

A STUDY IN DECISION-MAKING ROLE PERCEPTIONS:
THE BANKERS OF MANHATTAN, KANSAS

by

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CHAPTER I

APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF COMMUNITY

DECISION-MAKING

Introduction

This thesis concerns the possession and use of power by a social and economic elite group of Manhattan, Kansas. In the past, studies concerning the possession and use of power have been conducted in a variety of ways. These studies have resulted in opposing theories of decision-making. It is the objective of this introductory chapter to familiarize the reader with these opposing views concerning the nature of power in community policy making. It is also the purpose to expose the methodology which has been utilized to make these investigations. This review of past studies is helpful for the comprehension and appreciation of the present study. But before one undertakes these objectives a few terms which appear throughout this investigation should first be defined.

Power, the object of much research in the discipline of political science, is the subject of this study. The process of influencing and making decisions at the community level has power as one of its basic components. Therefore, at the beginning of this community study it seems necessary to examine the meaning of power. The concept of power as operationalized here means the ability that a person or group of persons has to persuade, through a variety of means, another person or group

of persons to act or not to act in a specific manner in which they would not have acted had they not been influenced.¹

Another term which will be used throughout this study is that of decision-making. This concept synthesizes the idea of power with the process of public policy making. Thus the meaning of decision-making is the use of power by social, economic, or political means to determine public policy. Policy influencing is also a component of decision-making. Not only is there an active process of making decisions, but there is also a more informal act of influencing the decisions which are made. Thus, decision-making not only concerns the actual making of decisions but also the influencing of these decisions. With common "footing" concerning these quite ambiguous terms, one can begin a review of the theories and methodologies present in the study of community decision-making.

The nature of decision-making in American communities is the impetus of much controversy by both theorists and empiricists in the discipline of political science. The major proponents of this controversy tend to align themselves with one of the two popular schools of thought: pluralist or elitist. It is not the objective of this thesis to at last lay this controversy to rest. But it is believed that some basic information concerning the ideologies of pluralism and elitism is necessary at the onset of a study concerning community decision-making. Thus, before attempting a discussion of the possession

and use of power and the decision-making abilities of one sector of the community of Manhattan, Kansas, a review of the three major schools of thought concerning decision-making will be conducted.

Political Theories of Decision-Making

Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca were instrumental in the establishment of the study of elites as a part of political science.² In their classical approaches to elitism these two theorists attacked not only the theory of classical democracy,³ with its main emphasis on the importance of widespread political participation by the citizen, but also and to a greater extent, the pluralist ideology.⁴ Mosca gave a concise statement of the general elitist position as follows:

Among the constant facts and tendencies that are to be found in all political organisms, one is so obvious that it is apparent to the most casual eye. In all societies. . .two classes of people appear--a class that rules and a class that is ruled. The first class, always the less numerous, performs all political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages that power brings, whereas the second, and more numerous class, is directed and controlled by the first, in appearance at least, with material means of subsistence and with the instrumentalities that are essential to the vitality of the political organism.⁵

Harold Lasswell states a similar position concerning elites in society. He says that, ". . .the division of society into elites and masses is universal," and that even in a democracy, ". . .a few exercise a relatively great weight of power and the many exercise comparatively little."⁶ Although today there are many variations of this general elitist theme,

there are also many points with which a majority of the elite theorists agree. The variations prevailing in this theory stem from the origination of the elite's power and influence.⁷ But regardless of these basic differences, the theory of elitism, in relation to contemporary society, is relatively coherent.

Elites as a group are thought to be coherent, self-conscious, autonomous, competent guardians of society. They are also thought to be atypically upper socio-economic, whose positions become more and more entrenched as society industrializes. "To put it into a facile formula, all elites shall be credited here with what we should call the three C's; group consciousness, coherence, and conspiracy,"⁸ with the last "C" meaning a common will to action. Because of this basic self-consciousness and coherence, the elites share a consensus concerning the basic values of the social system and the preservation of that system.⁹ And as a result of the autonomy¹⁰ exhibited by the elites, the consensus of the basic values of the social system can effectively be implemented. Thomas Dye and Harmon Zeigler summarize this position as follows;

This is the irony of democracy: elites must govern wisely if government 'by the people' is to survive . . . for the masses of America are apathetic and ill-informed about the politics and public policy, and they have a surprisingly weak commitment to democratic values--individual dignity, equality of opportunity, the right to dissent, freedom of speech and press, religious toleration, due process of law.¹¹

Thus,

the relationship of the elites to the masses is,

in a vital way, reversed from the classical theory: masses, not elites, become the potential threat to the system and elites, not masses, become its defender.¹²

It is for these same reasons that V. O. Key wrote:

The critical element for the health of the democratic order consists of the beliefs, standards and competence of those who constitute the influentials. . . . If democracy tends toward indecision, decay, and disaster, the responsibility rests here, not with the masses of people.¹³

Thus, in many cases the elites are found to be the guardians of the democratic values of the political system. In explanation of this elitist characteristic, David Truman said:

Being more influential, they (the elites) are privileged; and being privileged, they have, with few exceptions, a special stake in the continuation of the system in which their privileges rests.¹⁴

Decision-making in the arena of public policy characterizes another aspect of elitism and the subject of many empirical community studies.¹⁵ In this theory, the elites determine the policy to be followed by the non-elites. For the most part, ". . . mass sentiments are manipulated by elites more often than elite values are influenced by the sentiments of the masses."¹⁶ It is argued that, with mass suffrage and the democratic institutions of political parties and elections, the masses will have a more active role in making public policy. To this argument the elite theorists respond by saying that these democratic institutions are only important in their symbolic value.¹⁷ They help to tie the masses of non-elites to the political system. For the most

part, "elitism contends that the mass have at best only an indirect influence over the decision-making behavior of the elites."¹⁸

The last major attribute of the elites, which is held strongly by most elite theorists, concerns the composition of the elite group. The elite are socially and economically unique and removed from society.

The power elite is composed of men whose positions enable them to transcend the ordinary environments of ordinary men and women; they are in positions to make decisions having major consequences."¹⁹

The elites are composed of a group of people whose economic positions in the community are on a higher level than that of the non-elite. They are wealthier, own the best homes in the best neighborhoods, drive the better and newer cars, are either professionals or have the better white collar occupations, and surround themselves with the luxuries that the majority of the non-elites do not have and cannot obtain.²⁰

These men are said to own or control most of the wealth, holding the key leadership positions in corporate and financial institutions. From these economic positions, they control most of the economic transactions which occur within the community.²¹ Elites are also thought to hold higher positions socially within the community. In this area the elites are also highly homogeneous. They are said to possess comparable educations, belong to similar or the same clubs and organizations, associate with other elites of similar status, and have the same or similar ideas and ideologies.²²

With this social, economic, and political elite position in the community, they possess potential decision-making influence. Moreover, the elite theorists assert that power in one sector of the community, political, social or economic, will tend toward a dominance of power in both the remaining sectors. This is what elite theorists refer to as the cumulative aspect of power.²³ Being powerful socially, economically and politically the elites compose a tight-knit group into which they regulate admittance. Whether this criteria be social, economic, or ideological, the elite has much control over the admittance of new members. As Dye states, "only non-elites who have accepted the basic elite consensus can be admitted to governing circles."²⁴

With this brief description of elitism, one of the explanations concerning the making of public policy in the American democracy has been encountered. But after a cursory survey of elitism one might wonder how, in a system of classical democracy²⁵ based on rule by the people, a small minority of the citizens can make the decisions concerning public policy? Many answers may be given in response to inquiries of this type. The main argument centers around the growth and industrialization of society. As one theorist stated, "the key political, economic, and social decisions are made by 'tiny minorities'. . . . It is difficult--nay--impossible to see how it could be otherwise in large political systems."²⁶ Not only has the size of the political system made rule by the

people impractical, the specialization of industrialization has added much to the impossibility of the myth of classical democracy.

The democratic ethos notwithstanding, men must become accustomed to bigger, more extensive and more specialized elites in their midst as long as industrial societies keep growing and become more specialized.²⁷

From these explanations one finds that society has outgrown, both in terms of numbers and in respects of complexity, the classical form of democracy. Not only are there too many people for mass decision-making, but the people are also not well trained enough to make the decisions which are necessary. If this approach seems a bit dictatorial to take place in the "democracy" of America, then there is another approach offered in explanation of this process of decision-making.

In contemporary political science literature pluralism is the prevailing ideology. This is the characterization of American decision-making processes by means of competition, bargaining, and compromise among the many interest groups that compete for the rewards distributed by the political system.²⁸ According to this theory, the complexity of each group and the fact that their memberships overlap insures against the eventuality of one group dominating the rest and thus the political system. It is theorized that through these groups the individual citizen will gain access to the political system.

Pluralism contends that the American system is open and accessible to the extent that any interest held by a significant portion of the populace can find expression through one or more groups.²⁹

Thus, the idea of pluralism aligns itself much more readily with the classical theory of democracy and popular participation. According to the pluralist theory, it is the masses and not the social, economic, or political elites that make the decisions influencing public policy. These first two theories can be altered to result in a third theory of decision-making.

The combination of certain aspects of elitism and the major institutions of pluralism has resulted in another approach to the making of decisions in American communities.³⁰ By application of the elitist theory to the interest groups of pluralism, a new theory was formed which is referred to as plural elitism.³¹ The theorists supporting this approach do not deny the presence of interest groups with mass memberships, and they do not deny the presence of elites. The idea that has been furthered under this theory is that all interest groups ". . . tend to be governed by a small minority of their membership and the characteristics of the leaders across all groups tend to be similar."³² The plural elite model views power as widely shared among individual groups. Each group represents a different segment of society. Each of these groups is composed of membership of the masses with decision-making in specific issue areas by a small elite. Within these interest groups the elites are influenced, to a limited extent, through group pressure by the masses of membership. The theory of plural elitism is a compromise be-

tween the previous two theories with aspects of each determining the decision-making processes.

It is through these three theories mentioned, elitist, pluralist, and plural elitist, that theorists have attempted to answer questions concerning community decision-making. In order to determine which of these theories actually applies empiricists have gone into communities to study the actual exercise of decision-making.

Empirical Approaches To Community Study

In recent years, studies in community decision-making have resulted in findings which tend to suggest that the power structures of certain communities are of one of the varieties mentioned above. In each of the communities studied, the empiricists were trying to determine who was instrumental in the decision-making. Attempts at trying to resolve this central question have introduced a variety of methods for community study, each with its own advantages and disadvantages. The major methodological approaches which have been implemented are: the reputational approach, the decision-making approach, and the synthesis approach.

The reputational approach was devised by Floyd Hunter for what has become one of the classical studies of community decision-making.³³ In his investigation of Atlanta, Georgia, Hunter found a relatively small and powerful decision-making elite working through a larger understructure of personnel. Although his conclusions seemed reasonable, the validity of

his methodology, in which he asked selected people who the leaders of the community were, was and is the subject of much debate. Among the many criticisms of the reputational approach, three are dominant, they are: the linkage of the individuals' reputation and decision-making ability, the failure to investigate the issue areas where decision-making was actually taking place in the community, and the initiation of the investigation with a prior knowledge of the leaders.³⁴

An alternative methodology to the above, devised by Robert A. Dahl for his study of New Haven, Connecticut, has been termed the decision-making approach.³⁵ Using this approach, Dahl was able to determine that the composition of decision-making in New Haven resembled a form of pluralism. In this approach to community study, Dahl observed a variety of key decisions within the community in order to determine who the decision-makers were in each case. The validity of this methodology is also questionable. The main criticisms leveled against the decision-making approach concerns the selection of the decisions which are to be studied. These criticisms include inquiries into the number of decisions which should be studied and the importance of each decision made.³⁶

The last of the major approaches to the empirical study of community decision-making is the synthesis approach. This approach has not only benefited from the advances but also from the criticisms of the earlier studies. As a result of the groundwork set by their predecessors' works, empiricists

such as Robert Agger, Daniel Goldrich, and Bert Swanson, and Robert Presthus have tried to incorporate the existing rival methodologies--reputational and decision-making.³⁷ As a result of this combination, Agger, et al., and Presthus have been able to provide a more comprehensive account of the influence affecting community decision-making. They have concluded that the nature of community power structure varies from one community to another. They have also concluded that the previous methodologies were biased toward one or another of the theories of decision-making--reputational toward the theory of elitism and the decision-making toward pluralism.

Proceeding on the conclusions drawn by Agger, et al., and Presthus I have conducted an empirical study of an elite sector of the Manhattan community. The main objective of this survey was to determine the role of an elite sector--the bankers--in the process of decision-making in Manhattan. Before initiating this investigation there was a preconceived hypothesis--namely, that a small elite sector of the community, the bankers, possessed and exercised much decision-making influence in Manhattan. This initial hypothesis adheres closely to the elitist theory of decision-making.

Following the advice of the preceeding empiricists, I have neither attempted to employ a reputational nor a decision-making approach in this study. Nor has the synthesis approach been implemented. Instead, I have implemented a methodology which has been termed a perceptive approach. As more thoroughly

treated in a later chapter, this approach is based on the sample's perceptions of their roles in community decision-making. By asking the sample questions concerning their activities in the decision-making processes of Manhattan, one has been able to determine their perceived decision-making impact on the community.

Conclusion

This introductory chapter has laid the basic groundwork necessary for a study concerning community decision-making. There have been several theoretical explanations concerning the process of decision-making in American communities. The first of these, elitism, proposes that decision-making abilities are centralized in the hands of a small number of elites who rule over the non-elites. The theory of pluralism--with its popular participation, interest group competition, and majority rule--is another of the explanations given concerning the process of community decision-making. The last of these major theories is plural elitism--a combination of aspects from elitism and pluralism.

