Civil-military relations, coup-proofing, and militaries in the Arab Spring

by

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M.A., University of Central Missouri, 2000

AN ABSTRACT OF A DISSERTATION

submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

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Abstract

In late 2010 and early 2011, some Arab countries witnessed mass protests that led to different outcomes. These protests are considered a turning point in the contemporary history of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The protests were a natural outcome of the social, political, and economic conditions that the Arab population had been enduring under the totalitarian regimes who could not understand and deal with the changing circumstances in their countries. The goals of the protests were to improve the living conditions of the population and empower the youth, women, and the marginalized. The term coined to describe these protests was the "Arab Spring" revolutions.

Often in history, when protesters have threatened a regime, political leaders have tried to suppress them by using force. Before the Arab Spring, most literature on civil-military relations in the MENA region assumed that the Arab armies represented homogeneous entities whose interests aligned with the interests of the leaders of the states. Some scholars went further to attribute the stability of authoritarian regimes for long periods in the Middle East to the support of these security services.

This study is a systematic examination of the civil-military relations in the Arab World during the time of change. It argues that historical evolution of civil-military relations during state-formation periods and the formation of armed forces along ethnic, religious, and tribal lines in the Arab majority countries are significantly related to the outcomes of uprisings. My hypothesis is that Arab militaries' actions during the uprisings and the resulting outcomes, whether civil war, democratization, or authoritarianism were products of decades of different and dissimilar ways that the civil-military relations and the states developed in those countries. Social

and ethnic configuration of the armed forces also played an important role in shaping the protest outcomes.

The objective of this study is to explain the different responses and reactions of the armed forces to the popular uprisings in those Arab countries. I explain why the behavior of each country's military differed during the Arab Spring revolutions in Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Tunisia, and Syria using comparative case study method. I use these cases to both develop a theory about different outcomes of the uprisings and test the implications of this theory. For robustness check, I apply my theoretical framework to the new wave of the uprisings unfolding in Algeria, Sudan, Lebanon, and Iraq. By and large, the evidence supports my explanation about the roles of historical development of civil-military relations and social composition of armed forces in shaping the outcomes of mass protests.

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Dedication

To Dale Herspring: Scholar, Mentor, and Inspirer.

Without You being there for me always, this could've not been done.

Thank you from the bottom of my Heart.

Preface

Arab Militaries' Response to the Wave of Revolutionary Protests

The Arab region has witnessed widespread popular protests since late 2010. The protests led to the overthrow of some authoritarian regimes, as happened in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen, and rocked the pillars of other regimes that did not fall, as happened in Syria. Those events later became known as the Arab Spring. These protests began in Tunisia, and then moved to Egypt where they become immensely influential in the uprisings in other Arab-majority countries.

As is the case in most countries witnessing widespread popular protests that intend to topple the government or even the entire regime, political leaders try to suppress demonstrators by relying on the support of armed forces. This action usually comes after other type of security forces have retreated in front of the demonstrators' resilience. The political survival of the rulers depends on answering this question: "Will the military obey the orders to confront the demonstrators and shoot or not?" According to the literature on civil-military relations, the armed forces' support for the revolution, or at least its neutrality, is a necessary condition for the success of the protesters aiming to topple the political leadership of the country (Jensen 2008; Kårtveit and Jumbert 2014). This study tries to track the reactions of the Arab militaries toward the popular protests, focusing on the states of Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Yemen, and Libya. The time span of this study extends from the beginning of 2011 until present time.

Most literature on civil-military relations in the Arab world and the Middle East assumed, before the outbreak of the Arab Uprisings, that the Arab armies represented homogeneous entities and similar repressive apparatuses, whose interests aligned with the interests of the leaders of the states. Many assumed that the position of the security services and the militaries in

these countries would be to stand by the political leaders in the event of political crises threatening the survival of the ruling regimes. Some scholars went further to attribute the stability of authoritarian regimes for long periods in the Middle East to the support of these security services (Bellin 2004: 144-147). The Arab Spring provided a significant test of the positions of the security services especially the armies vis-à-vis the regime and the public. The reactions of the militaries in some of the Arab countries varied despite the similar political context. In Tunisia and Egypt, the army sided with the demonstrators to topple the dictators. In Yemen and Libya, the army split into two parts and the conflict was prolonged. In Syria, the army sided with the political regime and suppressed the demonstrators by force; this led to the start of a phase of armed conflict that dominated all parts of the country until now.

The Arab Spring uprisings provided a good opportunity for all Arab leaders to review the civil-military relations in their societies. In this, the regimes scrutinized these relations in a way that acknowledged the unique patterns in the political and historical developments in each country, the characteristics of armed forces and in ultimately their national interests. To address this important point, this study examines how the role of the Arab armies evolved, in one way or another, into the political role that they played before the 1970s.

The analysis makes a specific policy recommendation. Arab countries should start professional programs aimed at reviewing their civil-military relations. These programs should deal with the military as a national institution represented by all segments of society. The programs should help the armed forces achieve a degree of professional independence, while at the same time submitting to the institutions of civil governance. Just as the June 1967 defeat in the Arab-Israeli War constituted a starting point for some Arab countries to modernize their armed forces, the events of the Arab Spring uprisings presents a historical opportunity for all

Arab countries to carry out a review of the degree of professionalism of their armies. This review is not a matter of luxury; it directly affects the security and stability of the countries. The lessons of the Arab Spring show that the high degree of politicization of armed forces may lead to disintegration and collapse of states.

This review requires that all Arab countries reform their security institutions. In this review, the Arab countries will need to determine where their militaries are located on the scale of professionalism, including the concepts of professional independence and transparency, reliance on the criteria of merit, and not being politicized. At the same time, the review should examine how the military reacts to the institutions of civil governance and what is stipulated in the constitution and the law. It is a matter that requires time and strong political will. The reforming of the Arab militaries will not be achieved in the short term. The process of comprehensive reform is also linked to official frameworks and consensus. Changing official frameworks is the easy part of any reform process. Consensus is not an easy matter to achieve. It takes an open community dialogue that has credibility and transparency, in which citizens participate in the first place. Media institutions, civil society institutions, and state leaders change the culture. If a real political will does not exist, it may lead to the faltering of the reform process and even its reversal.

The choice of the Egyptian and the Tunisian militaries not to support the political system had a major impact in protecting those two countries maintaining stability and avoiding the Libyan, Yemeni or Syrian scenarios. However, reviewing most of the literature that dealt with the military's role in the revolution, we see that no one knows exactly what happened before President Mubarak's decision to step down. This makes any analysis in this situation extremely difficult for researchers (Frisch 2013 b: 180-204).

Most of the literature on civil-military relations in the Middle East has faced real deficiencies in its analysis regarding the daily interactions of the armed forces with civilians. Analysis of these interactions is absolutely necessary to examine the responses and manners of militaries in confronting the ruling political regimes. This aspect has not received enough attention from scholars. This study also attempts to fill this gap and recommends the matter should be rectified after the Arab Spring to provide a more accurate analysis of the Arab political and security environments and their interactions.

Chapter 1 - Introduction

1. Arab Uprisings: Now and Then

Why study the Arab Uprisings of 2010-2011? At the end of 2018, the scene of youth flocking to the streets in several Arab-majority countries resembled the scenes in 2010, with banners reading, "the people want to topple the regime." The youth flooded the streets from Algiers to Khartoum, then Baghdad and Beirut. These moments and more distinct features mimicked the first wave of Arab Spring uprisings that started in Tunisia in 2010. The original Arab Spring has not yet reached its last breath, as some scholars claim (Frisch 2013a: 177), but it has only entered an inertia period, particularly due to brutal events in Syria, Libya, and Yemen. The roots of a second wave of mass demonstrations go back to the first wave of Arab uprisings in the year 2011. Therefore, it is important to study different dimensions of these extraordinary events. An important but generally neglected factor in the scholarship on Arab uprisings is the role of military.

The objective of this study is to explain the causes and consequences of different responses of the armed forces to the popular uprisings in Arab-majority countries. Stated another way, the main research question that the study tries to answer is this: Why did behavior of each country's military officers differ during revolutionary protests in different countries? The fact that a significant variation existed in the reactions of the armed forces indicate that there is a need to explain those different responses. To explain this variation, this study focuses on the cases of Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Yemen, and Libya. To that end, the analysis utilizes two explanatory mechanisms in each case. First, the study examines the composition, development, and conduct of civil-military relations in each country. Within this explanatory mechanism, I focus on the role of military in state-building trajectories and ethnic composition of the society as

reflected in the military. Second, the analysis looks at the coup-proofing mechanism adopted by each regime as an intervening variable mediating the effects of state-building trajectories and ethnic composition of the military. This framework is used to explain the different reactions of Arab militaries during, and after the uprisings and to understand how different outcomes occurred the way they did in different countries.

Specifically, this research is a systematic examination of the civil-military relations in the Arab World during the time of social change. The analysis utilizes comparative case study approach. This research is built on a simple postulate: the formation of civil-military relations in Arab countries that witnessed uprisings is fundamentally connected to the historical development of these relations in the stages that preceded the change. This means that Arab militaries' actions, as we saw it on the ground, result from decades of different and dissimilar ways of developing civil-military relations in the cases under investigation. The cases include Tunisia, Egypt (most similar systems) where the outcomes of the uprisings were democracy and authoritarianism respectively; and Syria, Yemen, and Libya (most different systems) where the outcome of the uprisings was civil war. The analysis explains the role of different factors related to the military including state-building trajectories, ethnic structure of the military, and mediating role of the coup-proofing mechanisms in leading to these different outcomes.

Before introducing the main argument and analyzing different military reactions during the Arab uprisings, we must discuss some basic concepts that characterize Arab militaries and societies. First, there is no armed force isolated from politics. The military institution deals daily with matters of war and defense, and other issues related to national security, ranging from purely military affairs to issues related to political, economic, and social stability in the state. This situation applies to democratic and non-democratic countries. Accordingly, all cases of

civil-military relations in the Arab world and the Middle East region include a prominent role for militaries in the political process. In addition, programs designed to enhance military professionalism in the Arab context did not translate, in practice, to the removal of the armed forces from the political field. Instead, these programs strengthened the cohesion of the institution, due to its limitations in technical, military, and other logistical aspects.

Second, differences in the response of the military in each of the cases under investigation were a result of the interaction of many factors. Some of prominent factors include the nature of the relationship between the armed forces and the political regime, the characters of the popular uprisings, the nature of the political system, and the external environments.

Third, most Arab political regimes have benefited the armed forces and its members in different ways. Some regimes provided the military with a high level of armament. Some have spent a high percentage of GDP on defense. Some regimes provided the military with high personal benefits and allowed some economic activities to be undertaken by the armed forces to ensure its continued loyalty to the regime and to compensate for the decline in the military's political influence. Despite this logistical advantage, the response of the military varied in different countries. Therefore, it can be said that sometimes other factors may have had a greater weight in the armed forces' calculations during the popular uprisings.

The recent developments in Algeria and Sudan, which are still ongoing, have raised questions about whether we are witnessing a new wave of the Arab uprisings reminiscent of the events of 2011 in the Arab world. The protests in Sudan and Algeria have resulted in the removal of two chronic leaders, which reminded us of some of the events of the spring of 2011. These developments bring about important questions concerning the future of democracy in Arab societies. What are the similarities and differences between the old and new wave of the

protests? Will the second wave lead to democratization? Will the countries experiencing new waves of protests fall back to chaos, authoritarianism, and conflict? How did the role of military change in this second wave? To answer this second group of questions, this study examines the waves of protests that started in late 2010 and the military action toward them. The point of understanding the military conduct then is so essential to draw lessons about the armed forces' stand in the old and new waves of protests. To that end, this study examines the trajectories of civil-military relations in the context of Arab uprisings and its aftermath. In the next two sections, I provide a conceptual overview of the term military and structure of civil military relations. In the last section of this chapter, I introduce the theoretical framework and summarize the road map for the dissertation.

2. What is Military and How to Study It?

Many scholars and activists in the Arab world call for military disengagement from politics. However, this is unrealistic, since it is close to impossible to prevent armed forces from participating in political life. Even when they renounce engaging in politics, officers will not be far from politics, or they will participate in politics in non-conventional ways. This behavior is predicted by the theories of civil-military relations. As one of the leading theorists in the field of civil-military studies, Samuel Finer states, "the military as an independent political force has intervened in the politics of many countries in the past, and are doing so today; that their intervention is usually politically decisive," (Finer 1969: 3). This means the presence of the military in the political field is unavoidable in many circumstances. The problem is not isolation of military men from politics. The issue is how to organize and regulate military participation to make it beneficial and to put it in the service of democracy. This focus makes the discussion

about the role of the military fundamentally complex. It becomes so fundamental when it comes to talking about Arab militaries.

Issues related to the military in the Arab world are kept secretive for strategic and security reasons sometimes, and often, for protecting the ruling regimes. Therefore, using an objective approach for the analysis is challenging, since the researchers will depend on whatever the military establishment makes available to them. Usually, this is a very small amount of information, and they provide it in a way to show the "Great Role" of the military and not for the benefit of the scientific research. Furthermore, the researchers usually depend on Western-oriented literature that is derived from intelligence resources, enhancing the view that military issues are one of the dangerous taboos in Arab societies (Brooks 1998: 13-18; Bishara 2017 a: 2-4).

Several strategic and institutional features define the civil-military relations in the Arab World. Generally, the discussion about these relations concern the struggle for power, where the military possesses the power of arms, organization, and unity of decisions. This organization transgresses the military establishment to connect it to local, regional, and international networks, making the military system more complicated than what it looks (Bruneau 2006: 6). In addition, the military possesses the power of information and communication. It is one of the main characteristics of modern militaries that the military intelligence bears the responsibility of monitoring the internal security of the armed forces, the state, and the external security issues. The military can exchange information quickly, among different levels of the hierarchal bureaucratic system, in a way that ensures the speed and effectiveness of the action of the different military units. The stake here depends on the ability to preserve the solid and rigorous bureaucratic system, as well as developing the information gathering and distribution network in

a fast and smooth way. That network ensures a high propagation of information among armed forces units and ranks, giving the military a comfortable advantage relative to all other political and social organizations. This information flow preserves the terms of precedence and surprise, which are so important in the military doctrine.

The three elements listed above-- the arms, organization, and information-- solidify the brotherhood solidarity among military men. Brotherhood in arms is higher and stronger than any other type of solidarity, and sometimes it surpasses family ties. It is assumed that members of armed forces will protect each other, and this creates a special kind of bond among the military members. The bond becomes binding to all and becomes a characteristic of the military organization that punishes anyone who does not respect that bond.

The military bureaucratic organization of armies suggests the existence of a mechanical solidarity, as stated by Durkheim (Gofman 2014: 45-69). The implicit relations that brings the military men together indicates the existence of 'organic' solidarity among the components of different military units. This means that the classification of solidarity put forth by Durkheim is not beneficial in the military case, or it needs addition of another type of solidarity that combines the other two types, a special type of solidarity that combines the mechanical and organic solidarities. Mechanical solidarity is determined organizationally, legally and bureaucratically, and it imposes the obedience of it through fines and regulations (Thijssen 2012: 455-458). At the same time, this solidarity becomes an organic solidarity built on the terms of honesty, integrity, and sharing the burden and hopes of bearing arms. As Janowitz (1957: 14) states, "the military profession emphasized honor as a unifying ideology, and intra-service marriage patterns have been a power device for assimilating newcomers into the military establishment".

The military, in essence, is an armed force and specialized in its field of operation, whether land forces, naval forces, special forces, or air forces. Each force works to provide its members with all the equipment required to ensure the highest field effectiveness, which political and civil organizations lack. It is not enough for the armed forces to have the military kit and ammunition, but it also needs plentiful training on arms in its possession, according to strategies of the high command; continuous preparedness is the base rule for any military force.

Hierarchal organization also represents an important characteristic in modern militaries. The armed forces are organized based on a hierarchical and rigid organizational structure, with wide bases and single specific apexes. According to Janowitz (1957: 15), "…that promotion is in good measure linked to compliance with existing procedures and existing goals of the organization," All of that makes obedience and discipline a fundamental military duty from the bottom to the top, where the emphasis is placed on the duties performed by the individuals, not their personalities.

These characteristics give the military the rule of power in all its possible meanings. The militaries are established to achieve specific goals. One of them may be the support of civilian authorities; however, the main goal continues to be the fighting and winning of wars. The specific features of the military are "centralized command, hierarchy, discipline, intercommunications, and *esprit de corps* and corresponding isolation and self-sufficiency," (Finer 1969: 6). Such characteristics make the armed forces a different entity from other organizations in society.

Modern militaries are characterized by central command, where all decisions are made by the commander-in-chief, even if the military command depends on delegation of its authority to subordinate or operational units. In the end, all directions are taken with the permission of the

high command. When we see a coalescence of central command and other characteristics, we see a strong and solid system in comparison to the civilian political community. The civilian community lacks the power of arms; is characterized by pluralism of organizations; and has complex, weak, and uncertain information. In addition, the civilian community displays weak solidarity among its components. Politics is based on relativism of all its aspects, and on competitiveness and mistrust among the essential actors, instead of the military brotherly solidarity. These differences are the root of the problematic issues in the relationship between military and civilian entities. The civilian does not have power, except the power of "legitimacy", and it is trying to dominate over the military, who has the "rule of power."

While states can tackle different dimensions of civil-military relations, an important matter of inquiry may be how to ensure military protection for the civilians, without the military crossing the "red" line of civilian rights, turning the protection into control and dominance outside the legal and constituted frames that regulate the actions of the state. The strategic power play between the military and the civilians have occupied the political scientists' minds since Ancient Greece as exemplified in Plato's words: 'who guards the guardians' (Rukavishnikov and Pugh 2006: 135).

The division of authority between the "rule of power" and the "rule of legitimacy" is an eternal problem associated with the rise of the concepts of the state and its political and security institutions. If the duty of the guard is to protect the state, then the duty of the state is to search for ways and mechanisms that enable it to protect and control the guard. These mechanisms may be legal or constitutional, as it is in democratic states. It could also be strategies and tactical arrangements, outside the rule of law, that allow the ruling political elites to ensure the loyalty of the military and to control it.

In this discussion, we should look at the civil-military relations as bidirectional. The concept of "military dominance" is used interchangeably with the concept of "political dominance." The term "civilian" refers to the superiority of the civilian institutions that are based on popular legitimacy, and its precedence, when it comes to defense and security decisions. The onus of keeping control of the use of violence, in a rigorous manner, in the hand of legitimate civilian authorities remains the essential point (Rukavishnikov and Pugh 2006: 136).

The line is extremely thin between military dictatorship and civilian authoritarianism. The absence of democratic mechanisms and transparency in the running of the state and the military affairs will lead the state, inevitably, to deviate away from democracy toward military dictatorship or civilian authoritarianism. Therefore, the civilians hold a huge and dangerous responsibility, particularly when the military gives up its authority and ambition and obey the civilian rule. Within the argument about civilian control of the armed forces comes the level of transparency in the field of armaments and military expenditure as well the degree of informing the citizens regarding those issues (Rukavishnikov and Pugh 2006: 138).

There are other reasons explaining why civil-military relations are considered complex and difficult to study. They contain a lot of contradictions and paradoxical issues, or, as Peter Feaver (1999: 214) states, "the civil-military problematique is a simple paradox: the very institution created to protect the polity [i.e. the military] is given sufficient power to become a threat to the polity." The militaries that were created and given the monopolistic right to use violence for protecting the state, whether from external or internal threats, can turn dangerous. Because of misuse of this right, they can threaten the security of the civil and political communities and their stability. The mere existence of this feeling toward the military as a source of danger and insecurity will limit the freedom of the state and its various institutions.

The spread of mistrust between the military and the civilian will lead to some actions and reactions that frame their relationship and determine the position of each other and their strategies. This issue will control any positive or negative development in civil-military relations.

In this research, I will investigate the circumstances and the manifestations that determined the reactions of Arab militaries in dealing with uprisings. I will develop an explanatory framework that enables me to dismantle the relationship between the civilian and the military to understand the reasons for the disparities in the reactions of Arab militaries. I will start with a theoretical introduction trying to explain the standards used to comprehend civil-military relations. Then, I will review the literature research that attempted to dissect the civil-military relations and established classifications that help understand those relations around the world. The objective is to discuss those theories and point to their shortcomings in explaining the cases of Arab militaries. I will develop an explanatory framework to study the Arab militaries in the second part of this research. The third part will be designated to test that explanatory framework on Arab militaries in the Arab spring countries: Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Yemen, and Libya. The final part of the research contains conclusions about the feasibility of the explanatory framework to understand the relationship between the military and civilian authority.

3. Conceptualizing Civil-Military Relations

The relation between the military and politics, or the military and polity, represents a classic field of research, deriving its continued relevance from the perpetual relationship between the military and civilian rulers. That is because the armed forces play an important role in the political and social life of a society (Hashim 2011: 115). From early civilizations to today, the military has been an essential actor in the political and social arrangements that organize the state, especially in cases of crises. These crises may range from the establishment of the polity to

the struggle of two distinct parts of the polity to ascend to power, monopolize it, or preserve it. Consequently, scholars have and will continue to study civil-military relations. As civil-military relations studies show its intertwined connection with different type of political regimes, they point clearly to different models of civilian control of the military in democratic and authoritarian regimes (Kartveit and Jumbert 2014: 1).

Whether the military gets involved in politics on the side of the ruling regime or the opposition, or stays neutral, especially in times of transition, it will be an essential actor in setting the power equation between the government and the opposition. This study assumes that civil-military relations are primarily shaped by the principle of loyalty to the ruling regime. In this scenario, the military and security forces have a monopoly on using violence to protect the citizens. Armed forces are characterized by their affiliation to the state and their readiness to use arms and sacrifice their lives in that cause. In other words, what makes them unique among armed groups is their service to the state (Gaub 2014: 13). I argue that the network that connects the military and civilians will be shaped by the core principle of loyalty.

The building of the civil-military relationship on the loyalty principle necessitates that we provide clear definitions of civil-military relations in a given setting. The understanding of civil-military relations and its components will help us to develop a system of analysis for a quantitative and qualitative understanding of the concept of loyalty. I use the definition of civil-military relations established by Baev and Micewski (2005): "…a concept encompassing all aspects of the relations between armed services, society, and state of which they are part. A comprehensive idea of civil-military relations in the sense of understanding all components of political and social relations between the military, state, and society," (Baev and Micewski 2005: 8-9).

In this definition, the civil-military relations indicate the boundaries between the power of military and civilian interests, which are boundaries controlled by the status and duties authorized to the military and its soldiers and officers. Those status and duties, in turn, are determined by the history of the relationship between the development of the armed forces within the paths of state building.

Rahbek-Clemmensen [et.al] (2012: 673) suggest four differences between the military and civilians, that any scholar needs to consider when studying civil-military relations. These differences include cultural, demographic, political, and institutional differences. According to this framework, the differences between the two institutions is cultural because of the difference in values that the military and civilians believe. It is demographic because the differences in the characteristics of the individuals that constitute the political community and the military. The military is more harmonious because of the specific task of the military; the social composition of the civilian polity is less harmonious and more complex. The third difference is the political preferences of the military and the civilians. The preferences of the military are restricted in the preservation of the country's stability; such preferences are more rational. The civilian preferences are more complex, more ambitious and less rational. Finally, the military is different from the political entity institutionally. The military institution is different than the civilian institutions in its functions, organization, and emotions.

I argue that within this difference framework, the civil-military relations are related to the historical development paths of the military, state, and society. Theories of civil-military relations are especially interested in the interaction and relations among the state, society, and the military. As Barany and Moser (2009: 183) succinctly put, scholars interested in studying civil-military relations should "direct our attention to the triangle of linkages between state, society,

and the armed forces, in other words, civil-military relations," These relations connect three essential sides involved in the power relations of the state. The military as the owner of the force; the state, represented by the political elites, as the owner of the legitimate authority; and society as the owner of the accountability mechanism. Under normal conditions, the military is required to protect the state and the society, and the state is required to enhance the capabilities of the military and to prevent it from exceeding its power limits. The society is required to respect the state and the military, check the limits of the military's use of its power, and provide oversight of the state's functions and the extent of the state's use of legitimacy.

However, in cases of crises, two of the triangle components will be in alliance against the third component. When the military ally itself with the political elite against the society's ambitions, the state will fall prey to totalitarianism and dictatorship. When the military builds an alliance with the people against the political elites' ambitions, the revolution rises and can lead to change and transformation. When the society and political elites build their alliance against military ambitions, the revolution rises that might lead to civil war. When studying civil-military relations, it is important to pay attention to these three components (Bland 1999: 12-13). These components and their interrelationships will be utilized to explain how the two variables under investigation, state-building and ethnic composition of the military, shape and interact with the coup-proofing mechanisms, taken as a mediator variable in this study.

One prominent area where civil-military relations can be analyzed is the state-building. The military played, and still plays, an essential role in the state building processes around the world. Examining the military arm of the triangle, Lenze (2016) states that in the developing world, the military was the crucial player in the nation-building and state formation process.

Therefore, the military's role in politics in the states that emerged during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries so obvious and essential (Lenze 2016: 2).

Examining the developmental paths of civil-military relations and state-building in advanced democracies will help us better understand nature of civil-military relations in developing countries. We can determine how those countries were able to regulate the civil-military relations, within little more than half a century, in a final way that clearly and rigorously outlines the role of the military and the polity. The civil-military relations are quite different for underdeveloped countries; where in most of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries, there is not that much hesitation of military intervention in politics, and this is even welcomed sometimes. That makes Western models not appropriate to understand civil-military relations in those countries.

One simple characteristic in many developing countries is the level of education and skills acquired by military officers that makes them progress to assume high positions in government (Nye 1977: 210; Said Aly 1996: 35-36). In those countries, there is no separation between the civilians and military in regards to interest in politics implemented. In many underdeveloped countries, the military men are either the actual rulers and do not mind ruling the country in their military uniform, or are behind-the-scenes rulers who determine who really rules the country. In these cases, the simplest civilian rulers become "servants" of the military, or the military becomes the tool to implement the totalitarian desires of the civilian rulers.

In the Arab World, the historical development of most Arab states after independence, with regard to the polity–military relations brings to our attention the intertwined structure of the above mentioned relationship. Militaries became so essential in the political, social, and economic life of those countries to a degree that they became the main player of determining the

political authority and its decisions. Militaries became so intertwined in all aspects of the polity to the degree that "in many cases there are no clear lines separating what is military and what is civilian in the Arab Countries," (AbdElsalam 2008: 66). This statement shows that Arab militaries' reactions to the Arab uprisings since the end of 2010 came in the context of their historical involvement in the political arena. Despite the differences in the reactions by the militaries in each of the Arab Spring countries, the common denominator among those militaries is the existence of special relationships between the military and polity.

4. Theoretical Overview and the Way Forward

In this section, building on the parameters of civil-military relations described above, I present a general overview of my theoretical explanation and case selection. In Chapter 3, I will introduce a detailed discussion of the theory. Figure 1.1. depicts the theoretical framework. This framework proposes two explanatory variables, ethnic and sectarian diversity as reflected in the military and military's role in state-building. In addition, it takes coup-proofing as a mediation mechanism through which these variables shape the military's behavior in the context of the Arab Spring. First, I explain coup-proofing mechanisms in the MENA region.

The Arab states are known for their use of security forces, in particular the military, for external and internal "defense" against the "enemies". In that sense, the military, in most Arab-majority countries, if not all, performed internal security operations (Sayigh 2011). Therefore, in their approach to build and conduct the civil-military relations, the regimes focused on building such relations to enhance those functions. However, the other face of the coin is the fear of the regimes from the strengthening the military capabilities and its independence in decision making from the polity. Such increase in professionalism of the military, according to Western literature on civil-military relations should reduce the military appetite to intervene in politics (Huntington

1957). The Middle East proved to be exceptional on many fronts, among them the military intervention in politics.

Since gaining independence, most Arab countries witnessed military coups, coup attempts, and military mutinies. The region is known for its high rate of military intervention in changing regimes or keeping them compared to the rest of the world (Quinlivan 1999). Despite the claim that military coups are something of the past for MENA region countries, the facts on the ground falsify this claim: 1982 Mauritania coup, 1989 Sudan, and many "palace coups" in Qatar 1996, Saudi Arabia 2017, among other cases. These cases point to the continuous importance and influence of armed forces in Arab politics. The rulers being either military men or civilians depending on the armed forces to stay in power realize that fact very well. Therefore, they developed mechanisms to buy loyalty or deny the military the chance and capabilities to replace them. That is what we call coup-proofing mechanisms.

Since Quinlivan (1999) coined the term "coup-proofing" in the study of military in MENA, it became a popular explanatory variable in studies dealing with the military's role and behavior in politics of the region. Coup-proofing is an intentionally crafted strategy designed by a political leader or regime to increase military's loyalty to the regime through the use of several social, economic, and political mechanisms including patronage or ethnic linkages. As the term suggests, coup-proofing is designed to discourage coups d'état, not to ensure loyalty during mass challenges. Many studies have pointed to this phenomenon to explain the diverse outcomes of the Arab Spring (Gaub 2013; Louer 2013; Makara 2013; Albrecht 2015). Coup-proofing is not a single variable, but rather an overall umbrella for the multifaceted efforts of political leaders to control the military. Two coup-proofing strategies include patronage related to the distribution of material benefits and to use of social structures involving ethnic, sectarian, or tribal identities. A

third coup-proofing strategy is institutional counterbalancing that proliferates rival organizations and use balancing among these organizations within the coercive apparatus, which aims to make coup plotting more difficult (Quinlivan 1999; Belkin and Schofer 2005; Bohmelt and Pilster 2015; De Bruin 2017). In this formulation, counterbalancing matters because it reduces patronage to the military or creates a situation of relative deprivation for the military vis-à-vis the other security organizations.

If the central problem in civil-military relations is creating a military strong enough to protect the regime from attack but subordinate enough not to overthrow it; the bulk of the Arab regimes have erred on the side of subordination at the expense of military effectiveness. According to Brooks (1998:10) this is "in part because the methods regimes use to ensure military loyalty often conflict with the principles of efficient military organization." This is not a problem of functioning or lack of access to training and weapons, because the armed forces in the region have some of the largest shares of per capita military expenditures (Springborg 2016: 72-74). Rather, the issue here is the reduced external effectiveness of military resulting from, rather, a deliberate strategy for retaining regime control (Pilster and Bohmelt 2011: 333-335). That is, regimes did not set up their militaries very well to fight foreign wars but they were well prepared to defend the regimes from their own troops, if necessary.

As a result of internal and regional changes, and the surge of oil wealth, Arab regimes began to gain greater control over their militaries in the 1970s and on. The Arab regimes applied different strategies to isolate the role of the military in politics and this explains the decreasing number of coups in the Arab world after 1970. Quinlivan (1999) argues that several Arab regimes had become "coup-proofed", sacrificing external military capability for internal stability by heavily politicizing and dividing their militaries.

Coup-proofing is, however, a disputed concept. Albrecht (2015 a) argues that coup-proofing is a myth: "Coup-proofing in authoritarian regimes is only partially successful in that it reduces the number of coups and coup attempts. Yet, general coup risk remains high as long as authoritarian rule persists. Coup-proofing works to buy incumbents time in office but does not reduce the general risk of falling to coups" (Albrecht 2015 a: 660). A better way to conceive of it is that coup-proofing works, just not perfectly; it reduces the danger of coups but does not fully eliminate them. Moreover, different coup-proofing strategies may reduce different types of threats and work differently in different regimes.

Albrecht (2015 b) addresses the value of various coup-proofing strategies. He argues that there is a "paradox of authoritarian coup-proofing: in times of relative peace and stability, a whole array of coup-proofing strategies has the effects intended by incumbents, provoking consolidated regimes to apply measures aimed at keeping their officers out of politics" (Albrecht 2015 b: 37-38). In normal times, it may seem a good strategy to build an autonomous military that is detached from day-to-day politics. However, in a crisis, a military that does not identify with the leadership might find it easier to abandon a regime (Brooks 2016: 203-205). In fact, it might be a better strategy to closely intertwine the military with the leadership. Politicized offers may present a greater coup risk in times of peace, but are more likely to defend the regime against public uprisings.

As will be shown throughout this dissertation, different coup-proofing strategies served as filters in creating different military reactions to protest and different outcomes. Autonomous militaries like Tunisia and Egypt are more likely to overthrow a leader but preserve the state and perhaps the bulk of the regime. Factionalized militaries like Syrian army are more likely to try to

protect a leader, but can weaken or damage the state by opening the way for civil war and sectarian or ethnic conflict (Albrecht 2015 a: 661).

The relative success of the Syrian military in protecting the al-Assad regime may lead more regimes to pursue that strategy (Albrecht 2015 b: 50). In fact, the factionalized Syrian system has increased in appeal as a coup-proofing strategy in the Middle East. Moreover, the authoritarian leaders are not free to choose any coup-proofing strategy they wish, as Kevin Koehler argues "authoritarian incumbents do not choose coup-proofing strategies. Rather the management of political-military relations is intimately linked to larger dynamics of regime development" (Koehler 2016: 52). For Koehler, coup-proofing strategies are strongly path-dependent. The coup-proofing strategies available to leaders are limited by social structure, resources, history, regime dynamics, and external influences. Authoritarian regimes make decisions about what they value and what they fear. They make their decisions concerning what coup-proofing strategy to adopt and develop based on the risks weighing external invasion over internal overthrow, whether the leaders are more concerned about revolutions or military intervention, the loyalty of military leadership to the leader and the regime survival (Stacher 2012: 1-5; 47-48). These decisions take place within constraints of social structure and history, but are also influenced by powerful leaders, unpredictable events, and conflict among regime elites.

Several common, overlapping strategies are identified throughout the coup-proofing literature, with different terms used by different authors. Albrecht (2015 b) identifies two broad strategies: integration with or segregation from the political leadership (Albrecht 2015 b: 40-41). However, we can group the strategies in three broad categories, in general.

1. Subjective control: As mentioned by Huntington (1957: 83), where the goal is to create a military that has interest similar to the interest of the state, so that it has little interest in changing the nature of the polity.

2. Fragmentation and surveillance: Where the military is prevented from acting in concert because of heavy monitoring and breaking up the military into discrete and overlapping organizations that will block one another in any coup attempt.

3. Distraction: Whereby the leadership gives the military high-level training tasks, non-military tasks to keep it occupied, and material incentive to keep it happy (or what is called economic coup-proofing (Abou Refaie 2016)), in hope that it will be content with its material situation and focus on something besides political.

These strategies, plus external protection and oil wealth, have made Arab regimes increasingly resistant to coups and external invasions since the early 1970s. The coup-proofing strategies also created particular types of militaries, which shaped how those militaries would act when faced with mass protests. Therefore, any factor's effect on civil-military relations and military behavior in MENA will be filtered through coup-proofing mechanism. Each country in the Arab world developed in a different path after independence despite the similarities in cultural, linguistic, and historical backgrounds. The difference in those development paths came as results of variations in social, economic, and political conditions. The military in each country was influenced by those development paths and influenced the development paths as well. The process is bidirectional. In that sense, the state and society relationships with the armed force, or what we call civil-military relations developed in variety of ways in each country. Each country has its own trajectory of those relations.

Based on the above introduction, the theory of this dissertation is based on simple assumption: Arab rulers developed and conducted civil-military relations for one purpose: ensuring the loyalty of the armed forces and keep their power checked. In such efforts, the leaders of the Arab regimes built certain coup-proofing mechanisms in each country that is organically connected to the social structure, economic conditions, and the political system in each country. This dissertation is an attempt to explain how the structure and conduct of civil-military relations in the five countries that witnessed the popular uprisings in 2011 shaped varieties of the military responses to those uprisings. In this attempt, the analysis of coup-proofing mechanisms is central to the extent that it is the main mediating path in the military's behavior. Through case studies of the five countries, I looked at the role of the military in the state formation and the sectarian and ethnic structures of each society as it is reflected in the armed forces to analyze the different coup-proofing mechanisms built by the regimes in those countries. Different coup-proofing mechanisms played a filtering role, in turn, that led to different military reaction to the popular uprisings.

Another factor that played an important role in determining the course and the fate of the uprisings and the regimes in the Arab Spring countries is the external factor. Global and regional powers with interest in those countries were and still major players in the determination of the development and the path of the Arab uprisings. Some examples of external factor include the NATO intervention in Libya that led to the toppling of Gaddafi regime; the intervention of Turkey, Iran, and Russia in Syria, which aggravated the civil war in that country; and Saudi Arabian and Iranian intervention in Yemen that is dragging the civil war in there to an unknown end. Despite the crucial role of the external factor in the path and development of the Arab Spring, this research does not examine this factor. The focus of this study is the conduct of the

armed forces in each country of the Arab Spring and understand the way they acted in response to the protests and why they acted the way they did. The external factor should be studied in a separate research project.

Figure 1.1. Explanation of the Arab Militaries Responses Toward the Uprisings



The theoretical framework explains the development and conduct of the civil-military relations in each country based on the role of the military in the state formation and nation building processes as well as the social structure of society as they relate to specific coup-

proofing mechanism. Such mechanism led to different responses of the military toward the popular uprisings.

As Arab regimes developed their civil-military relations during the 1970s to achieve the goal of regime stability and continuity, they created a blend of coup-proofing mechanisms in that path. Such coup-proofing mechanisms played major role in reaching such goal. In that regard, the coup-proofing mechanisms were designed to keep the military at bay from politics to minimize the probability of changing the regime with force from within the system itself. However, the challenge those regimes faced in 2011 was how to deal with popular uprisings rather that power struggle from the ruling elites. Their survival depended on their militaries as the defender of last resort. Therefore, the actions of the armed forces toward the mass protests decided the fate of those regimes.

In terms of functionality of the above explication, we can look at the following operationalization of variables. The setting of coup-proofing mechanism works, somehow, as a mediator of the effect of the civil-military relations being the independent variable to affect the outcome (dependent variable) being the reaction of the armed forces to the popular uprisings. The mediator variable creates a mechanism through which the independent variable influences the dependent variable (Baron and Kenny 1986: 1173). We can see that the coup-proofing mechanisms, even though a product of certain civil-military relations in each regime, were detrimental factors in shaping the armed forces' reaction to the popular uprising. Hence, the coup-proofing mechanism plays a mediator role in transferring the influence of the structure, development, and conduct of civil-military relations on the behavior of the armed forces in front of the popular uprisings that challenged the survival of the regimes.

Based on the above analysis, we can show the directionality of the influence from the civil-military relations on the behavior of the armed forces in front of the uprisings through coup-proofing mechanisms in Figure 1.2. below.

Figure 1.2.

Coup-Proofing Mechanisms as a Mediator Variable



The civil-military relations developed by each regime in the Arab world were determined by the historical path of the of the military's role in the state building and the social structure of each society that provided the ruler the tools to formulate a specific form of such relations that rise from the particularities of each society (Cronin 2014). These factors can directly shape the military's behavior or they can work their effects through coup-proofing mechanisms as depicted in Figure 1.2.

5. Case Selection

In this dissertation, I employ a historical-comparative case study methodology designed to trace the Arab militaries response to the popular uprising during the Arab Spring. Middle Eastern militaries and political regimes have long been studied as distinct general cases, owing to shared political, linguistic and religious bonds (Hurewitz 1969; Cook 2005). In particular, the region is notable for its relative absence of democracy, which has been attributed to the strength,

coherence, and effectiveness of Middle Eastern states' coercive apparatuses (Bellin 2004). At the same time, coercive apparatuses in the region are notable for their hybrid nature: security forces are militarized while military forces sometimes perform internal policing roles (Sayigh 2011).

The varied outcomes of the 2011 uprisings represent a novel opportunity to compare states with comparable political histories but divergent outcomes. At the end of 2010, large crowds of Tunisians flooded the streets in what was later became known as the spark of the Arab Spring. Inspired by that, large uprisings occurred in Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Libya, and Bahrain. In each case, a popular uprising threatened regime survival, and in most cases the military responded by defending the regime, leading to either government victory or a violent escalation into civil war.

In three cases (Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen), the military's response led to the replacement of a long-ruling authoritarian president. In the case of Libya, the uprising ended by the fall of the totalitarian regime and the start of a new path to build a new political system. In Syria, the military defended, with no limits, the regime and the president and caused a devastating civil war. In Yemen, the military split into two factions from the beginning and neither one could save the country from falling into civil war that made it a failed state. Along with a diversity of outcomes, the cases also exhibit the variety of causal mechanisms influencing military decisions to deal with the uprisings.

My selection of a primarily qualitative research design is motivated by my initial review of the literature in the areas of state formation, and ethnic/sectarian factors as they are related to the building and conduct of civil-military relations and coup-proofing mechanisms in the Middle Eastern countries. Such review brought my attention to the lack of more comprehensive theoretical analysis of military loyalty and defection, and military responses to uprisings. Most

studies available were case studies of one or a few cases of military response, but the theoretical basis for their claims relied on generalizations "discovered" in the 1960s. I noted a troubling tendency to repeat the same claims of previous studies despite a lack of original evidence, and to list some explanatory variables without any means of testing whether they had any causal effect on the outcome. As a result, I embarked on deeper case studies in comparative fashion rather than using a specific case for high-level generalizations (Gerring 2004; Van Evera 1997; Bennett and Elman 2006).

With comparative historical case studies of Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Yemen, and Libya, I seek to answer this question: why did the Arab militaries in those countries respond differently to the popular uprisings? By evaluating the factors that shaped the civil-military relations and the conduct of coup-proofing mechanisms in those five countries, I am able to trace the effect of the variation of those mechanisms on the outcomes (Thelen and Mahoney: 2015). In addition to that, the five cases are "the representative sample" of the countries involved in the Arab Spring, and at the same time they show the "useful variation" of the variables involved in the analysis (Seawright and Gerring 2008: 296).

The choice of the five cases is for two reasons. First, the uprisings threatened the survival of the regime in all of those countries, forcing the leader in each one to call upon the military to respond to the uprisings to "save" him. Second, these cases contain variation on both the outcomes and the factors that shaped the civil-military relations and coup-proofing mechanisms.

One of the cases is the case study of Tunisia, where the Arab Spring's least violent and most successful regime transition took place, and it was the starting point of the popular uprising that inspired the people of the other countries to go to the streets and demand change. Tunisia is an excellent case because it witnessed the most successful uprising, with the lowest level of

violence, of any Arab Spring country. It is a typical case to investigate the phenomenon under study and is therefore an excellent case to identify the cause and effect mechanism I want to study (Mahoney and Goertz 2006). Tunisia also exhibits historical variation in military responses. The military used violence against protesters in 1978 and 1984, but it refrained from such act in front of the uprising in 2011. Tunisia's military had rarely been studied prior to the Arab Spring, and hardly any information was publicly known about it. Such lack of systematic studies make the choice of Tunisia an essential move to understand the origin and the development of the military reaction to the uprising (Brooks 2013).

The second case is Egypt where the military had mild response to the uprising and the country ended going back to autocracy that the protesters wanted to remove as their "The People Want to Topple the Regime" chants were synonymous for the call for democracy. Third case is Syria where the military employed full-scale "warfare" style response to the protesters which kept the embattled President Bashar al-Assad in position but caused the failure of the state and the destruction of the country through prolonged civil war. Similar results happened in the fourth and fifth cases (Yemen and Libya) as results of military response to the uprisings despite the different approaches in the two countries of building and conducting civil-military relations.

After going through the historical analysis of the case study of Tunisia and Egypt, I conduct three comparative case studies from the region of Syria, Yemen, and Libya where similar uprisings led to different outcomes.[1] The pre-2011 regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Yemen, and Libya bore a striking resemblance: all were led by "civilian presidents-for-life," four of them with military training, who centralized decision making, employed their hegemonic

[1] Van Evera (1997) suggest choosing cases with high or low values on the dependent variable and explore their association with the independent variables.

ruling parties or families to distribute privileges rather than building clear civilian control of the armed forces, held power through penetrative and repressive security forces. Scholars classified the countries in the same regime type category, whether "sultanistic" (Barany 2011), "neopatrimonial" (Brownlee 2002), or "mukhabarat"[2] regimes (Kamrava 2000).[3] Although the short-term outcomes of the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings were superficially the same (i.e. the fall of the regime), a closer look reveals significant differences in the role played by the two armies. These differences, in turn, help explain why Tunisia's transition stayed on track while Egypt reverted to military rule. As in Tunisia, I first trace the creation and development of civil-military relations prior to 2011, then assess the effect of this civil-military relations on the military response in each case.

I excluded the case of Bahrain, as it is the exception that makes it not fit in the variation of the factors and the large effect of the external factor that played the major role in determining the outcome of the military response to the uprising. With a firm and belligerent military response and foreign assistance from the conservative and oil-rich Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain crushed the uprising quickly and completely. Unlike the national armies discussed previously, the Bahraini military was established from the beginning as a praetorian force, designed to defend not the nation but the monarchy, and staffed with foreign mercenaries (Louër 2013: 248-253). The result was a coup-proofing mechanism which dictated the use of violence to defend the status quo.

Compared with Tunisia, there is a wealth of secondary materials available on the armed forces of Egypt and Syria, where the military has played a far more prominent role in politics in

[2] Mukhabarat (in Arabic): The Intelligence and Security Services.

[3] Geddes et al. (2014) code Tunisia as a "party-based" regime, but Egypt and Syria as "party–personal– military" (see Table 1.1.). They refer to Yemen and Libya as Personal type regime, and Bahrain as a Hereditary Monarchy.

the post-colonial era. By studying cases with similar outcomes (Syria, Yemen, and Libya) and different outcomes (Tunisia and Egypt), I am able to identify how the variation in civil-military relations and coup-proofing mechanisms in those countries effected the particular outcomes. By including the dissimilar cases of the Arab Spring countries, I tried to avoid the danger of using the outcome as criteria of selecting the cases (Geddes 1990). The four countries (other than Tunisia) cases are also particularly informative because they are prominent examples of the use of patronage, ethnicity, tribal and family connections to establish control of the military. In all five cases, the conventional wisdom proves inadequate to explain the military response to the Arab Spring.

