

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ETHOS-BASED STATEMENTS
MADE BY JOHN KENNEDY AND RICHARD NIXON IN THEIR
1960 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN SPEECHES

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PART I

AN INTRODUCTION

Contemporary United States has been struck within this decade by a barrage of communication disturbances and events. Modern rhetoric is replete with the evidences of society's confusion and struggling changes. One segment of the population speaks and the other segments hear, but seemingly have an inability to listen. President Nixon in his Inaugural Address entreated the American public to "speak softly enough so that others might try to listen" (1). Much emphasis has been placed on rhetoric; so much emphasis, in fact, that the word rhetoric is now being used with ease and even understanding by more individuals than ever before. Recently Life Magazine, a magazine appealing to and read by much of the United States today, printed an article, "Rhetoric Meets Reality" (2). The word, rhetoric, is becoming one which is used in everyday, household conversations.

Aristotle in his Rhetoric defined the word, rhetoric, as, "the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion" (3). He went on to determine what the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word are. These modes he listed as, "the personal character of the speaker . . . putting the audience into a certain frame of mind, (and) the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself" (4). The first of the three, character of the speaker or ethos, was listed first and praised highest

among the artistic forms of proof in the Rhetoric. Aristotle considered ethos important enough in his age; and indeed, is this concept any less important as a consideration in the study of Twentieth Century rhetoric?

In many instances ethos--its 1960 counterpart term, image--has had a great impact on American life. One aspect, politics, has been shaped greatly by a shrewd application of the general principle of ethos. During Dwight Eisenhower's campaign, it was quipped that he could have won the Presidency running on a laundry ticket (5). Kennedy, in the 1960 campaign, relied heavily on ethos; and Nixon, in the 1968 campaign, had learned many of the old Kennedy tactics and perhaps partially generated his own victory as a result (6). It would seem, then, that ethos, an age-old concept, still bears great importance for students of rhetoric today.

Because of the apparent importance of this concept on the shaping of today's world, it is the purpose of this paper to explore ethos in the Twentieth Century by a comparative analysis of the ethos-based statements contained within the 1960 Presidential campaign speeches of Richard M. Nixon and John F. Kennedy.

The writer shall begin investigation by determining the Aristotelian definitions of ethos. In carrying out this portion of the investigation, the general definition of ethos as discussed in Aristotle's Rhetoric shall be given, as well as the more specific applications of the term to the individual in the Ethics and the relation of the individual to

the State in the Politics. Once these definitions have been established, it shall be the purpose of the writer to apply them as a base for the comparative analysis of the ethos-based statements of Richard Nixon and John Kennedy.

The question of the feasibility of separating ethos and pathos should be considered at this point. At first glance it would appear impossible to separate the two, as it seems that it is the purpose of the speaker's ethos to arouse various emotions in his audience. These emotions are those listed by Aristotle in the Rhetoric and discussed in more detail within his De Anima: anger and calmness, friendship and enmity, fear and confidence, shame and shamelessness, kindness and unkindness, pity, indignation, envy, emulation. Aristotle even related these emotions to the characters of young men, old men, and men in their prime with respect, in addition, to fortune, power, and wealth--all considerations of character. However, although he relates them in this instance, he also separates them even though it may be a sort of artificial separation. Ethics actually describe the passions--they are not passions in themselves. Additionally, passions (pathos) involve feelings that are actually involuntary reactions that an audience experiences. Ethos is involved with reactions likewise, but voluntary reactions not involuntary ones. Herein would lie one difference.

It shall be the purpose of this paper, then, to examine the ethos-based statements of Kennedy and Nixon within the framework of the Aristotelian concept of ethos. The

organization of the remainder of this paper will be as follows: (1) the Aristotelian concept of ethos, (2) a review of the literature, (3) the use of ethos-based statements by Nixon, (4) the use of ethos-based statements by Kennedy, (5) the comparison of Kennedy's use and Nixon's use of ethos, and (6) the conclusion.

PART II

A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

In order to write this paper, it is necessary to take a look at the directly-related and the indirectly-related literature. A division of the literature for discussion purposes reveals four separate areas: (1) the same type of study which this paper reports, (2) the ethos-related studies, (3) the 1960 Presidential campaign commentary, and (4) the ethos-related political commentary. The review of the literature for this paper follows.

I. THE SAME TYPE OF STUDY:

WINDES STUDY--This study investigated Stevenson's campaign speeches for a measure of their effectiveness or ineffectiveness. Some of the considerations of this study were on ethos. The factors Windes found associated with effectiveness and ineffectiveness were: revisions of the draft were made while speaking in order to clarify and identify with the audience; the presence of direct ethical appeals was noted; of course, these appeals were noted to be present in the effective speeches. Two hundred ninety-seven examples of direct ethos, statements which established favorable personality and character, were found in effective speeches and 113 examples were found in ineffective speeches (7).

THOMPSON STUDY--This study sought to determine the

effect of a campaign address on the attitudes of a specific audience. College students listened to a wire recording of a Thomas Dewey address and filled out a questionnaire and an attitude scale indicating their attitudes toward Dewey. The students considered Dewey's ideas, speaking skill, and acceptability as a candidate. After hearing him speak, the students indicated that their estimates of his speaking ability were higher, but their estimates of his ideas and his acceptability as a candidate remained largely the same (8).

ROSENTHAL STUDY--This Ph. D. dissertation was written to compare and to contrast the speaking of Kennedy and Nixon in the television debates of 1960. A critical analysis, this dissertation refers to the visual aspects of ethos and also to the Kennedy use of F. D. R. as a "third person." The study further substantiated the fact that while authorities considered Nixon the winner of the debates, the television viewer believed Kennedy to have won. Viewers' criteria for giving the debate victory to Kennedy were based upon the visual appearance of Kennedy on the television screen. Kennedy did not appear as tired or as old as Nixon appeared. Television studio lighting was also considered in Nixon's loss of the debates as the viewer considered it (9).

II. THE ETHOS-RELATED STUDIES:

CLEVENGER STUDY--This writing is a general handbook for the individual who wants to know more about audience analysis both on the old intuitive basis and on the experimental

basis. The book seemed to be written on the basis that a person aware of the intuitive and theoretical would know more about persuading an audience (10).

ANDERSON, CLEVENGER STUDY--The material contained within this article was concerned with the influence of ethos on communication, techniques for generating and changing ethos, and measurements of one or more aspects of ethos with attempts to determine the levels of ethos of individuals or groups. A collection of various ethos studies, this article presented an excellent picture of the quantifiable studies in ethos. The conclusions were as follows: (1) ethos of the source is related to the impact of the message, (2) some audiences are susceptible to ethos appeal more than others, (3) expert opinion is important, (4) printed and oral propaganda can alter images, (5) characteristics of a speech can affect ethos of the speaker: giving both sides, citing sources of evidence, and obvious attempts to build ethos are good, (6) non-moral traits are important to consider (11).

WIEMAN, WALTER STUDY--The purpose of this study was to investigate and suggest a standard for the analysis of ethical problems which may become a basis for the ethics of rhetoric. They applied this to ethos in the following manner: Definition of ethos: those aspects of the speaker himself that affect his belief-making power. The speaker must have a skill in symbolism in order to suggest desirable things about his intelligence. A frustrated speaker cannot easily reflect goodwill. The speaker who does not understand

others or is not interested in others may have difficulty convincing them that he is a man of good character (12).

ROGGE STUDY--The thesis of this paper was that the audience sets the standards and values upon which the speaker and his speech are evaluated. These are the standards established by society. The standards will vary as the following elements vary: the speech situation, leadership of the speaker, and the necessity of the implementation of the speaker's proposals (13).

LUNDLUM STUDY--The purpose of this study was to evaluate experimentally the effects of certain techniques for increasing the credibility of an argumentative speech. Speeches evaluated were concerned with the 1956 Presidential campaign. The techniques for study were designated in Aristotelian terms--artistic ethical proffs: (1) acknowledging opposing arguments, (2) manifesting integrity, (3) leading thoughts of the listeners, (4) support, and (5) recent message. Major conclusions were: (1) Significant change in listener attitudes can be achieved by a short oral argument. (2) One speech will not necessarily cause an opposing party member to join the speaker's party. (3) The straightforward political argument approach seems the best one to take in political speaking. (4) There is no real difference in effectiveness between speeches of attack on and speeches in support of party policy (14).

HAIMAN STUDY--This was an investigation of the prestige factor, skill of the speaker factor, overall personality of

the speaker factor, and a combination of the speaker's likeableness and physical attractiveness. These conclusions were found: (1) the presence of introductory remarks were significant, (2) competence in the speech material was important, (3) likeableness and physical attractiveness were important but not termed "significant," (4) the audience determined the speaker's fairmindedness by the attitudes they held prior to hearing the speech, (5) positive correlation between ethos and success in the art of persuasion (15).

FLYNN STUDY--This article dealt with what Aristotle described as ethos--in other words, a survey of ethos on the basis of what Aristotle said in his Rhetoric. (1) Definition: Ethos is an indirect proof conveying to the audience an impression of the speaker's intelligence, moral character, and goodwill. (2) Praise and blame affect intelligence and moral character assignments that the audience will make about the speaker. (3) Creation of a feeling of goodwill requires an understanding of the emotions. (4) In adapting the speech to the area the speaker utilizes all three aspects of ethos. (5) Using maxims establishes goodwill and character. (6) Appropriate language aids in establishing good moral character. (7) One should establish high moral character in the narration--rather than establishing wisdom in the narration. (8) Ethos use should not be apparent to the audience. (9) In political speaking enthymenes should be avoided (16).

MARPLE STUDY--To measure the comparative degree to which three age groups were susceptible to the influence of two

forms of suggestion, majority opinion and expert opinion, was the purpose of this study. Groups consisted of three hundred high school students, three hundred college students, and three hundred adults. Conclusions of the study were: the three groups, ages sixteen to forty-five, were susceptible to group opinion and expert opinion. Of the two, group opinion is the more important (17).

LORGE STUDY--The objective of this study was to measure the interaction of settled attitudes with tentative attitudes. The procedure of this study included using the field of politics and well-known personages with political opinions and statements which were ascribed to them. This study indicated that: attitudes can be changed more readily by utilizing praise as opposed to attacks, and opinions are changed in the direction of agreement (18).

WEGROSKI STUDY--The writer of this report subjected children to controlled propaganda with the idea of proving the fact that attitudes of children are based on the acceptance of the opinions of others. The results of this study indicated that: girls shifted opinion more frequently than boys; boys shifted opinions regarding hating more than girls; girls shifted opinions regarding liking more than boys. The attitude toward some labels remained the same regardless of propaganda presentation (19).

KNOWER STUDY--The author was interested in determining the extent attitudes can be modified or changed by argument and what factors influence attitude change. Speeches pro and

con about prohibition were used on 607 experimental subjects and 100 control subjects. Knower discovered that logical and persuasive speeches were equally effective in changing attitudes; greater change occurred when arguments were presented in a face-to-face situation; women changed attitudes more than men; sex of the speaker made little difference; men liked logical arguments more than the women who were more impressed with the emotional arguments; of the speakers, men were more communicative with an audience, and women were more communicative in face-to-face situations (20).

CHEN STUDY--This writer wanted to measure the permanency of the effect of propaganda. The subjects were given propaganda talks relating to the Japan-Chinese controversy. Chen discovered that international attitudes swing back to original attitudes within five months with a short propaganda talk. Adverse reactions to propaganda remain adverse after the test interval of five and one-half months (21).

ANNIS, MEIER STUDY--Using the newspaper medium, the authors attempted to determine the effect of defined propaganda on establishing the extent of favorable and unfavorable opinions. Two kinds of editorials were written, one expressing strong agreement with an issue and the other expressing disagreement with an issue. It was concluded that a high percentage of the readers of both kinds of content became biased with respect to the content of the editorials. Attitudes were changed to agree with the editorials. This was accomplished in a very short time period, as little as seven

newspaper editions (22).

ALLPORT, CANTRIL STUDY--This study endeavored to determine that voice is a valid determinant of personality features, and as such this study is concerned with non-moral ethos described in this paper. Using eighteen male speakers, six hundred judges and the radio medium it was determined that personality can be revealed by the voice and that listeners do tend to form stereotypes of the individual who is speaking (23).

SATTLER STUDY--Sattler compiled what he considered to be the representative Greek conceptions of ethos. Chief representatives listed in his discussion were Aristotle, Cicero, Plato, Isocrates, and Quintilian (24).

HASTORF, PIPER STUDY--The purpose of this study was to determine what the effect of giving clear, precise instructions for the second administration in a typical suggestion experiment would be. Two hundred students were twice subjected to a statement list of forty-five entries. The first test was conducted with no suggestions or elaboration being made. The second time, part of the group had suggestions made to them about the dissemination of their reactions in the study. The important result of the study indicated that suggestions did affect responses. Those students to whom suggestions were made changed their original responses (25).

LEWIS STUDY--This study set out to analyze some of the principles that determine prestige influences in the field of

political judgment. Lewis wanted to prove the hypothesis that when changes in judgment occur it is because the material to be judged is seen in a new light. She used college students and asked them to work with ten political slogans. Finally each subject was interviewed. Results indicated that (1) ranking of the slogans remained relatively stable, (2) differences in shifts were small with liberal shifting more frequently than radical. (3) If a shift occurred it was based on considering the slogan in a new light rather than just a mind change (26).

BURTT, FALKENBERG STUDY--The purposes of this study were several: to determine whether majority and expert opinion were effective in religious attitude formation, to determine the prestige differences between the field of the clergyman and the field of economics or politics, and to investigate ritual and doctrinal considerations with respect to expert, majority suggestions. An attitude scale, which consisted of statements attributed to the church, economic, or political fields, was administered to the subjects after they had taken a similar test which consisted only of isolated statements. Attitude change under the influence of majority or expert opinion was significant, but no real difference existed between majority opinion and expert opinion. The religious expert was considered more prestigious than the economic or political expert (27).

SCHANCK, GOODMAN STUDY--Using high school and college students, the writers of this article tested the effects of

propaganda on both sides of an issue compared with propaganda on either side alone. "Loaded" questionnaires were administered which determined the following results: the subjects evidenced heavy prejudice in favor of civil service; propaganda on both sides of an issue had no significant effects; hearing propaganda which is opposed to established prejudice tended to confuse the subjects (28).

MOOS, KOSLIN STUDY--The questions of this study were designed to uncover information about the way followers perceive a leader. They used prestige suggestions as a tool in order to determine their study questions. College students were chosen, divided into three groups with two groups subject to political prestige factors. After dividing the test blanks into Republican and Democratic groups the results indicated that: (1) suggestion is effective, (2) both Republicans and Democrats are susceptible to suggestion, and (3) the more vague the suggestion material the more susceptible the subject was to suggestion (29).

TANNENBAUM STUDY--The purpose of this study was to study attitude shift toward concept and source of communication as a function of the attitudes held by the recipient toward these elements. The two variables, source and concept of the message, were significant in determining the amount of attitude shift; these two variables also interact in determining attitude shift. In addition, susceptibility to change is inversely proportional to the intensity of initial attitude (30).

WHITE STUDY--Written in two parts, prior-convention events and post-convention events, the book presents an excellent commentary on the 1960 Presidential contest. Subject, as it was, to personal bias it nonetheless presented a good picture of the power of American politics. The book presents the 1960 campaign in a step-by-step process with a detailed description of the events, both small and large, which ultimately shaped the election outcome (31).

MILLER, HARDING, KISSEL STUDY--This paper presented a summary of the 1960 Presidential campaign. In it were discussed the general issues, the campaigners, the debates, and the results. It contained a detailed discussion of Nixon's image. The campaign tactics of Kennedy were also present. The authors presented some rhetorical questions that only time could answer. These questions revolved around the sincerity of Kennedy and whether he actually possessed the statesmanlike wisdom the office of President required (32).

PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 1960 (PART I)--The first of a two-part article dealing with the 1960 Presidential campaign, this article presented an excellent thumbnail sketch of all the Presidential aspirants and their speaking prior to the conventions and during the conventions. The contributors, all noted speech instructors at the time of publishing, made concise statements concerning the speaking ability, campaign style, and strategy of the various "hopefuls." Although short, this article provided an excellent introduction to the campaign of 1960 (33).

GILKINSON, PAULSON, SIKKINK STUDY--The authors of this study investigated the use of authority in speaking. Two speeches were used. Twenty percent of the content of one speech was attributed authority; twenty percent of the second speech was unattributed authority. Subjects, who were divided into two groups listened to the speeches and were tested for their retention of the material. The results revealed no differences in retention (34).

PAULSON STUDY--In this study it was determined that ethos was not significantly related to retention of the speech content. Presentation of both sides of an issue did not cause a great shift of opinion; however, men retained the speech content more than women in this instance. Another result of this study involved the discovery that ethos was related more to change of opinion for men than women (35).

BERLO, KUMATA STUDY--Subjects in this article revealed that a satirical dramatic allegory which attacked Senator McCarthy could result in favorable attitudes. The satirical allegory which attacked McCarthy was broadcast from the Canadian Broadcasting Company. Listeners later completed a form which required them to state their reactions to the radio broadcast. The audience evidenced unfavorable attitudes with respect to both the Congressional committees and with the network broadcasting the production (36).

HARMS STUDY--Listeners in this study evidenced a tendency to form judgments about the status and credibility of a speaker on the basis of his individual status. If he was

considered a well-known expert, the more credible the audience rated him. , This rating could take place within ten to fifteen seconds after he began speaking (37).

THISTLETHWAITE, KEMENETZKY, AND SCHMITT STUDY--This study was concerned with the presentations of one side of an issue versus the presentation of two sides of an issue. Subjects evidenced that it made little difference whether one side or two sides were presented, as opinions generally were not changed if the subjects were opposed to the message (38).

BETTINGHAUS STUDY--The purpose of this investigation was to determine if delivery effectiveness contributed to the credibility and persuasiveness of the speaker. The results of the study revealed that an effective delivery achieves both credibility and persuasive effectiveness for the speaker (39).

MILLER, HEWGILL STUDY--The purpose of this study was to determine if the credibility of a speaker would diminish as nonfluencies increased. The speaker was rated on three levels--competence, trustworthiness, and dynamism. Results indicated that while trustworthiness ratings remained basically the same as nonfluencies increased, competence and dynamism ratings decreased. Repetition was judged the least desirable nonfluency, and it negatively affected the audience's judgment of a speaker's competence and dynamism (40).

TOMPKINS, SAMOVAR STUDY--This study attempted to determine whether credibility of a speaker affected learning of groups and whether speech introductions changed audience

attitudes toward speaker credibility. The subjects were measured for knowledge before and after a speech on medicare was given to them. An introduction made by a credible individual was given to part of the students, while a neutral introduction was given to another group. No introduction was given to the control group. It was discovered that groups' learning was not affected by the credibility assigned to the source and that introductions could change audience attitudes toward speaker credibility (41).

KING STUDY--The author of this report used a recorded speech in an attempt to determine whether artistic and non-artistic ethos affected the ability of the audience to remember the content of the informative speech. He discovered that neither of the two types of ethos affected this (42).