In this chapter one has also seen the methods by which some political scientists have tried to empirically determine which of these theories actually applies to community decision-making. In this investigation two empirical approaches, the decision-making and the reputational, have been found to be most commonly implemented. Both contained methodological

flaws which would bias them toward either the elitist or pluralist theories. A third approach, the synthesis approach, claimed no biases and supposedly allowed for the true nature of the community decision-making processes to be investigated. The methodology employed in this study is of none of these varieties. In this study, a perceptive approach to the study of community decision-making was employed.

An investigation of this perceptive approach will be conducted in Chapter II. The importance of this chapter is to explain and familiarize the reader with the research approach and the methodology implemented in this study. In Chapter III this sample of bankers will be shown to compose a social and economic elite of the Manhattan community. After demonstrating the homogeneity of this social and economic elite sample of the community, in Chapter IV an attempt will be made to present their like-mindedness and amount of political activity. The amount of decision-making influence that this elite sector perceives that it possesses and exerts in the community will also be determined. The final chapter of this thesis, Chapter V, will be spent summarizing the findings of the previous four chapters and in attempting to explain the role of the bankers in the overall decision-making process of Manhattan. This latter objective will help align this study with one of the fundamental theories concerning the structure of community decision-making.

Footnotes

¹Robert A. Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," American Political Science Review, LII (June, 1958).

²Vilfredo Pareto, The Mind and Society (New York: Harcourt-Brace and Company, 1939); Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class, ed. by Livingston (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939).

³For further reading by contemporary proponents of this theory the following works should be consulted: Henry S. Kariel, The Decline of American Pluralism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961) and The Promise of Politics (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966); T. B. Bottomore, Elites and Society (London: Watts, 1964); Peter Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic Elitism (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967); Jack L. Walker, "A Critique of the Elite Theory of Democracy," American Political Science Review, LX (June, 1966).

⁴For further background information some leading proponents of this field may be consulted: A. F. Bentley, The Process of Government (Bloomington: Principia Press, 1949); David Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951); Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963), "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," American Political Science Review, LII (June, 1958), and Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961).

⁵Mosca, The Ruling Class, p. 50.

⁶Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 219.

⁷Of these variations in the elitist theory, four are predominant and are represented by one or more prominent elitists. The first of these variations held by G. Mosca, in The Ruling Class, and Robert Michels, in Political Parties (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958), asserts that the elite position is directly a product of their organizational ability. The second of these variations attribute the elites' positions to the psychological make-ups of both the elites and the masses. An account of this can be found in Pareto, Mind and Society. A third variation, held by James Burnham, traces the elites' positions to their control of the economic resources; see, e.g., his book (The Machiavellians [New York: John Day Press, 1956]). The final major variation in the elitist theory is set forth by C. Wright Mills in The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956). In this book, Mills ascribes the elites' dominance to the positions they hold in a number of key institutions within society.

⁸James H. Meisel, The Myth of the Ruling Class (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1962), p. 4.

⁹For a more in-depth discussion of consensus, see: Peter Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic Elitism, pp. 47-64; Geraint Parry, Political Elites (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1969), pp. 90-94.

¹⁰Autonomy is considered one of the main factors in explaining the elitist power structure, see: Raymond Aron, "Social Structure and the Ruling Class," British Journal of Sociology, I (nos. 1-2, 1950), pp. 1-16 and 126-143; Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, pp. 35-38.

¹¹Thomas R. Dye and L. Harmon Zeigler, The Irony of Democracy (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1970), p. 2.

¹²Bachrach, Democratic Elitism, pp. 8-9.

¹³V. O. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 558.

¹⁴David Truman, "The American System in Crisis," Political Science Quarterly (December, 1959), p. 489.

¹⁵The degree of decision-making influence which the elites exercise range from the extreme stand taken by C. Wright Mills, in The Power Elite, to a much more moderate position taken by Thomas Dye and Harmon Zeigler, The Irony of Democracy.

¹⁶Dye and Zeigler, The Irony of Democracy, p. 5.

¹⁷An in-depth account of the role of symbols in politics can be found in; Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964).

¹⁸Thomas R. Dye, Understanding Public Policy (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972), p. 22.

¹⁹Mills, The Power Elite, pp. 3-4.

²⁰For a more detailed account of the economic elite in society see: Mills, The Power Elite, Chapter 1; Dahl, Who Governs?, pp. 63-84; Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure (New York: Van Rees Press, 1953), pp. 26-60.

²¹See: Hunter, Community Power Structure, p. 12; Mills, The Power Elite; Dahl, Who Governs?, pp. 63-84; G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America? (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967); Robert S. Lynd and Helen Merrell Lynd, Middletown (New York: Harcourt-Brace and Company, 1929), and Middletown in Transition (New York: Harcourt-Brace and World, Inc., 1937).

²²Supra, n. 21.

²³Mills, The Power Elite, p. 10.

²⁴Dye, Public Policy, p. 20.

²⁵See: Pareto, The Mind and Society; Mosca, The Ruling Class.

²⁶Robert A. Dahl, "Power, Pluralism and Democracy: A Modest Proposal," (A paper delivered at the 1964 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association), p. 3.

²⁷Suzanne Keller, Beyond the Ruling Class (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 71.

²⁸The interest group theory is explained at length in, Truman, The Governmental Process.

²⁹Dye and Zeigler, Irony of Democracy, p. vi.

³⁰This synthesis of elitism and pluralism is explained more fully by: Richard M. Merelman, "On the Neo-Elitist Critique of Community Power," American Political Science Review, LXII (June, 1968); Dye and Zeigler, Irony of Democracy.

³¹Dye and Zeigler, Irony of Democracy, pp. 10-11.

³²Ibid., p. vi.

³³Hunter's reputational approach was conducted in the following way. First, he compiled a list of men who held prominent positions in four general groups--business, government, civic associations and society activities. These lists then underwent a process of selection and rejection by a group of 'judges'. The final step was a process by which the proposed leaders ranked each other according to leadership ability. (Community Power Structure, pp. 10-11.).

³⁴Objections to the reputational approach to studying community decision-making can be found in: Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model"; Raymond E. Wolfinger, "Reputation And Reality in the Study of Community Power," American Sociological Review, XXV (October, 1960); Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," American Political Science Review, LVI (December, 1962).

³⁵Dahl, Who Governs?.

³⁶Objections to the decision-making approach to studying community decision-making can be found in: Frederick Frey, "Comment: On Issues and Non-issues in the Study of Power,"

American Political Science Review, LXV (December, 1971); Nelson Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963).

³⁷Examples of the synthesis approach to studying community decision-making can be found in: Robert E. Agger, Daniel Goldrich, and Bert Swanson, The Rulers and the Ruled (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964); Robert Presthus, Men at the Top (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964).

CHAPTER II

RESEARCH PROCEDURES: A PERCEPTIVE APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF COMMUNITY DECISION-MAKING

Introduction

In the previous chapter it was seen that for reasons of methodology the validity of many community studies has been questioned. It is the purpose of this chapter to examine the methodology underlying the present study. I will present the research instrument and examine the nature and procedures of its implementation. The research site, i.e., the Manhattan community, and the research sample, i.e., the bankers of Manhattan, will also be examined. The value of this knowledge concerning the research procedures is two-fold:

(1) it is necessary for the readers evaluation of this study's findings and (2) it is a prerequisite for the completion of further perceptive studies of this type. Knowledge concerning the methodology implemented in this study is necessary for the evaluation of the validity of the findings. Knowledge of the methodology used is also necessary for future follow up studies to be completed. In short, the value of this thesis depends, to a large extent, upon the validity of the methodology implemented--the subject of this chapter.

The Research Site

The site of research reported on in this study is Manhattan, Kansas. Manhattan, a city with a population of

approximately 27,575,¹ was selected as the research site for several reasons. First, Manhattan was selected because it was convenient. Second, and more importantly, Manhattan was selected because of its manageable size. Finally, Manhattan was selected because limited politically-oriented research has been conducted in the community.

For an accurate study of community decision-making it was necessary to be able to maintain an awareness of the decision-making activities. It was necessary for this awareness to be of more depth than a cursory reading of city newspapers could provide. For this reason it was necessary to select a community in which one could personally observe the decision-making processes. Thus, it was necessary to have a research site which was, for convenience sake, close enough within traveling distance to facilitate the study. For this reason of convenience, Manhattan was selected as the research site.

Size was another of the determinants in the selection of a research site. It was necessary to select a research site which was large enough to allow for competition among elites. But it was also necessary to limit the size. A site that was too large would tend to obscure the actual interactions which occur. It has been put forth by many elite theorists that the possession and use of power is indirectly, if not directly, related to the possession of wealth and social prestige.² For this reason it was necessary to select a city large enough to contain a diversity of both social and

financial interests. In almost all cases, the larger a city is, the more financial diversity, i.e., corporations, businesses, and financial institutions, it would contain. Thus, a city that was too small could be dominated by one set of social and financial elites. In a small city, because of the lack of other, off-setting social and financial elites, the bankers would probably be dominant. Similarly, a city which was too large was avoided because of the complex and numerous roles which could be played by the bankers. In a very large city a difficulty would arise when attempting to assess the social and economic impact of this sample on the total community. The interlocking ties between the bankers and the social and financial interests of the community would, in many cases, be too complex to assess. Accordingly, Manhattan was large enough but not too large. This city was found to be an acceptable research site.

The last of the considerations, in the selection of Manhattan as a research site, concerned the limited amount of recent politically-oriented research conducted in the community. At approximately the same time as this study, a positional study of the Manhattan elites was initiated.³ Prior to that, there had not been a study conducted in the community since 1959.⁴ Further, in neither of these previous studies were bankers studied with the main emphasis placed on their decision-making impact in the community. Thus, it is for these reasons--convenience, size, and lack of politically-oriented research conducted--that Manhattan was

selected as the research site for this study.

The Research Sample

In the past, one of the major criticisms leveled against community studies has concerned the selection of an elite sample. An example of this problem may be found in Floyd Hunter's selection of the "men of power" in Regional City.⁵ By selecting an elite group whose members were already defined this major methodological problem was avoided. The research sample of this study is an existing and defined group of individuals within the Manhattan community.

The population which was the object of this research was the bankers of Manhattan, Kansas. More specifically, this population included sixty-six individuals. They composed the chairmen of the board of directors, the directors, the presidents, and the vice-presidents of the four banks of Manhattan. Because of the inclusion of the directors in this population, many of the individuals studied have main occupations other than banking. Many of the members of the boards of directors are professionals and businessmen within the Manhattan community. But because of their fundamental roles in the decisions made by the banks, in this study they will be termed bankers. The term banker will be operationalized in this study to refer to the composite of chairmen of the boards of directors, directors, presidents and vice-presidents, regardless of their primary occupations.

The financial institutions which were represented within this sample were: The Kansas State Bank, The Union National Bank, The First National Bank, and The Citizens State Bank. Of this population of sixty-six, the sample which was studied was composed of fifty-three bankers. Thus, 80.3 percent of the total population of bankers were studied. The remaining 19.7 percent of the population were contacted but for a number of reasons were inaccessible.⁶

The research sample was composed of four chairmen of the boards of directors, thirty-three directors, four presidents, and thirteen vice-presidents.⁷ These respondents were fairly evenly distributed among the four financial institutions. From the Kansas State Bank thirteen respondents were interviewed; these consisted of the chairman of the board of directors, eight directors, the president, and three vice-presidents. From the Union National Bank, the chairman of the board of directors, eight directors, the president and five vice-presidents composed the total of fifteen respondents interviewed. The First National Bank was also represented by fifteen respondents; the composition of this group was the chairman of the board of directors, eleven directors, the president, and three vice-presidents. Finally, the Citizens State Bank was represented by ten respondents; they consisted of the chairman of the board of directors, six directors, the president, and two vice-presidents.

A word of caution and explanation concerning this sample seems in order. The composition of the population from which

this sample was drawn is generally stable over time, with changes in the directors and officers rarely occurring. The caution which should be set forth concerns this uniformity of structure. From the time that the population was researched and the sample was interviewed, i.e., from June, 1972, to October, 1972, there have been changes in the directors and the officers of the institutions studied.⁸ Although the ramifications of this caution may not seemingly be great because of the homogeneity and coherence exhibited by this population,⁹ it is a necessary warning for future empirical studies concerning the bankers of Manhattan.

The Research Instrument

As was stated in the previous chapter, the approach used in this study was neither of the reputational nor the decision-making variety. Instead, the methodology employed in this study was termed a perceptive approach. This method of study seeks the respondent's perceptions of their roles in community leadership and decision-making. This approach employs an investigation of the way the respondents view both the process of decision-making and the roles they play in this process. Through this approach the validity of the responses given might be questioned. It can be argued that the respondents are cautious concerning their influence in the community and that they would not admit to the possession of such influence. The rationale of this argument explains that the respondents fear the loss of the influence to which they ad-

mitted the possession of. This argument concerning the withholding of information by the elites has been proposed by some elite theorists.¹⁰ The response to an objection of this sort lies in the interviewing process implemented. In this study a rapport was established with each respondent before any questions were asked.¹¹ To gain the respondents' confidence it was made absolutely sure that they were convinced of the good will in which this study was conducted. Prior to each interview the respondent was told of the academic nature and purpose of this investigation and the necessity for his most accurate responses. He was also assured of complete accuracy and anonymity in the recording of his responses. With the assurance of these facts and the rapport which was established in this study, the hesitance, by the respondent, to be truthful seems to be overcome. With these interviews posing no obvious threat to the sample, the accuracy of the findings of this perceptive approach are strengthened.

The research instrument employed in this study was a set of questions in the form of a questionnaire. These questions were designed specifically to determine the amount of influence each respondent perceived himself as having on the decision-making within the Manhattan community. Each respondent was interviewed at a location of his choice. The same questionnaire was used in each interview. The sessions spent in interviewing ranged from thirty minutes to an hour and fifteen minutes. The questionnaire used, which is

included as Appendix I, was composed of approximately sixty questions. It was divided into four major areas of interest.

