

THE MAJOR POWERS AND GERMAN REARMAMENT
1950 to 1954:

AN APPRAISAL OF THEIR ATTITUDES

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by

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
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INTRODUCTION

The importance of the status of Germany in American-Soviet relations following World War II cannot be over-emphasized. As had been the case after World War I, the problem of what to do about Germany posed the most difficult question for those charged with planning the peace. The German question has been central to European affairs since the early nineteenth century. The former United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union, George Kennan, suggested that the success of Soviet foreign policy since 1918 derived in part from the Allies' failure to solve the German problem.¹ The importance of the German question following World War II is in accord with the emphasis that statesmen have placed on the status of Germany since the nineteenth century.

This report examines one crucial aspect of the German question in the post World War II period, West German armament. Lloyd Gardner, in his book Architects of Illusion, suggested that one of "three issues which, if they had been decided differently, might have spared the world the worst moments of the Cold War" was the failure by the United States to offer the Soviets a guarantee of German disarmament.² The question of German armament seems to be one of the basic questions which divided the United States and the Soviet Union and provides a means to study the attitudes of the major powers during the post World War II era when the

Cold War took shape.

The United States sought West German rearmament to support its own military policy. The structure of this policy was not new, but one which had its origins after World War I and had been followed actively since the beginning of World War II. The question of who was responsible for the Cold War which is central to Gardner's thesis is beyond the scope of this paper. Gardner's argument, which places a large part of the responsibility on the United States, considers the broader question of policy justification and is concerned with the motives, personalities, and world outlook of the United States policy makers. The questions considered here deal with United States military policy and the attitudes of the European powers toward it.

There is a voluminous amount of material written on the subject of West German rearmament. Principal primary source materials used in the research for this report were the New York Times, The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, reports from the Nineteenth and Twentieth Congresses of the Soviet Union Communist Party, Official State Department papers, Congressional Documents, and the memoirs of some of the leading personalities involved in the events. Secondary sources whose value require special mention were two works by Lewis J. Edinger, West German Armament and a biography of Kurt Schumacher.

The terms national policy, military policy and strategy need definition. B.H. Liddell-Hart differentiated

between strategy and grand strategy in the following way:

". . . strategy is the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy," whereas grand strategy has the role of co-ordinating and directing "all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, toward the attainment of the political object of the war - the goal defined by fundamental policy."³ Grand strategy, according to Liddell-Hart, is practically synonymous with national policy in time of war, a similarity that does not exist in peacetime. In peacetime the role of grand strategy is to plan how the resources of a nation would be used best in case of war and how the peacetime military force can be used to deter war or otherwise further national policy. It appears that the term military policy is a more useful term to use in peacetime to describe those functions performed by grand strategy in time of war. Since grand strategy is a rather clumsy term, strategy is often used when grand strategy would be a more precise term. National policy is synonymous with foreign policy when the former term is used in the context of international relations and describes the actions a nation undertakes to attain its defined goals.

The rearmament of West Germany was dictated by the military aspects of United States' national policy, which is to say by military policy. Other aspects of this national policy had as goals the economic and political integration of West Germany with Western Europe. Obviously, these three aspects of policy are inter-related at the highest levels of

government and one can argue that the military integration of West Germany with the western powers assisted in the attainment of political and economic integration. The difference is a matter of emphasis and priority. The United States viewed the Cold War in the early 1950s primarily as a military confrontation and accordingly placed emphasis on the military aspects of national policy. In this context, the rearmament of Germany seems an objective dictated by the requirements of military policy.

The first concrete proposal for the rearmament of West Germany was made in late 1950 in the framework of the European Defense Community (EDC), a concept of a unified West European Army. French Premier René Pleven proposed in October 1950 the creation of a European Army which would include Germans and would be under a supra-national command. On May 27, 1952, six nations (France, West Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries) signed a treaty creating a European Army. This treaty was subsequently approved by four of the signatories but was rejected by the French National Assembly on August 30, 1954. Successive meetings of foreign ministers at London and Paris during September and October 1954 quickly generated an alternate method to rearm West Germany. These agreements, which are known as the "Paris Agreements," allowed for the entry of West Germany into NATO and the Brussels Treaty Organization and for the rearmament of the Federal Republic. They were subsequently ratified by all parties concerned.

The United States was a zealous supporter of all proposals to rearm Germany, despite the fact that such a policy would alienate allies and compound problems with the Soviet Union.

CHAPTER I

UNITED STATES MILITARY POLICY AND WEST GERMAN REARMAMENT

The rearmament of West Germany formed a key element in the foreign policy of the United States from 1950 until 1954 as both a Democratic and a Republican administration pressed vigorously for its adoption. No other nation in the world expressed such desire to revive the German Army. Until the summer of 1950 the United States' official or announced policy was that Germany should remain demilitarized. However, policy makers at the highest levels had previously determined that West Germany must eventually make a military contribution to European defense. The Korean War caused a sudden change in the announced policy as the leadership of the United States Government saw an immediate Soviet military threat in central Europe, calling for an analogous response. A military policy which the United States had followed since the beginning of World War II but whose origins can be traced to a much earlier time defined this response. It had the following tenets: the United States would depend on collective security for defense; America's contribution to the coalition would be the productive capacity of her industry; and she would depend upon allies to provide the preponderance of ground combat forces.

UNITED STATES MILITARY POLICY
1940-1945

Paul Hammond, in his book Organizing for Defense, suggested that following World War I airpower provided an alternative strategy for victory that was particularly appealing to this nation's leaders. He argued that not only did airpower provide for industrial growth but that it also offered a way to win the next war "which was more attractive than trench warfare and more compatible as well with American isolationism and the business oriented society."¹ It was with the advent of airpower that the concept of America depending on her industrial might for security had its origin. It was nurtured in isolationism which followed the signing of the Versailles peace treaties and the rejection by the Senate of American membership in the League of Nations.

This strategic concept had its first test with the advent of World War II. In January 1941, President Roosevelt gave clear notice of the role he envisaged for the country when he said in a speech before a joint session of Congress: "Our most useful and immediate role is to act as an arsenal for the [democracies]"² It was in this speech that the President proposed the Lend Lease program which subsequently cost over 33 billion dollars.³ Winston Churchill accepted this role for America. In a speech on February 9, 1941, he asked America to "Give us the tools and we will finish the job."⁴ Throughout World War II, American strategic planning was based upon the concept that allies would

provide the preponderance of the ground combat forces while the United States contributed the productive capacity of her industry. Lend Lease was just one of the methods by which the United States implemented this policy.

The most striking manifestation of this strategic concept was the decision made in July 1943 to mobilize only 90 ground combat divisions. Earlier estimates had indicated that a far greater number would be required for victory. One estimate, based on the assumption that the Soviet Army would collapse causing the United States and Great Britain to fight without allies, called for 213 divisions.⁵ But as the war progressed it became evident that Soviet ground forces would provide the allies with numerical superiority on the battlefield and that America should maximize her industrial output as her major contribution to the wartime coalition. With a proper emphasis on the aviation industry, this policy would insure air superiority over the heartland of Nazi Germany. Thus General Marshall's decision in July 1943 to mobilize only 90 ground combat divisions, was less a decision and more a confirmation that the "arsenal of democracy" strategy was still a valid one.

A review of the strength and casualty figures in the war provides an indication of who did how much of the fighting. Although the official strength and casualty figures are often misleading and contradictory and although most such figures are necessarily approximations, a comparison of the strengths and casualties of the American

and Soviet armies leaves no doubt that Russia's role was to do most of the fighting. Dupuy's The Encyclopedia of Military History gives the following figures:⁶

Nation	Total Mobilized (Millions)	Battle Deaths	Battle Wounded	Civilian Deaths
US	14.9	292,100	571,822	Negligible
USSR	20.0	7,500,000	14,012,000	10-15 million
UK	6.2	397,762	475,000	65,000
France	6.0	210,671	400,000	168,000
Germany	12.5	2,850,000	7,250,000	560,000
Japan	7.4	1,506,000	500,000	300,000
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Total	100.0	15,000,000		26-35 million

These figures show that while the Soviet Union provided twenty per cent of the total forces mobilized, she suffered fifty per cent of the battle deaths. For every soldier the United States lost in battle, the Soviet Union lost almost twenty-six. This does not take into account the enormous number of civilian deaths suffered by the Soviet Union, a price that the United States did not have to pay. The numbers of combat formations organized by the Soviets provide further evidence of the enormity of the Russian contribution to ground combat. Like the previous figures, these are estimates and the numbers vary depending on the source. A reasonable estimate for the end of 1943 is that the Soviets had 530 rifle divisions plus supporting artillery and tank formations.⁷ This figure probably includes units stationed throughout the Soviet Union as well as those on the German front. Even allowing for probable inaccuracies, these figures clearly reflect who did the fighting to defeat Nazi Germany.

American reliance on allies for ground combat forces

in World War II is further demonstrated by United States' efforts to have the Soviet Union provide ground forces in the war against Japan. Louis Morton suggested that, "the decision to seek Soviet participation in the war against Japan⁷ provides one of the clearest examples in recent history of the subordination of the political to the military consideration of policy."⁸ Although Morton may be correct as to the clarity of this example, it should be noted that this policy was in consonance with the 90 division ceiling on American ground formations and was only a continuation of the "arsenal of democracy" strategy. There was nothing unique about wanting allies to provide the ground forces against Japan.

Soviet willingness to commit ground forces against Japan was first revealed at the Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference in the fall of 1943. General Douglas MacArthur had estimated a need for 60 Soviet divisions for use in Manchuria; without these forces an attack on the Japanese mainland would not be possible.⁹ Stalin assured Roosevelt at Teheran that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan once Germany was defeated, and the final arrangements were agreed upon at Yalta in February 1945.¹⁰ In return for intervention against Japan, the Soviet Union was to receive the Kuriles Islands, the southern half of Sakhalin, a lease to the port of Dairen, the naval base at Port Arthur, and the Chinese Eastern and South Manchurian railroads, as well as a guarantee of the sovereignty of Outer Mongolia.¹¹

President Harry Truman went to Potsdam in July 1945 with the objective of confirming Soviet entry into the Japanese war.¹² There were some dissenting opinions within the administration including that of Secretary of State James F. Byrnes. Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal recorded in his diary that Byrnes wanted to end the war with Japan before the Russians were able to get in and General Dwight Eisenhower told Forrestal two years later that he begged Truman prior to Potsdam not to make any concessions to the Russians.¹³ But the effects of the atomic bomb were too uncertain and Japanese strength in ground forces, particularly in Manchuria, was still too strong to allow a change in strategy at this late date. The alternative policy for Truman was the same as it had been for Roosevelt, either get the Russians in the war or mobilize considerably more American ground formations. The enormous logistical problems and the general unreliability of Chiang Kai-shek precluded the possibility of using Chinese troops as far north as Manchuria. Both presidents made the decision to get the Russians to do the fighting.

