporating critical antecedents that are theoretically relevant to this study (Slater and Simmons 2010). Slater and Simmons define *critical junctures* as “periods in history when the presence or absence of a specified causal force pushes multiple cases onto divergent long-term pathways, or pushes a single case onto a new political trajectory that diverges significantly from the old” (Slater and Simmons

2010:888). To them a major benefit of the critical juncture framework is its compatibility with experimental, eventful, and mechanism-based understandings of historical causation (Slater and Simmons 2010). This dissertation uses coordination as a critical juncture to explain post-conflict reconstruction.

Slater and Simmons (2010) main argument is that causal factors preceding a critical juncture can sequentially combine with causal factors during a critical juncture to produce divergent long-term outcomes.³ Critical antecedents help cause the outcome of interest. Each case in this dissertation is analyzed along this framework advanced by Slater and Simmons (2010).

4.1.3 Case Selection

Case selection rests at the heart of improving the validity of causal inferences from qualitative research. The validity of causal inferences in qualitative research heavily depends on the selection of cases (Seawright and Gerring 2008). This dissertation appreciates the fact that attention to purposive modes of sampling is needed when selecting cases from a large universe for in-depth case study analysis and that case selection is the primordial task of the case study researcher (Mahoney 2010). Case selection and case analysis are intertwined and can scarcely be separated when the focus of a work is on one or a few instances of some broader phenomenon like post-conflict reconstruction. Methodological advice on the selection of cases in qualitative research stands in a long tradition. Mill (1856) is one of the earlier works in which he proposed

³ Slater and Simmons (2010) assertion is that because a critical antecedent produces the outcome of interest in combination with the causal force or forces operative at the critical juncture, it complements a critical juncture argument and does not contradict it.

five methods that were meant to enable researchers to make causal inferences: the method of agreement, the method of difference, the double method of agreement and difference, the method of residues, and the method of concomitant variation. Modern methodologists have questioned and criticized the usefulness and general applicability of Mill's methods. However, without doubt Mill's proposals had a major and lasting impact on the development of the two most prominent modern methods, namely the 'most similar' and 'most different' comparative case study designs (Przeworski and Teune 1970; Lijphart 1971, 1975).

Seawright and Gerring (2008) have provided a formal definition and classification of techniques of case selection. They suggest that the 'most similar' design chooses cases which appear to be identical on all controls but different in the variable of interest (Seawright and Gerring 2008: 304). Equally Lijphart gives a formal operationalization of a variant in this method when he proposes that researchers should maximize "the ratio between the variance of the operative variables and the variance of the control variables" (Lijphart 1975: 163). In selecting cases for this study consideration has been given to the importance of having the ideal number of cases that helps evaluate in unbiased manner the theory that has been developed in this dissertation (Gerring 2007). Selection bias is most often described as occurring when there is a deliberate selection of cases that results in inferences, based on resulting sample that are not representative of the universe of cases and which can produce indeterminate or unreliable results (Gerring 2007).

Given that most case studies seek to elucidate the features of a broader population, truly representative case studies are paramount to any research (Seawright and Gerring 2008). Causal inference from qualitative research becomes more reliable

when researchers select cases from a larger sample and maximize the variation in the variable of interest (Mahoney and Goertz 2006). Case study approach is also a useful data collection technique especially in situations where the area to be researched is unsafe, when resources are limited, and when detailed information on a particular case is needed (Mahoney and Goertz, 2006). Mahoney and Goertz (2006) have argued that qualitative researchers usually start their research by selecting cases where the outcome of interest (dependent variable) occurs (these cases are often called “positive” cases). This is because their research goal is the explanation of particular outcomes. Therefore if researchers want to explain certain outcomes, they have to choose cases that exhibit those outcomes. Mahoney and Goertz further add that although sometimes qualitative researchers may only select positive cases, quite commonly they also choose “negative” cases for the purposes of causal contrast and inference and also to test theories (Mahoney and Goertz 2006).

The subsequent chapters evaluates the hypotheses and theoretical framework advanced in chapter two by using three positive cases where there have been successful post-conflict reconstruction and one negative case is chosen to facilitate comparison. Gerring (2007) and King, Keohane and Verba (1994) have argued that cases selected should satisfy the principles and fundamental characteristic of “goodness” in case selection process. The unit of analysis is state. The positive cases are Kenya, Namibia, and Sudan, while the negative case is Rwanda. The cases in this dissertation vary in a number of ways from level of heterogeneity, wealth and population size among others. The cases also have similarities to other cases within the international system. Therefore the findings can be generalized.

4.2 Summary

This chapter has demonstrated the utility of qualitative research in this study. Structured focused comparison and process tracing research designs help develop case analysis and also offer explanation on the mechanisms in play during post-conflict reconstruction. To facilitate a structured focused comparison of the cases being examined in this study, same set of questions that relates to the study's theoretical framework and hypotheses are posed in each case. The questions investigate the role of actors, leadership, and power in a coordination network as well as how coordination influences post-conflict reconstruction. Process tracing is used to investigate causal progression in a historical causation approach. Critical antecedent and critical juncture are used to trace the causal path of mechanisms at play during post-conflict reconstruction in Kenya, Sudan, Namibia and Rwanda.

Chapter 5 - Kenya: Towards a New Constitutional Order

5.1 Introduction

The Republic of Kenya is located in Eastern Africa. It occupies a total area of approximately 580,367 square kilometers and has a population of about 40 million. Kenya has 42 tribes. The major ethnic groups are Kikuyu who make up 22% of the population followed by Luhya 14%, Kalenjin 13%, Luo 12%, and Kamba 11% (Government of Kenya 2010). During the pre-colonial period the different ethnic groups co-existed peacefully. Inter-ethnic interactions were characterized by trade, intermarriages, and inter-cultural exchange events. Each ethnic group had its own political system under the leadership of a council of elders, whose members were elected by the local people. The council of elders helped resolve disputes both at community or intercommunity level. However, the British colonial government altered indigenous people's political system.

Kenya became a British colony in 1894. The British colonial government imposed boundaries on the communities in Kenya and a new political system was born. Through a policy of indirect rule local chiefs were appointed to be administrators on behalf of the British colonial government. Local people were dislocated from their arable land to give way to colonial settlers. Kenya became independent on December 12, 1963, however, the post-colonial government in Kenya did not change fundamentally from the colonial policies of ethnic favoritism. Subsequent government regimes perfected the act of ethnic and elites favoritism and an unequal distribution of public goods. This further divided Kenyans along ethnic lines a problem that persists up to the present.

Kenya has for a long time been considered as one of the most stable countries in Africa. It functions as a financial and communications hub as well as a magnet for tourism within the Eastern and Central African region. It is also the headquarters of many international nongovernmental organizations and the only Third World country with a fully pledged United Nations headquarter office housing headquarters for the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT). Therefore the outbreak of violence over disputed elections in late December 2007 shocked both the local and international communities.

On December 27, 2007, Kenyans voted in what were generally peaceful local, parliamentary, and presidential elections. The presidential election was a tightly contested race pitting President Mwai Kibaki, of the Party of National Unity (PNU), against his main challenger Raila Odinga, of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). The Electoral Commission of Kenya announced Kibaki as the winner on December 30, 2007. However, the leadership of ODM disputed the presidential results claiming that there were rigged. ODM refused to accept the results of the election and called for mass action in protest (Mwagiru 2008). The protests quickly turned into violent demonstrations resulting in killings, looting, and the burning of property sending the country into turmoil. During the month of January and part of February 2008, violent conflict engulfed six out of eight provinces in Kenya. This sent the country to the brink of civil war. According to the report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence, also known as the Waki Report, more than 1,300 people were killed and about 600,000 were internally displaced from their homes during this violent period.


This disputed presidential election acted as a catalyst that brought to the surface deep and long standing divisions that have characterized the Kenyan society. These divisions were threatening to the very foundation of Kenya as a unified one nation-state. State authority almost collapsed in the political strongholds of the opposition Orange Democratic Movement, mainly in Kisumu and north, south, and central parts of the Rift Valley Province (Waki Report 2008), as supporters of Odinga took to the streets in violent protest against the Kikuyu and Kisii communities perceived to be loyal to Kibaki (ICG 2008). The civil war had a major regional impact in January 2008 Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, South Sudan, and eastern Democratic Republic of Congo were short of fuel and other essential commodities because the Mombasa highway, their main supply route, was paralyzed. A report by the International Crisis Group (ICG) argues that the loss for the Kenyan economy due to this violence was estimated to be over Kenya Shillings 100 billion (close to \$1.5 billion) by early February 2008 (ICG 2008). These figures might be higher given the cost of property that was destroyed and the cost of post-conflict reconstruction.

The international community reacted swiftly to the post-electoral violence in Kenya with an aim of safeguarding the country from self-destruction. A series of international efforts to help mediate between the Kibaki and Odinga factions eventually culminated in the formation of an internationally driven mediation team under the leadership of former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Each of the two internal rival factions sent four negotiators. This team of local negotiators and international mediators came to be known as Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) team under the chairmanship of Annan. Annan spent over a month in Kenya as the head of a panel

of eminent African experts and with his team laid out a four-point agenda for the negotiations: (1) measures to bring an immediate halt to the violence and to restore the rights and freedoms of the Kenyan people; (2) measures to address the humanitarian crisis and to promote reconciliation; (3) a political solution to the Kibaki-Odinga standoff in the form of some transitional government that incorporates both factions; and (4) fundamental institutional reforms to address underlying grievances in Kenyan society including issues relating to judicial independence, parliamentary oversight authority, electoral reforms, and land policies (Mwagiru 2008).

The international community used and enhanced its pressure, which included aid conditionality and threats and application of targeted sanctions against perceived hardliners and spoilers in order for negotiations to succeed (Rannenberger 2008). The pressure and threats have continued even during the post-conflict reconstruction period (Clinton 2009). These efforts by both local and international actors yielded fruits under an accord brokered by Annan. Kenya's two main political parties agreed to a power-sharing arrangement as a way to end the violence. The accord called for the creation of the Grand Coalition Government in which the two parties would be equal partners. This signing of power-sharing accord on February 28, 2008 marked the beginning of the post-conflict reconstruction in Kenya. The causal path to Kenya's successful post-conflict reconstruction can be traced to a combination of critical antecedents and critical juncture as shown by figure 5.1. The next sub-section discusses the critical antecedents that acted as catalyst to the violent conflict in Kenya.

Figure 5.1 Causal Mechanism for Kenya



5.2 Critical Antecedents

Slate and Simmons (2010) argues that *critical antecedents* are factors or conditions preceding a *critical juncture* that combined in a causal sequence with factors during a critical juncture to produce *divergent long-term outcomes*—successful or unsuccessful post-conflict reconstruction. The critical antecedents significantly shape the choices and changes that emerge during critical juncture (Slate and Simmons 2010). This chapter incorporates *colonial legacy, political violence, ethnic tensions, and land issues*

as critical antecedents to clarify and uncover the powerful yet underspecified importance of long-term and historical causal factors in post-conflict reconstruction. Unresolved issues around these critical antecedents are seen to have highly likely precipitated the crisis in Kenya. These factors are relevant when examining political violence in Kenya.

5.2.1 Colonial Legacy

Violent conflicts in Africa can neither be explained nor understood without first unraveling the continent's colonial experience. Colonialism had profound and lasting effects on the development of contemporary African states. One of the most profound legacies of the colonial period has been ethnic conflict. When the European powers imposed formal territorial boundaries throughout the African continent in 1885, the seeds for ethnic conflict in post-colonial Africa were sown (Blanton, Mason & Athow 2001). The boundaries were drawn with little or no consideration to the actual distribution of indigenous ethno-cultural groups (Blanton, Mason & Athow 2001).

Like the rest of Africa, Kenya's colonization starting point was the 1884/85 Berlin Conference, the 1886 Anglo-German Agreement, and other inter-European territorial arrangements that set in motion colonial occupation. These conferences were instrumental in erecting artificial boundaries in Africa (Ogot & Ochieng 1995; Mwaura 2005). In 1894, Britain declared protectorate over Kenya. Kenya's boundaries were demarcated without consulting the indigenous people. Therefore, the colonial government established a large territorial entity that arbitrarily brought together about 42 previously independent communities into one territorial entity (Overton 1987; Ogot & Ochieng 1995). To make matters worse, a large number of ethnic communities found themselves in two or more different countries as a result of the artificial boundaries that

were imposed by the colonial administration: the Maasai and Kuria between Kenya and Tanzania, the Somali among Kenya, Somali, and Ethiopia, the Luo also among Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, and the Teso and the Samia between Kenya and Uganda (Munene, Nyunya and Adar 1995). The fact that the administrative and ethnic boundaries were coterminous nurtured ethnic antagonism as different communities competed for scarce resources.

The imposition of colonial boundaries, administrative systems, economic policies, and social policies restructured Kenya's pre-colonial communities and, in the process, enforced politics of ethnic identities (Mwaura 2005). The colonial state remained alien to the local people as it was built on colonial heritage and was governed through authoritarianism. It ethicized the state by mobilizing the citizenry around ethnic politics and totally failed to consolidate the state (Blanton, Mason & Athow 2001). One of the long-term causes of the clashes in Kenya is attributed to the colonial legacy, which has ramification to the post-independence Kenya.

The British used indirect rule strategy, that is using local administrative and leadership structures, and where none existed they created chiefs, to rule on behalf of the colonial government. It is a historical fact that the indirect rule administered by the British colonialists later turned out to be the "divide and rule" strategy that polarized the various ethnic groups in Kenya (Blanton, Mason & Athow 2001). This in turn contributed to the subsequent incompatibility of these ethnic groups as actors on one nation-state called Kenya (Blanton, Mason & Athow 2001). In fact, the early political parties in Kenya that championed the nationalist struggle against colonial establishments were basically distinct ethnic unions. The Kikuyu, for instance, formed the Kikuyu

Central Association, the Akamba formed the Ukambani Members Association, the Luhya formed the Luhya Union, the Luo formed the Young Kavirondo Association, the Kalenjin formed the Kalenjin Political Alliance, the Coastal tribes formed the Mwambao United Front, Taita formed the Taita Hills Association, in that order of ethnic conglomerations (Mwaura 2005).

Political violence has played out in different manners throughout Kenya's history. When the British East Africa Company (BEAC) obtained concessionary rights to the Kenyan coast from the Sultan of Zanzibar, Waiyaki Wa Henya, a Kikuyu chief was abducted and killed by the British after having burned down the fort of a BEAC official (Overton 1987). Likewise, Kenyans' opposition to the building of the Uganda Railway prompted the British to use violent means such as assassinations (Overton 1987). As a reaction to settlers' dominance over economic resources and political exclusion, in 1921, Kenya's first African political protest movement, the Young Kikuyu Association (later the Kenya African Union) was born (Overton 1987).

British colonialism in Kenya was founded upon a strategy where effective rule of the colony relied on "divide and rule" that is building alliances with certain ethnic groups and escalating tensions between these and other ethnic groups. The colonial government favored different ethnic groups differently for example the Kikuyu, Luo, and Luhya were exposed to western education and religious ways of life, while the Akamba, Maasai, and Kalenjin were employed in the military and police sectors of government (Overton 1987). Therefore, besides its immediate connection with political violence, colonialism through divide and rule policies brought about and, at the same time, escalated inter-community conflict, the effects of which may still have importance for the prevalence of political

violence (Blanton, Mason & Athow 2001). Simultaneously, the construction of a colonial state sustained inequality, land ownership by a few, and regional differences. Local people were displaced from their arable land which was allocated to British settlers, who used local communities as cheap and forced labor. Both the colonialists and indigenous Kenyans used violence in their pursuit of political objectives, most clearly evident from the 1952-1960 Mau Mau rebellion against the British colonial rule and its repression by the colonial government (Mwaura 2005). When Kenya gained independence from the British in 1963 under a negotiated constitution at Lancaster House in London, it inherited a flawed constitution which favored the post-colonial elite and perpetuated the colonial policies of inequality, exclusion, and ethnicized politics (Young 1986, 1995; Mwaura 2005).

5.2.2 Ethnic Tensions

Ethnic tensions have been frequent and pervasive in post-colonial Kenya. A variety of explanations have been offered to account for this phenomenon, the major one being real as well as perceived ethnic and regional inequalities (Anderson 2008). Kenya's first independent government, which took office in 1963, confronted deep-rooted ethnic divisions whose origins were the divisive policies adopted towards the country's 42 ethnic groups during the colonial period (Young 1986, 1995). This has continued to hamper the consolidation of Kenya into a united state and adversely affects the political life of the country.

