

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE POSSIBILITY AND SIGNIFICANCE OF
FORMULATING PLANNING THEORY, IN TERMS OF SYSTEMATIC
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS

2148-5608A

by

CHAN-CHI CHO

B. S., College of Chinese Culture, 1969

A MASTER'S REPORT

submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree

MASTER OF REGIONAL AND COMMUNITY PLANNING

Department of Regional and Community Planning

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas

1974

Approved by:


Major Professor

LD
2668
R4
1974
C55
C.2
Document

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER I. PLANNING THEORY AND ITS CONCEPTUAL PHASE . . .	3
CHAPTER II. IDENTIFICATION OF THE TENDENCY TOWARD SYSTEMATIC FORMULATION	8
A. Analysis of the changing views on the subject matter of planning	9
B. Analysis of the changing views on the planning process	12
C. Recognition of the need for systematic frameworks	16
CHAPTER III. LOGICAL COMPONENTS AND FUNCTIONS OF CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS	22
A. What is a conceptual framework?	22
B. Logical components	24
C. Logical functions	30
CHAPTER IV. CLARIFICATION OF THE MEANING OF SYSTEMATIC FRAMEWORKS	36
A. Partial understanding of the nature of systematic frameworks	37
B. The levels of systematization	39
C. The possibility of systematic formulation	44
CHAPTER V. SIGNIFICANCE OF SYSTEMATIC FRAMEWORKS FOR PLANNING THEORY	49
A. Logical significance	53
B. Orientational significance	55
C. Methodological significance	57
CONCLUDING REMARK	60
NOTES	61
REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY	66
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	

INTRODUCTION

The idea of formulating planning theory through the use of "systematic conceptual frameworks" has been proposed by several planning theorists in their works¹. However, the meaning of "systematic conceptual frameworks" as revealed in their writings is apparently far from clear. And its value for planning theory is, consequently, still up to further investigation. With this understanding, the main effort of this paper is thus directed toward a methodological clarification of the meaning of "systematic conceptual frameworks" and a proper evaluation of such a concept for the prospect of planning theory. This study is divided into three related approaches:

- a. To point out the implied but vague conceptions of "systematic frameworks" in various works on planning.
- b. To clarify the meaning of "systematic frameworks" in terms of logical components and functions.
- c. To investigate the significance of "systematic frameworks," after clarification, for the prospect of planning theory as a body of theoretical knowledge which undergoes different stages and levels of development.

The body of this paper falls into five chapters. The first chapter describes the situation planning theory is facing today and explains briefly why a methodological approach to the conceptual phase of planning theory is needed. The second chapter is devoted to identifying the tendency towards a systematic formulation of theories in the growing literature on planning. The third chapter is an analysis of component elements and logical functions

of conceptual frameworks. The fourth chapter takes up the problem of the clarification of the meaning of systematic frameworks at the present stage of planning theory. Finally, the fifth chapter is a full evaluation of the significance of systematic frameworks for planning theory as a developing method for gaining relevant theoretical knowledge. The scope of this study is confined to the conceptual aspect of those theoretical works, articles or books, intended as positive (not prescriptive or a rational model) approaches to the study and analysis of practical planning behavior. Specifically, relative emphasis is on the work of three authors, J. Friedmann, R. Bolan and Y. Dror. The primary method used is a theoretical analysis of methodological implications in works or studies relevant to this study.

CHAPTER I. PLANNING THEORY AND ITS CONCEPTUAL PHASE

Like so many words that are bandied about, the word theory threatens to become meaningless. Because references to theory are diverse--including everything from minor working hypotheses, through comprehensive but vague and unordered speculations, to axiomatic system of concepts--use of the word often obscures rather than facilitates understanding.

As has been pointed out by J. Keller, the situation in the planning field is no better:

Planning theory is cluttered with references to models but they have often misled us, either to equate models of rationality and learning with the planning process or to substitute models of client behavior and problems for models of planning behavior. Planning theory remains impractical partially, and perhaps primarily, due to an inadequate notion of theory to which it might aspire and respond.¹

and:

Much of what is called planning theory should not be called planning theory. That is not to say that those areas are unimportant but that they are better described as either philosophy and history or programs and practice.²

Throughout this paper, the term planning theory will be used to refer to the use of intermediate endeavors which are consciously directed toward the description of how planning as individual or institutional behavior, takes place in the actual world. Planning theory proper, as defined above, should be distinguished from other theoretical efforts such as planning models, predictive models, normative theories, working programs or simulation models.

As B. Harris has observed:

Theory may deal to some extent with technology and concrete things on the one hand, and on the other hand with mental constructs which are seldom or never encountered in the physical world outside of men's minds until they have been written down. The real world of mental constructs is a very important one, and in the end has many practical applications.³

In this understanding, any scientific theory can be analytically approached from two different sides that are actually inseparable in the formal steps of scientific inquiry:

- a. conceptual side
- b. empirical side

This paper will confine its concern to only one of these analytical phases--the conceptual side--of planning theory as it has been presented to date. In other words, planning theory in its conceptual phase will be assumed as a specific and autonomous area for academic study. With respect to the conceptual phase of theory, B. Harris writes:

A theoretical statement about the real world may not be, to the layman at least, a recognizable mapping of the real world, and the nature of the correspondence between the theory and the world and the consequences of the theory may not be readily expressible in everyday language. This sometimes makes it difficult for the layman to conclude at first glance that the theory is in any sense realistic or has any practical consequences.⁴

In this sense, a specialized way of thinking is needed to deal with the problems relating to the functions and structure of the conceptual phase of theory. This area of academic study in which a specialized way of thinking is called for, is commonly referred

to as methodology.

In planning, as J. Keller has observed, "Much of the clutter of planning theory could be ordered if the conceptual part of theory was distinguished from the whole."⁵ A methodological exploration of the conceptual phase of planning theory as it has been presented to date, is needed for an orderly understanding of the clutter of planning theory. And it is also needed for a meaningful evaluation of planning theory's potential and prospect to be a scientifically rigorous discipline.

This paper is intended to be a tentative effort at such an exploration. Its relatively limited scope will be the unique problem of the structure of the conceptual phase of planning theory. It will not enter into other areas of methodology such as the problem of what level of verification is proper for planning theory; how the conceptual structure of planning theory is empirically fitted to the empirical data in its available form; how to formulate a prescriptive planning theory from the objective and descriptive studies of planning behavior; or how to utilize theoretical findings at a practical level. Though these problems are equally significant and, in a sense, closely related to the present topics, the structural survey of the conceptual phase of planning theory--its conceptual framework--will be taken as a relatively independent and analytically autonomous subject for study. The basis of this study is mainly derived from the following observation.