Table 1.1.

Arab Spring Uprisings 2010-2011: Military Action and Immediate Results

Country	Leader and Tenure	Leader's Background	Military Reaction to Uprising	Immediate Outcome of Uprising
Tunisia	Zine El Abidine Bin Ali 1987-2011	Military	None	Regime Change
Egypt	Hosni Mubarak 1981-2011	Military	Low	Regime Face Change
Syria	Bashar al-Assad 2000-Present	Civilian	Extreme	Civil War
Yemen	Ali Abdullah Saleh 1978-2011	Military	Extreme	Executive Change
Libya	Muammar Gaddafi 1969-2011	Military	Extreme	Regime Change

The comparative method is built based on J.S. Mill's System of Logic (1843). In the comparative politics, an essential question in the selection of cases has been the difference between Most Similar (MSS) and Most Different (MDS) systems designs (Przeworski and Teune

1970). The question here is how to select the cases for comparative analysis to explain social phenomena. The Most Similar System Design (MSS) is based on comparing two or more very similar systems or units of analysis. It relies on comparing two or more systems or units that share a range of similarities, but also differ in at least few respects. Thus, in the MSS, differences are the key for the analysis. In that sense, what need to be different are the independent variables to see the effect on the "similar" dependent variable (outcome). The most similar systems design has been used extensively in comparative studies, given that it is the design that attempts to employ the independent variables through case selection and to control inessential variance (Anckar 2008). The MSS is the most common approach to small-N research problems in political science. It examines a few cases that are as similar as possible, except on the outcome. In that setting, similarity of cases means we control for many alternative explanations. However, the MSS is not free of problems. In that system, we treat the independent variables as somewhat simple variations. The more complex the operationalization, the harder to determine the causality using the MSS.

On the contrary, the Most Different System Design (MDS) is based on comparing two or more different systems. It is built on finding two systems that differ in almost all aspects, except with regard to the acknowledged independent and dependent variables, where the many differences are eliminated as potential explanatory variables. Therefore, in the MDS, the similarities are the key to analysis (Anckar 2008). The MDS begins with an assumption that the phenomenon being explained exist at a lower, sub-systemic level. This means that this strategy is often looking at individual level behavior and attempting to explain relationships among variables in samples of individuals. If that relation can hold up in a large number of varied cases,

then we can say, with higher confidence, that there is a proper relationship, not as a result of the influence of some unmeasured nonessential variables that exist in relatively similar systems.

In other words, the MDS is used to examine few cases that are as different as possible, except on the outcome. Difference of cases means we control for many alternative explanations. If one factor is the same between cases, and outcome is the same, then we can claim that this is the probable cause for the outcome. The MDS suffers from some problems as well. Similar to MSS, it is very hard to use to determine multiple causal factors. This design is more useful for ruling out "necessary" causes than determining causality.

In regard the cases I chose in this study, they represent a group of countries with variety of factors involved in determining the outcome, i.e. the military response to the popular uprisings. The five cases in the study is a classic example of small-N research problem. However, the outcomes are of two general sub-groups: civil war, and success in reaching a political solution. Therefore, based on the variation of the outcome (the dependent variable), I classify the five case studies into two subsets according to the comparative methodology. Hence the MSS and MDS designs are appropriate way for the classification.

In the first subset of the cases, I grouped Tunisia and Egypt as the outcome is different for the two cases. For Tunisia, the country is moving to consolidate democracy after the regime change as a result of the popular uprising. However, Egypt is back to autocracy as a result of July 2013 coup by the armed forces. Hence this subset fits into the category of the Most Similar System Design (MSS). With the different factors that shaped the military response to the uprising (independent variables) with low military role in the state formation in Tunisia and high for Egypt, and different coup-proofing mechanisms in the two countries, that resulted in different outcomes, the MSS can be of great explanatory power for explaining the variation in the

outcomes. Table 1.2. is a summary of this subset. It should be noted, we don't have enough cases to make final determination about the causes of the outcome. Rather, I use this design heuristically to explain coup-proofing mechanisms and especially discussing the role of military in state building as it relates to outcomes of the uprisings.

The second subset of cases has the similarity of the outcome in all three countries: civil war. With the variations in the social structure, military role in the state building, and coup-proofing mechanisms among the three cases, this subset definitely fits into the Most Different System Design (MDS). Table 1.3. is a summary of this subset. Similar to the MDS, the cases do not allow me to make strong causal inference, however, this design helps me to use the comparative method as a heuristic device to reach some generalizations and explain the role of military and social structure in leading to coup-proofing mechanisms that all resulted in civil war in reaction to the uprisings.

Table 1.2.

The Most Similar System Design

Country	Social Structure	Military Role in State Building	Coup-Proofing Mechanism	Result
Tunisia	Homogenous	Low	Civil Control of Armed Forces	Democracy
Egypt	Relatively Homogenous (Coptic minority)	High	Armed Forces Seized the State	Autocracy

Table 1.3.

The Most Different System Design

Country	Social Structure	Military Role in State Building	Coup-Proofing Mechanism	Result
Syria	Ethnic and Religious Sectarianism	High	Politicized Sect Hegemony	Civil War
Yemen	Tribal and Religious Sectarianism	Middle	Integrating Tribal and Military Command	Civil War
Libya	Tribal	Low	Marginalization and Weakening	Civil War

While the world had witnessed continuous waves of democratization since nineteenth century (Sasson 2016), the MENA region kept its unique position by staying out of such waves (Korany and Noble 1998). One major explanation of lack of democratization and the durability of authoritarianism is the role of armed forces in keeping the status quo (Bellin 2004). However, this is not in itself a sufficient reason for the lack of democracy in the region (Schlumberger 2007). Other countries around the world witnessed the heavy involvement of military in politics through their modern history; however, they were still part of certain democratization waves (Huntington 1993). This leads us to think that other factors, in conjunction with the military's role in politics, made the MENA countries unique in their absence from worldwide democratization movements (Posuseng 2005). Some of these factor are lack of democratic rule in the history of the MENA region, the traditional and pre-industrial social relations, and political consequences of rentier state model that does not allow representation in the lack of taxation structures (i.e. no taxation no representation) (Stephen 2009; Lawson 2007). While acknowledging the importance of these factors, this study contributes to the literature by focusing on the role of military in the Arab region.

It should also be stated that while some common factors may explain democratization or its lack thereof in MENA vis-à-vis the other regions, the region has some unique properties. In

comparison to other regions of the world, the MENA countries still lag behind and live under authoritarian regimes despite the worldwide movements of democratization. In historical perspective, the MENA societies lack any democratic experience through their history to base their democratization aspirations on. This might be attributed to their Islamic heritage, tribal social structure, and lack of economic development, among other factors. Unlike the countries of Eastern Europe where the democratization process was based on old democratic heritage existed before the Soviet occupation and control. Therefore, the societies of Eastern European countries were able to recall their democratic experience from their history to base their move away from authoritarianism towards representative democracy. These countries also had their success, failure, or stability stories, but they had some advantages based on the democratic structures of their neighbors and their history.

The rest of this dissertation is structured as follows. In the next chapter, I review the literature about the role of the militaries in societies, their significance in scholarly research, and the different stands militaries may take during the popular uprisings and revolutions. I especially focus on and evaluate the scholarship about civil-military relations approaches and the different variables used by scholars to explain the military responses to revolutions. In that regard, I look specifically at the Arab militaries response to the Arab Spring. In chapter 3, I provide additional discussion supporting the explanatory framework I will use to analyze the Arab militaries' reactions to the popular uprisings of 2011. In that chapter, I will look at the sources, nature, and the varieties of coup-proofing mechanisms adopted by Arab regimes. I argue that it is not totally correct to label the popular movements in some Arab countries in 2011 as revolutions. I point to limits of the research project in this chapter and the need for future investigation about the subject.

Chapters 4 and 5 represent the case studies I selected to explain and support the analysis framework of the military reactions toward the Arab Spring, and the different outcomes of such responses. In chapter 4, I look at the case of Tunisia as an example of successful democratization and the case of Egypt as an example of reversal to authoritarianism against the demand of the protestors. In chapter 5, I examine the cases of Syria, Yemen, and Libya where the uprisings and the military responses came to lead to civil wars and the destruction of the state.

In chapter 6, I compare the old wave of protests, Arab Spring (Version 1) in 2011 and the new wave Arab Spring (Version 2) that started in 2018 in Algeria, Sudan, Lebanon and Iraq, countries that escaped the first wave. In this chapter, I attempted to find lessons learned from that comparison and check if the analysis framework I built in this dissertation can help explain the military responses to the new wave of protests. The last part is the conclusion of the dissertation and the lessons of the comparison of the two Arab Springs waves. Appendix I shows some data about the armed forces and their structures in the countries studied in this dissertation and the four countries that are witnessing the new wave of protests. Appendix II shows a graph of the declining number of successful and failed coups in the Arab World since the 1960s as Arab regimes adopted different coup-proofing mechanisms.

Chapter 2 - The Role of Military in Societies and Uprisings

1. Why the Civil-Military Relations?

Many factors affect the political, social, and economic circumstances in the modern world. Since the military constitutes a crucial factor, we can justify the need for deep and comprehensive studies on the civil-military relations. By and large, the relationship between the state and the armed forces is crucial for the survival of the state during inter and intra-state conflict. Nevertheless, there is not much of literature on contemporary topics such as civil-military relations in countries going through political transition (Bruneau and Matei 2013). Countries around the world spend large percentages of their GDP on defense. According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the world average for military spending as a ratio to total budget is 2.2%, and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries are among the highest spenders on national security in general (SIPRI 2010). Third, in countries going through political transition, as the countries that witnessed the Arab uprising, the armed forces were key to the survival and longevity of the previous autocratic regimes (Bellin 2004) as well crucial factor in determining the fate of those states as they reacted to the mass uprisings.

While the study of civil-military relations is important, explanations about this issue are complicated for variety of reasons. One obvious reason is the lack of conceptual or theoretical consensus within the scholarship on the subject. Since the World War II, scholars started debating the concept of civil-military relations from different angles: political, military professional, social, among many. Most studies focused on studying the Western democracies as they are the model of civilian control of the armed forces and the availability of data regarding

that relationship (Bruneau and Matei 2013). Despite the long period of such debate, there is no agreement reached to explain the relation even in those democracies.

The lack of studies about the Arab countries in the literature on civil-military relations is so acute. Gregory Gause III (2011) argues that, for the past two decades, Middle East researchers have shown little interest in studying the role of military in Arab politics, making them poorly equipped to understand recent political processes in the region. This claim is supported by other scholars who contend that Arab militaries, and their role in Arab societies, have received little scholarly attention (Bellin 2012; Albrecht and Bishara 2011). The events of the last few years have further demonstrated the need for thorough studies and analyses of the security sector in Arab countries, and of the relationship between armed forces and civilian actors.

Researchers in the fields of comparative politics are concerned with understanding the conditions when the armed forces intervene in politics and overrule civilian authorities, or withdraw from politics and "return to the barracks." In addition, a new generation of researchers seek to explore under what circumstances, and by what means, military forces are willing to defend authoritarian regimes against popular uprisings. The events of early 2011 in the Arab world encouraged a strong focus on dramatic moments of revolutionary change. More recent developments stress the need to examine the role of military forces in the slow-grinding processes of everyday politics, beyond the sudden fall of autocratic leaders (Kårtveit and Jumbert 2014).

2. Scholarly Approaches on Civil-Military Relations

The emergence of this rich field of research coincided with the formation of early military organizations as an apparatus of the state. We can consider the 20th century as the start

of the systematic and rigorous studies of the relationship between the military and society. These studies used psychological, sociological, and economic approaches to explain the possible connections between the military and civilians. This research was also used to help the ruling elites to determine which mechanisms allow the military to remain under the control of the polity. As Rukavishnikov and Pugh (2006: 132) argue, this field of research started as a pure American tradition: "From the 1950s to the 1980s, American political scientists examined civil-military relations as an interaction between the armed forces, political elites, and citizenry, focusing on the influence of the military high commanders on the making of foreign and defense policy," (Rukavishnikov and Pugh 2006: 132).

Scholars in the American context were interested in studying the ways to make militaries more professional and to exclude the military, as much as possible, from influencing political decisions. The interference of the military in civilian life, whether positive or negative, or their neutrality of not interfering in civilian affairs, represents a phenomena we can only comprehend by reviewing many factors. The position of the military in civilian life is simply an outcome imposed by many of those factors, which we must grasp to understand their effect on civil-military relations. According to Karabelias (1998), there is a need for multidimensional model to understand the civil-military relations. The model should take the military itself into account, in addition to the domestic economic and social circumstances, the effect of international factors, and the history of the military role in the development of the civil-military relations in the country studied (Karabelias 1998: 15-16). Following Karabelias (1998), the process of studying civil-military relations and dissecting it, surpasses the two principal actors of the military and the civilian. Studies must be expanded to include local and international environments where those two actors act, in addition to the common and private history of each of them.

The principal interest that civil-military relations revolve around is power and how to legitimize it to preserve it. From there, the society (i.e. population, the citizens) becomes a crucial element in this complex and ramified relation. The study of civil-military relations in democracies focus mainly on the relationship between the armed forces, civilians, and the society (Lutterbeck 2011: 8-9). In the cases of non-democracies, the matters become more complicated. When the civilians suffer in maintaining their power, they will try to preserve authority in any way possible. This includes attempts to resist social reactions that might be opposing his rule, or even hostile to it. Here, the civilians need the military to protect them. At the same time, they might fear them, since the military does not provide their service for free. The opposition may wish to achieve a change, but the fear of the reaction of the military make them retreat or wait for signals from the military. In this case, the military remains the controlling power of the civil-military relations and the civil-civil relations and the main debates are centered on freedom and democratic institutions (Karabelias 1998).

Since the end of World War II, many studies and research hinged around the military and its relationship with civilians. The result of such research was a web of theories that tried to put classifications on militaries, according to the reactions of those militaries in dealing with political movements that characterize their countries. The goal of those classifications was to understand the different formats of civil-military relations, and to give policymakers the ability to forecast, even relatively, what the military's reactions could be in different situations. The ability to forecast is especially important when it comes to political crises and the power struggle that may arise between the military and civilians, or among civilians themselves. These studies and classifications represent crucial sources and materials that can help us to develop our methodology and study the subject in a rational manner. The following sections explain various

prior approaches to studying civil-military relations. I detail the characteristics of these approaches and explain how I use them to develop my own analysis in this research area.

2.1 Samuel Huntington Approach

Samuel Huntington (1957) starts from the American model, which constitutionally establishes the relationship between the military and civilians. American legislation determines the civilian authority over the military, and the appointment of the civilian head of state as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Furthermore, all the legislation concerning the military, from the budget to public policies regarding the United States armed forces are determined in the civilian legislative institution. In this approach, the military is a professional institution charged by the civilian authorities to perform clear and specific duties. According to Caforio (2006), Huntington classifies control policies over the military into two types: exercising power of one social group over the armed forces and the second is the achievement of military professionalism separately from the political authorities (Caforio 2006: 16).

Huntington's book, *The Soldier and the State*, is considered a constitutive text in the field of civil-military studies. Nevertheless, its approach is problematic because it does not address how to keep the military, despite its power, under the control of the civilians. Caforio (2006: 15) succinctly puts Huntington's approach as, "the primary objective of this policy [security policy] is to develop a system of civil-military relations that can maximize military security with minimum sacrifice of the other social values." From his perspective, Huntington's interest was to investigate the methods of the military's performance of the duties entrusted to it, with the incorporation of professionalism and insuring the neutrality of the military with regard to civilian and political issues.

Huntington suggests concentrating on the officer corps, as they are the military authority that can stand in front of the political elites' groups or confront them (Huntington 1957: 3). To that end, he examines the ethnic, social, and economic background of the officer corps. These demographics help us determine the type of personality the officer corps has. Huntington's approach is useful for understanding the reactions of the officer corps in front of agitators, their relationship with civilians, and to explain their actions. Huntington says, "the principal focus of civil-military relations is the relation of the officer corps to the state," (Huntington 1957: 3). Therefore, the analysis of the background of the officer corps will allow one to realize the professionalism of the military, or what Huntington calls "idealism."

Huntington goes on to explain three responsibilities that the military ought to perform to serve its country and state. These three responsibilities are the representative function, where the military must keep the polity informed about the needs of the armed forces, the advisory function where the military provides professional view and experience about security matters, and the executive function where the military implement the authorities' decisions regarding the state security issues (Huntington 1957: 72)

Huntington (1957) depended on the term "praetorianism" to explain the equation of independency, professionalism, and neutrality. This term is derived from the title of the Roman Imperial Guard that was the force in charge of protecting the Emperor. However, the activities of the force went beyond this duty where the Imperial Guard became involved in many political issues. The most important of such political issues was determining when the displacement of the Emperor and installation of the new Emperor takes place.

Samuel Finer (1969) follows in the footsteps of Huntington in affirming that military professionalism includes three components: expertise, social responsibility, and organizational

loyalty to practicing fellows, or corporateness. Caforio (2006: 15-16) explains this approach by putting the profession to the center where military men are seen as the technicians of applying violence and regulating it, as a responsibility toward their clients, that is, the state. They also have strong organization and traditions.

The view of civil-military relations based on the equation where the military provides the service and the state is the client, represents a special rationale. This service/client view gives the military the characteristic of professionalism. However, to Huntington, this professionalism is new. Before the French Revolution, officer corps were formed either from mercenaries who serve whoever pays the most, or from the nobles who follow the king, even when ousted from the throne. While the beginning of the 19th century did not witness any professional militaries, the beginning of the 20th century witnessed a few non-professional militaries (Huntington 1957: 24).

Huntington's approach is foundational, but it has some deficiencies. The primary deficiency is the difficulty of realizing independency, professionalism and neutrality in real life. This assumption essentially reduces his approach to a utopia. According to Karabelias (2011: 11), "a problem with his typology is that his attention is not only subjective but elusive as well. It fails to consider that a military intervention may start as one type of a coup but the military could be forced to undergo certain radical changes." This means that a static view on the relationship between the military and civilians cannot explain the dynamics of how the military interacts with its environment. The transformation from one type to another is very possible. Also, it would be hard to explain the reactions of the military without connecting them to specific periods; thus, this classification could be correct in specific and short periods of time only.

Finer discussed Huntington's approach to the concept of professionalism and tried to tear apart one of the pillars of Huntington's theory. Huntington claims the increase in military professionalism necessarily leads to an increase in its neutrality and isolation from politics. Finer refutes this using historical examples. Finer says, discussing what Huntington puts forth, "In so far as professionalism makes the military look on their task as different from that of the politicians, and as self-sufficient and full-time, it ought, logically, to inhibit the army from wishing to intervene. Yet it is observable that many highly professional officer corps have intervened in politics — the German and Japanese cases are notorious," (Finer 1969: 21). In such cases, we can see that the military intervened in politics and was not neutral, despite its high level of professionalism. From Finer's (1969: 21-22) point of view, Huntington's conclusion, in terms of relations among independency, professionalism, and neutrality, is a mere hypothetical deduction based on the definition he gave for professionalism.

2.2 Finer Approach

As discussed previously, Finer (1969) criticized Huntington's (1957) approach, which determines that the professionalism of the military necessarily leads to its neutrality. Finer considered it a hypothetical conclusion based on the definition that Huntington gave to professionalism, nothing else. Based on this criticism, Finer establishes his classification about the level of military in politics and its strength. He focuses on the sociological, anthropological, and historical backgrounds of the military. He believes that those backgrounds are what determine the military's responses to provocation from civilian sides.

From the beginning, Finer contradicts Huntington's approach about professionalism. Finer sees that "professionalism is not what Huntington says it is, the sole or even the principle force inhibiting the military's desire to intervene. To inhibit such a desire, the military must also

have absorbed the principle of the supremacy of the civil power," (Finer 1969: 24). Therefore, professionalism according to Finer, is not a result of the course of the support and advancement of military independency. It is not the motion that results in supporting the military neutrality and its advancement. It is a rigorous political decision that clearly, officially, and legally, determines that the civilian elites hold the authority and supremacy above the officer corps. With necessary legal structures in place, we can talk about the military professionalism.

Finer (1969) also develops theory to deal with the complex matter of classification of militaries based on their involvement in civilian life. First comes indirect military rule where the military is not directly involved in areas that civilians practice their authority and responsibility according to state legislation. In this type, civilians fall under the extortion of military men at the organizational level in the areas of budget and equipment. In this classification, the extortion can develop in times of crisis to the limit of the contribution of the military in the efforts of changing one civilian government for another that is more in accord and understanding of the military's desires.

A second type is the Dual Type rule based on two fundamental sources of authority, the military and the political party. In this type of rule, responsibilities will be divided according to the balance of power between the two sources of authority. This is upheld according to an implicit alliance between a political power legitimizing the intervention of the military, and a military power that protects the legitimacy of the political party, supporting it with force. The last type of military is represented by the direct military rule. This is a regime where the military declares itself the direct and *de facto* ruler of the country and assumes the civil and political responsibilities, in addition to its military duty (Finer 1969: 151).

Based on those classifications, Finer's approach shows how complex and intertwined civil-military relations are. It appears that the lines separating the different forms of ruling regimes remain very thin, to the degree that it becomes almost impossible to predict when a specific regime changes from military status to civilian status. This is because the characteristics and mechanisms used by the military wing or the civilian wing to affirm its legitimacy and impose its authority are so intertwined.

Finer's approach to classifying civil-military relations hinges on the importance of understanding the factors that brought the military to intervene in the civilian domain. He stresses that the type of factors and the degree of their effect are what determines the form of the military intervention in civilian life. The justification used by the military for its intervention is one of the most important strategies for affirmation of the military rule, no matter what form it takes. The media and the political and civilian elites that are in alliance with the military play crucial roles, no less important than the role of weapons, to rationalize the military intervention as a necessary and mandatory action to save the country from collapsing.

Finer also looks at the "political culture," which he associates with the level of existence of official institutions and their functions, and the legitimate procedures that regulate political practice in the country (Finer 1969: 79). States with a weak political culture are the states who lack these institutions and procedures, whether they are nonexistent or simply weak (Finer 1969: 79-80). Military interventions in civilian life tend to be more in states with weak political cultures. While in states with a strong political culture, even if interventions happen, they will be for the purpose of exerting pressure, not for direct influence on ruling (Finer 1969: 79-80).

The major drawback of Finer's classification is that it is superficial and simplistic. His classification is a mere stenographic description he tried to use to combine the largest possible

number of militaries in the lowest number of classifications. This stenography hampered the comprehension of the major complexities that characterize civil-military relations, especially in the third world and Arab countries. He described such complexities clearly in the explanation of his classification methodology. However, he surpassed them in the classification itself, to make his classification more readable and less ambiguous.

2.3 Morris Janowitz Approach

Morris Janowitz (1988) provides a sociological approach where he focuses on social and cultural factors in propagating the culture of civilian supremacy over the military. In Janowitz's view, professionalism is not connected in an equation through which a combination of a set of elements are built to reach the desired result. Professionalism is connected with pedagogical work that aims to spread the culture of civilian supremacy over the military and the military serving the civilian voluntarily. This approach is best explained by Rukavishnikov and Pugh (2006: 133) who state that the "civilian control of the military could be realized on the basis of social networks: not professional warriors, but citizen-soldiers, either conscripts or reservists, would better link the military to its host society through their civilian roots."

If the previous theories focus on the technical, fighting soldier, as a condition to ensure professionalism, then Janowitz considers that the cultural aspects are the most important. Instead of the "fighting soldier," he prefers the "citizen soldier." The soldier that is saturated with the values of citizenship and civilian sense can easily be persuaded of the importance of attention to his military duties that must be done under supervision of civilian elites. At the same time, he abstains from participation in the civil political life.

Janowitz (1988) is also concerned with the transitions. He considers that societies are characterized by fast transitions and their continuation. As a result, the armed forces are

compelled to adapt for these transitions. According to Caforio (2006: 17), these transitions are important and the military should be studied during the process of change. Therefore, the processes of transition are what push the armed forces to respond, whether positively or negatively, to the emerging circumstances because of those transitions. For Janowitz, it is only through response during transitions that we can evaluate the military professionalism and evaluate civil-military relations in real terms.

For Huntington, independency is the first condition for professionalism and neutrality. However, Janowitz starts with the paradigm of similarity of the military and civilian. Instead of independency, he assumes that the incorporation of military in both the civilian and social lines is the only way to insure their professionalism. According to Caforio (2006), Janowitz believes that, modern officers must be integrated within the society, since it is impossible to isolate the professional soldier from politics. Therefore, Janowitz (1988) proposes having representatives of national political parties in the officers' political training. In such a framework, the officer will be favorable to the civilian political control. This shows that Janowitz believes that professionalism is a cultural matter more than a technical issue.

Janowitz (1988) suggests a more dynamic approach to the concept of professionalism in the military by adding some ethical characteristics to the military practice self-confidence and standard of merits. Even when thinking about making military policies, Janowitz takes a different position. He depends on the concept of "consultation" between the military and civilians instead of "hegemony." According to Born [et. al.] (2002: 6), Janowitz determines that "…the military and the political leaders decide together about direction and implementation of a military goal because the politicians and military leaders are depending on each other."

Instead of hegemony, Janowitz prefers collaboration and consultation between the military and polity, since they need each other. As time passes, the trust between them and the conviction of each side of his need for the other, become important principles in moving the long-run educational effort that aims to affirm the military professionalism as a social culture. Janowitz tried to repair Huntington's theory and cover its deficiencies. He is credited with the differentiation between civil-military relations in Western countries and those in the rest of the world.

Janowitz's classification reflects the complexity that characterizes civil-military relations, through different stages of human history, in addition to different domestic and international social, economic, and political circumstances. These factors create the civil and military systems and determine how they develop in those circumstances. According to Janowitz (1988), we cannot avoid the military interference in politics. The priority should instead be looking for ways to use it for the interest of the state and society (Lutterbeck 2011: 9-10).

I believe Janowitz is establishing the military civilianization project based on the long run pedagogic work. The development of civil-military relations remains connected to other factors, like the level of democratization, and the level of the development of the economic and political systems. In addition, the position of the state and its military in the domestic and international geopolitical stakes must be considered. Therefore, I argue that Janowitz was able to surpass the shortsighted vision that characterized the work of his predecessors who studied civil-military relations. However, he was not able to overcome the difficulty of implementing these concepts in real life. If Janowitz's theory as a conceptual framework helps in understanding the ramification of the civil-military relationship and its complexity, then it will be a useful tool for this field of

research. However, if it is taken as a mechanism to change the civil-military relations and develop it positively, then the results are not guaranteed.

2.4 Dale Herspring Approach

Civil-military relations are the subject of considerable scrutiny and debate throughout modern American history. In his summary of American civil-military relations since Franklin Roosevelt, Dale Herspring recognizes that it is up to the military to adjust to the president rather than the other way around and expresses worry about the conservative trend in military culture.

His first work about civil-military relations was his 2005 book, *The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations From FDR to George W. Bush*. This book focused on the American model confronting two issues that are central to the canonical discourse of civil-military relations: civilian control of the military by elected and appointed political officials, and the political neutrality or non-neutrality of those in uniform. Herspring (2005) focuses his attention primarily on the senior ranks of the military, the controlled, rather than on the civilian controllers. He considers the intersection of presidential leadership and military culture an arena of inevitable conflict. He reminds us that this relationship has often been a very tense, even antagonistic, partly because the military has become a highly organized and very effective bureaucratic interest group.

Herspring notes that he "…could not find a serious study from the vantage point of the 'controlled'," (Herspring 2005: xii). That viewpoint is what makes his approach so important in the realm of civil-military relations by diverting attention to different sides of the equation. Herspring aims to develop a framework to understand the problem from both perspectives (Herspring 2013: 1). Herspring (2013: 1-6) believes the military should be viewed as just another of the U.S. government's many interest groups, bound to conflict with civilians at times. He

thinks that presidents and secretaries of defense who are sympathetic to military culture can manage this conflict more effectively than those who are not. This is not a startling new insight, but Herspring would argue that it captures reality better than some of the more well-known theories of civil-military relations.

One of Herspring's (2005, 2013) main conclusions is that all American officers accept civilian control, even when those civilian leaders disagree with professional military advice. What usually causes the most friction, however, is when those civilians are contemptuous of the military and refuse even to consider their professional opinions. Herspring goes on to identify instances in which civilian leaders violated the culture of either an individual service branch or the uniformed military as a whole. He argues that such violations usually came at a considerable price for both sides (Herspring 2005).

In his second book about civil-military relations, Herspring develops a comparative analysis of the subject by looking at four different countries. In *Civil-military Relations and Shared Responsibility* (2013), he provides a comprehensive, comparative analysis of civil-military relations across four nations: the U.S., Russia, Germany, and Canada. Herspring (2013) argues that the optimal form of civil-military relations is a situation of 'shared responsibility' between the military leadership and civilian leadership in working to set defense, procurement, or international policy, as well as in strategic decision-making. While a seemingly obvious approach to government, such a situation exists only fleetingly in contemporary history. He states that the "…goal is to provide civilians with an understanding of the conditions that are most likely to lead to shared responsibility," (Herspring 2013: 6).

This idea of shared responsibility is counter to the ideas of Kemp and Hudlin (1992) who offer that the civil-military relations function best when the lines between the military and

civilian spheres are distinct, and the spheres are separate. Herspring, however, suggests that civilians deciding on the "…ends of policy", and the military being responsible for "…the means" is too simple (Herspring 2013: 3). He does not believe that the "magic line" between the civilian and military spheres exists (Herspring 2013: 3). Military officers lead civilian lives and have individual opinions, particularly on issues of defense that vary from one officer to the next. Likewise, civilian leaders have varying opinions and priorities.

The key to Herspring's approach is that he identified the difficulty in attempting to discern whether a policy was more or less 'influenced' by the 'military sphere' or the 'civilian sphere'. Instead, rather than seeking to identify influence, the motivations and ideas of individual key players on the civilian and military sides must be understood, as well as the dynamics of the formal and informal relationships between them. To do this, the structure of the analysis is a two-part history of each country's civil-military relations, with the lens sharply focused on defense ministers, chiefs of staff, and national leaders. The narratives presented are primarily about the character and personalities of each individual, and how those qualities affected the civil-military relations (Herspring 2013: 22).

Herspring's military vantage point, though valuable, is not without limits when moving from the empirical to the normative consideration of effective policy decisions, which this study invites. The concept itself represents an ideal framework for policy formation in military/diplomacy matters. However, as Herspring highlights repeatedly, such a framework is another of those that are easier aspired to than implemented; much due to the realities of institutional, inter-group, and interpersonal relationships, particularly at such heights of decision-making (Herspring 2005: 426). Despite these shortcomings, Herspring's work attempts to fill the

gap in the literature regarding practical analysis of a new idea in institutional structuring of defense.

2.5 Mehran Kamrava Approach

The most important character of Mehran Kamrava's study is its specificity about the civil-military relations in the Middle East. Kamrava presents us with specific typology of civil-military relations in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. In addition, he continues the tradition of classification of the civil-military relations but on different levels. Instead of using the classical levels used by other scholars, he builds his classification on the types of the political regimes in the MENA regions which differ on a large spectrum from one country to the next.

In developing a specific typology of Middle Eastern civil-military relations, Kamrava (2000) grouped the Middle Eastern states in regard to maintaining control over their militaries into four categories. The first category is within the somehow democratic settings, like Israel and Turkey, where the military still plays an important role in politics, nevertheless, the polity is the dominant force. The second category is inclusionary states like Iran, Iraq, and Libya, where the regular military is balanced by creating parallel armed forces based on ideological and familial connections to the regime. The third is in countries like Algeria, Egypt, Syria, Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen, where a former General who civilianized himself still in power and turned to a civilian autocrat. The last category is the monarchies, where the royal families depend on either foreign personnel to fill the ranks of their militaries as in Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates, or rely on tribal alliances to build parallel armed forces to balance the regular military as the case in Kuwait, Jordan, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia (Kamrava 2000: 68).

In this research, I do not look at the first category as they are non-Arab states. By excluding Bahrain from the investigation here, I do not look at the fourth category of monarchies. The analysis in this dissertation; however, is focused on the second and third categories of Kamrava's typology as the countries studied here fall in inclusionary state category (Libya) or exclusionary states category (Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen).

This classification is built on the ideological distribution of the MENA region, and it is, to a certain degree, a good classification that helps us see the Middle East in a different perspective. The ruling regimes and militaries in the MENA region were affected directly by the historical factors that led to the creation of the nation-state in the region. Therefore, for Kamrava (2000) the civil-military relations were a deterministic result of such circumstances.

Kamrava views exclusionary states as continuation of military rule in the form of civilian rule. Lutterbeck (2011: 181) summarizes Kamrava's proposition as follows: these states "are usually led by former military officers who have turned into civilian politicians. While the military is no longer directly involved in politics, it still plays an important role often through more informal channels." In this category, we observe the transformation of the military into something similar to a "parallel government" that is the real ruler of the country, but from behind the scenes.

Tribal monarchies, on other hand, are characterized by their absolute dependency on forces that are connected to the loyal tribes and on foreign 'mercenaries' in order to counterbalance the power of regular army (Kamrava 2000; Lutterbeck 2011: 13). Within the category of "dual subordination" (or multiple), the military structure is less connected to tribal loyalty alone. The structure also connects with a loyalty to an ideology, as is the case in some countries like Iran and Iraq before 2003, and Libya at the time of Gaddafi. In addition to the

regular militaries, these states created parallel militias, with fundamental missions to protect the regime from domestic threats, including the threats from the regular militaries (Kamrava 2000: 82). In this scenario, the regime tries to control all the state's apparatus ideologically, including the military apparatus. The ideological education and initiation of special cells within the armed forces become very active to support the image of the regime among the officers and soldiers and also to monitor their adherence, in terms of loyalty and obedience, to the ruler. The circle will be sealed by creating militias and battalions that are organizationally independent from each other. All will work to protect the regime and to monitor the loyalty of the rest of militias at the same time (Kamrava 2000: 82).

Overall, Kamrava presents a classification based on the historical development of the Middle Eastern militaries and regimes. This classification remains important and necessary to understand the mechanisms of how Arab militaries operate, and how they conduct civil-military relations. It does not give us the tools to explain the reactions of those militaries in times of crises. Based on Kamrava's classification, we expect that armies, within one category with similar characteristics, properties, and mechanism, will react similarly or at least closer to each other. However, the Arab Spring crisis presented to us huge differences in the reactions of Arab militaries in dealing with the crisis. This classification will be a starting point to answer questions about the Arab Spring crisis. I will try to use it to understand what happened, why it happened, and why it happened that way and not differently.

2.6 Zoltan Barany Approach

Zoltan Barany's (2016) approach remains distinguished from other approaches, because it looked at the military at the time of the uprisings. His study was not a comprehensive study

about civil-military relations in general, but it was confined to these relations during the time of the uprisings only.

Barany dedicated a chapter in his book, *How Militaries Respond to Revolutions, and Why?* (2016), to study the Arab militaries' reactions to the Arab uprisings. From the start, he indicated that there are only a few studies available about Arab militaries, because, as he states. "Arab armies were difficult to study given that the entire Arab world was composed of authoritarian states that did their best to control information and shroud their security sectors in secrecy," (Barany 2016: 3). The lack of available information to Arab and non-Arab scholars on the subject of Arab militaries (Barak and David 2010) is the most important impediment faced by researchers in the field of Arab security. The lack of information is associated largely with the nature of Arabic regimes, which are, in general, oppressive and totalitarian regimes. This structure made their various security apparatuses a very hard subject to study, and according to Pollack turning it into a taboo (Pollack 2019).

Barany's approach is concerned, particularly, in the experts' ability to forecast the reactions of the militaries in the face of Arab revolts. Then he moves to determine a methodology that will allow researchers to overcome these shortfalls, and allow the experts and researchers to predict the reactions of security apparatuses in cases of intense crises.

Barany justifies his approach using two basic arguments. First, the success or failure of revolutions depends on the stand of the military with respect to them (Barany 2016: 5). The revolutionaries, after they start the flame of the revolution, wait for the military response. That response is considered to be the message that determines the format of the development and direction of the revolution and determines its fate as well. Second, the success of uprisings can be predicted if scholars know enough about the military in a given setting (Barany 2016: 5).

With these premises, Barany (2016) classified the military of the countries that witnessed the "Arab Revolts" into three categories. Some militaries "stood" with the revolutionaries, as in Egypt and Tunisia. In other cases, the militaries were divided about the support of the revolution, as in the case of Yemen and Libya. Finally, some other militaries decided to preserve the status quo, as in Bahrain and Syria. He added a fourth category that he called the Arab monarchies' militaries that are considered to be totally separated from the political motions in their societies.

The major factor that distinguishes Barany's approach is that it takes the military as a central point for the research. He paid more attention to the soldiers and the officer corps. His attention was not about the civilian authorities or the society, except when it comes to their ability to prove his ideas that are related to making a theoretical model that allows the experts to predict the examined military response. Prior theories dealt with the civil-military relations as an interactive case between the civilian and the military. Barany dealt with these relations as an action done by the civilian side independently and freely, and the reaction done by the military side, also as an independent and free action, that might be affected by the social, economic, and anthropological circumstances of the society. Despite all of that, Barany believes military behaviors can be predicted once we learn the stimulating factors that led those behaviors to happen.

I believe that the important thing when studying civil-military relations is not the prediction of actions and reactions, as much as trying to understand those actions and reactions to explain the real world. Prediction remains subject to the pressure of the specificity of the social and human phenomena and its complexity. Therefore, it is not very logical to claim the ability to predict what a social and human phenomena can devolve into by just comparing it with previous phenomenon and with other social, economic, and anthropological circumstances. From that, we

can say that the gap between what Barany determined as goals for his study, and what he achieved, remains large, since his work is no more than a brief and comprehensive outcome of what the Arab region witnessed in 2011, and the stands of Arab armies with respect to it. The claim of the ability to predict in retrospect that Barany wanted to present in his work, by going back to read various experiences of world militaries with revolutions, and compare those experiences, does not guarantee, by any means, the ability to predict the reactions of other militaries in different economic, social, historical, and anthropological circumstances in the future.

Additionally, Barany's approach suffers from great ambivalence between his premises and the spirit of the revolution itself. He accuses the experts and scholars of the inability to predict the revolution, and therefore, the inability to predict the militaries' reactions to it. In reality the literature related to the study of revolutions suffers from its accusation of not being able to predict the event of the revolution in a society. However, this accusation contradicts the nature of the revolution itself, which relates to the eruption of conditions in a sudden moment that is not subject to material control by quantitative statistics and technical studies. The revolutionaries themselves are unable to predict the time and degree of its occurrence, its size, duration and outcome.

The Arab revolutionary situation is not complete yet, and presents itself as a model worthy of further study and reflection (BoNouman 2012: 16).The uprisings and the reactions to them are two actions based on the elements of surprise and abruptness. Therefore, attempting to predict such phenomenon remains closer to intelligence work than to scholarly academic work. Unquestionably, refuting the premise with which Barany started will lead to refuting a large part of his analysis and explanation about the different revolutions around the world. What he did not

notice, or possibly ignored, is the nature of the revolution. Despite the deficiencies that characterized Barany's approach, his work remains an important attempt, from a methodological perspective, considering the large amount of information that was brought out by his work.

2.7 Evaluation

In evaluating civil-military relations at the theoretical level, it is reasonable to argue that classifications are beneficial to learning about the common characteristics among a group of militaries and what distinguishes them from other groups. On the practical level, however, the classifications cannot be exclusive and unifying. There is always at least one military that fits in more than one category because it holds similar characteristics with more than one group. This makes explaining the reactions of militaries a complex matter, and sometimes leads to wrong conclusions.

If it is possible to put one military in more than one category, then it would be possible to explain its reaction in more than one way. Classification may help us to deeply understand the characteristics of the militaries. Zeki Sragil says, "In social sciences, typologies are criticized for being descriptive, nonexplanatory, and static," (Sargil 2011: 265). From another point of view, classification may help us compare the units that we want to classify, but it cannot help in providing a deep understanding to the reaction phenomena. Classification may remain static at the description level, while explanation and analysis need other types of mechanisms.

My main criticism of Western approaches are based on their shortcoming that uses the same analogy between Western militaries and militaries of developing countries, ignoring the particularities of those societies and their militaries. This shortcoming justifies the use of "comparative case studies" approach, which can benefit from scholarly legacy built on civil-

military relations. This approach is the most viable technique to understand and comprehend the complexities of civil-military relations.

The concordance theory was one of the most critical theories of this dominant model within the Western perspective. According to the concordance theory, when studying the civil-military relations of any country, primary attention must be paid to the cultural and historical heritage of that country, and how this legacy affects both the political and military institutions. In addition, this theory indicates that society is a major player in establishing the appropriate model for civil-military relations for each country alongside the other players, the military institutions, and political institutions (Abd Raba 2015: 30).

The other approaches that built their classifications on the different reactions at times of crises and revolutions lost direction when those approaches, as a main goal, relied on these classifications as mechanisms to predict the happenings of crises and the reactions of militaries dealing with those crises. Such predictions conflict with the essence of the revolution and the nature of the reactions that are based on the element of surprise and abruptness. Azmi Bashara (2017) says, "It is difficult, if not impossible, to make generalizations across time and space about army and politics, that is, outside a specific historical context encompassing local history, culture, social structure, and other determinants," (Bishara 2017 a: 1). This notice gains power when it comes to the security and repressive apparatuses, which exercise block, rigorous and systematic filtration of information that scholars need to use in their analysis.

Based on this logic, I will use a sociopolitical approach building on cases study method instead of the highly descriptive classification approach. The sociopolitical approach encompasses explanation and analysis on a case-by-case basis, through an explanatory framework that arises from historical, sociological, and economic data related to the military and

the state. This requires the development of an explanatory framework that will provide a convincing explanation. As such, I will consider each state as an independent category. Then I will use the explanatory framework to examine each case separately. This will allow me to understand the reaction of each military with respect to the Arab uprisings, as a special case, while evaluating their fit to the model through compatibility of the explanatory framework.

Many Western studies generalize the relations between Arab militaries and political elites. This takes away many essential facts, such as cultural, ethnic, and sectarian specificities of those countries. Such generalizations ignore the distinction of each state in the Arab world, and those distinctions make the relation between the military and polity different for each state, requiring us to study those states case-by-case in a comparative case study approach relying on a single explanatory framework.

According to Hansen and Jensen (2008), some scholars see that the role of Arab militaries was reduced to the level of protecting the ruling totalitarian regimes. However, this is a simplistic view and a contradiction of real-life propounding. This simplification does not reflect the complexity levels of the military and polity relations in the Arab world. Therefore, at the level of methodology, we avoid these generalizations, as they do not allow us to understand the Arab realities in a clear and rigorous way. As the coming chapters demonstrate, the role of the military in many cases surpassed the matter of protecting the authoritarian regimes to protect the military itself, or at least its corporate interest, or protecting the different communities that are connected to the military or the civilians.

3. The Military's Role in Revolution: A Review of Scholarship

Based on Beissinger's (2013: 574n1) concept of urban civic revolts, which involve "rapid concentration of protesters in urban spaces and the articulation of demands for political and civil

freedoms," I define popular uprisings as sustained, public, primarily nonviolent protest movements demanding regime change. Mass mobilization is difficult to predict because, in an authoritarian context, most individuals will refrain from any form of protest unless and until they believe regime change is imminent; however, once a critical mass is reached, mobilization can escalate rapidly and sweep regimes from power (Granovetter 1978; Kuran 1991).

Because the military generally has the physical capacity to violently disperse demonstrations, the military often becomes a *de facto* arbiter between protesters and the regime. When citizens opt for nonviolent protest, repression becomes one of several tools regimes may use to counter their demands, along with concessions and neglect (Bishara 2015). For political leaders, countering with physical repression relies on the cooperation of the security forces. In most cases, the police are up to the task of basic repression, dispersing crowds and restoring calm. But if protests escalate beyond the repressive capacity of police and other internal security forces, leaders must choose whether to resort to the most severe form of physical repression: military force against unarmed citizens. In these cases, the armed forces are the state's last resort to halt protesters.

Charles Tilly (1993) argues that a revolutionary outcome is marked by a loss of the monopoly of force, which happens when the regime or the military is unwilling to use (sufficient) force against protesters. In this way, the military determined the success or failure of the great European revolutions as specified by Tilly (1993: 241) "The organization of military force [has] mediated effectively between revolutionary situations and revolutionary outcomes: challengers to existing rulers who actually lack the capacity to seize power often produced revolutionary situations… but no one seized state power without gaining effective control over military force."

This central role of the military in revolution has long been observed, but not well explained. Most existing research frames the question in terms of defection and points to various factors believed to influence the military's loyalty to the political regime. As Lee (2015) argues, the critical question for military officers is whether to "defect or defend." Loyalty is an appealing explanation because it fits into the political economy rational choice framework. Whether loyalty stems from officers' values (professionalism), material interests (patronage) or identity ties (ethnicity), it is assumed that soldiers will refrain from challenging the political regime, and will even fight to defend it, as long as they remain faithful to its leader.

Military responses to revolution can encompass an array of behaviors besides mass defection or loyal defense of the regime. In a crisis, the military might also split into rival factions (Albrecht and Ohl 2016), remain quartered in their barracks (Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 2010), or attempt a coup d'état (Casper and Tyson 2014). As such, officers' loyalty to the political leadership is insufficient to explain the wide variety of roles they play in revolution.

Many discussions of the Arab Spring have framed the military response as a binary: defend the regime or support the uprising. However, when soldiers confronted the Arab Spring uprising, they responded not only with loyalty or desertion, but with a variety of strategies to manage and restore public order. The Egyptian armed forces took an active role in the crisis from the beginning, but with mixed intentions: first, they used force to quell protests, but later they delivered an ultimatum for Mubarak to resign. In Tunisia, the army's restraint toward protesters allowed the revolution to succeed, regardless of officers' political preferences. Meanwhile, defections in Syria were not enough to topple the regime, because the remaining forces applied warfighting tactics to kill and punish civilian demonstrators. In the next chapter, I offer a

framework to explain this diversity of responses to popular uprisings, illuminating the varied roles played by the militaries in the Arab Spring.

