

THE LOUISIANA MANEUVERS, SEPTEMBER, 1941:
PRACTICE FOR WAR

by

GEORGE EDWIN PATRICK MURRAY

B. A., Villanova University, 1969

9589

A MASTER'S REPORT

submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of History

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas

1972

Approved by:


Major Professor

LD
2668
R4
1972
M87
C.2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
I. The Louisiana Maneuvers.	1
II. The Fighting	20
III. What the Maneuvers Showed.	31
IV. Acknowledgments.	42
Footnotes.	43
Bibliography	52
Appendix A	55
Appendix B	57
Appendix C	59
Appendix D	61

LIST OF MAPS

1. Map 1 - Louisiana Maneuver Area, 1941 - 1962 3
2. Map 2 - Second Army vx. Third Army - Louisiana Area - 1941 26

CHAPTER I. THE LOUISIANA MANEUVERS

In the latter half of September, 1941, less than three months before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor forced the United States into World War II, Lieutenant General Ben Lear's Second Army and Lieutenant General Walter Krueger's Third Army fought the first and only army-versus-army war game in United States history.¹ From September 15 to September 28, 1941, nineteen divisions participated in the maneuvers throughout over 30,000 square miles (19.2 million acres) of Louisiana.² The estimate of men involved varied greatly from source to source; suffice it to say that approximately 123,000 served in Second Army and 219,000 in Third Army.³ The Louisiana Maneuvers were the largest war games ever undertaken by the United States Army and represented the culmination of the Army's large-unit training exercises prior to the American entry into World War II.

Unlike many previous maneuvers which were "played," the strategy and tactics known in advance, the Louisiana Maneuvers were a "free" maneuver. There was nothing prearranged about their outcome. The Army's General Headquarters (GHQ) favored free maneuvers and gave Lear and Krueger a wide strategic directive, but the tactics and results were up to each commander's daring and initiative, plus the ability and resourcefulness of his men.

Hemispheric defense was the strategic assumption behind the maneuvers. Lieutenant Lesley J. McNair, Chief of Staff of the recently formed GHQ, told Brigadier General Mark W. Clark, Deputy Chief of Staff GHQ, "...keep the directive as simple as possible."⁴ Clark took a roadmap of Louisiana and drew a "big goose egg" in the area of Shreveport where Lear would assemble his army, and another for Krueger's forces to the south, put a broad line between the two which no troops could cross before signaled, and gave each

army a mission to draw them into contact.⁵ Krueger's forces represented the mythical nation of ALMAT (Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Tennessee) and were part of a hypothetical invasion bridgehead on the Texas and Louisiana Gulf Coast, acting as a screening force for the other invasion troops supposedly pushing north behind them. Lear's job as vanguard of the defensive forces of the mythical KOTMK (Kansas, Oklahoma, Texas, Missouri, and Kentucky) was to stop Krueger and push him back into the Gulf.⁶


Due to their unprecedented size and unpredictable nature, the war games were the Army's closest approximation to actual combat, and because of their implicit value, the Army stressed realism. The Louisiana Maneuvers marked the following firsts: the first time armored forces figured in American battle strategy; the first use of the new provisional antitank battalions; the first use of paratroops by the United States; the first joint Navy Marine Corps and Army Air Force support of ground troops--the greatest number of tactical airplanes yet assembled (over 1000); the first field-test of the Army's medical and signal facilities; and two types of air-raid warning systems.⁷ The maneuvers featured the last time mounted cavalry made an appearance in strength, as two regular cavalry divisions and a National Guard brigade took part.⁸ Adding to their realism, the maneuvers were of greater duration than prior war games, and there were no ceasefires or rest periods during the fighting--only a pause between the two stages.

The maneuvers between Second and Third Armies took more time than previous war games because the forces involved were much larger, and they were not merely acting out a set of prearranged instructions. For example,

ILLEGIBLE DOCUMENT

**THE FOLLOWING
DOCUMENT(S) IS OF
POOR LEGIBILITY IN
THE ORIGINAL**

**THIS IS THE BEST
COPY AVAILABLE**



MAP 1- LOUISIANA MANEUVER AREA, 1941 - 1962

the "play" of VIII Corps and command post (CP) exercises lasted from June 2 to June 6, 1941.⁹ Fighting in the Louisiana Maneuvers took place in two stages, the first from September 15 to September 19, and the second from September 24 to September 28; however, fighting was not the only significant aspect as the two armies moved large masses of men and material from place to place between the first and second phase.

The sham fighting took place in an area bordered roughly on the north by Shreveport, on the east by the Red River, on the south by State Highway 21, and on the west by the Sabine River. Three rivers influenced the general area: the Calcasieu River valley to the south, and the rice country east of it, was low and swampy with many canals and bayous; the Sabine River valley, like the Calcasieu, was wood and swamp land; the Red River area drained well, was covered with scrubby pine, and less difficult for foot soldiers to get around in than the other two areas.¹⁰ Before the maneuvers, the V Corps Engineers' reconnaissance of the area noted the terrain was low, tended to be swampy, and that the roads, with the exception of main highways, were in extremely poor condition; rain would surely cause serious problems.¹¹ Virtually the entire terrain was difficult for tanks and probably did as much to hamper Lear's use of his tanks as it did Krueger's antitank battalions. The Second Army was indignant over the Third Army's claim to victory in the first stage of the maneuvers and cited the area's water table as the damaging factor--according to the Second Army memorandum it was two feet below sea level.¹²

The immediate rationale for the huge maneuvers was to give field commanders, and their staffs, the opportunity to manipulate army-sized forces for the first time. Operating on such a large scale was a totally

new experience for the Army which expected ineluctably to be involved in the war in Europe. Up to that time (1941), there were few officers left in the Army who had had any experience at commanding large forces. Colonel Dwight D. Eisenhower, Krueger's Chief of Staff, later wrote: "Not one of our [Third Army] officers on the active list had commanded a unit as large as a division in the first World War."¹³ Peacetime appropriations had negated such a possibility. Large-scale maneuvers were an impossibility throughout the twenties and most of the thirties. The atmosphere of disarmament, the economic effects of the Great Depression, and beginning in 1934 the Nye Committee's investigation into "the merchants of death" hoping to prove that war followed upon the greed of munitions makers, all created an atmosphere of derision for the Army. Even planning for a large-scale maneuver was suspect.¹⁴

The Army entered the 1940's woefully short of men and equipment. One week after Germany invaded Poland, September 8, 1939, President Franklin Roosevelt directed an increase of 17,000 enlisted men, bringing the Army up to its 227,000 man ceiling.¹⁵ Less than a year later on August 27, 1940, Congress, in a joint resolution, authorized the President to call up the National Guard and the reserves to federal service for one year but limited deployment of such troops to the Western Hemisphere. The Burke-Wadsworth Selective Service Act passed Congress on September 16, 1940, allowing a peacetime draft for one year, the first in United States history. Congress renewed conscription by one vote, 203 to 202, while the Louisiana Maneuvers were in progress.¹⁶ In the area of equipment, the Army was short everything and much of its equipment was either obsolete or on the verge of obsolescence. To make matters worse, the lend-lease contracts of September, 1941 made

certain that an Army of 1,820,000 men would be only 70% equipped as late as June, 1942. Lend-lease obligations further exacerbated equipment shortages as almost all medium tanks were scheduled to go to Britain and Russia.¹⁷

The deplorable state of leadership was another of the Army's major problems. General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army, realized the desperate state of leadership and instituted a program to rectify the situation. Large-scale maneuvers were part of the Chief of Staff's plan. General Marshall felt the Army needed three things: 1) an intensified training program, 2) much more equipment, and 3) realization by the Congress and the country of the extreme seriousness of the world situation vis-a-vis the armed forces of the United States.¹⁸

While he was Deputy Chief of Staff, he wanted to get rid of the Army's antiquated promotion system. The peacetime seniority system, which had no rank higher than major general, necessitated the senior corps commander moving on automatically to any vacant Army command. Sometimes the new commanding generals had only weeks or months left before they retired. Marshall wanted to get rid of the system and wanted officers who "would work like the devil and be interested in something besides the two extra cars and the bathroom for his wife."¹⁹ He lobbied successfully for the temporary lieutenant general ranks for his Army commanders.

Marshall also felt that many men had held junior rank for so long that when they finally reached colonel or brigadier general, they were totally unprepared for their new responsibilities. So the Chief of Staff often passed by older men for younger men more able to withstand the rigors of field duty. In some cases he relocated older officers where they could still serve with competence. Rumour had it Marshall and McNair were out to "purge"

officers, especially National Guard officers. Hate groups sprang up with men convinced that Marshall was out to settle old scores.²⁰ Although it was politic to deny a purge was going on, the rumours were true. In Third Army, Eisenhower and Krueger were "lopping off heads even before the maneuvers got under way."²¹

In his biennial report to the Secretary of War in the first half of 1941, Marshall urged passage of a bill designed to shorten the process of removing officers. The proposal would have speeded up the removal of "Grade B" officers, eliminating appeal to the President as Commander in Chief of the Army.²² Another problem in removing officers was the representative or senator from the officer's home district who would often appeal to the Army and/or the President for the officer to be kept on the active rolls.²³ Congressional interference was not universal but it was annoying and time-consuming.

The Chief of Staff hoped the Louisiana Maneuvers would rivet the nation's attention upon the weaknesses of the Army, especially its equipment shortages. The Army was short trucks, artillery pieces, ammunition, anti-aircraft guns, and desperately short of tanks. At the same time, Marshall was looking to remove incompetent officers from combat command, he was also looking for men of general officer caliber. Both kinds would stand out in the maneuvers. The maneuvers were merciful in that mistakes made in them could be corrected, the incompetent replaced, and few men died in the process. General Marshall replied tersely to Congressional criticism of the financial cost of the maneuvers, a viewpoint shared by much of the general public, by saying: "My God, Senator, I want the mistakes down in Louisiana, not over in Europe, and the only way to do this is to try it out, and if it doesn't

work find out what we need to do to make it work."²⁴

Marshall wanted to put on a big show for the country to capture its attention. The Louisiana Maneuvers would do that. The Army was extremely aware of the public relations coup it could reap from the maneuvers and made elaborate plans for the care and comfort of visiting newsmen. The more important the newsman, the more privileges he was entitled. The average reporter had to pick which army he wanted to follow and would then be issued an arm band for that army: Blue for the Third Army and Red for the Second. Feature writers, such as the New York Times' military analyst Hanson W. Baldwin, newsreel crews, and broadcasters were allowed to visit one or both of the opposing armies during the maneuvers. The Army did not give these men any information not available to reporters covering only one army, however. The only major restriction the Army put on stories was that of publishing tactics and plans in advance of their actual implementation. The Army held daily press conferences for the reporters with the emphasis on the Army's professional progress, such as modernization, mechanization and motorization.²⁵ It did not hurt the Army's cause, nor was it critical of the War Department, to mention to the reporters that the Army was short of trucks or ammunition.