Recently, many of the authors of planning theory, in describing the purpose of their theoretical inquiries, consider the formulation of certain conceptual frameworks as a new direction toward which theoretical efforts in planning should be oriented. This

orientation has been clearly stated by J. Friedmann in "A Conceptual Model for the Analysis of Planning Behavior":

What has been lacking up to now is a preliminary theoretical framework for ordering the available data and for supplementing them with studies that will ask theoretically relevant questions and begin to test promising hypotheses.⁶

Other writers of planning theory such as R. Bolan and Y. Dror also take this view point. But what exactly is the accurate meaning of a "theoretical or conceptual framework?"

Moreover, for a better understanding of its outlook and nature, the following questions must be raised:

1. Is it true that conceptual frameworks are nothing but stylized formats for presenting certain general and vague subjects, employed only as a rough classification tool for clarity of exposition and expression? Or, rather is it a kind of specific methodological device, thus having distinctive functions for the task of theoretical formulation?
2. Why are planning theorists now trying to shape their theoretical efforts under the concept of "conceptual framework?" What are the intrinsic factors in the long-term development of planning theory, from the stage of "ideological polemics"⁷ to that of "dispassionate analysis,"⁸ which make the present theoretical efforts take the form of searching for "systematic frameworks?"
3. Will these efforts stand as intermediate endeavors which could facilitate further development of planning theory? If the answer is "yes", then, in what sense? In other words, what is the specific significance of the concept of "systematic frameworks" for the

planning theory as a fledgling scientific study of planning behavior?

These questions constitute the core of present inquiry. They will be dealt with step by step. The first question will be the main concern of chapters three and four, "Logical Components and Functions of Conceptual Frameworks" and "Clarification of the Meaning of Systematic Frameworks at the Present Stage of Planning Theory" respectively. The third question will be taken up in chapter five, "Significance of Systematic Frameworks for Planning Theory."

The second question will be pursued immediately --for it is the leading one. The next chapter will be devoted to the second question under the title, "Identification of the Tendency toward Systematic Formulation of Planning Theory."

CHAPTER II. IDENTIFICATION OF THE TENDENCY TOWARD SYSTEMATIC FORMULATION OF PLANNING THEORY

The main objective of this chapter is to point out that there is, in the growing views on planning in recent literature, a tacit tendency toward the formulation of planning theory in terms of "systematic frameworks."

The sign that planners are gradually changing their views on planning and, most of all, the direction toward which these emerging new conceptions of planning are moving, will be analyzed in light of these two leading questions:

- a. Why are planning theorists at present trying to shape their efforts under the concept of "systematic conceptual frameworks?"
- b. What are the intrinsic factors in the long-term development of planning theory which make present efforts take the form of searching for "systematic frameworks?"

Apparently, change and convergence of views came about gradually based on the experience of the last decade--a period in which many cities for the first time undertook the preparation and implementation of comprehensive plans. The massive uncontrolled changes wrought in the urban landscape with the intensification of urbanization, suburbanization and unprecedented prosperity have induced a reexamination of the general assumptions and corresponding conceptual frameworks implied in the previous planning approach.

A number of recent theoretical efforts probes into the nature of the urban phenomena as the subject matter of planning concern, and of the planning process as an institutional function. They

suggest a new understanding of the total process of social and economic change and its structural constituents involved in the planning perspective. And they show a new approach to the very nature of theoretical frameworks used in the systematic analysis of those process.

For example, R. Bolan's approach to set forth a conceptual framework for a better understanding of the relationships between the planning process and community decision-making;¹ L. Haworth's excellent analysis of the close relationships between these concepts in planning perspective such as "institutions", "urban actions", "embodiment of patterns of action", and "ordered opportunity;"² J. Friedmann's behavioral model of varying planning styles associated with comparative policy-making environments;³ a number of studies to relate the "social system analysis" to cities and communities phenomena.⁴ All of them indicate a convergence of thought which points to, contrary to the classical simplistic approach, a realistic understanding of the complex and highly interrelated phenomena that define the environments and actions of planning.

Naturally, this new theoretical orientation will call for a more sophisticated and formalized framework to conceptualize the totally different landscape which has been opened little by little.

A. Analysis of the Changing Views on the Subject Matter of Planning

Traditionally, the subject matter of planning was the physical features of the human dwelling place. The unique function of the

planner was to design a physical framework for the growth and development of urbanized areas--a framework which specified the type distribution of related public facilities, and the type and intensity of land use. Only in recent years has the inevitable need been increasingly recognized to extend the subject matter of the planning field to include within its consideration all the social and economic factors underlying the urban process. In this regard P. Davidoff writes:

The view that equates physical planning with city planning is myopic. It may have had some historic justification, but it is clearly out of place at a time when it is necessary to integrate knowledge and techniques in order to wrestle effectively with the myriad of problems afflicting urban populations.⁵

The inadequacy of planning's historic concern with the physical environment and its conceptual approach was demonstrated in experiences of the last decade. The inability to guide private development and social change by regulating land use and planning public facilities was also evident.

This tendency provides greater understanding of the specific material peculiar to the planning field. It has been recognized generally that the spatial or physical characteristics of urban activities--physical infrastructure and the movements of people and goods--are expressions of the interplay of powerful social and economic forces.

Within any city, growth and development are the result of an interaction of public-private, national-local, social, political and economic factors whose precise relationships are as yet

undetermined. The economic, social, political and environmental process are, obviously, inextricably interwoven. None of these aspects is an autonomous empirical system. Rather, they are merely several analytical phases of an organic whole.

Assuredly, it is this total process of complex, dynamic and highly interrelated phenomena--cultural, social, political, economic and spatial--that has been recognized gradually as the proper subject matter for planning efforts. In this complex process, there is no simple, one-to-one, cause-and-effect relationships for the understanding and tackling of most urban problems. Also, there is no single treatment that will work alone.

However, the complexity of the process does not inherently exclude the possibility to understand and to study it in an orderly manner. Rather, it calls for such an approach. Coming to an orderly understanding of the process of highly interrelated phenomena requires a set of interrelated concepts, unified through several specialized disciplines, that are comprehensive enough to make overall understanding possible, yet penetrating enough to include in its perspective the depth of the dynamic process.