SHARP, McCLUNG STUDY--This study offers further substantiation of the claim that the less organized a speech is the lower the opinion the subjects will have of the speaker after he finishes the message. If the speech is well organized, evidence in this study showed that little shift in student attitude toward the speaker occurs (43).

McCROSKY STUDY--McCroskey used factor analysis to gain these results in his study: (1) the only important constituents of ethos are those of speaker authoritativeness and character and (2) the speech and the speaker introductions produced different ratings of ethos on a significant level. Introductions of a speaker and his speech affect attitude change. Formal introduction of a speaker and his speech

predispose an audience to form favorable attitudes of both the speaker and his message (44).

SHERIF STUDY--This investigation attempted to study the influence of stereotypes and prestige-suggestion on responses made by a listener. A set of three similar experiments were carried out in a time period of two years. College students indicated their preferences for various literary authors. These preferences for sixteen authors were ranked in order of preference. One month later these same students listed their preferences for sixteen literary passages to which the author's name had been attached. The results indicated that prestige-suggestion or stereotype plays a considerable part on people's judgments (45).

KELMAN, HOVLAND STUDY--The writers of this study were interested in investigating the differences that occur between the immediate effects and the delayed effects of a speech which was designed to produce opinion change. Subjects consisted of college students. They were tested for the variables of this study: prestige of the communicator and reinstatements of the communicator. The speech was presented by three speakers: a prestige speaker, a poorly-informed speaker, and a neutral speaker. Subjects were administered opinion questionnaires before the speech, directly after the speech, and three weeks later. Reinstatement for part of the subjects was achieved after a three-week period by replaying the introduction of the original transcription, before the opinion questionnaire was distributed. The results indicated

that initial effect on the subjects was greater with the prestige communicator presenting the material. If no reinstatement occurred over a three-week period, the positive reactions declined while the negative reactions increased. If reinstatement occurred, the agreement with the prestige communicator increased; and the agreement with the poorly-informed communicator decreased (46).

BIRCH STUDY--This study attempted to determine the effects of socially approved and socially disapproved labeling upon agreement with controversial social viewpoints. Statements concerning racism and mechanization were used for testing. The researchers used four groups totaling 349 college subjects. When the subjects were presented with these viewpoints, they tended to respond with the aid of stereotyped patterns of response. If the beliefs of the subjects were strongly held, even the application of socially disapproved labels, such as "un-American," could not easily change them. This, however, does cause a certain amount of conflict for the individual, and he will rate his beliefs as less strongly held (47).

SAADI, FARNSWORTH STUDY--The purpose of this study was to determine the degree of subject acceptance of dogmatic statements under three conditions: prestige reader, disliked reader, and reader. Using a questionnaire, the subjects rated statements. Some of the statements had no author attached to them, while other statements were attributed to well-known and to disliked authors. It was discovered that acceptance

is greatest when well-liked names were attached and acceptance was least when no author's name was attached. Acceptance under conditions of disliked authors fell between the two former extremes. So, statements attributed to well-known and liked individuals carry the most importance with the listener (48).

HOVLAND, MANDELL STUDY--The problem under investigation was concerned with, "The influence of explicit drawing of the conclusion by the speaker upon the audience's attitudes in the area studied. Three variables were examined: audience confidence in the speaker, the audience's intelligence, and personality traits evidenced by the audience members." Two identical speeches were presented by a partial and an impartial speaker. Variations of the speeches were: (1) explicit statement of the conclusion at the end and (2) an introduction which elicited the audience's suspicion of the motives of the speaker. Four speeches were necessary for the experiment. Opinions were measured before and after the communication. The study indicated that: (1) the "impartial communicator" was judged more sincere by the audience; and (2) when the communicator drew the appropriate conclusions for the audience, more subjects shifted their opinions in favor of the speaker (49).

DUNCKER STUDY--Duncker attempted to solve the problem of how to persuade an individual to react to something in a manner contrary to the way he normally would have responded. The researcher tried to influence behavior through real or

imagined social situations of a suggestive kind. Telling stories to children, in groups and alone, Duncker discovered that by applying social pressure in the form of suggestive stories, he could induce children to choose certain foods. The stories associated heroes with disliked food. The effect lasted only several days. Reinstatement of the disliked food preferences could be gained by reminding the children of the story, but this response, too, declined very rapidly (50).

WEISS STUDY--A speech about the disadvantages of smoking was given to three groups of high school students. Each of the subjects filled out a questionnaire during an interview in order to determine if the speech had been capable of producing differences in learning. Responses were taught to the students with one group aware that the responses were untrue. No differences in learning occurred. However, when an attitude change occurred, a correlation could be made between the learning that took place and the attitude change. Attitudes took the form of negative reactions to smoking and were based on information given in the speech (51).

MICHAEL, ROSENTHAL, DeCAMP STUDY--The writers of this study framed two hypotheses, (1) that prestige of the authors of prose and poetry selections affect a shift of reader preferences and (2) that the degree of shift is related to the amount of prestige accorded the author. Three subgroups of forty subjects each ranked literary authors and passages. It was discovered that the results of this study did not support the traditional prestige-suggestion hypothesis; also

few shifts in preferences occurred once names were applied to passages (52).

COLE STUDY--The purpose of this study was to attempt to induce changes in judgment involving ambiguous art stimuli using four different sets of conditions. The aim of the presentation of the art stimuli, abstract finger paintings, was to contrast prestige-suggestion with rational argument. Ranking of the art stimuli received significant changes under the influence of logical arguments which were presented by the leader. Simple discussion periods involving prestige suggestion did not cause significant changes in ranking (53).

KRAUS STUDY--The purpose of this study was to determine whether the attitudes of white high school students toward Negroes could be changed by films employing white and Negro actors. Attitude scales were used and administered at intervals to the students of six Iowa schools. Results of the study indicated that believability of the actors depends upon whether the actor actually "practiced what he preached." Students identified with situations in which whites talked favorably to Negroes about Negro rights, if the two shared comparable social, cultural values and norms. Under this influence, attitudes were modified (54).

DONCEEL, ALIMENA, BIRCH STUDY--This study's purpose was directed at determining the extent to which students would accept prestige suggestions when they were applied directly to their personality. Each subject was given a contrived personality sketch of himself and under mild suggestion from

a prestigious individual, a significant number of them accepted it. Under stronger suggestion from an authority, all subjects accepted their personality sketches (55).

AVELING, HARGREAVES STUDY--In this study the experimenters wanted to determine how prestige suggestion or how the lack of prestige suggestion affected children's responses. They determined that when personal suggestion or prestige suggestion occurs, it does affect certain task performance. Some children reacted in a negative manner to everything suggested and not suggested (56).

CATHCART STUDY--This study investigated the effects of the various methods of presenting evidence in persuasive speeches. The speech used for study had four variations on the subject of the abolition of capital punishment. It was delivered to selected high school audiences. The variation of the speech was as follows: (1) this speech contained only generalized statements, (2) the speech contained unidentified and undocumented evidence, (3) the above speech, speech two, was documented by source, and (4) speech three was both source documented and the credentials of the source were also given. Results indicated that the soundly documented speech was the most effective in persuading; however, giving the credentials of the documentation did not significantly affect the persuasiveness of the speech. In addition, sex was found not to be related to the believability of the speech (57).

KULP STUDY--This study aimed at determining the permanence of attitude changes under a single-experience situation.

Graduate students were chosen as subjects and were tested for their liberality. At a later time certain subgroups were told that the test responses had been written by prestigious individuals. Shifts in subject attitude were then noted. Results indicated that sudden shifts in attitudes can occur and be effected by controlled suggestion. Authorities in some fields had more prestige than authorities in other fields. Reversion to original attitudes does occur but only slightly (58).

CALDWELL, WEST STUDY--The purpose of this study was to shed light on suggestibility and emotionality factors involved in prestige. In order to do this, eight professional and civic groups were named, and eight statements were devised concerning solutions to the problem of the metallic base of currency. The solutions supposedly were those formulated by the eight groups. The forms were given to students, who filled out the forms and gave reasons for their choices. It was discovered that there was no consistent change in suggestibility from junior high to high school levels, but some change occurred between high school and college. Women were more suggestible than men, and the more mature the individual, the more the prestige of the civic and professional groups entered into subject decisions. Emotions seemed to influence the less-mature individuals in their decisions (59).

OSGOOD, STAGNER STUDY--This study investigated and analyzed the frame of reference which can be called occupational prestige or esteem. The experimenters wanted to know

what determinants operated in occupational prestige. The subjects judged persons and jobs with respect to prestige rankings. The results indicated that their technique for measurement was valid and that prestige is imputed to occupations on the basis of such considerations as hopefulness, being noticed, financial gain . . . and prestige is imputed to people employed in jobs on the basis of brains, leadership . . . (60).

SIKKINK STUDY--The purpose of this study was to discover whether weak positive trends favoring anticlimax order persist when the variables of order and authority are combined. Also tested was the effect of delayed testing. The significant discovery was that there were no significant attitude shifts or ratings in persuasiveness present in authority versus non-authority presentations (61).

LURIE STUDY--This was a critical study of what had been done with the area of prestige and prestige suggestibility prior to 1938. Lurie emphasized the need for valid studies and challenged his colleagues to undertake such studies (62).

III. THE 1960 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN COMMENTARY:

U. S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT ARTICLE--This article was concerned with the non-moral traits of the candidates. It discussed various facts about the campaign and went so far as to say that Nixon lost on the basis of the television debates and the placing of the candidates side-by-side for comparison (63).

TIME ARTICLE--With excerpts from several of Kennedy's early campaign speeches, the author wrote of the audience spell which Kennedy's speeches cast. The excerpts were some of the ethos-based examples used in the writing of this paper (64).

SHAFFER ARTICLE--This article compared the two candidates' crowd appeal, speeches, and personality. It was obviously written by a Republican commentator, as the article depicted Nixon as the more virtuous of the two campaigners. Shaffer attributed Kennedy's appeal to the emotionalizing which the audience did upon seeing him (65).

NEWSWEEK ARTICLE--The differences of the two candidates were pointed out in this article. Nixon was said to be warm and sincere; Kennedy was said to be cold and reserved with his audiences. The basic "speech" of the candidates was also compared: Nixon referred to his vice presidential candidate--Kennedy did not. Nixon was "folksy" in his delivery of the "speech"--Kennedy was "bookwormy" (66).

NEWSWEEK ARTICLE--This was a discussion of the second debate and the non-moral ethos present within it. The author seemed to believe that Nixon had not presented as good an image as Kennedy on television; in other words, Nixon was not as pretty (67).

GREENFIELD ARTICLE--The author of the article presented here described Nixon's style of speaking and how he fitted the portions of his speeches together. He characterized Nixon as a man who would like people to believe he is a

"regular guy," "a nice guy," or a "man to stand up to the Russians." Greenfield said that Nixon used his experience. In using his experiences, Nixon interchanged them and varied them as well as he interchanged and varied other speech considerations (68).

BERQUIST ARTICLE--This article discussed the debate that occurred between Hubert Humphrey and John Kennedy prior to the campaign. Berquist listed the following as characteristic of the Kennedy speech: lots of examples, support for what he said, comprehensible and plain language, smooth and uncluttered style, experience use, courage, gratitude to the people for allowing him the opportunity to learn first hand the problems of the area. His appeal is basically non-partisan (69).

NATION ARTICLE--This was a commentary on the first debate of the Nixon and Kennedy campaign debates. It gave the decision of the debate informally to Kennedy on the basis that Nixon was not on the offense enough during the debate. This author would have liked to see some of the ole "slash for the jugular vein Nixon" (70).

NATION ARTICLE--This was a symposium of debate criticism. The members of the symposium and their views are as follows: Alan Harrington--Both candidates were quick, tough; Kennedy came across in a strong manner non-morally, but neither candidate classified issues or added intellectually to the campaign. Harvey Wheeler--Accidental features in the styles of delivery of both men happened to favor Kennedy, for

example, Kennedy's unadorned, energetic features. Kenneth Rexroth--He criticized the debate of the "Great Debates of 1960" and really did not say much at all. W. G. McLoughlin--This was one member of the symposium who believed that Americans really did not consider the non-moral attributes of Kennedy when they watched the debates or when they voted on election day. Don W. Kleine--Kleine believed that both candidates focused the issues with a good deal of clarity (71).

BEAN ARTICLE--This author felt that Kennedy won on the basis of his attack of the religious issue and his use of religious prejudice as a lever. He also believed that Kennedy could not and did not overcome the Nixon-Lodge ticket of maturity and experience until the first debate when it became clear that each party had chosen young men of high ability and intelligence (72).

NEW REPUBLIC ARTICLE--This was a short commentary on the first television debate. The article pointed out that Kennedy was the calm candidate on the offense, who had a knack for elegant phrasing of the current issues. Nixon was characterized during the debate as the nervous candidate who was constantly on the defensive, almost begging his television audience to believe him as a sincere man (73).

FREELEY ARTICLE--The purpose of this study was to record the role of the speech profession in the 1960 television campaign debates and to suggest a future course of action regarding other debates. Because of the impact of the

debates on audiences everywhere, the Speech Association decided to continue encouraging political debates and other important debates in the future (74).

JOHNSON ARTICLE--Johnson discussed Kennedy as the winner of the television debates because of the television lighting and the influence that it had on the non-moral ethos consideration. He commented on the fact that the first debate discussed and clarified the issues, giving information and thereby praising the unseen television audience's intelligence (75).

ALSOP ARTICLE--Alsop gave Kennedy a good chance to win the election on the basis of his organizational ability, the non-moral attributes of both himself and his family, and his deft handling of the religion issue. Alsop also made note of the Kennedy detachment--lack of sincerity--and the Kennedy ability to face and use facts squarely (76).

ALSOP ARTICLE--This article discussed Nixon's boring use of "the speech" and the fact that it moved the voters with seven applause points. Nixon inevitably left his audience happy when he took his leave of them. In an attempt to aid communication with the audiences, Nixon frequently over-emphasized the issues and made folksy audience identification references, the football team's scores reference. Alsop concluded that the Nixon campaign was very effective and impressive (77).

COMMONWEAL ARTICLE--Although the author of this commentary was not pro-Nixon, he had to admit that the Vice

President had, indeed, handled himself well with Mr. Krushchev in Russia in the kitchen. In addition, he had done both himself and his country a great service by handling himself as well as he did (78).

SAMOVAR ARTICLE--The purpose of this study was to determine whether ambiguous and/or unequivocal statements were made on important issues in the television debates and to determine what effect political affiliation had on the interpretation of the message. The results of the study indicated a great deal of ambiguity was present in the debates, and the ambiguity was centered around the prime campaign issues--farm policy, civil rights, Quemoy-Matsu, United States prestige. Unequivocal passages centered around Berlin, Cuba, Quemoy-Matsu, and United States prestige (79).

IV. ETHOS RELATED POLITICAL COMMENTARY, 1960 AND OTHERWISE:

NILSON BOOK--This book was a seeming oversimplification but Nilson admitted such. He does raise some pertinent questions about the politician and his ethics: Is this the way to discuss issues that are of vital importance? Are the candidates genuinely devoted to public interest? Nilson seemed to believe that the search for ethics in speaking helps the individual to make the world better by putting a stress on the individual to continually better himself (80).

KRAUS BOOK--This book was an informative discussion of the Great Debates of 1960 Presidential campaign. The purpose of the book seemed to be to evaluate the debates of '60 and

and to determine the feasibility of such debates for the future. Contributors to the book presented basically good discussions of their particular areas. The sections that were particularly helpful were those dealing with the campaigner's images and the reactions of the television viewers (81).

PART III

A SURVEY OF ETHOS AS ARISTOTLE MIGHT HAVE VIEWED IT

Ethos was listed first and praised highest among the artistic forms of proof in the Rhetoric, "of the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word there are three kinds. The first kind depends on the personal character of the speaker" (82). Aristotle goes on to say, "his character may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion he possesses" (83). Upon further examination of the Rhetoric, it can be noted that the concept of ethos is interwoven throughout the entire scheme of the rhetorical handbook. In invention ethical appeal is one of the means for eliciting a favorable decision. In style ethos is also a factor in presenting the material verbally; and ethos is found, in addition, to be a factor in the oral presentation delivery. So, as can be seen, ethos holds a prominent position in the whole rhetorical system. Sattler offers this conclusion in explaining why ethos held this position, ". . . first, the probable nature of reasoning in rhetoric places a high value upon the intellectual and moral character of the speaker" (84).

Aristotle, however, was not the first to recognize the importance of ethical proof as being a significant part of rhetorical persuasion. The appeal to the moral character of the speaker was a common practice among orators prior to and during Aristotle's lifetime. Even as far back as Homer's

literary heroes, ethos was a factor:

This is often illustrated in Homer where the speaker relies heavily on his personal authority and the impression he gives, as does Agamemnon in his debate with Achilles in Book One. Thus also Athena increases the poise and dignity of Telemachus in the Odyssey to make up for his youthfulness (85).

The litigants in the Greek trials found it a helpful consideration,

In fact ethos is used by the orators as an actual topic of persuasion so that Aristotle's category is by no means only theoretical. This ethos is especially marked in Lysias, who is fond of developing the characters of the litigants to show the jury should favor his client. Indeed, the regular structure of the Lysianic proof is (1) direct evidence, (2) proof or refutation by probability, (3) proof by character (86).

However, Kennedy also states,

Insofar as it appears in the prooemium, ethos is not a direct element of persuasion, as Aristotle would have it, but a means of conciliating the minds of the judges in order that they can subsequently be persuaded (87).

Lysias modified and improved the use of ethical proof as preliminary to the main event of persuasion with his ethopiia. This is defined as,

The technique of conveying something of the character of the speaker into the orations he wrote for a customer to deliver by adapting propositions and supporting arguments to the educational and vocational background of the customer (88).

All of this points to a growing awareness of the importance of an ethical appeal in persuasion.

The mere placement of ethos into Aristotle's rhetorical system and presentation of a brief evolution of its importance in persuasion from Homer through Lysias to Aristotle

cannot begin to point out the definition of ethos in a clear manner. Even defining ethos as Aristotle did in the early sections of the Rhetoric, "Persuasion is achieved by the speaker's personal character when the speech is so spoken as to make us think him credible" (89), is not enough. This is because Aristotle used the word, Ethos, in a variety of ways. It is necessary, therefore, to go beyond this early definition of ethos in search of a more inclusive definition of the concept. In order to do this, it is necessary to examine the Aristotelian definition of ethos by paying particular attention to the Rhetoric and its complements, the Ethics and the Politics.