The principal challenge to stability in Kenya comes from the centrality of ethnicity in politics. Kenya, like other African countries, is a highly diverse society. By

the standard classification scheme, there are 42 tribes.⁴ While ethnic differences are not automatically salient in multi-ethnic societies, in Kenya such divisions became politicized early during the colonial period and have since remained central to Kenyan politics (Young 1986, 1995). The divisiveness of ethnic cleavages in Kenya is in large part the result of a history of perceived ethnic favoritism by Kenyan leaders. The first President, Jomo Kenyatta, was supposedly seen to rely heavily on trusted members of his own Kikuyu ethnic group (Throup 1987). Furthermore, the land redistribution scheme, undertaken shortly after independence, was seen as disproportionately benefiting Kikuyu (Throup 1987). Because Kikuyu were relatively better off than other tribes at independence, they were able to take advantage of the sale of highly productive land that was purchased from departing white settlers by the government in the 1960s and 1970s and then resold on a willing-buyer, willing-seller basis (Throup 1987). Rightly or wrongly, the fact that some Kikuyu benefited from the government's land redistribution scheme fed the belief that the Kenyatta government favored the Kikuyu at the expense of other tribes (Throup 1987).

After Kenyatta's death in 1978, the Vice President, Daniel arap Moi, a Kalenjin from the Rift Valley Province, ascended to the presidency. Like Kenyatta, Moi also was seen to depend on an inner circle drawn largely from his own ethnic group, the Kalenjin (Kanyinga 2007, Throup 1987). Moreover, Moi aggressively promoted people from his ethnic group, Kalenji, within the government administration, parastatals, the military, and

⁴In order of size, the largest groups are the Kikuyu (22%), Luhya (14%), Kalenjin (13%), Luo (12%), Kamba (11%), Kisii (6%), Mijikenda (6%), Meru (6%). Data from the 2009 Kenya National Population Census.

the police, perpetuating the sense that state largesse was distributed along ethnic lines (Kanyinga 2007, Throup 1987). The advance of Kalenjin within the government structures came largely at the expense of Kikuyus (Kanyinga 2007). In 2002, Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu from Central Province, became Kenya's third President. Kibaki came to power at the head of a diverse coalition party, the National Alliance Rainbow Coalition. While the party held the promise of creating a broadly inclusive government, in practice, Kibaki, like those before him, was seen as favoring his own group, particularly in promotions to top cabinet and administrative positions (Barkan 2008).

A second factor behind ethnicity divisions is the party system, which has historically reflected and reinforced ethnic cleavages. Prior to independence, competing parties emerged as champions for different ethnic blocs, turning early electoral contests into us-against-them battle for control of the state and the resources that come with it (Kanyinga 2007). The first party to be formed in the early 1960s was the Kenya African National Union (KANU), which initially brought together leaders from across the ethnic spectrum, united in their goal of gaining independence from Britain. But within a few years, leaders from several smaller tribes split from KANU after becoming convinced that they would never play a major role within the party, which was controlled by Kikuyu and Luo politicians (Kanyinga 2007). With the introduction of multiparty politics in 1991, Moi encouraged formation of political parties along ethnic lines. The political parties in Kenya today are devoid of any ideological agenda and as they are personality and ethnically founded.

5.2.3 *Politics of Violence*

Most significant political activities and changes in leadership throughout Kenya's history as a colonial and as an independent state have been followed, and to some extent formed, by violence, usually framed along ethnic lines (Kanyinga 2007). Political violence in Kenya can be attributed to several factors that include weak institutions, ethnicization of politics, winner-take-all political system, personalized rule that centered on the president's patronage, prevalence of a culture of impunity, and youth employment (Kanyinga 2007; Mwangiru 2008).

Political violence can be defined as the commission of violent acts motivated by a deep desire, conscious or unconscious, to obtain or maintain political power (Hibbs 1973). It is therefore the pursuit of political objectives—not the end result of gaining or not gaining political power—that is at the core (Hibbs 1973). Political violence takes place in the collective sphere where acts of violence are typically committed by a multitude of individuals from one group against individuals from another group, primarily because the targeted individual happens to belong to this group (Coady 2008). Political violence typically takes the form of murder, assaults, and sexual abuse such as rape, forced pregnancy, or sterilization (Coady 2007).

Coady (2008) argues that political violence is to be understood as violence that takes place in relation to political competition. Coady adds that the term *political violence* is used for a broad variety of situations, ranging from terrorist attacks, armed revolution, violent demonstrations, or attacks by citizens aimed at their government to humanitarian intervention and intra-state wars. It can therefore be discerned that political violence is not confined to non-state actors' use of violent means to further a political agenda, but it

can also relate to the state's exercise of force, both against its own citizens and against other states and their citizens (Coady 2008; Kisangani & Nafziger 2007). It is important to note that some mass-scale violence is portrayed as essentially apolitical while in reality being predominantly political. It is vital to understand that political violence relates to acts of violence that are carried out primarily as a means of achieving political influence or power and usually entail a group-component (Coady 2008; Hibbs 1973)

Political violence has played out in different manners throughout Kenya's history. Since attaining independence in 1963, Kenya has had a political history marked by violent uprising. Repression of political opposition has been a common practice. This included violent demonstrations, excessive uses of force, tortures, indefinite detentions, and other measures (Mwagiru 2008). For example, in 1982, following a coup attempt, the Moi regime amended the Constitution of Kenya making Kenya officially a one-party state. What followed were violent demonstrations against this move. Police and security forces dispersed demonstrations against this move forcefully (Mwagiru 2008). Internal and external pressure on Moi's government led to opening up of political space and the first multi-party elections were held in 1992. It is during the multiparty elections under Moi's regime that a new phenomenon emerged in the form of electoral violence in the 1992 and 1997 elections. Moi warned that the return to multiparty politics would result in ethnic clashes (Waki Report 2008). In 1992 multiparty election campaigns; the election itself and its immediate aftermath was characterized by threats, harassments, and the occurrence of violent clashes between supporters for different parties, claiming the lives of around 1,500 Kenyans and displacing more than 300,000 persons, most in the Rift Valley Province (Roth 2009). Far from being the spontaneous result of a return to

political pluralism, there is clear evidence that the government may have been involved in provoking this ethnic violence for political purposes as no adequate steps were taken to prevent it from spiraling out of control (Waki Report 2008).

Moi maintained power with the 1992 elections and, despite increased openness in the political system, the Moi regime continued to repress the political opposition. Like the 1992 elections, the 1997 elections were also associated with violence. Six months prior to the elections, KANU party activists allegedly backed armed gang groups that attacked non-native ethnic groups in the Coast Province, causing the death of more than 100 people and leading to the displacement of more than 100,000 (Akiwumi Report 1999).

After the elections, politically motivated violence between ethnic groups took place. According to Amnesty International (1998), more than 120 Kenyans lost their lives in the Rift Valley when KANU supporters clashed with armed youths belonging to the Kikuyu ethnic group. Amnesty International noted how political violence predominantly occurred in those areas where the Kikuyu-dominated opposition party, the Democratic Party, had won over the Kalenjin-dominated KANU. This report by Amnesty International further indicated that the violence in the Rift Valley, like the pre-election violence in the Coast Province, was endorsed and supported by political leaders, and responses from security forces to halt the violence were non-existent or too reluctant or too delayed to have any meaningful effect. Political violence in the 1990s resulted in many of the persecuted Kikuyu leaving their homes and property in the Rift Valley (Waki Report 2008).

In 2002, after Moi had held two terms and was therefore not allowed to run for president again, Uhuru Kenyatta was appointed as KANU's candidate. Dissatisfied with Moi's choice, a number of KANU members formed a faction, the Rainbow Coalition with Raila Odinga as its leader, which later formed a coalition with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The 13-party coalition, the National Alliance Party of Kenya, joined fronts with the LDP under the name of the National Rainbow Coalition, headed by Mwai Kibaki as its presidential candidate (Wrong 2009). This election was the most peaceful and no violence was witnessed. It is important to note that the two main presidential candidates were from the Kikuyu ethnic group that has been mostly the victims of political violence in Kenya.

The 2007 post-election violence came as a surprise for many Kenyans and the international community—especially given that Kenya has for a long time been considered a politically stable and peaceful country. The violence erupted even before Kibaki was declared winner of the elections, but increased in scale after the announcement. According to the Waki Report (2008), about 1,133 were killed and more than 600,000 Kenyans were internally displaced. To date, a significant number of Kenyans remain in internal displacement camps.

The violence first erupted in the Rift Valley, in particular, around Eldoret. It took the form of ethnic-based clashes between Odinga's supporters, especially from the Kalenjin ethnic group, targeting supporters of Kibaki, mostly from the Kikuyu ethnic group. In one of the worst incidents during the week-long bloodbath, a Kalenjin mob set a church on fire in Eldoret on January 1, 2008, killing more than 35 Kikuyu who had taken shelter (ICG 2008). Certain local politicians incited the violence by urging the local

youths to carrying out brutality directed against individuals according to their ethnic affiliation (ICG 2008).

Support and resistance to political leaders of Kenya have often followed ethnic lines. When forming government, some political leaders have rewarded and ensured advantages to individuals from supportive ethnic groups, while marginalizing or excluding individuals belonging to ethnic groups associated with political opponents (Waki Report 2008). The Waki Report (2008) noted how Moi rewarded his supporters, particularly the Kalenjin through appointments to political offices and with jobs in the public service and the military. As a result, political power has been perceived as vital for obtaining access to public goods, and the distinction between individuals benefiting or being marginalized from such access is viewed in ethnic terms (Wrong 2009). Added to this, political leaders may have a personal interest in obtaining power because large-scale corruption has become institutionalized (Wrong 2009). In a sense, gaining political office has been seen as a struggle for survival. If power is obtained, the perception is that access to scarce resources is ensured; if not, marginalization and exclusion is reckoned to follow (Wrong 2009).

For a long time, the Constitution of Kenya was based on its colonial-era form where the president was awarded with extensive powers. Human Rights Watch (2008) suggests that this increases the risks of a winner-takes-all calculus. The Waki Report (2008), in a similar vein, observes that power has been personalized around the presidency, and this has been increased by changes in the constitution under each president since independence. Laws were routinely passed to increase executive authority, and those laws seen as being in the way were often changed or even ignored

(Waki Report 2008). This has led the public to believe that a person from their own ethnic group must be in power, both to secure benefits and to provide a defensive strategy to keep other ethnic groups from taking jobs, land, and entitlements. This has led both politicians and the public to see acquisition of presidential power as a zero sum game in which losing is seen as hugely costly and unacceptable (Wrong 2009).

Inaction to prosecute and punish those responsible for the election violence in 1992 and 1997 has led many to believe that the culture of impunity rules in Kenya. Judicial inquiries into these outbreaks of political violence named several persons involved and recommended prosecutions. However, neither the Moi-administration nor its successor, the Kibaki-administration, had interest in prosecuting those mentioned (Waki Report 2008; Akiwumi Report 1999). For these reasons, when the most recent election violence erupted in December 2007, perpetrators had good reason to assume that politically motivated violence would go unpunished.

The Waki Report (2008) observes that the Akiwumi Commission established to investigate the ethnic/political violence in the 1990s made recommendations to further investigate certain political leaders, and progress on those recommendations was halted by lack of commitment in government circles and by a legal sector structured in such a way that prosecutions of high-profile political figures were unlikely to occur. The rule of law has thus tended to be put aside in contexts of political competition.

Socioeconomic factors such as widespread poverty, unequal distribution of resources, and high unemployment rates are also among the causes of political violence in Kenya. Kenya has an estimated two million unemployed youth who are fundamentally dissatisfied with social and economic conditions of life (Mwagiru 2008). Joining

criminal gangs may be seen for many young men as a way of life that can increase possibilities to earn a living (Waki Report 2008).

5.2.4 Land Issues

Land has been a source of political conflict in Kenya for many years. In particular, questions related to land distribution and ownership are central in explaining political violence in Kenya. Disputes over land ownership are historically related to colonial and post-independent allocation of land and the colonial government forceful resettlement of individuals from certain ethnic groups into different areas (Zezeza 1992). Such disputes remain unsolved, and some political leaders escalate land-related tensions by making reference to ethnicity. By doing so, the problem acquires potential for inter-community conflict, as has indeed been a characteristic of political violence throughout Kenya's history (Mwaura 2005). Despite several attempts of reforms, land grievances dating back to the colonial era continue to constitute a major obstacle to peaceful co-existence in Kenya (Kanyinga 2007).

Blanton, Mason and Athow (2001) argue that when Kenya became independent in 1963, the most fertile areas that had been occupied by white settlers were handed over to the new government instead of the people who had lived there before. Besides selling pieces of this land on market terms, Kenyan governments have continuously allocated these areas to supporters for patronage purposes (Mwaura 2005). Moreover, because colonial laws were never fundamentally changed, there are no provisions for collective land rights, thus complicating ownership for communities that have traditionally been pastoralists (Mwaura 2005). Shortage and unequal distribution of land has led to dissatisfaction, and violence has been used as means of expressing frustrations. Long-

lasting problems of land ownership and distribution have created tensions among communities more so in the Rift Valley. According to the Waki Report, Kenyans who belong to the Kalenjin ethnic group tend to view the most recent election violence as a result of land injustice. Political violence in Kenya has tended to concentrate in the Rift Valley, often with the Kikuyu ethnic group on the one side and the Kalenjin ethnic group on the other (Waki Report 2008).

The land issue in Kenya has its origin in the colonial history, where the colonialists dreamed of making Kenya a colony for settlement. The colonialists established the Kenya protectorate, and, later on, the Kenya colony with the finance that was to be generated from the white settler plantations, which covered the highly arable areas of the country (Blanton, Mason & Athow 2001). Large tracts of agriculturally potential land (i.e., white highlands) were alienated by the British colonial administration. As a result of the massive land alienation in the early period of colonialism, many of the hitherto cultivating populations were pushed into the “infertile” native reserves that were not conducive for arable farming (Harbeson & Rothchild 1995).

The displaced populations lived as farm laborers, casual workers, and tenants as well as squatters. During the period of nationalism and decolonization, land grievances were central to all ethnic groups that actively participated in the struggle for independence. In fact, the land question is one of the main factors for the Mau Mau rebellion of 1952 to 1956 in Kenya and the subsequent declaration of the state of emergency by the British colonial government (Harbeson & Rothchild 1995).

The British administration, on the eve of independence, worked out a formula of handing over land to the indigenous ethnic groups in Kenya. The British government

established a special grant that was aimed at facilitating the re-distribution of land, particularly in the former white highlands (Mwaura 2005). The transfer of land took various forms, starting from small holdings to medium and large holdings. Blanton, Mason and Athow (2001) note that the obvious expectation during the struggle for independence was that land would be freely distributed to the people since it had, in the first place, been forcefully taken away from them. But this was not to be the case because, under the independence agreement with Britain, the Kenya government was to buy it from the settlers. In fact, the British advanced a loan to Kenya to facilitate this purchase (Blanton, Mason & Athow 2001). That in turn meant that there was no free land for distribution. The price-tag made land very scarce. This is the critical point at which the subsequent land-tenure became a factor of ethnicity; hence, ethnic animosity intensified (Mwaura 2005).

Most of the Kikuyu formed land buying companies and cooperatives using their earnings and savings. They raised money and managed to buy land mostly in the Rift Valley (Mwaura 2005). Apart from their access to land, the economic success of the Kikuyu is enviable by other ethnic groups. The Kikuyu are entrepreneurial, and the regions they inhabit enjoy good modern roads, abundant school and education facilities, expanded health services, piped water, electricity, and other forms of infrastructure (Mwaura 2005).

Consecutive governments have used land as a tool of rewarding supporters. The Waki Report also notes that, during the 1980s and 1990s, land grabbing and allocation of public land as political patronage were part of the gross corruption of this period. In this way, land allocation was often turned into a reward to politically correct individuals. This

perception of unfair distribution and allocation of land has made many communities result to violence in the name of defending or reclaiming their land.

5.3 Critical Juncture-International Intervention and Coordination

A critical juncture constitutes a branching point or a major watershed activity that triggers events and in the process sets in motion structural change (Collier and Collier 1991) The distinctive contribution of the critical juncture framework in this chapter is its approach to explaining post-conflict reconstruction in Kenya after the 2007-2008 post-electoral violence. International intervention and in particular coordination is taken as the critical juncture that engineered constitutional and institutional reforms in post-conflict reconstruction.

The first signal that the international community was serious to see an end to Kenya's post-election crisis was on January 8, 2008, when then chairman of the African Union (AU), Ghanaian President John Kufuor, arrived in Kenya (Mwagiru 2008). His mediation efforts were with the AU mandate. The AU charter recognizes the responsibility to intervene in member states in situations of grave circumstances such as war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity (Mwagiru 2008).

Though President Kufuor was not able to bring the warring factions to a negotiating table, he was instrumental in establishing of the AU Panel of Eminent African Personalities to facilitate resolution of the crisis in Kenya. The panel included former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, as the chairmanship, former President Benjamin Mkapa of United Republic of Tanzania and former First Lady Graça Machel of Mozambique (Mwagiru 2008). On January 24, 2008, Annan and the panel began working to seek to bring a public meeting of the two leaders and consulting widely before the

formal launching of the mediation process. Within two days, a public handshake between President Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga had taken place (Mwagiru 2008).

