

PRE-CONFLICT INTERACTIONS: A CASE STUDY
OF ARAB-ISRAELI CONFRONTATIONS 1949-72

by

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
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

"Aggression is most likely to arise in social positions in rank-disequilibrium. In a system of individuals it may take the form of crime, in a system of groups the form of revolution, and in a system of nations the form of war. But these extreme forms of aggression are unlikely to occur unless (1) other means of equilibration towards a complete topdog configuration have been tried, and (2) the culture has some practice in violent aggression."¹ Johan Galtung continued to define aggression as "...drives toward change, even against the will of others," and his definition of the extreme forms of aggression included wars between nations. His argument was that these extreme forms of aggression make aggression both problematic, and a cause of concern and prevention,² if possible.

The Arab-Israeli conflict, without doubt, fits into the broad parameters of Galtung's theory of aggression. The conflict definitely has all the attributes necessary for the title "war" as Nicholas S. Timasheff has indicated: a situation where "antagonism [has] reached a level of danger as specified and be further reinforced by aggravating circumstances; none of the parties to the conflict, especially one likely to play the aggressive role, have normative inhibitions to war; one of the parties has lost hope of achieving goals short of war; and subjectively there is a perception

by each of the parties of a fair chance for victory."³

Timasheff postulated that the 1948 Palestinian War contained all four of the above conditions: Israel had a goal of existence while the Arab goal was to prevent this creation and subsequent existence; all previous attempts to settle the question had failed, such as the British Mandate, the UN Partition Plan of 1947 and the British attempt to quell the subsequent guerrilla uprisings; at the outbreak of war on 15 May 1948 each of the opponents perceived eventual victory; and, the antagonism was present because of opposing claims to the land and territory.⁴

"There are some indications that at the present time the problem of interstate conflicts is ripe for a concerted research attack, combining the methods of several of the social sciences. The aim of this research would be to develop techniques to do three things: to identify generally those conflict situations and states which are likely to lead to war; to evaluate particular conflict situations and the probable lines along which they are likely to develop if left to themselves; and to suggest further possible techniques for controlling or containing such conflict situations so as to prevent them from breaking out into war."⁵ Deutsch's statement was very appropriate in 1957 considering, in retrospect, those events that had just occurred within two or three years prior, and those that were to occur within the next two or three years: the Korean War, 1956 Sinai Campaign, Russian invasion of Hungary, the French-Indo China War, Lebanese Civil War of 1958, Algerian Revolution, just to name

a few. The statement today is still appropriate when one considers the on-going conflicts around the world such as in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and the Philippines.

This paper will treat one of these conflicts between states to determine the applicability of Deutsch's concept. The Middle East has been defined by many scholars, in almost as many ways. For our purposes the Middle East is defined as the Arab states of North Africa from Morocco on the west to Egypt and the Sudan on the east; the Arabian Peninsula countries of Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Kuwait, Aden, Kuwait and the Trucial States; and the Fertile Crescent countries of Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Iraq. This definition is used in order to identify the Arab-Israel conflict as one of "those conflict situations" in a system of nations "likely to lead to war;" and these states have been the main actors in the conflict. Further, the scope of the research will be condensed to include only six actors: Israel on one side with Jordan, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and the Arab League which consists of the four Arab states here named and the rest of the Arab states named above, on the other side of the conflict.

From an historical viewpoint one can assume that the violent conflict and aggression between the two factions will continue. Current violent interaction between Arabs and Israelis gives this indication. Therefore, this paper will establish that patterns of conflict interaction exist, and attempt to establish a predictable pattern for the future, or as Deutsch puts it, "...to evaluate particular conflict situations and the probable lines along which they are likely to

develop if left to themselves."

Generally speaking, the Middle East as defined above has been in a constant state of turmoil for several centuries. However, our main concern is with the immediate history of the past 25 years. When the period began world tensions were very high; however, these tensions seem to have lessened to some degree since Deutsch made his statement, due in part to acceptance of the People's Republic of China into the United Nations, the recent economic and political exchanges between the Soviet Union and the U.S., the SALT talks and agreements, and the exchanges between the two German states, to name a few. However, enough tensions still exist as already established. The Middle East, as one of the tension areas of the world, is important for several reasons. The region has long been important from a strategic viewpoint because of the Suez Canal and the land-bridge between Europe and Asia. Within the last decade or so it has taken on new importance. The impending energy crisis in the world currently centers on the area because of the vast petro-chemical resources between the Persian Gulf and the western confines of our defined Middle East. The industrial empires of Western Europe and Japan are highly dependent on these petroleum resources. The United States, rapidly depleting her own proven reserves, becomes each day more dependent on Middle East petro-chemical supplies.

Because of the world market for oil products, and the trend toward Arab government nationalization of oil reserves, the Arab world will soon become a major money-holder of the world's currencies with all the power attributed to great wealth.

From a geographic standpoint the area continues to be important. The Soviet sphere wants, and needs, warm water access through the Mediterranean Sea. The West, on the other hand, wants to maintain control of the Mediterranean in order to continue the power-balance established several decades ago.

In the more recent past Red China has sought political influence in the Middle East through the supply of arms and guerrilla training for the Arab states.

Because of the above both East and West great powers have established positions in the Middle East, and probably will try to continue "taking sides" in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

As one scholar put it, "Super powers may...affect the degree of military preparedness of the parties to the conflict and types of weapons used by them" and "...make violence possible. [They] may exercise restraining influence on the level of violence...in periods of crisis...conflict generated by conditions...beyond the control of the superpowers. If American and Soviet leaders are unaware of the actual scope and limitations of their influence, they face the danger of being drawn unwittingly into confrontation with each other in support of their clients."⁶ Because of what Milstein's statement means, a position held by this author also, hopefully the ability to meet Deutsch's third reason for research can be met -- to suggest possible techniques to control, or at least contain the next Arab-Israeli war.

THEORY

What is the theory behind prediction of the outbreak of

war? According to Frank L. Klingberg a prediction to the end of an existing war is possible by analysis of aggregate data of the population losses, battle casualties and resource consumption.⁷ This same technique can be used to predict the next Arab-Israeli war using raw aggregate data of the conflict interactions between the Arabs and the Israelis. If a pattern of conflict interaction exists, and this pattern repeated itself in each of the two wars fought since the 1949 armistice, then the pattern could be used a third time to try to predict the next war. If this is possible then the two superpowers might have more time to react, or act, to control or cool-off the level of conflict. In 1956 and in 1957 the superpowers had to act after the outbreak of general fighting. Fortunately in 1956 the two powers were in agreement, and in 1967 the "hotline" between the two leaders was used. Perhaps a third "surprise" might be avoided by earlier prediction and action.

What is the feasibility of such a study? Is it practical? And, would it be useful? Undoubtedly yes in answer to the last two questions, but the first question must be investigated to some degree before an answer is presented.

Earlier work, at least from Quincy Wright to very recent events-data analysis provide several leads. Wright, in A STUDY OF WAR, said, "Efforts to tabulate the military events of history and to study their trends and fluctuations over long periods of time have not been particularly rewarding for a number of reasons."⁸ This appears to be a good statement except for the undefined phrase "over long periods of time."

However, Wright presents arguments that are partly in contradiction as his study of war continues. For example, "Analysis of the factors relevant to war and of their relationship is possible, but such analysis does not permit precise prediction,"⁹ or "Predictions may be based upon a projection of the present as a whole, with all its complications, for a few months or years into the future...may also be based upon an abstraction of elements of history deemed to be persistent through centuries or milleniums."¹⁰ Wright also asserts that practical prediction of the time and place of the next war is possible by interpreting an existing situation, analyzing the situation, and continuously comparing the analysis with a continual update of the developing facts and events.¹¹ Wright has presented four methods of predicting war: opinions of experts, extrapolation of trends of certain indices, ascertainment of the periodicity of crises, and analysis of relations of distances between states. Of the second method, trends of indices, Wright lists several events that could be indexed and treated on an index analysis. The three he considered the most susceptible to quantitative treatment are legislative or other action such as embargoes that reduce trade with another state, an increase in military appropriations and preparedness programs, and violent or adverse expressions in the press and other public opinion media in regard to other states. He also states that it is risky to extrapolate but "...a continuous charting of the changing characteristics of the opinions manifested by the press of each of the great powers, paralleled by a

chronology of events, would give valuable evidence concerning the political importance of events and incidents. Such indices might provide a basis for short-range forecasting of political crises and hostilities better than that provided by any indices now available."¹²

Another argument in favor of the feasibility that merits mention is one wherein the Feierabends summarize one of their studies as follows: "1. Political turmoil and violence comprise a structured and patterned universe of events; 2. Political violence has many correlates in the socio-economic environment of political systems. A definite pattern of ecological trait associations, perhaps the underlying conditions of political instability, can be identified in the cross-national sample of contemporary nations; and 3. Considerable evidence was found for the principle of social discontent and systemic frustration as the genesis of political turmoil."¹³ According to the study quoted aggression includes acts of international antagonism, embargoes, verbal behavior by diplomats, and unfavorable public attitudes, all of which are mild forms of external aggression. Therefore, put simply, structured and patterned universes, or systems, are predictable. All of these events are commonplace in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

So, for the first question, what is the feasibility of such a study, the answer would have to be that it is feasible, and possible.

METHODOLOGY

Based upon Quincy Wright's theory this paper will use

raw aggregate data from the March 1949 - November 1972 period to establish that there are patterns of events of conflict interaction between the Arabs and the Israelis that preceded the 1956 Sinai Campaign, and the June 1967 Six Day War; and, further, the study will establish that the patterns of events repeated themselves before the two wars. Lastly, the events-data since July 1967 will be investigated to determine the possible repetition of the other patterns in the time between July 1967 and November 1972. If the patterns exist, and tend to repeat themselves in the third period, then the next outbreak of the Arab-Israeli war can be predicted within a reasonable period of time of about three to six months.