4. Military Responses to Arab Uprisings

Observing the critical role of the military in the success or failure of the Arab uprisings, researchers have produced a growing body of work seeking to explain these responses (Albrecht and Bishara 2011; Barany 2011; Lutterbeck 2013; Nepstad 2013; Taylor 2014; Bou Nassif 2015; Albrecht and Ohl 2016). In this section, I survey the theoretical literature to identify the most prominent competing arguments. While the literature on the subject is large and growing, most scholars have repeated the same few explanations, which are based on capability, professionalism, patronage, or ethnicity. However, I argue that there are other factors can be used to explain the type of military responses to Arab uprising based on the structure and the development of the civil-military relations in regard to state formation, coup-proofing, and the sectarian and ethnic structure of society.

As the unprecedented popular mobilization gained strength across the Middle East and North Africa, rulers and their security forces were defiant but fearful. During the uprisings, authoritarian regimes looked to their militaries to restore order when anti-regime protests overwhelmed the normal repressive capacity of the police and other internal security forces. The military and, in the view of the Arab leaders, are not an institution under the leadership of the state to perform its classical function as a defender of the state from foreign aggression, but are rather viewed as instruments of internal duty to save the ruling regime as a defender of last resort. Therefore, it's the action of the military at crucial political and security moments that will determine the survival of the regime. Subsequently, divergent military responses were instrumental in creating varied political outcomes across the region. The uprisings proved that

even if protesters shared similar symbols, slogans, and aspirations, the military's dissimilar responses could lend to either social transformation or human tragedy. Until now, soldiers' decisions in these critical moments remained almost a black box to outside observers. When and why do militaries intervene to repress mass uprisings and under what conditions they do not?

There are several parallel security organizations in many Arab states that exist alongside the armed forces. While acknowledging that they also played a role during the uprisings, this dissertation focuses on the armed forces. One reason for this is the accumulated scholarship which gives a logistical advantage to researchers in investigating the military intervention in response to Arab uprisings through the divergence of interactions. Another reason concerns the ability to compare an institution that can be defined along a standard set of parameters across different countries. Existing explanation in the literature for both the outcomes of the Arab Spring generally and military's role in particular offer explanations based on characteristics of the military, such as professionalism, capacity, patronage, ethnicity, or sectarianism. Instead I argue here that the primary variable in the military's behavior during the uprisings is the nature of the civil-military relations that was built and developed by Arab regime in their modern history after independence. Specifically, the development and the conduct of the coup-proofing mechanisms adopted by those regimes to keep their militaries away from politics. This dissertation tries to explain the divergent Arab militaries' responses to uprisings in a way rooted in civil-military literature, by focusing specifically on the coup-proofing mechanisms that emerged and developed during the decades of military-polity interactions in those countries. Overtime, the civil-military relations became institutionalized and routinized, turning into a specific culture and set of established practices. In the development of coup-proofing mechanisms, the most edifying moments come when the military is tested operationally, whether

in foreign combat or domestic intervention. Across the MENA region, at time when economic crisis and social unrest came as results of decades of mismanagement of societies and their resources, the popular movement came out to shake the foundation of the Arab state. In one country after the other, mass demonstrations led to confrontations with security forces, and protesters overwhelmed the police and rulers ordered the military to intervene as they sought the rescue from their defender of last resort. The varied experiences of domestic intervention by Arab militaries and its consequences at this critical juncture was established through lasting legacies of specific paths of civil-military relations developed through past-decades, with important implications for the militaries behavior when faced with new popular uprisings.

4.1 Capability of the Armed Forces

A first set of explanations focuses on capability of the military to repress the uprising by force, which depends on the size of the protests, the size and ability of the armed forces, and foreign intervention. Because internal security forces almost always respond to protests before the military, the question at hand pertains to the subset of cases where demonstrations surpass the repressive capability of the police and the need for military intervention. In responding to an uprising, the military's first consideration must be its ability to subdue protesters by force. Officers worry that the application of insufficient force may generate a backlash of increased popular mobilization (Carey 2006). In theory, the military should refrain from violence if it is too small, poorly trained, or ill-equipped to confidently confront demonstrators. It is this basic capability to repress which makes the military a persistent gatekeeper to revolution (Barany 2016: 4-5).

4.2 Professionalism

A second explanatory variable for military responses is the professionalism of military officers. Professionalism is drawn from classic civil-military relations theory and has been widely embraced despite suffering from conceptual problems that undermine its explanatory power. Professionalism is generally believed to improve combat performance in war (Biddle and Long 2004). However, the evidence on whether professionalism deters or encourages political intervention is mixed. Among the most influential arguments is the claim that military professionalism encourages depoliticization and submission to civilian control (Huntington 1957).

In the Arab Spring, scholars have claimed that professionalism either increased or decreased the likelihood of defection. For those who focus on the military's institutionalization, professionalism is associated with pro-revolutionary responses (Lutterbeck 2013; Bellin 2012), but for others, professionalism instead implies submission to regime control (Gause 2011; Barany 2011).

4.3 Patronage

A third set of explanations rests on patronage. The fundamental problem of civil-military relations has often been framed as a principal-agent or moral hazard problem (Bruneau 2006: 1-3). In such environment, the military considers its collective political and economic interests before deciding whether to support or overthrow the political regime. In this game, the regime, fearful of a coup d'état, tries to buy the loyalty of the armed forces by satisfying its material (economic and political) interests. In this way, patronage arguments conflate political interventions led by the military, on the one hand, and political crises to which the military must

react, on the other. Anti-regime public opinion and mass mobilization, when included as variables, are seen to strengthen the military's bargaining position vis-à-vis the regime.

Some scholars argue that the military's institutional autonomy determines the cost of regime change to the military organization. The military's organization is patrimonial if it depends on personal rather than formal networks and hierarchies. In this view, a patrimonial military will resist revolution in order to protect the privileges, status, and material benefits conferred by their ties to the regime. Conversely, well institutionalized armies are less averse to regime change because they will not be "ruined by reform" (Bellin 2004; 2012).

4.4 Ethnic and Religious Structure of Society

A final variable, ethnicity. The argument looks at the ethnic composition of the armed forces relative to society at large as a primary causal variable of its action (McLaughlin 2010). Scholars have argued that ethnicity determines military behavior in revolution (Makara 2013; Bou Nassif 2015). According to this literature, militaries are less prone to violent repression when their own ethnic or ideological composition mirrors that of society at large, and more violent when "ethnic stacking" fills the upper echelons of the military hierarchy with "co-ethnics" of the embattled leader (Lutterbeck 2013). With its violent response to protesters, the Syrian Armed Forces have become an example of the power of ethnicity to determine military behavior.

More broadly, ethnicity primarily affects military cohesion, rather than political loyalty or operating procedures (Albrecht and Ohl 2016). Military cohesion is not a direct cause of military responses. In sum, the ethnic composition of the armed forces relative to that of society at large does not exactly predict the military response to uprisings. On the other hand, politicized

ethnicity sometimes features military behavior, which in turn shapes soldiers' interactions with the population.

5. Conclusion

While the literature on the military and the Arab Spring is large and expanding, most scholars have relied on few explanations, which are based on capability, professionalism, patronage, or ethnicity. Since Quinlivan (1999) applied the label "coup-proofing" to Middle Eastern politics, these strategies have been a popular explanatory variable in studies of military behavior. As the term suggests, coup-proofing is designed to discourage military intervention in domestic politics, rather than ensuring loyalty during mass challenges. The coup-proofing mechanisms are based on patronage (i.e. material interests), or ethnicity, institutional counterbalancing, which proliferates rival organizations within the coercive apparatus to make coup plotting more difficult (Quinlivan 1999.) They are, separately, considered as alternative explanations. However, I argue that each one on its own separately, does not offer a convincing explanation of military responses to the uprisings.

In terms of capability of the armed force, I argue it does not, alone, explain the behavior of militaries during the Arab uprising. Regardless of the strength of the armed forces, raw capability can be undermined by the absence of force cohesion as factionalism within the military creates a lack of capability to respond to uprisings. This case can be most clearly seen in the Yemeni military action. Second, despite the military's strength and intentions, foreign intervention can be decisive either in support for or opposition to the regime. The case of NATO air campaign that annihilated the Libyan armed forces is a good example.

The argument that professionalism, alone, was the determinant factor of the action of Arab armies in general, and Tunisian army in particular, lack solid evidence and is non-falsifiable since it uses one case to show its claim. My argument is explained in chapter 4.

For the argument of patronage, which considers that patrimonial military will resist revolution in order to protect the privileges, status, and material benefits offered by the regime, I argue it is not a comprehensive explanation as well since it misses that fact that even the wealthiest states cannot afford to buy the loyalty of an entire army, and a lack of support or loyalty from junior officers can force senior officers to back down from supporting the regime. An illustration example is the case of Yemeni armed forces as discussed in Chapter 5.

In regard of ethnicity as an explanatory factor of the Arab armies' behavior, a closer look at the history of the Syrian military reveals inconsistencies in this "monocausal explanation." I argue that in the Syrian political-military development, the politicization of ethnic bias in the military, not the ethnic composition of the military relative to society, shaped the military's doctrine and response to the 2011 protests. I provide evidence about this position in Chapter 5.

Chapter 3 - The Explanatory Framework of Civil-Military Relations in the Arab World

In the previous chapters, I reviewed the conceptual and theoretical background of civil-military relations. In chapter 1, I introduced the theoretical framework. Now, I will move to a second level of analysis, examining the conceptual foundations of explanatory mechanism, that is the coup-proofing, to better understand various responses of the militaries to the Arab uprisings. The events in those countries showed us that the responses of Arab militaries were shaped by organizational and historical background in addition to the nature of the political system in their home countries. From that perspective, each single military was case specific; each produced specific reactions when the Arab uprisings started. This chapter should serve the goal of conceptual clarification before I test the implications of the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 1 that aims to answer two questions: What are the circumstances that contributed to the formation of Arab militaries? What is the explanatory framework that explains the different reactions of Arab militaries toward the uprisings of people?

In this chapter, I first briefly review the theoretical framework. Then, I provide a conceptual discussion about coup-proofing mechanisms and the nature of the Arab uprisings. It is important to present this discussion for supporting the theoretical framework and the analysis in subsequent chapters. My goal is to understand and explain the reactions of Arab militaries, with respect to acute crises that the Middle East region has been witnessing since 2010. The explanatory framework is eclectic and it builds upon the axioms and predictions of previous theories. The analysis focuses on the MENA region, especially based on the works of Janowitz (1988) and Kamrava (2000). The proposed framework takes into account the direct and indirect effect of civil-military relations on political system or the military. Furthermore, my explanatory

framework is informed by domestic social conditions. Finally, this chapter should be seen as an attempt to apply the theoretical framework to the cases in the Arab region.

1. The Coup-Proofing Mechanisms

The explanatory framework will build on a basic concept, connected organically with the motives that lead to it and the results that come from using that concept. I will refer to this concept using the moniker coined by prior scholars, the coup-proofing mechanisms. A historical investigation of the circumstances of the formation and development of Arab militaries show us that civil-military relations in the Arab World are determined by three essential factors. Each of them has a direct connection to the coup-proofing mechanisms.

The role of the military with the state building path is the first factor to be considered. The modern and contemporary history of the MENA states reveals clear differences in the paths of state building. Those paths include, among many, revolutions and obtaining independence from Western colonialism, or military coups against the monarchy regimes that formed after the fall of the Islamic caliphate. The militaries also had different contributions in the process of state building. Some were originators and promoters of the process, and therefore causing the state building. In other cases, the military was a product of the state building process, meaning it did not exist during the state building process (Gaub 2014: 15).

The first factor is closely related to how the rulers view the military. The methods of how Arab rulers ascend to power during the state formation process can be restricted to hereditary, coups (whether military or civilian), revolution, or political settlement. The rulers' view of the military can generally be characterized in various ways including fear, caution and suspicion of it, the desire to preside over it, submission to it, or the goal of being neutral and independent

from it. These various reactions formed according to the military's role in state formation, in turn, determine to a large scale the nature of the coup-proofing mechanisms.

The social, ethnic, and sectarian formation of society is the second factor that is part of explanatory framework. Theoretically, the military is supposed to pay attention to the operational duties assigned to it by the laws and official covenants of the state. This approach is explained by Drysdale (1979: 360-361) who states that the military "had a rational, formal, and hierarchical structure, that advancement within it was based on achievement rather than ascriptive criteria, and that it was receptive to innovation and hence technologically oriented." However, because of its social pertinence, the military institution is compelled to interact with the social, ethnic, and sectarian characteristics of the society of which it is a part. As a result, some militaries abandon their rationality and formality, and even its hierarchy. In the Third World countries, in general, and Arab countries, in particular, the role of ethnicity, sect, tribe, and family remains important on different levels of the armed forces. The degree of loyalty to the denomination or the tribe, in some militaries, precedes the loyalty to the state or the military. It is an inherited norm from the time of colonialism. Colonists worked hard in their hegemonic strategies to take advantage of the diverse ethnic, sectarian, and tribal differentiation in those societies, to extend their influence on the colonies with the lowest cost possible.

In this regard, Donald Horowitz (2000) mentions three elements: "the connections between soldiers and politicians; the difficulty officers experience in putting ethnic affiliations aside; and civilian intrusion into military affairs- are mutually reinforcing conditions." (Horowitz 2000: 470). The effects of these three elements, especially of the ethnic affiliations contribute to determine the role of the military and its position in the power relations network within the triangle of civil-military relations, which include the armed forces, state, and society.

The non-professional stance of the armed forces, in regard to the societies to which it belongs, is related to colonial policies. The colonial power, which was claiming to modernize the colonized people, first formed domestic armed forces. That was not an act to protect the colonialized countries but for extending the colonial forces' dominance. To carry out these actions, anthropology was the best tool to use, and it worked well. Knowledge about the ethnic and sectarian distribution was acquired accurately, then this distribution was utilized during the formation of the domestic armies. The colonial powers depended on minorities in the formation of militaries to help the colonial forces to control and make the majority submissive. As Horowitz (2000: 464) succinctly puts it:

> The persistence of ascriptive loyalties among officers and men is not on doubt. The reliability of predecessor colonial armies was founded on the willingness of troops to do their duty, not in spite of ethnic loyalties, but because of them. In some unreconstructed armies, this tradition survives. In other armies, the reconstruction of the ex-colonial officer corps to align its composition with that of the civilian regime was equally inimical to the development of ethnically detached professionalism.

After independence, many political elites in the Arab region continued to depend on ethnicity and sectarianism in the formation of armies and other balancing political acts, sometimes with more enthusiasm than the colonial powers. These colonial habits continued with independent militaries. It became clear, and sometimes necessary, that the ethnic, sectarian, and tribal structure in MENA countries to be used in shaping the role and behavior of the military. The ascriptive characteristics also influenced the levels of organization, listing, recruitment, goals, and strategies of the independent militaries. The regimes that are characterized with ethnic and sectarian diversification, both positively and negatively, use that diversification to manage

the equations of loyalty and obedience within the military's officers and personal (Gaub 2014: 15-16).

The international circumstances around the MENA region is the third factor to be considered. In this dissertation, I do not focus on this factor, but briefly mention it in my discussion where appropriate. MENA region is an arena of struggle for international and regional powers to enhance their economic, political, and cultural spoils. The political maneuvering can be represented by the creation of Israel and the occupation of Arab lands by its military. Economic struggles can be represented by the fact that the region contains most of the world's reserves of oil and natural gas. The MENA region is home to some of the most important of cultural and religious struggles worldwide. The geostrategic position makes the region one of the closest markets and transportation routes to all major economies of the world. That makes MENA, essentially, a mandatory transportation route to those markets and economies.

I argue that the formation and structure of the militaries in the region was largely influenced by these factors. Coup-proofing mechanisms was the driver of how each military perceived and responded to the uprisings. For example, the Tunisian army's reaction was a neutral one, while the Egyptian army's reaction swung between supporting the protesters and the regime. The Syrian military reaction was support of the regime all the way, while the reactions of the Libyan and Yemeni military were characterized by hesitation and division between supporting the protestors and the regime. The forms of those military reactions are what determined fundamentally the outcomes of those uprisings.

The Arab spring resulted in political and security instability of varying degrees in the region. The outcomes of the uprisings ranged from the continuation of comprehensive disorder associated with reactions of desertion or supporting the regime (Syria, Libya, and Yemen) to the

relatively chaotic situations associated with the neutral reaction or gradual reaction (Tunisia and Egypt). The worst failures of the state occurred in Libya, Syria, and Yemen. Tunisia has some probability of success of the state, while Egypt has a higher probability of failure.

Given this information, my proposition is that we can understand the outcomes of Arab uprisings through the reactions of the Arab militaries toward those uprisings. The explanation will examine these reactions through coup-proofing mechanisms strategies utilized in each country. It is proposed that the reactions of the military are also associated with the relationship of the ruler with the military, the role of the military in the state building process, the ethnic, sectarian, and cultural structure of the society, and the international environment. I will use the explanatory framework to test this proposition.

1.1 The Sources and Nature of Coup-Proofing Mechanisms

Civil-military relations are complex realities as convincingly demonstrated by the scholarship on the subject (Karabelias 1998; Lutterbeck 2011; Finer 1969). The vast literature on the subject points that the borders separating the military rule and the civilian rule are very thin, especially in authoritarian regimes. In Third World countries, the ascents to authority and power devolution rarely occur according to clear and determined mechanisms that are recognized by all members of society. Therefore, in these settings, the coups and counter coups are quite common. Civil-military relations in Third World countries, in general, are viewed in terms of conspiracy against the ruler by his opponents or from his closest aides. Machiavelli's words still remain valid when explaining the situation of Third World rulers today. He says, "Kings lose their lives through conspiracy more than open war," (Machiavelli 1532 [1950]: 410).

After WWII, coups[4] against rulers in Third World countries became the sole mechanism for power devolution. Belkin and Schofer (2005: 143) find that half of the developing countries experienced a coup between 1945 to 1985. They cite 357 coups for the 1945-1985 period and 75 coups during the 1986-2000 period. These numbers indicate troubled picture in the Third World. With this level of coups and coups attempts, the trust is lost between the civilians and militaries. The civilian does not trust the military, seeing them as an imminent threat for his existence and power. The military, on the other hand, does not trust the civilian, seeing him as a potential threat to his materialistic and incorporeal gains and privileges.

The Arab world represents a classic example of the mistrust that is prevalent between the ruler and military elites. After the independence, the majority of Arab nation-states experienced at least one coup or coup attempt. In some of those states, coups became the rule; political stability and peaceful power succession is the exception.

The rulers who came to power through coups and power of arms sought to continue the case of fear and reciprocal fear, which became prevalent among political military elites. Those rulers were in need of building mechanisms to prevent what happened to their predecessors. They worked to apply some tactics and strategies to reshape the civil-military relations. Through these mechanisms, it became hard, if not impossible, to think about initiating a coup against the ruler. These tactics and strategies are known as the coup-proofing (or prevention) mechanisms.

It appears that the driving force for the coup-proofing mechanisms is to create suspicion among different units of the armed forces, for the purpose of controlling the information flow within and among the units (Belkin and Schofer 2005). Suspicion prevents officers and soldiers

[4] Gilbert Achcar (2013) distinguishes between four types of coups including revolutionary, reformist, conservative, and reactionary.

from initiating a collective move. In addition to suspicion, the ruler will push the military units to compete against each other to demonstrate their loyalty to the ruler, which enhances his generosity and at the same time raises the levels of suspicion and caution within the different military units.

James Quinlivan (1999: 133) argues that since 1949 the Middle East has been a regime where many coups and coup-attempts took place. This situation created an environment of phobia. The ruler became uneasy for his physical safety and about maintaining the power he holds. Then, Arab regimes worked on implementing strategies to restrict the authority of the military, so its existence does not become a source of threat to the ruler. As a result, the experiences that Arab rulers faced in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s were inspiring for the rulers who wanted to proof against the coups. Those experiences made later rulers think seriously about how to avoid what their predecessors did earlier. Hence, the coup-proofing mechanisms became a fruitful strategy that led to the endurance of Arab States regimes for long decades.

Michael Makara (2013) distinguishes among three types of coup-proofing mechanisms including the "building parallel security institutions, distributing material incentives, and exploiting communal ties." The parallel paramilitary powers are given total independence from the regular military and at the same time are directly connected to the office of the leader for protecting the regime and preventing any coups attempt against it. The separation of those powers from the regular military is designed to create some type of power balance and suspicion between the military and these parallel paramilitary forces. This factor will ensure that the feasibility of any military coup is based on the calculations of cost-benefit analysis. In the absence of accurate information, the cost-benefit calculation process leans toward not executing a coup (Makara 2013: 336). This situation helps create the myth of the 'leader who knows

everything about everything.' This myth gives the ruler precedence and advantage over all other apparatuses of the state, including the intelligence apparatuses. This centralized information flow favors the ruler. From this point, carrying out a coup becomes a dangerous adventure that only audacious individuals will dare to do.

Second, as a type of political bribe, the regime deliberately provides generous benefits to the members of armed forces. Through this strategy, the regime tries to renew loyalty of these forces, since these incentives will give the armed forces a source of social mobility. Therefore, the demand to join the armed forces will increase. This increased demand gives the regime the ability to choose the individuals who are most compatible with the approved coup-proofing mechanisms (Makara 2013: 336).

Third, Makara introduces the selective recruitment to the military based on communal identity. The sectarian and ethnic groups, as well the blood relationships, will be used in filling the ranks and staff of the military to ensure absolute loyalty. This strategy works to the extent that ethnic, religious, and regional minorities live under repression in Arab-majority societies (Makara 2013: 337). If connected to one of those minorities, the ruler becomes the "Awaited Mahdi.[5]" The interest of the ruler to protect his rule will overlap with the interests of the ethnic sect; the regional group will protect his existence and keep the threat of the majority away. As a result of these interactions, recruitment based on communitarian lines will create common ground between the ruler and the ethnic, sectarian, or regional minority. Consequently, recruitment along minority lines will limit the potential thinking of a military coups.

[5] Awaited Mahdi: The Mahdi means "the guided one". Is an eschatological redeemer of Islam who, according to some Islamic school of thoughts, will appear, rule the world before the Day of Judgment, and rid the world of evil.

The coup-proofing strategies are a continuum between strengthening and weakening. Based on those strategies, we can understand the civil-military relations as a reaction to the coup-proofing mechanisms. The reactions of the ruler differ toward the threat from the military according the ethnic, sectarian, and political structures of the state and society. Some rulers will deliberately strengthen the military and gain its loyalty for his benefit as a strong ally for the ruler. Others work to weaken the military, as it is considered as threatening an enemy as the rulers (Barany 2011: 29).

1.2 Varieties of Coup-Proofing Mechanisms and their Consequences

The literature specifies four different types of coup-proofing models (Brome 2018; Holger 2015; Quinlivan 1999) including military threat, subordination of the military, subjugation of the ruler, and the professionalism (i.e. modernity). When faced with a threat from the military, the ruler will depend on a mechanism established based on marginalizing the military and dismantling it from any sort of authority that can affect the future of the ruler. In essence, this strategy strengthens the ruler and weakens the military. Therefore, the loyalty to the power will follow the logic of the strength or weakness of the ruler. This model represents the case of Libya. The circumstances of Ghaddafi ascending to power, and the tribal structure of the Libyan society, pushed the ruling regime to substitute the construction of the army with the concentration on militias and arming and training the population. This led to a weakened military operating on the margin of the state and not using its mandate. In the Libyan case, the army collapsed and the country descended into the destructive civil wars.

Second, in the military subordination to the ruler model, the ruler attempts to strengthen the military in the way that benefits his authority. This model develops a quasi-incorporation between the ruler and the military, therefore the loyalty to the authority happens according to the

ruling junta rationale. This model fits the Syrian and the Yemeni cases. In those two countries, the historical circumstances, including coups, civil wars, and social circumstance such as diversity of ethnic and sectarian pluralism, led to the integration of the military into the state and its apparatuses. With the start of the uprising, the state unity collapsed without a total collapse of the regime, and we witnessed the creation of more than one army and the waging of the civil war.

In the ruler subjection to the military model, the military turns to a ruling institution from behind the scene, in what is known as parallel government and deep state strategy. In this case, the loyalty to authority happens according to the military logic. This model represents the Egyptian case. The imposition of protectionism by the British, the Free Officers coup, and the Arab-Israeli wars played principal roles in forming the military institution. Thus, the prevailing political, economic, and cultural circumstances in Egypt led the military to become a parallel institution to the state. That position made the military act, almost fully, independently from the conduct of the state, where it adopted the withdrawal to win in offense strategy. The result was to sacrifice the regime for the purpose of rebuilding the military state and renovate it. Hence, the acceptance of the military of the fall of Hosni Mubarak at the expense of the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood was nothing but a strategy to resurrect the power of the officers' corps (Sayigh 2012: 20-21).

Finally, in the professionalism or modernity model, the state neutralizes the military to the benefit of strengthening the police force and the ruler's authority. This means adopting the professional military strategy where loyalty to the authority occurs based on a cost-benefit analysis. This model represents the state of Tunisia. The historical circumstances that were associated with the creation of the Tunisian state, and the adoption by the Tunisian people of a

modernity project that derives its pillars from the Western model, produced a professional military that dealt with the uprising in a way that allowed for a smooth transfer of power without so much material or human casualties with relatively little cost. Even though that action led to the fall of the regime, the state stayed in position and acted independently. Table 3.1. below shows the essence of the coup-proofing models.

Table 3.1.

Coup-Proofing Models: Elements and Examples

Model	Elements	Cases
Threat from Military	Marginalization	Libya
	Dismantling authority	
	Strengthening ruler and weakening military	
Military subordination to ruler	Strengthen military to benefit ruler	Syria
	Quasi-incorporation of ruler and military	Yemen
Ruler subjection to military	Military rules from behind the scene	Egypt
	Loyalty to authority according to military conditions	
Professionalism (modernity)	Neutral political stand	Tunisia
	Strengthening police force and ruler authority	
	Distance military from repression practice	

Since the beginning of the 1970s, Arab countries witnessed a significant reduction of coup attempts, and mostly failed. This can be attributed to the adaption to various coup-proofing mechanisms by the different regimes. In other words, the coup-proofing mechanisms brought what those regimes aimed to achieve: survival of the regime, political stability, and keeping armed forces away from the aspiration of changing the status quo by force (Makara 2013: 335). This does not mean that coup-proofing mechanisms were a perfect way to eliminate coups and

coup-attempts, but they succeeded in reducing the probability of military coups significantly. The exceptional cases became rare (Sudan and Mauritania), and change of some heads of regimes in some Gulf monarchies that can be depicted as "reforms" in distribution of power within the ruling family. Therefore, we can notice clearly that coup-proofing mechanisms adopted by different Arab regimes were effective as the average tenure of Arab rulers in power became among the longest in the world.

These mechanisms were successful in enhancing the power of the ruler, and ensuring the stability of the governance in his hands for long periods. However, it led to the weakening of the armed forces of the Arab states in a dreadful manner. If we examine the details of those coup-proofing mechanisms for each Arab state, we can increase our understanding of setbacks that Arab militaries have witnessed through 1960s to 1980s. This is what Ulrich Pilster and Tobias Bohmelt (2011: 335-337) stress when they explain clearly that the coup-proofing mechanisms, as much as it solidifies and strengthens the power of the leader, it weakens the effectiveness of the militaries and slows down the speed of the operative unit. Consequently, the coup-proofing mechanisms transformed the Arab armies into weak armies that were unable to have initiatives and to move fast (Powel 2012: 1024). Overall, while the coup-proofing mechanisms were beneficial to the ruling regimes, it weakened the armed forces and their ability for fast reaction, even in their original duty of performing and winning wars.

2. Revolutions, Coups, and Popular Mobilization

We cannot pass to the stage of dissecting the relationship between the civilian and the military during the period of transformation during the Arab Spring and its aftermath without discussing the concept of the revolution and exploring its relationship with the coups. This will

provide a conceptual and theoretical background to develop a clear view when presenting information about the specific cases in the Arab World.

There is an extensive literature on revolutions (Lane 2008; Tilly 1993; Skocpol 2015; Goldstein, Jiao, and Lhundrup 2010; Tanter and Midlarsky 1967). Tanter and Midlarsky (1967: 267), for example define revolutions in terms of insurgents, capture of political authority, and use of force. Lane (2008: 528-529), on the other hand, differentiates between a putsch, coup d'état and revolution and views revolution as the most significant social event. Despite the essential differences among the three modes, in Lane's account, the surrounding circumstances facilitate, to a large degree, the transformation from one mode to the other. In the same way that a military mutiny turns into a revolution, the revolution can turn into a coup at any moment. The military mutiny indicates a radical violent change through which the governing elites will be charged and expelled and may be suppressed by other elites that were able to control the state with violence and power of arms.

The revolution follows a more complex path. Charles Tilly (1993: 234) defines a 'revolution' as: "a forcible transfer of power over a state in the course of which at least two distinct blocs of contenders make incompatible claims to control the state, and some significant portion of the population subject to the state's jurisdiction acquiesces in the claims of each bloc." Therefore, the main characteristic that distinguishes the revolution from the previous two modes is the complete freedom of the elites who choose to take this path away from the governing elites. Therefore, the revolution represents formidable challenge to the existing regime, where the public support is necessary for the revolution's success. The revolutionaries are seeking to be a part of the remuneration for their weak political, legal, and military position, using the public support to exert pressure on the existing regime. In this situation, the revolution will not be

successful until the revolutionaries are able to change the balance of power by controlling all the power resources and galvanizing the public aspirations for change.

Looking deeply into those revolts and the counter revolts in the Arab uprisings, it becomes obvious that we cannot label them as revolutions. This conclusion follows the conceptualizations presented above. Specifically, the conflicts among the segments of all the existing Arab regimes and their governing elites, the outcomes of those Arab revolts and the actual beneficiaries from those outcomes demonstrate that most of these uprisings were significant mobilization movements but they were not revolutions. Contradictions were the character of the period. There was the temporary alliance between secularists and Islamists, then the vicissitude of either one of them on the other, in addition to other factors pushing into the environment. One cannot say without hesitation that the Arab uprisings were taken advantage of and used as means for coups. Some segments of the existing regimes managed to surpass the coup-proofing mechanisms and transform the "revolution" into some sort of reformist revolutionary coups.

The segments who set those uprisings in motion that way were able to "hit a swarm with one stone". One segment toppled all other segments, without breaching the national and international laws and norms. If those had been violated, it would have required extraneous diplomatic activities to justify and push the change through. At the same time, the segment that utilized the revolution had fulfilled, in nominal terms, the protestors' demands for change, surpassing the public pressure created by the uprising with minimum effort and losses possible and without losing the public base for the governing elites, or for parts of them at least. Also, the determination of the protestors was broken without aggravating the international and domestic publics and avoiding the media storm that usually accompanies revolutions at the same time.

Most importantly, the segments who exploited the Arab uprisings were able to hit the Islamic movements with suppression, without falling under pressure from international human rights standards or entangling them in the long-term exhaustive struggle in the global war on terrorism.

The developments of the Arab uprisings allow us to find a common trend in different countries: the establishment elites are allowed to come back to power. In that regard, the Islamist movement, being almost the only organized opposition movements to Arab ruling regimes, became the scapegoat of the struggle for redistribution of power. The start was in Egypt, where members of the Islamic movement were removed from the top of the power structure to go into prisons or exile. In Tunisia, the pressure from secularists and fear of repeating the Egyptian experience caused the Islamists, despite winning the majority seats of the parliament, to give up their attempt to form the government. In the other three cases: Yemen, Syria, and Libya, they became parties in conflict and in some cases aligned with radical elements. All the factions will be different when the wars end, no matter what the results of those wars were.

Based on those outcomes, the Arab uprisings created a situation basically characterized by some polarization: Sunni-Shia; Arab-non-Arab; moderate Islamists-Radical or violent Islamists; and Islamic-Christian. Such polarization clearly is not beneficial to any of those states and societies. In addition, the process of reconstructing the methods of power-sharing was not beneficial to any of the insurgents' groups. On the contrary, the ruling elites, or some factions of them, became more entrenched in the power structure. All that had happened for the elites is to reenter through the window after being expelled through the door.

As a result of all of the above, it is hard to speak about revolution in the Arab cases, according to the standard definition of a revolution. This assessment may seem prejudiced and pessimistic. However, if we follow the history of old and modern revolutions and examine the

mechanisms used to manipulate the revolutionary momentum, we may find after evaluating it based on its negative outcome, that the revolution was transformed into bloodless coups. David Lane (2008) affirms such an assessment. “The coloured revolutions, I contend, fall into the revolutionary coup d’état category: they have high elite (or counter-elite) participation; high public (mass) participation but of an ‘audience’ type; they lead to elite renewal, but not to the reconstitution of the political class or wider social and economic changes in property relations,” (Lane 2008: 529).

As an example, there is much to debate still about what happened in Egypt in 2013. Was it a counter-revolution or a military coup? The debate remains because the totalitarian ruling regimes are able to play with the concepts and terms in ways that enable them to cast doubt and suspicion among the most intelligent citizens. The rulers create this confusion and complication on purpose between the concepts of revolutions and coups. It is totally rational to raise the question about the actions that were called “Arab revolutions”. Were they really revolutions or just coups coated with genuine and emotional public uprisings that was hijacked and exploited in a way that permitted the avoidance of the revolution and the reconstruction and redistribution of authority? Did repression of the uprisings allowed for the return to the status quo with the least possible losses?

Azmi Bishara (2011) criticizes some of the Arab elites because they denied the Arab movements to be called “Revolutions”, accusing those elites of being influenced by their leftist notions, which do not recognize a revolution unless it is led by the political elites and the intelligentsia. This criticism might be correct at a certain level of analysis; that analysis points to these movements as a popular attempt aiming to change the current situations using political

means. Here we may object the stand of the Arab elites, as did Bishara; as these movements only contained the minimum levels of the elements to be considered revolutions.

However, we also agree with these elites, since these movements that were called revolutions incur exploitation from their early stages by some political and intelligentsia elites, like Islamists, states elites, nationalistic elites, and opposition elites living abroad. Later in the life of the movements, they were not able to reach the requisites of a revolution especially, when those elites succeeded in transforming what were called Arab revolutions into coups against the existing regimes and revolutionaries. They even were successful in surpassing the stage of the popular uprising, to bring back the equilibrium to the political and social situations and the country itself to the old situation. In other cases, the movements took destructive paths, because they fell prey to domestic-national and other global-external calculations, which cannot be described as a revolution anyway.

To be fair to Bishara (2011) and the Arab elites he criticized, we can say that the movements started as revolutions and ended as something else. Various types of plots transferred those movements to something similar to bloodless coups or quiet coups in some cases, like Tunisia and Egypt, or to a civil war in Syria, Libya, and Yemen.

Bishara says (2011: 22), “What is meant by the revolution is a broad popular movement outside the existing constitutional structure, or outside legitimacy, intended to change the existing system of governing in the state. In that sense, the revolution is a movement to change an existing political legitimacy that it does not recognize and replace it with new legitimacy.” This definition is affirming what I present here, as a compromise, between Bishara’s stance defending Arab revolutions and the stance of other Arab elites who negate them.

With respect to Bishara's definition of a revolution, I agree that the Arab movements were revolutions, or at least beginnings of revolutions. However, if we continue with his definition, we find that he points to a movement to change an existing system and replace it with new system. When we realize that none of the cases of the Arab movements succeeded in really changing an existing system to a new one, then we agree with some Arab elites who Bishara criticized. Using the same standards that Bishara himself determined, we say there were no revolutions, only revolution attempts. Quickly the political elites contained them and turned them into bloodless coups or civil wars.

The realization of this specific definition of revolution leads me to question the change evoked by the "revolution" in Tunisia. What is the difference between Zain El Abidin Bin Ali and Albaji Caid Sibsi? What is the difference between Hosni Mubarak and Abdulfatah al-Sisi? What is the difference in the circumstances in Libya, Syria, and Yemen before and after the "revolutions"? Understanding the Arab movements as incomplete revolutions, or abortive revolutions, is important to test the implications of proposed theoretical framework. We will be able, using this framework, to comprehend the Arab militaries' reactions toward the revolts, as part of the course of military intervention in politics and civil life in the Arab World and as a complement to that path. As much as those revolution attempts carried the effluent hopes of freedom and liberation, their ends were killers to those hopes (Dahab 2013) because of the sufferings that Arab societies endured as a result of those uprisings.

Tunisia represents the clearest example of the frailty of the separating boundaries between revolution, coup, and conspiracy and of such explanatory argumentation that cannot be believed easily. The Tunisian case appears to look like a complete and successful revolution. The popular movement continued to pressure the regime and the security forces, causing the

president to flee, after the military abandoned him, in a move that looks like a fictional movie for the Arab mind. In the moment when the president needed the military, this institution decided, against the custom in the region, to be neutral. Neutrality here is read, according to the approaches of Janowitz (1988) and Finer (1969), as a decisive and fatal political action. Through this, the first battle was settled in favor of the people and the uprising, at least as it looked then. However, the following battles and the final results of what was called the "Jasmin Revolution" indicated that what happened was an exploitation of a revolution that was on its way to success.

This expected success meant realization of deep changes in the social structure, and in the distribution of power, and moreover, radical changes in the redistribution of the physical, financial, and economic privileges among the bourgeoisie, the political, and even military, elites. Therefore, it was necessary for those elites to interfere. Even to make alliances to frame this revolution, and to frame the possible changes that might come out of it. After that, plots started to materialize against the regime and the revolution at the same time. Bin Ali was sacrificed, since his existence, even before the revolution, became dangerous to these bourgeoisie, political, and military elites' interests. Also, some of the revolutionary principles were sacrificed, since its completion would be dangerous to those elites, as well. From here, the "happy" end result was for the revolution to be finalized without the implementation of the sought changes, and the return of the Bin Ali regime elites to the front, with the blessing of the revolutionaries themselves.

3. Limits of the Research Project and Necessary Methodological Cautions

This research will explore the associations between state formation paths, military structures, and the reflection of social heterogeneity in military organization in those states that witnessed revolutionary actions and faced it with various military responses. Therefore, this

research will surpass cases of some Arab states. My strategy is to exclude certain cases for complications that will make the analysis and testing so complex. I consider Iraq as a special case for several reasons. First, the chaos witnessed by this country preceded the Arab revolts; it was a result of the U.S. invasion and the toppling of the Saddam Hussein regime and the dismantling of its military. The other side caused such chaos is the regional, particularly Iranian intervention in domestic political, social, and economic Iraqi affairs. Thus, there are various endogenous effects that forces me to exclude Iraq. Second, I prefer not to focus on the Jordanian and Moroccan kingdoms due to low intensity protests. In the early stage of weak protests in these countries, the regime intervened quickly and expanded the political space for the opposition to allow them to compete for power in a limited democratic environment. Therefore, the opposition became the safety net for the royal regime, and played the role of safeguard against shocks, and worked, whether realizing that or not, for the benefit of protecting the royal regime. In the second stage, the ruling regimes used the tragic outcomes of the Arab revolts as excuses to intimidate the society and activists about affecting the security and stability, using the equation of "I or the chaos and devastation." Finally, Bahrain is not included due to other endogenous factors complicating the case. Despite strong protests there were two issues in Bahrain. First, it was purely Shia population who participated in the popular movement, demanding equal rights from purely Sunni elites, who control the power structure. Thus, the sectarian dimension was the essence of the movement, without including other parts of the population. Second, the foreign military intervention, through the *Desert Shield* forces, worked in favor of the regime and suppressed the revolt completely. This factor removes the possible variation in civil-military relations and their effects on protest outcomes.

I also limit the analyses to the study to the regular militaries under the control of the Ministry of Defense. The other security forces, most likely under the command of the Ministry of Interior, will be outside the scope of this research, unless it is necessary to examine those forces. Essentially, in the cases where exploring the role of these forces is important and beneficial for understanding the military phenomena and its development, then those forces will be examined in any of the cases studied.

Furthermore, my sample is also limited to the Arab Uprisings. These include the mass protests that followed the Tunisian uprising which started at the end of 2010. This means the time frame for this research will be limited to the uprisings that characterized some Arab states starting at the end of 2010. I will not examine other specific events, unless that examination is important, beneficial, and helpful in understanding the development of the revolutionary actions or the military reaction occurring after 2010 that are covered by this research.

In this dissertation, I developed an explanatory framework utilizing the discussion I put in the previous chapters about the civil-military relations literature and the resulted coup-proofing mechanisms. The analytical framework is based on the different paths of the creation and development of the civil-military relations in each country under investigation and how the coup-proofing mechanisms adopted by each regime played role in influencing the military response to the popular uprisings. This chapter provided the conceptual background about coup-proofing and the nature of uprising that supports the theoretical mechanisms related to the military's reaction to the Arab Spring. The coup-proofing mechanisms in the countries I investigated are organic product of the view of the regime (ruler) of the armed forces, the role of the military in the state formation and nation building, and the ethnic and sectarian structure of society. All those factors, together, shaped the formation and adoption of the specific coup-proofing mechanisms in each

country that produced the military response to the popular uprisings and their aftermath. The international factors also matter, but this dissertation will only briefly mention this effect for the sake of simplicity.

Chapter 4 - Analysis of Military Reactions Toward the Arab Spring Uprisings: Between Democracy and Authoritarianism

This chapter and chapter 5 are designed to discuss the different paths of the development and the outcomes of the Arab uprisings in the five states covered in this study. Based on the classification I developed in chapter 3 according to the most similar and most different systems design (Przeworski and Teune 1970; Anchar 2008), I will discuss the cases of Tunisia and Egypt in this chapter as they represent the relatively "successful" and the relatively "peaceful" (though return to autocracy) experiences of the Arab uprisings in the two countries respectively. The decision to put these two cases together in this chapter is based on the similarity of their social ethnic structure, and the "relatively" peaceful outcome of the political change that ended either with democracy or authoritarianism as a result of the uprisings (most similar systems).

In this research, I define success, stability, and failure in the context of the military's reaction to the demands of the protestors. Despite the differences among the mass uprisings in Cairo, Tripoli, Tunis, Sanaa, and Damascus, they all had one common denominator that asked for a regime change. The protestors were asking for transparency, accountability, inclusiveness, and public service. The failure and success are defined with respect to these demands. As such, Tunisian case is a success where the armed forces allowed the transformation of power to a system of representative democracy moving toward those goals. While the case of Egypt is not the same as the armed forces took control of the situation based on their own interest rather than meeting the demand of the protestors. Therefore, the armed forces in Egypt brought the country back to authoritarian stability in terms of continuation of old practices of the deposed regime by keeping the country under tight control of the armed forces from behind the scenes. This makes the Egyptian case a failure story that reverted to authoritarianism. In one sense, the authoritarian

stability continued. In the cases of Libya, Syria, and Yemen, the results of the armed forces reaction to the demand of the protestors brought the three countries to civil war. In other words, the results in these cases can be classified to be failure to the extent that protestors' demands were not met and this resulted in instability. The three regimes could not go back to the old style of authoritarian control as happened in Egypt, nor are they moving toward peaceful, consistent, and open democratization as happened in Tunisia.

Relatively peaceful in these two cases is the context that the armed forces did not use excessive force to quell the demonstrations. In other words, the armed forces in Egypt and Tunisia did not use their armed capabilities to defend the political regimes by attempting to crush the uprisings violently in comparison to what the Syrian, Libyan, and Yemeni armed forces did.

The next chapter, chapter 5, will include the cases of Syria, Yemen, and Libya based on the similarity of the outcome of the uprising being prolonged civil war, collapse of the state, and the destruction of the national institutions and societies, but different ethnic, social, and military structures (most different systems)..

After introducing the explanatory framework, I will now discuss the structure and the behavior of the militaries in the Arab Spring countries. Using the conceptual and theoretical foundations developed in the previous chapters, I will explain the civil-military relations and their effect on the outcomes of popular protests in the Arab world. The analysis will begin with the introduction of statistical figures about the Arab militaries, based on 2010 statistics. Despite the availability of more recent data regarding those militaries, the 2010 data represent the situation of those militaries at the time of the Arab Spring uprisings. Therefore, those are the data upon which I will apply this explanatory framework. These militaries witnessed huge structural changes after 2010 resulting in significant social and political outcomes. First, I will discuss the

ruler's relations with the ethnic and sectarian diversity with respect to the structure of civil-military relations in each case. Then, I will examine the coup-proofing mechanisms adopted by the ruler, and its effects on the military's role, position, and strength relative to other apparatuses of the state. Finally, I will look at the military's reaction toward the crises created by the uprisings in each country, the results of such a response, and the outcomes of this reaction for each case.

1. Tunisian Military: Professionalism at Stake

On January 14, 2011, the Tunisian protestors succeeded in ousting the country's autocratic president for twenty-three years without the force of arms. The key to their success was the restraint of the army, which did not join the police in suppressing the anti-regime protests that would topple President Ben Ali and lead to the county's first free and fair elections in its modern history. This military response, unique in the Arab world, defies simple explanation, yet it played a critical role in the success of the uprising.

Tunisia is an exemplary case to study the role of the military in a non-violent uprising because it is the only still ongoing democratic transition to follow the wave of popular uprisings in the Arab World. The national army's political neutrality throughout the uprising and transition has been critical to Tunisia's democratization. Not only did the army refrain from intervening to suppress the uprising, but it also remained unified and capable enough to restore order in the aftermath of Ben Ali's fall.

Since the Arab Spring, scholars have worked to make sense of the Tunisian army's surprising positive role during the uprising. Most explain the army's response as a result of either incapacity or disloyalty, motivated by professionalism (Bellin 2012), organizational interests (Brooks 2013), or personal grievances against the civilian regime (Bou Nassif 2015 b). Upon

close inspection, however, we see that the army was neither disloyal nor incapacitated, but genuinely neutral.

