

AN ARAB'S POINT OF VIEW TOWARDS SOLVING THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

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## I. Introduction

For a long time, the strategic environment of the Middle East has been very important and very difficult either to explain or to predict. This difficulty arises from many different factors in the environment of the area itself and its importance to many countries. The Middle East area is, indeed, very complex and ambiguous even to the residents themselves. This assertion might seem either unbelievable or strange, but if we try our best to understand the environment of the Middle East and to grasp it realistically, we will recognize its importance. It is at the very heart of the well-being of our world.

This region, because of its location, history, and natural resources, has always attracted the interest of outside powers. In the 1980's, it promises to be an arena of intense U.S.-Soviet strategic and economic competition. The tension in the area demands that the superpowers exercise their ability to persuade their indirect and direct allies to seek a peaceful and rational solution to conflict—a solution which guarantees the historical and humanistic rights for all of the groups in the area.

The Middle East is not a single country with only one kind of culture, as many assume. On the contrary, there are many countries and diverse cultures, such as Arabic, Persian, and Western cultures. Although the differences between these cultures might be confusing to the layman, a knowledgeable person can sort through and understand them.

In reflecting upon this, my discussion of the United States' policy towards the Middle East will emphasize the Arab-Israeli conflict and its development, beginning in 1917 (when the Arabs were divided under the mandate and tutelage systems.)<sup>1</sup>



## II. Historical Background of the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Both Arab and Jewish sects have claimed religious rights to Palestine dating back to biblical times, and since the Balfour Declaration, the conflict has added political complications. "Both Arabs and Israelis over the past thirty-three years have exhibited a common tendency to view themselves in a very special historical light."<sup>2</sup> "Both in the Arab and the Jewish case there is a good deal of religious background and rivalry involved in the process."<sup>3</sup> Their ambitions have been in conflict, forcing both to live in frustration and fear.

The clash of Zionist and Arab aspirations, almost more than any other contemporary issue, has been irreconcilable and has constantly endangered national stability. The Arabs feel that they have been shamefully wronged by the Zionists. For a long time, they have siezed every available means to re-establish their alleged right to exist in Palestine. Historically, the Jewish people have been separated and scattered over the whole world.<sup>4</sup> And, the story on which the Jewish people have built their dream and Hebrew kingdom evolved from their religious writings. "Israel, an alien immigrant state, was established in the large part of Palestine and more than three quarters of the people of the country were cast out into the desert and across the frontiers. And, in June 1967, Israel siezed and occupied the remaining part of Palestine, driving more than 250,000 people eastwards across the River Jordan into exile."<sup>5</sup> It is important to emphasize that they were a scattered people; this is common knowledge. The Jews had been widely disseminated, but that does not mean they have no homeland. Palestine is a country for the Palestinian people, as America is for the Americans.<sup>6</sup> The Jewish people deserve a place they can call their

homeland, even though the Arabs insist that this must not correspond to their dream. Why? Because the Arabs feel the Jewish dream is based on expansionist policy. Arabs have been generous for accepting the Jewish people to live amongst them. Prince Feisal, the official spokesman of the Arabs in the Conference of Paris in 1919, did state in a letter to a member of the American Zionist delegation:

We feel that the Arabs and Jews are cousins in race, suffering similar oppressions at the hands of powers stronger than themselves and by a happy coincidence have been able to take the first step toward the attainment of their national ideal together. We Arabs, especially the educated among us, look with the deepest sympathy upon the Zionist movement. Our deputation here in Paris is fully acquainted with the proposals submitted by the Zionist Organization to the Peace Conference, and we regard them as moderate and proper. We will do our best, in so far as we are concerned, to help them through; we will wish the Jews a most hearty welcome home. With the chiefs of your movement, especially with Dr. Weizmann, we have had and continue to have, the closest relations. He has been a great helper of our cause, and I hope the Arabs may soon be in a position to make the Jews some return for their kindness. We are working together for a reformed and revived Near East, and our two movements complete one another. Our movement is national and not imperialistic; and there is room for both of us. Indeed, I think that neither can be a real success without the other.

As a matter of fact, the result of this generosity was the encouragement for the Jews to immigrate to Palestine, since 1914. Following the first wave of Jewish immigration to Palestine, the Zionist organization formed, giving direction for the Jews.

#### A. Palestine under the British Mandate and the Balfour Declaration

The Arab countries were under control of the Ottoman Empire, until the British and their allies convinced the Arabs to accept their help to free themselves from Turkish rule. Britain paved the way for agreement on an Arab military revolt against the Turks. Arab forces were to be supplied by Britain with arms, equipment, and money as needed, but they would not be supported by British troops. This plan was drawn up by Britain and its allies of that time (the same of today).<sup>8</sup> On the other hand, Arabs specifically promised by Britain that they would get their full independence. Yet the only thing they got was the distribution of their land between Britain and its closest allies and friends, including France, one of the superpowers of that time.<sup>9</sup> Palestine fell under the mandate of the British.<sup>10</sup> The secret Balfour agreement for this land was hidden from the Arabs.<sup>11</sup> But the secret was revealed by the Russians when the Bolsheviks seized power. Then, the dream of a promised land for the Jews became a matter of reality instead of only a longing for happiness. At this time, Britain announced that it would give the Jewish people a homeland in Palestine. In November of 1917 the Balfour Declaration was announced, which gave the Jews formal occupation of the land formerly belonging to the Arabs.

From the first minute the British set foot in Palestine, they started to encourage a massive immigration of Jews. The Jewish people, looking for stability, began buying homes and land from the Arabs. The result of this seeking security by the Jewish people left many Arabs homeless. This led to a war between the Arabs and Israelies, the War of 1948. But we should remember that the General Assembly of the United Nations had adopted, on November 29, 1947, a resolution on the future government of Palestine, which

provided for the partition of the country, along with a system of economic union, between Jewish and Arab states, including an international area for Jerusalem. This resolution was rejected by both sides, the Palestinians (Arabs) and the Jews. The result was the war of 1948, which began as a clash between the Palestinians and the Jews, and went on for several months. But the war came later on, following the termination of British mandate, when the conflict increased and included not only Palestine, but the neighboring states as well. Egypt, Transjordan, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon became involved and clashed with Israeli forces in various sections of the Holy Land. The United Nations, in 1956, stepped in and attempted to suggest acceptable settlements when Egypt nationalized its own Suez Canal. This bold, self-assertive action presented a threat to non-Arab countries. Britain, France, and Israel decided to attack Egypt.<sup>12</sup> The United States was greatly opposed to this attack. In fact, the position of a leader of a great country was presented in a speech by President Eisenhower in October of 1956:

#### The United States Rejects the Use of Force:

The United States was not consulted in any way about any phase of these actions. Nor were we informed of them in advance. As it is the Manifest right of any of these nations to take such decisions and actions, it is likewise our right—if our judgement so dictates—to dissent. We believe these actions to have been taken in error. For we do not accept the use of force as a wise or proper instrument for the settlement of international disputes.

To say this—in this particular instance—is in no way to minimize our friendship with these nations—nor our determination to maintain these friendships.

And we are fully aware of the grave anxieties of Israel, of Britain, and of France. We know that they have been subjected to grave and repeated provocations.

The present fact, nonetheless, seems clear: the action taken can scarcely be reconciled with principles and purposes of the United Nations to which we have all subscribed. And, beyond this, we are forced to doubt that resort to force and war will for long serve the permanent interest of the attacking nations.

Now we must look to the future. In the circumstance I have described....We took our first measure in this action yesterday. We went to the United Nations with a request that the forces of Israel return to their own land and that hostilities in the area be brought to a close...<sup>13</sup>

From an Arab point of view, the sense of justice of the United States appears clear from the position of its President. The U.S. rejected violence and occupying policies and also worked through the U.N. for the withdrawal of foreign forces.

From war, to an agreement of ceasefire, to a breakdown of a peace settlement, came the second major war of 1967 between Arab and Israel. Arabs were defeated in this war as the result of three major factors. The first one was their dependence on the Russians and their weapons, and especially the fact that the Russians were not serious in their support to the Arabs. The Russians did not fulfill their promises to the Arabs, along with the strange ploy to provide false information by an anonymous secret agreement among the top leaders of the U.S.S.R. The second reason for the Arabs' defeat was the complete support of the United States to Israel.<sup>14</sup> The third reason for defeat was the disunity among the Arab countries. Arabs were also disappointed by Israel not being forced to respect the territories of other states, which allowed Israel to occupy a great deal of Arab territory. The U.S., by abstaining from voting in the U.N. General Assembly in 1967 on the condemnation of Israel for annexing the Arab part of Jerusalem, gave their assent to Israel's action.