The data to be used will consist of the conflict events initiated by the parties to the conflict, Israel, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and the Arab League. These will be charted and graphed in a similar treatment to Klingberg's study on peace prediction. To accomplish the prediction portion of the test use will be made of a concept developed by Edward E. Azar, that of a "normal relations range" (NRR). Azar defines the NRR as "an interaction range (on a scale from very friendly to very hostile) which tends to incorporate most of the signals exchanged between that pair and is bound by two critical threshold is that level of hostility above which signals exhibited by either member of the interacting dyad are considered unacceptable by either member. If interaction continues above this upper threshold for more than a very short time then a crisis situation exists. The lower critical threshold is that level where if interaction continues

for any period of time, then the two members of the dyad will probably change their relative position -- possibly by federation or even annexation of one by the other.¹⁴ The NRR is established over a period of time, and is unlikely to change in a short period of time of from six months to a year. Azar, in his study of the 1956 Sinai Campaign, used only five months to establish his NRR. He also used a dyad of only two states in his cumulative charts. However, for this paper we will use a time period equal to the interim between each of the Arab-Israeli wars. This would tend to be more accurate because in our research, with one exception, all signals fell into the hostile range of Azar's 13-point scale. That one exception was when Egypt and Israel cooperated to control drug smuggling across the then shared border/armistice line. Therefore, the NRR for the Israelis and the Arabs is considered to be hostile.

Also, in using Azar's concept further deviation was made to form a dyad consisting of Israel as one member, and the five Arab actors, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and the Arab League, as the other member of the dyad. This deviation was done because: (1) the Arab guerrilla action against Israel originated from all four of these Arab states at one time or the other; (2) one of the main problems of the conflict, the Palestinian refugees, live in all four of the Arab states; (3) Nasser, as leader of Egypt during most of the period under investigation, was also the charismatic leader and spokesman for the Arab world; and, (4) one of Israel's goals in the continuing conflict has been to eliminate the threat

of invasion by the combined military power of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and their unified Arab military command.¹⁵

Azar, in his study, went further than just the Arabs versus the Israelis to show that frequently the Arab states had hostile interaction amongst themselves. However, our findings show that over the 23-year period the problem of Israel was one of the main causes of inter-Arab hostility due to the perceived lack of adequate action against Israel by one or more of the Arab states. Conversely, Israel was also the catalyst that prompted what Arab unity there has been during the same period.

The many works that have been done on the Arab-Israeli conflict fall primarily into the historical category such as Stock's book on the 1956 campaign and Yost's article on the 1967 war;¹⁶ or, they are categorized as biased accounts such as Moshe Dayan's biographical book, DIARY OF THE SINAI CAMPAIGN¹⁷ and the book edited by Abu-Lughod that presents works by several Arab scholars that gives the Arab perspective on the 1967 war.¹⁸ However, few empirical studies have been made, and most of these were made on separate short time periods in explanation of the reasons for the wars. None appear to have tried to predict the next outbreak of war between the Israelis and the Arabs, or to have been a study of the entire time period.¹⁹ That is the ultimate reason for this paper.

Data collection for this paper was done by investigating contents of several indices, THE NEW YORK TIMES, TIMES of London, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, and FACTS ON FILE. All but one were discarded; TIMES of London because it was a near

duplicate of events reported in THE NEW YORK TIMES and time did not permit a thorough study of both, FACTS ON FILE was discarded as too incomplete, and the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR was not used because span of coverage began only in 1960 and data was needed beginning with 1949. Consequently, THE NEW YORK TIMES INDEX was used to cover each year from March 1949 through November 1972. A total of 7,386 events were recorded. The criteria used was all hostile conflict interaction signals between the Arabs and the Israelis. The events recorded included all acts of violence such as military action by regular forces, terrorist/guerrilla/commando attacks or minings or bombings, kidnaping and hijacking attempts regardless of degree of success, assassinations, and so forth. The other class of conflict interaction events recorded were of the non-violent category such as statements by government leaders, ambassadors, politicians, official and semi-official spokesmen to include prominent newspaper editors and radio commentators, and demonstrations or riots for or against certain agencies or activities. These latter were recorded as non-violent even though the demonstrations or riots may have become uncontrollable resulting in property damage or casualties. The events recorded were only those that could be attributed to the parties of the dyad. No attempt was made to delve into a state's intra-national problems such as the Egypt-Syria split in 1961, or the Jordanian suppression of the Palestinian guerrillas in 1970. In these situations only the initial and ending announcements were recorded. Because of conflicting claims and accusing statements

by the UN observers, Israeli spokesmen, and various Arab agencies no attempt was made to separate the violent events into the "who hit first" category except where there was only one statement or admission of violence initiation. However, the non-violent events were easily traced to a specific individual, news medium or government spokesman. Of the approximately 4,400 events in this category, 1,795 (44.5%) were initiated by the Israelis, the remainder came from the combined Arab states and the Arab League.

The data collected was then charted and graphed to determine if there were any trends or patterns in the interaction between the Arabs and the Israelis. The patterns looked for were in frequency or intensity of conflict interaction to determine if there was any recurring picture on the graphs. First, the data was graphed on the basis of total events. Then the data was divided into the two categories discussed above. These initial graphs were made to cover the entire 23-year period. The data was then divided to cover the three separate time periods, March 1949 - November 1956, January 1957 - June 1967, and July 1967 - November 1972. Within each of these three periods several tendencies did appear which will be discussed in detail in the third chapter.

The idea for a study of this type first occurred as the result of an interview in Spring 1969 with one of the Israeli general officers. This off-the-record six hour conversation was interesting in that the Israeli general, who had been born and raised in Palestine/Israel, said that in his opinion the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict was one of repetitive

cycles of events, that the events remained the same and only the names of the perpetrators changed.²⁰

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

As stated in Chapter I, the Arab-Israeli conflict is largely territorial in nature. There are religious differences, but these arise mainly from the argument over territory, or the claim to the Holy Sites of Jerusalem. The Israelis base their claim on the UN Partition Plan of 1947, the Sikes-Picot agreement among others, and historical and biblical references. The Arabs, especially the Palestinians, base their claim on an equally strong array of arguments. These opposing claims have in the past, and remain so now, been a major source of violent and non-violent interaction.

A. L. Tibawi has presented the Arab and Muslim view that the Jewish people have no claim to Jerusalem since it has been Arabic for several hundred years, dating from the latter half of the 7th Century when the Umayyad Dynasty expanded the Arab kingdom from the Arabian peninsula. He bases his argument on religious grounds pointing to the absence of any reference to Jewish synagogues in his sources. However, Tibawi honestly states his article is written from the Arab and Muslim point of view.²¹ One cannot argue with this view; however, the history of the Middle East goes back to about the year 5,000 B.C. Between that time and the time of Jesus Christ, numerous invasions by various peoples took place; the Sumerians, the Elamites, the Persians and various Indo-European peoples. Ultimately, the Greeks, then the Romans controlled the area. During this period, Moses led his people

out of Egypt and into the "Promised Land", that area now known as Israel and part of Western Jordan. For several centuries, they and other tribes inhabited the area. The Romans, because of one-too-many Jewish uprisings, destroyed Jerusalem and dispersed the remaining Jews with the admonition to never return to Jerusalem under threat of death. The basic claim of the Israelis to Israel and Jerusalem is based on this, and the hope and dream of some day returning to Israel, the home of the Israeli tribes.

Subsequent to Roman Empire disintegration the Byzantines ruled the area, to be followed in turn by the Umayyads (the first Arabic rulers), the Abbasids, the Fatimids of Egypt, the Seljuk Turks, the Mamluks (Turkish warrior slaves who rebelled against their Egyptian rulers) and eventually the Ottoman Turks who maintained control of the region until World War I. This early period, of course, saw the beginning of the world's major religions; Judaism in Judea, Christianity in the Bethlehem-Galilee area, and Islam in Mecca. The religious claim to the area belongs to each of these, not just one, especially since Islam came later than either of the other two.

During the entire 7,000 year period the Middle East was a cross-roads for European-Asian commerce, and a land-bridge for invasion routes that were used by each of the many invaders and conquerors of the area. As a result the people of the area are the result of this melting-pot influence.

With the exception of Egypt, which has a long historical claim to a geographic region, each of the other four states --

Israel, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan -- were born geographically soon after the end of World War I. Prior to that time, even prior to the advent of the Ottoman Turks in 1517, the four states in question were part of Greater Syria. None of the four states of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan or Israel had ever been an independent state with defined boundaries as we know them today. The current divisions are a result of several things; the Ottoman administrative regions, the Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 1916, the McMahon-Hussein correspondence of 1914, the Balfour Declaration of November 1917 which promised the Jews a national home in Palestine, and the Treaty of Sevres of August 1920. Each of these various agreements gave certain promises only to be broken by subsequent accords. For our purposes we can eliminate the Ottoman Administrative regions. The McMahon-Hussein correspondence promised the Arabs independence and autonomous rule of the entire area in exchange for assistance in the defeat of the Central Powers including Turkey. The Sykes-Picot Agreement defined the areas to be ruled by Russia, France and Britain, to include the spheres of influence of France and Britain in the Arab territories in contradiction of the McMahon promises to Hussein, the Sharif of Mecca, leader of Islam.

One and a half years later, after the Arabs fulfilled their part of the bargain to overthrow the Turks, the Balfour Declaration was completed fulfilling the Zionists dream -- a national home in Palestine which was under the British sphere of influence because of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Three years later, the Treaty of Sevres established the French

Mandate over Syria, and the British Mandate over Palestine and Trans-Jordan with Egypt as a British protectorate. The Arab rulers of Arabia were granted independence.²²

The years between World War I and World War II saw many changes. France created two states out of the mandatory of Syria -- Lebanon and Syria -- with promises of independence to each. However, in the end France refused to sign the two agreements or to grant independence until forced to do so by British threats of military action in 1946. Britain, in the meantime, contributed to the present Arab-Israeli conflict by her inability to satisfy both the Jews and Arabs in Palestine. Each of the two people wanted an independent Palestine for itself. Even though the Arabs were 85 per cent of the Palestinian population, the Jewish people progressed more rapidly because of heavy Jewish immigration (both legal and illegal) and the massive financial aid by the world's Jewry.

The massive Jewish immigration to Palestine caused by Hitler's persecution eventually caused the Arabs to rebel and demonstrate against the growing Jewish population, and the British occupation. In an attempt to pacify the Arabs, the British tried to limit immigration of Jews, thereby causing the Jews to retaliate with the Stern gang, a group of terrorists. The end of World War II brought United States assistance to Jewish immigration into Palestine, and an attempt by Britain to disarm the Jews before any large immigration was to be permitted. The result was the open military campaign against the British by the Haganah, the Irgun and the Stern gang.