It appears that the Tunisian experience was the only successful experience in transition to democracy, compared to the other four cases. Therefore, the Tunisian model provides hope that a positive change may happen in the existing Arab regimes, particularly if Arab militaries reach the level of professionalism that the Tunisian army showed during and after the Tunisian uprising. The Tunisian army was able to play the role of mediator that ensured the balance with the other two sides of the triangle: the state and the people.

The Tunisian military went through a tough test during the "Jasmine Revolution", as the Tunisians refer to their uprising. It succeeded in the first stages of that test and needs to stay on that same path during the following stages, which it is still going through since Tunisia entered the transitional period. First came the technical test in the war against terrorism. The success in that would have been evidence of the power of the military and its capabilities to protect the country from external and internal threats. Second came the political test in ensuring moderation of Islamists and inclusiveness of secularists in the political process. The success at this stage is evidence of integrity and professionalism, and the unwillingness of any involvement by the military in a restless political interaction, that would become even worse if the military gets involved.

According to International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), in the wake of mass protests, the Tunisian military was composed of 35,000 members. Among those, 27,000 were in the army, with 5,000 active duty and the rest are reserves. Four thousand-eight hundred were in the Navy, and 4,000 were in the Air Force. The paramilitary units had about 12,000 men. The military service period for reservists is 12 months, and it is selective (IISS 2011: 274). The

military spending amounted to only1.4% of the GDP, making Tunisia a very low spender on military in the world and the lowest in the Arab region (Brooks 2013: 210). The Tunisian military was small and weak, however, it was well-trained based on Western programs, especially since it participates widely in international peacekeeping missions.

1.1 The Tunisian Military and State-Building Tracks

Tunisia became a French protectorate in 1881. The Tunisians resisted the French mandate until Tunisia gained independence in 1956. What distinguishes the Tunisian case is that it gained independence with no need for violent struggle. Tunisians, in contrast to many Arab countries, did not go through an armed struggle that could lead to the formation of a revolutionary military that bears the burden of liberating the country and then building it. The independence came as a result of a long political resistance process led by former President Habib Bourguiba. The leader of independence movement was a civilian, a lawyer. This made a difference, according to Halkjelsvik, who argues that "the Tunisian military [became] a product of independence, rather than that it being the one who created independence," (Halkjelsvik 2014: 11). This specific path led the Tunisian case to subdue military to the civilian authority from the beginning (Brooks 2013: 209). As a result, the Tunisian military's loyalty was directed to the Tunisian state, not any specific group, tribe, or the leader.

The general and common sense of the subordination of the Tunisian military to the Tunisian state led to the voluntary acceptance of the military to stay in its barracks, and monitor the situation in silence and neutrality. That can be explained by the level of professionalism gained (Gaub 2014: 26). Even when the officers and soldiers had political stands about domestic and regional events, they kept silent and neutral, so they did not influence the political life in the country. Lisa Anderson confirms this proposition by stating, "Tunisia's military also played a

less significant role in the country's revolt than the armed forces in the other nations experiencing unrest. Unlike militaries elsewhere in the Arab World, such as Egypt, the Tunisian army has never experienced combat and does not dominate the domestic economy," (Anderson 2011: 3).

President Bourguiba was highly influenced by the modern Western model, in general, and the French model, in particular. Therefore, he tried to reproduce that model in exact form, without consideration of the cultural peculiarities. This issue made his project falter and did not bring the outcomes for which he hoped. Nevertheless, we can say that his project succeeded, at least with regard to the civil-military relations, as he tried to organize it based on the European model (Gaub 2014: 26). After 30 years of independence and the separation of the military from civilian rule, the separation of the professional military and political tracts was very clear for the Tunisian regime. The mixing of the tracks by President Ben Ali was a mistake that he tried to use to correct Bourguiba's error of totalitarian rule and the desire to rule exclusively, without taking in consideration the values of modernity that he spent his entire life defending and promoting.

The Tunisian regime, during both the reigns of Bourguiba and Ben Ali, prohibited the military from approaching the political domain. The military had a limited share of the total public spending ranging from 2% to 5% (Taylor 2014: 74) and even lacked the ability to discuss this financial situation with the government officials.

Townsend (2015: 6) points that the Tunisian military was directed toward international missions and somehow isolated from intervening in domestic issues. Ironically, the service of military attention toward international conflicts and peacekeeping operations resulted in a professional army well trained according to the international standards. As such, Taylor (2014: 74) argues that, President Bourguiba followed a double strategy of curtailing military budget and

occupying the armed forces with international operations. However, given the peaceful ideology of the Tunisian regime with its neighbors and the international community, and the lack of domestic unrest and disturbances, in reality, the military practiced only one mission. They participated in social activities sponsored by the state for building infrastructure and supporting educational activities.

Consequently, the Tunisian military has been a professional and neutral institution serving the Tunisian state regardless of the political leadership. What we have in the case of Tunisia is a military establishment that removed itself from the political arena (Sarigil 2011: 267). As a result, Eva Bellin concisely states, "in Tunisia the decision by the military elite to defect was the least surprising development. Tunisia was well known for having a professional army which was small and removed from politics," (Bellin 2012: 133-134).

The professionalism of the Tunisian military had two consequences. First, it ensured the modesty of the officers' and soldiers' inspirations, through their discipline and commitment to the tasks conferred upon them by the country's constitution, which included protection of the country not the regime. Second it provided a feeling of security to the political establishment to the extent that it was not the tradition of the Tunisian military to threaten the political leaders. As such, building a professional military turned to be one of the authoritarian regime's strategies to protect its rule and continuation in power. These two conditions, therefore, resulted in what can be called *Tunisian exceptionalism*: when the struggle between the regime and the opposition materialized, as it happened after the "Jasmine revolution," it was limited in the political arena taking place between the regime and its opponents. The third actor of the triangle, the military, had no intention of using or threatening to use its power to resolve the political issues.

In effect, this outcome has been partly caused by Ben Ali's deliberate strategy. Not only he isolated the military and prevented it from participating in the daily affairs of the Tunisian state, but there are suspicions that he was involved in physical eliminations of some of the best officers in the Tunisian military. In general, there are three important events that can help us understand, to a large extent, the relations between the military and the civilians in Tunisia.

The first stage was the coup attempt of December 1962, and the suspicions about the military's involvement. As detailed by Hopwood (1992: 85-89) several military men along civilians were executed or prisoned as a result of quick and partial trials. This first event exemplifies the end of the struggle between Bourguiba and his fellow rebels, where he was able through the discovery of this conspiracy, or fabricating it, to put an end to the attempts of the old rebels to influence the path of building the Tunisian state. Bourguiba, the intellectual and the political activist, was not enthusiastic about including non-educated individuals, who had little political experience, in political activities. He despised them and refused even to discuss the issue. The state, for him, was an issue for the intellectual political elite that have technical experience in different fields of development, to manage. The important issue in that case, which formed the stance of the president toward the military and the military's stance toward the president, to a large extent, is that the conspiracy was arranged by civilians (Hopwood, 1992). They had the initiative, and they sought help from military men, mostly retired ones. Nevertheless, the military paid the cost of the failure of that attempt, when a strange order was issued to punish all of the officers by demoting their ranks, which was an inconsistent order with the standards of legal provisions and the constitution. However, the military understood the message very well. Its distance from politics became a necessary condition to obtain professionalism (Wren 1979: 1-3).

The second event was the Hunger Revolution, or the Bread Revolution of 1984 and the military's role in its suppression. The military participation at that time was necessary from a political point of view, and it was a decisive intervention to bring security and stability back. However, it was a very important lesson for the military, which realized later that it committed a mistake by siding with the government against the people, especially when their demands were objective and legal. The regime, from its own perspective, felt that it made a mistake as well by not preparing the needed forces to confront situations like what happened. So reforms were needed (Brooks 2013: 206-208). This is what Ben Ali did when he established some paramilitary security apparatuses whose numbers were about five times that of the regular military. That reform was necessary because the civilian elites knew that engaging the military in situations like those will open its appetite for more involvements that might affect the civil-military relations that were controlled well by those elites until now (Wren 1979)

The third event was the fall, or possible shooting down, of the Tunisian military commander-in-chief's helicopter with 12 high ranking Tunisian officers aboard. Rumors spread about the involvement of President Zain El Abidine Ben Ali and his security forces in that incident (BBC 2002; Kallander 2011).

In light of the military experience with the first stage, and the lesson it learned from the second stage, and the doubts about the aggressiveness of the political elites toward the military officers in the third stage, the civil-military relations matter and demand of the neutrality of the military by the state and the people, became a military requirement, before it became a civilian and political necessity.

1.2 The Ruler and the Ethnic and Sectarian Diversity

Before the establishment of the Tunisian state, people of Tunis were embedded in traditional social structures based on kinship and tribalism. This social structure was maintained during the Ottoman and the French reign. Habib Bourguiba strove to change this in the process of nation-state formation. The Bourguibian modernist project was a radical revolution against all traditional social organizing forms. He saw the traditional social mechanisms as retroactive structures that did nothing but increase the backwardness of the Tunisian society and the state. The nation-state worked to achieve national integration by all political, administrative, cultural, and media means. Since its inception, it has taken the initiative to replace the structures inherited from the pre-colonial times with new organizational structures aimed at achieving national unity (Bou Talib 2012: 106). Thus, Bourguiba focused on education as a central means to propagate and instill his modernist vision of the state.

The modernist project eventually succeeded in transforming Tunisia into a modern nation-sate that did not suffer from acute ethnic or sectarian conflicts. The Tunisian society lived in relative homogeneity in regard to ethnicity and sectarianism. There were no major ethnic tension reported between the Arabs and the Berbers as was the case in Algeria, Morocco, and Libya. All kinds of possible interactions between the tribes and the modern structures of the state had been weakened, even eliminated to the degree that the tribal order in Tunisia appeared as if it did not exist. Eliminating the tribal order does not mean eliminating the existence of the tribe. History and experience taught us that tribal structure mastered the practice of "precaution." In that, the tribal structure pretends to hide when the pressure to change becomes dangerous to its existence, then it quickly emerges again when it senses the weakness or collapse of the central structures of the state.

On the religious side, the majority of Tunisians are Sunnis, followers of the Maliki school of thought. The Bourguiba modernist project worked to reshape religion and its position in the nation-state. Bourguiba was keen to remove religion from any role in political, economic, and even social relations among the Tunisians (Boulby 1988). He strived to transfer religion into a ritual practice, with no social or political role. The "battle of religion" was the main battle in Bourguiba's modernist effort against all traditional practices; this "battle" led to acute polarization between Islamist and secularists. This polarization made the Tunisian regime very cautious about any attempts of Islamists to move against the secular system. Based on that, the Tunisian regime was not afraid of the military, any ethnic group, or religious sect, but they were afraid of Islamists. Murphy (1999: 200) argues that the regime worked hard to isolate the Islamists and prevent them from participating in political activities in a free and independent competition.

In addition to the polarization between Islamist and secularists, there was also class-based and regional polarization in Tunisia. The latter includes polarization between north and south, or urban coastal areas and southern rural and desert areas. Despite its relative ethnic homogeneity, there are important socioeconomic differences in Tunisian society. For example, Murphy (1999: 226-227) reports significant economic variation between the highly urbanized North holding the 67% of the population with rural South with 33%. The majority of residents of the northern coastal areas are secular and modern, but the residents of the more isolated areas are more religious and traditional (Taylor 2014: 58). Faced with these social differences, and in fear of revolts demanding a more fair distribution of wealth and development projects among Tunisia's different regions, the Tunisian regime worked to restrict a variety of freedoms. The first concern

of the regime was not the possibility of a military coup. Instead, they feared possible revolts by the deprived citizens.

The Tunisian regime was relatively successful in the political modernization of the country, but it failed miserably in economic modernization, particularly in the southern and interior regions. According to Murphy (1999: 220), instead of addressing this deficiency, the regime worked hard to develop its oppressive organizations to prevent the citizens from expressing their dissatisfaction with the circumstances that developed from the regime policies. When the pressure of fear meets the pressure of poverty, the explosion becomes inevitable. Whoever seizes control after the explosion can turn it into a destructive political movement against the regime and its members. That was the case with the "Jasmine Revolution."

1.3 Tunis: The Revolution-Proofing Mechanism Instead of Coup-Proofing

The Tunisian regime did not develop a special coup-proofing mechanism, since it did not fear the military. Barany (2011: 31) argues that this exceptionalism is due to lack of significant coup attempts as well as military's isolation from state-building and politics. Since the regime feared the people and not the military, it sought to develop a similar mechanism to that of coup-proofing that might be called a revolution-and-uprising-proofing mechanism.

The Tunisian regime mechanism for preventing a revolution is based on two fundamental principles. First, the regime weakened the military and isolated it from politics as much as possible (Gaub 2014: 26). The regime worked to reduce the ability of the military to influence Tunisian public life, by making the military small and ineffective and removing it from domestic security functions (Brooks 2013: 209). This strategy of not allowing the military any chance to sneak into the public and political domains was not only directed toward maintaining the survival

of the regime. Bourgiba truly believed in this arrangement (Barany 2011: 31). President Ben Ali similarly implemented the same strategy.

A second strategy pursued by the regime was the strengthening of the internal security agencies under the control of the Ministry of Interior, implying its direct subordination to the president. Townsend (2015: 6) succinctly explains the outcome of this strategy by stating, "a security force five times larger than the military was used to enforce the will of the dictator on the people, freeing the military from an antagonistic role within society." As much as this procedure gave a semi-absolute power to the dictator over his people, it freed the military from involvement in any clashes between the regime and the people.

The Tunisian regime formed many paramilitary units under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior including the State Security Department, Rapid Intervention Response Brigade, the Anti-Terrorism Brigade (BAT) an elite force of the National Guard, and even special units within the military (Brooks 2013: 212-213). All of these forces were directed to protect the regime from its people, especially during the uprisings of 2010 and 2011. These special units, however, while protecting the president and limiting possibility of military influence in the domestic political life, also led to the neutrality of the military (Brooks 2013: 213).

The combination of the above two characteristics of the coup-proofing mechanism led to another specific characteristic of the Tunisian military: its absence from the coercive apparatus of the regime (Bellin 2002). These two characteristics of civil-military relations allowed the military to develop loyalty to the military and the state, not the regime or the ruler, and also created a culture of professionalism (Brooks 2013: 208). On the flip side, the police and other special security units operated directly within the social realm leading to their affiliation with the

regime (Hanlon 2012: 6). The security agencies were characterized by a high level of politicization. They had absolute loyalty to the president and worked to spread fear into people through raids, kidnapping, and interrogation processes. The agencies even used the processes of torture and execution out of the justice system (Lutterbeck 2015). These approaches were used as a strategy adopted by Ben Ali's regime to force the serious opponents to stop even thinking about seeking change or initiating a revolution. Based on this bloody and painful history, the security apparatuses are considered the most hated Tunisian organizations by the people of Tunis (Sadiki 2002).

The mechanism adopted by Ben Ali's regime to avoid a possible revolution can also be extended to the ruling party, the Democratic Constitutional Party (DCP). The president transformed this party into something similar to a parallel security organization. Due to its widespread influence on the land of Tunis and the penetration of security organization members into its ranks, the DCP became an important source of collecting information for the security agencies. This is due to Ben Ali's appointment of his relatives and allies to central and local branches (Murphy 1999: 231). At the same time, the DCP became a source of fear and panic for the people who did not dare to express their views in front of any member of the DCP.

In summary, we can summarize the coup-proofing and rebellion mechanism that was adopted by the Tunisian regime, from Bourguiba to Ben Ali, in three basic levels. The first was the military level. Here, the regime strategy focused on marginalization of the military and its relegation to the periphery of the political domain and from state affairs in general. The regime's treatment of the military weakened its abilities to influence civilian life and limited its role to border protection. However, the regime had the military participate in international peacekeeping missions, which improved its training significantly.

The second level of the coup-proofing mechanism was the security level, and it was a complementary procedure to the first level. The regime created several paramilitary forces directed to monitor the opposition and the "undisciplined" political elites and suppress them. These forces had a higher number of members than the regular army and were more influential in the civilian and political lives. The third level of the mechanism was the political level. The regime managed to transform the DCP into a monitoring apparatus belonging to the regime, and working to monitor the opposition and the different wings of the regime itself. The DCP functioned to prevent any attempt of revolt that may come from the masses or the political or even the security elite.

Through these means, the Tunisian regime was able to maintain the political game so that the leader was in control of all the outcomes and had a comfortable advantage against all potential rivals. There was no possibility of a coup or revolt against this tight mode, except through a comprehensive popular movement that could benefit from the gaps in the mechanism that the regime built. One of these gaps was certainly the path dependent development of a divergence between the military on one side and the ruling and political elites with their special security units on the other.

1.4 The Tunisian Military Protect its People and Take Revenge for Itself

The uprising in Tunisia surprised everyone. Nobody expected the fall of the Tunisian regime to be that easy. The ease of the uprising inspired all Arab people to get rid of their totalitarian regimes. The uprising in Tunisia did not succeed only in breaking Ben Ali's regime. It also succeeded in breaking the fear barrier that the coup-proofing mechanisms had created both in Tunisia and other Arab countries that had different ideological and political orientations.

The civil-military relations in Tunisia had a pivotal and crucial role in the development of the "Jasmine Revolution." The military reaction toward the uprising, and toward the order of the president to intervene and suppress the demonstrators, was effective and determined the outcomes of the events. This unexpected military stand helped significantly in toppling Ben Ali's regime. However, the military did not intervene for or against the uprising; it stood neutral and preferred not to shoot the protestors (Townsend 2015: 6-7).

The Tunisian military deployment was aimed to protect the state's institutions from any sabotage attempts. In that, the Tunisian military answered the call for what the regime wanted it to do for the last sixty years. It performed its duty, as the regime had designed over many years. It was the regime's intention to keep the military small and confining its functions to limited security and peacekeeping operations (Bellin 2013: 8). Consequently, the Tunisian military intended to protect the state and the people and refused any intervention on behalf and to the benefit of the president. This was its main strategy despite receiving orders otherwise.

The exceptionalism of Tunisian case in regards to the civil-military relations and the military's response to the uprisings is well noted by the observers of Tunisian politics (Lutterbeck 2011: 20-23). The Tunisian military's reaction toward the uprising was unique insofar as the armed forces clearly succeeded in distancing themselves from the regime and its opponents. Using of the explanatory framework developed in this study, we can understand why the military in Tunisia was not invested in keeping Ben Ali in power when it had the chance. The refusal of the army to fire on protestors, and its refrain from protecting the president, had the extreme effect of accelerating the toppling of the dictator. The explanatory framework would explain these outcomes by the path dependent development of the relations between the military

and the civilians as well as the historical circumstances that determined the position of the military toward the polity or vice versa.

The position of the armed forces was unique during the initiation of protests as well as the transitional period. The military did not intervene directly in the debates about the transition, the new constitution, or even in the struggle among the different political forces. The action of the Tunisian military was rational in a complex situation that was very close to slipping into a civil war or terrorist acts (Gaub 2014: 28). It was able to preserve the neutrality and professionalism that characterized it since the day of independence.[6]

After the fall of the regime, Tunisian elites started a cautious transitional period. The transitional period was full of risks, because of the weakness of the state, and the many challenges it faced partially because of the deterioration of the security of the neighboring countries of Libya and Mali. Two problems, the lawlessness and the growth of terrorist networks, were particularly challenging (Ben Mahfoudh 2014: 8). Despite these challenges, the Tunisians continued to move, cautiously, to build the post-revolution Tunisian state and democracy. They resisted the possibilities of failure of the process and tried to bring it to safety and success.

Given this situation, the armed forces faced a second challenge, more dangerous than the first one. This second challenge was about the continuation of the commitment of neutrality in the face of the acute political struggle and the Islamists-secularist polarization. Could the military continue to not respond to the calls for the military to intervene to resolve the battle, for the

[6] Nevertheless, AbdRaba (2015: 54) argues that the division in the Tunisian political scene between the Islamists and the secularists remains a danger that may open the door to a political role for the Tunisian army, despite its historical reputation of professionalism and no-interference in political affairs.

benefit of this side or the other? If the Tunisian military succeeds in preserving its neutrality and honors its professionalism, which appears to be the case at the moment, this would give hope that some Arab countries might change from authoritarian to democratic regimes according to the nature of civil military relations. However, if the military decide to support one side against the other, it would not do anything but expand the club of the failed democratization.

About ten years after the fall of President Ben Ali, the Tunisian military is still faithful to its principles. However, there are some challenges that might put some pressure on its neutrality in the future. First, the Islamists-secularists struggle continues and the desire of each side to use the military for its benefit increases. This might open the appetite for some military men to leave their uniforms and engage in the ambiguous political struggle. The second challenge is the strong involvement of the Tunisian military in the war against terrorism and smuggling. This war, and the sacrifices made by the Tunisian military until now, might create a perception that the military men in Tunisia has some sort of top-down intervening right over the civilians and the rest of the population. The rationale underlying this argument is derived from other cases where more sacrifices somehow lead to the perceptions that military has a right to intervene in politics. That is, there is a chance that might lead military men to the desire to practice politics and ruling, instead of leaving it to the politicians. This becomes particularly clear if the politicians fail to resolve the essential issues in the transition period.

The third challenge to the military's principles is represented by new legislation giving the military the right of trail of civilians in front of military courts. This already started in the trial of some journalists on charges of publishing some information about the military's anti-terrorism operations. This legislation and trials might seduce some members of the armed forces into the dangerous territory of power politics and oppression.

The fourth challenge is related to the projection of the Tunisian military as a neutral military siding with the aspirations of the Tunisian people. Since the fall of President Ben Ali, there are continuous and systematic efforts to project the Tunisian military as the hero of the "revolution." Despite the marginalization and even the mistreatment the military received during Bourguiba and Ben Ali's reigns, it stayed loyal to the Tunisian people. The military's neutral stance was seen as siding with the protesters, instead of being involved in bloodshed that could have taken the country into a similar situation as in Libya. The military institution is still weak and searching for its role in society. Its neutrality enabled the military to shed the role of "The Grand Mute,"(Gaub 2014: 26) the marginalized and maltreated. It now wears the cloak of the strongest, most honorable, and non-corrupt institution in the country. The military is one of the most trusted institution by Tunisian society (Lotito 2019). This creation of the "myth" of the exceptional Tunisian military might be the first and essential step in the path to bring the military into the political arena.

These four challenges are considered to be the most dangerous ones that confront the current civil-military relations in Tunisia. Momentum was created by the revolution, by the will of the oppressed, of all kinds, in taking back their political and civil rights that the previous regime took away. Now, the *Grand Mute* is guaranteeing the freedom of speech and claiming materialistic and moral rights, and even political ones in Tunisian society. Such claims will be associated with the presence of the arms in the hands of the military and other groups and will increase the sacrifices that the military is making to ensure the safety of Tunisia and the Tunisians. Based on the analysis of civil-military relations in Tunisia, one can see the importance of developing a mechanism that will allow the military to practice their constitutional duties and,

at the same time, help hold back the aspirations of the officers or discouraging them from abusing the authority given to them.

When examining the Tunisian uprising as a whole, the events that Tunisia witnessed make us reevaluate the "aura" that was created around the uprising. Based on the standards cited for a successful revolution at the beginning of this research, it can be concluded that the Tunisian "revolution's" success is relative, not total (Gomez 2014). What is clear from the uprising is that, some of the interest of the elite, particularly members of the old regime, needed to be sacrificed in order to preserve the interest of the rest of the elite. "The fact that an eighty-four-year-old [then] political 'dinosaur' was chosen to head the government provided clear indication of the bankruptcy of the political component and the vacuum thus created at the pinnacle of state," (Achcar 2013: 147).

In the end, the uprising resulted in significant gains toward democratization in Tunisia, but at the same time there is still a long way to go. Some pessimistic analysts put the Tunisian uprising in the category of revolutionary coups. Those analysts see it as a coup in which some of the political elites are investing in the ongoing revolution to displace other political elites, using them as scapegoats to minimize losses and expected resistance to (Bradley 2012: 20). The revolution still has not been able to get rid of the remnants of the old regime and their hold on many essential government agencies.

The worst thing that the uprising did was to successfully reviving the old structures of social solidarity, such as the tribe, and to revive the debate about the status of women in society. Prior to the uprising, Tunis was the ideal model in the Arab world when it came to the steps it took in regard to women's rights. John Bradly (2012:109) lists a set of conflicts initiated in Tunisia based on tribal issues after the uprising and points to the danger of what he calls

"surprises that erupt tribal conflicts." If the uprising slips into such labyrinths, it could be indicative of the enactment of destabilizing factors by those who want to hijack the uprising and use it for their own ideological goals. In fact, remnants of the old regime are still intact. As Achcar (2013: 147), succinctly puts, "the capitalist class structure that had spawned the social crisis--the state and the market bourgeoisies, combined in a neoliberal framework--survived the earthquake. The same is true of the state's repressive hard core, made up of the army plus the main corps of the paramilitary forces: the National Guard, as well as a variety of 'brigades'," (Achcar 2013). On a positive note, however, the mechanisms that were created by the transitional period continue to provide a glimmer of hope, making us believe that Tunisia may still resist failure and have a high probability of success in political change.

2. The Egyptian Military: The Deep State

Despite the superficially similar role of the Tunisian and Egyptian militaries in the Arab Spring, the actions they took during the 2011 uprisings were fundamentally different. Instead of neutrality, the Egyptian Armed Forces responded to the uprising by forcing the president from power and asserting military control over the ensuing political transition. While Tunisia is considered a classic case of a professional and non-politicized military, Egypt is a paradigmatic example of military based on patronage with a highly politicized organization. In Egypt the military controls a substantial share of the national economy helping it to subsidize a military budget about $5 billion annually since 2006. Retired officers, too, participate in the military's vast economic empire reaping substantial financial rewards after their years of service. Before the Arab Spring, the conventional wisdom was that patronage in Egypt will guarantee the loyalty of the armed forces to the regime. This conventional thinking failed badly in 2011.

In comparison with Tunisia, the Egyptian military played a larger role in the country's political life. Many of the defining moments in modern Egyptian history cast the armed forces in a central role. The military's participation in politics has changed over time, going through three distinct phases under President Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak. Yet the military's ultimate authority has been the foundation of the Egyptian political regime despite the ebb and flow of officer's involvement in day-to-day governance. In Harb's (2003) words "throughout these periods of changing political roles, the Egyptian military remained the loyal repository of political power answerable only to a strong executive leadership in the person of a former military officer (the president) and sure of its privileged position within the polity" (Harb 2003: 270).

I argue that the specific form of the civil-military relations in Egypt as a result of the historical development of the regime created strong ties between the political center and the armed forces. The military, as an essential pillar of this nexus, enjoyed almost no civilian oversight, an essential privilege the military sought to preserve at all costs during the uprising and the political transition. The fact that the Egyptian armed forces crafted a state within the state gives it the required autonomy to act almost independently within the deep state. On top of that, the "given understanding" regarding the origin of the president is unwritten, but has been an essential red line for the military establishment.

According to International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the number of the Egyptian armed forces is estimated to be around 468,500 active duty forces as of 2010. Among them, 340,000 are in the Army, 18,500 are in the Navy, 30,000 are in the Air Force, and 80,000 are in the Air Defense Command. There are also around 397,000 in para-military units. The reserve force, where the service period of its members ranges between 12 months to three years, with a period of rehabilitation every nine years, is estimated around 479,000. Among them,

375,000 are in the Army; 14,000 are in the Navy; 20,000 are in the Air Force; and 70,000 are in the Air Defense Force (IISS 2010: 248).

The Egyptian military represents the largest military force in the MENA region in raw numbers. It is also one of the best-trained militaries. This military has a regular periodical training and formation program. It is involved in international training programs with the United States and NATO. It has also gained experience over time from engagement in several wars during different stages of the contemporary and modern Egyptian history.

Kechichian and Nazimek (1997) argue that the military command in Egypt view the Egyptian national security, which is essentially equal to the security of the regime, as combination of three serious challenges. These include national security related to regional conflict, threat of Islamic extremism, and internal threats to domestic orders (Kechichian and Nazimek 1997: 129). Based on that, we can affirm that the civil-military relations in Egypt are founded on two basic pillars: the history of the Egyptian military institution and its commanders, and the exploitation and inflation of the internal and external threats to the Egyptian national security. Based on these two axes, I will discuss the adopted analysis mechanism to gauge the Egyptian civil-military relations and the military's response to uprising.

2.1 The Egyptian Military Builds its Own State

To learn the position of the current Egyptian military in the state and its role in its formation, we need to trace the historical path of state-building and military formation. Since the time of the Pashas[7] during the British tutelage, the military was viewed as nothing but an agent

[7] Pasha, title of a man of high rank or office in the Ottoman Empire and North Africa. It was the highest official title of honor in the Ottoman Empire, always used with a proper name, which it followed. It was given to officers and high civil officials in 19th-century Egypt and continued until it was canceled after 1952 coup.

for the British, and in the best case, a servant for an arrogant aristocratic class. On the other hand, the ruling elites dealt with the military with contempt and disdain, since its members come from a peasant's background and lower social class. As Finer puts it, before the 1952 coup, "with the exception of the decorative cavalry, the army officer was socially despised, and no self-respecting bourgeois would dream of allowing his daughter to marry one," (Finer 1969: 36).

Based on this social and class structure, the Free Officers movement did not have only political goals to remove the king and eliminate the British influence, but also a social revolution against the encroachment of the Egyptian bourgeoisie and against the bourgeoisie elites' contempt of the military members providing those elites with security and protection (Finer 1969: 52). Therefore, the Free Officers movement was the beginning of a big and important social revolution, that turned the sons of *Fallahin* into new *afendis* and state builders. They seized the country, and its fates, at the same level that the old bourgeoisie *afendis* class had ruled previously. However, the post-coup environment gave rise to an internal struggle within the military ranks (Finer 1969: 32).

The hesitation and indecisiveness in the fatal decisions in the nascent republic show the severity of the conflict among the military men themselves. Immediately after the success of the coup, the personal aspirations started to rise. That issue led to the emergence of two approaches toward the state building: the first wanted to move quickly to the civilian rule and the second wanted the military men to benefit the most from the coup results and then stay in power as long as possible.

What is important here is the explanation of the complexity of the Egyptian case. From the beginning, I focused on the discussion of the civil-military relations. However, in the Egyptian case, there is an important dimension added to those relations, the within military

relations. The struggle for the distribution of power does not attract only the civilian versus the military, but also the military against the military. This Egyptian tradition started from the early days of the coup, when the struggle was evolving between Nasser and Naguib[8], and then moved to be a struggle between Nasser and Abdul Hakim Amer[9]. The goal of those struggles was not the seizure of power as much as it was to establish a balance among the officers, so the military can attain full and complete control on all power resources, and on the state as a whole. Field Marshal Abdul Hakim Amer was not interested in taking the president's position but wanted to create a power system that gives him an equal authority as the president. As a commander-in-chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces, Amer dedicated himself to transform the army into 'a state within a state' under his control. Thus, loyalty determined who would be promoted to higher ranks. Amer's goal was not to give Nasser a chance to implement any military shake-up that will undermined Amer's grip on the armed forces (Kandil 2014: 51-52). The relation between Nasser and Amer constitutes an ideal example of the struggles among the free officers that continued with less intensity during the time of presidents Sadat and Mubarak. Neither one of them had charisma close to Nasser.

For the military, this internal struggle ended by adopting the strategy of appointing the president by the military from among the military officers. Then the military officers shelter the president mightily to prevent him from going against them. In case it became hard to control the president, they would have gotten rid of him by any means possible. With presidents Sadat and

[8] Mohamed Naguib (19 February 1901 – 28 August 1984) was the first President of Egypt, serving from the declaration of the Republic on 18 June 1953 to 14 November 1954.

[9] Mohamed Abdel Hakim Amer (11 December 1919 – 13 September 1967) was an Egyptian general and political leader. Played a leading role in the military coup of 1952. The following year, he was made Chief-of-Staff, bypassing four military ranks. In 1956, he was appointed commander-in-chief of Egyptian armed forces. Viewed as being key to Egypt's defeat in the 1967 six-days war

Mubarak, the military influence in the polity started dwindling under the pressure of the tense relationship between the president and the officers. Gradually moving away from direct involvement in politics, the army, nevertheless, continued to serve as the backbone for the regime security while keeping an image of independence and professionalism (Achcar 2013: 151). By this behavior, the military embodied the patrimonial tendency that characterizes totalitarian regimes. The civilians, even the president who was appointed by the military, are considered as "minor children" who are given total freedom of conduct, by the military, or "the father", within very well determined domains. In the case of some conflict among the "sons", the "father" does not interfere and gives them the space to resolve their struggles quickly without havoc that can affect the stability and security of the state. The "father" does not get involved until he realizes that his involvement is the solution of last resort, when the "sons" cannot reach an understanding.

Egypt is a unique case relative to all other MENA region countries in regard of the military conduct within the state. According to Finer (1969), the military approach to monopolize the formation and organization of the state succeeded, and the military men became the ones who decided on everything in the country. They also established veto power on all civilian and field decisions. This power allowed them to reject any decision proposed by civilians.

Between the 1952 coup and the start of the Arab Spring, four presidents ruled Egypt; all were military men. Therefore, the military had the major and pivotal role in building the Egyptian republic on the ruins of the Farouq monarchy. The Egyptian military markets its historical legitimacy through its prior actions: participation in the liberalization of the country from the British colonization, participation in the "Tripartite Aggression" of 1956, and the wars

it fought against Israel. This marketing strategy empowers the military to monopolize the management of the country and exclude all other powers. With this, the military became the main guardian and supporter of the civilian regime from eras of Nasser to Sadat and Mubarak to al-Sisi (Achcar 2013: 149).

The Egyptian system is built on the ideology that the military is beyond politics. As Gaub (2014) explains, "due to its preeminent place in Egyptian history, its partial distance from domestic politics and its professionalism, the Egyptian military therefore assumed, internally, a position which was seen as above petty politics yet dedicated to Egypt as a nation and state," (Gaub 2014: 24).

The most important characteristic, distinguishing the Libyan case from the Egyptian case, is that Gaddafi succeeded in removing his fellow officers after their coup against the king. Thus, Gaddafi seized the state and ruled it as his own estate. While in the Egyptian case, the officers were successful in preventing the four presidents to solstice them. They remained in control of the different reins of the state. Therefore, they gained the position "above the state", creating the "Officers' Republic" (Sayigh 2012: 3). This is the republic that was established as a result of the officers' "capture of the state", meaning they had all of the power and authority over the state resources. What describes the social transformation of the military officers in the social stratus in Egypt is that the military men came to power and they created the social and political organizations that assist them in monopolizing the resources of power and wealth of society. However, the outcome of an effective monopoly for the power and wealth resources would be the birth of a new class, the class that owns the state and its economic resource (Alnaqeeb 1991: 144).

The ruling regime in Egypt has been a military backed authoritarian dictatorship totalitarian regime, where civilians represent its stated interface (Bradley 2012: 77). This military hegemony on civilian life did not come without some resistance. Presidents Sadat and Mubarak tried to isolate the military and prevent it from involvement in political affairs (Abul-Magd 2013: 8; Satloff 1988: 1-2; Cook 2007: 28). However, the military learned how to spoil the plans of the president who it appointed. In the Egyptian military mind, an axiom was established that an army should not take orders from civilians. In addition, the military planted another axiom in the civilian mind of a nation not used to being led by anyone other than the military (Abdalla 1988: 1464). With these characteristics of Egyptian military, we can understand the developments in Egypt after the officers' coup and those that characterized the country after the Arab Spring uprising.

2.2 The Ethnic and Religious Diversity in Egypt

Similar to the Tunisian case, Egypt is characterized by relative ethnic and sectarian concordance. From an ethnic dimension, the modern nation state was able to limit the influence of the tribal effect. It was also able to neutralize the religious sectarianism effect. That neutralization was assisted by the fact that the vast majority of Egyptians are Sunni Muslims. Only a small Christian Coptic minority of about 9% (Taylor 2014: 9) and two smaller minorities of Nubian and Baha'i exist. These small minorities had less importance and influence than the Christian minority (Tawfiq 2014: 104), and all combined were much less influential than the Sunni majority.

The modern state was able, so far, to accommodate this diversity and prevent it from negatively effecting the regime and the society. That accommodation came through the adaptation of a repressive authoritarian system that applies both to the majority and to minorities.

The position of Egypt in the heart of the Middle East, being a neighboring country to Israel and its vast experience in institutionalization of the state are all factors that helped the state to relatively neutralize the effect of the ethnic and sectarian factors. This background is very similar to Tunisia where ethnic and religious sectarianism was curtailed during the modernization period.

Azmi Bishara (2012) addresses "The Coptic Question" as a challenge to national unity. The Copts were lost between two polar stands. The Coptic elites held an isolationist view, struggling to form an identity of the Copts of Egypt that is separate from the rest of the Muslim Egyptians. It establishes a pure Egyptian identity with no ties to the identity of the Arab or Islamic world. This isolationist point of view does not see Muslims in Egypt as Egyptians. The other stand is a state approach that failed to establish the principle of citizenship and the affiliation to the homeland. Its failure to fulfill the principle of citizenship, and its inability to perform its role in that made it stand by when individuals resort to other entities that reshape their principles in a collective mental framework that can often narrow the containment of the principle of citizenship (Bishara 2012: 44). The "Coptic Question" between the two polar positions, the state and the Coptic elites led to the discharge of the sectarian issue of the Muslim-Christian polarization. Therefore, not acknowledging the "Coptic Question" and dealing with it on national level, neutralized its effect on the power elites attempts to use it in the distribution and conduct of power in all the stages of the building of the Egyptian state.

Based on that, the only hurdle facing the civil-military relations in Egypt was the "Islamist opposition." It is known that Egypt was the birthplace of the Muslim Brotherhood, an organization whose members were, and continue, to be almost the only viable competition to the regime and the military, as was seen in the results of the elections after the Egyptian uprising.

The perceived threat from the Brotherhood's and to a lesser degree from the he Salafis helped the regime to instrumentally use this threat to solidify its ranks and strengthen the ties between the civilians and the military. We may say that the military deepened its hold on power in order to confront this danger. To a degree, it became hard to distinguish between the civilian and the military in the ruling system in Egypt.

The relationship between the regime and the Islamists is complex. It ranges from alliance to political conflicts, which developed in many periods into violent armed struggles. The main character of this relationship is that the regime was able to conduct the relation in the way it wanted and in the direction it desired. The regime benefited from the special position of Egypt being a strategic ally to different great powers. It used both the iron fist and the velvet glove, as circumstances dictated, and according to delicate strategic calculations. This balance contributed to form the characteristics of the civil-military relations, as we expected using our analytical mechanism.

Before the uprising, the common characteristic among all the presidents of Egypt is that they started their presidential eras with reconciliation with the Islamist movements, giving them legal stands, and then, they demonized them. This proves that the real player, who moves the game with the Islamists and the others, is one that the presidents represent only its face. The controlling side of the threads of the game with the Islamists is the military. Through its intelligence and security organizations, the military utilized an adaptive strategy to the international circumstances and environment. This strategy developed pragmatically based on the circumstances and facts: from bloody oppression and violence, to cautious and legitimization, and finally to cooperation. What is clear in all of this is that, after about 90 years of the creation of the political Islamic movement in Egypt, the regime is still firmly in control. The patriarchal

regime continues to view the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic movement, in general, as an illegitimate son that it was forced to recognize due to internal and external imperatives.

2.3 Coup-Proofing Mechanism against Coup Plotters

Contrary to the choice of Gaddafi to weaken the military, the Egyptian regime chose to strengthen the military to the extent that it became the real power in the country. All four presidents that took office after the Free Officers' coup in 1952 came from the military. Since then, the military worked to monopolize the political decisions in Egypt. Nothing is done there without the knowledge or approval of the military. During the rule of Nasser, five coup attempts happened; all failed. Due to Nasser's strong position, his personal charisma, and the favorable political circumstances that transformed him into an Arab leader without dispute, he could not be confronted directly. As Marfleet (2013) puts it, "the military command, and Nasser, in particular, accumulated enormous prestige. Seen as leaders of an authentically independent state and an emerging pan-Arabism, they were projected onto the world stage as key figures within the movement for a 'third' way, independent of East and West" (Marfleet 2013: 149).

President Sadat faced two coup attempts. To confront such threats, he resorted to the quick rotation system of officers to commanding posts and positions. The rationale was that the officer would not stay in his post for enough time to build connections that would enable him to conspire with others against the regime. Also, he used the "divide and conquer" policy to ensure the loyalty of the high commanding officers. At the same time, Sadat worked to strengthen the police and the Central Security Apparatus (CSA) forces to achieve power balance with the military, and to break the military's monopoly on oppression means. Nasser and Sadat employed different strategies to prevent a possible coup. The former used a control and reward tactic while

the latter engaged in micromanagement and strategic pitting of officers against each other (Harb 2003: 282).

The military men, not the civilians, were the essential threat to authoritarian rulers in Egypt. The coup-proofing strategy in Egypt during that time was summarized in two basic principles. First, it was important to prevent the president from sidelining the officers. Second, the strategy was designed to prevent the officers from carrying out a coup against the president. Therefore, the Egyptian mechanism was dual to a certain degree. It moves in the direction of monitoring the role of the president and limiting it from the military's view, while at the same time, monitoring the role of the military and limiting it from the president's view.

President Sadat's plan to occupy the military away from politics came from that mechanism. He pushed the military into the world of business and economy and that made the Egyptian military the strongest economic power in Egypt. Moreover, he allowed this economic power to get out of the state's control and supervision. That made the military's economic activities uncontrolled by the state apparatus regarding inputs and outputs and free of all taxes and collection rules imposed by the state on all the civilian forms of economic activities. The Egyptian military became so involved and active in all kinds of economic fields that it developed an important economic machine. This economic machine emerged with a vital role to the state in the volume of production, the labor force it employs, and the financial assets that it controls and uses with no censor or audit (Marfleet 2013: 164; Barany 2011: 32; Hashim 2011: 109). As a result, we might explain the tactical military disengagement from the political domain by its exuberant economic activity. The military's officers did not possess the ability to function on more than one front.

President Mubarak tried to continue his predecessor's way to curb the military influence, but he was not able to do so much. He tried again to separate the military from the polity through "counterbalancing and promoting the privileges of the military elite," (Bou Nassif 2015: 260). However, the military's fear that Mubarak would control both the power and the state resources made them think of ways to prevent his plan of turning Egypt's rule into a hereditary one by grooming his son for presidency and to stop his plans to neutralize the military (Kartveit and Jumbert 2014: 10). Consequently, the Arab Spring provided the lifeline that allowed the military to facilitate the ousting of Mubarak and helped them prevent the transition of power by revolutionary means.

Before the uprising in Egypt, coup-proofing strategies in Egypt were built on two pillars: creating parallel security institutions and distributing material benefits. President Hosni Mubarak created an array of security units responsible for policing and surveillance. For example, early in 2011, the Ministry of Interior in Egypt employed around 1.4 million people working in areas as diverse as monitoring the public and other government agencies activities as well as eavesdropping (Makara 2013: 345-346).

In Egypt, the coup-proofing mechanism can be observed in the centralization of the political and military decisions in the hands of the Armed Forces and its Supreme Council. The officers are the ones who appoint the president, and they are the ones who run the country in reality. To achieve that, they worked to make the military a closed institution, even to the president himself. No one can enter this institution even at the lowest level, or progress in its chain of command, without security apparatus approval. Such a statement may seem fictitious. However, anyone who follows the Egyptian military's history, can assert that during the

Egyptian contemporary history nothing was done without the approval of the Egyptian armed forces command, including the appointment of presidents and the ouster of Mubarak.

2.4 The Egyptian Military Turns against All

The Egyptian military reaction toward the January 25, 2011 uprising was strategically organized and coherent. This reaction demonstrated the strength of the Egyptian Army, despite common misperceptions about the incapability of it. This planning was an initiative of the Supreme Council of the Egyptian Armed Forces (SCAF). When the military institution became autonomous from the state, it gained the ability to maneuver. With the outbreak of the unrest in Tahrer Square, and the violent and failed intervention of the police, the armed forces had the choice of either siding with the autocrat and shoot the protestors or embrace the change (Hashim 2011: 115).

They chose to use the events for change, but not according to the wishes of the protesters. That meant the SCAF delayed the shooting until after reorganizing the matter and making change that the protesters would not have preferred. Initially, the SCAF ensured security using the army to control the streets without any friction with the protesters. Pictures of children with soldiers on top of tanks spread across media as a strong indicator that Egypt had entered a new era ending dictatorship. The scene continued with the approval of President Mubarak's resignation and the trial of Mubarak and his clique, as the protesters desired. The next step was to foster free, democratic elections after the adoption of the new constitution to end totalitarian rule forever. However, as Makara (2013) argues, the Egyptian military "hijacked the constitutional reform process" to carve benefits for itself and protect the institution from civilian oversight (Makara 2013: 347).

After about one year, the military decided to pursue the second choice, shooting the protestors, after they isolated the Islamists, and society became divided between those who supported the elected president Mohammed Morsi and those who opposed him. The military took advantage of the existence of a media that worked very closely with the armed forces and broadcast its messages according to "orders" at the right time. The mass protest episode ended with the ousting of President Morsi and outlawing of the Muslim Brotherhood. In that, the military was able to get rid of Mubarak and the "revolution" and to bring Egypt back to the situation it prefers: a ruler appointed by the military institution that does not dare to move or decide out of the orbit of the armed forces.

The power and the wealth that the Egyptian military possesses assure that it would be impossible for it to accept any change that threatened its corporate interest. The stakes here go beyond changing the president and onto changing the system as a whole (Abul-Magd 2013: 3). From such logic, the military establishment prevented any attempt that could affect its economic might, or put it under the censorship of any second establishment, or make it subject to the tax system applied to the civilian establishments (Sayigh 2012: 8-9).