Arabs had learned from their recent past to depend only on themselves

—the only way to assure success. From this point, they devoted all their energies and unified their policy for the ultimate goal of regaining their alleged rights. They recognized that success would depend on force and that force lay in unity. But this resolution of learning from past experience only worked to some degree for the Arabs in the war of 1973. Yet it did teach them to identify their capacity, including their opinions, plans, decisions and the resources as long as they need to do so. But neither the Jews nor the Arabs achieved victory in the war of 1973.

#### B. Middle East Countries and Their Strategic Position

The lands of the Middle East occupy a unique geographical position, lying between and linking the three continents of Asia, Europe, and Africa. Cultural influences from all three continents are strongly represented. At the same time, while some parts of the Middle East are easily accessed and have acted for centuries as transit zones, thereby acquiring a mixed culture, there are also extensive areas of difficult terrain—mountains, deserts, and swamps—where invaders have not often penetrated and where ancient languages, religions, and ways of life are different from area to area, many still unaltered.<sup>15</sup>

This combination of seclusion and openness to outside influence is characteristic of the Middle East and explains why the races are mixed in some regions and not mixed in others. It also explains why there is a modern outlook existing alongside ways of life that have persisted with little change since ancient days. Rapid transition from one way of life to another within a small region is thus a marked feature—there can be groups of people with traditions, language, religion, and racial origins radically

different from those of near neighbors.<sup>16</sup>

The Middle East has played an important role in the affairs of the world for several thousand years. Mesopotamia, crossroads of the three old continents, cradled today's civilization. Then came the famed cultures of Surmen, Babylonia, and the Egyptian Nile. The ancient names of the Middle East are names which fill the pages of history: the Koran, the Bible, Hammurabi, Xerxes, Darius the Great, Suleiman the Magnificent, Moses, Solomon, the Queen of Sheba, Jesus, Muhammed, and Alexander the Great.<sup>17</sup>

The Middle East is important today for different reasons: geographical position, oil, politics, and money. Many of the lands have new names, such as Qatar, Kuwait, Bahran, the United Arab Emirates, while others have remained the same, such as Iran, Egypt, Jordan, and Palestine. Some of the names in recent history are those of kings and sheikhs whose desert kingdoms are dotted with the tall steel towers of oil rigs, belonging to military leaders, revolutionaries, and even some terrorists. Some countries are still traditionally ruled by families like the Sa'ud and Sabbah families of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. And other countries have changed and are not family ruled, but are ruled by such organizations as the Islamic Republic in Iran, the Democratic Republic in Egypt, Israel's military craftsmen, and others.

#### C. U.S. Policy Prior to the Crisis of 1956

Since the rise of the United States and its increasing role in international affairs, it has focused on establishing the rights of nations and peoples to have their freedom, land, independence, prestige, and welfare founded on a high standard of living.<sup>18</sup> This approach was due to

America's own previous lack of freedom when it was under British control. On a positive note, the United States supported Egypt in 1956 by bringing about the withdrawal of the forces after the third attack on Egypt by Israel, France, and Britain.<sup>19</sup>

There were other supportive measures taken toward the Arab countries prior to 1956. Wilson's "Fourteen Points" for peace in France made it clear that all secret agreements already agreed upon during wartime (between Britain, France, Russia, Italy, Greece, and the Zionists) for the partition of the Ottoman Empire were to be dissolved.<sup>20</sup> In 1945, President Roosevelt "commented after meeting with Ibn Saud that five minutes of conversation with the Arab ruler had taught him more about the Palestinian problem than an exchange of two or three dozen letters. Roosevelt always professed sympathy for the Zionist aspirations. However, one of his last public acts was to write King Ibn Saud to assure him that the United States would not undertake any decision regarding Palestine without full consultation with Arabs and Zionists alike."<sup>21</sup>

### III. International and Middle East Politics

From an international point of view, the conflict in the Middle East is immensely complicated and difficult. The active outside parties in the crisis are the two superpowers, West Europe, East Europe, and some others. The policy of any country regarding this problem should be very well planned because of its inevitable effect on international politics—west and east, south and north, and rich and poor. So again, when the U.S. makes decisions about their policies, they should consider the reaction of the Soviet Union and the interests of the U.S. allies. Although the U.S. has been the most



active lately in the Middle East, the Russians have been active too. But the Russian actions have not been noticed because of the U.S. initiatives. Both parties have been acting in the interests of a balance of power, but after the War of 1973 the U.S. has attempted to be the sole mediator. "The United States has generally been opposed to a Geneva conference, which would include the U.S.S.R. and the European powers. As Kissinger had explained, his diplomatic efforts were designed 'to keep the Soviets out of the diplomatic arena' and to ensure that Europeans and Japanese did not become involved in the diplomacy concerning the Middle East."<sup>22</sup> A most interesting facet of this is that the U.S. is depending on treaties between persons and not between nations. It deals with one party exclusively and gives that party all that it wants, even if this causes the failure of the U.S. initiatives. For example, to create the Treaty of Camp David, the Egyptian President Sadat traveled in January of 1978 to Jerusalem and embraced his former enemies. Not only did he break a 29-year-old Arab ban on direct dealing with the Israelis, he went straight to the rostrum of the Knesset to proclaim his willingness to live with them in permanent peace and justice.<sup>23</sup> In this example, this Arabic leader did what no other leader had done before. How did the Jews respond? The Israelis didn't accept the full autonomy talks, and Sadat lost his people's trust, and his popularity in the Arabic world. "I attribute a certain amount of blame to the U.S. for what happened to Sadat," said Hermann Eilton, former U.S. ambassador to Egypt, "Washington has followed a policy of almost total inaction on the broader Middle East peace treaty."<sup>24</sup>

The Mediterranean, said Emil Luding, is the Helen among oceans. Like her, it has been desired by all who saw her. The Middle East is one of the

areas of the world which acts as a barometer of world politics. This has been especially true in our time.

The politics of the Middle East has many components. All of these components differ slightly. There are three religions and many different sects. Each religion and each sect has its own place in the political, economical, and social fields.<sup>25</sup>

Along with religious variety, there is also great cultural variety. Three basic cultures exist in the Middle East. First is the Islamic culture, which does not separate religion from politics. Second is the Western culture, which has several problems because it does not originate in the area, and has imported foreign ways and styles to the land. Third is the Persian culture, which is a mixture of Islamic, Western, and other cultures. Due to this mixture of three basic cultures in the Middle East, conflict is a continuing problem.

Thus, the politics of the Middle East remains difficult to deal with because of this mixture of cultures. And these difficulties are intensified by interferences and pressures from the West and East. This interference creates instability in the region. Instability in this region causes fear in the Western world because it is afraid to cut the vein of life, the oil. As a matter of fact, Middle East countries have already been using oil as a component of their politics, such as in the Arab/Israeli War of 1973.

#### A. The Security of Israel

Every state has to make sure to create objectives which guarantee its independence and needs. Israel, in this sense, is a strange country surrounded by Arab countries, not because it is a Jewish government, or

because of its religion, or because of its political system, but because of its recent occupation of the land in 1967. It has the property of others and it has scattered many Palestinian people. Yet Israel still survives by the help of other countries; otherwise, it would be dissolved. Its population is not that big in number in comparison to the neighboring states; therefore, it cannot secure itself. As a matter of fact, it could only face others through the help of Britain and, later, the U.S., which guarantees its security. "1942 saw the transfer of power in the World Zionist movement from the British to the American Zionists...The Truman era...was one of the strong pro-Zionist posture. In 1946 the President called upon Britain to admit 100,000 displaced Jewish persons to Palestine....On May 14, 1948, President Truman extended recognition to Israel within minutes of its proclamation as an independent state....On May 25, 1950, the U.S. regulated the flow of arms to (Israel) by the U.S., Britain, and France...U.S. aid to Israel (in five years) exceeded everything to all Arabs."<sup>26</sup> This is a probable result of a small number of Jewish people in the U.S. who hold great wealth and power and can influence the mass media of America. The most important exercise of this influence can be seen during an election year in the U.S.

