

THE WARSAW PACT: AN ALLIANCE IN
THE AGE OF NEGOTIATIONS

by

11

349 5839

BILLY CARL BROWN

B.S., Texas A&M University, 1962

A MASTER'S REPORT

submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Political Science

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas

1973

Approved by:


Major Professor

LD
2668
R4
1973
B79
C.2
Document

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This study is dedicated to Connie, Elizabeth, and Billy -- whose sacrifice enabled me to continue when the family was being asked to give too much.

A special acknowledgement goes to my close friend and former fellow officer, Anthony P. Terracciano, who has, over the years, probably unknowingly, stimulated my intellectual curiosity and broadened my horizons of life.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	iii
CHAPTER	
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. ORIGIN OF THE WARSAW PACT	4
Post World War II Russian Foreign Policy	
Russian-East European Security Prior to	
the Warsaw Treaty Organization	
Establishment of the Warsaw Treaty	
Organization	
III. THE WARSAW TREATY	14
An Alliance of Equals?	
Provisions of the Treaty	
Status-of-Forces Agreements	
IV. THE WARSAW PACT AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1968	22
External Defense or Internal Control	
Sovereignty and the Brezhnev Doctrine	
Post Invasion Pact Changes	
V. THE WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION IN THE	
AGE OF NEGOTIATIONS	37
The Impact of Detente	
Ostpolitik and the WTO	
Russian and WTO Support for a Conference	
on European Security and Cooperation	
VI. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE	59
Problems Within the Warsaw Treaty	
Organization	
A New Forum for Europe?	
Conclusion	
FOOTNOTES	74
BIBLIOGRAPHY	81
APPENDICES	86

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to examine the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) in relation to the period of intensive international negotiations conducted since 1960. Specifically, the examination will consider the Pact's formation, significant events that have affected the Alliance, and what may be some of the prospects for change as a result of intra-alliance and international discussions.

It is assumed, a priori, that the WTO has been and continues to be in 1973, both a means of external defense and internal control for the Soviet Union. Military considerations will be discussed primarily in relation to the overall military-political nature of the organization. Examination of WTO developments in individual countries will be discussed only to show the impact on the alliance as a joint East European and Russian organization.

Credit has sometimes been given to alliances for preserving peace by insuring order and stability among the major nation-states. Modern alliances, such as the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have also been rated as instruments of peace even though they have prepared for war since their beginning. Alliances have in fact shown this duality of personality -- war promoting and peace-seeking -- throughout the ages.¹

Alliance strategies have often been linked to primarily domestic needs, but common perceptions of threat have probably been the most frequent sources of such strategies. As Thucydides noted over 2000 years ago, "mutual fear is the only solid basis upon which to organize an alliance."²

What has been the "nature" of the Warsaw Pact as an alliance? Is the WTO still an integral part of the Soviet Union's strategic and diplomatic considerations? What impact has the age of intensive international negotiations since 1960 had upon the alliance? These are some of the questions that will receive a close analysis in this study. But before these questions are considered, the events which led to the formation of the WTO should be examined in an attempt to understand the Soviet Union's view of the need for such an alliance.

Chapter II will concentrate on the events leading to the creation of the WTO. The political and military structure established by the Warsaw Treaty and subsequent agreements will be discussed in Chapter III. Chapter IV will analyze the Czechoslovakian crisis of 1968 and the role of the Warsaw Pact as an alliance in the crisis. The impact of the age of intensive negotiations of the 1960's and 1970's will be examined in Chapter V. The concluding section, Chapter VI, will evaluate some of the problems facing the alliance and consider what may be some of the prospects for the future.

Methodology

The emphasis of the discussion in the study will be

descriptive in nature. The study does not include within its scope either the ramifications of further deterioration of Russia and the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) relations or the impact of the current 1973 Mid-East crisis. The current Soviet-Chinese political differences are referred to in this study only to show the Soviet Union's attempts to use the Chinese-Russian border conflict as justification for expanding the scope of the alliance.

The terms Warsaw Treaty Organization, Warsaw Pact, and Pact will be used interchangeably throughout the study. Socialism will be used interchangeably, unless otherwise indicated, with the word communism. The terms will be considered synonymous to assist the reader in identifying those countries, people, and parties who maintain that Marxist-Leninist socialism is the last stage prior to communism.

CHAPTER II

ORIGIN OF THE WARSAW PACT

Post World War II Soviet Policy

By May 1945, military action in Europe had ceased and by September, World War II (WWII) had come to an end. By the end of the war, the Soviet Armies had marched across Eastern Europe into Berlin leaving behind them an area practically cut-off from the Western World. It was this tight grip on the Soviet liberated and simultaneously occupied countries that gave rise to the famous Churchill telegram to President Truman on May 12, 1945, in which he stated, "An iron curtain is drawn down upon their (Russian) front. We do not know what is going on behind." In the same telegram Mr. Churchill stated he "felt a deep anxiety because of the misinterpretation of the Yalta decision."³

Soviet post-war policy pursued three general objectives that appeared to be designed to insure the consolidation and extension of the power obtained in World War II. The policy has been summarized as:

1. Consolidation of wartime and post war territorial and economic gains and the strengthening of military power and potential. (e.g. the purge and cautious militarization of the satellite countries of Eastern Europe.)

2. Attempts to fill power vacuums. (e.g. Czechoslovakia in 1948.)

3. The stimulation and exploitation of all vulnerabi-

lities or contradictions within and between the noncommunist states, and colonies. (e.g. French fears of Germany, British-American differences, neutralism in Europe and Asia, civil war in Indo-China, nationalist agitation in the Near and Far East.)⁴

The Soviet Union achieved significant accomplishments in the first two categories, but in the third there were setbacks: Failure in the third category became the Russians' justification for establishing the WTO. The failure was that the intercapitalist contradictions did not develop as the USSR had predicted. Specifically, the West cooperated to form a united defense for Western Europe which included a rearmed West Germany.

Soviet-East European Security Prior to the WTO

Immediately following World War II the Soviet government was not prepared to accept collective security based on cooperation of the four major powers. The USSR did favor bilateral agreements.⁵

The formal approach the Soviet Union took to establish and maintain control over the newly acquired satellite countries was by means of a series of bilateral state agreements. The treaties of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance were the most significant. These bilateral alliances had the cumulative effect -- both politically and legally -- of a multilateral collective security treaty.⁶

When NATO was established in the Spring of 1949, the USSR had treaties of mutual assistance with:

Czechoslovakia (December 12, 1943)
 Poland (April 1945)
 Rumania (February 4, 1948)
 Hungary (February 18, 1948)
 Bulgaria (March 18, 1948)

In addition, there were in force the following mutual assistance treaties concluded by the Soviet allies themselves in Eastern Europe.⁷

Czechoslovakia-Poland (March 10, 1947)
 Bulgaria-Albania (December 16, 1947)
 Bulgaria-Rumania (January 16, 1948)
 Hungary-Rumania (January 24, 1948)
 Czechoslovakia-Bulgaria (April 23, 1948)
 Bulgaria-Poland (May 29, 1948)
 Hungary-Poland (June 18, 1948)
 Bulgaria-Hungary (July 16, 1948)
 Czechoslovakia-Rumania (July 21, 1948)
 Poland-Rumania (January 26, 1949)
 Czechoslovakia-Hungary (April 16, 1949)

Albania was connected with the system of bilateral alliances by a treaty with Bulgaria. East Germany had defense agreements with other Eastern European countries and it was not until June 12, 1964, that she received her mutual assistance treaty with the Soviet Union. Not included in this system of treaties were the seven treaties to which Yugoslavia was a party. These seven were repudiated at the end of 1949 following Tito's defection from the Cominform.⁸ As the key provisions of these treaties were identical, the general effect was that of a collective agreement.

The bilateral alliances were actually developed in four distinct and politically significant phases.⁹ The first stage from December 1943, to March 1947, linked the USSR with those states which had fought on the side of the Allies during the war. Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia signed treaties with the Soviet Union and in turn signed alliances

of mutual aid among themselves. These pacts between the Soviet Union and the East European countries explicitly mentioned non-interference in the internal affairs of the member nations.

The second stage from July 1947 to January 1948, was also unique. During this period Tito of Yugoslavia and Dimitrov of Bulgaria were conducting discussions concerning the possibility of forming a Balkan Union. When the USSR officially took a stand against such a union, the bilateral treaties were completed in similar manner to those of the first phase.¹⁰

The third stage saw the Soviet Union signing treaties with the "ex-enemies" -- Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria. These treaties accounted for all satellite countries except East Germany.

The fourth, and final, stage brought East Germany into the socialist pact system -- but not at the same level as the other East European countries. East Germany was officially a de-militarized state, therefore, the Eastern European treaties involving East Germany were limited to treaties of friendship. The bilateral security system was augmented by an informal integration of the satellite armed forces with those of the Soviet Union.

The general pattern of Soviet control following WWII was characterized initially by a deemphasis of the armed forces of the satellite countries. The demobilization also insured the removal of any prewar officers whose policies were likely to be anti-Communist. Only in Yugoslavia which was not

liberated by Russian troops during WWII did the Army maintain its end of war strength. Yugoslavia was also an exception because of the tensions over Trieste, nationalism from the war, and Tito's effective control.¹¹

It was not until after 1948, when international tensions grew, that the Soviet Union initiated energetic efforts to build up the satellite forces into more modern organizations. However, with the enlargement of the Armed Forces came the problem of loyalty, both to the existing East European governments and to the USSR. The Russian's concern with loyalty was demonstrated by the appointment of trusted Communists to head the respective armed forces of the East European countries.¹²

Establishment of the WTO

The Soviet Union had already signed the bilateral treaties previously discussed. Only East Germany and Albania were not included in the treaties of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. Why the multilateral alliance? What purpose did it serve for Moscow? What was the relation to the domestic developments of the Soviet Union?¹³

On the international level, the Russians' explanation or justification appeared to be straightforward. The Pact was based on Russian and East European fears of a rearmed Germany. Specifically, it grew out of Moscow's efforts to prevent West German membership in the West European Union (WEU) which was the way West Germany would eventually become a member of NATO.

In January 1946, the United States government offered to conclude a Four Power mutual assistance treaty with the Soviet Union, France, and Britain. The treaty was designed to guarantee the disarmament of Germany and the collective security of Europe. The United States followed this proposal with a draft of such an agreement which it submitted on April 29, 1946, to the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers. The Russian leadership was unresponsive to the idea of a joint guarantee of European security and suggested that consideration of the American proposal be postponed to some future date.¹⁴

When the American proposal was made, however, the Soviet Union was more interested in a concrete opportunity for extending its influence over those elements of the German economy which could serve as a source of future German military might. At the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, which was held in March 1947, Molotov insisted that a special regime of control representing all four powers be established over the Ruhr industrial area.¹⁵

From 1946 to the establishment of the WTO, the Soviet Union sought a more favorable solution to the European security question and German rearmament in particular. On June 24, 1948, foreign ministers of the USSR, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland, Rumania, and Hungary issued a declaration condemning the Six Power Conference, which had met in London from February to June 1948, for its discussion on Germany. On October 20, 1950, a similar conference of foreign ministers, but without Yugoslavia, and

including the German Democratic Republic (GDR) which in the meantime had achieved statehood, issued a declaration condemning the decision of September 19, 1949, by the Americans, British, and French governments. The Western powers had agreed to end the state of war with Germany and to revise the occupation statute. The Soviet and East European declaration also took issue with the North Atlantic Council's decision to organize a German Army contingent as a part of the defense force of Western Europe.¹⁶

On February 10, 1954, Molotov proposed to the conference of the Big Four Foreign Ministers that they draw up a Treaty of Collective Security in Europe. In the summer of 1954, the USSR prepared a note directed against ratification of the Paris Agreements which would permit West German entry into NATO. The note was sent to the governments of twenty-three other European countries and the United States, inviting them to take part in an all-European Security Conference to be held in either Moscow or Paris in November 1954. The USSR note condemned the October 23, 1954, Paris Agreements for resurrecting German militarism in violation of previous international agreements and stressed that German unity would be the price of including West Germany in the West European Union.¹⁷

The West refused the Soviet Union's offer for a European Security Conference just as they had disapproved the Russian proposal for a collective security pact for Europe. Only the East European countries attended the November meeting in Moscow. The announced purpose of the meeting was to settle

the German question and to prevent the splitting of Europe into separate defense arrangements. As a result of the United States and other Western powers refusal to participate, the conference issued a warning that if the Western powers should ratify the Paris Agreements, the East European States would go ahead with their own collective security arrangement to counter-balance the threat of a revived German militarism.¹⁸

But the organization of the WTO was apparently prompted by more than military fears of West Germany and her non-communist allies. While the military and political role of the Pact as a reaction to developments in Western Europe tends to overshadow its other functions, it also played an important role in relation to political developments within the USSR's sphere of influence. A paramount goal was to continue the presence of Russian troops in Eastern Europe under new legal arrangements and in a new role, not connected with the occupation status of Austria and East Germany.

