

U.S.S.R. ARMS TRADE WITH CUBA AND INDONESIA  
1960-65: A CASE FOR IDEOLOGICAL ALIGNMENT

by

JOHN D. THOMPSON, JR.

B.A., Nicholls State University, 1973  
J.D., Louisiana State University, 1975

---

A MASTER'S REPORT

submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree


MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Political Science

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY  
Manhattan, Kansas

1977

Approved by:

  
Philip A. Hall

LD  
2668  
R4  
1977  
T55  
C.2  
document

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
LIST OF TABLES . . . . .	ii
TABLE OF GRAPHIC ILLUSTRATIONS . . . . .	iii
Chapter	
I. Introduction . . . . .	1
The Nature of the Problem	
Specific Research Questions	
Relevant Literature	
Methods of Analysis	
Conclusion	
Footnotes	
II. Cuba under Castro: A Search for Identity . . .	19
Castroism: An Ideological Enigma	
U.S.-Cuban Relations - 1960 to 1965	
Soviet-Cuban Relations - 1960 to 1965	
Cuba and the Sino-Soviet Dispute	
Soviet Arms Trade to Cuba - 1960 to 1965	
Footnotes	
III. Indonesia, Sukarno, and the PKI: The Struggle for Power . . . . .	69
Indonesian Nationalism: The West Irian Phase	
Indonesian Nationalism: The Malaysian Phase	
U.S.-Indonesian Relations	
Indonesia and the Sino-Soviet Dispute	
An Analysis of Soviet Arms Transfers to Indonesia 1960-1965	
Footnotes	
IV. Conclusions . . . . .	114
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . .	131
APPENDICES . . . . .	137



**THIS BOOK  
CONTAINS  
NUMEROUS PAGES  
WITH DIAGRAMS  
THAT ARE CROOKED  
COMPARED TO THE  
REST OF THE  
INFORMATION ON  
THE PAGE.**

**THIS IS AS  
RECEIVED FROM  
CUSTOMER.**

## LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
IV-1 Annual Arms Import Expenditures 1961 to 1965: USSR Arms Shipments to Cuba and Indonesia . . . . .	114
IV-2 Dimension of Interaction (DI) Mean (Coop) Scores USSR to Cuba 1960-1965 . . . . .	117
IV-3 Soviet-Cuban DI Mean (Coop) Scores 1960-1965 . . . . .	117
IV-4 Dimension of Interaction (DI) Mean (Coop) Scores USSR to Indonesia 1960-1965 . . . . .	124
IV-5 Soviet-Indonesian DI Mean (Coop) Scores 1960-1965 . . . . .	125

## TABLE OF GRAPHIC ILLUSTRATIONS

	Page
1. USSR Arms Shipments to Cuba 1960-1965 . . . . .	66
2. USSR Arms Shipments to Indonesia 1960-1965. . . . .	111
3. USSR Arms Shipments to Cuba and Indonesia 1960-1965 . . . . .	129

## Chapter I

### Introduction

#### The Nature of the Problem

A. The general research problem upon which this report is to be centered concerns the arms trade between the Soviet Union with Cuba and with Indonesia during the period, 1960 through 1965. More specifically, the purpose of this report is to ascertain whether or not there has been any kind of relationship or linkage between the quality and quantity of arms supplied to either of the countries forming the basis of this study -- namely, Cuba and Indonesia -- and the political ideologies expounded by the leaders of these two countries -- namely, Fidel Castro of Cuba and Sukarno of Indonesia. With respect to Castro, some attention will be devoted to his political relationship with Ernesto Che Guevara, and an attempt will be made to contrast their differing ideological positions on several important matters particularly as they relate to the ideological split between the Soviet Union and China as it developed during the early 1960's. With respect to Sukarno, some attention will be devoted to the impact of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) on the ideological orientation of Sukarno especially in the area of foreign

policy decision-making. Sukarno's role in the Sino-Soviet dispute will also be examined. This study will explore the thesis that the more closely aligned ideologically the leaders of Cuba and Indonesia have been to officially sanctioned and approved Soviet doctrine, the more arms, both in quality and quantity, they have tended to receive from the Soviet Union.

This general research problem can be justified on several different grounds. First, the validation of the particular thesis under study is likely to reveal certain important objectives underlying the conduct and implementation of Soviet foreign policy in Latin America and in Southeast Asia. Specifically, some knowledge of Soviet ideology as reflected in its foreign policy decision-making process with respect to arms trade with specific developing countries may have significant long range benefits for U.S. foreign policy decision-makers. For instance, a knowledge and understanding of Soviet objectives within a particular geographical area of the world as an inherent feature of Soviet arms trade to these areas could help to stimulate very meaningful negotiations concerning problems of mutual concern to both the Soviet Union and the United States as well as to other major powers throughout the world. These mutual problems would doubtless encompass such areas as arms control and disarmament, since the need to halt, or at least to limit, the future production of arms by the major developed nations of the world, and to

curtail their transfer to less developed countries around the world is a primary objective in such negotiations. The current Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) are aimed at trying to negotiate a mutually satisfactory solution to these problems among all interested parties, particularly the U.S.S.R. and the United States since these two countries account for the vast majority of all arms exported to less developed nations throughout the world. It would certainly seem to be beneficial for U.S. negotiators at these SALT meetings to have a firm grasp of the Soviet political system and, more importantly, to understand the objectives underlying current Soviet foreign policy decision-making as it effects the principal geographical areas of the world today. Such an understanding of Soviet foreign policy, and especially of its ideological underpinnings, would be an enormous asset to U.S. negotiators in the sense that they could more realistically discuss and evaluate various alternatives and other such compromise proposals which could serve to greatly diminish a problem which may soon threaten the world's peace and security.

A second justification for this study, which may well be related to the first one, is centered around the possible benefits to be derived from the study of Soviet ideology in action. While ideology, in itself, is a somewhat nebulous, thus intangible, aspect of Soviet foreign policy, the fact is that such a feature of the Soviet foreign policy decision-making process is likely to play a

predominant role in the eventual implementation of any future Soviet foreign policy decisions. The elucidation of any particular ideology is most clearly reflected in a country's historical development. Such a statement has particular relevance for the Soviet Union in the sense that the top U.S.S.R. political leaders of today are closely tied to their country's historical past insofar as this past historical development served to influence their current foreign policy decision-making. Seemingly, it would appear that a study of Soviet political behavior as reflected through its arms trade policy toward Cuba and Indonesia, and indirectly by its ideological underpinnings as rooted in Russia's historical past, should most certainly serve as a valuable tool for top level U.S. diplomats endeavoring to reach some common ground for the understanding of many problems which confront these superpowers and therefore all of the people of the world today.

Third, such a study may prove useful in determining which individuals or groups are key elements in, or tend to dominate, the foreign policy decision-making process within the U.S.S.R. For instance, which individuals or groups seem to be the final arbiters in Soviet foreign policy decision-making with particular reference to approving proposed arms trade agreements with other nations? A working knowledge of Soviet arms policy, while admittedly a very narrow focus in relation to the entire range of Soviet foreign policy decision-making, could serve as a valuable

aid in determining and clarifying how such arms policies are reached and which individuals or groups dominate the decision-making within this particular sphere of Soviet foreign policy.

#### B. Specific Research Questions

An understanding of the problem under study can be facilitated through an understanding of certain more specific research questions which will help to tie together the various diverse aspects of this study.

With reference to Cuba, this report will focus upon Cuban historical development under Castro. What is Castroism and how did such an ideology or philosophy effect Cuban foreign policy relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union? Since Castro's ideological orientation would seem to be an important and integral part of his overall foreign policy program as it evolved during the early 1960's, an assessment of Castroism will help to clarify certain aspects of Cuba's historical development especially as this relates to an evolution of Cuban foreign policy. Another important question which will be briefly touched upon will be the relationship between Castro and Ernesto Che Guevara and how such a relationship impacted on the future development of Cuban foreign policy and particularly how it effected Castro's foreign policy relations with the U.S.S.R. and the other Communist parties throughout Latin America. A brief evaluation of U.S.-Cuban relations



will also be discussed in an effort to show how the ultimate break in such relations help swing Castro closer toward an affiliation with the U.S.S.R. and the other Communist bloc countries throughout the world. Another area which will be focused upon during the course of this report will surround an assessment of Cuba's role in the emerging Sino-Soviet ideological split in the late 1950's and the early 1960's. How did Castro's attitude and position in this dispute help to improve or hurt his relationship with the Soviet Union? On a related issue, how was the level of arms transferred to Cuba effected based on Castro's ideological stance in this dispute between China and the Soviet Union?

Essentially these same general questions will be discussed in conjunction with Soviet-Indonesian relations. The initial inquiry will be devoted to a discussion of how influential was or what role did the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) play in the ultimate development of President Sukarno's ideological and foreign policy decision-making? What was the political strategy of the PKI leadership during the early 1960's? An assessment of PKI ideology will help to develop an understanding of their domestic political tactics and how these tactics were important in elevating the PKI to a position of political power within the Indonesian domestic political hierarchy. As with Cuba, Indonesia's relationship with the U.S. will be briefly examined in an effort to more clearly elucidate the political and ideological underpinnings of the PKI's doctrine and philosophy

and to link together Sukarno's nationalistic and anti-imperialistic foreign policies to the PKI's role in Indonesian domestic and political affairs. Likewise, how did the PKI's ideological orientation and political strategy serve to effect Sukarno's rejection of U.S. economic assistance and his move toward more anti-imperialistic foreign policy schemes as evidenced in his confrontation with Malaysia during 1962-1963. An analysis of Sukarno's position in the Sino-Soviet dispute will also be discussed in an effort to show how Sukarno's ideology meshed with the ideological positions being espoused by both China and the Soviet Union during the period 1960 through 1965.

This report will utilize yet another approach in an effort to demonstrate the existence of a linkage or relationship between ideological alignment and the level of arms trade between the Soviet Union with Cuba and Indonesia. Does an increased degree of sophistication with the various weaponry systems transferred to both Cuba and Indonesia by the U.S.S.R. serve as a valid indicator of some measure of ideological alignment between the Soviet Union and these two recipient nations? How may such weaponry sophistication be measured? Are the indicators utilized valid or otherwise useful in gauging the differences in the various types of arms transferred to these two countries?

Basically, this correlation between the varying levels of arms trade and ideological alignment will be approached

and measured on two different and distinct levels. First, with reference to the degree of sophistication in any particular weaponry system transferred from the U.S.S.R. to Cuba or Indonesia, such sophistication will be measured utilizing the initial production year for any particular weapons system being analyzed. In other words, the more modern the weaponry systems transferred are in terms of their initial production and manufacture by the U.S.S.R., the more technologically sophisticated should be their military capabilities as compared to those weapons systems produced in earlier years. Another method which will be utilized will involve the calculation of annual arms import expenditures for the total of all major weaponry systems transferred from the U.S.S.R. to Cuba and Indonesia from 1960 to 1965. These annual arms import expenditure figures will be presented by utilizing data obtained from the figures projected by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). This latter method is used not so much to gauge the degree of weaponry sophistication, but to show cooperation or consensus, and hence may serve as a measure of ideological alignment, among the arms transferror the U.S.S.R., and the arms recipient, either Cuba or Indonesia.

#### Relevant Literature

The problem being addressed in this study -- namely, the possibility of a linkage between the quantity and quality of arms being received by both Cuba and Indonesia

from the U.S.S.R. and their ideological alignment with Soviet governmental policy -- seems to be rather unique in its orientation. There has been little, if any, prior research into this particular aspect involving arms trade. While there has been significant work undertaken, the study of arms trade and arms transfer,<sup>1</sup> it appears that there has been no definitive study attempting to link together the level of arms being received by a particular recipient country to that country's ideological relationship to the arms supplier exporting such weaponry systems to the recipient country. There are likewise numerous books which offer a good discussion of Soviet ideology in general<sup>2</sup> as well as the Soviet ideological posture during the Sino-Soviet dispute<sup>3</sup> which was, of course, a prominent feature of world affairs during the early 1960's.

With respect to Cuba, there is an abundance of literature<sup>4</sup> available on the Fidel Castro march to power in Cuba and his subsequent takeover of the government in that country. There are also a number of books relevant to Soviet involvement in Cuba and Latin America.<sup>5</sup> There are also a number of good periodical articles<sup>6</sup> which are useful in developing the historical-ideological information needed for this paper. There are several particularly good periodical articles which are centered around a discussion of Soviet foreign policy-making and which discuss the role of ideology in Soviet foreign policy-making.<sup>7</sup> Similarly, there are also several periodical articles relative to a discussion of the Sino-Soviet ideological split<sup>8</sup> which have

been utilized in some measure in the preparation of this paper.

With respect to Indonesia, there is also quite a large amount of literature of all different kinds available on the question being considered at least, insofar as the historical-ideological development of Indonesian political thinking is concerned from 1960 through 1965.<sup>9</sup> There is also a great number of periodical articles which are devoted to Indonesian ideology and especially to the role of the PKI in the ideological orientation of Indonesia's President Sukarno.<sup>10</sup> Since Indonesian ideology under Sukarno was extremely nationalistic in tone, several periodical articles have been utilized as a basis for extracting information relative to Indonesia's involvement with the Netherlands over West Iran and with the British and Malaysian governments over the formation of the Malaysian Federation.<sup>11</sup>

A number of books and periodical articles were also utilized in order to obtain information relative to the role played by the U.S.S.R. in Indonesian politics during 1960 to 1965.<sup>12</sup>

### Methods of Analysis

Two particular analytical methods are employed in this study in an effort to link together the various weaponry systems being sent to Cuba and Indonesia by the Soviet Union to the degree of ideological affinity between these countries as evidenced by Castro's and Sukarno's acceptance of

officially approved Soviet doctrine and ideology.

The first analytical method utilized in this study is of a descriptive nature and is centered around an historical-ideological overview of Soviet-Cuban and Soviet-Indonesian relations between 1960 and 1965. This approach is utilized on the assumption that the concept of ideology can best be understood through an analysis of the historical interactions between two or more countries over a particular period of time. The various positions of all relevant parties can be most clearly discerned through utilization of this historical approach. This approach enables the reader to obtain a firm grasp of the ideological positions of the various political actors interacting with one another over a specified period of time.

Through the use of this historical approach which emphasizes the various ideological positions held by the different personalities involved -- namely, Castro of Cuba, Sukarno of Indonesia, and Khrushchev in the Soviet Union -- an attempt is made to link together the varying levels of arms being received by Cuba and Indonesia from the U.S.S.R. in any given year from 1960 to 1965. It should be obvious after reading the historical-ideological background information which briefly outlines the relationship between the Soviet Union with both Cuba and Indonesia, and then compares these accounts to the fluctuating levels of arms trade between these countries that there is some kind of linkage between ideological alignment and the level of arms

received by Cuba and Indonesia from the Soviet Union. There are two empirical or quantitative techniques which are used in order to demonstrate that such a linkage between ideology and arms trade does in fact exist.

The first quantitative technique utilized will be derived from the Azar-Sloan Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB)<sup>13</sup> which is concerned with measuring the degree of conflict or cooperation between any two nation-states based on an events data type of approach. The COPDAB data information concerning the behavior between the U.S.S.R. and both Cuba and Indonesia from 1960 through 1965 will be analyzed in order to obtain an empirical measure of the cooperation level between these countries. This approach, utilizing the data and the systematic analysis of this information according to COPDAB procedures, will present a kind of mathematical gauge of which the reader can make use in order to determine the relative degree of overall cooperation existing between the U.S.S.R. with Cuba and with Indonesia during any specific year from 1960 to 1965.

A second empirical technique which is utilized will concentrate upon obtaining an annual arms import expenditure figure for all of the major weaponry systems transferred between the Soviet Union to Cuba and Indonesia during 1960 to 1965. The rationale behind the utilization of such an approach is that it will help to show the differing levels of arms trade between the U.S.S.R. and Cuba and the U.S.S.R. and Indonesia from 1960 to 1965. The objective behind this



approach is to measure the trend in military equipment being transferred to either Cuba or Indonesia by the U.S.S.R. on a strictly monetary basis. This approach can be used to show a possible linkage between the kind of military hardware received by the recipient nations, in terms of its sophistication, to the level of ideological alignment presently existing between the arms transferor, the Soviet Union, and the arms transferee, either Cuba or Indonesia. Conceivably, the Soviet government will tend to either give or sell its more expensive and thus more modern and sophisticated military weapons to those countries which it feels are more closely ideologically aligned with the views of the CPSU. While ideological alignment, or the lack of it, with the Soviet Union is not the sole, or necessarily even the primary, factor which might induce the Soviets to curtail or otherwise cut back the quality and quantity of weapons transferred to any given country, such a factor is doubtless a consideration in the ultimate decision to transfer certain weapons systems or to withhold others.

However, with regard to this second kind of measurement, it should be emphasized that the valuation procedure used in this study is by no means totally accurate insofar as the price level figures for any particular year involved in this study are concerned.

As noted by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI),

"The purpose of valuing all items in a common unit is to be able to measure changes in the total flow of weapons...



Various methods of valuations are conceivable. The obvious ones are military value and monetary value. Military value is generally unmeasurable because it depends on the circumstances in which the weapons may be used. Monetary value ...measures something that is relatively precise...the quantity of resources used .... The monetary values chosen may not correspond to actual prices paid. Actual prices paid vary considerable according to different pricing methods, the lengths of production series and the terms involved in individual transactions."<sup>14</sup>

The monetary values for the various years 1960 through 1965 are derived from estimates formulated by SIPRI in preparing individual weapons systems costs for arms transferred by the major arms exporters to the various regions around the world. These SIPRI figures were also utilized in the preparation of similar arms expenditure levels projected by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

### Conclusion

In summation, this report will be structured in the following manner. Chapter Two will concentrate on Cuba with the first part being devoted to a historical ideological discussion of the evolution of Castroism and Fidel Castro's involvement with the Soviet Union, and, to a certain extent, with Ernesto Che Guevara. Cuba's relations with the United States, as well as Cuba's and Castro's role in the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute, will also be briefly discussed.

Chapter Three will be concerned with Indonesia and the

impact of the PKI on the formulation of Indonesian foreign policy under the Sukarno regime. The historical-ideological development of the Sukarno-PKI relationship as well as the specific phases of Indonesian foreign policy will also be given brief attention. Likewise, as was the case with Cuba in Chapter Two, a brief discussion of Indonesia's, and particularly that of the PKI's involvement in the Sino-Soviet split will also be touched upon. Likewise, U.S.-Indonesian relations will be briefly discussed.

Chapter Four will conclude the report with a summary of major findings and a discussion of the pertinent implications of these findings.

## Footnotes

## Chapter 1

1. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), The Arms Trade with the Third World (New York: Humanities Press, 1971); Amelia C. Leiss, C. Leiss et al., Arms Transfers to Less Developed Countries, Vol. 3: Arms Control and Local Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1970); Louis A. Frank, The Arms Trade in International Relations (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969); Wynfred Joshua and Stephen P. Gilbert, Arms for the Third World; Soviet Military Aid Diplomacy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969); Uri Ra'naan, The USSR Arms the Third World: Case Studies in Soviet Foreign Policy (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1969), and John L. Sutton and Geoffrey Kemp, Arms to Developing Countries: 1945-1965 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1966).

2. John Armstrong, Ideology, Politics and Government in the Soviet Union: An Introduction, 3rd ed. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975); Darrell P. Hammer, USSR: The Politics of Oligarchy (Hinsdale, Ill.: Dryden Press, 1974); John S. Reshetar, The Soviet Polity: The Government and Politics of the USSR (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1971), and Morton Schwartz, The Foreign Policy of the USSR: Domestic Factors (Encino, Calif.: Dickenson Publishing Company, 1975).

3. William E. Griffith, Sino-Soviet Relations 1964-1965 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966); William E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1964); Irwin Isenburg, The Russian-Chinese Rift: Its Impact on World Affairs (New York: H.W. Wilson Company, 1966); Klaus Mehnert, Peking and Moscow (New York: New American Library, 1963); and Harry Schwartz, Tzars, Mandarins, and Commissars: A History of Chinese-Russian Relations (New York: Anchor Press, 1973).

4. Theodore Draper, Castroism: Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1965); Edward Gonzalez, Cuba under Castro: The Limits of Charisma (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1974); Maurice Halperin, The Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro: An Essay in Contemporary History (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1972); Martin Kenner and James Petras, eds., Fidel Castro Speaks (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1969); and Herbert Matthews, Castro: A Political Biography (London: Penguin Press, 1969).