Inquires into the respondents' social and economic backgrounds composed the first major section of the questionnaire. In this section the respondents' age, occupation, level of income, education, religion, social class, social mobility, memberships in clubs and organizations, and length of residency were key issues of importance. The necessity of these aspects is made clear in the next chapter where efforts are made to prove this sample a social and economic elite of the Manhattan community.

The next major section of this questionnaire was concerned with the respondents' political activities. In this section, questions were directed toward the respondents' political identification and voting behavior. Along with this, the respondents were questioned as to their interests in public affairs, interests in political campaigns, contacts with public representatives, and holding of political offices. The questions in this section were valuable in attempting to determine the respondents' general degree of political activity.

The third, and most important, section of this questionnaire was concerned with the amount of social, economic, and political influence which the respondents perceived themselves as having. The respondents were asked for their perceptions of the amount of social, economic, and political influence which they held. They were also questioned as to the roles which

they would play in certain hypothetical situations. Supplementing these, a number of questions were asked concerning the roles which the respondents have played in specific, concrete issues which have affected the community. These concrete issues concerned the past and present contexts of community decision-making. They illustrate the perceived positions taken, the perceived roles played, and the perceived successes achieved by the respondents. The issues under investigation were: the construction of a new airport, the administration of urban renewal, the arrival of a regional discount center, and the arrival of a new corporation. These perceived actions or inactions and perceived successes or failures supplemented the more abstract perceptions of influence. As a result, this section of the questionnaire helped to form conclusions concerning the respondents' social, economic and political influences and activities in the Manhattan community.

The final section of this questionnaire contained questions which were designed to determine the respondents' political ideology, efficacy, and trust. It was the purpose of these questions to determine whether or not they thought alike, i.e., were generally like-minded. These questions were valuable in their ability to show the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the ideologies held by the research sample.

As can be seen from this brief discussion of the research instrument employed, much information was collected concerning

the bankers of Manhattan. Supplementing this research instrument, and used primarily for historical and structural decision-making information about the community, were three secondary sources of information.¹² As a result of the collection and coding of this information--the code book is included as Appendix II--a profile of the bankers of Manhattan, Kansas can be constructed.

Conclusion

It has been the objective of this chapter to present the methodology employed in this study of decision-making in the Manhattan community. The selection of the research site was explained with main emphasis placed on the convenience of study, appropriateness of size, and lack of recent politically-oriented research conducted. The research sample was explained as a defined sector of the society composed of the chairmen of the boards of directors, directors, presidents, and vice-presidents of the four banks of Manhattan, Kansas. The research instrument was then examined. It was seen that this study was based on a questionnaire composed of four sections concerning: social and economic background; political activities; social, economic, and political influence; and ideology. For reasons of validating the findings of this study and facilitating future studies of this type, it was necessary to include a chapter concerned with the methodology of this community study.

Footnotes

¹U. S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of the Population: 1970, Final Report PC (1)-C1, United States Summary (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1972).

²For further explanations of these relations see: C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956); Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure (New York: Van Rees Press, 1953).

³Jan L. Flora and Steven F. Randle, "The Economic Power Structure of Manhattan, Kansas," (An unpublished and incomplete study initiated in the spring of 1972, Kansas State University, 1972).

⁴Bernard Bray, "Community Power Structure: A Case Study," (Unpublished M.S. Report, Kansas State University, 1959).

⁵The problems referred to here concern the selection of decision-makers on the basis of their reputations and the use of independent 'judges' to make this selection. See note 34 of Chapter I of this thesis. Also see the following works: Robert A. Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," American Political Science Review, LII (June, 1958); Raymond E. Wolfinger, "Reputation and Reality in the Study of Community Power," American Sociological Review, XXV (October, 1960); Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," American Political Science Review, LVI (December, 1962).

⁶The reasons of inaccessability were numerous. Three individuals in this population were not interviewed because they do not live within the Manhattan community. One individual was ill and could not be interviewed. And the remaining eight individuals in this group which were not interviewed, refused the request to interview them.

⁷These numbers do not add up to fifty-three, the total number of respondents in this sample, because one of the chairmen of the boards of directors was also the president of one of the banks.

⁸There has been a death in one of these financial institutions which has caused a change in the personnel which occupy its offices. There has also, since the time of this study, been a change in the chairmanship of the board of directors of one of the other banks. In total there have been minor changes in the boards of directors and officers of three of the four banks.

⁹As set forth by elite theorists, this principle is

explained in Chapter I of this thesis, on page 4. For further explanation of this principle as applied to the sample, the reader can refer to Chapter III, where the homogeneity and coherence of this sample is investigated.

¹⁰For further information concerning this argument see: Mills, The Power Elite, p. 17; Hunter, Community Power Structure, p. 207.

¹¹For further explanation of the rapport with elite respondents see: Lewis A. Dexter, Elite and Specialized Interviewing (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970).

¹²From the study by Jan Flora and Steven Randle, "The Economic Power Structure of Manhattan, Kansas," information was gained to check the information that was drawn from the research instrument. This information concerned the various positions which were held by the sample in other corporations in Manhattan. Another of the secondary sources which were used contributed mainly a historical view of decision-making in the Manhattan community. This information was derived from conversations with Louis Douglas, a long time and concerned resident of Manhattan, Kansas, (private conversations held in a time period from February, 1972 to February 1973, Kansas State University). The last of these supplementary sources of information was: U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of the Population: 1970. The information gained from this secondary source was mainly concerned with the population of Manhattan, Kansas.

CHAPTER III

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC HOMOGENEITY
OF THE BANKERS OF MANHATTAN, KANSAS

Introduction

From the previous chapters it can be concluded that there is a concept of elitism underlying this study of bankers. With this in mind one can discuss the social and economic characteristics of the bankers. The objective of this chapter is to determine this sample's social and economic position in relation to that of the community. The social and economic homogeneity of this sample will also be examined. The objective of this chapter is to prove that the bankers are a socially and economically elite sector of the community. The achievement of this objective will prepare one for an investigation of this sample's political decision-making influence. Before attempting a discussion of the social and economic status of the bankers of Manhattan, a bit of background information concerning the Manhattan community is necessary. Thus, a social and economic comparison will be made between Manhattan and other communities in Kansas.

The Manhattan Community:
Social and Economic Aspects

To gain a perspective of the social and economic position of the bankers in Manhattan, it is necessary to show the relationship of this community to others in Kansas. Socially

and economically, Manhattan is an atypical Kansas community. In relation to the average level of education and income achieved within Kansas communities, Manhattan ranks high.

Residents in Manhattan have almost a year more education than the general Kansas population. In Manhattan, of persons 25 years old or over, the median of school years completed is 13.2. This figure can be contrasted to the state-wide median of 12.3 years completed. Also, by investigating the average levels of income in Manhattan, the high social and economic standards again become evident. In this community the median level of income per family is \$9,006 yearly. The annual median income per family state-wide is \$8,693. These contrasting income levels reveal that the Manhattan community is atypically high. With this perspective set, it is now one's task to study the bankers as members of this community.

Both socially and economically, this sample of bankers is very much a part of the Manhattan community. They compose a group who have lived within Manhattan many years. Of this sample, 60.4 percent have lived in Manhattan for more than thirty years. Furthermore, 18.9 percent have lived in Manhattan their entire lives. They also compose a group who are socially active. Within this community, members of this sample belong to many different organizations. In part, they belong to civic organizations, churches, and many belong to the Chamber of Commerce. They also lead community-minded organizations such as the United Fund. They

are concerned with the community's socially-oriented programs and many of them are directors on hospital boards within the community.

Within Manhattan along with these socially-oriented roles, the bankers play many economic roles. These economic roles help tie them to the community. Simply, the fact of being bankers makes them a part of the community economically. But along with this role, it can be found that many of them are also businessmen. In Manhattan this sample is tied to the community through many economic investments. A large number of them have invested in interests other than their main occupations--stocks and bonds, retail sales and services, and real estate.

From this discussion it is evident that the bankers are not only a part of the community socially but also economically. In summary, the bankers are active members of this atypical Kansas community. It is now one's task to determine the extent of this membership. Whether this social and economic membership is a participation within the community or an influence over the community.

A Social and Economic Distinction: The Bankers and the Community

This section is concerned with the social and economic relationships between the bankers and the Manhattan community. Previously in this chapter it was seen that this sample is socially and economically active in the community. In relation to the rest of the community, it is now one's task to

determine the extent of the bankers' activity. Are there social and economic differences between the bankers and the rest of the community? And if so, what are these differences?

During the interviews conducted, each respondent was asked how he perceived his social influence. In Manhattan it was found that 92.5 percent of the bankers perceive themselves as having an average or above social influence. This influence is perceived as being one of two types. First, they perceive this influence as their activity in community social programs such as the United Fund Drive or the Human Relations Board. Second, they perceive this influence as entertaining socially, i.e., hosting and attending social events. Of the bankers, 60.4 percent believe that their social influence stems from the amount of entertaining they do. Another 18.9 percent attribute their social influence to the roles they play in community social programs. And 11.3 percent attribute their social influence to both of these factors.

As noted, the bankers are very active in socially oriented civic clubs and organizations. More specifically, 60.4 percent belong to one or two clubs, and 34 percent belong to three or four. Within these civic organizations, 53 percent have held offices. Bankers are also active in the Chamber of Commerce. Within this organization, 34 percent of the bankers have held offices. A number of Manhattan's churches are represented in this sample. They belong to seven different churches. Of these churches represented, 37.7 percent of the

bankers are Methodist, 20.8 percent are Presbyterian and 15.1 percent are Catholics. Of the bankers studied, 79.3 percent belong to the Manhattan Country Club. The membership for this organization is on a referral basis and it is very expensive. Thus, it is an exclusive organization.

The amount of education achieved is another commonly accepted social indicator. As compared to other communities in Kansas, Manhattan has a relatively high educational level. The median of school years completed in Manhattan is 13.2. The bankers' median level of education is 16.3 years. By referring to Table III-1, it can be seen that the bankers have

TABLE III-1.--Educational Level Comparisons: Bankers and the Community

Total Years of Education Completed (%)	Sample of Bankers (N=53)	Community of Manhattan*
Elementary		
1-4	0	0.8
5-7	0	1.9
8	0	8.5
High School		
1-3	0	9.6
4	3.8	27.7
College		
1-3	17.0	16.3
4	79.2	34.4


*Figures taken from; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of the Population: 1970, Final Report PC(1)-C1, United States Summary (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972). These figures represent the total years of school completed by the population of 25 years old and over.

achieved a higher level of education than the rest of the community. Whereas only 78.4 percent of the total community com-

pleted four years of high school or more, all of the bankers achieved this educational level. Of the sample which achieved this level of education, 79.2 percent also completed four or more years of college. For the rest of the community this figure is much lower. Of the Manhattan community, only 34.4 percent completed four or more years of college.

These differences in levels of education achieved can also be shown statistically. As shown in Figure III-1, through the

FIGURE III-1.--Inequalities of the Distribution of Education in Manhattan, Kansas



use of the Lorenze Curve we can graphically see these differences. Using a Lorenze Curve, the more bend in the curve, the greater is the inequality being measured.¹ As can be seen from Figure III-1, the curve comparing the bankers' education to the community's education is bent significantly. The degree of this inequality can be measured by employing a Gini Index.² The closer the Gini Index is to one, the more unequal in the benefit distribution, in this case education. A Gini Index of zero would represent a completely equal distribution. In measuring this inequality of education, one finds that there is a Gini Index of 0.42. This Index indicates that there is a significant degree of inequality of education between the bankers and the community. It should be noted here that if it were not for the location of Kansas State University in this city, the educational differences between the bankers and the community would be much greater.

By contrasting bankers economically with the community, one can also find many distinguishing features. During the interviews conducted, each respondent was asked how he perceived his economic influence. Of this sample, 90.5 percent perceived themselves as having an average or above economic influence in the community. This economic influence is perceived to be of one of two different types. First, 43.4 percent of the bankers believe that their economic influence stems from their business interests. Second, 30.2 percent believe that their influence stems from their acquaintances who are wealthy--this is a more indirect influence.

As noted earlier in this chapter, many bankers have occupations which make them a part of the Manhattan community. But these occupations also help to economically distinguish this sample from the community. By referring to Table III-2, one can observe this distinction. Of the bankers, 13.2 percent

TABLE III-2.--Occupational Comparisons: Bankers and the Community

Total Employed (%)	Sample of Bankers (N=53)	Community of Manhattan*
Professionals	13.2	18.8
Managers and Admin- istrators (self-employed)	86.8	2.0
Sales Workers	0	7.0
Others	0	72.2

*Figures taken from; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of the Population: 1970, Final Report PC(1)-C1, United States Summary (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972). These figures represent the total employed, 16 years old and over.

are professionals; that is, they offer a service which requires technical knowledge.³ The remaining 86.8 percent are self-employed managers or administrators.⁴ These categories can readily be contrasted with the community. While in the Manhattan community 18.8 percent of the population are professionals, only 2 percent are self-employed managers or administrators. All of the bankers are employed in these two occupational areas. This can be contrasted to the total community, where only 20.8 percent of the population are

professionals or self-employed managers or administrators.

The bankers also have many economic investments within the community. These investments are other than their main occupations. Of the bankers, 56.6 percent derive additional income from these supplementary economic interests. Within this sample, 9.5 percent own stocks and bonds, another 9.4 percent own retail sales and service establishments and 30.2 percent own real estate. A combined ownership of retail sales and service establishments and real estate supplements the incomes of another 15.1 percent of the bankers.