Throughout 1955, the innerparty struggle among Stalin successors had created wide repercussions. The principal cause of the conflict resulted from differing views of the "correct" foreign policy and military doctrine, both vital questions for the Soviet Union's evaluation of the Warsaw Treaty Organization.¹⁹

Malenkov as Premier, was associated with both the Soviet Union's commitment to detente and with the theory that nuclear war could mean "the destruction of world civilization". Within the Soviet Politburo, Khrushchev, Molotov, Bulganin, and

Voroshilov had been opposed to Malenkov. Their opposition, in foreign policy matters, demanded sustained "vigilance" and the full development of Russian defense in order to combat the "aggression of the imperialist". The anti-Malenkov group viewed steps to reduce international tension with suspicion. At the Moscow Conference of future Warsaw Pact members in November-December, 1954, Molotov, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, presented the Russian view of the situation facing the conference participants. According to Molotov, the threat of a rearmed Germany and the aggressive element of the West and the United States required not only a "special vigilance" but also practical measures to safeguard "socialist securities."²⁰

However, Malenkov's domestic program was defeated in late 1954 and January 1955 and Bulganin assumed the premiership. When Bulganin took over the premiership, Molotov became a member of a collective leadership which appeared to be concerned with moving away from a hard-line approach to foreign relations. The extent to which Molotov had been downgraded was evident by his reduced role at the Warsaw Treaty Conference in early May 1955. Molotov went to the conference, but Bulganin spoke for the government. Molotov had previously stressed at the preceding Moscow Conference that the threats to peace centered on the Paris Agreements and the aggressive nature of the Western Powers. Bulganin began by stating that "the unalterable principle of Russian foreign policy is Lenin's principle of co-existence of different social systems." Molotov's emphasis had been on the

aggressive plans of the West. Bulganin stressed in contrast: the Soviet Union's commitment to peace; the Austrian settlement; and Soviet disarmament proposals.²¹ However, the degree of hostility toward the West was not the only difference between the position of Molotov and the Bulganin statement to the Warsaw Conference. Bulganin's reference to the future East European members of the Warsaw Treaty stressed the equality of these countries in contrast to Molotov's assertion that the future Warsaw alliance was an instrument of socialist coordination which would guarantee the boundaries of the socialist camp.²²

The Warsaw Treaty was signed by the USSR, Hungary, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland, and Rumania on May 14, 1955 -- one day prior to the signing of the State Treaty for the re-establishment of an independent and democratic Austria. The Austrian Treaty removed the legal basis for the continued presence of Russian garrisons in Hungary and Rumania. No less important to the Russians was the need for a new legal justification for the huge Russian garrison in East Germany. The signing of the Warsaw Treaty concluded the legal integration of East Germany into the framework of the "socialist commonwealth". It gave the East Germans the right to have their own army. It transformed the occupation of East Germany into Russian-East German military cooperation. The presence of Russian troops in East Germany was no longer dictated by the need to enforce Russian rights.²³

CHAPTER III

THE WARSAW TREATY

An Alliance of Equals?

The Warsaw Pact as an organization reflects several of the contradictions inherent in Russian relations with Eastern Europe. The Pact is presented as an alliance of sovereign states, yet its military organization and policies are decided in Moscow. The two main institutions that were established as a part of the Pact organizations from the beginning were the Political Consultative Committee (PCC) and the Joint Command. The PCC has two auxiliary bodies -- a Secretariat and a standing commission -- both of which are located in Moscow and dominated by Russian officials. The Joint Command's Commander-in-Chief and Chief-of-Staff have always been Russian officers. There is no Warsaw Pact military doctrine separate from USSR doctrine. The Soviet Union has always maintained tight control over all nuclear weapons. There is no separate command or logistical organization for the Pact. Warsaw Pact air defenses are under the command of the Soviet Union. Russian efforts to improve the military capabilities of the WTO appear to have taken place in the context of centralization and control from Moscow. Thus the more the Russians have sought to improve the Pact as a military instrument, the more it seems to have contradicted the idea of the Pact as an "alliance of equals."²⁴

Provisions of the Treaty

The treaty text (Appendix I) and organizational structure reflect the international priorities of the Khrushchev-Bulganin leadership. The treaty consists of eleven articles defining the member-states relationship to one another, the United Nations, and to nonmember states. There are actually two basic documents that created the Pact. The first was the treaty itself with the eleven articles. The second document, attached to the treaty, established the Joint Command of the WTO military forces.²⁵

In the basic treaty, the majority of the clauses concern the relations between member states. Basing the treaty on the "principal of respect for independence and sovereignty of others and noninterference in internal affairs" (Article VIII), the members agreed (1) to settle all disputes peacefully (Article 1); (2) to consult on all international issues affecting their common interests; (3) to consult immediately in the event that one of the treaty partners is threatened with armed attack so as to "ensure joint defense" (Article III); (4) to establish a joint command (Article V) and a political consultative committee (Article VI); and (5) to promote economic and cultural intercourse with the group (Article VIII). The treaty specified that it was in accordance with the U.N. Charter (Article I) and that measures of joint defense would be taken under Article 51 of the charter (Article IV). Non-member states were invited to join the treaty if they agreed with its aims "irrespective of their social and political systems" (Article IX). In Article II, the treaty participants

pledged to take part in international activities designed to safeguard the peace and, in turn, not to join any coalitions or alliances or make any agreements in conflict with the treaty (Article VII). The duration of the Treaty was predicated on the development of a General European Treaty of Collective Security and thus dependent upon actions of both members and nonmembers.

The individual articles of the WTO and NATO are similar in many respects. However, one difference in the treaties should be discussed before proceeding. The conditions of assistance and definition of aggression vary between the two alliances.

Defense alliances, in the words of Kazimierz Grzybowski, "attempt to provide security by making a common danger of a common cause."²⁶ A treaty of alliance uses the technique of providing for a stereotype situation, which should be met by a stereotype common action. The precondition for the limitation of common action is the restriction of freedom of individual action by the participating nations. Such limitation is created as the members of the alliance agree to consider some aspects of international relations matters of common concern, and to react in a predetermined manner in such a situation. This situation constitutes the so-called "casus phoederis", and it provides the key to determining the political nature of the alliance.²⁷

Article IV of the Warsaw Treaty provides that in case of an

armed attack in Europe on one or more of the

Parties to the treaty by any state or group of states, each of the Parties to the treaty, in the exercise of its rights to individual or collective self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations Organization, shall immediately, either individually, or in agreement with other Parties to the Treaty, come to the assistance of the states attacked with all such means as it deems necessary, including armed force. The Parties to the Treaty shall immediately consult concerning the necessary measures to be taken by them jointly in order to restore and maintain international peace and security.²⁸

The provisions of Article IV of the Warsaw Treaty are almost the same as Article V of the NATO Pact (Appendix II). Both provide for action either by individual states or collectively in case of an armed attack. Article 5 of the NATO alliance provides that

the Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all, and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

In both cases the extent of their commitment is rather elastic, leaving the choice of actions to be taken to be determined by the specific situation, without committing the parties "irrevocably" to the use of force.²⁹

Common defense arrangements of the "Socialist Commonwealth of nations" have been designed for cases of external attack. Professor Tunkin, a spokesman for the Soviet Union on international law, proposed that the Warsaw Treaty differs significantly from "capitalist treaties of alliances." Under Article IV of the Warsaw Treaty, the duty of other members to come to the assistance of the victim of aggression arises only in case of an attack "by any state or group of states." Professor Tunkin interprets these terms as a guarantee of assistance in the case of external aggression only, although, as Professor Tunkin states, "the treaty gives no legalistic definition of aggression." As it speaks only of an "armed attack in Europe" "by any state or group of states" it must be interpreted in accordance with the general principles of international law, which refer only to an armed conflict between states. Professor Tunkin maintains that the Warsaw Pact differs basically in this respect from the capitalist treaties of alliance. He cites the example of the Inter-American Treaty where the *casus foederis* was defined as arising in connection with an armed attack on the part of any state. None of the other capitalist treaties of "similar nature," including the Brussels Treaty of 1948 and 1954, the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, or the Manila Treaty of September 8, 1954, have, in his words, "specified that an attack setting the alliance machinery in motion must be an armed attack by another state."³⁰

Grzybowski concluded that, "as Tunkin sees it the lack of precision on this important point in the capitalist alli-

ances is not without purpose. It permits a broad and loose interpretation of the circumstances authorizing a foreign government to undertake an armed action, which may amount to an intervention in the internal affairs of another state. As by definition, there is no danger of an external attack on the part of any socialist state, all capitalist treaties of alliance are designed to be used primarily for the suppression of internal political movements. As Grzybowski specifically noted,

that this interpretation of the Warsaw Treaty was the official view of the Soviet government is indicated not only by the close connection of Professor Tunkin with the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It must be remembered that the Warsaw Treaty was offered to European countries as an alternative to two opposed collective security arrangements dividing Europe along ideological lines. The Warsaw Treaty was drafted to permit membership to states without regard to their social or political order. *Casus phoederis* in this situation had to be restricted to formal cases of external aggression.³¹

Status of Forces Agreements

Prior to 1956, the Soviet Union apparently considered itself free to move troops wherever it desired within Eastern and Central Europe. But the Polish and Hungarian revolts in the Fall of 1956, prompted the Soviet government to seek additional justification for the presence of Russian troops in the territory of other socialist countries. An effort was also made to determine more precisely the terms of the relations between the Russians and the local authorities and populations. The basis for the Soviet Union's concern was shown by the

following in Pravda on October 31, 1956.

With a view to establishing the mutual security of the socialist countries, the Soviet government is ready to examine, with other parties to the Warsaw Pact, the question of Soviet troops stationed in the territory of those countries. In this the Soviet government proceeds from the principle that the stationing of troops in one state, which is a part to the Warsaw Pact, on the territory of another member state should take place on the basis of an agreement among all the Pact's participants, in addition to the agreement of the state on whose territory whose troops are stationed, or are planned to be stationed at its request.³²

Status-of-forces treaties were completed with Poland (December 1956), East Germany (March 1957), Rumania (April 1957) and Hungary (May 1957). Russian troops were withdrawn from Rumania in 1958, which nullified the Russian-Rumanian Agreement. These agreements were the first such arrangements to be made known publicly, although secret accords may have already existed. The treaties followed a somewhat standard approach with the exception of the East German arrangement. The agreement with East Germany is unique in that it included a safety clause allowing the USSR to interfere if it found its own security to be endangered. Article 18 of the treaty states:

In case of a threat to the security of the Soviet forces which are stationed on the territory of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the High Command of the Soviet Forces in the GDR, in appropriate consultation with the GDR government, and taking into account the actual situation and the measures adopted by the GDR state organs, may apply measures for the elimination of such a threat.³³

Apart from the East German exception, the remainder of the agreements dealt with the following issues:³⁴

- The strength and movement of Soviet forces in the host country.
- The jurisdiction over Soviet forces, individual soldiers, members of Soviet military families and civilian employees while on the territory of the host country.
- Soviet control and use of military installations on the territory of the host country.
- Jurisdiction of local authorities in civil and criminal matters arising out of, or in conjunction with, the presense of Soviet troops.
- Matters subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of Soviet authorities.
- Settlement of mutual claims.

It should be stressed that the published text of the Warsaw Treaty (which excludes the secret protocols and conventions which probably are actually the most important regulators of the political-military relations among the member countries) constitutes a "superstructure" for the existing bilateral pacts between the Soviet Union and each participating country.³⁵ The events in Poland and Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, tend to support such an assertion.

CHAPTER IV

THE WARSAW PACT AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1968

External Defense or Internal Control

In August 1968, the armies of the Soviet Union, East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria invaded Czechoslovakia.³⁶ Moscow attempted to justify the invasion as an obligation under the Warsaw Treaty. The justification was difficult to understand based strictly on the wording of the articles of the Pact where no stipulation pertains to the intervention in the internal affairs of a WTO member state. What effect did developments in Czechoslovakia have on the Russian perception of the Warsaw Pact? How did the alliance function preceding and during the confrontation? Did actual changes occur in the coalition?³⁷ These particular questions should provide a basis for examining the operation of the alliance during the crisis.

The invasion of Czechoslovakia, however, was not the first time that Russian forces had come to the "defense" of socialism in an East European communist state. In 1956, there were the riots in Poland and the revolt in Hungary. Actually in Poland the Russian troops were not committed in armed conflict. On October 19, 1956, a Russian delegation headed by Khrushchev landed unannounced in Warsaw to discuss Polish domestic problems with Wladyslaw Gomulka. Simultaneously, Russian troops and tanks started moving toward the capital. Gomulka explained the Polish revisionist policies,

stressed that the changes were being performed by the Polish Communist Party that still held close ties to Moscow. His explanations were accepted and the Russian troops returned to their bases.³⁸

An important point that distinguished the Polish crisis from the Hungarian and Czechoslovakian revolts was the fact that the Polish Communist Party did not try and break away from the Warsaw Pact. In short, what mattered most to the Russians was that the Communist Party should remain in power -- a promise which Gomulka made and kept. Also, the move by the USSR forces was a unilateral action without an effort to coordinate WTO involvement.

The Hungarian revolt occurred shortly after the Polish uprising and for similar reasons, but the Hungarians went much further with their demands. Not only did they want a greater autonomy for the Hungarian Workers' Communist Party, but the Imre Nagy leadership just prior to the actual outbreak of violence of October 23, 1956, stopped a proposed farm collectivization program, reduced the concentration of investment in heavy industry, and began to decentralize the economy and strengthen the functions of state as distinct from the Party.³⁹

As startling as these changes were, it appeared that the Soviet Union was prepared to accept them -- at least for the present. Ghita Ionescu concluded that,

Initially, the revolution had not only succeeded in Hungary, it had been accepted in Moscow as an unwanted but hard fact by 29 October. By then, however, violent, popular feelings in Hungary demanded com-

plete independence from the Communist
"Yoke".⁴⁰

The overall concluding events were summarized by
Bennett Kovrig:

In the first place, Nagy was returned as a figurehead premier, but under the pressure of the revolutionaries his regime acquired the outlines of a multi-party system. Following rather than leading the uprising, he found himself insisting on the evacuation of Soviet forces and ultimately announced Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and appealed to the United Nations for recognition and protection in his country's neutrality.⁴¹

The Bulganin warning in Warsaw on July 21, 1956, that "while every country should go its own way to socialism...we cannot permit this to be used to break up the solidarity of the camp of peace" was apparently the basis for the October intervention in Hungary. Overcoming the earlier hesitation, on November 4, 1956, the Soviet Union launched a counter offensive of intervention and repression. The Russian decision to use force was apparently a reluctant one. Obviously the use of force would clash with the policy that was being labeled as "peaceful co-existence" and "anti-colonialism." But the real or imagined danger of a neutral Hungary bordering the USSR was apparently too much for the Russians and such a situation could have caused further revolt in the remaining East European countries. The intervention and the consequences were serious setbacks to the de-Stalinization and liberalization of East European states that had been developing since Stalin's death. The Hungarians had just cause to question the action

of its Warsaw Pact partner [Soviet Union] in relation to Article VIII of the WTO concerning respect for independence and sovereignty and noninterference in domestic affairs. Again, as in Poland, the Soviet Union's move was a unilateral action. Events leading to the Czechoslovakian intervention in 1968 would parallel the Hungarian situation in many respects.

