

TRENDS IN SUBURBAN POLITICAL BEHAVIOR:
1952 to 1964

by

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B.A., St. Benedict's College, 1967

3735

A MASTER'S THESIS

submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree

MASTER OF ARTS


Department of Political Science

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY

Manhattan, Kansas

1970

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CONTENTS

	PAGE
CHAPTER I	
INTRODUCTION	i
PURPOSE OF STUDY.....	4
METHODOLOGY	6
HYPOTHESES	12
CHAPTER II	
DATA AND ANALYSIS.....	14
Demography.....	14
Party Identification and Voting Behavior.....	34
Party Switch.....	48
Participatory Nature of Suburbia	53
CHAPTER III	
SUMMARY OF DATA	75
IMPLICATION OF THE DATA	79
FOOTNOTES.....	81
BIBLIOGRAPHY	85

TRENDS IN SUBURBAN POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 1952 to 1964

Introduction

The influx of millions of former urban and rural residents into the suburban areas of the United States has brought about a considerable amount of speculation with regard to trends present in recent presidential elections.¹ The tremendous growth of these areas is one of the most pronounced changes in the American social scene during the past three decades. In 1940, only 9 per cent of the United States population lived in these outer residential belts of the metropolitan centers. However, by 1955, the figure had grown to 28 per cent.²

Beginning with the 1920's the freedom of movement that the automobile gave the American citizen encouraged the middle class to leave the over-populated cities for the suburban countryside where one could hope to possess "a place of one's own." All around the central city what have been called "dormitory suburbs" grew, the residents of which commuted to the central business district of the city for employment. This "flight to the suburbs" is continuing today.³ It has, in fact, been projected that between 1954 and 1975 the metropolitan ring of the central cities will grow in population between 155.5 per cent as a low projection, to 226.2 per cent as a high projection. This prediction is particularly important when one considers that the same study has cited central city growth for the same period of time as between a minus 1.9 per cent as a low projection and a growth of 2.9 per cent as a high projection. On the average, suburban population seems to be growing at considerably higher rates than that of the central city. Sociologists have been quick to point out that there are

two distinct trends in the location of population, both lending to suburbanization. One trend indicates that some people prefer to be close to their employment which is now possible with the movement of manufacturing and other employment from the central city to the suburbs. But the major part of the so-called middle-class Americans make the move because they seem to favor low-density suburban living to crowded city life. In most of the central cities, vacant land zoned for single family dwellings is almost non-existent. This fact of city life allows for expansion only in the suburban areas.⁴

Before proceeding with this discussion of suburbia, it is proper that we determine, as near as possible, what suburbia is. Thomas R. Dye in his article "City-Suburban Social Distance and Public Policy," defines suburbia as

... a densely settled nonagricultural community adjacent and dependent upon a large central city. By "dependent" it is meant that suburban communities represent sources and destinations of the internal circulation of goods and people that make up the daily rhythm and activity of the large metropolis.⁵

Emphasizing his point, Dye later reiterates that "the distinguishing feature of a suburb remains its economic dependency upon, and extensive intercourse with, the larger metropolis."⁶ An operational definition, as used by the United States Census Bureau, sees suburbia as an "urbanized area" lying outside the central city. In the 1960 census, the Bureau identified some 213 urbanized areas in the United States. To be considered an urbanized area the city must have a population of 50,000 or more in addition to its "surrounding ring of contiguous high density areas."⁷ These rings are said to follow census enumeration districts, but are not always coterminous with political unit boundaries. The

rings mentioned are thought to be the best conceptualization of the suburb.

In a simpler, if not as precise, description, Robert Wood says that suburbs "are places in the country immediately outside a city and suburbanites are the inhabitants of the country."⁸

Despite the fact that many political scientists and sociologists have recognized the importance of suburban development of the twentieth century, they are still relatively ignorant as to the what and why of suburban political behavior and its effects on American political patterns in general.⁹ In the past, social research has primatily dealt with suburbia's characteristics, but surprisingly, little has related to its political life.¹⁰ That is the goal of this study.

PURPOSE OF STUDY

The purpose of this study is to examine the suburban presidential voter and try to find out what it is that helps to determine the way that he votes, identify himself with a particular political party, if any, and take an active interest in political campaigns. The primary objective is to determine if there has been any shift in the behavior of the suburban resident during a period of time from 1952 to 1964. There has been a great deal of speculation regarding the possibility of such a shift and it seems worthy of investigation.

This study will concentrate on four primary topics of interest. The first of these will be the determination of the demographic and socio-economic characteristics which make up past and present suburbia. Second, the study will attempt to find out the voting habits of suburbia and at the same time ascertain if there has been any shift in the party loyalty of suburbia as a whole since 1952. Does the suburbanite vote the way that he identifies with the political parties? What changes, if any, have come over the suburban voter since the first election of President Eisenhower? Third, what is the effect of moving to suburbia on party identification and voting habits? Do people who move from the city vote differently in the suburb? The final part of the study will be to determine the participatory habits of suburbia. The questions to be asked will relate to the amount of efficacy that is found in suburbia and to what extent this influences voting behavior. Also to be examined is the voting frequency of suburbia and the amount of active campaign participation that is entered into by its residents.

General questions to be asked are: What has been the pattern of the election-to-election shifts between 1952 and 1964 when comparing the suburban areas of the nation to that of the central cities? What are the long-range effects of these shifts to the political parties and the candidates nominated by them? How may these findings be related to the socio-economic situations in each of these environments? To what extent does suburbia differ from the central city in its political attitudes, activities and ideology?

METHODOLOGY

This study relies on data gathered by the Survey Research Center located at the University of Michigan. The data were collected in the course of the Center's pre- and post-election studies in 1952, 1956, 1960 and 1964. Since this is a study of suburban and urban residents and their political behavior, it is unfortunate that the data that are available are only gross data and do not allow for treatment of individuals who have moved from the urban area to the suburb, those who have lived all of their lives in the central city or those who have spent it all in the suburbs. Fortunately, however, the data do pertain to a cross section of the adult population of voting age who lived in the designated sections of the metropolitan community at the time of the four election studies.¹¹

As previously stated, this study will attempt to compare the political preferences of the urban and suburban residents, while controlling for the customary demographic variables of income and education. Regarding the samples to be compared, all data in the Survey Research Center studies which are called "urban-metropolitan" areas in the 1952 survey, and all those called "central cities" in the 1956, 1960 and 1964 surveys are included in the use of the term "central cities." The areas we call "suburban" is made up of the 1952 "suburban-metropolitan" area and in 1956, 1960 and 1964, the "suburban" areas having populations between 2,500 and 10,000 and above. Omitted in the study are all areas not falling in the designated categories. The total samples used in the four surveys are as follows:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Urban</u>	<u>Suburban</u>
1952	290	141
1956	245	217
1960	249	223
1964	192	230

Although the samples of the four surveys appear smaller than is desirable for statistical comparison, they may have the effect of furnishing consistent trends. And, while the individual comparisons may fall short of statistical significance, they often afford insights into possible future studies.

Of course, all the suburbs studies are not of a single type. There are lower income as well as upper income suburbs. An example of the contrasting types of suburbs is given by Banfield and Wilson in the following excerpt from their City Politics:

Not very far from upper-class suburbs where garbage is collected in paper bags and put in fly-proof trucks and where high school teachers are paid as much as many Ivy college professors, there may be communities in which most people cannot afford or else do not want even such basic amenities as sidewalks, police protection, and community sewage disposal.¹²

In addition to the different income levels of suburbs, there are both residential and industrial suburbs.

Generally, however, this study is concerned with residential suburbs rather than the industrial type. Residential suburbs are those which lie on the fringe of the metropolitan area and the residents of which commute to jobs in the central city. Industrial suburbs are those which have within their boundaries the industries and businesses which are the means of employment

for the residents of those suburbs. The suburbs included in the surveys have almost all been determined to be of the residential type. Previous studies have noted that the "contaminating effect" of a few industrial suburbs in the sample would tend to minimize the urban-suburban peculiarities, because, as it was stated, industrial workers tend toward the Democratic Party. This small degree of industrial influence should have a conservative effect on the results of the survey.¹³

Throughout the study suburban residents will be compared with urbanites. All comparisons will deal with the differences between these two elements of the metropolitan community. While previous studies have dealt with geographic analyses, they have mainly concentrated upon urban-rural variations. Urban-rural differences have generally been studied because the rural sector of society was, for a long time, thought of as the frontier and it has consequently been stressed in history and social sciences since that time. The alleged division between the urban and suburban, however, is something relatively new and seems to finally be receiving the notice of the social scientists and fitting into its own niche in the twentieth century urban-rural frame of reference. This study was begun because political science seems to know so little about the differences between the urban and suburban elements of society in their political attitudes and actions.¹⁴

In the first portion of the study, the customary demographic variables will be compared to the urban-suburban division to form a basis for finding out if there is any possible relationship between social class and the political behavior of the individual. Most important in this section is the determination

if there has been any change in the type of people that are populating the central city and the suburbs as compared with the same areas in the early 1950's.

The second section of the study deals with party identification and voting behavior. To determine general trends in party identification, the sample included a question asking the actual vote cast by the respondent in the past election. Here, also, it will be ascertained whether there has been any shift in the relative strength of the political parties in the cities and the suburbs. The actual vote of the individual will be controlled for education and income in an attempt to isolate the suburban factor.

The third segment of the analysis deals with the concept of party identification and party switch. The same questions asked in the second part of the study will be used, but in addition to them, a question relating to change in party identification will be employed. It is hoped that this section will, in some way, help us understand the argument among many political scientists regarding the partisan changes that may result from a move to suburbia. Here, too, party switch in the urban area will be studied and compared to suburbia.