By now, tired of the Palestine problem, and financially

over-extended because of WWII, Great Britain decided to turn the problem over to the United Nations. The UN investigated, came to the conclusion there would never be any Arab-Jewish cooperation, and voted to partition Palestine into an Arab state and a Jewish state with an international zone around, and including, Jerusalem. This precipitated the Arab-Jewish civil war of 1947 within Palestine. Britain consequently planned to evacuate the area no later than 15 May 1948. David Ben-Gurion, head of the Jewish Agency, declared the formation of the State of Israel on 14 May 1948. The result was an immediate invasion by the combined forces of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.²³

The 1948 war between the Arabs and the Israelis is history. The cause, or causes, of victory or defeat are unimportant for the purposes of this paper, the results are. The Armistice of 1949 established Israel in territory that she claimed as her own, about half again as large as that given by the UN partition plan of 1947. The population was about 30 per cent higher, the increase almost entirely Arabs. Israel was also the smallest state, in size of population, in the Middle East, but slightly larger in area than Lebanon. Approximately 1,000,000 Palestinian Arabs fled the area and became refugees. These refugees became a major problem and the Middle East moved into a period of tension, instability and war.²⁴

CHAPTER III

DISCUSSION

The material in this chapter will be used to determine the trends in conflict interactions between the Arabs and the Israelis, and to establish the patterns if they exist. The third portion will be the information covering the July 1967 - November 1972 period with a comparison to the first two wars to determine if the pattern(s) repeat in this modern conflict. The first two parts of this chapter will cover the two wars and the time preceding each of them, March 1949 - October 1956 and January 1957 - June 1967.

MARCH 1949 - OCTOBER 1956

Several observers of the Arab-Israeli conflict have given three major reasons as the causes of the 1956 Sinai Campaign, and of the June 1967 Six Day War. However, since the first offensive thrust in each war was made by Israel perhaps these reasons should be stated in terms of the objectives formulated by Moshe Dayan. Simply stated they are: "...freedom of shipping for Israeli vessels in Gulf of Aqaba; an end to Fedayeen terrorism; and a neutralization of the threat to attack on Israel by the joint Egypt-Syria-Jordan military command."²⁵ If one accepts the broad identification of "Fedayeen" as all the Arab guerrilla, commando, terrorist and regular forces incidents of terrorism the objectives become plausible. The intent of this section is to establish a

pattern, or trend, in events that lead from a Normal Relations Range to increasing escalation, and eventually to open warfare.

In the Spring, 1949, Israel concluded separate armistice agreements with each of her protagonists of 1948. Since there was a technical and literal state of war between Israel and the four Arab states, Jordan, Egypt, Syria and Lebanon, prior to March the NRR would have been off-scale. After March 1949 the first two years of Arab-Israeli confrontation level was quite low. The only significant armed conflict reported during this period was between Israel and Jordan or between Israel and Syria. Compared to the average number of conflict situations for the 1949-1956 period of 13.7 events per month, verbal and physical, the NRR was low, less than one fourth, an average of only a little over three incidents per month. Through March 1951 the non-violent and violent incidents were about equal, 37 non-violent and 38 violent. The initial flurry of armed conflict came in the April-June 1949 period, mostly between Jordan and Israel which is not surprising since the Arab Legion was the only really effective Arab armed force in 1948. Besides, the large refugee population of the Jordan River west bank would be the most logical place to begin anti-Israeli actions. Secondly, the vast Sinai Desert separated Egypt from Israel, and, it was much too early to expect an organized guerrilla movement in the Gaza Strip for the same reason. Syria, of course had internal problems caused partly by the war. Political dissatisfaction within the Syrian army was rampant; the defeat was blamed on the politicians. This, combined with the discovery by the

army of widespread corruption in the civil government, and malversion of army funds, precipitated the first of three military coups de etat in 1949.²⁶

The second high period of conflict during this two year period occurred in August-September 1950. This confrontation again was between Jordan and Israel; the subject was alleged seizure of land by Israel southeast of the Sea of Galilee and alleged guerrilla action initiated by Jordan-based guerrillas.

However, rather than a decrease in the incident rate to the NRR of the past, this Fall 1950 series of incidents appears to be the start of an ever increasing level of confrontation that culminated in the 1956 Sinai-Suez war. (see Figure 1.)

Even though Egypt initiated a blockade on commercial shipping to Israel in the summer of 1949 the first really overt action to bar Israeli-bound cargoes from the Suez Canal began in August 1950, by the banning of resupply of water and food for ships' crews at Ports Said and Suez for ships taking "contraband" to Israel. The initial exchanges between Egypt and Israel were primarily non-violent with Egypt attempting to justify the Suez Canal ban and Israel making charges about Egyptian action to the United Nations. Egypt's argument was that a "state of war" existed between the Arabs and Israel; therefore, there was legal justification for Egypt as a sovereign power over the Suez Canal to prevent goods being shipped to, or from, Israel from canal passage. The argument was based on the original contract for the canal

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


Figure 1

construction, and a subsequent international accord in the 19th century that recognized Egypt as having sovereignty over the Suez Canal, and permitting Egypt to prevent wartime enemies from using the canal.²⁷ Israel conceded that the 1959 armistice left intact the state of war, but insisted that Egypt's exercise of belligerent rights was in direct opposition to the UN Charter that both nations were to abuse in the next twenty years.

One cannot argue with either position since the state of international law leaves a great amount of leeway in formulating opposing opinions and arguments. What is important, though, is the fact that Egyptian exercise of sovereign control of the Suez Canal was a contributing factor to the increasing trend to Arab-Israeli confrontation.

Through February of 1951 almost all violent conflict was between Israel and Jordan. However, in March Israel began work on a swamp drainage and reclamation project in the Lake Huleh region north of the Sea of Galilee. Part of this project was to deepend and straighten the Jordan River bed. The swamp area had been declared a demilitarized zone by the 1949 armistice, but territory that belonged to Israel. Israel, however, was not to gain any military advantage by activity in the zone. Although the Israeli activity was purely civilian in nature, confirmed by the UN Truce Supervision Organization Chief of Staff, General William Riley, the Syrians complained that Israel would gain military advantage and therefore was in violation of the truce. Because General Riley did feel, however, that the armistice was being

broken by flooding of Arab owned land, he asked Israel to cease project work. Israel refused, and violence broke out in late March and continued until mid-May when the UN Security Council called for a temporary suspension of work. Work was resumed 11 June 1951 with General Riley's blessing, and immediately protested by Syria. Israel's counter-argument was that it was a purely civil matter and the UN was without jurisdiction in civil matters.²⁸ Bassiouni, in his article, only very lightly touches upon this subject with the assertion the UN declared the project illegal.²⁹ Regardless of the legal status, the Lake Huleh argument brought Syria into direct confrontation with Israel, and resulted in what the Syrians could rightly perceive as a technical defeat. It was also the first real beginning of a unified Arab stand against Israel since the May 1948 invasion. The Lake Huleh incident caused Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and the Arab League to back Syria with either offers of aid, actual dispatch of forces, or political votes of confidence.

Although the level of violence decreased after the Lake Huleh peak, the non-violence political exchange level was established. This violent exchange decrease was to continue until May 1953. (See Figure 2.)

The political votes of confidence for Syria brought on by the Lake Huleh affair did much to consolidate the members of the Arab League. Until this time the Arab League had been almost completely non-existent in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The League, besides becoming a major spokesman for the Arab Cause, in May 1951 became a unifying factor for Arab action

FIGURE 2

	<u>VIOLENT</u>	<u>NON-VIOLENT</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
June 1951	2	6	8
July	2	5	7
August		4	4
September	1	16	17
October	1	9	10
November	1	4	5
December	1	2	3
January 1952	1	9	10
February	2	5	7
March	2	7	9
April	2	1	3
May	2	1	3
June	6	7	13
July	3	3	6
August	2	7	9
September	2	5	7
October		3	3
November	1	12	13
December	1	19	20
January 1953	3	8	11
February	3	11	14
March	2	4	6
April	<u>7</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>13</u>
TOTALS	47	154	201

against Israel when the first Arab League meeting brought forth Iraqi military aid. This meeting also produced an Arab League agency to direct the economic boycott of Israel by the Arab nations. This action, coupled with Egyptian tightening of the Suez Canal blockade in Fall 1951 produced the only other significant above-average confrontation in 1951.

As stated above, the level of violence was relatively low during the two years from June 1951 through April 1953. This peaceful period was, on the part of Israel, a time of offering concessions to the Arabs, and of trying to consolidate her status politically on the international scene. These concessions, in Israeli perceptions, were magnanimous since the Israelis felt themselves victorious and able to act as any other nation would within its own boundaries. On the other hand, the Arabs were beginning to get organized, and were able to present a unified front on three accounts; the Palestinian refugee question, the demand for Israel to retreat within the 1947 UN partition plan boundaries, and the establishment and enforcement of an Arab economic boycott of Israel. The Arabs demanded total repatriation and resettlement of the Palestinian refugees in their old homes; Israel adamantly refused but did resettle over 40,000 refugees that reunited families, and offered to compensate all other refugees in various ways.

This one issue, the refugee problem, has remained the one constant in the Middle East for the last 25 years. Several times peace proposals made by one side or the other have been

rejected because of the two widely separated stands. The June 1951 - April 1953 period was no exception. The first offer made by Israel, tentatively accepted for further negotiation by the Arabs, fell through in September 1951 because of the Israeli offer of money and the Arab demand for resettlement. These negotiations, charges and countercharges made up a large percentage of the non-violent confrontation from September 1951 - January 1952.

Beginning in January 1952 a second major issue arose. Part of the Israeli and Zionist dream was to return to Jerusalem as the capitol and center of Judaism. Remember that the Islam faith also claimed Jerusalem as a Holy Place, second only to Mecca in importance. Syrian spokesmen asked for Jerusalem to be an internationalized city under UN control, a concept totally unacceptable to the Israelis who had begun moving government offices from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in late 1949. The Jerusalem issue was hotly contested by Jordan, and accounts for much of the diplomatic flurry in Summer 1952. The high peak in December 1952 was caused by Israel asking for peace talks. The talks might have come about except Israel demanded direct talks with the Arabs, while the Arab states unanimously called for indirect talks under UN aegis to discuss the main issues of the conflict. A good example of the lack of give-and-take by either side was David Ben-Gurion's comments in mid-December 1952 when he said Israel wanted peace, early direct talks on regional cooperation, barred any major territorial adjustments, that Israel would aid the Palestinian refugees but would not repatriate them, and that

the Jerusalem issue was settled as the eternal capitol of Israel. In answer, the Arab League with the full backing of Egypt and Syria condemned the "mere idea" of an invitation to the Arabs to negotiate directly with Israel, and stated they hoped the UN would not again try to arrange direct talks between the two opposing factions. This stand was announced on December 26, 1952.