American recognition of the State of Israel in 1948 illustrates the kind of link that can exist between domestic and international politics. Israel came into existence in 1948, a Presidential election year in the United States. It was necessary for both candidates to take positions on the issue of Israeli recognition, but it was particularly important that Harry S. Truman, the incumbent Democrat, adopt a favorable attitude toward the New Jewish state because he desperately needed the Jewish vote in big

states like New York and the financial support that Democrats had traditionally received from the Jewish community. For President Truman, Jews in Israel constituted a significant constituency because of their links with the Jewish community in the United States. He adopted a pro-Israeli position, despite the advice of members of the Departments of Defense and State who feared that such a policy would alienate the petroleum-rich Arab states. Figure 1 represents schematically the links among various groups in 1948 in relation to this particular issue. Arrows designate how the groups are linked. To understand Truman's decision in detail we would have to identify and describe direct links between him and other members of government, between the government and social groups like the Jewish community and the Democratic party, and between the United States government and those foreign countries.<sup>27</sup>

This indirect impact and influence in U.S. policy is the most important one in guaranteeing the survival of Israel. Another one is that, because of the continual and fast change in the political situation of the area, the U.S. has been spending time in the planning of a suitable policy that presents a suitable change for the area. Part of this policy has to be achieved by a strong ally to the U.S. The strength of this ally, Israel, needs full support to perform its role adequately. Therefore, we arrive at the conclusion that Israel is one of the protectors of the American interests in the Middle East. The American interests referred to earlier included access to Arab oil and denial of the Middle East to the Communists. Now, the interests of the U.S. in the Middle East are at a critical point because of the success which communists have been enjoying in establishing themselves in the areas, such as South Yemen, Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, and




Figure 1. A simple communications model of Israeli recognition, 1948.

etc. Maybe, the U.S. plans to give more support to Israel to secure its interests in the area. Arab oil is an important item to the U.S. In addition, oil is vital to american allies in Western Europe and also to Japan. Around 76% of Western Europ's oil imports come from the Middle East and North Africa. The U.S. also depends on Arab oil to supply its military installations around the world, from Ireland to the Far East. All of the U.S. fleet depends on the oil of the Middle East. And from this it becomes evident that the U.S., and its allies, have a great deal at stake in Israel. Such strong support of Israel has caused an imbalance in the Middle East. "Over the years since 1948, when Harry Truman overruled the 'realists' in

his administration and gave the fledgling nation of Israel its first diplomatic recognition, the United States has been Israel's patron. It has defended Israel at the United Nations and served as arms supplier of first resort."<sup>28</sup>

#### B. The Friendship of Some Arab Countries

Relations between the U.S. and Arab countries began establishing themselves roughly between 1820 and 1920, but these relations were not on a governmental level. Instead, they were largely relations among individuals and groups in the form of contracts. The government was seldom involved with such. The purposes of these contacts were trade development and the spread of Christianity. When Muslims resisted the latter, the Christians adapted new methods, choosing an educational, humanistic approach, but still with an underlying goal of spreading their beliefs. Two of the schools which remain from this approach, but still with an underlying goal of spreading their beliefs. Two of the schools which remain from this approach are the University of Beirut and the American University at Cairo, both of which began as religious schools.

The U.S. concern was to protect its merchant shipping into the Mediterranean against any action from the Barbhorian states of North Africa. This led to an image of the Americans as only interested in economic politics, and not humanitarian principles. The fact the the U.S. maintained trade relations with the Ottoman Empire, to protect its merchant shipping, until the end of the nineteenth century reaffirms this. This continued until President Wilson's attendance at the Paris Peace Conference and his "Fourteen Points" in 1918. World War II forced the U.S. into more frequent

economic and political interaction with the Middle East. In 1954 President Eisenhower met with some Arab leaders and was informed of the Palestinian problem.

Several factors brought about the U.S. taking a more direct role in the Middle East: the revolution of 1953 in Egypt, the nationalization of the Suez Canal, the continued Soviet progress with Middle Eastern countries, and the tendency of Arab countries to become liberated. Indications of America's renewed interest in the Middle East are many: the Baghdad Pact in 1955, the position of the U.S. in the Suez attack of 1956, and the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957. Middle East and U.S. relations have become noticeably strained since the massive U.S. aid to Israel, and even more since U.S. gave full support in 1967.

During this time, the Arab world was also going through the growing pains of ever-changing political climates: nationalism, conservatism, modernism, and liberalism. Of course, these did not all appear at the same time. Liberalism and nationalism were gaining momentum and might have succeeded if no obstacles had been place in their way. "It was the Eisenhower-Dulles team which first had to face the first outbursts of revolutionary Arab nationalism and to live with it through the entire length term."<sup>29</sup> Conservative governments of Arab countries, supported by the U.S. acted as barriers to the growing liberalism. Such conservatives as Saudi Arabia and Jordan depended on Great Britain and the U.S. to maintain control in their countries.<sup>30</sup>

To this cause, the conservatives developed their relations with the U.S. in particular, and also with Western Europe in general. These stronger ties helped the U.S. to establish more active trade relations all over the

Middle East. In addition, the U.S. would trade off guaranteed lower oil prices in exchange for aid programs, even if this aid could not compare to the massive U.S. aid to Israel.<sup>31</sup> This position was comfortable for the U.S. because they didn't expect that other countries would become involved in the Middle East and try to sway the Middle Eastern countries to their ideology. And, as a matter of fact, it was not too long before another superpower, the Soviet Union, emerged and started to interfere among some Middle Eastern countries through different methods.

#### C. Choosing Sides in the Arab-Israeli Conflict; The Oil Embargo of 1973

To act as a solver of conflicts between two parties, one can be most effective by taking a neutral position. At the beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Arabs were convinced that the U.S. would eventually see things their way and ultimately support them. But that never happened. As a matter of fact, the U.S. acted as the neutral observer, but became continually more pro-Israel. All the time, they pretended that their only real interest was that Israel be safe.<sup>32</sup> On the other hand, the Soviet Union in the fifties became involved, making it clear from the beginning that they were interested in establishing friendships with the Arab countries. Some Arabs welcomed their help but were deceived. The Russians offered help without needing the Arabs' oil.

So the first result of a non-equal alliance policy is losing friends step-by-step and country by country. This led to more and more countries looking to the Russians for help. But the Middle Eastern countries did not become radical yet, because they still listened to Arab conservative states. They waited and waited without results until the War of 1967. What came



after the War of 1967 were promises and more promises to solve the problems. But no end to the conflict came or even appeared possible. The War of 1973 broke out and the Arabs achieved a small victory by gathering their forces and cooperating against even the strength of U.S. involvement.<sup>33</sup> Now, the value of unification became very clear. And the oil embargo proved the importance of oil to the West.<sup>34</sup>

Before the War of 1973, many Arabs, and particularly King Faisal, had strongly warned the U.S. that a U.S. refusal to change its policy toward the Middle East would have a disastrous impact on the U.S. and its allies. The U.S. did not seem concerned about this warning. On October 17, 1973, a number of the most important men from the Arab countries arrived in Washington, D.C. and had a priority meeting with President Nixon, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and Under Secretary Joseph Sisco.<sup>35</sup> They talked of the war and brought with them a letter from King Faisal which specifically stated that an oil embargo would result from America's continued support of Israel. This was the last warning.<sup>36</sup>

President Nixon replied that U.S. policy in that regard had been firmly set. He said there was no possibility of changing such a policy. In the end, Nixon asked Congress to vote for an additional \$2.2 billion in aid to Israel. These top men had tried to convince the Nixon administration that this was their last chance. Then, when the oil embargo took place, the U.S. and its allies could only think nostalgic thoughts about returning to the good, old days. The oil embargo stunned the Western world because they thought the Arabs would not be so steadfast.<sup>37</sup>

#### D. Opinions and Attitudes

To evaluate a policy of a country from its process, effect, and feedback (negative and positive), we have to go back and measure the important development facts by those who were in touch with the policy from beginning to end. So, here we will have a brief look at the opinions of those who played different roles in the making of U.S. foreign policy. Let us start with Mr. Andrew Young, the ambassador of the U.S. to the United Nations during President Carter's administration. This man, believing in the interests of his country overall, had a chance to meet a person from the PLO and it changed his opinion on the Middle East situation dramatically. His resignation letter to Carter made this clear:

It is very difficult to do the things that I think are in the interests of the country and also maintain the standard of protocol and diplomacy...I really don't feel a bit sorry for anything I have done. And, I could not say to anybody that given the same<sup>38</sup> situation, I wouldn't do it again almost exactly the same way.