The year of Morsi's presidency shows us how he was "Half President" or president for "Half of Egypt" (Alexander 2013: 274). The "Officer's Republic" remained intractable for him; it preserved its autonomy relative to civilian organizations, the revolutionaries, and even to the presidency (Alexander 2013). Therefore, Morsi was like an "uninvited guest" at the Presidential Palace. The military was waiting for the opportunity to implement the next phase of their coup to end with his ousting. They turned him, in a dramatic scene, from legitimate, freely elected president to a traitor accused of conspiring with foreign countries.

The first and foremost interest of the military was finding mechanisms that allowed them to enhance their power and influence, ahead of the increasing revolutionary pressure coming from the circumstances prevailing in the MENA countries then. Bradley evidences this proposition by the increased number of trials that eliminated the main rivals by the military under Egypt's emergency law (Bradley 2012: 78). The Egyptian uprising was exploited systematically for preventing real democratic transition. After that, the Officers' Republic stretched in way that enabled it to gain control. Therefore, civil-military relations in Egypt are what shaped the armed forces reaction toward the revolutionary act. This reaction was planned by a strong and autonomous establishment, according to its view and to serve its agenda and doctrine. This establishment seized the Egyptian state and controlled its president. The army's action of July 3, 2013 represented a coup against the elected president and democracy. Bishara (2017 a) aptly describes the novel character of this coup in following words:

> The coup by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) led by Abdel Fattah al-Sisi differed from what we have seen in the past, from Abdel Karim Kassem to Muammar Gaddafi and Jaffar Nimeiry via the Syrian coups. It was not a coup by officers inside the army against the ruling regime, or against their colleagues in other cases, but a coup by the army itself, that is its high command, against the democratic process, to keep hold of power for itself, in the context of the existing regime (Bashara 2017 a: 10-11).

3. Conclusion

Looking at the Tunisian and Egyptian cases of military response to the popular uprisings, we can see different approaches by the rulers to build and conduct the civil-military relations, which resulted in different coup-proofing mechanisms that led to different reactions of the two militaries.

For Tunisia, being the first country that witnessed the start of the Arab Spring, the military action was detrimental in defining the results of the popular uprising. The Tunisian military was a product of the formation of the state after independence and therefore its role in the nation building was negligible if any. Since the start of the republic under the leadership of President Bourguiba in 1957, the state worked to build civil-military relations based on the Western model of subordination of the armed forces to civilian authority. In that approach, the military was kept small, weak, and officers were not allowed to participate in any political activities. Therefore, the armed forces were not influential in the decision-making process in the state even with regards to its own affairs. When President Ben Ali came to power in 1987 through a palace coup that did not involve the use of the military, he followed the legacy of his predecessor. Ben Ali kept the army small and weak and occupied it in international peacekeeping missions. To control the internal affairs in the country, the president created and utilized many security agencies freeing the military from the daily repression tasks against the people. The military gained a notable degree of professionalism and high level of respect from the Tunisian people. Despite the involvement of the Tunisian military in putting down public protests in 1978 and 1984, it went back to the barracks and did not participate in any political or internal security action after that. When the Arab Spring started, the Tunisian army, being professional military and having high degree of corporate ethics, stood neutral between the regime and the protestors. It adhered to its corporateness ethos by saving the people and preserve the state. The Tunisian case is summarized in the chart below.

Figure 4.1.

Coup-Proofing and the Results of the Uprising in Tunisia



Among the Arab states that experienced social uprisings in 2011, Tunisia has the dual distinction of being the first to witness protests as well as the state that emerged best prepared to transition from an autocratic past after the removal of the country longtime autocrat, President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. The ability of the country to endure serious political crises since Ben Ali's ouster has been a crucial basis for optimism about its future (Gall 2013). A second cause for hope, is the unique characteristics of the Tunisian military and its willingness to submit to civilian control. Among its Arab counterparts, the Tunisian military is often cited as capable of accommodating to structure and processes of civilian oversight of armed forces (Ware 1985).

The importance of these issues cannot be under-estimated. In autocratic regimes, reform of the military, police, intelligence, and security entities are central to the establishment of institutions that support law and order and are responsive and accountable to county's citizens. In that regard, I argue that the strategy of civilian control employed by the country's autocrats, Habib Bourguiba and Ben Ali, has shaped the Tunisian military, rendering it well to accommodate the institutional and structural bases for civilian oversight of the armed forces. The

coup-proofing strategy adopted by the regime through marginalization and exclusion, shaped the incentives and corporate interests of the military. Consequently, the military has little to lose from its neutrality and submitting to democratic transition and likely to be normatively receptive to allowing the democratization process to move forward.

In the modern history of Egypt since the 1952 military coup, the armed forces have been the only state builder in all aspects. In the last sixty years since the 1952 coups, the armed forces chose all four Egyptian presidents from its own ranks. Officers occupied all the major positions in the state, sometimes in civilian suites. The military has the final say in what policies would be issued and implemented. In that role, the military was the most influential actor in the nation building process. The relationship between the military and the state, represented by the president, was mutual balance: the military kept the president's power checked, and the president made sure the military did not pass its power limits. To keep the military loyal and not intervene directly in politics, the state used high level of patronage as a coup-proofing mechanism. The Egyptian armed forces became the largest "conglomerate" in all fields of businesses all over Egypt using cheap labor (conscripts). When the Egyptian people went to the streets demanding change of the regime, the armed forces represented by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) determined its actions through cost-benefit analysis. The ultimate goal was to protect its own corporate interest and SCAF came to the decision to sacrifice the president for those interests. When a civilian was elected as president, the armed forces was not at ease with him and conducted a classical revolutionary coup to keep its privileges, political and material, and brought Egypt to the old days of autocracy. The Egyptian case is summarized by the following chart.

Figure 4.2.

Coup-Proofing and the Results of the Uprising in Egypt



Egypt represents a strong case for the distinct behavior of an institutionalized but internally focused military. As in Tunisia, its armed forces turned on the president when faced with massive protest. Unlike Tunisia, the Egyptian military did not hand over power to a civilian transitional government for over a year and then quickly took back control. Again, Egypt, unlike Tunisia, gained *de facto* independence in a military coup and its independent state was built by military men.

The military was a beneficiary and key pillar of the Egyptian regime, but when challenged by public protests it abandoned the leadership and looked after its own interests. The Egyptian military is involved in a wide variety of non-military tasks and maintaining control of its vast business interests. These would have been put in danger by unleashing massive repression against the peaceful protest in Tahrer Square. With generals holding the presidency for six consecutive decades, the armed forces abstained from direct intervention in politics until February 11, 2011 when the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) forced President

Mubarak to resign. Egypt's Arab Spring succeeded in dislodging the unpopular autocrat after thirty years in power. Yet the political result of the uprising was a reassertion of the military domination of the Egyptian state. In the wake of its decree removing Mubarak, SCAF seized power directly, issuing constitutional decrees and serving as the country's executive authority until President Morsi was sworn into office. Only a year later, on the first anniversary of Morsi's inauguration, massive protests erupted calling for his resignation, and the military deemed Egypt's experiment in pluralism a failure. Within a week, the military announced the removal of Morsi from office. The military appointed an interim government, clearing the way for General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the head of the Armed Forces to become president. For Egypt, the upshot of the Arab Spring has been a further retrenchment of the political power of the armed forces (Brooks 2015: 29).

Chapter 5 - The Unfavorable Outcome: Military and Civil Wars in the Arab Uprisings

This chapter follows a similar approach to Chapter 4 in using three case studies to support the argument of this research that the civil-military relations and coup-proofing mechanisms adopted by the ruling regimes determine the outcome of the uprising. Despite the different reactions of the of the militaries in these three countries toward the uprisings covered in this chapter, the outcomes came to be similar. I argue, supported by the three case studies, that development of the civil-military relations and the structure of the coup-proofing mechanisms in Syria, Yemen, and Libya were the main factors shaping military reaction to the uprisings and the path to civil wars.

These three cases represent the most different cases (Przeworski and Teune 1970; Anckar 2008) in the nation building process and the formation of the state. The ethnic and sectarian dimension effect in the structure of the social and political domains clearly affected the military role in the state building and the political system development. However, the military reaction to the uprisings and the results of that reaction came to one similar outcome: prolonged civil war and destruction of the state and its institutions.

1. The Syrian Military: The Sectarian Loyalty

The Syrian case study represents a case where Arab Spring uprising was met with military force at the direction of President Bashar al-Assad. Syria is an important counterexample to the largely nonviolent responses of the Tunisian and Egyptian armed forces. From the outset of the 2011 demonstrations Syrian security forces and military responded with force employing live ammunition to disperse demonstrators. Rather than quelling the unrest, however, their violent response backfired, provoking armed rebellions in several regions of the

country and defections from the armed forces. From there, Syrian society collapsed into civil war. Although the military's violent approach has ultimately succeeded in preserving the al-Assad regime's grip on power, the regime is far from declaring a decisive victory. The Syrian military had borne enormous costs in the conflict, both in desertions and combat casualties. Therefore, the exceptionally high cost of the war in Syria requires an explanation about the military response to the uprising.

Why then did the Syrian armed forces escalate the conflict unlike the Tunisian army, or why did they differ from the Egyptian officers who seized control of the state? The most popular explanation is that Syrian officer corps were loyal to the al-Assad regime because of "ethic stacking." For decades, scholars of ethnic politics have asserted that the dominance of the Alawis, an ethno-religious minority, in the military virtually guaranteed the military's loyalty to the al-Assad regime (Horowitz 2000: 492-507; McLauchlin 2010). However, the Syrian military history of domestic intervention belies a simple relationship between ethnicity and violence against protestors. While officers' preferences strongly influence how the armed forces respond to an uprising, officers' loyalty to the regime does not automatically translate into a violent pro-regime response.

I argue here that the deep politicization of ethnic identity manifested in merging the military and the regime to become a blended entity was the major contributor to the assurance of loyalty of the officer corps to the regime. The armed forces realized clearly that if the regime collapses, they collapse as well and they have no future without the regime. In other words, the history of Syrian military domestic intervention belies a direct causal relationship between the military's ethnic composition and its response to protest. Rather, it is the merge of the armed

forces and the regime is the primary factor that can explain the stand of the Syrian army toward the mass uprising started in 2011.

As the Baath Party came to power in Syria through a military coup in 1963, the corresponding rise of the military within the Syrian state started. As soon as the Baath party took power, it immediately started a process of institutionalizing the military as the pillar of the regime. Military recruitment was explicitly ideological and many Alawi noncommissioned officers received promotions to commissioned ranks (Van Dam 2011: 31-36). In 1966, another coup was staged by younger more radical members of the party dissatisfied with the policies of the current regime. Captain Hafiz al-Assad was one of the main architects of the new coup and became defense minister and the president in 1970 in another coup. By this time, the government was filled with military officers, the majority from al-Assad's Alawi sect (Devlin 1976: 2080-282).

To legitimize his rule, Hafiz al-Assad worked hard to present himself as the leader of the Baath party, not head of military, but the regime was military in most other respects. The al-Assad's power base was in the armed forces that brought him to power in the first place and kept him there (Ma'oz 1990: 55). Under his rule, the Syrian armed forces became an explicit vehicle for political and ideological indoctrination.

Based on 2010 statistics reported by IISS, the Arab Syrian Army consisted of 325,000 active duty personnel, with 220,000 in the Land Forces (the Army), 5,000 in the Navy, 40,000 in the Air Force, and 60,000 in the Air Defense forces. Also, the Syrian military includes 108,000 in para-military units, and 314,000 in reserve, with 280,000 in the Army, 4,000 in the Navy, 10,000 in the Air Force, and 20,000 in Air Defense forces. The period of service for the reserves continues for 30 months (IISS 2011: 272).

In contrast to the Libyan and Egyptian cases, the Syrian case is characterized by almost entire incorporation between the ruler and the military. The totalitarianism of the Syrian rule was characterized by the seizure of the state, by the ruler and the military, for the interest of the denomination to which they belong (Wedeen 2015). This was a result of the historical, sociological, and anthropological circumstances that characterized the modern and contemporary Syrian state.

1.1 The Coups' Military Ends Up as a Sectarian State

Since it gained independence, Syria experienced significant waves of unrest in which the military played a major role. During the first thirty years of its independence, the country witnessed no less than 11 military coups and correction movements that were mostly successful. These coups changed the course of the state and its ideology from one extreme to the other. I can argue that the Syrian Armed Forces had the central role in the state building, and the political system's formation and development as a whole.

After the time of the unrest resulting from the interference of the Armed Forces in the political affairs, the Baathist regime worked to consolidate the military in almost every way in the Syrian state. Hafez al-Assad benefited from the experiences of his predecessors in establishing a totalitarian regime based on the concept of the leading party in the political domain, and the dominant sect in the security and military fields (Zain El Abidine 2008: 426). The civil-military relations in Syria merged the political, military, and sectarian dimensions to a degree that makes it almost impossible to distinguish among them. The president, even though he is elected, keeps his military status as the commander-in-chief of the Syrian Arab Army.

The Syrian military was involved heavily in Syrian political life until Hafez al-Assad came to power, the military controlled the appointment of the presidents. Finer (1969) argues

that military was greatly shaped and also had great influence in foreign policy matters including the decisions about unification with Iraq or Egypt and the war with Israel were foreign elements that had a big influence on the military actions and reactions (Finer 1969: 54). Given the power of the military in political life, the Baath regime under the leadership of the al-Assad family, worked to seize the military and turn it into an institution that serves the state and the Baath Party. In reality, the military was serving and protecting the interest of the Alawite sect, in general, and the al-Assad family and its close associates, in particular.

In the last third of the twentieth century, Hafez al-Assad realized that the civil party segment was the weakest circle among the conflicting factors for power. He gave this institution a formal pattern limited to certain sectors in the administration and governance systems, and formulated the balance of power within the regime based on a military establishment with extended influence, by forming military divisions specializing in the protection of the regime, and security apparatuses that dominate public life. In all of that, he relied on the sectarian-tribal-family element since it is considered the most trusted for achieving the difficult equation of balance within the military establishment (Zain El Abidine 2008: 426).

The magic mix that al-Assad adopted, and worked to implement in Syria, was based on merging the state, represented by the party, the Armed Forces, represented by the military and different security forces, and the sect, represented by the Alawite sect members. Through that, he was able to form an organically solid political system, based on the family kinship; after the family comes the tribe and the sect (Finer 1969: 112). Beyond that, the animosity and containment strategies start. Anyone outside the family, tribe, sect, and region does not qualify for anything other than to be contained and serve the regime with discipline and silence (Wedeen

2015). Any opposition and demands beyond that arrangement resulted in violent repression of severe form as seen in the 1982 massacre in Hama..

The most important characteristic of struggle for power in Syria is the use of the military by the different Syrian sects and ethnic groups to seize power and determine the grand characteristics of the Syrian state. These hot and cold conflicts among the different components of the Syrian society led to the heavy involvement of the military in politics, a matter that led to weaken both the state and the military. The wars with Israel are clear manifestations of the fragility of the Armed Forces, as it failed to preserve the unity of the Syrian territory. There are still large parts of the Golan heights under Israeli occupation, without even a declaration from the Syrian armed forces to take it back. In what follows, I will explain the geo-strategic, ethnic, and sectarian circumstances that made the regular Syrian Army adopt this form of conduct with regard to civil-military relations.

Despite the ability of President al-Assad to find the blend that allowed him to control power, the civil-military relations were suffering from chronic disorder. The regime in Syria during its reign suffered from the multitude of challenges to its power. The presidency, the party, the government, the sect, and the family, are all power sources, even if they are unified in the loyalty to the president. Their greediness, personal interests, and aspirations started to swell, because of spread of security and stability in the country. This stability pushed the individual groups into power struggles, very similar to mafia struggles and wars.

These struggles began with Hafez al-Assad's brother, Riffat. He alleged that some other power sources refused to appoint non-Alawite personnel to the committee that was running Syria's affairs when President al-Assad was hospitalized. So, Riffat led a military mutiny where the sect and the family played pivotal roles from start to end. On the other side, the military

commands were trading absolute loyalty to President al-Assad for legal and illegal privileges. Any objection to such privileges meant an engagement in a direct confrontation with the officers. No matter how strong the intervening actor was, these confrontations usually ended with dangerous crimes, and even overthrow of government officials. The military, even if it looked to be outside of politics, was an essential player in the political field.

1.2 When the Sect Established a State in Syria

Syria is known for its large sectarian and ethnic diversity that is very influential in political and social life (Taylor 2014: 9). On the religious level, there is a Muslim majority and Christian minority. The Muslims are divided into a Sunni majority, which is divided into moderate Sufis, the Muslim brotherhood, radical Salafist and Wahabbis, and the Shia minority, which includes Alawites, Ismailis, and Twelvers. In addition to all of those groups, there is the Druze sect. On the ethnic level, the population is distributed according to a very complex ethnic map. There is an Arab majority, Kurdish, Armenian, Turkman, Circassians, Assyrians, and Aramics. At those two levels, Syria represents one of the most ethnic and sectarian diverse countries in the MENA region (Taylor 2014: 9).

This diversity does not stop at the cultural levels. It goes on to shape the struggles for power in its different forms: political power, cultural power, and economic power. The studies of the coups series in Syria clearly show that they exploited that diversity. Often, such studies indicate that this coup was carried out by a group of Sunni officers, and the other coup was carried out by a group of Alawite officers or Druze officers. The religious identity of the coups' leaders was one of the most important indicators to which analysts look when a coup is manifested. Based on that, we can affirm the existence of a Sunni-Shia polarization, or more accurately, a Sunni-Alawite polarization. While the Sunnis are the majority in Syria, the Alawite

minority started to have a big influence in political, military, and economic lives in Syria after Hafez al-Assad assumed power.

It is important to mention here that the Alawite sect was a castaway sect of Shia, but some Shia scholars legitimized it (Wastridge 2017: 149). The Twelvers Shia who are dominant in Iran switched stand regarding the Alawite because Iran needed Syrian support during the Iraq-Iran war. Additionally, Iran aimed to spread its political and cultural influence in the region through the creation of satellite entities connecting the Tehran-Beirut axis through Damascus. From that, we can consider the Twelvers strategically switched their position with respect to Alawite sect, the members of which were traditionally among the most impoverished people in Syria (Pipes 1989: 429).

Gradually, the Alawite sect became a central element of power struggles in Syria. When the rule settled in the hands of the Alawite Baathist Hafez al-Assad, he carefully thought about how to exploit this sectarian divisions for the benefit of his regime and his power. The major dilemma he faced was how to control a country with an Alawite minority of 12% (Lutterbeck 2011: 46) against a Sunni majority. Not surprisingly, he turned to the armed and security forces for such a task. Here he faced another dilemma: if the majority of the population is Sunni, then surely the majority of the personnel in the military would also be Sunni. The Syrian Armed Forces needed to be militarily effective given the regional threats, the Kurdish crises in Iraq and Turkey, and the civil war and sectarianism in Lebanon. On the other hand, al-Assad needed to keep it under control. This brought about the military recruitment policies based on ethno-religious criteria (Gaub 2014: 37).

Members of the Alawite sect, who were close to the Syrian regime, controlled most of the Syrian military high command posts. Hafez al-Assad's decision that all major forces must be

under the command of an Alawite officer came without written text, despite the presence of many Sunni officers. Moreover, President Hafez al-Assad was known to appoint army commanders based on kinship, sect, or loyalty to him, placing them in the strategic forces and positions (Achcar 2013: 173-174). The overall orientation of the military was focused on attracting the largest number of Alawites in the active forces and helping them through promotions and progression into the highest posts of the hierarchy. So, the high command, in the end, comes under their control.

General Ali Aslan, a prominent Alawite general and strong supporter of President Hafez al-Assad played a prominent role in recruiting Alawite tribesmen into elite military divisions with the best training and equipment. Those divisions were tasked with guarding the Presidential Palace, government buildings, and officials' residences. They are deployed at the top and foothills of Mount Qassioun and at the entrances to and around Damascus. The Syrian military leadership recruited large numbers of non-commissioned officers and elite military soldiers from the Matawra tribe, which is the tribe of Hafez al-Assad, especially from the town of Qardaha and surrounding villages (Zain El Abidine 2008: 504).The ethnic/sectarian recruitment policies represent the systematic approach Hafez al-Assad planned for and implemented to keep his total control on the state and the military, a matter that allowed him to control all other sects, even if they were the majority (Drysdale 1979: 366).

Hafez al-Assad adopted a pure secular system, citing the religious freedom that is guaranteed by the constitution for all religious sects. The Article 35 of the 1973 constitution guarantees the freedom of beliefs, freedom of worship, and state's respect for all religions in the name of respecting the public order. However, the Syrian regime was careful not to show this sectarian diversity under the cover of the unifying Pan-Arabism. Despite the depth of this

religious and sectarian diversity in social tradition, it was not recognized by the regime officially. It was supported by unitary rhetoric and slogans. All the social actors of those different sects, and the challenges this diversity posed, did not have any presence in the official public domain in Syria, except when it is used for the support of the Syrian regime. The different sects were not mentioned in a clear manner as active social actors by the regime or the concerned sects (Hinnebusch 2019: 50-54; Elhusseini 2014: 42-47). That meant every Syrian was living within the context of sectarianism, practicing solidarity with all means and modalities with his fellow sectarians, and at the same time, pretending that his Arabism and Syrianism were above all religions and ethnicities.

The regime dealt with this sectarian diversity by developing a very selective mechanism for the military. This resulted in most reservists being Sunni and the active duty being Alawite. According to Lutterbeck (2011) the elite forces were exclusively allocated to Alawites, and especially the relatives of al-Assad. Even in those units where Sunnis had been numerically predominant, efforts were made to subject them to tight Alawite control.[10]

The claim about secularism of the Syrian state, as stated in the constitution, is falsified by actual data. These numbers show clearly the regime's bias towards its own religious sect. Before the regime turned into a strong ally to the Shia sect, it intentionally, and without declaration, strived to guarantee the superiority of its sect in all the military and security apparatuses of the state (Fildis 2012: 154-155). In contrast to the preferential treatment of the Alawites, the regime used all its power to deal with other sects and ethnic groups. The massacre of civilians in Hama in 1982 can be considered one of the bloodiest actions of the regime against

[10] Lutterbeck precisely explains this situation in the following words: "Thus while Alawites make up only around 12% of the Syrian population, they account for 70% of career soldiers in the Syrian armed forces. The imbalance is even more pronounced in the officer corps, where 80–90% are estimated to be Alawites," (Lutterbeck 2011: 46).

its opponents. The regime tried through such a violent action to deter its opponents and make them think twice before attempting to rebel in real and serious manner. This process of conducting the relations between the ruler and the different sects will be reflected in the coup-proofing mechanism, and therefore on the military's reaction toward the Syrian "revolution", as I explain below.

1.3 Coup-Proofing Mechanism and its Reflections

After the end of the mandate period, Syria witnessed a situation of chaos and instability and power struggles, which made it fall prey to a series of coups and counter coups. Between 1949 and 1970, there were 21 coups, coup attempts, insurrection, and mutiny by some Syrian army officers. The remaining 30 years of Syrian history in the twentieth century witnessed only one coup attempt, which was quietly suppressed. General Hafez al-Assad assumed the presidency between 1971 and 2000 and imposed a system of governance based on the merge of the Baath Party and the armed forces to dominate the institutions of the civilian rule (Zain El Abidine 2008: 425).

This transformation from chaos to stability, during al-Assad's reign, shows the huge efforts that the Syrian regime exerted in search of a way to ensure military loyalty. Particularly the military is composed of heterogeneous officers and personnel, who easily can change their loyalty to their sect or ethnic group. The Syrian coup-proofing mechanism is summarized by the pursuit of merging the military and the political system into one organically solidified entity. It convinced the members of the military, as the civil war showed, that their survival is organically connected to the survival of the regime (Gaub 2011: 36; Kartveit and Jumbert 2014: 14-15).

The regime restructured the military at its core and periphery and allocated the core of the military operating forces to the Alawite officers, or to the ones that the regime guaranteed their

loyalty totally. As such, we encounter a highly politicized military in Syria (Barany 2011: 36). The peripheral elements consisting of other ethnic and religious groups worked under the close scrutiny of the Alawite core (Taylor 2014: 108). By that, we can say that al-Assad obtained a strong Alawite army covered by thin and relatively weak Arab Sunni casing.

In addition, the Syrian regime divided the military into many overlapping units with regard to responsibilities and deployment. There could be more than one force and more than one unit in the same region for the same purpose as a way of generating loyalty toward regime through competition and control mechanisms (Taylor 2014: 104). Taylor (2014) also reports that the regime supported the different military units with many intelligence services that were overlapping, intersecting, directly connected to the power center and being occupied by various groups. In that way, the al-Assad regime ensured the ability to control all state and military details. All the information, whether big or small were reaching the helm of power in more than one way, with more than one speed.

By analyzing the Syrian coup-proofing mechanism, we can see clearly that the regime deliberately merged the military hard core into the regime, such that the survival of each one became connected with the survival of the other. Therefore, the military fought very hard in defense of the regime and continues to do so. In exchange, the regime works hard in support of the military with all kind of resources, armaments, and foreign alliances.

The Syrian regime adoption of sectarian recruitment and "communal coup-proofing strategy" (Makara 2013: 348) in conducting its coup-proofing mechanism helped in its longevity. This strategy also resulted in promotion of the concept of hereditary rule in a regime that claimed to be a republic, without any resistance. The president was able to ensure the loyalty of the essential elite forces, which somehow compels the rest of the forces to engage in the regime's

approach out of fear of its retaliation or seeking its generosity. Furthermore, this mechanism is what enabled the military to preserve its unity when the "revolution" started. No major collapses or military defections happened as did in the cases of Libya and Yemen.[11]

Despite the fact that this mechanism helped in strengthening the loyalty to the regime, it weakened the tactical capabilities of the military, making it slow in movement. Also, making all the decisions so centralized, particularly by the president, made the military ineffective, in real terms, in its maneuvering (Pilster and Bohmelt 2011: 336). This was proven by the outcomes of the Syrian wars with Israel, where the operating field units were not able to make crucial decisions without referring to the central command. This gave the Israeli units the advantage of initiative and freedom of maneuvering. Thus, the results were a series of catastrophes. In addition, the military interventions in dealing with the popular movements confirmed the ability of the Syrian military to preserve its unity and solidarity. This unity and solidarity remains without avail. The military was not able until now, despite the Russian and Iranian support and the participation of Hezbollah members, to resolve the battle on the ground.

1.4 The Military Reaction towards the "Revolution" and the Results of that Reaction

Immediately after the outbreak of the Syrian "revolution", President Bashar al-Assad adopted the "security solution" of suppression of the protestors with excessive force, without taking the international community pressures into consideration. "Military units were called into the places where the protest movements were deemed most threatening, such as Daraa, the

[11] The building of this complex mechanism was not an easy task, especially if we take into account the size of the Alawite sect relative to the Sunnis and other sects and ethnic groups. However, the al-Assad clan were able to do that through strategic recruitment and promotion (Makara 2014: 349).

Damascus suburbs, Homs, and Latakia," (Al-Saleh and White 2013: 7). Orders were given to officers and soldiers to fire with different types of weapons. The reaction of the regime toward the protestors was strong and violent in all measures.

The regime did not hesitate to call for a comprehensive mobilization of all the armed and security forces to put an end to the insurgency. The military reaction was in harmony with the decisions of the regime. The military defended the regime, not just because it was the source of its livelihood, but because it was the source of its existence as well. The fall of the regime would indicate the end of the existing military institution and the benefits it provides for the Alawite regions that are known to be mountainous and poor. Therefore, serving in the military has been seen as the main source of income for those people, if not the only source.

The military's enthusiastic involvement was in line with the regime's plan to suppress the protesters. That outcome was a natural and inevitable result, given the process the regime used to conduct the sectarian and ethnic matters. Achcar (2013) explains this outcome with the extensive control of the regime over military and the lack of general insurrection among the various ethnic and religious groups (Achcar 2013: 183). These conditions allowed the Syrian military and the regime to re-organize their ranks and overcome the first shock caused by the uprising in its early stages. The regime succeeded in ensuring the unity of the military despite the complexity of its components, and that helped the Syrian regime for the last nine years in resisting all the pressures exerted on it, whether politically, militarily, or economically.

After the start of violence, signs of defections quickly emerged. Some of the Syrian military officers and soldiers started to desert their units and join the revolution. However, these activities were limited on an individual level. Gaub (2014) argues that only about 3% of the soldiers defected were mainly juniors and that this rate is comparable to the international figures

(Gaub 2014: 37).[12] This evaluation shows that the Syrian military kept its balance, force, unity, and its conformity despite the length of the conflict. It does not appear that the Syrian military has any intention of changing the path of war in a different direction than what the regime wants.

The Syrian military also benefited from the weakness of the opposition and its forces. The core of the regime was strong and coherent in sharp contrast to the status of the opposition forces. These forces, the Free Syrian Army (FSA), were composed of some of the soldiers who deserted the service in the regular army, some professionally trained civilians who bear arms against the regime, and some foreign fighters who became a source of weakness for the opposition after they arrived to fight the regime (Spyer 2012: 47). Furthermore, the FSA also suffers greatly from weak professionalization, fragmentation, and ineffective command structure (Bhardwaj 2012: 86).

Historical tracking of the Syrian conflict shows that the timing factor was always in the regime's benefit. The regime learned how to re-organize its ranks, units, and solidify its alliances. In contrast, time was not on the side of the opposition. It became more fragmented, weak, and lost confidence of the civilians as the conflict progressed. Civilians became doubtful of the rebels' ability to emerge peacefully out of this trap. The Russian Foreign Minister, Mr. Sergey Lavrov, evaluates the military conditions of the rebels saying, "It is clear as day that even if the opposition is armed to the teeth it will not defeat the Syrian army, and there will simply be slaughter and mutual destruction for long, long years," (Reuters April 4, 2012, quoted in Al-Assad 2012: 90).

In addition to the military civil war, an ideological sectarian civil war emerged after the protests started. During the civil war, the opposition tried to gain more sympathy and external

[12] Gaub argues that the defection rate in the American army was 2% in 2006 (Gaub 2014: 37).

support, while the regime wanted to use it to weaken and crumble the opposition. The regime's strategy was to frame the rebels as terrorists and to justify the organized, violent, and ruthless military reaction against these opponents. Religious ideology played a crucial role in this framing. Painting the opposition as Sunni radicals had dual purposes. In the beginning, the goal was to divide the ranks of the opposition and to discourage non-Sunni rebels. Second, that strategy was used to discharge the "revolution" from the political potential, tearing out the trust of people, and subsequently raising the fear of the Western public by labeling the opposition as an extremist movement to enhance the role of the regime as defender of secularism (Elhusseini 2015: 55-56; Hinnebusch 2019: 60-61).

The Syrian regime tried, with all its potential, to label his war against the opposition as a war against terrorism. The regime framed the civil war as a conflict between a secularist state, that it represents, and a radical Islamist opposition to elevate the international pressure exerted on the opposition. However, the sectarian nature of the military, the participation of Hezbollah fighters, and the explicit Iranian support for the regime quickly turned the Syrian conflict into a conflict between Sunni Islamists on one side and Shia Islamists on the other side (Phillips 2015: 359). Western powers took this as a war between Shia Islamic terrorism and Sunni Islamic terrorism. Based on that, projects to solve this conflict were hesitant, ambiguous and not genuine, adding to the continuation of the crisis and the tragedies of the Syrian people. It became clear that there was no real will or possibility for the international community to find a solution to this crisis.

The results of the iron fist that the regime used against the protesters were catastrophic for the people, and for the state as a whole. The Syrian conflict, which started as peaceful demonstrations on January 26, 2011, turned to the bloodiest conflict the MENA region witnessed

(Bhardwaj 2012: 84). The conflict transformed more than half of the population into refugees, after the quasi-full destruction of their cities and towns. Syria inevitably became a failed state, because the strong merger of the regime and the armed forces. The key to solving the Syrian conflict is not war or dialogue, but rather the dismantling of the strong tie between the regime and the armed forces. The displacement of the Syrian regime, and ensuring the preservation of the Syrian military with a changed doctrine, could be the beginning of a solution to prevent Syria from turning into the cases of Libya and Yemen.

2. The Yemeni Military between the Tribe, Sect, and Ideology

Yemen is one of the most challenging cases for conventional interpretations in the civil-military relations literature, which is one reason why it's not studied often in comparative accounts (Barany 2011; Makara 2013). In simplifying an admittedly more complex phenomenon, the common argument in the literature in general is that militaries would stay by incumbents in times of crisis when the procedures of recruitment and promotion were ultimately characterized by personal relations in what is coined "patrimonial" "or "communal" military. The internal fabrics of such organization would then be characterized by kin, family, tribe, or religion.

In Yemen, the trajectory of the military can be described as king maker that shifted to regime changer. After it ousted the Imamate and then the first two presidents, it finally in 1978 brought former President Ali Abdulla Saleh to power, who was a military officer. Saleh was first a friend of the Yemeni armed forces and increased their number significantly and initiated modernization processes. But the Yemeni military was far from cohesive or professional; rather, it was held together by personal and tribal loyalties and accordingly fell apart when it had to endure political pressure. In large part, this was Saleh's own doing.

Distrustful of the military that brought him to power, he put family members in charge of key units, appointed and promoted officers based on personal ties or tribal affiliations, thereby undermining the official command structure and creating a shadow one tied to him. Tribes used the military to bolster their positions and secure patronage; military ranks conferred no authority unless bolstered by membership of an influential tribe; and communication ran along tribal lines, not command structure. When protest struck Yemen in early 2011, the armed forces consequently fell apart along personal and tribal lines: some units following General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, President Saleh's rival and a member of Hashed tribal confederation. Others, under the leadership of Saleh's family members stayed loyal to him whereas the rest of the army went home. Overall, however, the military units avoided open confrontation with each other.

The Yemeni case represents a mixture of the cases under investigation in this study. In ethnic and sectarian diversity, it is very close to the Syrian case. In the dimension of the strategies adopted by the regime in conducting the civil-military relations, it is very similar to the Libyan case with the ruler seeking to weaken the military. It is important to study this case through the adopted analytical mechanism. It will provide us with a new frontier of understanding of the failed civil-military relations and the current situation of the failure of a whole country and the suffering of its people.

According to the IISS reports, the Yemeni military consisted of 66,700 active duty troops as of 2010. Among those, 60,000 were in the army, 1,700 were in the Navy, 3,000 were in the Air Force, and 2,000 were in Air Defense Force. Also there were about 71,200 paramilitary men. The reservists serve for two years (IISS 2010: 276).

2.1 The Yemeni Military and the State Building

The "happy" Yemen, as it is called, is the weakest circle in the Middle East, in general, and the Gulf area, in particular. It has been treated as the "minor sister" by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. This country, at least during its contemporary history, has been characterized by almost permanent instability, armed conflicts, and miserable poverty. The strategic position of Yemen at the entrance of the Red Sea and at the Indian Ocean did not provide any intercession. Instead, it became a curse on the country and its people, and did not help it achieve what should have enabled it to become truly "happy" Yemen. The country continued to be the victim of its strategic position connecting east and west and north and south. This was one matter that led former President Ali Abdullah Saleh to describe ruling Yemen as a "dance on the head of a snake," (JCSR 2008: 6), as a caution to all parties indicating the permanent and continuous struggles in the country.

Following the path of the state building and analyzing it in the case of Yemen is a complex matter. This complexity involves tribes, regional variations, colonial legacies, and religious identities (Wedeen 2008: 38). By and large, this complexity combined with lack of economic resources resulted in many conflicts that affected Yemen's economic and political development and political stability. Thus, Yemen's state's building path is characterized by instability and lack of security. As Al-Rasheed and Vitalis (2004: 4) succinctly put in a very short time, "Yemen moved from Imamate to Republic, followed by political upheavals, civil wars, and finally unification."

After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the Zaydis[13] of Yemen, under the leadership of Imam Yahya Bin Alhussain Bin Al Qassem, established a ruling system based on the Imamate[14]. The story of the relationship between the Imamate and the Liberals in Yemen still seems like a mythical story. Prior to the formation of the Yemen Arab Republic in 1962, the country was almost closed to the outside world under an autocratic Imamate regime that was finally overthrown in September 26, 1962. During that period, "a group of Yemini teenagers were sent to study abroad at universities in Cairo, Lebanon, Western Europe, and the United States. They formed the core of the "Free Yemen" network of expatriates that played major role in the overthrowing of the autocratic Yemeni Imamate," (Orkaby 2015: 2).

Those forty scholars, which were called 'Liberals', worked in cooperation with military officers continuously to displace the traditional retroactive Imamate regime, and to replace it with a modern Republic regime. However, the tribal conflicts and ideologies pushed the country into civil war with regional dimensions. Saudi Arabia stood by the Imam side, while Egypt supported the coup plotters, until they were able to achieve their goal.

It was assumed that the establishment of the modern nation state based on a republican system would lead to the dismantling of all the old structures that dominated Yemen before, such as the ethnic tribal system, the Royal system, and the religious sectarian system. However,

[13] Zaydi; occasionally known as Fivers, is one of the Shia sects. Zaidiyyah emerged in the eighth century out of Shi'a Islam. Zaydis are named after Zayd ibn 'Alī, the grandson of Husayn ibn 'Alī and the son of their fourth Imam Ali ibn 'Husain. Followers of the Zaydi Islamic jurisprudence are called Zaydi and make up about 40% of Muslims in Yemen.

[14] The Imams of Yemen and later the Kings of Yemen were religiously consecrated leaders belonging to the Zaydi branch of Shia Islam. They established a blend of religious and secular rule in parts of Yemen. Their imamate endured under varying circumstances until the military coup in 1962. Zaydi theology stresses the presence of an active and visible imam as leader. The imam was expected to be knowledgeable in religious scholarship, and to prove himself a worthy headman of the community, even in battle if this was necessary.

nothing of that nature happened. The relations between the republic ruler and the remnants of the Royal regime and the tribes on one side, and the religious sects on the other side, were what largely determined the formulation of the modern and contemporary Yemen. Parallel to these developments, the military started to emerge as a nontraditional institution along with other special security units (Dresch 1989: 266).

The military emerged as a prominent actor during the sectarian and tribal regional conflicts periods, which characterized the history of Yemen. It operated to resolve the issues in favor of the ruling regime. Despite the importance of the military and the importance of its decisive interference in resolving Yemeni conflicts, its role was limited to militaristic matters and did not crossover into civil and political issues. The group of 'Liberals' was the one who planed, organized, and led the different policies that the state and the ruling regime adopted.

The ruling regime in Yemen tried to contain the traditional ethnic and sectarian differences within the modern republic regime. Therefore, it gave so many concessions that contradicted the basis of the modern state that it made the Yemeni state continue to operate as an institution overloaded with its ethnic and sectarian history. One of the strangest concessions that the modern state made to benefit the traditional structures was to accommodate the remnants of the Royal regime. The new republic regime incorporated them as ministers, representatives, and in high positions in the state.

The most dangerous concession; however, was the lack of a guarantee of the state monopolizing the use of legal violence at the hand of the security and military establishments. It allowed the tribes and sheiks to bear arms and form armed militias, so the Yemeni population became one of the most armed people among Arab countries. Tribal men have the freedom to bear arms, and some have more than one piece of heavy armaments. The worst decision was that

the regime appointed tribal men and Sheiks to command many military units, which gave tribes' Sheiks active membership in the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. Instead of the regime dismantling these traditional structures, it made circumstantial and self-intensive alliances with them, based on the situations on the ground. The regime, especially during President Saleh's reign, fought the alhouthis and then made an alliance with them and fought alongside them. The regime also made an alliance with Al-Ahmar tribes and then fought them. One of the tribe's Sheiks summarized the stand of the President as, "You don't know when he is your friend, or when he becomes your enemy," (Ghalib 2007: 3). The first and last bet in all of those maneuverings is the control of the summit of the regime.

Overall, a member the armed forces, President Ali Abdullah Salih, built the regime by forming coalitions of various types among tribal leaders and military officers. Wedeen (2008) argues that despite Salih staying in power for a long time, his regime remained fragile which led him to use "the divide-and-rule policies as an alternative which themselves created spares of disorder that may, paradoxically, help enable his rule," (Wedeen 2008: 51). As a result, since its independence, Yemen lives in a state of disturbance due to civil wars or because of military mutinies. During the 1970s and 1980s, Yemen was characterized by instability that put external and internal pressure on the Yemeni regime. On October 11, 1977, President Ibrahim Al-Hamdi was assassinated. Eight months later, his successor President Ahmad al-Ghashmi was also assassinated. Next came the borders war with Southern Yemen in 1979, followed by the war with Saudi Arabia in 1980. There were several military coups, mutinies within the military, and repeated dredges and squabbles against the regime (Phillips 2008: 44-45).

Yemen hardly witnessed any periods of a few years of security and stability. When a war ends, it usually enters into another one. The ethnic composition of Yemen is represented by a

strong tribal structure and a sectarian grouping represented by a Zaydi-Sunni polarization. The Yemeni regime exploited these compositions to insure its security. The ethnic composition and regime responses are all factors that made the Yemeni political structure so fragile and explosive, under any circumstances.

Ali Abdullah Salih, a military man, assumed presidency in 1978, after the assassination of President al-Ghashmi. He exploited the Yemeni situation and its contradictions and tried to use it to solidify his rule. He depended on tribal men and provided a lot of concessions to them at the expense of the modern state that he was calling to build. As a result of those actions, he stayed more than three decades in his post. He continually exploited the chaos and instability resulting from tribal and sectarian conflicts to distribute power in Yemen, to strengthen his rule, and to make his supporters political masters of Yemen.

As a result of the special relationship between the military and the civilian, the military was weakened. The military became non-unified because of the multiplicity and split of loyalty, as well as the spread of corruption in it. The appointment of loyal tribal men to command posts of military units gave them the chance to turn the army from a military security establishment to a rent establishment that they used to amplify the number of personnel and collect their "notional salaries". With respect of the multiplicity of loyalties, Salih made the military units act as tribal militias rather than being units belonging to a national security institution. This matter affected the disciplinary capabilities of the units and personnel. Instead of contributing to nation-building and social integration, the army has become one of the factors of social disintegration and has contributed to deepening social divisions (Al-Sharjabi 2013: 6).

The informal relationship between the civilian and the military participated in weakening the state as the state did not have monopoly of control on its institutions, especially the security

ones. Despite the essential role of the Yemeni military in toppling the Imamate, during the unification of Yemen, and the confrontations with the Alhouthis and the Southern movement, the military remained marginal in the state-building track by all measures. One reason for this weakness was related to the fact that the organization of Free Officers was limited to junior and middle level officers. On the issue of governance, as some of its leaders say, the organization was fully convinced not to take serious political responsibility in the government, leaving those political matters to the 'fathers,' civilians, and military, who had previously many political experiences, on condition that things should go according to the goals of the revolution (Khasrouf 2012: 7). As for the regime, it was treating the military as a group of "mercenaries" that perform a specific duty on behalf of the civilian rulers and then returns to its barracks to get paid.

2.2 The Yemeni Military between the Tribe and the Sect

Samy Dorlian (2012) describes the Yemeni reality as highly complex, that it cannot be read on one level, whether sectarian, tribal, or political (Dorlian 2012: 183-184). To start with, in addition to ethnic and sectarian diversity, Yemen also has significant regional differences, which contributes to complicating social and political issues. About 64% of the population is Sunni Arab who mostly reside in the South and 35% of the population is Zaydi mostly residing in the North. African Arabs and South Asians reside in the South, and the remainder of the population is a small minority of Jews and Christians (JCRS 2008: 29-30). These different groups are distributed over a network of tribes that differ in size and are spread over territory and differ in their relation to the regime. The Yemeni-Yemeni contentions and conflicts sometimes originate from tribal affiliations that incidentally intersect with sectarian affiliations.

In Yemen, conflicts could be based on regional affiliations as well. The North and the South continued to represent chronic struggle spaces, whether during the colonial period, the Imamate time, or the time of the Republic. On the regional level, the conflict between the North and South played a pivotal role in forming an important part of Yemen's political and military life. In terms of military, the compositions of the North and South militaries and their doctrines significantly.

The Southern military was more disciplined, systematic, and committed to international military standards. It was qualified to establish the essential nucleus for a national army in professional terms. The Northern military was far from being an army of a nation-state but was a "family" army where its loyalty was to some individuals instead of to the state (AlNakeeb 2012). The state for the army of the North was nothing but a source of rent and fast profit for which officers were competing, to the point that they fought each other to gain it. The great calamity that the Yemeni army suffered does not lie in that contradiction alone; it also comes from the failure of the professional Southern army in confronting the tribal and family military. Yemen, therefore, has come under the mercy of those officers' desires, who lead an army that is subject to their whims and aspirations as seen in the 1994 war (AlNakeeb 2012: 218).

We can say that the traditional structures of the Yemeni society, whether tribal or sectarian, were able to thwart the modern structures. This trend was especially visible in the development of military. Yemen continued reeling in virtual happiness in its rags. Despite being more advanced in its modern nation-state building, the South had to deal with this poverty as well. This situation caused more grudges, feelings of injustice, and grievances, as a result of the forces docility "for the one who is lower" as the Southerners believed.

On the ethnic level, the tribe is considered one of the most organized elements of the Yemeni society. The tribal structure is quite complex and it also demonstrated significant variation across regions. According to Swagman (1988:252), "in the highland regions are three major confederations associations of Yemeni tribes: the *Hamdan* federations (*Hashid* and *Bakil* in the northern and central parts of Yemen) and the less active *Mdhhij* federation in the southern regions." In addition, tribe is one of the most important components of identification for many Yemenis (Swagman 1988; Wedeen 2006).