In 1949 the Israeli government adopted three foreign policy objectives: "(1) to obtain ratification of the territorial status quo; (2) to obtain foreign aid in the attainment of economic self-support and in the defeat of Arab obstacles to economic well-being such as the boycott and the obstruction of navigation in Arab-controlled waterways; and, (3) to prevent the return of large numbers of Arab refugees from Palestine."³⁰ The third objective has been briefly discussed and, except to say there has never been a relaxation of it in the last 25 years, needs no more discussion until the last chapter. However, the other two need some elaboration in connection with events beginning in 1953 and continuing on throughout the entire period of investigation.

The first objective, "to obtain ratification of the territorial status quo," has two parts. The first is directly related to the third objective, ethnic homogeneity. The second part, security -- especially physical security -- and the need for it in relation to neighboring Arab states has been the crux of Israeli armed action many times. This policy developed into a policy of retaliation for border violations and violent acts perpetrated by terrorists, or by Arab states.³¹

This has continued throughout Israel's entire 25 years of independence. The first real major retaliation raid was on 6 January 1952 against Bet Jallah, Jordan, in retaliation for a rape-murder on Israeli soil.

With exception of the Bet Jallah raid only minor raids and counter-raids occurred during the remainder of 1952. However, at the beginning of 1953 the level of violence began to increase. Not so much the number of incidents, but the severity of the raids and casualties began to increase. (See Figure 2.) Beginning in late April the violence escalated. Of the seven events recorded for April, six occurred after 15 April -- five of these in the last week alone. From this time forward there was a steadily increasing level of violence until the 26 October 1956 invasion of the Sinai by Israel. (See Figure 3.) In Figure 4 are the numbers of events broken down with Israel as one atagonist and either of the five Arab actors as the other antagonist. There is no attempt to assess blame for the event initiation except where Israel, or one of the Arab states, has definitely stated it was a retaliation raid. Note the change in pattern from one Arab state to the others. In the early period Jordan is the main Israeli opponent. There are undoubtedly several reasons, among them are: (1) the Jordanian army was the only really effective Arab army at that time; (2) USSR broke diplomatic relations with Israel in February 1953 as a result of an Israeli terrorist attack on the Tel Aviv Soviet Embassy, and the Soviets had not yet begun to supply arms to Arab states; (4) Syria still had many international political problems that occupied




FIGURE 4

VIOLENT EVENTS, ISRAEL VERSUS:

	<u>JO.</u>	<u>EG.</u>	<u>SY.</u>	<u>LE.</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
May 1953	11*				11
June	7*		1		8
July	4*				4
August	3*	1*			4
September	1				1
October	5*				5
November	9*	1			10
December	7*	2	1		10
January 1954	6	1			7
February	2	1	1		4
March	8*	5	4		17
April	9*	12*	2	1	24
May	15*	1	1		17
June	6*	1			7
July	6	2	1		9
August	8*	1*			9
September	6*	3			9
October	4	2			6
November	4				4
December		1	1		2
January 1955	1	2			3
February	1	1*	2		4
March	3*	3	1		7
April	1	2			3
May		11*			11
June		4			4
July		3	1		4
August		22	1		23
September	3	7*	1		11
October		7*	3*		10
November	5	12			17
December	1		2*		3
January 1956	4	8			12
February	2	7	3		12
March	9*	17	3	1	30
April	12	20*	4	2	38
May	8	7	1	1	17
June	5	8	1	1	15
July	15	8	3		26
August	7	7*			14
September	10*	3*	1		14
October	5*	2			7
TOTALS	213	195	39	6	453

* Includes retaliation raids by Israel.

much of the Syrian Army leaders' time, and there was to be no political stability before 1954 and later;³² and, (5) Lebanon really was more concerned with world trade than with Israeli presence, and had never been as rabidly anti-Israel as her Arab neighbors.

Note in Figures 3 and 4 that the level of violence drops in the December 1954 - March 1955 period. This pattern is repeated in the 1957 - 1967 period in the latter half of 1965. (Figure 6) Figure 5 shows the non-violent exchanges initiated in the May 1953 - October 1956 time frame. Approximately 50 per cent of these were initiated by Israel. During the early part of the period Jordan was the source of about one-half of the Arab initiated events, then towards the middle of the period Egypt became the major spokesman for the Arab cause. This was about the time Nasser emerged as the Egyptian "strong man".

In the winter of 1954 - 1955, as noted above, there was a big drop in the violence level. A look at Figure 4 makes the reason evident. During the March-August 1954 period, Jordan or Jordan-based guerrillas initiated numerous incidents of violence in the city of Jerusalem, or the rural area immediately surrounding the city. During the same time frame Israel mounted numerous retaliatory raids beginning with the March 29th raid on Nahalin in retaliation for the Scorpion Pass bus ambush. This series of reprisals caused over 80 Jordanian casualties, killed and wounded. Jordanian government authorities eventually decided they had recieved enough punishment, agreed to a cease-fire, coupled with a much more

FIGURE 5

NON-VIOLENT/VERBAL EXCHANGES INITIATED BY:

	<u>IS.</u>	<u>JO.</u>	<u>EG.</u>	<u>SY.</u>	<u>LE.</u>	<u>A.L.</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
May 1953	4	1				2	7
June	7	5			1		13
July	5	1	1			1	8
August	1		*			2	3
September	5	1	1	4	2		13
October	13	5*	3	5	1		27
November	2	3	1		2		8
December	1	1		1			3
January 1954	3	2					5
February	6		1				7
March	9	1*	1	2		2	15
April	6	5	*	1			12
May	4						4
June		1					1
July	5	1	2		1		9
August	7		4				11
September	4	2	1	1		2	10
October	5		1				6
November	4			2			6
December	3		1	1			5
January 1955	1						1
February	2	1	*				3
March	2	1	2				4
April							
May			*				
June	4	1	2				7
July	3		1				4
August	4		2				6
September	3		7*	3			13
October	13	1	8*	5			27
November	11		8	4	1		24
December	4	4	1	3*			12
January 1956	10	1			1	1	13
February	8	1		1	1	2	13
March	6	3	6	3		4	22
April	8		4*			1	13
May	2	1	3	2	2	3	13
June	8		1	2			11
July	4			2		2	8
August	4	1	1*	2			8
September	6	*	3*	1			10
October	<u>16</u>	<u>5*</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>36</u>
TOTALS	213	49	73	48	14	25	422

* Major retaliation raids by Israel

stringent Israeli policy of jailing all apprehended Arab border crossers beginning in October 1954, caused the Jordan border area to remain relatively quiet for above twelve months. Note, however, that Jordan-Israeli conflict interaction began again in November 1955 and steadily increased until the Qalqilya raid by Israel on 11 October 1956 that caused nearly 120 Jordanian casualties and 80 Israeli casualties. Some observers of the time, and since, have felt that this was the prelude to the 1956 Sinai Campaign, a diversion to mislead Egypt and other powers as to the true Israeli intentions.³³ This same pattern and feeling on the part of observers was repeated in the Spring of 1967 with the massive raid by Israel on Syria in April of that year.

In the meantime, however, Egypt had begun to receive arms aid from the USSR, had started to train and arm the Palestinian refugees in the Gaza Strip, and initiated military forays in the Sinai-demilitarized zone near El Auja. Syria also became more active towards the end of 1955, action that culminated with an Israeli assault on Tiberias in December that caused over 135 Syrian casualties. This raid was preceded in the fall by Israeli retaliation raids in the Gaza Strip at Khan Yunis and Kuntilla, and at El Auja, directed against Egyptian army incursions and fedayeen terrorist and mining incidents. These raids possibly were the turning point in Egyptian policy of non-alignment with the Soviet bloc. At least, after the Khan Yunis raid, Nasser decided to accept the Soviet offer of arms aid.

The decision by Nasser to accept Soviet arms started an

ever spiraling arms race in the Middle East that has continued ever since. It also pitched another subject into the verbal arena that increased the non-violent interaction level. Of unquestioned certainty, the Fall 1955 Israeli-Egyptian exchanges in the El Auja, Kuntilla, Khan Yunis and Taggart Fortress areas convinced the Egyptians of the need for more and better arms. Since the U.S., Britain and France Tripartite Agreement of 1951 to restrict arms shipments to the Middle East prevented Western suppliers from fulfilling Nasser's request for arms, the only resort was to the Soviet bloc nations. The first Israeli protest came in December.

Of more interest is the fact that the Israeli policy of retaliation did not accomplish the desired results as in 1954. There was only a one month respite before the level of violence began to increase again in January 1956. (See Figures 1 and 4.)³⁴

Anti-Israeli violent interchange rapidly increased in the first five months of 1956. Of the three causes of the Arab-Israeli wars put forth by Charles Yost,³⁵ two were now present; fedayeen terrorism, and a potential threat to Israel by combined Egypt-Syria-Jordan military forces, made possible by Soviet supplied arms to Egypt. The third cause was not long in coming. On 26 July 1956 Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal. This action completely barred any Israeli connected cargos from passage through the Canal, regardless of which national flag was flying. Since Egypt in 1953 had blockaded the Straits of Tiran against Israeli shipping, the only seaports now available to Israel were Jaffa-Tel Aviv and Haifa via the

long sea routes around the tip of South Africa and through the Mediterranean Sea. The result was a call by the right wing Herut party leader, M. Begin, for Israel to take a strong stand on the Suez Canal and to make a pact with any anti-Nasser power. Within a matter of days all the Israeli leaders, Ben Gurion, Eban, Ben-Zvi, Eshkol and others, had agreed to Begin's request. Within weeks all had issued public statements along this line. The stage was set for France and Britain to approach Israel for a mutual pact to take military action against the Egyptian Suez Canal policy. This agreement afforded Israel the "outside-power" guarantee of assistance needed to match the USSR-assisted Egypt.³⁶

In retrospect, if one reads the comments and statements made by Israeli leaders during this period they become a classic example of the warnings of retaliatory action as given by Israeli authorities before almost every reprisal raid of consequence made in earlier years. This should have been warning to the superpowers that war was imminent. The opinion of this writer is that Nasser's July 26th action on the Suez Canal made war inevitable. The exact time was the only thing yet to be determined.