In attempting to distinguish the bankers economically from the community, occupations and supplementary economic investments have been contrasted. It now seems necessary to contrast their incomes. By simply glancing at Table III-3,

TABLE III-3.--Income Comparisons: Bankers and the Community

Total Yearly Income of Families (%)	Sample of Bankers (N=53)	Community of Manhattan*
Less than \$1,000	0	1.4
\$1,000-\$2,999	0	8.6
\$3,000-\$4,999	0	13.4
\$5,000-\$6,999	0	12.9
\$7,000-\$8,999	0	13.3
\$9,000-\$11,999	0	18.1
\$12,000-\$14,999	2.0	13.3
\$15,000-\$24,999	28.0	15.5
\$25,000-\$49,999	50.0	2.6
\$50,000 or more	20.0	0.3

*Figures taken from; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of the Population: 1970, Final Report PC(1)-C1, United States Summary (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972).


it is obvious that there is a great discrepancy between the

**THIS BOOK
CONTAINS
NUMEROUS PAGES
WITH DIAGRAMS
THAT ARE CROOKED
COMPARED TO THE
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INFORMATION ON
THE PAGE.**

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RECEIVED FROM
CUSTOMER.**

incomes earned by the bankers and those earned by the community. One can see that 67.7 percent of the community earns less than \$12,000 per year. This category contains none of the bankers. Thus, all the bankers earn \$12,000 or more per year. This much is earned by only 31.7 percent of the community. Furthermore, 80 percent of the bankers earn \$25,000 or more, while in the community only 2.9 percent earn this much. To further realize this unequal distribution of incomes one can refer to Figure III-2.

FIGURE III-2.--Inequalities of the Distribution of Incomes in Manhattan, Kansas



In this figure a graphic representation of the inequality of income can be seen. Here again, the amount of bend in the Lorenze Curve indicates the amount of inequality which exists. In this comparison between the bankers' income and the community's income, the inequality is great. A Gini Index of 0.64 represents this inequality.

From the previous discussion one can conclude that there are many social and economic differences between the bankers and the Manhattan community. It has been found that they perceive themselves as being socially and economically influential. They are members and have held offices in many socially-oriented and civic-minded organizations. They have a higher educational level than the community. They hold many of the better occupations in the community and make more income per family. In short, it has been found that the bankers of Manhattan are socially and economically distinct. From this discussion, one could tentatively conclude that the bankers are a social and economic elite of Manhattan. But before this conclusion is made one should investigate the social and economic homogeneity and coherence displayed by the bankers. For this is a major attribute of an elite sector of society.

Social and Economic Homogeneity of the Bankers

It is the purpose of the remainder of this chapter to investigate the bankers social and economic homogeneity. To accomplish this task many of the same social and economic factors previously used, will be employed.

Concerning their perceived social influence, the bankers displayed much homogeneity and cohesion. Only 7.5 percent denied having an average or above social influence. The reasons for many of these denials were given. In many cases the respondents did not perceive much social influence because they were in a state of semi-retirement. Along with this one finds much homogeneity displayed in the bankers' memberships in many clubs and organizations. All of the sample belong to at least one or two and 34 percent belong to three or four. The remaining 5.7 percent belong to five or more civic organizations. There are two civic organizations to which many of the bankers belong. Among it's membership, one of these civic organizations has 77.3 percent of the bankers. The other has 49 percent of the bankers within its membership. The Manhattan Country Club is another organization which many of this sample of bankers belong. Within this organization's membership, one can find 79.3 percent of the bankers. From this common organization membership, one can see that the bankers readily associate with one another. By once again referring to Table III-1, one can also see this sample's educational homogeneity. All of the bankers graduated from high school. Beyond this, 30.1 percent have achieved a higher degree than the Bachelors. Regarding the level of education achieved, one can conclude that the bankers are a very homogeneous, college educated group.

Similar to this social homogeneity exhibited by the bankers, an economic homogeneity can also be found. The

perceived economic influence displays much of this homogeneity. Only 9.5 percent denied having an average or above economic influence. As with the perceived social influence, the reasons given for these denials were because the respondents were, again, in a state of semi-retirement. The occupations of the bankers also depict a very homogeneous group. All of them are employed within two areas--professionals and self-employed managers or administrators. Economic investments in addition to their main occupations also tend to show the coherence of the bankers. In many of these economic interests bankers have joined together to form partnerships, i.e., West Loop Shopping Center. By referring to Table III-3 concerning income, one can readily see the homogeneity of this sample. Of the bankers, 78 percent have incomes from \$15,000 to \$49,999. Below this range is 2 percent--one person, retired and living on a pension. Above this range is 20 percent of the bankers. It should be noted that even if the incomes do vary, the bankers are homogeneous in the fact that they all, in relation to the rest of the community, receive high incomes. As was noted in Figure III-2, the inequality of income between the bankers and the community is very high, represented by a Gini Index of 0.64.

From the comparisons made among the members of this sample, one can conclude that they are socially and economically homogeneous and cohesive. They belong to the same clubs and organizations and have achieved similar levels of education. They have similar occupations and investments from which they

recieve high incomes. With this coherence and homogeneity and their dominant positions in society, this sample of bankers seems to be a social and economic elite of the Manhattan community.

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to illustrate the social and economic relationships between the bankers and the Manhattan community. It has been found that the Manhattan community is socially and economically higher in status than most other Kansas communities. With this perspective in mind, the social and economic relationships between the bankers and the community were explored. It was found that even though the bankers are members of the community, they are atypical. They are socially and economically aloof--more socially active in civic clubs and organizations, better educated, better employed, and wealthier. The homogeneity and coherence of the bankers was then investigated. They are found to be very homogeneous and cohesive. These aspects of homogeneity and coherence, along with the dominant social and economic roles played in the community, led one to conclude that the bankers are a social and economic elite of Manhattan.

Footnotes

¹C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 10.

²For further explanation of the use of this see: Haywood R. Alker, Jr., and Bruce M. Russett, "On Measuring Inequality," Behavioral Science, IX (June, 1964); Haywood R. Alker, Jr., Mathematics and Politics (New York: The Macmillian Company, 1965), pp. 29-53.

³Alker and Russett, "On Measuring Inequality"; Alker, Mathematics and Politics, pp. 29-53.

⁴Specific occupations listed under this broad category can be found in; U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of the Population: 1970, Final Report PC(1)-C1, United States Summary (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1972).

⁵Ibid.

CHAPTER IV

THE COHERENCE OF THOUGHT, POLITICAL ACTIVITY,
AND DECISION-MAKING INFLUENCE OF THE BANKERS

Introduction

According to elite theorists, as noted in Chapter I, elites maintain a cohesive thought pattern. They have similar political values and as a result, react to political situations similarly. It is this coherent thinking and political activity which compose the political influence displayed by an elite group. It is the purpose of this chapter to investigate the likeminded quality, political activity, and decision-making influence of the Manhattan bankers. Furthermore, it is the aim of this chapter to determine whether or not this sample of social and economic elites are also members of the community's political elite. That is, it is the purpose here to determine whether or not the bankers are influential in the decision-making process of Manhattan.

The Similarities of Beliefs of Manhattan
Bankers

The system of beliefs, as operationalized in this chapter, refers to the composite of thoughts and values held by the bankers. The meaning here employed is similar to that which Phillip E. Converse implemented in his study of mass and elite attitudes.

We define a belief system as a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence.¹

As was the procedure in Converse's study, I will attempt to determine the similarities of the bankers' belief systems by

investigating certain aspects of their attitudes. There are many indicators which will be explored to determine these belief systems. This sample's attitudes toward democratic values will be investigated. I will also investigate the bankers' party identification, perceived opinion correlations, and ultimate goals set for Manhattan. Political efficacy and trust are also aspects of these belief systems which will be investigated. By investigating these different aspects, it is hoped that one will be able to determine the similarities or differences between the belief systems held by the bankers.

Elite theorists agree that within society, elite members uphold democratic values much more strongly than do the masses.² In his book, The Politics of Mass Society, William Kornhauser found that the masses of people do not uphold the basic democratic values of American society.³ In short, most elite theorists believe that,

. . .the lower strata are relatively more authoritarian, that they will be more attracted to an extremist movement than to a moderate and democratic one, and that, once recruited, they will not be alienated by its lack of democracy. . . .⁴

As a result, democracy would not survive if it depended upon support for democratic values among the masses in America. In view of this, one can investigate the bankers' attitudes toward democracy. Since they are elites of Manhattan, one should find that the bankers strongly uphold the basic democratic values of society. To determine this, the bankers were asked to agree or disagree with four statements concerning

democratic values. These statements were:

1. The main trouble with democracy is that the people don't really know what's best for them, the issues and the arguments are beyond the understanding of most voters. For this reason, it will always be necessary to have a few strong, able people actually running everything.

2. People ought to be allowed to vote even if they can't do so intelligently.

3. The more voice people have in government, the better the government will function.

4. No matter what a person's political beliefs are, he is entitled to the same legal protections and rights as anyone else.

By referring to Table IV-1, the extent to which the bankers up-

TABLE IV-1.--Opinion Correlation of Democratic Values

	Sample of Bankers (N=53)	
	Agree (%)	Disagree (%)
The main trouble with democracy. . .	37.7	60.4
People ought to be allowed to vote. . .	67.9	26.3
The more voice people have in government. . .	69.8	26.4
No matter what a person's political beliefs. . .	88.7	9.5

hold the democratic values and their likemindedness can be observed.

In the first case, 60.4 percent of the bankers uphold the idea of a government "by the people." This first statement concerns the ability of the masses of people to govern themselves. Only 37.7 percent believe that, because the masses do not understand the issues and the arguments, it will always be necessary to have a few strong and able people actually running everything. In the second of these statements concerning democratic values, similar results were found. Here the democratic values are upheld by 67.9 percent. These bankers believe that people should be allowed to vote even if they might not be able to do so intelligently. The third statement has to do with the amount of popular political participation of the masses. Here again, it is found that the bankers uphold the ideas of democracy. Of the bankers, 69.8 percent believe that the more voice people have in government, the better the government will function. In the last of these statements, the legal protections and rights of all people is questioned. In relation to this statement, 88.7 percent of the bankers agree that no matter what a person's political beliefs are, he is entitled to the same legal protections and rights as anyone else.

From the above discussion, one can conclude that the Manhattan bankers seem to uphold the ideals of democracy. Concerning democratic values, the bankers exhibit what Seymour Martin Lipset has termed "upper class liberalism."⁵ One can also see that the bankers possess a coherence of thought concerning these ideals of democracy. Along with these attitude indicators, concerning democratic values, one can investigate

other factors which illustrate this group's coherent belief systems.

Although it is a very weak measure of beliefs, party affiliation is another aspect of the bankers' belief systems. Many political theorists would say that party affiliation could not be an aspect of a belief system because people do not perceive of the ideological stands of their party.⁶ I believe, as does Phillip Converse, that the elites of society are able to make an ideological distinction between political parties.⁷ Thus, since the bankers are an elite of society, we can consider their party affiliation as an aspect of their belief systems. Of the Manhattan bankers, 81.1 percent align themselves with the Republican Party and of these, 41.5 percent profess to be strong Republicans. Thus, an overwhelming majority of the bankers, because of their party identification, could be considered ideologically, coherently conservative.⁸

Another aspect which one can investigate in relation to the likeminded quality of the bankers is the goals which they have for the future of Manhattan. The responses to an inquiry concerning goals for Manhattan have been put into two categories--progressive and persistent. These two terms are almost self-explanatory but for a consistency of thought, definitions are in order. As operationalized here, a progressive goal is one in which the community would grow and expand. A persistent goal would be one in which Manhattan would remain the same. Of the bankers, 84.9 percent indicate that

they have a progressive goal in mind for Manhattan. The remaining 15.1 percent are happy with Manhattan as it is and do not especially want to see it grow and expand. From this one can conclude that the bankers are a coherent and progressively-minded group.

Political efficacy and political trust are also elements of bankers' belief systems. Political efficacy is a subjective feeling that a person holds that he can influence governmental decisions. A politically efficacious person feels that he can influence governmental decisions. Political trust is the feeling that governmental officials can be relied on to do what is right. In relation to the political efficacy perceived by the bankers, 86.8 percent believe that the government pays attention to them when it decides what to do. Furthermore, 96.2 percent believe that most public officials care about what bankers think. Although the amount of political efficacy perceived by the bankers in these first two aspects are high, we find a discrepancy in the third aspect. Only 67.9 percent of the bankers believe that they have a say in what government in general does. Later in this chapter the reasons for this discrepancy will be explored. At the present time, it should be noted that even though this last frequency is low in relation to the other measures of political efficacy, the bankers are a coherent and politically efficacious group.

The political trust of the Manhattan bankers also illustrates their coherence of thought. Of the bankers, 94.3 per-

cent believe that people in government waste money we pay in taxes. Although they perceive this monetary waste, 98.1 percent also believe that they can trust government to do what is right. Furthermore, 96.2 percent believe that government is run by people who know what they are doing. Thus, one can conclude that the bankers are a coherent group who display much political trust.

During the interviews, a question was asked concerning the perceived belief correlation of the respondent with other bankers. As a result of this inquiry, one can see that 90.5 percent of the bankers perceive their belief systems to be the same or similar to those of the other bankers in Manhattan. Only 7.5 percent did not perceive a positive correlation between their beliefs and those of others. This, along with the findings concerning the upholding of democratic ideals, party affiliation, ultimate goals, and political efficacy and trust, tends to indicate an overall cohesive thought pattern. These results tend to indicate that there is a similarity of belief systems held by the bankers. That is, they tend to be like-minded. It is this coherence of thought which underlies the similar political activities and roles played by the elites.

Political Activities of the Bankers

In the previous chapter it was made evident that this sample of bankers was very socially and economically active in the Manhattan community. It is now my objective to determine the extent of the bankers' political activity within this community.