While this was a critical and significant first step, it did not dispel tensions; the violence continued to rise as the mediation began in earnest (Mwagiru 2008). While the pressure to bring the two leaders together was a main focus in the first days of the mediation, the panel also spent several days meeting with a broad range of civil society and private sector actors to hear their concerns and grievances in preparation for the dialogue process (Mwagiru 2008). The Panel of Eminent African Personalities was joined by eight negotiators, four each from PNU and ODM. This team of mediators and negotiators came to be known as the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation and was officially launched on January 29, 2008. The objectives of the mediation were twofold: (1) to bring about a political resolution to end the violence; and (2) to bring about a dialogue to address longer term structural problems in Kenya and institute the foundation for the reforms needed for sustainable peace in the country (Mwagiru 2008). The dialogue dealt with four items. The first three focused on the short-term objective of finding a resolution to the immediate crisis, the fourth item, now commonly referred to in Kenya as Agenda Item Four, concerned with long-term issues and solutions (Mwagiru 2008).

Through local and international pressure, the effort yielded fruits on the critical issue of political power-sharing on February 28, 2008. Aided by Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete, Annan got Kibaki and Odinga to sign an Agreement on the Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government. Both leaders committed to establishing a governing coalition of the PNU and ODM, changing the Constitution to create the

position of prime minister for Odinga. The position was established to coordinate and supervise the execution of government functions and affairs (National Accord and Reconciliation Act 2008). The National Accord and Reconciliation Act (2008) provide that the prime minister and the two deputy prime ministers, one from PNU and the other from ODM, be removed only by a majority vote in Kenya's National Assembly. The peace agreement states that cabinet positions are based on parliamentary strength, with no minister subjected to removal unless both party leaders approve. Finally, the agreement states that the coalition will be dissolved should the parliament be dissolved, should one party withdraw, if an election is held, or should both parties agree to the dissolution (Kenya Parliament National Accord and Reconciliation Act 2008).

The United States of America (USA) government was in the forefront exerting power through “carrot and stick” during the negotiation process and post-conflict reconstruction period. Kenya has been a valuable USA ally since independence, providing the United States with access to USA military facilities and political support in the United Nations (Munene, Nyunya and Adar 1995). Policy makers in Washington, once considered Kenya as a model developing country with shared democratic values in a continent where civil wars raged and military and authoritarian governments reigned. Kenya has been an important United States ally in the war against terrorism since the bombing of United States embassy in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 (ICG 2008).

Given its importance to regional stability and to United States interests, Kenya's crisis assumed a higher priority for the United States than other flashpoints of instability on the continent. The fact that the Embassy of the United States in Nairobi is the largest in all of sub-Saharan Africa reflects the country's centrality to a number of USA

priorities (ICG 2008). Kenya is a significant counterterrorism partner and an important point of military and humanitarian access in the region (Nyambura 2011). Kenya has also been a vital diplomatic partner in efforts to bring stability to Sudan and Somalia. Moreover, the country is a regional hub for the United States international nongovernmental programs as well as the linchpin for private sector activity in East Africa (Munene, Nyunya and Adar 1995). The international community appreciated that the stakes went beyond Kenya, whose political and economic health is an essential ingredient for the security and prosperity of Eastern and Central Africa. Kenya's stability determines regional access to energy supplies and basic commodities and guarantees a relatively safe environment for hundreds of thousands of Somali and Sudanese refugees, and for landlocked countries like Rwanda and Uganda.

The USA involvement in efforts to end Kenya's post-election violence started by the sending of U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi E. Frazer to Kenya in early January 2008 to advocate for an end to the violence and a political solution (Frazer 2008). The United States and other members of the UN Security Council supported the Annan-led mediation and urged Kenyan political leaders to engage fully in finding a sustainable political solution and recommended that those responsible for violence be brought to justice (Mwagiru 2008). The USA House of Representatives and the Senate held hearings focused on the Kenyan crisis in early February 2008, and both bodies passed resolutions expressing deep concern about the turmoil and supporting a peaceful resolution (Mwagiru 2008).

The USA administration also announced that it would review its roughly \$500 million per year foreign assistance program for Kenya in light of the government's

questionable legitimacy, but it also provided over \$5 million in emergency humanitarian and \$10 million for governance (Ranneberger 2008).

In the midst of his Africa trip, United States President George W. Bush dispatched United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to Nairobi on February 18, 2008 to underscore USA support for Annan, to pressure the parties to move quickly toward an agreement, and to reinforce the signal that there would be no “business as usual” until some power-sharing arrangement had been struck (Rice 2008). On February 26, 2008 Secretary Rice issued a strong statement reiterating United States’ support for Annan, expressing disappointment in the failure of the parties to come to agreement on power-sharing and stressing that the USA relationship with both warring sides and their legitimacy hinged on their cooperation to achieve political solution and peace in Kenya (Rice 2008). Once the power-sharing agreement was announced, the secretary issued a statement congratulating Kenyans and pledging continued United States’ support.

Another instrument that the international community used to force reforms in Kenya was the International Criminal Court (ICC). In December 2010, ICC Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo alleged that six senior Kenyan officials had instigated the post-election violence and accused them of crimes against humanity committed during post-election violence. These officials include Head of the Public Service Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Finance Minister Uhuru Kenyatta, former Police Chief and current Chief Executive of the Postal Service Mohamed Hussein Ali, former Minister of Higher Education William Ruto, former Minister of Industrialization Henry Kosgey, and Head of Operations of KASS FM Joshua Arap Sang (ICC 2010). Interestingly, the USA government was among the very first countries to voice their support for the ICC process.

U.S. President Barack Obama urged all Kenyan leaders and the people to cooperate fully with the ICC investigation. This is despite the fact that the USA is not a signatory to the Rome Statute that established ICC. Kenya government has been opposed to the ICC process, and, in January 2011, the government of Kenya received the support of the African Union for a deferral of the ICC prosecution of the six suspects. In a statement, the AU stated that the ICC process threatens the on-going national efforts in peace building, national reconciliation, and political transition. In early April 2011, the United Nations Security Council informally rejected Kenya's request for deferment of the ICC cases, with three of the members of the Security Council, (Britain, France, and the United States), being highly opposed to deferment. These trials at the Hague are likely to have a huge impact on the Kenya's political environment as the country gears for the 2012 general elections.

There have been concrete coordination and commitments from major international and local actors during implementation of the peace deal and progress on needed reforms in post-conflict Kenya. The United States has used its power to keep the coalition together and to facilitate needed institutional and structural reforms. To support post-conflict reconstruction in Kenya, the USA government provided the highest bilateral foreign assistance amounting to \$ 666.458 million in 2008 fiscal year, \$ 704.642 million in 2009 fiscal year, and \$ 659.135 million in 2010 fiscal year (DCD-DAC 2010).

The United Kingdom was second with an average of \$ 113 million in the same period (DCD-DAC 2010). The European Union (EU) has exercised leadership in support of critical structural reforms and meaningful power-sharing. The USA and EU has been involved in land reforms, judicial reforms, police reforms, constitutional reforms, and

electoral reform in Kenya. The USA and EU have also played a vital role in donor coordination and burden-sharing by establishing a more formalized multilateral structure to support Kenya's recovery. Thus the small number of actors involved in the coordination network helped achieve constitutional, institutional, and land reforms to set the path towards peaceful co-existence in Kenya.

5.3.1 Constitutional Reforms

On August 4, 2010, through a national referendum, Kenyans approved a new constitution with 67% in favor and 31% against. The new constitution was promulgated on August 27, 2010 by President Mwai Kibaki. The international community played a vital role in encouraging Kenya to adopt a new Constitution. The USA embassy in Kenya actively and openly campaigned and urged Kenyans to approve the new Constitution during the referendum. The new Constitution heralds a new beginning for Kenya and it has started to fundamentally transform the country's political, economic, and social landscape. It addresses political patronage, gender disparity, negative ethnicity, and land grabbing issues that have afflicted Kenya since independence (Gettleman 2010). The new constitution establishes a Supreme Court and an upper legislative house or the Senate. The position of the prime minister is abolished and a presidential system with checks and balances is established. The new constitution also contains one of the most progressive Bill of Rights provisions (Kenya Constitution 2010).

The passing of a new constitution marked a conclusion of over 20 years of struggle in search of a new constitutional order in Kenya. The struggle for constitutional reform has been on the Kenyan political agenda since the late 1980s. The struggle, in most cases, had been characterized by violent demonstrations. By the early 1990s there

were calls to completely overhaul the constitution as one way of restoring good governance and economic development in the country. However, even with the re-introduction of multiparty politics in Kenya in 1991, most aspects of the old constitutional dispensation were left intact (Mwagiru 2008).

The resolution of the 2007-2008 post-election violence offered an opportunity for constitutional reforms in Kenya. Based on the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation committee's agreement, two commissions, the Independent Review Commission on the 2007 Elections and the Commission of Inquiry on Post-Election Violence, were formed to investigate and report on different aspects of the crisis (KNDR Report 2008).

As expected, their subsequent recommendations formed the bases for electoral and institutional reforms and, more importantly, the foundation for a comprehensive constitutional review. In late 2008, a Parliamentary Select Committee on Constitutional Review was named and two review statutes, the Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Bill 2008, and the Constitution of Kenya Review Act 2008, were enacted by Parliament (Kenya Parliament 2008). These paved the way for the subsequent creation of the Interim Independent Electoral Commission, Interim Independent Boundaries Review Commission and the Committee of Experts on Constitutional Review (KNDR Report 2008). The USA government provided the most funds to support constitutional reform between 2008 and 2010 the USA government had given Kenya approximately \$ 65 millions to go towards constitutional and judicial reforms (USAID 2010).

Kenya has witnessed the onset of fundamental changes since the enactment of the new constitution. New institutions have been established that can facilitate and deepen

state-building and the democratization process. The Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution is a new body whose central function is to monitor, facilitate, and oversee the development of legislation and administrative procedures required to implement the constitution.

The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights and Kenya's National Commission on Gender and Development were merged to serve as one commission charged with the task of safeguarding human rights and equality concerns. They established the Constitutional Implementation Oversight Committee of Parliament whose key mandate is to co-ordinate with the attorney general, the Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution, and relevant parliamentary committees to ensure the timely introduction and passage of the legislation required by the constitution (KNDR Report 2011).

A new Judicial Service Commission that embarked on renewing Kenya's judiciary was established. It has, so far, facilitated recruitment and appointment of the chief justice, the deputy chief justice, Supreme Court judges, and judges of the high court who have taken office. This has gone a long way in restoring Kenyan faith in the judiciary (KNDR Report 2011).

The judiciary is going through institutional reforms that include financial independence, transparent and merit-based appointment, discipline and removal of judges, strong commitment to human right and gender equity, and reconstitution of the Judicial Service Commission to include other stakeholders and enhance independence and autonomy of the Commission. Reforms include the enacted Judicial Service Commission Act with provision for peer review mechanisms and performance

contracting along with streamlining the functioning of legal and judicial institutions by adopting a sector-wide approach to increase recruitment, training, planning, management, and implementation of programs and activities in the justice sector (KNDR Report 2011). The goals of these reforms were to restore Kenyans faith and trust with the judiciary and government in general. This was important in facilitating a successful post-conflict reconstruction.

5.3.2 Institutional Reforms

The reforms in the security sector have been momentous. The new constitution established an independent police service. The police and the administration police are to be merged under one command of an inspector general of police (Kenya Constitution 2010). The National Task Force on Police Reforms and the Police Reforms Implementation Committee have come up with draft bills, namely, the National Police Service Commission Bill, 2011; the Private Security Industry Regulation Bill, 2010, and the National Coroners Service Bill, 2010 (KNDR Report 2011). The National Police Service Bill, 2011, has since been enacted into law while the National Police Service Commission Bill and the Independent Policing Oversight Authority Bill, 2011, are before the Kenyan Parliament (KNDR Report 2011).

There have also been steps to recruit and train more police officers to raise the police-to-population ratio to the UN standard. This includes improving the living conditions of officers and upgrading the deplorable state of police stations countrywide (KNDR Report 2011). The USA government gave an average of about \$45 million each year in support of security sector reforms from the year 2007 to 2010 (USAID 2010).

Institutional reforms in the Civil Service have equally been implemented. This includes results-based management and performance contracting to cover all persons paid from public funds, ensuring public offices adhere to the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, 2003, and the Public Officer Ethics Act, 2003; parliamentary vetting of senior public appointments, and ensuring whistleblower and witness protection have been instituted (KNDR Report 2011). In support of civil service reforms the USA gave an average of \$5 million in each of the fiscal year between 2007-2010 (USAID 2010).

The parliament is going through fundamental institutional reforms. For example, comprehensive review of the parliamentary standing orders and procedures is being undertaken to enrich quality and output of parliamentary debates and strengthen multiparty democracy (KNDR Report 2010). Parliament's research centre has been strengthened and live coverage and electronic voting have become operational (KNDR Report 2009). The international community has supported enhanced oversight by Parliament over the national budget and a monitoring and implementation committee has been created to ensure stricter and timelier deliberations on reports. Parliament has also been freed from the executive and will control its own calendar (Kenya 2010). The USA government provided \$3 million in each of the fiscal years 2007-2010 in support of parliament reforms (USAID 2010).

The international community has also supported efforts geared at ensuring transparency, accountability, and fight against impunity in government. To strengthen institutions to fight corruption, the USA government gave Kenya an average of \$6 million for the fiscal years 2007-2010 (USAID 2010). These steps includes strengthening the policy formulation framework, establishing legal and institutional framework for

increased public transparency and accountability, anticorruption, ethics and integrity through the development of a national anti-corruption policy, and capacity enhancements to strengthen the Kenya National Audit Office (KNDR Report 2010). The government has also undertaken programs to support improved prosecution and adjudication of corruption and economic crimes and to support improved oversight and consideration of anti-corruption and audit reports by Parliament. This will enhance capacity and performance in the investigation and asset tracing programs and revitalization of public financial management including the management of devolved funds. Full operationalization and capacity-building of the Public Complaints Standing Committee has also been undertaken (KNDR Report 2010).

In brief, these institutional reforms were intended to facilitate good governance, government effectiveness, and the rule of all which are critical elements of post-conflict state-building.

5.3.3 Land Reforms

While land and land-based resources remain the single most important economic factor in Kenya, their mismanagement and maladministration has led to massive human rights violations. In Kenya, 75% of the population is directly dependent on land yet land distribution is skewed in many ways (Mwaura 2005). Unequal distribution of land can be traced to the oppressive and disharmonized land governance systems in Kenya initiated by the colonial rule and retained by the post-independence regimes. The new constitution has ushered in land reforms. Some of these reforms involve addressing fundamental issues of land tenure and land use along with the development and implementation of national land policies taking into account the linkages between land use, environmental

conservation, forestry, and water resources (Kenya Constitution 2010). Some of the reforms being undertaken include harmonization of land laws into one statute to reduce multiple allocations of title deeds and establishment of a transparent, decentralized, affordable, and efficient GIS-based land information management system and a GIS-based land registry at the Ministry of Lands including all local authorities (KNDR Report 2009).

The National Land Policy specifically offers a framework of policies and laws designed to ensure the maintenance of a system of land administration and management that will provide: (a) all citizens with the opportunity to access, occupy, and use land, (b) economically viable, socially equitable, and environmentally sustainable allocation and use of land, (c) efficient, effective, and economical operation of land markets, (d) efficient and effective utilization of land and land-based resources, and (e) efficient and transparent land dispute resolution mechanisms (KNDR Report 2009). The land reforms were aimed at addressing unequal distribution of land, irregular allocation and reducing corruption at the ministry of lands, which have been a major source of inter-community conflicts.

5.3.4 National Cohesion

National cohesion refers to acts or processes that are geared towards uniting Kenyan so that they can co-exist harmoniously and peacefully. Efforts have been made to enhance national cohesion and unity. These have been through National Cohesion and Integration Act 2008, enacted in December 2008 (Kenya 2008). The acts seeks to encourage national cohesion and integration by outlawing discrimination on ethnic grounds, hate speech, and provides for establishment of the National Cohesion and

Integration Commission to ensure the provisions of the act are followed (Kenya Parliament 2008). The international community helped in building institutional framework for a Peace-Building and Conflict Resolution Program (PBCR) and early warning mechanisms on social conflict, including a PBCR monitoring and evaluation system and a restructured secretariat, and enactment of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) Act, 2008. This act was signed into law on November 28, 2008 (Kenya Parliament 2008). The TJRC Act seeks to assess past human rights violations and other historical injustices with the view to bringing the perpetrators to justice, while providing remedies to the victims. The USA government provided an average of \$4 million each year in the period 2007-2010 in support of national cohesion programs (USAID 2010).