JANUARY 1957 - 5 JUNE 1967

The level of conflict inter-action between the Israelis and the Arabs immediately after the October 1956 war was very little different than immediately preceding the October 29th outbreak. Also, in November and December 1956 Israel remained in position in the Sinai, withdrawing to pre-war lines only

after the first of the year 1957 under pressure from the U.N. and super powers. However, by the end of 1957 the NRR had been re-established. The average conflict interaction level for the January 1957 through 4 June 1967 period was 14.1 events per month as compared to the 13.7 monthly average for 1949 through 1956. It is therefore safe to say that the normal Arab-Israeli relations range for the 1949 - May 1967 period would be the 14-event average established in accordance with Azar's definition.

Of more immediate interest for the purpose of this paper is the fact that the pattern established in the 1951-1956 period is repeated during the 1957-1967 era. This will be established in this section of the chapter.

The high point of conflict attained by Arab-Israeli conflict in the first five months of 1954 was duplicated in the first four months of 1965. The same decline, then rapid increase that occurred during the second half of 1954 and 1955 appears to have been duplicated in 1956 and the first nine months of 1966. There was also a drastic reduction in very early 1967 just as there was in mid-1956, followed by a very rapid increase in the last 30 to 45 days before the outbreak of war. (Figure 6) Note that there is a slight difference in the timing of each "high" and "low", but that a distinct pattern does exist. Also, note that for about 12 months before each outbreak of war the average conflict interaction was just over 30 events per month, a significant parallel in these two wars wherein the interaction was about double the NRR. Part of the extreme high in May 1967 (101 events) can





Figure 6

be explained by the extremely large number of verbal interactions that occurred -- 86 events -- while the number of violent incidents were not significantly different than in October 1956 -- fifteen in 1967 as compared to only seven in 1956 -- in percentage of total events, about 17% - 18% in each case. There was also a lag of about one week between the last major incident and the outbreak of war in each of the two years.

From January 1956 until February 1963 there was a general decline in conflict interaction, then a "leveling-off" period until August 1964. Figure 7 shows this trend and the four notable exceptions that occurred in Spring 1957, November 1957, February 1960, and August 1963.

Other than the exceptions noted above, the period of 1957-1964 was a repeat of the 1949-1953 period. The issues were the same; the main differences were the dates and the names of the Syrian and Israeli government leaders since King Hussein and Nasser both survived the defeat of 1956. Egypt re-imposed the blockade of Israeli trade through the Suez Canal in 1959, using the same argument that a "state of war" still existed between Israel and the Arab countries. The trouble between Jordan and Israel concerning the status of Jerusalem continued with charges and countercharges of truce violations with consequent armed clashes, especially in 1957 and 1958; and Israel continued to consolidate the use of Jerusalem as a national capitol. Syria continued to dispute the DMZ near the Sea of Galilee. This area was the cause of major clashes in March 1962 and August 1963 with continual



34A

TOTAL EVENTS

Figure 7

minor incidents through the entire period.

The two items lacking were: (1) the blockade of the Straits of Tiran, and (2) the presence of an organized Egyptian military force in the Sinai and the Gaza Strip. Both of these were partially blocked by the insertion of the U.N. Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Gaza Strip and the Sharm el Sheik heights overlooking the Tiran Straits. However, an Egyptian civil governor was installed by Nasser in the Gaza Strip; and the Egyptian anti-Israel radio broadcasts said that "the Gulf of Aqaba will be closed to Israeli ships and our commandos will continue to sow terror in Israel."³⁷ The Israelis perceived the civil governor as an organizer of Palestinian self defense paramilitary in the Gaza Strip, and the propaganda broadcasts as violations of the cease-fire.

Ernest Stock says that the combination of circumstances that caused the 1956 war did not recur and cause the 1967 war.³⁸ However, he made this statement in 1967, immediately after the June 1967 war, partly in defense of his original conclusion that the Sinai circumstances would not likely recur. If he were to be asked now, he undoubtedly would state differently, that they did recur. An examination of this statement tends to prove it.

Mr. Yost's original causes of the two wars, based on his presence in the Middle East during these years, still stand. Stock and Yost both agree that the three circumstances were present in 1956. Research for this paper tends to back Yost's hypothesis for 1967.

The Straits of Tiran were closed to Israeli shipping in

1953. This left only the tenuous situation of the Suez Canal for Israeli cargos, whether on Israeli flagships, or ships of another nation. This vital sea route was closed to Israel by Nasser on 26 July 1956, and was rigidly enforced in September and October of 1956. The Suez Canal was closed again to Israeli ships in 1959, but the UNEF presence at Sharm el Sheik maintained the free passage of the Tiran Straits for Israeli shipping until mid-May 1967 when Nasser removed the UNEF and occupied Sharm el Sheik with Egyptian forces. This occupation effectively closed the last sea route just as did the strict enforcement of the blockade in October 1956. That was one third of the "causes of war" in 1956, and again in 1967.

U.N. observers in Syria and Jordan were never too effective from 1957 to 1967. At best they were able to vote as part of the U.N.-backed Mixed Armistice Commission (MAC). Because of this, and earlier agreements, both Jordan and Syria were able to maintain armed forces right on the 1956 cease-fire lines. This was especially true in Jordan's case since Israel had long before broken off participation in the MAC with Jordan. However, the UNEF and the January 1957 negotiated agreement prohibited a large Egyptian force right at the Sinai cease-fire line. In addition, Egyptian involvement in the Saudi Arabia-Yemen war in the mid-sixties precluded Nasser from stationing any sizeable force in the Sinai. When, on 15 May 1967, Nasser occupied the Sinai and two days later began occupying the Gaza Strip and Sharm el Sheik, Israel was once again faced with "...the threat of attack...by the joint Egypt-

Syria-Jordan military command." This made the second of three causes of war, two out of three.

The third objective, or cause, "an end to Fedayeen terrorism", began to assume urgent proportions in late 1964 and early 1965. By this time Al Fatah was becoming an effective force. The PLO had been formed a year earlier and was trying to form a Palestinian Liberation Army. Egypt offered the Sinai and the Gaza Strip as training areas and operations bases. Until this time most of the violent conflict with the Israelis had been by either Jordan or Syria. This had been sporadic and appeared to be unorganized between Arab states. With the exceptions already noted the level was relatively low. In addition, the majority of all the clashes were between regular forces of the two opposing factions in the form of artillery duels, mortar attacks and small arms fire exchanges. Beginning in 1965 the pattern began to change. The attacks increasingly became the hit-and-run commando type of attack, usually supported by artillery or automatic weapons fire covering the fedayeen withdrawal. At first most of the attacks originated in Jordan, but Israeli sources indicated Yasir Arafat, the Al Fatah leader, had his headquarters and training base in Syria. As time continued the attacks began to originate in Syria due to several reasons. In February 1965 another military coup de etat in Syria installed a more extreme faction as Syrian government leaders. They announced open, full support for the guerrillas. At the same time Hussein was imposing controls on the Palestinian guerrillas, requiring them to answer to the Jordanian army command control.

However, Arab pressures from Syria, Egypt and Al Fatah still permitted some operations out of Jordan, but most were transferred to Syria.

Although not reported by numbers in the NEW YORK TIMES INDEX, there is ample evidence of almost daily guerrilla activity originating in both Syria and Jordan throughout 1965 and 1966. Press releases by Israeli government sources frequently mentioned "daily guerrilla activity", but seldom gave more details. This was in keeping with a new Israeli policy of semi-secrecy. However, those clashes that were reported had increased in scope and intensity. Rather than platoon or company-size ground assaults with supporting artillery fire, the raids now became much larger. As an example one can cite the Israeli bombing of the Baniyas River project in July 1966, or the regimental-size attack on Es Samu in November 1966 that caused numerous Jordanian and Israeli casualties and effectively destroyed the village, and the Israeli air attacks against Syria on 7 April 1967.

A look at Figure 6 will show a sharp increase of total conflict confrontation in the latter half of 1966 and the early part of 1967. The exception in February 1967 appears to be due to two things: (1) the violence of the Es Samu raid aroused world public opinion against Israel as well as internal Israeli public opinion which questioned Jordan, rather than Syria, as the target; and, (2) the aftermath of the raid in Jordan caused a cessation of cooperation between Hussein's government and the PLO, hence a lessening of guerrilla activity originating in Jordan. Perhaps the Es Samu raid and the 7

April 1967 air raids on Syria were the diversions to mislead Egypt as to true Israeli intentions just as was the Qalqilya raid in October 1956.

The respite was only temporary as the Syria-based activity greatly increased beginning in January 1967 and continued until April 1967 when Israel retaliated with heavy ground fire and air raids on the 7th. This latter was followed by a lull of about four weeks, and the heavy activity began again in mid-May. This time, however, the raids came from all four of the Arab states bordering on Israel. The third factor, heavy Arab guerrilla action, was now present, a close parallel to the 1956 prelude to war.

The only other significant factor that this author feels was important in 1956 was the "outside power" assistance, or moral backing. In the 1956 war the Soviet bloc was assisting the Arab cause. The same was true in the 1967 war. However, the British and French assistance for Israel was lacking in 1967. DeGaulle had removed French support for Israel much as he had done with NATO. Great Britain, because of political and financial reasons, had also lessened support except on the diplomatic level. The U.S. had been selling arms to Israel in sufficient quantities only to match USSR support to Egypt, and to help maintain the power balance in the Middle East. Israel, however, had progressed technically to the point that many of the near-obsolete tanks had been modified to make them more than a match for the Arab armored vehicles. Israeli tactics had improved to the level of being some of the best and most aggressive in the world. Israeli mobilization

procedures were such that mobilization could be accomplished within a matter of hours, without any outward sign to observers except to the most astute expert. These factors made outside military forces unnecessary, so when the United States condemned the Egyptian action on closing the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping, Israel had the "outside power" moral backing. As in the case of Nasser's 26 July 1956 closing of the Suez Canal, his 22 May 1967 action in closing the Straits of Tiran made the signals exhibited by the Arabs unacceptable to Israel and war became inevitable. The only unknown, once again, was the precise date of starting the action.

As stated earlier, in the case of 18 years of retaliation raids when the level of harassment by the Arabs exceeded Israeli toleration the Israelis retaliated. Contrary to Stock's hypothesis, the circumstances of 1956 had recurred.

12 JUNE - NOVEMBER 1972

A comparison of this period with the pre-1956 and pre-1967 war periods is, at best, a difficult task. The following reasons are presented in support:

1. The NRR for the 1967-1972 period is considerably higher.
2. There was a period of "near" all-out war from August 1968 to July 1970.
3. Israel now occupies the Sina, Sharm el Sheik (with control of the Straits of Tiran) and the militarily advantageous positions in the Golan Heights, and the Jordan River

west bank and all of Jordanian Jerusalem.