Sattler states that the word, Ethos, was derived from the Greek word for custom, habit, or usage. Included within this definition was the consideration that these habits, customs, and usages were common to a particular class or society and that these traits were equated with what was right and proper. So, in this respect is found a consideration of the audience. This is because the characteristic traits possessed by a social group are being considered. The audience would expect their traits to be mirrored by the speaker. So, the speaker necessarily would have to possess these common traits or adopt them consciously in order to make himself acceptable to his audience. The speaker would need to impute these traits to the audience he was addressing, "But rhetorical persuasion is effected not only by demonstrative but by ethical argument; it helps

a speaker to convince us, if we believe that he has certain qualities himself, namely, goodness, or goodwill towards us, or both together" (90). The writer believes the important consideration behind all this to be one of appropriateness to the particular audience. The ethos or acceptable moral character of the speaker was, therefore, a relative matter to be varied as the differing audiences varied. In support of this relativist viewpoint, this substantiation is offered. Aristotle considered at one point in his writings that, "persuasion . . . should be achieved by what the speaker says, not by what people think of his character before he begins to speak" (91). With this statement Aristotle seems to be saying that the audience's trust of a speaker should not depend on an antecedent impression--that the speaker is this or that kind of an individual. At another point in the Rhetoric, Aristotle stated that should the audience possess a pre-speech decision, no need to speak existed. "The use of persuasive speech is to lead to decision. (When we know a thing and have decided about it, there is no further use in speaking about it.) This is so even if one is addressing a single person . . ." (92). From this it would seem that an antecedent impression of an individual was recognized as a fact but that Aristotle considered it unrelated to persuasive speech. It should be noted here that, as already intimated, Aristotle is not internally consistent in his writing. What he says at one point in one of his writings he may contradict in another place. The above quote is one

example of this. Of course, Aristotle would be the last person to admit the fruitlessness of speaking and ethos appeal if it has already been established that the audience was acquainted with the speaker's materials such as character and good will.

Aristotle's approach to audience analysis is summed up in his discussion of the causes of human action; "Still we must consider what kinds of actions and of people usually go together" (93). The action Aristotle desired of his audience was that of a decision, "hearers, who are to decide . . ." (94) or, "The use of a persuasive speech is to lead to decisions" (95). Knowing these two things, the only route left for the speaker was to consider the particular audience and the particular approaches that would incite it to an action--that of a decision being made.

From this presentation, then, it can be seen that Aristotle probably would concur on the impossibility of separating the audience from the speaker when considering the concept of ethos. Ethos is just as much a matter of what the audience thinks the speaker is as what he really is or is not. This does not offer a rationale for the absence of a consideration of personal goodness. On the contrary, it supports this consideration even further. Aristotle recognized goodness as being a prime facet in a high ethical appeal, but never, of course, does he suggest that every speaker is good. The speaker in his speaking must present himself to his particular audience as possessing good sense,

goodwill, and a good moral character. In so doing, a careful analysis of the audience was needed, for unless the speaker could determine his audience prior to speaking, he would not know how to construct his ethos in order to have the greatest impact.

Aristotle in Book II, chapters twelve through seventeen, described various audiences. Starting with government, he proceeded to age, fortune, wealth, and power. Aristotle stated this about government:

The most important and effective qualification for success in persuading audiences and speaking well on public affairs is to understand all the forms of government and to discriminate their respective customs, institutions, and interests. For all men are persuaded by considerations of their interest (96).

Since the audience interests would correspond to the government under which they lived and in the maintenance of that order, it was necessary that the speaker have an idea of the different audiences so that he could appeal to the interests, tendencies, and institutions of that particular governmental form. Aristotle listed four forms of government with which the speaker was to acquaint himself and defined each form in a brief manner. He also determined the ends: democracy--freedom; oligarchy--wealth, aristocracy--maintenance of education; and tyranny--protection of the tyrant. At this point Aristotle emphasized again the importance of ethical argument and the qualities of a speaker which lead to effective ethos: goodness, goodwill to the audience, or a combination of both. With this Aristotle concluded his

discussion of government by suggesting the reader carry his education on government further by studying the Politics. The discussion of the Politics will be considered on completion of remarks concerning the Rhetoric and Ethics.

Age is the next consideration of Aristotle. A knowledge of age level coupled with an understanding of the special interests of that level is beneficial to the speaker when he is choosing his ethical proof. "People always think well of speeches adapted to, and reflecting their own character; and we can now see how to compose our speeches so as to adapt both them and ourselves to our audiences" (97). Aristotle arrived at this conclusion after a detailed, common sense discussion of young men and elderly men and the traits and characters applicable to them. Basically, Aristotle considered elderly men to be opposites of young men due to the effects of time and life's experiences. For instance, young men trust others because they are not old enough to have been cheated. Old men, on the other hand, trust no one due to the frequency with which others have cheated them. Aristotle then proceeded to a discussion of men in their prime; and as the reader suspects, he placed this group between the young and elderly groups. It is this group which profits from the best qualities of both the young group and the elderly group. Those undesirable qualities of both extreme age groups are modified and mellowed.

Fortune is the third audience that Aristotle studied, and almost in the same breath, birth, power, and wealth as

related to good fortune are discussed. Generally speaking, men possessing good fortune are characteristically prone to arrogance and injudiciousness, but their saving grace is centered in one excellent quality--that of "piety, and respect for the divine power . . ." (98) those possessing good fortune have a respect because they believe the good fortune to stem from chance. The speaker reflecting this would have good ethos appeal when speaking to an audience composed of men of good fortune.

If a speaker were to appeal ethically to a group consisting largely of wealthy men, he would best reflect what Aristotle considered the wealthy to be. They were successful, prosperous fools whose egos were inflated, and the "newly rich" were worse than those accustomed to wealth because they had no education in riches.

For the audience consisting of powerful individuals, Aristotle suggested a tone of respect in the use of ethical proof. This audience is fully aware of its importance, and the more responsibility they are given, the more serious they become; therefore, the more respect they demand from others.

But, what can be said of the other audiences: the poor, the unfortunate, the powerless? Aristotle left this analysis to the integrity of the speaker by stating, "we have only to ask what the opposite qualities are" (99). Here Aristotle referred to the opposite qualities of the aforementioned five audiences--age, government, fortune,

power, and wealth.

After analyzing the audience, the speaker should adapt his message to that particular group. "The appeal to the hearer aims at securing his good will, or at arousing his resentment or sometimes at gaining his serious attention to the case, or even at distracting it" (100). Aristotle offered the use of facts as an acceptable method of attaining this, ". . . the more actual facts we have at our command, the more easily we prove our case" (101). In addition, Aristotle suggested the use of maxims and stated that they invest a speech with moral character. He, however, mentioned that the use of maxims presents a danger, and the wise orator must be acquainted with it. This danger is that maxims should be used by older, mature speakers lest the audience think the young man presumptuous.

Aristotle devoted time to several additional ethos considerations. These were the use of ethos adaptation throughout the speech from introduction to conclusion; the choice of enthymemes, and examples; and the appropriateness of the language, subject matter, speaker, and delivery to the audience. So, from this it can be seen that Aristotle's concept of ethos permeated the entire speaking situation.

After a discussion of the Rhetoric, it logically follows that two additional Aristotelian works need to be considered before a discussion of Aristotelian ethos can be complete. These works are the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics, both works being complements, in terms of ethos, both to them-

selves and to the Rhetoric. In the Ethics it can be seen how a man's character depends on the society and social class in which he is reared. In order to live according to reason, a man must have a field of action in which to operate. This field, according to Aristotle was the State. In the Politics Aristotle investigated that larger science of which ethics is a part. The Politics was thus Aristotle's book on government. Aristotle, himself, pointed out the importance of a study of politics as related to ethics in the closing paragraphs of the Ethics when he said,

. . . compilations of laws and constitutions are serviceable to those who know how to examine them critically, to judge what is good or bad in them and what enactments suit what circumstances yet when people without a "trained faculty" plod through such compilations, they cannot frame valid judgments (unless they chance to do so by instinct)--although they may, to be sure, acquire a certain amount of political discernment in the process (102).

Due to the fact that the question of legislation had been uninvestigated prior to his time, Aristotle proposed to examine it in order to complete his discussion of human nature. So, from this the writer will proceed to a discussion first of the Ethics, and then to a discussion of its complement, the Politics.

It seems as though Aristotle was directing his discussion of ethics not to the masses but to the gifted, well-to-do class. It seems that this was the only class which Aristotle considered capable of careful reflection on goodness for he said,

Now if arguments were in themselves enough to make men good, they would justly have won very great rewards, and such rewards should have been provided; but as things are, while they seem to have power to encourage and stimulate the generous-minded among our youth, and to make a character which is gently born and a true lover of what is noble, ready to be possessed by virtue, they are not able to encourage the many to nobility and goodness (103).

For "the many" to which Aristotle alluded he offered no hopes of general goodness and virtue. He stated that the only thing possible was contentment for the masses, and this was possible only after argument and all the other forces that result in good have developed a "tincture of virtue."

In other Ethics references Aristotle offered further evidence for this segregation. The masses do not have the ability to discriminate, "Let a man but speak ill of pleasure who is observed now and then to desire it, and his lapses will be taken to mean that he really inclines toward it as something altogether good; for the masses cannot discriminate" (104). In addition he offered more proof that only the gifted and affluent of Greek society would ever possess virtue. In his discussion of a magnificent man, for instance, Aristotle stated that, "a poor man cannot be magnificent, not having the means to make great outlays fittingly . . . an action is virtuous only when it is done in the right way" (105).

It would seem, therefore, that the man who is born to the aristocracy, who possesses power, or who is wealthy is predisposed to a virtuous life and virtue because he possesses the means to be virtuous. "For it is impossible, or

not easy, to do noble acts without the proper equipment. In many actions we use friends and riches and political power as instruments" (106).

However, merely possessing high birth, power, or wealth does not insure the man of a "good" label; he must have a type of natural virtue also. "Those who have nothing but external goods are apt to become supercilious and insolent, for without virtue it is not easy to bear good fortune becomingly" (107). It would seem, therefore, that to be given the label of "good man" is not a simple situation; the man must possess "good" at birth along with position, wealth, or power--a kind of natural goodness.

The question of a man's goodness is not only determined during childhood but also during his adult years, and the question arises as to the source of a man's goodness. Does it stem from nature, habits, or teaching? Those individuals who receive goodness from nature receive it divinely. The limitations of theory and instruction are centered in the doubt that all men can receive them. Yet it seems that rearing a child within the framework of the proper laws until the law-prescribed pursuits of the young become habitual is the necessary and proper method of developing a good man. However, this "natural virtue" is still necessary as well as a prudent use of teaching and habit development. "Accordingly we may conclude that before theory or instruction can be effective the character must originally possess a sort of natural kinship to virtue, loving what is noble

and hating what is base" (108). It is necessary that attention be given to making sure the adult remains virtuous. Aristotle thought laws should govern adulthood also. This program should follow a two-pronged direction: (1) people should be encouraged to be virtuous on moral grounds and (2) punishments and penalties should be given to and taken from those who are disobedient. Aristotle's program, then, for developing the "good" man, and maintaining his goodness can be attained only by reason coupled with a threat of force in the form of a pain completely opposed to the pleasure a man loves. In this manner ethos is connected with nous. This term refers to man's soul. Perhaps this is the only way this term can be translated into English. Involved with soul are man's highest reasoning and classifying abilities. Man's proper and distinctive function in activity would seem, therefore, to be one in conformity with reason and intelligence. Due to this fact it would follow that all man's actions whether good or bad would be rational. The goal of the study of ethics would seem finally to determine how a man should act.

Central to a discussion of ethos is a definition of virtue which Aristotle furnished:

Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a man, i.e. the mean principle to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it (109).

This definition made note of the mean, a term that Aristotle hastened to define and elaborate upon. The mean

consists of that middle ground in respect to actions and passions which has on each side a vice, one involving excess and the other involving deficiency. It is the aim of the good man to attempt to avoid the extremes (vices) and aim for the mean (virtue). This area is difficult to find and depends on "the right person, the right extent, the right time, with the right motive, and in the right way" (110). Aristotle simplified the matter, however, by determining some things have no means and always have a bad label attached to them--spite, shamelessness, envy, adultery, theft, and murder.

Once virtue was defined, Aristotle divided it into two areas, moral virtue and intellectual virtue. The moral virtues he listed as courage, temperance, virtues concerned with money, virtues concerned with anger, virtues of social intercourse, a quasi-virtue, and justice.

Courage is the first moral virtue to be discussed; and it is a mean with regard to those things which cause fear or inspire confidence. In the execution of courage, events are endured or chosen on the basis of one or two things: it is either noble to do so, or it is base not to do so. Never is a man brave simply to escape from pain. Aristotle applied courage to five additional categories. The application of the term courage to each of these categories is a mistake, as the general pairing of the term, courage, to each of these categories was not a valid application. Aristotle might say that these five forms of courage could not be true courage

because each involved some sort of unvirtuous action.

(1) Citizen-soldier courage, this is the one most like true courage because it is due to virtue and the desire for honor coupled with the avoidance of disgrace--all of which Aristotle considered ignoble. (2) The second type of "courage" concerned experience with regard to particular facts. Because the man possessing this courage had special knowledge based on unusual experiences, he could afford to seem courageous when little danger was involved. For instance, Aristotle said that professional soldiers can fight better--be more courageous--because they have the knowledge to do so. These same men, however, are the first to run when they realize because of the knowledge they have that all is lost. (3) Passion is sometimes confused with courage. The dividing point seems to be honor. If a man acts from passion alone, he is not courageous; but should he act for honor's sake only aided by passion, then he possesses courage. (4) Those people who are sanguine are not brave. Aristotle said, "they are confident in danger only because they have conquered often and against many foes." When they realize their actions are meeting with no success, however, they run away. (5) The final "courage" is concerned with those who are ignorant of danger (111).

Temperance is the next virtue about which Aristotle wrote, and it is concerned with bodily pleasures excluding certain of those that deal with vision, hearing, and smelling (unless the odor reminds the individual of the

object of his appetite). In regard to temperance excess can be called self-indulgence. The self-indulgent man is pained because pleasures are withheld from him, and the temperate man is not pained at the absence and/or abstinence from pleasures. This man is, therefore, virtuous.

The third moral virtue mentioned is that of liberality. This virtue is concerned with money and all things that can be measured in a monetary sense. Since liberality is considered the mean, the excess and deficiency are noted as being prodigality and meanness. Meanness is a characteristic of those who care more than they should for wealth; and the word, prodigality, is given to those individuals who waste their substance. It is the liberal individual who is most virtuous because he gives to others, thus proving himself useful. All the giving, however, depends on the definition of virtue as stated earlier--the right people, the right time, the right amount. Giving and taking are considered with regard to prodigality and meanness. "Prodigality exceeds in giving and falls short in taking, while meanness falls short in giving and exceeds in taking" (112). Aristotle hastens to add that the man prone to prodigality is not thought of as bad or possessing a bad character because "it is not the mark of an ignoble man to go to excess in giving and taking--only the foolish one" (113). Also this individual can change his ways either through a mellowing of age or the application of habit. Something should be done to enable them to become liberal because in

remaining prodigal they run the risk of becoming self-indulgent--thereby wasting money on reckless pleasures.

Meanness is characterized by persons who can be called "miserly," "stingy," or by individuals who exceed by taking from wrong sources such as pimps.

Magnificence is the next moral virtue listed, and it is related to wealth only with respect to actual expenditures.

These expenditures should be made noble on things such as worship of the gods, public banquets, theatrical equipping--noble expenditures on a public scale that will be lasting.

In all cases, spending of the magnificent man will be judged according to the status and resources of the spender. The

deficient in magnificence is the stingy man who falls short in some manner--if only in grumbling about the amount spent.

The excessive is the vulgar spender who spends with only a display of his wealth in mind--always tasteless.

Aristocratic pride is concerned with what is called great. To be proud is to be conscious of a superior worth that is really possessed. Those who claim more worth than they actually possess are vain while the opposite vice is that of a false humility. In determining the mean of Aristocratic pride, honor needs to be considered, for proud men deserve and expect a certain degree of honor.

Aristocratic pride then seems to be a sort of crown of the virtues; for it makes them greater, and is not found without them. Therefore, it is hard to be truly proud; for it is impossible without nobility and godness of character (114).

Somewhat nebulous in his definition of a proud man, Aristotle went on to describe him as a person who combined his external advantages with personal excellence, who despised dishonor, who accepted honors from the worthy while rejecting honors from ordinary people (the masses), who did not expose himself to trifling dangers but faced great dangers willingly, who did not ask favors but always rendered aid, who was open in his hatreds and friendships, who was extremely truthful, who was never a gossip, who never complained, and who possessed beautiful, profitless things rather than those with cost and utility to recommend them. At this point the writer was reminded of the Biblical phrase taken out of context, "If there be any man among you . . ." But in addition to all this, the proud man walks slow and speaks in a low-pitched voice with precise diction--just like the western cowboy hero of United States cinema fame. This is the mean of aristocratic pride. The vices, vainness, and humbleness can be regarded as opposites in excess and deficiency of the mean.

In the cases of the remaining moral virtues there exists no nameable mean--only the vices can be recognized. As there is no mean which can be named, it seems as though the vices are in direct contradiction to each other, but in knowing the vices, the individual can compute the mean in order to strive toward that goal.

Such is the case with ambition and unambitiousness, both of which are vices--the middle ground is sought after

as an unnamed mean in respect to honor and virtue.

Good temper is a mean for referring to anger although it leans toward the deficient vice, irascibility; and the opposite excess, inirascibility, is on the other side of the mean. The mean is the praiseworthy state because it is anger "with the right people, at the right time, at the right things, in the right way . . ." (115). The excess and defect are blameworthy states which are dependent on the degree of excess and defect. Just how far the individual can stray before becoming blameworthy depends upon the particular situation and the perceptions of those involved.

Aristotle next listed the three virtues of social intercourse, "the means in life" (116). All three are concerned with an interchange of word and deed, but one is concerned with truth while the remaining two are concerned with pleasantness in social intercourse. The first one defined resembles friendship as a mean, but it is not really friendship because it implies no affection for one's associates. This middle state gives praise when it is necessary, puts up with and resents "the right things in the right way" (117). The vices can be called obsequiousness in the case of those who give pleasure-praise to everything, caring nothing if pain is given. The second social intercourse virtue, likewise, has no name but the vices are called boastfulness and mock-modesty. If a mean were to be delineated, it would probably be called truthfulness; and in this state exists the "call things as they are" philosophy.

The truthful man "loves truth and is truthful where everything is at stake (and) will be still more truthful where nothing is at stake" (118). The boastful man--according to Aristotle the worst character of the two vices--tends to desire glory so much that he will make false claims, or he will claim more than he actually possesses. The mock-modest person understates his involvements in order to avoid attention. The last mean in the class of social intercourse is that of the individual who has a ready wit in his speaking. Tact also characterizes this person, because he who strikes this mean will use his wit with propriety. This virtue is to be admired but the excess of too much humor is known as vulgar buffoonery and should be avoided by the virtuous man. The buffoon strives for humor at all costs to his audience, even to the point of causing pain. The deficiency is the boorish person who is never a pleasant individual with whom to be associated. He finds fault with everything and contributes nothing. Aristotle pointed out the importance of the virtues of social intercourse when he stated, "But relaxation and amusement are thought to be a necessary element in life" (119).