To deal with the youth unemployment challenges, several youth employment programs and capacity development have been initiated. The Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports has initiated a Youth Employment Marshall Plan, which aims to create over 500,000 jobs in the formal and informal sectors (KNDR Report 2009). The African Development Bank approved a Ksh2.9 billion (KNDR Report 2009) loan that targets the youth in Kenya and the money is expected to help finance a Technical, Industrial, Vocational and Entrepreneurship Training project in the country as a response to the problem of huge numbers of unskilled and unemployed youth (KNDR Report 2009). The loan is channeled through investment programs within the framework of the Kenya Education Sector Support Programme 2005-2010, which aims to improve access, quality and relevance of skills (KNDR Report 2009). In addressing the issues of poverty, inequality, and regional imbalances, efforts to ensure equity and balance in development

across all regions including in job creation, poverty reduction, improved income distribution, and gender equity (KNDR Report 2010).

Another set of policies have targeted to increase community empowerment through devolved public funds for both social and income programs and development of local capacity to manage devolved funds. Community empowerment has also increased through implementation of policies and programs that minimize the differences in income opportunities and that provide access to social services across Kenya, with special attention to the most disadvantaged communities in the arid and semi-arid districts, urban informal settlements, and pockets of poverty in high potential areas (KNDR Report 2010).

The Kenya government and its international development partners have registered improvement in wealth creation opportunities for disadvantaged groups and regions through increased infrastructure spending in roads, water, sewerage, communications, and electricity as they target poor communities and regions; they have increased availability of affordable and accessible credit, savings programs, and appropriate technologies to create an enabling environment for poor communities to take part in wealth creation (KNDR Report 2010). Efforts have also been noted in development of an affirmative action policy and, more so, through enhancing the Women's Enterprise Fund along with improved health infrastructure in undeserved areas of the country through construction or rehabilitation of community health centers (KNDR Report 2010).

5.4 Summary

The February 28, 2008, peace agreement provided Kenyans and the international community an opportunity to implement far-reaching post-conflict reconstruction reforms

aimed at addressing the fundamental root causes of recurrent post-election violence and to create a peaceful and stable Kenya. With the adoption of a broad reform agenda in constitutional making and institutional reforms, Kenya has taken the right path towards post-conflict reconstruction.

Kenya has adopted a new constitution that guarantees freedom and rights as well as responsibilities. Fundamental institutional reforms in the areas of security sector reforms, civil service reforms, parliamentary reforms, electoral reforms, and judicial reforms among others intend to enhance political, economic, and social-cultural security and development in Kenya. These reforms offer a solid framework to end the culture of impunity and, at the same time, propagate good governance in terms of respect for the rule of law, citizens' participation, and government effectiveness.

The international community has played big role in shaping Kenya's post-conflict reconstruction. There is enormous evidence, as shown above, of greater collaboration and coordination among local actors in Kenya and members of the international community, more specifically, the African Union, European Union and United States of America. Local and international players formed a coordination network. The formation of a grand coalition government ensured that local players were in one umbrella and in the process made the number of actors few. The USA used "carrot and stick" within the network, while the "Friends Group" offered legitimate leadership. The Kenya case demonstrates that the local and international actors have been able to effectively coordinate their policies and activities in a more coherent and consensual manner in their push for a secure, stable, and peaceful post-conflict Kenya.

Chapter 6 - Sudan: The Birth of a New State

On July 9, 2011, The Republic of South Sudan officially became the world's youngest state. The independence of South Sudan marked a significant development in the international system as it signaled a turning point to one of the longest civil wars in Africa. It also resulted in the partitioning of Africa's largest country. Through a referendum held on January 9, 2011, Southern Sudanese overwhelmingly voted to secede from the Republic of Sudan. The road map for this journey had been explicitly outline in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed on January 9, 2005, in Nairobi, Kenya, between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/SPLA).

The CPA framework had provisions on security arrangements, power-sharing, some autonomy for the South, and equitable distribution of economic resources, including oil. While the parties to the CPA established the unity of Sudan as a priority under the agreement, they decided to set up a six-and-a-half-year interim period during which interim institutions would govern the country with international monitoring mechanisms. It provided for a referendum after six and half years in which South Sudan had to decide either to be part of the larger Sudan or to secede (CPA 2005). The CPA instrumentally brought to a halt the longest civil war in Africa.

Since achieving independence in 1956, Sudan has been plagued with prolonged violent conflicts. The first Sudanese civil war started in 1955 and ended in 1972. The second civil war began in 1983 and ended in 2002. These conflicts have stalled its political, economic, social, and cultural development. It is estimated that about two

million people died as a result of the fighting that took place for over two decades, over four million people have been displaced and driven from their homes within Sudan, while almost over half a million refugees have spilled into neighboring countries making it the largest displacement in the world today (Burr 1998).

Some of the causes of these conflicts can be attributed to colonial government and others to the post-colonial government. The colonial administration is to be blamed for mapping the road for possible ethnicity cleavages, religious divisions, and development in the post-independent Sudan. However, the national governments that followed are equally to blame for injustices, inequality, and mismanagement of the country's affairs. The post-colonial government in Sudan demonstrated a lack of ability and will to deal with the contemporary issues that faced and continue to face the people of Sudan.

The major protagonists in the Sudan civil war have been the Sudanese government through its political wing the National Islamic Front and the rebel movement the SPLA. The two warring factions have carried out the civil war with stark brutality, although the government of Sudan has been accused of being responsible for the worst human rights abuses (ICG 2004). The civil war was in some ways a religious war between a Northern government that was largely Arab and Muslim and a Southern insurgency that was largely black and significantly Christian (ICG 2002). It is important to note that a united Sudan had 65% Africans and 35% Arabs. Over 70% of Sudanese are Muslim, of whom a large percentage is of African descent. Most of the rest follow traditional religions, with 5-10% being Christian (ICG 2002). The civil war was also over oil and other natural resources, and it was also a war about ideologies, including the

degree to which a government's radical Islamist agenda could be moderated and a rebel movement's authoritarianism could embrace civilian democracy (ICG 2002).

Most of the nine countries that bordered the united Sudan, that is, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libyan, and Uganda, frequently supported Sudanese factions, hoping to keep their large neighbor destabilized or hoping to remove perceived threats to their own governments (ICG 2004). However, turmoil in Sudan has been destabilizing to its neighboring states, many of whom struggle with internal violence and secessionism movements (Deng and Morrison 2001).

Sudan has been accused of providing a rich breeding ground for international terrorism and extremism hence threatening international peace and security (ICG 2004). Sudan was seen to have longstanding ties to terrorist organizations, aiding and abetting representatives and businesses of terrorist groups, as well as providing Osama bin Laden refuge until pressure from the United States of America (USA) led to his departure in 1996 (ICG 2004).


During the last two decades of the civil war in Sudan, there has been proliferation of peace initiatives and agreements that were either partially implemented or totally dishonored by the parties to the conflict. The lack of an internationally driven, multilateral, high-level effort was a major cause of failure to build a viable peace process in Sudan. This was eventually realized during and after negotiations for the CPA. The signing of the CPA in 2005 marked the formal end of a 22-year civil war between Sudanese government led by the National Congress Party, and the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement/Army, the southern principal rebel group (CPA 2005).

The international community, as a critical juncture, achieved significantly the goal of stabilizing Sudan. International and local actors have committed the necessary political, diplomatic, and financial resources and, through effective coordination, helped midwife a new nation-state. They also ended one of the longest and worst civil war.

The United States of America used its hegemonic power to exert pressure on local actors to work towards peace. The USA sustained its support during the negotiation and showed serious commitment to the process by appointing USA Senator John Danforth on September 2001 as USA President George Bush's special envoy to Sudan. This appointment represented the highest-level commitment to supporting peace in Sudan than any previous administration in Washington, had made (ICG 2004). During the post-conflict reconstruction, the USA government appointed different high-level personalities as special envoys to Sudan with a mandate to keep all parties engaged to successful reconstruction of Sudan. The coordination network for post-conflict in Sudan included the USA, Norway, United Kingdom, France, and Italy. The leadership of this Contact Group/Friends of Sudan has been instrumental in supporting post-conflict reconstruction in Sudan.

Figure 6.1 illustrates the process tracing mechanism that resulted to a successful post-conflict reconstruction in Sudan. Several factors, critical antecedents, precipitated the intervention of the international community. These factors are discussed in the next sub-section.

Figure 6.1 Causal Mechanism for Sudan



6.1 Critical Antecedents

This chapter examines *colonial legacy, self determination, religious tensions* and *oil/natural resources* as critical antecedents that combined in a causal sequence with factors during a critical juncture to produce *divergent long-term outcomes*—in this case, post-conflict reconstruction in Sudan (Slate and Simmons 2010). Most of Sudan’s political landscape has been characterized by civil war that has spanned for over two decades. The civil war can be attributed to factors like colonial legacy that perpetuated ethnic-based politics, a policy of divide and rule, religious tensions, and competition for oil and other natural resources.

6.1.1 A Brief Historical Background

Sudan's civil war began even before the country had attained its independence. In 1955, just as the country's independence approached, Southern anxiety led to riots and a bloody rebellion; this was after hearing speculations that they were to be disarmed and transferred to the North (Akol 2003). Akol (2003) observes that the soldiers from the army's Southern Corps went on mutiny and fled into the bush or neighboring countries after killing 300 people, mostly Northerner. Further tensions began in September 1956 when the Legislative Assembly appointed a committee to draft a national constitution; only three of 46 members were Southerners (Abdel 1970). Abdel notes that the southern delegation walked out after its repeated calls for a federal constitution were outvoted.

The provisional constitution that established Sudan on January 1, 1956, failed to settle two issues critical to many Sudanese, that is, whether the state would be secular or Islamic and whether the state would be a unitary or a federal system (Abdel 1970). In November 1958, the army, led by General Ibrahim Abboud, seized power (Akol 2003). Upon coming to power, this military regime suppressed opposition by imprisoning politicians, trade unionists, and university students (Akol 2003). Through an aggressive campaign, Abboud began a controversial effort to Islamize the South and, in the process, forced thousands of Southerners into exile in Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, and the Central African Republic (Akol 2003).

These refugees formed themselves into an opposition group against the government in the North. The Sudan African National Union (SANU) became the most significant opposition group for the people of Southern Sudan (Akol 2001). SANU petitioned the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity, now called the

African Union, seeking self-determination and a peaceful solution to the Southern Sudan problem (Akol 2001). SANU was the political voice of Southern Sudanese, the *Anya-Nya* ("snake poison") emerged as the military movement composed mainly of former soldiers and policemen from the 1955 mutiny who had managed to avoid arrests (Akol 2001). Most the Southerners explicitly or implicitly associated themselves with SANU or *Anya-Nya* or both.

A Northern civilian uprising forced Abboud from power in October 1964, and civilians installed Nimeiri as the President. There was optimism that this presented an opportunity for peace; however, a roundtable conference in Khartoum in 1965 failed to bring a political settlement (Alier 1990). The war intensified and became internationalized, with increasing numbers of external powers supporting either the government or the *Anya-Nya* and sometimes both (Alier1990). For example, in 1965 rebels from the Democratic Republic of the Congo provided *Anya-Nya* with arms (Elnur 2009). At the same time, Israel became a key financier of *Anya-Nya* after the Six-Day War of June 1967 and shipped weapons captured from Egypt, with an aim of encourage the government to limit its assistance to Middle East nations (Elnur 2009).

Israel established a base in Uganda and began training and supporting *Anya-Nya* troops, who also relied on Ethiopia as a sanctuary (Elnur 2009). On the other hand, Muslim nations like the United Arab Emirates, People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the State of Kuwait aided the war effort by providing arms, ammunition, and funds to the Northern Sudan government (Ahmed 2008). The government's main financier, however, was the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Soviet aid increased dramatically after the Six-Day War, and, in January 1968, Sudan and

the Soviet Union signed a \$100 million agreement (Woodward 1995). The Arab-led Khartoum government reneged on promises to Southerners to create a federal system, which led to a mutiny by Southern army officers that launched the civil war (Abdel 1970).

In May 1969 Nimeiri reached out to Southern Sudanese leaders and neighboring countries to broker peace (Ahmed 2009). Nimeiri signed an agreement in Addis Ababa in 1972 that granted a measure of autonomy to the South. Southern support helped him put down two coup attempts, one initiated by officers from the western regions of Darfur and Kordofan who wanted for their region the same privileges granted to the South (Ahmed 2009). But tensions grew over the government's systematic violations of the peace agreement, discovery of oil in the South, and a growing Islamic shift culminating in Khartoum's countrywide imposition of Islamic sharia law in 1983 (Ahmed 2009).

In the year 1983, armed groups in the South, including the main rebel organization, the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), began a fresh insurrection. The war continued even after Nimeiri was ousted and a democratic government was elected. On June 30, 1989, Colonel Omar al-Bashir led a group of army officers in ousting the unstable coalition government of Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi in a bloodless military coup (Salih 2009). Under al-Bashir's leadership, the new military government suspended political parties and introduced an Islamic legal code on the national level (Ahmed 2009).

6.1.2 Colonial Legacy

Most of what has prevailed in Sudan for the last couple of decades can be attributed to the colonial legacy. Sudan came under the control of Britain in 1898. Britain

took over management of Southern Sudan, leaving the North under nominal Egyptian rule, which by then was a quasi-protectorate of Britain (Abdel 1970). Britain formulated an exclusive policy targeting Southern Sudan. The prime objective of this policy was to prevent economic integration of the two regions in order to curtail the northern Arabic and Islamic influence (Woodward 1995).

Woodward (1995) argues that the British saw a distinct South as a buffer that could preserve English values and beliefs, such as Christianity, and eventually either be developed into a separate political entity or integrated into British East Africa. This buffer zone was to keep the Northern Sudanese from traveling south and the Southern Sudanese from traveling north. Therefore, a Christian missionary presence was encouraged in the South, as were the English language and British legal traditions (Woodward 1995).

In the process, the Southern part of Sudan was largely closed off to Northern contact and increasingly isolated from the Northern part of Sudan. On the other hand, in the north, Egypt encouraged Islamic values, while the British colonial government focused its efforts largely on economic interests (Elnur 2009). As a result, economic and political power came to be centered in the north. Gasim al Seed (2008) argues that the creation of ethnic boundaries by the British colonial government was further exacerbated by the focus on enforcing unequal development between the north and the south. The north and south regions' cultural and religious identities became more divisive, and the stage was set for discord. In 1947, after realizing the inevitability of Sudanese independence, the British fused the separately ruled zones and gave political power to the

northern elite, thereby sowing the seeds of war in newly independent Sudan (Woodward 1995).

Like many colonial creations, the British colonial government amalgamated territory and peoples that had never previously been a coherent entity and used a divide and rule policy to plant divisions among them (Woodward 1995). The British ruled the north and the south under separate administrations and policies, and there was a clear separation between the two geographical regions from 1924 to 1956, which spurred increased amounts of isolation from one another. The Northern Sudanese increasingly perceived the Southern Sudanese as the “other,” and vice versa, despite the fact that the two groups lived in the same republic (Woodward 1995). Thus, the roots of conflict were initiated during this colonial period. The post-colonial governments in Sudan perpetuated if not perfected the colonial ways of governance, further compounding racial divisions, inequality, ethnicity, and religious tensions among the people of Sudan. As a result, two decades of civil war followed.

6.1.3 South Search for Self Determination

The Sudan civil war was mainly a struggle by the southern Sudanese in search for self determination. Sudan's domestic political landscape and its international alliances were dramatically altered in July 1971 by a failed coup. During this period north Sudan government's diplomatic relation with the Soviet bloc took a worsening turn, but, on the other side, those with Western Europe, the United States, People's Republic of China, and most of the Arab states improved significantly (ICG 2002). Consequently, the Soviet Union terminated its support for the war effort denying Nimeiri his largest military

backing. It is from this background that Nimeiri came to see peace as more attractive than fighting an unpopular war backed by a weak army (Elnur 2009).

In the face of delicate domestic support, Nimeiri signaled his willingness to address the civil war issues and improve regional relations, hoping to strengthen his hold on power. In March 1971, he signed an agreement with Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia in which both leaders promised to cease assisting the other's separatist movements. Nimeiri also signed an agreement with Ugandan dictator Idi Amin to end support of Ugandan rebels in exchange for similar action. (Elnur 2009). Amin expelled the Israelis from Uganda. With this loss of external support, the *Anya-Nya's* war capabilities were hugely reduced, forcing Southern politicians to consider Nimeiri's peace overtures in late 1971 and early 1972 (Elnur 2009).