5. Luis E. Aguilar, Marxism in Latin America (New York: Knopf Publishers, 1968); Robert G. Carlton, Soviet Image of Contemporary Latin America, A Documentary History, 1960-1968 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1970); Stephen Clissold, ed., Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1918-1968, A Documentary Survey (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970); Marshall Goldman, Soviet Foreign Aid (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1967); Bruce D. Jackson, Castro, the Kremlin and Communism in Latin America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969); Gregory J. Oswald and Anthony J. S. Stover, eds., The Soviet Union and Latin America (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1968); Harry H. Ransom, The Communist Tide in Latin America (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1972); Andres Suarez, Cuba, Castro, and Communism 1959-1966 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1967), and James D. Therberge, The Soviet Presence in Latin America (New York: Crane, Russak and Company, Inc., 1974).

6. Wayne Smith, "Soviet Policy and Ideological Formulations in Latin America," Orbis 15 (Winter 1972); Jaime Suchlicki, "An Assessment of Castroism," Orbis 16 (Spring 1972), and Daniel Tretiak, "Cuba and the Soviet Union: The Growing Accommodation, 1964-1965," Orbis 11 (Summer 1967).

7. Vladimir Petrov, "Formulation of Soviet Foreign Policy," Orbis 17 (Fall 1973); Gerhart Niemeyer, "The Role of Ideology in Communist Systems," Orbis 17 (Fall 1973), and Lothar Metz1, "The Ideological Struggle: A Case of Soviet Linkage," Orbis 17 (Summer 1973).

8. George D. Damien, "On the Philosophy of Contradictions: The Sino-Soviet Dispute as a Case Study in Communist Conflict Thinking," Orbis 11 (Winter 1968), and Bryce F. Denno, "Sino-Soviet Attitudes Toward Revolutionary War," Orbis 11 (Winter 1968).

9. Antoine C.A. Dake, In the Spirit of the Red Banteng; Indonesian Communist Between Moscow and Peking 1959-1965 (Hague: Morton and Company, 1973); Herbert Feith and Lance Castles, Indonesian Political Thinking 1945-1965 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1970), and Rex Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics 1959-1965 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1974).

10. Nazli Choucri, "The Non-Alignment of Afro-Asian States: Policy, Perception, and Behavior," Canadian Journal of Political Science 2 (March, 1969); Herbert Feith, "Indonesian Political Symbols and their Weilders," World Politics 16 (October 1963); Herbert Feith, "President Sukarno, the Army and the Communists: The Triangle Changes Shape," Asian Survey 4 (August 1964); Donald Hindley, "The Indonesian Communist Party and the Conflict in the International Communist Movement," China Quarterly Number 19

(July-September 1964); Donald Hindley, "The Indonesian Communists and the CPSU Twenty-Second Party Congress," Asian Survey 2 (March 1962); Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communism's Expansionist Role in Southeast Asia," International Journal 20 (Spring 1965); Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communism's Revolutionary Gymnastics," Asian Survey 5 (May 1965); Ruth T. McVey, "Strategic Triangle: (2) Indonesia," Survey Number 54 (January 1965); Guy J. Pauker, "Current Communist Tactics in Indonesia," Asian Survey 1 (May 1961); Donald E. Weatherbee, "Traditional Values in Modernizing Ideologies: Indonesian Example," Journal of Developing Areas 1 (October 1966); Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communism and the Changing Balance of Power," Pacific Affairs 37 (Fall 1964); Donald Hindley, "President Sukarno and the Communists: The Politics of Domestication," American Political Science Review 56; Bernard K. Gordon, "The Potential for Indonesian Expansion," Pacific Affairs 36 (Winter 1963-1964).

11. Nadia Derkach, "The Soviet Policy Toward Indonesia in the West Irian and Malaysian Disputes," Asian Survey 5 (November 1965), and Justus M. van der Kroef, "The West New Guinea Settlement; Its Origins and Implications," Orbis 7 (Spring 1963).

12. Hannes Adomeit, "Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior: From Confrontation to Coexistence," Adelphi Papers Number 101 (Fall 1973); Alexander Dallin, "Soviet Foreign Policy and Domestic Factors: A Framework for Analysis," Journal of International Affairs 23 (1969); Robert C. Horn, "Changing Soviet Policies and Sino-Soviet Competition in Southeast Asia," Orbis 17 (Summer 1973); Peter Howard, "The USSR and Indonesia," Mizan 9 (May-June 1967); Charles B. McLane, "Foreign Aid in Soviet Third World Politics," Mizan 10 (November-December 1968); Guy J. Pauker, "General Nasution's Visit to Moscow," Asian Survey 1 (March 1961); Bernard K. Gordon, The Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Publishers, 1966); Walter Levi, The Challenge of Politics in South and Southeast Asia (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Publishers, 1968), and Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1967 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1968).

13. Edward E. Azar and Thomas J. Sloan, Studies of Conflict and Peace Report No. 15; A Codebook of the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) (Chapel Hill: Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina, 1973).

14. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Arms Trade Registers; The Arms Trade with the Third World (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1975).

## Chapter II

### Cuba under Castro: A Search for Identity

Fidel Castro's rise to power in early 1959 ushered in a new and dynamic dimension in the U.S.-Soviet "cold war" era. Subsequent events in Cuba were illustrative of this fact. An increasing level of tension could be noticed in relations between Cuba and the United States particularly after 1960. There could be sensed a growing concern by U.S. foreign policy makers over Castro's growing accommodation with the Soviet Union in all phases of his foreign policy making. This concern by U.S. foreign policy officials reached its height in the October 1962 so-called Cuban missile crisis when the United States discovered that the Russian government was supplying Soviet made IRBM missiles to Cuba and thereby decided that such action constituted a serious threat to U.S. national security interests. This crisis had brought the world to the brink of nuclear war. Fortunately, negotiations between President John F. Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev were successful in ending this potential threat to world peace and security. This event is of some significance in that it is usually associated with the termination of the "cold war" between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. This



confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union also served to bring about a change in Soviet-Cuban relations. The Soviet's withdrawal of the weapons systems which they had previously supplied to the Cuban government created some small amount of discord between the top Communist Party leadership in Moscow and Castro. The October 1962 Cuban missile crisis was an important international event in that it helped to bring to light the serious ideological rift between the Soviet Union and her Asian counterpart, China. The Cuban affair therefore helped to polarize the opposing forces as well as the issues behind this Sino-Soviet dispute.

For his part, Castro played a significant role in these emerging international developments. His ideological orientation was a dominant force in helping to focus world attention not only on U.S.-Cuban or Soviet-Cuban relations, but also on the internal split within the international Communist movement. An understanding of Castro's ideological posture on a variety of issues will help to explain the nature of Cuba's ideological alignment with the Soviet Union and more particularly how this ideological alignment served to effect the quality and/or the level of Soviet arms trade with this island nation.

#### Castroism: An Ideological Enigma

Theodore Draper has noted that "Castroism by its very nature is a living phenomenon...."<sup>1</sup> He continued, "Castroism is a leader in search of a movement, a movement in search of power, and power in search of an ideology."<sup>2</sup>

Castroism did not formally come into existence until July 25, 1953 almost a year and a half following Fulgencio Batista's seizure of power in Cuba and Castro's unsuccessful attack on the Moncada Army barracks in the area around Santiago de Cuba. The basic principles underlying this ideological doctrine were formulated between October 1953 and May 1955 during the course of Castro's imprisonment due to his participation in the Moncada incident. Castro admitted that the principles embodied in his proposed program for Cuba's political, economic, and social reform were not as radical as he might have desired at least in terms of his own political philosophy and thought. Castro's ideological orientation and practice from 1956 to 1958 reflected an increasing amount of moderation and constitutionalism. Castro even went so far as to advocate the rights of free enterprise and invested capital as part of his overall program aimed at restoring the rights embodied in the 1940 Constitution. Castro also guaranteed free and open public elections once he obtained power. "As far as most Cubans were concerned, Castroism was what these manifestoes, programs,...and assorted declarations said it was...Castroism was the creation of Fidel Castro, but he created and recreated it, partly in his own image and partly in the image of those whom he wished to win over."<sup>3</sup>

Actually the ideas and programs being advocated by Castro prior to the time when he formally took over control of the government in Cuba were in no way innovative or



otherwise unique. His policies could not be considered radical in any true sense. His policies and programs were structured so as to allow Castro to gain the widest amount of public support possible. In a very real sense, "Castro's road to power was based on tactics, not on ideas."<sup>4</sup> This same kind of sentiment has been expressed by other Communist leaders around the world. In one sense, Castro "won power with one ideology, and has held it with another."<sup>5</sup> Castro's use of guerilla warfare within his movement which was a frequently used tactic in helping the Castroite forces in overthrowing the Batista regime, was later adopted as one of the primary tenets underlying the formulation of his so-called "ideology". Ernesto Che Guevara who was one of Castro's closest friends and followers during the course of his struggle against Batista, argued that the theory of guerilla warfare in Cuba was not based on any Chinese model or theory but was derived solely from past Cuban history and tradition. Castro's policies prior to 1959 were oriented toward a mass struggle against the allegedly corrupt and despotic Batista regime.

"Ideologically, then, Castroism had never lived a life of its own. Tactically, as a form of armed struggle, it had something all its own. And as such, it could attach itself to different ideologies."<sup>6</sup> By late 1961, Castro had publically declared himself to be a Marxist-Leninist. His transition from one ideology to another was a very protracted and complex process. Castro himself noted that his first

contact of any meaningful significance with the Communists was initiated in 1955 while Castro was in Mexico planning his future operations directed toward the overthrow of the Batista government. Actually Castro during this period of time, did not and was not relying on the Communists in his struggle against Batista. It was only around 1964 and after that Castro chose to emphasize his relationship with the Communists. In their mutual collaboration during the late 1950's and early 1960's, the Communists were not completely in accord with the political tactics used and employed by Castro. Particularly the Communists did not believe that armed struggle was the correct way to acquire political power in Cuba. However, the Communists noted that their disagreements with Castro were confined to "methods and tactics."<sup>7</sup> By early 1958, the Communists changed their tactics to accord with Castro's tactics which were directed toward a policy of "armed struggle in the countryside and the unarmed, civil struggle in the cities."<sup>8</sup> This was the first real evidence of some kind of meaningful alliance between the Castro forces and the Cuban Communist Party (PSP). The only significant difference still remaining between the Communists and Castro concerned the issue of armed struggle as a means of obtaining political power. As far as the Communists were concerned, such a question was one of tactics rather than one of principle. Therefore, it was very easy for the Communists to concede this issue to Castro without really deviating from their orthodox Marxist-

Leninist philosophy. "The Castro-Communist alliance left the Communists' ideology intact. It did not leave Castro's ideology, or whatever he professed to be his ideology, intact."<sup>9</sup>

The next transition in this Castro-Communist alliance did not take place until the latter part of 1960. The previous year had been dominated by internal cleavages and conflicts within the PSP and Castro's 26th of July Movement. The split within the 26th of July Movement was primarily centered around the pro-Communist and anti-Communist factions, while the division within the PSP took on a different slant.

"the main struggle was over the balance of power in the new united party. In order to achieve fusion, the Fidelistas had to pay homage to the old time Communists' ideological pre-eminence, and the old time Communists had to pay tribute to the Fidelistas' tactical superiority. Yet in practice, the question remained whether the new party should be based on those who had been the long time guardians of the orthodox ideology or on those who had been the long derided executors of the successful tactics."<sup>10</sup>

By 1961, the situation in Cuba seemed to suggest that the old time communists had acquired the upper hand since Castro had publically confessed his ideological backwardness, his pledge of allegiance and support for the principle of "collective leadership", and his agreement to put the old time Communists in control of the party's training schools throughout Cuba.

It is quite clear that Castro did not have any set ideology during the first several months after he had

succeeded in ousting the Batista regime from control over the Cuban government. At times, he professed support for both the pro-Communist and anti-Communist factions within his 26th of July Movement. His attitude toward Communism throughout most of 1959 did not reflect any strong or otherwise coherent bond between Castro's ideology and orthodox Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Castro referred to the Communists as "counter-revolutionaries" in promoting unrest in Cuba. He, in fact, lumped all Communist regimes together calling them "totalitarian" in nature thus equating them to a fascist form of rule. However, within several months after he had made these statements, Castro was the most avid supporter of the Communist cause in Cuba.

"In the struggle for power...Castro never tried to give his movement a distinctive doctrine or ideology. After he took power, however, Castro did make one attempt to put forward an embryonic doctrine or ideology which he could call his own. This phase of 'Castroism' was summed up in the term 'humanism' which for a time served as a trademark of his revolution."<sup>11</sup>

As far as Castro was concerned, this concept of "humanism" served as a possible alternative to both Communism and capitalism. As Castro stated,

"Neither dictatorships of men, nor dictatorships of caste, nor oligarchies of class: government of the people without dictatorship and without oligarchy, liberty with bread and without terror -- that is humanism."<sup>12</sup>

Castro later abandoned this humanistic concept after coming under attack by the Cuban Communists who criticized him for

causing ideological confusion by associating himself with such a doctrine. The attempted adoption and implementation of this humanistic concept was Castro's only real involvement with an ideology which he might have purported to have formulated on his own, but which in fact was neither very original in its conception nor successful in its actual implementation.

The purge of Anibal Escalante, a leading Communist within the PSP in March 1962 paved the way for Castro's only attempt to try and assert his individuality within the international Communist movement. The October 1962 missile crisis which brought the United States and the Soviet Union to the precipice of world war provided Castro with the opportunity he needed in order to assert himself as a leading figure within the world Communist movement. In a January 1963 speech Castro vehemently criticized the various Communist Party leaders throughout Latin America for their failure to follow the "Cuban example" and their reluctance to use armed struggle as a means of obtaining political power within their respective countries. Castro asserted that the objective conditions needed for such revolution were in existence in most parts of Latin America, but that the lack of the required revolutionary will was the only thing which held these armed struggles from taking place throughout most of Latin America. Castro even went so far as to claim that the Communist leaders in most Latin American countries were fearful of revolution or that they were guilty of

compromising with imperialism. He emphasized the proper way for carrying out this armed struggle by outlining four conditions which would serve as prerequisites to such a struggle. First, it was noted that the masses were the driving force behind all history and that these masses must be led into battle by revolutionary leaders and organizations. Second, it was pointed out that the Cuban Revolution had been carried out by the mobilization of these masses by only a few guerilla leaders. Third, it was pointed out that the need for a revolutionary will is all important in order to take full advantage of the existing objective conditions which would make revolution possible in most Latin American countries. Finally, Castro proclaimed that the "peaceful transition" to socialism might be possible but since this had not been the case in all previously recorded history, the use of armed struggle would be the only alternative for the various revolutionary leaders throughout Latin America.

The growing conflict between the Latin American Communist Party leaders and Castro was one of the problem areas taken up on Castro's visit to Moscow in April 1963. A joint message was issued by both Castro and Khrushchev at the conclusion of this meeting which stated that:

"the peaceful or nonpeaceful road toward socialism in one country or another will definitely be decided by the struggling peoples themselves, according to the practical correlation of class forces and the degree of resistance of the exploiting class to the socialist transformation of society."<sup>13</sup>

In other words, the decision to adopt armed struggle as a means for acquiring political power within any country in Latin America must be left up to the people within that particular country; it was their own internal affair, and Cuba should not interfere under these circumstances. While Castro seemed to acquiesce to the principles enumerated in this May 1963 joint communique, Guevara was not as passive in his acceptance of this newly enumerated doctrine. Although he did modify the extremist stand which he had previously taken on the necessity for armed struggle, he still continued to proclaim that this was the only way for socialism to be successful in most Latin American countries. However, by late 1963, the principles announced in the previous April-May meetings between Castro and Khrushchev had been seriously eroded or otherwise distorted in actual practice. By the beginning of 1964, Guevara had turned back to his former extremist stand with regard to the issue of armed struggle. He asserted that violence was the only way to transform most Latin American countries to the socialist way. Castro still continued to publically uphold the basic principles, relative to the issue of armed struggle, which had been adopted during his previous April-May meeting with Khrushchev. He acknowledged that the path to socialism in each particular country might be altogether different depending on the circumstances evident in each particular case. However, Castro once again reversed his ideological position with regard to the necessity for armed



struggle when the Chilean Communist Party was defeated in the September 1964 general elections in Chile. In retrospect, it can be seen that Castro's adherence to the ideological position agreed upon with Khrushchev in their April-May talks regarding the issue of armed struggle was motivated more by practicality than by any doctrinal considerations. Most Latin American Communist Party leaders thought that the Castroite doctrine expousing the necessity for armed struggle, which in most instances meant sheer terrorism, was more harmful to the internal relations among these Communist parties than it was to the existing regimes in these countries. The incessant concern of Castroism with this issue of armed struggle served as the distinguishing feature in separating Castro's brand of Communism from that being advocated and practiced by the top party leaders within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). If it were not for this one distinguishing characteristic, Castroism would have become submerged within the world Communist movement. In order to maintain some degree of individuality within the international movement, Castro might be seen to modulate or otherwise bend some of his more extremist ideological positions, but he can not afford to completely abandon any of them.

Castro does not practice the typical Caudillismoism which is characteristic of most other Latin American leaders. Rather, he is a new brand of caudillo with a need to find some ideological justification for the power and position



he has acquired.

"Yet Castro's ideology has never come out of himself. He has only produced a 'road to power,' which has attached itself to different ideologies. He won power with one ideology and has held it with another. This is perhaps the most peculiar aspect of the Castroite phenomenon."<sup>14</sup>

The leading Cuban Communist, Blas Roca, noted that Castro's "great historical merit" was confined to the fact he has always been able to find the right road to power. In sum, it might be noted that:

"Castroism gave Communism total power in Cuba and Communism gave Castroism an ideology of total power....In this sense, Castroism has never been self-sufficient or homogeneous; it has been made up of elements of different traditions and movements; it has mainly contributed means and sought elsewhere for ends."<sup>15</sup>

Castroism does not serve to evidence a political movement characterized by the leadership of a series or otherwise profound political thinker. Despite these liabilities, Castro has nonetheless exhibited the qualities of a great charismatic leader able to mobilize great public support for his various policies and programs. Castro's philosophy and ideological attitudes have also been profoundly influenced by his "deep, persistent feeling of intellectual inadequacy and inferiority, a tendency to depend on others for fundamental values or systematic theorizing, an inherent political superficiality and instability."<sup>16</sup> Castroite ideology has been adopted in other parts of Latin America outside of Cuba but its relationship to the indigenous Communist movements

within these countries is not as coherently or clearly visible as it is when compared with the Soviet ideological model as it existed in the early and mid-1960's.

In effect, Castroism as it exists today is representative of a particular tendency within the international Communist movement. There is no such thing as "Castroism" per se yet that peculiar label is continuously applied in an effort to distinguish Castroite ideology from the Marxist-Leninist underpinnings of Soviet or Chinese Communism. In the sense that Castroism may be distinguished from other tendencies within the world Communist movement, elements such as its history, its leadership, its geographical "sphere of influence", its language, and its "road to power" are of some importance. First, the history of the Castroite movement is indicative of the fact that this peculiar tendency within the international Communist movement is the only one which did not initially develop from within the prevailing world Communist model which advocates the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism. Once developed, Castroism has required the support of the world Communist movement in order to give Castroism some doctrinal semblance and viability. In return, the international Communist movement has needed the assistance of Castro in order to expand their political influence in Latin America. Second, with reference to the leadership of the Castroite movement, it is embodied exclusively in Fidel Castro rather than in some outside force such as the Soviet Union or China. Castro has developed his

own personal cadre and following within Cuba which, in certain instances, has enabled him to acquire some degree of maneuverability with respect to other Communist leaders, parties and countries around the world. Third, Castro has utilized Cuba's geographical location to stake out for himself a particular "sphere of influence" within the Latin American region. Castro's ultimate objective has been directed toward establishing himself as the unchallenged Communist leader in the Western Hemisphere. In a sense, he has sought to elevate himself to a position of equality with both the Soviet and Chinese leadership. Fourth, Guevara has pointed out the fact that Cuba has a common link with the rest of Latin America through its common language, Spanish. Language is an important asset to Castro in his quest for an increased political role in Latin American affairs. The final point or criterion distinguishing Castroism from the remainder of the world Communist movement is the way, i.e., "the road to power" which Castro has utilized in establishing himself as the predominant authority within the Cuban government. Indeed, Castro's "road to power" was not achieved in the orthodox Communist manner. Under traditional Communist doctrine, the use of revolutionary force and violence has been considered the last rather than the first stage of the revolutionary struggle. The Cubans have relied almost exclusively on the concept of armed struggle or partisan warfare in achieving their revolutionary struggle. The use of such armed force has

been advocated regardless of the support which the indigenous Communist movement may be able to offer these revolutionary forces. Castroism is representative of a peculiar kind of cross fertilization of a Latin American revolutionary tradition and a European Communist tradition. By 1965, the prognosis for Castroism was as yet uncertain since the development of this rather unorthodox strain of Communism is of such relatively recent vintage and since the fact that such an ideology is susceptible to such rapid change and fluctuation.