Implicit in the grand strategy followed by the allies in World War II was the concept that America's contribution to the wartime coalition would be the productive capacity of her industry and farms, while the other allies would provide the predominance of the ground combat forces to fight the Axis powers. For the United States it was more than simply a military decision or the subordination of

political to military policy. It was an aspect of national policy based upon the perception by the decision makers as to what America's role in coalition warfare should be. When the war ended and the United States emerged as the most powerful nation in the world, having paid the lowest price in human life of any of the major powers, no one could doubt the validity of this military policy. World War II had proved that the security of the United States rested on the industrial strength of the nation.

COLD WAR MILITARY POLICY 1946-1954

American military policy during the Cold War was a continuation of the policy followed so successfully during World War II. Once the policy makers concluded that the Cold War was primarily a military confrontation with the Soviet Union, they proceeded to form an alliance system to provide for America's defense. The formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was a manifestation of this policy in Europe. The perception by the policy makers of America's role in NATO anticipated the rearmament of West Germany.

When Winston Churchill delivered his celebrated "Iron Curtain" speech at Fulton, Missouri in March 1946, the Atlantic Alliance was in its planning phase. From that day forward, the nations of Western Europe and North America moved gradually toward a defense alliance. The Dunkirk Agreement signed between Great Britain and France in

March 1947 was a concrete step toward the final alliance even though it was aimed ostensibly at Germany. After the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia on February 22, 1948, five Western European nations (Great Britain, France, Belgium, Holland, and Luxemburg) moved quickly to conclude the Brussels Treaty which subsequently produced a unified European command under Field Marshal Montgomery. This defense alliance had the blessings of American policy makers. Shortly after the formal signing, discussions took place between the signatories and the United States concerning military aid and, according to Forrestal, this was to be a type of lend-lease amounting to "not less than three billion dollars."¹⁴

During 1948, the United States and Great Britain pressed ahead with plans to reorganize the structure of the three western sectors of Germany. The Soviet Union objected to these plans and the Russian representative in the Allied Control Council withdrew in protest during March. Particularly objectionable to the Soviets were the proposed currency reforms. The expected extension of these currency reforms into Berlin caused the Russians to react with a full blockade of Berlin late in June. During this period of conflict with the Soviet Union, the United States and her European allies proceeded with their planning for an Atlantic Alliance culminating in the signing of the NATO Pact in Washington on April 4, 1949.

Actions and statements by public officials during

the year following the signing of the NATO treaty reveal the role envisaged for America. Dean Acheson pointed out that the Defense Assistance Program was closely related to the NATO treaty and that both "flowed from a common source."¹⁵ This common source was fear of Russian aggression. In defense of the NATO treaty before a Senate Committee Acheson explicitly stated that ratification would not require American troops in Europe.¹⁶ Likewise General Marshall said: "The Treaty does not provide for nor does it contemplate sending American troops to Europe."¹⁷ The day President Truman signed the ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty, he sent to Congress a request for military aid amounting to one billion four hundred million dollars.¹⁸ A cartoon in the July 24, 1949 New York Times graphically depicts America's role in NATO. The cartoon pictured a cannon representing NATO and the ammunition representing American military aid.¹⁹ In March 1950, the NATO Chiefs of Staff met to determine the roles of the member countries. The United States' role was stated to be strategic bombing and control of the seas while France was to provide the majority of the ground forces.²⁰ General Omar Bradley said in a speech in April that the historic theory of balanced military force might have to be scrapped in favor of a larger Air Force and Navy and that military aid was an integral part of America's defense.²¹ It is clear that until the summer of 1950 American military policy in

Europe was a continuation of the arsenal concept from World War II.

Implicit in NATO defense policy was the requirement for West German rearmament. The United States ostensibly maintained that Germany would remain demilitarized. The Petersburg Agreements signed in November 1949 with the newly created Federal Republic of Germany explicitly stated that the new state would remain unarmed.²² Despite this official position, there was considerable talk behind the scenes about West German rearmament by the end of 1949. Hanson Baldwin, writing in December 1949, concluded that one of the "hottest issues" on the international scene was West German rearmament. Referring to statements by Field Marshal Montgomery, Baldwin said that rearmament had the support of both British and French military leaders.²³ Acheson explained this difference between announced policy and rumored policy as a difference of opinion between the Defense Department and the State Department. He wrote in his memoirs:

For some years the Defense Department had held that Europe could not be defended without the willing and active participation of Western Germany, but the State Department had not yet gotten that far. Indeed, as late as June 5, 1950, after returning from London, I had said, in asking for Mutual Defense Assistance funds, that the United States would continue the policy of German demilitarization.²⁴

Actually, Acheson believed that the integration of West Germany into the defense of Europe would be a process of evolution.²⁵ The political climate was not deemed ready

for a revived German Army.

With the advent of the Korean War, military needs took priority over political considerations. Bradley observed that "communism was willing to use arms to gain its end" and this called for a fundamental change in American policy.²⁶ The predominance of military requirements over all other considerations constituted this change. Acheson wrote that during the early period of the Cold War western policy makers believed the United States' monopoly of nuclear weapons would make a political commitment sufficient to deter an attack. "The Russian nuclear explosion in 1949," he said, "and the attack on South Korea in June 1950 . . . /destroyed/ the 'myth that making our intention clear' would provide security."²⁷ The destruction of this myth dictated a military policy which required ground forces in Europe. In consonance with the policy followed since 1941, the United States looked to allies to provide these forces, and West Germany with a population of fifty million was an obvious source of manpower. The military advantage of West German rearmament outweighed the political disadvantages.

Technology provided the most significant challenge to this strategy. Did not nuclear weapons make the use of ground forces obsolete? Winston Churchill questioned the need for twelve German divisions if the defense of Europe were to be based upon tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. Two different arguments representing two different points

of view arrived at the conclusion that ground forces were still required. One view, represented by B.H. Liddell-Hart and Hanson Baldwin, two knowledgeable and highly respected military writers, argued that since a nuclear war would be suicidal for both sides, a strategy must be adopted which could win without nuclear weapons and which accordingly would require ground forces.²⁸ Both Liddell-Hart and Baldwin argued that the defense of Europe must not depend on tactical nuclear weapons since there was no difference in a tactical and a strategic nuclear weapon in the end effect. The other viewpoint represented by the opinions of American military leaders, General Alfred Gruenther and Admiral Arthur W. Radford, held that tactical nuclear warfare could exist without necessarily escalating to the use of strategic weapons. Ground troops, they argued, were required for the proper use of tactical weapons.²⁹ Speaking before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in April 1954, Admiral Radford stated:

. . . We are doing everything possible to encourage and assist the anti-communist countries overseas to build up and increase the effectiveness of their ground forces. For example, the United States at the present time is making every effort to get a German contribution to the NATO forces in the form of ground forces.

In view of certain misunderstandings, I would like to take just a moment here to assure you that: Our planning does not subscribe to the thinking that the ability to deliver massive atomic retaliation is, by itself, adequate to meet all our security needs.³⁰

The challenge from technology was rebuffed and the "new look" in military policy still required ground troops.

Also unchanging was the concept that America would depend on her allies to provide these forces.

Thomas Dewey proposed what might be called an alternative policy in December 1950. He suggested that the United States mobilize 100 divisions in face of the growing Soviet threat.³¹ As a leading spokesman for the Republican party, Dewey argued that the only reason the Soviet Union had not already launched total war was fear of atomic bombing and since the Soviets now had the bomb, he did not know how much longer this fear would act as a restraint. In the same speech, however, he called for arms to be given to the Germans so that they could fight their "ancient enemy" and suggested that the United States should choose her allies according to "Who has the divisions and who will fight on our side." Dewey's suggestion for 100 divisions was a one-time shot and he did not persist in pressing it on the Democratic administration. One could suggest several reasons why he made such an extraordinary proposal, but it is sufficient to say that it was not serious and accordingly received no consideration by the decision makers.

During the period 1946 to 1950, the United States increasingly came to view the Cold War in terms of a military confrontation. The outbreak of the Korean War marks the date that this perspective came to dominate American policy toward the Soviet Union. Charles Bohlen, in his memoirs, said that not only the United States but Western Europe as well feared an attack from the east after the North Korean attack.³²

Although this fear of an overt attack had greatly diminished by 1954 in Western Europe, the United States persisted in her demand for a rearmed West Germany. John Foster Dulles, while testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee concerning the accession of West Germany to NATO, indicated that German membership in NATO would mean no increase in American troops in Europe.³³ By inference, one could say that Dulles suggested that without West Germany in NATO, more American troops would be required.

American Cold War strategy required ground forces and in consonance with the policy followed so successfully in World War II, allies were expected to provide most of them. The rearmament of West Germany was necessary to implement this military policy.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

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¹Paul Hammond, Organizing for Defense (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 94.

²Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address to Congress on January 6, 1941, New York Times (NYT), January 7, 1941, p.4.

³U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1947 (68th edition) (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 913.

⁴Winston S. Churchill, The Grand Alliance (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1950), p. 128.

⁵Maurice Matloff, "The 90 Division Gamble," in Command Decisions, ed. Kent Roberts Greenfield (Washington: Department of the Army, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 366.

⁶Ernst R. and Trevon N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 1198. Edgar C'Ballance in his The Red Army (London: Faber and Faber, 1964), p. 185, estimates Soviet Army losses at seven million dead and suggests that the figure is a low estimate. Hanson Baldwin in The Soviet Union, ed. Harrison Salisbury (New York: Harcourt Brace and World, 1967), p. 362, estimates 13.6 million military casualties for the Soviet Army.

⁷Albert Seaton, The Russo-German War 1941-45 (London: Arthur Barker Limited, 1971), p. 399. These figures may be favorably compared with those recorded in Forrest C. Pogue's

biography of General Marshall (New York: The Viking Press, 1973). In a footnote on page 657 Pogue says that Marshall's G-2 division reported in December 1944 that the Russians had 440 divisions deployed on a 1450 mile front. Seaton's figure of 530 divisions takes into consideration units in the interior including training units and those in Siberia, which are not included in Marshall's figures.

⁸ Louis Morton, "Soviet Intervention in the War with Japan," Foreign Affairs, XL (July, 1962), p. 662.