The political activities which are of main concern here are, the bankers' voting regularity; interest in political campaigns; display of political partisanship; attendance at political meetings, dinners, or rallies; monetary political contributions; communications with political officials; holding of political office; and attention to public affairs. By investigating these activities it is hoped that one will be able to determine not only the similarities and differences in the political activities of the Manhattan bankers, but more importantly, the extent of this political activity.

By referring to Table IV-2, one can observe the bankers'

TABLE IV-2.--Political Participation of the Bankers

	Sample of Bankers (N=53)	
	Politically Active (%)	Politically Inactive (%)
Voting regularity	100.0	0
Following political campaigns	96.2	3.8
Display of political partisanship	58.5	41.5
Attendance of polit- ical meetings and rallies	79.3	20.7
Monetary political contributions	96.2	3.8
Communications with political officials	92.5	7.5
Political office holding	43.4	56.6

general levels of political activity. At the weakest level of political activity--voting--it can be seen that most of the bankers display much activity. In elections at all levels, since they have been old enough to vote, 90.6 percent of the bankers said that they had voted in all of them. Furthermore, 7.5 percent said that they had voted in most elections and 1.9 percent admitted to have voted in only some.

Another measure of political activity is the interest in following political campaigns. As can be observed in Table IV-2, the bankers display much interest in following political campaigns. Specifically, 66 percent of the bankers are very much interested in following political campaigns, while 30.2 percent are somewhat interested.

In showing their partisanship in these campaigns, only 58.5 percent of the bankers have been active. By wearing campaign buttons and displaying campaign stickers, only 17 percent showed partisanship most of the time, while 41.5 percent displayed this support some of the time.

Another common measure of political activity is the attendance of political meetings, dinners and rallies. As noted in Table IV-2, the bankers maintain a high level of political activity in this area. Political meetings, dinners, or rallies are attended by 79.3 percent of the Manhattan bankers. When invited to such functions, 15.1 percent attend most of the time while 64.2 percent attend some of the time.

Contributions to political parties or candidates are also an indication of political activity. By referring to Table IV-2,

one can see that 96.2 percent of the bankers make political contributions. When asked to give money or buy tickets to help pay the campaign expenses of a political party or candidate, 37.7 percent of the bankers contribute most of the time and 58.5 percent contribute some of the time.

At a higher level of political activity one sees, in Table IV-2, that 92.5 percent of the bankers communicate with public officials. By phoning or writing personal letters, 28.3 percent have contacted public officials many times, while 64.2 percent have contacted them a few times.

At the highest level of political activity--the holding of political offices--one can see that the bankers are also active. As noted in Table IV-2, 43.4 percent hold or have held political offices of some sort. More specifically, 22.6 percent hold or have held elected offices and 20.8 percent hold or have held appointed political positions.

From this discussion of the bankers' political activities, one can conclude that they are a very politically active group. In all areas except two--display of political partisanship and attendance of political meetings and rallies--the bankers are highly active. An explanation for the lower levels of political activity in these two areas can be given. Both of these activities require a more open and overt political action than the others. By reviewing the bankers' occupations one can see that it would be to their business' benefit not to alienate any potential patrons. Most of their businesses necessitate good public relations. As a result, for fear of losing potential

patrons, the bankers do not make their political feelings known.⁹ Thus, in these two areas of overt political activity, the bankers are not as active as in other areas. In the rest of these areas of political activity, from the weakest to the highest levels, one can conclude that the bankers are very active.

Along with this discussion of bankers' political activities, one should not fail to consider their interests in government and public affairs. This interest can be observed in Table IV-3. Concerning general public affairs, one can see

TABLE IV-3.--Bankers' Interest in Government and Public Affairs

	Sample of Bankers (N=53)		
	Interest (%)		
	Great Deal	Some	Not Much
General Public Affairs	88.7	9.4	1.9
International Affairs	52.8	43.4	3.8
National Affairs	81.1	18.9	0
State Affairs	79.2	20.8	0
Local Affairs	89.8	11.3	1.9

that all of the bankers are interested. On the specific level of international affairs, 96.2 percent are interested in what is going on. At the national and state levels of government, one can see that all of the bankers are interested in public affairs. Concerning public affairs on the local level, in Manhattan, all but one respondent displayed interest. The banker who did not is an elected official on the state level of government. He believed that he was not in the city enough to become

concerned and to stay informed.

By observing these results in conjunction with the previously discussed aspects of political activity, one can conclude that the Manhattan bankers are very politically active in the community. The only exceptions to this being in the areas of more overt political activity. With the extent of political activity known, the political influence of the bankers should now be investigated. One should now attempt to determine the amount of political decision-making influencing that they do in the community.

The Decision-Making Influence of The Bankers

The process of decision-making in the Manhattan community has gone through several stages within the last thirty or forty years.¹⁰ As the city of Manhattan has grown, the process of decision-making has evolved. Within recent years, the process of decision-making has gone through two definite phases--"single elite dominant and super elite pluralism."¹¹

From approximately 1940 to 1961, decision-making in Manhattan was dominated by a single person. This person was a very influential member of the Democratic party, a past mayor of Manhattan, and the chairman of the board of directors of one of the banks. This individual was, in the truest sense, a "city boss."¹² His dominant position in Manhattan was accepted and respected and he was "more influential than any other person in the community."¹³ During this period of time, he and his "machine"¹⁴ influenced all decisions made. Since

he was a banker, many of the members of his machine were also bankers. During this era, the bankers experienced much decision-making influence.

It was during this first period of time that the traditional mayor-council form of government was replaced by a reformed city manager-commission form. Even though this transition came at about the midpoint of his reign, the rule by the city boss was unaffected. His policy of containment of the Black population and of the political ambitions of the college people remained in effect. Although these first two policies remained the same, his policy of resisting development soon became a policy of expansion. This happened because of the economic profits which were to be made as a result of expansion. With the city boss' death in 1961 this era of single-elite dominance came to an end.

With the end of this era of single elite dominance a void of power was created. To replace this void in decision-making there was an active competition of many of the community's elites. This competition comprised the second era of decision-making, super elite pluralism. This second era began to take form in 1962 and lasted until 1970--one year before this study was conducted.

In competition, to fill this void in decision-making, were several different elites. One set of elites who were obviously competing for the decision-making position were the bankers. They were participants in the previous era's machine politics and wanted to continue their dominance in decision-

making. Another set of elites who vied for this role as decision-makers were newly formed elites of the community. These elites were formed as a result of the flood of 1951. Because of the flood, the expansion of Manhattan to the west began. As was mentioned, this westward expansion began and continued into the second era. This second set of elites were aptly termed the "syndicate." The syndicate was composed of land developers, realtors, and owners of construction-oriented businesses.

During this era, the decision-making which took place was a result of a pluralism of competing elites. All of the elites in this competition had relatively vast but equal decision-making influence. Because of this competition the previous era's policy of containment was changed to a policy of development, ushered in by the syndicate. As a result of this, both the bankers and especially the "syndicate" became much wealthier. Also resulting from this change in policy, the university people began to exert their influence in the politics of the community and integration of the Blacks began.

This second era of super elite pluralism began to change with the election of the 1970 City Commission. Following this second era is the phase of decision-making in which this study is concerned. One can see that the bankers have been very active in the decision-making of the previous two eras. Thus, in studying the decision-making process of the third era, it seems natural to investigate the political influence of the bankers. This study is concerned with the decision-making in-

fluence which the bankers exert in this third phase of decision-making.

This investigation of the decision-making influence of the Manhattan bankers will be conducted on two levels. First, it is necessary to investigate the decision-making influence perceived by the bankers in abstract situations. This investigation will observe: the amount of political influence which the bankers perceive themselves as having; and the perceived success in changing hypothetical laws or rulings. Secondly, it is necessary to observe the bankers' actions in the decision-making processes of four concrete issues which have been decided upon within the Manhattan community. These issues concern the arrival of McCalls Pattern Company in Manhattan; the expansion of the Manhattan Airport; the Urban Renewal project; and the arrival in Manhattan of a large discount store. The selection of these issues was based mainly on their time of occurrence. As a result of investigations on both these levels, it is hoped that one will be able to determine the general extent of the decision-making influence exerted by the Manhattan bankers in this third era of decision-making.

During the interviews a question was asked concerning the bankers' perceived political influence. In response to this inquiry, 56.6 percent of the bankers perceive themselves as having average political influence. Only 11.3 percent indicated that they were highly influential and, of these, one-half--three respondents--are state legislators. One can see that the bankers do not perceive themselves as possessing much political

influence. In fact, 88.7 percent of the bankers perceive themselves as possessing average influence or less. The extent of this perceived--average or less--influence should now be investigated.

An indication of the extent of this influence is the bankers' perceived ability to influence the making of decisions. In Table IV-4, this influence is illustrated on the city, state, and federal levels of government. By glancing at this Table,

TABLE IV-4.--Perceived Decision-Making Influence at Different Levels of Government

	Sample of Bankers (N=53)			
	Very Successful (%)	Somewhat Successful (%)	Not Very Successful (%)	
City	26.4	47.2	20.8	
State	15.1	41.5	34.0	
Federal	7.5	20.8	58.5	

one can conclude that the majority of the bankers do not perceive themselves as being very successful at changing a law or ruling at any level of government. By combining the success of those who perceived themselves as being "somewhat successful" with that of those who perceived themselves as being "very successful," the general success perceived by the bankers can be found. One finds that the bankers' perceived success is lower at the higher levels of government. The bankers perceive more general success at the city level (73.6 percent) than at the state level (56.6 percent) or the federal level (28.3 percent).

Although the success perceived in changing a law in Manhattan seems high at 73.6 percent, it must be noted that only 26.4 percent of the bankers believed that they would be "very successful." Thus it can be seen that the perceived success of changing a law or ruling at any level of government is not great. It seems as though the bankers' political influence is not great.

Some political science empiricists seem to believe that it is necessary to observe the actual roles played in concrete areas of decision-making before the true decision-making ability can be identified.¹⁵ Thus, in this investigation of the bankers' decision-making influence, it is necessary to observe the roles which they have perceived in relation to certain issues that have come before the community. Since there is no accurate criteria for the selection of issues,¹⁶ four seemingly important issues were selected in the time periods desired. As planned, two issues were chosen from the second era of decision-making--super elite pluralism--and the remaining two issues were chosen from the present era. As a result, one will be able to compare and contrast the differences between the decision-making influence exerted and the success achieved in the second era with the influence exerted and the success achieved at the present time. Further, the extent of the bankers decision-making influence at the present time will be apparent.

The first issue which was selected from the second era of decision-making in Manhattan is concerned with the locating of McCalls Pattern Company in this community. This issue faced the community in the fall of 1968 and the spring of 1969. Of

the bankers, 96.2 percent were in favor of McCalls locating in Manhattan. As noted in Table IV-5, only 45.3 percent of the

TABLE IV-5.--The Bankers Perceived Influence and Success of Influence in Selected Decision-Making Situations

	Sample of Bankers (N=53)	
	Percent who Influenced	Percent who Perceived Success
McCalls Pattern Co. Locating in Manhattan (Fall 1968-Spring 1970)	45.3	41.5
Expansion and Renovation of Manhattan Airport (Spring-Summer 1970)	77.4	41.5
Proposed Urban Renewal Project for South Manhattan (Spring-Summer 1971)	37.7	28.3
Wal-Mart Regional Dis- count Store locating in Manhattan (Fall, 1971)	18.9	13.2

bankers attempted to exert influence in this issue. In explanation of this low figure, one simply has to observe where the influence was directed. In this issue most of the influence was directed at important participants--the McCalls Company representatives and the City Commission. Of the 45.3 percent who exerted influence in this issue, 30.2 percent attempted to influence the McCalls representatives and 13.3 percent influenced the City Commission. The perceived success of this attempted influence was very high. Of the 45.3 percent who attempted to exert influence, 41.5 percent perceived success. From this discussion one can conclude that the bankers were very influential

in bringing McCalls Pattern Company to Manhattan.

The other issue which took place during the second era of decision-making concerns the expansion and renovation of the Manhattan Airport. This issue was before the Manhattan community in the summer and fall of 1970. In this issue, 79.2 percent of the bankers were in favor of expanding the airport facilities. Of the bankers, 77.4 percent attempted to exert influence in this decision-making area. Of these, 41.5 percent believed that they were successful. Again the perceived amount of influence exerted and success achieved was high. In this issue, as with the previous one, the bankers were very influential.

The next issue did not take place in the second era of decision-making, but instead, took place in the present era. This issue was a proposed urban renewal project for south Manhattan. It faced the community in the spring and summer of 1971. Of the bankers, 62.3 percent were in favor of this issue. In this issue only 37.7 percent attempted to exert influence. Of these, 28.3 percent perceived themselves to be successful.

The arrival of Wal-Mart Regional Discount Store to Manhattan was the last issue to occur in this time sequence. This issue was before the community in the fall of 1971. Thus, it also took place in the third era of decision-making. Concerning this issue only 50.9 percent of the bankers were in favor of its arrival. Of these only 18.9 percent attempted to exert decision-making influence. Success of this influencing was perceived by only 13.2 percent of the bankers.

Concerning these four issue areas certain points should be

made. First, the responses obtained concerning the influence exerted and success achieved are high in comparison of what one would expect from the general population. But more important than this, a change in the bankers' influence exerted and success perceived seems to have taken place. By referring to Table IV-5, one can see that the bankers, as a group, seem to have been losing both interest and success in their attempts at decision-making influence. An explanation of this change can be found in a continuation of the earlier discussion of Manhattan's different eras of decision-making processes. As noted, the decision-making in Manhattan has evolved through a single elite dominant period to a super elite pluralism. In both of these decision-making eras the bankers have displayed much influence. By referring to the McCalls issue and the airport issue, one can see the amount of influence exerted and the amount of success perceived in the second era of Manhattan decision-making. The bankers' highest amounts of influence exerted are found in these two areas. One also finds that in these two areas the influence was directed at important sectors of society such as the City Commission and McCalls representatives instead of at the general public or personal contacts which was the case in the other issues. But as noted earlier, this second era of decision-making--super elite pluralism--came to an end with the election of the 1970 City Commission. The reason for the bankers loss of power seems to stem from the election in 1970 of a "young, new, unmanageable City Commission."¹⁷ As was noted, during the second era of decision-making, the exclusion of the

university people from politics had ended. As a result, the university people were able to influence the 1970 election of the City Commission. The end result of this influence was a City Commission which would not cater exclusively to the desires of the elites. Because of the election the bankers' interest and success of decision-making influence declined.