McNair wanted the maneuvers to show up any fallacies in the Army's doctrine of logistics, organization and tactics, or at least he said he did. The Chief of GHQ was a proponent of the three newly-formed antitank groups. Later he became a major spokesman for mobile antitank battalions held in reserve to meet strong tank attacks wherever they occurred along a division's front.²⁶ With regard to tactics, the Louisiana Maneuvers were important because the Army was allowing an armored corps to have a role in battle strategy: its two divisions would fight for one and then both armies

simultaneously.²⁷ The Army would also study tactical lessons learned from the aerial support of ground troops, the use of paratroops, and McNair's provisional antitank regiments. The horse cavalry took part in the maneuvers for the final time in force, and some cavalry men felt McNair's rules hindered their effectiveness.²⁸

In mid-January, 1941 GHQ requested data from its four army commanders concerning their anticipated schedules of corps and army training, including CP, FEX (field exercises) and maneuvers. Corps training, GHQ noted, had to be completed before June 30, 1941 in order to use funds for Fiscal Year 1941. Army training was to be completed no later than August 30, 1941 because some National Guard units were scheduled for release from federal service at that time.²⁹ McNair's letter to army commanders projected the start of army training in June, 1941 when corps training finished. He also noted the duties of army commanders in the training exercises, and that GHQ would direct the final maneuvers.³⁰ Shortly after McNair's letter, Lieutenant Colonel LeRoy Lutes, then Assistant Chief of Staff of the Third Army's Supply Section, received instructions to prepare for the September maneuvers. On January 28, 1941, the G-3's (Plans and Operations Officers) of Second and Third Army met and forwarded to GHQ Lute's request that the maneuvers be put back until October or November due to a shortage of available service units.³¹ When their request failed, Lutes resigned himself to much hard work and beating a deadline.

In the course of his preparations for the maneuvers--such as setting up supply, making allowances for all possible contingencies, readying the logistical base necessary to feed, move, and equip an army, plus making arrangements to occupy the land in Louisiana--Lutes visited the War Department and GHQ in Washington, D.C. Lutes arrived in Washington in the second week of February,

1941 and reported to GHQ at the Army War College. The first man he saw, a Quartermaster officer, had never heard of the planned maneuvers. Lutes was luckier on his second try; he met with the GHQ G-3 and settled dates with him. Next, Lutes talked with McNair, who was astonished at the funds requested, i.e., the inclusion of estimates for rail transportation and rail travel. Lutes defended his estimates properly, and McNair said he would try to get the necessary funds.³²

The two officers also discussed the scheme of supply which GHQ agreed to: corps area to stock army depots; army to operate army depots; corps area to arrange for and move troops and baggage to army railheads; army to arrange all facilities for the de-training and movement of troops to bivouacs; army quartermaster to keep liaison with the corps area quartermasters and American Railway Association on above matters. Of their meeting Lutes wrote, "Frankly, I am not sure that General McNair understood just what we proposed to do."³³

Lutes then visited the War Department where he found the G-1 (Chief of Staff) and the G-3 had no knowledge of the maneuvers, that the matter had been handled directly between GHQ and General Marshall. As far as Lutes was concerned, action would have to be taken to get the money for the maneuvers included in the current budget. Lutes gathered that there was no one competent in G-4 section at GHQ, and that this would be a serious handicap because of the attitude toward supply matters at GHQ. He wrote, "There is no one in GHQ sufficiently experienced in G-4 functions to act as a buffer or advisor between the Army Headquarters (War Department) and the Commanding General, GHQ."³⁴ The best course of action, Lutes felt, was an independent one taking a chance as to whether or not such action conformed

to the policies of General McNair.³⁵

The maneuvers could take place even without General McNair fully understanding the exigencies of supply, but they could not start until the armies had acquired trespass rights to trapse all over northwestern Louisiana. The problems of obtaining trespass rights were myriad, as Lutes knew from past experience. The trespass rights from the Third Army's corps-versus-corps maneuvers in May and August, 1940, also held in Louisiana, expired in September, 1941.³⁶ Lutes recalled that thirteen officers spent six to eight months acquiring the land needed for those maneuvers. Furthermore, the problem of obtaining trespass rights was exacerbated by a lack of resolve at GHQ as to who was responsible for acquiring them--the commander of Third Army or the commander of the IV Corps Area.³⁷

Colonel R. B. Cole, President of the IV Corps Area Rents and Claims Board, worked closely with Lutes on obtaining trespass rights, and by the end of January, 1941, told Lutes that he had obtained two years trespass rights to over 90% of the maneuver area.³⁸ This percentage figure was illusory because it referred to the area of the 1940 maneuvers which was considerably smaller than the Louisiana Maneuver area of 1941 would be. Also, it did not allow for the concentration of Third Army in southern Louisiana in an area outside of that previously secured for army maneuvers. Plus, a large portion of the area was federal land preserves, such as the Kisatchie National Forest (259,000 acres) and military posts--Camps Polk, Claiborne and Livingston. Much hard work remained. On March 26, 1941, a letter from GHQ charged the Third Army commander with the acquisition of leases and trespass rights for both the Second and Third Armies. Lutes wrote: "... assuming only service installations and camp sites are required for the

initial concentrations a board of at least 40 officers will be required immediately for this work....This work should have been started January 1st in order to insure success."³⁹

Lutes wrote Lieutenant Colonel Mark W. Clark, at GHQ, and told him that the Second Army should handle its own rents and claims in northern Louisiana. On April 9, 1941, a letter from Clark cleared up the malaise and made Second Army responsible for their own rents and claims.⁴⁰ Once the problem of responsibility was set aside, Lutes and Cole began to acquire as much land as they could. After they obtained all the necessary camp sites and bivouac areas, any extra land they garnered was a strategic accomplishment because it would allow field commanders to choose points of concentration with an eye on tactical situations. On May 1, 1941, the State of Louisiana simplified matters for the logistic officers of Second and Third Armies by agreeing to purchase the remainder of the land needed for the maneuvers.⁴¹ Over 3400 Louisiana land owners cooperated with the Army by allowing their land to be used for the maneuvers.

Acquisition of land and trespass rights were two immediate problems in maneuver planning, but they were by no means the only problems. The Army took deliberate steps to insure good public relations with civilians during and prior to the maneuvers. Third Army Engineer plans made direct mention of the protection of civilian property. For example, barbed wire, trenches and pits were all extremely dangerous to cattle, and any unit digging a trench or erecting barbed wire had to take it down during the first break in tactics.⁴² In general, the Army did not think it was practical to erect barbed wire obstacles during the maneuvers.⁴³ Obstacles on highways were to be built on the side of the road and left there, and umpires decided how long they

delayed opposing troops. When an obstacle was left on a road, it had to be manned by soldiers who would remove it for civilian traffic. In towns where an obstacle might endanger civilians the materials to make it were left by the side of the road, and the appropriate number of men needed to build it were left behind for the estimated construction time.⁴⁴ Timber could be cut only on the orders of the army or corps commander, and permission to cut timber was to have been secured prior to the start of the maneuvers.⁴⁵

Maneuver rights did not cover timber, and there were several complaints about trees that were mangled by tanks and trucks. In general, troops were not to travel across cultivated ground. One farmer thanked the Army after the first phase of the maneuvers for clearing his field of weeds, grass and red bugs, to which one officer remarked that the soldiers had most likely taken the red bugs with them. The temperament of the Louisiana farmer was rather patriotic. One farmer who lost 100 out of 160 chickens to a roving company offered up the loss for the sake of national defense, though he did ask for protection for his remaining chickens.⁴⁶

In other areas the Army was careful not to trust too much to civilian manners. In the area of race relations, the Army was careful in choosing bivouac sites for its Negro troops. Lutes, now G-4, met with the Mayor of Lake Charles, Louisiana, prior to the maneuvers to ask the local official for a good place to bivouac the Negro troops of Third Army, most of whom were truck drivers.⁴⁷ The Army was also wary of false claims from private and public groups, and the Engineers were to carefully note the condition of property in the maneuver area before action began to guard against false claims afterwards. Engineers were also to keep account of any repairs they

made on roads or bridges during the maneuvers. After the 1940 maneuvers, the roads were in better condition than before the Army came into the area.⁴⁸

A great deal of money was involved in the maneuvers. McNair had been astounded by the early cost estimates Lutes had prepared for him, and he tried to get Third Army to pay for such things as training umpires which rightfully should have been paid for by GHQ.⁴⁹ GHQ had used up its budget for Fiscal Year 1942 by November, 1942 following the First Army-versus-IV Corps maneuver in North Carolina, which was at once an indication of the costliness of large-scale maneuvers and the high importance GHQ and the Department of the Army attached to them.⁵⁰ The Third Army payroll for enlisted men while it was in Louisiana for the entire month of September was \$11,000,000, and Second Army's payroll was approximately \$6-7,000,000, most of it spent in Louisiana.⁵¹

It was a considerable boom for Louisiana, and everybody wanted part of it. This was demonstrated by the presence and growth of Leesville, Louisiana which was the area's capital of vice and corruption. It was a crumbling lumber town until the troops moved in in 1940. The 1941 maneuvers resembled a gold rush for the town.⁵² Publicly, the governor of Louisiana told the Army he wanted to help them avoid gouging by the civilian population since he knew what the maneuvers would mean to his state financially. One of General George Patton's biographers, Colonel Robert S. Allen, wrote that the governor refused all entreaties to clean up Leesville and he even dismissed criticism of its filth as Yankee propaganda.⁵³ On the lighter side, one man approached a Third Army Fire Control officer and offered his LaFrance fire truck for rental.⁵⁴

The Louisiana Maneuvers were more expensive than previous maneuvers

for three reasons: 1) the size, number and character of the units involved, 2) the duration of the maneuvers, and 3) the two-phase nature of the war games. There was never any final cost of the maneuvers compiled by GHQ, but Third Army was allocated \$6,500,000 to cover the cost of its corps and army operations, of which \$875,000 went for corps maneuvers.⁵⁵ Figuring that Second Army probably spent a little more than half that much, and considering the vast distances involved in getting all the Navy, Marine Corps and Army Air Force planes to the area, the cost of the maneuvers was probably around \$25,000,000.