⁹ Walter Millis (ed.), The Forrestal Diaries (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), p. 31.

¹⁰ Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1943-1944 (Washington: Department of the Army, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 537.

¹¹ Louis Morton, "Soviet Intervention," p. 657.

¹² Millis (ed.), Forrestal Diaries, p. 78.

¹³ Ibid., pp. 78-79.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 425.

¹⁵ Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1969), p. 307. See also Hanson Baldwin's comments in the New York Times, July 24, 1949, Sec. IV, p. 3, col. 4.

¹⁶ Acheson, Creation, p. 285.

¹⁷ NYT, July 21, 1949, p. 1, col. 6.

¹⁸ Acheson, Creation, p. 309.

¹⁹ NYT, July 24, 1949, Sec. IV, p. 3, col. 4.

²⁰ NYT, March 29, 1950, p. 1, col. 5.

²¹ NYT, April 15, 1950, p. 1, col. 8.

²² NYT, November 25, 1949, treaty text on p. 4.

²³ Hanson Baldwin, NYT, December 29, 1949, p. 6, col. 4.

²⁴ Acheson, Creation, p. 435.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 437.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 436.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 308.

²⁸Hanson Baldwin, NYT, August 10, 1954, p. 8, col. 4; and B.H. Liddell-Hart, The Times (London), January 3, 1955, p. 7, col. 5.

²⁹Lewis J. Edinger, West German Armament, (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Research Studies Institute, Air University, 1955), p. 98.

³⁰U.S. Congress, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, 83rd Congress, Second Session, on Foreign Policy and its relations to military programs, March 19 and April 14, 1954 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954), p. 34.

³¹NYT, December 15, 1950, p. 10, col. 1.

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³³U.S. Congress, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 84th Congress, First Session, on Executives L and M, 83rd Congress, Second Session, March 27 and 30, 1955 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 36.

CHAPTER II

THE WESTERN ALLIES AND WEST GERMAN REARMAMENT

Dean Acheson believed German participation in West European defense would be an evolutionary process because he knew that the European allies did not want to see a revival of the German Army. He recognized that it would take time for the French, Dutch and Belgians to accept the idea of a rearmed Germany. For Acheson, Korea accelerated the evolutionary process and made West German rearmament an immediate requirement.¹ Unfortunately, Korea did not have the same effect on the Europeans. Generally, Europeans remained opposed to the rearmament of West Germany. While the British were the first to acquiesce to American desires, the French were among the last to accept West German participation in European defense.

FRENCH ATTITUDES

The American efforts to rearm West Germany brought to the forefront the critical problem of Franco-German relations. Although political opinion in France was frequently divided after World War II, there were some areas of common interest and consensus. One was opposition to a strong and unified Germany which Frenchmen - left and right - viewed as a greater threat to France than the Soviet Union.

The German historian Alfred Grosser has suggested that the French regarded Nazism and Hitler as the culmination of the direct line of German political development since Bismarck.² They saw the German totalitarian state as the natural outcome of a unified Germany and equated Nazism with Prussianism. Accordingly, after World War II, the French opposed a reunified Germany and pressed for such measures as the permanent separation of the Saar and the Ruhr from Germany.

The underlying fear of Germany was obvious. In December 1944, General de Gaulle signed a Treaty of Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union, an agreement motivated by fear of Germany as well as a desire to demonstrate independence of Great Britain and the United States.³ James P. Warburg, a thoughtful and perceptive critic of many aspects of Truman's foreign policy, correctly pointed out that "it was not Russia but France which... vetoed the carrying out of the Potsdam Agreement during the first period of its existence."⁴ The allies gave France a zone of occupation and an equal voice in the Allied Control Council without making her sign the Potsdam Agreements. In consonance with their basic fear of a strong Germany, French political leaders opposed the intent of the Potsdam accords which called for a unified Germany. Warburg argued that it was only after France had violated the agreements that the Soviet Union took a similar course.

French politics were in turmoil following the country's liberation from Nazi occupation. The birth of

the Fourth Republic in 1946 restored a multi-party system to France in which the strongest single party was the Communist Party. Collaboration with the Nazis under the Vichy regime had discredited the extreme Right. Thus their ultra-conservative political views were of little significance in the debate over German rearmament. The Gaullist Party (Rassemblement du peuple français, RPF) was the strongest political force on the Right. Between the Communists on the Left and the Gaullists on the Right, were several major parties which, by forming various coalitions, provided the leadership for the Fourth Republic from the time of de Gaulle's resignation in January 1946 until he again assumed the premiership in June 1958. The three most important center political parties were: the Socialists (Section française de l'Internationale ouvrière, SFIO), the Christian Democrats (Mouvement republicain populaire, MRP), and the Radicals (Rassemblement des Gauches republicaines, RGR). How a French political party viewed a particular foreign policy is not easily discerned. Roy C. Macridis has pointed out that as a rule French political parties "have not shown great interest in foreign policy on election day . . ." and that often a party would oppose a foreign policy simply because it did not agree with the government on a domestic issue.⁵

In the years immediately following the war, domestic issues were of primary importance in French politics. There was general agreement on German policy. The Communists, the Christian Democrats, and de Gaulle agreed on a hard policy

of dismembering Germany to which only the Socialists demurred.⁶ The membership of the National Assembly in October 1946 consisted of 618 seats of which the Communists had 183, the Christian Democrats had 167, and the Socialists only 105 seats.⁷ The voting power of the Communists and the Christian Democrats insured that France followed their hard policy toward Germany until June 1948 when the United States decided to create a West German State. This decision caused the "hard" French policy toward Germany to collapse. In 1949, the Atlantic Pact gained the support of all major parties except the Communist, a consensus that was rare in French politics. This set French policy on a new course based upon a European economic union and cooperation with the Federal Republic of Germany. French politicians challenged the policy of West European cooperation only when the unpopular cause of German rearmament was linked with it.⁸ In his memoirs, Dean Acheson noted an example of French hostility to the revival of a German Army. In the spring of 1952, he called on President Auriol who spent an hour telling Acheson of the "real danger" and "dreadful error" of rearming Germany.⁹

France's opposition to the resurrection of the German Army was explicit at the September 1950 meeting of the NATO Council in New York. Secretary of State Acheson recorded his impressions of French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman's feelings:

. . . His agreement to our proposals would be quite meaningless, he said in private, since even if the government should support him, which it would not do, the Chamber would not support it. He understood our reasons for wanting German participation in European defense and, over time, thought them sound. But France was not ready for them at present. We had not thought the problem through, particularly the political setting essential to any German rearmament.¹⁰

This meeting of the NATO Council closed with the French refusing to budge on the question. Very shortly thereafter, the French Government proposed the European Defense Community (EDC) which included a way to utilize German soldiers. C. L. Sulzberger has suggested that this plan, known as the Pleven Plan after the French Premier, was prepared rather hurriedly by French politicians when they concluded that the United States would rearm Germany one way or another.¹¹ After various modifications, the Pleven Plan evolved into the EDC Treaty. In spite of obvious deficiencies from an operational point of view, the United States Government accepted EDC as a way to rearm West Germany.

French politicians debated the EDC proposal for the next three and a half years and subsequently defeated it in the National Assembly. A coalition of Communist and Gaullist caused this defeat. It received unanimous support from only one party, the Christian Democrats; the other center parties split their votes. The approval of West Germany's entry into NATO and the Brussels Treaty Organization in December 1954, following the September 1954 rejection of EDC, was a result of significant Gaullist support and increased support from the Socialists.¹² The vote in the National Assembly approving

the Paris Agreements was 287 for, 260 against, with 76 members abstaining. The major party membership in the Assembly with the number of votes cast for West German membership in NATO was: Communist - 98 (0); Socialist - 104 (86); Christian Democrat - 85 (17); Radical - 76 (44); Gaullist - 72 (37); and Conservative groups - 138 (77). Although split on the approval of the Paris Agreements, the Gaullists had unanimously rejected EDC because of its supra-national character. Frenchmen generally opposed West German rearmament, but French politicians, because of pressure from the United States, worked to reach an acceptable compromise. They finally achieved success by a very narrow vote.

Following World War II, the French saw themselves as the leading nation in Western Europe, and it was with the leadership of such Frenchmen as René Pleven, Jean Monnet, and Robert Schuman that progress toward some type of West European union had been made. But internal problems had caused some doubt about French ability to lead. A newspaper in Amsterdam observed that "the French want to lead Europe, but they can't even lead themselves."¹³ Underlying France's internal political problems and her inability to establish her European leadership were economic problems caused by the devastation of her industry during the war. Economic recovery depended on financial and material aid from the United States.

Military aid provided the most leverage on French politicians. In her effort to regain a portion of her empire,

France became involved in a war in Indochina, the intensity of which increased after 1949. The war in Indochina was not popular in France but no French Government was able to simply give up a piece of the French Empire without an effort to retain it. Without an arms industry of their own, the French were almost completely dependent on the United States for military supplies and equipment. In 1954, a spokesman for the Finance Committee of the French National Assembly reported that 80 per cent of the cost of the war in Indochina was being paid by the United States.¹⁴ Without military aid from the United States, France would not have been able either to carry on the war in Indochina or to make a reasonable contribution to the NATO Alliance. Some of the procedures used to give France this aid reveal the link between aid for the French and West German rearmament.

The military aid program was enacted into law on October 6, 1949 as the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949.¹⁵ Of the total military aid the program provided to Europe, France received the largest share. From 1950 until 1959, almost 14 billion dollars were given to Europe of which France received about 4.5 billion dollars.¹⁶ Italy ran a distant second in military aid received with a share of about 2 billion dollars.

This aid did not come without strings attached. Military aid, the war in Indochina, and West German rearmament were closely related problems. Included in the Congressional appropriation bills activating the aid

program were guidelines that the funds should be used to support European military integration. The Mutual Security Act of 1953 stated that 50 per cent of the funds authorized would be provided to countries joining the European Defense Community.¹⁷ In the 1954 bill, Congress took note of the progress made toward European integration and directed that the funds authorized be so administered as to support military integration in Europe.¹⁸ Congress in effect said that American aid to France was conditional upon German rearmament.

The connection between military aid for France and the rearmament of Germany was further revealed in many of the diplomatic communications between France and the United States. A joint Franco-American communiqué by French Premier René Plevén and President Truman on January 30, 1951, reaffirmed American support of the French in Indochina as well as the conviction that Germany should be rearmed. The thousand word communiqué contained the following passages:

. . . The President informed the Prime Minister that United States aid for the French Union forces and for the National Armies of the Associated States will continue, and that the increased quantities of material to be delivered under the program authorized for the current fiscal year will be expedited.