Aristotle listed his next virtue as quasi-virtue, for it is not so much a state of character as it is a feeling. This quasi-virtue is shame and is, "defined as a kind of fear of dishonor producing an effect similar to that produced by fear of danger" (120). The age at which shame occurs is a prime consideration with regard to this virtue--it is a

virtue highly regarded in youthful people. Because of their youth and the strength of passions associated with youth, they commit many errors and, thus, should be prone to feel shame in order to be restrained by it. The older person should not feel the virtue of shame because it is associated with badness that the older person should have forsaken long ago. Shame for the older individual is associated with disgrace.

The last virtue Aristotle discussed was that of justice and injustice. He attached good to a man acting justly and being treated justly for his actions. Voluntary action is the prime prerequisite. If actions are on the involuntary level, the individual acts neither justly or unjustly except in an incidental way. The excess and deficiency are contained within being unjustly treated and acting unjustly. Of the two extremes, it is acting unjustly which is the worse; for vice is involved in acting unjustly.

So much for the moral virtues--all these virtues have been concerned with an actor and with another who evaluates the actions. In all these virtues it is necessary for the audience to make a value judgment about the individual's position with respect to the aforementioned virtues. So, in the final analysis, it gets back to that important consideration already mentioned in the discussion of the Rhetoric, the audience. This person or group of people must be ready to pass a judgment on the individual's virtue with respect to the appropriateness of the person to the action,

time, place, circumstances, and manner in which all occurred.

It would seem, in addition, that Aristotle considered it a necessity for the audience to be able to judge an action's propriety. In order to do this, they must be acquainted with what was judged virtuous. The manner in which they grew to recognize this state was by perception of their own behavior in regard to the listed virtues. In regard to the actions of others, then

We do not censure the man who deviates slightly from goodness, whether, on the side of excess or deficiency, but only the man whose error is too considerable to escape notice. To be sure it is not easy to determine rationally at what point or at what degree of error a man becomes blameworthy; but then, matters that fall within the scope of perception can never be so determined, for they depend upon particular circumstances, and our judgment of them depends upon our perception (121).

This ends a discussion of the Ethics; let this information now be related to the larger science of politics. In the Rhetoric is stated, "We must also notice the ends which the various forms of government pursue, since people choose in practice such actions (virtues) as will lead to the realization of their ends" (122). It is the specific moral qualities associated with each form of government which provide the most effective means of persuasion in dealing with it. This Part will end with a discussion of Aristotle's Politics that follows.

The study of politics, like the study of ethics, is for only the "upper crust" of society, for the nature of political study is such that it excludes those who perform the

functions of production, agriculture, laborers, or artisans. In order to study politics, the individual must have the leisure time that is necessary to practice virtue and to engage in political activity.

One question concerning the good man and the good citizen which Aristotle posed in the Ethics was carried over into the Politics, "for perhaps it is not the same to be a good man and a good citizen of any state taken at random" (123). Aristotle approached this consideration in several manners. One gave the answer that the virtue of the citizen must be relative to the constitution to which he belongs. Due to the fact that many forms of government exist, there is no one citizen virtue which is held in common and, therefore, a perfect virtue. In this respect it would appear that the good citizen and the good man need not possess the same virtues. Another way of looking at the situation exists. If all members of the State carry out their government duties well, they can be said to possess virtue. But, citizens cannot all be alike, so again the virtues of good man and good citizen may not necessarily coincide. Aristotle offered further proof in this approach. The state is composed of unlike individuals, and due to this fact, the virtue of all the citizens cannot be the same.

There are however, cases where the virtue of a good man and that of a good citizen may agree. Aristotle said later that the good citizen should know how to govern like a free man and to obey like a free man, for such are the virtues

of a citizen. The virtue of the good man will include both these actions. One qualified him to rule and the other qualified him to obey. Additionally, Aristotle seemed to be saying that it is the State's--as well as the family's--obligation to teach and eventually establish as habit those personal ethics which lead to personal goodness. A thorough study of statesmanship would lead to a citizen's goodness. This coupled with enforceable laws would hopefully produce good men who were also good citizens.

Those individuals who are superior both in virtue and in the power of performing the best actions should be followed and obeyed. It is necessary, however, that these people have the means for action as well as virtue. Aristotle seemed to equate happiness and virtuous activity; for he said, "If we are right in our view, and happiness is assumed to be virtuous activity" (124), then the active, virtuous person should be acting both for the good of the state in which he lives and for individual good as well. The legislator or leader must be both a virtuous person and trained in virtue in order to lead the populace to virtue through his deft application of the law. "Virtue and goodness in the state are not a matter of chance but the result of knowledge and purpose" (125). In all cases though, Aristotle was quick to point out that the virtue possessed by individuals and States is due to two things: fortune providing some goods while knowledge and purpose (study) provide other goods. The main virtues stem from knowledge

and purpose.

Aristotle in the Rhetoric mentioned that it was necessary when appealing ethically to an audience to know the governmental form of the audience in order to be effective with the persuasive appeal. Knowing the politics is, therefore, pure, simple audience analysis. In the Rhetoric four forms of government--democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, and monarchy are listed. "The supreme right to judge and decide always rests, therefore, with either a part or the whole of one or other of these governing powers" (126). In reference to these forms Aristotle stated that "the speaker should know the moral qualities of each form of government, for the special moral character of each is bound to provide us with our most effective means of persuasion in dealing with it" (127). The details of the forms of government are given in the Politics, and the writer shall examine each in turn.

To begin with, democracy is a form of government in which the citizens distribute the offices of the State among themselves by lot. The chief consideration in a democracy is that, "Wherever men rule by reason of their poverty, whether they be few or many, that is a democracy" (128). Another consideration is that of freedom; in a democracy exists a people who love freedom. Aristotle listed five variations of a democracy. The worst variety has all of its offices open to everybody and considers the will of the people to be supreme to all laws. This kind is a form of monarch because the people, in a sense, become a monarch and

seek to exercise a monarch's control. In this case there are no laws because all laws are open to change at any time. The first form of democracy is "based strictly on equality" (129). In this form the poor have no more voice than the rich--both are equal, and a high premium is placed in freedom and equality and on a government in which the opinion of the majority is decisive. The additional three forms vary between these two forms. The general basis of a democratic form of government is liberty. Each man lives as he likes or as Aristotle explained, "freedom based on equality" (130). So, in short, a democracy is concerned with these things: poverty, low birth, and a mean employment.

The oligarchy is a government composed of a group of wealthy people--the few property holders. As Aristotle said, "Wherever men rule by reason of their wealth whether they be few or many" (131), an oligarchy is the form of government followed. In an oligarchy Aristotle considered the worst of its various forms to be that one in which the officeholders receive their offices by heredity with the magistrates uncontrolled by law. This is a form of oligarchial tyranny which Aristotle called a "dynasty." That form and the one which consists of a government composed of officeholders who are qualified for their office because of property they hold are the two extremes. The remaining two forms vary between these.

Of the final two forms of government, Aristocracy considers a man's wealth and virtue before he is chosen for a

government position. Numbers is also considered by this government. In this form Aristotle said, "the two principles of democracy and virtue temper each other" (132). It appears necessary, therefore, that the individual who is chosen for rule in an aristocracy be one who has received an education--this man would be loyal to the government institution of education.

The final form of government is monarchy, and it is, as its name hints, the rule of one man over all. In the Rhetoric Aristotle listed two forms of monarchy, but in the Politics he listed five forms: royalty according to law (a lifetime generalship), barbaric monarchy (a hereditary tyranny), dictatorship (elective tyranny), heroic time kingly rule (hereditary, legal), and complete control (absolute royalty). The basic charge Aristotle made against the monarchy centered around whether the rule of one good man was more infallible than the rule of many good men.

The ends of the various governments were important to Aristotle because "(the) people will choose in practice such actions as will lead to the realization of the ends" (133). In democracy it is freedom, liberty, and equality; oligarchy--wealth; aristocracy--education, national institutions, and the maintenance of such; and monarchy--protection and furtherance of the tyrant. As for which form is best, Aristotle might have said that the form of government that works best and can be administered by the best, virtuous people should be the choice. Since the virtue of a good man

and that of the good citizen is best, it was obvious to Aristotle that if the State could mold good men, the good man would, in turn, mold the best government for his State. It is, in essence, what could best be termed as a vicious circle--one begets the other.

The question of where this discussion of the Rhetoric, Ethics, and Politics has led arises. Something of all three has been discussed with an attempt being made to remain practical. It seems that Aristotle in discussing ethos and in considering it so important was saying several things.

- (1) The intellectual and moral character of the speaker is valued due to the probable nature of rhetorical reasoning.
- (2) The audience is the second reason. They are the ones who judge and are influenced by the speaker's moral attributes. The speaker has choices to make when considering intelligence, character, and good will. The virtues of liberality, justice, courage, temperance, magnanimity, magnificence, and wisdom are involved as well as attributes of friendship which evidence his good will. Basically these can be described as a genuine interest in the audience, emphasizing particularly the word, genuine. The speaker has another choice to make--how to manifest his choices through invention, style, delivery, and arrangement. His big choice at this point seems to be one of audience analysis, and the factors he must consider are: age, wealth, power, fortune, and government form. This has to be tempered in consideration of what is appropriate for him: age, sex, government

form, moral character, education, vocation. As always there are some considerations that remain the same and must always be taken into account. These are justice, honor, and the necessary--all must be appropriate to time, place, person, audience, and occasion.

Aristotle seemed to be saying also that the individual who genuinely evidences good will, intelligence, and character will have the confidence of his audience. The speaker must have considered everything and reasoned carefully in determining ends; for if in determining the ends the speaker incorrectly calculates, the audience will not consider him as a possessor of wisdom. If this occurs, the speaker may be considered untrustworthy.

It appears that just being a good man is really not enough; the speaker must communicate these virtues to his audience. He must be good, noble, and virtuous; but he also must give his hearers some of his goodness, "a faculty of conferring many great benefits, and benefits of all kinds on all occasions" (134). The speaker confers good will upon his audience by wishing for them the same things he, himself, would like.

Since the word, ethos, is derived from the Greek word for custom, habit, or usage (135) it would appear that there is an additional dimension to ethos, that of a speaker's conformity to the customs of society as they were evidenced by and interpreted by the audience to which he spoke. The factors of consideration, therefore, might be those of age,

sex, physical characteristics, appearance--any non-moral trait which the particular audience would hold in esteem. It is important, then, that the speaker reflect what and resonate with the audience likes.

Aristotle carried his consideration of ethos into the realm of the selection of examples and maxims for use in his argument. The judicious use of maxims invest the speech with moral character because the audience connects them and their universal truths with the individual using them. So, "if the maxims are sound, they display the speaker as a man of sound moral character" (136). The use of maxims should, however, be appropriate to the age and experience of the speaker using them. Aristotle cautioned that they should be used only by older experienced men and even then only if the speech is well-known to the speaker. He based this on the fact that younger men had not experienced enough of life to have the wisdom for prudent use of maxims.

As to complimentary remarks about the speaker, they should be uttered by a third person as well as those uncomplimentary remarks about another. "Put such remarks, therefore, into the mouth of some third person," (137) if uttered by the speaker, either of these remarks may place the speaker in an uncomfortable position with the audience.

Finally Aristotle, himself, broadened the concept of ethos when he stated, "You may use any means you choose to make your hearer receptive; among others, giving him a good impression of your character, which always helps to secure

his attention" (138). Could it be that Aristotle considered the use of any ethos building device permissible as long as the end, establishing the speaker's personal character and good will, was attained?! With this concept of Aristotelian ethos in mind this paper will proceed to a study of the ethos-based statements of the 1960 Presidential campaign speeches of John F. Kennedy and Richard M. Nixon.

PART IV

THE ETHOS-BASED STATEMENTS OF VICE PRESIDENT
RICHARD M. NIXON

The Republican National Convention during July, 1960, saw many speeches presented which, in the estimation of various critics, were some of the best persuasive speeches ever given at political conventions (139). Of all the speeches delivered at the convention, Nixon's was judged the most stimulating and exciting. It set a standard for him to follow in his campaign speeches, but the important thing was that this acceptance speech presented another side of Nixon--one that the public heretofore had not perceived. Until this point, Nixon had been a speaker who had the potential of "slashing out at the jugular vein" in his political addresses. That is, he was rough and blunt in his speaking; he had the image of the tough, political street fighter. At the convention observers began to note that the old Nixon image could be adjusted--even, perhaps, overnight. In his acceptance speech "he spoke with seeming sincerity, maturity, humility, and stature many people had not expected . . . the overall impression was that of a skilled, bold, seasoned fighter" (140). It appeared that Nixon--the old, tough Nixon--realized that his ethos, its 1960 public relations counterpart term, image, would have to be adjusted if he were to successfully run for President of the United States. The convention startled critics, understandably,

and at the same time alerted them that this candidate was about to modify his image. The classic Aristotelian concept of ethos is centered around the "good" man evidencing his goodness through wisdom, character, and goodwill expression. Quintilian, a Roman rhetorician who is often cited when referring to ethos, agreed with Aristotle's concept of ethos as it is stated here. Quintilian would have said ethos is centered in the "good man speaking well." The man first must be a good man before he can show his goodness. The evidence of his goodness cannot be just actions; but instead they must be actions that result from this natural goodness. In other words the actions cannot be contrived just so the man may appear virtuous. The adjustment of the Nixon image may be in opposition to this classic consideration. However, the adjustments that Nixon needed to make in his image were not complete changes; but they were a softening of the "hard line" tactics he had formerly employed in campaigning.

And, he did succeed in his plan to modify his image, this writer believes. After reading his major campaign speeches, it appears that Nixon shakes off the vestiges of the old, tough Nixon and replaces them with new ones which were based in sincerity, maturity, humility, and stature. It was through his use of ethos that he effected this change in image. And, indeed, this is precisely with what this part of the paper will deal. Before discussing how Nixon established his image through his use of ethos, a few remarks about his campaign and statements about his speeches

need to be made.

The content of his campaign attack was centered around several major disseminating media: (1) personal visits with all fifty states carried out by three major campaign tours, (2) the television debates, which many critics believe lost Nixon the election on non-moral grounds, (3) special papers revealing his basic philosophy, (4) several major speeches in which he made major policy statements--one of which occurred October 14 in Los Angeles at the World Newspaper Forum, (5) some nationally televised rallies placed strategically toward the culmination of his campaign, and (6) the four-hour telethon on November 7.

The personal visits to all fifty states was important to Nixon because prior to this time no Presidential candidate had visited all fifty states. Nixon quipped in one of his campaign speeches that President Eisenhower would have visited all fifty states, but there were only forty-eight at the time of his campaign. This was a big first for Presidential campaigns, and Nixon capitalized on it.

From a study of Nixon's campaign speeches, the writer must agree with other campaign critics that the theme of Nixon's campaign was one of leadership. Repeatedly the question appeared, "Which of the two candidates is the one who can give the United States the kind of domestic and foreign leadership it needs?" Generally speaking this question was applied to world leadership, but it also was mentioned frequently in regard to domestic leadership.

The substance of Nixon's speeches basically was centered around this leadership theme and several international issues: Cuba, United States prestige, Quemoy-Matsu, and general domestic issues--civil rights, farming. The writer labels the domestic issues "general" because no one issue was emphasized in many of the speeches. Several of Nixon's addresses dealt with the farming problems (141) that this nation possessed at that time, and several others discussed labor-management difficulties (142). However, even in these speeches the constantly prevailing theme of leadership endured throughout the speech. Although Vice President Nixon made the statement that religion of the candidates--notably the Democratic candidate--was not to be an issue, the writer believes it became an issue and was used deftly by Nixon as an attack on Kennedy.

Nixon fitted all this substance into a concoction the press referred to as "the speech." Actually, during the entire campaign, Nixon gave only one basic speech--organizationally speaking. This was particularly evident during the first portion of his campaign. The debates on television and the campaign material of Senator Kennedy allowed Nixon variation of the "speech," but the basic pattern remained the same with few notable exceptions. One exception (143) was a great departure from the Nixon Speech, but although termed a speech, it was probably more of an informal, extemporaneous message. At any rate, it presented a bit of "comic relief" from the "speech." Also called the Nixon

speech an "accordion" which could be extended or compressed in order to suit the circumstances (144). Within this "accordion" Nixon fitted those matters which best expanded the basic leadership theme: (1) experience--both his and that of Henry Cabot Lodge, (2) use of private enterprise as opposed to federal control, (3) Eisenhower's image, and (4) the Russian situation.

Throughout the campaign, Nixon needed to present the image of a mature, capable, and experienced statesman. This had to be the image he presented if the platform of the Republican party were to be capitalized upon in the most effective manner. The question of whether he achieved the image he wanted to convey can be answered positively. Even in reading the campaign speeches, the writer felt this almost overwhelming dignified, statesmanlike Nixon image--an extremely moderate one. Occasionally glimpses of the old tough Nixon image crept into his speeches, but these were rare. Critics, even, wanted to see more aggression and fire put into his addresses to the people (145), but Nixon continued in his basic campaign strategy. Although midpoint in the campaign--perhaps in response to bloodthirsty critics--more aggression can be noted in the speeches. Nixon soon continued much as before.

Now that some general remarks about the campaign have been made, the specifics of how he effected his great change in image through his use of ethos will be considered. Specifically, this will be put within the form and framework

of the Aristotelian definition of ethos as discussed in the second part of this paper. In discussing the particulars of his ethos-based statements, the statements which were most apparent will be discussed. These considerations will then be placed into perspective according to the statement, the audience, and the context of the material, wherever this is possible, with the Aristotelian principles considered.

Aristotle, throughout his discussion of ethos in the Rhetoric, the Politics, and the Ethics, seemed to be dividing ethos into a consideration of basically three things: the intellectual virtues possessed by the speaker, the moral virtues possessed by the speaker, and the goodwill as expressed by the speaker for the audience. Of course, in each of these three considerations it was the specific type of audiences which offered the final consideration for making choices. So, due to this fact, the first part of a general discussion of Nixon's ethos will consist of a division of the apparent types of ethos-based statements into one of the above listed three areas: intellectual virtue, moral virtue, and goodwill expression.

First the intellectual virtues appear. Basically, Aristotle considered these as (1) wisdom, having to do with philosophic wisdom and (2) prudence, having to do with the practical application of wisdom in fitting the means to the end. The following types of statements refer to intellectual virtue: (1) fifty states, fifty-five countries, and eight years as Vice President, (2) a type of negative ethos,

(3) the frequently repeated statements, and (4) the religion issue.

The first type of statement was one which the writer liked to think of as the "I know; I was there" statement. In this one could be contained all the references Nixon made to his visits to fifty states, fifty-five countries, and his eight years as Vice President. Whenever he used this statement, Nixon was in effect saying, "I am acquainted with what is happening in the United States--fifty states; I am acquainted with what is happening in the world--fifty-five countries; I am acquainted with what is happening in government--eight years as Vice President--because I have been there; I've experienced it all; and because of this I can speak with authority."