The maneuvers had large-scale Army, Navy and Marine Corps aviation support with over 1000 planes taking part in dog fights, dive-bombing, "strafing" troops, communications, reconnaissance and transport. These planes came from as far away as San Diego and Long Island, at no small expense. The Third Task Force, under Major General Herbert A. Dargue, supported the Third Army with 145 bombers and 167 fighters. The Second Task Force, under Major General Millard F. Harmon, supported the Second Army with 141 bombers and 159 fighters. The combined air support units flew a variety of missions and aircraft. The units flew light and medium bombers, but no heavy bombers took part in the actual maneuvers, though heavies took part in an air show between the first and second phases. North American B-25-A's and Martin B-26's saw action as medium bombers, while Douglas A-20-A's and Douglas A-24's were the light bombers used. For fighter support, a variety of planes took part: the P-40 made by Curtiss, the Republic P-43 and its successor, the P-47, the P-39-D Bell Aircobra and the P-38 Lightning.⁵⁶

The large amount of airplanes provided America's first test of air-

to-ground support and added greatly to the realism of the maneuvers. Eight air groups, all the Army had available, took part in the Louisiana and the later Carolina maneuvers, plus seven squadrons of Navy and Marine Corps aviation joined the Army Air Force in the Louisiana Maneuvers. Even so, the ratio of planes to ground strength in the Louisiana Maneuvers was far below the normal requirements for modern warfare.⁵⁷ The Louisiana Maneuvers provided Army and Army Air Force officers the chance to work out the many complex problems of air-to-ground support. The Third Task Force stationed an Army Air Force officer at each corps headquarters and at each division headquarters engaged in a major effort. When lower echelons requested bomber support by radio, the liaison officer radioed the airfield directly, requesting so many planes and directed them to where they were needed. Bombers could contact the liaison officer by radio from the air to make certain front lines had not shifted so they would not bomb their own men. The Second Task Force used a system whereby requests for bomber support went from the front lines to Second Task Force Headquarters after passing through corps or division. It took longer, but the commander of the Second Task Force had greater control over his squadrons.⁵⁸

Aerial operations gave air crews a goodly dose of needed simulation in war work and provided ground troops the opportunity to learn the techniques of combatting airplanes. The Army tested two air-raid warning systems in the maneuvers. The Second Army used the big-eared sound locators standard at that time, while the Third Army had an elaborate network of 16,000 civilian observers. The civilians worked well for awhile but lost interest before the maneuvers were finished.⁵⁹

Part of the problem in air-raid warning systems was poor communications.

Communication difficulties plagued the Army at all levels. Most of the problem was due to the extremely short supply of radios. Both armies were greatly dependent upon Bell Telephone for their communication, at no small cost to the Army, because the Army's TWX (teletypewriter) equipment was also in short supply. Any Army officer could use the commercial phone system by giving his name, rank, whom he was calling, and by announcing "Army official Charge to LD 4000." He would also get his nickle back. In similar manner, the Third Army's civilian air observers depended upon Bell Telephone communications. By announcing to the operator "Army flash!", air-raid warnings would get the "same high priority" as a call to the fire department.⁶⁰

The Louisiana Maneuvers marked the first use of paratroops by the Army. The 501st Parachute Battalion, whose absurd slogan was "It Don't Mean a Thing if You Don't Pull That String," was under GHQ command and jumped for the Third Army in the first phase and Second Army in the second phase.⁶¹ Also under GHQ command, and subsequently used by both armies in the maneuvers, were the 1st and 2nd Armored Divisions of the I Armored Corps. The maneuvers also saw the first use of GHQ's newly formed antitank battalions. There were three battalions, the 73rd, 74th and 75th armed with the new .37 millimeter guns and the older .75 millimeter guns. Since the maneuvers were designed to be a test of antitank tactics, they were quite important.⁶²

The maneuvers also tested the supply system and the medical corps. About 14,000 men took part in supplying Third Army and caring for its medical needs. The problem of supplying such a large body of men with food, gasoline, oil, plus incidentals, was massive. The Tables of Supply made rationing somewhat easier in that the logistics officers knew how much food was required. Supply officers rationed material down to the last detail:

for example, one roll of toilet paper per 45 enlisted men per day.⁶³ There were three rations used in the Louisiana Maneuvers: 1) the A ration of perishables, such as fresh meats and vegetables, 2) the B ration, which was canned but had to be cooked, and 3) the C ration, which was carried by the troops and eaten out of the can. The Third Army planned to provide 16,600,000 meals using 9,000,000 pounds of potatoes, 11,271,600 pounds of bread, and 8,500,000 pounds of meat, just to list a portion of the food-stuffs involved.⁶⁴

The Army expected that every day of the maneuvers, 2.5 casualties per 1000 men would require evacuation, or out of 400,000 men involved, 1000 men daily. Over half these men, the Army figured, would be incapacitated for longer than a week. Maneuvers involved the use of dangerous vehicles and equipment; tanks moving at night without lights often crushed men who were sleeping on the ground out in the open. The medical facilities also treated artificial casualties for practice purposes. These artificial casualties were commensurate with the type of engagements fought and were handled in much the same way as actual casualties, though strict orders forbade the evacuation of artificial casualties to interfere with that of actual casualties. For practice, the Army even shipped medical records to the field hospitals.⁶⁵

The overriding principle followed in the maneuvers was the quest for realism. In some instances equipment shortages, safety factors, the huge area and the avoidance of physical combat which put an overemphasis on mobility, all combined to lessen the realism, but from staff planning to field operations, realism was the key. The men who made the maneuvers realistic were the umpires. They determined, according to the revised

Umpire's Manual of February, 1941, the victor and assessed casualties on personnel and equipment. The umpires judged engagements by the weight of a fire on a fire-power scale, for example:⁶⁶

Rifle--either M 1 or 1903.....	1
Automatic rifle.....	3
Light machine gun.....	6
Heavy machine gun.....	10
60-mm mortar.....	6
81-mm mortar.....	15.

Every minute infantry was under fire, it lost one percent of its strength; a plane attack on a column in the open caused ten percent casualties; and every time a tank got within 100 yards of infantry, it caused three percent losses.⁶⁷ Umpires also decided on such things as the simulated destruction of bridges. During the maneuvers one umpire marked a bridge destroyed and a short while later observed a squad of men crossing it. The umpire accosted the men by saying, "Hey! Don't you see that bridge is destroyed?" To which a corporal replied, "Of course I can see it's destroyed. Can't you see we're swimming?"⁶⁸

CHAPTER II. THE FIGHTING

On September 15, 1941, the Louisiana Maneuvers began. General Krueger's Third Army contained three corps of ten divisions (eight were square and one triangular), one re-enforced cavalry division, a provisional tank group of sixty light tanks, the three GHQ provisional antitank groups, a company of GHQ paratroops and the Third Task Force of 306 combat planes under Dargue. Lear had two corps, one of which was an armored corps of two divisions, three square divisions, two triangular divisions, one armored division, one cavalry division and the Second Task Force of 300 planes under Harmon.¹ Antitank groups, GHQ hoped, would counter mass tank attacks similar to the successful German blitzkrieg of Poland, France, and thus far, Russia.

In a meeting of 2000 umpires in the huge auditorium at Camp Polk, Louisiana, the night before the maneuvers began, General McNair, who was the Chief Umpire for the maneuvers, told the assembled officers: "These exercises are designed to test tank warfare in the face of intelligent antitank defenses. We are definitely out to see if and how we can crush a modern tank offensive."² Off the record, McNair told his umpires, "I want armor used properly in these maneuvers, and Patton [Major General George S. Patton, Commander of the 2nd Armored Division] must not be allowed to run all over the countryside as he did in the Tennessee maneuvers."³ One of Patton's biographers, Ladislav Farago, goes so far as to state: "It was no longer a secret in the inner circles of the Army that the big maneuvers--which General McNair hoped to stage in 'an atmosphere of complete impartiality'--were being deliberately rigged against armor."⁴

In the Tennessee Maneuvers of Second Army in late June, 1941, Patton's aggressiveness and tactics frustrated McNair's plans for the maneuvers.

McNair had to call them off twelve hours before they were scheduled to end, because Patton had wrapped them up.⁵ Another biographer of Patton, Colonel Harry H. Semmes, wrote: "Instead of seeking to 'harness the tide' to our own advantage, every effort seemed bent on 'stemming the tide.' For example, the epidemic of antitank measures, the doctrine of tank destroyers, and the accentuation of the technical and mechanical weaknesses of tanks and armor were exploited rather than the devastating shock action inherent in armor."⁶ Armor was not the only branch of the Army to feel the maneuvers were weighted against it. Many cavalry officers felt artificial restrictions hampered their operations. For example, the armies were approximately 100 miles apart and were not allowed to move towards each other until H hour. This chained the cavalry from operating in its traditional role in the forward areas where it could ambush approaching infantry or mechanized units. On H hour, the troops rushed off in trucks to engage each other without having to worry about cavalry.⁷

At 5:30 the morning of September 15, the two armies began to move. GHQ had indicated to Lear that large numbers of Third Army (Blue Army) troops were concentrated southwest of Alexandria and directed Second Army (Red Army) to attack in the direction of Lake Charles. These instructions required Second Army to cross the Red River along a line running from Shreveport to Alexandria.⁸ It began the largest river crossing and bridge building operation yet in United States military history.⁹ Engineers were forced into a situation of pre-eminence because of the tactical situation which involved numerous river crossings. Later, General McNair referred to the maneuvers as the "Battle of Bridges."¹⁰ Lear's engineers set up three pontoon bridges across the Red River. Then his troops moved south and captured Alexandria.

The Red Army drive was spearheaded by the 2nd Armored Division. Patton's troops pushed into the western flank of the Blue Army outflanking the CP (command post) of Major General John Greeley's 2nd Division, and captured Greeley. When Greeley ordered the private who had captured him to dispense with display, the soldier replied, "Nuts to you, general, this is war!"¹¹ The night before, Greeley had offered \$50.00 for Patton's capture, but Patton, never to be outdone, promptly offered \$100.00 for Greeley.¹²

Strong use of the 2nd Armored Division marked Lear's drive along the roads north of Many, south of Coushatta and west of Mansfield. The Second Army destroyed Third Army's east flank bridges at Moncla, delaying any counter-attack from that direction. Second Task Force planes bombed New Orleans, while Third Task Force planes bombed Red bridges at Boyce, Natchitoches, Coushatta and the Red airfield at Shreveport.¹³ During the dog fight that went on over Coushatta, a Second Task Force P-40 collided with a Third Task Force SBD-3. The P-40 pilot died when his plane crashed, but the Navy dive-bomber made it safely back to Lake Charles.¹⁴ Both armies raced for Peason Ridge, which was the only dominant terrain in the area.