#### U.S.-Cuban Relations -- 1960 to 1965

One of the more troublesome problems facing Castro following his seizure of power in Cuba in early 1959 was the course of future relations between Cuba and the United States. Castro had previously noted in a newspaper interview in February, 1957 that "we have no animosity toward the United States and the American people."<sup>17</sup> Such a statement was less than candid, but it was probably the most prudent under the circumstances given the fact that Castro and his followers were then engaged in a life and death struggle against the Batista government. Once he had succeeded in overthrowing the Batista regime, Castro's policies and attitude toward the United States became more independent. Castro began to accuse the U.S. government of being involved or otherwise associated with the tyrannical Batista regime, prior to its ouster in late 1958.

Castro's first visit to the U.S. after taking over control of the Cuban government was in April 1959 and was such as to create a great deal of speculation as to future course upon which the Castro regime might embark insofar as its relations with the U.S. were concerned. Castro's speeches and meetings in Washington indicated that he was not looking for any favors from the U.S. government except perhaps a better commercial treaty for the sale of Cuban sugar to the U.S. Castro also indicated that U.S. investments in Cuban industry but not in its agriculture would be welcomed when such investments were deemed to be beneficial to Cuba's interests and needs. Castro indicated that at present he had no plans to expropriate U.S. investments or other U.S. owned property holdings in Cuba. Castro's economic reform program was concentrated around agrarian reform, industrial development, and the expansion of purchasing power in the domestic marketplace. Such development would be financed almost entirely through national savings and the promotion of foreign private investment. Castro reiterated on several occasions that he was not a Communist, nor was he a capitalist; instead, he was a "Cubanist." He also remarked that neither did he ask for nor did he receive any aid from the U.S.S.R. He further announced Cuba's continued support for the Rio Treaty as well as Cuba's support for all Latin American exiles who were opposing dictatorships within their countries; but that Cuban policy would be one of non-

intervention in the internal affairs of all Latin American countries. Castro's trip to the U.S. and the focus and content of his speeches served to create a great deal of concern among the pro-Communist faction within the 26th of July Movement as well as in other parts of Latin America and also in the Soviet Union.

Soviet policy toward Latin America and the surrounding Caribbean Sea area had previously been one of caution and restraint. However, Castro's nationalistic and radical attitudes and policies offered future possibilities for the Soviet government to increase their influence within this area.

Castro was first and foremost a nationalist and his trip to Washington gave him the opportunity to enumerate his position in relation to the U.S. He merely wanted sovereignty and independence, but he knew that these objectives might not easily be fulfilled at least without a future confrontation with the U.S. Castro's visit and his speeches in Buenos Aires in May 1959 indicated that Castro was beginning his move away from future domination by the U.S. While in Buenos Aires Castro remarked that:

"we have declared that the democratic ideal is the ideal of this hemisphere...; however, economic and social conditions in Latin America make the realization of the democratic ideal impossible...Whether power is held by a dictatorship of the left or of the right, what counts is that they are dictatorships and thus completely deny the principles which are the aspiration of the peoples of Latin America."<sup>18</sup>

During his visit to Buenos Aires, Castro further asked that the U.S. extend a \$30 billion economic credit to the countries of Latin America to help finance their future economic development. "After Buenos Aires, the prospects for a modus vi vendi between the United States and Cuba rapidly diminished."<sup>19</sup> By late 1959, indications were such as to suggest that the U.S. was not willing to raise Cuba's sugar quota for 1960. There was even speculation that their sugar quota might be considerably lower. Such action would likely be necessitated due to the fact that the U.S. Department of Agriculture had previously made prior commitments to buy a large amount of their estimated sugar purchase for 1960 from other foreign and domestic producers.

Castro replaced his Foreign Minister, Roberto Agramonte, in June 1959. Agramonte had been an advocate of reconciliation with the U.S. Castro's new Foreign Minister was Raul Roa, a fervent radical and nationalist. At about this same time, Castro sent his close friend, Guevara, on a three month journey to Asia, Africa, and Europe in order to establish closer political and commercial relations between these countries and Cuba. Castro felt that such global contacts would help to strengthen his position toward the U.S. Castro soon learned that trade with many of these underdeveloped countries was no alternative to trade with the U.S. In fact, Guevara's trip only served to increase tension between the U.S. and Cuba due in large



measure to Guevara's outspoken criticism of the U.S., and his known pro-Communist sympathies. Castro had also appointed a former PSP member, Osvaldo Dorticos, as Cuban President in July 1959 and such an appointment had also played a role in further alienating the U.S. toward Cuba particularly after 1960. The appointment in early August 1959 of Marcelo Fernandez as undersecretary for foreign affairs served as yet another indication of Castro's move away from closer ties with the U.S. since Fernandez was an ardent and zealous Fidelista dedicated to carrying out the foreign policy program outlined by Castro.

The U.S. helped to organize a meeting of the Organization of American States (OAS) in Santiago, Chile in order to determine whether or not Cuba was involved in promoting several revolutionary movements throughout various parts of Latin America during this time. Although there was little doubt that Cuba was so involved, the political climate in Latin America during this time favored Castro over those military dictatorships which had brought such charges against him, and which, at any rate, had little difficulty in putting down the revolutionary uprisings in their countries.

Roa's speech before the UN General Assembly in September 1959 set the tone for future Cuban foreign policy. This speech indicated that Cuban foreign policy was one of independence; Cuba would remain neutral in the "cold war" and Cuba would moreover be aligned with the Third World

nations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America in this U.S.-U.S.S.R. dispute. Roa's UN statement sharply criticized the use of imperialism throughout the world. After 1960, events occurred in such rapid fashion that the ultimate decline in U.S.-Cuban relations was all but inevitable.

The receipt of both economic and military assistance from several socialist countries during the first part of 1960 put a further strain on U.S.-Cuban relations. Formal diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union were re-established on May 7, 1960. During this same time, Cuban governmental officials began to seize and expropriate many U.S. owned businesses in Cuba. The U.S. sponsored OAS meeting in Costa Rica in August 1960, which resulted in the so-called Declaration of San Jose, condemned "intervention and threat of intervention, even when conditional, from an extra-continental power in the affairs of the western hemisphere."<sup>20</sup> Such a statement was made in reference to the growing involvement of the Soviet Union with Cuba and its pledge to support Cuba on a military basis in the event Cuba was attacked by the U.S. The remainder of 1960 witnessed the continued expropriation of U.S. owned business enterprises throughout Cuba. In response to such action on the part of the Cuban government, President Dwight Eisenhower continued to reduce the Cuban sugar quota until it was completely eliminated by December 1960. Formal diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Cuba were severed on January 3, 1961.

The installation of John F. Kennedy as the new U.S. President later that month did not alter the course of U.S.-Cuban relations. The Castro government's foreign policies became increasingly nationalistic and anti-imperialistic during the first half of 1961. On the American side, the preparations for the planned Bay of Pigs invasion, initially begun before President Eisenhower had left office, went forward. Subsequent events are common knowledge. The April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion was a disaster as far as the U.S. government was concerned. Cuba's international prestige was enormously heightened as a result of this ill-fated invasion attempt which was alleged to have been actively promoted and supported by the U.S. government. Although Castro was quite successful in his first military encounter with the U.S., he was less successful in helping to solve Cuba's many economic problems.

The Inter-American Economic Conference convened in Punta del Este in August 1961 saw Castro's foreign policy become more aligned with that being practiced by the Soviet government insofar as a policy of peaceful coexistence was sought to be followed. The main thrust of this conference was to set up guidelines for the U.S. sponsored Alliance for Progress program. The U.S. government had hoped to use this meeting in order to gain the support of the various OAS members in condemning Cuba's involvement in various parts of Latin America where it was alleged that Castro was helping to promote revolutionary unrest in these areas.

However, the U.S. was not able to gain the consensus that it would have desired. The U.S. had called for some sort of punitive measures to be taken against the Castro government for its involvement in these various revolutionary movements throughout Latin America. Such measures were soon forthcoming in the sense that very soon after the termination of the Punta del Este conference, several Latin American governments broke diplomatic relations with the Cuban government. Castro condemned Washington's involvement in what he termed their "collective intervention" against the government of Cuba. A subsequent OAS meeting in January 1962, once again held in Punta del Este, saw the OAS members vote to oust Cuba from the OAS alliance system. Such a task was made easier due to Castro's previous declaration the preceding December that "I am a Marxist-Leninist and shall remain a Marxist-Leninist until the day I die."<sup>21</sup> The Punta del Este II meeting had gained a unanimous approval for the following resolution,

"The adherence of any member of the Organization of American States to Marxism-Leninism is incompatible with the inter-American system and the alignment of such a Government with the Communist bloc breaks the unity and solidarity of the Hemisphere. The present Government of Cuba, which has identified itself as a Marxist-Leninist government is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the inter-American system."<sup>22</sup>

The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 was undoubtedly the most notable and most dynamic confrontation between the

U.S. and Soviet Union since the end of the Second World War. Suffice it to say that cool heads prevailed and a potential nuclear war was averted. However, such an event did not serve to ease tensions between the U.S. and Cuban governments. The strained relations between these two governments continued into 1963 with the OAS meeting in Costa Rica which brought forth both a pledge of increased economic assistance to the non-Communist governments of Latin America and a renewed promise by President Kennedy to contain the spread of Castroite terror and revolution to other parts of Latin America where such Castro sponsored revolutionary groups were not already in existence or otherwise operating.

Indirect negotiations between Castro and President Kennedy took place during the autumn of 1963 in an effort to improve U.S.-Cuban relations. Castro's willingness to reach a settlement of differences with the U.S. was, to a certain extent, promoted by the Soviet Union during Castro's visit there in April 1963. Indications are such that it is very apparent that Castro would have desired to reopen normal diplomatic relations with the U.S. since he believed that President Kennedy was a sincere and realistic man who understood the myriad of complexities inherent in Latin American political affairs. However, Kennedy's death in November 1963 was a severe blow to any such future negotiations. Nevertheless, Castro still believed that he could still reach a mutually satisfactory agreement with the new American President, Lyndon B. Johnson. Castro's hopes for

a reapproachment between Cuba and the U.S. continued up until April 1965 when the U.S. invaded the Dominican Republic. Since this time, U.S.-Cuban relations have once again reverted to their former strained, if not hostile, nature. This tense relationship between the U.S. and Cuban governments has also been due in part to the increased involvement of the U.S. in the Vietnam conflict as well as by Cuba's growing economic and military dependency on the Soviet Union.

#### Soviet-Cuban Relations -- 1960 to 1965

Relations between the Soviet Union and Cuba during this six year period have been dominated to a large extent by the Soviet Union's involvement in the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute. Based on the particular status of this dispute and the particular position being adopted by Cuba in this ideological split, relations between the Soviet and Cuban governments have ranged from very cordial to mildly antagonistic.

"The most extraordinary coincidence affecting the Cuban Revolution was the fact that Fidel Castro came to power at almost the precise moment when the Soviet Union acquired both the capability and willingness to underwrite the survival of a revolution 6,000 miles from its border and 90 miles from the United States."<sup>23</sup>

The emergence of Khrushchev as the guiding force behind the Soviet leadership in 1957 was another factor in the redevelopment of Soviet-Cuban relations. The Soviet Union had

been involved in trade relations with Cuba since 1955 exporting large quantities of petroleum to that island nation. The U.S.S.R. was also a prime buyer of Cuban sugar especially after 1960, purchasing over 750 million tons between 1956-1958 alone.

Guevara's tour of Asia, Africa, and parts of Europe between June and September 1959 brought him into contact with the leaders of several Communist bloc countries. It was also during this period of time that Guevara was also in contact with top Czechoslovakian officials. Their talks eventually culminated in a commercial trade treaty, but more importantly, the talks resulted in the transfer of various military weaponry systems from this socialist bloc country to Cuba.

However, the fact that Castro and Cuba were not committed to an alignment with any outside power was amply demonstrated by Foreign Minister Roa's speech before the Fourteenth UN General Assembly in September 1959. "It was a speech that undoubtedly reflected the real position of the Cuban government at the time, not only with respect to the United States, but also to the Soviet Union."<sup>24</sup> Roa mirrored Castroite ideology when he noted that:

"Cuba rejects both world systems because it refuses to choose between capitalism under which people starve to death, and communism, which solves economic problems by suppressing the liberties that are so dear to mankind."<sup>25</sup>

Castro's delegate to the UN, Roa, echoing his leader's sentiments, criticized the Russian intervention in Hungary



and called for all such worldwide aggression to cease. Roa concluded his remarks at this UN meeting by proclaiming:

"in the chess game of power politics, you will never find us playing the part of a docile pawn. It is in the nature of things that a small nation, once it falls into the sphere of influence of a great power, can not easily escape the role of pawn when it suits the purpose of the great power."<sup>26</sup>

Roa also added that Cuba was encouraged by the so-called "spirit of Camp David" which had been inculcated into the conduct of U.S.-Soviet relations, but that Cuban governmental leaders were less than pleased that such meetings did not include or take into account the opinions of smaller nations and particularly of those in the Latin American community. Castro was to voice this same criticism almost three years later when he denounced Khrushchev's unilateral action in withdrawing the Soviet supplied IRBM missiles from Cuba following the 1962 missile crisis. It was asserted that this unilateral Soviet action had been undertaken without consulting with Castro in this matter.

Soviet policy toward Cuba was always influenced by two factors. The first factor concerned Cuba's geographical position. Cuba was situated about ninety miles from the U.S. mainland, while at the same time Cuba was over six thousand miles from the Soviet Union. Hence, Soviet pronouncements on its willingness to defend Cuba must always be couched in vague or otherwise ambiguous terms. A firm and unequivocal defense commitment to Cuba in the event of

outside attack would have been unrealistic as far as the Soviet Union was concerned. It would not have been possible for the Soviet Union to supply direct military aid to Cuba without putting itself in a position whereby it might have to launch a nuclear attack against the external aggressor, which might well be the U.S. The vast majority of weapons supplied to Cuba were intended more for their use and deployment in a defensive military role or for political and psychological warfare than for use in an offensive military capacity. Actually, the U.S.S.R's leaders were pushing their policy of peaceful coexistence with the U.S. as a means of trying to alleviate the strained relations between the U.S. and Cuba. As far as Castro was concerned, "the prospect of ending up as a pawn in big power politics was extremely unpalatable."<sup>27</sup> Cuba's geographical position also helped to limit Moscow's attempts to try and gain a larger degree of control over the conduct of Cuban political affairs and especially in the shaping of their foreign policies.

The second factor holding sway over the future conduct of relations between the U.S.S.R. and Cuba was the political and ideological attitudes and beliefs held by Castro and Khrushchev. Formal diplomatic relations between these two countries were resumed in May 1960. During the remainder of 1960, the Soviet Union and Cuba concluded both commercial and military assistance agreements thereby bringing these two countries closer together. Khrushchev, in a July 1960

speech, warned the U.S. that the Soviet Union would use "rockets" in support of the Castro government in order to protect it from any outside attack or intervention by the U.S. Although Khrushchev made this threat on a symbolic level only, Castro and the Cuban people took this offer of assistance in its very literal sense. Castro and other Cuban government officials signed both economic and technical assistance agreements with several other socialist countries before the end of 1960, thus tying Cuba more closely to these Communist bloc countries. Castro continued on the road toward socialism in the early months of 1961. A White House Paper written largely under the supervision of President Kennedy urged Cuba to sever its ties with the international Communist movement. This proclamation came roughly three weeks before the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba by U.S. supported Cuban exiles. Castro announced during the course of his 1961 May Day address that Cuba was now a socialist country. Castro continued his drive toward the Communist bloc by proclaiming his allegiance to the principles of Marxism-Leninism in a December 1961 address. The top CPSU leaders were initially somewhat reluctant to recognize or acknowledge Castro's claims that he was, in fact, a Marxist-Leninist who ruled over a socialist state. "For if it were to do so, it would imply an ideological commitment to defend Cuba...."<sup>28</sup> Such a prospect was an extremely difficult one for the Soviet Union to acknowledge at this point in time. Furthermore,

to acknowledge Cuba as being a socialist state would, from a purely ideological point of view, negate a primary tenet of Marxism-Leninism -- namely, that a so-called truly socialist state is controlled by the Communist Party in that state, which in Cuba's case would have been the PSP. The simple fact of the matter was that the PSP was not in control of the Cuban government. The ideological problem also raised a number of political problems for the Soviet leadership. A particularly explosive problem centered around the almost certain decline or decrease in authority which would ultimately effect the various Latin American Communist parties if the Soviet Union were to recognize that a socialist state did, in fact, exist in Cuba despite the plain fact that the PSP did not control the Cuban government. The Communist parties in Latin America were a particularly susceptible target for a potentially decreased position within the international Communist movement. Castro's contentions that Cuba was now a socialist country being led by a true believer in the principles of Marxism-Leninism was designed as a "spectacular effort to break the continuing ideological blockade that compromised Cuba's security in the face of what he believed to be a growing external danger."<sup>29</sup>

#### Cuba and the Sino-Soviet Dispute

One of the most significant conflicts which both Castro and Cuba had to contend upon coming to power in early 1959

concerned the emerging ideological split between the Soviet Union and China. The November 1960 Communist Party meeting in Moscow served to elucidate the differences between the Soviet and Chinese leadership over the issues of peaceful coexistence, the inevitability of war, and the need for supporting national liberation movements as the proper means for advancing toward the creation and perfection of the socialist state. The Sino-Soviet ideological split was deplored by Castro but he did find that it could provide him with some interesting opportunities. "While for the Soviet Union, Cuba was primarily a front in the cold war with the United States, for China it was a front in its cold war with the Soviet Union."<sup>30</sup> The Sino-Soviet dispute hinged largely on the conduct of relations with the imperialist nations of the world and particularly with the U.S. Chinese foreign policy had advocated all out confrontation with such imperialistic forces. This approach in the conduct of foreign affairs was reflected in Chinese tactics in Cuba. Chinese leaders gave their unqualified support to the Cuban government insofar as encouraging them in their anti-American foreign policy position. The Chinese government hoped that their support for the foreign policy position being advocated by Castro toward the U.S. would help to sharpen Soviet-American differences and thereby create more antagonism between these two countries. "Consequently, the Chinese aim was to establish in Cuba a base from which to subvert the Moscow oriented Communist parties in Latin America."<sup>31</sup>

The initial Cuban posture in this dispute favored the Chinese since it was thought that the Chinese model appeared to be more relevant to the existing conditions in Cuba than did the Russian model. Although Chinese economic assistance to Cuba was only a fraction of the aid which Cuba received from the Soviet Union, the assistance received from the Chinese made a very positive impression on Castro. The economic transactions negotiated between Cuba and China were almost always on more favorable terms than those entered into between the Soviet Union and Cuba. However, despite their friendship toward one another, the Chinese government, much like their Russian counterparts, also refrained from recognizing Cuba's existence as a true socialist state.

Blas Roca, as the former leader of the PSP, advocated increasing adherence to the Soviet point of view in their ideological dispute with the Chinese in a speech made before the Twenty-Second CPSU Party Congress in October 1961. Such a position did not meet with a great deal of favor from the Chinese delegation present at this meeting. Castro's Second Declaration of Havana made in early February 1962 attracted widespread attention from the Chinese Communist leadership. Particular attention was devoted to the need for giving material support to the conduct of armed struggle by the various Latin American Communist parties seeking to win their independence from the imperialistic forces ruling over them. Castro did not comment or

otherwise endorse the Chinese response to his declaration since, "after all, the solution to Fidel's problems, economic and military, lay in Moscow and not Peking."<sup>32</sup>

The Soviet Union refrained from immediately responding to Castro's Second Declaration of Havana. The Soviet Union also delayed any immediate comment on the matter of Cuba's expulsion from the OAS. The most that the Soviet government would say was that "Cuba was not alone"<sup>33</sup> in her struggles against the imperialistic forces of the U.S. Otherwise, the Soviet response was rather cautious and restrained. In fact, the Soviet's response to Castro's Second Declaration of Havana was such as to distort or otherwise dilute Castro's call for the increased use of armed struggle as a means of overcoming the oppressive policies being followed by many of the imperialistic governments throughout Latin America. Needless to say, Castro was somewhat upset over the tone reflected in the Soviet's response to his latest pronouncements. However, Castro was very careful to avoid any public criticism to the position taken by the Soviet government with regard to his Second Declaration of Havana speech. Shortly afterward, Castro did publically come out in support of the Soviet Union's policy of peaceful coexistence, but Castro also made clear that his acceptance of such a policy would in no way effect his resolve to defend Cuba at all costs against attack by any U.S. imperialist forces.