Nixon began his formal campaign in August with the first portion of it extending into the second week of September. Early in the campaign, indeed in his acceptance speech at the Republican Convention in July, he declared his intention of campaigning in all fifty states of the United States. In Hawaii he said, ". . . in the months ahead, my wife, Pat, and I, will be traveling over the fifty states of this country" (146). Often Nixon enlarged this statement to include not only his wife but also to challenge Kennedy to visit all fifty states, "And I want to tell you that I hope all future candidates for the Presidency of both parties will carry their campaigns to every one of the fifty states" (147). Other statements alluding to the fifty

states emphasized his own belief in the necessity of campaigning all the states in the interest of the people, "we're campaigning this country as it's never been campaigned before" (148). Throughout the campaign in a great number of his speeches, Nixon spoke of carrying his campaign to all fifty of the states.

The fact that he and his wife had visited fifty-five foreign countries during his Vice Presidency gave him more reason for saying "I know; I've been there." This statement offered firm support for his capability of world leadership if he were to be elected as President. This type of statement, as was the "fifty-state" statement, was mentioned frequently throughout the campaign. As a matter of fact, practically every speech stressed the fact that Nixon and his wife had been there, had seen for themselves, and could, therefore, make statements with assurance. For example, "Well, I know something about it; I have been around the world. I've been to over fifty countries, and I can tell you we can be proud of where America stands" (149), or this example from his Texas speech,

But in this struggle for peace and freedom, we will win and I'll tell you why. I have traveled the world with my wife, Pat, to fifty-five countries and I have seen in the faces of millions of people around the world . . . a desire for peace (150).

Frequently Nixon talked about his eight years as Vice President and Henry Cabot Lodge's eight years as Ambassador to the United Nations in the same manner as the "I know;

"I've been there" statement. Other examples which evidence something of the same thing are these: (1) In North Carolina, Nixon evidenced a knowledge of civil rights problems because he had attended Duke University for three years, ". . . because I say, having attended school here for three years, I recognize that this is not just a southern problem" (151). In other speeches such as the one he delivered to the Columbian Republican League Luncheon, Nixon evidenced this same tendency. Obviously there were many Italians in the audience because he said, in essence, that he loved Italian music and that he admired the Italian ability to sing despite hunger, poverty, and seeming unhappiness. He had been to Italy as a junior senator and had experienced and seen this (152). Finally, in reference to working with the Communists, Nixon would use the "I've been there; I know" statement. Premier Khrushchev obviously gave Vice President Nixon much trouble in the kitchen in Moscow during the United States Exposition because Nixon would refer to his kitchen meeting with Mr. Khrushchev and his defense of the United States. There are many examples of the "I know; I've been there" statement--Poland, the Communist countryside, in which Nixon compared the farms of Russia and Poland to those of the United States--but these examples adequately illustrate the "I've been there" statement.

The second type of statement is a "negative ethos" statement. The first question that arises is one of definition. What is meant by "negative ethos"? Perhaps this can

be explained best by giving several examples and explaining how each was used. , Nixon does not use this "negative ethos" statement frequently, but it does occur enough to be noted as a consideration in his ethical appeal. In the first example, Nixon used what could be termed a type of dialectical reasoning--he sets up a negative argument in question form and then counters it with a positive answer.

A few days ago when we announced we were going to be able to visit Alabama on this trip an individual came up to me . . . and he said: "If President Eisenhower, who is the most popular man ever to run for President in this century, who got the biggest majority that any President ever got--nine million votes in 1956--if he couldn't carry Alabama, why are you going to Alabama?"

And so I answered him and I am going to answer that question to you (153).

Nixon used this same type of reasoning in the speech he gave to the citizens of Atlanta, Georgia, the same day. As a matter of fact, whenever Nixon spoke to an audience he considered hostile, this type of reasoning could be noted within the text of his speech. Another type of negative ethos but along different lines of reasoning is the one used in the same address which combines the dialectical with a reductio ad absurdum argument:

And other people have said in the field of health that we just recently considered: "Wouldn't it be a lot easier Mr. Vice President just to have one Federal health program for our older people, rather than the kind of a program that the administration stands for, which is a Federal-state program with State responsibility as well as Federal?"

And my answer is, yes. It would be simpler. It would be easier to turn all our problems over to the Federal Government. But you know what would

be even simpler. To do away with the Congress, too, just to have one man at the top determine everything. That's the simplest way.

But, you see . . . (154).

The old debater, Nixon, has taken dialectical reasoning and turned it into an argument of reductio ad absurdum reducing the whole issue to the point of being ridiculous and then countering it by a positive statement. A word about the reductio ad absurdum argument--Nixon, the old college debater, used this argument frequently. In most cases it could be termed an ethos-based statement because it reduced the argument to extremes and then slowly narrowed it down, thus emphasizing Nixon's wisdom and reasoning ability in a clear manner. If the argument had been carried out in a step-by-step procedure--beginning, arguing, and ending in particulars--it would have been more difficult for the audience to follow and would not have been so explicit in pointing out Nixon's wisdom and prudence. In addition, the shock effect of the absurd would have been lost. Nixon also used this same principle of negative ethos to praise the audience.

Another type of ethos-based statement was the stock phrases which Nixon repeated frequently. These phrases, while in not all respects maxims, certainly smacked of the maxim label before the campaign was over--such was the regularity with which Nixon used them. Two of them began early in the campaign and were used throughout: "firmness without belligerency" and "it is not going to do any good

unless we are around to enjoy them." The third resulted from the Cuba situation and Kennedy's discussion of it, "shoot from the hip." Aristotle stated, "The use of maxims is appropriate only to elderly men, and in handling subjects in which the speaker is experienced" (155). While Nixon was not elderly, he was experienced; and the use of the first two statements pointed out that experience and foresight. For instance, "And I think that that posture can best be summarized--based again on the experience of these past years--with two words: We must always be firm without being belligerent, firmness without belligerency" (156). In almost all cases he emphasized his experience and the country's need for a leader who had those characteristics. Of course Nixon associated himself as possessing these traits: firmness with no belligerency. The reader will note from this example that Nixon did what Aristotle suggested be done in respect to maxims, that they be reworded for additional effect. The second one--"being around to enjoy it" Nixon used also in terms of the leadership issue. "We can have the best social security system, the best education, the best jobs that we can imagine, and it's not going to do any good unless we are around to enjoy them" (157). The final maxim example is the "shoot from the hip" one. The television debates emphasized the issues of Quemoy-Matsu, American prestige abroad, and Cuba. Basically Mr. Nixon used this statement in regard to Cuba as an attack on Kennedy. Also he emphasized, by example, that Eisenhower

had not "shot from the hip" in his handling of foreign affairs.

The fact that we have ended one war, avoided other wars, the fact that we kept the peace without surrender, the fact that we have had great progress, the greatest in any administration in history has been due to the fact that our President has been a wise man, a man who has not shot from the hip . . . (158).

In regard to Kennedy,

And then the third, the incident on Cuba; again a point of issue in our debate. Here it was shooting from the hip, but missing the mark, the President taking the correct position of quarantining Mr. Castro . . . by economic and political means . . . and Mr. Kennedy making the outrageous suggestion that the Government of the United States should intervene directly . . . This would have invited the Communists in, resulted in civil war or world war (159).

The use of these statements and others similar to them invested Mr. Nixon's speeches with a certain degree of common sense--wisdom and prudence. All of this and the others the writer has mentioned give his speeches a good intellectual ring.

The avoidance of the religious issue is the final intellectual virtue to be mentioned. Early in the campaign Nixon announced that he would not let religion--especially the Catholic religion of Kennedy--enter into the campaign. Nixon even instructed those in his campaign forces to ignore the religion situation. Placing this religious consideration into a discussion of intellectual virtues could be "risky," but Nixon used a great deal of wisdom in his "so-called" avoidance of the religious aspects of his campaign. First, the nation had never before had a Catholic

President and Mr. Nixon could have capitalized on the nation's fear of a Catholic President directly, but instead perhaps he unconsciously used the religious issue in quite a different manner. The manner in which Nixon used religion was this: (1) he vowed never to mention it--and he did not directly. (2) he did intimate toward the issue with his use of statements such as this one, "Don't vote on the basis of age, of personality, or religion, or party labels, but select the man who agrees with you on the great issues confronting America and the world" (160). Nixon's use of statements such as this is an unusual use of "the ignore religion" issue. If Mr. Nixon had coupled this kind of a statement with a bit of linguistic stress at the time of delivery, it could have been a most effective appeal. Generally, when he used this type of statement it was to an audience composed basically of non-Catholics. (By outwardly avoiding the issue he is saying, "I can rise above the petty detail of the religious issue.") Nixon also emphasized his own religion and in emphasizing one thing, it appears that sometimes the thing he had announced he would not do--make religion an issue of the campaign--indirectly occurred. The writer noted few references to his own religion, Quaker, throughout the first three-quarters of the campaign; but when he got to the home stretch, Nixon spoke of his Quaker religion directly, emphasizing the difference between the two religions:

My mother, as you may know, is a Quaker--my grandmother also--and from the time I used to go to Sunday School, the little Friends Sunday School and the church, I have always heard in the Quaker sense a concern for peace. I have a concern for peace (161).

Nixon did mention the religious issue directly once in all the speeches listed in Appendix I of this paper. This use probably tended to display Mr. Nixon's magnanimity, but as the audience perceives things according to time, place, speaker, message and occasion, it could have been interpreted differently.

There is no legitimate religious issue in this campaign. There are none because Senator Kennedy and I are men who have a deep religious faith. We differ as far as faiths are concerned, but we both have faith in God (162).

Nixon continued along this line for several paragraphs. Consider this and connect it to the fact that this speech was delivered to nationwide television. He turned the so-called non-existent religion issue into a strong ethical appeal for himself by indicating to the audience that he could rise above such trivialities.

The next major division of this section is a discussion of the moral virtues. In a consideration of the moral virtues, liberality, justice, courage, temperance, magnanimity, and gentleness, there are two things basically to remember: (1) the "good" man has the choices to make in dealing with these virtues; he must strike the mean in the minds of his audience and (2) the "good" man will exhibit these qualities by bestowing benefits (goods) upon his listeners; in both cases the speaker must consider the

perceptions of his audience.

In Nixon's speeches, the "speech", had a pattern for linking his name with the names of the people in that locale. In almost all cases this occurred in the introduction of his speech and consisted of the names of governors, senators, representatives, presidents of organizations, etc. Wherever possible Nixon would refer to the individual by his first name or even better, a nickname. This would be strengthened by reference to something the individual had done for freedom's sake or to something that Nixon and the person had accomplished together, linking them even closer. Frequently, Nixon would carry this over into the latter portions of his speech, thus fortifying his appeal by reminding the audience of the relationship stated in the introduction of his speech. This served a two-fold purpose; it also gave endorsement to those who were running for public office. It built ethos for other candidates by linking Nixon's name with them, but it seems to be an even stronger ethical appeal for Nixon, himself.

In much the same way Nixon referred to the names of Dwight Eisenhower, President of the United States, and Henry Cabot Lodge, Ambassador to the United Nations. Hardly a speech went by that Nixon did not mention Eisenhower and Lodge. Generally he spoke of their love of peace, freedom, and liberty for all mankind, their continual fight against Communism, and their unshakeable leadership under any circumstances. Nixon always led the audience to the conclusion

that it was a three-man team and that he was, of course, the third member of the team.

Aristotle stated that when a speaker had either praise to bestow on himself, or condemnation for his opponent, it should be done by a third party. In some respects Nixon fulfilled this requirement while in others he did not. These "others" can be explained by the pressures and requirements of twentieth century Presidential campaigns. It is simply not economical to have a third party praise or blame because of time and financial reasons. This third party could be carried out, however, by the use of such names as Jefferson, Jackson, Wilson, Eisenhower, and Lodge. In several cases Eisenhower actually introduced Nixon, and of course, the third person requirement was fulfilled in the person who introduced Nixon. On rare occasions is an introduction carried out without praising the speaker. And, on the occasions where it is not, either blame will be evident or the mere absence of praise will be sufficient to indicate blame.

At any rate, Nixon did make use of the third person as in these examples: Eisenhower: "We will give you the devoted leadership that President Eisenhower has given you . . ." (163) and quoting Eisenhower's own words, "'Peace is more the product of our day-to-day living than of a spectacular program intermittently executed'" (164). In using the record of Ambassador Lodge: "I say if I should be elected I will have as a partner in this enterprise a man,

Henry Cabot Lodge . . . I don't think anybody in the world has done a better job of representing the cause of peace and freedom than he has . . ." (165). He offers also the history of the thinking of Jefferson, Jackson, and Wilson--democrats, all:

. . . as a result of what the Democratic Convention did at Los Angeles, its national leadership forfeited the right to ask Democrats who believe in the great traditions of Jefferson, Jackson, and Wilson to vote for them in this election of 1960 (166).

At the Republican Convention Nixon began to change his image as a political campaigner from the tough political foe to the smooth campaigner who could accomplish what he started. He evidenced this change quite markedly in a magnanimous plea which he made to all groups. This magnanimous plea was a very conservative one that portrayed Nixon as the man who wished great things for his country and its people even if it cost him the Presidency. These things were, of course, peace, justice, and freedom for everyone.

Consider our case, make up your minds, and then work and vote, not just for a man, not just for a party, but work and vote for a better America in a new world, a world of peace and justice and freedom for all mankind (167).

This plea changed in tempo during the mid-portion of Nixon's campaign. Why? Possibly, it was due to the fact that his campaign was a bit too modest and magnanimous for his fellow party members. Although Nixon slacked off his magnanimous attitude just briefly, he soon was back at the old "Vote for America" routine once again. This magnanimous attitude continued until the last campaign speech had been recorded.

Another of the moral virtues can be seen in Nixon's references to Caracas, Venezuela. In Caracas, as almost everyone knows, Vice President Nixon and his wife were subjected to the riots masterminded by the South American Communists. Many people considered Nixon and his wife courageous during the Caracas demonstrations. Although not referring to it frequently, Mr. Nixon did mention it enough to remind his audience of his courage. Sometimes the reference to Caracas was just a passing one, ". . . that there were riots in Caracas while my wife, Pat, and I were there" (168). More direct were these remarks, "it is an attempt of the communists to work violence upon the Vice President and his wife in Caracas" (169). In all cases this re-emphasized what most individuals recognized, that the Vice President and his wife were courageous people who were willing to defend the American ideals in the face of dangerous adversaries.

Nixon evidenced another moral virtue, that of liberality, in his references to his proposed monetary policy. In some cases this was coupled with an attack on Kennedy and his affluence:

Well, you mention schools, you mention housing; you mention all these things that the people want, and in every instance your opponent comes in and says, "I will spend more money than Mr. Nixon will spend." Now, what's the answer?

The answer very simply, is this: As far as these promises are concerned he isn't going to pay for them with Jack's money, but with your money (170).

One of the cries of the people is for lower taxes, and to

hear a candidate say his programs will cost less than another's is evidence of his liberality.

An attack on his opponent's teamwork is carried further by this statement:

You know poor Jack; he has a terrible time with Lyndon. He can't have him up here, and Jack's afraid to go down there. So, I don't know what they're going to do. Well, whatever the case may be, Cabot Lodge and I speak with one voice for America, and with a sound dollar and a sound future for the future of this country (171).

An attack on the opposition is, thus, turned into a strong ethical appeal for the Nixon-Lodge ticket.

With this, Nixon's constant rebuttal of Kennedy's proposed programs, and Nixon's own record connected with a constant reference to the democratic virtues which all Americans hold so dear--liberty, justice, freedom, and peace for all--the reader finds a strong moral appeal.

The final major area to be discussed is that of the expression of goodwill by the candidate for the audience. This expression is concerned with "goods" the speaker seeks and gives to his audience.

One of the major considerations in the seeking and expressing of goodwill is to praise the audience. This Nixon accomplished; and, yet, kept his praise within the bounds of tact and good taste. He struck the "mean." Nixon evidenced his praise for the audience in many manners, but among these are the more prominent which follow.

Nixon stressed the fact that the audience possessed freedom, liberty, justice, and a desire for peace for all

mankind because they were Americans. What is more, they had the ability to see and to recognize the best kind of leadership for the United States and the world. It did not matter if the audience was composed of farmers from Iowa or newspaper men from all over the world who were present at a conclave in Los Angeles. "You're concerned about the leadership America is to have. That's why you're listening to me now . . ." (172); or this example expressing what "we" stand for:

We stand for moral and spiritual strength; for the great ideals that have always been the wonder of the world. What are those ideals? You know what they are. A faith in God; a recognition of the equal dignity of every man, woman, and child in this earth, regardless of his background; a recognition of the right of all people to be independent and to be free (173).

Nixon sometimes used the gross generality to further his ethical appeal in praising the audience. The example below is an example, "I was most pleased and honored to have my good friend, Karl Mundt, introduce me. Everybody in South Dakota knows my personal friendship for him . . ." (174).

Another means which Nixon used to praise his audience was the use of Henry Cabot Lodge's name. His use of Lodge in respect to a "third person" has been discussed, but he expanded upon this use. With very few exceptions each time Nixon endorsed Lodge, he added a phrase which praised the judgment and integrity of his audience. "I, of course, should not comment on my experience. That would be

presumptuous, but I can say something about the experience of the man (Lodge) who will visit this city next Tuesday . . . " (175). In some cases Nixon even went further in stating that, I, of course, should not comment on my experience. That is for you (the audience) to decide," thus, leaving the final decision to the audience and praising their integrity.

Negative ethos, a term defined earlier in this section, is also used in situations praising the audience as in this example,

I cannot stand before you, this audience, and say to you that I and my colleague, Cabot Lodge, are the only men that can provide this leadership. That is not for me to decide, or for him, or for our opponents. It is for you to decide (176).

Up to the point at which Nixon made this statement, he had spent a great deal of effort illustrating how he, as President, could provide the right leadership.

One speech stands out above all others in audience praise. This is the speech Nixon delivered to a labor group, the Association of Machinists in St. Louis, Missouri. In this speech Nixon praised the fair-mindedness of his audience, "The fact that you have invited me as well as my opponent indicates that you are fair-minded" (177). "And may I say that there has been no group in America that has been more aware of the . . . Communist threat . . . than the American labor movement, and you have proven it . . . " (178). ". . . my friends, speaking to one of the most highly skilled groups of workers in this country . . . " (179). In

no other speech studied for this paper was praise of the audience as strong as it was in this one.

Related to audience praise was Nixon's use of pronouns. A professor the writer once had cautioned against the use of pronouns such as "I want" or "you will do this for me" when trying to motivate a group to action. It is better if instead of so many I's, me's, and my's that more we's, us's, and our's are used. It puts everyone in a group. Nixon's use of the pronouns we, our, and us furthers the theme of "good for America and the world." Judicious use of first person, plural pronouns which places everybody--including the speaker--into a group that is oriented toward "good for America and the world" coupled with wise use of first person, singular pronouns when referring to the goods Nixon can provide as President and how his programs can be carried out indicates a building of ethos. It is "we" when voting and leadership are concerned and "I" when it comes to actually providing and carrying out programs to benefit the "we."