What makes it difficult for the U.S. to talk with PLO representatives is the promise which the U.S. has given to Israel not to recognize the PLO until the latter recognizes Israel's right of existence on the basis of resolution 242. Yet it is hard to expect the PLO to recognize Israel as the legitimate state for the land which they still wish to inhabit. In addition, the resolution 242 considers the Palestinians as refugees.

There have been other positive interactions between the U.S. and the P.L.O. Many other Americans have met with PLO representatives, such as Milton Wolf, a leader of the Cleveland Jewish community and currently U.S. Ambassador in Austria, who met with Issam Sartawi, a Vienna-based PLO official. Kissinger even sent a message of thanks to the PLO for its help

in evacuating Americans from Lebanon-Beirut during the Civil War of 1976. In November, 1978, Congressman Paul Findley, an Illinois Republican and a member of the House of Foreign Affairs Committee, carried a message from Carter to a meeting with PLO Chief Yasser Arafat in Damascus. Arafat told them that the PLO would pledge nonviolence, on the condition that an independent Palestinian state be created in the West Bank and Gaza, with connecting corridors. Robert Straus met in talks with several Palestinians living in the United States. In 1979, a five-man delegation led by former Attorney General Ramsey Clark met with Arafat in Beirut, toured Palestinian refugee camps, and visited sites of Israeli attacks in Southern Lebanon. The visit had been arranged by Congressman Findley. As Time magazine said, "Indeed, one thing certain about Andrew Young's secret meeting with a PLO official is that it was hardly an initiative."<sup>39</sup>

In addition, the declarations of two former presidents, Ford and Carter, when they went to Egypt to attend Sadat's funeral, stated that the U.S. would eventually have to negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization. The questions remain: Why did they not express this opinion while they were acting as president and why did they not act accordingly while in a position of responsibility?

On the November 11, 1983 segment of ABC's late-night news show, Nightline, George Ball (former Undersecretary of State) stated that Israel had not offered any proposal for peace and Yasser Arafat and the PLO were not radicals at all; instead, he said they were merely trying to be heard in the world and to achieve their ultimate goal, regaining their natural right. The Undersecretary of State under President Johnson, George Ball, compared the pressure that the U.S. uses on Israel to that used by parents on a small

child—one parent uses a tough stance with the child, while the other counteracts the effect of it by allowing the child great freedom. Public Opinion Quarterly gathered polls about the attitudes towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. In these polls, "The questions were submitted only to those who were aware of the situation in the Middle East."<sup>40</sup> The tables, from Public Opinion Quarterly, are presented on the following pages.<sup>41</sup> The progression of public opinion through the years concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict demonstrates a growing understanding and support for both sides.

Table 1

USA-AIPO: Have you heard or read about the situation in the Middle East? (If yes) In the Middle East situations are your sympathies more with Israel or more with the Arab nations?

	<u>Israel</u>	<u>Arab Nations</u>	<u>Neither</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
June 1967	56%	4%	25%	15%
Jan. 1969	50	5	28	17
March 1970	44	3	32	21
Oct. 6-8, '73	47	6	22	25
Oct. 19-22 '73	48	6	21	25
Dec. 7-10 '73	54	8	24	14
Jan. 1975	44	8	24	24
April 1975	37	8	24	31
June 3-6, '77	44	8	28	20
Oct. 14-17, '77	46	11	21	22
February 1978	33	14	28	25
April/May '78	44	10	33	13
Sept. 22-25, '78	42	12	29	17
Nov. 10-13, '78	39	13	30	18
Jan. 5-8, '79	42	15	29	14
July 1981	49	10	20	21
Jan. 8-11, '82	49	14	23	14
June 11-14, '82	52	10	29	9
July 11-14, '82	41	12	31	16
Sept. 22-23, '82	32	28	21	19

Source: Newsweek, October 4, 1982

Table one shows that the people in the U.S. who are aware of the situation in the Middle East are becoming less sympathetic with Israel while they are becoming more sympathetic with Arab nations.

Table 2

USA-Newsweek poll/Gallup: Compared to a year ago, would you say you are more sympathetic or less sympathetic to the Israeli/Palestinian position?

	Israeli Position:				Palestinian Position:			
	<u>More</u>	<u>Less</u>	<u>Same</u>	<u>Unsure</u>	<u>More</u>	<u>Less</u>	<u>Same</u>	<u>Unsure</u>
Feb. 1978	27%	34%	19%	20%	-	-	-	-
July 1981	29	37	18	16.	22%	36%	21%	21%
Aug. 4-5, 1982	32	41	15	12	28	26	18	14
Sept. 22-23, '81	24	51	10	15	39	27	15	19

Source: Newsweek, Aug. 16, 1982, Oct. 4, 1982

Table two shows sympathy by people in the U.S. toward the Palestinian position, which is increasing, while sympathy is decreasing toward Israel.

Table 3

Great Britain-SOC: Whom are your sympathies with in the present Middle East dispute: Israel or Egypt and other Arab countries?

<u>Interview Date</u>	<u>Israel</u>	<u>Egypt/ Arabs</u>	<u>Neither</u>	<u>Don't Know</u>
June 5-11, 1967	55%	2%	27%	16%
June 12-18, 1967	59	4	22	15
June 2-7, 1969	41	8	29	21
Feb. 28-Mar. 4, '69	53	6	21	20
Aug. 7-12, 1969	36	4	31	29
Sept. 11-14, 1969	41	5	35	20
Nov. 13-16, 1969	34	5	32	29
May 1970	43	5	29	23
Oct. 1-4, 1970	33	8	37	22
Oct. 19-24, 1972	40	5	30	25
Apr. 27-May 1, '73	33	7	35	24
Dec. 12-16, 1973	35	10	36	19

Table 4

Great Britain-MORI/Survey for the Main Event Ltd. on behalf of the P.L.O.: Has Israel's invasion of Lebanon made you more sympathetic to Israel, less sympathetic, or do you feel about the same? And has Israel's invasion of Lebanon made you more sympathetic to the Palestinians, less sympathetic, or do you feel about the same?

<u>Aug. 14-17, 1982</u>	<u>More</u>	<u>Less</u>	<u>Same</u>	<u>Don't Know</u>
Sympathetic to Israel	10%	34%	48%	8%
Sympathetic to Palestinians	23%	15%	52%	10%

Tables three and four reflect that British sympathy toward the Arabs and Palestinians is increasing, especially after Israel's invasion of Lebanon.

Table 5

Netherlands-NIPO: Do you consider yourself neutral in the conflict between Israel and the Arab states, or do you take sides? Are you on the side of Israel or on the side of the Arab states?

<u>Interview Date</u>	<u>Israel</u>	<u>Arabs</u>	<u>Neutral</u>	<u>Don't Know</u>
June 1967	67%	0%	26%	7%
July 1967	64	0	25	11
April 1968	52	0	31	17
Dec. 1969	51	1	27	21
Jan. 1973	36	1	59	4
Dec. 1973	40	1	51	8
Nov. 1974	37	3	56	4

Table 6

Denmark-GMA: Who in your opinion is right in the struggle between Israel and the Arab countries?

	<u>June 1967</u>	<u>Jan. 1969</u>	<u>May 1970</u>	<u>Jan. 1974</u>	<u>Mar. 1978</u>	<u>May 1981</u>	<u>Aug. 1982</u>
Israel	56%	42%	43%	37%	28%	25%	28%
Arabs	2	5	6	7	8	10	14
Don't Know	42	53	51	56	64	65	58

Table 7

West Germany-Demoskopie: A question about the conflict between Israel and the Arab nations: On whose side are you—more on the side of the Israelis or more on the side of the Arabs? (1970, 1971, 1973, 1978, and 1981) Whom are your sympathies with in the Middle East conflict: with the Israelis, with the Arabs, or with neither of the two parties? (April 1973)  
A question on the war between Israel and the Arabs: whom are your sympathies with in this war? (Oct. 1973)

	<u>Israel</u>	<u>Arabs</u>	<u>Neither</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
May 1970	45%	7%	32%	16%
April 1971	43	8	29	20
April 1973	37	5	37	21
Oct. 17-18, '73	57	8	25	10
April 1978	44	7	33	16
May 1981	24	16	41	19

Tables five, six and seven show a shift of attitude and support toward Arabs in the Arab/Israeli conflict by other West European opinion.