Finally, the study will concentrate upon the comparison of urban and suburban behavior when considering the amount of efficacy that a person feels about his place relative to his government, and the frequency with which he turns out at the polls. Related to this idea of effectiveness is the amount that the individual actively participates in other phases of the political process. Here questions related to campaigning and contributing to parties and

candidates will be weighed. Like the other sections of the study, the comparisons will be controlled for education and income.

Regarding the statistical significance tests on the data that have been used, it was previously mentioned that because of the small sample size it would be difficult to expect a significant correlation in many of the cases, but this study will attempt to indicate certain trends that might hold importance for future studies. The significance tests used on the data were the Chi-Square test with the two-tailed option and the use of the "Z Score for Gamma." The former of these tests was used on nominal data and the latter on ordinal. The conventional level of significance of 5 per cent is used with both of the above named tests. The real difficulty with the significance tests will arise when it is necessary to control for third variables. Because the cells of the tables will contain such small figures due to the small sample worked with, the chance that significant results will come from the controlled variables is considerably diminished. In all situations where the tables produce significant results, the level of significance will be stated. Where the tables fail to reach the desired level, a notation of non-significance will be made in the body of the text. It is intended in this study to state the results of the tests whether they be statistically significant or not. Should there be a result which fails to reach the normal statistical figure, this would be as important as any result that was to be expected to reach the desired level. The two-tailed test of significance refers to the fact that the results of the testing of the data may agree with the intended hypotheses or they may show a characteristic which was entirely unintended. Either way, these results

would be noteworthy.

Again taking into consideration the controls income and education used in the comparisons, all of the variables used in that manner were divided into three cells: low, middle and high. Although this trichotomization may harm the chances of receiving the desired levels of significance, it would seem of little value to divide the variables into only two cells and limit the differentiation between the levels of comparison.

THE FOLLOWING HYPOTHESES WILL BE TESTED:

1. Since 1952, the socio-economic differences between suburbia and the central city have become greater.
2. The influx of former city dwellers from the urban centers to the suburbs has had no great effect on individual party identification or voting habits, but merely reflects the general trends found in the metropolitan community in general.
3. Suburban voting patterns parallel those of other populations and theories that urban Democrats become suburban Republicans are unfounded.
4. Political participation in the form of voting turnout and active participation in the election campaign is higher in the suburb than in the central city.
5. There is a higher degree of political efficacy in suburbia than in the central city.

DATA AND ANALYSIS

What are the characteristics found to be inherent in suburbia that makes its residents different from the urban segment of society in their political orientations? How much have the characteristics of suburbia changed since the early 1950's and what is the outlook for the future? These and other questions will be looked into in this chapter of the study.

The differences between the two areas of population that are being studied here have been pointed out in numerous writings. Such differences between these two areas may be traced back to the earliest days of the city. It has been noted that at the time the central cities were laid out,

...the poor were crowded together in the mudflats along the river-front, close to their work, or in whatever open spaces they could find around warehouses and breweries. The rich lived on the hills, a few minutes by carriage from their places of business. The middle class, perforce, lived on the edges of the city, a safe distance from the noise, confusion, and immorality of the waterfront.¹⁵

The divisions among the classes of people that grew with the city have carried with them divergent views on legislation and approaches to be taken toward the problems facing government today. Differences of opinion between the suburb and the central city occur on questions of both national and local policies. The residents of the central city, which are often found to be heavily Catholic, Negro and lower-class, have tended to tolerate, and frequently favor, the machine-type politics of the Democratic bosses. In contrast to this, the newer suburban residential areas tend toward Republican identification, favoring higher levels of public services, and devotion to

"good government." Again in their City Politics, Banfield and Wilson have noted that there are important political differences between the central city and the suburbs:

That some people live on one side of a boundary and some live on the other is enough in itself to make an important difference. Those who live in one place (say the suburbs) do not want to be taxed to support facilities and services in another place (say the central city.)¹⁶

Other points of conflict between the two areas concern housing, race relations, and many other public issues which can and do have important implications for national legislation.

The importance of looking into socio-economic conditions has been pointed out by Frederick M. Wirt in his 1965 article dealing with the political sociology of suburbia. Wirt feels that

...suburban political differences, like those of the core city, are associated with socio-economic differences.

and

...There still remains an association between such factors as high income and Republican voting.... It has affected the behavior of party leaders in the conduct of campaigns.¹⁷

It is entirely possible that the differences between the central cities and suburbs on issue orientation may arise from differences in the socio-economic bases of the residential area. The political attachments of a voter tend to be strongly affected by both his and his family's "life-style," namely, occupation, education, income and religion. One's political loyalties will be reinforced by homogeneous life-styles which are consistent with those loyalties. However, discrepancies and heterogeneous life-styles will tend to weaken them.¹⁸

Joseph Zigmund has stated that "the social and political composition of most suburbs has remained quite constant over the past twenty years" and that the decade of the 1950's saw little or no change in the general socio-economic patterns of suburbia.¹⁹

It will be useful to describe first the general social characteristics of both the city and suburban residents. The following tables will be arranged so as to afford a comparative study of not only the differences between the city and the suburb, but also the trends of the two population segments between 1952 and 1964. The first tables will contain references to the standard demographic variables: age, marital status, sex, and religion. The following tables will contain socio-economic variables: occupation, income and education.

Table I relates to the age of the respondent. The election studies showed that in both 1952 and 1956, the suburban and the urban age make-up were found to vary little in the percentage of the population in the various age brackets. In the last two surveys, however, this has not been the case. In 1960, the major differences between the suburb and the city samples were found in the group under 35 years of age and those between 35 and 54 years old. The suburb had five per cent more people under 35 years of age than the city, and the urban area had 8 per cent more than the suburban area between the ages of 35 and 54. The 1964 survey seems to offer even more interesting results in that the suburban area finds itself with a greater proportion of its population in all divisions of age except that of those respondents who were 65 years old or over.

Table 1 Age of Respondent, By location and Year

1952*	<u>Under 25</u>	<u>25-34</u>	<u>35-44</u>	<u>45-54</u>	<u>55-64</u>	<u>Over 64</u>		<u>N</u>
Suburban	9%	26%	23%	18%	11%	13%	= 100%	141
Urban	8	23	35	19	15	10		290
1956*								
Suburban	6%	21%	30%	20%	14%	9%	= 100%	217
Urban	4	22	31	21	12	10		244
1960*								
Suburban	3%	19%	22%	27%	14%	14%	= 100%	223
Urban	2	15	31	26	18	8		245
1964*								
Suburban	6%	18%	19%	26%	20%	11%	= 100%	228
Urban	4	10	12	27	21	26		190

* P Not Significant

Twenty-six per cent of the urban sample were in that age bracket. The importance of these results may be felt by the political parties and candidates of the particular areas in which these respondents lived. Age has been related to active political participation in numerous studies. These studies have generally found that participation tends to rise with age, but reaches a peak and levels off around the age of 50 or 55 and then gradually declines above sixty. It has also been noted that the older a person is, the more likely he is to vote.²⁰ Participation and voting turnout can have important implications for political processes in the areas of residence. From the results of the 1960 and 1964 surveys, it may be inferred that the conditions are right for the suburban population to be more participatory in their politics, but that the vote turnout may be higher in the central cities.

The marital status of the respondents is considered in Table 2. Although the rates of marriage have remained relatively constant over the four survey periods in both the suburban and urban samples, the variation between the two areas varies from six to ten percentage points. In 1952, the suburban sample had 79 per cent of the respondents answering that they were married, but 73 per cent of the urbanites responded in the affirmative. Related to participation in the political processes of the community it has been noted that the most politically apathetic group in society are young and unmarried citizens who, as yet, are only marginally involved in their community. In general, studies have taken both sides of the issue. Several have found that married persons are more likely than are single persons to participate in politics,

Table 2 Marital Status of Respondent, By Location and Year

1952*	<u>Married</u>	<u>Not Married**</u>		<u>N</u>
Suburban	79%	21%	= 100%	140
Urban	73	27		289
1956*				
Suburban	82%	18%	= 100%	217
Urban	74	26		245
1960*				
Suburban	83%	17%	= 100%	222
Urban	75	25		247
1964*				
Suburban	80%	20%	= 100%	230
Urban	70	30		192

* Only 1964 has P .05

** Includes respondents who are either divorced, single or widowed

while others have found that there is no relationship. Individuals have been found, however, to be affected more by the number of children that they have than by whether or not they are married. This is more important, though, when considering what Milbrath calls "gladiatorial participation" than for voting turnout.²¹

Lester W. Milbrath, *Political Participation* (Chicago: Rand McNally Co., 1965), p. 20.

Gladiatorial participation as used by Milbrath means the small group of citizens which "not only participates (by voting, proseletyzes, and displays preferences) but is also drawn into the political fray; they attend meetings, campaign, become active in a party, solicit money, run for and hold public and party office."

With regard to the sex of the respondent, (see Table 3) the ratio of women to men seems to remain constant not only over the twelve year period between the surveys, but also between the cities and the suburbs. The only thing worthy of note is that out of every one hundred people to be interviewed in these areas, about fifty-five of them are of the weaker sex. The results of the surveys show a tendency, in the 1952 and 1956 surveys, in the suburbs to have about five per cent more men than did the urban areas. However, in 1960 and 1964, the urban areas seemed to level off with the suburb and vary only a percentage point from it. In fact, the last two surveys showed a higher percentage of males in the central city than did the suburb. Implications for the political fortunes of the parties could be important as shown in the 1960 and 1964 election campaigns with a higher number of male residents in the urban areas. One of the most thoroughly substantiated findings of social science is that men tend to participate in politics more than do women.²²

Table 3 Sex of Respondent

1952*	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>		<u>N</u>
Suburban	46%	54%	= 100%	141
Urban	42	58		290
1956*				
Suburban	47%	53%	= 100%	217
Urban	41	59		245
1960*				
Suburban	46%	54%	= 100%	223
Urban	47	53		249
1964*				
Suburban	48%	52%	= 100%	230
Urban	49	51		192

* No comparisons reached the .05 significance level.