The President and the Prime Minister were in fundamental agreement that the cause of peace in Europe and in the world would be furthered by a progressively closer integration in every aspect of a democratic Germany into a vigorous Western European community.

The Prime Minister also referred to the conference to be convened in Paris on February 6th, to consider the formation of a European Army the Plevén Plan¹⁹

The same message was carried in a review of French-American policies released on March 28, 1953.²⁰ President Eisenhower, in a letter to French Premier Rene Coty dated June 18, 1954, included the following passages:

The United States hopes to see realized, while the opportunity still exists, the imaginative and epochal French concept for belnding national military forces on the continent of Europe so that they will perform a single service of peace and security. . . .

In Indochina our nation has long shown its deep concern by heavy financial and material aid which continues.²¹

A consistent theme in American-French relations during the period 1950 to 1954 was the need for a rearmed West Germany and its link with the French effort in Indochina.

Accordingly, it is not surprising that the rejection of EDC by the French National Assembly on August 30, 1954 caused some repercussions in Washington. Secretary of State Dulles issued a statement the day following the rejection calling it a "saddening event" attributing it to "nationalism abetted by communism."²² He pointed out that the United States had flexibility to adjust its policies and referred specifically to the provisions of the appropriations bill which made a review of policies mandatory should progress toward a European Army be delayed. The French rejection of EDC was followed by the London and Paris conferences in September and October 1954, where an alternative plan for German rearmament was agreed upon. At the same time, France and the United States discussed the French position in Indochina. In an effort to maintain some degree of influence

there following the cease fire on July 20, 1954, France intended to keep an expeditionary force in South East Asia. A joint statement released on October 11, 1954, stated the intent of the United States to consider financial support for this force.²³ The Paris Agreements were subsequently approved by the French National Assembly on December 30, 1954.

France's dependence on the United States for economic aid, particularly her need for military assistance, forced the French Government to give ostensible support to German integration into a European Army. Persistent American pressure finally proved successful in getting France to approve arms for Germany. The war in Indochina not only created an immediate need for American arms, but it also took soldiers who otherwise could have been used in Europe as part of the NATO force. This two-fold effect of the Indochina war on France weakened her position vis-a-vis the United States. Except for this war, it would be hard to visualize support by any French government for German rearmament during the early 1950s. The French may have over-reacted when the Communists attacked South Korea as Charles Bohlen has suggested, but by 1953 their fear of a Russian attack had diminished.²⁴ In the final analysis, American economic pressure caused the French Government to acquiesce to West German rearmament.

BRITISH ATTITUDES

Great Britain was America's most dependable European ally. When the time came to stand up and be counted on an issue, the British usually supported the Americans even when they were not completely in favor of a particular policy. A case in point was Churchill's ostensible support of the "Morgenthau Plan" for a deindustrialized Germany. Lloyd Gardner wrote that when Churchill first heard of this plan he had violent objections but the need for American financial support and the intuitive feeling that America would eventually come to modify the plan caused him to show outward support for it.²⁵ Accordingly, he was satisfied when at Yalta Roosevelt indicated a change of heart and the harsh policies of the "Morgenthau Plan" appeared to have gone by the wayside. This willingness to be on the side of the United States in international disputes remained a relatively constant policy until the Suez crisis in 1956. It resulted from the recognition of her dependence on American economic aid. While France received the largest share of military aid, Great Britain received the most non-military aid. Her share was almost 3.9 billion dollars, while France received about 3.2 billion, and the total for all of Europe amounted to 15 billion dollars.²⁶

The British reaction to the United States' proposal to rearm Germany reflects this willingness to accept American leadership in international politics. The Labor Party was in

power in 1950 when the problem was first discussed. This Party, representing the Left in British politics, tended to oppose power politics and imperialism and showed pacifist views.²⁷ One might have expected Great Britain under Labor leadership to oppose West German rearmament. This was not the case. Dean Acheson provided an explanation of the British attitude in his reflection on the motivations of Ernst Bevin, the Laborite Foreign Minister. Acheson wrote:

Bevin had a deep mistrust of the Germans, but an even deeper one of the Soviet Union. And he understood power. He knew that choices had to be made, often choices between unpleasant alternatives, and never was misled, as so many well meaning people are, into believing that the necessity for choice can be transcended by a flight of eloquence. He profoundly believed that the possibility of life in freedom anywhere depended on the United States and the United Kingdom sticking together. Not that they could preserve freedom by themselves, or wanted to do so only for themselves; but he was sure that it couldn't be done anywhere for long if they drifted apart.²⁸

Accordingly, the pragmatic leadership of the Labor Party was able to fend off opposition from the far Left and the British Government supported American aims in Germany. With the election of the Tory government in 1951, any notion of British opposition was stifled.

Although she was not to be a member of the EDC, Great Britain advocated ratification of the plan to integrate German troops into the West European defense system. Following the defeat of EDC in the French National Assembly, it was Anthony Eden who provided the initiative for an alternative policy to rearm Germany by calling the meeting of Foreign Ministers in London. It was the guarantee of British and

American participation in the European defense system worked out in the London and Paris meetings that was an important factor in subsequent French approval of German rearmament. This counterweight to a rearmed Germany was not a provision in the EDC.

In their support for West German rearmament, the British considered factors other than European security and support of their economic benefactor, the United States. A letter from John Foster Dulles to President Dwight Eisenhower dated November 14, 1952, contains the following statement concerning a talk Dulles had with Anthony Eden:

Eden felt that the most urgent Western European problem was that of securing French and German ratification of the German Peace Contract, with consequent creation of the German military force which in turn would divert a part of Germany's economic activity from competition with the United Kingdom into rearmament.²⁹

Thus Britain foresaw the economic recovery of West Germany and the competition this would provide in world trade. If Great Britain was going to be forced to spend a portion of her income for defense, it was only logical that her potentially strongest competitor should be required as well to divert resources for defense.

Great Britain's policy toward German rearmament mirrored that of the United States. While the British did not fear an attack from the East as the Americans did, neither did they fear greatly a rearmed West Germany as the French did. In the Paris Agreements, the British agreed, as did the Americans, to keep ground forces in Europe on a

permanent basis. These forces served to alleviate French fears of a revived German Army as well as to guarantee the British and American commitment to European defense. France looked at German rearmament as contingent upon a growing West European Union.³¹ The Coal and Steel Community had been a necessary step from the beginning but by 1954 French politicians needed the additional guarantee of American-British military participation to counter-balance German military strength. Earlier during the three power summit at Bermuda in December 1953, Churchill and Eisenhower had promised French Premier Laniel their cooperation with EDC in return for French approval of the treaty. All three allies agreed on the political and economic goals of their German policy, that of insuring close political and economic ties between Germany and the West. Military integration tended to support these goals but United States' emphasis on defense considerations exceeded that of the French and the British. The subsequent rearmament of Germany illustrated the axiom that he who pays the piper calls the tune.

NOTES

CHAPTER II - THE WESTERN ALLIES AND WEST GERMAN REARMAMENT

¹Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1969), pp. 434-436.

²Alfred Grosser, Germany in Our Time (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), p. 36.

³Roy C. Macridis, "French Foreign Policy," in World Politics, ed. Roy C. Macridis (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 1958), p. 67.

⁴James P. Warburg, Last Call for Common Sense (New York: Harcourt, Bruce and Co., 1949), p. 145.

⁵Macridis, "French Foreign Policy," p. 61.

⁶Philip M. Williams, Crisis and Compromise (London: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd., 1964), p. 44.

⁷Ibid., p. 504.

⁸Ibid., p. 44.

⁹Acheson, Creation, p. 650.

¹⁰Dean Acheson, Sketches from Life of Men I have Known (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1961), p. 47.

¹¹C.L. Sulzberger, New York Times (NYT), July 3, 1951, p. 8, col. 3.

¹²See Williams, Crisis and Compromise, pp. 43, 498-499 for statistics on the French National Assembly vote on EDC and the Paris Agreements.

¹³Quoted in the NYT, October 26, 1952, Sec. IV, p. 2, col. 1.

¹⁴Ellen J. Hammer, The Struggle for Indochina, 1940-1955 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 313.

¹⁵U.S. Congress, House Documents, Miscellaneous, 81st Congress, Second Session. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), document number 613, First semiannual report on the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, June 1, 1950.

¹⁶U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States - 1960, (81st edition) (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 881.

¹⁷Department of State, American Foreign Policy 1950-1955 Basic Documents, Vol. II (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 3082.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 3108.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 1669-1671.

²⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 1672-1675.

²¹*Ibid.*, p. 1675.

²²*Ibid.*, p. 1471.

²³*Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 2400.

²⁴Charles E. Bohlen, Witness to History (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1973), p. 304.

²⁵Lloyd Gardner, Architects of Illusion (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), p. 233.

²⁶U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States - 1960, (81st edition) (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), pp. 877-878.

²⁷Leon D. Epstein, "British Foreign Policy," Foreign Policy in World Politics, ed. Roy C. Macridis (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 1958), p. 23.

²⁸Acheson, Sketches from Life, p. 34.

²⁹Personal correspondence John Foster Dulles to Dwight Eisenhower, November 14, 1952; Papers of John Foster Dulles (Princeton University Library), Eisenhower folder.

³⁰Another consideration for the American troop commitment was that United States' policy makers envisaged it as a means to "prime the pump". They hoped that a few U.S. divisions in Germany would cause the other allies to increase their troop commitments.

³¹See Premier Plevin's statement, NYT, October 25, 1950, p. 21, col. 1.

CHAPTER III

POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

The democratic political process developed slowly in West Germany after the war. The Americans set the pace in their zone of occupation, beginning the process at the bottom of the political hierarchy with local elections in Bavaria, Hesse, and Baden-Wuerttemberg during 1946. The principal political parties which emerged at that time were the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the Social Democratic Party (SPD), and the Free Democratic Party (FDP). These remained the principal parties in the Federal Republic throughout the debate on rearmament.

On April 8, 1949, the Foreign Ministers of the United States, Great Britain, and France announced agreement upon an Occupation Statute for West Germany. This Statute anticipated the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany and granted a considerable degree of self-government on domestic matters but reserved for the Western allies far reaching powers over foreign policy.¹ The Federal Republic came into existence in May and the first general election in Germany since 1933 was held in August. The CDU won the most seats in the Bundestag with 139 members, followed by the SPD with 131 and the FDP with 53 members.² No other party had a significant representation. Konrad Adenauer,

the CDU leader, formed a coalition government with the FDP and became the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic. The Adenauer era began with a strong SPD in opposition.