A typical point of view, within this approach, was highlighted by L. Haworth in "An Institutional Theory of The City and Planning." He says:

To "think the city as a whole" is to think a set of interrelated concepts. As interrelated they form a system, and it is the possibility of formulating such a set of concepts which justifies the assumption that the city is a whole. Accordingly, an inquiry into the nature of the city which concentrates on the fundamental

concepts which permit a synoptic view of the city seems called for.⁶

Haworth then goes on to introduce a set of fundamental concepts such as "institution", "articulation" and "embodiment of patterns of action." In terms of these concepts, he tries to set forth a preliminary step toward the task of offering "an orderly way to understand the urban process." As to the general characteristics, he concludes:

The urban institution is articulated, and its articulations are institutions....It is rather a structural plurality, or a differentiated structure. Its differentiations are all institutionalized, and it is an institutionalization of those differentiations.⁷

Apparently such an inquiry would be a kind of philosophical venture. One resulting characteristic is that its way of thinking is so general that no specificity can be derived from it. Though such general theoretical outlooks might have some broad practical implications, they constitute only the point of departure for the planning theorists. It is the task for further efforts in the planning field to develop specific, interrelated hypotheses by reformulating empirical generalizations and practical insights in the light of these generic orientations. The struggle for such a specific formulation is the continuing struggle of present theoretical efforts in the planning field.

B. Analysis of the Changing Views on Planning Process

In contrast to the realistic understanding of planning subject

matter, there is a growing tendency to define the planning process in terms of its immediate decision-making environment and larger social context. Until a few years ago, discussions of planning process were largely restricted to a consideration of an abstract model of perfect rationality in the process of social action.⁸

Now, it has been widely recognized that this rational model turned out to be unsatisfactory in use and that there existed a wide disparity between the traditional notions of planning process and the actual social, economic and political process by which policies are actually chosen and consequences result.⁹ The belief that a single static model of planning procedure can be imposed upon diverse concrete circumstances has been recognized as naive and practically irrelevant.

This simple formulation of the planning process is mostly an analogous extension of the notion of the determination of appropriate future action by an individual actor. On the individual level of action, with the proper assumptions of psychological integration and motivation belonging to the human personality, "planning" could be readily conceived as a process intended to determine procedural steps for future action, or a conscious realization of the goal-attaining process. That is, men adapt themselves to the conditions in which they are placed and, moreover, adapt the available means to their predetermined goals in such a way as to approach the most efficient manner of achieving these goals.

But the central fact is that this rational model which may be useful for the understanding and analysis of the individual action

process, is obviously less appropriate when applied to a totally different level of action--the organizational or institutional level in which planning is underway--without any modifications.

Instead of being conceived as a rational procedure, planning is now approached in the light of administrative science, and considered as a process of social action and guarded social change within and through institutional systems.¹⁰ In this regard, J. Friedmann writes:

Planning will be considered as the guidance of change within a social system. Specifically, this means a process of self-guidance that may involve promoting differential growth of subsystem components (sectors), activating the transformation of system structures (political, economic, social), and maintaining system boundaries during the course of change.¹¹

Viewing planning as the guidance of social change, the concepts and effects of individual action are somewhat secondary or indirect compared with the regulating action and function of institutions.

To develop valid explanations of the institutional process required in appropriate social guidance, the efforts of planning theory have to center on the way institutions actually function and change, rather than on the constructed rational model. As has been pointed out by Y. Dror:

It is very interesting to note that, despite the growing number of articles and books dealing with "planning" on one level or another, only a few efforts have been made recently to develop a systematic approach to the study of planning as an administrative process. Even authors

well known for their original contributions to the administrative sciences have often failed to deal adequately with the planning phase of institutional action.¹²

Social change is capable of being intelligently directed, while planning is such a means to direct institutional activities through properly influencing the decision-making structures and processes. Consequently, it is evident that the patterns and effects of institutional action must be taken into account to make planning a process of bringing about the desirable social change. These patterns and effects are subject to cumulative change through time. However they exhibit some regularities which can be formulated conceptually.

For planning purposes, all aspects of institutional process must be analyzed with respect to evolutionary development, current operations and future potential. And most of all, the controlling effects and guidance capacities of institutions by which on-going activities are to be regulated and directed intelligently should be carefully studied in advance. Without the functioning of institutional mechanisms in both controlling and guidance aspects, the idea of planning is nothing but an idealistic vanity.

In this way, the concern of planning must include both the individual and the institutional action process. And its emphasis has to be put on the understanding and explanation of the consequences, intended (goal-attaining) or unanticipated, of one institutional area for another or for the individuals. In planning, as R. Merton has suggested, institutional dynamics must be approached in terms

of "latent (unintended) functions" as well as "manifest (intended) functions," since:

To seek social change, without due recognition of the manifest and functions performed by the social organization undergoing change, is to indulge in social ritual than social engineering.¹³

By taking the process of institutional dynamics and its latent functions into consideration, theoretical efforts in planning have to minimize the role of the conception of intended (rational) action in constructing relevant concepts for theory formulation. And also they have to reexamine and broaden the previous conceptual frameworks.

With the reshaping and broadening of perspectives, specific way of formulating institutional process becomes the major prerequisite for mapping the planning process adequately. In this way, a more sophisticated conceptual tool has to be called for at the present stage of planning theory.

C. Recognition of the Need for Systematic Conceptual Frameworks

While the theoretical horizons of both the subject matter and the process of planning activities have been greatly extended in the last few years, the techniques for formulating these insights into clear conceptions have not emerged with equal clarity. The methodological devices and the analytical skills are still primitive.

New dimensions are approached only in partial manner. The

descriptions and explanations of planning phenomena are largely scattered and unintegrated.

Though it is not totally useless to have scattered and unintegrated bits of knowledge, this knowledge is unable to specify the determinate relationships between concepts and to facilitate the process of arriving at useful hypotheses. The latter is present only in so far as those bits of knowledge have been integrated together with reference to some clear-cut theoretical frameworks. All the newly emerged concepts in planning theory such as "decision making structure", "varying planning styles", "institutional process" and others can not be fully utilized for the task of a "scientifically more disciplined study of planning,"¹⁴ until those interrelated concepts have been structured together with reference to some "minimum of conceptual order."¹⁵ As R. Merton has observed:

(In the process of theoretical formulation,) an array of concepts does not constitute theory, though it may enter into a theoretic system....It is only when such concepts are interrelated in the form of a scheme that a theory begins to emerge.¹⁶

Planning theorists have learned from the experience of social scientists the necessity and utility of establishing some structured framework for theoretical formulation. To achieve an orderly understanding of both the subject matter and the process of planning, a distinctive framework must be developed that will explicitly illuminate the interdependence, complexity and orderliness of planning phenomena. That is the point of J. Friedmann when he writes:

Empirical findings may be incorporated into a positive theory of guided system change. Many of the elements of such a theory already exist; what has been lacking up to now is a preliminary theoretical framework for ordering the available data and for supplementing them with studies that will ask theoretical relevant questions and begin to test promising hypotheses.¹⁷

J. Friedmann's voice is not alone on this point. Other authors of planning theory, in describing the purpose of their theoretical inquiries, consider the formulation of certain conceptual frameworks as a new direction toward which theoretical efforts in planning should be oriented. For instance, in "Dimensions of Planning," Y. Dror suggests:

Through systematic construction of a framework of concepts, which are put into relation as parts of a model of planning, an attempt is made to focus attention on some of the problems which are implied in planning as such, and to provide some of the necessary conceptual tools for dealing with them.¹⁸

Moreover, he explains in a footnote:

This paper tries to apply to planning an approach which is receiving growing recognition within the social sciences...endeavoring to construct conceptual frameworks models which can be used for systematic classifications and thorough analysis of various social facts and problems.¹⁹

In another article, "The Planning Process: a Facet Design,"

the same author considers his theoretical task as an effort:

...to systematize the construction of a semantic structure which identifies the different elements and variables of which the phenomenon to be studied is composed and by which it is shaped.²⁰

In "Community Decision Behavior: The Culture of Planning,"

R. Bolan writes:

This paper attempts to formulate a conceptual framework for describing and understanding the relationships between planning and decision-making in urban government. Variables of the framework are identified and interaction between them is suggested by a series of interrelated hypotheses developed on the basis work in the field.²¹

In "Emerging Views of Planning," R. Bolan points out his purpose as:

This is an effort...with the basic purpose of indicating possible directions for a broader, more detailed conceptual framework for the planning process....From this discussion, the emergence of a framework for exploring more sophisticated views of the planning process can now be visualized.²²

The same point of view is implied in the writings of many other authors of planning theory such as G. Black, A. Catanese, R. Carzo, Jr. and J. Yanouzas, H. Hartly and C. Zwick.²³

From this evidence it is clear that many planning theorists have come to recognize if the formulation of planning theory is to progress beyond impressionistic images, philosophical conceptions or rough generalizations based upon limited experiences, it is essential to develop conceptual frameworks.

What must be emphasized here is that this tendency to formulate theory in terms of systematic frameworks does not take place accidentally. Rather, it is formed by three other closely related trends which are embodied in the changing views of planning:

1. The concept of planning has been emancipated from ideological and physical connotations, while the general assumptions and conceptual frameworks were reexamined.

2. The perspectives with respect to both the subject matter and the process of planning have been broadened. And these broadened views call for a more specified device for adequate formulation.

3. Planning theorists have been tacitly struggling for a scientific study of planning behavior from which determinate hypotheses could be derived.

With these three trends as its evolving background, the formulation of systematic frameworks represents the new phase into which planning theory will enter from its previous phases of "ideological polemics" and "abstracted model of perfect rationality." The present progress of planning theory will be characterized by the shift from the preoccupations with intuitive generalizations to incorporating empirical findings and new dimensions into a systematic framework.

But what exactly is the accurate meaning of a "theoretical or conceptual framework?" At first glance the task "to systematize the construction of semantic structure" (Y. Dror) or "to develop a theoretical framework for ordering the available data" (J. Friedmann) appears to entail few problems if it is assumed to be some simple

arrangement of the concepts and studies in an orderly manner. Yet, at second thought, it is evident that the concept of "systematic conceptual frameworks," without appropriate specifications, hardly provides any guidance for planning theorists. This problem will be dealt with in next chapter.

CHAPTER III. LOGICAL COMPONENTS AND FUNCTIONS OF CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS

In this chapter, an analysis of logical components and functions will be set forth as a prerequisite step to the clarification of the meaning of "systematic framework."

The perspective of this analysis is a tentative codification of the conceptions and insights on theoretical formulation widely accepted in social science. Such a codification is conducted with an expectation that prior experiences in other disciplines may provide useful criteria for investigating the theoretical efforts carried out in the planning field. This analysis begins with an attempt to provide a definition for the term "conceptual framework."

A. What is a "Conceptual Framework?"

In scientific activities it is observation rather than simple perception that plays the decisive part. But observation is a process in which the observer plays an intensely active role. An observation is always preceded by a particular interest, a question or a problem--in short, by something theoretical. An observation is a perception, but one which is guided by some set of theoretical concepts.

It is fundamental to recognize there is no empirical knowledge which is not in some sense and to some degree conceptually formed. All talk of pure sense data, raw experience or the unformed stream of consciousness is not descriptive of actual experience, but is a

matter of methodological abstraction, legitimate and important for certain purposes, but nevertheless, abstraction. In other words, it could be said that all empirical knowledge or observation is in terms of a certain conceptual scheme. This is true not only of the sophisticated scientific observations, but of the simplest common sense statements of fact. As A. Schutz has observed:

Scientific thinking involves constructs (i.e. sets of abstractions, generalizations, formalizations, idealizations) specific to the respective level of thought organization. Strictly speaking, there are no such things as facts, pure and simple. All facts are from the outset selected from a universal context by the activities of our mind. They are, therefore, always interpreted facts, either facts looked at as detached from their context by an artificial abstraction or facts considered in their particular setting. In either case, they carry along their interpretational inner and outer horizon.¹

Dealing with phenomena from an explanatory perspective, a simplistic scheme is not competent to handle the problem of explaining complex phenomena. A system of related schemes is needed for the promised theoretical purposes. Such a systematic combination of several schemes is designated as a "conceptual framework." As D. Walsh has pointed out:

The process of generating explanations is best understood as an activity which brings an organized conceptual framework to bear on a given range of phenomena and a given order of problems with regard to such phenomena.²

B. Logical Components of Conceptual Framework

Specifically, a conceptual framework usually consists of several logical components or phase. The following illustrations of each component will be exemplified by relevant cases drawn from various theoretical efforts in the planning field.

(1) Axiomatic scheme

This scheme involves no concrete data or empirical statements that are subject to verification. Yet, it is an indispensable dimension through which observers visualize and think about empirical phenomena. A conceptual scheme in this sense is inherent in the structure of general assumptions about the domain of certain subject matters. In the field of social science, different writers have used different names to refer to this scheme: K. Popper calls it "Horizon of Expectations,"³ and A. Gouldner calls it "Domain Assumptions,"⁴ Since this scheme refers to a set of general assumptions that are taken for granted implicitly in theorizing, it will be termed a "axiomatic scheme" in this paper.

In the planning field, typal conceptions of planning belong to this category of axiomatic schemes. These conceptual schemes or models attempt to capture the essence of planning in a set of general concepts. Many conceptual efforts in the planning field from early in this century to now, which ranged from "ideological polemics" to "dispassionate analysis," can be attributed to this axiomatic phase

of conceptualization. Chief among them are those that try to relate planning to various general concepts such as "Rationality vs. Efficiency" (Meyerson-Banfield),⁵ "Bounded Rationality" (Simon),⁶ "Choice" (Davidoff-Reiner),⁷ "Institutions and Ordered Opportunity" (Haworth),⁸ "Decision Making" (March-Simon),⁹ "Advocacy" (Davidoff),¹⁰ "Allocation" (Wheaton),¹¹ "Comprehensive" (Altshuler or Holleb),¹² and others.