The 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia is the most significant of the Eastern European crises in relation to a study of the Warsaw Pact as an alliance. The WTO intervened as a Pact force. Why did the Russians apparently go to such great lengths to make the Czechoslovakian intervention a joint Warsaw Pact effort rather than another unilateral action?

The Czechoslovakian revolt was significantly different from the Polish and Hungarian situations in several respects. The differences are valuable considerations in evaluating how much transformation is possible in the nature of the alliance. In the words of the anonymous "Journalist M" who wrote A Year Is Eight Months: Czechoslovakia 1968,

Today it is clear that the intervention [Soviet and WTO Armies] was not the result of strategic considerations. Czechoslovakia did not resign from the Warsaw Pact, nor was she interested in neutrality....

He continued by explaining that the main reason for intervention was not a Russian fear that the freedom of press and assembly that had been proclaimed in Czechoslovakia might spread to other countries. Certainly this freedom was inflama-

tory and threatened gradually to become a great danger to centralism as conceived by the Russians, but informed sources explained that this was not a decisive factor.⁴²

The main cause of the intervention was the danger that Czechoslovakia would free herself from the strict control that the USSR had exercised for twenty years, which Moscow bureaucrats considered the most important guarantee of their influence. All connections between the USSR supported regime and the Czechoslovakian state security forces, intelligence organization, Army, and party apparatus were in danger of being destroyed. During the "Prague Spring," the pro-Soviet officials were removed from these institutions and replaced by individuals whom the Russians did not know and whose obedience was not assured.⁴³

Initial efforts were made to exert economic pressures on Czechoslovakia throughout the beginning months of 1968 in an attempt to regain control over the situation. In May 1968, Secretary Dubcek visited the USSR for talks with Secretary Brezhnev, President Podgorny, and Premier Kosygin. This meeting was followed on May 8, by a one-day summit in Moscow for Communist Party leaders from Bulgaria, Poland, East Germany, and Hungary. The purpose of the May 8 meeting was to continue discussions on the Czechoslovakian problem.⁴⁴

Soviet Union pressure on Czechoslovakia then shifted as the military pressure started to increase, apparently after the softer economic approach had failed to achieve the desired results. At this point, the Russians who were advocating strong measures may have begun to attain greater influence.

The softer economic approach was believed to be supported by Kosygin and Podgorny, while Brezhnev was alleged to be in favor of the tough military approach.⁴⁵ On May 10, Radio Prague indicated that thousands of Russian troops were moving in the vicinity of the Polish-Czechoslovakian border to participate in Warsaw Treaty maneuvers. The radio further stated that the Czech government had been notified of the exercise well in advance. On May 17, the Russian leaders again attempted to solve the dilemma peacefully by dispatching Premier Kosygin to Prague for a "continuation of the exchange of views with Czechoslovakian leaders."⁴⁶ Further, and to keep both sides of the struggle in the picture, an eight-man USSR military delegation headed by Defense Minister Marshal Andre A. Grechko arrived in Prague on the same day. The Kosygin visit, however, was suddenly terminated three days short of the announced period followed by his return to Moscow without explanation. Kosygin's visit apparently had been to evaluate what was going on in Czechoslovakia and to try to persuade the Dubcek followers to return to a more acceptable communist position. In any event, his mission seemed to fail and he returned to the Kremlin. The military delegation, however, did not fail. On May 24, the Czechoslovakian News Agency CTK announced that the Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty nations were going to conduct a joint command and staff maneuver in Czechoslovakia and Poland in June, under the direction of Marshal Yakubovsky, the Russian Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Treaty forces. This action was a further indication that the Russian leaders

were attempting by both economic and physical pressure to discourage the Czech leaders from continuing their independent course. It also revealed that two factions were apparently competing for influence within the Russian leadership over how to solve the problem.⁴⁷ On July 11, Pravda again unleashed a propaganda warning to the Czech leadership by stating that the Soviet Union and other socialist countries were concerned over the counter-revolutionary activities in that country and that they were keeping watch on the country's democratization program.

In July 1968, a two day conference was held in Warsaw to provide the Czechoslovakian leadership with an expression of the collective opposition toward the reform movement. From this conference the Soviet Union, East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria developed the "Warsaw Letter". The letter stated that:

It is the common affairs of our countries, which have united in the Warsaw Pact to safeguard their independence, peace, and security in Europe and to place an insurmountable barrier in front of the schemes of imperialist forces, aggression and revanche. Never will we consent to allow imperialism by peaceful or nonpeaceful means, from within or without, to make a break in the socialist system and change the balance of power in Europe in its favor.⁴⁸

This act was followed by an unprecedented move in Russian politics. After the Czechoslovakian leadership refused to meet with Russian leaders in the USSR, the entire Russian Politburo traveled to the border of Czechoslovakia to meet with the collective Presidium of the Czech Communist Party.

This extraordinary meeting took place July 29, 1968, and was held to allow the Russian leaders a first-hand look at the Czech problem and to determine how much support Secretary Dubcek had from his colleagues. This historic meeting terminated with an agreement from the Czech leaders to meet with the other socialist nations of Eastern Europe on August 3, in Bratislava.⁴⁹

The August summit ultimately resulted in a joint agreement from all parties to "search and find ways of strengthening and promoting the fraternal cooperation among socialist states and not to permit anyone to undermine the foundations of the socialist system." Czechoslovakia promised in general to remain a loyal member of the world communist movement and in particular to support the Warsaw Treaty and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon). The Bratislava declarations were acclaimed throughout the communist world as a most significant step in solving the Czech problem. All parties were encouraged by Pravda to live up to the accords of Bratislava.⁵⁰ Apparently all was settled and the crisis was over. Unfortunately, this was not the case, for on August 18, Pravda proclaimed that the Czech leadership appeared to be losing control in the country, "subversive activities by anti-socialist forces have reversed and brought about a threatening situation."⁵¹ It further asserted that the workers of Czechoslovakia could rest assured that assistance was forthcoming from their communist neighbors to rebuff the counter-revolutionaries. Pravda further stressed the importance of keeping the Bratislava agreements. On August 20, 1968, the

Warsaw Pact (less Rumania) forces moved into Czechoslovakia.

Tass said,

Further aggravation of the situation in Czechoslovakia affects the vital interests of the Soviet Union and other socialist states....Party and government leaders of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic have asked the Soviet Union and other allied states to render the fraternal Czechoslovak people urgent assistance with armed forces. This request was brought about by the threat that has arisen to the socialist system existing in Czechoslovakia, and to the statehood established by the constitution, the threat emanating from the counterrevolutionary forces that have entered into a collusion with foreign forces hostile to socialism....This decision [to invade] is fully in accord with the rights of states to individual and collective self-defense envisaged in treaties of alliance concluded between the fraternal socialist countries.⁵²

The Pact attempted to justify the intervention by asserting that the defense of the communist states was not merely the concern of each country acting separately, but of all socialist countries. At the same time, it was also declared that each socialist country was obliged to preserve the leading role of the Communist Party and to wage a relentless struggle against bourgeois ideology and against all anti-communist forces.

The WTO was used as a front for the intervention in Czechoslovakia. The use of force in both Hungary and Czechoslovakia was justified "ex post-facto" by the Soviet Union by reference to the Warsaw Pact, but in fact there were no meetings of the Political Consultative Committee during the Hungarian crisis, and in the Czechoslovakian crisis the last meeting was held in March 1968. In the Czech crisis consultations after the March meeting were conducted on a bilateral and multi-

lateral basis outside the framework of the Warsaw Pact. The invasion was commanded not by the Warsaw Pact Commander-in-Chief, but by General Pavlovskii, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces.⁵³

The Russians provided additional justification politically and publically with the Brezhnev Doctrine. In essence the Brezhnev Doctrine was an elaboration of the Bulganin declaration of July 21, 1956.

Sovereignty and the Brezhnev Doctrine

Interestingly enough the "Brezhnev Doctrine" did not mention the Warsaw Pact.⁵⁴ First formulated by Sergi Kovalov in Pravda on September 26, 1968, it put forth a concept of limited sovereignty within the socialist community. In Kovalov's view, "sovereignty among socialist states must not be understood abstractly. Rather, within the socialist commonwealth international law must be subordinated to the laws of class struggle." In short, Moscow reserved the right to intervene militarily or otherwise if developments in any socialist country inflicted damage upon either socialism in that country or the basic interests of other socialist countries. Obviously incompatible with Warsaw Treaty guarantees of independence and noninterference in internal affairs, the logic of this interpretation would restrict the Warsaw Pact to an instrument for Russian political and military "coordination" among European Communist states.⁵⁵

Emphasis was on "consolidation" in a world situation threatening the survival of socialism. The idea was not new,

It echoed the "two camp theory" outlined by Zhdanov at the forming of the Comiform in 1947. Prior consultation in the Czech invasion had been limited to those members of the Warsaw Pact that agreed.⁵⁶ Rumania as mentioned earlier was the only Pact member that did not participate.

Secretary Brezhnev put his "personal stamp of approval" on the concept when he addressed the Fifth Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party on November 13, 1968. In Brezhnev's words,

And when internal forces hostile to socialism try to turn the developments of a given socialist country in the direction of restoration of the capitalist system, when a threat arises to the cause of socialism in that country -- a threat to the security of the socialist commonwealth as a whole -- this is no longer merely a problem for that country's people but a common problem, the concern of all socialist countries.⁵⁷

The significance of sovereignty and the different interpretation which may be applied was no more evident than with the Czechoslovakian crisis. The term sovereignty has numerous meanings depending upon the context in which it is used. One of these meanings appears to apply to the general discussion of alliance, nation-states, and the special relationship being discussed with the Brezhnev Doctrine. Sovereignty is defined as:

that special quality of the state, the quality of being a supreme power or supreme order of human behavior....However, to be a sovereign seems to be incompatible with being subject to a normative order; thus to maintain the idea of the state as the supreme authority this term is understood to mean only supreme legal authority, so that soverei-

gnty of the state means only that state is not subject to a legal order, e.g., the national law.⁵⁸

Sovereignty outside the Russian interpretation seems to imply the independent existence and equality of the state with other states, and attributes to the state full and unlimited jurisdiction over its territory and its unlimited ability to enter into international affairs.⁵⁹ In the extreme, a sovereign state may have the power to judge its own controversies, to treat its own nationals as it sees fit, to enforce its own conception of its rights, to increase its military armaments without limit, and to regulate its economy without regard to the effect of these regulations on its neighbors.⁶⁰ As reflected in the United Nations Charter, every state is fundamentally entitled to political independence and legal equality vis a vis all other states.⁶¹

The Soviet Union contends there is a duality to international law that has existed since the Great October Revolution in 1917. This duality in the Russian attitude toward traditional international law has been reflected in the use of sovereignty both as a shield to protect the Soviet Union from interference by capitalist states, and as a weapon in its class struggle with such states. While sovereignty is defined in USSR State Law as "...the supremacy of the state within its territory and its independence in international relations" the Russian view of sovereignty must remain dynamic. Sovereignty must contribute to the ultimate victory of socialism by providing legal support for the foreign policies and practices of the Soviet Union. Thus respect for state sovereignty

must not be an impediment whenever communist forces have an opportunity to gain political control.⁶²

The Soviet Union seems to accept traditional international law when it is to the Russians' advantage and rejects it when it is not. The universal condemnation of the Russian intervention in Czechoslovakia as a violation of international law is groundless, according to an article in Pravda, because such reasoning consists primarily of an "abstract non-class" approach to the concept of sovereignty and the right to self-determination. "...the norms of mutual relations of the socialist countries cannot be interpreted narrowly, formally and in isolation from the context of the class struggle in the modern world."⁶³

In Kovalov's view, men do not wield or submit to sovereignty. They wield or submit to authority or power. Authority and power are facts as old as political society itself, but they have not always enjoyed the support or suffered the restraints that the theory of sovereignty seeks to construct for them. Although it may be thought of as something concrete that may be lost or acquired, eroded or increased, sovereignty is not a fact. Kovalov concludes that sovereignty is an assumption about authority -- a concept men have applied in certain circumstances to the political power that they or other men were exercising.⁶⁴

The Brezhnev Doctrine was a clear expression to the remaining WTO members that independent action by Pact members would be tolerated only as long as it was in line with the Soviet Union's principal objectives. The implication appeared

to be that independent action would not be permitted if it did not recognize the central leadership role of the Soviet Union.

Post Invasion Pact Changes

From a military standpoint there were changes made following the invasion. Despite the politically divisive effects of the invasion, military activity of the Pact was intensified. The defense ministers met in Moscow October 28-30, 1968. A session of the Chiefs-of-Staff followed in Bucharest roughly a month later. The Moscow meeting participants had agreed in principle "to strengthen the Warsaw Pact" militarily, but such efforts made no visible progress until the March 1969 Political Consultative Committee meeting in Budapest.⁶⁵

The Budapest meeting approved both a standing committee of defense ministers and a new statute on the Joint Armed Forces. Based on drafts prepared by the member countries during the time that had elapsed since the PCC March meeting in Sofia, this reform was the first formal change in military aspects of the coalition since the communique on the establishment of the Joint Armed Forces in 1955.⁶⁶

It is difficult to judge whether or not these changes represented a significant jump in actual integration of forces. Since the Czechoslovakian invasion there have been increases in WTO military maneuvers and Political Consultative Committee meetings. What has been the actual increase in efficiency or degree of participation by Pact members remains unknown.

A more comprehensive analysis of Pact changes will be discussed in the concluding chapter.