The third use of ethos is one which could be called the "Pat Paulson" statement. Pat Paulson in making light of the 1968 Presidential campaign used as a stock laugh-getter the "this is a good place to settle down; I believe I'll settle down here some day." This points out the obviousness of statements like it in the 1968 campaign, and similarly Nixon's 1960 campaign also made use of this. For instance, "(today) we have driven through certainly the most beautiful

country in America" (180). More obvious is this statement, "This is a big state and you do things in a big way, and I want to be a Texan while I'm here; you can be sure of that" (181). This type of statement is saying, "I want to be one of you; I want to identify with you and the things you care for and the 'goods' you want as a people." Generally the above kind of statements were made in the introduction just as Paulson's statements were made at the beginning of his addresses. Another kind of identification statement is that one in which Nixon attempted to identify directly with the audience. To farmers he mentioned the fact that he once lived on a farm, although it was actually a thirteen acre citrus ranch in California. To labor and business groups Nixon mentioned his father's store and the problems encountered in that business. To a union-oriented group he talked about his father's attempt to organize labor in San Francisco. To low socio-economic groups Nixon spoke of understanding their problems because he had seen these same kind of people come into his father's store to charge food they could not pay cash for in order that their family might be fed. Or, there were others who were barely able to pay their bill at the end of the month. These statements are indicative of Nixon's attempts to identify with his particular audience, in this illustration, a union audience:

You know when you're around campaigning you always try to say, "Well, I used to be a member of this organization or that, or I have an uncle or a cousin or an aunt who was," and that immediately gets you

on the right plane with them . . . I cannot say that I'm a member of a union . . . (but) my dad was in an organizing venture that succeeded . . . (182).

In his audience identification attempts, Nixon suited his examples and statements to the type of audience. In all audience identification situations Nixon evidenced a passionate interest in "the people" and a strong desire to realize the people's problems as his problems.

One other important consideration of goodwill expression revolves around the "goods," as Aristotle described them, and the speaker's seeking and bestowing of them. In some respects the goods Nixon bestowed were specific and directed to certain particular audiences. He wished God's blessings on the farming groups to which he spoke and comfort for those in the audience who were standing or who were subjected to the ravages of the autumn weather. Most frequently, however, he referred to what was a common good for all people, not just isolated particular groups. This Nixon generally carried out with reference to President Eisenhower and the Eisenhower record in an "Ike gave us these goods; since I was on his team, I will do the same" type of statement. Under the leadership of Eisenhower,

America has moved forward economically, so that we are the most productive nation in the world, with the highest standard of living in the history of the world. Under his leadership we ended one war, kept out of others and have had a peace without surrender. I believe that Cabor Lodge and I can provide the same sort of leadership (183).

In at least one instance, Nixon referred to his leadership and to his bestowing goods upon the audience. He stated

this might be unpleasant for "the people." Even though it was unpleasant, "the people" still had a right to know.

The final major consideration of the virtues is one which is not actually a moral or an intellectual virtue but which probably emphasizes intellectual virtue, moral virtue, and goodwill expression. This is a non-moral consideration to an ethical appeal. Nixon made use of this too, although probably not to the extent which he could have. The non-moral aspect to ethos appeal is concerned with the appearance of the speaker and the use of audience habits and mores. If this is to be effective, the speaker should conform to the habits of the class to which he speaks--with tactful limit, however. Nixon was tactful in his use of the non-moral ethos appeal. In a sense these non-moral considerations belong to the goodwill discussion above because they are attempts by the speaker to identify with the audience. In several speeches--not many--Mr. Nixon used "folksy" sayings. To a group of farmers in Iowa--"hi!" To a group of people in Alabama, he cut off the "ing" endings of words and the voiced "th" sound as in "blame 'em." To a group of laborers he used the jargon peculiar to their group. Perhaps a great appeal could be centered in something which became his trademark in the campaign. Wherever and whenever possible he and Pat would approach the speaker's platform arm-in-arm through the crowd--just as though they had come from "the people." Whether the absence of more of this type of thing actually contributed to the loss of the

campaign remains to be seen. Nixon, however, might have used it more, particularly when one recognizes the fanatic frenzy Kennedy caused in his audiences.

So ends a discussion of the ethos appeal of Vice President Nixon. A comparison of this Part and of Part V, The Ethos-Based Statements of Senator Kennedy, will be made in Part VI of this paper.

PART V

THE ETHOS-BASED STATEMENTS OF SENATOR JOHN F. KENNEDY

The "Kennedy charm," the "Kennedy wit," the "Kennedy power," are all terms that could have been used to describe the image of Kennedy during the campaign of 1960. In addition, other terms such as "bold Kennedy," "detached Kennedy," "efficient Kennedy" could be used to describe his political campaigning. His opponents described him as the Catholic candidate, the inexperienced candidate, the wealthy candidate; but while the opponents described him in those terms, they, at the same time, realized Kennedy for the political threat he posed. The threat was based on the terms his proponents used to describe him. It is difficult to determine where Kennedy stood in August with regard to his image as a Presidential candidate. However, his national image was probably not as good as Nixon's image was. There are several reasons why this might have been the case, and all of them point to those criticisms the opponents had of him: experience, wealth, and religion.

To what extent did Kennedy have the experience he needed to be President? He had been a United States Representative and a Senator for the years just following World War II--total years, fourteen. During this time he had become a Senate leader and chairman of the powerful Senate subcommittee on Africa, thus distinguishing himself in the Senate. But, of other experience he seemed to be

lacking. He had served with the Navy in the South Pacific distinguishing himself as the hero skipper of the PT-109. So he could be termed experienced in courage. How did his experience compare to that of the Republican candidate, Nixon? Nixon also had Congressional experience and, additionally, had served his country in the number two position as Vice President under Eisenhower for eight years.

Kennedy was wealthy; and in a country which puts much emphasis upon the middle class of society, this wealth was a liability. Then, too, all the great Presidents of the United States--a gross generalization that segments of the United States populace frequently made during the 1960 campaign--had come from a log-cabin beginning. Monetary wealth was not a possession to be really admired by middle-class conscious America. Then there was Nixon, not a wealthy man, but probably he was not as poor as the people believed him to be. The big consideration, however, was that he was not as wealthy as Kennedy.

Religion was the issue that was in the minds of many voters in the United States. This applied to Catholic voters and non-Catholic. Kennedy was an Irish Catholic, and who was to say that the Pope in Rome would not run the United States government if Kennedy were to be elected. The prospect was frightening for many voters. Kennedy and his public relations team considered the best defense of this issue to be a strong offense, and they began to counteract the religious issue early in the primary campaign.

Basically this was a direct frontal attack. Nixon, on the other hand, was a Quaker. No Pope dictated his religion, and American history had shown the Quakers to be both tolerant of other religions and peace loving. This religion, therefore, posed little threat.

So, Kennedy's image seemed to be a strange combination of the above three considerations, and it probably was the weaker of the two images at the start of the 1960 Presidential campaign. Nixon needed to convey a statesman's image, while Kennedy needed to prove through his image that he posed no threat to the security of the American people.

Kennedy's campaign carried him into forty of the fifty states. He considered ten of these forty states, the ten largest, to be prime candidates for the campaign tours. For example, count the number of speeches listed in Appendix B that were delivered in New York state alone. Kennedy, in fact, did carry eight of the larger states he had set out to win. The deep South, largely due to Lyndon Johnson, whom Kennedy did not mention in his speeches, was again the "solid South" with its electoral votes going to the Kennedy-Johnson ticket. Kennedy's campaign was carried directly to the people of the United States with fewer television addresses directed to the nation, but more personal speeches than Nixon gave.

Whereas Nixon's campaign theme was "leadership," the Kennedy group chose the "new frontier" as their theme and stressed continuously throughout the campaign that it was

time the United States stopped sitting still and began to cross some of the new frontiers that existed. Kennedy hit the basic issues of the campaign as did Nixon--Quemoy-Matsu, Cuba, and United States prestige abroad, but he emphasized repeatedly the domestic problems and issues that concerned many citizens, civil rights and farm problems, for example. Religion to Kennedy was a major factor, and he refused to let it rest in the "prepared peace" that Vice President Nixon had created. The presence of the religion issue was one of which Kennedy was well aware, and in several of his speeches he had major comments to make concerning it (184), (185). In all cases Kennedy was direct in his dealing with religion--direct to the point of being bold; he never did attempt to hide his church and in doing so created a strong appeal for himself. More of the religious issue will appear later in this section.

As Nixon had a "speech," Kennedy also had a basic speech pattern, but the writer disagrees with some critics (186) that it was as monotonous and as repetitious as they would have the reader believe. Kennedy, at least, used new examples and historical quotes that were different. Each day he chose two new ones. Nixon used the same ones repeatedly and frequently; in fact, they were in almost the exact words each time he used them. Upon studying the Kennedy speeches listed in Appendix B, something seemed to be lacking. The missing element appeared to be one of personal sincerity. In the majority of his speeches,

Kennedy did not seem to be sincere in what he had to say; it was as though an "invisible shield" existed between the speaker and his audience. Most of the election commentators of 1960 also noted this lack of sincerity, and they, too, were unable to precisely define it. The observation of this paucity of sincerity results from reading and studying all the speeches; but, obviously, it did not adversely affect the audiences to which Kennedy spoke because the Presidential election fell in his favor. Outwardly apparent traits were: vigor, force, boldness, and an aggression that seemed to sweep the 1960 audiences along with him. For instance these examples point out the vigor with which Kennedy spoke:

I believe that there is a clear choice in 1960, as there was in 1948, as there was in 1932, as there was in 1912. I believe that the Democratic Party has once again an opportunity to be of service because I believe that the problems which the United States will face in the 1960's are entirely new, entirely different, and require new people and new solutions (187).

I believe it our function to so build our society here, to so reinvigorate it, to so move it, that people around the globe ought to wonder how they can follow our role, what the President of the United States is doing, not merely what they are doing in the Far East, and what Mr. Khrushchev is saying or doing.

. . . I want Khrushchev to know that a new generation of Americans has assumed the leadership, a generation of Americans that is not satisfied to be second best, that wants to be first, not first, if, but, when, or sometime, but first, period (188).

As with Vice President Nixon, Kennedy set about to convey an image to the American voter. Just how he conveyed

this image through his use of ethos will be the consideration of this section of the paper. In considering Kennedy, the writer will use much the same pattern as was used with the discussion of Nixon. The discussion of the ethos-based statements of John Kennedy will proceed from intellectual virtues, moral virtues, and to goodwill expression. Finally, a discussion of the non-moral qualities of Kennedy will be discussed.

In a discussion of the intellectual virtues, the speaker must show the audience that he possesses wisdom in a philosophic sense and, in addition, he must evidence prudence. This is a practical type of wisdom--fitting the means to the end. The big question for consideration is whether Kennedy did evidence the presence of both these considerations, and how did this evidence present itself? Probably if the writer had to give a positive or negative answer to the first part of the question, the answer would have to be a positive one. Kennedy did seem--from the reading of the speeches--to possess the philosophic wisdom and probably even the practical prudence, too. The consideration left is how he got his audience to believe that he was a wise man who could put his programs into operation. Basically, Kennedy seemed to make use of the following considerations: (1) the history lesson and (2) the maxim. In both he made use of comparison and contrast. Also included in a discussion of intellectual virtue will be the religious issue, the "I'm not even a citizen of your

state . . . and I know" statement, and a sort of negative ethos that Kennedy used.

The first was the history lesson, which Kennedy used very effectively. He quoted names, dates, incidents, places, actual words, and historical impact in every one of the sixty-seven speeches the writer studied for this paper. The selection and placement of these historical references did not seem to be as important as the fact that Kennedy put them in with astonishing frequency. But, in selecting and placing the history lessons Kennedy was shrewd enough to consider the audience carefully--a fact which is evident throughout his speeches. He did, in fact, pick and choose the history lessons that would have the most effect on the particular audience. In speaking to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Kennedy chose history lessons from past United States wars. He referred to the War of 1812, World War I, World War II, and the Korean War. His choice of historical lessons and heroes includes Winston Churchill, General George C. Marshall, and an unknown private (189). To the Mormons, the history lesson was concerned with their struggle for religious and social acceptance. Kennedy was able to connect their religious struggles with his own struggle for national acceptance (190). Perhaps the important consideration in the use of the history lesson was that it was used in almost all cases as a means of comparison. Kennedy would cite a lesson and then compare it to present day events or to his campaign; in each case he linked it to his

own method of determining what was wrong with the country and how his programs could remedy these wrongs. In short, the history lessons illuminated his programs while they built his image. They also accomplished something else. All along in the campaign Kennedy seemed to direct his appeal at Middle Class America and even in some respects to the lower middle class and lower class. Who of these classes could deny wisdom to a man who was so knowledgeable about his nation's past and the past of so many other nations of the world?

Kennedy uses the history lesson as a comparison in these examples. He compares his honesty and cognizance of the needs of a State with Demosthenes in this quotation:

They (Maine) want someone (Kennedy) who understands this section and its needs . . . who will speak for the country in a difficult and trying time.
 "Demosthenes . . . said that 'if you analyze it carefully, you will conclude that our situation is chiefly due to men who try to please the citizens rather than to tell them what they need to hear' . . ." (191).

Kennedy proceeded at this point to tell the people by means of a sort of negative ethos, to be discussed later, that he has the honesty the job requires. He uses history in another manner here:

Gov. Brown and I have been pushing a train all the way from the Oregon border, picking up olives, grapes, bananas, corn, and one thing or another all the way down the rich state of California. I am reminded somewhat of the expedition which Tom Jefferson and James Madison took in the 1790's to find fish and flowers . . . (192).

In the same speech Kennedy uses history to link his

cause directly to that of others, "I think of the Presidency in the same way that Franklin Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson thought of it . . . (193). History is used to counteract the religion issue in the Texas speech. Kennedy uses such glorious names as Bowie, Crockett, the Constitution, the Bill of Rights in statements like this one, "It was Virginia's harassment of Baptist preachers, for example, that helped lead to Jefferson's statute of religious freedom" (194). And, in all cases, Kennedy used the history lesson to support his actions and his thinking and to build his image.

Each locale Kennedy visited he created the image of the "man who didn't live here . . . but he knows our personal problems." In creating this image he did mention each section's special problems. This was good audience analysis and something more. That something was an evidence of wisdom. Kennedy actually mentioned how each problem he listed could be solved by the Federal Government if the voters would elect him President. The emphasis point was that he generally mentioned his home state, Massachusetts, in the "I'm not even a citizen of your state . . . and I know" statement. Generally this was placed in the earlier portion of his speeches, and only rarely did it occur in the middle or latter parts of his addresses. "I know Maine well because I live in Massachusetts" (195), or this one, "As a Senator I speak for Massachusetts and Senator Jackson speaks for Washington. But the President speaks for both Washington

and Massachusetts" (196).

If Kennedy suspected that his audience were largely uneducated, he used short, emphatic sentences. So, he put emphasis on his wisdom by his style of speaking. In many cases Kennedy used the same words over and over again in a very repetitious, but effective show of his wisdom. Before an audience can consider a speaker a wise man, they have to understand him.

As Aristotle said, maxims invest the speech with moral character pointing to the wisdom of the speaker. Kennedy used them. These were history lessons too. He chose Tom Paine, Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt, Teddy Roosevelt, and as many others as he felt necessary. The ones he quoted most frequently were Paine, Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt, and Churchill. Lincoln's words, "This Nation cannot exist half slave and half free," were restated thusly, "The great question confronting the country today is can the world exist half slave and half free?" (197). Tom Paine's words were used frequently; and several different ones were chosen; take this one, for example, "'A flame has arisen not to be extinguished'." Kennedy almost always restated the maxims--as Aristotle suggested--as in the same example, "Today that same flame of freedom burns brightly across the once dark continent creating new nations, new men" (198). One example, which was particularly interesting, is the one from the British legal world, "Under the old English legal maxim, 'He who seeks equity must come with clean hands'; and you

Mr. Khrushchev, do not come to the United States with clean hands" (199).

The religion issue provided Kennedy with the potential fuel to show his analytic wisdom. He turned a theologically impossible situation but a political necessity into a strong ethical appeal. In short, what he was saying was, "Look, I have the wisdom to see the separation of church and state and the wisdom to be able to separate them." Already discussed is the speech that Kennedy delivered to the Houston Ministerial Association, but other notable examples do exist, for instance, the Mormon speech. Kennedy used a Mormon example, Reed Smoot, who became a United States Senator--as Kennedy aspired to become President--despite the religious adversity he had to face--as Kennedy had to face. Kennedy also used applause words to show his perceptive wisdom,

More than 200,000 churches in 50 states represent some 255 religious groups . . . For here diversity has led to unity--liberty has led to strength. And today that strength--that spiritual, moral strength--is needed as never before (200).

In carrying out his programs, Kennedy promised, "I do not promise to consider race or religion in my appointments if I am successful. I promise only that I will not consider them" (201). In Baptist Oklahoma Kennedy struck a high note with this statement, "The issue for the people of Oklahoma and Arkansas and Texas is not where I go to church. The issue is: Do you want a Republican to lead this country for four more years?" (202).

In regard to the international issues, Kennedy would

use a simple point-by-point analytic method in displaying his wisdom. He included every fact--in a historical sense--that had a bearing on the present situation. Kennedy did this very poignantly with regard to the Cuban issue in an academic speech which he gave at a Democratic dinner (203). The content of the speech centered around the Communist threat to Cuba. The United States' position was stated in bold terms, and a historical, chronological sequence of the events which led to the appearance of the threat were related. Finally, Kennedy listed a proposed program that would help other Spanish-speaking countries in the Western Hemisphere avoid Communist domination.

The next division of this part is concerned with the moral virtues which Kennedy used to build his ethos. With this as an introduction to this section, the writer shall proceed to a discussion of the manners in which Kennedy evidenced his moral virtue. First in a discussion are those Aristotelian virtues upon which he built his ethical appeal: the Kennedy courage, the Kennedy ability, the Kennedy magnanimity, and the Kennedy honesty.

The Kennedy courage was indirectly evident in frequent statements such as this one, "I think to be an American in the next decade will be a hazardous experience. We will live on the edge of danger" (204). On September 16, Kennedy ostensibly delivered a speech to Premier Khrushchev who was visiting at the United Nations in order to participate in disarmament talks, but actually, his speech was to the people

of America. It was a strong invective against Khrushchev, but it indirectly showed the Kennedy courage. In this speech Kennedy spoke of Khrushchev's Paris insult to President Eisenhower, threats and encouragements of disorders the world around, colonialism, and half dozen and one other insults hurled at the Premier. On the surface this was a courageous thing to do, but how much actual courage was involved in hurling insults at an individual who was limited in travel to New York City? How much courage was involved in hurling mere words as opposed to the actions that a President must take? Perhaps Mr. Khrushchev's first impulse would have been to laugh, but to a nationalistic audience, Kennedy's attacks might have seemed most courageous (205). In one speech Kennedy almost directly said that he had the courage the Presidency required. Coupled with audience praise is this statement about courage, "They (the audience) start off by recognizing that the next President of the United States will face difficult and dangerous burdens" (206). The fact that Kennedy could make a statement like this and run for the Presidency while cognizant of this fact, brands him courageous.

Not only did Kennedy believe he had the courage but also that he had the ability to be President. He mentions frequently his fourteen years service in the Congress and four years service to his country during World War II. So, Kennedy did "not need Nixon to tell me of my responsibilities to my country" (207). This is a kind of boastfulness, and

yet it is tempered with good judgment. The writer believes it comes as close to striking a mean as can be achieved for a politician.