4. Russian presence and influence has been drastically reduced but arms aid has continued.

5. Abdul Gamel Nasser has died and been replaced by Anwar Sadat.

6. The leadership of the Arab world seems to be in a state of flux; Syria hosts most of the militarily active participants, and Khadafi of Libya is making a strong bid for the charismatic position so long held by Nasser.

7. The nature of the fedayeen, or guerrilla activity has changed drastically from being limited to Israeli territory to a world-wide attack on Israeli and Jewish interests wherever located.

8. The Arab economic boycott of Israel, and related international firms, has either been broken, or is largely ignored.

Each of these eight situations deserve a closer look.

1. The NRR for the 1949 to June 1967 period was established by 18 years experience at about 14 conflict interactions per month. The average monthly event occurrence from 12 June 1967 through November 1972 is 66.7, nearly five times as high. However, as we shall see below, the 2-year period of August 1968 through July 1970 was, for all practical purposes, a period of war, or at least total ignoring of the June 1967 cease-fire agreements. Therefore, if we eliminate this period and try to establish an NRR for June 1967 - July 1968 and August 1970 - November 1970, a period of 41 months, our monthly incident average drops to 50, still high but closer to a normal

range. Figures 8 and 9 show this difference.

2. The August 1968-July 1970 time frame was one of intense "trench warfare". The cease-fire lines of June 1967 were the Suez Canal on the west, the Jordan River on the east, and a series of commanding hills on the north of Israel. Both forces were well dug-in in bunkers and connecting trenches much as were opposing forces during World War I. There was no attempt to dislodge the other side, but heavy artillery duels and commando-like raids to ambush patrols and gain intelligence were commonplace. Israel had complete air supremacy much as did the U.N. forces in the 1952-1954 period of the Korean War. Because of this advantage Israel rapidly began to use the immediate airstrike in retaliation for artillery barrages, commando raids and terrorist attacks. These eventually proved to be insufficient to deter the Arabs from escalating the violence.³⁹ In retaliation Israel began to mount a series of deep penetration raids such as the 21 March 1968 raid against Karamah, Jordan that caused nearly 500 casualties. Five months later Salt, Jordan was attacked with another 135-plus casualties. In November and December Israel mounted commando raids across the Suez as deep as the Nile Delta and into the outskirts of Beirut, Lebanon. Hammah, Syria was struck in February 1969, and a series of air strikes and large scale assaults were mounted against Egypt in April, May and June 1968, with perhaps the largest against Ras Adbuja, Egypt on June 22nd. Other strikes were into the very suburbs of Cairo. Reprisal raids against East Ghor, Jordan and the irrigation system seriously threatened Jordanian

food supplies. The war began to take on minor strategic proportions with these raids. In August a major strike was launched by Israel against the Al Fatah base at Salt, Jordan in reprisal for the July 22nd hijacking by the PFLP of an El Al Israel Airline plane to Algeria.

During the early part of the period most of the Arab guerrilla activity was Jordan and Syria based. But toward the end of 1968 Egypt began a massive campaign of attrition through the use of artillery. The assaults into the Egyptian heartland were in retaliation for this escalation.

The Beirut, Lebanon raid was in direct retaliation for the December 1968 hijacking attempt at Athens, Greece.

As each Israeli reprisal took its toll, Al Fatah and the PFLP escalated their actions. The four Arab states gave open support, both political and military, to these two guerrilla operations. This in turn increased Israeli conventional retaliation against the Arab regular forces in a cycle that was soon to have a strong effect on the nature of support.

By late 1969 and early 1970 the ratio between violent and non-violent interactions had approached 3 to 1. This is in contrast to the pre-August ratio of 1 to 2. Therefore, in keeping with our definition of war, violence had become the order of the day rather than "political intercourse" as espoused by Clausewitz. For that reason, the August 1968-July 1970 period has been eliminated as a war level period rather than the NRR of the cease-fire situation prevalent in the periods before the Sinai Campaign and the Six Day War.

3. The Israeli occupation of the Sinai and Sharm el

Sheik accomplishes two things in relation to the other two periods. First, for Israel to be confronted by a ground attack by the Egyptian army, that army must first cross the Suez Canal, a formidable barrier when the attacker must also penetrate heavily fortified and well prepared defensive positions. Hence, for the time being Israel is under no immediate danger of a ground attack by the Egyptian Army. Current assessment of Egyptian capability to mount a large scale airborne attack is that the limit would be a brigade size force at best. It is true that the other Arab states could launch ground attacks, but are unlikely to do so unless there is a coordinated assault by Egyptian forces. Second, occupation of Sharm el Sheik leaves Israel with an open waterway and very valuable seaport at Elath. True, the same occupation of the Sinai prevents Israeli use of the Suez Canal but this rapidly loses importance with each passing year.

4. When Anwar Sadat ordered Soviet troops out of Egypt in 1972 the Russian prestige and influence dropped drastically in the Middle East. However, the resourceful Russians found a ready ally and arms outlet in Damascus. As a result, the heavy Soviet pressure/presence felt by Israel before Summer 1972 has been greatly decreased.

5. Nasser's death came at a very inopportune time for the Arab World. Jordan had just completed a purge of Al Fatah and PLO militants in September 1970, killing more Palestinians than were killed in the June 1967 war,⁴⁰ and Nasser was just arriving at the point of having the two sides mediate when he died. Hussein widened his purge to include pro-Egyptian,

pro-guerrilla factions within his government in the next two or three months. Sadat, on the other hand, has shown more ability to take a hard stand on a given issue as evidenced by the Soviet ouster, and seems less likely to sway with the wind as did his predecessor. Sadat also appears to be taking more steps toward economic progress than did Nasser, even though he still loudly takes war.

6. The militant anti-Israel leadership of the Arab world has begun to shift to Syria in the past two or three years. Prior to 1968 the most effective Arab army was the Arab Legion of Jordan. Because of Hussein and Jordanian political support for the Palestinian cause the army actively supported the guerrilla activities originating in Jordan. However, Al Fatah and other guerrilla organizations began a trend of intervention in Jordanian internal affairs in 1968 that led to the estrangement between Hussein, his traditional governmental policies, and the revolutionary philosophies of the younger Palestinians that climaxed in 1970. The Arab Legion, its hard-core Bedouin combat troops fiercely loyal to the Hashemite throne, resisted and prevailed upon Hussein to stand fast. As a result, since the winter of 1970-1971 the Palestinian guerrilla and commando organizations have established major base areas in Syria and Lebanon. The Lebanese government, although Western oriented, gave active and tacit approval to these guerrilla bases until Israeli retaliation became intolerable. At that time the Beirut leaders acted to either quell guerrilla influence or to expel it altogether. The result has been a "gathering-of-the-clan" in Syria where

the Ba'th Party rules and actively espouses the Al Fatah and PLO anti-Israel ideologies.

Because of recent USSR technical and arms aid, the Palestinian Liberation Army brigade in Syria, the presence of the main Palestinian guerrilla leaders, and Syrian sympathy for these causes, Syria has begun to take over the lead in armed conflict that Jordan held for over 20 years. Egypt, however, as of now probably has the best equipped Arab army, but the desire to fight another war does not appear to be present.

7. Palestinian guerrilla/commando activity has changed drastically since the Six Day War of 1967. Prior to that time Al Fatah was the "bell-toll" of fedayeen activity. Arafat's stated targets were the Israeli military and paramilitary organizations. He especially wanted to avoid purely civilian targets and terrorist tactics that would tend to turn world public opinion against the Palestinian cause. However, because of the ignominious Arab defeat in June 1967 several splinter factions of Palestinian guerrillas became thoroughly disenchanted with the then current Arab leadership. The result was the PFLP, led by radical George Habash. The PFLP espoused commando tactics or raids on any Israeli or Jewish (Zionist) interests anywhere in the world, civilian or military. The first attack occurred in July 1968 when the El Al Israel Airline plane was hijacked to Algeria; the second incident was the attack in Athens, Greece on 26 December 1968 against El Al. Since that time the incidents have increased to include the multiple airline hijackings of late summer in 1970 when the PFLP guerrillas hit U.S., British and Swiss

airlines with hostages held in Jordan for nearly one month. This incident, preceded by bombings and attempted bombings against Lufthansa and Swissair, was probably the first "push" that convinced Hussein of the necessity for a crackdown on Palestinian guerrillas within Jordan. These incidents were followed by the seige of letter-bombs, both Arab and Israeli sent, that covered the 1970-1971 period and the 1972 Munich Olympic tragedy wherein several Israelis and Arabs were killed. The aftermath of the last, of course, was the hijack of a Lufthansa plane on 29 October 1972 to obtain the release of the three surviving Arab guerrillas from German jails where they were awaiting trial.

8. When Israel completed the oil pipeline from Elath to the Mediterranean ports, put the Sinai oil fields back into production for Israeli benefits, and boycotted the international firms that had succumbed earlier to the Arab boycott, the Arab economic boycott became totally ineffective. During the early years of the past 25 years the boycott did cause some concern in Israeli government circles. However, because both Israel and her four Arab neighbors were highly dependent on outside financial and economic assistance the boycott was doomed to failure from the start. The oil producing Arab states might have made the boycott work, but these oil-rich nations need both the Western industrial market, and the Western technical knowledge to get the crude oil out of the ground. Consequently, they have actively supported Arab causes except where that support tended to interfere with local nationalism and economic welfare.

With all the above eight significant changes in mind, let's examine the trends in the pre-1956 and 1967 war periods. As shown by Figure 6 there is a close corollary in the 32-34 months preceding each war. As established above the four years preceding these two periods were relatively calm, approaching the NRR. The period of 1957-1959 appeared to be one of decline, then a leveling-off in the interaction rate. (See Figure 7) However, Figure 8 shows that the immediate 12 months immediately following the Six Day War showed a rapid decrease, then a rapid increase back to the above described period of war from August 1968 to July 1970. Now, if a starting point of August 1970 is used, and the two NRR's are super-imposed, a tendency toward the pattern established earlier is recognizable. However, there are two fallacies to this comparison: (1) there has been no "leveling-off" period as was present in the early fifties, and the late fifties/early sixties periods; and, (2) the NRR established for the first two wars was over an 18-year period while the NRR in Figure 9 is only over a 41-month period. On the basis of trends alone there is insufficient evidence to form a real comparison of the 1967-1972 period with the other two periods.