Reasons for this disparity have been many and varied. Among the most plausible is that demands on the mother of the house afford her little opportunity or "need to gain politically relevant experiences." Because of this and other factors, a woman could be expected to care less about politics and, as has been shown in almost every country, vote less than man.²³ It has been shown, however, that both economic and social modernization have begun to erode this difference between the sexes. Politics is definitely becoming less and less the sole province of man.²⁴

Religion seems to become quite predictable when it comes to the area of a metropolitan center in which the individual lives. As shown by Table 4, suburbia has continued since the 1952 election survey to be the home of the American Protestant. Nearly 60 per cent of those who expressed a religious preference claimed that they were Protestant in all four of the surveys. At the same time, only about 42 per cent of the urban sample showed a Protestant preference. Catholic respondents were found to constitute about an equal portion of the urban sample as the Protestants, but accounted for about five per cent less of the population of the suburban area. The main differentiation with religious preference and place of residence may be found with those of the Jewish faith. Although they comprised only about two per cent of the suburban sample in the 1952 to 1960 surveys, they did constitute about 17 per cent of the urban population. In the first three surveys being discussed, the suburbs seemed to be made up of about 60 per cent Protestants, a little less than 40 per cent Catholic, and the remaining two per cent Jewish. The

Table 4 Religion, by location and year**

	<u>Protestant</u>	<u>Catholic</u>	<u>Jewish</u>	<u>N</u>
1952*				
Suburban	60%	39%	1% = 100%	134
Urban	43	43	14	276
1956:				
Suburban	64%	33%	3%	214
Urban	42	41	17	230
1960:				
Suburban	63%	35%	2	203
Urban	41	41	18	218
1964:				
Suburban	56%	38%	6%	216
Urban	53	34	13	179

$P > .05$

**Of those who expressed a religious preference.

urban sample for these same surveys was somewhat more evenly divided with the Jewish people comprising almost 20 per cent and the other two about 40 per cent each. The most notable religious aspect of the four survey study, is the abrupt change of 1964. In the suburbs, the Catholic percentage has remained about the same, but the Jewish population in that area has gained about five per cent while the Protestants have lost that amount. At the same time, the urban center has seen a change in its own complexion. The Protestant percentage of the population has gained a full ten per cent over 1952, while the Catholics and Jews have each lost about five percentage points. The reason for this change may lie in the previously mentioned emigration of the lower-middle-class whites, probably European-born Catholics and Jews, out to the suburbs, both residential and industrial, and the influx of Protestant Negroes from the southern rural areas. The process of migration is well-known. The Negro moves into the central city from outside the state, usually the South, and the white labor class worker moves from this same central city location to avoid the Negro. This reason may not be true for all areas, but it has been found to be the pattern in many of our nation's major cities. With regard to racial population changes in the nation's largest cities, it has been noted that "although all of the country's largest cities had a greater representation of nonwhites in 1960 than in 1950, the reason for this shifting distribution by color varies from place to place."²⁵ The political implications of this change in the religious make-up of the central city and the suburb, if there are any, do not result from the specific content of the particular religion. The

teachings of the individual religions have, historically, born little relationship to the developing of interest in politics. "The relationship between politics and religion is based on organizational pressure, group interaction and identity, and group interest, not theology."²⁶ Although there appears to be no relationship between the particular theology or teachings of a religion and politics, that is not to say that particular sects do not have participatory and voting habits which affect members politically. Relating to religious differences and rates of participation, what has been termed "the rising standards of living and assimilation" of both Jews and Catholics, has brought these groups into equal or even higher rates of participation when compared to similarly situated (economically) Protestants.²⁷ Several studies have found that, in general, there are slight differences between the religions in participation. However, these studies have noted that Jews are slightly more active than Catholics in politics and they, likewise, tend to be more active than Protestants.²⁸ With regard to the relationship between religious affiliation and voting, it is a pattern of the past that Catholics consistently choose to identify with the Democratic Party and Protestants with the Republican Party. Reasons for this as stated by Clinton Rossiter are that the "Democratic Party remains more Catholic than Protestant in style and personnel, the Republican Party more Protestant than Catholic in memory and appeal."²⁹ As for the Jews, they have recently been casting votes for the Democratic candidate three out of four times. Reasons given for this Jewish voting pattern range from the memory of Roosevelt's New Deal of natural liberalism and internationalism, to

S. M. Lipset's suggestion that this vote stems from "their sensitivity to ethnic discrimination and their lack of effective social intercourse with the upper-status groups in America."³⁰ Although, as it has been stated, the religious differences are slight, they are, nonetheless, considerations to weigh when discussing present and potential political participation and vote in both suburban and urban settings.

Income has for many years been associated with suburbia primarily as an indicator of what type of people reside there. However, as has been previously noted, the complexion of the suburb has changed to some extent since the original movement to the suburbs was made by former urban residents. Suburbia is no longer the sole domain of the wealthier middle class. The suburbs are now attracting many different types of people whose income levels range as widely as their diversity. Table 5 describes the annual incomes of the respondents. The figures given indicate the amount of money that the family unit earned during the year designated and not simply the wages or salary earned by the head of the household or the respondent. The disparity between the suburbs and the central city are illustrated most convincingly by a comparison of the extremes of income. Comparing those respondents with incomes under three thousand dollars, there were, over the four survey span, approximately twice as many respondents in the central city who earned that amount than in the suburbs. The city averaged 21 per cent, while the suburbs had only 12 per cent in that lowest income category. As with the lowest income categories, there was a distinct difference in the upper levels between

Table 5 Income, By Location and Year

1952		Under \$1,000 2%	\$1,000- 2,999 13%	\$3,000- 4,999 44%	\$5,000- 7,499 23%	\$7,500- 10,000 5%	Over \$10,000 13%	= 100%	N 139 284
	Suburban	4	25	39	21	7	4		
	Urban								
1956									
	Suburban	3%	8%	22%	34%	18%	15%	= 100%	206
	Urban	4	14	35	28	12	7		238
1960									
	Suburban	4%	11%	13%	37%	11%	24%	= 100%	223
	Urban	2	11	23	36	18	10		249
1964									
	Suburban	3%	5%	10%	27%	19%	36%	= 100%	230
	Urban	7	15	15	25	16	22		192

P > .05

the suburban and the urban residents. In this case, the suburban sample appeared to have approximately twice as many people in the highest income bracket as did the central city. Over the four survey period, an average of 22 per cent of the suburban residents reported having an income of over ten thousand dollars. During this same period, the central city had about 11 per cent of its population in the highest income category. Between these two extreme categories both geographic areas showed similar percentages of its people having the same incomes. The suburbs appear to have twice as many people making the greatest amount of money and half as many people with the lowest of annual incomes. Income has, in the past, proven to be an important determinant in the individual's amount of political activity and his stands on particular public issues. Studies have shown a strong relationship between income and involvement in politics. Individuals of lower income levels and of lower-status jobs are considered to be less likely to become involved in politics, to be active and to be well informed. Also, the individual in a higher income bracket tends to be more politically active and competent.³¹

Another effect of income may be felt at the ballot box. Higher income people are more likely to have a higher rate of turnout at the polls than lower income people.³² As for the large block of citizens who fall in between the two extremes of income, about two-thirds of both the cities and the suburbs, their vote has the potential to swing entire elections to one political party or the other. While the upper income group is usually associated with the Republican Party, and those of lower income with the Democrats, that large segment of

the population which is at neither end of the income ladder is relatively unpredictable. Studies have found that, "middle income groups are, to a small extent, less emotional about their party feelings than either the more prosperous who may have clearer orientation on 'which side their bread is buttered.' "33

Education has been granted a primary role in the determination of the political inclinations of the individual for many years. Along with income and occupation, education is considered to have a strong influence on the amount of interest a person will take in politics.

Perhaps the surest single predictor of political involvement is number of years of formal education. There are apathetic college students and highly involved people of very low educational level but the overall relationship of education and political interest is impressive. It is impossible to say with confidence why it is that formal schooling makes people more responsive to political stimulation. One may surmise that education tends to widen the scope of one's acquaintance with political facts, to increase capacity to perceive the personal implications of political events, or to enlarge one's confidence in his own ability to act effectively politically. Whatever the precise nature of the educational process, it has clear effects on political interest.³⁴

The educational levels of the respondents of both areas seemed to differ considerably less than in other variables. (see Table 6.) While 8 per cent of the suburban sample was shown to have an eighth grade or less education, that figure was doubled in the central city. At the other end of the educational scale, while only 14 per cent of the urban sample reported that they had earned a college degree, 19 per cent of the suburban residents said that they had reached the same educational level. Over the four election period appears to be little change in the gross amount of education that the respon-

Table 6 - Education of Respondent, By Location and Year

Year	Location	<u>Some Grammar School</u>			<u>Grammar School Graduate and Some High School</u>			<u>High School Graduate</u>			<u>High School Graduate and Some College</u>			<u>College Degree</u>			N
		12%	19		29%	37		40%	28		17%	8		7%	8		
1952	Suburban	12%	19		29%	37		40%	28		17%	8		7%	8		139
	Urban																281
1956	Suburban	7%	17		30%	35		33%	33		17%	10		13%	5		216
	Urban																238
1960	Suburban	6%	19		26%	24		38%	31		18%	14		12%	12		221
	Urban																248
1964	Suburban	5%	11		25%	33		40%	30		16%	13		14%	13		229
	Urban																190

P > .05

dents had received. The population on the whole appears to have attained a higher level of education, but the real difference does not show up by looking at the four year intervals. Only in comparing the 1952 and 1964 results does the change appear. In both the cities and the suburbs, there is a smaller percentage of people admitting a lower level of education than in the 1952 survey. Along the same line, there is a higher percentage of respondents in both areas reporting a higher level of education. The most significant differences between the city and the suburb appear at the extremes of the education scale. However, throughout the comparisons of these two areas the suburban residents appear to be slightly more educated than their urban counterparts.