Table 8

USA-AIPO: As you may know, one of the major questions in the Middle East situation concerns the Palestinian people. Do you think the Palestinians should continue to live as they do now in Israel and the neighboring Arab nations?

	<u>Establish a Separate Nation</u>	<u>Continue as They Do Now</u>
Oct. 14-17, 1977	36%	29%
July 23-26, 1982	46%	23%

Table 9

USA-Newsweek Poll/Gallup: The Palestinians have fought for many years with Israel for the establishment of a Palestinian state. Israel says that such a Palestinian state would be a threat to its security. Should the United States favor a Palestinian state or not? Should the United States talk directly with the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people or not?

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>DK</u>
Favor Palestinian State			
April 1980	33%	37%	30%
July 1981	31	44	25
Aug. 4-5, 1982	37	45	18
Talk with PLO			
Aug. 4-5, 1982	48	42	10

Source: Newsweek, Aug. 16, 1982

Tables eight and nine show the U.S. public's support for the idea of a Palestinian state.

Table 10

Netherlands-Elsevier/NIPO: Are the Palestinians entitled to a state of their own?

	<u>Entitled</u>	<u>Not Entitled</u>	<u>No Answer</u>
Aug. 1979	91%	4%	5%
June 1982	88	7	5

Source: Elsevier's Magazine, July 10, 1982



Table 11

Great Britain-NOP/Survey for Eurabia Ltd.: Do you think the PLO should be involved in future Middle East peace negotiations?

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>DK</u>
April 22-28, 1976	49%	33%	19%

Table 12

Great Britain-NOP/Survey for Eurabia Ltd.: When the state of Israel was set up about 30 years ago in Palestine, large numbers of Palestinians who lived there became refugees and are still living in camps in other Arab countries. I want to ask you about some suggestions for dealing with this problem, and whether or not they would be acceptable in your opinion.

<u>April 22-28, 1976</u>	<u>Acceptable</u>	<u>Unacceptable</u>	<u>DK</u>
Firstly, leave the Palestinian refugees where they are.	25%	55%	21%
Allow the refugees to return and divide Israel into separate Arab and Jewish states.	43	38	19
Allow the Palestinian refugees to return home to become part of a new state in Palestine but giving equal rights to Jews and Arabs.	75	11	14
Allow the refugees to return and take over the whole state of Israel from the Israelis.	3	82	15

Tables ten, eleven, and twelve reflects West European opinion of different proposed solutions to the problem of Palestinian refugees, indicating that they support the idea of a Palestinian state.

Table 13

USA-AIPO: Some people say the U.S. should require that all weapons sent by the U.S. to Israel should be used only for defensive purposes. Other people say that Israel should be able to use these weapons in any way they feel is necessary. Which point of view comes closer to your own?

<u>Based on "Aware" Group</u>	<u>Defensive</u> <u>Use Only</u>	<u>Any Way</u> <u>Necessary</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
July 23-26, 1982	64%	26%	10%

Table thirteen reflects U.S. opinions about arms supplies and their use. These opinions indicate a strong belief that U.S. arms sent to Israel must only be used for defense purposes.

Table 14

Great Britain-SOC: America may give armed support to Israel, apart from anything decided by the United Nations. Should Britain follow America's lead or should we refuse to get our armed forces involved?

	<u>Follow America</u>	<u>Refuse to</u> <u>Get Involved</u>	<u>DK</u>
May 29-June 4, 1967	17%	71%	12%

Table 15

Great Britain-NOP/Survey for Eurabia, Ltd.: Do you think Britain should supply arms to:

	<u>Arabs Only</u>	<u>Israelis Only</u>	<u>Both</u>	<u>Neither</u>	<u>DK</u>
April 22-28, 1976	1%	5%	21%	68%	5%

Great Britain-MORI/Survey for the Main Event Ltd. on behalf of the PLO: Do you agree or disagree with Britains decision to impose a total embargo on arms sales to Israel?

	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>DK</u>
Aug. 14-17, 1982	63%	26%	11%

Tables fourteen and fifteen indicate that the British feel they should not give arms support to either side of the Arab/Israeli conflict.

Table 16

USA-CBS News Poll: Some people say Israel is right to fight in Lebanon in order to stop the PLO—the Palestinian Liberation Organization. Others say that Israel is wrong to go into Lebanese territory. Do you think that Israel is right or wrong to fight in Lebanon?

	<u>Right</u>	<u>Wrong</u>	<u>Other(vol)</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
June 26-27, 1982	34%	38%	4%	24%

Table 17

USA-CBS News Poll: What should the United States do? Should the U.S. government publicly support Israel, should it say or do nothing, should it publicly criticize Israel, or should it reduce its military aid to Israel?

	<u>Support</u>	<u>Say Nothing</u>	<u>Criticize</u>	<u>Reduce Aid</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
June 26-27, 1982	20%	32%	7%	24%	17%

Table 18

USA-Newsweek Poll/Ballup: In the past few days Israel has sent its military forces into West Beirut to try to expel the PLO military forces. What should the U.S. government do?

	<u>Aug. 4-5, 1982</u>
Support Israel's actions	16%
Criticize Israel and pressure Israelis diplomatically	16%
Suspend military aid to Israel for the time being	27%
Permanently cut off military aid to Israel	16%
Do nothing	15%
Don't know	10%

Source: Newsweek, August 16, 1982

Table 19

USA-Newsweek Poll/Gallup: Which of the following comes closest to your view? (Asked only of those who had heard about the massacre in Beirut)

Sept. 22-23, 1982

Israel cannot be held responsible for the massacre because it was carried out by Lebanese Christian militia.	8%
Israel must bear partial responsibility because its troops had taken control of the area where the massacre occurred.	49%
Israel is very much responsible because it let Christian militia soldiers into Palestinian camps.	32%
Don't know.	11%

Source: Newsweek, October 4, 1982

Tables sixteen, seventeen, eighteen, and nineteen show that U.S. public opinion opposes Israel's entrance to Lebanon to fight the PLO, calls for reducing military aid to Israel, and blames Israel for the massacre in Palestinian camps because Israeli troops had taken control of the area where the massacre took place.

It can be seen in these polls that the people of the U.S., Britain, the Netherlands, Denmark, and West Germany have indicated a shift in their support to encompass the rights of both the Israelis and the Arabs. This may corroborate the changing policies of the Western allies toward more understanding of the Palestinians and their predicament.

#### IV. Steps to a Just Solution of the Conflict

To write about a just solution for any conflict, we should not let our emotions override our judgment. To attempt to solve any problem, we should keep in mind that logic, facts, and understanding should be the only basis for a decision; otherwise, we may create even worse tensions, rather than practicing wise counsel.

What must be performed is a calm, reasoned search into the roots of the problem. How did they develop? What helped them to continue their development, and what was behind them? Was there a reaction to the process

and how did it develop? Some of these questions have detailed answers in the previous pages. The rest of the questions will be answered in the following pages.

Before we begin our discussion about recognizing realities, we need to go back and examine some of the resolutions, plans, and treaties which previously were part of the attempt to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict. The United Nations resolution 242, which was established after the war of 1967, was intended to create peace by requiring Israel to go back to the pre-June 1967 borders. A secondary purpose of U.N. resolution 242 denied the Palestinians their national rights and referred to them solely in the context of a refugee problem. The resolution did not mention the word Palestine or Palestinians.