On September 16, the two armies were in contact along a sixty mile front from Alexandria stretching westerly to a point forty miles south of Shreveport. Third Army was in command of Peason Ridge, and its air force was extremely aggressive in attacking Second Army tanks, troops and bridges. After successfully attacking towards Leesville on the first day, Lear's tanks had dropped out of sight. Many Third Army officers felt Patton was about to make a flanking maneuver through Texas to hit their flank in the rear, but he was not allowed to do it in the first phase. The 2nd Armored Division had withdrawn northwest into Texas on a flanking sweep until

umpires stopped it.¹⁵ Blue opposition was strong and probably necessitated the move. The provisional antitank groups were aided in their attack against the Red Army by reconnaissance planes and repeated dive bombing and strafing attacks. The superiority of Third Army air power began to tell on the 16th, enabling the 37th Division to cross the Red River in a counter-attack against Alexandria.¹⁶

Air power made its pressure felt for the Third Army on September 17. For the first time in United States military history, paratroops took part in a simulated combat jump. Third Army paratroops jumped at 9:30 a.m., achieving complete surprise. Landing behind Second Army lines, they blew up their main objective, a pontoon bridge, ambushed Red Army units passing in supposed safety on Highway 84, and temporarily cut Lear's communication along that road. By mid-afternoon, the Blue air force had destroyed or damaged numerous bridges, strafed moving truck columns (which were travelling the highways in broad daylight!), and knocked out for twelve hours the Red airfields at Shreveport, Monroe and Jackson.¹⁷

The Third Army halted the Second Army drive southward and Krueger's V Corps, under Major General Edmund L. Daley, made marked progress, pushing up to Colfax on the Red River. Even though this thrust made Lear move his headquarters from Winnfield to Natchitoches, the armored divisions of the I Armored Corps were strangely quiescent. Red bombers did manage to put out of action temporarily Blue airfields at Lake Charles and Ellington Field, in Houston, Texas.¹⁸

There was no doubt about the position or intent of the Second Army's armor on September 18th. In the fiercest battle of either phase, Lear's army counter-attacked with three columns of tanks driving in a southeasterly

direction, between the Red and Sabine Rivers, towards Peason Ridge. The Red forces made a desperate attempt to circle the waters of Kisatchie Bayou in Kisatchie National Forest to reach more favorable terrain where the mechanized units might leave the roads and fan out into the Blue's rear areas. The Blue's provisional tank defenders (two out of three) were out of position to meet the attack: one had been sent west to shore up the Blue's First Cavalry tank defense, and the other was not immediately available.¹⁹

The Third Army threw everything it had against the Second Army's counter-attack which had broken through in the northwest and was moving east of Peason. Krueger moved two reserve units to Simpson to block Second Army's move east. On the 19th, in a final master stroke, Third Army's First Cavalry moved out of east Texas, smashed the Second Army's west flank, and seized the Second Army's gasoline supplies. Without gasoline, the Red Army's Armored Division were impotent. Krueger had allowed his line to bend and give, but when the Second Army drive was spent, he struck by plugging up his lines and cutting the salients off at their base.²⁰ One entire Red regiment, the 106th Infantry of the 27th New York National Guard, plus a battalion of the 105th of the same division, were captured by the 36th Texas National Guard Division, which had just received a Regular Army commanding officer, Major General Fred Walker.²¹

The morning of the 19th signaled the utter collapse of the Second Army. The Third Army's right wing was firmly anchored on the Red River, at Alexandria, and began a move northwestward which reached Natchitoches. The Second Army was falling back precipitously, and for the second time in the maneuvers, Lear had to evacuate his command post. Before General McNair called off the first stage of the maneuvers, the Third Task Force added


insult to injury by dropping propaganda leaflets on the Second Army. The leaflets read:

Your commanders are withholding from you the terrible fact of your defeat. Your gasoline stores have been captured. From now on, if you move, you do it on the soles of your shoes. Your food stores have been captured. Your dinner today is going to be what was left over from yesterday. No one is going to bring up any of the steaks that the men of the Third Army will have tonight. Rout, disaster, hunger, sleepless nights in the forest and swamps are ahead of you--unless you surrender, surrender while there is still time!²²

Lear had started out hard and fast, but ended up cold. The terrain was generally unsuitable for tanks, and a hurricane gale on September 14th had not made it any better. The Third Task Force had won command of the air, and the Second Army had violated the principles of armored warfare. Major General George Patton was infuriated with the poor showing of his tanks and summed up the situation with: "Never get in a squirting match with a skunk ...grab 'em by the nose and kick 'em in the tail."²³ Patton wrote later,

Fire from the rear is more deadly and three times more effective than fire from the front, but to get fire behind the enemy, you must hold him by frontal fire and move rapidly around his flank. Frontal attacks against prepared positions should be avoided if possible....Catch the enemy by the nose with fire and kick him in the pants with fire emplaced through movement.²⁴

The combination of terrain, weather, unfavorable umpire rulings and the provisional antitank battalions had combined to stop armor in the first phase of the maneuvers. Lear's numerically inferior force was top heavy with armor which had been misused by attacking down highways against prepared positions. The Third Army captured almost two regiments of the 27th Division which led Hanson W. Baldwin, the military analyst for the New York Times, to remark: "Had today's final [September 19th] been real war, General Lear's Second Army would probably have been annihilated."²⁵ If it had been real war, Patton's tanks would not have been hindered by hidebound umpiring.



Map 7-Second Army vs. Third Army-Louisiana Area-1941

Between the 19th and the 24th of September the armies shifted positions, divisions, celebrated and rested. Third Army issued a memorandum claiming victory which the Second Army answered by saying, "quick moves to confuse an enemy do not constitute flight." The Second Army carried the polemics further by blaming their showing on "Krueger's five to one numerical advantage." This was simply not so; the Third Army had a numerical advantage of 1.7 to one.²⁶

Part of the GHQ plan for maneuvers was to have a critique after each phase. During his critique on September 23rd, McNair cited "deficiencies in small unit training and inadequate officer leadership" as the primary weaknesses shown by the Louisiana Maneuvers' first phase. He also lobbied for equipment to the assembled press, telling reporters, "if the troops' equipment were [sic] completed they would give a better account of themselves [in actual war] today than American troops did in World War [I]." McNair added, "Which is not saying too much."²⁷ The Chief of GHQ took great pains to note, and Baldwin and other reporters wrote it up, that powder, anti-aircraft guns, and radio equipment were in very short supply. He hoped more ammunition would be available for target practice within a month. McNair noted that the Germans had had seven years to develop their war machine, so it was not unthinkable to expect the Army to need more than one year's training.²⁸

McNair praised the provisional antitank groups which were specially formulated for testing in the Louisiana Maneuvers. He also speculated that they were probably peculiar to the United States Army. McNair called the threat to the Army from tanks the most serious threat, and final steps were being taken to combat it; more antitank battalions and possibly bigger units might be formed.²⁹ Even the new M-4 medium tank [Sherman] was potentially a

tank killer with its .75 millimeter, three-inch gun. McNair mentioned that terrain had hampered armor's use, plus the great mass of antitank guns, and strafing by planes had also hurt Second Army's armor. He did allow for the fact that Lear did not have enough trucks to transport infantry to back up an "end sweep" by its armor: equipment shortages again.³⁰ What had won the first phase for Third Army was a combination of superior use of air power, much better supply, the capture of the Second Army's gasoline supply and the umpire's restrictions of the 2nd Armored Division.³¹

For the second phase of the maneuvers, Third Army consisted of four corps, eleven divisions, an armored division, and a provisional antitank group. Second Army lost its armored corps but retained one of the armored divisions. Lear had seven divisions in the second phase and two of the provisional antitank groups.³² Both armies retained their air forces virtually unchanged. The center of operations shifted to the northwest and the Second Army had the job of defending Shreveport.³³ Action on the first day of the second phase, September 24, was light and limited to aerial and ground reconnaissance because the tailend of a hurricane had soaked the ground on the 23rd. The storm limited action on the second day also. The mud made roads impassable; rivers rose and greatly aided Lear's defense. The Red Army also carried out extensive demolitions on bridges and culverts which made the Blue forces advance very slowly. Lear's main consideration was avoiding any action that would bring Krueger's numerical advantage down upon Second Army.³⁴

On September 27, Second Army paratroops landed near Eunice, the Third Army Supply Center, and blew up a trestle and a bridge on Highway 26. They failed to disrupt the Third Army's supply operations, however.³⁵ At the same time, paratroops were causing problems for the umpires by refusing to remain

captured and starting fistfights and Patton was planning more trouble for McNair's umpires. He took his 2nd Armored Division, now attached to Third Army, on a long end run, 380 miles from a point near Leesville to a point outside of Shreveport. The armor general told his men, "We'll take the city no matter what, and we'll take it from the rear."³⁶

At this point the accounts of eyewitnesses and Patton's biographers differ sharply with those of GHQ. According to Hanson Baldwin, Shreveport "resembled a town under siege," and by September 28, the Third Army's armor was just outside Shreveport.³⁷ Patton's 2nd Armored Division had travelled 380 miles, much of it during the night without lights, come through repeated bombings and strafings by the Red air force, beaten off numerous antitank attacks, and thrown up a line 3/4ths the way around Shreveport. It had also seized the city's waterworks and was fighting at one end of the Cross Bayou Bridge when McNair called off the action.³⁸ General McNair ordered a ceasefire at 4:45 p.m., saying Third Army had not been able to capture Shreveport but was in a position to launch a concerted attack within 24 hours.³⁹ The ceasefire order came 24 hours ahead of schedule, but McNair still said, "The Army has not yet learned how to handle armored divisions."⁴⁰

As in the first phase of the maneuvers, the 2nd Cavalry Division did outstanding work. Unable to match the speed of tanks and motorized columns (28-30 miles per hour), cavalry was forced to operate on the flanks. The 1st Cavalry Division made two forced marches. The first covered 44 miles in 20 hours, crossed the Sabine and decisively attacked Second Army's communications. In the second phase, the 1st Cavalry Division marched 71 miles in 35 hours, crossed the Sabine, which had swollen to 10 feet deep, and established a bridgehead for the crossing and deployment of the I Armored Corps.⁴¹ Despite

the stellar performance of these two great cavalry divisions, it was not enough to save the cavalry arm from extinction, which came in March, 1942 with the reorganization of the Army.

CHAPTER III. WHAT THE MANEUVERS SHOWED

The maneuvers came in for strong criticism from Army officers and other observers. General McNair led off the critiques following the second phase of the maneuvers. Most of his comments in November, 1941, following the end of the Carolina Maneuvers, and the close of large-unit GHQ exercises, are applicable to the Louisiana Maneuvers. Lear and Krueger were not critiqued in public as General Marshall did not think it was good for subordinates to be present during criticism of their commanding officers.¹ The critiques were copied and circulated to the other field armies in the United States to help prevent similar mistakes.