It has been noted that college graduates make up twice as great a proportion of the suburban population as they do in the city. Also, education has, in the past, been clearly associated with active political participation. Of all such educational experiences, college education has been thought of as the most effective in this regard. It is also true, however, that the longer a student stays in school, the slighter will be his tendency, in later years, to feel strongly about party loyalties. This may result from the freedom that such a person feels to look at the issues and candidates as well as the party.³⁵ Education has other aspects which contribute to the political scene. If suburbia is more educated than the central city, it should be the beneficiary of more active participation than the city. Higher education has been known to increase the likelihood that a person will participate in more political discussions than the less-educated person, be more prone to belong to political

participation. The content of that participation is not, however, determined by education.³⁷

Often combined with income and education as determinants of political participation and voting is occupation. The reasons for this inclusion are many:

A person's work life is certain to color his outlook on society, to structure his attitudes, and affect his behavior. The type of work he does, his occupation, will influence his political behavior chiefly through affecting 1) his skills and capacities, 2) the people with whom he associates, 3) his perceived stakes in political decisions, and 4) the social roles which occupation imposes upon him. At the same time, the occupation will act as a screening device to select from among the population persons with certain skills, friendship and status memberships, and role preferences. Selection and influence are, thus, intertwined in the relationships observed between occupation and political activity.³⁸

In the four election studies, the suburban sample constantly showed a higher percentage of professional and business owners and managers than did the urban area for the same period of time. (See Table 7.) These categories comprised from 29 to 39 per cent of the suburban sample in the four surveys. In the central city, the figures varied anywhere from 14 per cent in 1960 to 26 per cent in 1964. In any given year, the suburban sample was made up of from 8 to 25 per cent more of these upper status occupations than the urban sample.

The other area of occupation which showed a marked difference between the two areas is in the unskilled type of labor. In each election study the urban center showed a higher percentage of unskilled labor than did the suburban sample for the same period. The figures relating to unskilled labor are

Table 7 Occupation of Respondent, By Location and Year

1952	Suburban Urban	Profes- sional	Business- men	Clerk or Sales	Skilled and Semi- Skilled	Unskilled	Farm	Unemployed and Students		N
		14% 10	17% 13	24% 23	36% 30	9% 24	N/A N/A	N/A = 100% N/A		85 182
1956	Suburban	21%	8%	23%	19%	13%	10%	6%	= 100%	143
	Urban	9	11	20	16	20	12	12		142
1960	Suburban	18%	21%	16%	17%	11%	14%	3%	= 100%	133
	Urban	7	7	33	17	14	19	3		163
1964	Suburban	15%	21%	23%	15%	17%	6%	3%	= 100%	149
	Urban	14	12	22	14	20	15	3		111

P > .08 (1952)

P > .03 (1956)

P > .001 (1960)

P Not significant (1964)

interesting for another reason, in that since 1952, this percentage of the urban sample has not grown, but diminished to some degree. Suburbia, however, finds itself with a continually growing proportion of this type of resident which tends to mirror reports of the growth of "industrial suburbs." All other types of occupation, including unemployment, show little difference between the city and the suburb.

The fact that the suburbs show a greater number of professional and business management residents makes the suburb appear to have an advantage over the central city with regard to political activity. Higher status occupations have been said to have a direct influence on the political understanding and development of individuals. It is well known that "most executives and business owners and many branches of the professions deal with complex legal, economic, and technical problems which develop their understanding of the complex social and political mechanisms."³⁹ Generally, where the occupation considered encounters a good deal of "in-group interaction" in many of its activities and roles, and involves knowledge about complicated problems and requires leadership skills, the individual pursuing this occupation will tend to be more politically aware and to vote more frequently than the person whose employment does not have these aspects. The working man, presumably the unskilled type, finds that in the course of his employment he will neither develop skills on the job nor be selected for such skills which would make politics either understandable or meaningful to him.⁴⁰ In fact, most studies show laboring classes disinclined, on the whole, to become involved actively

in politics.⁴¹

The demographic characteristics which make up particular areas of the population are often considered to be determiners, or at least influences, of the political behavior of the residents of those areas. Though it is impossible to say whether or not these are the direct causes of such behavior, it is possible to draw inferences in this regard.

PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND VOTING BEHAVIOR

Most of the rapid growth of suburbia has been the result of people moving from increasingly congested cities. In 1958, political scientists said that this movement was of interest to political science because of the noticeable differences between party identifications in both the central city and the suburb. In fact, it was said that suburbanites showed "a pronounced Republican preference" in their party identification, and that these areas had "changed from a relatively minor aspect of Republican strength in several key states to an important element in Republican pluralities."⁴² Ten years later, this theory was challenged following the compilation of additional data on presidential elections. The study recalled that in the period before 1945, suburbia tended to vote and identify with the Republican Party. Since that time, however, political science' knowledge of suburban behavior has increased little.⁴³ Partisanship seems to be an appropriate vehicle for the study of suburban political behavior because it seems to be "party identification which sustains a person's interest in politics and determines his vote decision...rather than

his views on issues or candidates."⁴⁴

The question to be investigated here is: While suburban populations across the country have grown over the period between 1948 and 1964, what has been the general trend in party strength? This question should be answered by noting trends in both identification with a particular political party and voting habits. Also to be taken into account is the size of partisan identification when compared with the central city over the same period of time.

As a means of measuring partisan preference, the question asked was: "Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?" Those interviewed who expressed allegiance to either the Republican or the Democratic parties and those who claimed to be "independent" but thought of themselves as closer to one or the other were included in one of the two major party categories. Those who professed complete independence were placed in a third category, labeled "Independent." The results of the urban-suburban comparison in party identification are shown in Table 8. The Chi-square test for significance was used and the results for all elections were well within the five percent level of significance. The data show that between 1952 and 1960 the Republican Party appeared to be gaining in the number of citizens who identified with it in the suburbs. In 1952, only 36 per cent admitted to being Republican (the same percentage as the Democrats). In 1956 and 1960, however, the percentage increased to 43 per cent. The election of 1964, the Goldwater debacle, has somewhat clouded the trend

Table 8 Party Identification, By Location, By Year

	<u>Republican</u>	<u>Democratic</u>	<u>Independent</u>	<u>N</u>
1952				
Suburban	36%	36%	28%	= 100% 138
Urban	27	50	23	283
1956				
Suburban	41	37	22	214
Urban	22	57	21	241
1960				
Suburban	43	32	25	212
Urban	21	53	26	235
1964				
Suburban	27	46	27	229
Urban	19	59	22	188

in this respect and the percentage dropped to a mere 27 per cent. The Democratic percentage remained fairly constant over the same period, but gained heavily in 1964. Independents claimed between 22 and 28 per cent of the respondents overall. In the urban sample the Democratic Party received between 50 per cent in 1952 and 59 per cent in 1964. The Republican Party was the real loser here, in that between 1952 and 1964, their share of the identifiers fell from 27 per cent to 19 per cent. They were below the Independent identifiers in three out of the four elections.

In order to determine whether the difference between the city and the suburb is merely the result of the influence of the area where the respondent lived or if there is some relationship between this party identity and the social class of the people found in suburbia, it was incumbent to control for the variables most often associated with social class, namely income and education.

First, education was controlled for by trichotomizing the data into three categories, from low to high. (See Table 9) The low category people with only a grammar school education, the middle included those of a secondary level education, and the high for people with a college education. The categories were compiled so as to include respondents who have completed that type of education and received a diploma or a degree for it. With the use of these three categories, it was shown that at almost all levels of education for the four election studies, there was a higher percentage of Republican identification for the suburban respondents than for those of the central city.

Table 9 Party Identification, By Location and Year, Controlling for Education

	<u>Low Education</u>				<u>Medium Education</u>				<u>High Education</u>			
	Demo- cratic	Repub- lican	Inde- pendent	N	Demo- cratic	Repub- lican	Inde- pendent	N	Demo- cratic	Repub- lican	Inde- pendent	N
<u>1952</u>												
Suburban	55%	17%	28%	29	37%	34%	24%	79	18%	54%	28%	28
Urban	54	23	24	97	55	28	17	133	22	37	41	46
<u>1956</u>												
Suburban	40	50	10	38	47	28	25	110	19	58	23	65
Urban	56	27	17	75	63	18	19	123	38	30	32	37
<u>1960</u>												
Suburban	42	48	10	68	46	26	28	119	22	56	24	25
Urban	59	28	13	101	60	11	29	106	41	33	26	28
<u>1964</u>												
Suburban	71	12	17	24	48	22	26	137	34	34	32	68
Urban	76	13	11	46	51	20	29	92	54	25	21	48

The only instances where the relationship between Republican identification and suburban residence "washed out" was at the low level of education. This may be explained by the fact that the sample includes respondents from "industrial suburbs" which are the home of people not oriented to the traditional mold of middle-class suburbia and where education does not feel the esteem usually found in residential suburbs. Also, these suburbs are potentially fruitful for Democratic-labor union political coalitions.

A similar controlled comparison was made for the income of the respondent. The income variable was trichotomized just as was the education control. The low category contained people with an annual income of under three thousand dollars, the medium for those making between \$3000 and \$7500 and the high for those over \$7500. (See Table 10) At all levels of income, there is a higher percentage of respondents who identified with the Republican Party in the suburbs than in the city. The differences reached statistical significance in all the elections except 1964 for the high grouping of income. However, as with education, in all other levels of income there was a consistent trend toward Republicanism in suburbia.