CHAPTER V

THE WARSAW PACT IN THE AGE OF NEGOTIATIONS

The Impact of Detente

Detente between the Soviet Union and the West would seem to depend upon at least a continuation of the dialogue that has been established between the United States and Russian leaders. However, the success of detente as an "on going spirit" -- if it is such, should probably be measured by the results of the international negotiations that are being conducted. Many Westerners remain suspicious of Soviet Union's motives and consider the Russian's objectives as irrevocably in conflict with the West. The difficulty of understanding Russian policy continues because of the appearance of Russian efforts to be moving in different directions. "Is this to be taken as evidence of subtle and agile policy-making, of confusion about goals and methods, or perhaps of the need to mollify conflicting views and interests in Moscow?"⁶⁷

How has the period of detente between East and West affected the WTO? As Roman Kolkowicz noted,

Major alliance systems created for specific military or political purposes are essentially unstable. The viability of such alliance systems is determined by two broad factors: how does the alliance survive an attack from, or against, the potential external adversary? And even more important, how does the alliance survive when the internal threat from the outside abates?⁶⁸

The impact of detente has somewhat centered on these basic questions as far as the Warsaw Pact is concerned. But what are the Russian aims in Europe and what role is envisioned for the Warsaw Pact? As was stated in the introduction, the Warsaw alliance has served as both a defensive alliance and internal control mechanism for the Soviet Union. But more specifically, what are the current purposes of the Warsaw Pact as seen from the Russian viewpoint?

First, the military security question should be examined. Although the term "security" is prominent in the Soviet Union's European policy for both Russian and other East European countries' policies, in actuality it probably has little to do with Russian national security in the direct, narrow military sense.⁶⁹ Some United States' analysts of Russian policy have concluded that Western Europe has by and large ceased to be a genuine policy relevant source of military insecurity for the Soviet Union as a national entity or coalition leader. These same analysts, among them Mr. Fritz Ermarth of the Rand Corporation, propose that fear from Western aggression against the Soviet Union in or from Europe declined materially as a premise for Russian policy toward Europe between 1965 and 1968. This transition seems to have been noteworthy particularly in relation to two significant events -- the NATO proposal for a Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF) and the WTO invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Russians waged a strong campaign to prevent the creation of the Multilateral Nuclear Force with West German participation. The MLF was seen by some to be the last "real and

present danger" for the Soviet Union. Although adding little to NATO's military power, in Russian eyes it would have added greatly to pretexts and opportunities for unleashing it.⁷⁰

The other event was the Czechoslovakian invasion and the events surrounding it. During the months, weeks, and days leading up to the invasion, the Kremlin leadership was clearly uncertain about NATO's reaction. This doubt may have even delayed the decision to invade. The Russians watched the Vietnam and Mid-East situation and questioned whether an "imperialist counter-offensive against the position of socialism" might also be the basis for an East-West crisis over Czechoslovakia. But in spite of their allegations that NATO was deeply involved in their Czechoslovakian problem, the Russians appear to have concluded that they had little to fear from immediate or more long-range NATO military countermeasures. The fact that the USSR employed approximately eight of their own divisions from the GDR, along with East German and Polish forces, may have reduced their ground order of battle by almost one-half in the most critical sector of the Central front.⁷¹ NATO did not appear a prohibitive threat for the WTO moves.

The detente attitude was apparently furthered by Brezhnev and the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on March 30, 1971. In his report to the CPSU Central Committee, Brezhnev stressed that "new prospects in Europe are opening up as a result of a substantial shift in our relations with the FRG." He continued by discussing

what he called the basic concrete tasks of the struggle for peace and friendship among nations. The second and third tasks specifically pertained to the area of the Warsaw Pact. The second task was:

to proceed from the final recognition of the territorial changes that took place in Europe as a result of World War II. To bring about a radical turn toward detente and peace on this continent; to ensure the convocation and success of an all-European Security Conference.

To do everything to ensure collective security in Europe. We reaffirm the readiness expressed jointly by the participants in the defensive Warsaw Treaty to have a simultaneous annulment of this treaty and of the North Atlantic Alliance or -- as a first step -- the dismantling of this military organization.⁷²

During the visit of President Nixon to the Soviet Union in 1972, the detente atmosphere was officially continued as a portion of the Joint US-Soviet Union Communiqué of May 29, 1972, reflected. It stated,

The USA and the USSR are prepared to make appropriate contributions to the positive trends on the European continent toward a genuine detente and the developments of relations of peaceful cooperation among states in Europe on the basis of the principles of territorial integrity and inviolability of frontiers, non-interference in internal affairs, sovereign equality, independence and renunciation of the use or threat of force....Both sides believe that the goal of ensuring stability and security in Europe would be served by a reciprocal reduction of armed forces and armaments first of all in Central Europe. Any agreement on this question should not diminish the security of any of the sides. Appropriate agreements should be reached as soon as practicable between the states concerned on the procedures for negotiations on this subject in a special forum.⁷³

Once the pressure of the intense intra-Communist conflict over Czechoslovakia had subsided, normalization was sought again. Once developments in Czechoslovakia had been contained, the Warsaw Pact began to function again and turned away from exclusively intra-alliance concerns. There were Russian and East European (less East Germany) hopes for a renewed dialogue with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) based on the election of Willy Brandt's government. Simultaneously the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) provided hope for an on going US-Soviet Union detente. These signs of relaxation in the international sphere encouraged the Warsaw Pact to renew efforts to convene a European Security Conference and improve relations with West Germany.⁷⁴

The impact of the Czechoslovakian intervention was unique in several respects. Although the invasion split the "international" Communist movement, the main divisive impact was outside the East European realm. Among the WTO members, only Rumania neither participated in nor condoned the "allied socialist entry of troops". Robin Remington concluded that "organizationally the scars healed faster than in 1956." As she also noted,

...in a touch of procedural irony, Alexander Dubcek served as chairman of the first post-invasion meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee when 'all seven' member states convened in Budapest in March 17, 1969, -- just short of one year after the Dresden meeting that had excluded Rumania.⁷⁵

On March 17, 1969, the Pact leaders issued a statement

entitled, "Message from the Warsaw Pact States to all European countries," and it was noteworthy for its contrast with earlier documents. Even though it still described the European situation in such a grave manner to require international attention, it failed to blame the US, NATO, or the FRG for the circumstances. The message stressed three concrete proposals for further European reapproachment: (1) strengthening political and economic cooperation among European states; (2) acceptance of the status quo and pursuit of a solution to the German problem; and convening a European Security Conference.⁷⁶ The emphasis appeared to be on security and rapport with the West, including broader cooperation as well as a solution of outstanding problems, rather than developing some utopian security solution or the immediate erosion of the Western alliance. In short, the emphasis was on peace, detente, and coexistence.

But something of possibly far more significance from the standpoint of the alliance itself and its direction of evolution was the manner in which the meeting was conducted and the appeal written. Institutionally the appeal itself was less significant than the way it was written. Rather than acting out the normal stereotype Soviet Union-East European dialogue where a Russian-preferred draft would be reduced to a point where Rumania would sign, it appears the appeal was a genuine collective effort. There were indications of major Hungarian input. The Poles also claimed that their delegate contributed substantially to the document. Even Rumania, the regular obstinate member at Pact meetings,

stressed that the "opinions of each country were considered."⁷⁷ Was such a collective effort a concession on the part of the Russians in an effort to heal the wounds from the Czech invasion? Subsequent events surrounding detente and Ostpolitik suggested the group effort was a degree of greater participation by Pact members. The atmosphere was also in line with that which prevailed when changes in the Pact structure were completed following the invasion.

Ostpolitik and the WTO

When Chancellor Willy Brandt first enunciated the doctrine of "two states in one German nation" on October 28, 1969, he openly challenged the East Germans to open the way to a peaceful contest of systems and normal relations. This institution of Brandt's proposed "special relationship" also placed new and dynamic demands on the East Germans and in turn on the Warsaw Pact as an alliance.⁷⁸ The lesson had been learned by the West Germans that any approach to the Pact countries had better be through Moscow if favorable results were expected. The Czechoslovakian pre-invasion contacts with the FRG underscored the dangerous nature of the bilateral West European to East European state approach.

The early phase of Bonn's Ostpolitik sought to develop direct economic, cultural and diplomatic ties with the countries of Warsaw Pact. The policy was based primarily on the premise that liberalization in Eastern Europe could not only be achieved before similar reform was implemented in Russia, but that such internal change would create analogous

transformation of the Soviet Union. However, since 1968, it became increasingly more difficult to contend that the road toward improved East-West relationship in Europe lay through one of the East European satellite capitals. Some West Germans still considered Ostpolitik as hopeless. But where in the past Bonn saw the most favorable prospects in going to East Europe first, the USSR second, and East Germany third, if at all, after the invasion it was clear that Moscow was the dominant "bargaining partner."⁷⁹ Shortly after the Czechoslovakian invasion, the Brandt government constructed a "new" Ostpolitik which accepted the existing political realities in Eastern Europe.

The Bonn-Moscow Treaty was signed on August 12, 1970, and appeared to open the way for a greater detente between East and West European countries. This atmosphere of detente seemed to continue to hold Moscow's support. The "new" Ostpolitik of the FRG was seemingly well received in all Pact countries except East Germany. Even though there was greater harmony or outward appearance of agreement at the 1969 Budapest meeting than had occurred in seven years, the states had differed with the East Germans on the question of Ostpolitik.⁸⁰

The East Germans opposed the approach as undermining the struggle of their state for recognition as a nation with established boundaries. Prior to December 1969, the Warsaw Pact had publicly supported the East German position. But the Pact Political Consultative Committee meeting on December 3-4, 1969, abandoned the so called "Ulbricht Doctrine".

Previously the Pact summits had made the demand, at the GDR's insistence, that East Berlin must be recognized by Bonn as a precondition to bilateral discussion between any of the East European States and the Federal Republic. Instead, the Warsaw Pact States now affirmed that they would encourage bilateral relations with Bonn based on the following principles: "Equality of rights, non-interference in internal affairs, and recognition of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and inviolability of the existing boundaries."⁸¹

Ulbricht was removed from office in May 1971, and replaced by Erich Honecker. The Honecker government began diplomatic efforts by playing down the West German special status and relationship with the "Western Bloc of monopoly-capitalist states". The measure of the change in regimes was the "near total abandonment of attacks on and reporting of news about West Germany in the East German press."⁸²

Soviet and WTO Support for a Conference on European Security and Cooperation

The Conference on European Security and Cooperation convened in Helsinki, Finland, on July 3, 1973.⁸³ The second phase of the Conference was reconvened in Geneva, Switzerland, on September 18, 1973.⁸⁴ What does the Conference hold for the future of both NATO and the WTO is yet unknown. But the proposals which have preceded the Conference have been such that significant changes in alliance structure could be made. The history of attempts to convene the Conference provides some valuable information concerning the Warsaw

Pact's potential role and what Pact changes might result.

The proposal for the convening of an all-European Security Conference is not a recent proposal. The meeting in Helsinki is, however, the first session since such a Conference was first proposed by the Russians in 1954.

One of the unique considerations for the convening of a European Security Conference has been the manner that the proposals themselves have been altered over the years since 1954. Generally speaking, European Communist regimes -- with the Soviet Union as the principal actor -- have traditionally viewed security matters from the perspectives of: (a) American tactical and strategic nuclear superiority, (b) West German rearmament, and (c) the confrontation between two military blocs.⁸⁵ The changing nature of these reference points has corresponded with an evolution in the political aspects of the East-West dispute that has resulted in a variety of commitments -- often contradictory or inconsistent -- for the establishment of a European collective security system. As discussed in Chapter II, when faced with the realities of 1954, and the integration of West Germany into the NATO military structure, the Russians advanced the first plan for "general European security."⁸⁶ The Russian proposal for European Security during the mid-1950's called for the dissolution of military blocs within the context of Article XI of the Warsaw Treaty. Both East and West interpreted the Article to mean that a general European collective security accord would only come following the dissolution of NATO and other cooperative agreements.⁸⁷

In the late 1950's and early 1960's, the USSR modified the position by proposing "non-aggression" accords between the two pacts that would leave the military organizations intact. During the same period, as early as 1958, the Polish Foreign Minister, Adam Rapacki, proposed the establishment of a denuclearized zone in central Europe, and two years later the "Gomulka Plan" called for a nuclear freeze in Poland, Czechoslovakia and the two Germanies. Even though these "schemes" were unsuccessful, the Warsaw Pact credited the proposals as being major contributions leading to the ratification of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.⁸⁸

In December 1964, after Khrushchev had been removed, the Warsaw Pact announced a renewed interest in European security. Poland proposed to the United Nations General Assembly the convening of a conference of European States to examine "the problems of continental security in their entirety". The proposal was promptly endorsed by the Pact's Political Consultative Committee which met in January 1965, to consider appropriate responses to the possibility of West Germany participating in NATO's Multilateral Nuclear Force. The Pact communique which came shortly afterward urged the convening of a conference of European States to discuss measures to insure collective security in Europe.⁸⁹

Following the January 1965 meeting, there was a period of almost two years when there were no declarations issued on European security. But what Westerners consider the "propaganda apparatus" actively pursued the theme. Also, a variety of bilateral discussions were opened, primarily

between some of the small countries of both NATO and the WTO. Poland, Rumania, and Hungary were especially active on the communist side while Belgium, the Netherlands, and Denmark were most active in the NATO alliance. During this period, emphasis was placed on generating interests for the conference as well as recruiting non-governmental or unofficial groups on both sides of the Iron Curtain to consider the various aspects of collective security.⁹⁰ But the impetus for convening a security and cooperation conference still came from the WTO members -- not from the West.