Instead of being dismantled as an essential and necessary requirement of the modern state, the tribe started extending and stretching and penetrated the frontiers of the modern institutions of the state. President Saleh purchased the loyalty of tribal sheiks by granting them military ranks and appointing them to military commands of the most important military units in Yemen. The parliamentary system also supported this arrangement to consolidate the patrimonial regime (Achcar 2013: 156). The result of all these combinations between the traditional structures, represented by the tribe and religious sects, and the modern structure, represented by parliament and military, was the empowerment of Saleh and his family. Overall, the Yemeni nation-state entered the modernity with its rags, and that was reflected in the path of state-building, and the distribution of power between the modern and the traditional institutions.

The historical path of forming the state was fraught with external and internal risks, and the most important among them were those that originated internally through political struggle on the surface but actually it was originated from tribal, religious schools, and sectarian background. Lastly from ideological background between the components of party conflicts between the socialist left, Arab Nationalists, Nasserists, and Baathists, where all of them were at political and field intersections continuously. All those conflicts are done according to alliances

with pre-national components. The consequences were the reformation of the tribe and the sect in the framework of the political struggles in order to be supportive and protective of the struggling parties, which weakened the state (Al-Salahi 2012: 38).

It is a complex path leaning on the traditional structures to organize the society to insure the tribal, sectarian, and ideological loyalties. The final result was the establishment of a deformed and weak state that can barely be seen as a theoretical entity. Everyone claims to belong to it and defend it, but on the actual level, loyalties continue to be in favor of the tribe and the sect.

The tribal presence in the power struggle represents an old Yemeni tradition. Even at the time of the Ottoman rule in the north, and the British colonialism for some parts of the South, there was no thinking to dismantle the tribal organization. The Turks, and the British to a lesser degree, worked to exploit the tribal distribution and conflicts to enhance their presence in the region. The Zaydi Imamate continued the same way of dealing with the tribes and exploitation for the purpose of strengthening the Imamate and securing its rule. Those same steps were followed by President Saleh without change.

This exploitation of the tribal, ethnic, and sectarian structure produced a “hybrid” political system. A system adopting the principles of the modern state as an organizational framework for the political structures, but at the same time, depending on the tribal and sectarian distribution as a criterion of power distribution among the different components of the Yemeni society (Wedeen 2008: 149).

This complex picture based on the interaction of traditional and modern structure produced unique combinations of survival strategies involving the tribe, the party, and the military. This hybrid composition between the three contradictory structures in the Yemeni state

led to the emergence of a traditional form of power balance. The Yemeni state looked like a federation of tribes, each tribe had its own party and army, and monitored and deterred other tribes. At the same time, the tribe competes for power and rent resources from the state, even resorting to corruption and fraud, such as inflating the number of members of its own party and militia. What made this condition unique was the attachment of military to this structure to give way to an arrangement that, according to Phillips, "the military of the new republic became, as it remains today, a base of tribal power at the elite level and a source of co-optation and wealth distribution at the lower levels," (Phillips 2008: 92).

In this context, the political stability and national security become temporary matters and primarily shaped by the tribal elites' ambitions. The tribe, as a traditional social institution, allows the modern political transformations to take place in a select way. These transformations take root and becomes institutionalized in the real life to the extent they meet the needs of tribe. As a result, the tribal leaders continuously form lobbies that pursue their self-interests at the expense of public interest. As Al-Salahi (2012) convincingly argue, this leads to a pragmatic mentality, that exploits the state for its benefits and does not hesitate to leave or destroy it when the state apparatus threatens its benefits or limit its influence (Al-Salahi 2012: 50). It is this pragmatism that calls for building a school and a hospital, but revolts when there is an attempt to build a police station or military barracks in the region under the tribe's control.

The establishment of the Yemeni Republic by the military men and the Liberals group, who received a modern education imbedded with modernity and citizenship values, was the hope to end the tribal and sectarian organization. Yemen's rules gave the state total control to modernize the institutions by dismantling all the traditional and reactionary structures and organizations and enhancing the official and modern institutions, like the military and elected

councils. However, the elites chose the exact opposite approach. The rulers worked to weaken the military and flood it with corruption and renter practices to the limit that the relations among some military units and their structure resembled the tribal and family relations and structures. The tribe's Sheik or his son becomes the military unit commander, and most of unit's soldiers are his tribesmen (Al-Sharjabi 2013: 4). The tribal and sectarian organization were enhanced and exploited to resolve the power equations.

President Saleh was asked, in an interview with the Majala magazine on October 1, 1986, "To what extent has Yemen succeeded in moving from the stage of tribalism to that of the state?" The president's answer was clear and direct. "The state is part of the tribes, and our Yemeni people is a collection of tribes," (Dresch 1989: 7). Therefore, the president, or any of the politicians, do not hesitate to acknowledge the adoption of the tribal system as part of the modern state-building path.

To manage this complex and conflicting situation, President Saleh continued the Imamate approach in regard of the state-tribe relations. He worked to ensure that neither the state nor the tribe would gain in absolute power in the Republic of Yemen. The government had to build alliances with the tribes to survive. However, "It is also threatened by the power it cedes to those alliances and so works to undermine tribal power where possible," (Phillips 2008: 92). Therefore, the Yemeni government continued to be weak, particularly outside urban centers, where it was exercising ambiguous sovereignty. Yemeni tribes were considerably affecting the regime's calculations. The tribal system in its *Asabia*[15] nature and vertical loyalties gained encouragement by the political system as it viewed that system as a safe partner in powers and

[15] *Asabia*: Strongly defend those who he/she is defending, and have great enthusiasm in the inclinations to their cause. It can be national, ethnic, religious, or tribal.

for its role in limiting the induction of change and participating in the recreation of what already exists (Ghanim 2012: 218). It is a form of collusion between the president and the tribe to seize the state.

In a study by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDIIA) in March 2007, "Yemen: Tribal Conflict Management Program Research Report", the cycle of distrust between the tribes and the official government institutions was indicated. The report acknowledges the connection of state-tribe interaction in some cases and their split in others.

> In contrast with the common perception that tribes are resistant to state intervention in their affairs, many sheikhs reported that in the last 5 years they or a sheikh from the opposing tribe had requested intervention by government institutions. Forty-six (29%) had requested intervention in every conflict in which their tribal unit was involved. Eleven percent had requested intervention in some conflicts in which their tribal unit was involved, but not in others. Reasons for not requesting intervention fell into three major categories: lack of accessibility to government institutions; discontent with the performance of these institutions; and, preference for tribal customs and traditions (NDIIA 2007: 18).

However, among the respondents of the survey, there were some Sheiks who never requested any state interventions in their tribes' affairs or issues related to their regions (NDIIA 2007: 18-19). Sarah Phillips affirms the finding of the above report (Phillips 2008: 102-103). The results of her study reflect the strength of the tribes and clearly show the resistance by tribes toward any attempts of modernity that the state tries to introduce. The tribal elite try to benefit from the rent from the state, and subsequently they welcome the development projects, but they resist any attempt to use the development as a way to extend the state authority in the tribe's region, and that is the contradiction that has kept the Yemeni state chronically weak. On the flip

side, the state always relied on tribes to confront the external and internal threats (Phillips 2008: 92).

The same contradictions can also be observed in the post-unification Yemen after 1989. One factor that contributed to that negative environment between the North and South is that unity was kept by force, after the 1994 attempt by the south to regain independence failed. The north, which established a contradictory state combining traditional and modern aspects through a consensual and non-rational approach, seized, to a certain degree, the south, which had a more rational and modern republic. In the south, the tribe had no effect on politics; the military was state military not tribal military (Phillips 2008: 92).

In such a situation, the unity was kind of a victory of the traditional on the modern, the Bedouin over the urban, which would lead to many social, political, and regional imbalances and contradictions between the North and the South. These contradictions played a role to weaken the republic and its institutions and the abatement of the president and the state authority. They enhanced the Southerners' continuous feelings of injustice, grievance, and marginalization in front of the strong North with its tribes controlling the military and the politics at the same time.

The Yemeni uprisings and the civil war that followed demonstrate that the president's and the state's authority did not extend beyond the enclosures of the Presidential Palace. The Yemeni president did not really rule all of Yemen. There was sort of a distribution of power by mutual consent between the president and his ruling circle on one side, and tribal, sectarian, and regional leaders on the other side (Kronenfeld and Guzansky 2014: 79). All those factors played a role in creating a chaos that, as the current civil war showed, the Yemenis cannot resolve. Through the coup of 1962, the civil war that followed it, and the foreign intervention that resolved that war, to the 2014 coup, the civil war that followed it, and the foreign intervention

that came to resolve that war, we find no meaningful changes and differences in Yemen reality. The practices and approaches stayed the same. Nothing changed but the roles of the players and the formations of their alliances. This issue alone represents a strong indication that the Yemeni situation did not change much under the republic.

Thus, I conclude that the relation between the ruler and the tribal and sectarian structure is a special one. It worked to strengthen the influence of some tribes and sects on one side, and dissipate the ties among them for the sake of domination and ruling on the other side.

The last important element in Yemeni political life, which enhances the complexity of the case, is the religious sectarian element. The religious map in Yemen is composed of a Sunni majority, distributed between the Shafii majority and the Maliki minority, and a Shia minority, distributed between the Zaydi majority and the Alawite minority.

The conflicts among Yemenis were primarily tribal and political conflicts rather than religious. This can be attributed to the close link between the Zaydi and Shafii schools of thought. However, the victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran, and the desire of Imam Khomeini to "export" the revolution, affected this harmonious sectarian distribution. The entry of the political variable into some Islamic schools of thought precipitated the emergence of the Alhouthi group as a political and militaristic group. It also precipitated the spread of the Al-Qaeda organization as a reaction to the emergence of Alhouthi group and the Yemeni-U.S. reproach within the framework of the global war on terrorism.

Alhouthi group was established in Sa'da in 1990. Before that, it was called The Young Believers Group (*Alshabab Almowmen*). It sought the revival of the Shia-Zaydi heritage in Yemen, after this sect was marginalized in the September 1962 coup in the North against the Zaydi Imamate. This group adopted the belief of the political priority of "*Al Albayt*", the

descendants of the profit. In the beginning, it was connected to the *Haq Party* that was established in 1990 under the circumstances of the unity between the North and the South. At that time, there were some attempts for reconciliation between the Zaydis and the republic. In 1997, the Young Believers Group separated from the *Haq Party* and faced many divisions and defections. The last defection in 2002 was led by the former member of parliament from the *Haq Party* and Zaydi Muslim Scholar, Mr. Hussein Alhouthi (Eissa 2013).

After the September 11, 2001 events, this young Muslim scholar tried to reform the teaching of his school of thought, the Zaydi sect, to make it more effective in standing up to the United States' foreign policy in the Middle East. This attempt bothered many of the Zaydi scholars, and strongly bothered the Yemeni government, which was a U.S. ally in the war on terrorism. The Alhouthi slogan is, "God is Great. Death to the U.S. and Israel. Curse on the Jews and Glory to Islam." This caused a lot of clashes with the government and led to the 2004 War of Sa'da (Brandt 2014: 113). The relation between the state and the Alhouthi group swung between war, peace, and reconciliation before it turned to full scale civil war after the Arab Spring. At that time, the ousted President Saleh forged an alliance with the Alhouthi group to lead a military coup and mutiny against the transitional legitimate government.

2.3 The Yemeni Regime Fortified Itself with Family and Tribes

To confront the military threat, Saleh developed a simple coup-proofing mechanism. At first sight, his strategy appears to be development, reformation, and reorganization of the military. A closer look, however, reveals that he controlled the military by appointing his sons, relatives, his tribesmen, and members of his allied tribes to the command posts of the armed forces (Khasrouf 2012: 11). Pursuing this strategy, President Saleh created "a family army" where he depended on his kin for maintaining his power (Makara 2013: 351). After his victory in

the war against the South in 1994, Saleh systematically dismantled the army of the South, seized its equipment and ammunition, and ended the service of most of the officers of the Southern military by sending them to retirement, even if they did not reach the legal age for that (Al-Sharjabi 2013: 2).

Saleh assumed the presidency after a series of coups and revolts, but he stayed obsessed with the threat from the military. The first act he did when he assumed the presidency was to promote himself to the highest military rank. He then executed everyone who he believed conspired, or could conspire, against him. Finally, he appointed close family members to the highest positions of command in various military and security organizations. The priority of the ruler in that country is securing his rule and protecting himself and his family because he was convinced that his rule is about "dancing with the sneaks in their terriers." Despite its important role in Yemeni political life, the armed forces remained, according to Gaub (2014: 41) "weak – both in military and in social terms, where they were constantly bypassed by tribal structures. Military ranks have no authority unless bolstered by an influential tribe: communication lines follow tribal lines, not command structures. Normal military functioning is virtually impossible under such circumstances".

Although Saleh believed that he had firm control of the armed forces. In reality, he was not controlling the armed forces, as a coherent and disciplined force, but was controlling some of its command posts (Makara 2013). Other commands were loyal to him insofar as he was generous to them. This picture was further complicated with the tribal militia who carried a large arsenal of advanced weaponry matching the power of the military (Lutterbeck 2011: 36-37). Against these parallel structures, Saleh tried to weaken the tribal influence by reviving an old habit practiced by old Yemeni kings. He encouraged aggravation of tribal dredging and stocking

enmities among tribes, so they would be distracted from thinking about controlling the military and the state. Thus, exploiting the tribal competition for resources and benefits, Saleh managed to implement a somehow successful coup-proofing mechanism (Makara 2013: 351).

Saleh's strategy, however, had one weak spot. Although President Saleh was controlling the command posts, he was not in control of the units and the personnel. They were loyal to their tribes and not to the regular command structure. This is what the events of 2011 showed. The junior officers and soldiers executed the orders of the tribal sheiks, and they simply deserted the military and left their units. No one stayed with the president, except members of his family and tribe. In other words, the solid nucleus of the Yemeni state continues to be the composition between the military and the tribal dimensions (Makara 2013: 351; Fatah 2011: 82).

The Yemeni state worked to maintain the traditional structures. However, these structures themselves stood up against Saleh's ambitions, particularly for the promotion of his son Ahmad to be the next president. This strategy eventually alienated some powerful tribes including the strong *Hashid* tribal confederation (Achcar 2013: 156). Thus, it was natural that the leader of this tribe Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar became one of Saleh's worst enemies.

This situation shows us the fragility of the coup-proofing mechanism adopted by the president. It also explains that the mechanism was dual direction. As the president was cautions in his dealing with the tribes and had the preparations to face any attempt of rebellion against his rule, the tribes were cautious of the government and prepared themselves to deter any magnification in the president's ambitions. This led to a sort of power balance that not only prevented one side to turn against the other, but divided Yemen into two competing forces for power and resources. Within this delicate balance, military provided one of the best opportunities for obtaining direct government benefits or public employment. Makara (2013:350) reports that

defense spending during the rule of Saleh amounted to between 25% to 40% of the total budget. With such resources, military provided job opportunities that many Yemenis took advantage of to earn income and support their families.

Despite the large government spending, it did not benefit the military itself. It was, in reality, nothing but a way to channel the funds to the tribes and their Sheikhs. This matter made the tribal elites compete to obtain as much as possible of these "transfers" to support their positions. As a result of this weak, simple, and contradictory mechanism, the president obtained a weak state and fragile military that could use its weapons to attack the president himself at any moment. That happened in 2011. This dual weakness of the state and the military was reflected in the army's reaction toward the mass protests.

2.4 The Military Reaction Toward the Uprising and its Outcomes

Under the above-mentioned circumstances, the Yemeni "revolution" came in the midst of unstable international circumstances. That period was characterized by the establishment of a branch of Al-Qaeda in Yemen, the Alhouthi tide controlling the North, the tribal influence critical of the president and his entourage, and the desire of the southern movement for revenge for its repeated political and military defeats in its prior confrontations with the ruling regime. The difficult living conditions that Yemenis were going through and the erroneous economic policies of the president further exacerbated the situation.

All of these issues justified the spark of the uprising. However, what happened after the outbreak of the uprising made it difficult for any side to control it and clench it for good. Based on that, the military reaction was disordered, undisciplined, incoherent, and subject to changing circumstances. Immediately after the outbreak of the uprising, General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, the commander of the North-Eastern military region and the first armored division, and

commanders of some other military units declared their support for the protesters The Yemeni military became divided into two militaries: uprising supporters' military and the family military, as it was described by the protesters (Al-Sharjabi 2013: 1). The result was exactly what Sheikh Sinan Abu Lahoum warned about in 2007. He said, "We must take care of our unity, otherwise Yemen will be destroyed and we will be like Somalia," (Ghalib 2007). Indeed, after the uprising's success in ousting the president, he came back to rearrange his alliances and started forming an alliance with the Alhouthis to march to the capital to carry out a coup against the "revolution" and the national efforts to rebuild a new Yemen.

All the circumstances given had an inevitable outcome which is the undisciplined reaction of the military toward the revolution. Despite the president's desperation to keep what he believed to be his right to stay in position, he was forced to step down for national interest. However, his concession was circumstantial, temporary, and tactical, as he knew very well the limits of the military and tribes' power. Once the new government started planning to restructure the military, to correct the loyalties among the military institution commands, the resistance to change mechanism started moving to confront any reformation attempts. The result was the country entered a very dangerous and destructive civil war.

The later developments for ousting President Saleh show us that he was well prepared for this new reality. He planted his family members in the various state agencies, and they were the ones who stayed even after his departure. For example, his son remained as the commander of the Republican Guard and other relatives played critical administrative roles. Based on this, Achcar (2013) concludes that Yemeni case resulted in the most superficial regime change among the Arab Spring cases. Among the outcomes of all Arab uprisings, the outcome of the Yemeni uprising been the most artificial. "Not only has the change to which the uprising gave rise left the

underlying cause of the explosion intact; it has not even gone far enough to usher in a period of temporary, relative stabilization before the revolution pursue its course, or the country sinks into chaos," (Achcar 2013: 159-160).

Initially, followers of the ousted president, who he had planted in the various military, security, and paramilitary organizations, were very afraid of the new regime's intentions. Realizing Saleh's influence in the security apparatus, the new President Mr. Abd al-Rab Mansur Hadi tried to ensure the success of the transition period by targeting Saleh's relatives and allies (Makara 2013: 352). In response, the ousted president was forced to push the country into a civil war that is still going.

Yemen became a failed state because of the wrong policies for conducting the issues of the armed forces. The civil-military relations prevented the military from becoming a professional institution capable of protecting the unity of the country and playing the role of a mediator in times of crises, as in the crisis that Yemen is going through now. After decades of being a weak state living on a level of subsistence, Yemen today became a failed state. The no-war-no-peace situation that Yemen witnessed for years now makes the future of the country ambiguous. Given the current situation, it does not look like the country will be able to exit the vicious cycle of failure. The domestic, regional, and international realities prevent the emergence of a Yemeni power that is able to redraw the political map, according to the country's demographic, political, religious, and cultural characteristics. The best scenario that might happen could be the division of Yemen into two states.

3. The Libyan Military: from Dismantling to Chaos

In sharp contrast to the way the 2011 uprisings unfolded in Tunisia and Egypt, the elimination of Mummar Gaddafi was the result of armed intervention and collapse of the armed

forces with subsequent civil war. Similar to other state encountering popular uprisings in the MENA region, the military response was the key variable which determined the social-political conflict. The Libyan military's response was unlike that of Tunisian and Egyptian counterparts, however. While the military engaged in unified behavior in Tunisia and Egypt, the Libyan military response was divided along regular and elite unit lines. Elite units had low interest in disobeying regime orders, and thus they exhibited fervent support for the regime. Regular military units had high interest in disobeying orders and they exhibited fractured support for the regime.

The Libyan armed forces have occupied a certain place in a specific social structure through its modern history. It brought up the regime change in 1969 through a military coup, but its strength as the only group that can develop a corporate interest across tribal boundaries ultimately turned it into a threat. Gaddafi mistrusted the armed forces whose role was deliberately made unclear. As a result of this distrust of the Libyan armed forces, Gaddafi worked to weaken those elements of the military which could jeopardize his rule, namely all of those which could develop collective identity and interests. He targeted all the human elements which make or break the armed forces, rather than its equipment. Gaddafi regime had no intention of creating strong cohesion in the armed forces. After all, it was cohesion of the Free Officers Movement that produced the coup in 1969. Therefore, the regime proceeded to weaken the Libyan military in a number of ways as a process of a systematic coup-proofing mechanism.

Gaddafi leveraged the military's budget to restrain its ambition, ensured it remained a decentralized organization, kept it in remote areas away from urban centers, and created a myriad of internal security organizations and parallel militaries to monitor and balance the military. In

all those efforts, Gaddafi maintained control of his military by creating a center hub and spoke approach with his family at the center and key tribes along the periphery.

When the uprising began in February 2011, the Libyan military had rarely been used to deal with riots and hence was confronted with a set of challenges new in tactics and loyalty. More importantly, its position within the regime power structure had major implications that rendered its capability of dealing with the crisis.

During the reign of Muammar Gaddafi, the Libyan security forces were a complex organization "…composed of a number of different entities; the most relevant are the Libyan Armed Forces, the *Katiba,* and the Revolutionary Committees," (PCHR, AOHR, and ILAC 2012: 14). The size of the Libyan military, according to 2010 statistics, was about 76,000 active duty soldiers. They were distributed as 50,000 in the army, 8,000 in the air force, and 18,000 in the navy. Added to those soldiers were about 40,000 in reserve. Since the reserve conscription period is between one year and two years, most of the reservists were popular militias. In other words, Libya had a relatively small military compared to the neighboring countries (IISS 2010: 262)

During the reign of Gaddafi, the Libyan military faced the worst dismantling and weakening strategies, which turned it into a military force that had nothing in common with military organization, except the name. The stand of Gaddafi toward the state and its various apparatuses, including the military, was specific. He tried to establish a new and unique political notion (i.e. people's republic) that was different from other political theories. The outcome was catastrophic and reflected the level of mental instability with which Gaddafi was diagnosed (Oakes 2012).

Libya suffered greatly from its “estate” character going back to the Ottoman rule later to be annexed by Italy as an estate. While it was an Italian estate, the allied forces tried to annex Libya. It finally gained independence in 1951. Here it became a weak, obscure hereditary kingdom, that did not experience stability from its formation until its fall out. Therefore, the state formation path represents a weak foundation in Libya. On September 1, 1969, a group of military officers, under the command of Muammar Gaddafi, executed a coup against the king and declared the formation of the Libyan Arab Republic. Many observers thought the coup would mark the beginning of the Libyan development path, especially since the country contained one of the largest oil reserves in the region.

This expectation collided with the pressing desire of Muammar Gaddafi to dismantle the various state agencies, without providing any alternatives to replace them. Therefore, his end and the fall out were dramatic and tragic, in all measures. When we apply the proposed analysis mechanism on the Libyan case, we can easily understand the situation in which the country ended and what happened to Gaddafi in 2011. These events were the inevitable outcome of forty years of systematic dismantling of a state and the tribal composition of the military that gave way to specific coup-proofing mechanism.

3.1 The Libyan Military on the Margin of the State Building Paths

Gaddafi attained the rule through a military coup that he led personally, with the help of a group of officers in 1969 (PCHR, AOHR, and ILAC 2012). Gaddafi inherited a weak state from all angles. Under King Idris, the Libyan kingdom did not have strong state traditions. The traditional organizations, such as tribes and oasis territories, looked like independent and undisciplined entities. Gaddafi’s role as leader and founder of the Libyan state was built on this condition and his charismatic personality. In few years, he forged a system that established a

regime that merged charismatic rule with absolute patrimonialism. Gaddafi did not only "seized" the state and its economy, but changed his stand several times and radically affected the whole Libyan society (Achcar 2013: 164). In that process, Gaddafi assumed the function of commander-in-chief of the Libyan armed forces.

Regionally, the Arab world was witnessing the rise of pan-Arab Nationalism. Members of that movement were able to reach the power in some countries, such as Egypt, Syria, Algeria, and Iraq. Those precedents played a large role in the success of the Libyan coup, and its acceptance by the Libyan population as a natural outcome of the path of the desired Arab revival.

Despite the fact that a respectable group of young officers participated in the 1969 coup and worked to make it successful, the selfish desire of Gaddafi to establish a project that carried his personal mark turned this project into a nightmare for the Libyan people, in general, and to the officers and military, in particular. According to Taylor (2014:167), "Gaddafi explained his ideas in the Green Book. According to Gaddafi, the most efficient way to protect the country was to build a People's Militia, which could provide popular resistance and collective self-defense."

The contradiction of desires between Gaddafi and his partners in the coup led to the repetition of coup attempts against him. This matter refined the stance of Gaddafi toward the military, and therefore, pushed him to think about a mechanism that allowed him to control the military and neutralize its danger forever.

When we talk about the relation of the military with the paths of state building in Libya, we notice that Gaddafi, as a young military officer, lived in the peak period of pan-Arab Nationalism. Therefore, he strived to end the rule of the "reactionary" king and replace it with progressive, popular, and socialist rule. Thus, we find that the military had a pivotal role in toppling the monarchical regime. However, the military turned, at the same time, to be a source

of danger and instability during Gaddafi's rule. Even though the military was pleased about the change and the end of the "reactionary" monarchical rule, it was not satisfied at all about Gaddafi's approach of running the country and the military affairs. Especially his dismantling of professionalism in the military led a situation where "the military retained no corporate identity and exercised little institutional autonomy," (Taylor 2014: 165).

3.2 State, Military, and the Tribe

The coup regimes that plagued the Arab region since the 1950s tried to modernize the state and transfer it from a weak, lagging, disintegrated, tribal system to a modern, unified, institutional, nation-state system. The Gaddafi project was opposite of this strategy. He wanted to surpass all the theories and institutions that existed then; he favored the state of the masses (*Jamahiriya*) system, which is a deformed version of socialism where civil organization is undermined (Toaldo 2015: 80).

The ambitions of Gaddafi collided with many factors and planted the seeds of his regime downfall, from the early days of forming it. Gaddafi turned into a thinker overnight, while he is not known to have acquired high scientific, technical, or intellectual education and training. His ego was one of the major reasons for his fall. On the other hand, Gaddafi came to rule a country that was rich in natural resources but weak in all other aspects. Libya was a country without strong norms for state institutionalization. Since the Ottoman rule, to the Italian colonization, to the Allied forces protection, to the formation of the kingdom, the Libyans were absent from the rule in all those periods. This fact could be the main reason that encouraged Gaddafi to promote his audacious *Jamahiriya* theory. In addition, the Libyans had a low educational and knowledge level during the monarchy (Oakes 2012). These circumstances combined with the ethnic, language, and regional differences of the Libyan society provided a fertile ground for Gaddafi's

rule based on tribal affiliations far from the modern state structures. Taylor (2014) concisely summarizes these differences:

> Libya's most prominent divisions exist between tribes, regions, and urban versus rural areas. Libya is predominantly Arab and Sunni, but there are major rifts between tribes who support Gaddafi and those who do not. Additionally, Libya has been historically differentiated between regions in the west, east, and south. Lastly, there are significant differences between denizens in major urban areas along the cost and ruler communities in the southern hinterlands (Taylor 2014: 9).

The duty of the modern state was to dismantle all the traditional structures, including the structure of the man, as a subject of a tribe or sheikh, and replace them with modern institutions based on the free and master citizen. However, Gaddafi's "modernizing" project was nothing but consecration of the tardiness from which he found Libya suffering. He invested in the tribal, ethnic, language, and regional diversity of Libya to enhance the loyalty for his "estate". He also fought the religious scholars violently and strongly (Toaldo 2015: 80).

In sum, Gaddafi's idea of state building was to dismantle all the existing modern institutions and replace them with traditional institutions that would be kept on the margin. He put himself and his family in the center, since the state and the *Jamahiriya*, in the end, simply was Muammar Gaddafi himself. All the institutions and elites remained accessories on the margin of the center that was occupied by him.

There existed more than 140 tribes and influential families in Libya; at least 30 of those had significant clout. These tribes operated according to a traditional arrangement similar to the modern state arrangement. Often the different arrangements among the tribes led to radical controversies and conflicts about influence, which led to forming alliances and counter-alliances.

This is exactly what Gaddafi noticed and invested in throughout the 42 years of his rule. To solve the problem of ensuring the military loyalty to him in this complex environment, he depended on the strategy of creating multiple layers of loyalty among the members of these tribes and to play those against each other (Taylor 2014: 160). This strategy resulted in a state composed of successive and narrowing circles, until it reached the top of the hierarchy, which contained the small circle of Gaddafi's blood relatives. He himself represented the focal point that other circles revolved around.

The tribe in the Libyan society represents an influential institution, because the tribal norm pushes the tribe members to prefer their tribal loyalty over their loyalty to the state institutions, including the military institution. "Those serving in the regular military units were loyal to their region and tribe, not to Gaddafi as an individual, or the corporate identity of the military as a profession," (Taylor 2014: 166). Gaddafi's tribe was small relative to other tribes. Thus, he decided to build alliances in different ways with the rest of tribes. He approached the *Warfaly* tribe that has a blood connection with his own tribe. He employed the *Makarhu* tribe that occupied a large part of the southern Fazan area and used the *Tabo* tribes that were present at the boundaries with Chad. He gave those tribes some privileges, such as employment in middle and low level positions in the government, providing social services, distributing funds, and assisting the *Tabo* tribes in their struggle with the neighboring countries.

According to the circumstances and conditions propagated by the Gaddafi regime, the tribe became "…a means to protect the individual and community from the state, and at the same time a means to protect the state from the individuals," (Bou Talib 2012: 75). This means that individuals and communities used the tribe as a protective shield from the pressure of the modern state that Gaddafi wanted to build in Libya. Simultaneously, Gaddafi and his state used the tribe

as a protective shield against any attempt for political change about which individuals and communities might think. The major effort of Gaddafi, toward tribes, was to prevent them from challenging him for power and control the armed forces (Taylor 2014: 162). This affirms the effect of the social fabric and ascriptive identities as instruments that help the ruler manage the civil-military relations. Models of state and military building, social and ethnic divisions, and pan-Arab populist ideologies together form the background for the strategies of coup-proofing mechanism in Libya.

3.3 Weakening the Military as a Mechanism of Coup-Proofing

The social history of Libya had been characterized by the dominance of the idea of decentralized power, where the tribes were always inclined toward rebellion out of the control of the center, interested in self autonomy, and sometimes even secession. Therefore, King Idris and Gaddafi tried to adapt to it and to take advantage of it to continue in power. This desire for autonomy was kept through a complex blend that included two contradicting issues: the state sovereignty on the entire country, and at the same time, the sovereignty of the tribes and regional powers. Theoretically, Gaddafi succeeded in creating the organizational framework, through the idea of *Jamahiriya* and direct popular democracy, to incorporate this contradicted parallelism in power distribution between the state and the Libyan society. He wanted to frame a traditional entity within the modern state. However, this achievement was his biggest failure, where his state remained a traditional and weak entity cloaked in a modern theoretical and ambiguous scope. This was reflected in the various state institutions, especially the military and the different security institutions.

According to Florence Gaub (2014), “A regime might weaken its armed forces in two ways: either by portraying the armed forces as a pro-regime militia rather than as a national

institution, or by limiting its resources and internal capabilities in order to reduce its threat potential," (Gaub 2014: 19). With the repeated coup attempts against Gaddafi, he lost trust in the armed forces, so he sought to weaken and marginalize them (McMahon and Slantchev 2015: 305). He gave the priority to the parallel militias that were under the command of his relatives. He formed those militias to create power and fear and develop a balance between him and his potential rivals. Gaddafi's strategy in building his coup-proofing mechanism that was based on weakening the regular military, deploying it to the borders and distant regions, and forming alternative security organizations. Barany (2013) confirms this pattern as, "in Libya, the military and security establishment were divided into numerous organizations. The regular military was charged with the external defense of the country, while the security forces were supposed to protect the regime, though in practice, ensuring regime survival was the main mission of all these forces," (Barany 2013: 64-65).

Gaddafi created many parallel forces and paramilitaries as a strategy to activate the coup-proofing mechanism against any coup attempt. As Toaldo (2015: 79) argues, a poorly trained and equipped regular army was working parallel to loyal tribes as well as "…a complex structure made of praetorian guards, political militias and special units commanded by members of his family (such as the infamous Khamis brigade)". Therefore, Gaddafi's strategy was built upon trust in his close family members, then trust in tribal members allied with him. All of that happened at the cost of a strong, professional, and regular army (PCHR, AOHR, and ILAC 2012: 14-15). He saw that military as a challenger to him for power control, not as an institute under the control of the state. As a result, the military was weakened as provide by the simple international conflicts that Libya had with the U.S. and Chad.

Another dimension of Gaddafi's strategy to build his coup-proofing mechanism was limiting the military's decision independency, as much as possible. He tried, with all means, to centralize those decisions to be made by himself or his direct and narrow circle. The Libyan military was characterized as being one of the most politicized Arab militaries. After many coup attempts, Gaddafi decided to promote officers based on their loyalty, not on merit. All of that was built upon the idea of limiting the ability of the military from moving in the opposite direction of the desires of the ruling leader (Gaub 2013 b).

In addition, Gaddafi implemented a policy to rotate officers in command posts in an attempt to dislodge anyone he suspects of weak loyalty. He did this to prevent them from forming strong ties with their groups. The longer the officer stays in his unit, there would be higher probability of strengthening the accord between the commander and his subordinates, which could have a negative effect on the loyalty to the regime. In addition, special security units were created and charged to implant informers, "people's Guardians", inside the units to ensure the loyalty of the officers and soldiers and prevent that loyalty from vanishing. At the same time, Gaddafi granted little authority to military commanders with regard to assessing their budgets and spending, training program, and procurement of ordnance and equipment (Droz-Vincent 2016: 6).

Gaddafi also inflated the figure of the regular military. As Gaub (2013 a: 1) states, "the armed forces, previously estimated to number some 76,000 men, in reality totaled only 20,000. Not only was their arsenal outdated and badly maintained as a result of sanctions and neglect, but the troops were organized primarily with a view to protecting the regime from a coup d'état." Training, in general, and training with live ammunition was almost forbidden for the regular

military. This added to the weakness of the forces, and their inability to act as professional military institution.

Gaddafi purposefully implanted mistrust among units and among the officers commanding them. One way he did that was the continuous rotation of field commanders that resulted in ineffective and incoherent military (Gaub 2013 a: 1). He systematically cracked the fraternal solidarity, which is a specific character of modern militaries. This solidarity in modern militaries is built upon the characteristics that the military unit establishes for itself, which is represented by the command of the unit and the strong social bind among the unit's members. Therefore, Gaddafi's fundamental program was to break those landmarks, starting with the command. The frequent rotation of commanders and officers was intended essentially to prevent the formation of a social and emotional bond between the commander and his troops and replace it with an enduring case of mutual suspicion between the commander and his forces. This issue makes the sharing of information among the unit's members much harder. When these landmarks are fractured and social bonds are cut, suspicion will exist, and then it will not be possible to coordinate anything. Therefore, it will not be possible to organize and manage a military coup.

Gaddafi worked from the beginning to marginalize his associates in the Revolutionary Council by appointing civilians to government posts since the military coup that brought him to power in 1969 (Taylor 2014: 162; Gaub 2014: 39). He then limited the ability of military commanders in making the decisions related to conducting the affairs of the military institutions. Furthermore, he dissolved all the ministries, including the ministry of defense, in his *Jamahiriya*. He replaced the ministries with "Revolutionary Committees", and everyone lived the illusion of "Everyone's Rule". The reality was that there was only one ruler, Gaddafi.

Until the fall of the regime, Gaddafi's inner circle controlled the defense budget. This resulted in excessive accumulation of military arsenals during the 1970s and 1980s. His military was not able to maintain or use this arsenal because the lack of personnel with sufficient training and the weak logistic system. Foreign observers criticized Gaddafi because he owned one of the largest military arsenal in the world, but it remained inside the warehouses, without any strategic benefit, except being an arsenal that will feed the Libyan-Libyan fighting during and after the uprisings. In short period of time after Gaddafi assumed power, the Libyan military acquired the highest ratio of military equipment to personnel in the Third World (St. John 1998: 40). According to Taylor (2014: 162) "the military defense budget was reduced from 4.4% of GDP in the late 1990s to roughly 1.2% of GDP from 2006 to 2008. Gaddafi reasoned that Libya's détente with the West necessitated a commitment drop in defense budget."

Most of the military budget was used to buy weapons and ammunition. In contrast, almost nothing was allocated for training the units, and hence, the troops were inactive and had bad morale. They were without the corporate spirit that determines the military fighting doctrine. This was very clear in the Libyan-Chad War and was then affirmed by the military reaction toward the uprisings. The Libyan regime defenses collapsed so fast, and its units disintegrated. It was unable to use the weapons arsenal that it had guarded for so long; it was not trained to use it.

The paramilitary forces represented the hard core of the Libyan Armed Forces as the first support units and the base of the regime. The *Katiba*, for example, were autonomous special units loyal to Gaddafi who were commanded by his close allies. They were equipped with advanced and heavy weaponry (PCHR, AOHR, and ILAC 2012: 15). *Katiba* had the advantage of being close to the leader and earning his trust and hence they had a better position than the regular army. They were among the main forces participating in repression of any form of

insurrection, because of their closeness to urban centers, and their possession of advanced communication technologies.

In addition, Gaddafi also depended on the forces of the *Revolutionary Committees* in charge of internal security as well as protection of regime. These forces were "paramilitary organisation established by Muammar Gaddafi in 1977, and charged with 'safeguarding the revolution.' They are composed of individuals loyal to Gaddafi, and are reportedly divided into 8 regional commands, which are directly subordinated to Gaddafi's office," (PCHR, AOHR, and ILAC 2012: 15). According to existing reports, the Revolutionary Committees were armed with light weapons and means of transportation and communication with a count of around 60,000 personnel (PCHR, AOHR, and ILAC 2012: 16). The Revolutionary Committees were pre-emptive security forces, who worked to collect information about the citizens, to prevent any possibility of revolt against the official authorities.

The goal of establishing these parallel forces, which were separated from each other but connected with direct communication channels to the decision center, was to create an environment of mistrust among them. This mistrust would drive them to compete for the satisfaction of the ruler. The ability to coordinate among them became close to impossible, especially with the existence of the oppression that Gaddafi used to ward off any attempt to change the direction of loyalty and obedience.

3.4 The Libyan Army Faced the Uprising with Weakness and Collapse

At the outbreak of the Arab Spring uprisings, the Libyan people joined the movement, Gaddafi faced the protesters with rage and severe furor. He decided to hit with "an iron fist," using all forces at his disposal. However, his way of running the security affairs through the 42 years of his rule had a direct effect on the way the military related to the "revolution." Gaddafi

ordered the deployment of all forces that he controlled and who had stayed loyal to him against the protesters. However, the military were not prepared to face the internal unrest and protect the regime. Gaub (2014) effectively summarizes the situation with respect to military and security units "reacted broadly to the conflict in three distinct ways: individual exit as individual soldiers deserted, collective exit as units disintegrated *en masse* in order to join the rebel forces, and loyalty as some units remained in the armed forces to crush the revolt," (Gaub 2014: 40).

The Libyan armed forces, on the other hand, first disintegrated due to its weak structure until Gaddafi reconstructed the units (Droz-Vincent 2011: 2). However, the crisis was serious and it did not give Gaddafi enough time to gain advantage on the mounting power of the protesters from the increasing popular support and the international support against the *Colonel*. Consequently, the results of the coup-proofing mechanism adopted by Gaddafi were catastrophic in all measures (Townsend 2015: 7). The regime concentrated all its efforts to face the danger that might come from the armed forces and from the officers, and therefore weakened the military and security institutions in an unprecedented way. From that, the fall of the regime was determined after the first serious shock that Libya experienced.

The military reaction was not only catastrophic on the regime, but also on the state and society as a whole. The disintegration of the armed forces and the state put Libya into chaos; it became a fertile land for the sprouting and development of all kinds of radical ideologies. Even though the protesters were able to terminate the battle quickly, violently, and forcefully, they could not rebuild what they destroyed of the state and the Gaddafi regime. The country entered a civil war that is fueled by internal and external parties. As a result, Libya joined the club of the failed states, and to date, the Libyans have failed to establish a ruling regime that is able, stable, and trustworthy.

The systematic disintegration of the armed forces done by the Gaddafi regime led to the quick collapse of the different security forces. It became necessary to rebuild the armed forces, and the security and paramilitary organization, to reframe the post-revolution Libyan state.

Rebuilding the military and security forces project collided with a group of objective hurdles. First, the disintegration and the quasi-collapse of the military and the security forces made the process of rebuilding the security organizations one of the most challenging and sensitive jobs. In Libya, there was a crucial need to establish a national army and collect the weapons randomly spread among tribes and militias. A second hurdle was the emergence of armed militias that belongs to tribes and different fighting groups that participated in the uprising and the toppling of the Gaddafi regime. Suddenly, these militias became strong and numerous (Barany 2013: 65). A possible future solution in Libya will have to take these militias in consideration. Third, the fear of retaliatory acts caused the old members of the military and security forces to reject the call to participate in the rebuilding of the armed forces and the security forces. This issue necessitated the rebuilding of the armed forces from scratch, with the help of foreign experts and the militias who were controlling the situation. After these militias carried uncontrolled attacks and targeted some Western embassies, the government decided to abandon the militias and replace them with regular disciplined and trained forces. However, this process remains inconclusive since 2012 (Gaub 2013 a: 3). Fourth, the fighting sides in Libya after the "revolution" associated with different and competing foreign forces. This issue pushed Libya into a civil war and a tragic struggle for power in the country, which made the process of rebuilding the national army harder.

From these hurdles, we can see that rebuilding the Libyan military and security forces has not been successful to date since the outbreak of the uprising and the fall of Gaddafi. This failure

came fundamentally from the systematic disintegration of the official military and the state apparatus. The first and foremost goal of that disintegration was to protect Gaddafi regime and he himself from any meaningful attempt for change. Clearly, Gaddafi did not succeed. Rather, Libya fell into an endless civil war and collapse of the state followed.

4. Conclusion

By looking at the three cases above, we can see that different paths of the creation and conduct of civil-military relations came to result in different coup-proofing mechanisms and thus different reactions of the militaries to the uprising in each country. The different civil-military relations were organic results of the trajectories of the roles the militaries took in building the state in each country, and the variations in the social structure of each society that resulted in different structure of the armed forces. Such civil-military relations produced different coup-proofing mechanisms, which produced various reactions of the militaries to the popular uprisings. However, the final results of the military reactions came to be the same: civil wars.

In Syria, since the time of President Hafez al-Asad, the civil-military relations were built based on the merging of the party-sect-military. As President Hafez al-Asad knew very well the capability and the history of the Syrian military in changing the political regimes since the independence in 1949, he capitalized on the Alawite sect to fill the high rank of the armed forces with members of his own sect despite the low ratio of it within the Syrian society. He turned the sect into a political-security cult that became the backbone of his rule. In that merger of the three elements mentioned, the al-Assad regime was able to turn the armed forces in Syria to be major player in balancing the struggle for influence and benefits from the state in front of the other two elements. The armed forces came to the realization that its survival is the survival of the regime, and therefore did not hesitate to defend the regime with all its ability from

the beginning. However, that coup-proofing mechanism reduced the capabilities of the Syrian armed forces tremendously and hence it was not able to end the conflict, which turned into catastrophic civil war that destroyed the state and all its institutions. The Syrian case can be summarized by the following chart.

Figure 5.1.

Coup-Proofing and the Results of the Uprising in Syria



Building on its initially close relationship with the regime, the military continued to play a central role in the governing apparatuses of Syria over four decades of al-Assad family rule. Although elections were held with some regularity, *de facto* power remained with the president and his inner circle the majority of whom were high ranking military officers (Mora and Wiktorowicz 2003: 102). The military became the most important support source for the al-Assad regime, at the expense of party and internal security organizations (Ziadeh 2011: 24). Since the beginning of the al-Assad rule, the regime has relied on a combination of familial and sectarian linkage to strengthen its relationship with the armed forces. This has manifested itself

in the military receiving funds beyond its usefulness to the country. Under the al-Assad regime, military officers were categorized into concentric circles of loyalty, based first of familial and personal relationship and second on party membership. In moments of domestic crisis, only the inner circles of loyal officers were trusted with sensitive regime security missions. Even in the largest domestic interventions (1977-1982, and 2011-present), officers in the outer circles were not assigned to lead order maintenance and combat operations.

For the Yemeni case, President Ali Abdullah Saleh built a civil-military relations based on two pillars. First, he utilized the strong tribal dimension of the Yemeni society to give the tribal leaders stake in the survival of his regime as he allowed them to create their own militias and lead them and used their power to obtain rent from the state. The second dimension of the civil- military relations was the appointment of family members in critical and influential positions in the armed forces. Such civil-military relations produced a coup-proofing mechanism that allowed the president to control the top brace of the armed forces but not its members. Therefore, when the uprising occurred, the Yemeni armed forces split based on tribal affiliation and family loyalty and the country went into chaos that led to devastating civil wars that still going without clear end. The chart below is a summary of the Yemeni case.

Figure 5.2.

Coup-Proofing and the Results of the Uprising in Yemen



Nowhere encapsulates the contradictory forces of modernity and primitive practices in the MENA region more than Yemen, a country that has become synonymous with terms 'failed' or 'failing' state. Endemic tribalism, religious sectarianism, rebellion movement in the north and a succession movement in the south, among other problems, suggest that the state authority is in terminal decline. When set with wider economic and social problems, then, Yemen would hardly seem to conform to the Weberian ideal where state authorities exercise a monopoly over the state power. The Yemeni government has never had complete control over the legitimate exercise of violence in its territory. This weak government was never able, or willing, to form a distinct professional military. The armed forces were not distinct or subordinate to the regime, so at least part of it tried to protect the leadership. But because the military did not have a strong internal structure, it split.