The agreements between the new West German State and the three Western allies not only reserved for allies authority over foreign policy but also specified that the allies would retain authority over disarmament and demilitarization. Although there was considerable speculation in the press that the Federal Republic would become soon a member of NATO, all official agreements stated that West Germany would remain demilitarized. This was the situation when rearmament became an issue in the summer of 1950.

Chancellor Konrad Adenauer discussed the question of West German rearmament in his Memoirs under the title "On the Road to Full Sovereignty." This expressed well Adenauer's sense of the meaning of the revival of the German Army. When it became apparant that the United States wanted military cooperation from the Federal Republic, Adenauer seized the opportunity to gain full sovereignty for his country. He wrote in his Memoirs:

In the long run the German people could not be a perfect partner of the peoples whose interest were parallel to ours unless there was equality. These were the guiding principles of my policy toward the Western powers during all the years when, as Federal Chancellor, I had to determine the guidelines of our policy.³

Believing that a rearmed West Germany would be on equal standing with other nations of Western Europe, Adenauer accepted the American proposals for a German Army and

pressed vigorously for their adoption. But the Chancellor's enthusiasm was shared by all Germans.

American statesmen had anticipated the problems that German rearmament would cause with France, but the strong resistance within the Federal Republic came as a surprise. The decision makers had not considered the desires of the Germans but assumed that patriotic fervor and their military tradition would bring young Germans rushing to the colors.⁴ They were wrong. It was much easier to enforce disarmament in 1945 than it was to initiate rearmament in 1950. An influential factor was the denazification program which had been vigorously implemented by the Western powers in 1945. This program convinced many Germans that the rise of Hitler resulted from the militaristic tradition and accordingly, they were not prepared for the sudden change in American policy. Adenauer indicated that he expected several kinds of resistance. He said that he looked for: "political opposition from the opposition parties; psychological opposition from pacifist-minded, nationalists, and certain church circles; and opposition from former Wehrmacht groups who, for various reasons, could not be given a part in the raising of a German contingent."⁵

Adenauer was correct. There was widespread antipathy toward proposals to rearm. The Government's intelligence chief, Dr. Otto John, defected to East Germany for what he described as a conflict of conscience over the Washington-Bonn rearmament policy.⁶ Pacifists, including many who were

members of the CDU, vigorously resisted the revival of a German Army. But it was the political opposition of the SPD that was the most significant. The SPD assimilated all the various arguments against rearmament into an organized program. Accordingly, a discussion of their arguments provides a reasonably complete summary of the reasons why many West Germans resisted the rearmament proposals.

Adenauer and the CDU supported the West European union. Wolfram Hanrieder has written: "For Adenauer, all West German foreign policy goals, including that of security, derived their fundamental meaning and purpose from the vision of a European political and economic community."⁷ Accordingly, the Adenauer government favored the concept of rearmament within the framework of a West European Army in which the West German military formations would be subordinate to a supra-national command. For Adenauer, the important point was for the Federal Republic to be on equal status with other West European nations. In his negotiations with the allies, Adenauer pointed out the strong opposition to rearmament within the Federal Republic. In his Memoirs he recalled:

. . . The situation in Germany could now /1950/ be saved only if the governments of the Western Allies made a statement that the man in the street could understand to the effect that the Federal Republic of Germany would soon enjoy equal rights with other nations.⁸

Cooperation with the American demands for a military contribution was a means to gain equal sovereignty.

Dr. Kurt Schumacher, leader of the SPD, directed the

attack on Adenauer's rearmament proposals. In 1945 he was the best known political leader in West Germany and had been a leading voice of the Social Democrats during the Weimar Republic. He was among the first of the Third Reich's political prisoners, spending the years from 1933 to 1943 in a Nazi concentration camp. Although he had lost an arm in 1914 as a soldier in the German Imperial Army and had been crippled further during his long Nazi imprisonment, Schumacher was a powerful political leader who commanded respect from friend and foe alike.

The proposal for West German rearmament posed a dilemma for Schumacher. He was a Marxist, and the SPD had a Marxist tradition from its birth. But the Cold War division of Europe and the merger of the Social Democrats in the East zone with the Communist Party caused the SPD to fear changes of internationalism, and it developed what Hanrieder called "preventive nationalism."⁹ In 1950 the SPD was more nationalistic than the CDU. Unqualified opposition to rearmament would undermine their nationalistic position. On the other hand, rearmament was an unpopular issue with the West German voters, and as the party in opposition, the SPD needed an issue which could gain them votes in the next election.¹⁰ In December 1949, Adenauer had tested the public attitude toward rearmament in an interview with a reporter from the Cleveland Plain Dealer.¹¹ In this interview, Adenauer suggested the possibility of a West German Army and the response indicated that the German

public was not ready to see their country rearmed. The West Germans reflected the same attitude in the local elections of November 1950 in Hesse, Baden-Wuerttemberg, and Bavaria. The results of these elections were not favorable to the government coalition and the SPD gains were attributed primarily to their stand in opposition to rearmament.¹² Schumacher and the SPD did not oppose rearmament per se but rather Adenauer's method to accomplish it. The proposed force structure in late 1950 envisaged a European Army with West German military units providing much of the manpower. The Federal Republic would be dependent on the allies for strategic weapons and industrial support. The SPD argued that German participation under those circumstances would make the German soldier nothing more than a foreign legionnaire. Thus Schumacher was able to oppose Adenauer's rearmament proposals and still maintain his nationalistic position.

It was not only to get votes that Schumacher opposed rearmament. He had a basic distrust of depending on the Western allies for security. When he went to prison in 1933, Schumacher had firmly believed that the Nazi regime would be forced to collapse by pressure from the West.¹³ But instead of pressure he saw collaboration as France and Great Britain sacrificed Germany and Czechoslovakia to their own national interests. Since assistance did not appear in the 1930s, Schumacher saw no reasons to expect help in case of a crisis in the 1950s. Accordingly, he opposed a security

arrangement which depended on the West.

Intertwined with the proposed rearmament program within the framework of the European Defense Community was the question of economic policy. Schumacher and the SPD had opposed the Marshall Plan in 1948 and viewed the proposed Schuman Plan as the unwanted economic sister of the rearmament plan. Schumacher viewed both the Marshall Plan and the Schuman Plan for a European Coal and Steel Community as efforts to rebuild a capitalistic economy in Germany at the expense of the working class. He saw "authoritarian capitalism and national communism" as common enemies of the German people and related these two forces to the rise of Hitler in 1933. He argued that America had helped German big business in the 1920s and then suddenly withdrew the aid during the world wide depression. The resulting economic crisis led to the Nazi regime, he said, and he could see no reason to depend on the capitalistic elite in the present postwar period.¹⁴ He particularly objected to the generally understood proviso which made German rearmament conditional upon the approval of the Schuman Plan. He termed this an attempt to blackmail Germany into accepting an economic system which was not in the best interests of the German people.¹⁵

The perception of the Soviet threat provided another basis for SPD opposition. The Socialists tended to view the threat in economic terms rather than in the military terms that seemed to dominate the thinking of the political parties

on the Right. The SPD believed that rearmament would increase international tension and result in less rather than more security for the Federal Republic. They feared that German rearmament would give the Soviet Union reason to conduct a preventive war in Europe.¹⁶ Adenauer expressed the same fear. Incorrectly anticipating a visit from Allen Dulles in September 1950, Adenauer sent Dulles a letter outlining some points for discussion. One of the Chancellor's concerns was the possibility of Soviet intervention when the West Germans started to rearm.¹⁷ Because of this threat, Adenauer thought that at least 12 additional allied divisions should be mobilized in Europe before he could undertake rearmament. While the Chancellor was calling for reinforcements in private correspondence, Schumacher was doing so publicly. In late October 1950, he asked that allied forces powerful enough to resist a Russian invasion be sent to Germany as a prerequisite for rearmament.¹⁸ Adenauer believed as well that the rearmament of West Germany would increase the possibility of Russian interference. He recognized that the specter of a Soviet attack caused "broad sections of the population [to be] seized by paralyzing fear," and increased their opposition to rearmament.¹⁹ Accordingly, Adenauer called for the allies to provide the necessary troops to guarantee West German security before rearmament began. His proposals for German participation in European defense were coupled with requests for more "freedom of action and responsibility."²⁰ In Adenauer's view, a West German Army meant sovereignty rather than security.

George Kennan suggested that the threat of a Russian attack was a myth. He wrote that the failure of the West to press for the demilitarization of Germany confused the Soviets and led them to believe in more sinister considerations.²¹ In recent years, most historians have judged the SPD perception that there was no Russian military threat to be correct.²²

The most effective SPD argument was that rearmament in 1950 would delay or prevent reunification of Germany. This argument had a two-fold advantage for the Social Democrats. First, reunification was a major political issue in West Germany, and it was not possible for any political party to adopt a program that did not include reunification. Therefore, the position that rearmament would delay or prevent reunification was politically sound. Second, it attacked Adenauer's proposal for rearmament at its weakest point. Adenauer argued for reunification through strength. But this would presuppose a willingness to use force to accomplish it, a policy which Adenauer denounced.²³ Thus reunification through strength was a myth. Although unable to admit it publicly, Adenauer had subordinated reunification to what he determined to be the more important goal of economic recovery within the West European community. Dean Acheson recalled a conversation he had with Adenauer in November 1949 in which the Chancellor stated his view. "His great concern was to integrate Germany completely into Western Europe. Indeed he gave this end priority over the reunification

of unhappily divided Germany"24 In trying to allay the French fears that German arms would be used some day as an instrument of unification, Adenauer told French Premier Mendes France: ". . . we Germans are willing to suffer a divided Germany a little longer to create European union."25 Schumacher and his SPD recognized the Adenauer policy for what it was and objected.

For the Social Democrats, reunification was more than an issue through which they hoped to gain votes in West Germany. It was a real goal they hoped to attain, their first priority. As Henry Bretton pointed out, there were three reasons for the SPD to place priority on reunification.²⁶ First, it was an important issue to the tens of thousands of refugees pouring into West Germany from the East Zone. For a political party in opposition, it was necessary to have these votes if they expected to gain control of the government. These refugees were leaving homes, property, and friends in the Soviet Zone, and it was of primary importance to them to have Germany reunified. Thus reunification was consonant with the SPD's nationalistic ideology and provided a way for them to gain votes in West Germany. Second, the northeastern part of Germany which made up the East Zone had been a strong Social Democratic area prior to 1933. Many of the leaders, including Schumacher himself, came from this area; and the SPD had every reason to believe that should this area be included in Germany, the SPD would gain considerable support from the people living

there. Thus the SPD stood to gain more through reunification than did the CDU. The final reason had to do with fear of Catholicism in German politics. Adenauer himself was a Catholic, and he had strong support from the predominantly Catholic areas in West Germany. Since East Germany was predominantly Protestant, the SPD believed that the inclusion of these areas in Germany was necessary to prevent undesirable influence from the Catholic Church in German politics. Thus the reunification issue was real for the SPD.