From the historical evolution and development of these axiomatic schemes, it is evident there has been a transfer of this basic orientation from normative or prescriptive phases, to positive phases. Apparently, the task of planning theory today, in the sphere of axiomatic scheme, is to convert some elements of prescriptive or normative concepts into a clear delineation of "positive"¹³ variety.

(2) Descriptive scheme

In order to delineate the positive variety, a descriptive scheme is certainly needed. But factual descriptive in this sense is not a reproduction, but a selective ordering of external reality.

The descriptive scheme is fundamental to all sciences. Facts can not be adequately described except by means of such a scheme or set of such schemes. A description of relevant facts in terms of a descriptive scheme or schemes has the function of defining an empirical phenomena which is to be explained. That is, out of the great mass of possible empirical observations, only those are selected which are meaningful within the adopted axiomatic scheme and bring them together by a descriptive scheme. Thus, axiomatic and descriptive schemes serve together to characterize the essential aspects of concrete

phenomenon which then become the object of scientific investigation.

A few descriptive schemes have been constructed in the planning field. Some of them are uni-dimensional, while others are intended to be multi-dimensional. Both types of schemes try to provide a framework for defining or describing planning phenomena in terms of particular aspects or set of components of planning behavior and its environment.

The better known are those of Y. Dror¹⁴ which address planning activities from a total perspective, and those of R. Bolan¹⁵ which focus on the aspect of planning as community decision-making behavior. The main difficulty all schemes of this type face is they are so inherently confined to a level of abstraction that the "typologies" they made up can not be supported by factual investigations and empirical research. As R. Bolan correctly pointed out :

This description of the conceptual framework of the culture of urban planning is, at best, a preliminary and tentative one in which many of the variables require more precise definition. It is also clear that development of objective measurement scales for each of the variable is an immediate and formidable task. Specific relationships between variables are not as yet seen precisely. The design of empirical research and analysis will be equally complex and demanding.¹⁶

In other words, these schemes are somewhat unable to provide the adequate connection between theoretical formulation and empirical investigations. Perhaps this is the very reason there exists a wide gap between planning theory and planning practices. However, this situation does not imply:

1. The gap is inherently unbridgeable in the future.
2. Any further theoretical efforts are totally futile and unfruitful.

For the differentiation and specification of the skill for utilizing empirical data and for designing measurement scales will certainly progress in the future. Therefore, it is quite reasonable to believe that the descriptive scheme will then become an actually applicable tool for empirical investigations and practical purposes.

(3) Structural scheme¹⁷

Explanation begins with description, but description alone is not explanation. Theoretical explanation demands the concrete data under description be analyzed into component parts in terms of which the described phenomenon is to be explained.

Take the theory in physics for example, the nature of a physical matter is theoretically explained by that of its component molecules. In the process of analyzing and explanation, it is necessary to employ a schematic network specifying the relationships between the described phenomenon and its components as well as between each of them. Such a schematic network is hereby called the structural scheme. In this scheme, as has been pointed out by A. Etzione, the distinctions among three or more different levels of reference such as units, sub-units and supra-units, is drawn. Each of these entities on different levels of reference, displays properties of its own and of its relations to entities on the same level as well as to those on other

levels. The properties of the relationships between units on the same level, e.g., two units or two sub-units, are different from those of inter-level relationships, e.g., between a unit and a sub-unit or between a supra-unit and a unit. The former are referred to as relational, and the latter as hierarchical.¹⁸ These two relationships interweave a context in which the described phenomena can be explained.

Until now we haven't had any such structural schemes in planning theory that are stated and formulated explicitly in respect to the structural relations involved in the concepts of planning function and institution. Its absence is largely due to the complexity of the subject matter in planning. As Dror has pointed out:

The distribution of planning and plan-executing functions between various units on different levels of action, complicate the picture beyond description.¹⁹

It is also partially due to a failure to adequately utilize and assimilate the experiences in other areas of administrative science such as the theory of communication and formal organization. However the importance of working out the structural scheme for the theoretical formulation of planning behavior is not neglectable.

For without it, such essential questions as set forth by J. Friedmann could not be approached within a meaningful and specific theoretical context. These questions are:

What is the relation of planning institution and process to social context?...How are planning functions distributed along a centralization-decentralization continuum, and what are their relations horizontally at each level

as well as vertically among a hierarchy of ordered centers?²⁰

(4) Analytical scheme²¹

There is another kind of conceptual scheme, which is called an analytical scheme. This type of conceptualization presupposes the three schemes mentioned above. For once facts have been described and structural schemes established, all elements or units, thus derived, will of logical necessity have certain general attributes or qualities. An analytical scheme is an orderly array for the categorization of emergent qualities or properties.

Any theoretical construct must be thought of as capable of being described by a set of the particular "values" of those properties. Thus a physical body is described as having certain values of these properties such as mass, velocity, location, relevant to the particular space-time system in the theory of mechanics. Similarly, a planning agency, defined through particular descriptive and structural schemes, can be described under some constructed schemes of classification such as developmental or adaptive, allocative or innovative, as having a certain degree of adaptive orientation and innovative orientation, at certain periods of time. It is to these constructed frames for scaling the values of some properties, which closely interweave with a given set of descriptive and structural schemes, that the term "analytical scheme" is applied

In planning, a few of these analytical schemes have been explicitly formulated. J. Friedmann's works are representative in the

area of national planning. He defines two sets of analytical concepts: (a) developmental and adaptive (b) allocative and innovative. These are used for the analysis of various planning styles associated with comparative, national, political and economic environment. Most noticeably, in providing a model for comparative study, he has tried to formulated explicitly the descriptive and structural schemes into a specific context. These descriptive and structural schemes consist in the following set of elements:

1. Criteria for classication of national systems.
2. Descriptive categories of aspects of the decision environment.
3. Aspects of institutional form of national planning decisions.²²

The difficulty that Friedmann's model faces is the same as all other similar models which deal with such a large topics as national planning or planning in general. Since neither the empirical devices nor the sociology of modern bureaucracy are sufficiently advanced, there is no adequate empirical measures for actually conducting field investigations. Meanwhile, the analytical schemes are still too primitive and rough to be an useful theoretical tool.

C. Logical Functions of Conceptual Frameworks

A conceptual framework for the purpose of this paper, includes the four types of schemes discussed above as its logical components. These components are closely interdependent and interrelated. There is never a system of analytical schemes which are not to some degree related, implicitly or explicitly, to a corresponding complex set of

frame of reference or to a conception of the structure of the concrete phenomena. And axiomatic scheme remains implicit in any use of these schemes. Indeed, it is this element which binds descriptive, structural and analytical schemes together.