By controlling for both income and education, the tendency toward suburban Republican identification did not "wash out." The fact that in both education and in income the 1964 results did not reach the significance level desired, may merely reflect the inconsistent patterns which resulted from the Johnson landslide. The findings in this particular phase of the study, with the exception of 1964, agree with the findings of a study of the 1952 election by Greenstein and Wolfinger.⁴⁵

Table 10. Party Identification By Location and Year, Controlling for Income.

	<u>Low Income</u>			<u>Medium Income</u>			<u>High Income</u>					
	<u>Dem.</u>	<u>Rep.</u>	<u>Ind.</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Dem.</u>	<u>Rep.</u>	<u>Ind.</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Dem.</u>	<u>Rep.</u>	<u>Ind.</u>	
<u>1952</u>												
Suburban	37%	16%	47% = 100%	19	43%	33%	24% = 100%	93	8%	60%	32% = 100%	25
Urban	60	25	15	81	49	29	22	168	33	17	50	30
<u>1956</u>												
Suburban	39	35	26	23	44	33	23	113	28	56	16	68
Urban	69	19	12	42	56	22	22	148	48	27	25	44
<u>1960</u>												
Suburban	57	30	13	30	27	42	31	106	28	50	22	76
Urban	67	21	12	33	56	21	23	136	41	20	39	66
<u>1964</u>												
Suburban	33	22	45	18	54	22	24	85	42	31	27	126
Urban	58	20	22	41	66	12	22	76	51	27	22	71

A control for the geographic region in which the respondent lived was attempted, comparing the northern and southern portions of the United States. The north was to include all those areas outside the south including the "border states." Unfortunately, the sample drawn from the suburban areas was too small to hope for any meaningful results. The comparison was intended to see if there was any difference between the two regions with regard to political identification in the city and the suburb.

It is not enough to determine the party identification of suburbia. No matter which political party an individual identifies with, the important thing to find out is the way that he actually votes. It has been determined that the largest number of suburban party identifiers fall in the ranks of the Republican Party. It should be noted here, however, that in suburbia there is in each election a large number of people who say they identify with neither political party and claim to be independent. An average of over 25 per cent of suburban respondents claimed to be independent over the four election period. The percentage of suburban respondents who claim to be independent is greater than the percentage of independents in the urban areas in three out of four election studies, although the differences are arbitrarily insignificant.

Table 11. Percentage of area sample who identify as independents.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Suburban</u>		<u>Urban</u>	
	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>
1952	28	39	23	65
1956	22	46	20	50
1960	26	54	26	62
1964	27	62	22	42

This independent identification in suburbia has had important consequences for the actual voting behavior of that area. William S. Whyte has said that suburbanites

...make a great to-do about their being independent--the 1952 plurality, they maintain, was due to their crusading spirit. Maybe so, but even without this extra stimulus, they vote Republican just the same.⁴⁶

Although individuals may claim, at other than election time, to be either a Democrat or a Republican or an independent, this identification changes as campaign and election time draws nearer. This is true because both elections and campaigns

...tend to arouse partisanship, in part, at least, because campaign appeals reinforce class, ethnic, and regional group loyalties. They "activate" the predispositions which lie latent in the public, pushing the marginally-interested and wavering voter back into his "natural" group.⁴⁷

The actual voting habits of the respondent is the best way to study the political behavior of suburbia. Before this can be done, however, it is necessary to call attention to the fact that not all the people who were interviewed in the pre-election study and who identified with a particular political party actually voted. The totals of the urban and suburban party identification and voting figures are shown in Table 12.

Table 12. Total number of respondents who were interviewed and total who actually voted, urban and suburban samples.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total interviewed</u>	<u>Total vote</u>
1952	421	302
1956	455	360
1960	447	348
1964	417	312

On the average, less than three-fourths of the people interviewed actually went to the polls in the general election. Turning to the actual voting behavior of suburbia, the earlier statement of William Whyte seems to be, at least partially, borne out. In the 1952 study, among suburban respondents, 36 per cent said that they identified with the Republican Party, while 28 per cent claimed to be independent. The 1952 actual vote showed that 63% of the suburban respondents voted Republican, that party probably absorbing many of the independent identifiers who voted. In 1956, the situation remained unchanged. The Republican vote exceeded even the total of both the Republican and independent identifiers. The 1960 and 1964 elections changed the pattern, the Republican presidential candidates receiving only about 20 per cent of the independent vote which theoretically became available. But, this phenomenon is not something germane to suburbia only. The urban data report results for the 1952 and 1956 elections similar to those of suburbia. In 1960, both of the political parties split the independent vote equally. In 1964 only 10 per cent of the independent urban vote went to the Republican candidate.

Based upon the statistics at hand, it seems difficult to say whether or not independent identifiers really vote Republican. Because of the great number of people who do not vote, it is possible that not many of these are in that category. Then, too, it may be that they are those very people. It appears that independent identifiers do not necessarily go with the Republican Party, but with the most popular candidate running for election at the time. In both

the city and the suburbs, Eisenhower received almost all of the independent votes in the 1952 and 1956 elections. It is well-accepted that Eisenhower was by far the most popular candidate during those two election periods. In the 1960's the candidates changed and so did the percentages of both the total national popular vote and the urban-suburban differences. John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson both outpolled their respective rivals for independent votes, with the Kennedy decision being quite a bit closer. This was true of both the city and the suburb. This change in the independent vote may be a mere reflection of national trends. Taking into account the suburban vote on the whole, suburban shifts in vote tended to parallel shifts in the whole population and the urban area. Suburban shifts, in other words, were not out of line when compared with other voting groups.

Again indicators of social status were controlled for, this time with regard to the actual vote in suburbia. The same levels of education were used to categorize the low to high trichotomization. (See Table 13) Within each education group there was a higher percentage of Republican voters among suburban respondents than for urban residents. Unfortunately, these differences did not reach the statistical significance desired and failed to show anything other than a trend in the data.

Income was then controlled for using the same categories as were used with party identification. (See Table 14) As in the previous case, within each income group, there was a higher percentage of Republican voters among suburban respondents than among those from the central city. However, trends

Table 13 Actual Vote By Location and Year, Controlling for Education.

	<u>Low Education</u>			<u>Medium Education</u>			<u>High Education</u>		
	<u>Dem.</u>	<u>Rep.</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Dem.</u>	<u>Rep.</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Dem.</u>	<u>Rep.</u>	<u>N</u>
<u>1952</u>									
Suburban	56%	44%	16	37%	63%	62	23%	77%	22
Urban	63	37	60	43	57	99	32	68	37
<u>1956</u>									
Suburban	37	63	32	43	57	86	23	77	61
Urban	48	52	50	56	44	94	47	53	32
<u>1960</u>									
Suburban	55	45	35	49	51	81	43	57	49
Urban	67	38	52	65	35	91	59	41	40
<u>1964</u>									
Suburban	81	19	16	69	31	100	60	40	55
Urban	87	13	32	76	24	67	75	25	40

Table 14 Actual Vote By Location and Year, Controlling for Income.

	<u>Low Income</u>			<u>Medium Income</u>			<u>High Income</u>		
	<u>Dem.</u>	<u>Rep.</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Dem.</u>	<u>Rep.</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Dem.</u>	<u>Rep.</u>	<u>N</u>
<u>1952</u>									
Suburban	50%	50%	12	40%	60%	67	14%	86%	21
Urban	53	47	49	48	52	126	42	58	26
<u>1956</u>									
Suburban	31	69	16	41	59	97	30	70	59
Urban	74	26	23	51	49	115	49	51	37
<u>1960</u>									
Suburban	67	33	15	55	45	82	44	56	68
Urban	75	25	24	65	35	110	57	43	49
<u>1964</u>									
Suburban	64	36	11	74	26	57	64	36	103
Urban	84	16	32	87	13	54	67	33	55

are the only results of the data as it, too, failed to reach the 5 per cent level of significance. The above trends are only that, primarily because as one subdivides his sample to control for additional variables, the chances of receiving a statistically significant table diminish. Trends are not completely without value, however, as they may lead to more fruitful avenues for further study.

From the evidence presented by the data it seems obvious that suburbia is not as strongly dominated by the Republican Party as has often been assumed. The data bear out other political scientists who have noted that suburbia is more of a two-party situation than is sometimes believed. The electoral pattern that was evident in the 1950's has been radically changed by the elections of 1960 and 1964. The data support the theory that suburbs, between 1952 and 1964 were permanently under the control of neither political party. This applies to both party identity and actual voting behavior. The large pluralities of the Republicans in 1952 and 1956 found suburbia going Republican. In the Democratic years of 1960 and 1964, suburbia went with the Democratic ticket.⁴⁸ Over the four election period, the data indicate that Republicans did not, as is often assumed, dominate suburbia. On the contrary, it suggests "that inter-party suburban competition is more lively and energetic" than is generally believed.⁴⁹

The differences noted do not appear to be the result of income and education factors only. Particular elections need, also, to be explained in terms that are more political. These political explanations should take into account

the issues, changing conditions, and, primarily, the candidates involved in the particular election.⁵⁰ Suburbia acted in a manner reflecting the society as a whole in the elections between 1952 and 1964 and voted primarily on political terms.

Party Switch

Speculation has been widespread over the past few years that American suburbia is changing in its political character. One theory has it that as former urban democrats move to suburbia, they bring with them their party allegiance and are gradually making it more Democratic. The data show that the percentage of votes that the Democratic candidates have received in that area has grown over the past three elections. In 1952, Adlai Stevenson received only 37 per cent of the suburban vote cast for president. The percentage continued to grow until 1964 when the Democratic ticket swept up 67 per cent of the suburban votes cast.