The reason this resolution was unsuccessful is simple and clear. It denied the belief that there is a country on the world's map called Palestine. More than that, it denied a complete nation their land and homes. The resolution classifies the Palestinians as "refugees." But it seems to be out of touch with the total understanding of the situation. Certainly this resolution, created by an international organization, has caused frustration among the Palestinians and the Arabs in general. It taught them that they must find their own way to solve their own problems, or to face the consequences of being refugees in their own land and homes. In March, 1979 Sadat signed a separate peace treaty with Israel. Under it, Egypt regained the Sinai Peninsula, Israel was allowed to keep a military zone on its borders and relocate its airfields in the Niger, and the Palestinians were to get autonomy but not self-determination on the West Bank and Gaza strip. Israel was also allowed to maintain its security

forces in both the West Bank and the Gaza strip. And this phase of negotiations was accepted as a five-year transition period.<sup>42</sup>

The Camp David accords might have been successful if they had taken into consideration all of the parties involved in the conflict and discussed their demands on an equal and legitimate basis. Instead, the focus was only on Egyptian and Israeli concerns. Furthermore, the Camp David treaty didn't recognize the hopes and aspirations of the indigenous population of Palestine, which is the key issue in the Arab-Israeli conflict.<sup>43</sup> The Palestinians didn't accept the Camp David Treaty because they would remain under control of the Israeli Army. The Palestinian response to all of this was simply, "So what else is new?" The Israeli Army would remain in their land, and Palestinians would still have no right to organize or to express their views as to their own political future, since it would endanger security and public order.<sup>44</sup>

George Ball, former Undersecretary of State, described Camp David as "fatuous." He said, "Our annual subsidy (from the private sector—which amounts to close to \$1,000 for every Israeli man, woman, or child) provides essential means for an overstretched Israel to maintain itself as a garrison state and impose a costly military occupation over 1.2 million Arabs. These two facts inevitably make the U.S. a full partner. They delegate the U.S. to use all possible leverage to find a peaceful solution. The force us also to recognize that the continued military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip is not only contrary to our human-rights commitment but the longer it continues, the greater the danger of a devastating war."<sup>45</sup> In other words, Israel preferred to start its peace process with Egypt and left the more sensitive Palestinian question to a later stage—and the later the

better. Why did they begin with Egypt? Egypt is the largest Arab state involved in the conflict and also has the greatest military power. So, peace with Egypt would definitely leave Israel in a very favorable military position. As a matter of fact, Israeli attacks in South Lebanon increased after the Camp David agreement. These were daily, heavy attacks—victims usually numbered not less than a hundred per day. The Israelis were tired of the constant attacks by the PLO guerillas. From August 1981 to May 1982, Lebanese airspace was violated 2,125 times and Lebanese territorial rights were violated 652 times. And none of these succeeded in eliciting a PLO "provocation which could serve as a pretext for a planned invasion."<sup>46</sup>

The invasion was planned and "the U.S. gave the green light and Haig was able 'to live' even with an entry into Beirut."<sup>47</sup> Former chief of the Israeli Defense force, Mordechai Bar-On, wrote about the aim of the invasion, "There is no doubt that the war's central aim was to deal a crushing blow to the national aspirations of the Palestinians and to their very existence as a nation endeavoring to define itself and gain the right to self-determination."<sup>48</sup> In response to this statement, Harold Saunders, a former Assistant Secretary of State, who helped negotiate the 1978 Camp David accords, stated that the PLO in Lebanon is only a symbol of a whole nation that is dispersed over the whole world, "You can't kill a national movement. You can't kill a symbol."<sup>49</sup> Also, Saif Addin Zuabi (associated with the Labor Party and Vice-President of the Knesset) wrote a letter to Begin, indicating his dissatisfaction with going beyond the originally announced 40 km limit. Furthermore, he states that he had never admired Yasser Arafat, "But after the war it became clear to everyone that Yasser Arafat is the most fitting representative of the Palestinian

people."<sup>50</sup> A soldier stated that he fought in Sinai in October 1973 to defend his home, but during the fighting in Lebanon against the PLO he and his "buddies" came to conclusion that they didn't know why they were dying, because they knew they could not "wipe out the Palestinian problem with arms."<sup>51</sup> Despite this feeling among the Israeli troops, they allowed the massacre of Sabra-Chatila refugees to take place as planned by Israeli officials. The Phalange Colin Campbell stated that the plan for Christian militiamen to enter the camps had been discussed for some time between Israeli and Christian officers—that it had, in fact, been outlined before the assassination of Bechir Gemayel (the elected President of Lebanon).<sup>52</sup> A French writer, Roger Garaudy, stated in his book, The Case of Israel, that Hitler victimized the Jews, but this should not be rectified by the Jews committing a greater sin several times against a people like the Palestinians who have nothing to do with Hitler. Besides that, this crime does not solve the problem at all.<sup>53</sup> The further killing in Lebanon is not a solution.

Another problem that was ignored during the Camp David negotiations was the involvement of the U.S.S.R., which is necessary if peace is to be guaranteed in the Middle East. And now, President Reagan seems to be preoccupied with domestic issues. When Israel invaded Lebanon and tried unsuccessfully to destroy the Palestinian nation, Reagan appeared on TV in September 1982, to deliver the most impressive foreign policy stance of his Presidency. He presented a new peace plan for solving the Arab-Israeli conflict. The plan called upon Arab states to recognize Israel's right of existence as a nation and a state. It called upon Israel to halt any new settlement in the occupied territories and to be ready to withdraw from most



of the already occupied territories. But he firmly rejected any idea of the establishment of a Palestinian state. Instead he called for a self-government "in association" with Jordan.<sup>54</sup>

Because of the ambiguity of some parts of Reagan's plan, such as the exact territories Israel was expected to withdraw from, the reactions of Arabs and Israelis differed. Arabs, including the Palestinians, showed positive signs of approving the plan. Farouk Kaddoumi, the PLO's de facto foreign minister, said, "It is good. I hope there is some scope for discussion with that."<sup>65</sup> Israel rejected the plan.<sup>66</sup> Why had U.N. resolution 242 died? Why had the Camp David agreements reached a dead end? And why could Reagan's plan promise different results? These questions made the proposals seem irrelevant, and all of the attempts to reach a solution seemed hopeless. These three attempts were all far from the reality of the situation, but how far? This is the question to be considered in the next part of this paper.

#### A. Recognizing Realities

The Arabs and the Jews must recognize that their area of the world is very sensitive because it has religious importance for the three main religions in our world today. For Islam, it is important because of the Al Aqsa Mosque in Old Jerusalem, the third holiest spot in Islam. For Christianity, the Holy Sepulcher, the place from which Jesus rose from the dead, is found here. For the Jews, the area represents their claim to a homeland. They must first recognize these inevitable points of conflict. They must then discover how to manage their lives so that they can live together in mutual obligations and in peace, not for the sake of any nation,

but for the sake of Arabs and Jews.

If the question is raised as to the Arabs' role in the peace-making process, it is easy to point to their continued, honest efforts to bring the problem to a peaceful end. "In February 1970, President Nasser of Egypt declared that it will be possible to institute a durable peace between Israel and the Arab states, not excluding economic and diplomatic relations, if Israel evacuates the occupied territories and accepts a settlement of the problem of the Palestinian refugees."<sup>57</sup> Amnon Kapehouk observed that "this declaration received no response at the time in Israel."<sup>58</sup> This attempt by President Nasser was a real chance for achieving peace, especially in that Nasser used the same word at that time (refugees) which was even used in U.N. resolution 242. At the same time, Nasser mentioned nothing about the establishment of a Palestinian state. When Sadat came to power, one of his first policies was to seek peace with Israel. Why was Sadat's offer of peace rejected? The answer is simple. It was rejected simply because it did not offer a separate treaty between Israel and Egypt, as did the Camp David accord. Another important reason for the rejection was that the proposal included the return of territories which would solve not only the Palestinian problem, but also the whole Arab-Israeli conflict. Jordan declared, in 1971, that it was ready to recognize Israel if they would return to pre-June 1967 borders.<sup>59</sup> This declaration was rejected by the Israelis. All these rejections and some others were "backed by the United States....Kissinger assumed that Israel's power was unchallengable."<sup>60</sup> The last, but not the least, attempt was by one of the Arab leaders, Anwar Sadat. Sadat took his sacred mission to Israel in January of 1978, raising new hope for peace by facing the realities of the

situation. At the Knesset, Sadat said that he did not come to sign a peace treaty but to break down the "barrier of suspicion, fear, illusion, and misinterpretation" that for so long has prevented the two neighbors from even talking about peace.<sup>61</sup> In the strongest acknowledgment ever made by an Arab leader of Israel's right to exist, Sadat said, "You want to live with us in this part of the world. We welcome you in sincerity."<sup>62</sup> Sadat promised that "we will accept all the international guarantees you might require."<sup>63</sup> He admitted that the Arab states had rejected Israel in the past, refusing to meet its representatives. "Yet today we agree to live with you," he also stated that Israel has become a fact accomplished and recognized by the whole world. Sadat insisted that Israel should have peace with justice and security, but on the condition of returning all Arab territory occupied during the War of 1967, including the old city of Jerusalem, and to get the Palestinians back to their original home. He said, "Even the U.S., your first and foremost ally, chose to face the reality."<sup>64</sup> This was the offer of the Arabs.