Any conceptual framework which has only one of these elements manifested in its formulation will be classified as a partial framework. In contrast, a conceptual framework in which the reciprocal relations among these four logical phases are made to constitute a single theoretical context, will be classified as a systematic framework. For a systematic framework, it is precisely the interconnection and intertwining of this four-fold conceptual formulation--the axiomatic, the descriptive, the structural and the analytical--that gives systematic conceptualization its singularly quality. This synthetic or systematic power enables it to formulate the multi-dimensionality of complex phenomena within a meaningful context.

As a unified system of various sets of schemes, a systematic framework performs several logical functions:

1. The first function is to furnish a frame of general reference and orientation. The framework confers meaning of significance and sets direction on our scattered experiences, actions, observations and generalizations. In other words, it is the general setting within which all empirical works, technical studies and research take shape and make sense.

2. The second function is to provide a frame of reference for describing the complex phenomena which are interrelated within each other, thus constituting concrete system. The conceptual frame-

work enables one to view a concrete system structurally, as it is composed of hierarchical and relational units.

3. The third function is to offer firm ground for structural analysis. It enables one to identify analytical properties at different levels and establish uniform relationships among them.

4. The fourth function is to provide a general skeleton for logical deduction, thus furnishing the necessary theoretical channelizations for deriving explanations. (See Figure 1)

After having formulated the logical functions of conceptual framework, it will be worthwhile now to turn to the clarifying of some common misconceptions about conceptual framework. Since the currency of these misconceptions is the source of the charge that theoretical endeavors in such a broad field as planning will inevitably lead to building grand theory, and that they are thereby devoid of any empirical meaning in the strict sense.

1. Conceptual Framework and Empirical Investigation:

The first misconception assumes that conceptual frameworks can be effectively developed before a great mass of basic observations have been accumulated. According to this view, conceptual frameworks are inherently so "unearthly" as to preclude all empirical contents. In fact, just as there is no empirical knowledge which is not in some sense conceptually formed, there will be no conceptual framework which is totally without empirical contents.

Formulations of conceptual frameworks and empirical investigations are only two facets of the scientific enterprise. All




FIGURE 1 Logical components and functions
of conceptual frameworks

schemes included in a conceptual framework are devised through familiarity and objectively acceptable interpretations of empirical observations. Usually they are based on refinement and amendment of previous or existing theoretical works.

However, conceptual frameworks are not intended to be a straitjacket. Both relevant schemes and structural relationships among them may be changed as a result of new empirical findings. There is, then, a reciprocal process existing between conceptual frameworks and empirical investigations.

2. Conceptual Framework and the Development of Theory:

The second misconception assumes the development of scientific theories totally rests upon new empirical findings. What must be emphasized here is, since there is a reciprocal process between the conceptual phase and the empirical phase of a scientific theory, the conceptual framework of a theory--most generally defined as a system of logically interrelated concepts of empirical reference--is not only a dependent, but an independent factor, in the development of scientific theory. The conceptual framework generally determines the way how discovered facts are to be interpreted and also provides standard for selecting relevant facts. It goes without saying that to be sound, a theoretical framework must fit the facts. But it does not follow that the facts alone, discovered independently of the theoretical framework, determine what the conceptual framework is to be, nor that the conceptual framework is not a factor in determining what facts will be discovered and what is to be the

direction of future empirical investigation.

3. Conceptual Framework and the Scope of Theoretical Inquiry:

The third misconception assumes the effects of formulating conceptual frameworks inevitably lead to something like "grand theory" or "general theory." Actually, the task of conceptual formulation is apparently neutral to the problem of which kind of theoretical scope it will take. Though the term "conceptual framework" is historically related to these theoretical works which are conducted within a comprehensive or all-inclusive scope such as Keynesian system or Parson's social system, its usage will not be limited by the scope of the inquiry. It could be also utilized in middle-range theoretical works, or even in detailed orderly descriptions of particular cases that are not generalized at all. For instance, it could be utilized in Y. Dror's theoretical efforts toward a general theory of the planning process, or just as well in R. Bolan's modest efforts toward such a limited area as community decision behavior.

Although the problem of which kind of theoretical scope is proper for planning theory, is now a significant and important subject, it does not concern the purpose of the present paper. The immediate objective is concerned only with the logical components and functions of conceptual frameworks which, as R. Merton noted about sociological theories, are "the general modes of formulation, irrespective of the specific problem and scope at hand."²³

CHAPTER IV. CLARIFICATION OF THE MEANING OF SYSTEMATIC FRAME- WORKS AT THE PRESENT STAGE OF PLANNING THEORY

Strictly speaking, there are only a few theoretical efforts in the planning field directed toward the formulation of systematic frameworks in the sense as defined in the preceding chapters. Though the term "systematic framework" has been widely employed in the methodological justifications of various theoretical works in planning. As exemplified in previous analyses of the logical elements of a systematic framework, many tentative efforts toward systematic frameworks in the present stage of planning theory involve, in fact, only some partial schemes of various types. They are not systematic frameworks yet. They are only partial frameworks at best. This situation in planning theory has been clearly pointed out by J. Keller in "Notes on the Structure of Planning Theory":

Typal concepts of planning are the most prominent form of theory....Dimensional concepts provide a partial framework for understanding the variations exhibited in the typal models. Unidimensional studies address particular components or aspects of planning behavior....But few of these studies are systematically dimensional in the sense that there is a system of dimensions into which the unidimensional discussion fits.¹

Despite the growing number of articles and books trying to formulate planning theory into conceptual frameworks, few of them have developed a systematic approach--structuring together

explicitly all logical phases i.e., axiomatic, descriptive, structural and analytical, into a single unified framework.

A systematic approach of this kind, with more refined concepts and new emerged insights, and most of all, with all logical elements of conceptualization integrated into one single structured context, is urgently needed in the present stage of planning theory. The lack of the systematic frameworks results largely from misconceptions and partial understanding of the logical structure and methodological functions of conceptual frameworks.

A. Partial Understanding of the Nature of Systematic Frameworks Implied in the Existing Theoretical Works of Planning

Though the tendency to formulate planning theory in terms of systematic frameworks has been increasingly noticed, nevertheless, the nature of such frameworks has still remained in vague and crude conceptions.

For instance, the nature and functions of a systematic framework, according to J. Friedmann are simply:

1. It is the minimum of conceptual order which is necessary for a scientifically more disciplined study of planning.
2. It is a theoretical device intended to be an aid to empirical research.
3. It orders the available data.
4. It will provide relevant hypotheses.