There were also unique features about the East European proposals for a conference. First, the smaller WTO members showed a keen sense of urgency in advancing the cause of European security and in turn were apparently disappointed at the lack of progress. It seemed that their urgency reflected their assessment that only in the broader context of East-West rapport could they increase their freedom of maneuver in foreign policy. The smaller WTO members' frustration was due in part to the variety of conflicting national priorities that were emerging in the East, and in part to a lack of interest in the Kremlin.⁹¹

The second unique factor concerned USSR support for the other WTO members' proposal for the European Conference. The early East European efforts projected the impression of being an integral part of the new Russian leaders' policy of broadening rapprochement whenever it seemed feasible and to the Soviet Union's advantage. It was not, however, until Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's visit to Rome in April 1966,

that Moscow officially restated its desire for an all-European Security Conference.⁹²

Renewed Russian interest

Why was there a change on the part of the Soviet Union beginning in 1966? There have been several reasons given for the change. First, the Sino-Soviet dispute had erupted again after Chou En-Lai's visit to the new Kremlin leaders, and the Chinese influence seemed at an all time high during the Summer of 1965. Also, the Kremlin attempted to reverse the erratic domestic and international schemes that had characterized Khrushchev's era of leadership. Additionally, the Cuban missile crisis had suggested that there were limits to Moscow's strategic capabilities or the usability of strategic military assets. Within the year following the crisis, the Hot Line Accord and the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty were signed as a step toward increased detente. Another probable reason for renewed USSR interest was the fragmentation within the Communist movement. In contrast, the Communist cause in South East Asia was progressing satisfactorily. Finally, Moscow apparently viewed the West at that time as being in a state of "acute crisis." Britain was not permitted to join the European Common Market, the Multilateral Nuclear Force did not develop, the United States was heavily committed to non-European affairs, and there was widespread disagreement in the West involving Turkey, France, Greece, and NATO.⁹³

The Russians were claiming on Radio Moscow on March 23,

1967, that "the national interests of individual NATO countries are gaining the upper hand. This process will inevitably continue as more people in the NATO countries grasp the senselessness of a military grouping directed against the socialists which are no danger to European people."⁹⁴ In the 1966-67 period, there was significant disagreement within the WTO on Pact military organizations and policy toward the West. The Soviets supposedly wanted to take advantage of the lull in relations with the US, resulting from American preoccupation with the Vietnam conflict and France's independent attitude toward NATO, to strengthen the defensive position of the WTO. The Rumanians were openly opposed to the suggestion. The Rumanians argued that attempts to improve substantially the Pact's military capability would be perceived by the West as not contributing to reducing tensions, but would produce countermeasures leading to a further deterioration in relations. The argument was partially successful because there were no "institutional improvements" made and military modernization programs were left to "individual members' discretion."⁹⁵

The WTO's Political Consultative Committee issued on July 5, 1966, the historic "Declaration Strengthening Peace and Security in Europe". The declaration was described by the East Europeans as the definitive position of all Warsaw Pact countries on European security and foreign policy issues. The key points were directed against West Germany, the US, and NATO. It stated that the preconditions for lasting settlement in Europe were Bonn's recognition of the permanence

of the existing political borders in Central Europe and its renunciation of all territorial claims and access to nuclear weapons. It called for liquidation of all foreign bases and "serious consideration of European security arrangements."⁹⁶ Even though Bucharest was the site of the historical 1966 Declaration, Rumania became more and more a dissenting nation as the WTO attempted to develop a common security policy. Rumania had continued to expand trade with the West, in particular West Germany, and was therefore hesitant to foster a militant approach toward the non-communist West.

This changing climate was obvious at subsequent meetings. In April 1967, a conference was held by the East European states in Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia, to expand the campaign for a European Security Conference. Again attacks against the FRG, USA, and NATO were associated with an overall deteriorating political situation in Western Europe. The conference proposals called for the West's acceptance of Europe's existing borders; the East German claims to diplomatic recognition; invalidation of the Munich agreements; renunciation of the Hallstein Doctrine; acceptance of West Berlin as a separate political entity; ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); and the renunciation of the use of force. But there was a degree of relaxation on the German question shown by the encouragement of cooperation with "progressive elements" in West Germany. Without identifying them, the East Europeans admitted that there were "good and bad West Germans". The distinctive feature

of the Karlovy Vary meeting was the inauguration of a campaign to gain broad support for the dissolution of NATO during the treaty's Twentieth Anniversary year, when members could legally withdraw. This was the most aggressive Soviet effort to promote security through the collapse of the adversary pact.⁹⁷

Moscow was distracted by the Mid-East crisis that led to the Six-Day War and did not return its attention to a European Security Conference until March 1968, when the WTO Political Consultative Committee met in Sofia, Bulgaria. The purpose of the Bulgarian meeting was to consider the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its importance in relation to European security. But international events again halted Moscow's plans for European security as the 1968 Czech crisis led to WTO intervention. In March 1969, the Pact leaders met again in Budapest to reopen the European security question.⁹⁸

Following the Budapest meeting, the Pact Foreign Ministers met in Prague in late 1969. The meeting was held on October 31, 1969, and it specifically called for a European Security Conference to be held, possibly in Helsinki, during the first half of 1970. A tentative agenda was proposed consisting of two issues: European security matters related to the renunciation of force and the expansion of cooperation among the European states. The October 31, 1969, meeting was "coincidentally" in close proximity of the November NATO Council meeting which also discussed European security matters. The NATO group did not accept either the agenda

or the 1970 start period proposed by the WTO. Instead, the NATO Council insisted upon adequate preparation on substantive issues such as the mutual reduction of forces. It was suggested that NATO's cool response may have caused another change in direction noted in a subsequent Communist meeting. On December 3-4, 1969, the Pact leaders met in Moscow. A major document came out of this meeting that reviewed almost all aspects of the Warsaw Pact policies. The document stressed continuation of bilateral discussion between individual member nations of NATO and the WTO.⁹⁹

Resurgence of Detente

The WTO proposals continued in 1971, with the Bucharest meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. This meeting criticized the NATO Council demands for more detailed preparatory work. Also, the FRG -- East German question was stressed. The communique stated that,

The Warsaw Member States consider it important to stress again the big significance for the course of European and international security of the establishment of equal states which have not yet established such relations. Relations based on generally accepted norms of international law should be established between the GDR and the FRG. An ending of opposition to accepting the GDR into the United Nations and other international organizations would also be in the interests of easing tension.¹⁰⁰

During this same period when it was becoming progressively more difficult for the West to remain out of a security conference -- regardless of the suspicion of the USSR and WTO motives -- the principal issues were SALT, the Four-Power

talks in Berlin, bilateral negotiations with Eastern European countries, and the FRG-East German relationship following the Bonn-Moscow Agreement.¹⁰¹

One of the questions that Moscow opposed vigorously was the West's insistence that the Brezhnev Doctrine be discussed at a European Security Conference. This opposition continued up to the July 3, 1973, starting date. Ironically, the Russians themselves entered on the agenda the question of the "non-employment of force and the threat of force in relations between European States".¹⁰²

The period from 1970-1973, was spent in making preparations for the security conference. Even though the West insisted on detailed preparation, events were rapidly proceeding for the convening of the Conference. The Bonn-Moscow Treaty was completed in May 1970, talks continued on Berlin, SALT-I Agreements were signed between the Soviet Union and the US, the Vietnam War was approaching conclusion. Also, concrete developments had been made toward application of both the FRG and West Germany for United Nations membership, and plans were being made for separate talks on troop reductions to be held in Vienna in 1973. As the Conference approached what were the current USSR and East European goals?

The main and most consistent aim of the Soviet Union appears to have been to gain formal Western recognition of its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and the present frontiers, including Poland's Western frontier, and especially the frontier dividing Germany into two states. These aims

were only partially achieved -- and generally to an unsatisfactory degree -- with the Berlin Wall, Czechoslovakian invasion, and the treaty with West Germany. The formal codification of the situation, in fact, came in early 1973, with West German recognition of the East German government. Some Western observers still maintain that the Soviet Union wants to make a propaganda point about peace in Europe. Security of the Soviet Union's Western flank in case of trouble with China may also be a primary conference support consideration.¹⁰³

The economic strength the European Economic Community (EEC) has continued to develop has been offered as a reason for Russian and WTO support for the Security Conference. The growing strength of the EEC has been proposed as a partial explanation of the paradox between the post-1968 Warsaw Pact strengthening, Comecon integration efforts, Brezhnev Doctrine legitimization and Czechoslovakian "normalization" being simultaneously undertaken with a headlong drive to achieve detente with the Western countries allegedly responsible for most of the trouble in the first place. An answer to the paradox,

...would appear to be that the Communist States, particularly the Soviet Union, see themselves in a race against time when the status quo that was a legacy of World War II is broken up and new power constellations are formed. This race is seen as requiring the convening of a security conference and the establishment of its institutional progeny before the economic forces at work in Western Europe produce an enlarged and strengthened EEC, unbreakable economically or politically, gaining in military potential, and becoming increasingly attractive to the

neutrals and to East Europe -- all under the potential domination of West Germany.¹⁰⁴

Principal Reasons for Russian Changes Since 1954

What have been the reasons for the various changes in WTO and Russian proposals from 1954 to the convening of the Helsinki Conference? The more prominent ones are: (1) The rise of polycentrism within the Communist world, and especially the Pact, has tended to polarize opinion on important issues to the point that parties between the poles have often supported the minority position solely on the right of dissent. Accordingly, Moscow has been forced to make substantive concessions to achieve solidarity. (2) Rumanian return to Pact Councils on security matters was in part an acknowledgment of the risks in her exposed position after the Czechoslovakian invasion. But, possibly of more importance, the Rumanian return appears to have been in response to the shifts on key issues by other members toward the Rumanian position. (3) A persisting handicap for the Pact members seems to have been their inability to agree on the purpose of a regional collective security arrangement. Was such a plan to increase East-West understanding, stimulate rapport and cooperation, facilitate closing the technological gap, sponsor political detente, consolidate the status quo, expand the appeal of neutrality, insure international recognition of vital interests, outline military disengagement, encourage NATO's dissolution, curtail American leadership, or disarm and incapacitate the Federal Republic? (4) President DeGaulle's visit to Poland in September 1967, and his call

for the assertion of Polish independence, marked the end of the Russian-French "honeymoon" and the curtailment of French overtures toward the East. (5) A related situation was Russia's realization that NATO had recovered from the "crisis" of the French independent action within the West European Alliance. (6) Russian strategic parity with the US has strengthened Moscow's confidence in its ability to deal with lesser nations without the risk of such nations seeking unqualified protection from the US. (7) Moscow's inability to achieve its European aims without talking to the Germans about German problems led to a major policy change. Specifically, the entry of the Social Democrats in West Germany led to the Ostpolitik of Brandt's coalition government and the subsequent 1970 Bonn-Moscow Agreement.¹⁰⁵

The first phase of the 35-nation European Security Conference ended on July 7, 1973. The second of three phases of the talks began again on September 18, in Geneva and is scheduled to last until sometime in the Spring of 1974. What happens in the Geneva rounds will determine when and where the third phase will take place. The most optimistic view would have the third phase culminate in a summit -- probably in Helsinki.¹⁰⁶

What was accomplished in the first phase? Principally, the agenda for the second phase was developed. The delegates of the Geneva meeting will be getting into greater detail in the areas of military security. Issues such as renunciation of force as a means of settling disputes, recognizing existing European borders and nonintervention

in the internal affairs of other states will be the principal topics. Also to be considered are "confidence building measure" such as advance notice of troop movements and exchange of observers between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces on maneuvers. Humanitarian questions such as the movement of families between countries and expanding contacts between East and West through travel, cultural exchanges, and a freer flow of information are supposed to receive priority.¹⁰⁷

The record seems to indicate that the basis for Soviet Union support has changed as the Russians' national interests have changed. The remaining WTO members have been generally enthusiastic for a conference since the original proposal. Are the USSR interests such in 1973, that something meaningful will come from the Helsinki talks that will benefit East and West Europe as well as the world? Will the conference truly advance security and cooperation in Europe? The answers are still to come, but regardless of the outcome the stress apparently remains on the Soviet Union as it evaluates the current and prospective roles of the WTO.

CHAPTER VI

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

Problems Within the Warsaw Treaty Organization

The WTO continues to play a major role in guaranteeing power for the Moscow oriented Communist regimes in Eastern Europe. However, dissolution of the Pact and even the withdrawal of Russian troops from all the territories of Eastern European countries, probably would not mean the end to Communist domination in those countries.

The Soviet Union's hold over Eastern Europe weakened considerably following the establishment of the WTO as a result of three principal factors: The struggle within the collective Russian leadership following the death of Stalin; a more autonomous development of individual East European Communist parties; and the Russian's recognition in 1955-56 of Yugoslavia's right to follow a separate route to Communism.

In the context of these factors influencing the weakening of Russian influence, the following problems exist in 1973 and could influence the development of the WTO.

National Communism

Eastern Europe today represents a "kaleidoscope" or patchwork of ideological deviations and sociopolitical developments within a broad common philosophical and institutional framework. The diversity remains one within a given ideological, social, and historical context.¹⁰⁸ This diversity which has characterized the Communist world since 1956,

has become known as "polycentrism" to distinguish it from the "monocentrism" of the Stalinist era. Vernon V. Aspaturian writing on "East European Relations With the USSR" commented on the above distinction and concluded that while the term polycentrism has gained general currency, it is somewhat awkward, since the idea of many centers of Communism is not only an inaccurate description but a logical absurdity. While China and the Soviet Union might conceivably consider themselves as rival "Communist centers", most of the Communist States are not centers of anything. A more descriptive term in Professor Aspaturian's view might be "pluralistic" Communism.¹⁰⁹

Regardless of the term applied to the relationship of the East European countries with the Soviet Union, a degree of nation-state/Communist nationalism has arisen. Because there never has been a "monolithic" grouping of East European States, the respective countries' interest and ideological interpretations have generally influenced their pursuit of their respective national objectives.¹¹⁰ Specifically, the Sino-Soviet conflict enabled Albania and Rumania to gain greater autonomy within the Communist movement as both Peking and Moscow bid for international communist leadership.