What was the response of Israel? Former Israeli foreign minister, Moshe Dayan, said, "We are sitting on the Golan Heights, the West Bank, and most of the Sinai. If the Egyptians want to come to an agreement with us, fine. If they don't they will go home and we'll go home, but the Israeli Army will stay where it is."<sup>65</sup> However, this declaration is not different from some other declarations a decade ago that were stated by former Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir. Mrs. Meir said, "There was no such thing as Palestinians. It was not as though there was a Palestinian people and we came and threw them out and took their country from them. They did not exist."<sup>66</sup> A contrary statement by Mrs. Meir said, "I want

a Jewish state, with a decisive Jewish majority (majority of what, if she denies the existence of the Palestinians?) which cannot change overnight... I always believed this was plain Zionism."<sup>67</sup> And about territories, she was asked in an interview, "What territory do you consider necessary for Israel's security?" She replied, "If you mean that we should draw a line, that we have not done. We will do that when we get to it. But one of the basic articles in Israel's policies was that the borders of 4 June 1967 cannot be re-established in the peace agreement."<sup>68</sup> All the statements by people in power are very dangerous and they indicate that Jews do not want to live in peace, as we would rather not assume. But this assumption by us is necessary here. Why? Because Israel's people in power say they don't want to negotiate with the Palestinian representatives of the PLO because they are terrorists. Yet Israel's own files tell us that "Menachem Begin, Moshe Dayan, Ariel Sharon, Ezer Weizmann...etc. are hardly justified in shunning Yassar Arafat as a terrorist (while) each of (you) has ordered acts of terrorism that, in terms of brutality and the loss of innocent lives, exceed any act or operation for which credit has been claimed in the name of the PLO."<sup>69</sup> This is in addition to the organization of terrorism in Israel which has been active for years.<sup>70</sup>

From this, we can claim that Israel and the Palestinians are acting similarly, but in different dimensions. Each is acting in accordance with his capacities and source of support, but for different purposes. Israel wants to destroy the Palestinians completely so that they can live without being bothered, while the Palestinians want to go back to their home. Furthermore, the final goal of each of the parties is to live in peace!

The signs of the desire for each to live in peace are coming to us

every day through the news media and the national leaders. The last sign of peace was heard on June 13, 1984 by United Nations Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar. In a news conference, he stated that all the leaders he had met were interested in a peaceful solution to the problem. All the Arab leaders of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan have supported a proposed U.N. peace conference involving all the adversaries and the two superpowers, but Prime minister Yitzhak Shamir of Israel and opposition leader Shimon Peres both rejected the idea.

#### B. Peaceful Co-existence

Hopefully, the next generation of Israelis and Arabs will like and prefer peace. As stated earlier by Secretary-General Cuellar, the desire for peace is available and is the final goal that the Middle East's leaders are looking for.

In order to stress that the Middle Eastern people and leaders have desired peace in the last few decades, let us review what has been stated. Yasser Arafat, PLO chairman, declared that he accepts all the U.N. resolutions that are in relation to the Palestinian problem, which means that he accepts peace as a real possibility in a Palestinian state with a separate Israeli state. Also, Congressman Paul McCloskey announced that Arafat signed a statement which recognizes Israel's right to exist.<sup>71</sup> From the Israeli side, Aman Cohen, assistant at the Hebrew University Institute for Asian-African studies, said, "We have to examine the possibility of peace between Israel and Palestinian Arabs, to serve as the basis of a wider peace that will emerge...While an arrangement with the Palestinians alone is by no means ideal, it seems to me to be the most

fruitful solution here and now."<sup>72</sup> And Dr. Moshe Sneh, head of the Israeli Communist part and editor of the Hebrew daily, Koh Haam, said, "To be practical, I think we should first have negotiations between the Israeli government and a representative body of the Palestinians."<sup>73</sup> Finally, Mahmud Alu-Zuluf, editor and journalist of an Arabic daily in Jordanian Jerusalem prior to the 1967 war, and now editor of the Arabic language newspaper, al-Quds, published in Jerusalem, said, "I'd like to see peace between the Arab world and Israel."<sup>74</sup> So, let us suggest one thing to both parties: control yourselves and don't rely on support from others, which may not be there tomorrow. Both can show the world that they are a generous people and that they can live with each other. The Palestinians must recognize the right of Israel to exist in peace within their territory. The Israelis should give back the West Bank, the old part of Jerusalem, and Gaza, and recognize the Palestinians as a people. By this they can show the world that they are a peaceful people and can depend on themselves to make their own decisions.

### C. The Need for Mutual Respect

What are the mutual obligations for respect? What about respect between two governments?

First, each of them has to recognize the other's independence, avoiding interference in its internal affairs as well as in its foreign affairs. One state should not interfere with the internal affairs of another state either directly or indirectly, even if the other party is violating human rights, because international organizations will take care of human affairs. Second, each of them has to avoid any kind of confrontation that may lead to

conflict. Third, both of the states have the right to follow one line of policy if they feel that their objectives are going to be accomplished by working together. Fourth, any two states must agree on the substance of transactions to achieve their common objective. Finally, official or unofficial rules that will govern all future transactions should be implemented. Other factors are also important in obtaining mutual respect, such as self-interest, prestige, welfare, and defense. And cooperation between two states can help sustain economic plans and programs, which will help both nations maintain a high standard of living. This will help to satisfy the people of an area and effectively communicate to others, "If you want trouble, look elsewhere."

#### D. Neutralization of the Area

Traditionally, there has been confusion over the differences among such terms as "neutrality," "neutralism," and "non-alignment." In one sense they signify the same type of foreign policy orientation, where a state will not commit its military and, sometimes, diplomatic capabilities for another's purposes. This is the hallmark of non-alignment as a foreign policy. But there is some variation in the circumstance by which a state adopts a non-aligned policy. It is here that neutrality and neutralism have distinct meanings.

Our concern here is neutrality, which refers to the legal status of a state during armed hostilities. Under the international laws of neutrality, a non-belligerent country, during wartime, has certain rights and allegiances not extended to belligerent countries. These rules state, for example, that a neutral country may not permit use of its territory as a

base for military operations by one of the belligerent countries and may not furnish military assistance to them. But a neutral country may enjoy free passage of its non-military goods on the open seas, under certain conditions, through belligerent blockades.

A neutralized state is one which must observe these rules during armed conflict but which, during peace, must also refrain from making military alliances with other states. A neutralized state should achieve its position by virtue of the actions of others. This happens when the great powers agree to guarantee its non-aligned position through a multi-lateral treaty. Switzerland was neutralized in 1819 and many other states followed it.

This is the best solution that could be proposed for the Palestine/Israel problem. However, the intention here for the Palestinians and Jews is to be demilitarized, except for the requirements of internal security. For external security only, it is suggested that they build up three military bases: naval, air, and ground. All of these should be placed in the territory of states which are non-aligned. In other words, these three bases must be placed under the control of the two superpowers and the U.N. if both the Jews and Palestinians agree to include the U.N. The three military bases under the control of the superpowers and the international guarantees will, in turn, guarantee the security of Israel as well as the security of the Palestinians.

#### V. Obstacles to a Just Solution

The conflict in the Middle East can only worsen if it is not altered. If the parties in the conflict continue their current roles, the conflict



will certainly be, as it now appears, timeless. The miracle needed can only come from the just solutions suggested in the previous chapter.

#### A. Superpowers: U.S.S.R. and U.S.

Thus, the situation has advantages and disadvantages for both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. While the Soviet Union has been trying to move in, the U.S. is faced with unbalanced relations with the states of the Middle East.

The Middle East countries are openly engaging in a policy of dealing with both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union are doing their jobs quite well. They call their game the "Soccer of Nations," with both of them acting as players, and the Middle East as the ball. So, it becomes evident that a fourth round of this Middle East "game" is likely. But it will probably be fought with more destructive weapons than the last time. It may escalate into a conflict between the two superpowers. This region has, in other words, the making of a crisis with potentially more dangerous results than in Vietnam. Whether the deadlock could be broken by the U.S. and the Soviet Union is doubtful, but it is certainly in their power to localize the conflicts.