According to R. Bolan:

1. It can identify significant variables.
2. It can describe the relationships among sets of variables.
3. It can provide a forward step in explanatory power in a highly complex area of human behavior such as planning.

According to Y. Dror:

1. It is the semantic structure which identifies the different elements and variables of which the phenomenon to be studied is composed and by which it is shaped
2. It is the necessary conceptual tool for systematic classification and theoretical analyses.

Most of the conceptions listed above are justifications for the use of systematic frameworks, rather than definite specifications of its logical structure and function. They have not clearly distinguished the different phases of the process of conceptualization. Most of all, none of them have tried to inquire about the "systematic" nature of conceptual frameworks. It has been ambiguously denoted by such vague term as "minimum conceptual order" and "semantic structure." To clearly understand it, the "systematic" nature of conceptual frameworks is contained not only in the so-called semantic structure, but also in the syntactic context into which the various component semantic structures will orderly fit.

Thus, they fail to provide adequate ground for defining the meaning of systematic frameworks. An absence of clarification of the meaning of systematic frameworks is the main source of

misconceptions which take the efforts of formulating systematic frameworks for the general orientation seeking the grandeur of global summaries, or the intention of building grand theories.

The systematization of a conceptual framework does not imply a broadening of the theoretical scope to such an extent as to cover all relevant problems under a single global point of view. Rather, it involves the degree to which the reciprocal and interdependent relations among the four structural phases of a conceptual framework are made to constitute a single theoretical context. It is precisely the interconnection and intertwining of the fourfold conceptual formulation (the axiomatic, the descriptive, the structural and the analytical) that gives the systematization of conceptual frameworks its singularly quality.

B. The Level of Systematization of Conceptual Frameworks

So far as the concept of systematization of conceptual frameworks is concerned, it will be worthwhile here to inquire further into the "systematic" nature of conceptual frameworks. There are two related problems relevant to the concept of "systematization" --one concerning the level of systematization, the other concerning the "system of partial frameworks."

There are three levels of systematization of conceptual frameworks in order of their "explicitness" relative to the reciprocal relations among four component schemes:

1. Partial Frameworks
2. Systematic Frameworks
3. Theoretical Systems.

The first type involves the employment of one of four logical elements of conceptual frameworks. Usually the emphasis is put on the descriptive phase for the sake of making summary statements about the subject matter. In this type no attempt is made to fit the conceptual schemes partially employed with the subject matter in such a way that conceptualization is patterned upon the relations between phenomena and schemes. Partially employed schemes are quite independent of one another, and logical relations among them are implicitly postulated in the general background of a theorist's perspective.

Conceptual formulations of planning activities up to now, ranging from the axiomatic discussions of typical conceptions of planning, to the various descriptive and analytical schemes of planning behavior, planning strategies, patterns of decision-making, organizational structure and dimension of plan, are examples of this level of systematization. Most of the theoretical works in planning are not systematic frameworks, but are only partial frameworks.

The second type, systematic frameworks, involve a complete system of schemes which is formed to fit the complexity of the structure so the intrinsic relations among schemes, which are in accord with the relations among different dimensions of the real world, are brought into the sphere of theoretical concern. The

frameworks of this type have sufficient complexity and articulation to duplicate, in one sense, the formal interdependence of empirical phenomena. A systematic framework, thus, is the logical articulation of several schemes in which the interrelatedness of component schemes is integrated into a structured context.

With respect to the present stage of planning theory, the systematization of this type, defined here as a methodological working paradigm, rather than a dogma of all-inclusive syntheses, is the immediate and feasible goal for future theoretical efforts. The idea of logical articulation of component schemes will provide the principles of how to develop planning theory adequately. Whatever the scope, a master conceptual framework, a middle range theory, special theory, or even a simplistic model, the paradigm of the systematic framework will facilitate the process of modifying the theoretical devices in their logical cohesiveness and completeness.

A large part of what is now described as planning theory, consists of general orientation toward empirical data suggesting types of variables. But few of them start with a framework to take into account the specificity of variables and implicit relationships among vaguely defined variables. The latter can be reached only within the structured context constituted by supporting multi-schemes. The lag of planning theory at the present stage results largely from this partiality of conceptual frameworks. And the methodological concept of a systematic framework represents the immediate goal of future endeavors which

promise to bring planning theory closer to its final aim of the scientific discipline.

The theoretical system, the third level of systematization, is a systematic framework in which analytical laws, those which state generalized and uniform relationships of interdependence among specified variables, could be effectively established. Analytical laws presuppose specific relationships among component schemes, since only in terms of these relations can variables be structurally defined. Classical mechanics and some special theories of economics are the most common examples of what is designated here as theoretical systems. (See Figure 2)

At the present stage of planning theory, there is no such reliable theoretical knowledge on which analytical laws of the phenomenon of planning behavior can be established. Even the ability of defining meaningful variables and of formulating formal relationships among variables is still primitive and crude.

For instance, it can be generalized from empirical observations that there is a relatively unspecified relationship between planning institutions and their social context; between planning performance and its decision environment; between planning strategies and the dynamics of social systems, and so forth. But these concepts are largely derived from generalizations, or borrowed from other disciplines. Their designations are usually intermingled or overlapped with one another. Moreover, in different theoretical contexts they have different meanings. Without a systematic framework, none of these concepts can be clearly defined,




FIGURE 2 Levels of systematization of conceptual frameworks

No clue relevant to empirical research design can be reached. Without a set of pertinent multi-schemes to frame them into more specific context, these concepts are only loose-knit. Without a systematic framework, nothing can be gained from these concepts except vagueness and ambiguity. Apparently, systematic frameworks represent the intermediate step through which planning theory will be able to tackle the problems of formulating uniform relationships between clearly defined variables. It is the working paradigm for realizing the aim of theoretical system.

C. The Possibility of Formulating Planning Theory in terms of Systematic Frameworks

As to the possibility of formulating planning theory through the use of systematic frameworks, the question of how the concept of a working paradigm can be utilized by theory formulation, has to be answered first. And this must be approached in a way to show how planning theory can be oriented into systematic framework from the state of unintegrated conceptions and partial frameworks. The task will start with the analysis of the previously mentioned concept of "system of partial frameworks."

It is evident that the existing planning theories are internally diversified and mutually overlapped. However, there are also unspecified theoretical relationships among them. They are not entirely scattered and unrelated pieces. In one sense, they could be regarded as constituting a system of their own.

This will be called a system of partial frameworks. In respect to

the development of social theory, T. Parsons states:

The body of theory in a given field at a given time constitutes to a greater or lesser degree an integrated system.²

The concept of a system of partial frameworks should be understood in the same sense by which T. Parson referred to "an integrated system." The unspecified relationships among various elements of a system of partial frameworks can be elaborated into an integrated system of concepts.