General McNair said the fundamental weakness was the deficiency in company and platoon training which was mainly due to inadequate leadership.² He also cited poor communications and underestimation of the danger of the airplane. McNair said the practice of moving on roads in daylight would be catastrophic in war.³ He criticized communications, asking whether the Germans had Bell Telephone in Europe. On the subject of communications, a Signal Corps officer had remarked earlier, "It is doubtful whether much reliance can be placed in time of war on the extensive use of commercial communications systems especially in areas where civilian population is unfriendly."⁴ The problem of communications was due almost entirely to equipment shortages.

Richard C. Hottelet and Leon Kay covered the maneuvers for United Press; both had been European correspondents and both concluded German leadership, equipment, and battle tactics were superior to the United States Army. Too many American soldiers were still using simulated weapons.⁵

Hanson Baldwin, military writer for the New York Times, cited the poor coordination of ground-to-air efforts; the lack of initiative and daring on the part of higher officers; a lack of finesse, feint and surprise; serious supply shortages, especially ammunition; poor communications; and little interest in the Army by the enlisted men. Baldwin wrote of the enlisted men, "They have one compelling desire to get out and get home as rapidly as possible."⁶

The inferior quality of leadership was basic to many of the Army's problems. The Army had held the maneuvers to examine leadership, and the maneuvers successfully separated the incompetent from the capable officers. Several National Guard officers lost their jobs to regular Army officers. Major General Fred Walker replaced the National Guard commander of the 36th Texas National Guard Division prior to the start of the maneuvers. The commander of the 27th Division from New York, Major General William P. Haskell, which the 36th helped to rout; lost his command in October, 1941. So did Major General R. E. Truman, commanding general of the 35th National Guard Division, from Kansas, Nebraska, and Missouri.⁷

A comparison of the various corps and army maneuvers held in the summer and fall of 1941 showed consistent technical errors. General Walter Krueger pointed out that fact to his subordinate commanders, saying that it reflected upon their proficiency.⁸ Earlier, following the V Corps maneuver near Alexandria, Louisiana in late June, 1941, Krueger had told his commanders that they "would be in for the surprise of their lives" unless they corrected errors he had previously cited, adding that this "was not a threat, but a solemn promise."⁹ At the critique in Camp Polk's huge hall, following the second phase of the maneuvers, McNair said: "There is no question that the

weaknesses developed in these maneuvers are repeated again and again for lack of discipline. Our troops are capable of the best of discipline. If they lack it, leadership is faulty. A commander who cannot develop proper discipline must be replaced."¹⁰

Leadership was the key to the Army's problems. The Army intended to solve it, but Congress was determined to interfere. The greatest problem was in the National Guard where many of the generals were either old, or political appointees, and very often did not care whether they stayed in the Army. Many National Guard generals were successful businessmen and wanted to be back in civilian life.¹¹ The problem with replacing National Guard generals was demonstrated by Senator Bennett Clark's attack upon General Ben Lear after Lear had demoted a relative of Senator Harry Truman.¹²

Initially, General McNair had felt the existing regulations were adequate in replacing incompetent officers and he had blamed army commanders for lacking "the guts and the discernment to act."¹³ After the Louisiana Maneuvers, however, he changed his mind and regarded the system as at fault.¹⁴ He received authorization from the War Department to speed up reassignment and reclassification, and as far as possible to avoid embarrassment to the officer concerned.

The War Department realized, possibly as a result of the Louisiana Maneuvers, the potential for disaster if war developed, forcing incompetent officers to become combat commanders.¹⁵ Removing the incompetent was, perhaps, McNair's chief priority following the Louisiana Maneuvers. Equipment was in woefully short supply, but if the Army's leadership was poor, all the equipment in the world would not change that or make the Army any less vulnerable to an opponent with similar equipment but superior leadership.

McNair said, "A lot of generals who want to fire their Chief of Staff ought to fire themselves. We're going to start at the top and work down. We've got some bum generals, and maybe I'm one of them, but we're going to weed them out. Have we the bright Majors and Captains to replace them? Yes."¹⁶ The Chief of Staff of Third Army, whom reporters had referred to as "Lt. Col. D. D. Erenbeing," "Eisenborn" and "Eisenberg," later wrote, "Some officers, both Regular and National Guard, had of necessity to be relieved from command; controversies and rumors, following on this step, required quick action to prevent injury to morale among officers and troops."¹⁷ Time magazine reported on September 29, 1941 that the rumored replacement rate ran as high as 30 percent.¹⁸

McNair also struck at the laxity of discipline. Discipline was particularly lax in National Guard units where the men often drank with their officers, called them by their first name, and where men often went AWOL, Absent Without Leave, and were not subject to punishment.¹⁹ In his critique in November, 1941 of the overall maneuver period, McNair cited the absence of the sort of discipline which caused the individual to subordinate himself to his unit, which is an absolute necessity in war.²⁰ Discipline, morale, leadership and equipment shortages went hand in hand. The Army's morale suffered from poor discipline, brought about by poor leadership, compounded by equipment shortages.

Most of McNair's criticism rested on the massive equipment shortages. The Signal Corps problems were exacerbated by the short supply of the Army's TWX (teletypewriter system), and communication was poor in general due to the almost total lack of two-way radios. Most of the two-way radios available were used by umpires to report the progress of the maneuvers to the

Chief Umpire; that and to mark simulated incoming artillery fire.²¹

The Army's shortage of supplies came from two sources. The first was a penurious Congress which had ignored the Army for twenty years, and the second was the build-up of the Army to almost 2,000,000 men. The Army was short ammunition, 105 and 155 millimeter fieldpieces, anti-aircraft guns, antitank guns, .50 caliber machine guns, motorcycles, large trucks, medium tanks, planes, self-propelled mounts, and radios.²² The lack of ammunition was the outstanding deficiency. Many soldiers had never fired their rifles, even after the Louisiana Maneuvers. Few troops had thrown live hand-grenades, and even fewer had fired the Army's 37 millimeter antitank gun or anti-aircraft gun. The shortages slowed training and dulled the soldier's interest. Few men were able to get excited about a wooden gun.²³

Shortage of manpower accompanied material shortages in hindering the effectiveness of various service branches during the maneuvers. One engineer battalion and two combat companies spent 15 hours constructing a reinforced 487 foot long, 10 ton bridge. Colonel William F. Tompkins, Engineer, GHQ, believed that if there had been more engineers, they could have built the bridges faster by working in shifts.²⁴ When McNair ran down the work done by engineers, Tompkins replied, "In a real war, a delay of a day or so in front of an obstacle which will surely be overcome is seldom a matter of great importance whereas, in a maneuver problem lasting altogether only four or five days, such delay is highly important, and attracts great attention."²⁵ Tompkins pointed out that the Germans had not won any victories because of split-second bridging of rivers.²⁶

On the positive side, there was much to be said for the Army's largest maneuvers ever. General Krueger felt the maneuvers gave his staff a thorough

workout, welding it into a "smoothly functioning, highly effective team." Krueger called the maneuvers an "invaluable" experience. He even found something good to say for the supply shortage: "Moreover, the woeful shortage of weapons and equipment of all kinds taught my staff and me how to do much with little and get along with what we had."²⁷ Colonel Eisenhower later wrote, "The beneficial results of that great maneuver were incalculable."²⁸ He felt they "accustomed the troops to mass teamwork" and "speeded up the process of eliminating the unfit." Eisenhower may have been speaking about himself when he wrote the maneuvers "brought to the specific attention of seniors certain younger men who were prepared to carry out the most difficult assignments in staff and command."²⁹

Both armies had had major problems to solve and had succeeded; for example, "concentration of an entire army; crossing unfordable rivers; clashes of large units; use of retreat and pursuit; changes in supply lines."³⁰ The Army had learned the piper cub was useful as a liaison and observation plane. The small planes allowed heavy artillery to imitate the accuracy and rapidity of adjustment common to smaller guns. Piper cubs also gave field commanders a glimpse of the tactical situation.³¹

The brightest spot for the Army was supply. McNair said, "The essential effectiveness of supply...was an outstanding feature of the maneuvers. The magnitude of the problem alone was sufficient to warrant apprehension as to whether the troops would be supplied adequately. Combat commanders and the services alike deserve the highest praise for the results achieved."³² Lieutenant Colonel LeRoy Lutes was the man who ran Third Army supply. He even moved his entire center of operations 75 miles the night before the final phase of the maneuvers. McNair told Lutes that his supply operation

gave Third Army the victory.³³ Lutes had operated G-4 as if it was a separate command under his own command. Eisenhower and Krueger left logistical problems entirely to Lutes.³⁴

Careers were made and broken by the maneuvers, which was a good thing for the Army both ways. Though it was hard on officers, who had suffered through the thirties with low pay and little prestige attendant to the Army, to be left by the boards at the last, it was far better for the soldier to be led by competent men. It was in the Louisiana Maneuvers that the Army discovered an obscure staff officer who went on to become the Supreme Allied Commander in World War II. Colonel Eisenhower was Krueger's Chief of Staff and responsible, in part, for Krueger's success. Eisenhower received a degree of notoriety following the maneuvers. For example, Drew Pearson and Robert S. Allen wrote of him, "Colonel Eisenhower who conceived and directed the strategy that routed the Second Army...has a steel-trap mind plus unusual physical vigor..."³⁵ General Marshall made a point of visiting with Eisenhower on his second trip to the maneuver area and referred to Eisenhower as "resourceful" and his planning as "brilliant." General Krueger spoke of Eisenhower in the following terms, "...a man possessing broad vision, progressive ideas, a thorough grasp of the magnitude of the problems involved in handling an Army, and lots of initiative and resourcefulness."³⁶ Eisenhower was promoted to brigadier shortly after the maneuvers and Lear was jumped two ranks to brigadier two months later.³⁷

After the Louisiana Maneuvers and the Carolina Maneuvers, General McNair planned a four month period of intensive small-unit training to go over the fundamentals of warfare. By that time he expected there would be enough ammunition for target practice for every man. After a period of small-

unit training, the Army would begin task-force training, several months training of aerial and tank coordination designed to produce a highly trained, highly coordinated mechanized Army.³⁸

Since the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor before the Army completed its predetermined training schedule, it is difficult to accurately assess the overall importance of the maneuvers. The Louisiana Maneuvers did not produce a well-oiled, battle-ready, Blitzkrieg-tested war machine, but the experience of the maneuvers made shipping the vast numbers of men to the West Coast following Pearl Harbor easier.³⁹