Command and control

There still appears to be a question of who commands the Warsaw Pact forces under what conditions. The Pact was established with the idea it was an alliance of equals and

the senior leadership was to be rotated among the various nations. In fact, the Political Consultative Committee and Joint Armed Forces Command have been dominated by Russians. Until 1970, the Warsaw Pact Chief-of-Staff was a First Deputy of the Soviet General Staff. There remains no Warsaw Pact doctrine outside the Russian doctrine.¹¹¹ The 1969 Budapest changes were significant and point to possible further reduction of Russian influence, but the extent of increased participation by the member countries is actually unknown. The reorganization in 1969 appeared as an effort to increase the military effectiveness of the Pact while trying to alleviate the grievances of the non-Russian members.¹¹²

Mission

The East European countries seem to be well aware that the Pact is both a means of external defense and internal control for the Soviet Union. In 1969, the Soviet Union attempted to convince Pact members to send forces to the USSR-China border as a display of WTO unity. The members balked by reminding the Soviet Union the WTO was an alliance for the protection of Eastern Europe and the Western side of the Soviet Union. Moscow did not force the issue.¹¹³

Unilateral Actions

Independent actions of Rumania and former WTO member -- Albania -- underline the type unity problems which the Pact may face. Albania formally withdrew from the WTO following the 1968 Czechoslovakian invasion and has openly sided with

China during the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute. Rumania served as a "mediator" between the Chinese and Russians during the beginning stages of the dispute.

The Soviet Union has seemingly tried to adjust to the East European desires to manage their own affairs as long as the countries remain "Socialist". Rumania refused to condemn the Red Chinese during the Sino-Soviet split and adopted a policy of pursuing friendly relations with all countries, including the United States. One of the major questions has become -- what constitutes socialism? In Vernon V. Aspaturian's words,

What started out as de-Stalinization was soon legitimized in the doctrine of separate roads to socialism, but it quickly became evident that the separate roads to socialism created both logical possibilities and practical opportunities for subverting and displacing the social order implied and established by the Soviet Union.¹¹⁴

Nuclear Strategy

The question of the control of nuclear weapons remains a problem in the Pact. In 1964, Khrushchev decided to provide East European armed forces with missiles and aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons, but the Soviet Union was careful to insure the control remained in Russian hands. In 1965, East Germany supposedly pressed for access to, or control over, the use of nuclear weapons. The East Germans did not get the control. In the early 1960's, Rumania demanded that Moscow not employ nuclear weapons without consulting other members of the WTO. The East Europeans have

been given training in nuclear methods in joint exercises, but Thomas Wolfe of the Rand Corporation contends that the Russians have insured the nuclear warheads are kept well out of the reach of their East European allies, an impression bolstered by the occasional informal reports of Russian officials. The issues of access to the nuclear weapons and participation in nuclear planning are likely to remain sensitive areas on a permanent basis as long as the East Europeans are uncertain of the Soviet Union's intentions concerning the use of nuclear weapons.¹¹⁵

Economic Issues

Economic considerations remain major problems. Specifically, the questions are which WTO members share in the cost of training, re-equipping, and maintaining the WTO forces and to what extent are the costs equally shared. Secondly, will the WTO be required to serve as a "supranational" structure in the economic area of Russian and East European policy to replace the marginally successful COMECON organization? Will the Soviet Union be able to respond to the economic demands that in recent years have started coming from the WTO countries -- a complete reversal of the early days when the Soviet Union placed demands on the East European countries? The answers to these economic questions are apparently unresolved, but the outcome should strongly affect the future role of the WTO.

The question of who should pay for the maintenance of Russian occupation forces goes all the way back to the early

days after WWII when the USSR troops were first stationed in East Europe. Thomas W. Wolfe, concluded that in the course of time, from 1949 to 1957, the Soviet Union gradually reduced the charges for Russian troop maintenance from \$900 million to \$350 million, and reportedly lifted the obligation in 1959. After the status-of-forces agreements were signed with Poland and Hungary in 1957, these countries, too, were probably freed from direct support of the Russian garrison costs. He stated:

However, as suggested by Rumanian complaints in 1966 about the expense of maintaining Soviet troops in East Europe the question apparently had not been laid to rest. As no Soviet troops had been stationed in Rumania herself since 1958, the complaint suggests the expenses of Soviet troop maintenance may have been prorated within the Warsaw Pact.¹¹⁶

The Soviet Union was probably equally unhappy in the late 1960's to share the costs for procurement and training programs designed to bring the various national forces of the East European countries up to a common level of modernization and integration. Unfortunately, little information is available on how these costs may have been distributed, but in Professor Wolfe's opinion each country was probably expected to pay its own. The military budgets of the Warsaw Pact members have followed the upward course of Russian military expenditures in the period after Brezhnev and Kosygin came to power. The size of the forces have remained about the same, which suggests the budget increases have been used for re-equipment and modernization.¹¹⁷

It has been estimated that the Soviet Union will spend

the equivalent of \$81 to \$84.4 billion for defense in 1973. How much of this cost will be devoted to Warsaw Pact related expenses remains unknown to Western observers. The cumulative defense expenditures for the remaining Warsaw Pact members for the same period has been estimated to be the equivalent of \$6.7 billion.¹¹⁸

A second aspect of the WTO management cost issue has been dissatisfaction expressed by the Russians who feel that they share an undue burden of the Warsaw Pact defense. In particular, the Soviet Union points out the burden they carry with the "nuclear shield" for the WTO nations.¹¹⁹

Political Questions

What effect will the Soviet Union's detente with the West, and the United States in particular, have on the WTO? Has the detente already weakened the Pact because the East European members realize their collective security is secondary to the overall Russian political objectives? The Russian-American detente may have served to diminish both the US threat to Moscow and the Russian threat to the West and thereby contributed to the progressive erosion of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organization. Is the Soviet Union, unilaterally, prepared to dissolve the WTO under the provisions of Article XI of the Pact which permits the organization to "lose its face" if a system of collective security can be set up?

The Soviet Union pushed strongly for the European Security Conference in 1954, but the events since the beginning of the

WTO seems to indicate that Russian support has changed as the USSR's national interests have changed. The results of the Conference on Security and Cooperation may permit a more accurate appraisal of the current national objectives of the Soviet Union.

Generation Change of the 1970's

The leadership in the Soviet Union and the East European countries no longer consist of participants of the 1917 Revolution. The leaders currently rising to power appear to be more pragmatic, less revolutionary -- but still Marxist-Leninist Communists. The problem of "transformation versus dissolution" of the WTO and the degree of political relevance rests in the new generations' hands.

WTO Conflicts of Interest in the 1970's

It has become even more obvious in 1973 that the allies of the Soviet Union in the Warsaw Pact have interests in such things as the Security Conference which are only partially identical with the Russians. Rumania has pressed hardest for the dissolution of the military blocs, and would possibly have the most to gain from a reinforcement of the doctrine of sovereignty and non-interference. She also has the highest level of Western trade -- at least before the US-Soviet Union Agreements of 1972-1973. Hungary, with the next highest level trade and most adventurous economic reforms, also needs more "breathing space" and may be willing to disengage from the Soviet Union. Poland's interest would be

closely related to Hungary's in the area of speaking out for national sovereignty and greater independence. Since the 1968 invasion, the Czechoslovakian government has been utterly dependent on the Soviet Union while appearing to be anxious to gain popular support by negotiating withdrawals. The East Germans find themselves in a special situation as the Russians have provided a greater impetus toward detente with the West than the East German government itself. Bulgaria is the most likely WTO member to follow Russian wishes whatever they might be.

Most of the WTO members would apparently like more freedom of maneuver to satisfy national pride and gain more legitimacy in the eyes of their people. They would like to strengthen their bargaining power in relation to the Soviet Union, particularly in economic matters, and already there are signs of moves toward specifically East European projects which do not directly involve the Soviet Union.¹²⁰ On some of these issues the Pact members may find themselves able to form a common front in negotiations with the Soviet Union.¹²¹

A New Forum for Europe?

The prospects for the WTO to continue as currently organized appear uncertain. Following the Russian led WTO intervention into Czechoslovakia, a review of the Russian political picture of East Europe was somewhat confused. The Russians were possibly confronted with their ultimate "moment of truth" when deciding whether or not to intervene in Czechoslovakia. It seemed all their choices would have far

reaching disadvantages and the choice of intervention appeared to be unpleasant.

Before the intervention in Czechoslovakia, the Kremlin's influence in East Europe has been weakened significantly from Communist nationalism, "polycentrism", disunity over WTO cost sharing, economic independence, and nationalist fears of the Russian leaders lack of concern for the WTO countries individual security.¹²²

As the Czechoslovakian crisis erupted, Vernon Aspaturian maintains the Soviet empire was virtually on the verge of dissolution or the brink of a fundamental transformation. In the opinion of Professor Aspaturian, the impending change could have assumed one of three forms:

1. The Warsaw Pact and the COMECON could have been converted to an authentic Socialist "commonwealth of nations" in which the individual members would have been allowed a wider latitude of internal deviation from the Soviet norms of socialism. Additionally, they could have been given greater freedom and permitted to engage in cultural relations with the West. The countries would have still remained tightly bound to the Soviet Union in a purely defensive alliance.

2. The spontaneous devolution of the Warsaw Pact, the COMECON, and the other multilateral organizations might have occurred. These organizations could have been replaced with a series of bilateral and trilateral agreements. The Soviet Union could have made periodic ad hoc adjustments to the situation, allowing the natural interests of each state to

more or less shape its internal development and its individual relationship with the Soviet Union and with the outside world.

3. The Soviet Union could have been reconstituted as a "sphere of influence" or domination. Wherever and whenever necessary, naked force and fear would replace reliance on the uncertain allegiance to ideology, pliable local leaders, and a common social system, in order to preserve Russian control.¹²³ The Soviet Union chose this alternative in 1968 in an attempt to resolve the Czechoslovakian problem.

The alternative choice of dissolution or transformation may still face the Soviet Union and the WTO; although, the Soviet Union is still maintaining that the Pact is a viable defensive alliance against NATO. In January 1973, Andre Grechko, then the Soviet Minister of Defense, stated that:

The current ways to avert war and most effectively curb the aggression is to strengthen to the utmost the defense might of the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community and reinforce the militant cohesion of the Armies of the Warsaw Treaty Organization.¹²⁴

It appears that the Russians would need a substitute system -- if the WTO were dissolved -- to insure that the principles of external defense and internal control are maintained. Could such a substitute be the existing bilateral treaties with the East European governments or a Warsaw Pact reduced to a skeletal structure? This procedure would probably have to be accompanied by a new forum which would permit the coordination of foreign policy and facilitate the

resolution of disputes among these East European States.

The Soviet Union might be willing to rely on the bilateral agreements and the "Brezhnev Doctrine" to justify whatever external defense and internal control that may be required. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, in exchange for the disbanding of NATO could be thus accomplished without seriously endangering Russian influence or security in East Europe.

But is any change probable with the ideological firmness which has characterized the USSR since 1917? There are indications that the Russian ideological approach can change. Nathan Leites conducted research into what he labeled the "operational code" of the Bolshevik leaders or decision-makers. Leites concluded that "even a belief system that reflects well-considered evaluations of past political experience is subject to change under certain conditions." He continued by proposing that "indications are available that some changes in important elements of the classical Bolshevik operational code, [in this case the belief system] took place or became noticeable in the Khrushchev era." Generally these changes reflected a more moderate view than in the Lenin-Stalin era.¹²⁵ Such a change in attitude as the belief system may be the reason for the Soviet Union's attitude toward dissent within the WTO. The current attitude seems to suggest an effort to not so much exclude all conflict and disagreement as to "contain and manage it" within the Pact.¹²⁶

Conclusion

What can be expected from the era of intensive negotiations? There are few firm answers. The Soviet Union's continuing view of the Pact as a means of external defense and internal control suggests that the alliance will continue as currently structured for an unknown period. The results of the second and third phases of the Conference on European Security and Cooperation may provide some indication of the possibility for change.

It is generally acknowledged that the Warsaw Pact has been a more cohesive and unified organization than Western alliances. However, the complex interrelationship of bloc security and internal political problems suggest that it will be less flexible, adaptive, and cohesive in a period of more intensive East-West contact.¹²⁷ Also, if the questions of defense of the Soviet Union and control of Eastern Europe were uncoupled from that of political development in Eastern Europe, it might be possible for the Soviet Union to permit a greater degree of diversity in socialist development in the WTO member states. Such diversity might allow the Eastern European regimes to attain even greater stability and legitimacy.

Material evaluated for this study suggests that lack of cohesion between the WTO members and the Soviet Union and between the WTO members themselves will remain a problem as individual countries pursue their respective national objectives. The Soviet Union can probably be expected to tolerate greater autonomy if such relaxation does not threaten the

central role of the Communist Party and the USSR as the principal leader. Although the Russians would probably be reluctant to resort to the use of the 1968 Czechoslovakian type WTO intervention, there is no realistic reason to believe they will not use such force under the provisions of the Brezhnev Doctrine. The USSR's proclamations concerning the Brezhnev Doctrine seem clear that force will be used to maintain the solidarity of the "Socialist Commonwealth."

The Soviet Union may be willing to permit the WTO to be officially disbanded under the provisions of Article XI of the Pact. Such dissolution would almost certainly be predicated on the West's willingness to dissolve NATO or the emergence of a European Collective Security arrangement that would in effect neutralize NATO. Regardless of the "dissolution of military blocs" question, the need for bilateral agreements between the Soviet Union and the WTO members will remain critical. The internal control as well as defense guarantees demanded by the Russians would seem to be assured by the bilateral agreements. Although the symbolic stamp of "legitimacy" of Kremlin initiated WTO action against an individual Pact member would seem to be desired, the bilateral treaties might serve the Russians' purpose in the absence of the Warsaw Pact.

Predictions of WTO developments remain especially difficult due to the complexity of the relationship that exist in the Warsaw Pact region between domestic political changes and international relations and between military and political considerations at the international level. This complexity

characterizes the entire problem of European Security and makes it virtually impossible to say with any certainty what new arrangements will come from the current international negotiations. David Holloway concluded that one can outline alternative new security arrangements for Europe, but one must allow for the possibility that the Soviet Union's desire to serve its own interests may limit any possibility for change. In view of such limitations the present international negotiations may be "yet another turning point that fails to turn."¹²⁸

FOOTNOTES

1. Julian R. Friedman and others, Alliance In International Politics (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1970), p. 3.