#### B. Arabs and Israel

The U.S. and U.S.S.R. policy seems to never aim directly at a solution of the problem. Instead, it always seems to aim at the creation of those economic and political conditions they desire in the Middle East. If the Arabs and Jews do not solve their problem in a peaceful way, they will have to relinquish their natural, religious, and historical rights.

If the Jews and Arabs are not prepared to solve their problems, they are not going to break out of their cycle of frustration and fear. If they are not going to sit down together and think logically of an appropriate solution to their biggest and most basic problem, without involving their emotions, they will certainly find themselves living under the control of the superpowers and again under the mandate system.

Of course, they must communicate clearly that the Arabs are not in a position to be cheated anymore (as happened in the nineteenth century), and the Jews are not going to be homeless either. They should tell the superpowers that the game is over and they need a peaceful solution which guarantees the required rights for the whole people of the area.

## VI. Conclusions

The previous pages of this research show, from an Arab point of view, the root of the problem, the development process of the conflict, the status quo, the just solution which seems appropriate, and, finally, a prediction of the future, if the conflict is not solved immediately.

Once one has had even a glimpse of the stages of the conflict, one can see that the situation is worsening, and tension in this area follows the tension in world politics. Though the previously suggested solutions have all been rejected because they did not consider the original people of the area, the suggestion I have presented is based on justice for all the people of the area, without any discrimination. This is why I would expect full peace if the suggestions were taken into consideration, with slight modifications.

Finally, there can be no peace without a just solution which guarantees

the just rights for all of the nations of the Middle East. Peace will not be for the Middle East people only, but for the whole human race. This solution will help us avoid a global nuclear war.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup>Haig Balian, The Middle East: Old Problems and New Hopes (Curriculum Resources, Inc., 1963), p. 16.

<sup>2</sup>Willard A. Beling, The Middle East Quest for an American Policy (New York: State University of New York, 1973), p. 5.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 14.

<sup>5</sup>Michael Jansen, The United States and the Palestinian People (Lebanon: The Institute for Palestinian Studies, 1970), p. 3.

<sup>6</sup>Beling, p. 15.

<sup>7</sup>Saul Friedlander and Mohmaud Hessein, Arabs and Israelies (London: Neywork, 1974), pp. 70-71.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 61.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 63.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 63.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 61.

<sup>12</sup>Harry B. Ellis, Israel and the Middle East (New York: The Ronald Press Comany, Inc., 1957), p. 39.

<sup>13</sup>Ralph H. Magnus, Documents on the Middle East (Washington, D.C.: Institute of Policy Research, 1969), p. 170.

<sup>14</sup>Abdulkarem Abo Nssr, "Mehmoud Riad Remembers," Al Majalla, 15-21 August, 1981, pp. 13-20.

<sup>15</sup>Saul B. Cohen, Geography and Politics in a World Divided, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 231-239.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., pp. 231-239.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., pp. 231-239.

<sup>18</sup>Thomas A. Bryon, American Diplomatic Relations with the Middle East (Netuchen, NJ: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1977), p. 187.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., p. 200.

<sup>20</sup>Paul Seabury and Aaron W. Wildavsky, U.S. Foreign Policy: Perspective and Proposals for the 1970's (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1969), p. 189.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 193.

<sup>22</sup>Noam Chomsky, The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel, and the Palestinians (Boston: South End Press, 1983), p. 70.

<sup>23</sup>"Sadat's 'Sacred Mission'," Time, 28 November 1978, p. 28.

<sup>24</sup>U.S. News and World Report, October 1981.

<sup>25</sup>"Sadat's 'Sacred Mission'," p. 28.

<sup>26</sup>Seabury, pp. 200-201.

<sup>27</sup>Raymond F. Hopkins and Richard W. Mansbach, Structure and Process in International Politics (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1973), pp. 134-135.

<sup>28</sup>Peter McGrath and John Lindsay, "Send in the Marines," Newsweek, 19 July 1982, p. 14.

<sup>29</sup>Seabury, p. 200.

<sup>30</sup>Thomas A. Bryon, American Diplomatic Relations with the Middle East (Netuchen, NJ: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1977), pp. 1-3.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., pp. 1-5.

<sup>32</sup>Ellis, p. 5.

<sup>38</sup>W.C. Eveland, Ropes of Sand: America's Failure in the Middle East (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1980), p. 349.

<sup>39</sup>John Duke Anthony, The Middle East: Oil, Politics, and Development (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Public Policy Research, 1975), pp. 41-44.

<sup>35</sup>Clarke Newton, The Middle East and Why (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Company, 1979), pp. 3-5.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., pp. 3-5.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., pp. 3-5.

<sup>38</sup>"The Fall of Andrew Young," Time, 27 August 1979, p. 10.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., pp. 10-16.

22. <sup>40</sup>"Public Opinion Quarterly," Vol. 47: Spring 1983, 121-131, p.
- <sup>41</sup>Ibid., pp. 123-131.
- <sup>42</sup>Harold H. Saunders, "Camp David Formula," Newsweek, 13 September 1982, p. 24.
- <sup>43</sup>Mark Whitaker, "The Camp David Formula," Newsweek, 13 September 1982, p. 24.
- <sup>44</sup>George W. Ball, "America's Interests in the Middle East," in At Issue: Politics in the World Issue (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1981), p. 299.
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- <sup>46</sup>Robin Wright, "Israel Provocations in Southern Lebanon Fail to Goad PLO—So Far," Christian Science Monitor, 18 March 1982.
- <sup>47</sup>Chomsky, p. 261.
- <sup>48</sup>Chomsky, p. 203.
- <sup>49</sup>John Walcott, "Beirut's War of Nerves," Newsweek, 12 July 1982, p. 40.
- <sup>50</sup>Chomsky, pp. 63-64.
- <sup>51</sup>Walcott, p. 40.
- <sup>52</sup>New York Times, 1 October 1982.
- <sup>53</sup>R. Garaudy, The Case of Israel (Britain: Shorouk International, 1983) p. 60.
- <sup>54</sup>Douglas Brew, "Reagan's Fresh Start," Time, 13 September 1982, pp. 8-12.
- <sup>55</sup>"Reagan's Fresh Start," Newsweek, 13 September 1982, pp. 22-25.
- <sup>56</sup>Ibid., p. 23.
- <sup>57</sup>Chomsky, p. 64.
- <sup>58</sup>Ibid., p. 64.
- <sup>59</sup>Ibid., p. 65.
- <sup>60</sup>Ibid., p. 64.

- <sup>61</sup>Time, 2 January 1978, pp. 10-35.
- <sup>62</sup>Ibid., pp. 10-35.
- <sup>63</sup>Ibid., pp. 10-35.
- <sup>64</sup>Ibid., pp. 10-35.
- <sup>65</sup>Milan J. Kubic, "Mideast Thaw," Newsweek, 24 July 1978, p. 49.
- <sup>66</sup>Sunday Times, 15 June 1969.
- <sup>67</sup>Garaudy, p. 48.
- <sup>68</sup>Ibid., p. 128.
- <sup>69</sup>Eveland, pp. 352-353.
- <sup>70</sup>New York Times, 10 May 1984.
- <sup>71</sup>"Do I Look Like a Monster?" Newsweek, 9 August 1982, p. 28.
- <sup>72</sup>Irene Gendzier, A Middle East Reader (New York: Western Publishing Co., Inc., 1969), p. 419.
- <sup>73</sup>Ibid., p. 421.
- <sup>74</sup>Ibid., p. 426.

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AN ARAB'S POINT OF VIEW TOWARDS SOLVING THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

by

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AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S REPORT

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During the twentieth century period, several regions in different continents of the world have been suffering from continual conflicts. The Arab/Israeli conflict in the Middle East is one of the world regions' conflicts which is becoming more complex day by day.

From an Arab point of view, this paper attempts to examine: (1) the historical background of the different stages of the Arab-Israeli conflict; (2) an overview of the United States' policy toward the different parties of the conflict, and (3) the world view of the different circumstances surrounding the parties involved in the conflict.

The main reason behind this approach is to highlight the discrepancies between the realistic status of the conflict and the inadequate gestures that have been tried to resolve the conflict.

The method of examining is by presenting the atmosphere that has helped the conflict to develop. Policies and resolutions that have been established to solve the conflict and the reasons of their failure are examined. Finally, some proposals are offered for solving the conflict. They emphasize the need for recognizing the realities of the problem, and the obstacles that stand behind the continuation of the conflict if no just solution is applied.