There is another school of thought which believes that suburbia is continuing to be Republican and that the only change taking place is that suburbia is becoming more Republican than ever before. There are three basic theories that have been put forward relating to the effect of people moving to suburbia from the urban centers. The first theory is what has been labeled "population redistribution." It explains that of those people who move to the suburbs, most of them are upper income and status groups which are most likely to vote Republican no matter where their homes may be. When they

move out of the cities they bring their Republicanism with them. Support for this theory is found in The American Voter, which states that

...many of the emigrants from big city living occupy the top rung of the social and economic ladder. They tend to be well-educated members of well-to-do families of professional people and businessmen. They are more often than not Republicans, and they reflected this in their voting...⁵¹

There is a second hypothesis put forth by the believers of strengthened Republicanism in suburbia. This theory has been named by Robert Wood the "conversion theory." In it, new immigrants to suburbia are seen, as a result of their prosperity, moving to better surroundings in suburbia. When they arrive there, they switch loyalty to the Republican Party. White says that middle class suburbs have become a "great melting pot" because newcomers to suburbia discard their old values. He also says that

Whatever the cause, it is true that something does seem to happen to Democrats when they get to suburbia....Figures rather clearly show that people from big, urban Democratic wards tend to become Republican and, if anything, more conservative than those whose outlook they are consciously adopting.⁵²

The third theory seems to be an offshoot of the second. It involves a process of self-selection which operates in the willingness to move to the suburbs.

This willingness allegedly predisposes the new suburban resident to attitude change. He is seen as voting Republican "as an act of identification symbolizing his arrival" in suburbia or because Republicanism is viewed as a characteristic of upper-class American of which he seeks to be a member.⁵³

Immigrants to suburbia are

...upwardly mobile, newly middle class in fact or aspiration. Their desire to move to the suburbs is considered as part of a larger set of

attitudes in which a shift to Republican preference is implicit.⁵⁴

Judging by the data that have been compiled in the study, there appears to be anything but a growth of Republican strength in the suburbs. In order to find out if there is any merit in the theories presented, a single question was available for determining the value of the speculation that suburbanites switched party identification on their arrival there. All of the election studies posed the following question to the respondents: "Have you ever thought of yourself as a (Republican, Democrat)?" The question was phrased in this manner to allow the questioner to pose the question so that the selection would be opposite that of the party with which the person is presently identified. About 12 per cent of the urban and suburban sample admitted to having identified with another party previously. (See Table 13.) In the following three elections the percentage swelled to almost 25 per cent in each of the studies. Of those who admitted having identified with another party, the percentage of people who had identified with the Democratic Party exceeded those with past Republican allegiance in every study except 1964, where there was 50 per cent for each party. One might be led by these figures to think that suburbia was a place where former urban Democrats will be automatically turned into suburban Republicans. However, the trend does not find its only manifestation in suburbia. The urban respondent was found to change his identification much in line with his suburban counterpart. When compared with the voting statistics for the same years, party switching follows the same general course. The large plurality of the Eisenhower elections is mirrored in the large percentage

of respondents who claimed they had switched to the Republican Party. The decrease in the Republican share of the suburban vote is reflected in the shrinking percentage of switchers from the Democratic Party. Switching to Republicanism in suburbia follows a pattern that is evident in the central city as well. (See Table 15.) Although the test for significance failed to reach the desired level, the results still prove useful for the study of trends in behavior. Because the statistics related to party switch parallel those found in actual voting behavior, it may be inferred that the switching of political party identification may result from preference for one candidate over another, the issues present at a particular point in time, or current trends in the general will. In view of the data presented, it is unlikely that any of the three theories of suburban influences on party identification can be proved to have merit over the other two. The statistics show, on the contrary, that any changes in the political orientations of suburbia, at least for the elections from 1952 to 1964, is a part of the national trend to change party identification according to the individual attractiveness of the candidates and programs at that particular point in time. Manis and Stein reached a similar conclusion in 1959, even before the strength of the Democratic Party was felt in the suburbs. They reported that their investigation of suburban voting habits and party identification changes resulted in data that did not "confirm the claims of political analysts that moving to suburbia changes Democrats toward Republican identifications." They found that the explanation for changing parties was on a "man rather than party" basis and that these decisions

Table 15 Party Identification Switches, By Location and Year.

	<u>Dem → Rep</u>		<u>Rep → Dem</u>		<u>No Switch</u>	
<u>Year</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>
<u>1952</u>						
Suburban	3	5	8	16	89	251
Urban	5	10	10	22	85	117
<u>1956</u>						
Suburban	5	12	13	32	82	176
Urban	11	26	13	31	76	184
<u>1960</u>						
Suburban	10	21	15	31	75	160
Urban	11	25	11	27	78	183
<u>1964</u>						
Suburban	12	27	11	26	77	176
Urban	12	23	12	23	76	142

are often influenced by "major national trends" rather than the move to suburbia.⁵⁵ Although some of the respondents may have been influenced by the very fact that they moved to suburbia, the evidence is now considerable that most of the new arrivals to suburbia retain whatever party loyalties they may have had in the city.⁵⁶ This is both possible and probable because a move to the suburbs, for the vast majority, is merely a change in residential location and not their relative position in the social structure.⁵⁷ Finally, The American Voter reports

...the absence of a really unique change in political allegiance among ex-urbanites (which) further indicates that movement out of the metropolitan centers cannot stand as the factor responsible for changes in partisan loyalties that cut across non-movers as well.⁵⁸

THE PARTICIPATORY NATURE OF SUBURBIA

The purpose of this section is to determine if there is any significant difference in the efficacy feelings and participatory habits of suburbia and the central city. The efficacy questions relate primarily to one's attitude toward government. Participatory habits refer to the levels of political activity in which the individual respondent engage.

Efficacy

Political efficacy, as it is used here, means the degree of effectiveness that an individual feels that he has in government affairs. Under this heading fall three questions related to political efficacy. The first one is called pure

efficacy, which questions the feeling of ability one has to affect government decisions. The question as stated in the surveys is: "People like me don't have any say about what the government does. Do you agree or disagree with that?" People who answer this question in the affirmative are more likely to engage in politics. They are thought to learn more about political situations, and be more consistent in supporting their party's stands on various issues.⁵⁹ In fact, it has been sypothesized that,

...participation in politics and feelings of efficacy feed on each other, producing a circularity of effects, ...political participation probably increasing sense of efficacy, and ...sense of efficacy, in turn, probably increases... participation.⁶⁰

The results of the comparisons, (See Table 16) show that there is very little difference between the central city and suburbia with regard to pure efficacy. Although suburban residents appear to be more efficacious according to this particular question, the difference is so small as to make it insignificant.

Vote efficacy is similar to the pure variety, except that this applies to the amount of importance that the individual feels that his vote has in affecting government decisions. The following question was posed to the respondents: "Voting is the only way that people like me can have any say about how the government runs things. Do you agree or disagree with that?" Again with vote efficacy, as with pure efficacy, a greater percentage of suburban than urban respondents were more efficacious in their replies. A pattern similar to the previous one indicated that the difference between the two areas was not great enough to be statistically significant.

Personal understanding is the third component of efficacy to be studied.

Table 16 Efficacy Patterns (Figure given is percentage of response determined to signify high degree of efficacy)

	Suburban		Urban	
<u>Pure Efficacy</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>
1952	77	139	72	279
1956	79	214	63	238
1960	77	216	72	245
1964	69	230	70	187
<u>Vote Efficacy</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>
1952	25	139	16	279
1956	31	211	24	234
1960	31	217	23	247
1964	36	227	25	189
<u>Personal Understanding</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>
1952	37	139	34	283
1956	45	215	38	237
1960	48	206	47	246
1964	43	226	36	185

Personal understanding relates to the amount of knowledge of government affairs that an individual believes he possesses. It has been pointed out that "an understanding of political events is a tool for living, an instrument whereby other goals are achieved."⁶¹ To determine the extent of an individual's sense of personal understanding, the respondent was asked: "Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on. Do you agree or disagree with that?" Again, the results show that suburbia is higher in this aspect of political efficacy, but not to the extent that it is statistically significant.

Comparisons similar to those found in Table 16 were also made with educational and income levels held constant. (See Tables 17-22) Because this divided the sample into even smaller groups than in the original comparisons, the statistical significance of the results was far beyond the acceptable level. The results did show, however, a trend indicating that neither education nor income alone could account for the differences between city and suburb in efficacy.

Participation

Voting is the only form of political participation as most Americans understand the term. There is, however, a large number of people who do other things in a campaign to participate in politics. The participatory nature of suburbia should show some differing characteristics than that of the central city. Based on the fact that suburbia is an area of younger, wealthier and better employed people, it would seem to reason that there would be an oppor-

Table 17 Respondents Claiming a High Degree of Pure Efficacy by Location and Year, Controlling for Education.

	<u>Low Education</u>		<u>Medium Education</u>		<u>High Education</u>	
	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>
<u>1952</u>						
Urban	76	22	75	60	86	24
Suburban	63	60	74	97	85	39
<u>1956</u>						
Urban	68	26	75	82	92	60
Suburban	45	33	66	81	95	35
<u>1960</u>						
Urban	57	70	77	123	81	28
Suburban	53	107	55	111	54	30
<u>1964</u>						
Urban	38	9	66	90	88	60
Suburban	57	25	67	62	80	43

Table 18 Respondents Claiming a High Degree of Pure Efficacy by Location and Year, Controlling for Income.

	<u>Low Income</u>		<u>Medium Income</u>		<u>High Income</u>	
	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>
<u>1952</u>						
Suburban	60	12	83	77	68	17
Urban	61	48	75	124	81	25
<u>1956</u>						
Suburban	46	10	80	90	90	61
Urban	39	16	66	77	77	34
<u>1960</u>						
Suburban	61	20	73	77	90	69
Urban	73	22	66	95	83	58
<u>1964</u>						
Suburban	63	12	69	59	70	88
Urban	60	24	71	54	75	53

Table 19 Respondents Claiming a High Degree of Vote Efficacy by Location and Year, Controlling for Education.