The purge of various "old line" Communists in March



and April of 1962 paved the way for Castro to consolidate his power and bases of support within the Cuban governmental hierarchy. Although certain PSP leaders such as Blas Roca were represented on the Organizaciones Revolucionarias Integradas (ORI) Directorate and ORI Secretariat, the ultimate power was held by Castro and the other top Fidelista leaders, including Raul Castro, Fidel's brother, Guevara, and Dorticos. Castro had re-structured the PSP following the purge of Anibal Escalante in March 1962. Unlike other Communist parties throughout the world, "the job given to Fidel's party was neither to seize nor to wield power, but to activate and consolidate mass support for an existing power structure."<sup>34</sup>

By the end of April 1962 Khrushchev had managed to convince the top CPSU leaders that there was a need to bolster the Castro regime in Cuba and that this could be accomplished by deploying certain strategically placed missile sites throughout Cuba so as to deter any future attack on Cuba by the U.S. Such Soviet action would also convince the Chinese that the Soviet regime was not afraid of the so-called "paper tiger". In short, the supply of these IRBM missiles to Cuba would serve to convince the U.S. that the Soviets were serious about their threats to defend Cuba. Castro asserted that "it was not in order to secure our own defense, but primarily to strengthen socialism on the international scale"<sup>35</sup> which prompted him to agree to accept these missile shipments from the Soviet Union.

The events surrounding the October 1962 missile crisis are common knowledge. The confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union over the deployment of these Soviet built IRBM missiles in Cuba only ninety miles from the U.S. mainland served to almost envelop the world in a nuclear holocaust. However, negotiations between Khrushchev and Kennedy eventually reached an agreement whereby the Soviet Union would remove the missiles from Cuba in exchange for a promise by the U.S. government that it would not invade Cuba. The aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis may not be so commonly known. The conclusion of this crisis served to put in motion several key events. One of the foremost consequences coming out of this missile crisis revolved around the escalation of the Sino-Soviet ideological split.

Peking had initially supported the Soviet military assistance given to Cuba, and particularly the installation of the IRBM missiles throughout Cuba. When these missiles were later withdrawn by the U.S.S.R., the Chinese were the first to criticize the Soviet government for what the Chinese leadership termed "the cowardice of modern revisionism."<sup>36</sup> This was a severe blow to the top CPSU leaders in Moscow. "China's argument, that the Soviet Union was guilty of 'adventurism' in sending the missiles to Cuba, and of 'capitulation' in withdrawing them, touched the Soviet leadership in a sensitive spot."<sup>37</sup> Such repercussions ultimately fell on Khrushchev and almost certainly were a contributing factor in his ouster from the Soviet

regime almost two years later. Castro himself added to the accusations made by the Chinese by privately criticizing the Soviet leadership and especially Khrushchev for withdrawing their missiles under U.S. pressure, and without prior consultation with Castro in this matter.

Khrushchev attacked the ideological position being advanced by the top Chinese leadership on the grounds that the ideological beliefs being espoused by the Chinese was incompatible with the modern day state of world affairs. Khrushchev's foreign policy address in December 1962 was aimed at justifying the course of action which he took in helping to bring an end to the Cuban missile crisis. The Chinese response to this December 1962 speech by Khrushchev sought to clarify the Chinese ideological position in several respects. First, it was asserted that "the Chinese ...have always maintained that the course of history is always decided by the great strength of the masses of the people and not by any weapons...."<sup>38</sup> Second, it was contended that:

"we (Chinese) have never considered that it was a Marxist-Leninist attitude to brandish nuclear weapons as a way of settling international disputes...what we do strongly oppose...is the sacrifice of another country's sovereignty as a means of reaching a compromise with imperialism."<sup>39</sup>

Third, with regard to the matter of peaceful coexistence, the Chinese reply stated that:

"in the present situation it is possible to prevent imperialism from launching a

new world war if all the peace loving nations of the world unite...and fight together, but it is one thing to prevent a world war and another thing to eliminate all wars."<sup>40</sup>

Although Castro had his differences with the Soviets, he was generally inclined to support the Soviet viewpoint in most instances especially when the adoption of a similar ideological stance might help to further or promote some particular objective being pursued by Castro. Castro met with the top party leaders of the Soviet Union from late April to early June of 1963 in an effort to try and resolve the differences which had arisen between the Soviet Union and Cuba following the termination of the October 1962 missile crisis. The ruling CPSU leadership in Moscow were also very anxious to try and obtain Cuba's support in their ideological polemics with the Chinese and therefore, they were willing to make some compromises or other such minor concessions to Castro. This meeting between Castro and Khrushchev also functioned to bring the Soviet Union and Cuba closer together as members of the international Communist movement. This meeting also witnessed the Soviet Union's recognition of Cuba as a member, in full standing, "in the great socialist community, and of its party, the Partido Unido de la Revolucion Socialista (PURS), as a genuine Marxist-Leninist vanguard."<sup>41</sup>

Cordial relations between Castro and the U.S.S.R. continued to exist throughout the remainder of 1963 and into 1964 while Cuba's relations with China could be seen to be

on the decline from their former cordial status of previous years. Cuba had throughout 1963 and 1964 tried to maintain a neutral position on the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute, but their preference for the viewpoint taken by the Soviet Union would eventually begin to surface in 1964. Overall Cuban intercourse and relations with the U.S.S.R. between 1961 and 1964 was much more intense than were Cuba's relations with China. "Only on certain key issues such as on the nuclear test ban treaty and the spread of armed revolution did Havana tend to side with Peking against Moscow."<sup>42</sup> Following Khrushchev's dismissal as head of the CPSU in 1964, the new Soviet regime began to move closer toward a consolidation of their position in Cuba. The new Soviet regime sought to promote their interests in Cuba by increasing the prestige of the PSP with respect to the other Communist parties throughout the rest of Latin America.

"Even at times of relatively high tension between the two governments, the benefits accruing to the Cubans from adherence to the Communist sphere provided an effective basis for Soviet-Cuban accommodation."<sup>43</sup>

Such an approach undoubtedly reflected Cuba's silence following Khrushchev's ouster from power in 1964 despite the fact that both Cuba and China were prone to resent the policy of peaceful coexistence as promoted by Khrushchev as the official Communist position in Latin America. A secret meeting among the various Communist parties of Latin America in Havana in late 1964 served to more closely align the

Cuban government with the official Soviet viewpoint taken in their ideological dispute with the Chinese. In fact, this meeting saw a number of the Latin American Communist parties tacitly criticize the Chinese position on several matters being disputed over in the course of the Sino-Soviet ideological split. Likewise, the Soviet's policy underwent a slight modification with regard to the issue of armed struggle as a means of obtaining political power and control of the national governments within the various Latin American countries. The new Soviet regime was willing to modify its stand on this issue of armed struggle so as to recognize its usage, under a limited set of situations and circumstances, as a means of overthrowing the imperialistic regimes now controlling the national governments throughout Latin America. Castro's speech on March 15, 1965 noting that "Cubans do not understand the language of division"<sup>44</sup> was directed toward China in terms of its role in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Cuba's attendance at the March 1965 meeting of Communist parties in Moscow was still another indication of Cuba's support for the U.S.S.R. The disappearance of Guevara from Cuba which was announced in October 1965 was yet another indication of the growing accommodation between the Soviets and the Cubans. This last event, relative to Guevara's departure from Cuba, is of some importance. Since the time when Castro had first taken over control of the Cuban government in January 1959, Castro and Guevara could be seen as having

their differences of opinion with regard as to how Cuba should proceed toward the establishment of a socialist state within Cuba. Guevara pressed for those programs which were aimed at increasing Cuba's industrial growth and productive capacity. Castro, on the other hand, was content on trying to upgrade and diversify the status of the agricultural sector of Cuba's economy. Especially after 1963, Guevara pushed for the increased use of armed struggle and guerilla warfare throughout Latin America as a means of elevating the Communist parties to power within these countries. The Soviet leadership was very much opposed to Guevara's extremist views since they did not fit well into the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence which was trying to be promoted with regard to the U.S., particularly after the almost catastrophic Cuban missile crisis the preceding October. Castro himself found that his own views were not nearly as radical as those being proposed and expounded by Guevara. The Soviet Union had also been very much opposed to Guevara's ideas that the Cuban government must concentrate on building up their industrial base and they tended to side with Castro's view that the Cuban economic problems could be alleviated through a more diversified approach to agriculture. It was probably as a major concession to the new Soviet regime that forced Castro to disassociate himself from Guevara during 1965. It would hardly be conducive to the promotion of closer ties between Cuba and the Soviet Union for Castro



to have supported the radical and extremist views being advocated by Guevara at this time. Guevara's departure from Cuba in early 1965 "was in fact a contribution to the resolution of the controversial issues that had kept Cuba and the Soviet Union apart."<sup>45</sup> Castro had finally come to realize the need for a closer ideological alignment between the policies being promoted by his government and those being propounded by the government of the Soviet Union. Such a goal was deemed to be a necessity even if it meant the temporary sacrifice of Cuban national and international objectives. "It was therefore necessary to disassociate Guevara's opposite views from Castro's official policy."<sup>46</sup> Cuba's closer links with the U.S.S.R. were also evident on a different level. Increased Cuban participation in various "front" organizational meetings throughout 1964 and 1965 was indicative of the closer relationship being pursued between the two governments both on a domestic and a foreign policy level. Cuban-Chinese relations continued to decline during this period of Soviet-Cuban accommodation. An indication of this trend can be observed in the coverage by the Chinese press of events in Cuba. Chinese news coverage of events in Cuba was virtually non-existent after January 1965.

#### Soviet Arms Trade to Cuba -- 1960-1965

Most of the arms trade between the Soviet Union and Cuba took place between 1960 and 1963. Soviet involvement in Cuba had definitely become established by mid-1960. A

rather large arms sales agreement had been concluded between the two governments that same year which signaled the beginning of a large scale Soviet military assistance program to Cuba. Soviet threat perception insofar as it applied to a possible U.S. based attack on Cuba together with the need to try and recruit Castro to the ranks of those Communist parties who would side with the Soviet position in the emerging Sino-Soviet ideological dispute served as underlying motivations for the increased amount of Soviet military aid going to Cuba between 1960 and 1963. While the initial shipments of Soviet military hardware to Cuba were confined to various forms of transport aircraft, such as the II-14 and the An-2 as well as the Mi-1 transport helicopter, Cuba also received a rather large shipment of medium sized tanks, mainly the T-34, as well as some sixty BTR-40 armoured personnel carriers (APC's) albeit these armoured fighting vehicles were not of the most recent vintage. Cuba also received a lesser number of the more modern and sophisticated T-54-55 medium sized tanks during 1960-1961 which effectively served to bolster the military capability of Cuba's ground forces. Furthermore, the shipment of about one hundred Su-100 tank destroyers, although not the most modern or sophisticated in terms of military capability, did function to complement the shipment of T-34 and T-54-55 tanks received by the Cuban armed forces in 1960 and 1961.

Castro's continued support for the Soviet regime as

well as the abortive April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion sponsored in part by the U.S. government, were probably reasons for the transport of more modern and technologically sophisticated weaponry systems to Cuba during the latter part of 1961 and 1962. During this time Cuba received the sophisticated MIG-15 and MIG-17 jet combat aircraft. Cuba also required over five hundred modern SA-2 "Guideline" surface to air missiles which were primarily deployed as coastal defense weaponry systems. Castro's armed forces also received over one hundred AT-1 "Snapper" anti-tank surface to surface missiles which were used to equip the Su-100 tank destroyers which he had previously received from the U.S.S.R. The further supply of other surface to surface missiles including the "Frog-1" and the "Samlet" cruise missile gave added depth and dimension to the overall military preparedness and capability of Cuban ground forces. The supply of approximately seventy-five BTR-60 armoured personnel carriers which were then being employed as a front line Soviet weaponry system are evidence of the more sophisticated military hardware being received by Cuba during late 1961 and 1962.

The 1962 weapons build-up in Cuba can be attributed to several factors. Castro's assertion in late December 1961 that he considered himself, ideologically, to be a Marxist-Leninist, can doubtless be offered as at least a partial explanation for this weapons build-up in 1962. Another explanation which might help to shed some light on the

increased amount of military assistance being given to the Castro regime during 1962 could be the Soviet's delayed response to the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion and the Soviet Union's concern in seeing to it that another such attack was not repeated anytime in the near future. This U.S. sponsored invasion attempt served to tie Cuba even more closely to the Communist bloc and to the Soviet Union and further away from the U.S. Increased economic and political ties between the Soviet Union and Cuba are evident throughout most of 1962. Castro's growing dependency on the U.S.S.R. for both political support and military assistance together with Cuba's need for foreign commercial markets for its sugar crop helped to ensure a continuing relationship between these two countries.

During 1962, the U.S.S.R. transferred over one hundred and twenty modern jet combat fighters including the MIG-17, MIG-19, and the MIG-21. Cuba also acquired ten of the Soviet Union's most advanced An-24 heavy transport carriers. The inclusion of over twenty IL-28 medium range bombers in the military equipment transferred to Cuba during 1962 helped to bolster the strength and effectiveness of the air arm of the Cuban armed forces. The receipt of over three hundred and fifty different types of missiles were important in helping to increase the striking power of both Cuba's air and naval defense forces. The missiles were predominately of the air to air variety consisting of about two hundred and fifty K-13 "Atoll" missiles. These missiles

were transferred and intended for use with the forty-two modern MIG-21 fighter aircraft transferred that same year. The remaining missiles consisted of the surface to surface SS-N-2 "Styx" missile which were to be used in conjunction with the "Komar" class missile patrol boats which Cuba also received during 1962. The Cubans also received a fair amount of the surface to surface "Salish" cruise missile which was deployed in a coastal defense capacity throughout Cuba. Additionally, the Cuban armed forces received a large shipment of heavy tanks during 1962. While these tanks were by no means the most modern in their design or military capability, they did serve to increase the striking and deterrent capabilities of the Cuban Army. Cuba also acquired a significant number of various types of naval craft during the course of 1962. Including in the arms shipped to Cuba from the Soviet Union, were some "P4" motor torpedo boats, some "Kronstadt" submarine chasers, as well as the more advanced "Komar" class missile patrol boats already previously mentioned. All of the above naval vessels were utilized in a coastal defense role since they are all characterized as fast attack craft.

The subsequent drop in arms shipments after 1962, both in terms of quality and quantity, can be rationalized on several different grounds. First, the aftermath of the October 1962 missile crisis was such as to create a gradual but nevertheless definite shift in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy. The emergence of a policy of "peaceful

coexistence" is seen, by many observers, to have been a direct consequence of their previous confrontation with the U.S. over the build-up of IRBM missiles in Cuba during the summer months of 1962. Soviet foreign policy makers adjusted their foreign policy programs to accord with this newly sanctioned policy of peaceful coexistence. A necessary consequence of this new foreign policy approach was the reduction in the level and quality of weapons systems being transferred to their allies, including Cuba. A second factor might be asserted to be an underlying cause for the drastic decline in the level of arms transfer to Cuba after 1962. Castro was very dissatisfied over the way in which the top CPSU leadership, especially Khrushchev, had handled the October 1962 missile crisis affair. Castro seemed to feel that he should have been consulted by Khrushchev before the Soviet missiles were withdrawn from Cuba. Soviet-Cuban relations remained slightly strained throughout 1963 although some improvement could be noticed toward the end of that year due in part to Castro's visit to the Soviet Union in April and May of 1964, which resulted in some concessions being made to Castro in order to help mend the ill feelings which had grown up between Castro and the CPSU leadership following the end of the October 1962 missile crisis. Basically, Castro tried to remain neutral in the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute, but Cuba's growing economic dependency on the U.S.S.R. forced Castro to ultimately align himself with the Soviet viewpoint by

1964-65. The only visible improvements in Soviet-Cuban relations could be noticed in late 1964 at the Havana meeting attended by all the major Latin American Communist parties. All those Latin American Communist parties in attendance were pro-Soviet in their ideological orientation. The joint communique which ultimately emerged from this secret meeting was very favorable to the Soviet position on several issues being debated and disputed between Moscow and Peking at this time.

Arms deliveries during 1963 were centered around a new shipment of MIG-15 jet fighters and some Mi-1 helicopters. Both these weapons systems were not the most modern or sophisticated which the Soviet Union possessed at this time, since upgraded versions of both these weaponry systems had been developed by 1964. The political and ideological reasons mentioned above may well account for the decline in the amount of weapons systems transferred to Cuba during 1963 and 1964, but a further reason may simply be that Cuba's armed forces had received enough weapons in the previous years so that a saturation point was thereby reached and no further arms deliveries were needed during these years. However, the political and ideological reasons seem more plausible as far as they serve as a gauge in measuring the decline of arms being transferred to Cuba during 1963-1964. The improvement in Soviet-Cuban relations toward the end of 1964 may be seen to be reflected in the types of arms transferred to Cuba during 1965. During this



year, Cuba received some additional MIG-21 jet fighters as well as some more "Komar" class missile patrol boats. There is a discernible qualitative improvement over the weapons systems transferred in 1965 as compared to the outmoded "SOI" patrol boats transferred during 1964.


In sum, it might be noted that:

"within the Communist world, the Soviet Union has acted as the typical dominant power toward weaker states within its sphere of influence. In recent years, Cuba has been pressured to reorient its domestic and foreign policies, and to embrace peaceful coexistence with the capitalist states under threat of the loss of Soviet aid."<sup>47</sup>

It might also be pointed out that:

"the involvement of Moscow and Havana in the Latin American revolutionary movement has been marked by periods of competition and cooperation resulting from differences in national interests, perceptions of Latin America's revolutionary prospects, and the respective bargaining power of both countries. But from the very beginning, both countries have shared certain common interests: weakening the position of the U.S.; the spread of Communist ideology; strengthening the Latin American revolutionary movement; and building Communism in Cuba."<sup>48</sup>

Figure 1



## Footnotes

## Chapter 2

1. Theodore Draper, "Castro and Castroism," in Fidel Castro's Personal Revolution in Cuba 1959-1973, ed. James N. Goodsell (New York: Knopf Publishers, 1975), p. 33.

2. Theodore Draper, Castroism: Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1965), p. 48-49.

3. Ibid., p. 16.

4. Ibid., pp. 21-22.

5. Goodsell, Fidel Castro's Personal Revolution in Cuba 1959-1973, p. 34.

6. Draper, Castroism: Theory and Practice, p. 26.

7. Ibid., p. 30.

8. Ibid., p. 31.

9. Ibid., p. 34.

10. Ibid., p. 36.

11. Ibid., p. 38.

12. Ibid., p. 39.

13. Ibid., p. 43.

14. Goodsell, Fidel Castro's Personal Revolution in Cuba 1959-1973, p. 34.

15. Ibid., p. 35.

16. Draper, Castroism: Theory and Practice, p. 50.

17. Maurice Halperin, The Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro: An Essay in Contemporary History (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1972), p. 17.

18. Ibid., p. 52-53.

19. Ibid., p. 54.

20. Ibid., p. 79.

21. Ibid., p. 120.

22. Ibid., p. 121.

23. Ibid., p. 43.
24. Ibid., p. 69.
25. Ibid., p. 70.
26. Ibid., p. 71.
27. Ibid., p. 126.
28. Ibid., p. 127.
29. Ibid., p. 131.
30. Ibid., p. 141.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., p. 146.
33. Ibid., p. 147.
34. Ibid., p. 158.
35. Ibid., p. 168.
36. Ibid., p. 173.
37. John Gittings, Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute: A Commentary and Extracts from the Recent Polemics, 1963-1967 (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 176.
38. Lester A. Sobel, ed., Cuba, the U.S. and Russia: 1960-1963 (New York: Facts on File, 1964), p. 98.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Daniel Tretrak, Orbis, p. 441.
42. Ibid., p. 442.
43. Ibid., p. 444.
44. Ibid., p. 446.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid., p. 448.
47. James D. Therberge, The Soviet Presence in Latin America (New York: Crane, Russak and Co., 1974), p. 20.
48. Ibid., p. 56.