More likely than not, the Army intended the Louisiana Maneuvers as a bit of lobbying for their point of view. Surely, Marshall wanted to put on a show which would capture the nation's attention. Once he had the attention of the country, he could focus national attention on the weaknesses of the Army, its small size, the leadership problems, and the equipment shortages. The Army was putting its best foot forward knowing in advance that it was barefoot.⁴⁰

Marshall and McNair also knew the United States was already in a shooting war with German submarines in the North Atlantic, and a declared land war against Germany was a foregone conclusion. Early in September, 1941, a German submarine had fired on an American destroyer, the USS Greer, after the Greer had been following the U-boat for three hours. After this incident, President Roosevelt issued his "shoot-on-sight speech."⁴¹

The United States Army was in no position to fight the German Army after the Louisiana Maneuvers. The Germans had sent 19 armored divisions into Russia in June, 1941, plus numerous infantry divisions. The United States Army had employed 19 divisions in the entire Louisiana Maneuvers. At the end of September, 1941, the Army had 27 infantry divisions, one of them

specially motorized-mechanized; 2.5 horse cavalry divisions; 4 armored cavalry divisions; 2 incompletely organized armored cavalry divisions; plus many corps and other units. The United States Army totaled 33.5 divisions to Germany's 260-300, Japan's 55-70, and Italy's 60-70.⁴²

The importance of the maneuvers was political, psychological and military. Because of the maneuvers, the Army began to think of itself as an Army--even as an Army approaching modernity. Krueger, Eisenhower, Lutes, all thought the maneuvers had been invaluable. The American people were shocked by pictures of mock-ups used in the Louisiana Maneuvers.⁴³ Marshall and McNair had gotten the message of equipment over to the people. Congress had passed the extension of the draft, if by only one vote. The Army did not have to fear the men they had trained for a year leaving before their training was complete.

The Louisiana Maneuvers provided the basic data for future American tank battles.⁴⁴ Later, after America entered the war, British tank officers were amazed that the officers of the United States Army's 1st Armored Division quoted the results of the Louisiana Maneuvers "rather as others quoted from the Bible."⁴⁵ Even though the tanks were seemingly the recipients of an "antitank epidemic" during the maneuvers, the Army learned a great deal from the experience.

Perhaps no other branch learned as much from the maneuvers as supply. It was supply which had to work as if it were in an actual war: unloading trains strictly at night, travelling entirely without lights to forward depots. Supplying so many men was a task in itself, and especially in the Third Army it was done to perfection. The Army learned how to work under the pressure of a deadline. Lutes, who earlier wanted the maneuvers post-

poned a month or two until the shortage in service personnel could be cleared up, later admitted it was a good thing that he had to work under the pressure.⁴⁶ Krueger had said the same thing about the pressure being a good experience, an important part of training a staff. General Marshall, who had ordered the pressure, also ordered the armies to change their bases during the period between the phases of the maneuvers. Many officers said it would take as long as a month and be very expensive. Lutes moved his center of operations in one night. Marshall said it cost a lot of money, but it was worth it in the efficiency it developed in the troops: "that's why Patton, Hodges [General Courtney, First Army] and Bradley [General Omar, 12th Army Group] were able to move as fast as they did."⁴⁷

Marshall had listed three things he wanted from the maneuvers: 1) intensified training (better leadership), 2) much more equipment, and 3) realization by the country and Congress that time was running out for the United States being able to stay out of the war. The situation was extremely serious. Marshall had as much as predicted American involvement in the European War while testifying before Congress concerning the maneuvers.

The Louisiana Maneuvers did not accomplish everything the Army had hoped for. In some respects the Army turned back and returned to basic infantry training after them, but the maneuvers were more than a military exercise. The Army reaped much publicity and a certain amount of support from the people, particularly over the equipment shortages. The maneuvers were a much needed psychological boost for the Army officers who took part in them. Leadership began to improve after the maneuvers as much dead wood was lopped off the Army's active rolls. Some equipment began to arrive, but it was not enough. And it is difficult to say how much the nation and its

Congress appreciated the seriousness of the international scene vis-a-vis the Army. There were some signs that this was happening when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor usurping the implicit and explicit functions of the maneuvers and plunging the United States into war. Without the Louisiana Maneuvers, and the jolt they gave the Army and the country, the United States would have been even worse off than it was on December 8, 1941.

IV. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This master's report is an elongated version of a seminar paper first prepared for Dr. Edward M. Coffman, Wisconsin University, when he was the visiting Eisenhower Professor of War and Peace at Kansas State University. Dr. Stephen E. Ambrose, Louisiana State University New Orleans, also read the paper while he was Eisenhower Professor, suggested certain revisions and corrections, and helped with the style. I owe him a great debt. Dr. Robin Higham read the paper and made helpful comments.

My greatest thanks go to Lieutenant General LeRoy Lutes, U. S. Army (Retired), who over the course of several months read two drafts, offered valuable criticism and gave me a highly valuable and informative interview. This report owes more to him than anyone else.

I would also like to thank Miss Joan Howard and Miss Brenda Reger of the Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas for their archival assistance. Thanks are also due to Dr. Edwin A. Davis, managing editor of Louisiana History, at Louisiana State University in Baton Rouge for allowing me to enlarge a manuscript which he had already accepted for publication.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER I

¹Jean R. Moenk, A History of Large-Scale Army Maneuvers in the United States, 1935-1964 (Fort Monroe, Virginia: Headquarters United States Continental Army Command, 1969), p. 53.

²Moenk, Large-Scale Maneuvers, p. 10.

³Brigadier General Mark W. Clark, Deputy Chief of Staff, General Headquarters (undated but filed in AG 353 (515-41)), cited in Mark Skinner Watson, Chief of Staff: Pre-war Plans and Preparations (The United States Army in World War II: The War Department) (Washington: Historical Department of the Army), p. 237.

⁴Mark W. Clark, Calculated Risk (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), p. 15.

⁵Clark, Calculated Risk, p. 15.

⁶Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, The Framework of Hemispheric Defense (The United States Army in World War II: The Western Hemisphere) (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1960), p. 146; Donald W. Mitchell, "What the Maneuvers Showed," Nation, November 22, 1941, p. 504; Life, September 1, 1941, pp. 31-34.

⁷Moenk, Large-Scale Maneuvers, p. 61; "No More Phony Maneuvers," Time, June 16, 1941, p. 19.

⁸John K. Herr (Major General, USA (Retired)) and Edward S. Wallace, The Story of the U. S. Cavalry, 1775-1942 (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1953), p. 250.

⁹Colonel LeRoy Lutes, 1941 Louisiana Maneuver Records, Personal G-4 Journal, January-August, 1941. Headquarters, Third Army, San Antonio, Texas. [These items are in the LeRoy Lutes Papers at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library in Abilene, Kansas.]

¹⁰Blanche D. Coll, Jean E. Keith, and Herbert Rosenthal, The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment (The United States Army in World War II: The Technical Services) (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1958), p. 128.

¹¹Moenk, Large-Scale Manuevers, p. 53.

¹²Hanson W. Baldwin, The New York Times, September 22, 1941, p. 3.

¹³Dwight D. Eisenhower (General, USA), Crusade in Europe (Garden City:

Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1948), p. 11.

¹⁴Moenk, Large-Scale Maneuvers, p. 2; Walter Millis, Arms and Men: A Study in American Military History (New York: Capricorn Books, 1967), p. 266.

¹⁵Moenk, Large-Scale Maneuvers, p. 3.

¹⁶Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1967), pp. 427-434.

¹⁷Weigley, History of the United States Army, p. 433.

¹⁸Forest Pogue, George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, 1939-1942 (New York: The Viking Press, 1966), p. 91.

¹⁹Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, pp. 91-92.

²⁰Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, pp. 92-93.

²¹Interview with Lieutenant General LeRoy Lutes (Retired), August 4, 1971.

²²Newsweek, July 14, 1941, p. 36.

²³Leonard H. Nason (Major, USA R) Approach to Battle (Garden City: Doubleday, Doran and Co., Inc., 1941), pp. 110-112. Nason was vituperative in his criticism of Congress, saying its interference with removing officers allowed "drunks, incompetents...to get our sons killed."

²⁴Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p. 89.

²⁵Colonel LeRoy Lutes, Public Relations Plan, Maneuver Instructions Number 12, September 12-30, 1941.

²⁶Weigley, History of the United States Army, p. 463.

²⁷Moenk, Large-Scale Maneuvers, p. 61.

²⁸Herr and Wallace, U. S. Cavalry, pp. 250-251.

²⁹Moenk, Large-Scale Maneuvers, p. 44.

³⁰Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert P. Palmer, and Bell I Wiley, The Organization of Ground Combat Troops (The United States Army in World War II: The Army Ground Forces) (Washington: Historical Division Department of the Army), p. 40.

³¹Lutes, Personal G-4 Journal, January 28, 1941.

³²Lutes, Personal G-4 Journal, February 15, 1941.

- 33Lutes, Personal G-4 Journal, February 15, 1941.
- 34Lutes, Personal G-4 Journal, February 15, 1941.
- 35Lutes, Personal G-4 Journal, February 15, 1941.
- 36Lutes, Personal G-4 Journal, January 29, 1941.
- 37Lutes, Personal G-4 Journal, March 26, 1941.
- 38Lutes, Personal G-4 Journal, January 29, 1941.
- 39Lutes, Personal G-4 Journal, March 26, 1941. The italics are Lutes'.
- 40Lutes, Personal G-4 Journal, April 9, 1941.
- 41Lutes, Personal G-4 Journal, May 1, 1941.
- 42Lutes, 1941 Louisiana Maneuver Records, Maneuvers Instructions Number 12, July 12, 1941. Engineer Plan, Annex #4.
- 43Umpire Manual, General Headquarters, U. S. Army (Reproduced by the Command and General Staff School) February 17, 1941. Enclosure of GHQ letter, April 9, 1941, subject: "Obstacles in Maneuvers," p. 1.
- 44Umpire Manual. GHQ letter, April 9, 1941, p. 1.
- 45Umpire Manual. GHQ letter, April 9, 1941, p. 2.
- 46The New York Times, September 23, 1941, p. 7.
- 47See Appendix A for Negro troops with the Third Army in Louisiana Maneuvers. This was in the days of the segregated Army. Lutes, Personal G-4 Journal, May 26, 1941; interview with Lieutenant General LeRoy Lutes (Retired), August 4, 1971.
- 48Lutes, Personal G-4 Journal, March 27, 1941.
- 49Interview with Lieutenant General LeRoy Lutes (Retired), August 4, 1971.
- 50Moenk, Large-Scale Maneuvers, p. 62.
- 51The New York Times, August 31, 1941, p. 21.
- 52Robert S. Allen (Colonel), Lucky Forward: The History of General George Patton's Third U. S. Army (New York: A MacFadden-Bartell Book, 1965), p. 14.
- 53Allen, Lucky Forward, p. 14.