Alier (1990) has advanced that, with a monopoly of power, Nimeiri faced little opposition to ending the war in the South. This situation facilitated the search for peace as at that time the *Anya-Nya* was changing from a disparate group plagued by ethnic and personal rivalries into a more unified political force. Alier adds that Colonel Joseph Lagu seized authority in *Anya-Nya*, united its officers under his command, and declared the formation of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (Alier 1990).

The unity of the South Sudan Liberation Movement/*Anya-Nya* proved invaluable in the peace negotiations that began at Addis Ababa in 1971 (Alier 1990). Whereas the 1965 roundtable failed because southern representatives were split between those favoring secession or a federal system, a settlement was achieved this time because Lagu convinced his followers to accept Nimeiri's proposal for peace within the framework of one Sudan (Alier 1990).

Ratification of the Addis Ababa Agreement on the Problem of South Sudan in March 1972 inaugurated a peaceful and cooperative era. The agreement included power-sharing and security guarantees for southerners and, most importantly, granted the south political and economic autonomy. Former *Anya-Nya* soldiers were to be included in the national army in proportion to the national population, and 6,000 southerners were to be recruited into the army's southern Command, an important security provision (Alier 1990).

After the Addis Ababa peace agreement, there was a period of about ten years of stability during which the south politically progressed in terms of democratic principles compared to the rest of the country. The civil war resumed after 10 years of relative tranquility, security, and stability and effectively stopped work on major developmental projects such as the Jonglei Canal project that was hoped could eliminate marginalization and poverty in the south (Alier 1990).

The second and longest Sudanese Civil War started in 1983 and lasted up to 2005. Over 2 million people were killed and over 4 million displaced due to the conflict (Ahmed 2008). The resumption of the North-South civil war was a result of failure by Nimeiri and the North Sudan government to fully honor and implement the provisions of the Addis Ababa peace agreement (Alier 1990). On June 5, 1983, Nimeiri issued Republican Order Number One, in which he dishonored the Addis Ababa Agreement and, in the process, returned regional powers to the central government (Alier 1990). Alier (1990) asserts that the Republican Order Number One explicitly destroyed the south's autonomy and carved it into three powerless administrative provinces. It transferred the South's financial powers to the central government and declared Arabic,

not English, the region's official language (Alier 1990). In addition to dramatically re-centralizing political and economic power, Nimeiri officially transformed Sudan into an Islamic state, decreeing in September 1983 that *sharia*, Islamic law was to be the sole guiding force behind the law of the Sudan (Alier 1990). Though one-third of the population was non-Muslim, Islamic penal codes were imposed on the entire country. This unilateral action enraged southerners who engaged in violent protest and mobilized around the SPLA with John Garang as its leader (Ahmed 2008). To gain support, the SPLA defined its objectives more broadly than southern autonomy, arguing that all of Sudan needed to be transformed into a multi-racial, multi-religious, and multiethnic democratic state (Ahmed 2008). This strategy earned SPLA an overwhelming popularity among the people of South Sudan.

On June 30, 1989, the current President of Sudan, Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir seized power in a *coup d'état*. Upon getting into power, al-Bashir immediately canceled all prior peace agreements with the South Sudan including the proposed constitutional conference (Ahmed 2008). He imposed a state of emergency and created the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation, which he chaired, to serve as a cabinet (Ahmed 2008). He further revoked the Transitional Constitution of 1985, abolished the Parliament, banned political parties, detained all political party leaders, and closed all newspapers (Ahmed 2008).

Garang and his military wing, the SPLA, launched a successful military attack against the al-Bashir government in the first seven years, but thereafter it started to endure severe setbacks (Akol 2001). These setbacks were due to a combination of factors, but, mostly in May 1991, the collapse of the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia

deprived SPLA of its main operating base, its primary military and financial supplier, and most of its military momentum (Akol 2001).

The new Ethiopian government that was composed of various rebel groups backed by the Sudanese government remained unsympathetic to the SPLA. This situation forced the SPLA to evacuate its military camps from Ethiopia, and, at the same time, over 200,000 Sudanese refugees were forced back into South Sudan (Akol 2001). In May 1991, the Sudanese government Air Force bombed Sudanese refugees as they fled their camps in Ethiopia (Akol 2001).

What followed was a proliferation of third-party mediation attempts. Talks convened in Abuja, Nigeria, from May 26 to June 4, 1992, that included the government, the SPLA, and the SPLA-United (Elnur 2009). During the peace talks, the government of Sudan insisted that SPLA-United, which was a breakaway from SPLA, should have its own delegation in an effort to play the rebel factions against one another (Elnur 2009). The talk was doomed to fail as the government came prepared to make no concessions because of its military success, and it was aware that the SPLA was in a weak bargaining position (Elnur 2009). Though international pressure forced the Abuja talks to resume approximately a year later, both sides deadlocked again on a number of issues: religion and state, the political system and security during an interim period, socio-economic policies, and a referendum on self-determination (Elnur 2009).

The infighting between Dinka and Nuer southern groups further undermined rebels bargaining power. In 1994, Riak changed the name of his movement from SPLA-United to the Southern Sudan Independence Movement (Healy 2008). Unable to secure weapons abroad, Riak increasingly turned to Khartoum to maintain his fight against

Garang. In 1996, Riak and other former SPLA officers and politicians negotiated a Peace Charter with the government (Healy 2008). Within a year, it was transformed into a formal peace agreement that promised a regional referendum on South Sudanese independence to take place after an interim period of four years in exchange for Riak's cooperation in merging his remaining forces with the national army (Healy 2008).

It did not take long before regional politics came into play in Sudan. In March 1995, the Sudanese government bombed Ugandan territory, which prompted Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni to break diplomatic relations and increase support for the SPLA (ICG 2002). Sudan's meddling in the State of Eritrea and Ethiopia domestic affairs forced those regimes to begin helping rebels opposed to the Sudanese government (ICG 2002).

Eritrea became the operating base of the National Democratic Alliance after Eritrea's President Issaias Afewerki accused Khartoum of being behind Eritrean Islamic Jihad rebels (ICG 2002). Al-Bashir's backing of Islamic groups in Ethiopia generated a rift between two countries that had been on close terms in the early 1990s. The attempted assassination in June 1995 of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Ethiopia forced Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia to accuse Sudan of providing logistical support and sanctuary to the perpetrators (ICG 2002).

This isolation coupled with SPLA's strengthening and offensive attack forced the Sudan government to the negotiation table. The negotiations that started in 2002 in Kenya culminated with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement on January 9, 2005, in Nairobi, Kenya, between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army. This marked the end of the one of the longest civil war in Africa.

6.1.4 Religious Tension

Religion has been at the center stage during the civil war in Sudan. Northern Sudan's population is comprised mostly of Arabic-speaking Muslims, while those in the south primarily practice animist traditions or Christianity (Gasim al Seed 2008). Elnur (2009) observes that the Muslims in the north make up 70% of Sudan's total population and are significantly more affluent than those in the south. The colonial governments encouraged religious divisions. By the time Sudan gained independence from Egypt and the United Kingdom in 1956, religious and ethnic cleavages had already been internalized among the Sudanese people (Elnur 2009).

Some North Sudanese still largely think that most southerners of various ethnic origins have no culture or religion, and that they are primitive and are in need of development in the form of Islamization (Akol 2003). The entire political and economic programs of the Sudan government have been masked in a civilization project of Islamization. These tensions of religious nature have been a source of political instability and a threat to a united Sudan. The First Sudanese Civil War lasted from 1955 until 1972. The violence ceased as a result of the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972, which granted autonomy to the South. A decade of peace in Sudan followed the agreement.

When Nimeiri issued Republican Order Number One, he indicated his intentions to abrogate the Addis Ababa Agreement and return regional powers to the central government, hence re-centralizing political and economic power (Alier 1990). In addition, Nimeiri officially transformed Sudan into an Islamic State, decreeing in September 1983 that sharia be the sole guiding force behind the law of the Sudan (Gasim

al Seed 2008). This sparked controversy and was perceived by opponents as an attempt to force everyone to become Muslims (Gasim al Seed 2008).

Despite rhetorically embracing calls for peace, al-Bashir demonstrated little interest in serious negotiations. Two attempts to seek peace, one in Addis Ababa in August 1989 and the other in Nairobi in December 1989, failed to achieve much, with Islamic law being a key sticking point (Gasim al Seed 2008). SPLA demands to revoke sharia were anathema to the National Islamic Front—the Islamist political movement behind the al-Bashir coup—and the crackdown on opposition parties and non-governmental groups silenced some of the most forceful peace advocates (Gasim al Seed 2008).

6.1.5 Oil and other Resources

Since the discovery of oil in Sudan, disputes over control of oil and oil revenues were all factors that contributed to the Second Sudanese Civil War, which lasted officially from 1983 to 2005 (Elnur 2009). The Sudanese government has been determined to exploit of major oil deposits and has increased its belief that it can prevail militarily and, therefore, raised the stakes of the war dramatically (Elnur 2009). Despite strong rhetorical support for religious fundamentalism, its primary objectives have been maintaining the unity of the country and keeping control of and protecting the oilfields (Elnur 2009).

Oil was discovered in Sudan in the 1970's with most of the oilfields being found in south Sudan. Oil became the government's main source of income and a driving force to Sudan's economic growth. Revenues from petroleum production were used to finance the conflict and the oilfields became strategic targets for rebels and government of Sudan.

Therefore, access to and control of petroleum wealth and oil industry has played a critical role in sustaining and escalating the Sudanese civil war (Elnur 2009).

6.2 Critical Juncture-Planting the seed for a New State

This section examines international intervention and, in particular, coordination as a critical juncture that engineered post-conflict reconstruction in Sudan. International and local actors remained engaged and effectively coordinated post-conflict reconstruction since the signing of the CPA in 2005. The warning sign that the international community was serious and willing to help resolve the Sudan conflict began when, in May 1996, the UN Security Council imposed non-economic sanctions on the Sudan government (ICG 2002). The USA government supported UN sanctions and, at the same time, placed Sudan on its list of state sponsors of terrorism. The USA further imposed stringent sanctions against Sudan government and its leadership (ICG 2002). These series of diplomatic sanctions were applied in a well-coordinated manner.

For a long time, the Sudan government and USA government had an uneasy, often hostile, relationship (ICG 2002). USA high government officials openly held frequent meetings with the SPLA leadership. For example, during her tenure, USA Secretary of State Madeleine Albright met twice with Garang (ICG 2002). In wake of September 11, 2001, terror attacks in the United States, there was urgency among USA policy makers to deal with the Sudanese crisis. The USA demonstrated its commitment to be involved in search for peace in Sudan by appointing Special Envoy Danforth (ICG 2002). Five local actors, that is, the Sudanese government, the SPLA, the National Umma Party Sudan, Popular National Congress Party, and the National Democratic Alliance dominated Sudan's civil war scene (ICG 2002).

The international community was instrumental in the peace negotiations that concluded with the signing of the CPA in 2005, which ended the Sudan civil war. This was through explicit support to the peace process and threat to use sanction to those perceived to be spoilers. The 2005 CPA established a new Government of National Unity and the Interim Government of South Sudan and called for wealth-sharing, power-sharing, and security arrangements between the two parties, and, more importantly, a referendum in the South to determine whether the south wanted to separate or be part of larger united Sudan (CPA 2005).

Some of the provisions of the agreement also provided for a ceasefire, withdrawal of troops from South Sudan, and the repatriation and resettlement of refugees. It also stipulated that by the end of the six-year interim period, during which the various provisions of the CPA were to be implemented, there would be elections at all levels (CPA 2005). This set the stage for post-conflict reconstruction in Sudan and, more specifically, South Sudan. When Garang, the leader of SPLA, died in a helicopter crash while coming from Uganda, there were fears that war could resume and reconstruction of Sudan collapse; however, pressure from the USA, more specifically, forced SPLA and Sudan government to honor their side of bargain.

There is a clear coordination pattern of international community engagement in Sudan's post-conflict reconstruction. The international donor community rallied behind the CPA in 2005, aiming to make unity attractive while at the same time ensuring the South's right to self-determination through a referendum vote according to the terms of the peace agreement. The Friends Group of Sudan or the Troika, whose members were Norway, the USA, and United Kingdom, offered the needed leadership in the

coordination network of post-conflict Sudan. This group contributed in maintaining all the actors engaged and ensured parties involved in the post-conflict reconstruction act in a coordinated manner. Like in Kenya, the International Criminal Court was used as an instrument to ensure that parties were aware of the consequences if they engaged in violence. In March 2009, the ICC issued an arrest warrant for al-Bashir for seven counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity, accusing him of responsibility for atrocities in the Darfur region (ICC 2009). The arrest warrant is the first of its kind issued against a sitting head of state.

The USA used its hegemonic power within the coordination network involved in post-conflict reconstruction of Sudan. In working through the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) the USA was instrumental in helping craft the content the CPA. The USA also facilitated presence of a large UN military in South Sudan by providing \$70 millions each year in 2006, 2007, and 2008; \$38 millions in 2009; and \$42 millions in 2010 in support of peace keeping in South Sudan (USAID 2010).

6.2.1 South Sudan Independence

Beginning January 9 until January 15, 2011, South Sudanese held a referendum to decide whether or not to become independent. This was in line with the provisions of the CPA that unequivocally stated that after a six-year interim period, South Sudan was to hold a referendum to choose either to secede or be part of a united Sudan. The outcome of the referendum was that 98.83% of the Southern Sudanese people voted in favor of independence. July 9, 2011, marked the creation of the Republic of South Sudan as an independent state.

The CPA ended the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983–2005) and established a Government of National Unity in Khartoum (CPA 2005). The CPA provisions established the Government of South Sudan with its headquarters in Juba and with authority in respect of the people and semi-autonomous state of South Sudan. The Interim National Constitution and the Interim Constitution of South Sudan were both ratified in 2005 in the spirit of the principles of the CPA (GoSS 2008). The provisions in the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan recognized the positions of the president, and the first vice-president to be held by the chairperson of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement. (GoSS 2008). The president was to appoint the vice president and the Council of Ministers and these appointments were to be ratified by a two-thirds and simple majority, respectively, of the South Sudan Legislative Assembly. Moreover, 25% of the Council of Ministers must be women (GoSS 2008).

The Governments of Sudan and South Sudan still have a number of issues that they need to address jointly and with the support of the international community. One such issue is the oil rich area of Abyei that rests on border between the South Sudan and Sudan. Abyei region accounts for more than one quarter of Sudan's total crude oil output; this has made the area to become a huge target for investment by many multinational oil companies (Elnur 2009).

A dispute exists between the two countries about which polity really owns Abyei. Each of these two countries claims to own this region. Another issue is a dispute over oil revenues. The Sudan government had awarded oil drilling contracts to mainly Chinese companies, and it is not clear how the revenue generated from oil drilling in South Sudan will be shared before the contracts expire. China is Sudan's largest economic partner with

a 40% share in oil, their main export (Elnur 2009). Rising oil revenues have boosted Sudan's economy considerably and are, therefore, of great significance to the country. It is still unclear, however, how these oil revenues will be split up between these two countries. These issues of border demarcation and revenue sharing need to be addressed urgently as they be a source of future inter-state conflict between Sudan and South Sudan.

6.2.2 Institutional Reforms

After the signing of the CPA in 2005, the southern part of Sudan, like most of post-conflict situations, was faced with many challenges. The CPA provided for the semi-autonomous interim government of South Sudan that was to administer the area for an interim period of six years. One of these challenges included provision of security and establishing legitimacy, which are fundamental requirements for state-building and for sustaining peace. Another challenge was making the state work effectively and efficiently, as failure to do so could raise the risk of conflict recurring (Healy 2008).

The Interim Government of South Sudan lacked institutional capacity. However, with the support of the international community, a lot of institutional reforms were instituted and this was helpful as South Sudan became independent. The international community, through effective coordination of players carried out a comprehensive need assessment to facilitate provision of strategic priorities in terms of state-building (World Bank 2009, 2010). The main difficulty was that of turning the SPLM from a movement involved in struggle for self determination into a viable government and also converting SPLA from a guerilla movement to a conventional military force (GoSS 2006).

International and local actors were cognizant of the fact that there were, and still exist, limited institutional capacity, limited human and financial resources, and limited experience for effective government service delivery within the government of South Sudan. People of South Sudan had high expectations to get the peace dividends through better access to public services. Measures were put in place through the provisions of the interim constitution assigning responsibility for service delivery to the states and counties (GoSS 2009). To boost public confidence with governance, meritocracy framework for hiring in public service was institutionalized with appreciation that hiring and promotion be based on merit as well as be balanced with the need to accommodate various tribal and other constituencies. As the structures of the new state were, and are still, being put in place, an architecture framework for fighting corruption was instituted to help curb rooting of public funds (Goss 2009).