In his opposition to Adenauer's rearmament proposals, Schumacher found allies among some former Wehrmacht officers. Paradoxically, these officers represented the traditional right wing perspective of the German officer corps. Heinz Guderian, the respected Wehrmacht panzer general, voiced his objections to the rearmament proposals when he ridiculed the military posture of the West and argued for a unified and neutral Germany rather than a security system based upon an alliance with the West.²⁷ Former Nazi general, Bogislav von Bonin proposed a 150,000-man professional army, highly trained and disciplined, which would be armed primarily with anti-tank weapons and would defend the eastern frontiers of the Federal Republic.²⁸ These views on West Germany's defense needs were based upon strong nationalistic feelings and were useful to Schumacher and the SPD because they added a degree of expertise to their arguments against Adenauer's proposals. But more important, these views tended to contradict the charges that the SPD was soft on communism.

The Communist propaganda against rearmament was in many ways similar to the arguments used by the SPD. Adenauer has suggested that the unpopularity of his rearmament proposals with the German people was due in part to the agitation of the Communist Party.²⁹ John Foster Dulles told the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that the reluctance of the Germans to rearm could be attributed to the communists.³⁰ Therefore, the support from the extreme Right helped the credibility of the SPD.

West German politicians debated rearmament until the national elections in September 1953, when it was a major issue. Adenauer and the CDU won a decisive victory, taking 244 seats in the Bundestag while the SPD captured only 150 seats.³¹ Adenauer had gained a clear mandate and used it to carry out his foreign policy objectives, including rearmament, in his own way. Although the SPD made an attempt to revive the rearmament question in the fall of 1954 after the French National Assembly defeated the EDC proposal, the 1953 election in effect settled the question of West German rearmament as an internal political issue.³²

The reasons for the SPD defeat are many and varied. The death of their able leader Schumacher in 1952 must have had its effect, as did the success of Adenauer's domestic policies. The benefits of the economic recovery of West Germany had been felt throughout the electorate, and the German people were reluctant to change governments and jeopardize their prosperity.

Adenauer had strong backing from the United States. On the eve of the election Secretary of State John Foster Dulles made a public statement, declaring that the failure to retain the Adenauer government in the coming election would be disastrous for Germany and possibilities for German unity.³³ It is doubtful that this particular statement swayed the election considering the margin of victory, but it does indicate the extent to which American policy makers were willing to use their influence to defeat the SPD. Dean Acheson recorded his dislike for Schumacher after a meeting with the party leader in November 1949, and even suggested that after Schumacher's death, the SPD assumed a more constructive role in German politics.³⁴ Thus it appears that United States' favoritism toward the CDU was a policy of long standing.

In the final analysis, the Federal Republic of Germany had the choice between two basic policies in 1950. It could have cast its lot with the Atlantic Alliance and rearmed in consonance with American desires, or it could have remained neutral between the two super-powers, in which case rearmament might have been an issue at a later time. For Adenauer the choice was easy. As early as 1923 he had spoken of a "community of economic interests" in Western Europe, and his belief in a post war West European political and economic community was basic to his concept of West German foreign policy.³⁵ In this sense, Schumacher's accusation that Adenauer was the "Chancellor of the Allies"

was incorrect.³⁶ West German integration into the West European community was absolutely necessary in Adenauer's judgement and rearmament was the price to pay. Although West Germany received considerable amounts of economic and military aid from the United States, this aid was not used, as it was in France, as a means to pressure the West German government.³⁷ The autocratic Adenauer made his decision without economic pressure, although obviously the benefits incurred from the aid were a strong selling point among the politicians of West Germany.

The SPD pressed for the neutral policy and had strong support within the Federal Republic. Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki suggested a similar policy in 1957 which received no serious consideration by Washington policy makers.³⁸ George Kennan, in a 1957 lecture to Oxford College students, suggested a defense policy for West Germany along the lines of the Swiss example, a militia organization rather than a regular army.³⁹ This suggestion was in consonance with a neutral policy and envisaged a disengagement of the super-powers in central Europe. The French scholar Raymond Aron in his critique of Kennan's suggestion gave perhaps the best reason against a neutral Germany. Aron wrote:

. . . The present situation of Europe is abnormal or absurd. But it is a clearcut one and everybody knows where the demarcation line is and nobody is very much afraid of what could happen . . . If something happens on the other side of the Iron Curtain - and we have the experience of a year ago, Hungary - nothing happens on this side. So a clear partition of Europe is considered, rightly or wrongly, to be less dangerous than any other arrangement.⁴⁰

One can only speculate on the merits or demerits of a neutral policy. The fact is that the reelection of Adenauer in 1953 discarded that option and it was most probably other issues that caused the West German people to vote as they did. The man whom Gordon Craig called "the most impressive statesman in the Western Alliance" successfully guided the Federal Republic away from neutralism into the Atlantic defense community.⁴¹

NOTES

CHAPTER III - POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

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- ⁵Adenauer, Memoirs, p. 300.
- ⁶NYT, August 12, 1954, p. 1, col. 6.
- ⁷Wolfram F. Hanrieder, West German Foreign Policy (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1967), p. 95.
- ⁸Adenauer, Memoirs, p. 304.
- ⁹Hanrieder, West German Foreign Policy, p. 65.
- ¹⁰Adenauer, Memoirs, p. 302.
- ¹¹NYT, December 6, 1949, p. 16, col. 3.
- ¹²Adenauer, Memoirs, p. 301.
- ¹³Lewis J. Edinger, Kurt Schumacher (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1965), p. 50.
- ¹⁴Ibid., p. 82.
- ¹⁵NYT, October 26, 1950, p. 19, col. 1.
- ¹⁶Robert McGeehan, The German Rearmament Question (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1971), p. 70.
- ¹⁷Henry A. Byroade note to Dulles, September 8, 1950 with memorandum from Adenauer to Allen Dulles attached, Papers of John Foster Dulles (Princeton University Library), Byroade folder.

¹⁸NYT, October 28, 1950, p. 5, col. 1.

¹⁹Adenauer, Memoirs, p. 304.

²⁰Ibid., pp. 280-281.

²¹George F. Kennan, Memoirs 1950-1963 (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1972), p. 340.

²²In an article in the May 23, 1973 issue of the New York Review of Books, Ronald Steel lists Adam Ulam, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Arthur Schlesinger as examples of historians with "orthodox" views who have revived their opinions concerning the Soviet threat. Steel suggests that it is the work of younger historians such as Lloyd Gardner, Walter La Feber, and Gar Alperovitz who have caused this subtle revision. However, Eugene V. Rostov maintains the "Cold Warrior" perspective in his Peace in the Balance (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972).

²³NYT, September 16, 1953, p. 16, col. 2. Also see Gordon A. Craig, From Bismarck to Adenauer (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins Press, 1959), p. 131.

²⁴Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1969), p. 341.

²⁵U.S. News and World Report, September 3, 1954, p. 19.

²⁶Henry L. Bretton, "The German Social Democrat Party and the International Situation," American Political Science Review, Vol. XLVII (Dec. 1953), p. 989.

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²⁸Charles W. Thayer, "German Arms and the Men," The Reporter, April 21, 1955, p. 26.

²⁹Adenauer, Memoirs, p. 302.

³⁰U.S. Congress, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 84th Congress, First Session, on Executives L and M, 83rd Congress, Second Session, (March 29 and 30, 1955) (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 22.

³¹NYT, September 8, 1953, p. 1, col. 4.

³²In December 1954, the SPD demanded that one final attempt be made to negotiate the German problem with Moscow before approving the Paris Agreements. This demand was ignored and the Paris Agreements were subsequently ratified by the Bundestag. See NYT, December 9, 1954, p. 8, col. 1.

³³NYT, September 6, 1953, p. 1, col. 8.

³⁴Acheson, Creation, p. 342.

³⁵Craig, From Bismarck, p. 125.

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³⁷From 1948 until 1959 the Federal Republic received over 1.5 billion dollars in non-military aid and slightly less than one billion in military aid. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States - 1960, (81st edition) (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), pp. 877 and 881.

³⁸NYT, October 3, 1957, p. 4, col. 2.

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CHAPTER IV

SOVIET RUSSIA'S REACTION TO WEST GERMAN REARMAMENT

The Soviet view of West German rearmament was outlined in the Soviet press during the period 1949-1955 and in statements by Soviet officials at the Nineteenth and Twentieth Party Congresses (1952 and 1956). Representing the official Soviet position, these sources must be handled discreetly. Yet they are useful because they indicate the picture that Soviet leaders wished to present to foreign governments.

The Soviet elite conceived of an anti-Soviet military coalition including Germany as the greatest possible threat to their security following World War II. Accordingly, preventing a rearmed Germany from becoming a member of the Western alliance was a principal aim of Soviet foreign policy from after the War until near the end of 1954.

The effect of ideology on Soviet attitudes toward West German rearmament is a complicating factor. Vernon V. Aspaturian has written that one of the key functions of ideology in Soviet foreign policy is that it serves as an analytical prism through which the Communists view the world. He explains:

The Soviet ideological prism reflects an image of the world that is virtually unrecognizable to a non-Communist,

yet it is upon this image that Soviet foreign policy is based. It reflects a world of incessant conflict and change, in which institutions, loyalties, and philosophies arise and decay in accordance with convulsive rhythm of the dialectic, which implacably propels it upon a predetermined arc to a foreordained future-world Communism.¹ This image is accepted as the real world by Soviet leaders.

Through this ideological prism, the Soviets perceive scientific laws which guide diplomacy, and the proper application of these laws insure the proper outcome. Failure of a specific policy does not invalidate the laws but results from improper application of Marxist-Leninist theory. The Communists viewed the rise of Hitler as the result of the German social structure, specifically the unequal distribution of economic power.² Accordingly, denazification for the Russians meant a social revolution, the reorganization of wealth and property. They viewed the maintenance of the pre-war social structure in the western zones as an indication that there would be no change in the political structure.