	<u>Low Education</u>		<u>Medium Education</u>		<u>High Education</u>	
	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>
<u>1952</u>						
Suburban	4	1	26	21	43	12
Urban	11	10	15	20	30	14
<u>1956</u>						
Suburban	19	7	22	24	54	35
Urban	14	10	22	26	51	19
<u>1960</u>						
Suburban	29	6	32	27	39	32
Urban	14	14	12	31	36	26
<u>1964</u>						
Suburban	26	6	29	39	55	36
Urban	7	3	30	28	35	17

Table 20 Respondents Claiming a High Degree of Vote Efficacy.
by Location and Year, Controlling for Income.

	<u>Low Income</u>		<u>Medium Income</u>		<u>High Income</u>	
	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>
<u>1952</u>						
Suburban	10	2	24	22	40	10
Urban	10	8	19	31	19	6
<u>1956</u>						
Suburban	0	0	25	28	52	35
Urban	16	6	21	31	39	17
<u>1960</u>						
Suburban	35	12	19	20	47	36
Urban	19	6	19	28	33	23
<u>1964</u>						
Suburban	22	4	29	25	42	52
Urban	17	7	27	21	28	20

Table 21 Respondents Claiming a High Degree of Personal Understanding by Location and Year, Controlling for Education.

	<u>Low Education</u>		<u>Medium Education</u>		<u>High Education</u>	
	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>
<u>1952</u>						
Suburban	24	7	35	28	61	17
Urban	22	22	34	45	57	26
<u>1956</u>						
Suburban	40	15	41	46	55	36
Urban	21	15	41	49	70	26
<u>1960</u>						
Suburban	29	5	39	43	33	21
Urban	23	20	40	30	51	50
<u>1964</u>						
Suburban	29	7	40	53	57	38
Urban	16	7	30	27	65	32

Table 22 Respondents Claiming a High Degree of Personal Understanding by Location and Year, Controlling for Income.

	<u>Low Income</u>		<u>Medium Income</u>		<u>High Income</u>	
	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>
<u>1952</u>						
Suburban	10	2	40	37	52	13
Urban	20	16	36	60	55	17
<u>1956</u>						
Suburban	18	4	48	55	49	33
Urban	21	8	37	55	59	26
<u>1960</u>						
Suburban	27	8	47	47	58	44
Urban	32	10	46	66	57	40
<u>1964</u>						
Suburban	32	6	41	34	47	58
Urban	30	12	26	19	49	35

tunity afforded these residents that is lacking to the city dweller. Participation, in this study, is determined by four indicators of political activity. They are: voting frequency, financial support for political campaigns, talking for the candidacy of a particular office seeker, and wearing of a campaign button or placing a campaign sticker on one's automobile.

In all cases, the comparisons failed to show any statistically significant difference between urban and suburban activity patterns. As with the efficacy questions, suburbia did, however, appear to be higher than the central city where one response was considered indicative of greater participation than another. Still, trends that have developed from the comparisons indicate characteristics that may apply not only to suburbia and the central city, but to the nation as a whole. Voting frequency was the first participatory question asked. In each study, approximately 55 per cent of the suburban sample said they had voted in every presidential election since they had become qualified to do so, while about 48 per cent of urban sample reported voting in all of them. (See Talbe 23) Reasons for this closeness in voting turnout may be provided by the fact that the city is known to be more heavily immigrant, of ethnic, Catholic and Jewish people, and most of these groups have higher than the average voting rates. Suburbia, on the other hand, is known to be a better educated and higher income area, both of which are also associated with high turnout at the polls.⁶² The result is that the difference in the voting frequency of both areas is so small as to lack significance.

Participation, for any people, is the product of talking to other people

Table 23 Participation

(Figure given is percentage determined to indicate high participatory response.)

	<u>Suburban</u>		<u>Urban</u>	
<u>Vote Frequency</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>
1952	57	72	49	133
1956	56	115	45	106
1960	53	115	46	112
1964	55	126	48	103
<u>Talk for Candidates</u>				
1952	36	47	29	74
1956	37	81	29	70
1960	34	67	26	57
1964	33	68	34	61
<u>Wear Button or Put Sticker on Car</u>				
1952	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1956	22	47	17	42
1960	18	39	16	35
1964	16	33	16	28
<u>Financial Support</u>				
1952	12	15	6	16
1956	16	35	11	26
1960	18	39	7	15
1964	15	32	8	14

and trying to influence them in their voting behavior. The question was asked the respondents: "Did you talk to any people and try to show them why they should vote for one of the parties or candidates?" In all of the studies, the urban and suburban samples showed that approximately 30 and 35 per cent respectively, reported having done so.

The third indicator used to study participatory habits is related to outwardly displaying one's political preference. The question was asked: "Did you wear a campaign button or put a campaign sticker on your car?" A characteristic of people who engage in this form of proselyting is that they get involved no further.⁶³ In 1952 the above question was not asked. In the following years, the results failed to report a statistically significant difference between the central city and suburbia. In both areas, between 19 and 22 per cent of the respondents admitted to having worn a campaign button or placed a sticker on their automobiles.

Financial support for a particular candidate or political party is the final index of participation in this study. The respondents were asked: "Did you give any money or buy tickets or anything to help the campaign for one of the parties or candidates?" The results show that almost twice as many suburbanites contribute to campaigns as do urbanites. This has relevance for the 1960 and 1964 elections in particular because only they reached the significance level desired. The results may be accounted for by the fact that income and occupation levels tend to be higher in the suburbs than in the city. It would seem that a person with a higher income, in this case the suburbanite, is more likely to give money to a political campaign because:

... (a) he is a more visible target to money raisers, (b) his stakes in public policy may be more direct and easily seen, (c) the sacrifices entailed in making the contribution are smaller (on the theory of diminishing marginal utility of money.)⁶⁴

A comparison between these participatory questions and areas of residence was also made with the income and educational levels of the respondents held constant. (See Tables 24 to 31) Although the results did fail to reach statistical significance, there was apparent a trend which indicated a close relationship between income and political contributions.

Essentially, there are no significant differences between the city and the suburb with regard to the participatory habits of their residents. Although suburbia does appear to be somewhat more participatory, especially in financial support at campaign time, the differences between the two are not great enough to eliminate the possibility of chance inhibiting the results of the surveys.

Table 24 Respondents Claiming a High Degree of Vote Frequency,
By Location and Year, Controlling for Education.

	<u>Low Education</u>		<u>Medium Education</u>		<u>High Education</u>	
	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>
<u>1952</u>						
Suburban	57	16	50	35	77	20
Urban	36	35	56	69	63	26
<u>1956</u>						
Suburban	44	17	53	56	69	42
Urban	39	29	46	54	60	21
<u>1960</u>						
Suburban	57	10	46	17	52	28
Urban	43	30	40	20	41	38
<u>1964</u>						
Suburban	63	12	69	72	71	41
Urban	46	18	71	52	78	32

Table 25 Respondents Claiming a High Degree of Vote Frequency,
By Location and Year, Controlling for Income.

	<u>Low Income</u>		<u>Medium Income</u>		<u>High Income</u>	
	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>
<u>1952</u>						
Suburban	44	8	58	47	64	16
Urban	36	28	51	80	74	23
<u>1956</u>						
Suburban	23	5	60	64	60	40
Urban	33	14	42	61	66	27
<u>1960</u>						
Suburban	35	12	44	47	74	56
Urban	39	13	45	65	50	34
<u>1964</u>						
Suburban	71	12	74	42	67	72
Urban	50	18	59	35	83	50

Table 26 Respondents Claiming to Have Talked for Candidates, By Location and Year, Controlling for Education.

	<u>Low Education</u>		<u>Medium Education</u>		<u>High Education</u>	
	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>
<u>1952</u>						
Suburban	14	4	35	26	65	17
Urban	20	17	28	35	44	19
<u>1956</u>						
Suburban	23	9	34	38	51	33
Urban	17	13	32	30	43	16
<u>1960</u>						
Suburban	29	5	34	20	49	31
Urban	24	20	29	30	30	22
<u>1964</u>						
Suburban	24	5	27	34	48	29
Urban	21	9	34	29	50	23

Table 27 Respondents Claiming to Have Talked for Candidates,
By Location and Year, Controlling for Income.

	<u>Low Income</u>		<u>Medium Income</u>		<u>High Income</u>	
	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>
<u>1952</u>						
Suburban	5	1	37	31	63	15
Urban	20	15	28	43	53	16
<u>1956</u>						
Suburban	35	8	33	38	50	34
Urban	27	12	29	44	30	13
<u>1960</u>						
Suburban	16	5	34	35	42	27
Urban	40	12	25	33	21	12
<u>1964</u>						
Suburban	29	5	24	18	39	45
Urban	34	13	30	22	39	26

Table 28 Respondents Claiming to Have Worn a Campaign Button or Placed a Campaign Sticker on their Cards, By Location and Year, Controlling for Education. (N/A in 1952)

	<u>Low Education</u>		<u>Medium Education</u>		<u>High Education</u>	
	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>
<u>1956</u>						
Suburban	18	7	15	17	35	23
Urban	14	11	21	26	11	4
<u>1960</u>						
Suburban	14	1	13	14	30	22
Urban	18	6	29	22	13	11
<u>1964</u>						
Suburban	10	2	11	14	28	17
Urban	11	5	21	18	11	5

Table 29 Respondents Claiming To Have Worn a Campaign Button or Placed a Campaign Sticker on their Cars, By Location and Year, Controlling for Income. (N/A in 1952)

	<u>Low Income</u>		<u>Medium Income</u>		<u>High Income</u>	
	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>
<u>1956</u>						
Suburban	9	2	23	26	27	18
Urban	11	5	18	27	23	10
<u>1960</u>						
Suburban	13	4	20	21	19	14
Urban	13	4	17	23	14	8
<u>1964</u>						
Suburban	24	4	15	11	16	18
Urban	16	6	18	13	14	9

Table 30 Respondents Claiming to Have Given Financial Support to a Party or Candidate, By Location and Year, Controlling for Education.