Unlike most post-conflict countries, the access to oil revenue provided South Sudan with opportunities not typically available in other post-conflict states. This revenue is vital in supporting post-conflict reconstruction. However, oil wealth can present challenges for public administration because it can weaken the connection between the people and its government that is maintained through a greater reliance on taxation as a source of revenue and, in this way, reduce the demand for accountability (Kisangani and Pickering 2010).

The international community provided substantial donor support to a united Sudan towards post-conflict reconstruction. The USA government provided the highest amount of bilateral foreign assistance, amounting to \$906 million in 2008, \$461 million in 2009, and \$433 million in 2010 (USAID 2010), towards post-conflict reconstruction of

a united Sudan. Through effective coordination and under the leadership of a Friends Group/Contact Group for South Sudan, all the donor countries and institutions were brought together under one umbrella called Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) to support different programs of the post-conflict reconstruction (MDTF 2009).

A monitoring system was also put in place that is the Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) for framework for Sudan. The donor contributions through the South Sudan MDTF have been quite large and exceeded \$430 million between 2005 and 2009 (MDTF 2009). Total donor support to South Sudan has averaged about \$ 200 million per year (MDTF 2011). Local and international actors have been holding joint review and have underlined the importance of good governance as one of the cornerstones of post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building in South Sudan (MDTF 2011).

The players have also noted that low public administration capacity, weak public financial management, inadequately organized civil service, and slow progress in decentralization systematic governance are constraints in accelerating the progress in implementing of the CPA and JAM frameworks (MDTF 2011). An institutional reform agenda was put in place with the South Sudan civil service, consisting of all the employees of the Government of South Sudan and based on principles of nonpartisanship, professionalism, and merit, with balanced representation assured to all the people of South Sudan. To support this framework, the USA and the “Friends Group” helped in creating the South Sudan civil service commission, with power to review, oversee, issue directives, and give advice to the government on civil service matters as well as to hear and determine the grievances of civil service personnel (Goss 2008). The international multilateral and bilateral donors have been instrumental in supporting South

Sudan institutional reforms in civil service and security sector reforms particularly in transforming, integrating, and professionalizing SPLA into a conventional military and police force. Much of the focus has been in police recruitment, training, and equipment (GoSS 2008).

As in other post-conflict situations, the South Sudanese faces two sets of challenges. The first includes the provision of security and establishing legitimacy—fundamental requirements for state-building and for sustaining the peace. The second set of challenges is to make the state function effectively. Failure to do so raises the risk of reverting back to conflict. The Government of South Sudan is an extremely weak partner for the international community, dealing with a massive lack of capacity and high rates of corruption. There is an overriding emphasis on national ownership through national government in capital Juba, while there is a lack of attention for the role and responsibilities of state authorities at all a level.

There has been substantial donor support for the administration's transition from war to peace. Following the Oslo conference, the initial support was provided through the JAM framework. Early support to the Government of Southern Sudan capacity-building effort was provided by the World Bank through the Sudan Low-Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) project— Capacity Building for Development in Post-conflict Sudan— with a focus on the Ministries of Finance and Economic Planning (MoFEP) and Labor Public Service and Human Resource Development.

This was followed by the MDTF-funded Core Fiduciary Systems Support Project directed at supplementing the public financial management capacity of the MoFEP and the Capacity Building, Institutional and Human Resource Development Project, which

targeted the public service and vocational training. In addition, UK's Department for International Development, the European Commission, the U.S. Agency for International Development and the United Nations Development Programme were key supporters of governance initiatives. These early interventions supported the development of basic governance infrastructure, legislative frameworks, contracting out of essential functions, technical assistance and training (World Bank 2009).

A review at the Second Sudan Consortium in March 2007 underlined the importance of good governance as one of the cornerstones of the reconstruction and peace-building in South Sudan. Low public administration capacity, weak public financial management, inadequately organized civil service, and slow progress in decentralization were highlighted as systematic governance constraints in accelerating the progress in implementing the CPA and JAM frameworks. Western aid donors and government of South Sudan committed to a higher level of cooperation to work closely together to deliver on the peace dividend and improve the lives of the people of South Sudan.

According to Johnson (2003), unlike in the North Sudan, civil administration in the south was always weak even at its most intrusive during the late colonial period. It has also never been effective in regulating and managing the delivery of services which were either non-existent or largely managed by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Recruitment and appointments were based on patronage. Even when this was not the case, the lack of available skills ensured that unqualified or under-qualified people had to be recruited. The public service was characterized by tensions between various groups. It would be fair to conclude that the public service that the government of South Sudan

inherited in 2005 lacked cohesion and was devoid of bureaucratic culture or tradition. On the other hand, it was fraught with cleavages similar to those in 1972 between “insiders” and “outsiders” and between different regional and ethnic groups (Johnson 2003). Public servants inherited by the government of South Sudan came from the diverse traditions of the Coordinating Council of Southern Sudan and South Sudan Roads Authority and the Civil Authority for the New Sudan making integration a huge challenge. As in the past, the government of South Sudan needed to balance ethnic and tribal considerations with consequences for size and quality. It also needs to absorb large number of ex-militia that need to be disarmed. In terms of capacity, the new public service is to be built from scratch (GoSS 2009).

Available evidence (Elnur 2009) suggests that the government of South Sudan also inherited an environment of corruption or, at least, poor public financial management. The issue of improper procurement of the Tecma contract was brought before the Regional Assembly in the first year of the Southern Regional Government in 1972. Elnur (2009) notes the lack of accounting and bookkeeping capacity in the 1980s. During the war years of the late 1980s and the 1990s, the private and public domains were not clearly distinguished, particularly in the areas of taxation and trade, which were conducted under the auspices of the military leadership. Some of these practices have continued.

The scope and challenges of the state building project in Southern Sudan after the 2005 signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement were unprecedented. Although the idea of southern nationhood took shape during the years of struggle culminating with the CPA, the SPLM was faced, after the agreement, with a different and somewhat

unfamiliar set of challenges in building the apparatus of the state virtually from scratch and delivering on the promise of peace and development. The transformation from a military organization to a political party presented significant challenges compounded by the pressure of delivering on the peace promise.

The Sudan People's Liberation Movement /Army (SPLM/A) had been essentially a military enterprise with centralized decision making focused on its struggle with the north for southern autonomy. When it became the dominant partner within the new government of South Sudan that emerged from the CPA, it had to adapt to civilian administration. In addition to administrative capacity and systems, policy-making and coordination capacity was also very limited and intra-government systems of communications virtually nonexistent.

For reasons that are easily understood, many of those who are now running the government in South Sudan have limited experience of managing a relatively well-resourced government, of collecting taxes, or of providing public services such as education, health, roads, water, and sanitation. With the weakening of the Southern Regional Government in the early 1980s, service delivery was largely handled by NGOs that were in theory contracted by the state (Johnson 2003). When the state was unable to pay them, the NGOs began to directly collect fees for their services, leading to further weakening of the state. The SPLM/A ran a patchy administration through the Civil Authority of new Sudan. In some areas, traditional authorities act as intermediaries between the people and the Sudan People's Liberation Army and provide local law and order.

6.3 Summary

The challenges of the post-conflict reconstruction in South Sudan after the 2005 signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement were unprecedented. The Sudanese People's Liberation Movement has faced a different set of challenges in building the state apparatus virtually from scratch and delivering on the promise of peace, stability, and development to the people of South Sudan. The main challenge that faced Sudanese People's Liberation Movement /Army was transforming itself from a military organization to a political party that leads a civilian government that can effectively and efficiently deliver public service to its people.

The international community and local players remained actively engaged and effectively coordinated their activities and therefore enhancing a successful post-conflict reconstruction in South Sudan after the signing of the CPA. The proactive nature of these players saw the establishment of the Multi-Donor Trust Fund to help coordinate international multilateral and bilateral donors in support of post-conflict reconstruction in South Sudan, and also instituted the Joint Assessment Mission as a monitoring framework for post-conflict reconstruction programs.

It is through these mechanisms and frameworks that financial support and technical expertise has been channeled. Power sharing among the local actors reduced the number of players within the coordination network. The USA used its power and influence within the coordination network to help in ensuring a successful post-conflict reconstruction. The Friends Group/Contact Group which was made of Norway, United Kingdom, USA, France, and Italy provided the needed legitimate leadership that was

acceptable to all the actors in the coordination network involved in post-conflict reconstruction in South Sudan.

Chapter 7 - Namibia: The Path to Self-Determination

7.1 Introduction


Namibia became independent on March 21, 1990. This was after 24 years of insurrection and warfare as Namibian people struggled for self-determination from colonialism and occupation. As a result of this violent conflict, 25,000 lost their lives and hundreds of thousands were displaced from their homes (Lamb 2006). Namibia went through a long history of colonization as a German colony, then under the mandate of League of Nations and a United Nations (UN) administered territory, and thereafter was a South African colony. The South African apartheid regime forced its laws and racial segregation policy on Namibia. Black Namibians were denied political rights, social freedoms, and economic freedoms among other fundamental human rights (Brown 1995).

In 1964, they formed a liberation movement called South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO). Two years later, in 1966, SWAPO established the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) and an armed revolt began (Brown 1995). SWAPO used self determination as it rallying call for it supporters to resist and fight against the racially dominated system of South African apartheid rule in Namibia. For over two decades, Namibians engaged in a struggle for self-determination against South Africa occupation.

Through international pressure, South Africa and SWAPO agreed to negotiate. The peace negotiations were internationally driven with Chester Crocker, the USA assistant secretary of state for African affairs, as the main negotiator. A cease fire was agreed and announced on August 8, 1988 in Geneva. Just like Kenya and Sudan case

studies analyzed earlier, Namibia can be considered as a successful post-conflict reconstruction. With the support of the international community, Namibia established and consolidated a new state and political regime and has remained peaceful and stable since then. Figure 7.1 demonstrated the causal path that Namibia followed in securing a successful post-conflict reconstruction. The struggle for freedom, ethnic tensions, and natural resource competition are analyzed as critical antecedents, while international community intervention and, specifically, coordination is the critical juncture that resulted to a successful post-conflict reconstruction in Namibia.

Figure 7.1 Causal Mechanism for Namibia



The international community and local actors worked in a coherent and coordinated manner during the post-conflict reconstruction. The USA used its power to ensure that members of the coordination network worked harmoniously. The Contact Group for Namibia offered the needed legitimate leadership and, in the process, facilitated effective coordination with the network.

7.2 Critical Antecedents

A number of factors or critical antecedents combined during critical juncture in Namibia (as show in figure 7.1) in a causal sequence to produce successful post-conflict reconstruction outcome. The critical antecedents significantly shaped the choices and changes that emerged during critical juncture. Some of critical antecedents' factors include colonization and subsequent struggle against colonization, ethnic tensions, and competition for natural resources. Namibia went through a long history of colonization and struggle to free itself from colonialism. The South Africa apartheid regime colonized Namibia and implemented a divide and rule policy coupled with racial segregation; hence, the apartheid regime perpetuated ethnic and racial tensions. South Africa's regime occupation of Namibia was driven by economic interest with an aim of exploiting natural resources. The violent conflict in Namibia started in 1966 and ended in 1989, and, thereafter, Namibia got independence on March 21, 1990.

7.2.1 Struggle against Colonialism

Namibia became a protectorate of Imperial Germany in 1884. Following the German defeat in World War I, the colony of South West Africa was declared a Class C mandate of the League of Nations (with far reaching authorities transferred to the

mandatory power). The trusteeship was eventually executed by South Africa on behalf of the British Crown. The South African de facto administration of Namibia started thus in 1919.

South Africa made efforts to incorporate South West Africa into the South African Union by holding a referendum in late 1945 (Weiland & Matthew 1994). This move was highly rejected by the UN General Assembly. In protest, South Africa refused to sign a formal trusteeship agreement with the United Nations and maintained that the mandate had lapsed with the dissolution of the League of Nations (Weiland & Matthew 1994). In 1950, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held an advisory opinion that the mandate for South West Africa remained in force. Following this opinion by the ICJ, the UN General Assembly decided in 1953 to supervise the administration of the territory even without the cooperation of South Africa (Weiland & Matthew 1994).

When most African states became independent in the first half of the 1960s, they joined the Non-Aligned Movement and used their numbers within the platform of the UN General Assembly to try to address the decolonization of South West Africa (Weiland & Matthew 1994). This propelled the issue to become an agenda for regional and international politics. On October 27, 1966, the General Assembly formally revoked South Africa's mandate with Resolution 2145 (XXI) and subsequently qualified its continued presence there as illegal occupation. With Resolution 2372 (XXII) South West Africa was renamed Namibia in 1968 by the General Assembly (Weiland & Matthew 1994).

Namibia struggle for self-determination began on August 26, 1966, when PLAN fighters near Ongulumbashe in the Ovambo region attacked the South African police. As

a response, the South Africa police killed two fighters in a helicopter attack, captured nine fighters, and arrested 45 new recruits from the surrounding areas of Ovambo ethnic group (Brown 1995). The conflict in Namibia was essentially framed as a struggle for independence. South Africa was determined to keep Namibia for geo-strategic and economic interests (Brown 1995).

South Africa institutionalized a system of racial segregation in Namibia, and made Namibia part of its fifth province governed by a South African administrator general (Brown 1995). In the mid 1970s South Africa started to build up an internal government with indigenous administrative structures and a security apparatus in Namibia (Brown 1995), an attempt to create some legitimacy for its continued rule. Through a conference held in Windhoek, an umbrella organization of ethnic parties known as Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) was formed and elections were immediately held in which ethnically-based representatives were elected (Brown 1995). The DTA won 41 out of 50 seats and formed a Council of Ministers, however, the veto power on all decisions rested with the South African administrator general (Brown 1995).

Ethnicity played a role in explaining the participation of Namibians in their search for territorial control and sovereignty given that even SWAPO was created as an ethnic movement from Ovamboland (Brown 1995). SWAPO waged guerrilla warfare against the South Africa military. With formation of PLAN as the military wing for SWAPO, the group got better trained, well-structured, and professional to face the professional South African military in a conventional war. SWAPO sought support from neighboring countries. In fact, neither SWAPO nor PLAN had a base within Namibia. SWAPO's

headquarters were initially in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, from where it moved to Lusaka Zambia, and eventually moved to Angola (Brown 1995).

The independence of Angola completely changed the nature of the conflict and changed political and military strategies for SWAPO (Bauer 1999). With the help of a friendly regime in Luanda, Angola, SWAPO built its bases along the Northern border of Namibia and, meanwhile, intensified political propaganda and military incursions into the Kavango and Ovambo regions in Namibia (Bauer 1999).

The victory of armed liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe strongly boosted the morale of PLAN fighters and led to a mass recruitment of several thousand young Namibians who joined the struggle in exile (Bauer 1999). SWAPO lobbied for and was able to achieved recognition by the international community and the United Nations to be the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people. Most importantly, SWAPO was able to obtain formal observer status to the United Nations bodies and other international organizations (Brown 1995). The struggle for independence mobilized most ethnic groups against a common enemy, South Africa. This was a critical unifying factor among groups.

7.2.2 Ethnic Tensions

The South Africa colonial administration used ethnic card of divide and rule to assert its rule in Namibia. When SWAPO was formed, South African, claimed that SWAPO was dominated by the Ovambo ethnic group who make up just over 50% the population of Namibia, others are 9% Kavango, 7% Herere, 7% Damara, and 5% Nama (Lamb 2006). The other ethnic groups were urged not to join SWAPO, and were rewarded with land taken away from Ovambo (Lamb 2006). This forceful displacement

of Ovambo from their land, and subsequently giving it to the Kavango, Herere, and Damara among others created ethnic tension between these ethnic groups, hence, this played a role in escalating violent conflict. The South African government arrested and detained those persons supporting SWAPO, and they were accused of engaging in terrorism, a crime that earned them long prison sentences of imprisonment. The Ovambo ethnic group was marginalized within the governance system, while South Africa convinced the leaders of several smaller ethnic groups to consider involvement with establishment of a semi-autonomous government (Lamb 2006).

The South African administration ruled Namibian state with an iron fist and used state apparatus to oppress those who were perceived to resist. The logic of racial segregation was used exclusively for the benefit of the minority population (Brown 1995). With the creation of 10 communal areas, the provision of law and order, infrastructure, and welfare was left to indigenous administrations without competencies or the necessary resources (Brown 1995).

7.2.3 Natural Resources

Although Namibia is largely a desert, it is rich in minerals that include diamonds, uranium, vanadium, lithium, and tungsten among others. It was these mineral deposits that encouraged South Africa to hold on to Namibia. The focus of South African rule was exploitation of the mineral wealth. South Africa viewed Namibia as being strategically important due to the presence of these valuable minerals. Different ethnic groups in Namibia united to resist exploitation of their natural resources by the South Africa. The minerals were also used to fuel the conflict as the warring groups used revenue from these resources to buy weapons (Ross 2004).