Any good political campaigner wants to appear magnanimous to his audience, and Kennedy was no exception to this rule. One area in which a political campaigner can show his magnanimity is in the statement about the voter on election day and in praise of the individual voter's decisive ability. "I am confident that whatever their verdict, Republican or Democrat . . ." (208). Of course, because Nixon was present, Kennedy should be magnanimous and tactful, but his magnanimity appeared in other contexts as well. "I would like to set aside my role as Democratic nominee, and speak as a citizen of the United States" (209). Or these statements: "If I am elected President, . . . I am not going to select men and women for positions of high leadership who happen to have the word 'democratic' behind their name." And from the same speech, "They (Democrat and Republican parties) are a means of providing gifted men and women for the service of this country" (210). In all cases the name Kennedy was larger than the pettiness of campaign politics.

As for the Kennedy honesty, who could call a man dishonest who admitted that the road to American progress would not be easy and that it would be impossible to accomplish everything America needed in four years? "I don't run for the Presidency to tell you what you want to hear (but) because we need to be told what we must do if we are to

maintain our freedom . . . " (211). "I have tried to tell the truth to the American people, whether that truth was pleasant or not. I sought to serve the American people, not to please them" (212). It would appear that Kennedy's honesty was coupled with his magnanimity.

During his campaign Kennedy did not spare the attacks leveled on his opponent, and he chose whatever weapon best suited his purposes: humor, comparison, history lessons, third person usage, slogans, direct attack, and indirect attack. He even used President Eisenhower's words to attack his opponent and support his own position. Here is an example of this tactic, "Quemoy and Matsu are not of any strategic value. It was President Eisenhower who said, 'Fundamentally anyone can see that the two islands are not greatly vital to Formosa'" (213). Nixon had stated that Formosa's security was dependent upon these islands. Often Kennedy's attacks were put in the form of questions, "What has Nixon ever done for Oklahoma or what have the Republicans ever done?" (214). Humor was used. Kennedy referred frequently to Nixon's rescue squad. This was composed of Rockefeller, Dewey, Lodge, Landon, and Eisenhower. Kennedy stated that it was not a President the Republicans wanted to elect but a Presidential Committee. At the end of the campaign, Kennedy pictured Nixon swinging on the tail of the Republican elephant ahead of him at a three-ring circus. One of Kennedy's most effective attacks came innocently enough in the form of campaign slogans. It even has a bit

of humor for the reader today. Kennedy continuously pictured the Republican Party as a "do nothing" party, and he attacked Nixon and the party with the historical party slogans.

No Democratic President ever ran in this section on a slogan of "Stand Pat With McKinley," or "Keep Cool With Coolidge," or "Return to Normalcy With Harding," or "Had Enough," or "Time for a Change," or "You Never Had It So Good." The Democratic Presidents in this century have looked to the future, the New Freedom, the New Deal, the Fair Deal, the New America, and now I hope the New Frontier (215).

Kennedy used his personal experience to build his ethos with the "I was there when . . . now" statement, and its close associate the "I was there . . . I saw" statement. In addition, he referred to specific problems the locale had. Because he had seen these problems, he could, therefore, understand them. Few statements can carry so much weight with an audience as the personal experience ones, and Kennedy used them whenever and wherever he could. This example refers to low farm wages, "I spent most of this winter in Wisconsin. The average wage for a dairy farmer in Wisconsin is about 52 cents an hour . . ." (216). This illustration spoke of poverty, "McDowell County, W. Va., mines more coal than it ever mined before and there are more people receiving surplus food packages in this county than any other county in the United States" (217). These two examples are ones that he used everywhere in his campaign. In addition, Kennedy would directly refer to specific problems he had seen. In Montana, Kennedy referred to the Red

Horse Dam project and the Hell's Canyon blunder; in Oklahoma it was the dredging project on the Arkansas River. These references were made along with "goods" he promised to the people in that particular area and to the people of the United States.

In convincing the audiences to which Kennedy spoke that he possessed high moral virtues, Kennedy associated himself with other virtuous issues. Almost in rebuttal to the issue of religion Kennedy made numerous references to God and to the seeking of God's help. He quoted the Bible in as many instances as was tactful. An American deity, Abraham Lincoln, was raised from the dead often. Kennedy almost made him live again through the Lincoln quotations and experiences related in the campaign speeches. Lincoln was artfully associated with the "modern day Lincoln," Kennedy. In addition, on at least two occasions Kennedy referred to his late brother's virtuously dying for his country. Everyone knows that dying for one's country is one of the highest virtues possible in a country whose government is basically democratic. Kennedy used the Bible as an authority and quoted from it; thus he proved that a Catholic knows and can use the handbook of the Christian world, a fact doubted by much of the Protestant world. The use of God, the Bible, and Lincoln could appear at any point in the speech, but generally these appeared at the end of the address. Kennedy's association with these morally virtuous considerations was a strong moral appeal. As was the case with most

all the ethos-based statements, the audience was considered. If the audience were farmers or strongly religious, the references to God and the Bible were always used. "'Pursue peace,' the Bible tells us, and we shall pursue it with every effort and every energy that we possess" (218).

We emphasize this basic principle. The essence of any government that belongs to the people must lie in the Biblical injunction, 'No man can serve two masters, for he will hate one and love the other, or else he will hold to one and despise the other' (219).

In reference to God, this example points out the use of both God and Lincoln:

"I know there is a God and that he hates injustice" Now, 100 years later, we know there is a God and we know he hates injustice . . . and we see the storm coming but . . . I believe that we are ready (220).

His late brother was the one killed in World War II while flying over Great Britain. Kennedy could have used this more, as it is a fine virtue association, but he did not.

"I am proud to be here as a past commander of a Veteran of Foreign Wars post named after my late brother" (221).

The last one to be discussed with regard to moral virtue is Kennedy's use of the third person. This also was used as a sort of association with the virtuous. Kennedy used any third person he could to support his programs, and the references appeared in any context in which he felt it necessary to use them. He drew from such personages as Churchill, Herter, Paine, Jefferson, Lincoln, Demosthenes, T. S. Eliot, and Eisenhower. These were important well-known

people whom he chose to bolster his campaign by either praising his programs or blaming his opponent's.

The final section of this paper will concern itself with goodwill and an expression of such. One of the prime considerations of an expression of goodwill is audience identification which Kennedy used in several ways: Kennedy was a member of certain organizations, for instance, the Veterans of Foreign Wars mentioned in the August 26 speech, and these he spoke of whenever he could. To every college audience Kennedy used one example which concerned German college students and a statement Prince Bismark once made about them. This example, by the way, was used at Kansas State University by Robert Kennedy in his first speech of the 1968 Presidential primary campaign. The "Pat Paulson" statement was not evident. Kennedy did not care to live in any State but Massachusetts. Here is an example of audience identification: "The campaign has two more days. I came to Suffolk County to ask your help in it. My wife grew up in this county . . ." (222).

Closely allied with this is a concern for the audience which Kennedy evidenced when, for example, the weather became inclement. On October 28, he spoke to a group which had been standing to hear him for several hours. Toward the end of his speech Kennedy recognized their discomfort in standing for a long time and expressed his concern. At several other campaign locations it rained, and he again evidenced a concern. He added a joke to the effect that it had rained

on the Republican candidate the day before.

And, in sequence to the above two concerns is the praise Kennedy leveled upon the audiences to which he spoke. First, he asked their help in creating a better America; in attacking the "New Frontier" thus praising them in this manner. In all speeches Kennedy did this--generally toward the last of his speech. But there were special praises he gave at other times, like praise of audience courage, "That resolution showed courage and it makes me proud to be a member" (223). This statement resulted because of a resolution the Veterans of Foreign Wars convention had made concerning the defensive strength of the United States. Kennedy used praise in the following manner in many of the states he visited: "I am glad to be in the county, because it is my judgment that here in Pennsylvania the next President of the United States may well be chosen on Nov. 8" (224). If as many of the states cast the deciding vote in his favor as Kennedy said, he certainly had a lot of deciding votes. The speech in Alaska (225) gave some typical Kennedy audience praises. Kennedy complimented the audience because (1) the Alaskan caucus had voted for him, (2) because Alaska provided the only "new frontier" left to the United States, (3) because the Alaskans possessed a great building spirit, (4) because the Alaskans possessed courage in extreme degree. With the exception of the second example listed, the manner in which Kennedy praised his audiences seems to be summed up in this speech.

One important possession which a speaker must have in considering an expression of goodwill is that of goods for the audience. Audience praise can be considered "goods" to some extent, but Kennedy promised others such as: "a giant electric grid stretching from Anchorage to Juneau, the Rampart Dam, great linking highways, more population, an abundant life" (41). In the October 14 speech Kennedy promised on the national level the following things: less unemployment, medicare, higher minimum wages, higher agriculture income, a stronger monetary policy, development of national resources, better education, and the sound leadership of both himself and the Democratic party (227). But, the main consideration of the promised "goods" was not the goods he promised, but the fact that he told the people what they wanted to hear--he promised them on a local level that certain things would be theirs if they elected him President. In short, it was a beautiful job of audience analysis.

Emphasizing this is Kennedy's pronoun usage. When referring to "goods" the audience would receive if they voted Democratic, the pronoun was always "I will do such and such"--I, I, I. The prominence of the pronoun, I, was apparent throughout the speeches of Kennedy. Whenever direct voting for him was mentioned, it was always "we" again. In addition, when leadership was mentioned, it was always a "we" can do it together type of statement coupled with the ever-present I.

The final consideration of this section is the non-moral qualities that Kennedy exhibited. It has been the opinion

of many critics that the reason Nixon lost the slight edge he held in the campaign to Senator Kennedy was basically due to the Senator's handsome appearance. Women fell under his spell and could be seen everywhere during the campaign attempting to touch the Democratic candidate. He was young; he was handsome; he was dashing; he was bold; and he was daring. He was photogenic in printed material and he had an outward personal magnetism in personal appearances. Many saw only these characteristics. The debates brought the two candidates together for comparison on many levels, and Kennedy had a television appearance that Nixon could not evidence. Just how much import these non-moral qualities had on the election results remains to be seen, but it is considered almost certain that many voted for Kennedy simply because he looked better to them than Nixon did.

A huge question looms out at this point for consideration--one which seems appropriate for investigation. Was the election decided by the image that the two candidates exhibited? Were their images that important? Did Kennedy evidence the Aristotelian traits so necessary to a political speaker--high intellectual virtues, high moral virtues, and sincere good will--or were the virtues Kennedy showed only the result of a shrewd political public relations team? The final section of this paper will take a look at these questions.

PART VI

A COMPARISON OF NIXON'S ETHOS-BASED STATEMENTS
AND KENNEDY'S ETHOS-BASED STATEMENTS

A comparison implies similarities as well as differences, but in the case of Kennedy and Nixon it was not the similarities that were apparent but the differences between the two speakers. That both speakers wanted to win, wanted to change and further their image, wanted the people to consider them men worthy of the Presidency and full of virtue and good will, are obvious similarities. But, when it comes down to the means of accomplishing these things, there are notable differences. Prior to this part of the paper, views of the ethos-based statements of each of the candidates have been presented. These views considered each candidate in what was as objective a viewpoint as possible in the consideration of Politics. What follows this short introduction to Part VI is a list of the notable differences between the candidates Nixon and Kennedy and a short conclusion based on these differences.

At the end of Part V one thing was mentioned, which needs to be kept in mind during a presentation of the differences. Did the candidates' use of ethos affect the eventual outcome of the election? If so, how was this carried out? Since Kennedy did win the election, it is possible that another question should be considered. Did Kennedy sincerely evidence the Aristotelian traits that are so necessary to

the political speaker, namely, high moral and intellectual virtue with sincere expression of good will? The following is an elaboration on the outstanding differences of the two candidates' ethical appeal and a partial answer to the two questions posed by the writer.

(1) The matter of logic is one well worth mentioning. Nixon, the old college debater, evidenced an abundance of formal logical arguments which he hoped would serve to prove his statements and further his image. Mentioned in the discussion were dialectical reasoning and the reductio ad absurdum argument. Others were present, but these two were the ones he used chiefly to further his image. Kennedy, also a college debater, relied less frequently on the formal arguments to further his image. It would appear possible that Kennedy was wiser than Nixon in this area. In an election campaign directed to the middle class--as Kennedy's was--it is not impossible that formal arguments could become tiresome and maybe ostentatious. In the place of formal arguments Kennedy relied on simple dialectical reasoning to carry him through, and the simpler he judged the audience, the simpler his sentences and construction became.

(2) Excessive usage of the first person, singular pronoun invested Kennedy's speeches with more fire and bounce than Nixon's speeches. True, Kennedy ran the risk of being labeled egocentric, but as long as he promised the audience what they wanted to hear, the risk would be short-lived. The "I" carried a great deal more promise and fire than the

"we" of Nixon. It had a stronger impact. For one who considered the audience as closely as Kennedy did, the risk was, perhaps, worth taking. However, while Kennedy was stating all his "I's," the audience mentally noted those things "I" promised to deliver once elected as President. If he could not have carried out his campaign promises once elected, it is possible that he could have fallen from favor in a gradual depression. The American people do hold a campaigner to his promises. At any rate, the "I" makes the speeches more individual centered and gives them more power. Perhaps this is what the American people wanted rather than the nebulous "we" of the Nixon speeches.

(3) One thing that stood out as a vivid difference was the number and length of the speeches Kennedy gave in comparison to the speeches Nixon gave. Kennedy spoke more frequently and stated his program in less time than Nixon did. Generally speaking, the more speeches that were given, even though they were delivered in only forty states, the more chances the people had to see the candidate in action. He can, thus further his image to more people. Nixon spoke in more states--all fifty--but gave fewer speeches, and his speeches were all longer. It seems likely that the man who can say what he wants to say in the shortest possible time stands a better chance of being considered a wise person. People do get tired of listening to long-winded speeches. At the risk of being considered trite, consider Lincoln's "Gettysburg Address."

(4) One of the most important considerations for this section of the paper is that of audience analysis. In this area Nixon fell victim to Kennedy and his campaign workers. Kennedy put his issues on the "grass roots" level where the man on the street could grasp them. He mentioned the "little things" to his audiences, those things the individual members could fathom. Mentioned in Part V were these things: the Arkansas River Project in Oklahoma, additional dams in Alaska, and the blunder of the Federal Government in Montana. Obviously, these things were understood because they touched the lives of all who lived in these respective states. Kennedy varied his language to fit the audience. If he considered the audience to be low in education or to be working-class, "blue-collar" people, the simpler the language became. Thus, perhaps he did actually become a man of the people. Nixon's speeches were all on one level intellectually--higher than Kennedy's, and he mentioned few "grass-roots" problems to the people--only those problems on a national level--the "big things." It is doubted that Kennedy could take all the credit for the shrewd audience analysis. Public relations people, who work in politics, generally do this audience analysis. But, whatever the case, Kennedy's audience analysis seemed very effective.

(5) Along with this, of course, goes the "goods" list. Kennedy was specific and Nixon was general. Even in his generality, Nixon was a bit nebulous. Kennedy spoke to his audience about basic "goods" they could understand, and he

threw in the abstract terms such as liberty, justice, and equality to arouse the nationalistic fever of "Mother, God, and apple pie" in each audience to which he spoke. These abstract terms could be called applause words, for they elicited applause whenever used with regularity. For Nixon the scene was different. He rarely spoke in specifics. Generally, he spoke in terms of abstract words like leadership, equality, justice, freedom--abstract, general terms that were nebulous. Each term meant something different to each individual; and Nixon's speeches were, thus, interpreted in various lights.

(6) Kennedy's speeches were not much better than Nixon's as far as organization is concerned, but it is logical that the easier it is for an audience to follow the words of the speaker, the wiser he becomes--simply because the audience can follow easily what he says. Keeping the effort as low as possible for an audience is like chicken soup when one is dying; "it can't hurt." Nixon would begin to number off his considerations and then either forget to complete the numbers or get so engrossed in what he was saying that he forgot to continue numbering. Kennedy did a much more efficient job of sign-posting. As a result, his speeches were much easier to follow.

(7) The speeches of Nixon were generally defensive in tone--his attacks on Kennedy existent, but nowhere as vicious as Kennedy's attacks. Kennedy's speeches, on the other hand, generally took the offensive--full of the sound

and fury of attack both on the level of personal attack and on the larger level of Republican Party attack. The logical explanation is that Nixon was, in reality and out of necessity, defending the eight years of Republican rule in the country. In addition, he was attempting to build and sustain his image of the seasoned political campaigner who did not "slash out at the jugular vein" of his opponent. This image, as already mentioned in this paper, was one which he was trying to avoid. If he had, as some critics think and his campaign workers urged, become more directly offensive and less defensive, perhaps the story of the campaign would have been different. Mr. James Brady, Vice President of Whitaker and Baxter, never allows his candidates to become defensive. Staying on the offensive lessens the chance of defensive backtracking regardless of position, whether incumbent or not. Kennedy was on the offensive and Nixon was basically defensive, and this could have made a difference.

(8) Americans tend to admire the individual who can quote from memory events, names, places, and dates in American history. It shows that the individual has an intimate personal knowledge about our nation's past; and, for this reason; he is thought to be a good American. In addition, the use of Greek history and literary history, with appropriate quotations, cannot hurt either. Wise citizens can do that at will; it evidences a broad education. Kennedy did. He frequently illustrated and supported his

programs from the pages of American history, Greek history, world history, or literary history. As has already been mentioned, he spoke of everyone from Demosthenes to President Eisenhower. Something was there for everybody--college student to intellectual to "Gramps." Nixon did not make use of American history or of the "finer things of life." He called on fewer third persons than did Kennedy and certainly less diverse ones. Most of his support emanated from the eight years of his Vice Presidency, his experience. This in itself was a virtuous thing, for the man who actually experiences something has a great deal on his side, but the lack of showing a knowledge of America's history was sorely missed, particularly when Kennedy used history so much. Good Americans know their nation's history. Only good Americans who are wise and perceptive, are worthy of their nation's highest honor, that of the Presidency.

(9) Something has already been said of the non-moral qualities possessed by the candidates, so suffice it to say at this point that here, too, there was a difference perhaps of deep dimensions. The writer suspects the depth of dimensions to be one of a particular perception depending on the critic. This was of particular importance in the television debates. Kennedy appeared very handsome on the screen, while Nixon's image was tired and haggard-looking.

So, where do all these differences lead? It seems to be a one-sided show--all Kennedy. Although Kennedy appears to have been outwardly more shrewd in his ethos use, he

still seemed to lack something in all his speeches, particularly when his personal appeal is considered. He went through all the motions and was very effective in audience analysis and the other ethos considerations. However, the ring of honest sincerity is just not there. In some respects the depth of feeling does not exist. This dearth of deep feeling is not easily defined in words and concepts. Perhaps there is no one word which will describe it, but a lack of something does exist. Election commentaries make note of the lack; but they, too, cannot define it. Also, although calling the Kennedy campaign effective, spoke of the lack of an inward sincerity to Kennedy's speeches. His speeches seem to fit the Aristotelian pattern as laid down, but on closer examination and study this element of sincerity--or truth--appears to be missing. Aristotle would contend that this is a basic moral virtue and as such needs to be inherent in an ethos appeal. So Kennedy's success with this consideration seems to be questionable.