### Chapter III

#### Indonesia, Sukarno, and the PKI: The Struggle for Power

Indonesian politics between 1960 and 1965 were largely influenced and controlled by two dynamic personalities, President Sukarno and D.N. Aidit, as leader of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). In order to understand the political events which transpired during this time, it will be necessary to delve into the ideological orientations and attitudes which were often so decisive in the Indonesian political decision-making process. Since the ideological beliefs of President Sukarno were practically the mirror image of those being espoused and advocated by Aidit, an examination of the PKI's ideology will serve to illuminate Indonesian political decision-making during the early 1960's. However, before an examination of Indonesian Communist ideology is undertaken, a brief historical sketch of the PKI might prove useful in bringing up to date the course of events prior to 1960. The main focus of this report will concentrate upon political events taking place in Indonesia from 1960 to 1965.

The PKI had been in existence in Indonesia since the late 1920's, but its influence in Indonesian politics had been minimal and sporadic until 1951 when the PKI was

reorganized under the leadership of Aidit. During the early and mid-1950's the PKI's main concern was oriented toward the successful completion of their so-called united national front strategy which, in essence, called for the mobilization of all of the Indonesian working and peasant classes in order that they might overthrow the existing social structure of Indonesian society. Such a shift in the social class structure would be designed "to bring about a shift in the balance of forces between the imperialists, landlord class, and compradore bourgeoisie on the one hand, and the people on the other."<sup>1</sup> Gradually the PKI leadership after 1954 began to play down this concept of the class struggle, and the importance of PKI hegemony over the united national front strategy and instead turned its attention toward the creation of an alliance with the Indonesian Nationalists (PNI). This trend in PKI strategy continued under Aidit reaching its height under the Sukarno era of "guided democracy".

"The PKI's desire to obtain a more permanent and secure position within the Indonesian political system depended on a close alliance with Sukarno and the 'progressive' wing of the national elite and expressly subordinated the party's claims to Sukarno's continued primacy in the political system."<sup>2</sup>

This strategy, while seemingly somewhat unorthodox for a Communist party, was necessitated by the fact that Indonesia's experiment with parliamentary democracy initiated since 1945 had been declared to be a failure by Sukarno in 1957. In

that year, Sukarno in alliance with future Defense Minister, A.H. Nasution, took over control of the Indonesian national government. From 1957 through 1963, Indonesia was governed under a state of martial law. Several political parties were declared to be illegal and thereby outlawed by the new governing regime. Among those parties declared to be illegal were the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI) and the anti-Communist Masjumi Party. Sukarno, in effect, wielded a form of dictatorial control over Indonesian political affairs from 1957 on. Sukarno's charismatic qualities eventually, after 1960, enabled him to play the predominant role in Indonesian policy making up until October 1965. Based on such a state of affairs, it can be seen that the PKI's political strategy and tactics in the period following 1957 were not only rational, but also very practical.

Since acquiring its independence from the Netherlands in 1949, Indonesian political ideology can best be described as being very anti-imperialistic as well as extremely nationalistic in its orientation. Under Sukarno, Indonesian politics and national policies particularly after the institution of his "guided democracy" program became increasingly nationalistic and anti-imperialistic in tone much more so than had previously been the case. Sukarno thought that Indonesia could rise up and become the most powerful nation in Southeast Asia under his leadership and guidance. Under his tutelage, Indonesia could serve as the leading example of an emerging nation fighting against all imperialist forces throughout the world. During the mid and



late 1950's the PKI's ideological attitude mirrored the beliefs, positions, and policies being advocated by Sukarno and the other top governmental leaders. During this time, the PKI could not afford to be too outspoken or otherwise critical of any governmental policy being pursued since its continued political existence depended on its ability to keep a sort of low profile while it concentrated on building up its base of support among the people and otherwise consolidating the political gains that it had made up until this time. This being the case, the PKI leadership was content to give its support to whatever policy was currently being implemented by the Sukarno regime. In many ways the PKI was a very practical political party in its approach to politics and in its drive toward gaining increased status and power within the Indonesian political system. Initially, the PKI was not tied to any rigid ideological position since the PKI leadership viewed ideology as

"not a static set of ideas but an evolving body of precepts, programs, and policies. New ideas are added to the original stock to take account of new situations and tasks confronted by the organization...the initial ideology of a specific leadership may be modified to one degree or another in response both to change in circumstances and to the altered preceptions of the leaders, with regard to their basic requirements."<sup>3</sup>

Although the principles of Marxism-Leninism played a significant role in the ideological precepts of the PKI and also in their policy formulation, these principles were neither

the driving force behind fundamental PKI political philosophy nor were they always seen to be applicable to the Indonesian political culture and to the unique circumstances often encountered by the PKI leadership. Just as the Soviet ideological model did not fit into or otherwise conform to the needs and goals of the PKI, neither did the Chinese model. The leaders of the PKI would use components from both the Soviet and Chinese ideological models depending on the circumstances and the varying requirements faced by that organization under any given conditions. Both Soviet and Chinese ideology must be evaluated and utilized in accordance with the peculiar conditions facing the PKI leadership as it operated in the Indonesian political system. As has been noted by one observer, "The PKI leaders of the Aidit generation were unusually independent of spirit. They were lightly touched in the formative stages of their development as Communists by either the hand of Moscow or Peking."<sup>4</sup>

Indonesian politics generally drew its top governmental leaders from much lower social classes than was the case in other parts of the world, especially within the Asian region. Hence, these leaders tended to be oriented more toward policies utilizing nationalism as a basis for their justification as well as programs advocating a higher degree of social radicalism than might be the case in another geographic setting. Communists in Asia and especially in Indonesia have traditionally come from these lower social

classes and as a result, their programs and policies have been structured so as to try and lessen the plight of the working and peasant classes.

Aidit and many of the more powerful and influential leaders within the PKI were initially drawn toward Marxism-Leninism due to their earlier involvement in the pemuda or national youth movement in Indonesia which was quite prominent following the end of the Japanese occupation in 1945 and during the final years of Dutch rule in Indonesia. This common link among many of the top PKI party leaders gave the PKI a very cohesive organizational structure. The basic tenets underlying early PKI ideology were drawn up and elaborated upon at the PKI's Fifth Party Congress held in March 1954. The final product of this meeting served to outline future PKI goals and to enumerate the PKI strategy and tactics to be employed in achieving these goals.

First, the PKI leadership professed their respect for and adherence to the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism.

Second, these principles were to play a guiding role in the future formulation and implementation of all PKI initiatives and policies. Third, these principles would be utilized to instruct the party's followers in the goals underlying the various PKI political programs and to ".... enhance their organizational commitment...to the leadership."<sup>5</sup>

Finally, these principles would be employed in order to deter criticism from those groups who were opposed to the programs and policies being pursued by the PKI. These

proclamations were not always strictly followed in the future since the dominant PKI philosophy dictated a course of action which would maximize the freedom and independence from becoming bound to any rigid doctrine or ideology.

PKI philosophy also was cognizant of the fact that Indonesia could not become the leader of the peoples and of the newly emerging nation states in Southeast Asia unless it become more industrialized and thereby uplifted its entire economic base. In order to do this, it would be necessary to eliminate all feudalistic and imperialistic forces from Indonesian society and to erect a government dedicated to pursuing and advancing the interests of all its peoples. The PKI could only accomplish such an objective with the assistance of the working and peasant classes. Only then, i.e., after all the feudalistic and imperialistic classes had been eliminated from Indonesian society, could any kind of "democratic" reforms be instituted. As can be noted, the initial PKI political philosophy utilized the Soviet model relative to the class struggle as the ultimate means for obtaining political power. However, this ideological basis of the PKI political philosophy was to change following the 1955 Bandung Conference in which both the Soviet Union and China modified their previous political positions so as to take into account the political positions being pursued by the so-called "non-aligned" states which were beginning to obtain their independence from former colonial rule throughout many parts of Asia and Africa.

Both the Soviet and Chinese governments indicated that they would be willing to assist the indigenous Communist parties in these newly developing areas despite their "non-aligned" status.

On the question of armed struggle, the PKI leadership initially adopted a position advocating a peaceful path toward the attainment of political power and the formation of a people's democratic form of government. While the majority of the PKI's political philosophy and orientation could be interpreted by the top Soviet leaders, the PKI also drew on a number of Chinese interpretations of this same political philosophy in order to formulate some of their own policies. Aidit's speeches indicated that he thought that the Dutch were the main imperialistic threat faced by the newly emerging Indonesian state. The U.S. imperialistic threat was not emphasized or otherwise highlighted to any considerable degree until after 1960. Since this was the current policy position being advocated by the PNI, the PKI felt constrained to support this policy since it did not as yet have enough political power so that it could effectively oppose such a policy approach. The U.S. imperialistic threat was being played down prior to 1960, in the hopes that the U.S. might supply Indonesia with the needed economic and military assistance in the event that Indonesia was made the target of some external attack which could thereby threaten continued Indonesia sovereignty and independence.

Aidit and the PKI leadership knew that they would have to work through existing political structures and institutions in order to gain any kind of political power within the Sukarno regime. When the National Constituent Assembly was dissolved in 1959 and a presidential ban put on both the PSI and the Masjumi political parties by Sukarno, thereby eliminating them as any type of potent or potential political force within his regime, Aidit became concerned about the future of the PKI within the Indonesian political system. Hence, he sought to try and maneuver the PKI into a position of favor with Sukarno. If the Communists were to have any hopes of surviving and hopefully obtaining some degree of political power for itself within the domestic political system, such an approach would become a practical, if not a political, necessity. In order to facilitate such an approach, the PKI leadership resolved to subordinate itself to the dictates of its stronger alliance partner, the PNI, in return for a promise that the PKI would be left free to develop its own party apparatus without outside interference. PKI hegemony would temporarily be deferred until the PKI's organizational strength enabled it to obtain a greater measure of political power within the Indonesian governmental hierarchy. Such an objective could further be promoted by the PKI tailoring its ideology and policies so as to appeal to the widest spectrum of the general public. Clearly such a view was contrary to basic Marxist-Leninist ideology which insofar as it related to

the desirability of having great mass support for the ultimate attainment of political power would have instead stressed the importance of building up a small yet cohesive party organization. As was observed by the more prominent PKI leaders, their "main hope rested in Sukarno's growing partiality toward the PKI and his competition for political dominance with his Army partners, with whom he had little in common apart from a desire to strengthen centralized government."<sup>6</sup> As Sukarno himself noted, "the public demonstrations of identity, the pulling together of all political and social groups in support of bold and imaginative policies, the setting aside of petty interests and disputes in a common endeavor to put the country on the world map"<sup>7</sup> were paramount and critical goals for any government. Sukarno saw the PKI as a good counterbalance to the military elements in his regime. The PKI could help to further increase Sukarno's power and influence in Indonesian political affairs. For their part, the PKI leadership was only too happy to give their support to Sukarno since a growing military force in the government could help to eventually lead to a military takeover within the government and the ouster of the PKI from any future political advancement within the Indonesian political system.

Indonesian political ideology can be broken down into several component parts. First, insofar as Sukarno was concerned, his political philosophy and ideology were basically anti-imperialistic and nationalistic in tone but



like the PKI, his ideological orientation and outlook was capable of being molded and changed in order to conform to the particular demands being made upon him at any given moment. If Sukarno thought that he could play the U.S. off against the U.S.S.R., he would do so in the interest of Indonesian nation building. In addition, he sometimes used this tactic in playing off the Soviet Union against China and visa versa. As far as Sukarno was concerned, Indonesian interests came first in his policy considerations. If these national interests could be promoted or otherwise advanced, so would Sukarno's image and overall prestige with the Indonesian public. His vision of being the leading exponent of Asian nationalism in his constant struggle against the forces of imperialism and neo-colonialism often served as an underlying precept in much of his foreign policy decision-making.

The PKI's ideological stance up until 1960-61 was one characterized by caution and by a submissiveness to those parties and governmental officials who were in a more superior political position within the Indonesian political hierarchy. The PKI leadership was content with trying to improve its position on the political spectrum by utilizing a large measure of tact and diplomacy in its relations with rival political party factions, the military, and especially President Sukarno. The PKI's political survival depended to a large extent on how well it would be able to maneuver itself into political favor with Sukarno. By 1960, the PKI

leadership could begin to notice some small amount of success in their attempts to win over Sukarno as a future political ally. However, these apparent gains were not entirely satisfactory to the leadership of the PKI, in the sense that the leading figures in this party, including Aidit, realized that they would need some event or situation which would enable them to consolidate the gains they had previously made. More particularly, the PKI leadership was seeking some event which would enable it to capitalize on the anti-imperialistic and nationalistic crusade which Sukarno was currently in the process of waging during this time. The PKI's ultimate objective was centered around making Sukarno the driving force behind a larger Asiatic nationalistic movement especially as such a movement might be linked to the newly emerging ex-colonial Asian countries. Such a position would later be enumerated by Sukarno in his "new emerging forces - old emerging forces" doctrine (NEFO-OLDEFO). This particular ideology was first alluded to by Sukarno during a 1960 address to the United Nations, and was more fully developed in an April 1962 address. The PKI leadership had acknowledged that:

if nationalism was to sustain an alliance between the President and the Communists, and act as a political spearhead for both, as the trajectory of their policies in 1959 suggested, then it required a specific focus of action and general ideological concepts that would channel politics in the desired direction...an answer to the first requirement was ready at hand, in the form of the West Irian issue, a piece of unfinished business left over from the 1949 settlement of the Dutch-Indonesian conflict.<sup>8</sup>

Indonesian Nationalism:  
The West Irian Phase

The struggle against imperialism and neo-colonialism was the crux of Indonesian foreign policy under Sukarno. Sukarno's NEFO-OLDEFO doctrine was the officially acknowledged ideology used to justify the Indonesian policy of anti-imperialism and nationalism. Such a position served a dual purpose as far as the PKI was concerned. First, it enabled them to build up their party membership through its endorsement of Sukarno's nationalistic policies. Secondly, it also helped them to enhance their domestic standing and prestige because of their affiliation to this anti-imperialistic and nationalistic foreign policy position being advocated by Sukarno. The West Irian issue proved to be a source of great friction between the Dutch and Indonesia during the 1950's. Indonesian leaders had demanded that the Dutch cede their last remaining piece of their former East Indies colonial empire to them as soon as Indonesia had obtained their complete independence from Dutch rule in 1949. During the late 1950's the West Irian issue became rather tense and relations became more strained between the Dutch and Indonesia. This state of affairs served to alter Indonesia's foreign policy position so as to make it more anti-western in its view toward the conduct of world affairs. Sukarno's radical nationalism was seen as a means of uniting the Indonesian people in a unified effort in helping to solve Indonesia's many domestic and

foreign problems. The PKI was in the vanguard insofar as it gave its complete support to the current policy position being pursued by Sukarno. Such a tactic was seen as a method by which the PKI could demonstrate its loyalty and allegiance to the Sukarno regime. It was also about this point in time that the PKI sought to identify the U.S. as the primary exponent of neo-colonialism in Southeast Asia. Sukarno himself had previously noted that "colonialism-imperialism, and not cold war issues was the crux of international politics."<sup>9</sup> Sukarno's NEFO-OLDEFO doctrine divided the world into two opposing camps. Sukarno's NEFO's were representative of those forces in the world which were endeavoring to rid themselves of colonial domination. The opposing camp consisted of those individuals and nations which were dedicated to the practice of imperialism and were depicted as the so-called old emerging forces or OLDEFO's according to Sukarno's theory. Overall political support for Sukarno's extremely nationalistic policies was quite weak. Sukarno himself was engaged in trying to gain the backing of the U.S. government for his position in the West Irian dispute with the Dutch. The possibility that Sukarno might be able to elicit some support for his position as regards the West Irian dispute is at least partly responsible for tempering the extremism in his foreign policies at least for a brief period of time. On the other hand, the PKI leadership was vigorously involved in promoting the idea that the U.S. constituted the bastion

of worldwide imperialism and as such threatened all prospects for world peace.

The West Irian issue reached its height in 1961-1962. During this time, Indonesian foreign policy evidenced a dualistic aspect. Essentially, Indonesian leaders adopted a more radical and nationalistic course in their foreign policy dealings. Formal diplomatic relations with the Netherlands were broken in August 1960 over the worsening West Irian problem. Between April and September 1961, Sukarno embarked upon a foreign policy course aimed at taking over the West Irian area by force, if necessary. Military incursions into West Irian began in September 1961. However, Indonesian military forces suffered several humiliating defeats during January 1962 which caused a temporary setback to Sukarno's foreign policy program and objectives. These events helped to momentarily stifle the implementation of Sukarno's radical foreign policies to the extent that negotiations, sponsored in part by the U.S., were opened up in an effort to try and peacefully resolve this dispute.

As it turned out, the eventual peace settlement worked out through these negotiations was a very humiliating one as far as the Dutch were concerned, while on the other hand, it was very favorable inasmuch as it recognized almost every one of the claims made by the Indonesian government concerning their interests in West Irian. As a result of Sukarno's great diplomatic triumph in these negotiations concerning the West Irian settlement, his domestic standing

and prestige were tremendously increased. Sukarno's tactical approach to the conduct of this entire West Irian issue evidenced brilliant strategy on his part in the sense that he was able to successfully play off the U.S. against the Soviet Union in order to obtain the needed material support for the Indonesian claims being asserted in this case.

"Soviet Military aid had been of great importance in waging the West Irian campaign....In its wake economic and technical assistance was extended on a lavish scale....These developments were naturally welcomed by the PKI; they drew Indonesia closer to the Communist bloc and away from the United States; at the same time they promoted greater interest in and sympathy for Communism and gave the party an opportunity to act as a political broker between the two governments...."10

The position of the military forces in the Sukarno regime was considerably weakened as a result of their unsuccessful participation in the conduct of the West Irian affairs. Specifically, the consensus of the various military elites within the Sukarno government shifted over so as to bring their policy orientation into conformity to that which was being promoted by Sukarno.

"As a result of the acquisition of Soviet hardware the army was by the end of 1962 a more formidable force in terms of physical power, but it had lost some of its political cohesion and drive, which had been built up in large part around anti-Communism. Its popularity had waned as restiveness grew at the manner in which the army's martial law powers were exercised."11

By the start of 1963 the military's position insofar as their status and prestige within the governmental hierarchy was concerned had been drastically reduced from what it had been in previous years.

The West Irian campaign had served to illustrate the theoretical underpinnings of Sukarno's NEFO-OLDEFO doctrine. This doctrine was reflected in the PKI's call for the mobilization of the entire Indonesian adult population in order to repulse the imperialistic Dutch forces in West Irian. This plan was endorsed by Sukarno, but the widespread mobilization called for by the PKI never did occur due to the opposition of many military leaders including General Masuati, whose policies were successful in preventing many potential PKI supporters from obtaining any kind of meaningful or otherwise comprehensive military training. Such events illustrate the military's increasing concern over the rise to power of the PKI within the Indonesian political system.

"Overall then, the PKI had made significant gains during the West Irian campaign, both in having an official ideology adopted and consolidated that accorded with its views and in obtaining through its own activities and its alliance with the president at least a temporary enhancement of its place within the Guided Democracy order....But the party's position was still very insecure and might rapidly deteriorate should there be a new governmental swing to the right in conjunction with a flow of American aid."<sup>12</sup>

The PKI could definitely not tolerate such a shift in official government policy if they had any hopes of advancing their



party's interests upward in the Indonesian political hierarchy. The PKI leadership would try to promote the views and interests of their party by continuing to exert a subtle kind of pressure on Sukarno in the hopes that he would continue to pursue the same radical and nationalistic policies which he had previously advocated. The U.S. involvement in the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis helped to keep this nationalistic spirit alive in Indonesia. The next opportunity presented to the PKI came in mid-December 1962 when a revolt in the North Borneo Sultanate of Burnei broke out.

#### Indonesian Nationalism: The Malaysian Phase

The Burnei revolt served to signal a growing amount of dissention and resentment to the proposed incorporation of Burnei into the future Federation of Malaysia. This revolt was also staged in order to help promote a greater voice in the political decision-making process for the Burnei People's Party. Sukarno had also been highly critical of this proposed Malaysian Federation.

The PKI leaders gave their full support and backing to the Burnei rebels. In fact, there were indications that the PKI was behind an organized attempt to aid the rebel's cause by transporting armed volunteers to the area of conflict. The Malaysian government accused the Sukarno regime of interfering in the internal affairs of Malaysia. The charges that Indonesia's government was involved in

promoting unrest within Burnei caused a worsening of tensions between the Indonesian and Malaysian governments.