Yemen's military structure was divided, but it differs from factionalized military structures in Syria and Libya. This is because it was not only a result of design but also the inheritance of a weak state and strong tribal structure. Factionalism is a coup-proofing strategy

where regimes create parallel militaries where in-group loyal soldiers are treated better in benefits, training, and equipment than out-group soldiers. While factionalism is intended to mitigate the effects of social divisions, it is a modern strategy meant to deal with certain imperatives related to civil-military relations. In a sense, this strategy attempts to obtain loyalty from in-groups soldiers and integrate those in the out-group. Yemen's military also had elements of premodern tribal structure as a result of the condition where strong social groups confront a weak state. Like a factionalized military, such military is likely to split in response to a large uprising.

The case of Libya took different path to build the civil-military relations. The leader Muaamar Gaddafi came to power through a military coup and alienated his follow officers that helped him achieve the helm of power. Several coup attempts were initiated against his rule. Realizing the threat of the military to his reign he created civil-military relations based on sidelining the army and make it secondary apparatus in the armed forces of Libya. He created a coup-proofing mechanism based on two pillars. Weakening and marginalizing the army, and deploy it to the borders of the country to become far from urban centers, and the second pillar is to create many parallel armed unites, *Katiba*, under the leadership of his sons , family members, and loyal tribal me. Those *Katibas* had better training, equipment, communication capabilities, and located near or around urban centers to be in a better position to defend the regime in case of social unrest. The result of this coup-proofing mechanism was the collapse and disintegration of the military in front of mass protests. The military was not able to keep its ranks and file and therefore led to the collapse of the state and the start of a civil war that is still going on. The Libyan case is summarized by the following chart.

Figure 5.3.

Coup-Proofing and the Results of the Uprising in Libya



The Gaddafi regime had weakened the characteristics necessary for an armed force to function as a cohesive force. Hence the military reacted to the popular uprising in broadly three ways: individual exit as individual soldiers deserted; collective exit as units disintegrated, and loyalty as some units remained loyal to the regime to crush the uprising. Ultimately, desertion was not unexpected as it was the outcome of weakening the leadership and cohesion of the armed forces as part of Gaddafi's coup-proofing mechanism. As a force that had been consistently weakened in terms of cohesion, the Libyan military was not prepared for a situation which can be challenging for any armed forces, namely to act against its own people.

Chapter 6 - Comparative Analysis and Extensions

1. Comparative Analysis of Five Cases

In this chapter, I first provide a review of the main findings from the previous two chapters. Then, I put some concepts of generalization that might be drawn from the experience of each country that I explored in this study. After that I compare these cases to the new of protests that have taken the Arab region. Before the Arab uprisings, the militaries have often escaped the attention of scholarly research in terms of its influence on social movements, political development, and political protest in the Arab world. Scholars neglected the role that the military played in determining the fate of the protest movements. In every case where an autocrat fell threatened as a consequence of popular uprising, and the military had refused his pleas for assistance and it remained on the sideline he is ousted. History tells us that military insubordination has helped to bring down authoritarian, and democratic regimes and has done so in countries with and without traditions of military interventions in politics (Pion-Berlin 2016:8).

The core question is why would armed forces choose to obey or to disobey orders to repress popular uprisings that challenge the regime existence? Instead of searching for global, regional, or country specific explanation in terms of political, economic, or social factors, the search should be for clues inside the military itself by examining motivations of its decision through its relations to the state, society, and other security apparatuses. In other words, we need to understand the conduct of the civil-military relations by the leader and their historical development to ensure the loyalty of the armed forces to prevent any “unfavorable” military intervention in politics.

The case studies in the previous two chapters document the particular pathways that Arab militaries went through in their development as “national institutions” under the specific type of

civil-military relations developed and adopted by the ruler of each country. In that regard, we can see different reactions of those militaries to the Arab popular uprisings of 2011 as a normal result of the different conducts of those civil-military relations in each country. The Arab states emerging from colonial rule after WWII were left to grapple with diverse institutional legacies. The relationship of the military to the independence movement and the emergent political regime would come to have a powerful long-term influence on civil-military relations (Anderson 2016: 291-323; Richards and Waterbury 2008: 344-361).

The Arab Spring encompassed a diverse array of uprising patterns and military reactions. The uprisings included both violent and nonviolent military responses, successful and unsuccessful protest movements, and divergent political trajectories, from authoritarian retrenchment to democratization. In Tunisia, a Western style civil-military relations pattern aimed to ensure military subordination to civilian control helped to keep the military on the sidelines of the uprising. This enabled a largely peaceful transfer of power and subsequent transition to democracy. In Egypt, a civil-military relations built on the military being the backbone of the political system and large amount of material incentives to the military prevented widespread military violence during the 2011 uprising as the military wanted to make sure it has the final say in who rules the country. It also inspired a military-led "counterrevolution" in 2013 that brought the autocracy back to the political scene.

In Syria, civil-military relations was based on merging the military with the regime and this led the armed forces to immediately engage protesters with tanks and artillery, provoking a disastrous civil war. The military knew that its existence and future depends organically on the survival of the regime and therefore acted to preserve it and itself at the same time. In both Libya and Yemen, protests escalated to full-scale uprisings in 2011. The authoritarian leaders of both

countries were ultimately deposed, but only after their armies responded with violence against civilians, and then dissolved into rival factions whose fighting continues to this day. The divisions that split the Libyan and Yemeni armies were not spontaneous consequences of the Arab Spring. Instead, these militaries lacked cohesion and never established a unified common agreement on roles and missions (Gaub 2013 a; Knights 2013). In Libya, civil-military relations followed a pattern where weakening of the military and disposal of armed forces to borders as well as creating many parallel, and may be stronger paramilitaries, resulted in the disarray of the military response to the uprising and its collapse in front of the protesters. In Yemen, a civil-military relations pattern based on turning the military into a "family army" and tribal militia using it as a tool for rent seeking from the state created a clear disunity in the armed forces and made the loyalty to tribal leaders instead of the state. This helps in the explanation of the rapid disintegration and fracturing of the Yemini armed forces into rival militias and armed groups that are fighting a prolonged civil war fueled by foreign intervention.

2. Some Generalization Aspects

In retrospect, it seems that if any major democratization were to occur in the Arab world, it would have to start in Tunisia. It is a unique case among Arab countries for its combination of strong national identity, high levels of education, economic openness, state capacity, and military professionalism, all topped by a stifling and visibly corrupt regime. It is where the Arab Spring began, and could serve as a benchmark to measure other Arab counties' cases of political transitions.

Tunisia has few internal divisions and, unlike Egypt, gained its independence through a broad-based struggle led by an inclusive political movement, not a military coup. The mistrust of President Bourguiba of the military, encouraged the regime to create a small, professional army

that was not heavily invested in the regime. While the military's character would probably never caused it to coup on its own, when faced with orders to shoot peaceful protestors on the behalf of the "despised and corrupt" President Ben Ali, the military choose to look after the interest of the state and overthrow him instead. It then quickly supported a civilian transitional government, and Tunisia started its way to become a democratic state even as it faces challenges from within and without. If successful, Tunisia will prove to be exceptional not only in comparison with its Arab counterparts but also compared with many militaries in autocratic states in Latin America and Asia that have proven to be resilient in maintaining independence from civilian control.

In the Egyptian case, the nature of the military action is driven by being a pillar of the regime and the socio-economic status it has been able to curve out over the past decades. In states where armies have the capability to run the scenes from behind, they resurface as essential political actors in terms of serious crisis in order to preserve their endangered position. Therefore, the armed forces have to act against the public demand of civilian, democratic transition. The Egyptian army is eminent part of the underlying structures of authoritarian resilience and accordingly has no incentive to support a democratic transition, which would undermine its comfortable position within the status quo.

President Hafiz al-Assad sought to transform the "army of politics" that had brought him to power into a truly "ethnic-ideological army" with hierarchical familial, sectarian, party structure. As both a praetorian guard and powerful interest group, the military has remained "the most powerful actor which, particularly in times of crisis, has the potential to shape outcomes" (Hinnebusch 2019: 64). Unlike Egypt, the armed forces did not develop autonomy or independence from the civilian regime, leading to a conflation of national security with regime security.

However, to strengthen loyalty through the officer corps, the military establishment created an enclave, which shielded officers from the interests and concerns of broader Syrian society. Khaddour (2015) has described this strategy as the "ghettoization of the officer corps," pointing to the development of a benefit system for army officers that creates their strong dependency to the regime (Khaddour 2015: 28). The combination of social privilege and deep ties with the ruling elite instilled soldiers with a powerful inclination to defend the existing order. With regard to keeping the regime in power, the Syrian experience appears to be the single "success" case in the Arab Spring.

The general idea about the Yemeni case is the interaction between civil-military relations and the so-called "tribal republic" (Fattah 2010: 7). Key tribes took control of the Yemeni military during Ali Abdullah Saleh's rule. The behavior of the Yemeni military during the uprising of 2011 was dictated by the long-awaited tribal struggle within the political environment in the country and can only be understood against the backdrop of tribalism within the military. Yemen's military clearly lacked the military professionalism envisioned by Huntington and practically there were not clear structural elements to determine the activities of the military. Therefore, it is argued here that the creation of the 'tribal-military-patronage' system involved both subjective and objective control of the military by civilians. Subjective control measures were used to limit military coup possibilities were continued by creating special armed units under control of Saleh's family members. At the same time, the tribalization of the military might be viewed as objective civilian control by colonizing the ranks with tribal leaders and members who did not subscribe to the corporate identity of the military. As Huntington notes "military institutions which reflect only social values may be incapable of performing effectively their military function" (Huntington 1957: 2). In other words, if the military losses its special

characteristics by becoming too much like the society it should protect, it ceases to be an effective military.

Gaddafi's regime had never been able to build his project of revolutionary *Jamahiriya* with a strong and centralized bureaucracy. This problem extends to the armed forces, who were built as a secondary force, and whose regular units dissolved quickly in the face of a popular uprising. Being a dysfunctional and aimless force, it was not capable of organizing its ranks to stand to deal with the crisis and that led eventually to a near total erosion of the military.

3. The Arab Spring 2011 and 2019: Comparing Two Waves

Since 2018, the scene on the streets of Beirut, Baghdad, Algiers, and Khartoum resembled the streets of Tunis, Cairo, Tripoli, Damascus, and Sana'a during the Arab uprisings of 2010 and 2011. Once again, people are rejecting the policies of the corrupt, authoritarian political regimes, after a period of declining public appetite for protest against the ruling regimes. People's fear of the recurrence of conflicts, similar to those in Syria, Libya, Yemen, and internal wars, appear to have lessened (Shamaileh 2019). Since the end of 2018, some Arab countries have witnessed a wave of protests that have revitalized the "spirit" of the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings. The new wave of protests is characterized by peaceful demonstrations in which protesters have refused to be drawn into armed conflict. These actions have kept the protests on non-violent path. In Sudan, Algeria, Iraq, and Lebanon, the protesters took to the streets to protest against the deteriorating living conditions, corruption of institutions, and other causes related to public demands of regime change or radical political reforms.

This new wave of protests, which some journalists and observers are referring to as "Arab Spring Version 2" (Muasher 2019; Feuer and Valensi 2019) is driven by several factors. First, the trust among the people and the ruling regimes declined. Second, the financial and

political corruption became widespread and more visible. Governments have not provided job opportunities and decent living standards. Beginning in Tunisia since 2011, these factors led the people of some Arab countries to resort to peaceful protests to change the situation, in general, and toppling some authoritarian regimes, in particular.

The 2019 protests proved that the motives for the 2011 actions are still strong in some other Arab countries (Alterman 2019; Grewal, Kilavuz, and Kubinec 2019). The period of calm between 2011 and 2019 was only to recalculate and prepare for the new wave of protests. The spark of "spring" did not go away, and it did not become "autumn." The generation that leads the current revolution aspires to build countries less sectarian and dictatorial, and with more democracy and social justice. We find that the sons of these revolutions may tend to absorb the lessons learned from the previous Arab uprisings and avoid their mistakes of falling into the quagmire of identities and affiliations, in defense of their unified national identity. As communication barriers have been broken down between countries, we find that the arenas in Sudan, Iraq, Algeria, and Lebanon unite under one demand. They seek to achieve a radical change in the ruling class, and to achieve a concrete transformation, by activating democracy with actual parliamentary elections from the people outside any sectarian, doctrinal, or regional restrictions.

This new wave of protests has started because social discontent has been growing for years, and the same reasons that led to the outbreak of the 2011 uprisings are still present in the region. However, the economics of the area have changed. For example, the drop in oil prices in Algeria in mid-2014 led to a deterioration of the economic situation. By 2019, the government reached a point where it was no longer able to buy social peace as it did in 2011 (Grewal et. al. 2019).

The Tunisians succeeded in the peaceful change of the ruling regime in 2011. In Egypt, people witnessed two changes in power that ended with the return of the country to a "military" regime. Yemen, Syria, and Libya have experienced internal conflicts and civil wars that have continued since 2011. It must be noted that regional and international interventions played essential roles in the status of the three countries witnessing violent, internal conflicts. Moreover, “nominal” reforms have had no effect in addressing urgent issues such as unemployment, marginalization of the youth, and rampant corruption. Today, the demonstrators want real and tangible change. In addition, they do not trust the political parties, the opposition, and the old political staff to make those changes. From Algiers to Beirut, the cry calling for the departure of the political class is uniform.

Overall, there are many similarities between the 2011 and 2019 protests including the sources (corruption), momentum (gradual swelling), youth activism, and spontaneous and leaderless mobilization (Alterman 2019: 1). However, Alterman (2019) argues, there are also differences between the two waves including lower expectations and lack of careless confidence.

3.1 Results of the New Wave of Arab Uprisings, So Far…

After protests that lasted from December 2018 to April 2019, the Sudanese overthrew President Omar al-Bashir. Sudanese society is characterized by ethnic, religious, and tribal divisions, and a long history of internal conflicts and wars. Despite these hurdles, the Sudanese leaders of the revolutionary movement have avoided dragging the country into chaos by avoiding engaging in armed conflict with government forces and security services, as happened in Yemen, Libya, and Syria.

As for Iraq, following decades of external wars, internal conflicts, and the spread of the corruption after the 2003 invasion, the standard of living in Iraq has declined to levels that are

not commensurate with the size of the resources owned by the country. In the middle of 2018, after the end of the four-year war against ISIS, Iraqis still hoped to improve their living conditions, reduce unemployment, and combat corruption. However, the Iraqi government failed to respond to the aspirations of the Iraqi people. Protests in Iraq began in October 2019. In the largest and most challenging of those, it appeared that the protesters had overtaken the subordination and cynicism of the political blocks. In previous protests between 2015 and 2018, those political blocks, like the *Sadrist* movement, claimed to have organized the protests and were speaking on behalf of the protesters. In actuality, those political blocks were accused of collusion with the government to circumvent the protesters' demands.

The case of Lebanon is similar to Iraq with respect to the context that gave way to the protests. The state institutions in both countries lack complete independence, due to the wide influence of the paramilitary armed forces that essentially represent a state within the state. Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Popular Movement Units (PMU) in Iraq are those paramilitary forces. Iraq and Lebanon are also suffering from the repercussions of sectarian conflict and internal wars. These countries also suffer from high unemployment, a decline in the standard of living, poor basic services, and high levels of corruption in state institutions by the main political leaders who dominate the authority.

In mid-October 2019, widespread protests erupted in the Lebanese capital, Beirut, and most major cities, in protest against the decision to impose fees on communication services. However, these protests continued to evolve, even after the fee decision was canceled. The protests followed a path that focused on corruption, poor government performance, and deteriorating infrastructure. Protestors demanded that the government drop the three

"presidencies"[16], and they continued the protests even if those in authority responded to their demands. The progress of Prime Minister Saad Hariri with a financial reform paper did not resonate in the Lebanese streets. The Lebanese protests have succeeded in overcoming the social and sectarian divisions of the society, and the political quota that forms the basis of the political system that determines who rules the country.

The case of Algeria has the most prolonged protests. Former Algerian president, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, succeeded for many years in overcoming the popular movement, after the Arab Spring revolutions. He faced massive protests for several months that forced him to relinquish power to army leaders in the hope of holding elections in the coming months. He did this amid continuing protests that demanded the fall of all symbols of power, from Bouteflika and previous eras, and the trials of the most corrupt.

3.2 Consequences of First and Second Waves

The most prominent development in the first Arab Spring uprisings was when the Egyptians overthrew Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in 2011. This occurred weeks after the overthrow of the Tunisian President, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, in the first successful uprising. Less than two and a half years after Hosni Mubarak was overthrown, and less than a year after the election of President Mohamed Morsi in the first "real" elections, army leaders turned on Morsi in "counter revolution." Some conservative Arab regimes played a primary role in supporting these counter-revolutions, interrupting the Arab Spring uprisings in Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. In "formal" elections, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi assumed power in Egypt in 2013. He strengthened his powers with the support of the armed forces and without

[16] The three Lebanese Presidencies are: The President of the Republic, the President of the Council of Ministries, and the President of the Parliament.

implementing any real economic, political, or social reforms. These actions led the Egyptian people to come out several times in protests that were met with crackdowns and road closures leading to public squares and arrests of hundreds of protesters.

In a similar fashion, the new wave of protests resulted in the fall of two long-ruling dictators. It would be a mistake to assume that the fall of Bouteflika and al-Bashir are completely separate incidents. Just as in Egypt and Tunisia where protestors toppled Ben Ali and Mubarak, the Algerian and Sudanese demonstrators took advantage of deteriorating conditions that still prevailed in much of the Arab world. In most cases, the conditions have not improved since the events of 2011. The attempts to reform, respond quickly to demands, and increase transparency were not successful increasing the momentum of protests to lead to the toppling of dictators in Sudan and Algeria.

The social, political, and economic conditions in the first Arab Spring wave are very similar to the new wave in terms of the continued state of frustration among large sectors of youth. Both waves were driven by unemployment, deteriorating living conditions, and increasing corruption in state institutions and governments. The general scene is repeated on the streets of Beirut, Baghdad, Algiers, and Khartoum. The features of a new wave of protests express popular rejection of the policies of the ruling regimes, whether economic or social. Protestor demands are related to aspects of political reform, freedom of expression, and human rights.

The current wave of protests appears to focus on undermining the foundations of the political systems and institutions that are mired in corruption and nepotism. These protests aim to stem the depletion of the resources of these countries for the benefit of the ruling and influential political classes. The 2019 movements were marked by a new awareness among the demonstrators that stems from the importance of accommodating all social, economic, and

political groups. In 2019, the change carries a pragmatic breath. The demonstrators do not seek power or to take a role in the state. They seek to exert pressure on the ruling class and lobby its decisions.

Looking back eight years, it turns out that the 2011 demonstrations resulted in democracy in a single case, Tunisia, and sparked civil wars that are still raging in Libya, Syria, and Yemen. What was once considered a great enthusiasm for change in Egypt and Bahrain no longer exists. The fall of the two presidents in Algeria and Sudan did not create the same overwhelming joy that the Arab Spring demonstrations provoked. First, crowds on the streets realized that they still had hard work ahead of them. Second, "the Algerian and Sudanese militaries have asserted firm control over the situation in each country. Conditions are more akin to a military coup than a popular revolution." Third, "the regional enthusiasm that marked the 2011 events is absent," (Alterman 2019: 2).

Alterman (2019) says that these three differences, the more modest expectations, military control, and the lack of enthusiasm in the region, have led to diminished international interest in these events. The whole world was watching the events of 2011, presidents and prime ministers rushed to embrace the demonstrators and give them legitimacy. The American magazine, Time, chose the protesters to be the person of the year. The times were different in 2011. At the moment, the question in the minds of policymakers is not how to help the demonstrators gain control, but how to ensure that their country does not fall into chaos.

History records that the 2011 uprisings were largely peaceful and that the bloody battles in Syria and Libya were due to the military reactions of the two regimes. The 2019 revolutions are more committed to peace and are more aware of ways to preserve peace. The bullets being fired at the demonstrators in Iraq and Sudan, and the repression that confronted the Beirut and

Algiers demonstrators, was not met with retaliation by the demonstrators. At the same time, demonstrators are reluctant to show new leaders, for fear of confiscation of demands for change or killing of those leaders. Thus, most of the movements seem to be headless and without leadership. Nevertheless, the second Arab Spring 2019 wave paves the way for the emergence of a new style of field leaders, and a new type of non-sectarian, non-aligned parties with different minorities, majorities, or ethnic groups within the national scene.

The greatest challenge in the coming stage will be the possibility of the success of one model of democratic change in an Arab regime. A journey of change and reform that ends with a government that is truly accountable and derives its authority from the people in a republican or royal state will set a precedent, in a scene of continuous change. If that government is established in 2020, we can examine its success and determine if there are opportunities for expansion to other Arab societies.

4. Arab Militaries and the New Wave of Arab Spring Protests

Next, I turn to the role of militaries in the new wave. In the 2019 movements, awareness has risen about the necessity of limiting the role of the militaries in politics, as is the situation in Sudan and Algeria. This is a significant change compared to the 2011 stage. Awareness of the role of militaries and the risks of their control over political and economic power derives its momentum from the lesson learned from the role of the Egyptian army since the 2013 coup. The push for militaries to return to their barracks has become linked to a movement that exists in several Arab countries.

The major question here is what the military reactions to this new wave of protests will be. The need to analyze the armed forces' structures, formation, and their relations to the polity, and their reactions to the new wave of protests, is crucial to understanding the developments and

paths of these new popular movements in Iraq, Lebanon, Algeria, and Sudan. In the last two countries, it appears that the armed forces are in positions of leadership. I believe that the explanatory framework developed in this thesis would be extremely helpful in analyzing and understanding the armed forces reactions and responses to the new popular movements in the four countries. Those responses will determine the fates of the *Arab Spring Uprisings Version 2* and these states where the new protests have been unfolding.

A decade of anti-government protests in the Arab world have shaken popular trust in the military and raised the essential question again: how people in the streets look at their militaries at time of change. The answer to this question could enhance or undermine the military's position as one of the most trusted institutions. Long gone are the days when protesters on Cairo's *Tahrer Square* chanted "the military and the people are one." In 2011 it was the barriers of fear that protesters broke. Created by autocratic rulers, fear was what long kept the disgruntled from taking their grievances to the street. In 2019 and 2020 those barriers have been further reduced with protesters refusing to back down despite the use of brutal force by law enforcement and security forces in Lebanon and Iraq and occasional violence elsewhere in the Arab world.

Changed popular perceptions of the military are the result. Increasingly, the military is seen at best as positioning itself to salvage what can be salvaged of an old regime and at worst the enforcer of a hated regime. One protester in Baghdad Tahrir square told this researcher in person on December 26, 2019, only a week after one night of mass killings in Baghdad "Iraqis broke the shackles of fear and reached the point of no return. The movement will not stop, and the Iraqi people will never be silenced."

5. Will the New Wave Bring Change?

Dunne (2020) reflects on the new protests and views them as continuation of old wave where the question of democracy is still not resolved. He stresses that the new Arab Spring version 2 protestors have different demands. Dunne states, that the demands concern "changes to undemocratic aspects of current power structures: sectarian bargains in Iraq and Lebanon, and military dominance in Sudan and Algeria," (Dunne 2020: 182).

Looking back to the 2011 protests, a crucial nail was put in the coffin of the notion that unity of purpose existed between protesters and armed forces with the 2013 military coup in Egypt that produced one of the Arab world's most repressive regimes under general-turned-president Abdul Fattah al-Sisi. Protesters realized almost a decade after the 2011 protests in which demonstrators declared victory once leaders like Egypt's Hosni Mubarak and Tunisia's Zine El Abidine Ben Ali had resigned, that their only chance of success is to retain their street power until elites, including the military, come to an agreement as appears to be the case in Sudan. Military is now viewed with suspicion by many protesters.

Each one of the four countries witnessing the new Arab Spring movements has particular circumstances that shape the protests and the demands of protestors but also share some similarities. In increasingly violent clashes in Beirut in early 2020, protesters unsuccessfully sought to persuade the security forces that they were attacking the demands for a complete break with Lebanon's political elite which is also in the interest of men in uniform. In Lebanon protests escalated as a result of the elite's attempt to address the crisis with the appointment as prime minister of Mr. Hassan Diab, widely seen as beholden to Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed militia and political group. Mounting violence on the streets of Lebanon and Iraq in which hundreds of protesters have been killed or wounded will do little to rebuild confidence in the military and

allied security forces. If Lebanon and Iraq are anything to go by, clashes are likely to escalate and leave deep-seated scars.

Rami Khouri (2020), terms the new waves of protests as "Revolution (*thawra*) for democratic freedoms, social justice, and pluralism." These new waves essentially showed the continued determination of people to create change. In that, militaries have increasingly been viewed as outposts of a political system that has produced brutal autocracies and/or economic and environmental mismanagement. The new wave of demonstrations sees the governments as illegitimate and agents of outside forces and not looking for the welfare of their own citizens (Khouri 2020).

The story continues in Algeria and Sudan where the two countries faced not just the old regimes and their authoritarian, oppressive policies, but the challenges of dealing with new regimes that are military regime in case of Sudan or military backed in case of Algeria. There was constant fear that the militaries would eventually undermine democratization (Dunne 2020: 184). The new generations of protestors, however, are very well aware of the military regimes and what they can do to "hijack' their revolutions based on the experience in Egypt and their own countries (Dunne 2020: 185).

Algeria's newly elected president Abdelmadjid Tebboun is struggling to garner legitimacy with mass protests continuing nine months after the toppling of Abdelaziz Bouteflika. Citizens voted in December 2019 presidential elections with 60% abstaining. Algeria was railroaded into the election by its powerful military in a bid to outflank protesters by holding the poll before they had an opportunity to prepare for it.

In Sudan, unlike in Egypt in 2011, this meant protesters and/or civil society groups ensuring that they had a seat at the table before they surrendered the street (Dunne 2020: 189). It

is an epic battle that has turned the once revered military into yet another institution that finds itself on the wrong side of history. While Arab protesters have made that clear on the streets of Khartoum, Algiers, Beirut and Baghdad, Iranian students demanded the departure and demise of the Revolutionary Guards in anti-government demonstrations prior to and after the recent killing of Iranian general Qassim Soleimani. *The Arab Spring V1* and *V2* stem from the same roots and growing with different shapes and paths. All come to two basic concepts: no clear direction of the future of the revolutions and no clear stand and position of the militaries.

6. The Role of Military in the New Wave

6.1 Algeria: The Military as the State

Algeria has the clearest example of a strong relationship between the military and the polity. Even if Algeria does not appear to be a military dictatorship, the military occupies a central place in the state. It is the center of power and the source of the state's legitimacy. Because of the historical circumstances in the formation of the Algerian nation-state, the military was able to monopolize power and control the pattern of its distribution and the tools of its reproduction. The Algerian resistance armed groups as the predecessor of the Algerian National Army (ANA), are the only armed groups in the Arab world that can claim to be the liberator and creator of the state through armed struggle against a colonial power. As a result, its influence on politics has been interlinked with Algeria as a political case (Sorenson 2007: 103-104).

Since the establishment of Algeria as a state, the military's presence has been prominent in all aspects of the power mechanisms in the country. The first constitution, adopted in 1963 gave the military the duty of national defense and the right to participate in political and economic activities through the framework of the National Liberation Front (NLF) party. Despite different amendments to the Algerian constitution, the role of the armed forces in political and

social Algerian society stayed preserved. The circumstances surrounding the formation of the Algerian state ensures that the military remains an important actor in the political life (Cook 2007).

Before the National Liberation Front (NLF) liberated Algeria from the French colonialism, there was a differentiation between the military and civilians. Before 1954, the national struggle had a political wing led by the national bourgeoisie elites, and an armed wing mainly staffed with rural inhabitants. The political wing failed to unify the Algerian people before the brutal French colonization. That failure caused the radical armed organization, named the "Secret Organization", to win the leadership of the National Liberation struggle and created the ground for the intervention of this organization in Algerian politics that exists today (Lenze 2016: 16-19).

Algerian army officers were recruited from all social, and ethnic sects in Algerian society. Despite being diverse linguistically and ethnically, the army leadership included all sects and ethnic groups in the military rank and file. This diversity solidified the legitimacy of the military as the father of the nation and strengthened its linkage with the society. It allowed the military to liberate the country from the French. The action of the military facing the Arab Spring protests is a clear manifestation of the military's wide range of societal groups represented in its ranks and the absence of any dominant sect or ethnic group (Davis 2019). However, the military elites in Algeria see the society as politically immature. As Ghanem (2019) argues, the military views society as incapable of choosing the government officials, and thus assigning itself with the duty of saving the nation from forfeiture and collapse. The military leadership sees all independent social and political organizations, if not censured, as a source of disorder and chaos.

On June 19, 1965, Colonel Houari Boumediene led a military coup against the president and established the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) to rule the country under the Colonel's presidency. Mr. Boumediene's first decision was to ban the NLF from any political activities, as the military wanted to break any power that stood in the way of its control of the country. Over time, the NLF party became a political extension of the army that was making all the decisions under the leadership of Boumediene (Addin 2002). As Minister of Defense, Colonel Boumediene planned to use the military against his rivals so that he could rule Algeria in the long run (Lenze 2016: 20)

When President Boumediene died in 1978, the NLF party "accepted" the army's nomination of General Chadli Bendjedid to assume the presidency. As a president, Bendjedid occupied the positions of Minister of Defense and General Secretary of the NLF party. The NLF party commenced in its Fourth National Conference and appointed some high-ranking officers as members of its Central Committee. This militarization of political activities continued until the 1989 constitution that opened the door for political pluralism (Gaub 2017).

In 1986, oil prices fell dramatically and caused the revenue of the Algerian state to decline substantially. The mismanagement of the Algerian economy brought about the public disturbance of October 1988. The military faced the protesters with violence and caused the death of hundreds of civilians within a few weeks. In response to this disturbance, President Bendjedid decided to implement some political reforms to allow a multiparty system to function in the country (Oumansour 2019: 3). A new constitution was adopted to allow political pluralism. However, the military kept its control of the political arena by using the NLF to manipulate the political process. In the first multiple party election in 1990, the Islamic Salvation Front (ISF) won the majority of seats in the parliament. That event shocked the pillars of the

established Algerian regime and caused the president to resign. This signified the return of the army to the political forefront again (Lahouri 2002). The military was the decision maker to appoint Mr. Mohammad Boudiaf as the new president and his successor Liamine Zeroual, after the assassination of Boudiaf . The Algerian army, under the leadership of General Khalid BinNizar, was threatened by the ISF victory in the election. In response to the threat, the army decided to return the state to military rule, under General Liamine Zeroual. Aborting the election results was catastrophic for the Algerian Society; it caused a decade of violence that caused more than 200,000 casualties (Gaub 2017: 175).

In 1999, as part of the national process, the military allowed elections for the president to take place. In April 1999, Mr. Abdulaziz Boutaflika won the presidency after all the other candidates withdrew. The other candidates accused the army of serious intervention to seal the election in favor of Mr. Boutaflika. Boutaflika stayed in power through formal elections, until he was forced to resign on April 2, 2019 facing public protests of the deteriorating situation in the country (Grewal, 2019: 1). Military support was the main reason that President Boutaflika stayed in office for 20 years.

The civil-military relations in modern Algeria can be seen through four distinct frameworks. During Boumediene's presidency, the military controlled the RCC to guarantee its power over the civilian council ministers and to support Boumediene's rule. During Chadli Bendjiedid's reign, military officers were the influential members of the NLF Political Bureau and the Central Committee. When President Bendjedid introduced the multi-party reelection process, the military become *the behind-the-scenes* ruler, withdrawing its direct membership in NLF party. This role represents the third framework of the military's intervention in politics in the country. The fourth framework started in 1991. The army became the *de facto* ruler of the

country. The military did not answer to anyone but itself, and it manipulated the parties and the media (Lenze 2016: 38).

During his reign, President Boutaflika had to deal with the power distribution in the military. He intended to change the civil-military relations to limit the extra political power that the military had assigned to itself since the independence and through the painful civil war. Boutaflika wanted the army to be under the control of the presidency. He gradually appointed allies to top positions in the central and regional governments and promoted and shifted senior officers to gain loyalty among the military leadership (Tlemcani 2013: 1; Mortiner 2006). His efforts were bearing fruit; Boutaflika was able to appoint his close friend Major General Ahmed Salah Gaid as chief-of-staff.

As time progressed, Boutaflika was able to secure a constitutional amendment to remove the presidential terms limit. He decided to run for a fifth term. This action sparked the Arab Spring version 2 in Algeria in 2018 (Telemcani 2013: 2). Mass protests calling for the change of the regime continued, despite the resignation of president Bouteflika on April 2, 2019. The *Hirak*, or protest movement, was not satisfied with the resignation of the president. The protesters demanded total elimination of the corrupt and inefficient clique that surrounded Bouteflika, the overhaul of the Algerian political system, and the creation of genuine institutions. In dealing with the protestors, the military, as the real arbiter in Algerian politics (Lenze 2016: 38), returned to the forefront of Algerian politics during the transitional period. The military removed key political figures associated with the former president and defused any opposition to the army chief-of-staff, who ensured that the army was still the "King Maker" (Profazio 2019). These actions enabled the military to best preserve its own interest (Grewal 2019: 1).

During his reign, President Bouteflika worked to weaken the opposition. This strategy created a vacuum in power succession after his resignation. This situation was enhanced by the division among the ruling elites. A coalition of military and intelligence services joined forces to take control of the situation. Therefore, the military became the main power broker during the transition, causing a high level of suspicion from protestors about the military's intention. Given the power vacuum, the military managed the transition period without any consultation from any political or public organization. The military managed to hold presidential elections, despite the rejection of the protestors the entire time.

With the victory of the military-backed presidential candidate, Abdelmadjid Tebboune, the military's role in politics returned to a similar framework as the time of President Bendjedid. President Tebboune became the minister of defense and commander-in-chief of the army. Tebboune attributed to the military all of the "success" in saving the country through a difficult time. With the election of Mr. Tebboune as president, the military signaled it would step back from its traditional role of being the real ruler of the country, whether directly or behind the scene. Time will tell whether this promise will materialize (Ghanmi 2020). The greatest success that the popular uprising in Algeria achieved is that it pushed the military back to practicing its traditional role in Algerian politics, rather than as the real ruler of country.

6.2 Sudan: The Continuous Cycle of Civilian and Military Rule

Sudan is a former British colony with a very diverse social and ethnic structure. The military was built based on the British system, as Sudan was under the British rule when Sudan was part of Egypt. In 1956, Sudan gained its total sovereignty. In the two years after gaining sovereignty, Sudan became a Republic that avoided radical policies. This can be ascribed to the

standards of the civilian bureaucratic system built by the British and the high quality of the British officials' performance during colonization (Hurewitz 1969: 163-167).

Through its modern history, Sudan suffered from chronic social conflict between the Muslim Arab North and the Christian dominated South. This conflict had a clear impact on the political, social, and economic development in the country. In the end, the south split off from Sudan to form an independent country, South Sudan. Moreover, the social conflict caused the stagnation and paralysis of the political process in Sudan (Bechir 1997:42-46). Since 1958, Sudan went through repeated cycles of civilian and military rules, one after the other. The situation became a "revolving door", civilian rule following military rule and vice versa.

The first election in the country after independence took place in February 1958. The Ummah party[17], despite winning the majority of seats, failed to secure a coalition to form a government for a while. The paralysis of the newly elected parliament and the inefficiency of politicians to make the new parliamentary system work were attributed partly to the struggle between the North and the South. In addition, the economy was going through a recession at that time. The main export of the country, cotton, was not growing fast enough to bring the expected economic growth. The trust of the public was disintegrating, and the politicians in the system were drowning, as the parliament failed to produce a permanent constitution. The image of civilian politicians as representatives of the people went away.

The Prime Minister then, Mr. Abdullah Khalid, who served in the military for more than three decades before entering politics, noticed the ineffectiveness of the parliamentary political

[17] The National Ummah Party [NUP] is a moderate Islamic, centrist political party led by Al Sadig Al Mahdi. It was formed in 1945 on a platform advocating national independence for Sudan. The party began as an alliance between the Ansar, some tribal chiefs and Sufi sects. The party's main supporters are Ansar Muslims in the provinces of White Nile, western Darfur, and Kordofan.

system. Mr. Abdullah Khalid believed that the army would be better and more decisive leading the country. He shared this idea with the commander-in-chief of the army, Major General Ibrahim Abbud. On November 17, 1958, General Abbud and his fellow officers staged the first military coup in Sudan after independence; it was the first coup in sub-Saharan Africa as well (Hurewitz 1969: 166-167). This coup represents the first cycle in the revolving door of military rule following an elected civilian rule.

General Abbud and his military junta, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) ruled the country through direct military rule. General Abbud became the president and minister of defense; other ministers were also military officers who kept their military status and control of the military establishment. The military junta disbanded all political parties and detained the members of the former parliament for some time. Despite a few military coup attempts against it, the military regime stayed in control of the situation in the country.

Similar to their civilian predecessors, the military junta was not able to provide a suitable outcome ruling the country. Both in the South and the North, opposition to the military rule was developing. With the failure of economic and social policies of the military regime, the people of Sudan went on general strike in October 1964. At that time, most of the security forces were deployed to the South to deal with the social unrest caused by inefficiency in the management of the region and the discrimination felt by its inhabitants. Therefore, the civil disobedience in the capital, Khartoum, and other major cities went unchecked. The demand of the protesters was the transfer of power to a civilian government. The military officers who led the country during the six years of the military rule were educated and trained by British officers and influenced by a British organizational and political culture that called for military abstinence from politics. They had different religious denomination affiliations and came from the Arab-dominated North (First

1970: 229). The generals felt threatened by the situation and were forced to accept the demand of the protesters and returned power to the civilians (Hurewitz 1969: 170-171).

The civilian rule, after the collapse of the military regime, witnessed the resumption of the political stalemate between the politicians. The religious dimension began to enhance the division among the politicians, as religious leaders allowed the political parties to expand their bases in ruler and urban centers. Bechtold (1968) mentions that the years following the fall of the military regimes were full of machinations, anti-machinations, and behind-closed-doors conspiracies. The problems with such acts were that the issues of the country were neglected, the economy was mismanaged, and the South was mistreated. That mistreatment led to the start of the civil disobedience and military insurgency in the region (Bechtold 1968: 23-25). In addition, the government decided to ban some leftist political parties, making the political field a highly polarized and contested environment.

In such an environment, the second cycle of the revolving door happened on May 25, 1964. At that time, a group of military officers, under the leadership of Colonel Jaffar Nimeiry, initiated a military coup. This group of officers called themselves the "Free Officers", referencing the influence of the military junta that orchestrated the 1952 coup in Egypt. The new military rulers dissolved the parliament, banned all political parties, suspended the constitution, and dissolved the civilian government. Most of those "Free Officers" were of mid ranks and attended the Sudanese Military Academy in the early years after independence. That institution was a fertile ground for political recruitment of cadets by the different Sudanese political parties, causing the politicization of the Sudanese armed forces (Woodward 1990: 244). Contrary to the first military junta that ruled the country from 1958 to 1964, the officers of the second military regime implemented some social, economic, and political policy changes. One of the early

decisions was to disband the tribal and ethnic administrative system. They viewed it as a system feeding the classical political parties with power, funds, and personnel (Musa 2018: 163-170).

The new military regime sought to enhance its leftist orientation, as it dealt violently with some traditional social and religious movements that are entrenched in Sudanese society. In the confrontation of March 1970 with the Ansar[18] denomination, the government used full military operations against the members of the movement and killed its leader as he was trying to flee to Ethiopia. In the meantime, disagreements grew between the military officers and the Communist Party, the main political backer of the military regime. The regime needed the communist support when facing the different traditional religious, ethnic, and social groups. However, the cooperation between the two started to weaken as Jaffar Nimeiry marginalized the influence of the Communist Party by firing three communist officers from the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). The RCC was the real ruling power of the country under Nimeiry's leadership. The three fired officers staged a coup attempt on July 19, 1971 that lasted three days, but Nimeiry was able to put it down and executed four of the Communist Party leaders, as well as the coup leaders. Hundreds of members of the Communist Party were either imprisoned or fled the country. This failed coup marked the end of the collaboration between the military regime and the Communist Party and gave Nimeiry a near-monopoly on ruling the country (Abdel-Rahim 1978: 21-28).

With General Nimeiry's authoritarian approach to ruling the country, the economy started suffering. He started using a heavy handed approach in dealing with the conflict in south Sudan, instead of trying to find a political solution (Abdel-Rahim 1978: 18-20). In 1972, President

[18] The Ansar, or followers of the Mahdi, is a Sufi religious movement in Sudan whose supporters are followers of Muhammad Ahmad (12 August 1844 – 22 June 1885), the self-proclaimed Mahdi.

Nimeiry introduced a new military doctrine requiring military officers to take an oath of allegiance to the regime, not to the state. Nimeiry also started to provide material goods to top military officers to create a vested economic interest in defending the regime. The economic situation started deteriorating even further with the continued and intensified conflict in the south that drove international oil companies to withdraw from the country. Those circumstances enabled the opposition to gather momentum to oust President Nimeiry and his military regime. The opposition forces were able to organize a broad-based, civil protest movement that was able to threaten the regime seriously. Given that opposition, the SCAF, under the leadership of General Abdul Rahman Sewar Aldahab, decided to move against Nimeiry. His regime eventually was overthrown, and the military kept its hold of power with new faces (El-Battahari 2016: 2-3). General Sewar Aldahab became the president of the transitional government and promised to return power to civilian rule within a reasonable time period. Aldahab did hand over the power to a civilian-elected president in 1986. The country returned to civilian rule, and Mr. Sadiq Al-Mahdi, leader of the Umma Party, became the prime minister.

During the time of this new civilian rule, more of the old political divisions came back to dominate the Sudanese political arena. As in the past, they paralyzed the function of the government. A few of the political parties pulled out of the civilian coalition government in December 1988, and the government lost majority in the parliament. The relationship between the Prime Minister and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) became very tense. In this political environment, the SAF issued a Communique signed by about 150 senior and junior officers, among them was the commander in chief of SAF. The Communique requested major changes in Sudan's policies, both internal and external. In February 1989, the SCAF reiterated its views of the previous Communique. In March 1989, the opposition political parties and labor unions

signed a program requesting the resignation of the government, among other demands. The following day, the SCAF entered the political scene by requesting an answer from the president. The ministers resigned, and a new government was formed at the end of March 1989. These events happened without the participation of the National Islamic Front (NIF), a political coalition of Islamic parties that were gaining solid ground in Sudan's politics. The new government tried to achieve peace in southern Sudan through negotiation and submission to the demand of the armed groups who were fighting the SAF in the region. This action did not resonate positively with the NIF and the Umma Party. The new government also moved to stop the implementation of Islamic Laws as the basis of criminal and civil laws in Sudan, which had been introduced by President Nimeiry. While debating that in the National Assembly, the fifth military coup took place on June 30, 1989, under the leadership of General Omar Hassan al-Bashir (El-Battahari 2016: 3-4). Sudan returned to the direct military rule for the third time.

The fifth military coup of June 1989 came during a period of a tense political environment. The war in the South was intensifying, and the country was suffering economically. All this led to political instability. The new regime started building a coalition with the NIF to gain political support. The regime banned all political parties, suspended the constitution, and purged all people, who were not supporting the regime, from civil services and the military. The regime also intensified the military operations in the South and hoped to achieve military victory to resolve the conflict.

To ensure the survival of the regime, President al-Bashir created a new paramilitary force, the Popular Defense Forces (PDF) that recruited volunteers to fight in the south. The PDF grew very fast to include thousands of the regime's supporters and started receiving larger financial and military equipment support from the regime. In a short time, the PDF became the

main force that the regime used to balance the regular army's power (El-Battahari 2016: 3). As a result, the SAF ceased to have a monopoly on the use of violence, and SAF leaders began to question the regime's intention toward it.

Eighteen months after the coup, and under pressure from the NIF, the regime declared Islamic laws as the basis of all laws in the country and started the application of "Sharia law" as a way of life in all domains of Sudanese society. In response, all other political parties and movements formed a new front of political opposition named the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). The NDA was able to convince the main armed group in southern Sudan, the Southern People Liberation Army (SPLA), to join the new opposition group (Bechir 1997: 62-63). The new military-Islamist regime repressed political opposition violently, purged the officer corps of non-Islamist, and deprived the opposition political parties from gaining any economic benefits from any source in the country. It also created a new political organization to support the regime, the National Conference Party (NCP), that included all political figures supporting the regime and was dominated by the NIF (Alex 2019: 4-5). The regime increased the PDF size and power to thwart the threat of the SAF to the continuation of the regime.

As time progressed, the NIF started demanding that Islamic "revolution" should be the leading power in the country, and the military should step aside (Alex 2019: 8). Fragmentation began within the NCP, but General al-Bashir maintained control of the scene totally in 1998. President al-Bashir became the central figure in the regime, and the NCP became a loose umbrella of people who built connections with the regime through economic interest and rent. President al-Bashir became the sole decision maker in the Sudanese affairs and took decisive political and economic actions that affected Sudan's situation tremendously.

President al-Bashir managed to stay in power for about 30 years, using classical coup-proofing mechanisms. These mechanisms included: balancing power between the SAF and the PDF that he created, providing economic incentives to top military officers, building circumstantial alliances with political parties and movements, and regional and international maneuvering to gain support from outside powers. All those mechanisms came to an end when the popular uprising in January 2019 began. The protests started as reaction to the increase in prices of essential goods, such as bread and gas, similar to the popular uprising at the end of 1984 that toppled President Nimeiry.

With the spread of the popular uprising, the SAF came back to the front of the political and public arena. The SAF wanted to show itself as the protector of the protesters and as the only national institution that serves the interests of all Sudanese people. When the security forces started dealing violently with the protesters, the SAF intervened to shield protesters. The minister of defense, General Awad Ibn Auf, announced that the military would not allow the country to slide into chaos. As the protests continued, the security forces intensified their violence against the peaceful protesters. People saw the army as their refuge. Given that support, the SCAF decided to move and ousted President al-Bashir in another classic military coup on April 11, 2019. General Ibn Auf became the president of the Transitional Military Council (TMC) that started ruling the country. The same old story started evolving again: dissolving national legislature, imposing state of emergency, suspension of the constitution, and encouraging the protesters and political parties to reach a transitional agreement to move the country forward (Aljazeera 2019). General Ibn Auf declared himself president of Sudan and formed a military government. On April 12, 2019, the military government declared its intention to transfer power to a civilian government through negotiation with the protesters. The same day, General Ibn Auf

stepped down as the head of the TMC and chose General Abdel Fattah Abdulrahman Burhan as his successor. Mr. Ibn Auf's resignation was seen as a victory by the protestors.