7.3 Critical Juncture: International Intervention

International community intervention and, more importantly, coordination is an important critical juncture that contributed to a successful post-conflict reconstruction in Namibia as show in figure 7.1. With a realization by the warring factions that none could win using military force and that they were in a hurting stalemate, the parties to the conflict agreed to sit at a negotiating table. The international community also exerted much pressure and coercion on the warring parties to seek a peaceful means to resolve the conflict. The South African government was becoming more isolated internationally, and the costs of military intervention were increasing (Crocker 1994).

The peace negotiations were driven by the international community with USA undersecretary Chester Crocker as the main negotiator supported by the Contact Group for Namibia. The UN helped form a Contact Group of influential western powers that included the United Kingdom and USA. Both pressured South Africa to let Namibia become independent (Crocker 1994). The final stages of the peace negotiations went quickly: the first took place in Cairo in June 1988, followed by negotiations in New York on July 13, 1988, where the New York Principles were signed. Then the teams met in Geneva in August 1988 and signed the protocol on disengagement of military forces and security measures affecting SWAPO deployments. The teams thereafter signed the Brazzaville Protocol of December 13, 1988. The final peace agreement was signed in New York on December 22, 1988 (Crocker 1994). This set in motion the process of post-conflict reconstruction.

The peace agreement protocol stipulated some mandates that required UN intervention. The UN established the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) on April 1, 1989. UNTAG drew its mandate from Resolution 435 (1978). The mission had a Special Representative who was Martti Ahtisaari from the Republic of Finland (Crocker 1994). The UN sent a peacekeeping force to monitor the agreement and to help supervise fair elections. Elections were held in 1989 and SWAPO won with 57% of the vote and gained 41 seats in the Assembly; the opposition won 29% and 21 seats and, therefore, Namibia had its first multi-party system (Crocker 1994).

The international community played a major and supporting role in the post-conflict reconstruction of Namibia. The presence of UNTAG observers ensured the safety of returning refugees and demobilized liberation fighters (Lamb 2006). The Namibia state had to be re-constructed; with the main challenge being the transformation of SWAPO into a civilian government and the peaceful transfer of power from the South Africa government to SWAPO (Lamb 2006).

The limited political mandate of UNTAG is often considered as one of the main secrets behind the apparent success of this intervention (Chesterman 2004). The UN set parameters with Resolution 435 (1978); the central feature of UNTAG's mandate, as reiterated in Resolution 632 (1989), was the supervision of free and fair elections for a Constituent Assembly from transition to independence acceptable to the whole international community. UNTAG also had a major role in creating the conditions for such free and fair elections, mainly through monitoring the demobilization and, in the case of South Africans, the withdrawal of troops, by assuring the return of Namibian refugees, and preventing police intimidation. UNTAG was a genuine UN operation under

Chapter VI of the UN Charter (Chesterman 2004). UNTAG seems to have been sufficiently equipped to fulfill the mandate. This was boosted by effective coordination and cooperation among the international and local actors on the ground.

7.3.1 Self Determination

This sub-section is about self determination as part of critical juncture to explain post-conflict reconstruction in Namibia. The history of Namibia's struggle for self-determination and the efforts thereafter to reconstruct a stable and functional state present an excellent case study of the important role that the international community can play in supporting post-conflict reconstruction.

Namibia achieved self-determination on March 21, 1990. The turnout for the first elections was high and conditions to ensure an effective suffrage of the Namibian population was in place. Namibian elections have been regarded as free and fair since independence (Lamb 2006). The Constituent Assembly Elections in 1989 were supervised by the international community through UNTAG, that drew its mandate from the UN Resolution 435 (Lamb 2006). This resolution clearly fixed a time span of one year for fulfillment of the mandate, and UNTAG was able to achieve its mandate and withdraw even nine days before the expiration of the mandate (Lamb 2006).

Election monitoring was the main objective of UNTAG. Within UNTAG the Electoral Division was responsible for advising the Special Representative on all special and technical aspects of the elections and for the supervision of the registration and electoral processes. It was also responsible for assisting the Special Representative in negotiations with the South African Administrator-General concerning the electoral legislation and the manner in which the South African authorities were to implement it

(Lamb 2006). However, during the post-conflict reconstruction period several hundred of UNTAG personnel stayed in Namibia as consultants to ministries, particular as trainers for the newly created Namibian Police (Lamb 2006).

UNTAG looked after the whole electoral process, especially the drafting of relevant legal documents, and the terms of electoral registration. UNTAG and the South African administration set up 36 permanent registration centers. They also worked out on the necessary regulation of political parties with appropriate rules, reducing the number of parties from the initial 45 to 10 (Chesterman 2005). UNTAG also carried out civic education and information programs in which more than 200 radio broadcasts translated electoral materials and information into the country's many languages. About 32 television programs were aired and more than 590,000 information items were produced. More importantly, before the electoral campaign could begin, UNTAG ensured that all discriminatory legislation had been repealed (Cliffe et al. 1994).

Other steps taken to facilitate free and fair elections included enactment of specific regulation of the electoral campaign through a code of conduct that stipulated the ground rules for political conduct in a country which had never before enjoyed free and fair elections and provision for a mechanism to handle campaign-related complaints of parties (Cliffe et al. 1994). The international community support was crucial in creating a level playing ground for the first free and fair elections in Namibia. This helped set the country on a democratic path.

7.3.2 Institutional Reforms

Following independence, Namibia's post-conflict institutions needed reconstruction. The government of Namibia sought and received support from the

international community. In June 1990 a donor pledging conference was held in New York, for which the Namibian government presented a General Policy Statement that outlined institutional reforms that were needed (Bauer 1999). On judicial reforms, the international community helped establish courts that were independent, and efforts have been made to ensure judges and officials act in accordance with the constitution and legal norms (Bauer 1999).

To facilitate this, most of the judges and court officials received training and appointment through a competitive and transparent process through support from the international community. The Namibia government did not politicize appointment of new judges, and the decisions are generally guided by the constitution and the rule of law (Bauer 1999). A credible electoral body was put in place and adequately trained in order to be able to supervise free and fair elections at all elective levels. This process included elaboration of legal regulations and registration to the voting act, and civic awareness (Bauer 1999).

The international community was able to coordinate its effort and support in security sector reform in Namibia. The international community trained and helped equip Namibia Police to enable it enforce the law impartially, thereby ensuring that citizens could express their views without fear of intimidation (Chesterman 2005).

The international community also helped in professionalizing the Namibia military. The issues of demilitarization, demobilization, repatriation, and reintegration were addressed in the negotiations and through Resolution 435. Military tasks consisted in disarming of South African Defence Force (SADF) and SWAPO troops, in monitoring the SADF withdrawal, and in demobilizing the Namibian regular units who fought

against SWAPO (Chesterman 2005). Effective coordination among the local and international players played a crucial role in supporting institutional reforms in Namibia.

7.4 Summary

Namibia, like Kenya and Sudan, stands out as an example where effective coordination among international players resulted in a successful post-conflict reconstruction. The formation of a government that brought together all local players ensured that the coordination network had few actors. The leadership of the United Nations and the Contact Group, coupled with the presence of the USA as a powerful player within the coordination network, facilitated an effective coordination. The international community supported the institutional reforms and strengthening in Namibia. The generous financial support of the international community to Namibia contributed to strengthening the legitimacy of the Namibia state and the realization of self-determination for the Namibian people.

Chapter 8 - Rwanda: Things Fall Apart


8.1 Introduction

Rwanda is located in the Central Africa region. It is a landlocked country and its neighbors are Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, and Tanzania. Rwanda occupies an area about 26, 338 square kilometers. It has a population of approximately 11, 370,425 people. Rwanda has three main ethnic groups whose distribution is as follows: Hutu (84%), Tutsi (15%), Twa (1%) (Kisangani 2000). On July 1, 1962 Rwanda gained formal independence as a sovereign state and the structures of the government were dominated by the Hutu. In 1990, the Tutsi under the umbrella of Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) waged war to resist Hutu domination; this resulted into a two year civil war. The civil war ended on August 4, 1993 with the signing of the Arusha Peace agreement.

The international community's contribution to the peace negotiation was instrumental and culminated in signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement by President Juvénal Habyarimana of Rwanda and Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) Chairman Alexis Kanyarengwe. This signing of a peace agreement marked the beginning of post-conflict reconstruction in Rwanda. However, peace did not last for long. On April 6, 1994, an aircraft carrying President Juvénal Habyarimana of Rwanda and President Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi, who were returning from Dar-Es-Salaam after attending a meeting to discuss the implementation of the Arusha Accords, crashed around 8:30 p.m. near Kigali International Airport. The violence or genocide that followed, within a period of less than three months, left an estimated 800,000 people dead. Over two million people fled to neighboring countries, and over one million became internally displaced (Kisangani 2000).

The 1994 Rwanda genocide stands out as a serious consequence of failure by the international community and local actors to effectively coordinate post-conflict reconstruction activities. Rwanda is thus a negative case and helps to understand how post-conflict reconstruction was unsuccessful due to failure by international and local players to coordinate post-conflict reconstruction programs. Unlike Kenya, Sudan, and Namibia cases, there was no leadership to coordinate post-conflict reconstruction. The USA, as a powerful actor, never played any role in the coordination network in the post-conflict reconstruction in Rwanda. Figure 8.1 indicates the causal mechanisms in Rwanda's post-conflict reconstruction process. The sections that follow discuss the critical antecedents and critical juncture that resulted in the failed post-conflict reconstruction in Rwanda.

Figure 8.1 Causal Mechanism for Rwanda



8.2 Critical Antecedents

A number of interlinked factors contributed to the civil war in Rwanda that precipitated the international community to intervene. Some of these factors include colonial legacy and ethnic tensions. The following section discusses these factors.

8.2.1 Colonial Legacy

Pre-colonial Rwanda was highly organized and hierarchical monarchy. Inter-ethnic relations were characterized with interdependency and peaceful co-existence. Hutu and Tutsi intermarried and traded with each other (Kisangani 1998, 2000). However, relationship between these two ethnic groups changed with the arrival of colonial

administration. Between 1899 and 1916, the kingdom of Rwanda was colonized by Germany, which administered it from Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania. The German colonial government systematically used divide and rule or indirect rule and destroyed the pre-colonial governance structures of the people of Rwanda. The divide and rule principle involved using local structures to perpetuate colonial policies and structures. Some ethnic groups were favored and their leaders made administrators on behalf of the colonial government (Melvern 2000; Reyntjens 2004). This meant full use of the existing local political system.

After First World War, Rwanda became a Belgian colony. Belgium continued the policy of divide and rule. The colonial government introduced identification card with an aim of creating divisions between Tutsi and Hutu ethnic groups of Rwanda (Reyntjens 2004). Each Rwandese adult had to have an identification card that indicated if a person were Tutsi or Hutu. This reinforced the ethnic divisions and awareness among communities that had lived in harmony before colonial period (Reyntjens 2004). This fundamentally affected ethnic inter-relations in Rwanda. The colonial administrations perpetuated the perception that the Tutsi were more intelligent and superior than the Hutu (Melvern 2000). The Hutu chiefs and deputy-chiefs were removed and replaced by Tutsi within local governance structures (Melvern 2000). Furthermore, a policy favoring protection and strengthening of the Tutsi hegemony was vigorously pursued (Melvern 2000).

Further discrimination of the Hutu was introduced in the Catholic schools, which represented the dominant educational system throughout the colonial period in Rwanda (Melvern 2000). Tutsi, who had resisted conversion into Christianity, became

increasingly enrolled in the Catholic mission schools. The educational policy encouraged the Tutsi to be well educated, while the Hutu received only education required to work in the mines and industry as casual workers (Reyntjens 2004). The colonial government sowed the seeds for ethnic tension by favoring one ethnic group over another. The monopolization of power in the hands of Tutsi constituted a crucial and undisputed factor in establishing ethnic cleavages. The colonial rule caused the Tutsi and Hutu to become distinct political categories that engaged in competition over resources and power. The colonial legacy has thus been a major contributor to political, economic, and social-cultural challenges in Rwanda.

8.2.2 Ethnic Tensions

As discussed above, the colonial government framed political issues along ethnic lines. It was therefore not surprising that when political parties were formed in the late 1950s, political parties were established along ethnic cleavages with Parmehutu, known in French as Parti du mouvement de l'emancipation des Bahutu, and APROSOMA, which stands for Association pour la promotion sociale des masses, being essentially for the Hutu, while UNAR (Union nationale rwandaise) and RADER (Rassemblement d'‚mocratique rwandais) were essentially for Tutsi (Reyntjens, 2004). Even as Rwanda was gearing towards independence, political demands were formulated in ethnic terms. For example, the Bahutu Manifesto of March 24, 1957, demanded Hutu emancipation as well as democratization. Starting from the colonial thesis that Tutsi were outsiders/foreigners and claiming that Hutu being the majority were true Rwandese nationals, and thus the rightful rulers of Rwanda. The manifesto was a significant statement for both the social revolution from 1959 and the deepening ethnic cleavages

(Prunier 1995). The document that was presented to the United Nations questioned the whole concept of Belgian administration and maintained that the basic problem of Rwanda was a conflict between Hutu and Hamitic or foreign; this was in reference to Tutsi (Prunier 1995). The Tutsi intellectuals also wrote a similar letter in which they rejected Hutu participation in independent Rwanda by arguing that because Tutsi kings conquered the land of the Bahutu, they are to be under them by traditions (Reyntjens, 2004).

The revolutionary transition from the Tutsi-dominated monarchy to the Hutu-led republic, constitutes a crucial period for the understanding of the subsequent ethnic division in Rwanda (Reyntjens 2004). Sensing that a Hutu led revolt was moving towards war at the end of the 1950s, the Belgian authorities suddenly started to pay attention to the grievances of the Hutu majority (Keane 1996). A similar, radical change occurred within the Catholic Church as it started to adopt a pro-Hutu stand arguing that the social discrimination faced by the Hutu was no longer consistent with a sound organization of Rwandese society (Reyntjens 2004).

On November 1, 1959, Hutu versus Tutsi ethnic violence broke out as a result of a leader of the Parmehutu party being molested by Tutsi youth (Reyntjens 2004). The ensuing riots led to a widespread Hutu uprising, during which hundreds of Tutsi were killed (Reyntjens 2004). The Belgian colonial government responded by sending troops. However, the Belgian military did not attempt to crush the Hutu revolt, but adopted a de facto pro-Hutu policy through the installation of a military-led administration and the appointment of more than 300 Hutu chiefs and sub-chiefs to replace those Tutsi

incumbents who had been deposed, killed, or had fled during the initial stages of the uprising (Reyntjens 2004).

With the support of the Belgian administration, the Hutu-dominated revolution led to the abolition of the monarchy and to the removal of all political and administrative Tutsi structures that for decades the Belgium colonial government had based its policy of indirect rule (Reyntjens 2004). Furthermore, in May 1960, the Belgian administration came up with a new policy through which it set up an indigenous military territorial guard of 650 men, based on ethnic proportionality, with 85% Hutu and 15% Tutsi (Reyntjens 2004).

The success of the revolt became definitive in September 1961 when, at a referendum, 80% of the electorate voted in favor of a republic (Reyntjens 2004). The results of the first parliamentary elections of September 1961 confirmed Rwandan ethnic cleavages. The Hutu parties obtained about 83% of the vote, corresponding roughly to the proportion of Hutu among the population. In other words, a demographic majority came to be matched by a political majority (Reyntjens, 2004).

From 1965 onwards, following the elimination of the opposition, Rwanda became a de facto single party state under Hutu domination (Reyntjens 2004). This was followed by an implicit exclusion from public life of Tutsi since their political parties had been banned. Tutsi who expressed dissent, openly or covertly, against the Hutu authoritarian government were subjected to intimidation, arrest, and physical violence and, others were assassinated (Reyntjens 2004). As a result of this many Tutsi became refugees in neighboring countries.

8.2.3 Civil War

The October 1990 attack on government forces by the RPF from their bases in Uganda marked the start of a two year civil war in Rwanda. The members of the RPF were predominantly Tutsi refugees, who had run away from Rwanda during the postcolonial establishment of a Hutu-dominated government in the early 1960s. The RPF soldiers had gained valuable military experience fighting with Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Army in western Uganda against the Uganda government (Prunier 1995). The RPF helped Museveni and his guerrilla movement to overthrow President Milton Obote in Uganda. RPF used Uganda as a launching base for its invasion of Rwanda and effectively exploited growing domestic opposition against President Habyarimana (Prunier 1995). This undermined the Rwanda government domestically, while, on the other hand, international financial institutions like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund forced the government to implement a structural adjustment program (Reyntjens 2004).