	<u>Low Education</u>		<u>Medium Education</u>		<u>High Education</u>	
	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>
<u>1952</u>						
Suburban	7	2	7	5	31	8
Urban	2	2	5	6	19	8
<u>1956</u>						
Suburban	10	4	13	14	26	17
Urban	9	7	11	13	14	5
<u>1960</u>						
Suburban	14	3	13	8	24	11
Urban	6	3	12	6	17	13
<u>1964</u>						
Suburban	0	0	11	14	30	18
Urban	2	1	6	5	17	8

Table 31 Respondents Claiming to Have Given Financial Support
To a Party or Candidate, By Location and Year, Con-
trolling for Income.

	<u>Low Income</u>		<u>Medium Income</u>		<u>High Income</u>	
	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>
<u>1952</u>						
Suburban	0	0	12	10	21	5
Urban	5	4	6	9	10	3
<u>1956</u>						
Suburban	0	0	12	14	31	21
Urban	5	2	11	17	14	6
<u>1960</u>						
Suburban	0	0	10	11	38	28
Urban	0	0	6	8	12	7
<u>1964</u>						
Suburban	12	2	9	7	20	23
Urban	3	1	6	4	13	9

SUMMARY OF DATA

This study of suburban political behavior was initially intended to determine how American suburbia differs from the central cities around which they are located. At the outset, there were four specific topics to be covered: the demographic characteristics of the two areas, whether or not suburbia has changed in its orientation to political parties, if individuals have changed their party identification once they have moved to suburbia, and the participatory nature of suburbia.

The social class of suburbia was found to differ from the central city in only a few of the variables tested, namely education, age, income and occupation. It is not surprising to find that the greatest variation between the two areas is found at the extremes of the scale, i.e., low and high income, education, age and professional and non-skilled labor. Perhaps the fact that most of the people in the population fell among the categories in which there was little or no difference may be indicative of the lack of statistically significant results which were to follow. The fact that these surveys took their samples from many areas of the country and from all types of suburbs and presented only gross data may be a factor which eliminates the possibility of studying any certain classes of suburbia which may be necessary to discover any differences between it and the central city.

Rather than the Republican domination thought to dictate the political fortunes of suburbia, it seems that there is quite a different force which has been present in suburbia in the elections of 1952 through 1964. People of

this geographic area find themselves identifying and voting with and for political parties on an election-by-election basis. That is, people are not predominately anything in suburbia. They vote for the man who happens to be running in the particular election and hesitate to entrench themselves in any single pattern of identification, as demonstrated by the large number of independent identifiers. The data indicate that there is a trend for people who claim to be independent in party identification to vote similarly, often paralleling national movements toward one party or the other. Indeed, the data suggest that inter-party competition in suburbia is keener than most of the literature of the past has indicated. Additional proof of the propensity of suburbia to change its voting habits is derived from a study of whole suburbs where it was found that the Democratic share of suburbs dropped sharply in the 1950's, but in the 1960's, their share rose once again to "exceed its pre-Eisenhower total as the Republican share dropped to its lowest point."⁶⁵ Essentially, the changes in suburban politics mirrored those trends found in the central city for all four election studies. It is unlikely that suburbia is becoming more Republican or Democratic, but is merely reflecting society as a whole at that particular place in time. Says Joseph Zigmund in an article of similar substance:

...The election-to-election shifts of suburbs tend to be no greater than the comparable election-to-election movement of the central city of the same metropolitan area and of rural areas of the same state.⁶⁶

Although there are numerous theories available relating to the reasons why suburbia is becoming more and more Republican and why emigrants from

the city become Republican both in ideal and in fact when they acquire suburban residence, the data do not prove that either hypothesis is true. Suburbia is not becoming more Republican and individuals who do not switch party allegiance are simply mirroring a phenomenon that is taking place in the central city as well. While theorists have speculated that people are trying to accept the suburban milieu of Republicanism or "self-selection," the data point to the fact that no greater per cent of suburbanites have become Republicans than have city dwellers.

It appears, to the contrary, that upward social mobility has been experienced every bit as often by the non-movers as by those who have traded convenience for space, and it is associated equally in both groups with pro-Republican changes in political partisanship.⁶⁷

When compared to the central city, suburbia appears to differ to such a small extent in party switches that it would be impossible to choose one of the theories of party change in suburbia as better than the others.

The participatory nature of suburbia failed to show any significant difference between it and the central city. The main reasons for the lack of statistical significance is that for the activity questions there were very few affirmative responses and any comparisons between the two areas would have been useless. As has been noted earlier, another reason might be the balancing effect of the various influences that help to determine the priorities of individuals. For example, urban immigrants may tend to offset suburban wealth, as could urban religion offset suburban education. Nevertheless, the results show that the activity and efficacy patterns of the suburb and the city are more

similar than one is led to believe. There is little difference between the two divisions. Primary group relationships, as found in suburbia, cannot, by themselves, totally account for whatever variation may exist between it and other areas of residence. Other influences, such as economic interests, the mass media, salient issues, and the candidates will have to be considered as potentially effective.⁶⁸

IMPLICATIONS OF THE DATA

In order for one to realize the importance of suburban expansion on the politics of America, it must be remembered that suburbia, despite what many people think, is quite diverse both socially and politically. This diversity may be found not only between different metropolitan areas, but also within each metropolitan area. Most of the suburban areas had been Republican strongholds, but under the impact of large scale construction of low and middle cost housing, increased automobile ownership, and general decentralization of both commerce and industry, the characteristics of suburbia have undergone great change. This diversity admits to the presence of working class suburbs, having Democratic orientations and found in nearly all large metropolitan areas. Traditionally defining suburbia in terms of white, middle-class, Republican-dominated residential areas is to ignore one of the most important aspects of what has been and is the "suburban phenomenon."⁶⁹ Partly because of the way that suburbs developed in their initial states and partly because of the social mobility that is part of the American ideal, suburbs have continued to grow in a heterogeneous manner. A balance in this basic structure has helped suburbia to maintain a similar composition to that of the urban centers from whence most suburban residents came. This, in itself, allows for one to reason for the similarity of socio-economic and political patterns in both areas. The past may be used for one to speculate that this pattern will continue for as long as the American system offers the opportunity to rise above what the individual presently possesses and move

to the home of the socially mobile -- suburbia.

While prospects indicate that suburbia will continue to afford homes to similar types of people, it seems natural that the politics of suburbia, known to partially result from one's social status will, likewise, mirror the past. The presidential elections between 1952 and 1964 indicated that neither party was in control of suburban politics. The pattern of the 1950's was reversed in the elections of 1960 and 1964. Suburbia, throughout that period of time, followed a course which paralleled national trends. In overwhelmingly Republican years, (that is, 1952 and 1956,) suburbia voted equally strongly for Eisenhower. In the marginal election of 1960, suburbia gave a slim majority to John Kennedy. The implications of this tendency may be great, for,

. . . most suburbs follow the year-to-year shifts of the parties across the nation and, therefore, in any given election it is possible for most suburbs to go either Democratic or Republican, depending on the nationwide fortunes of the two parties.⁷⁰

The fact that many people now find themselves voting for the man rather than the party, or according to the present political climate, or major national trends, makes it seem unlikely that suburbia can be expected to automatically promote Republican victories more than any other division of the population.

Footnotes

- 1 Lazerwitz, Bernard, "Suburban Voting Trends: 1948 to 1956," Social Forces, (October, 1960), p. 29.
- 2 Greenstein, Fred and Wolfinger, Raymond. "The Suburbs and Shifting Party Loyalties," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXII (Winter, 1958-9), p. 473.
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TRENDS IN SUBURBAN POLITICAL BEHAVIOR
1952 to 1964

by

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AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S THESIS

submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Political Science

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY

Manhattan, Kansas

1970

THESIS ABSTRACT

The United States has, for the past three decades, been experiencing a gravitation of its population away from the city to the suburbs on their fringes. It is projected that the growth of these areas will grow at a much greater rate than any other area of population concentration. There have been a number of reasons given for this population change. The lack of habitable land in the central cities, the desire to get out into "the country" away from the troubles and overcrowdedness of the city, and work now available on the outer edges of metropolitan centers.

Because of the rapid growth that the United States is experiencing in suburban areas, it is reasonable to assume that these geographic locations do and will have considerable impact on the political system. Despite the fact that many political scientists and sociologists have recognized the importance of this development of the twentieth century, they are relatively ignorant as to the what and why of suburban political behavior and its effects on American political patterns in general. Social research has, in the past, dealt primarily with suburbia's socio-economic characteristics, but has afforded little attention to its political life. That is the object of this thesis.

The purpose of the thesis is to determine the political behavior of American suburbia. Three main areas of interest are voting behavior, party identification and political participation. In analyzing suburbia and its political habits, four topics are essential. The first of the topics is the socio-economic or demographic characteristics of suburbia. Second, the study deals with party identification and actual voting behavior. Third, is

the effect of a move to suburbia on the individual voter. Fourth, it covers the participatory nature of suburbia with special attention given to political efficacy. Along with these primary questions goes the voting frequency of the individual.

Suburban political behavior is here studied through the use of public opinion surveys compiled by the Survey Research Center for the 1952, 1956, 1960 and 1964 elections. This data apply to a cross section of the adult population of voting age selected in a random manner in all the election years mentioned.

The study compares suburbia, as defined to be population areas located on the fringe of metropolitan centers and economically dependent on them, with the central cities of these metropolitan areas. The reason for this type of comparison is that the author is primarily interested in seeing if there is any difference between the central city dweller and his suburban counterpart who has emigrated from those same surroundings. It also seems natural to bring suburbia into the comparative framework which was once the sole domain of the urban and the rural areas of the country.

This study was attempted because political science seems to have only begun to know the many facets of suburban political life.