Overall the Malaysian campaign was less successful from an Indonesian point of view than their previous involvement in the West Irian dispute had been. However, this campaign did enable the PKI leaders to keep alive and promote the nationalistic fervor that was engulfing Indonesia during early 1963. By this time, Sukarno had come to regard the PKI and its leaders as one of the most loyal and enthusiastic supporters of his regime and the policies being advocated by him. Such an attitude on the part of Sukarno greatly helped the PKI to consolidate their political gains and their position within the Indonesian national government. Unlike the West Irian affair, where the PKI remained content to underwrite and give merely vocal support to Sukarno's radical and nationalistic foreign policies, their involvement and role in the Malaysian dispute took on a different flavor. Specifically,

"as the confrontation against Malaysia reached a crescendo,...the party escaped its subordinate ideological role and began to provide the theoretical concepts that underwrote the campaign. Sukarno's themes remained prominent, but they were progressively overshadowed by the innovations devised by the PKI leadership, and Sukarno himself came to borrow more and more extensively from the PKI's ideological armory."<sup>13</sup>

The changed balance between Sukarno and the PKI reflected the PKI's enhanced position in the overall governmental hierarchy following the West Irian confrontation with the

Dutch. By late 1963, the PKI leaders were beginning to see their political position as being more secure so that they felt more confident in beginning to formulate and undertake bolder and more aggressive political initiatives. Sukarno welcomed the support of the PKI and the strength which it afforded to his position in the Indonesian government just so long as the PKI did not seek to undermine his standing, power, or prestige as the supreme leader within the Indonesian political system.

PKI policy in the early part of 1963 was directed toward a course of action whereby the PKI did not initiate or otherwise aid in the formulation of any specific foreign policy with regard to the increasingly tense relations between Indonesia and Malaysia. On the other hand, the PKI leadership was ever vigilant against the adoption or implementation of any policy or decision which they deemed to be detrimental to their interests or standing within the government. Actually, Malaysia during the early part of 1963, played a relatively minor role with the PKI leadership. The primary concern being voiced by Aidit during this time revolved around a growing disquietude over the threat of U.S. imperialism in Southeast Asia, and their attempts to increase their influence and position within Indonesia.

#### Indonesian-United States Relations

Until the early part of 1960, the U.S. had substantial

economic and commercial interests in Indonesia. Many U.S. governmental leaders were becoming increasingly concerned over the growing amount of Communist influence within Indonesia during the late 1950's and early 1960's. The U.S. government refused to extend any military or other material support to the Sukarno regime during the course of their initial dispute with the Dutch over West Irian. Since the Netherlands was a member of the NATO alliance system, U.S. foreign policy makers felt that they could not go against their alliance commitments to the Dutch by supporting the Indonesian claims to West Irian. The growing shift in Sukarno's politics in the late 1950's and early 1960's as reflected in his moves toward establishing closer relations with the U.S.S.R., is indicative of this changed stance or shift in his foreign policy orientation. His increasing reliance on the Soviet Union for military and technical assistance during the conduct of the West Irian dispute with the Dutch was a very troublesome issue for President John F. Kennedy. Under President Kennedy the U.S. sought to try and slow Indonesia's move toward the Communist bloc. The U.S. government thought that by aiding the Indonesian armed forces they could thereby effectively counter the growing power and influence of the PKI within the domestic Indonesian political system. The Indonesian military was predominantly anti-communist in their political orientation at least up until the time before the conclusion of the West Irian dispute and as such the increased support

which the U.S. proposed to give them would have served as an effective counterbalance to ensure that the PKI could not take over the control of the Indonesian national government in the event Sukarno was somehow to lose his predominant position as head of the Indonesian government. While the Kennedy administration was not willing to sell the Indonesian government military equipment while they were involved with the Dutch over West Irian, they would be willing to sponsor some sort of negotiations, and act as a mediator in order to try and help resolve this conflict. President Kennedy sent his brother, Robert, to try and initiate these peace negotiations in February 1962. By March, the disputing parties were meeting in order to try and negotiate a settlement under the efforts of U.S. appointed mediator, Ellsworth Bunker. After five months of negotiations, a settlement was finally reached on terms very favorable to Indonesia. It was decided that the territory of West Irian would be governed by the United Nations until May 1963, when it would then be turned over to Indonesia.

For its part, the PKI was very influential in turning Indonesian foreign policy away from the West and toward closer relations with the Communist bloc. The PKI leadership used U.S. involvement in both the Belgian Congo and in Cuba to help stimulate a strong anti-American sentiment within Indonesia. However, "among elite circles in particular, opinion had by no means solidified in favor of

a decisive break with the United States and total commitment to the Communist bloc."<sup>14</sup> The PKI was very much concerned over the possibility of any future Indonesian involvement with the U.S. They were particularly worried about a U.S. sponsored economic stabilization policy scheme which was designed to help promote growth and development of the Indonesian economy which was in rather dismal shape during the early 1960's. The PKI leaders, however, viewed this economic stabilization scheme as a means whereby the U.S. government would be able to increase their power and influence within the Indonesian political system. During late 1962 and early 1963, PKI efforts were directed against this economic stabilization scheme in an effort to curtail the possibility of any increased U.S. involvement in Indonesian domestic politics. Sukarno's concern with economic stabilization and improvement of economic conditions in his country in late 1962 seemed to bolster U.S. influence in Indonesia. "The United States had been content for some time in encouraging such a course, which, it believed, would promote stability in Indonesia, combat Russian influence, and undercut the appeal of the PKI."<sup>15</sup>

As was noted by one observer:

"the PKI had a great deal more to fear from the projected stabilization scheme than just the adverse effects austerity would have upon its electorate; and it is not necessary to assume,...that the PKI leaders welcomed the prospect of economic collapse as an aid to their revolutionary objectives to appreciate why they should have been alarmed by signs that stabilization was being seriously considered."<sup>16</sup>

The PKI leaders pushed the concept that the U.S. sponsored economic stabilization scheme was a neo-colonialist plan to take over the Indonesian economy and thereby "promote the interests of reactionaries among the Indonesian political elite."<sup>17</sup> As far as Sukarno was concerned, he would have liked to have confronted Malaysia while also being able to receive the substantial U.S. economic aid promised under their economic stabilization plan, but he realized that he could not hope to successfully accomplish both these objectives. Aidit continued to warn against the dangers inherent in the U.S. economic stabilization plan urging instead that Indonesia's economic ills could be solved by different means which would not require Indonesia to relinquish its independence. Aidit urged the Sukarno government to seek assistance from the various friendly Communist regimes throughout the world. Initially, Sukarno was undecided about how to handle this situation. He eventually decided in September 1963 to formally endorse his "crush Malaysia" policy. After this time, the U.S. gave up its efforts to support Malaysia and placate Indonesia. From this time forward, Sukarno and the PKI moved steadily to the political left, and thus closer to the Communist bloc.

#### Indonesia and the Sino-Soviet Dispute

In its early stages, the PKI and Indonesia were virtually untouched by this ideological dispute. "The major factor in this achievement was the long tradition of



independence from outside control established by the PKI, which Aidit and his colleagues fostered and made a cornerstone of their policy."<sup>18</sup> The PKI was, however, tied into the international Communist movement. Formally, the leaders of Indonesian communism viewed their party in orthodox fashion as both an integral part of the Indonesian national movement and a detachment of the international communist movement indicated to the goals of overthrowing capitalism and imperialism and establishing socialism on a world scale.<sup>19</sup> The PKI leaders ran their own movement and recognized no other outside authority which could dictate decision-making to them. PKI leaders only wanted their movement to be respected by outside Communists and they pledged their best efforts to work for a unified and united Communist movement worldwide. Their success insofar as the second objective was concerned was somewhat minimal. The development of the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute in the early 1960's served to ultimately shift PKI ideology away from the Soviet viewpoint and bring it more into line with the Chinese ideological viewpoint. This shift was brought about largely through the Chinese support for Indonesian nationalism which formed a vital element in the PKI's domestic strategy and which would eventually enable them to gain political power within the national government. However, the Indonesian Communist leaders only adopted so much of the Chinese viewpoint as they regarded as necessary for their own unique ideological

programs and policies. The PKI tried to avoid any entangling alliances or special attachment to any outside Communist movement in the early stages of this ideological dispute. During the 1950's, the PKI leaders viewed the Soviet Union "as the pioneer of socialism and a staunch ally of Indonesian independence."<sup>20</sup> After 1953, both the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties began to favor a policy which was aimed at affording to other Communist parties around the world greater latitude in devising and coordinating their own particular programs as well as determining their own solutions relative to domestic power and how such power might be acquired. Initially, the Indonesian Communists favored the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence between the capitalist and Communist nations of the world. As noted by Aidit and other PKI leaders:

"the presence of the Communist state system opened up the possibility that, with 'disinterested socialist aid', the ex-colonial countries could, at least in some instances, avoid foreign subjugation and dependence, build up national economies based on state enterprise, and proceed by way of a stage of 'national democracy' to socialism."<sup>21</sup>

Both economic and military assistance were vital elements in this transitional process. The Sino-Soviet conflict did not begin in earnest until 1959 and by 1960, Soviet domination over the international Communist movement was at a close and China was emerging as a world Communist power in Asia. China's geographical location and concern over unique Asian problems were contributing factors in

her future dominance over this area of the world. The Soviet ideological view predominated within the PKI until late 1961 when it gradually started to become submerged until it was finally publically renounced in the latter part of 1963. As was noted "the image of the Soviet Union as the major center of Communism remained substantially intact until late 1961, despite the fact that by then disagreements had arisen between the CPSU and the PKI."<sup>22</sup> This attachment to the Soviet Union can be explained in part,

"by the important role Russian aid played in 1959-1961 in preparing Indonesia for the campaign to liberate West Irian, aid which, to the Indonesian Communists, emphasized the strength of the U.S.S.R., its support of national liberation struggles, and its value in cementing the nationalist alliance between the PKI and Sukarno."<sup>23</sup>

The PKI's "Indonesianization of Marxism-Leninism" became the phrase by which the Indonesian Communist leaders underlined their independence in determining their policies. They found considerable difficulty, however, in explaining precisely what characterized the Indonesian features of their theory and strategy. The difficulty lay not in the absence of such features but in the fact that their distinctiveness flowed basically from the adaption of the Communist movement in Indonesia to the conditions established and imposed by a non-Communist elite. To have acknowledged this, however, would have lowered the PKI leaders' accomplishments, both in their own eyes and in those of their followers and other Communist parties, by drawing a

contrast between their image as bold revolutionaries and their "revisionist" strategy toward the question of power.

The Sino-Soviet ideological split served to undermine the Communist claims that such a philosophy eliminated and served to ameliorate differences between the nations of the world and that all Communist nations were always united in the common struggle against imperialism. Initially, Aidit and the other PKI leaders refused to acknowledge that there was any sort of split between Soviet and Chinese ideology. Aidit did condemn the Soviet leadership for the breach between the CPSU and the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) noting that the ideological dispute was at least partly attributable to Soviet-Yugoslavian problems. However, throughout 1960, the PKI leadership continued to side with the Soviets on most of the issues being debated as part of the growing ideological discord between the CPSU and the CPC. The crux of the Sino-Soviet dispute centered around three innovations to Communist ideology proposed by Khrushchev: the doctrine of peaceful coexistence, the inevitability of war and granting of support to the various national liberation movements around the world as opposed to the peaceful transition to power in these non-Communist countries. One of the most frequent charges leveled against the CPSU by the CPC was the lack of sufficient aid being rendered to these various national liberation movements around the world. Such an allegation also usually criticized the Soviet Union for their policy

of peaceful coexistence toward the capitalist countries of the world, particularly the U.S. The policy of the CPC advocated the use of armed force in order to free a country from colonial domination. The ideological issues raised by the CPC were of crucial importance to the PKI. Very often, the PKI, instead of taking an affirmative stance on one side or another in this ideological debate, would try to act as a mediating force in order to unify the international Communist movement. Various attempts to try and resolve the differences between the CPSU and the CPC proved futile. The meeting of the Twenty-Second CPSU Party Congress in October 1961 witnessed the expulsion of Albania as a member of the Warsaw Pact military alliance system. The Chinese delegation to this party Congress was highly critical of this Soviet action. When Khrushchev criticized Stalin during this party congress, the PKI leaders noted that they would continue to respect Stalin's writings and to give these writings whatever credence they thought his writings deserved under any given circumstances. The PKI leadership thus reaffirmed their policy of independence by taking such a position. The PKI's ideological orientation still stood somewhere in between that of the Soviets and the Chinese by the end of 1961, although a subtle shift in PKI ideology toward the Chinese viewpoint could be detected upon close observation of their policies and programs. As Ruth McVey has so aptly pointed out:

"In the changed atmosphere of guided democracy, aims and not institutions are real...the nation's aims can not be achieved by compromise and calculation, but only by enthusiasm and faith...the revolution will not be completed until imperialism is crushed...the pragmatic flexibility of Khrushchev's goulash communism was hardly compatible with this spirit; it appeared self-seeking, complacent, concerned with the petty problems of adapting to the present rather than the monumental task of creating for the future. Far more sympathetic was the Chinese stand, with its crusade against imperialism, its assertion that the under developed countries are the world's revolutionary centres and its assurance that even the poorest countries need not depend on foreign aid....all themes recurrent in the rhetoric of guided democracy."<sup>24</sup>

However, the PKI leaders were not totally at ease with the entire ideology and philosophy of the CPC. While the PKI asserted its desire not to take an affirmative stand on the Sino-Soviet dispute:

"the PKI in 1961 almost certainly underestimated its reservations about the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence, probably because of concern over the risk that Russia would slow down military supplies, whose availability had greatly strengthened the PKI's domestic standing."<sup>25</sup>

Once the West Irian venture had been concluded, the preference of the PKI for the more radical and nationalistic policies being espoused by the CPC became more evident. Actually, this trend in the PKI's ideological orientation could be noticed before this time. The PKI's Seventh Party Congress held in April 1962 put great emphasis on the need to maintain a vigilant and continuing struggle against all forms of

imperialism. Khrushchev's policy of peaceful coexistence was declared to be contrary to this objective. The CPSU was criticized for its collaboration with the U.S. and its "attempts to intimidate parties that declined to follow its ideological lead."<sup>26</sup> Gradually throughout 1962-1963 the PKI's ideological viewpoint became more aligned with that of the CPC. The U.S.S.R.'s involvement in the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis gave added impetus to the Indonesian charges that the Soviet ideological policies were helping to undermine the entire world Communist movement. Although the differences between the Soviet Union and Indonesia became more pronounced throughout 1963, there never was any formal break in relations between the two countries at least not until after 1965. The Soviet Union responded to the PKI's changed ideological stance by refusing to render further military assistance to Indonesia in their confrontation with Malaysia. Sukarno's NEFO-OLDEFO doctrine was repudiated by the CPSU at least as it was being employed in his confrontation with Malaysia. Although the PKI was ultimately to adopt the Chinese ideological prospective in this Sino-Soviet dispute, the PKI leaders made it abundantly clear that the Indonesian Communists were only adopting so much of the Chinese philosophy as was determined to be relevant to the radical and nationalistic policies being pursued by the Sukarno regime.



An Analysis of Soviet Arms Transfers  
to Indonesia -- 1960-1965

The largest number of Soviet made weaponry systems were transferred to Indonesia between 1960 and 1963. Most of the military equipment transferred from the U.S.S.R. to Indonesia during this time was in response to the Indonesian involvement in West Irian, and to a lesser extent with Indonesia's later confrontation with Malaysia.

A discussion of the various weaponry systems involved in the arms trade between these two countries together with a brief look at the political events transpiring during this same period of time will help to show some type of correlation between these two factors, i.e., an inter-relationship between the quality and quantity of weapons systems being transferred from the U.S.S.R. to Indonesia to the ideological alignment between these same two countries as perceived through a historical-political evaluation.

Beginning in 1960, the Indonesian government was beginning to receive a substantial amount of sophisticated weaponry systems especially insofar as combat jet aircraft were concerned. The receipt of twenty MIG-19's during that year gave the Indonesian air force a relatively modern combat fighter aircraft. In fact, the MIG-19 was the first Soviet built aircraft to obtain supersonic speed in level flight. The MIG-19 was first operational in the Soviet air force in 1956 so that its transfer to Indonesia

roughly four years later is indicative of the rather closer ideological relationship between these two countries. Sukarno's anti-imperialistic stance in the West Irian struggle with the Dutch together with his initial support for the Soviet ideological position in the emerging Sino-Soviet ideological dispute were doubtless other underlying factors in the Soviet Union's decision to transfer such advanced weapons to Indonesia in 1960. Likewise, the transfer of about forty IL-28 light jet bombers in this same year, although not as modern or sophisticated as the MIG-19, were most likely given to Indonesia more for their strategic and tactical benefits rather than for any high degree of sophistication which they may have possessed. These IL-28 bombers were a formidable strategic offensive weapon given their speed, range and bomb payload capacity. Moreover, the IL-28 was probably one of the most versatile aircraft in operation during this time. This aircraft was capable of performing in a variety of combat situations including those missions calling for aircraft to be employed in a light bomber, tactical reconnaissance, or anti-ship torpedo roles. The Indonesian ground forces were also supplied with both the Mi-4 and Mi-5 helicopters which were not as modern as some of the other Soviet front line military transport helicopters, but nevertheless, were well suited for the type of role for which they would eventually be employed in Indonesia, namely -- military transport and airlift. Normally the Soviet government will not supply

their allies with the most sophisticated military equipment which the Soviet government currently possesses although exceptions are sometimes made, particularly in those instances where the Soviets have an opportunity to expand their influence in a strategically important area. Indonesia did receive the very sophisticated MIG-21 jet fighter in 1964, but by this time new versions of this particular aircraft had already become operational within the Soviet air force. Such advances by the Soviet government enabled them to transfer the slightly outdated version of the MIG-21 to the Indonesians.

Most of the military equipment received by the Indonesian government from the Soviet Union during 1961-1962 consisted of various types of naval vessels together with numerous kinds of missiles, including the SA-2 "Guideline" surface to air missile, the SS-N-2 "Styx" surface to surface missile and also a large amount of AS-1 "Kennel" air to surface type missiles. The naval vessels supplied to Indonesia were designed to assist her in her confrontation and struggle with the Dutch over West Irian. Being an island nation, the Indonesian armed forces relied primarily on naval and amphibious warfare in their struggles against those forces believed to be an imperialist or neo-colonialist threat to her recently acquired independence. The receipt of various kinds of motor gunboats, as well as a cruiser, a destroyer, and some frigates is indicative of Indonesia's dependence on her naval forces in protecting

Indonesian national security interests. Although most of the naval vessels transferred to Indonesia between 1961 and 1964 were more than seven years old at the time of their delivery, they did serve to effectively modernize and bolster the scanty number of old Dutch naval vessels which had been left behind in Indonesia following the Dutch pullout in 1949.

The types of missiles being transported to Indonesia from the U.S.S.R. between 1961 and 1965 were much more sophisticated than were the naval vessels mentioned above. For instance, the air to surface AS-1 "Kennel" missile which was first received in Indonesia in 1962 was less than one year out of initial production by the time it arrived in Indonesia. These missiles were to be carried aboard some of the twenty-five Tu-16 bombers supplied to Indonesia during 1962 and 1963. The delivery of such a sophisticated missile during 1962 came at a time when the West Irian dispute was at a crisis stage. The supply of the Tu-16 bomber to Indonesia also helped to increase the offensive firepower of the Indonesian air force. The fact that these Tu-16 bombers were nearly ten years out of initial production is not a basis for concluding that this was not a very effective weapons system. Quite the contrary, when the Tu-16 was armed with the more up to date AS-1 "Kennel" air to surface missile, its offensive firepower and military capabilities were enormously increased. This same point is equally applicable to the supply of the

modern SS-N-2 "Styx" surface to surface cruise missile which is normally employed with the "Komar" class missile patrol boats transferred to Indonesia between 1961 and 1963. The combination of these two weaponry systems helped to strengthen Indonesia's coastal defense system.