Nixon had the beginning of a strong Aristotelian ethos appeal, but it seems he did not carry it far enough. This study stimulates an academic curiosity to study Nixon's speeches in the 1968 campaign in order to determine what he learned from his 1960 defeat. Mr. Brady suggests that Nixon learned enough about Kennedy's tactics of campaigning and ethos appeal to generate a win this past year.

Giving a positive or negative answer to the question of the effect of ethos on the outcome of the 1960 election,

would be, indeed, risky. However, on the surface, it would appear that each candidate's image as effected through his use of ethos did affect the election to an extent. Just how far that extent went still remains to be seen, and the question will be one to haunt American political critics and the writer of this paper for years to come. What is more important, however, is the fact that the use of ethos in the 1960's is as important as it was when Aristotle listed it first and praised it highest in 4th Century B.C. Greece.

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148. Speech; 1960 Campaign Dinner; Boston Armory; Boston, Mass.; Sept. 29.
149. Speech; National Guard Armory; Rockford, Ill.; Sept. 22.
150. Speech; Memorial Auditorium; Dallas, Tex.; Sept. 12.
151. Speech; Coliseum; Charlotte, N. Car.; Oct. 3.
152. Speech; Columbian Republican League Luncheon; New York, N. Y.; Oct. 5.
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157. Speech; Greensboro; N. Car.; Aug. 17.

158. Speech; CBS-TV; Chicago, Ill.; Nov. 7.
159. Speech; Anchorage, Alaska; Nov. 6.
160. Speech; Woodrow Wilson Park; Birmingham, Ala.; Aug. 26.
161. Speech; O'Hare Field; Chicago, Ill.; Oct. 29.
162. Speech; Nationwide Television; Los Angeles, Calif.;
Nov. 6.
163. Speech; Civic Center; Charleston, W. Va.; Sept. 27.
164. Speech; World Newspaper Forum; Los Angeles, Calif.;
Oct. 14.
165. Speech; WHO-TV; Des Moines, Iowa; Sept. 16.
166. Speech; Civic Center; Charleston, W. Va.; Sept. 27.
167. Speech; Greensboro, N. Car.; Aug. 17.
168. Speech; National Guard Armory; Rockford, Ill.; Sept.
22.
169. Speech; World Newspaper Forum; Los Angeles, Calif.;
Oct. 14.
170. Speech; Armory; West Orange, N. J.; Oct. 4.
171. Speech; O'Hare Field; Chicago, Ill.; Oct. 29.
172. Speech; WHO-TV; Des Moines, Iowa; Sept. 16.
173. Speech; Ozark Empire Fairgrounds; Springfield, Mo;
Sept. 21.
174. Speech; Soil Conservation Field Days; Sioux Falls,
S. Dak.; Sept. 23.
175. Speech; Soldier-Sailor Auditorium; Kansas City, Kan.;
Sept. 23.
176. Speech; Greensboro, N. Car.; Aug. 17.
177. Speech; Association of Machinists; St. Louis, Mo.;
Sept. 5.
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180. Speech; 21st Annual Plowing Contest; Guthrie Center, Iowa; Sept. 16.
181. Speech; Memorial Auditorium; Dallas, Tex.; Sept. 12.
182. Speech; United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners; Chicago, Ill.; Sept. 26.
183. Speech; 1960 Soil Conservation Days; Sioux Falls, S. Dak.; Sept. 23.
184. Speech; Houston Ministerial Association; Houston, Tex.; Sept. 12.
185. Speech; Mormon Tabernacle; Salt Lake City, Utah; Sept. 23.
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189. Speech; VFW Convention; Detroit, Mich.; Aug. 26.
190. Speech; Mormon Tabernacle; Salt Lake City, Utah; Sept. 23.
191. Speech; Fairgrounds; Bangor, Maine; Sept. 2.
192. Speech; Shaine Auditorium; Los Angeles, Calif.; Sept. 9.
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194. Speech; Greater Houston Ministerial Assn.; Houston, Tex.; Sept. 12.
195. Speech; Portland Stadium; Portland, Maine; Sept. 2.
196. Speech; Civic Auditorium; Seattle, Wash.; Sept. 6.
197. Speech; Sheraton Park Hotel; Washington, D. C.; Sept. 20.
198. Speech; National Council of Women, Inc.; New York, N. Y.; Oct. 12.
199. Speech; Pikesville Armory; Pikesville, Md.; Sept. 16.

200. Speech; Mormon Tabernacle; Salt Lake City, Utah; Sept. 23.
201. Speech; Wittenburg College Station; Springfield, Ohio; Oct. 17.
202. Speech; Municipal Auditorium; Oklahoma City, Okla.; Nov. 3.
203. Speech; Democratic Dinner; Cincinnati, Ohio; Oct. 6.
204. Speech; Citizens for Kennedy Rally; New York, N. Y.; Sept. 14.
205. Speech; Pikesville Armory; Pikesville, Md.; Sept. 16.
206. Speech; Luncheon; Dayton, Ohio; Oct. 17.
207. Speech; Convention Hall; Philadelphia, Pa.; Oct. 31.
208. Speech; Al Smith Memorial Dinner; New York, N. Y.; Oct. 19.
209. Speech; Pikesville Armory; Pikesville, Md.; Sept. 16.
210. Speech; Fairgrounds; Bangor, Maine; Sept. 2.
211. Speech; Portland Stadium; Portland, Maine; Sept. 2.
212. Speech; Chicago Auditorium; Chicago, Ill.; Nov. 4.
213. Speech; Democratic National and State Committee; New York, N. Y.; Oct. 12.
214. Speech; Municipal Auditorium; Oklahoma City, Okla.; Nov. 3.
215. Speech; Coliseum; Charlotte, N. Car.; Sept. 17.
216. Speech; Convention Hall; Philadelphia, Pa.; Oct. 31.
217. Speech; Civic Center; Charleston, W. Va.; Sept. 19.
218. Speech; Civic Auditorium; Seattle, Wash.; Sept. 6.
219. Speech; Wittenburg College Station; Springfield, Ohio; Oct. 17.
220. Speech; Auditorium; Indianapolis, Ind.; Oct. 4.
221. Speech; VFW Convention; Detroit, Mich.; Aug. 26.

222. Speech; Commack Arena; Long Island, N. Y.; Nov. 6.
223. Speech; VFW Convention; Detroit, Mich.; Aug. 26.
224. Speech; Scranton, Pa.; Oct. 28.
225. Speech; The Edgewater; Anchorage, Alaska; Sept. 3.
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Nixon, Richard M. Speech given at the Waikiki Shell; Honolulu, Hawaii; Aug. 4, 1960.

_____. Speech given at Greensboro, N. Car.; Aug. 17, 1960.

_____. Speech given at the V. F. W. Convention; Detroit, Mich.; Aug. 24, 1960.

_____. Speech given at Woodrow Wilson Park; Birmingham, Ala.; Aug. 26, 1960.

- Nixon, Richard M. Speech given at the Memorial Auditorium; Dallas, Tex.; Sept. 12, 1960.
- _____. Speech given at the International Association of Machinists Meeting; St. Louis, Mo.; Sept. 15, 1960.
- _____. Speech given at the 21st Annual Plowing Contest; Guthrie Center, Iowa; Sept. 16, 1960.
- _____. WHO-TV; Des Moines, Iowa; Sept. 16, 1960.
- _____. Speech given at the Ozark Empire Fairgrounds; Springfield, Mo.; Sept. 21, 1960.
- _____. Speech given at the National Guard Armory; Rockford, Ill.; Sept. 22, 1960.
- _____. Speech given at the 1960 Soil Conservation Field Days, National Plowing Contest; Sioux Falls, S. Dak.; Sept. 23, 1960.
- _____. Speech given at the Soldier-Sailor Auditorium; Kansas City, Kan.; Sept. 23, 1960.
- _____. Speech given at the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners meeting; Chicago, Ill.; Sept. 26, 1960.
- _____. Speech given at the Civic Center; Charleston, W. Va.; Sept. 27, 1960.
- _____. Speech given at the 1960 Campaign Dinner, Boston Armory; Boston, Mass.; Sept. 29, 1960.
- _____. Speech given at the Coliseum; Charlotte, N. Car.; Oct. 3, 1960.
- _____. Speech given at the Armory; West Orange, N. J.; Oct. 4, 1960.
- _____. Speech given at the Columbian Republican League Luncheon; New York, N. Y.; Oct. 5, 1960.
- _____. Speech given at the World Newspaper Forum; Los Angeles, Calif.; Oct. 14, 1960.
- _____. Speech given at the Association of Business Economists; New York, N. Y.; Oct. 20, 1960.
- _____. Speech given at O'Hare Field; Chicago, Ill.; Oct. 29, 1960.

Nixon, Richard M. Speech given at Fresno, Calif.; Nov. 6,
1960.

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Brady, James. Personal interview, Nov. 1968.

APPENDIX A

Vice President Richard M. Nixon - Speeches studied in conjunction with the writing of this paper.

PLACE:	DATE:
Waikiki Shell, Honolulu, Hawaii	Aug. 4
Greensboro, N. Car.	Aug. 17
V. F. W. Convention, Detroit, Mich.	Aug. 24
Woodrow Wilson Park, Birmingham, Ala.	Aug. 26
Atlanta, Ga.	Aug. 26
Memorial Auditorium, Dallas, Tex.	Sept. 12
International Assn. of Machinists, St. Louis, Mo.	Sept. 15
Convention of National Federation of Republican Women, Atlantic City, N. J.	Sept. 15
21st Annual Plowing Contest; Guthrie Center, Ia.	Sept. 16
T. V. Address; WHO-TV, Des Moines, Ia.	Sept. 16
Ozark Empire Fairgrounds, Springfield, Mo.	Sept. 21
National Guard Armory, Rockford, Ill.	Sept. 22
1960 Soil Conservation Field Days, National Plowing Contest; Sioux Falls, S. Dak.	Sept. 23
Soldier-Sailor Auditorium, Kansas City, Kan.	Sept. 23
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, Chicago, Ill.	Sept. 26
Civic Center, Charleston, W. Va.	Sept. 27
Long Island Arena, Commack, Long Island, N. Y.	Sept. 28
1960 Campaign Dinner, Boston Armory, Boston, Mass.	Sept. 29
1960 Campaign Dinner, Closed Circuit T. V., Boston, Mass.	Sept. 29
Arlin Field High School Football Stadium, Mansfield, Ohio	Oct. 1
Coliseum, Charlotte, N. Car.	Oct. 3
Armory, West Orange, N. J.	Oct. 4
Columbian Republican League Luncheon, Comodore Hotel, New York, N. Y.	Oct. 5
Convention Hall, Philadelphia, Pa.	Oct. 5
Public Hall, Cleveland, Ohio	Oct. 6
Mormon Tabernacle, Salt Lake City, Utah	Oct. 10
World Newspaper Forum, Los Angeles, Calif.	Oct. 14

PLACE:	DATE:
American Legion Convention, Miami, Fla.	Oct. 18
Association of Business Economists, New York University, New York, N. Y.	Oct. 20
Muhlenburg College Gymnasium, Allentown, Pa.	Oct. 22
Syria Mosque, Pittsburg, Pa.	Oct. 24
Sigma Delta Chi, Toledo, Ohio	Oct. 26
United States Masonic Auditorium, Davenport, Ia.	Oct. 28
O'Hare Field, Chicago, Ill.	Oct. 29
T. V. Speech, Chicago, Ill.	Oct. 29
T. V. Speech, WHEN, Syracuse, N. Y.	Nov. 1
War Memorial Auditorium, Rochester, N. Y.	Nov. 1
"Nixon Tonight" CBS-TV, New York, N. Y.	Nov. 2
KFRE-TV, Fresno, Calif.	Nov. 4
Anchorage, Alaska	Nov. 6
Nationwide TV Speech, Los Angeles, Calif.	Nov. 6
CBS-TV, Chicago, Ill.	Nov. 7

APPENDIX B

Senator John F. Kennedy - Speeches studied in conjunction
with the writing of this paper.

PLACE:	DATE:
V. F. W. Convention, Detroit, Mich.	Aug. 26
Fairgrounds, Bangor, Maine	Sept. 2
Portland Stadium, Portland, Maine	Sept. 2
Fairgrounds, Palmer, Alaska	Sept. 3
Edgewater, Anchorage, Alaska	Sept. 3
Cadillac Square, Detroit, Michigan	Sept. 5
High School Auditorium, Pocatello, Idaho	Sept. 6
Civic Auditorium, Seattle, Washington	Sept. 6
Multnomah Hotel, Portland, Oregon	Sept. 7
Civic Auditorium, Portland, Oregon	Sept. 7
Shrine Auditorium, Los Angeles, Calif.	Sept. 9
Houston Coliseum, Houston, Texas	Sept. 12
Greater Houston Ministerial Association, Rice Hotel, Houston, Texas	Sept. 12
I. A. M. Convention, Kiel Auditorium, St. Louis, Mo.	Sept. 14
Democratic Women's Luncheon, Commodore Hotel, New York, N. Y.	Sept. 14
Citizen's for Kennedy Rally, Waldorf- Astoria, New York, N. Y.	Sept. 14
Commodore Hotel, Acceptance of Liberal Party Nomination, New York, N. Y.	Sept. 14
State-wide TV Speech, Zembo Mosque Temple, Harrisburg, Pa.	Sept. 15
Pikesville Armory, Pikesville, Md.	Sept. 16
Colesium, Charlotte, N. Car.	Sept. 17
Colesium, Raleigh, N. Car.	Sept. 17
Civic Center, Charleston, W. Va.	Sept. 19
United Steel Workers Convention, Convention Hall, Atlantic City, N. J.	Sept. 19
Civic Center, Charleston, W. Va.	Sept. 19
Sheraton-Park Hotel, Washington, D. C.	Sept. 20
National Plowing Contest, Sioux Falls, S. Dak.	Sept. 22
Shrine Auditorium, Billings, Montana	Sept. 22
Mormon Tabernacle, Salt Lake City, Utah	Sept. 23
Memorial Auditorium, Buffalo, N. Y.	Sept. 28
Democratic Fund Raising Dinner, Syracuse, N. Y.	Sept. 29
Polish-American Congress, Chicago, Ill.	Oct. 1

PLACE:	DATE:
Chase Hotel, St. Louis, Mo.	Oct. 2
Southern Illinois Stadium, Carbondale, Ill.	Oct. 3
Armory, Springfield, Ill.	Oct. 3
Auditorium (Coliseum), Indianapolis, Ind.	Oct. 4
Fairgrounds, Louisville, Ky.	Oct. 5
Cincinnati, Ohio	Oct. 6
Bowling Green, Ky.	Oct. 8
Airport, Columbus, Ga.	Oct. 10
Little White House, Warm Springs, Ga.	Oct. 10
Associated Business Publications Conference, Biltmore Hotel, New York, N. Y.	Oct. 12
National Council of Women, Inc. Waldorf-Astoria, New York, N. Y.	Oct. 12
Waldorf Astoria Hotel	Oct. 12
Park-Sheraton Hotel, New York, N. Y.	Oct. 12
Saginaw, Michigan	Oct. 14
Luncheon, Biltmore Hotel, Dayton, Ohio	Oct. 17
Wittenburg College Stadium, Springfield, Ohio	Oct. 17
American Legion Convention, Miami Beach, Fla.	Oct. 18
Hemming Park, Jacksonville, Fla.	Oct. 18
Al Smith Memorial, Waldorf Astoria, New York, N. Y.	Oct. 19
Madison Square Gardens, Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, New York, N. Y.	Oct. 21
Auditorium, Kansas City, Mo.	Oct. 22
Fieldhouse University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis.	Oct. 23
Milwaukee, Wis.	Oct. 23
Detroit Coliseum, Michigan State Fair, Detroit, Michigan	Oct. 26
Eastern Parkway Arena, Brooklyn, N. Y.	Oct. 27
Sunnyside Gardens, Queens, N. Y.	Oct. 27
Scranton, Pa.	Oct. 28
Valley Forge Country Club, Valley Forge, Pa.	Oct. 29
Convention Hall, Philadelphia, Pa.	Oct. 31
East Los Angeles Stadium, Los Angeles, Calif.	Nov. 1
Beverly Hilton Hotel, Los Angeles, Calif.	Nov. 2
Cow Palace, San Francisco, Calif.	Nov. 2
Municipal Auditorium, Oklahoma City, Okla.	Nov. 3
Chicago Auditorium, Chicago, Ill.	Nov. 4

PLACE:

DATE:

Commack Arena, Commack, Long Island,
New York, N. Y.
Boston Garden, Boston, Mass.
Boston, Mass., Faneuil Hall

Nov. 6
Nov. 7
Nov. 7

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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ETHOS-BASED STATEMENTS
MADE BY JOHN KENNEDY AND RICHARD NIXON IN THEIR
1960 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN SPEECHES

by

OLETTA JO BUNTZ

B. A., Kansas State University, 1963

AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S THESIS

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requirements for the degree

MASTER OF ARTS

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1969

John F. Kennedy and Richard M. Nixon were the Presidential candidates in the political campaign of 1960. This study was concerned with the ethos-based statements which they made in their campaign speeches.

The purpose of this thesis was to study the ethos-based statements within the framework of an Aristotelian definition of ethos. This was done in an attempt to note the similarities and differences between Aristotelian ethos and modern political ethos.

To fulfill this purpose, a background study of Aristotelian ethos was done in order to establish a framework for the study of the campaign speeches. The concept of ethos was based on Aristotle's Rhetoric, Politics, and Nicomachean Ethics. The forty-two speeches from Nixon's campaign and the sixty-seven speeches from Kennedy's campaign were selected for study. The criterion for the selection of both candidate's speeches was the governmental publication, Freedom of Communications. Only those remarks labeled as a speech were chosen for investigation, and each speech was the verbatim text. No advance release texts were studied.

The results of the study indicated that each candidate's ethos-based statements evidenced some similarities to an Aristotelian concept of ethos, and each candidate differed in his approach to ethos. The basic differences in approach are as follows: Kennedy was more precise in his analysis of the audience. Nixon, in associating himself with the virtuous, used fewer references to other individuals and

events. Kennedy's attacks on his opponent were more frequent and more severe. Nixon relied on formal arguments to prove his wisdom; Kennedy relied on simple constructions. Kennedy's promises of "goods" were made in first person, singular pronouns; Nixon used first person, plural pronouns. Kennedy promised specific "goods" to each particular audience. Nixon's promises of "goods" were for the general benefit of the American people.

The study indicated that ethos was an important consideration in the 1960 Presidential campaign rhetoric. Each candidate made use of ethos-based statements in order to prove his intellectual virtue, moral virtue, and sincerity. Many of the ethos considerations could be compared to Aristotle's concept of ethos.