After World War II, the Soviet Union retained a large standing army, a large part of which was stationed in East Europe. Many western statesmen have used the failure of the Russians to demobilize in 1945 as evidence of Soviet aggressive intentions. George Kennan explained that land power represented by a large standing army had been a historic characteristic of the Russian nation.³ He pointed out that Soviet ground forces had been superior in Europe until the late 1930s and that in 1945 Soviet air and naval forces were inferior, both in quantity and quality, to those of the West. Since the United States had a monopoly in atomic

weapons, demobilization was inconceivable to the Soviets and could hardly be interpreted in their view as a threat to the West. Stalin, in 1951, asserted that the Soviet Union had in fact carried out a partial demobilization after 1945, and Khrushchev said the same thing in 1960.⁴ The degree of demobilization seems irrelevant since the Soviets were content to give the impression that the Red Army remained a powerful force.

Adam Ulam has suggested that "on the German issue. . . the Soviets in 1945 were not clear in their own mind what they wanted, what kind of Germany would serve eventually their interests best."⁵ The Soviet Union had suffered enormous damage during the war and the first priority was to rebuild their devastated economy. The complete destruction of the German Army was a fact. Charles Bohlen has suggested that the Soviet military, specifically Marshal Zhukov, knew that West Germany posed no threat to the Soviet Union without the aid and assistance of the United States. Thus Bohlen concluded that "the Soviet fear of Germany was an illusion."⁶ Unlike the French, the Soviet Armies had played a dominant role in the defeat of Germany and the Soviet elite had no deep psychological fear of Germany. But because of the geographic location, the Soviets did fear a rearmed West Germany included in the Western alliance.

The Soviets viewed the Marshall Plan as the first step toward the remilitarization of West Germany. Ulam has suggested that the Soviets feared economic aid to West

Germany more than they feared the atomic bomb.⁷ They saw the ultimate result of the Marshall Plan as the creation of large standing European armies while America furnished the naval strength and the atomic air arm.⁸ In accordance with Marxist doctrine, the economic recovery of West Germany with complete dependence on United States' capital was the first step toward an anti-Soviet military coalition.

The Soviets were alarmed at events of 1949 and the first half of 1950. Their foreign policy since 1946 had caused increased cohesion among the Western powers.⁹ The Soviet press reflected the belief that the United States Government was deliberately creating anti-Soviet feeling in America by means of anti-communist propaganda through movies, the press, radio, and the church.¹⁰ This campaign, the Soviet press suggested, was to counter the general good will and sympathy for the Soviet people which developed in America during the war. Articles in the press showed a concern over the possibility of West German participation in NATO. Pravda reported in January 1949 the reconstruction of Krupp war plants. Meetings between American officers and former Wehrmacht officers drew comment in Izvestia during the same period.¹¹ In March, Pravda announced that the formation of NATO would provide "German fascists" with undreamed of prospects since inclusion of West Germany would mean rearmament.¹² Reports of the creation of a West German Army were announced in the Soviet press as the military aspects of the Marshall Plan.¹³

Soviet newspapers suggested that secret agreements existed in both the NATO treaty and the Petersburg agreements which called for the creation of a West German Army.¹⁴ Since the Atlantic Alliance was a reality, the Soviets directed their efforts at preventing West German membership.

Soviet leadership anticipated the American effort to rearm West Germany and believed they could prevent it. Under Stalin, policy was based upon the belief in the inevitability of wars among the capitalist countries. After World War II, there were those among the Soviet elite who considered this theory no longer valid. They believed that war between capitalism and communism was imminent. But Stalin provided the official doctrine in his keynote address to the Nineteenth Party Congress (September 1952). He said:

It is said that the contradictions between capitalism and socialism are greater than the contradiction between the capitalist countries. Theoretically, this is of course true. It is true not only now, at the present time, but it was also true before the second world war. And this the leaders of the capitalist countries did, more or less, understand. Yet the second world war began not with a war against the USSR, but with a war among the capitalist countries.¹⁵

He explained that war with the USSR would challenge the very existence of capitalism, a risk that the West would not take. He added that the "hubbub" raised by the capitalists about a Soviet threat was only for propaganda purposes, that they really did not believe it. Stalin suggested that should the United States be successful in rearming West Germany, the Germans would not remain under the heel of American imperialism.

The Soviet leadership believed that internal

contradictions and the threat of Russian intervention would prevent the rearmament of West Germany. Other officials at the Nineteenth Party Congress and the Soviet press expressed this idea. At the Congress Nikolai Bulganin said:

The contradictions and internal difficulties among members of the North Atlantic bloc hinder them from carrying out their aggressive plans. But, even more, it is our mighty camp of peace and democracy that prevents them from carrying out their plans.¹⁶

In September 1952, a Russian journal reported opposition to the "criminal intentions" of the United States' ruling circles by Scandinavians and predicted this opposition would spread throughout Western Europe.¹⁷ In June 1953, Pravda reported French opposition to EDC and suggested that the treaty would not be approved.¹⁸ With the reelection of the Adenauer government in September, Pravda acknowledged the limited success of American policy but stated that the French were having second thoughts about the creation of a West German Army.¹⁹ Until the Paris Agreements in 1954, the Soviet leadership believed German rearmament could be prevented by emphasizing the problems within the Atlantic Alliance.

Since the start of the Korean War, Soviet diplomacy had attempted to contain the conflict and reduce international tensions.²⁰ The rapid advance into North Korea after the Inchon landings caused the Soviets to fear military solutions in other parts of the world and accordingly, they reacted by preparing to defend themselves. After the Chinese intervention and the stabilization of the military situation in Korea, the

Soviet Union gave an open sign of interest in a cease-fire.²¹ Thus the foreign policy which Stalin proclaimed at the Nineteenth Party Congress evolved from the Soviet perception in mid-1951 that the war in Korea would end in a stalemate. Marshal Shulman has characterized this policy as a "selective application of peaceful coexistence . . . , intended to encourage the relaxation and fragmentation of the Western alliance."²²

To point out the contradictions and increase the problems of the Atlantic Alliance, Soviet policy makers held out the prospect of a neutral and unified Germany. They made their most serious such proposal in March 1952, when West German rearmament became a real possibility.²³ The German Democratic Republic, which was the Soviet response to the creation of the Federal Republic, had recognized the Oder-Neisse line as the German eastern frontier. The critical question of the German-Polish boundary would not have been negotiable in a discussion of German reunification and neutrality. The leadership of the United States viewed this proposal as simply a means to defeat the EDC treaty and hence delay the rearmament of West Germany.²⁴ Since American policy makers gave no serious consideration to the proposal, one can only speculate on Soviet sincerity. One indication of the Soviets' inclination is their response to the defeat of the EDC treaty by the French National Assembly in September 1954. They made no special effort to gain acceptance of a unified and neutral Germany. Alfred Grosser has suggested that this was the one time

when such a proposal would have had the best chance of success.²⁵ It appears that while the Soviets were willing to negotiate and to make concessions to keep Germany disarmed, they believed that internal problems in NATO would prevent rearmament. Thus the view that proposals for a unified and neutral Germany were made to cause dissension in the Western alliance probably is correct. It seems that for the Soviets a reunified Germany was only a distant possibility. It is more probable that the Soviets viewed the permanent division of Germany as an acceptable solution to the German question.²⁶

The Paris Agreements of October 1954 and their subsequent approval by all parties was a defeat for Soviet foreign policy. The accession of West Germany to NATO and the revival of the German Army were conditions which the Soviets had hoped to prevent. The Soviet press denounced the agreements and, as had been the case with EDC, counseled the European governments to reject the American proposals. A Pravda article in December 1954 suggested that peace in Europe could only be insured if the USSR and France sustained their friendship, a condition that required the rejection of the Paris Agreements.²⁷ But the French National Assembly ratified the agreements late in December; and the quick change from rejection of EDC in September to approval of West German membership in NATO in December left the Soviets perplexed.

Russia's immediate response to the Paris Agreements

was to call for an all-European security conference.²⁸

After the United States ignored the Soviet request and the French ratified the accession of West Germany to NATO, representatives of the Soviet Bloc countries met in Warsaw and negotiated the Warsaw Pact. Ostensibly, this alliance was the Soviet response to West German rearmament and to a certain extent this was true. The Warsaw Pact tended to strengthen Soviet western defenses even though bilateral agreements already existed between the USSR and her satellites. It provided legal justification for keeping units of the Red Army deployed in East Europe, and it furnished the Soviets with an alliance with which to counter NATO at the negotiating table. In its conception it was Moscow's attempt to block the rearming of West Germany.²⁹ But during the Pact's gestation period, the Soviet world view was changing. The "hardliner," Foreign Minister Molotov spoke with authority when the Pact was first proposed in the fall of 1954. He called for "practical measures" to safeguard socialist security.³⁰ But when the alliance was signed at Warsaw the following May, Molotov's authority in Soviet foreign policy had been drastically downgraded and it was Bulganin who spoke for the Moscow Government.³¹ Molotov's next assignment was Outer Mongolia. A new Soviet elite had established itself in Moscow under the leadership of Khrushchev and Bulganin.

Statements by Soviet officials at the Twentieth Party Congress reflected their new perspective. Rather

than a bi-polar world of the Stalin era, the new elite in Russia saw the significance of the "third world" countries. The struggle between socialism and capitalism was to take place in these areas. At the Twentieth Party Congress Khrushchev said:

As a result, a vast "peace zone", including both socialist and non-socialist peace-loving states in Europe and Asia, has emerged in the world arena. This zone embraces tremendous expanses of the globe, inhabited by nearly 1,500,000,000 people - that is, the majority of the population of our planet.³²

In the same speech, Khrushchev called for improved relations with the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany.³³ Soviet Russia was now prepared to compete on a world wide basis with the capitalistic West. As to the German question, Khrushchev made this proposal:

Establishment of a collective security system in Europe, renunciation of the Paris Agreements, rapprochement and establishment of cooperation between the two German states - this is the right way to settle the German question.³⁴

The economic recovery of the Soviet Union and of East Europe along with the consolidation of the Soviet position with the Warsaw Pact had counted the significance of West German rearmament. But most important in reducing the significance of the West German Army was the advance in technology. Marshal Zhukov, speaking to the Twentieth Party Congress, said:

In building up the Soviet armed forces, we proceed from the fact that the means and forms of a new war will be very different from past wars. A future war, should it be unleashed, will be characterized by the massive weapons and various means of mass destruction such as atomic, thermonuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons.³⁵

Thus by 1956, the struggle for the third world countries and the Soviet perception of how the next war would be fought had reduced the significance of twelve West German divisions in NATO.