To make matters worse, Rwanda had to close its last tin mine due to increasing costs, collapsing world prices, and mismanagement (Reyntjens 2004). Tin provided 15% of Rwanda's export earnings. More dramatic was the decrease in coffee prices on international markets. Coffee accounted for more than two-thirds of Rwanda's foreign revenues, and it was, therefore, devastating for the country when coffee prices decreased by 75%, resulting in a four-fold increase of the debt service ratio (Reyntjens 2004). These political and economic challenges together with the drought of the early 1990s ignited a widespread domestic opposition to Habyarimana's regime (Prunier 1995). The government responded to any opposition with brutality, a situation that made more

people become sympathetic to the rebellion by the RPF. After struggling in the beginning, the rebellion increased its intensity and had, by 1992, captured an area in northern Rwanda (Prunier 1995).

In attempts to tame domestic pressure for democratization and RPF rebellion, Habyarimana introduced a multiparty system and a coalition government in April 1992, but formed alliances that allowed him to retain most of the executive and administrative power (Wayne1999). Meanwhile, he plotted with the two political parties that he controlled, the National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development (MRND) and the Committee for the Defense of the Republic (CDR), to undermine the democratization by forming militias known as the Interahamwe (those who attack together) and the Impuzamugambi (those who have the same goal) (Wayne1999).

The militias received weapons from the army and were involved in multiple violent acts throughout the country (Wayne 1999). As the conflict evolved, Habyarimana was increasingly criticized, even within his own party. He was caught between demands for political liberalization from the opposition and the international community. After it became apparent to the warring factions that none of them was assured of a clear military victory, they agreed to sit at a negotiation table in Arusha, Tanzania. The warring factions signed several cease-fire agreements that they kept violating. Some of the cease-fire agreements that were signed included the following: on October 26, 1990, at Gbadolite in Zaire, an agreement mediated by the Belgian government; on November 20, 1990, at Goma in Zaire; on February 14, 1991, in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania; and on March 29, 1991, in Nsele, Zaire, that was amended twice, on September, 16, 1991, in Gbadolite at an Organization of African Unity (OAU) Summit and on July, 12, 1992 in Arusha. It is

this amendment that led to the creation of a security zone between RPF-held territory and the rest of Rwanda (Magnarella 2002).

Coupled with the RPF invasion, the government of Rwanda was also facing conflict between the political parties and, more so, difficulties in establishing the first real transition government (Magnarella 2002). President Habyarimana and the MRND could regularly veto any breakthrough in negotiations that they felt might lead to a substantial decline of MRND power (Magnarella 2002). In fact, Magnarella (2002) observes that it took a lot of international pressure and coercion to make the President agree to the signing of the final peace agreement. Habyarimana also saw threats from the fact that RPF military attacks were gaining territory, there was deterioration of the economy, and ,worse, the increased number of internally displaced persons from 80,000 in late 1990 to 350,000 in May 1992 after the Byumba offensive, and the number was up to 950,000 in February 1993 (Drumbl 2000).

Another round of peace negotiations between the Rwandese government and the RPF started on August 10, 1992. The chief mediator was President Ali Hassan Mwinyi of Tanzania and his Ambassador, Ami Mpungwe. Other members included Burundi, Zaire, Belgium, France, Germany, USA, Senegal, and the OAU. The negotiations took one year before final agreement was reached and signed on August 4, 1993, known as the Arusha Agreement, with protocols outlining the principle and creation of rule of law, power-sharing to enlargement of the transition government by including RPF and the creation of a transition Parliament, the re-integration of refugees and internally-dislocated persons, and the creation of a national unified army (Arusha Agreement 1993). This marked the end of a two-year Rwandan civil war and, hence, the beginning of post-conflict

reconstruction.

On the rule of law, the protocol enshrined the principles of national unity, democracy, pluralism, and human rights in Rwanda. The protocol emphasized that all Rwanda citizens should enjoy the same rights and possibilities irrespective of their ethnic, regional, religious, or sexual identity, that the multi-party system should be one of the cornerstones of democracy, that creation of an enlarged transitional government should be honored, and that the protection of human rights should be guaranteed and supervised by a national commission (Arusha Agreement 1993, 9-11).

The protocol on power-sharing provided for transitional institutions that included the presidency, government, Parliament, and courts. The government was expanded to include the RPF and was composed of 21 ministers as follows: five from MRND including Minister of Defense, five from RPF including the Vice-Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, four from the Democratic Republican Movement including Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, three from Social Democratic Party, three from the Liberal Party and one from the Centrist Democratic Party.

However, the Coalition for the Defense of the Republic was excluded. The new government was in principle to decide by consensus. The transitional parliament was to be composed of 11 members each from MRND, the Democratic Republican Movement, the Social Democratic Party, the Liberal Party, and RPF, four members from the Centrist Democratic Party and one member each from the other recognized parties. Although Habyarimana was to remain head of state, he was to cede certain powers to the prime minister and the parliament. Presidential and parliamentary elections were to be organized at the end of the period of transition after drafting of a new constitution and its

ratification through a referendum (Arusha Agreement 1993). On the issue of refugees and internally displaced persons, the government of Rwanda and the RPF reached agreement that refugees would be allowed to settle back in Rwanda and that the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the OAU were to convene donors' conference to discuss the financial implications of the refugees' program.

Military reforms provided for the inclusion of the RPF in an integrated national army. The RPF was to obtain a ratio of 40% of all troops and 50% of all commanding posts with an army of 13,000 troops and a gendarmerie of 6,000 men (Reyntjens 2004). It was also agreed that 600 RPA men with an armored battalion were to be allowed to protect the RPF people in Kigali who were to participate in the transition government and administration, and they were to protect the capital in general. A neutral international force under supervision of the United Nations (UN) was to be in charge of the overall security in all Rwanda.

8.3 Critical Juncture-Failure of the International Community

The failure of the international community to effectively coordinate and remain engaged in support of Rwanda's post-conflict reconstruction is well captured by Kisangani (2000) who asserts that Rwandan genocide occurred partly because some powerful UN members, such as the USA, saw Rwanda as having little or no significant strategic interests. Rwanda's post-conflict reconstruction depended on support from the international community. Failure by the international and local players to coordinate post-conflict reconstruction activities in Rwanda resulted in genocide. The signal that the international community was not keen on supporting post-conflict Rwanda came with the delayed arrival of the United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) troops

by three months (Magnarella 2002). This delay was because the UNAMIR mandate had not been approved by the UN Security Council. UNAMIR arrived in Rwanda in November 1993 (Magnarella 2002).

UNAMIR's tasks were to guarantee the safety of the capital, the border area with Uganda, and the demilitarized zone in the north. These UN troops had to supervise military reforms, demobilization, and demilitarization. They also had to facilitate municipal, parliamentary, and presidential electoral process during the last six months of the transition (Berry and Berry 1999). Local players within Rwanda started to have internal disputes within different parties, and they demonstrated unwillingness to implement post-conflict reconstruction programs. Lack of a legitimate leadership to spearhead coordination meant that a round-table conference for the rehabilitation of the areas affected by the war and the social reintegration of the demobilized soldiers could not be convened on time.

The inauguration of a new government and parliament that was planned for January 5, 1994, later for February 23 and then for March 24 did not take place. Different parties were too internally divided to provide for a stable government and part of the opposition boycotted the installation of a new Parliament. Faustin Twagiramungu, who was proposed as prime minister, lacked the support of the majority of his party, which was strongly divided (Alvarez 1999). By mid-February, Jacques Booh-Booh, the representative of the UN Secretary-General in Rwanda, had warned of the massive spread of weapons among citizens and supporters of the militias (Kisangani 2000). Despite all warnings, it appears, however, that the international community was caught unprepared

when the genocide broke out on April 6, 1994 after President Habyarimana died when his aircraft was shot down near Kigali, Rwanda by the RPF (Kisangani 2000).

Immediately, the Hutu-dominated army and political supporters used the president's death to ignite an anti-Tutsi revolt (Prunier 1995). Within hours of the plane crash, the Presidential Guard, the army, the Interahamwe, and the Impuzamugambi mounted roadblocks (Alvarez 1999). The army and militias began a systematic sweep of the city, killing members of the transitional government and other civilians that were thought to be RPF collaborators and pro-Tutsi (Alvarez 1999). Their goal was to eliminate the opposition and to weaken the RPF support by killing most of the Tutsi. Lacking a clear mandate, the UN forces present in Rwanda to monitor the implementation of the Arusha Accords did nothing to help stop the massacres (Alvarez 1999). Even when it was obvious that genocide was taking place, the UN Security Council refused to send any peacekeeping mission. While the violence was initially in the capital Kigali, it quickly spread throughout the country (Alvarez 1999). As a consequence, over 800,000 people were killed, and over 2 million refugees left the country, creating one of the biggest humanitarian crisis (Alvarez 1999).

8.4 Summary

Rwanda, after the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement in 1993, is a classical example of unsuccessful post-conflict reconstruction. The ultimate cause of Rwandan genocide was the failure by local and international players to effectively coordinate post-conflict reconstruction. Rwanda government leaders took advantage of the international community being disinterested in reconstructing post-conflict Rwanda, and they perpetrated one of the worst genocides in the contemporary international community.

There was no Contact Group or the UN to offer leadership nor a powerful country like the USA to help in the coordination of a support network for Rwanda's post-reconstruction.

Chapter 9 - Conclusion

This research analyzed the role that the international community has played in Africa's post-conflict reconstruction. To achieve this goal, the study has endeavored to explain how the presence or the absence of coordination among international and local actors contributed to the success or failure of post-conflict reconstruction in Africa.

The study develops a new theoretical framework ("*Hybridized Model*") that combines market, hierarchical, and network models of coordination. Four hypotheses emerged from the theory that link the number of actors, leadership, and power to coordination and post-conflict reconstruction. This study thus identified coordination among the members of the international system as being a critical factor that explains success or failure to rebuild states after civil wars. While scholars and policy makers have noted that international actors have been, in most cases, working at cross-purposes, duplicating activities, and not knowing what other actors are doing in the field, there has not been systematic cross-case studies examining how coordination influences post-conflict reconstruction. This hybrid network structure offers a more balanced and comprehensive coordination framework that facilitates an effective and efficient coordination among international and local actors in post-conflict reconstruction.

This research has attempted to address a methodological major weakness in the current literature on post-conflict reconstruction as well. Research in this area remains largely qualitative. This study has used both qualitative and quantitative methods and offers new findings to the scholarship of post-conflict reconstruction. Quantitative method has provided net effect of each individual variable in the intervening variable, coordination. A qualitative, structured focused, case comparative research design has

been used, employing within-case causal narratives to elucidate the working mechanisms of the international role within post-conflict state building in Africa. Prior research on post-conflict reconstruction has mostly focused on the United Nations (UN) leaving out domestic actors as well as external players. This is a major theoretical omission in extant literature that this research has tried to remedy. First, local actors remain key ingredients in post-conflict reconstruction as conflict at the local level may derail any effort at the post-conflict state building. Second, characteristics of external actors such as their number, leadership, and power play a major role in coordinating efforts to build post-conflict states.

Successful post-conflict reconstruction supports the consolidation of the state by enhancing mechanisms for security and peace. Mechanisms such as justice systems, policing systems, or service delivery agencies provide a legitimate and credible arena framework for social groups to express preferences. Strong institutions in post-conflict states are vital for the purpose of providing public goods rather than engaging in corrupt activities, as this reduces the incentives for populations and political elites to elicit violence.

This chapter highlights the main findings of this dissertation, examines policy implications, and suggests some opportunities for future research.

9.1 Findings

The empirical evidence in this study suggests a number of findings. First that actors, leadership, and power play a significant role in a coordination network during post-conflict state-building. This is an omission that characterizes extant literature on post-conflict state building. These three factors are crucial determinants of a successful

coordination in post-conflict reconstruction. As demonstrated by the quantitative and qualitative analyzes, a few number of actors enhances coordination as does the presence of leadership that is perceived as legitimate or neutral. A network with a few numbers of actors has positive effects on coordination, as the actors may be more cohesive and work more coherently, promoting information flow and expertise among members of the network. Leadership is key in initiating strategic thinking and operational steps that help coordinate various activities and, at the same time, marshal support and consensus of members to agree on implementation frameworks, monitoring, and evaluation mechanisms as well as indicators and benchmarks for measuring success.

The presence of a powerful player in a coordination network equally enhances effective coordination during post-conflict reconstruction. In contrast to the existing network analyses of coordination in post-conflict reconstruction, this research recognizes the role power plays in coordination among various network members. It contends that coordination in post-conflict reconstruction is a political process; hence, the aspect of power is crucial in enabling or constraining coordination within any given network in post-conflict state building. Second, the research analyzes state's sources of revenue as well as governance in order to fully understand post-conflict state-building. Third, the study makes another important scholarly contribution by incorporating government effectiveness and rule of law in the study of state-building, therefore, going beyond the conventional predatory theory of state building. The results strongly indicate the significance of governance indicators in understanding post-conflict reconstruction.

Theoretically, the results suggest the paramount importance of coordination in post-conflict reconstruction. Both the quantitative and qualitative outcome support the

study's hypothesis that the higher the level of coordination among international and local actors the higher the probability of successful post-conflict reconstruction. Coordination facilitates effective use of resources and provides clarity and coherence in designing and executing post-conflict reconstruction strategies. It is important to ensure that the many agencies involved in post-conflict reconstruction be coordinated by improving and having well-established communication channels and structures for effective resources use. This can help to avoid duplication of activities and contradictory policies and strategies. Hence, it increases the chance of post-conflict reconstruction.

Kenya, Sudan, and Namibia case studies show how coordination among international and local actors can contribute to a successful post-conflict reconstruction, while Rwanda case demonstrates how failure to facilitate a successful post-conflict can have deadly consequences, as was the case with the Rwanda genocide. The international and local actors in Rwanda failed to coordinate their activities and programs, which resulted in a failed post-conflict reconstruction.

9.1.1 Policy Implication

Policy-related recommendations can be drawn from this study. First, it is important for policy makers to realize that well-coordinated post-conflict reconstruction is highly likely to facilitate peace, security, and stability within the international system. This is because it reduces significantly the chances for recurrence of violent conflict. Second, when designing a coordination network, the issue of number of actors, leadership, and power should be considered seriously as these factors significantly impact on coordination. Third, it is important for the international and local actors to work closely and in a coordinated manner to minimize the chances of peace spoilers

undermining post-conflict reconstruction programs. Fourth, post-conflict reconstruction need to focus more on institutions and structures that guarantees state-building in terms of good governance, more specifically, government effectiveness, ability to extract revenue, and the rule of law. Finally, international and local players need to understand that post-conflict reconstruction is a long term and complex process and there are no quick fix programs, hence rebuilding political, economic, and social-cultural institutions of post-conflict societies must be planned as a long-term undertaking.

9.1.2 Opportunities for Future Research

This innovative and groundbreaking research on post-conflict reconstruction opens new frontier for further academic research and interrogation that are not addressed in this study. First, there is a need to investigate how actors, leadership, and power interact and interplay with each other in a coordination network. Second, there is a need to investigate how other indicators of governance such as voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, regulatory quality, and control of corruption impact on post-conflict state-building.

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List of Countries

Country	Independence	Year When Conflict Began	Year When Conflict Ended	Data Years
Algeria	1962	1992	2002	2002-2008
Angola	1975	1975 1998	1991 1999	1991-1997 1999-2005
Burundi	1962	1965 1988 1991	1969 1988 1999	1970-1976 1988-1994 1999-2009
Central African Republic	1960	1996	1997	1997-2003
Chad	1960	1965 1980	1979 1994	1979-1985 1994-2000
Congo – Brazzaville	1960	1993	1997	1997-2003
Democratic Republic of Congo	1960	1960 1977 1996	1970 1978 1997	1970-1976 1978-1984 1997-2004
Djibouti	1977	1991	1994	1994-2000
Egypt	1953	1994	1997	1997-2003
Ethiopia	Not Colonized	1974	1988	1988-1994
Ivory Coast	1960	2003	2005	2005-2009
Kenya	1963	1963 1992 2007	1970 1993 2008	1970-1976 1993-1999 2008-2009
Liberia	Not Colonizd	1989 1992 2003	1990 1997 2003	1990-1996 1997-2003 2003-2009
Mali	1960	1990	1995	1995-2001
Morocco/Western Sahara	1956	1975	1991	1991-1997
Mozambique	1975	1976	1992	1992-1998
Namibia	1990	1973	1989	1989-1995
Nigeria	1960	1967	1970	1970-1976

		1980	1985	1985-1991
Rwanda	1962	1990	1993	1993-1999
Senegal	1962	1989	1999	1999-2005
Sierra Leone	1961	1991	1996	1996-2003
Somalia	1960	1988	1991	1991-1997
South Africa	1961	1976	1994	1994-2000
Sudan	1956	1963	1972	1972-1978
		1983	2002	2002-2008
Uganda	1962	1978	1979	1979-1985
		1985	1987	1987-1994
		1995	2001	2001-2007
Zimbabwe	1980	1972	1979	1979-1985
		1983	1987	1987-1993