2. K. J. Holsti, "Diplomatic Coalition and International Politics," Alliance In International Politics, ed. Julian R. Friedman and others (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1970), pp. 110-111.

3. Ghita Ionescu, The Break-up of the Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe (Baltimore: Penguin Book, Inc., 1965), pp. 16-17.

4. Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Military Policy (New York: Praeger, Inc., 1966), p. 76.

5. Kazimierz Grzybowski, The Socialist Commonwealth of Nations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), pp. 173-174.

6. W.W. Kulski, "The Soviet System of Collective Security Compared With the Western System," American Journal of International Law, XIX (1950), 453.

7. Kulski, loc. cit.

8. Ibid., pp. 173-174.

9. Piotr S. Wandycz, "The Soviet System of Alliances In East Central Europe," Journal of Central European Affairs, XVI (July, 1956), 177-186.

10. Ibid., p. 182.

11. Zbigniew K. Brezezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 121.

12. Ibid., p. 122.

13. Robin A. Remington, The Warsaw Pact (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1971), p. 10.

14. Grzybowski, op. cit., p. 172.

15. Grzybowski, loc. cit.

16. Ibid., p. 175.

17. Remington, op. cit., p. 10.

18. Remington, op. cit., p. 11.

19. Remington, loc. cit.
20. Remington, op. cit., p. 12.
21. Remington, op. cit., p. 13.
22. David Holloway, "The Warsaw Pact In the Age of Negotiations," Military Review, LIII (July, 1967), 49-50.
23. Grzybowski, op. cit., p. 178.
24. David Holloway, "Soviet Policy and the Warsaw Pact," U.S. Army Institute for Advanced Russian and East European Studies, 6th Annual Soviet Affairs Symposium, March 27-30, 1971 (Garmisch, Germany: Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 40-41.
25. Remington, op. cit., p. 15.
26. Grzybowski, op. cit., pp. 190-191.
27. Grzybowski, loc. cit.
28. Ibid., p. 192.
29. Prince Hubertus Lowenstein and V. Zuhlsdorff, NATO and the Defense of the West (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 347-350.
30. Grzybowski, op. cit., p. 196.
31. Ibid., pp. 196-197.
32. Ibid., p. 203.
33. Richard F. Staar, "The Warsaw Treaty Organization," Alliances: Latent War Communities In the Contemporary World, ed. Francis A. Beer (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1970), p.160.
34. Ibid., pp. 160-161.
35. Vojislav Bozic, "East Europe and the Warsaw Pact," U.S. Army Institute for Advanced Russian and East European Studies, 6th Annual Soviet Affairs Symposium, March 27-30, 1971 (Garmisch, Germany: Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 61.
36. Robin A. Remington, "Czechoslovakia and the Warsaw Pact," East European Quarterly, III (September, 1969), 315.
37. Remington, loc. cit.
38. Ionescu, op. cit., p. 65.
39. Ibid., pp. 81-82.

40. Ibid., p. 68.
41. Bennett Kovrig, "Decompression in Hungary -- Phase Two," The Changing Face of Communism in Eastern Europe, ed. Peter A. Toma (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1970), p. 195.
42. Journalist "M", A Year Is Eight Months: Czechoslovakia 1968 (Garden City: Anchor Books, Doubleday and Co., 1971), pp. 231-232.
43. Ibid., p. 232.
44. Remington, op. cit., p. 99.
45. Iran Godourek, The Political Control of Czechoslovakia (Leiden Holland: H.E. Stenfert Kroele N. V., 1953), p. 40.
46. Ibid., pp. 21-22.
47. Godourek, loc. cit.
48. Leonid Brezhnev, "Brezhnev Discusses Czechoslovakia at Polish Conference," The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, XX (December 4, 1968), 3-4.
49. Godourek, op. cit., pp. 66-67.
50. Golia Golan, The Czechoslovak Reform Movement -- Communism in Crisis 1962-1968 (London: Cambridge at the University Press, 1971), pp. 1-6.
51. Journalist "M", op. cit., p. 10.
52. Ibid., p. 17.
53. Holloway, "Soviet Policy and the Warsaw Pact," pp. 47-48.
54. Vernon V. Aspaturian, "East European Relations With the USSR," The Changing Face of Communism in Eastern Europe, ed. Peter A. Toma (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1970), p. 293.
55. Remington, The Warsaw Pact, p. 330.
56. Ibid., p. 109.
57. Boris Meissner, East Europe Monograph -- The Brezhnev Doctrine (Parkville, Missouri: The Park College Press, 1970), p. 20.
58. Hans Kelsen, "Sovereignty and International Law," In Defense of Sovereignty, ed. W. J. Stankiewkz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 115.

59. Walter Jaeger and William V. O'Brien, International Law: Cases and Notes, I (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1959), p. 30.

60. International Reconciliation Pamphlet, 1941, as quoted in J.K. Brierly, The Law of Nations, 5th ed., (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 48-49.

61. William L. Tung, International Law in an Organizing World (New York: Thomas W. Crowell Company, 1968), p. 122.

62. A. Denison and M. Kirichenko, Soviet State Law, trans. by S. Belsky and M. Saifulin (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1960), p. 155.

63. Harold J. Berman, Justice in the USSR (rev. ed., New York: Vintage Books, 1963), p. 6.

64. Sergi Kovalov, "Sovereignty and the International Obligations of Socialist Countries," Current Digest of the Soviet Press, XX (October 16, 1968), 10.

65. Remington, The Warsaw Pact, op. cit., p. 128.

66. Ibid., p. 129.

67. Fritz Ermarth, "Soviet Policy Toward West Europe and NATO," U.S. Army Institute for Advanced Russian and East European Studies, 6th Annual Soviet Affairs Symposium, March 27-30, 1971 (Garmisch, Germany: Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 3.

68. Roman Kolkowicz, "The Warsaw Pact: Entangling Alliance," Survey, A Journal of Soviet and East European Studies, LXX/LXXI (Winter/Spring, 1969), 99-100.

69. Ermarth, op. cit., p. 4.

70. Ibid., p. 5.

71. Ermarth, loc. cit.

72. Leonid Brezhnev, "Report to the CPSU Central Committee, 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," Reprints From the Soviet Press, XII (May 14, 1971), 30.

73. Joint U.S.-Soviet Communique, Department of Defense Commanders' Digest, XII (August 10, 1972), 6.

74. Remington, The Warsaw Pact, op. cit., p. 113.

75. Ibid., pp. 113-114.

76. Lawrence L. Whetten, "Recent Changes in Eastern European Approaches to European Security," The World Today, XXVI (July, 1970), 283-284.

77. Remington, The Warsaw Pact, op. cit., p. 115.
78. Robert Bleimans, "Ostpolitik and the GDR," Survey, A Journal of East-West Studies, XVIII (Summer, 1972), p. 37.
79. Fritz Ermarth, Internationalism, Security and Legitimacy: The Challenge to Soviet Interests in Eastern Europe, 1964-1968 (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, 1969), pp. 121-122.
80. Bleimans, op. cit., p. 37.
81. Bleimans, loc. cit.
82. Ibid., p. 47.
83. The New York Times, June 23, 1973, p. 1.
84. The Washington Post, July 8, 1973, p. A8.
85. Whetten, op. cit., p. 277.
86. Remington, The Warsaw Pact, op. cit., p. 204.
87. Whetten, op. cit., p. 277.
88. Ibid., p. 278.
89. Whetten, loc. cit.
90. Whetten, loc. cit.
91. Ibid., p. 279.
92. Whetten, loc. cit.
93. Ibid., p. 281.
94. Whetten, op. cit., p. 280.
95. Remington, op. cit., pp. 209-221.
96. Whetten, op. cit., p. 282.
97. Ibid., pp. 283-284.
98. Whetten, op. cit., pp. 284-285.
99. "Communique of Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Warsaw Treaty Member States," The Atlantic Community Quarterly, IX (Summer, 1971), 268-269.
100. Michael Palmer, "The Prospects for a European Security Conference," The Atlantic Community Quarterly (Fall, 1971), 294-295.

101. Michael Tatu, "European Security Conference: What's In It for Whom?," World Politics, III (July, 1972), 8.
102. Richard Davy, "The ESC and the Politics of Eastern Europe," The World Today, XXVIII (July, 1972), 289.
103. Davy, loc. cit.
104. Henry Schaefer, "East Europe's New Look at the Common Market," East Europe, XX (March, 1971), 15.
105. Whetten, op. cit., pp. 286-287.
106. The Washington Post, July 8, 1973, p. A8.
107. The Washington Post, loc. cit.
108. Vernon V. Aspaturian, "East European Relations With the USSR," The Changing Face of Communism in Eastern Europe, ed. Peter A. Toma (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1970), p. 293.
109. Ibid., p. 293.
110. Ibid., p. 295.
111. Holloway, "Soviet Policy and the Warsaw Pact," p. 41.
112. Ibid., p. 44.
113. Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, 1965-1969 (Santa-Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1969), p. 321.
114. Aspaturian, op. cit., p. 302.
115. Wolfe, op. cit., pp. 323-324.
116. Ibid., p. 321.
117. Ibid., p. 324.
118. The Military Balance, 1973-1974 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1973), pp. 8, 9, 74.
119. Garthoff, op. cit., p. 153.
120. Ionescu, op. cit., p. 155.
121. Ionescu, loc. cit.
122. Aspaturian, op. cit., pp. 302-304.
123. Ibid., pp. 303-305.
124. A. Grechko, "Militant Alliances of the Armies of the Socialist Countries." Reprints from the Soviet Press. XVI

125. Alexander L. George, "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-making," International Studies Quarterly, XIII (June, 1969), 216-217.

126. David Holloway, "The Warsaw Pact in the Era of Negotiations," Military Review, LIII (July, 1973), 50.

127. Ibid., p. 52.

128. Holloway, loc. cit.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

- Bender, Peter. East Europe in Search of Security. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972.
- Berman, Harold J. Justice in the USSR. Rev. ed. New York: Vantage Books, 1963.
- Brierly, J. K. The Law of Nations. New York: Oxford University Press, 1960.
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew K. The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966.
- Cornell, Richard. (ed.). The Soviet Political System, A Book of Readings. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970.
- Denison, A. and M. Kirichenko. Soviet State Law. Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1960.
- Ermarth, Fritz. Internationalism, Security and Legitimacy: The Challenge to Soviet Interests in Eastern Europe, 1964-1968. Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1969.
- Farrell, R. Barry. (ed.). Political Leadership in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1970.
- Friedman, Julian R. and others (eds.). Alliance in International Politics. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1970.
- Fulbright, J. W. Old Myths and New Realities. New York: Random House, 1964.
- Garthoff, Raymond L. Soviet Military Policy. New York: Praeger, Inc., 1966.
- Godourek, Iran. The Political Control of Czechoslovakia. Leiden, Holland: H.E. Stenfert Kroele N. V., 1953.
- Golan, Golia. The Czechoslovak Reform Movement -- Communism in Crisis 1962-1968. London: Cambridge at the University Press, 1971.
- Grzybowski, Kazimierz. The Socialist Commonwealth of Nations. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964.
- Ionescu, Ghita. The Break-up of the Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe. Baltimore: Penguin Books, Inc., 1965.

- Jaeger, Walter and William V. O'Brien. International Law: Cases and Notes, I. Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1959.
- Kusin, V.V. (ed.). The Czechoslovak Reform Movement 1968. London: T.B. Russell & Co., Ltd., 1973.
- Littell, Robert. The Czech Black Book. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1969.
- Lowenstein, Prince Hubertus and V. Zuhlsdorff, NATO and the Defense of the West. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962.
- "M", Journalist. A Year is Eight Months: Czechoslovakia 1968. Garden City: Anchor Books, Doubleday and Co., 1971.
- Meissner, Boris. East Europe Monograph -- The Brezhnev Doctrine. Parkville, Missouri: The Park College Press, 1970.
- Penkovsky, Oleg. The Penkovsky Papers. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1965.
- Ramundo, Bernard A. Peaceful Coexistence: International Law in the Building of Communism. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967.
- Remington, Robin A. The Warsaw Pact. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1971.
- Stankiewkz, W. J. In Defense of Sovereignty. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969.
- Starr, Richard F. The Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971.
- Toma, Peter A. (ed.). The Changing Face of Communism in Eastern Europe. Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1970.
- Tung, William L. International Law in an Organizing World. New York: Thomas W. Crowell Co., 1968.
- Wolfe, Thomas W. Soviet Power and Europe 1965-1969. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1969.
- Wolfers, Arnold J. (ed.). Alliance Policy in the Cold War. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1959.

Government Documents

Joint U.S.-Soviet Communiqué. Department of Defense Commanders' Digest, XII, August 10, 1972.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C. NATO After Czechoslovakia. Special Report Series #9. Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1969.

U.S. Army Institute for Advanced Russian and East European Studies. 6th Annual Soviet Affairs Symposium, March 27-30, 1971. Garmisch, Germany: Government Printing Office, 1971.

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth. Reference Book, No. 550-95. Fort Leavenworth: Government Printing Office, 1972.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations. The Warsaw Pact, Its Role in Soviet Bloc Affairs. 89th Cong., 2d sess., on S. Res. 181, May 11, 1966. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966.

Periodicals

Bleimans, Robert. "Ostpolitik and the GDR," Survey, A Journal of East and West Studies, XVIII (Summer, 1972), 37.

Brezhnev, Leonid. "Brezhnev Discusses Czechoslovakia at Polish Conference," The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, XX (December 4, 1968), 3-4.

Brezhnev, Leonid. "Report to the CPSU Central Committee, 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," Reprints From the Soviet Press, XII (May 14, 1971), 30.

"Communique of Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Warsaw Treaty Member States," The Atlantic Community Quarterly, IX (Summer, 1971), 268-269.

Dashichev, V. "A Symposium on European Security: Tasks and Prospects," Reprints From the Soviet Press, XV (April 25, 1972), 17.

Davy, Richard. "The ESC and the Politics of Eastern Europe." The World Today, XXVIII (July, 1972), 289.