This decline in influencing and success perceived can be shown in the final two issue areas observed. By referring to Table IV-5 one can see this decline. According to the time sequence, the amount of interest in influencing and the amount of success perceived declined. This low level of decision-making influence can also be observed in relation to the earlier, more abstract, questions asked. It was found that 88.7 percent of the bankers, in this third era of decision-making, perceived themselves as having average or less decision-making influence. Further, 68 percent believed that they would only be "somewhat" or "not very" successful in changing a law or ruling at the local level of government.

This perceived loss of decision-making influence was also verbalized on a number of occasions.¹⁸ One respondent when questioned about his ability to change a law or ruling on the city level, said that it would be almost "fruitless" to attempt such a venture. He went on to say that, if he or any other banker would approach the City Commission with a recommendation, it would most likely decide in an opposing manner just because of the recommendation. Another banker also verbalized this loss of decision-making influence. He

said that at one time businessmen, including bankers, were very respected and influential in the community. He went on to say that the university people and other "property-less" people, who don't have investments in the community, are now on the City Commission and making the decisions on public policy. He said that it was because of these people that he and other bankers had lost power in the community.

Thus, it has been found that the bankers do not possess the amount of decision-making influence which they once exercised. It has been seen that in Manhattan's first era of decision-making--single elite dominance--that the bankers were influential in machine politics. At the end of this era, a void in decision-making was created. This void ushered in a new era of super elite pluralism. During this second era of decision-making the bankers again perceived themselves as being very influential. With the end of this era a new void of decision-making was created. It was within this void of decision-making that the present study was conducted. In this third era, the bankers no longer perceive the decision-making influence which they once held. Although one can conclude that the bankers' decision-making influence is on a higher level than would be expected from the general public, this influence is not intense. The Manhattan bankers are not a decision-making elite of the Manhattan community.

Conclusion

In this chapter, three major aspects of the Manhattan

bankers have been investigated. It has been found that the bankers possess very similar belief systems, are very politically active and do not possess a great amount of decision-making influence. Because they possess very similar belief systems and because they maintain a high level of political activity, it would seem that the bankers would compose a very powerful decision-making sector of the Manhattan community. Because of their similar belief systems, they have very similar goals and similar thought patterns. It would seem that this would tie them strongly, as a group, to the quest of common goals. It would also seem that since they are politically active that they would be more familiar with the processes of decision-making and thus more politically influential. But, instead of finding them more politically influential, this study has shown that the bankers are not highly influential in the decision-making processes of Manhattan. It has been found that the bankers' decision-making influence has waned in recent years and that they are not decision-making elites of Manhattan.

Footnotes

¹Phillip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in Ideology and Discontent, ed. by David Apter (New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 207.

²For further discussion of this characteristic of elites see: Peter Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic Elitism (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), pp. 47-48; William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (New York: Free Press, 1959); V. O. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 558.

³Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society.

⁴Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1960), p. 101.

⁵Ibid., p. 298.

⁶Angus Campbell, et al., The American Voter (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964), p. 144.

⁷Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems," pp. 219-223.

⁸This is taken from the 'liberal-conservative continuum' which is explained by Converse, (Ibid.).

⁹This excuse was given in the majority of cases.

¹⁰This discussion of past decision-making in Manhattan is taken from; Louis Douglas (private conversations held in a time period from February, 1972 to February, 1973, Kansas State University).

¹¹Ibid.

¹²William O. Winter, The Urban Polity (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1970), pp. 69-72.

¹³Bernard Bray, "Community Power Structure: A Case Study," (unpublished M. S. Report, Kansas State University, 1959), p. 14.

¹⁴Winter, Urban Polity, pp. 69-72.

¹⁵Robert A. Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," American Political Science Review, LII (June, 1958).

¹⁶Frederick Frey, "Comment: On Issues and Nonissues in the Study of Power," American Political Science Review, LXV (December, 1971); Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," American Political Science Review, LVI (December, 1962); Raymond

Wolfinger, "Nondecisions and the Study of Local Politics," American Political Science Review, LXV (December, 1971).

¹⁷Louis Douglas (private conversations held in a time period from February, 1972 to February, 1973, Kansas State University).

¹⁸These quotes are not verbatim.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This study has been concerned with the decision-making activities of one sector of the community of Manhattan, Kansas. This study has posited that although they are social and economic elites, the Manhattan bankers do not possess or exert a great deal of decision-making power. That is, the bankers are not instrumental in the formulation of public policy.

The results of this study indicate that the bankers are social and economic elites of the Manhattan community. A large majority of the bankers were found to perceive themselves as being socially and economically influential. Further, it was found that the bankers had a higher educational level than the rest of the community and that they were very active in socially-oriented and civic-minded organizations. In relation to the rest of the community, they were also found to hold many of the better occupations and make more income per family. In regards to these same factors, the bankers were seen to compose a socially and economically homogeneous group.

The bankers were also found to possess a homogeneity of belief systems. Not only did they perceive themselves as possessing a coherence of thought, but also this coherence was shown through a number of other inquiries. By investigating their agreement with a number of democratic values and by examining their ultimate goals for the community, this cohesive thought pattern was made evident.

The bankers also displayed much political activity within the community. It was found that from the lowest level of political activity--voting--to the highest level--holding public offices--the bankers represent a very active group. The only exception to this was found in the cases of more overt activity--the public display of partisanship.

Being social and economic elites, possessing similar belief systems, and being politically active, it would seem that the bankers should possess much decision-making influence. In the past it was shown that the bankers experienced much influence in community decision-making. But as a result of the 1970 election of the City Commission which would not be influenced, the bankers' decision-making power has been weakening. By investigating the bankers' perceived influence in both hypothetical situations and also in concrete issues which were before the community, it was found that they were not influential in the process of decision-making in Manhattan. Instead of being dominant in the decision-making process of Manhattan--as was the case in the two previous eras--it was concluded that the bankers do not play a dominant role. These findings do not attempt to inject that the bankers have influence in decision-making. For it was found that they possess more influence than would be expected from the general public.

It has been found that the bankers possess the wealth, the social status and the coherence of belief systems which are the major aspects of an elite.¹ They have also proven to be very politically active within the Manhattan community. The only

aspect of an elite which the bankers fail to possess is the decision-making interest or ability. As was seen in the last two most recent issues, both the decision-making success achieved and the interest displayed declined. Some speculation in relation to these aspects can be conducted.

It could be posited that after the bankers began to confront resistance from the City Commission, they became disinterested in the process of decision-making in Manhattan. And as a result of this disinterest, they did not take part in the process of decision-making. This would be a similar role to that played by the social and economic "notables" which Robert Dahl found in New Haven, Connecticut.² But because of the high level of political activity and other aspects displayed by the Manhattan bankers, this argument of disinterest is rather weak. From an investigation of their political activities, it has been concluded that the bankers are very politically active. It could be argued, rather successfully, that because of this political activity the bankers must be interested in public affairs. To further this argument, one could propose that they did not become social and economic elites of Manhattan by being uninterested in public affairs. The argument could be furthered that if they did, indeed, lose their interest in public affairs, their social and economic status could soon be lost. From this it seems rather doubtful that the bankers would surrender the vast decision-making power which they once possessed and become uninterested in public affairs.

Another speculation can be offered to this rather low level of decision-making activity which the bankers have experienced in recent years. It could be set forth, as Hunter found to be the case in Regional City,³ that the older bankers who experienced the decision-making power of the past are now removing themselves from the decision-making processes so as to let the younger bankers become the decision-makers. Although this position could be strongly supported, the median age level of the bankers is 49 years old, and at age 50 it is unlikely that a banker would be ready to step down and let a younger man take his place in the decision-making process. Further, it was found that many of the younger bankers already hold influential positions in the banks. It could be argued that this void, which was found in decision-making, was a product of the transition from older to younger decision-makers, but this argument also seems rather weak.

Another argument which could be set forth accepts that the bankers did, indeed, lose much decision-making influence as a result of the 1970 City Commission election. But this argument would also speculate that the bankers still possess and exert much decision-making influence of another form. It could be speculated that the bankers sought other ways of decision-making after they confronted resistance from the City Commission. Because they are social and economic elite members of the community, it could be posited that the bankers have other ways to influence decision-making, indirectly or informally.

As was found, the bankers have many economic interests in Manhattan. Not only do they control most of the loans made, they also own much of the real estate and most of the "development" industries--abstractors, building contractors, cement works, engineering firms, lumber yards and other construction related fields. Through these economic interests, the bankers could work behind the scenes to influence most issues. They could successfully keep out unwanted businesses, industry and etc., even though the City Commission might make a zoning change which might be necessary to the business coming to Manhattan. Simply, it could be argued that they have the ability to apply financial pressures or aides to achieve desired goals. This argument would propose that the bankers informally meet periodically--such as 10 a.m. coffee or lunch--to discuss community issues and formulate action which could be taken.⁴ Since the bankers were not directly questioned about "informal" decision-making or these informal meetings, no information concerning them was obtained.

What was found was that the bankers did not exhibit much decision-making activity in the four issue areas examined. But it should be noted that in these four issues, the bankers were in agreement with the stands that the City Commission took. Although it was found that the bankers did not perceive their decision-making influence as being very successful, one did not find them in favor of an issue that failed the City Commission. Without finding a conflict of this type, it is difficult to interpret the extent of the bankers' influence. For it might be the

case that the City Commission realizes that the bankers' support is necessary--because of their informal influence--and as a result, make decisions which would be supported by the bankers.⁵ If a situation such as this did exist in Manhattan, the bankers may not be aware of the influence which they might possess. This discussion raises two major questions. Do the bankers actually have limited influence with the City Commission? Or do the bankers possess much informal influence that the Commission takes into account when it decides what to do? The answers to these questions would be found underlying an issue in which the bankers disagree violently with the City Commission. Thus, the selection of a key issue of disagreement would be necessary to determine the extent of decision-making influence.

But the selection of this key issue poses the arguments of issues and nonissues and the "two faces of power." The argument of nonissues asserts that because the bankers were in favor of the stands that the Commission was taking they were not motivated to get involved. The proponents of this argument put forth that no one decision will elicit a maximum resource expenditure by all potential actors.⁶ The second argument was voiced well by Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz in their discussion of the "two faces of power."⁷ They argue that there is no objective way to select issues which are to be studied. Key or representative issues cannot be determined. From this argument it can be concluded that a selection of issues on any other basis than the time of their occurrence would be ignoring the two faces of power and thus, biasing

the findings.

In conclusion, it was found that there are no answers to be put forth concerning the issues-nonissues argument or the method of issue selection. As a result, even if the selected issues may leave some questions unanswered, they have been randomly selected on an objective basis and have not been assigned the importance which would incur the wrath of these two arguments.

This study was concerned not only with these four issues within the society, but also the perceived decision-making influence in a number of hypothetical situations. As a result of this, a check has been put on the study of these issue areas--in which the validity of the findings has, in the past, been so violently contested. Because the findings of the issue questions were complimented by the perceived influence in hypothetical situations, the issue-nonissue and the "two faces" arguments do not negate the findings of this study.

Although this argument of informal decision-making processes seems to be valid when analyzing the four issue areas, it seems to be countered when an analysis of the hypothetical perceptions is conducted. By analyzing the amount of perceived influence which the bankers believe they have in hypothetical situations, one finds no more influencing ability--formal or informal--than was found in the concrete issue areas. It was also found that the bankers are unhappy in the roles which they maintain in the decision-making process. Thus, it seems that if they were able, they would become more influential.

As a result of this study of bankers, a "power elite" or a "ruling elite" or even "men of power" have not been found to be a part of the decision-making process of Manhattan.⁸ Instead, a situation was found in which there is a socially and economically powerful elite sector of a community which is governed by a form of pluralism. These results are very similar to Robert Dahl's findings in New Haven, Connecticut.⁹ The initial assumption--that because the bankers were powerful decision-makers of the past, they would be powerful decision-makers now--was not found to be the case.

It would be nice to be able to point to Manhattan and say, in a final sense, that pluralism is the form of decision-making and that the bankers are not decision-making elites. But this is impossible because of the dynamic nature of decision-making. It has been found that in recent years, decision-making has gone through two definite stages--single elite dominant and super elite pluralism. Because of this dynamic nature of decision-making, all that can be reliably said is that during the period in which this study was conducted--from the spring of 1972 to the spring of 1973--a pluralism existed in Manhattan. Although this form of decision-making could remain the same indefinitely, it could also change at any time. This change could come about for any number of reasons and it is not necessary for an election of the City Commission to take place. During this time period it can be concluded that the bankers--a social and economic elite of society--did not possess a large amount of decision-making influence.

Although these conclusions are a result of the investigation of decision-making in Manhattan at this time and in relation to these participants, it is hoped that the empirical structure and content of this study will be of some future use. Further, it is hoped that this study could serve as a baseline for future investigation into decision-making processes.

¹See: Chapter I; Peter Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic Elitism (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967); C. Wright Mills, Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956).

²Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961).

³Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure (New York: Van Rees Press, 1953).

⁴An example of this was found by Floyd Hunter, (Ibid.).

⁵Robert A. Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," American Political Science Review, LII (June, 1958).