General Burhan was one of the military officers who reached out to the protesters during the period before the military coup and listened to their demands. The MTC, after months of negotiations with political parties, labor unions, and professional associations, reached an agreement with the main public leaders to form a transitional government with a shared military-civilian coalition. The coalition would lead the country in the transitional period of two years, until the country could hold multiparty elections. The agreement was reached on August 1, 2019, and it ushered in a new phase in Sudan's political cycle. General Burhan kept his powerful position as the president of TMC, which is the real power center in the country. Civilians hold fewer positions than officers in the council. The agreement outlined the power sharing between the SAF and the civilians and developed the road map for the transitional period that should end with free, multiparty elections (The Guardian 2019). Only time will tell what the next phase in Sudan's current history cycle will be.

All civilian and military regimes that ruled Sudan after its independence came to power in different modes of social and economic circumstances, despite suffering from fragility and political instability. When the military came to power, it happened during a situation of division and political conflict as it happened in 1958, 1964, 1969, and 1989. When civilians come to power, it usually happened during periods of relative concord on the principles of political moves. The armed forces take advantage of conflict among civilian politicians, pointing to the failure of politicians, and portraying the military coup as a national action to save the country from chaos. Most of the time, civilians reach power when the military regime isolates itself from

its civilian allies, and the political activists reach a conclusion that the military regime is no longer a good mechanism to achieve their interest so it must be removed.

6.3 Lebanon: Professionalism vs. Factionalism

At the time of independence from France, the leaders of different ethnic and religious factions of Lebanon signed the National Pact in September 1943. The provisions of the pact unofficially gave positions in the government and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to certain sects. In that agreement, the president was to be Christian Maronite, the prime minister was to be Muslim Sunni, and speaker of the parliament was to be Muslim Shia (Anderson 2016: 318-319). In the National Pact, the positions of the LAF were set according to the sectarian map of the diverse social structure of Lebanese society. According to the Lebanese constitution, the president in his civilian political role is the commander-in-chief of the LAF, so that makes him, according to the National Act, a Christian Maronite (Gaub 2016: 19). The National Pact designated the chief-of-staff to be a Druz, and gave other key positions to other sects (Gaub 2014: 29).

Lebanon is an example of a sectarian political system in the Arab world. This system is designed not to give any one sect a majority of power. This system of sectarian politics had a direct effect on the military social structure. During the first phase of the Lebanese armed forces existence, military recruitment was built totally on sectarian lines by creating separate military units for each religious sect. As a product of the French-controlled *Troupes Special*, the LAF was given the duty to protect the state like any other national army. When it comes to its domestic role, the army acts only when the different sects come to a consensus, which has rarely happened in modern history of Lebanon (Anderson 2016: 322).

As the Lebanese constitution requires civilian control of the military, the Lebanese model follows the objective civilian control of armed forces with several institutions involved: ministry of defense, the parliament, and the president (Gaub 2016: 15). In Lebanon, the defense minister has to be a civilian. Out of the 54 defense ministers since independence, only seven did not fit this profile (Gaub 2016: 20). The parliament defense committee plays an important role in determining the allocation of resources to the LAF, overseeing the LAF, and following the action of the military regarding the deployment and purchase of weapons (Gaub 2016: 23).

The recruitment of officers and personnel of the LAF goes according to an ethno-religious quota that was introduced in 1978 to build an armed forces on a national level. Since independence until the end of the civil war that lasted from 1975 to 1990, the recruitment procedure aimed to build and staff military units according to the sects represented in Lebanese society. This procedure was designed to keep the army units in balance among different social groups (Gaub 2016: 27). The quota system allocated near-parity quotas of officers as 51% Muslims and 49% Christian, with those groups broken down further into the denominations of each religious group (Gaub 2017: 122). Such a system continues to function today; it made the LAF so diverse in its social structure that no single sect, ethnic, or religious group is dominant. Therefore, factionalism in the LAF changed from sectarian units to units containing members of several sects.

The Lebanese political system is highly sectarian, and on many occasions, several politicians tried to use the military for their own purposes. Different presidents sought to use the military to quell domestic unrest in 1952, 1958, and 2005. In each of those cases, the armed forces refused to intervene. There are multiple reasons for that refusal. First, the military is a clear representation of social divisions, and therefore its leadership was aware that any

intervention in domestic political affairs means affecting its own composition. Second, the doctrine installed by the first commander-in-chief of the LAF, General Fouad Shehab, upheld the notion that the military should stay away from politics. He was able to propagate his ideas to the vast majority of armed forces' personnel. This doctrine became known as *Shehabism* and was the foundation of the LAF ideology to abstain from intervention in politics in the country (Gaub 2014: 31).

The LAF went through three major phases of development since independence. The first one was the period from independence in 1943 until the start of the civil war in 1975. In that period, the Christian Maronites formed the majority of the officer corps. However, their percentage started declining over time, from 70% before 1945 to about 55% between 1958 to 1975. At the same time, other religious sects became more involved in the recruitment process (Moussa 2016: 2). During the second stage of development, the period of the civil war, the state tried to achieve a balance of sectarian representation in the LAF and particularly in the officer corps' recruitment. However, the civil war was a hurdle to the success of those efforts. Therefore, the structure of the military remained largely sectarian.

After the end of the civil war in 1990, the introduction of an informal 50-50 quota for Christian and Muslim officer recruitment reduced the dominance of the Christian Maronite and brought more balance to the LAF structure. Nevertheless, the sectarian dynamics in the LAF are still important, but it manifests itself in different ways, such as how the LAF deals with domestic unrest and public demonstrations.

Since independence, the LAF has sought to remain neutral during periods of unrest. The first test of its *Shehabism* doctrine was when President Bishara Khury ordered the military to put down public protests in 1952. In 1958 when President Camille Chamaun ordered the same. In

both cases, the military ignored the orders and preserved its neutral position in politics, according to its *Shehabism* doctrine. During the civil war, the LAF did not participate largely in the war and tried to act as a buffer between the fighting factions. However, it suffered from some disintegration, desertion, and mutinies, according to the confessional lines (Knudsen 2014: 1).

In the post-civil war era, the LAF went through a restructure process of its ranks and units to build a national army. However, its confessional structure still played a major role in its decision to intervene in domestic affairs. When public demonstrations started against the Syrian occupation in 2005, President Emile Lahoud ordered the military to quell it. The military disobeyed his order and stayed neutral (Gaub 2016: 32).

The LAF is highly respected by the Lebanese people as representative of the whole Lebanese society and the nation. The Lebanese people, however, do not hold the various political institutions in the country in high regard. Between 2001 and 2011, the trust in the LAF by Lebanese people stayed almost the same, above 70%. Meanwhile, the trust in the state itself plummeted from 41.7% to 5%. We can see that the military bypasses the political and confessional lines and communicates directly to the people, keeping its reputation more positive in the eyes of the people (Gaub 2017: 128). This is another reason that strengthens the *Shehabism* doctrine of neutrality in the political arena.

When General Emile Lahoud was appointed as commander of LAF in 1989, he followed his *Shehabist* conviction to keep the neutrality of the army and build its professional doctrine again as a national armed force. Professionalism in the military is characterized by certain institutional values and services for a greater cause; that professionalism can be seen in the actions of the LAF. The military kept its cohesion during the civil war, despite the disintegration along confessional lines as deserting units kept regular contact with the military leadership.

Deserted units even kept their training, sentry duty, equipment maintenance, and communication with command. The deserted units stayed on the payroll, received their salaries, and were even promoted (Gaub 2017: 125-126). In professional actions, the LAF maintained their distance from political leaders and policy makers, as their *Shehabism* conviction plays a major role in their view about inefficient and corrupt politicians. LAF professionalism goes beyond that in its training and education to promote standards, efficiency, and nationalism, as it views itself as a symbol of Lebanon (Gaub 2017: 126). The LAF is unchecked by civilians but refrains from interfering in politics. In its development and actions, the LAF showed clear allegiance to the state and the people.

The public uprising started in Lebanon in 2019 in reaction to the political and economic inefficiencies of the civilian elites that led to political and economic stagnation and the near collapse of the state. With the uprising, the army came to the center of the national theater. As the uprising showed a surge in national unity among protesters, their call for the removal of politicians that they accused of mismanaging the country's affairs began to be a threat to the whole political system. The situation became the most serious crises for the country, since the end of the civil war. In dealing with the protesters demand, President Michel Aoun, as commander-in-chief of the LAF, called on the LAF to deploy to the streets to quell the public unrest. They obeyed half of the order.

The LAF deployed to the streets of Beirut, but instead of quelling the public protests, it acted to protect them and save the state institutions. Regardless of the escalating violence and the death of some protesters and military personnel, the LAF stayed as professional armed forces with a focused mission, the safety of the whole nation. Adhering to its *Shehabism* doctrine and its view of itself as servant of the nation, the LAF was acting as a buffer between the

demonstrators and the supporters of the government who try to step up violence against the peaceful uprising (Khraiche and Noueihed 2019).

Such actions enhanced the LAF's image in the eyes of the Lebanese people as a national institution representing the whole nation. The anti-government protesters see the army as a unifying force in a divided country. The action of the LAF to protect the anti-government protesters instead of crushing them is a natural result of its historical development of professionalism and *Shehabism* doctrine of political neutrality through different generations of military leadership. The LAF's action made it even more popular in the eyes of the Lebanese society, in general, and the peaceful protesters, in particular.

6.4 Iraq: Can the Phoenix Rise Again?

Before the British constructed Iraq as a state, it was part of the Ottoman Empire. The British merged three Ottoman provinces, Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra, to craft the new country when Iraq came under the British Mandate after the WW I (Hurewitz 1982). The diversity of Iraq in ethnic, religious, and linguistic dimensions created a difficult situation. The majority of Shia in the South and central Iraq did not welcome the British invaders and sided with the Ottomans. Lacking the support on the ground, the British brought Prince Faisal Bin Alhusayn of Mecca, who had assisted the British in their war efforts, and installed him on the throne of Iraq (Simon 1986).

The first unit of the Iraqi army was convened on January 6, 1921 and was symbolically named *Fawj Alimam Musa al-Kadhim*, after the seventh Shi'i imam to please the Shia majority of Iraq. Through its history, the Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF) were predominantly Sunni in terms of officers and Shia in conscripts. King Faisal I, wanted to build harmonious relations among all Iraqi sects and ethnic groups in the design of the military. He assigned a group of former

Ottoman officers, known as the *Sharifians* who were Sunnis, to undertake both military and civilian positions during the life of the Iraqi monarchy. This action had long-term consequences leading to the minority rule in Iraq.

In 1922, the British raised the allocation of resources for the army and encouraged Iraqis from all communities to join the military. As a result, the Iraqi army increased from about 3,000 in 1921 to 12,000 by 1932. However, the sectarian mistrust of the state created another problem for the military. The leaders of Shia and Kurd communities did not want to support the government at the cost of their own regional power (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008). In this context, the Iraqi state was ruled by military personnel from its inception, and this pattern continued, with few exceptions, even after the fall of the monarchy in 1958.

The Royal Iraqi Military College was established in 1924, and the new Iraqi officers were trained under the instruction of British officers. To overcome the British policy of limiting the size of the Iraqi army, King Faisal and his defense minister, General Jaafar al-Askari, advocated military conscription. The King's proposal for implementing national conscription as a system that would achieve national cohesion by making the army more inclusive of all the communities of Iraq. The conscription law was adopted in 1933, after Iraq gained independence from Britain. However, it was not sufficient to solve the systemic problem of representation of diverse communities as the Sunnis, a minority group, dominatted the officer corps. The creation of the conscription system did not solve this overrepresentation problem, as there was no conscription mechanism to recruit officers (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008: 20-29).

The military first interfered in Iraqi politics during the rule of King Ghazi I, son of King Faisal, who ascended to the throne after the death of his father in 1933. King Ghazi sent General Baker Sidqi, Commander of the Third Infantry division of the Iraqi army, to handle the

escalating rebellion by the Assyrians[19]. By the end of the campaign, more than 300 Assyrian men were killed. General Sidqi gained high popularity among the public. This event is pivotal, as it represents the beginning of the continuous intervention of the military in Iraqi political affairs (Khadduri 1948: 275-280).

General Sidqi's popularity made him think of himself as the "savior" of the country from the inefficiency and corruption of the civilian politicians. He orchestrated the first coup d'état in the Arab world in the 20th century. On October 28, 1936, General Sidqi, with the help of other officers staged the coup and changed the government without changing the regime. The plotters demanded the removal of the government. General Sidqi dictated his choice for Prime Minister, Mr. Hikmat Sulaiman, a Turkoman politician who opposed the Pan-Arab nationalist attitude of the overthrown cabinet. The new government was overthrown ten months later, after the assassination of General Sidqi in Mosul. Sulaiman wanted to bring the assassins to trial in Baghdad, but General Amin al-'Umari, a pan-Arab commander of the Mosul garrison, refused and started a mutiny.

General Sidqi's coup and the toppling of Mr. Sulaiman's government were the events that opened the door for more consequential interference by the army in the country's politics. Between 1937 and 1941, the military, or at least some parts of it, used their power to change governments or force governments to adopt their own views in a series of acts that made the military the real moderator in Iraqi politics (Khadduri 1948: 280-290).

In April 1941, four pan-Arab Iraqi colonels staged a peaceful coup forcing the Prime Minister, Mr. Taha al-Hashimi, to resign and forcing the Regent to the Throne, Prince Abd al-

[19] An ethnic and linguistic minority group indigenous to north Mesopotamia, predominantly Christian. They formed the Iraq Levies that was established by the British before the creation of the Iraqi army to work as guards for the British camps and offices in Iraq and fought as loyal auxiliary force on the British side against the local inhabitants.

Ilah, to appoint Mr. Rashid Ali as prime minister. The colonels wanted Iraq to side with Nazi Germany instead of supporting the British war efforts. Tension escalated and ended in a British attack on the Iraqi army at the Habbaniyya air base. By the end of May 1941, the government collapsed, and the officers and the prime minister fled the country. A new government, formed by Prime Minister Nuri al-Sa‘id, purged the military of any officers that participated in the 1941 coup to ensure loyalty of the armed forces to the royal regime (Tarbush 1982).

Some Iraqi officers inspired by Nassir’s coup of 1952 in Egypt, organized in similar Free Officers cells starting in 1956. On July 14, 1958, some army units entered Baghdad and staged a military coup that changed the whole modern history of Iraq. They massacred the royal family and killed Mr. Nuri al-Sa‘id two days later. This event set the pattern for consequent bloody and peaceful military coups by controlling the radio station to communicate their message to the public. The officers announced the end of the monarchy and established the Republic of Iraq (Anderson 2016: 307).

The leaders of the coup, General Abdelkarim Qasim and Colonial Abdelsalam Arif, became the real power holders in the new Iraq. General Qasim became the prime minister, minister of defense and the commander-in-chief of the IAF. Colonial Arif became the minister of the interior and deputy commander-in-chief of the IAF. Differences between Qasim and Arif started mainly because of their diverging views about Iraq’s foreign policy orientation. Arif was accused of plotting a coup against Qasim, sentenced to death, and later pardoned by Qasim. This move sealed the fate of Qasim (Anderson 2016: 309-310). On February 8, 1963, Arif and a group of nationalist and Ba’athist officers and civilians staged a military coup against Qasim. They captured Qasim and brought him to the Baghdad Radio and TV Station, where he was executed (Anderson 2016: 310-311).

General Arif became the president and gave himself the highest military rank, Field Marshal. Military officers controlled the new government; the line between civil and military was unclear. The era of President Arif was characterized by the creation of parallel armed forces for the first time to balance the power of the regular army in Iraq. The first parallel security force was the National Guard, an armed militia composed of civilian Ba'athists volunteers. This militia committed horrific atrocities against the general public and had unchecked power. The second force that President Arif formed was the Republican Guard designed as an elite military force to protect the president and his military regime. Arif filled its ranks with the loyal members of his Arab Sunni tribe of Jamila and appointed his relative, Colonel Said Sulaybi, as its commander. The president also appointed his brother, General Abdulrahman Arif, as Chief-of-Staff of the IAF, to ensure the loyalty of the military. President Arif developed a praetorian regime through building loyalty and patronage networks based on family and tribal ties, a system later developed to a much higher level by Saddam Hussain (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008).

President Abdelsalam Arif died in a helicopter crash on April 13, 1966. Four days later, the National Defense Council[20], appointed his brother, General Abdulrahman Arif, as the new president. Two years later, on July 17, 1968 the Ba"ath Party with the help of some ambitious military officers staged a coup against President Arif. It was a bloodless and the president was sent to exile. The Ba'ath party leadership took firm control of the government in general, and the armed forces in particular. Two weeks after the coup, the Ba'ath party removed the two non-Ba'athists officers who played an essential role in executing the coup. This move allowed General Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr and his relative, the civilian Saddam Hussain, to rule Iraq with

[20] National Defense Council: A 12 member, high ranking officers council created by President Abdelsalam Arif in 1964 to control the Iraqi Armed Forces.

no major opposition. During that period, Saddam was enhancing his grip on Iraqi affairs, and he became the *de facto* ruler of Iraq with the help of the elaborate network of security forces he created that consisted of his own loyalists (Hashim 2003).

In March 1970, the Ba'ath party leadership announced the creation of the Popular Army, a paramilitary organization, as the new version of the old National Guard. All Ba'ath members were required to obtain military training and learn to use different small and medium size weapons. The goal of the creation of this paramilitary organization was to balance the power of the IAF. With the existence of the extensive security and intelligence network personally supervised by Saddam Hussain, the Ba'ath regime was able to discover and thwart at least two coup attempts in 1970s (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008).

In 1972, Iraq nationalized the Iraqi Oil Company. With the increase in oil revenue, the Ba'ath government was able to enhance the power of the IAF and increase its size. Between 1973 and 1980, the size of the IAF doubled, and the army added nine new divisions. In 1972, Iraq signed a Friendship Treaty with the former Soviet Union that allowed the IAF to acquire more weapons. In 1978, Colonel Adnan Kharallah, the son-in-law of President al-Baker and cousin and brother-in-law of Saddam Hussain, was promoted to General and appointed Minister of Defense. On July 16, 1979, President al-Baker resigned for "health problems", and Saddam became the president, commander-in-chief of the IAF, and Secretary General of the Ba'ath Party. Saddam started his reign by executing and removing some of the Ba'ath party leadership and forming a new government, mainly his loyalists, and reshuffling the leadership of the armed forces. After signing a peace treaty with Iran, the major supporter of the Kurds' insurgency in March 1975, Saddam had no other use for his large, expanding, well-equipped and trained military, other than external use (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008).

On September 22, 1980, Saddam ordered the Iraqi Air Force to attack Iranian airbases to clear the way for the Iraqi army to invade Iran. The Islamic revolution in Iran was a serious threat to the power of the minor Sunni sect in a Shia-majority country. The war with Iran lasted eight years, and it allowed Saddam to expand the IAF with careful inclusiveness. To enhance its security, the regime expanded the Republican Guard by including officers and soldiers based on their perceived loyalty. As the size of the Republican Guard expanded, however, some of its officers and personnel came from regions and sects that were not fully guaranteed in loyalty. Accordingly, the Republican Guard started losing its preferential position as the guardian of the regime. A new, more loyal, parallel military was formed from certain areas whose Sunni-Arab populations were known for their unfaltering support for the president. Saddam Hussein's second son, Qusay supervised the new force, the Special Republican Guard. It was given the duty of guarding the president, his family, the Republican Palaces, and other sensitive places where the president spent time (Brome 2018).

The Iraq-Iran war ended in August 1988. During that period, the regular Iraqi army expanded from 242,000 men in 1980 to 607,000 men in 1984, and reached about one million in 1990. With the collapse of the Iraqi economy due to the destruction of the means of production in many sectors and the collapse of oil prices in 1989-1990, Saddam needed to keep his large army busy, instead of giving them a chance to turn against him. He faced at least four coup attempts between 1988 and 1990, among them a plot by senior officers of the Republican Guard. Saddam decided to invade Iraq's small, weak, and rich neighbor, Kuwait, hoping to gain control of its oil reserves and vast wealth. Saddam refused all the calls to withdraw from Kuwait, and the United States led a military campaign to liberate Kuwait that caused a catastrophic defeat for the Iraqi military. The humiliating defeat of the Iraqi forces in Kuwait encouraged a spontaneous

uprising in the south and the north of the country. Al-Marashi and Salama (2008) argue that the popular uprising inducted a new episode of civil-military relations in Iraq. For the first time since its formation, the Iraqi army conducted comprehensive combat operations against Iraqi civilians in the north and the south of the country at the same time.

As a result of Iraq's occupation of Kuwait, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) imposed economic sanctions on Iraq in August 1990. The sanctions lasted until the fall of Saddam's regime in April 2003. The sanctions caused a heavy cost to Iraqi society, and the Iraqi armed forces were reduced in size. By 1994, the size of the Iraqi army was reduced to slightly more than 300,000 soldiers with the specific mission to protect the regime in case another popular uprising arose. However, the regime created yet another parallel military force to balance the powers of other military forces, including the regular army, the Republican Guard, and even the Special Republican Guard. In 1995, the regime created Fedayeen Saddam[21], a militia force manned primarily by thugs and unemployed Iraqi youth, under the leadership of Saddam's eldest son, Uday. The militia carried out some of the most brutal acts against the people and continued its operations until the fall of Saddam's regime in 2003 (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008).

After the occupation of Baghdad on April 9, 2003, the fate of the Iraqi army was one of the difficult questions before the American administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority, Mr. Paul Bremer. Bremer dissolved the military, and simply erased more than 80 years of the history of the institution that was established before the formation of the state itself. The military may have been the only power that could have saved the country from the sectarian and regional

[21] Fedayeen Saddam was a paramilitary organization loyal to the Ba'athist regime. The name was chosen to mean "Saddam's Men of Sacrifice". At its height, the group had 30,000–40,000 members.

power conflicts that resulted in a bloody civil war and the deterioration of Iraq to near collapse. The formation of a new army, and its aftermath, became a repetition of the steps taken to create it at the start of the British occupation about a century ago (Kadhim 2013: 135).

The new Iraqi army started as a predominantly Shia force because of the boycott by the Sunnis. The *de-Ba'athification*[22] process limited, to a large extent, the staffing of Iraqi military units with qualified officers. Since it takes time to prepare officers, the problem that plagued the army throughout the 20th century seems to continue with the new era. The current Iraqi military forces consist of the regular army, the National Guard, Rapid Intervention Forces, Iraqi Special Operations Forces, and Iraqi Anti-Terrorism Command, among other forces (Hoffmann 2009). On the positive side, the Iraqi army enjoyed the highest popularity in decades, in most provinces. In a poll conducted in 2004, the Iraqi army received 61% positive rating, while there was a negative rating for the U.S. and allied forces (Ricks 2004). There are good reasons for this popularity. For most Iraqis, the new army is no longer the oppressive instrument of the regime, and it represents their hope to see an Iraq free of foreign troops.

After 2003, the civil-military relations in Iraq began collapsing. In this context, Iraqi armed forces were required to build, train, and equip its units rapidly, while fighting a growing insurgency. The army was not able to end the violence. Training and recruitment efforts were stepped up, and the Iraqi armed forces' recruitment surged. In six years after the US occupation, the Iraqi military quadrupled in size, reaching more than 200,000 active members. However, it suffered from a lack of rigorous training. The rushed recruitment process hurt the officer corps,

[22] De-Ba'athification refers to a policy undertaken in Iraq by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and subsequent Iraqi governments to remove the Ba'ath Party's influence in the new Iraqi political and security system.

in particular. In 2008, only 73% of officers and 69% of noncommissioned officer posts were filled (Gaub 2016 (b): 2-3).

The 2005 election brought Mr. Nouri al-Maliki to become a prime minister. Mr. al-Maliki assumed office when the Iraqi government took control of the army from the US forces. He knew that the Iraqi military had intervened in Iraqi political affairs, since the creation of the state. Therefore, he wanted to contain the military from any further intervention. His coup-proofing measures included consolidating military decision-making in his hands, exploiting personal loyalties or sectarian affiliations, creating paramilitary groups to balance the power of the armed forces, and establishing security and intelligence agencies to monitor the military. He also sought to avoid any attempt of collective action on the part of the armed forces by interfering in the relations between commanders and their supporting officers. Instead of following the official command structure, Mr. al-Maliki created an informal one by issuing direct orders to officers and even calling them directly sometimes (Gaub 2016 : 3-4).

The widespread sectarianism of Iraqi politics, following the fall of Saddam's regime, distorted Iraq's civil-military relations. Although sectarianism existed as a social and silent phenomenon before 2003, the new political system institutionalized it. For the Iraqi armed forces, sectarianism has diminished the incentive to fight, which could explain why some soldiers refused to fight the Islamic State. When he became prime minister in 2014, Mr. Haider al-Abadi initiated some reforms. Among them was the decentralization of governmental structures, combating corruption, and declaring an end to political sectarianism. He was not able to implement all what he envisioned as necessary to move Iraq forward, as he lacked enough political support among the different ethnic and sectarian political factions. Therefore, the civil-military relations in Iraq still suffer from incoherent policies (Gaub 2016 b: 4-5). .

On October 1, 2019, thousands of angry Iraqis gathered momentum in Baghdad to protest against the failed government of Prime Minister Mr. Adel Abdelmahdi and the sectarian political system that produced it. The demonstrators were met with violent and brutal action by the security forces. The demonstrations continued and spread to other cities in the country, despite the heavy-handed approach by the government. The demands of the protesters were similar to those of protesters in other Arab countries: a new government that is free of corruption and able to provide basic services and create more job opportunities to the growing young population (Magid 2019). The Iraqi government denied the accusation that its forces were shooting live ammunition at the peaceful protesters. The government clearly did not have full control of all the armed militias, whether acting independently or according to Iranian orders. In the southern city of Nassiriya, a battalion from Iraqi Special Forces attacked a group of young protesters at dawn of November 28, 2019. The attack killed dozens of teenagers and raised rage among all Iraqis against the government. The prime minister resigned, and the process of finding a replacement proved to be a challenge in a country with a parliament paralyzed by the sectarian orientation of its members (Karam and Abdul-zahra 2019). The Iraqi uprising continued to increase in size and has gained enough public support to put Iraq at a turning point in its current history. The political factions are not willing to give up their hold on power and are willing to use all political and violent measures to keep their control over the vast wealth of the country through unprecedented levels of corruption in the country (Cockburn 2019).

In this environment, some Iraqis reverted to the state-building legacy and called on the military for a solution. The security forces were doing little to protect the civilian protesters from the brutal response of the armed militias. A less publicized war hero from the Iraqi Anti-Terrorism Forces (IATF) became to the face of the protest movement. General Abdel-Wahab al-

Saadi was admired by many Iraqis, as he led the military campaign against the Islamic State (IS) and was known for his steadfast stand against Iranian influence in the country. General al-Saadi made a name for himself by being a professional soldier away from any political influence or affiliation. He was dismissed from his post as deputy commander of the IATF by the government, a move that gave him even more popularity. Protesters started holding General al-Saadi pictures demanding that he form a new government (Bodetti 2019).

Since the resignation of the Prime Minister, Mr. Abdelmahdi in November 2019, the President of the Republic, Mr. Barham Saleh, has appointed three people to form a government. All failed to win the approval of the sectarian divided parliament. The inability to recognize that Iraq's current situation is different from what was it under the totalitarian regime, and the weakening in the momentum of the uprising, gave the sectarian politicians the illusion that they are still capable of directing Iraq's policies toward their own interests. However, Iraq is experiencing the upsurge of a young generation who are more liberal, who grew up in the environment of freedom, and who are not subject to single political and media influence. The failure of the sectarian politicians to handle the affairs of the country and the mismanagement of the vast wealth of the country has brought a new generation of young politicians that is known to be open to the full spectrum of society and to the world, as a result of travel and global communication (Dagher 2020). For the time being, the political situation in Iraq is characterized by stagnation and no clear solution, with hope looming for a military intervention to achieve salvation for the people.

7. Conclusion

By looking at the cases of the four countries, we can see some similarities and differences. Despite the differences in the background of the presidents of Algeria and Sudan, the

political systems were both military based regimes. As such, we can see similarities in the outcome of the uprising. In Algeria, the reality of the military being the true ruler of the country and the "Presidents' Maker" came back to the political scene. As it brought Mr. Boutaflika to the presidency during time of violent crisis in 1999, it pushed Mr. Tebboune to the helm of the state during civil uprising in 2019. In Sudan, the military maneuvered its action through protecting the demonstrators in order to show itself as the savor of the people. The military orchestrated a military coup against a military regime in order to continue ruling the country and preserve its own interest.

In Lebanon and Iraq, the two political systems are very similar being sectarian parliamentary semi-democracies with civilian control of the armed forces. The uprisings produced similar outcomes of political stagnation to form a government in Iraq and formation of an ineffective government in Lebanon with the task of saving the country from collapse. The similar outcomes came despite the difference responses of the armed forces to the uprisings in the two countries. The LAF still adhering to its *Shehabism* doctrine of not interfering in politics and serving the nation. While in Iraq the old style of military determining the fate of the nation is still the hope of some people at least.

Table 6.1.

Summary of the Cases of the Four Countries of the Arab Spring V-2

Country	Leader, Tenure, and Background	Social Structure of Military	Coup-Proofing Mechanism	Military Action	Result of Uprising
Algeria	Abdelaziz Bouteflika 1999-2019 Civilian	Nationwide recruitment of officers	Military is the State	No violence	Formal election of military backed president Military back to directly involved in politics
Sudan	Omar al-Basher 1989-2019 Military	North Sudan, Arabs domination	Divide and rule Paramilitary forces Material patronage	Mild Violence	Military coup Military is ruling the country
Lebanon	Michel Aoun 2016-Present Military	Sectarian, and ethnic units Balance of sectarian and ethnic communities in the military	Civil control, Professionalism, *Shehabism*	Protecting the protesters	Political stalemate Financial bankruptcy of country

Iraq	Adel Abdelmahdi 2018-2019 Civilian	Shia Dominant	Consolidating military decision making Factional loyalty Paramilitary groups Several intelligence agencies	Militias shooting on demonstrators Medium level of violence	Political stagnation

Conclusion

The civil-military relations in the Arab world, in general, and in the countries included in this study, in particular, represent special cases affected by the state-building path and the social and cultural circumstances that characterize each country. The international and regional conditions surrounding the Arab world also exert pressure on the internal civil-military relations in each country. Based on these factors, the authoritarian regimes of the region developed specific coup-proofing mechanisms to prevent the military from toppling them in the wake of crisis and challenges to the system. These mechanisms affected the military's strength, unity, and harmony.

All of these factors also had a prominent role in determining each military's reaction toward the revolutionary movements of the Arab Spring and on the outcome of the ensuing Arab uprisings. In the end, the reaction of each military led to the instability of the circumstances in all of the Arab Spring counties, to different degrees.

The Tunisian case remains the only positive case in regard to transition to democracy, even in relative measures. The regime's choice about the military's professionalism resulted in the military's professional, independent, and neutral reaction to the protests. The military's neutral reaction clearly helped to spare the country from sliding into chaos and civil war. In that, Tunisia remains, despite the unstable conditions it faces, the lone Arab country that was able to have a successful uprising. If the Tunisian military continues to honor its professionalism, then Tunisia will become the first Arab spring country to avoid failure in its democratization attempts.

The Egyptian case is special. Here, the military seized the state and controlled the ruler himself. Therefore, the military's reactions were political at the beginning and sought to "keep the house in order". The military's reaction, at the end, led the country into chaos and instability.

The military is still working to manage the country's troubled affairs to pull the country out of its current situation. The military is desperately trying to avoid the failure that appears to be almost imminent.

In Syria, the al-Assad family had the same story with the military that brought their father to power. Then, they worked to merge the military into the ruling regime and turn it into a vehicle to protect the ruling sect. The existence of the military became connected to the existence of the regime. This interwoven relationship helps to explain the military's violent reaction and merciless attacks on the protestors to protect the president and the regime. The final outcome was the collapse of the whole country. Syria is mired in civil war and failure.

Yemen fell victim to its tribal, sectarian, and regional history. The complexity of social, cultural, religious, political, and international situation made the rulers' relations with the military troubled and unstable. In the end, these conditions produced an undisciplined and non-unified armed forces. In addition, the military's reaction toward the Yemeni "revolution" was disturbed and undisciplined. That reaction led to a civil war that caused the country's uprising to fail.

In Libya, Gaddafi used the military to assume power. Then he marginalized that same military to avert any move against him. In theory, the military was turned into a "virtual" military force that collapsed quickly after the uprising broke out. The military collapse drove the county into a civil war labyrinth, and it made Libya a failed state.

I examined these cases using the explanatory framework developed in this study. This mechanism is based on some key concepts from prior research, and it allowed me to dissect each case on its own and understand the different circumstances. Therefore, I provided reasoned

explanations for the complex circumstances that characterized the Arab world conditions before, during, and after the Arab spring uprisings.

One of the main findings of this study is that the civil-military relations, if built on military professionalism will help strengthen the state, ruling groups, and opposition groups. A military with professionalism will allow the development of a democratic government that is able to prevent the country from falling. This is particularly true if the civil-military relations are built on the voluntary subordination of the officers' corps to the civilian authority. This voluntary subordination is referred to as "civilian control of the military" by Samuel Huntington (1957: Homan 2013: 83). Huntington (1957) also presents the notion of "proper subordination." This type of subordination does not lead to the seizure of the military by the ruler; it can be achieved only in a democratic system (Kohn 1997: 144).The civil-military relations is a complex and interconnected whole. It requires military professionalism for democracy to succeed. At the same time, military professionalism needs democracy itself to materialize in reality.

Within the new wave of uprisings, governments in Lebanon and Iraq are resorting to an old style sectarianism, which is the engine of the Syrian conflict, to divide the protestors, rather than promoting a unified national identity. In Sudan, a shaky power-sharing agreement between the civil opposition and the army emerged after months of mass demonstrations that started against the backdrop of soaring bread prices. The protests have garnered enormous popular support, and have not yielded to divided ideologies, political rivalry, or even the use of force. However, it remains far from clear whether this new season of protests will be more sustainable, peaceful, and resistant to violence and chaos. The 'green sprouts' of the 2019 revolutions offer some reasons for feeling hopeful.

The four countries experiencing protests in this new wave of protests, Algeria, Sudan, Iraq, and Lebanon, are countries that remained untouched by the "Arab Spring" in 2011. In these countries, the people were still shaken by years of conflict and political violence. However, a new season of discontent was launched, but this time the methods used were peaceful. We can cite three main reasons for this development. First, people learned from the lessons of their past. Second, there was a will toward maintaining their movement in time and attract more supporters at the national and international levels. Finally, people do not want to give their governments the opportunity to use repressive tactics against them and put an end to their popular demonstrations.

There are significant differences in the first and second waves of Arab protests across countries. In addition to the uniqueness that characterizes each country when the protests reached there, differences in demographic, ethnic, sectarian and social composition are also quite remarkable. Furthermore, the roles of internal and external forces, their varying interactions, the effect of these interactions with the protest movements should be cited. Despite these differences military is destined to play a significant role in the outcome of these uprisings.

The second wave of protests drew lessons from the first wave. The demonstrators are no longer content with overthrowing the old authoritarian rulers. Instead, they are targeting the deep state structures. At the same time, they are keen to avoid division based on their identities and affiliations and are demanding the organization of credible new elections. The challenge facing each country lies in finding the path leading to a political and economic transition process that satisfies the street. Even Tunisia's past democratization has not yet found the way forward. The wheel of history is spinning again, but future remains uncertain and military will play a role in these settings.

Algeria, Sudan, Lebanon, and Iraq witnessed popular uprisings since 2018 and are going through major political and social transformations where the military plays a major role. The analysis and explanatory framework presented in this study will provide insights that could help scholars to understand and analyze the role of militaries in the recent uprisings in these Arab-majority countries that missed the first wave of the Arab Spring version 1.

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Appendix I

In this appendix, I report some data about the countries covered in this study. The data for Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Yemen, and Libya is based on the situation of the countries and their militaries in 2010 when the Arab Spring started. In this data, we can see the level of variety of measures regarding the countries and the militaries as well.

For the countries of Algeria, Sudan, Lebanon, and Iraq, the data is based on 2018 levels as that is the year where the new Arab Spring Version 2 started to challenge the political regimes in each of those four countries.

The data is collected from the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the World Bank, Transparency International, and Heritage Organization (IISS 2010; SIPRI 2018; World Bank 2020; Transparency International 2018; Heritage Foundation 2020).

The variables included in the tables below are as follows:

ME/GDP: Military expenditure as percentage of GDP. It is a measure of the importance of the armed forces compared to other sectors in the economy. (Source: SIPRI 2018)

ME/G: Military expenditure as percentage of Government expenditure. Clear measure of patronage and buying loyalty. (Source: Source: SIPRI 2018)

AF/Pop: Armed forces as percentage of population. Classical measure of militarization of society. (Source: The World Bank Data Base).

Corruption Index: Corruption index (100 No corruption, 0 total corruption) (Source: Transparency International).

Economic Freedom Index: Economic freedom index (100 totally free, 0 totally not free) (Source: Heritage Organization).

GDP Growth: GDP Growth Rate (Source: World Bank Data Base).

Per Capita GDP: The GDP per person in real value (Source: World Bank Data Base).

Urban Population Growth: Urban 15 years and older Population Growth. (Source: World Bank Data Base).

Male Unemployment Rate: Male 15 years and older employment rate (Source: World Bank Data Base)

Urban Population/ Population: Urban population as percentage of total population (Source: World Bank Data Base).

Military Size and Structure: The size of the regular army and the paramilitaries, and the length of military service (Source: IISS 2010).

Table AI.1.

Tunisia Data

ME/GDP	6.23%
ME/G	5.15%
AF/Pop	1.26%
Corruption Index	43
Economic Freedom index	58.9
GDP Growth	3.51%
Per Capita GDP	$4141.97
Urban Population Growth	1.46%
Male Unemployment Rate	10.9%
Urban population/Population	66.67%
Historical Path of Armed Forces	Armed Forces product of state formation Organized based on European Model Put down uprisings in 1978 and 1984 Peacekeeping Missions
Military Size, and structure Regular Army: Paramilitary Military Service:	 35,800 12,000 12 Months, Selective
Military Response to Uprising	Neutral between regime and protesters Save the state and its institutions Disobeyed President's order to use violence Abandon the President
Outcome of Military response	No violence Fall of regime Good measures to consolidate democracy
Military Capability	Small, weak, and little resources Professional and neutral politically

Table AI.2.

Egypt Data

ME/GDP	6.22%
ME/G	6.2%
AF/Pop	3.04%
Corruption Index	31
Economic Freedom index	59
GDP Growth	5.14%
Per Capita GDP	$2644.82
Urban Population Growth	1.94%
Male Unemployment Rate	4.77%
Urban population/Population	43.02%
Historical Path of Armed Forces	Major role in nation building since 1952 Military Coup Real ruler of the country behind the Scene
Military Size, and structure Regular Army: Paramilitary Military Service:	 468,000 397,000 1-3 years
Military Response to Uprising	Based on cost-benefit analysis Protected protesters at the beginning Forced President to resign to protect corporate interest Minister of Defense became President through formal elections
Outcome of Military response	Mild violence Military coup 2013 Formal Presidential Elections Back to Autocracy
Military Capability	Strong, cohesive, high corporate interest, Major Economic role in the country Well-equipped and trained.

Table AI.3.

Syria Data

ME/GDP	13.62%
ME/G	25.9%
AF/Pop	6.99%
Corruption Index	25
Economic Freedom index	N/A
GDP Growth	N/A
Per Capita GDP	N/A
Urban Population Growth	1.39%
Male Unemployment Rate	6.21
Urban population/Population	55.6%
Historical Path of Armed Forces	Military major player in political change Sects and ethnic groups determine action of military
Military Size, and structure Regular Army: Paramilitary Military Service:	 325,000 314,000 30 Months
Military Response to Uprising	High level of violence Protected the regime and the president at all cost
Outcome of Military response	Civil war Destruction of state and its institution Failed state
Military Capability	Russian Equipped Low ability of maneuvering Multiple units for same purpose and region Politicized sect hegemony Multiple structures of each service

Table AI.4.

Libya Data

ME/GDP	N/A
ME/G	N/A
AF/Pop	3.5%
Corruption Index	22
Economic Freedom index	40.2
GDP Growth	5.02%
Per Capita GDP	$12064.78
Urban Population Growth	1.31%
Male Unemployment Rate	15.5%
Urban population/Population	78.05%
Historical Path of Armed Forces	Middle level of nation building role
Military Size, and structure Regular Army: Paramilitary Military Service:	 76,000 40,000 1-2 years, selective
Military Response to Uprising	High level of Violence Disintegration of military
Outcome of Military response	Civil war Regional intervention Failed state
Military Capability	Weak, untrained Marginalized Owned large amount of military equipment

Table AI.5.

Yemen Data

ME/GDP	15.51%
ME/G	15.5%
AF/Pop	2.63%
Corruption Index	22
Economic Freedom index	54.4
GDP Growth	7.7%
Per Capita GDP	$1334.78
Urban Population Growth	4.64%
Male Unemployment Rate	11.93%
Urban population/Population	31.78%
Historical Path of Armed Forces	Played mild role in nation building Tribes allowed to have their own militias Family Members in charge of key powerful units Structured based on tribal lines
Military Size, and structure Regular Army: Paramilitary Military Service:	 67,000 71,200 2 years
Military Response to Uprising	Military split into two factions Units followed Tribal loyalty
Outcome of Military response	Civil war International and regional intervention Failed state
Military Capability	Weak, Tribal Loyalty Used as mean for rent from the state

Table AI.6.

Algeria Data

ME/GDP	13.812%
ME/G	13.8%
AF/Pop	2.63%
Corruption Index	35
Economic Freedom index	46.2
GDP Growth	1.4%
Per Capita GDP	$4764.38
Urban Population Growth	2.81%
Male Unemployment Rate	10.13%
Urban population/Population	77.63
Historical Path of Armed Forces	National Liberation Movement Created the State
Military Size, and structure Regular Army: Military Service:	 110,000 One Year
Military Response to Uprising	No violence, Manage the transitional period
Outcome of Military response	Formal Presidential Elections Military Back to be the real Ruler
Military Capability	Strong, Cohesive, well equipped, and strongly connected to the state

Table AI.7.

Sudan Data

ME/GDP	11.54%
ME/G	11.5%
AF/Pop	1.09%
Corruption Index	15
Economic Freedom index	49.4
GDP Growth	-2.32%
Per Capita GDP	$1855.63
Urban Population Growth	3.18%
Male Unemployment Rate	9.18%
Urban population/Population	34.64%
Historical Path of Armed Forces	Major role in nation building
Military Size, and structure Regular Army: Paramilitary Military Service:	 124,000 85,000 2 years
Military Response to Uprising	Mild violence
Outcome of Military response	Military Coup Military back in charge of ruling the country
Military Capability	Cohesive Disciplined Old military equipments

Table AI.8.

Iraq Data

ME/GDP	8.4%
ME/G	8.4%
AF/Pop	2.14%
Corruption Index	18
Economic Freedom index	N/A
GDP Growth	-0.57%
Per Capit2 GDP	$5477.69
Urban Population Growth	2.6%
Male Unemployment Rate	7.2%
Urban population/Population	70.47%
Historical Path of Armed Forces	Created by the British Major role in Nation Building Highly Politicized during Saddam Era Disbanded by the US administration after 2033 Invasion Recreated based on Sectarian Lines
Military Size, and structure Regular Army: Military Service:	 209,000 Voluntary Service
Military Response to Uprising	Violence by Different Militias
Outcome of Military response	Resignation of Prime Minister Political Stagnation to Form New Government
Military Capability	Weak, Fragmented, Low training Low morals

Table AI.9.

Lebanon Data

ME/GDP	4.99%
ME/G	15.56%
AF/Pop	1.42%
Corruption Index	28
Economic Freedom index	51.7
GDP Growth	0.199%
Per Capita GDP	$8269.79
Urban Population Growth	0.73%
Male Unemployment Rate	4.95%
Urban population/Population	88.59
Historical Path of Armed Forces	Lebanese Armed Forces is product of French Colonization Minor role in nation building
Military Size, and structure Regular Army: Paramilitary Military Service:	 64,000 20,000 17-30 years of age for voluntary military service; 18-24 years of age for officer candidates; no conscription
Military Response to Uprising	No violence Protecting the protesters and the state institutions
Outcome of Military response	Resignation of Prime Minister Government Declaring Bankruptcy
Military Capability	Depends on foreign assistants for equipments Low training Different Units for Each ethnic and sect group

Appendix II

In this appendix, I show a graph of the coups in the Arab countries after independence. The left chart shows the successful coups and we can see clearly the decline in the number of successful coups after 1970. On the right, we can see the clear decline in coup attempts as the chart shows the failed coups for the same period of time. The decline in both cases (successful and attempted coups) may well be attributed for the different coup-proofing mechanisms adopted by Arab regimes after 1970s. The coup-proofing mechanisms clearly reduced the rate of changes of polities by force and brought stability for the authoritarian regimes in the Arab world and made the tenure of Arab leaders among the longest in the world.

Figure AII.1.

Graph 1: Arab World Coups 1946-2018



Data Source: Center for Systematic Peace 'Coup d'Etat Events 1946-2018'. Included all countries in the Arab World.