Between 1962 and 1964 another trend emerges insofar as the quality and quantity of weapons systems being transported to Indonesia from the U.S.S.R. is concerned. The pertinent data shows a definite decline in the number of weapons systems being supplied. For instance, no more sophisticated SA-2 "Guideline" surface to air missiles were transferred after 1963. The number of naval vessels declined sharply after 1962 in both quantity and quality. Doubtless such a trend is indicative of the growing animosity between the CPSU and the PKI after 1962, especially after the involvement by the Soviet Union in Cuba and the hostile moves being made toward the proposed Malaysian Federation by Sukarno's government. Such a policy was definitely not in line with Moscow's attempts to try and steer a more cautious and peaceful path toward relations with the capitalist states throughout the world. The small amount of weaponry systems transferred to Indonesia in 1963 as compared to those transferred the previous year is indicative of this new trend in Soviet foreign policy. Although willing to give vocal support to the Indonesian confrontation with Malaysia, the Soviet government was not willing to lend this support on a more tangible basis through the transportation and supply of

more highly sophisticated weapons systems. In fact, the only such weapons systems supplied to Indonesia during 1963 consisted of two "Riga" class frigates, ten "P6" class motor torpedo boats and thirty BTR-152 armoured personnel carriers (APC's). As far as the naval vessels are concerned, they were by no means very modern or otherwise sophisticated either in design or military capability. Such an observation is even more applicable to the BTR-152 APC's transferred to Indonesia during this time. This military equipment was utilized in World War II and hence was almost twenty years old by the time it was finally supplied to Indonesia.

While the overall supply of weapons systems supplied to Indonesia in 1964 increased over what it had been the year before, the quality of these weapons systems in terms of their design sophistication and military capability was possibly even inferior to those systems which had been supplied in 1963. Indonesia did receive some eighteen MIG-21's during 1964 along with over one hundred K-13 "Atoll" air to air missiles which were to be utilized as part of the weaponry systems aboard these newly delivered MIG-21's. The Indonesian Navy also was supplied with four additional "Komar" class missile patrol boats which were deployed in order to bolster Indonesia's shore based defense systems and other important military installations. The Indonesian Navy also received some older naval vessels including some "Riga" class frigates and a "Skoryi" class

destroyer, but these naval vessels had already been refitted and refurbished by the U.S.S.R. prior to their delivery, thus attesting to their outmoded condition. Indonesian ground forces also received the PT-76 light battle tank which was almost ten years old by the time it was delivered to Indonesia in 1964. It was inferior in both quality and design to both the T-54, T-55, and T-62 main battle tanks developed by the U.S.S.R. during the late 1950's and early 1960's.

Soviet reaction to the definite shift in Indonesian ideology, which brought Indonesia closer to the CPC prospective insofar as the Sino-Soviet dispute was concerned, could be noticed by the beginning of 1965. The level of arms supplied to Indonesia during the first nine months of this year dropped off drastically from the previous year's level. The supply of MIG-21's, K-13 "Atoll" air to air missiles and "Komar" class missile patrol boats were greatly reduced from the numbers which had been sold or given away in past years.

Relations between the U.S.S.R. and Indonesia between 1961-1965 can be seen to have been on a gradual decline throughout this entire period, but this trend in the relationships of these two countries was not always reflected in the levels or quality of arms being transferred to Indonesia at least not immediately in the sense that there was often a time lag as concerned the Soviet response to the changing ideological stance of Sukarno and the PKI



throughout any particular time period. Soviet reaction to a change in the foreign policy position being advocated by the top level Indonesian government leaders was very often slow in its inception due to the fact that the foreign policy makers within the Soviet Union wanted and needed time in order to evaluate and determine that if, in fact the Indonesian government was definitely committed to an ideological position contrary to that being espoused by the CPSU.

These conclusions insofar as they reflect the fact that the level of cooperation between the Soviet Union and Indonesia was gradually on the decline between 1960 and 1965 can be highlighted on yet another basis. By using the dimension of interaction (DI) scores derived from the evaluation of international events transpiring between the U.S.S.R. and Indonesia during this six year period as they are rated according to the various categories enumerated on the 15 point Azar-Sloan conflict-cooperation scale, as such is employed in conjunction with their Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) research measuring the levels of conflict or cooperation among various nations, it can be observed that there is a steady but gradual decline in the level of cooperation between these two nations. (See Table III-1) The lone exception is the DI score derived from 1965 which seemingly indicates a rise in the cooperation level between these two nations, however, this figure must be disregarded as less significant as the

frequency level used for obtaining this DI value was the lowest out of all of the years being evaluated. This 1965 DI score was derived at based on the occurrence of only six events transpiring between these two countries during this abbreviated year.

Soviet economic aid to Indonesia by 1965 had reached nearly \$70 million with all economic aid from all other Communist bloc sources amounting to about \$725 million. When military assistance is added to this total it will reach nearly \$1 billion. "Clearly the amount of Communist aid, both economic and military, has been very high."<sup>27</sup>

It is clear from the foregoing that by the early 1960's that Indonesia was one of the most highly favored Third World countries as far as the Soviet Union was concerned in terms of the amount of economic and especially military aid with which it was supplied by the Soviet government. Indonesia's geographical position and her influence among the other emerging Afro-Asian states made her a logical target for Soviet interest. The fact that Sukarno held very radical and especially anti-imperialistic ideological leanings made it that much easier for the Soviet government to establish a close working relationship with this Southeast Asian island nation. "One should meanwhile not overlook the importance in Soviet eyes of the Indonesian Communist Party in shaping Moscow's strategies in Indonesia."<sup>28</sup> The PKI's growing influence and collaboration with the Sukarno regime in the early 1960's was

one of the primary Soviet interests in Indonesia at this time. However, a gradual yet steady decline in Soviet-Indonesian relations can be observed throughout the period particularly from late 1961 to Sukarno's ultimate downfall in September 1965. While this trend in Soviet-Indonesian relations was seemingly not reflected at least insofar as their political intercourse was concerned, at least if such can be measured through diplomatic or other such cultural, economic, or scientific exchanges are concerned, there are indications that such a decline in their political and ideological relationships were evidently based to some degree on the level and quality of military hardware being supplied to Indonesia from 1960 to 1965. The decline in Soviet-Indonesian relationships following 1961 is attributable to two factors. First, the worsening state of the Indonesian economy, especially after 1963 led many Soviet economists to wonder whether or not Indonesia could repay the large economic loans extended to them by the Soviet government. Second, the increasing radicalization of Sukarno's foreign policies helped to push the U.S.S.R. and Indonesia further apart at least ideologically. The influence of the PKI on Sukarno's foreign policies was becoming increasingly evident after 1962, as was that of the CPC. The Soviet government could not bring itself to support Sukarno's NEFO-OLDEFO doctrine which he utilized first in his struggle with the Dutch over West Irian and then against the British in his confrontation with them over the proposed Malaysian Federation.

The failure of the PKI and Sukarno to endorse Soviet participation in the scheduled June 1965 Second Bandung Conference to be held in Algiers was ample evidence of this growing alienation between the U.S.S.R. and Indonesia. Soviet interest sharply declined over Indonesia after the middle of 1964, as Soviet leaders became increasingly critical of Sukarno's domestic and foreign policies.


"No very exact figure has been fixed for Soviet arms transfers to Indonesia, but it is probable that they ran as high as \$1.2 billion before they dwindled off in 1964 and 1965."<sup>29</sup> The fluctuations in Soviet relationships with many emerging Third World countries has led one observer to conclude that:

"Such has been the uneven course of Soviet relations with Indonesia, judged by some Western observers to reflect Russia's greatest failure in dealing with nations of the Third World. Whether or not the judgment is valid, depends upon how one views the Russian objective in Indonesia. If one assumes the Russian objective to have been the substitution of Russian influence for Western, then the spectacular Soviet successes before 1965 must indeed be considered to have been more than cancelled out in later years....If, on the other hand, Russia's main object after 1960 was to destroy Peking's influence, then the course of events in Indonesia does not represent a catastrophe for Soviet policy."<sup>30</sup>

In conclusion, it might be pointed out that:

"Given the condition that existed under Sukarno, it was highly unlikely that a constructive foreign aid program could even be developed...more than any other country, Indonesia reveals the difficulties of administering a foreign aid program in conditions of underdevelopment."<sup>31</sup>

Figure 2



## Footnotes

## Chapter III

1. Rex Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics 1959-1965 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1974), p. 45.

2. Ibid., p. 24.

3. Ibid., p. 23.

4. Ibid., p. 26.

5. Ibid., p. 42.

6. Ibid., p. 69.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid., p. 175. Cf. Justus M. van der Kroef, "The New West Guinea Settlement: Its Origins and Implications," Orbis 7 (Spring 1963) pp. 120-149; Justus M. van der Kroef, The West New Guinea Dispute (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1958), and Donald E. Weatherbee, Ideology in Indonesia: Sukarno's Indonesian Revolution (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966).

9. Ibid., p. 179. Cf. George Modelski, The New Emerging Forces: Documents on the Ideology of Indonesian Foreign Policy (Canberra: Australian National University, 1963), and Bernard Dahm, Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1969).

10. Ibid., p. 194. Cf. Marshall Goldman, Soviet Foreign Aid (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1967).

11. Ibid., p. 196. Cf. Herbert Feith, "President Sukarno, the Army, and the Communists: The Triangle Changes Shape," Asian Survey 4 (August 1964), pp. 969-980, and Guy J. Pauker, "The Role of the Military in Indonesia," in J.J. Johnson, ed. The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962).

12. Ibid., p. 199.

13. Ibid., p. 204. Cf. Donald Hindley, "President Sukarno and the Communists: The Politics of Domestication," American Political Science Review 56 (December 1962), pp. 915-926, and Ruth T. McVey, The Rise of Indonesian Communism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1965).

14. Ibid., p. 199.
15. Ibid., p. 205.
16. Ibid., pp. 206-207.
17. Ibid., p. 207. Cf. J.A.C. Mackie, "Inflation and Confrontation in Indonesia," Australian Outlook 18 (December 1964), pp. 278-298.
18. Ibid., p. 329. Cf. Justus M. van der Kroef, "Dilemmas of Indonesian Communism," Pacific Affairs 35 (Summer 1962), pp. 141-159, and Guy J. Pauker, "Indonesia: The PKI's Road to Power," in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., The Communist Revolution in Asia (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Publishers, 1965).
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid., p. 332.
21. Ibid., p. 333.
22. Ibid., p. 334-335.
23. Ibid., p. 335. Cf. Donald Hindley, "The Indonesian Communist Party and the Conflict in the International Communist Movement," China Quarterly No. 19 (July-September 1964), pp. 99-119, and D.P. Monzingo, Sino-Indonesian Relations: An Overview, 1955-1965 (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1965).
24. Ibid., p. 336-337.
25. Ibid., p. 342.
26. Ibid., pp. 346-347. Cf. Ruth T. McVey, "The Strategic Triangle: (2) Indonesia," Survey No. 54 (January 1965), pp. 113-122.
27. Ibid., p. 348.
28. Ibid., p. 357. Cf. Ruth T. McVey, "Indonesian Communism and China," in Tang Tsou, ed., China in Crisis, 2 Vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), Vol. II.
29. Charles B. McLane, Soviet-Asian Relations, Vol. II: Soviet Third World Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973).
30. Wynfred Joshua and Stephen P. Gilbert, Arms for the Third World: Soviet Military Aid Diplomacy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969), p. 73.
31. McLane, Soviet-Asian Relations, p. 81.



## Chapter IV

### Conclusions

The previous information presented with regard to arms trade between the Soviet Union with both Cuba and Indonesia is suggestive of the fact that there seems to be some kind of relationship between arms trade and ideological alignment. Such an observation becomes more valid or at least tangible when some empirical figures are offered in support of it. Based on a 1974 report to Congress by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency<sup>1</sup> the following figures were reported as annual arms import expenditures for both Cuba and Indonesia from 1961 to 1965.

Table IV-1

Annual Arms Import Expenditures 1961 to 1965  
(1974 U.S. dollars)

USSR to Cuba	USSR to Indonesia
1961 - \$35 million	1961 - \$123 million
1962 - \$455 million	1962 - \$497 million
1963 - \$76 million	1963 - \$238 million
1964 - \$34 million	1964 - \$118 million
1965 - \$21 million	1965 - \$178 million

When these annual arms import expenditure figures are compared to the various dimensions of interaction (DI) scores obtained from the events data contained within COPDAB, it becomes more apparent that a linkage does in fact exist between the overall transfer of various weaponry systems as denoted by the annual arms import expenditures noted above, and the level of consensus or cooperation between the particular countries involved. A brief descriptive analysis of the COPDAB results and their correlation with the various levels of arms expenditures will help to highlight the purported linkage between arms transfer and ideology.

With respect to Cuba and its relationship with the Soviet Union, there can be detected several periods where fluctuations can be seen to exist. These fluctuations are noted with reference to the different DI mean (coop) scores computed based on events data information presented in the current COPDAB files. Each particular event transpiring between the particular countries under study in this report are coded on a 15 point scale, wherein a score from 1 to 7 is indicative of a certain level of consensus or cooperation according to a specific weighted value given to each of the numbers within this 1 to 7 range. The number 8 is considered to be neutral insofar as it is neither cooperative nor conflictive in nature. Those DI score values between 9 and 15 are interpreted as being conflictive to one degree or another based on a similar

weighted value scale as was assigned to those numbers ranging 0 through 7. By coding each event with a value of 1 through 15, which has transpired between any two countries in question and by doing some simplified multiplication utilizing the specific weighted values assigned to each particular number times the frequency of events occurring between any two given nations, it becomes possible to obtain some empirical measure which is theoretically representative of the degree of cooperation or conflict existing between any nations over a particular span of time.

The DI mean (coop) scores calculated for Soviet-Cuban relations from 1960 to 1965 indicate two periods where some degree of variance or fluctuation is apparent or otherwise noticeable. A correlation of these DI mean (coop) scores together with a brief reference to those historical-ideological events dominating the relations between these two countries from 1960 through 1965 should prove helpful in deliniating any linkage between the level and quantity of arms being delivered to Cuba from the U.S.S.R. to the degree of ideological alignment existing between Castro and the top level CPSU leadership. (See Table IV-2 - next page).

Table IV-2

Dimension of Interaction (DI) Mean (Coop) Scores  
USSR to CUBA

Year	Frequency	Conf.	Coop.	Coop. Mean	Coop. DI	Coop. Mean DI
1960	14	1	13	5.46	203	15.62
1961	6	3	3	6.00	43	14.33
1962	27 (1 neutral)	1	25	5.08	450	18.00
1963	8	0	8	5.50	132	16.50
1964	6	0	6	4.83	115	19.16
1965	4	0	4	4.75	87	21.75

Soviet-Cuban DI mean (coop) scores from 1960 to 1965  
were computed and found to be the following.

Table IV-3

Soviet-Cuban DI Mean (Coop) Scores

1960 - 15.62
1961 - 14.33
1962 - 18.00
1963 - 16.50
1964 - 19.16
1965 - 21.75

These DI mean (coop) scores indicate that there are two years in which the cooperation level between the Soviet Union can be seen to have declined. First, the level of cooperation between these two countries dropped from 15.62 in 1960 to 14.33 in 1961. Such a decline in cooperation might be attributable to several factors including Cuban economic problems aided in part by the elimination of the annual Cuban sugar quota by the U.S. in early 1960. Another possible explanation might have been the fact that the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion, sponsored in part by the U.S. government, might have caused the Soviet government to briefly re-evaluate their foreign policy objectives in Latin America and thereby momentarily take a more cautious position toward the future development of their relationship with the Castro regime in Cuba. If in fact this was the case, Castro's consequent indignant attitude toward the Khrushchev regime might well explain the decline in cooperation from what it had previously been only one year before. The second instance in which a decline in Soviet-Cuban relations is evident is in 1963. The cause underlying this decline in cooperation is undoubtedly attributable to Castro's persistence in calling for increased Soviet military assistance to many of the underground leftist and other guerilla groups throughout Latin America, which were trying to overthrow the capitalist oriented regimes governing many of the countries throughout this area. The fact that Castro continued to insist on

the use of armed struggle or other such violent means for the transformation of these various Latin American countries along more socialist lines, was directly contrary to the newly implemented Soviet policy of "peaceful coexistence" following the near catastrophic confrontation with the U.S. over the stationing of missiles in Cuba during 1962. However, another reason of equal importance which is instructive in helping to assess this decline in cooperation between Cuba and the Soviet Union, arises out of the Soviet's handling of the October 1962 missile crisis. The unilateral decision by Khrushchev to withdraw the Soviet missiles previously transferred to Cuba was deplored by Castro as well as the Chinese Communists as an infringement of Cuba's sovereignty and independence. Castro was especially upset over the way in which Khrushchev had conducted himself throughout this entire matter. He seemed to feel that Khrushchev should have least conferred with him before making the final decision to withdraw the Soviet supplied missiles. Since the 1974 ACDA report does not give any estimate as to the level of Cuban arms expenditures for 1960 it would be mere speculation in trying to show any sort of correlation between the level of military expenditures for 1961 to the COPDAB data since no such expenditures level is given for 1960. However, with regard to the decline in cooperation for 1963, some correlation can be made predicted upon the level of Cuban arms expenditures made that year which amounted to only \$76 million as

compared to about \$455 million the previous year, and the COPDAB computation which dropped from 18.00 in 1962 to a reading of 16.50 in 1963. While the explanations given above are not necessarily the only interpretations suggested by the data in question, these explanations are at least indicative of a trend which holds forth the possibility that a linkage between the level of arms transfers, both quantitatively and qualitatively, and the level of ideological alignment, as measured by the degree of consensus or cooperation, may in fact exist.

Such a proposition becomes even more viable when it is noted that the increased amount of cooperation between Cuba and the Soviet Union during 1962 is at least, in part, attributable to Castro's assertion in December 1961 that he was a Marxist-Leninist dedicated to leading the Cuban people toward a closer relationship with the other Communist nations of the world and ultimately toward the successful creation of a socialist state in Cuba. Likewise, the rise in cooperation following 1963 between these two countries can be explained, based on Castro's visit to the Soviet Union in April-May 1963, in an effort to try and work out some kind of compromise solution to some of the problem areas which had grown up in Soviet-Cuban relations following the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis. These historical-ideological events can be tied into the levels of military expenditures for both 1962 and 1964.

Cuban military spending for 1962 totaled approximately



\$455 million more than in any other year during this period from 1960 to 1965. This high level of military spending reflects both Soviet and Cuban apprehensions over the possibility that Cuba might once again be invaded by U.S. sponsored troops or possibly even the U.S. itself at some point in time in the future. Such a state of affairs may well explain the massive amount of military assistance given to the Castro regime during 1962 by the Soviet Union. The fact that the U.S.S.R. had previously acknowledged that Cuba under Castro was in the process of "building socialism" was another reason underlying the high level of military aid being extended to Cuba by the Soviet government throughout the first seven or eight months of 1962. Cuba's strategic importance to Soviet foreign policy objectives in the western hemisphere and in Latin America in particular, was such as to necessitate an increased level of Soviet involvement in Cuba.

The increased amount of cooperation between the Soviet Union and Cuba during 1964 and 1965 is reflected in the DI mean (coop) scores for these years. The 1964 DI value increased to 19.16 over the 16.50 score for 1963. The 1965 DI mean (coop) score moved up to a figure of 21.75 thereby reflecting the growing accommodation between the Soviet Union and Cuba. Such an increase in cooperation from 1964 to 1965 is based largely on the fact that during this time Castro and Cuba had repudiated the Chinese viewpoint in the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute and had moved

into a position which accepted the majority of the Soviet's ideological positions on the numerous issues in dispute as a result of the Soviet-Chinese ideological discord. Although this increased level of cooperation was not reflected in the level of military spending by Cuba during this time, such a situation is explained by the fact that the volume of weapons which Cuba received from the U.S.S.R. in 1962 was such as to fully satisfy the present and immediate future needs of the Cuban military and naval forces. In other words, a saturation level was achieved after 1962 so that the level of military spending could be reduced in future years. The majority of the weaponry systems being delivered after 1963 were intended mainly as replacements for military equipment which had been worn out or otherwise become non-functional. Another equally creditable explanation which might help to clarify the decreased level of Cuban military expenditures in 1964 and 1965 could be centered around the fact that after relations between the U.S.S.R. and Cuba began to improve during these years, that there was a sort of "time lag" insofar as the transfer of future military equipment to Cuba was concerned. Such a time lag is not an uncommon feature of any particular nation's foreign policy program in the sense that such an element always seems to manifest itself when the foreign policy making process of a country is undergoing some change or modification in an effort to acclemate itself to the rapidly changing features and circumstances

of international relations in the highly complex world today. Indicative of this last point is the fact that Cuban military arms export expenditures evidenced a twofold increase from \$21 million in 1965 to \$42 million in 1966.