⁵⁴Lieutenant Colonel LeRoy Lutes Personal File, November 27, 1940-October 21, 1941.

⁵⁵Moenk, Large-Scale Maneuvers, p. 62; Lutes, Personal G-4 Journal, May 15, 1941.

⁵⁶Hanson W. Baldwin, The New York Times, September 23, 1941, p. 7.

⁵⁷Moenk, Large-Scale Maneuvers, p. 68.

⁵⁸Hanson W. Baldwin, The New York Times, September 28, 1941, p. 40.

⁵⁹The New York Times, September 8, 1941, p. 6; Hanson W. Baldwin, The New York Times, September 29, 1941, p. 30.

⁶⁰Lutes, Signal Communications, Maneuver Instructions Number 12, July 12, 1941; The New York Times, September 8, 1941, p. 6; Theodore Ropp, War in the Modern World (New York: Collier Books, 1962), p. 305 notes that the French air defense system "relied on observers using civilian telephones," and that it was "very weak."

⁶¹F. Graham, The New York Times, September 7, 1941, p. 6xx.

⁶²As an antitank weapon, the .37 millimeter was already obsolete. In September, 1941, a New Jersey foundry fired the .37 millimeter against its new one-inch homogeneous steel plate at 100 yards with no effect.

⁶³Lutes, Quartermaster Plan, Maneuver Instructions Number 12, July 12, 1941.

⁶⁴The New York Times, August 3, 1941, p. 26; The New York Times, August 11, 1941, p. 15.

⁶⁵Lutes, Medical Plan, Maneuver Instructions Number 12, July 12, 1941.

⁶⁶Umpire Manual, GHQ, p. 12.

⁶⁷Newsweek, June 9, 1941, p. 35; Time, June 16, 1941, p. 19; Third Army Training Memorandum.

⁶⁸Dwight D. Eisenhower, At Ease: Stories I Tell to Friends (New York: Avon Books, 1968), p. 236.

CHAPTER II

¹Moenk, Large-Scale Maneuvers, p. 53; G. E. Patrick Murray, "The Louisiana Maneuvers, September, 1941: Practice for War," Louisiana History, May, 1972. See Appendix B for organization of forces.

²Ladislav Farago, Patton: Ordeal and Triumph (New York: Ivan Obolensky, Inc., 1964), p. 162.

³Farago, Patton, p. 162.

⁴Farago, Patton, p. 158.

⁵Farago, Patton, p. 161.

⁶Harry H. Semmes (Colonel), Portrait of Patton (New York: Paperback Library, 1964), p. 72.

⁷Herr and Wallace, U. S. Cavalry, p. 250. The argument has some validity in regard to the alledged impartiality of GHQ, but as far as cavalry's role in modern warfare, it was already a moot question. Polish cavalry had demonstrated the futility of horses in the European War, so there was very little sense in GHQ concerning itself with cavalry tactics in Louisiana. The cavalry was used because the Army had not yet made complete the mechanization of cavalry divisions.

⁸Moenk, Large-Scale Maneuvers, p. 53.

⁹Moenk, Large-Scale Maneuvers, p. 57.

¹⁰Coll, Keith and Rosenthal, The Corps of Engineers, p. 130.

¹¹Life, October 6, 1941, p. 33.

¹²Farago, Patton, p. 163.

¹³Lutes, Personal G-4 Journal, September 15, 1941.

¹⁴Hanson W. Baldwin, The New York Times, September 16, 1941, p. 15.

¹⁵Farago, Patton, p. 163.

¹⁶Baldwin, The New York Times, September 17, 1941, p. 17.

¹⁷Baldwin, The New York Times, September 18, 1941, p. 15.

¹⁸Baldwin, The New York Times, September 18, 1941, p. 15.

- ¹⁹Baldwin, The New York Times, September 19, 1941, p. 13.
- ²⁰Baldwin, The New York Times, September 20, 1941, p. 19; Lutes, Personal G-4 Journal, September 18, 1941.
- ²¹Fred Walker (Lieutenant General, Retired), From Texas to Rome: A General's Journal (Dallas: Taylor Publishing Company, 1969), pp. 7-10.
- ²²Baldwin, The New York Times, September 20, 1941, p. 21.
- ²³Life, October 6, 1941, p. 38.
- ²⁴Farago, Patton, p. 159.
- ²⁵Baldwin, The New York Times, September 20, 1941, p. 21.
- ²⁶Baldwin, The New York Times, September 22, 1941, p. 33.
- ²⁷Baldwin, The New York Times, September 24, 1941, p. 9.
- ²⁸Baldwin, The New York Times, September 24, 1941, p. 9.
- ²⁹Baldwin, The New York Times, September 24, 1941, p. 9.
- ³⁰Baldwin, The New York Times, September 24, 1941, p. 9.
- ³¹Baldwin, The New York Times, September 21, 1941, p. 33.
- ³²Moenk, Large-Scale Army Maneuvers, p. 60. See Appendix C for organization of opposing forces.
- ³³Moenk, Large-Scale Maneuvers, p. 60.
- ³⁴Moenk, Large-Scale Maneuvers, p. 60.
- ³⁵Lutes, G-4 Telephone Journal, September 27, 1941.
- ³⁶Farago, Patton, p. 164.
- ³⁷Baldwin, The New York Times, September 29, 1941, p. 8.
- ³⁸Baldwin, The New York Times, September 29, 1941, p. 8; Farago, Patton, p. 164.
- ³⁹Moenk, Large-Scale Maneuvers, p. 61.
- ⁴⁰Farago, Patton, p. 164.
- ⁴¹Herr and Wallace, U. S. Cavalry, pp. 250-251.

CHAPTER III

- ¹Moenk, Large-Scale Maneuvers, p. 69.
- ²Life, October 6, 1941, p. 33; Kenneth S. Davis, The Experience of War (Garden City: Doubleday, 1965), p. 77.
- ³Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, Organization of Ground Combat Troops, pp. 45-46.
- ⁴Lieutenant Colonel Edgar L. Clewell, "Signal Communications in Fourth Corps During Spring Maneuvers," cited in Dulany Terrett, The Signal Corps: The Emergency (The United States Army in World War II: The Technical Services) (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1956), p. 153.
- ⁵Newsweek, October 13, 1941, p. 50.
- ⁶Baldwin, The New York Times, September 30, 1941, p. 50; Newsweek, October 13, 1941, p. 50.
- ⁷Mitchell, "What the Maneuvers Showed," pp. 504-06; Baldwin, The New York Times, September 28, 1941, p. 3.
- ⁸Moenk, Large-Scale Maneuvers, p. 51.
- ⁹Moenk, Large-Scale Maneuvers, pp. 48-49.
- ¹⁰Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 12.
- ¹¹Interview with Lieutenant General LeRoy Lutes, August 4, 1971; Watson, Chief of Staff: Pre-war Plans and Preparation, p. 239; Baldwin, The New York Times, September 27, 1941; "What the Maneuvers Showed," by Donald W. Mitchell, Nation, November 22, 1941, p. 506.
- ¹²"What the Maneuvers Showed," Mitchell, Nation, November 22, 1941, p. 506.
- ¹³Greenfield, Palmer and Wiley, The Organization of Army Combat Troops, pp. 49-50.
- ¹⁴Greenfield, Palmer and Wiley, The Organization of Army Combat Troops, pp. 49-50.
- ¹⁵Greenfield, Palmer and Wiley, The Organization of Army Combat Troops, p. 50.
- ¹⁶Time, September 29, 1941, p. 30.
- ¹⁷Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 13.
- ¹⁸Time, September 29, 1941, p. 30.

- ¹⁹Baldwin, The New York Times, September 28, 1941, p. 3.
- ²⁰Moenk, Large-Scale Maneuvers, p. 69.
- ²¹Umpires Manual, GHQ letter, February 17, 1941.
- ²²Interview with Lieutenant General LeRoy Lutes (Retired), August 4, 1971; Ashley, "War Games Lack Craft," The New York Times, August 31, 1941, p. 6xx; Newsweek, June 9, 1941, p. 34.
- ²³Mitchell, "What the Maneuvers Showed," Nation, November 22, 1941, pp. 504-506; Baldwin, The New York Times, October 1, 1941, p. 11.
- ²⁴Coll, Keith and Rosenthal, The Corps of Engineers, p. 130.
- ²⁵Coll, Keith and Rosenthal, The Corps of Engineers, p. 131.
- ²⁶Coll, Keith and Rosenthal, The Corps of Engineers, p. 131.
- ²⁷Krueger, From Down Under to Nippon, p. 5.
- ²⁸Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 11.
- ²⁹Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 11.
- ³⁰Moenk, Large-Scale Maneuvers, p. 61.
- ³¹Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 12. Later, when Eisenhower was with the War Plans Division of the Army, he was able to lobby for the inclusion of the piper cub into the normal equipment of every division.
- ³²Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 12.
- ³³Letter to the author from Lieutenant General LeRoy Lutes, U. S. Army (Retired), July 5, 1971.
- ³⁴Letter to the author from Lieutenant General LeRoy Lutes, U. S. Army (Retired), July 5, 1971; Interview with Lutes, August 4, 1971.
- ³⁵Davis, Experience of War, p. 76.
- ³⁶Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p. 163.
- ³⁷Letter to the author from Lieutenant General LeRoy Lutes (Retired), July 5, 1971.
- ³⁸Moenk, Large-Scale Maneuvers, p. 69; Baldwin, The New York Times, September 24, 1941, p. 9.
- ³⁹Clark, Calculated Risk, p. 16.

⁴⁰Murray, "The Louisiana Maneuvers, September, 1941: Practice for War," Louisiana History, May, 1972.

⁴¹Robert A. Divine, Roosevelt and World War II (Baltimore: Penguin Books, Inc., 1970), pp. 44-45.

⁴²Baldwin, The New York Times, September 30, 1941, p. 12.

⁴³Weigley, History of the United States Army, p. 432.

⁴⁴Kenneth Macksey, Tank Warfare: A History of Tanks in Battle (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1971), p. 133.

⁴⁵Macksey, Tank Warfare, p. 134.

⁴⁶Interview with Lieutenant General LeRoy Lutes (Retired), August 4, 1971.

⁴⁷Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p. 89.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

Letter to the author from Lieutenant General LeRoy Lutes, U. S. Army (Retired), July 5, 1971.

Lutes, LeRoy, Lieutenant General, U. S. Army (Retired), 1941 Louisiana Maneuver Records.