⁶Raymond Wolfinger, "Nondecisions and the Study of Local Politics," American Political Science Review, LXV (December, 1971).

⁷Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," American Political Science Review, LVI (December, 1962).

⁸See: Mills, Power Elite; Thomas R. Dye and L. Harmon Zeigler, The Irony of Democracy (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1970); Hunter, Community Power Structure.

⁹Dahl, Who Governs?.

APPENDIX I

THE QUESTIONNAIRE EMPLOYED IN THIS
PERCEPTIVE APPROACH

1. How old are you?
2. How many grades of school did you finish? Have you had other schooling? (If so) What was that? What college(s) did you attend? Do you have a college degree? (If so) What degree(s) have you recieved?
3. What is your exact title? (Directors) What is your main occupation? Do you have other economic interests that you receive income from here in Manhattan? What are they? What percentage of your total income would you say that you derive from these outside sources?
4. About what do you think your total income will be this year for yourself and your immediate family? (Just give the letter of the right income category on this card).
5. Are you Protestant, Roman Catholic, or Jewish? (If Protestant) What church is that, Baptist, Methodist, or what?
6. What social class would you say that you belong to? (If middle class) Would you say that you are average middle class or that you are upper middle class?
7. How long have you lived here in Manhattan? How many years is that?
8. What kind of work did your father primarily do when you were growing up?

9. What social class would you say that your family was when you were growing up?
10. Do you remember when you were growing up whether your parents were very much interested, somewhat interested, or didn't they pay much attention to politics?
11. Do you think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, Independent, or what? (If Republican or Democrat) Would you call yourself a strong Republican or Democrat or not a very strong Republican or Democrat? (If Independent or Other) Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic Party?
12. Which of the following civic organizations or clubs do you belong to? (Circle the letter of the ones that you belong to on this card).
13. Would you say that you follow what is going on in government and public affairs, most of the time, some of the time, only now and then, or hardly at all?
14. In relation to these public affairs, first how about international and world affairs; do you pay a great deal of attention, some attention, or not much attention to international affairs?
15. What about national affairs, do you pay a great deal of attention, some or not much attention to national affairs?
16. How about affairs here in Kansas; would you say that you pay a great deal of attention, some, or not much attention to State affairs?

17. And how about affairs here in Manhattan; do you pay a great deal of attention, some, or not much attention to local affairs of your city?

18. In the various elections, at all levels, since you have been old enough to vote, would you say that you have voted in all of them, most of them, some of them, or none of them?

19. Would you say that you have been very interested, somewhat interested, or not much interested in following political campaigns over the years?

20. In showing your support in these campaigns, have you worn campaign buttons or have you had campaign stickers on your car, most of the time, some of the time, or never?

21. When they take place in your community or the surrounding area, do you go to political meetings, rallies, dinners or things like that, most of the time, some of the time or never?

22. Of the political clubs or organizations that are present in Manhattan, do you belong to some of them, most of them, or none of them?

23. When asked to give money or buy tickets to help pay the campaign expenses of a political party or candidate, do you contribute most of the time, some of the time, or never?

24. Have you written to public officials giving them your opinion about something that should be done, many times, a few times, or never?

25. Have you ever, or do you now, hold a political office?
(If yes) Was, or is, this office an elected or an appointed

office and of what capacity?

26. Now I would like to try to gauge your influence in this community. First, your political influence. Would you say that you are highly influential, of average influence, or that you have no influence at all? What do you account for this (lack of) influence?

27. Suppose there is a law or ruling being considered by your city government that you considered very unjust or harmful. What do you think that you could do about it? If you made an effort to change this law or ruling, how likely is it that you would succeed; very likely, somewhat likely, or not very likely?

28. Suppose there is a law or ruling being considered by your State government that you considered very unjust or harmful. What do you think you could do about it? If you made an effort to change this law or ruling, how likely is it that you would succeed; very likely, somewhat likely, or not very likely?

29. Suppose there is a law or ruling being considered by Congress, in Washington, that you considered very unjust or harmful. What do you think you could do about it? If you made an effort to change this law or ruling, how likely is it that you would succeed; very likely, somewhat likely, or not very likely?

30. Next, how would you gauge your influence in the economic sector of the community? Would you say that you are highly influential, of average influence, of that you have no influence at all in this realm of the community? Could you specify this

influence? What do you account for this (lack of) influence?

31. Finally, how would you gauge your influence in the social sector of the community? Would you say that you are highly influential, of average influence, or that you have no influence at all in this sector of the community? Could you specify what this influence entails? To what do you attribute this (lack of) influence?

32. Along with the financial services your bank offers to the Manhattan community, are there other kinds of direct or indirect services that you can think of that your bank offers to the people of Manhattan?

33. On issues that come before the community do you find yourself consulted by the general public and its representatives for your opinion, all of the time, most of the time, some of the time or not much at all?

34. As a banker, what is your ultimate goal here in Manhattan? Are the opinions that you hold on various issues that affect the community, the same, similar, or not at all correlated to the stands that the bank takes on these same issues?

35. What was your stand on the airport issue? Did you try to influence anyone to your way of thinking? (If so) Who was it you were trying to influence? How did you go about influencing these people? Were you successful?

36. What is your stand on the urban renewal project which faces the city? Have you tried to influence anyone to your way of thinking? (If so) Who have you tried to influence? How have you tried to influence these people? Were you successful?

37. What was your stand on the arrival of the Wal-Mart discount store to Manhattan? Did you try to influence anyone to your way of thinking? (If so) Who was it you were trying to influence? How did you go about influencing these people? Were you successful?

38. What was your stand on the arrival of McCall's Pattern Company to Manhattan a few years ago? Did you try to influence anyone to your way of thinking? (If so) Who did you try to influence? How did you go about influencing these people? Were you successful?

39. The main trouble with democracy is that most people don't really know what is best for them, the issues and the arguments are beyond the understanding of most voters. For this reason, it will always be necessary to have a few strong, able people actually running everything. (Agree-Disagree)

40. People ought to be allowed to vote even if they can't do so intelligently. (Agree-Disagree)

41. There will always be poverty so people might as well get used to it. (Agree-Disagree)

42. The more voice people have in government, the better the government will function. (Agree-Disagree)

43. No matter what a person's political beliefs are, he is entitled to the same legal protections and rights as anyone else. (Agree-Disagree)

44. Do you think that people in government, in general, waste a lot of the money we pay in taxes, waste some of it, or don't waste very much of it?

45. How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in general to do what is right, just about always, some of the time, or just about never?

46. Do you feel that government, in general, is run by people, almost all of whom usually know what they are doing, only some of whom usually know what they are doing, or hardly any of whom know what they are doing?

47. Would you say that people like you have quite a lot to say, some to say, or not much at all to say about what government in general does?

48. Would you say that most public officials care quite a lot, some, or hardly at all about what people like you think?

49. Over the years, how much attention do you feel that government, in general, pays to what people like you think when it decides what to do, a good deal, some, or not much?

APPENDIX II

CODE BOOK

1. How old are you?

0 30-40 yr. old	4 71-80 yr. old
1 41-50 yr. old	5 Other
2 51-60 yr. old	6 N/A
3 61-70 yr. old	

2. How many grades of school did you finish?

- 0 some grade school
- 1 grade school
- 2 some high school
- 3 high school
- 4 some college
- 5 college
- 6 Masters
- 7 Ph.D.
- 8 law degree
- 9 business or trade school
- 10 M.D. or D.D.S.
- 11 Other
- 12 N/A

3. Where did you recieve your first degree?

- 0 KSU
- 1 KU
- 2 Washburn
- 3 Private college in Kansas
- 4 Private college outside of Kansas
- 5 Public college outside of Kansas
- 6 Jr. College in Kansas
- 7 Other
- 8 N/A
- 9 inapplicable

4. Where did you receive your highest degree?

- 0 KSU
- 1 KU
- 2 Washburn
- 3 Private college in Kansas
- 4 Private college outside of Kansas
- 5 Public college outside of Kansas
- 6 Jr. College in Kansas
- 7 Other
- 8 N/A
- 9 inapplicable

5. What is your main occupation?

- 0 banker
- 1 businessman (retail sales and service)
- 2 professional
- 3 professional (university)
- 4 farmer or rancher
- 5 engineer
- 6 other
- 7 N/A

6. What is your exact title with the Bank?

- 0 President
- 1 Sr. Vice President
- 2 Vice President
- 3 Chairman of the Board
- 4 Member of the Board of Directors
- 5 Other
- 6 N/A

7. What is your total income?

- 0 below \$24,999
- 1 25,000-34,999
- 2 35,000-44,999
- 3 45,000-54,999
- 4 55,000-64,999
- 5 65,000-74,999
- 6 75,000-above
- 7 other
- 8 N/A

8. Do you have other economic interests that you receive an income from here in Manhattan?

- 0 no
- 1 yes, stocks and bonds
- 2 yes, retail sales and services
- 3 yes, real estate
- 4 yes, stocks and bonds and retail sales and services
- 5 yes, stocks and bonds and real estate
- 6 yes, retail sales and services and real estate
- 7 yes, stocks and bonds and retail sales and services and real estate
- 8 other
- 9 N/A.

9. What religion do you belong to?

- 0 Methodist
- 1 Baptist
- 2 Lutheran
- 3 Christian
- 4 Presbyterian
- 5 Episcopal
- 6 Roman Catholic
- 7 Other
- 8 N/A

10. How many fraternal clubs do you belong to?

- | | |
|-------------|---------|
| 0 5 or more | 3 none |
| 1 4-3 | 4 Other |
| 2 1-2 | 5 N/A |

11. Do you belong to occupational oriented clubs, the Chamber of Commerce of the Country Club?

- 0 Chamber of Commerce (Chamber)
- 1 Country Club (cc)
- 2 Occupational oriented (occupational)
- 3 Chamber and cc
- 4 Chamber and occupational
- 5 cc and occupational
- 6 Chamber, cc, and occupational
- 7 none
- 8 Other
- 9 N/A

12. Have you held offices in the Chamber of Commerce, Country Club or occupational oriented clubs? or civic?

- 0 Civic
- 1 Chamber of Commerce (Chamber)
- 2 Country Club (cc)
- 3 Occupational oriented club (occupational)
- 4 Civic and occupational
- 5 Civic and Chamber
- 6 Civic and cc
- 7 occupational and Chamber
- 8 occupational and cc
- 9 Chamber and cc
- 10 Civic, occupational and Chamber
- 11 Civic, occupational and cc
- 12 occupational, Chamber and cc
- 13 Chamber, cc and Civic
- 14 Civic, occupational, Chamber, and cc
- 15 no offices held
- 16 inapplicable
- 17 Other
- 18 N/A

13. What social class would you say you belong to?

- 0 upper
- 1 upper middle
- 2 average middle
- 3 lower
- 4 other
- 5 N/A

14. How long have you lived in Manhattan?

- 0 lifetime
- 1 not lifetime, 1 to 10 years
- 2 not lifetime, 11 to 20 years
- 3 not lifetime, 21 to 30 years
- 4 not lifetime, 31 to 40 years
- 5 not lifetime, 41 to 50 years
- 6 not lifetime, 51 to 60 years
- 7 not lifetime, over 60 years
- 8 other
- 9 N/A

15. What was your father's main occupation?

- 0 banker
- 1 businessman (retail sales and services)
- 2 professional
- 3 professional (university)
- 4 farmer or rancher
- 5 engineer
- 6 other
- 7 N/A

16. What social class did your family belong to when you were growing up?

- 0 upper
- 1 upper middle
- 2 average middle
- 3 lower
- 4 other
- 5 N/A

17. How interested were your parents in politics?

- 0 very much
- 1 somewhat
- 2 not much attention
- 3 other
- 4 N/A

18. What is your party affiliation?

- 0 Republican, strong
- 1 Republican, weak
- 2 Independent, Republican
- 3 Independent, Democrat
- 4 Democrat, weak
- 5 Democrat, strong
- 6 other
- 7 N/A

19. How interested are you in public affairs, general?

- 0 most of the time
- 1 some of the time
- 2 only now and then
- 3 hardly at all
- 4 other
- 5 N/A

20. Do you follow what's going on in international affairs?

- 0 a great deal
- 1 some
- 2 not much
- 3 other
- 4 N/A

21. Do you follow what's going on in national affairs?

- 0 a great deal
- 1 some
- 2 not much
- 3 other
- 4 N/A

22. Do you follow what's going on in state affairs?

- 0 a great deal
- 1 some
- 2 not much
- 3 other
- 4 N/A

23. Do you follow what's going on in local affairs?

- 0 a great deal
- 1 some
- 2 not much
- 3 other
- 4 N/A

24. How interested are you in following campaigns?

- 0 very much
- 1 somewhat
- 2 not much
- 3 other
- 4 N/A

25. How many elections have you voted in?

- 0 all
- 1 most
- 2 some
- 3 none
- 4 other
- 5 N/A

26. How often have you worn campaign buttons or stickers?

- 0 most of the time
- 1 some of the time
- 2 never
- 3 other
- 4 N/A

27. How often do you attend political meetings or rallies?

- 0 most of the time
- 1 some of the time
- 2 never
- 3 other
- 4 N/A

28. How many political clubs do you belong to?

- 0 most
- 1 some
- 2 none
- 3 other
- 4 N/A

29. How often do you contribute to politics?

- 0 most of the time
- 1 some of the time
- 2 never
- 3 other
- 4 N/A

30. How often have you written to public officials?
- 0 many times
 - 1 a few times
 - 2 never
 - 3 other
 - 4 N/A
31. Have you ever or do you now hold a political office?
- 0 yes, elected
 - 1 yes, appointed
 - 2 yes, elected and appointed
 - 3 no
 - 4 other
 - 5 N/A
32. Of what capacity was this elected office?
- 0 city and county
 - 1 state
 - 2 national
 - 3 city and state
 - 4 city and national
 - 5 state and national
 - 6 city, state and national
 - 7 other
 - 8 N/A
 - 9 inapplicable
33. Of what capacity was this appointed office?
- 0 city
 - 1 state
 - 2 national
 - 3 city and state
 - 4 city and national
 - 5 state and national
 - 6 city, state and national
 - 7 other
 - 8 N/A
 - 9 inapplicable
34. How politically influential would you say that you are?
- 0 highly influential
 - 1 average influence
 - 2 no influence
 - 3 other
 - 4 N/A