But, as stated earlier, part of the hypothesis must rest on the assumption that little change will develop in either the Arab or Israeli demands; nor is there any reason to expect a lessening of the conflict interaction level. Instead, if the current trend continues the frequency will increase. As of the end of the data collection period the average number of events had climbed above the NRR of 50 events each month




Figure 8




Figure 9

to a level of approximately 75, a level of 150 per cent. If the average approaches the mark of 200 per cent of the NRR as in the 1956 and 1967 pre-war periods, then continued observation of the Arab-Israeli conflict may well establish a third parallel with a potential outbreak of war. This comparison would be especially applicable since about 28 months of the 34-month pattern established earlier has passed already.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

SUMMARY

The modern Arab-Israeli conflict dates back to the establishment of the Zionist movement in the 19th century, and the Zionist dream of a national home in Palestine. The conflict erupted in major proportions in 1948 when the state of Israel was proclaimed by Jewish leaders in Palestine. The Arab-Israeli conflict has resulted in three wars, the last two of which are the basis for this study. A pattern of Arab-Israeli conflict interactions was established for the period preceding the 1956 Sinai Campaign. The same pattern was repeated immediately prior to the June 1967 Six Day War. Based upon these two repetitive events an attempt to predict the outbreak of the next Arab-Israeli war is possible, especially if the pattern repeats itself a third time. The tendency toward this pattern has begun, but an accurate comparison is difficult because of several major differences in the status quo of the Arabs and Israelis since the 1967 war in relation to the previous 19 years.

CONCLUSION

The theory of war prediction based upon a study and analysis of historical events in a patterned and structured political system is felt to be valid, and one capable of being used effectively. This is especially true in a political system such as the one that encompasses the Arab-

Israeli conflict. While the names of the human actors have changed over the past 23 years, the nation state actors remain the same. In addition, the major problems still exist: the Palestinian refugees still demand territorial repatriation and use the same guerrilla tactics and terrorist activities to achieve this objective; Israel is still faced with the combined armed forces of Egypt-Syria-Jordan, and now Lebanon appears to be more active than earlier in the period; and Israeli shipping still does not have totally free access to shipping through the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal even though Sharm el Sheik and the Tiran Straits are under Israeli control, as evidenced by the rather infrequent Egyptian gunboat attacks on Israeli ships in the Red Sea.

Because of the above the hypothesis of prediction of the next war within a three to six month period remains in limbo. However, in light of the most recent events that have occurred in the Middle East since November 1972, the theory merits additional study and observation as indicated in the last section of Chapter III.

PROSPECTS FOR PEACE

Israeli ambassador Eytan, in France, on 19 July 1967 stated the Israeli position when he said that the Arabs have no better claim to the land than do the Israelis. Historically, this is true as shown in the introduction. He also stated that he expects the next war with the Arabs about 1975.

Whether this latter Eytan statement will come true depends on many factors. The Arab states continue, as in the

past, to bicker among themselves. The Libya-Egypt union appears to be going the same way of the UAR and the other pan-Arabism attempts of the last two decades. Arab unity will probably never occur, primarily because of the vastly different goals and ideologies of such nations as Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, Sudan, Yemen, Iraq, Jordan, and Algeria and Syria. On one side are the traditional monarchies such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Yemen; on the other side of the continuum are the revolutionary governments such as Syria and Egypt. In between are the democracies such as Tunisia and Lebanon, and the dictatorships such as Sudan, Libya, Iraq and Algeria. Even within these different types of governments interests are highly diversified. Khadfi of Libya wants to return to pure Islam, a religious state; Saudi Arabia and Kuwait spend their oil revenues to improve social welfare while the Yemen rulers still pocket the oil revenues. Egypt wants cultural and social reform while the Syrian leaders still want to eliminate Israel as an entity. In addition, inter-Arab jealousies continue, fed partly by the immense differences in national wealth because of oil, or the lack of it. Without this unity the Arab states are unlikely to form the massive military machine that would be necessary to defeat Israel militarily. However, most Arab states agree on the need to do something about Israel, the disagreement lies in the method and intensity.⁴¹

On the other hand Israel has clearly stated her national goals and objectives for the past 25 years. There has never been the slightest sign of waivering. Since most of these

goals are contrary to Arab ideology on the subject of Palestine, there seems to be no more chance of a political settlement now than there has been in the past.

The various Palestinian groups comprise the third factor in the quest for peace. For over two decades guerrilla activity has been conducted by them against Israel. The current commandos are, for the most part, younger people who were born and raised out of Palestine, without a country. From the earliest possible moment they are taught, and learn, that they are Palestinians and that the Israelis are in Palestine illegally, and must be forcibly removed. This has become their lifestyle, a total concept and way of life.

Perhaps Charles W. Yost, former U.S. ambassador to Israel, expresses most aptly the prospects for peace, "No peace, no security for the inhabitants until the Arabs recognize Israel is a fact of life, however unjust the creation may seem. Also, there will be no peace until the Israelis recognize the condition of their long-term survival is reconciliation with their Arab neighbors. This cannot be preserved by force alone; arrogance and inflexibility are not effective modes of international discourse; there will be no security until Palestinian refugees have been compensated, resettled and restored to dignity regardless of political and financial cost."⁴²

This last, if for no other reason, is sufficient justification to continue a study of the Arab-Israeli conflict in an effort to control, or at least contain, the next war in the Middle East.

GLOSSARY

Because of conflicting perceptions between pro-Arabic and pro-Israeli writers several terms have different meanings to the two factions. This same bias appears also in the eyes of the reader. For that reason the following definitions are presented only to clarify this paper, where appropriate. The definitions given are the result of an attempt by this writer to reconcile the differences, not an attempt to establish official meanings.

WAR: "War is a social institution." There is almost a total absence of a standard, all-encompassing definition of war. There are, however, many concepts of war; economic characteristics, naturalistic, political, legal or judicial, theological, emotional, and ethical.⁴³ Quincy Wright has gone a little further in giving a very broad definition, "In the broadest sense war is a violent contact of distinct by similar entities."⁴⁴ Of course, there is also Clausewitz's classic definition, war is "...an act of violence intended to compel our opponents to fulfill our will...war is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse." Wright continues to discuss the various aspects of war, and, in the end, states that war does not include such activities as assassination, robbery, riots, police action, executions, reprisals, and interventions;⁴⁵ but in the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict these as well as commando or guerrilla activities are commonplace and included in our definition of war for this paper. The causes of war, for our purposes, are religious, political and economic. Just

as did Arthur Porritt, the editor of THE CAUSES OF WAR, and his contributors, we have eliminated "dynastic" causes as irrelevant to our case.⁴⁶

ARAB BA'TH SOCIALIST PARTY: A political party formed in 1943 in Syria. Currently the ruling party in Syria as it has been since 1963. Although formed in Syria it has emphasized its Arab character rather than its Syrian birth. Its ideology "explicitly emphasizes nationalist goals over Social ones."⁴⁷ This is Arab nationalism, or pan-Arabism in the Western colloquialism, as opposed to nationalism such as Egyptian, Jordanian, or Lebanese. Herein lies one of the major oppositional beliefs among Arab nations. While pan-Arabism is highly touted, few, if any, of the Arab states leaders are willing to forego their own nation and power in favor of a single, united Arab federation or nation. The break-up of the United Arab Republic in 1961, instigated by Syrian nationalism, is a prime example. For our purpose the Ba'th (or Baath) is one of the major political parties, or organizations, in the Arabic world.

ARAB SOCIALIST UNION: At this writing the other major political entity in the Arab world is the ASU of Egypt. The only legal party in Egypt, it is not formally called a party. It serves all the functions of a political party under a true democratic system. It was formed by the Egyptian leader, Nasser, in 1961 as the successor to the National Union. It also became the official spokesman for the government, and legitimized the Nasser regime.⁴⁸

ARAB LEAGUE: "...founded in 1945 as the first collaborative association among Arab nations."⁴⁹ Original members were Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen; but the membership now includes Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, the Sudan and Kuwait in addition to the original six.

Formed to promote and strengthen ties among Arab states and to insure closer cooperation and collaboration in the political, cultural, health, economic, legal and social fields, the League was the only unifying factor and contact point for Arabic states during the early years of the Arab-Israeli conflict. While its effectiveness has been questioned by almost every Arab state head, it has performed some unifying functions in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian question.⁵⁰

PLO: The Palestinian Liberation Organization has been commonly, if mistakenly, equated to and cited interchangeably with the PLA, PFLP, Al Fatah and various other Arab or Palestinian resistance groups by most Westerners. The PLO was created by the Arab Summit Conference in January 1964 with an aging Palestinian lawyer, Ahmad Shukeiri, as leader. It was the first attempt among Palestinians for organized action against Israel. Some Arabs felt it was a device to permit Arab governments to avoid the responsibility of confronting Israel, and to give this dubious honor to the Palestinians alone. The PLO leader, however, created the PLA, Palestinian Liberation Army, and began to arm villagers located along the Israeli borders. In the beginning the PLO did not conduct guerrilla warfare, but served primarily as a political

and taxing body to raise funds for the Palestinian Liberation Movement.⁵¹

AL FATAH: This was probably the first organized Arab guerrilla, or commando organization, organized with Yasir Arafat as the leader. It has been the largest of the guerrilla movements with the prime goal of doing battle against Israel. The name, Fatah (or Fa'th) is the acronym for the Arabic name of "Movement of Palestinian Liberation." In summer of 1968 Arafat was also appointed head of the PLO, eventually to evolve into the Palestine Armed Struggle Command in 1969 which now controls all commando groups except for the PFLP.⁵¹

PFLP: The Popular Front For the Liberation of Palestine was formed after the June 1967 war with a Palestinian medical doctor, George Habash, as its head. This is the most militant of the guerrilla groups, responsible for tactics eschewed by others such as the airplane hijackings and bomb attacks on planes, public markets, theaters and other civilian gathering places. The PDFLP, Popular Democratic Front For the Liberation of Palestine, is a left wing off-shoot of the PFLP which does not call for armed conflict, but rather for establishment of an Israeli-Palestinian state in a "Peoples Democratic State" along the traditional far-left Marxist-Lenin lines.⁵²

ZIONISM: A much maligned and misunderstood concept that was formally proclaimed in 1897 at the Basle Conference with the founding of the World Zionist Organization. The Basle Program stated the basic aim of Zionism: "To create for the Jewish

people a home in Palestine secured by public law." It was the culmination of hopes and dreams of the Jewish people, nurtured since Biblical times when the Romans scattered the tribes of Israel. In a modern concept it is a socio-political nationalist movement with the objective of gathering in the Jews to a nation in Palestine/Israel. It is based on the Covenant established by God and Abraham, Isaac and Jacob that assigns Palestine to the Hebrews as "an everlasting possession." It is also based on history in that the Jewish people inhabited the area for centuries until dispersed by the Romans. It was given final impetus by the Balfour Declaration of 1917.⁵³

RETALIATION/REPRISAL POLICY: The policy announced and practiced by Israel in answer to Arabic incursions, either of guerrilla or Arab state initiation.⁵⁴ These reprisal raids are always preceded by warnings from leading Israeli spokesmen, and a pattern can be easily established.