Training Manual, Third Army.

Umpire Manual, General Headquarters, U. S. Army, February, 1941. (Reproduced by Command and General Staff School), February 17, 1941.

INTERVIEWS

Interview with Lieutenant General LeRoy Lutes, U. S. Army (Retired), August 4, 1971.

MEMOIRS

Clark, Mark W. Calculated Risk. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950.

Eisenhower, Dwight D. Crusade in Europe. Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1948.

_____. At Ease: Stories I Tell to Friends. New York: Avon Books, 1968.

Krueger, Walter. From Down Under to Nippon. Washington, D.C.: Combat Forces Press, 1953.

Walker, Fred L. From Texas to Rome: A General's Journal. Dallas: Taylor Publishing Company, 1969.

OFFICIAL HISTORIES

Coll, Blanche D., Jean E. Keith and Herbert H. Rosenthal. The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment. The United States Army in World War II: The Technical Services. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1958.

Conn, Stetson and Fairchild, Byron. The Framework of Hemispheric Defense. The United States Army in World War II: The Western Hemisphere.

Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1960.

Greenfield, Kent Roberts, Robert P. Palmer and Bell I. Wiley. The Organization of Ground Combat Troops. The United States Army in World War II: The Army Ground Forces. Washington: Historical Division of the Army, 1947.

Moenk, Jean R. A History of Large-Scale Army Maneuvers in the United States. Fort Monroe, Virginia: Headquarters United States Continental Army Command, 1969.

Terrett, Dulany. The Signal Corps: The Emergency. The United States Army in World War II: The Technical Services. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1941.

Watson, Mark Skinner. Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations. The United States Army in World War II: The War Department. Washington: Historical Division Department of the Army, 1950.

SECONDARY SOURCES

Allen, Robert S. Lucky Forward: The History of General George Patton's Third Army. New York: McFadden-Bartell, 1965.

Divine, Robert A. Roosevelt and World War II. Baltimore: Penguin Books, Inc., 1970.

Farago, Ladislav. Patton: Ordeal and Triumph. New York: Ivan Obolensky, Inc., 1964.

Herr, John K. and Wallace, Edward S. The Story of the U. S. Cavalry, 1775-1942. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1953.

Macksey, Kenneth. Tank Warfare: A History of Tanks in Battle. London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1971.

Nason, Leonard H. Approach to Battle. Garden City: Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc., 1941.

Pogue, Forest C. George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, 1939-1942. New York: The Viking Press, 1966.

Ropp, Theodore. War in the Modern World. New York: Collier Books, 1969.

Semmes, Harry H. Portrait of Patton. New York: Paperback Library, 1964.

Weigley, Russell. History of the United States Army. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967.

NEWSPAPERS, MAGAZINES

Baldwin, Hanson W. The New York Times, New York, September 1-30, October 1, 1941.

Life, Vol. 11, September-October, 1941.

Mitchell, Donald W. Nation, November 22, 1941, pp. 504-506.

Newsweek, Vols. 17-18, June-December, 1941.

Time, Vols. 37-38, June-November, 1941.

APPENDIX A

NEGRO TROOPS, THIRD ARMY


Negro troops of the Third Army in the Louisiana Maneuvers, September, 1941.

Engineers:	91st Engineer Battalion (Separate)
Army	93rd Engineer Battalion (Separate)
Engineer	45th Engineer Regiment (Garbage Service)
Service	585th Engineer Company (Dump Truck)
 Ordnance:	 57th Ordnance Company (Ammunition)
	60th Ordnance Company (Ammunition)
	64th Ordnance Company (Ammunition)
	65th Ordnance Company (Ammunition)
 Quartermaster:	 92nd Quartermaster Company (Railhead)
	93rd Quartermaster Company (Railhead)
	94th Quartermaster Company (Railhead)
	227th Quartermaster Company (Salvage and Collection)
	229th Quartermaster Company (Salvage and Collection)
	240th Quartermaster Company (Service)
	28th Quartermaster Regiment (Truck)
	Units of the 28th included were:
	HQ, HQ Detachment of 1st Battalion
	Company A & B, C & D
	HQ, HQ Detachment of 3rd Battalion
	Company I, K & L
	29th Quartermaster Regiment (Truck)
	HQ & HQ Detachment of 2nd Battalion
	Company E, M, F, I, K, & L
	48th Quartermaster Regiment (Truck)
	HQ & HQ Detachment of 2nd Battalion
	Company G

APPENDIX B

CHART 1—SECOND ARMY VS. THIRD ARMY — ORGANIZATION OF OPPOSING FORCES

14 - 19 SEPTEMBER 1941



APPENDIX C

APPENDIX D

CORPS AND DIVISION COMMANDERS

Corps and Division commanders of the Second and Third Armies with dates of service where available.

Second Army.....Lieutenant General Benjamin Lear

VII Corps.....Major General Robert C. Richardson, JR. (Aug. 1941 -
May 1943)

5th Division.....Major General Cortland Parker (Jan. 1941 - Aug. 1942)

6th Division.....Major General Clarence S. Ridley (Jan. 1941 - Aug. 1942)

27th (National Guard from New York)

Major General William P. Haskell (Oct. 1940 - Oct. 1941)

33rd (National Guard from Illinois)

Major General Samuel T. Lawton (March 1941 - May 1942)

35th (National Guard from Kansas, Missouri, and Nebraska)

Major General R. E. Truman (Dec. 1940 - Oct. 1941)

2nd Cavalry.....Brigadier General John Milliken (June 1941 - April 1942)

Third Army.....Lieutenant General Walter C. Krueger

IV Corps.....Major General J. L. Benedict (? - Sept. 1941)

Major General Oscar W. Griswold (Oct. 1941 - April 1943)

V Corps.....Major General Edmund L. Daley (April 1941 - May 1942)

VIII Corps.....Major General George V. Strong (May 1941 - April 1942)

2nd Division.....Major General John Greeley

4th Division.....Major General Oscar W. Griswold (Aug. - Sept. 1941)

31st (National Guard from Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, & Mississippi)

Major General John C. Parsons (Nov. 1940 - Sept. 1944)

32nd (National Guard from Michigan and Wisconsin)

Major General Irving A. Fish (Oct. 1940 - March 1942)

34th (National Guard from North Dakota, South Dakota, Iowa, & Minnesota)

Major General Russell P. Hartle (Aug. 1941 - May 1942)

36th (National Guard from Texas)

Major General Fred A. Walker (Sept. 1941 - June 1944)

38th (National Guard from Indiana, Kentucky, & West Virginia)

Major General Daniel I. Sultan (April 1941 - April 1942)

43rd (National Guard from Connecticut, Maine, Rhode Island, & Vermont)
Major General John H. Hester (Aug. 1941 - July 1943)

1st Cavalry.....Major General Innis P. Swift (April 1941 - Aug. 1944)

I Armored Corps (GHQ)....Major General Charles L. Scott (April 1941 - Jan. 1942)

THE LOUISIANA MANEUVERS, SEPTEMBER, 1941:
PRACTICE FOR WAR

by

GEORGE EDWIN PATRICK MURRAY

B. A., Villanova University, 1969

AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S REPORT

submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of History

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas

1972

In September, 1941, less than three months before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Lieutenant General Ben Lear's Second Army and Lieutenant General Walter Krueger's Third Army fought the first and only army-versus-army war game in United States history. Approximately 400,000 men participated in the maneuvers in the western part of Louisiana. The Louisiana Maneuvers were the largest war games ever undertaken by the United States Army and represented the culmination of the Army's large-unit training exercises prior to the outbreak of World War II.

Unlike many previous command post (CP) and field exercise (FEX) maneuvers which were "played" or staged with the results already predetermined, the Louisiana Maneuvers were a "free" maneuver. Besides the strategic directive, provided by the Army's General Headquarters (which had Krueger's army spearheading an invasion force moving up the Mississippi valley and Lear's army acting as the vanguard of the defensive force) the outcome of the maneuvers was up to the two commanders. Short of war, the maneuvers were the Army's closest approximation of combat, and as such the Army stressed realism in them.

Besides their unprecedented size the maneuvers were unique for many of their firsts: the first field-test of medical and signal facilities; provisional antitank groups; joint Navy, Marine Corps, and Army Air Force support of ground troops; air-raid warning systems; and paratroops. It also featured the last major appearance of the horse cavalry.

The immediate rationale for the maneuvers was to give commanders and their staffs the opportunity to wield army-sized units. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General George C. Marshall, counted on the maneuvers as a lobby through which he could reach the American people. He felt the Army needed

three things: 1) an intensified training program; 2) much more equipment; and 3) realization by Congress and the country of the extreme seriousness of the world situation vis-a-vis the United State's armed forces.

General Lesley J. McNair, Chief of Staff of the Army's General Headquarters, said he wanted the maneuvers to reveal any fallacies in the Army's doctrines of logistics, organization and tactics. There is some evidence presented by several biographies of General George Patton, who commanded the 2nd Armored Division in the maneuvers, that McNair (who was also the Chief Umpire) was not as impartial as he made himself appear to the press.

Since the maneuvers were the biggest show the Army had ever put on in peacetime, they attracted much publicity. Contemporary sources include articles by: Hanson W. Baldwin, the military analyst for the New York Times; Time, Life, Newsweek, and Nation. General Dwight D. Eisenhower was Krueger's Chief of Staff and wrote of the maneuvers in two of his books. Krueger mentions them briefly in his book. The Army's official histories of World War II mention the maneuvers in certain volumes. An obscure monograph by Jean R. Moenk, A History of Large-Scale Maneuvers in the United States, 1935-1964 (Fort Monroe, Virginia: United States Continental Combat Command, 1969) has been very informative. Primary sources include the generals' books cited above and the maneuver records kept by Lieutenant General LeRoy Lutes (Retired) who was Krueger's G-4, Supply Officer. The author has also written to and interviewed General Lutes.

The Louisiana Maneuvers did not produce a well-oiled, battle-ready, blitzkrieg-tested war machine, but the experience was invaluable for the Army and many officers. It was also the end of several careers. The Army had put its best foot forward, knowing in advance it was barefoot. The

American people were shocked at pictures of improvised tanks taken during the maneuvers. Something would be done about equipment shortages.

Marshall and McNair knew the United States was already in a shooting war with German submarines in the Atlantic, and a land war was a foregone conclusion. After the Louisiana Maneuvers, the Army was in no position to fight Germany, but it was able to defend the hemisphere, the assumption behind the maneuvers.

The importance of the maneuvers was political, psychological, and military. Because of the success of the maneuvers, the Army began to think of itself as an Army--even as an Army approaching modernity. Without them, the Army would have been hopelessly behind the times when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor and plunged the nation into war.