35. What do you account for this influence?

- 0 position in the bank
- 1 position in the community socially (friends)
- 2 position in the community economically (business)
- 3 position in the community politically (offices held)
- 4 bank and socially
- 5 bank and economically
- 6 bank and politically
- 7 socially and economically
- 8 socially and politically
- 9 economically and politically
- 10 bank, socially and economically
- 11 bank, socially and politically
- 12 socially, economically and politically
- 13 economically, politically and bank
- 14 bank, socially, economically and politically
- 15 inapplicable, have no political influence
- 16 Other
- 17 N/A

36. What would you do to change a law on the local level?

- 0 make personal contacts with representatives
- 1 work through a group
- 2 work through other friends in Manhattan
- 3 personal contacts and through a group
- 4 personal contacts and work through friends
- 5 through a group and through friends
- 6 personal contacts, through a group and through friends
- 7 take no action
- 8 Other
- 9 N/A

37. If you tried, how likely is it that you would succeed?

- 0 very likely
- 1 somewhat likely
- 2 not very likely
- 3 depends on the issue
- 4 Other
- 5 N/A

38. What would you do to change a law on the State level?

- 0 make personal contactes with representatives
- 1 work through a group
- 2 work through other friends in Manhattan
- 3 personal contacts and work through a group
- 4 personal contacts and through friends
- 5 through a group and through friends
- 6 personal contacts, through a group and through friends
- 7 take no action
- 8 Other
- 9 N/A

39. If you tried, how likely is it that you would succeed?
- 0 very likely
 - 1 somewhat likely
 - 2 not very likely
 - 3 depends on the issue
 - 4 inapplicable
 - 5 other
 - 6 N/A
40. What would you do to change a law on the national level?
- 0 make personal contacts with representatives
 - 1 work through a group
 - 2 work through other friends in Manhattan
 - 3 make personal contacts and work through a group
 - 4 make personal contacts and work through other friends
 - 5 work through a group and work through other friends
 - 6 make personal contacts and work through a group and work through other friends in Manhattan
 - 7 take no action
 - 8 other
 - 9 N/A
41. If you tried, how likely is it you would succeed?
- 0 very likely
 - 1 somewhat likely
 - 2 not very likely
 - 3 depends on the issue
 - 4 inapplicable
 - 5 other
 - 6 N/A
42. How influential are you, economically?
- 0 highly influential
 - 1 average influence
 - 2 no influence
 - 3 other
 - 4 N/A
43. Could you specify what this influence entails?
- 0 when a company is coming to town I am consulted
 - 1 business interests
 - 2 I am close to people who have much money
 - 3 when a company is coming to town I am consulted and I have many business interests (0 and 1)
 - 4 when a company is coming to town I am consulted and I am close to people have have much money (0 and 2)
 - 5 (1 and 2)
 - 6 (0, 1 and 2)
 - 7 I have no influence
 - 8 other
 - 9 N/A

44. What do you account for this influence?

- 0 position in the bank
- 1 position in the community socially (friends)
- 2 position in the community economically (business)
- 3 position in the community politically (offices held)
- 4 (0 and 1)
- 5 (0 and 2)
- 6 (0 and 3)
- 7 (1 and 2)
- 8 (1 and 3)
- 9 (2 and 3)
- 10 (1, 1, 2)
- 11 (0, 1, 3)
- 12 (1, 2, 3)
- 13 (0, 2, 3)
- 14 (0, 1, 2, 3)
- 15 inapplicable
- 16 other
- 17 N/A

45. How influential are you socially?

- 0 highly influential
- 1 average influence
- 2 no influence
- 3 other
- 4 N/A

46. Could you specify what this influence entails?

- 0 work in programs that will benefit the community
- 1 entertain
- 2 both of the above
- 3 inapplicable, have no influence
- 4 other
- 5 N/A

47. What do you account for this influence?

- 0 position in the bank
- 1 position in the community socially (friends)
- 2 position in the community economically (business)
- 3 position in the community politically (offices held)
- 4 (0, 1)
- 5 (0, 2)
- 6 (0, 3)
- 7 (1, 2)
- 8 (1, 3)
- 9 (2, 3)
- 10 (0, 1, 2)
- 11 (0, 1, 3)
- 12 (1, 2, 3)
- 13 (0, 2, 3)
- 14 (0, 1, 2, 3)
- 15 inapplicable
- 16 other
- 17 N/A

48. How often are you consulted by the general public?
- 0 all of the time
 - 1 most of the time
 - 2 some of the time
 - 3 not much at all
 - 4 other
 - 5 N/A
49. What is your ultimate goal for Manhattan?
- 0 keep the status quo
 - 1 progressive, emphasis on the university
 - 2 progressive, emphasis on the downtown
 - 3 progressive, emphasis on the whole community
 - 4 other
 - 5 N/A
50. How do your opinions correlate with those of the bank?
- 0 same
 - 1 similar
 - 2 no positive correlation
 - 3 inapplicable
 - 4 other
 - 5 N/A
51. What was your stand on the Airport issue?
- 0 for it
 - 1 against it, because they wanted more
 - 2 against it
 - 3 inapplicable
 - 4 no stand
 - 5 other
 - 6 N/A
52. Who did you try to influence?
- 0 no one
 - 1 general public
 - 2 City Commission
 - 3 personal contacts
 - 4 (1, 2)
 - 5 (1, 3)
 - 6 (2, 3)
 - 7 (1, 2, 3)
 - 8 other
 - 9 N/A

53. How did you influence these people?

- 0 presentations
- 1 personal conversations
- 2 public comments -- newspapers and radio
- 3 (0, 1)
- 4 (0, 2)
- 5 (1, 2)
- 6 (0, 1, 2)
- 7 inapplicable
- 8 other
- 9 N/A

54. Were you successful?

- 0 yes
- 1 no
- 2 not sure
- 3 inapplicable
- 4 other
- 5 N/A

55. What was your stand on urban renewal?

- 0 for it
- 1 against it
- 2 inapplicable
- 3 no stand
- 4 other
- 5 N/A

56. Who did you try to influence?

- 0 no one
- 1 general public
- 2 City Commission
- 3 personal contacts
- 4 (1, 2)
- 5 (1, 3)
- 6 (2, 3)
- 7 (1, 2, 3)
- 8 other
- 9 N/A

57. How did you go about influencing these people?

- 0 presentations
- 1 personal conversations
- 2 public comments -- newspaper and radio
- 3 (0, 1)
- 4 (0, 2)
- 5 (1, 2)
- 6 (0, 1, 2)
- 7 inapplicable
- 8 other
- 9 N/A

58. Were you successful?

- 0 yes
- 1 no
- 2 not for sure
- 3 inapplicable
- 4 other
- 5 N/A

59. What was your stand on Wal-Mart?

- 0 for it
- 1 against it
- 2 inapplicable
- 3 no stand
- 4 other
- 5 N/A

60. Who did you influence?

- 0 no one
- 1 general public
- 2 City Commission
- 3 personal contacts
- 4 (1, 2)
- 5 (1, 3)
- 6 (2, 3)
- 7 (1, 2, 3)
- 8 other
- 9 N/A

61. How did you influence them?

- 0 presentations
- 1 personal conversations
- 2 public comments -- newspapers and radio
- 3 (0, 1)
- 4 (0, 2)
- 5 (1, 2)
- 6 (0, 1, 2)
- 7 inapplicable
- 8 other
- 9 N/A.

62. Were you successful?

- 0 yes
- 1 no
- 2 not sure
- 3 inapplicable
- 4 other
- 5 N/A

63. What is your stand on the proposed Shopping center?

- 0 for it
- 1 against it, town not large enough
- 2 against it
- 3 not decided yet
- 4 inapplicable
- 5 no stand
- 6 other
- 7 N/A

64. Who did you influence?

- 0 no one
- 1 general public
- 2 City Commission
- 3 personal contacts
- 4 (1, 2)
- 5 (1, 3)
- 6 (2, 3)
- 7 (1, 2, 3)
- 8 other
- 9 N/A

65. How did you influence them?

- 0 presentations
- 1 personal conversations
- 2 public comments -- newspapers and radio
- 3 (0, 1)
- 4 (0, 2)
- 5 (1, 2)
- 6 (0, 1, 2)
- 7 inapplicable
- 8 other
- 9 N/A

66. Were you successful?

- 0 yes
- 1 no
- 2 not sure
- 3 inapplicable
- 4 other
- 5 N/A

67. What was your stand on McCall's?

- 0 for it
- 1 against it
- 2 inapplicable
- 3 no stand
- 4 other
- 5 N/A

68. Who did you try to influence?

- 0 no one
- 1 general public
- 2 City Commission
- 3 personal contacts
- 4 (1, 2)
- 5 (1, 3)
- 6 (2, 3)
- 7 (1, 2, 3)
- 8 other
- 9 N/A

69. How did you influence these people?

- 0 presentations
- 1 personal conversations
- 2 public comments -- newspapers and radio
- 3 (0, 1)
- 4 (0, 2)
- 5 (1, 2)
- 6 (0, 1, 2)
- 7 inapplicable
- 8 other
- 9 N/A

70. Were you successful?

- 0 yes
- 1 no
- 2 not sure
- 3 inapplicable
- 4 other
- 5 N/A

71. Suppose a Corp were moving to town?

- 0 for it because of free enterprise system
- 1 for it depending on the type of industry it is
- 2 both of the above
- 3 inapplicable
- 4 against it
- 5 other
- 6 N/A

72. What would your role be in this situation?

- 0 would not get involved
- 1 work through city commission
- 2 work through company officials
- 3 work with the people of Manhattan to get them behind it
- 4 work through City Commission and corp officials
- 5 work through City Commission and with Manhattan people
- 6 work through corp officials and Manhattan people
- 7 work in all the ways listed above
- 8 other
- 9 N/A

73. The main trouble with democracy. . . .For this reason it will always be necessary to have a few strong and able people actually running everything.
- 0 Agree
 - 1 Disagree
 - 2 other
 - 3 inapplicable
 - 4 N/A
74. People ought to be allowed to vote even if they can't do so intellengently.
- 0 Agree
 - 1 Disagree
 - 2 other
 - 3 inapplicable
 - 4 N/A
75. There will always be poverty so people might as well get used to it.
- 0 Agree
 - 1 Disagree
 - 2 other
 - 3 inapplicable
 - 4 N/A
76. The more voice people have in government, the better the government will function.
- 0 Agree
 - 1 Disagree
 - 2 other
 - 3 inapplicable
 - 4 N/A
77. No matter what a persons political beliefs are, he is entitled to the same legal protections and rights as any one else.
- 0 Agree
 - 1 Disagree
 - 2 other
 - 3 inapplicable
 - 4 N/A
78. Do you think the Government wastes a lot of money?
- 0 wastes a lot
 - 1 wastes some
 - 2 doesn't waste very much
 - 3 other
 - 4 N/A

79. How much can you trust government to do right?
- 0 just about always
 - 1 some of the time
 - 2 just about never
 - 3 other
 - 4 N/A
80. How many people in government know what they are doing?
- 0 almost all
 - 1 only some
 - 2 hardly any
 - 3 other
 - 4 N/A
81. How much do people like you have to say in government?
- 0 quite a lot
 - 1 some
 - 2 not much
 - 3 other
 - 4 N/A
82. How much attention does the government pay to you?
- 0 a good deal
 - 1 some
 - 2 not much
 - 3 other
 - 4 N/A
83. How much do public officials care about you?
- 0 quite a lot
 - 1 some
 - 2 hardly at all
 - 3 other
 - 4 N/A

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A STUDY IN DECISION-MAKING ROLE PERCEPTIONS:
THE BANKERS OF MANHATTAN, KANSAS

by

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AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S THESIS

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ABSTRACT

The process of community decision-making has been the impetus for much political investigation in recent years. In order to gain greater understanding of the American political process, political science empiricists have conducted many investigations into the process of community decision-making. In this study, by investigating the decision-making influence of one sector of the community, valuable insight into the decision-making process of Manhattan, Kansas was obtained. This investigation was concerned with the amount of decision-making influence possessed and exerted by the bankers of Manhattan.

This investigation was initiated with the following hypothesis in mind: An elite sector of the Manhattan community, the bankers, possess and exercise much decision-making influence. This hypothesis was tested and disproved by the implementation of a perceptive approach to the study of community decision-making. By implementing a standard questionnaire, fifty-three bankers were personally interviewed. This approach was based on the bankers' perceptions of Manhattan's decision-making process.

The results of this investigation indicated that the bankers were an atypical sector of the Manhattan community. They were found to be socially and economically elite members of the community. The bankers were more socially active in civic clubs and organizations, better educated,

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better employed, and wealthier. The bankers were also found to maintain a coherence of belief systems--they were like-minded. A high level of political activity was also exhibited by the bankers. It was found that, from the weakest to the highest levels of political activity, the bankers were very active.

Being social and economic elites, possessing similar belief systems, and being politically active, it would seem that the bankers should possess a high level of decision-making influence. Even though they had possessed much decision-making influence in the past, it was found that the bankers do not exhibit a great amount of decision-making influence.

The evidence found in this investigation negates the initial hypothesis. Instead of the bankers demonstrating much influence in the decision-making process of Manhattan, it was found that they possess and exert little influence. Thus, they were not found to be decision-making elites of the Manhattan community.