With regard to Soviet-Indonesian relations from 1960 to 1965, a similar pattern as the one existing in Cuba seems to be apparent. As was the case in Cuba, Indonesia received its largest shipment of Soviet weaponry systems in 1962. Military expenditures in that year amounted to about \$497 million or roughly a 400 percent increase in the level of military spending over the previous year. The increased amount of military spending by Indonesia in 1962 is in large measure due to the fact that the Indonesian government under Sukarno was then engaged in the struggle over West Irian with the Dutch. This confrontation necessitated equipping the Indonesian ground, naval and air forces with more modern Soviet military hardware. While Indonesia's military spending fluctuated throughout this 1960 through 1965 period, the DI mean (coop) scores show a gradual but steady decline in Soviet-Indonesian relations for this entire period of time. The lone exception to this last point is 1965 where the DI mean (coop) scores show an increased level of cooperation between these two countries. Such a situation is attributable to a variety of causes. First, this increased degree of cooperation is misleading in the sense that this DI score was based on the occurrence of only six events transpiring between

Table IV-4

Dimension of Interaction (DI) Mean (Coop) Scores  
USSR to INDONESIA

Year	Frequency	Conf.	Coop.	Coop. Mean	Coop. DI	Coop. Mean DI
1960	8	1	7	4.7	142	20.28
1961	11	1	10	4.9	171	17.10
1962	6	0	6	5.5	90	15.00
1963	7	0	7	5.9	92	13.14
1964	10	0	10	6.1	105	10.50
1965	6	1	5	6.0	59	11.80

these two countries during the first nine months of 1965, and therefore, the DI computation for this year does not accurately indicate the true nature or state of Soviet-Indonesian affairs during this period of time. An alternative explanation would view the DI mean (coop) score as being accurate and justified on the basis that the increasing association between Sukarno and the PKI with the Chinese Communist's point of view in the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute was such as to warrant some concern on the part of Soviet leaders which in turn might encourage them to supply a higher level of arms to the Indonesian armed forces in order to help them oust Sukarno and the PKI from power in Indonesia. This latter explanation is debatable given the trend in the Soviet-Indonesian DI mean (coop) scores which were computed as follows.

Table IV-5  
Soviet-Indonesian DI Mean (Coop) Scores

---

1960 - 20.3
1961 - 17.1
1962 - 15.0
1963 - 13.1
1964 - 10.5
1965 - 11.8

---

Soviet military assistance to Indonesia in 1962 amounted to almost \$500 million when compared to the declining rate of cooperation between these two countries is explained by the fact that the U.S.S.R. in giving Indonesia this massive amount of military aid, wanted to try and thereby recruit Indonesia and Sukarno over to the Soviet's ideological prospective, insofar as the position they were then advocating in the Sino-Soviet dispute was concerned. The PKI's increasing influence within the Sukarno regime together with Sukarno's increasingly radical and anti-imperialistic foreign policy orientation, especially as it evolved in his so-called "crush Malaysia" program after 1962 did not conform very well with the Soviet's newly initiated policy of "peaceful coexistence", following the nearly catastrophic October 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Likewise, the PKI's public repudiation of the Soviet

ideological viewpoints in their current dispute with the Chinese in September 1963, did not help to ease the growing tension in relations between the U.S.S.R. and Indonesia. Another factor which helped in the deterioration of this relationship surrounded the large scale economic difficulties faced by the Sukarno government, especially after 1962 and their inability to repay the enormous economic and other loans extended to the Indonesian government by the U.S.S.R.


A final overview of the material presented in this report would be incomplete without some reference to the asserted justification which have been previously alluded to as a basis for this study. The fact that the ideological orientation of a particular governmental regime seems to play some undetermined yet nevertheless apparent role in the conduct of their foreign policy decision-making process is indeed, a reinforcing element in the larger context of a total and comprehensive foreign policy program needed to cope with the complex problems encountered in the realm of international affairs today. In fact, many of the more pressing foreign problems faced by today's statesmen and diplomats around the world are capable of being solved or otherwise dealt with if some kind of compromise position is willing to be discussed by these individuals. Many of these problems, such as arms control and world disarmament, are such that no solution can be reached unless all the participants realize that some change or modification will have to be made in the position being proposed or advanced

by any particular country. An understanding of a nation's history and the ideological underpinnings which are so often a crucial component in the ultimate formulation of any comprehensive foreign policy program can very well serve to effectuate a condition whereby all the leading nations of the world might somehow realize that a compromise position is a meaningful alternative to possible worldwide destruction. A knowledge of those factors or conditions which are predominant in shaping the various foreign policy programs and positions of any nation on almost any issue which ultimately will effect the future of all mankind will doubtless serve as an example that some attempt is being made to understand and appreciate the forces and conditions instrumental in shaping any particular nation's foreign policy. Such a knowledge of ideology and its function in shaping a specific nation's foreign policy also functions as an indirect asset in that it may help to identify those individuals responsible for determining the ultimate course of that nation's foreign policy. Such a situation would prove very beneficial, especially to U.S. foreign policy decision-makers in the sense that by being able to ascertain who those individuals are, who are the final arbiters of a particular's country's foreign policy, such information could enable them to construct their foreign policy programs and proposals so as to indicate that alternatives are willing to be discussed and compromises are also willing to be entered into



in an effort to remedy many of the problems facing the world's leaders today. A foreign policy approach predicated on any other basis will not be adequate insofar as it paves the way for the elimination of these common worldwide problems. A world which is becoming more complex with each passing day must somehow endeavor to break down those barriers which have previously hindered the formulation of a worldwide consensus for solving many of our present and future problems.

Figure 3



## Footnotes

## Chapter 4

1. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The International Transfer of Conventional Arms. A Report to the Congress, April 1974.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

- Alexander, Jean. Russian Aircraft Since 1940. London: Putnam and Company, Ltd., 1975.
- Bluhm, William T. Ideologies and Attitudes: Modern Political Culture. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1974.
- Bonachea, Ronaldo E. and Valdez, Nelson P. Che: Selected Works of Ernesto Guevara. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1969.
- Bracken, Arnold. The Communist Collapse in Indonesia. New York: Praeger Publishing Company, 1969.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Southeast Asia's Second Front: The Power Struggle in the Malay Archipelego. New York: Praeger Publishing Company, 1966.
- Butwell, Richard. Southeast Asia: A Political Introduction. New York: Praeger Publishing Company, 1974.
- Carter, James R. The Net Cost of Soviet Aid. New York: Praeger Publishing Company, 1971.
- Dahm, Bernard. Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1969.
- Dake, Antoine C.A. In the Spirit of the Red Banteng Indonesian Communists Between Moscow and Peking 1959-1965. Hague: Morton and Company, 1973.
- Draper, Theodore. Castroism: Theory and Practice. New York: Praeger Publishing Company, 1965.
- Feith, Herbert and Castles, Lance. Indonesian Political Thinking 1945-1965. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1970.
- Frank, Lewis A. The Arms Trade in International Relations. New York: Praeger Publishing Company, 1969.
- Griffith, William E. Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-1965. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1967.
- \_\_\_\_\_. The Sino-Soviet Rift. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1964.

- Halperin, Maurice. The Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro: An Essay in Contemporary History. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1972.
- Hammer, Darrell P. USSR: The Politics of Oligarchy. Hinsdale, Ill.: Dryden Press, 1974.
- Hinton, Harold C. The Sino-Soviet Confrontation: Implications for the Future. New York: Crane, Russak and Co., 1976.
- Johnson, Cecil. Communist China and Latin America 1959-1967. New York: Columbia University Press, 1970.
- Joshua, Wynfred and Gilbert, Stephen P. Arms for the Third World: Soviet Military Aid Diplomacy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969.
- Kenner, Martin and Petras, James., eds. Fidel Castro Speaks. New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1969.
- McLane, Charles B. Soviet-Asian Relations. Vol. 2: Soviet Third World Relations. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969.
- McVey, Ruth T. The Rise of Indonesian Communism. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1965.
- Matthews, Herbert. Castro: A Political Biography. London: Penguin Press, 1969.
- Mortimer, Rex. Indonesian Communism under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics 1959-1965. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1974.
- Ra'naan, Uri. The USSR Arms the Third World: Case Studies in Soviet Foreign Policy. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1969.
- Reshetar, John S. The Soviet Polity: The Government and Politics of the USSR. New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1971.
- Sawyer, Carole A. Communist Trade with Developing Countries, 1955-1965. New York: Praeger Publishing Company, 1966.
- Scalapino, Robert A., ed. The Communist Revolution in Asia; Tactics, Goals, and Achievements. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969.
- Schwartz, Morton. The Foreign Policy of the USSR: Domestic Factors. Encino, Calif.: Scheinman and Dickenson Publishing Company, 1975.

Simon, Sheldon W. The Broken Triangle: Peking, Djakarta, and the PKI. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. The Arms Trade with the Third World. New York: Humanities Press, 1971.

Theberge, James D. The Soviet Presence in Latin America. New York: Crane, Russak and Company, 1974.

Tsou, Tang, ed. China in Crisis. 2 Vols. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968.

Walters, Robert S. American and Soviet Aid; A Comparative Analysis. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1970.

### Periodicals

Adomeit, Hannes. "Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior: From Confrontation to Coexistence." Adelphi Papers Number 101 (Fall 1973): 1-37.

Bjelajac, Slavko N. "Communism's Discordant Leadership: Mao and Khrushchev." Orbis 7 (Summer 1963): 386-399.

Bromke, Adam. "Ideology and National Interest in Soviet Foreign Policy." International Journal 22 (Fall 1967): 547-562.

Choucrist, Nazli. "The Non-Alignment of Afro-Asian States: Policy, Perception and Behaviour." Canadian Journal of Political Science 2 (March 1969): 1-17.

Crane, Robert D. "The Sino-Soviet Dispute on War and the Cuban Crisis." Orbis 8 (Fall 1964): 537-549.

\_\_\_\_\_. "The Cuban Crisis: A Strategic Analysis of American and Soviet Policy." Orbis 7 (Winter 1963): 528-563.

Damien, George D. "On the Philosophy of Contradictions: The Sino-Soviet Dispute as a Case Study in Communist Conflict Thinking." Orbis 12 (Winter 1968): 1208-1232.

Denno, Bryce F. "Sino-Soviet Attitudes Toward Revolutionary War." Orbis 12 (Winter 1968): 1193-1207.

Derkach, Nadia. "The Soviet Policy Towards Indonesia in the West Irian and Malaysian Disputes." Asian Survey 5 (November 1965): 566-571.

- Dinerstein, Herbert. "Soviet Policy in Latin America." American Political Science Review 61 (March 1967): 80-90.
- Feith, Herbert. "President Sukarno, the Army, and the Communists: The Triangle Changes Shape." Asian Survey 4 (August 1964): 969-980.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Indonesia's Political Symbols and their Wielders." World Politics 16 (October 1963): 79-97.
- Gilbert, Stephen P. "Wars of Liberation and Soviet Military Aid Policy." Orbis 10 (Fall 1966): 839-858.
- Gordon, Bernard K. "Regionalism and Instability in Southeast Asia." Orbis 10 (Fall 1966): 438-457.
- Harold, Robert C. and Mahoney, Shane E. "Military Hardware Procurement: Some Comparative Observations on Soviet and American Policy Processes." Comparative Politics 6 (July 1974): 571-599.
- Hindley, Donald. "The Indonesian Communists and the CPSU Twenty-Second Party Congress." Asian Survey 2 (March 1962): 20-27.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Indonesia's Confrontation with Malaysia: A Search for Motives." Asian Survey 4 (June 1964): 904-913.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Indonesian Communist Party and the Conflict in the International Communist Movement." China Quarterly Number 19 (July-September 1964): 99-119.
- Hoagland, John H. "Arms in the Developing World." Orbis 12 (Spring 1968): 167-184.
- Horn, Robert C. "Changing Soviet Policies and Sino-Soviet Competition in Southeast Asia." Orbis 17 (Summer 1973): 493-526.
- Kahin, George McT. "Malaysia and Indonesia." Pacific Affairs 37 (Fall 1964): 253-270.
- Lunsden, Ian. "The Future of Castroism." International Journal 24 (Summer 1969): 545-558.
- McLane, Charles B. "Foreign Aid in Soviet Third World Politics." Mizan 10 (November-December 1968): 210-250.
- McVey, Ruth T. "The Strategic Triangle: (2) Indonesia." Survey Number 54 (January 1965): 113-122.
- Metz1, Lothar. "The Ideological Struggle: A Case of Soviet Linkage." Orbis 17 (Summer 1973): 364-384.



- Miksche, F.O. "The Arms Race in the Third World." Orbis 12 (Spring 1968): 161-166.
- Morison, David. "Ideology and Common Sense." Mizan 8 (November-December 1966): 242-248.
- Mortimer, Rex. "Indonesia: Emigre Post Mortems on the PKI." Australian Outlook 22 (December 1968): 347-359.
- Pauker, Guy J. "Current Communist Tactics in Indonesia." Asian Survey 1 (May 1961): 26-31.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "General Nasution's Visit to Moscow." Asian Survey 1 (March 1961): 13-22.
- Petrov, Vladimir. "Formation of Soviet Foreign Policy." Orbis 17 (Fall 1973): 819-850.
- Polumka, Peter. "Indonesia's Future and Southeast Asia." Adelphi Papers Number 104 (Fall 1973): 1-36.
- Range, Willard. "Sukarnoism: An Interpretation." Orbis 10 (Summer 1966): 488-506.
- Smith, Wayne S. "Soviet Policy and Ideological Formulations for Latin America." Orbis 16 (Winter 1972): 1122-1146.
- Suchlicki, Jaime. "An Assessment of Castroism." Orbis 16 (Spring 1972): 35-57.
- Tretiak, Daniel. "Cuba and the Soviet Union: The Growing Accommodation 1964-1965." Orbis 11 (Summer 1967): 439-458.
- van der Kroef, Justus M. "Gestapu in Indonesia." Orbis 10 (Summer 1966): 458-487.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Sukarno's Fall." Orbis 11 (Summer 1967): 491-531.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Indonesian Communism's Revolutionary Gymnastics." Asian Survey 5 (May 1965): 217-233.
- Weatherbee, Donald E. "Traditional Values in Modernizing Ideologies: Indonesian Example." Journal of Developing Areas 1 (October 1966): 41-53.

#### Public Documents

- U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The International Transfer of Conventional Arms. A Report to the Congress, April 1974.

U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1966-1975. Publication 90 December 1976.

U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade 1963-1973. Publication 74.

### Published Reports

Azar, Edward E. and Sloan, Thomas J. Studies of Conflict and Peace Report No. 15: A Codebook of the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB). Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Department of Political Science (1973).

Leiss, Amelia C.; Kemp, Geoffrey; Hoaglund, John H.; Refson, Jacob S.R., and Fischer, Harold E. Arms Transfers to Less Developed Countries. Vol. III: Arms Control and Local Conflict. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Center for International Studies, C/70-1, February 1970.

## Appendix I

Soviet Weaponry Systems Transfers to Cuba1960

Quantity	Weaponry Systems Transferred
20	IL-14 Crate Transport
20	An-2 Colt Transport
24	Mi-4 Hound Transport Helicopters
60	BTR-40 Armored Cars
100	T-34 Medium Tanks
38	T-54 Medium Tanks
37	T-55 Medium Tanks
100	Su-100 Tank Destroyers

1961

5	MIG-15 Fagot Jet Fighters
30	MIG-17 Fresco Jet Fighters
500	SA-2 Guideline SAM Missiles
100	AT-1 Snapper Anti-Tank SSM Missiles
40	Frog-1 Artillery SSM Missiles
50	Samlet Cruise SSM Missiles
75	BTR-152 Wheeled Armored Personnel Carriers (APC)
75	BTR-60 Wheeled Armored Personnel Carriers (APC)

1962

30	MIG-15 UTI Midget Trainers
40	MIG-17 Fresco Jet Fighters
40	MIG-19 Farmer Jet Fighters
42	MIG-21 Fishbed Jet Fighters
23	IL-28 Beagle Light Jet Bombers
10	An-24 Coke Transport
240	K-13 Atoll AAM Missiles
100	SS-N-2 Styx Anti-Ship SSM Missiles
20	Salish Cruise SSM Missiles
100	T-34 Medium Tanks
60	JS-2 Medium Tanks
12	Motor Torpedo Boats "P4" class
12	"Komar" class Missile Patrol Boats
6	Submarine Chasers "Kronstadt" class

1963

25	MIG-15 Fagot Jet Fighters
20	Mi-1 Hare Observation Helicopters
37	T-54 Medium Tanks
38	T-55 Medium Tanks
12	Motor Torpedo Boats "P6" class

1964

Quantity	Weaponry Systems Transferred
----------	------------------------------

6	Patrol Boats "SOI" class
---	--------------------------

1965

3	MIG-21 Fishbed Jet Fighters
---	-----------------------------

4	"Komar class Missile Patrol Boats
---	-----------------------------------

## Appendix II

Soviet Weaponry Systems Transfers to Indonesia1960

Quantity	Weaponry System Transferred
20	MIG-19 Farmer Jet Fighters
40	IL-28 Beagle Light Jet Bombers
4	Mi-8 Hound Transport Helicopters
8	Submarines "W" class

1961

3	An-12 Cub Transport
16	Mi-4 Hound Transport Helicopters
6	SA-2 Guideline SAM Missiles
72	SS-N-2 Styx Anti-Ship SSM Missiles
8	Motor Torpedo Boats "P6" class
6	"Komar" Missile Patrol Boats
10	Motor Gunboats "BK" class

1962

25	Tu-16 Badger Medium Jet Bombers
150	AS-1 Kennel ASM Missiles
1	Cruiser "Sverdlov" class
2	Frigates "Riga" class
1	Destroyer "Skoryi" class
4	Fleet Minesweepers "T-43" class
1	Coastal Minesweeper "T-301" class
8	Submarines "W" class
6	Motor Torpedo Boats "P6" class
8	Motor Gunboats "BK" class
1	Submarine Tender "Don" class
1	Submarine Tender "Artrek" class

1963

30	BTR-152 Wheeled Armored Personnel Carriers
2	Frigates "Riga" class
10	Motor Torpedo Boats "P6" class

1964

12	L-29 Delfin Basic Trainers (Cze)
18	MIG-21 Fishbed Jet Fighters
6	An-12 Cub Transport
108	K-13 Atoll AAM Missiles

1964 continued

Quantity	Weaponry System Transferred
50	PT-76 Light Tanks
3	Frigates "Riga" class
2	Destroyers "Skoryi" class
2	Fleet Minesweepers "T-43" class
4	"Komar" class Missile Patrol Boats

1965

10	MIG-21 Fishbed Jet Fighters
8	Mi-6 Hook Transport Helicopters
60	K-13 Atoll AAM Missiles
2	"Komar" class Missile Patrol Boats

U.S.S.R. ARMS TRADE WITH CUBA AND INDONESIA  
1960-65: A CASE FOR IDEOLOGICAL ALIGNMENT

by

JOHN D. THOMPSON, JR.

B.A., Nicholls State University, 1973  
J.D., Louisiana State University, 1975

---

AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S REPORT

submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Political Science

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY  
Manhattan, Kansas

1977



The purpose of this report is primarily aimed at an assessment of Soviet arms trade effected by the shifting patterns in the political ideologies held by Fidel Castro of Cuba and Sukarno of Indonesia during the period from 1960 to 1965. Put another way, this report will endeavor to determine whether or not there exists any kind of linkage between the level of arms, both on a quantitative and qualitative basis, being transferred from the Soviet Union to Cuba and Indonesia to the degree of ideological alignment between the leaders of these two countries to officially sanctioned and approved Soviet ideology. In an effort to assess whether or not such a linkage does in fact exist, this report presents a historical-ideological overview of relations between the Soviet Union with Cuba and Indonesia during this six year period of time. An examination of both Cuba's and Indonesia's role in the emerging Sino-Soviet ideological dispute is also considered in an attempt to determine what impact this particular historical event had on the formulation, implementation, and overall conduct of foreign relations by these two countries vis a vis the Soviet Union during the early 1960's. This report also briefly touches upon the nature and status of U.S.-Cuban and U.S.-Indonesian relations during this same period of time. Various aspects of both the Cuban and Indonesian domestic political systems are examined in an attempt to further elucidate the shifting patterns of

ideology within the Castro and Sukarno regimes. The role of Ernesto Che Guevara in Cuba and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in Indonesia are examined in order to illustrate or otherwise give a different perspective to Soviet-Cuban and Soviet-Indonesian relations as they existed from 1960 to 1965.

Besides a descriptive analysis of Soviet arms transfers to these two island nations during the early 1960's, another, more quantitatively oriented, approach is utilized in an effort to try and link together the varying levels of arms trade between the Soviet Union with both Cuba and Indonesia by correlating the annual levels of estimated arms import expenditures by these two countries with the level of cooperation between these countries. Such cooperation is equated with the concept of ideological alignment and is measured in accordance with the events data research being carried on by researchers affiliated with the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) project which was initiated at the University of North Carolina in the late 1960's.