FOOTNOTES

1. Galtung, Johan, "A Structural Theory of Aggression," in ANGER, VIOLENCE, AND POLITICS: THEORIES AND RESEARCH, edited by Ivo K. Feierabend, Rosalind L. Feierabend, and Ted Robert Gurr (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972), Chapter 5, pp. 85-97.
2. Galtung, Ibid.
3. Timasheff, Nicholas S., WAR AND REVOLUTION (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965), Chapters 5 and 6, and pp. 102-103. Parathesis added.
4. Timasheff, Ibid.
5. Deutsch, Karl W., "Mass Communications and the Loss of Freedom in National Decision Making: A Possible Research Approach to Interstate Conflicts," JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, I (June 1957), p. 200.
6. Milstein, Jeffrey S., "American and Soviet Influence, Balance of Power and Arab-Israeli Violence," in PEACE, WAR, AND NUMBERS, edited by Bruce M. Russett (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1972), Chapter 5.
7. Klingberg, Frank L., "Predicting the Termination of War: Battle Casualties and Population Losses," in JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 10:2, June 1966, pp. 129-171.
8. Wright, Quincy, A STUDY OF WAR, abridged by Louise Leonard Wright (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 42.
9. Wright, Ibid., p. 336.
10. Wright, Ibid., p. 338.
11. Wright, Ibid., Chapter XIX.
12. Wright, Ibid., Chapter XX, pp. 338-341.
13. Feierabend, Ivo K., and Rosalind L. Feierabend, "Systemic Conditions of Political Aggression: An application of Frustration-Aggression Theory," in ANGER, VIOLENCE, AND POLITICS, edited by Feierabend, et al., footnote 1 above, Chapter 9, especially Study 5, "The Prediction of Changes in Political Stability Over Time," with Frank W. Scanland III.
14. Azar, Edward E., "Conflict Escalation and Conflict Reduction in an International Crisis: Suez 1956," in JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 16:2, June 1972.

15. Yost, Charles W., "The Arab-Israeli War, How It Began," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 46:2, January 1968, pp. 304-320; Moshe Dayan, DIARY OF THE SINAI CAMPAIGN (London: Weidenfield & Nicolson, 1966); Ernest Stock, ISRAEL ON THE ROAD TO SINAI 1949-1956 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1967), Chapter VIII; and Azar, Ibid.

16. Yost, Ibid.; and Stock, Ibid.

17. Dayan, Ibid.

18. Abu-Lughod, Ibrahim, ed., THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFRONTATION OF JUNE 1967: AN ARAB PERSPECTIVE (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970).

19. Some of these studies are very good, and suggested the method I decided to use: Jeffrey Milstein (footnote 6 above); Edward Azar (footnote 14 above); Robert Burrowes and Douglas Muzzio, "The Road to the Six Day War: Aspects of an Enumerative History of Four Arab States and Israel, 1965-1967"; and Jonathan Wilkenfield, Virginia Lee Lussier, and Dale Tahtinen, "Conflict Interactions in the Middle East, 1949-1967", both articles in JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 16:2, June 1972; and Barry M. Blechman, "The Quantitative Evaluation of Foreign Policy Alternatives: Sinai, 1956", in JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 10:4, December 1966, p. 155.

20. This conversation occurred in the March-April 1969 time frame when I was stationed in Europe with the U.S. Army. Because the events were controversial, and the Israeli general requested he not be quoted directly, I prefer not to reveal his name. However, if time permitted I feel sure he would now permit direct quotations if the request for authority were submitted to him, especially so since most of what he told me has since appeared in various works by many writers. Suffice to say he has served his adult life in the Israeli armed forces, and was one of the first Israeli officers to cross the cease-fire line in the 5 June 1967 attack.

21. Tibawi, A.L., "Jerusalem, Its Place in Islam and Arab History," in Abu-Lughod, Ibid.

22. Ismael, Tareq Y., GOVERNMENTS AND POLITICS OF THE CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EAST (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1970), Chapter 19, Part VI; and Gordon H. Terry, SYRIAN POLITICS AND THE MILITARY, 1945-1958 (Ohio State University Press, 1964), pp. 11-20.

23. Ismael, Ibid., Chapter 4.

24. Ismael, Ibid., p. 67; and Stock, Ibid., p. 1.

25. Yost, Ibid.; Stock, Ibid., Chap. VIII; and Dayan, Ibid.

26. Torrey, Ibid., pp. 104-115.

27. Bassiouni, Cherif, "Some Legal Aspects of the Arab-Israeli Conflict," in Abu-Lughod, Ibid.; and Stock, Ibid., pp. 100-101.

28. Stock, Ibid., pp. 108-109.

29. Bassiouni, Ibid., pp. 104-105.

30. Stock, Ibid., p. 5.

31. Stock, Ibid., p. 67.

32. Torrey, Ibid., p. 216-246; Manfred Halpern, THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), 4th printing, p. 370; and H.B. Sharabi, GOVERNMENTS AND POLITICS OF THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1962), pp. 129-131.

33. Stock, Ibid., pp. 196-198 and Footnotes, Chap. VIII.

34. Blechman, Barry M., "The Impact of Israel's Reprisals on Behavior of the Bordering Arab Nations Directed at Israel," in JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 16:2, June 1972, pp. 155-182.

35. Yost, Ibid., and footnote 25 above.

36. Knapp, Wilfrid, A HISTORY OF WAR AND PEACE, 1939-1965. (London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1967), Chapters 5 and 10.

37. Keesing's Research Report, THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, THE 1967 CAMPAIGN (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968), pp. 8-9.

38. Stock, Ibid., p. 218.

39. Blechman, Ibid.

40. Kerr, Malcolm H., THE ARAB COLD WAR, 3d edition (London, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 96-137.

41. For an interesting discussion of informal alignments see Sullivan, John D., "Cooperating to Conflict: Sources of Informal Alignments," in PEACE, WAR, AND NUMBERS, ed. by Bruce M. Russett, footnote 6 above, Chapter 4, pp. 115-138. Mr. Sullivan found that the independent variable that accounted for most variation in alignment was past levels of alignment. Because of this, one can assume there will be little more, if any more, tendency for the Arab states to unite to defeat Israel. If history repeats itself as it has so often in the Middle East, this would be especially true.

42. Yost, Ibid., p. 320.

43. Bernard, L.L., WAR AND ITS CAUSES (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1944), Chapter 2.
44. Wright, Ibid., p. 5.
45. Wright, Ibid., Chapter 1.
46. Porritt, Arthur, ed., THE CAUSES OF WAR (Freeport, New York: Books For Libraries Press, 1969), Summary and Chapter 1.
47. Abu Jaber, Kamel S., THE ARAB BA'ATH SOCIALIST PARTY HISTORY, IDEOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1966), p. 101.
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49. Halpern, Ibid., p. 370.
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53. Ismael, Ibid., Chapter 12, and pp. 64-67.
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PRE-CONFLICT INTERACTIONS: A CASE STUDY
OF ARAB-ISRAELI CONFRONTATIONS 1949-72

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The Arab-Israeli conflict has become the center of attention for much of the world today. The Middle East is dominated by the conflict which has involved all the Arab states and Israel, but also has involved the highly industrialized areas of the world because of the vast petroleum reserves located there which are so vital to industrial nations without sufficient energy sources such as those of Western Europe and Japan. In addition, the Suez Canal -- or its lack -- has been a vital sea-way for nations on the borders of the Mediterranean Sea. With the closure of the Suez by the Six Day War of 1967, the alternative has been the Cape of Good Hope at the extreme south of the African Continent. This has increased shipping costs and time for all the maritime nations of the world. Because of this, and other political factors, the Eastern and Western bloc nations have been active in the Middle East conflict since its beginning early in the Twentieth Century.

Since the area is strategically important to all the world, and because three Arab-Israeli wars occurred within 19 years, an attempt was made to establish a pattern of events that preceded both the 1956 Sinai Campaign, and the June 1967 Six Day War. This pattern, if it existed, was to be projected into the present-day Arab-Israeli confrontation to try to predict the next Arab-Israeli war. With improved weapons technology, and USSR-U.S. interest conflicts, the next war in the Middle East might involve the major powers of the world in an unwanted armed confrontation. Hence, the

prediction would be valuable to give advance warning to the U.S. and USSR and permit these two powers either to try to cool-off the Middle East, or at least to agree with each other on non-involvement and containment.

Very similar patterns of events and circumstances were established both for the 1956 and 1967 wars. This was accomplished through research of the NEW YORK TIMES INDEX, the TIMES of London, FACTS ON FILE and other secondary sources. Data was collected for all years from March 1949 through November 1972. Observers of the Middle East have established at least three major causes of the two wars researched. When all three of the causes reached a point of Israeli intolerance, war erupted. Two of these causes still exist: (1) a high rate of Arab guerrilla attacks against Israeli interests worldwide; and, (2) the combined military might of Egypt, Syria and Jordan. However, this second cause is in doubt at present because of opinion differences between each of these three Arab states on methods of dealing with Israel. The third cause, lack of shipping access for Israeli ships in the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba, is only partially complete with the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran presently under Israeli control.

The conclusion at this time is that events have not progressed far enough in the necessary time frame to establish conclusively the pattern of the 1970's will parallel the patterns of the 1950's and 1960's. However, Ambassador Eytan of Israel in July 1967 predicted the next outbreak of war about 1975. Recent escalation of guerrilla action and

resultant Israeli retaliation raids into the Arab states has started a trend that tends to follow the same pattern established early in the 1956 and the 1967 pre-war periods. If this holds true, and Eytan's prediction is accurate, then the next two years will be crucial as the parallel patterns of the other two wars developed over a 30-34 month period before the outbreak of war.