The new Soviet elite viewed the Warsaw Pact as an instrument of detente rather than a vehicle of military preparedness which had been its original purpose. This new perspective evolved internally in the Soviet Union for reasons that were unrelated to West German rearmament. Perhaps the most profound reason was that which resulted from changes in military technology.³⁶ The Warsaw Pact served the Soviet Union as an instrument of foreign policy primarily in East Europe and its purpose was much broader than merely opposition to West German rearmament. This alteration in the purpose of their alliance reflected the Soviets' new perspective of international politics. It is ironic that when the United States was finally successful in rearming West Germany, the Soviet policy became one of detente.

NOTES

CHAPTER IV - SOVIET RUUSIA'S REACTION TO WEST GERMAN REARMAMENT

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³George F. Kennan, Memoirs 1950-1963, Vol. II (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1972), p. 330.

⁴Marshal D. Shulman, Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 27 and 165.

⁵Adam B. Ulam, "Revisionism and the Futility of the Question," The Origins of the Cold War, ed. Thomas G. Paterson (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Co., 1970), p. 117.

⁶Charles E. Bohlen, Witness to History (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1973), p. 386.

⁷Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1968), p. 455.

⁸Ibid., p. 447.

⁹Shulman, Stalin's Foreign Policy, p. 29.

¹⁰Current Digest of the Soviet Press, I, No. 4 (Feb. 22, 1949), p. 6.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 23-24.

¹²Ibid., I, No. 12 (Apr. 19, 1949), p. 37.

¹³Ibid., I, No. 7 (Mar. 15, 1949), p. 33.

¹⁴Ibid., I, Nos. 13 and 27 (Apr. 26 and Aug. 2, 1949), p. 34 and p. 19.

¹⁵ Joseph Stalin, Keynote Address to the Nineteenth Party Congress, Current Soviet Policies (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1953), p. 7.

¹⁶ N.A. Bulganin, Speech at the Nineteenth Party Congress, Current Soviet Policies, p. 187.

¹⁷ Current Digest, IV, No. 39 (Nov. 8, 1952), p. 12.

¹⁸ Ibid., V, No. 23 (Jul. 18, 1953), p. 16.

¹⁹ Ibid., V, No. 37 (Oct. 24, 1953), p. 9.

²⁰ Shulman, Stalin's Foreign Policy, p. 157.

²¹ Ibid., p. 174.

²² Ibid., p. 176.

²³ Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, p. 535.

²⁴ Dean Acheson gives his opinion of Russian attempts to negotiate in Sketches from Life (London: Hamish Hamilton: 1961), p. 103.

²⁵ Alfred Grosser, Germany in Our Time, p. 319.

²⁶ Shulman, Stalin's Foreign Policy, p. 114.

²⁷ Current Digest, VI, No. 52 (Feb. 9, 1955), p. 29.

²⁸ Robin A. Remington, The Warsaw Pact (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1971), p. 10.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 27.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 12.

³¹ Ibid., p. 13.

³² Nikita Khrushchev, Report to the Twentieth Party Congress (Feb. 1956), Current Soviet Policies II (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), p. 33.

³³ Ibid., p. 38.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 35.

³⁵ Marshal G.K. Zhukov, Speech to the Twentieth Party Congress (Feb. 1956), Current Soviet Policies II (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), p. 104.

³⁶ Shulman, Stalin's Foreign Policy, p. 269.

EPILOGUE

This appraisal of the attitudes of the major powers toward West German rearmament shows that it was only the United States who viewed it as a major policy objective. West German rearmament was needed to support a defense policy with which the United States would depend on allies to provide the preponderance of the ground combat forces while America contributed the productive capacity of her industry. Rearmament began to evolve as a policy objective of the United States when the American leadership came to view the Cold War as primarily a military confrontation. This became evident in 1949 when the Russians exploded a nuclear weapon and United States' policy makers reexamined the military balance in light of this Soviet technical advance. The North Korean attack confirmed the conviction that the Cold War was a military confrontation. Accordingly, America asked the European allies to accept West Germany into the defense coalition.

America's European allies were not enthusiastic over the prospects of a West German Army. They resented American efforts to dictate policy and did not agree with the conclusion of United States' policy makers concerning the likelihood of a Soviet attack. While military considerations dominated American Cold War policy, the French and the British were more concerned with economic and

political questions. In the final analysis, it was economic pressure from the United States that caused the Europeans to accept a rearmed West Germany.

West Germany seems to have gained the most from the American request for her to rearm. With her contribution to West European defense, the Federal Republic took the final step to full sovereignty. Adenauer's recognition of the real significance of rearmament seems to sustain the evaluation of those who judge him as one of the all time great German statesmen.

Remilitarization of West Germany prevented the possibility of German reunification. Although it has been suggested that the division of Germany could well be the cause of another war, this possibility seems to have been exaggerated. The future will determine if the division of Germany was the solution to the "German problem" which has troubled statesmen for so long.

Although West German rearmament was directed against the Soviet Union, it seems to have affected that nation least of all. By the time rearmament had actually begun, the Soviets no longer viewed the Germans as a threat to their security. In one sense, it assisted them in consolidating their position in East Europe.

Perhaps the most significant aspect of West German rearmament is its demonstration of the tenacity of American policy. Having determined in the late 1940s that West Germany must eventually be rearmed, United States' policy

makers vigorously pursued this goal for over five years until it was attained. In the process, the goal was never questioned, only the ways to accomplish it were reevaluated. By 1949, The American policy makers had determined that West Germany should be included in the anti-Soviet military coalition. Her manpower, geographic location, and industrial resources were necessary to complement America's military policy which was a continuation of the successful World War II strategy. To have questioned the necessity of rearming Germany would be a rejection of the "arsenal" concept for national security. Otherwise, the only way to question the validity of West German rearmament was to question the perception of the Cold War as a military confrontation. This is the basis of Kennan's criticism. But given the perception of the Cold War as a military confrontation, the rearmament of West Germany was a valid policy. The question remains concerning the degree to which military requirements should determine national policy.

CHRONOLOGY

SIGNIFICANT DATES RELATIVE TO WEST GERMAN REARMAMENT

1945

May 7:
German Army surrenders to Allies at Reims.

July 17:
Potsdam Conference opens.

1946

January 20:
de Gaulle gives up leadership of France.

March 5:
Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech.

July-October:
Paris Peace Conference.

1947

March 4:
Anglo-French Treaty of Dunkirk signed.

June 5:
Marshall Plan launched.

1948

February 25:
Communist coup in Czechoslovakia.

March 17:
Brussels Pact signed.

June 18:
Currency reform in western zones of Germany carried out
over Soviet objections.

June 20:
Berlin Blockade begins.

1949

April 4:
North Atlantic Treaty signed.

1949 (cont.)

April 8:
Three Western Powers agree on German Occupation Statute.

May 11:
Berlin Blockade is lifted.

May 23:
Federal Republic of Germany comes into existence.

August:
General elections held in the Federal Republic of Germany.

September:
An atomic explosion is reported to have taken place in the Soviet Union.

October 7:
German Democratic Republic established.

1950

June 25:
Korean War begins.

September 12:
United States opens question of West German rearmament.

October 26:
Premier Pleven recommends creation of EDC.

1951

October 7:
Conservative Party returns to power in England.

1952

March 10:
Soviet Union proposes neutralization of Germany.

May 27:
EDC treaty negotiated.

August 20:
Kurt Schumacher dies.

1953

March 5:
Stalin dies.

September 6:
Adenauer wins sweeping victory in General Elections.

December 4-7:
Bermuda summit meeting.

1954

January 25 - February 18:
Berlin Four-Power Conference on Germany.

August 30:
French National Assembly rejects EDC treaty.

September 28:
Nine Power London Conference.

October 20-23:
Paris Agreements negotiated.

December 30:
French National Assembly ratifies the Paris Agreements.

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THE MAJOR POWERS AND GERMAN REARMAMENT
1950 to 1954:
AN APPRAISAL OF THEIR ATTITUDES

by

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AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S REPORT

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ABSTRACT

The importance of the status of Germany in American-Soviet relations following World War II cannot be over-emphasized. The early failure of the two great powers to reach agreement about Germany perpetuated the great power confrontation in central Europe. Accordingly, a study of the various post World War II policies followed by the major powers toward Germany is necessary to understand the origins of the Cold War.

One of the more crucial decisions made by United States' policy makers after World War II was the one to rearm West Germany. American perception of the Cold War as primarily a military confrontation led to this decision. This report examines West German rearmament and answers the questions: Why did American policy makers want Germany rearmed? What factors influenced the leadership of France and Great Britain to agree to rearmament? What were the political ramifications of this policy in West Germany? and What was the reaction in the Soviet Union? The United States government made West German rearmament a major policy objective from 1950 when the question became an issue for public debate until 1954 when a concrete program was adopted. An understanding of this aspect of American Cold War policy provides an insight into the world view held by American statesmen at the time and is useful in explaining the attitudes of the allies and the Soviet Union.

The first chapter presents the thesis that, since the beginning of World War II, the United States has perceived her role in coalition warfare as that of contributing industrial strength and technical know-how while depending on allies to provide the ground combat forces. This strategic concept is traced from its origins after World War I, through World War II, to the point in the Cold War when American leadership perceived the Soviet threat to be primarily overt military oppression, Central Europe being the most sought after goal of such aggression. This evaluation of the threat caused military considerations to come to the forefront, and American statesmen to look to allies in Europe for ground forces.

Chapter two addresses the factors which influenced the leadership in France and Great Britain to concur with a rearmed Germany. In spite of the traditional fear of a strong and unified Germany, France acquiesced to American demands because of dependence on economic and financial assistance. This dependence was intensified by involvement in Indochina. Britain's dependence on the United States for financial assistance as well as the recognition of West Germany as a world trade competitor weighed upon British support for German armament.

The third chapter discusses the political ramifications of rearmament in the Federal Republic of Germany. When United States policy made its volte face and called the Germans to arms, public opposition in the Federal Republic came as somewhat of a surprise. The Social Democratic Party, the

leading opposition party, faced a dilemma. On one hand the party was strongly anti-communist and nationalistic, while on the other hand it opposed close ties with the capitalistic west and the revival of militarism.

Chapter four examines Soviet attitudes toward a rearmed West Germany based upon an evaluation of selections from the Soviet press and Soviet Union Communist Party documents. The theme is that the Soviets were consistent in their opposition to a rearmed West Germany and were in the position of reacting to American initiatives.