George, Alexander L. "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making," International Studies Quarterly, XIII (June, 1969), 216-217.

- Grechko, A. "Militant Alliances of the Armies of the Socialist Countries," Reprint From the Soviet Press, XVI (January 26, 1973), 23.
- Holloway, David. "The Warsaw Pact in the Era of Negotiations," Military Review, LIII (July, 1973), 54.
- Kiraly, Bela. "Why the Soviets Need the Warsaw Pact," East Europe, XVIII (April, 1969), 11.
- Kolkowicz, Roman. "The Warsaw Pact: Entangling Alliance," Survey, A Journal of Soviet and East European Studies, LXX/LXXI (Winter-Spring, 1969), 99-100.
- Kovalov, Sergi. "Sovereignty and the International Obligations of Socialist Countries," Current Digest of the Soviet Press, XX (October 16, 1968), 10.
- Kulski, W.W. "The Soviet System of Collective Security Compared with the Western System," American Journal of Law, XXX (1950), 453.
- Palmer, Michael. "The European Community and A Security Conference," The World Today, XXVIII (July, 1972), 196.
- _____. "The Prospects for A European Security Conference," The Atlantic Community Quarterly (Fall, 1971), 294-295.
- Primakov, E. "The Essence of the Line Advocating European Security," Reprints From the Soviet Press, XV (April 25, 1972).
- Remington, Robin A. "Czechoslovakia and the Warsaw Pact," East European Quarterly, III (September, 1969), 315.
- Schaefer, Henry. "East Europe's New Look At the Common Market," East Europe, XX (March, 1971), 15.
- Sidorov, Colonel P. "Foundations of the Soviet Military Doctrine," Military Review, LII (December, 1972), 91.
- Tatu, Michael. "European Security Conference: What's In It For Whom?," World Politics, III (July, 1972), 8.
- The Military Balance, 1973-1974 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1973).
- The New York Times, June 23, 1973, p. 1.
- The Washington Post, July 8, 1973, p. A8.
- Wandycz, Piotr S. "The Soviet System of Alliance in Central Europe," Journal of Central European Affairs, XVI (July, 1956), 177-186.
- Whetten, Lawrence L. "Recent Changes in Eastern Europe

Zagladin, V. and Shoposhnikov, V. "The Promise of Peace In Europe," Reprints From the Soviet Press, XVI (February 9, 1973).

Unpublished Works

Bouton, Peter M. "The Warsaw Pact: External Defense or Internal Control?" Unpublished Master's Thesis, University of South Carolina, 1971.

Morrison, LTC William M., Jr. "Warsaw Pact Integration Since 1968." Unpublished Treatise, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1971.

APPENDIX I

TEXT OF WARSAW PACT*

Treaty

of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance
Between the People's Republic of Albania, the People's
Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic,
the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's
Republic, the Rumanian People's Republic, the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Republic

The Contracting Parties, reaffirming their desire for the establishment of a system of European collective security based on the participation of all European states irrespective of their social and political systems, which would make it possible to unite their efforts in safeguarding the peace of Europe;

mindful, at the same time, of the situation created in Europe by the ratification of the Paris agreements, which envisage the formation of a new military alignment in the shape of "Western European Union," with the participation of a remilitarized Western Germany and the integration of the latter in the North-Atlantic bloc, which increases the danger of another war and constitutes a threat to the national security of the peaceable states;

being persuaded that in these circumstances the peaceable European states must take the necessary measures to safeguard their security and in the interests of preserving peace in Europe;

guided by the objects and principles of the Charter of the United Nations Organization;

being desirous of further promoting and developing friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance in accordance with the principles of respect for the independence and sovereignty of states and of non-interference in their internal affairs,

have decided to conclude the present Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance and have for this purpose appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Republic of Albania: Mehmet Shehu, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Albania;

* Remington, Robin A. The Warsaw Pact, pp. 201-206.

the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Republic of Bulgaria: Vylko Chervenkov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria;

the Presidium of the Hungarian People's Republic: Andras Hegedus, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People's Republic;

the President of the German Democratic Republic: Otto Grotewohl, Prime Minister of the German Democratic Republic;

the State Council of the Polish People's Republic: Jozef Cyrankiewicz, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Polish People's Republic;

the Presidium of the Grand National Assembly of the Rumanian People's Republic: Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Rumanian People's Republic;

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Nikolai Alexandrovich Bulganin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.;

the President of the Czechoslovak Republic: Viliam Siroky, Prime Minister of the Czechoslovak Republic,

who, having presented their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

Article I

The Contracting Parties undertake, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations Organization, to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force, and to settle their international disputes peacefully and in such manner as will not jeopardize international peace and security.

Article II

The Contracting Parties declare their readiness to participate in a spirit of sincere cooperation in all international actions designed to safeguard international peace and security, and will fully devote their energies to the attainment of this end.

The Contracting Parties will furthermore strive for the adoption, in agreement with other states which may desire to cooperate in this, of effective measures for universal reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction.

Article III

The Contracting Parties shall consult with one another on all important international issues affecting their common interests, guided by the desire to strengthen international peace and security.

They shall immediately consult with one another whenever, in the opinion of any one of them, a threat of armed attack on one or more of the Parties of the Treaty has arisen, in order to ensure joint defence and the maintenance of peace and security.

Article IV

In the event of armed attack in Europe on one or more of the Parties to the Treaty by any state or group of states, each of the Parties to the Treaty, in the exercise of its right to individual or collective self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations Organization, shall immediately, either individually or in agreement with other Parties to the Treaty, come to the assistance of the state or states attacked with all such means as it deems necessary, including armed forces. The Parties to the Treaty shall immediately consult concerning the necessary measures to be taken by them jointly in order to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Measures taken on the basis of this Article shall be reported to the Security Council in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations Organization. These measures shall be discontinued immediately as soon as the Security Council adopts the necessary measures to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article V

The Contracting Parties have agreed to establish a Joint Command of the armed forces that by agreement among the Parties shall be assigned to the Command, which shall function on the basis of jointly established principles. They shall likewise adopt other agreed measures necessary to strengthen their defensive power, in order to protect the peaceful labours of their peoples, guarantee the inviolability of their frontiers and territories, and provide defence against possible aggression.

Article VI

For the purpose of the consultations among the Parties envisaged in the present Treaty, and also for the purpose of examining questions which may arise in the operation of the

Treaty, a Political Consultative Committee shall be set up, in which each of the Parties to the Treaty shall be represented by a member of its Government or by another specifically appointed representative.

The Committee may set up such auxiliary bodies as may prove necessary.

Article VII

The Contracting Parties undertake not to participate in any coalitions or alliances and not to conclude any agreements whose objects conflict with the objects of the present Treaty.

The Contracting Parties declare that their commitments under existing international treaties do not conflict with the provisions of the present Treaty.

Article VIII

The Contracting Parties declare that they will act in a spirit of friendship and cooperation with a view of further developing and fostering economic and cultural intercourse with one another, each adhering to the principle of respect for the independence and sovereignty of the others and non-interference in their internal affairs.

Article IX

The present Treaty is open to the accession of other states irrespective of their social and political systems, which express their readiness by participation in the present Treaty to assist in uniting the efforts of the peaceable states in safeguarding the peace and security of the peoples. Such accession shall enter into force with the agreement of the Parties to the Treaty after the declaration of accession has been deposited with the Government of the Polish People's Republic.

Article X

The present Treaty is subject to ratification, and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of the Polish People's Republic.

The treaty shall enter into force on the day the last instrument of ratification has been deposited. The Government of the Polish People's Republic shall notify the other Parties to the Treaty as each instrument of ratification is deposited.

Article XI

The present Treaty shall remain in force for twenty years. For such Contracting Parties as do not at least one year before the expiration of this period present to the Government of the Polish People's Republic a statement of denunciation of the Treaty, it shall remain in force for the next ten years.

Should a system of collective security be established in Europe, and a General European Treaty of Collective Security concluded for this purpose, for which the Contracting Parties will unswervingly strive, the present Treaty shall cease to be operative from the day the General European Treaty enters into force.

Done in Warsaw on May 14, 1955, in one copy each in Russian, Polish, Czech and German languages, all texts being equally authentic. Certified copies to the present Treaty shall be sent by the Government of the Polish People's Republic to all the Parties to the Treaty.

In witness whereof the plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and affixed their seals.

For the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Republic of Albania

Mehmet Shehu

For the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Republic of Bulgaria

Vylko Chervenkov

For the Presidium of the Hungarian People's Republic

Andras Hegedus

For the President of the German Democratic Republic

Otto Grotewohl

For the State Council of the Polish People's Republic

Jozef Cyrankiewicz

For the Presidium of the Grand National Assembly of the Rumanian People's Republic

Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej

For the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Nikolai Alexandrovich Bulganin

For the President of the Czechoslovak Republic

Viliam Siroky

* * * * *

In accordance with Article X, the Treaty came into force on 6 June 1955, the date of deposit with the government of the Polish People's Republic of the last instrument of ratification. Following are the dates of deposit of the instruments of ratification on behalf of the signatory states:

Poland	19 May 1955
GDR	24 May 1955
Czechoslovakia	27 May 1955
Bulgaria	31 May 1955
USSR	1 June 1955
Hungary	2 June 1955
Rumania	3 June 1955
Albania	6 June 1955

Establishment of a Joint Command

of the Armed Forces of the Signatories to the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance.

In pursuance of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the People's Republic of Albania, the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Rumanian People's Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Republic, the signatory states have decided to establish a Joint Command of their armed forces.

The decision provides that general questions relating to the strengthening of the defensive power and the organization of the Joint Armed Forces of the signatory states shall be subject to examination by the Political Consultative Committee, which shall adopt the necessary decisions.

Marshal of the Soviet Union. I. S. Konev has been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces to be assigned by the signatory states.

The Ministers of Defence or other military leaders of the signatory states are to serve as Deputy Commanders-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces, and shall command the armed forces assigned by their respective states to the Joint Armed Forces.

The question of participation of the German Democratic Republic in measures concerning the armed forces of the Joint Command will be examined at a later date.

A Staff of the Joint Armed Forces of the signatory states will be set up under the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces, and will include permanent representatives of the General Staffs of the signatory states.

The Staff will have its headquarters in Moscow.

The disposition of the Joint Armed Forces in the territories of the signatory states will be effected, by agreement among the states, in accordance with the requirements of their mutual defence.

APPENDIX II

TEXT OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY*

Washington, D.C., 4 April, 1949

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security.

They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:

Article I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article II

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

* Lowenstein, Prince Hubertus and Volkman von Zuhlsdorff, NATO and the Defense of the West, pp. 347-350.

Article III

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article IV

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

Article V

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all, and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article VI*

For the purpose of Article VI an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the occupation forces of any Party in Europe, on the islands under the jurisdiction of any Party in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the Parties.

* The definition of the territories to which Article V applies was revised by Article XI of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey.

Article VII

This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article VIII

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties, or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

Article IX

The Parties hereby establish a council, on which each of them shall be represented to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles III and V.

Article X

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

Article XI

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to

other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.

Article XII

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article XIII

After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

Article XIV

This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of the other signatories.

THE WARSAW PACT: AN ALLIANCE IN
THE AGE OF NEGOTIATIONS

by

BILLY CARL BROWN

B.S., Texas A&M University, 1962

AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S REPORT

submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Political Science

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas

1973

The Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) was established on May 14, 1955, with eight members -- the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR), Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania. The Warsaw Pact has had both a military and political character and was designed by the Russians primarily to counter the effect of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and subsequent West German rearmament.

The purpose of this study is to examine the WTO in relation to the period of intensive international negotiations conducted since 1960. Specifically, the examination considers the Warsaw Pact formation, significant events that have affected the Alliance, and what may be some of the prospects for change as a result of East-West negotiations.

The USSR and the East European countries have undergone three major crises since the WTO was formed. The Russians acted unilaterally in both Poland and Hungary in 1956, and the Warsaw Pact was given credit for coordinating the events only "ex post facto." The third WTO crisis was the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia by the armies of the USSR, Poland, Hungary, East Germany, and Bulgaria. The WTO was used as a "front" for the Russian led intervention.

International events following the Czechoslovakian crisis suggested the Soviet Union was interested in the resumption of detente. The Four-Power discussions on Berlin, Strategic Arms Limitations Talks, Bonn-Moscow Treaty, and

resumption of bilateral negotiations between the West and East European countries were begun. Agreements were also reached between the East and West in the early 1970's to convene a conference on European security and cooperation in Helsinki in 1973. Mutual force reduction talks were also scheduled for October 1973, in Vienna. Both negotiations are currently being held.

The impact of this period of intensive negotiations on the Warsaw Treaty Organization remains uncertain. Events support the appraisal that the WTO still remains in 1973, a means of external defense and internal control for the Soviet Union. Some of the problems affecting the cohesion of the Pact include: the national or "pluralistic" communism of the East European countries; disagreement over the command and control structure of the Warsaw Alliance; the actual mission or purpose of the Pact; the desires of WTO members to conduct unilateral actions with non-communist countries; access to nuclear weapons and nuclear planning; economic issues including costs of military modernization and Russian expenditures for a nuclear "shield" for the WTO; and the impact of detente between the Soviet Union and the West.

There appear to be few firm answers concerning the prospects for the Warsaw Pact in the current period of international negotiation, but some of the alternatives include: (1) a continuation of the reduction in Pact cohesion as WTO members pursue their respective national objectives within the bounds of the Brezhnev Doctrine, (2) the Soviet Union will remain prepared to use armed intervention under

the Brezhnev Doctrine if WTO states seek a course that denies the dominant role of the Communist Party or the central leadership of the Soviet Union, (3) the Soviet Union might be willing to permit the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact if NATO were dissolved or rendered ineffective by a European collective security arrangement, (4) the Russians can probably be expected to continue using the bilateral treaties with the East European countries as important means of external defense and internal control.

The period of intensive East-West negotiations continues in 1973. The prospects for the Warsaw Treaty Organization and its future role as an alliance appear to be closely related to results of these negotiations.