Different sectors in the system of partial frameworks have different probabilities of being germane to the formulation of systematic framework for special areas of planning theory. They have differing potentials of relevance. The elaboration of such an integrated system of concepts consists in the process of deliberately working out unspecified relationships between different logical phases of each partial framework for the relevant sectors of planning theory. For example, the intrinsic relevance between Bolan's concept of "formal and informal structure of influence" and Dror's concept of "organizational structure" can be elaborated into a structural scheme for the analysis of planning institutions and process. This analysis in turn constitutes one distinctive element of the special theory of planning institutions and process which is one sector of planning theory.

In each of these partial frameworks, though only one of the four-fold elements has been brought to attention, the rest of them, not being explicitly formulated, still remain in the general background of the theorist's theoretical horizon, in what

A. Gouldner calls the theorist's "background assumption."³ It is in this sense that the so-called unspecified relationships between partial frameworks are referred to.

For example, only the descriptive phase of the conceptual framework was made explicit in Y. Dror's paper "The Planning Process: A Facet Design," while structural and analytical phases have been obscured by his methodological postulations of "Cartesian Production" and the implicit assumptions behind such general concepts as "degree of penetration", "primary or delegated planning unit" and "organizational structure." Since cartesian production designates "the way of defining concepts... in most general terms,"⁴ only the descriptive phase of the framework can be made manifest by employing such a research tool. And the structural relations of concepts have been thus obscured therein. "Degree of penetration" designates the way in which a planning unit is said to penetrate more or less into its subject matter. This concept refers to a specific property of planning unit and therefore it should be utilized as an analytical scheme instead of a descriptive scheme. Meanwhile it is evident that a structural scheme has already been implied in the concepts "primary or delegated planning unit" and "organizational structure."

The process of carving out positive concepts and schemes from the implicit side of the system of partial frameworks, and reintegrating these concepts and schemes into structured context, will be the main path for planning theory to ascend to a higher level of theoretical systematization. In the example of Dror's

framework, the concepts of "degree of penetration", "primary or delegated planning unit" and "organizational structure," can be differentiated into proper logical phases. And these phases in turn can be reintegrated with elements from other relevant frameworks into a systematic framework by means of which the planning phenomenon corresponding to the concepts is to be analyzed and explained.

In such a practical-oriented field as planning, if theoretical formulation aim to reinforce categorical capacity to take into account problems which grow daily in number and difficulty, the only adequate systematic formulation should be a dynamic one, which is reformulated from time to time. There is no end to the process of reintegration, since experiences grow and new problems emerge day by day. The demand for a once-and-for-all, permanent theoretical system would mean a relapse into the static world of extreme intellectualism.

From the analyses set forth in the last chapter and the present one, it is evident that the concept of systematic framework is essential to the future development of planning theory. Specifically, its realization consists in the fulfillment of the following prerequisite tasks:

1. To assimilate new dimensions and insights emerged from the process of differentiation in planning theory.
2. To convert the elements of typical concepts of planning, and the new emerged views, into a clear delineation of positive variety.
3. To formulate the general concepts in terms of concrete descriptive schemes.

4. To work out structural schemes for the analysis of planning behavior in its institutional and administrative phases.
5. To formulate descriptive and structural schemes in such a manner as to frame analytical schemes into more specific contexts.
6. To integrate these four-fold schemes into a single structured context for each of the specific areas of the scientific studies of planning behavior.
7. All the tasks listed above will be facilitated by the basic approach of carving out and reintegrating of positive concepts and schemes from the implicit side of the system of partial frameworks.

Most of all, these tasks can not be carried out in a purely theoretical vacuum. Rather, they must be incorporated and supported by relevant empirical studies and acceptable interpretations of research data.

CHAPTER V. SIGNIFICANCE OF SYSTEMATIC FRAMEWORKS FOR PLANNING THEORY

As noted earlier, a large part of what is now described as planning theory consists of general orientations toward data, rough schemes for classifying typical concepts, empirical generalizations of comparable uniformities and some trivial working hypotheses based upon detailed study of particular cases, rather than well-formed frameworks for establishing analytical relationships between variables, thus arriving, by logical derivations, at determinate hypotheses.

A theory is more than an empirical generalization--an isolated proposition summarizing observed uniformities between two or more variables. A theory comprises a set of analytical relationships from which empirical generalizations have themselves been derived.¹ Such relationships can be specifically formulated only on the basis of a well-formed systematic framework. Ignorance of this point is the main source for unproductiveness and unfruitfulness of many theoretical efforts in the planning field.

Note how few, scattered and unimpressive are these proposed hypotheses which are derived from partial frameworks. For instance, based on the partial framework formulated in "Emerging Views of Planning," R. Bolan suggests the following relationship:

In any decision environment, as the number of independent decisionmakers increase, and as functional responsibilities become increasingly fragmented and specialized among independent decisionmakers, the capacity of the system to utilize comprehensive forms

of policy-making decreases, while the need of the system to utilize comprehensive forms of policy-making increases.²

Without any specific analytical schemes, the concepts of "the capacity of a system to utilize comprehensive forms of policy-making" and "the needs of the system to utilize comprehensive forms of policy-making" bring us to nowhere. And, without any adequate structural schemes, the concepts of "functional responsibilities" and "increasingly fragmented and specialized" are unable to refer to any specific relational or hierarchical context. The concepts of "functional responsibilities" and "specialization" can be adequately defined only with reference to specific structural schemes of planning organization and function.

Indispensable though these efforts are, they provide only the broadest framework for further inquiries. They do not facilitate the process of arriving at determinate hypotheses.

Corresponding to various scopes of inquiry, there are three kinds of methodological strategies by which planning theorists try to reach solid ground for finding relevant analytical relationships applicable to the phenomenon of planning behavior:

1. By general-theory-oriented approach

This approach--searching for a total system of planning theory in which observations about every aspect of planning behavior, organization and change promptly find their preordained place--tries to catch significant analytical relationships mainly by systematic conceptual analysis and categorical constructions. Some planning theorists, for example Y. Dror, expect the

formulation of planning to be broad enough to encompass vast ranges of precisely observed details of planning behavior, and fruitful enough to reach the analytical relationships underlying the total static structure of the planning phenomenon. This trend of thought requires a general and definite framework of planning behavior be built in addition to various special frameworks for empirical investigations and its relating perspective.

2. By middle-range theoretical approach

This approach confines its inquiry to limited areas of particular aspects of planning activities, and intends to find theoretical uniformities relevant to a limited area. Usually, this approach is coupled with the belief that someday, various special theories will be consolidated into a system of concepts and mutually consistent propositions. Thus, some theorists confine their efforts to subject matter of middle range such as local community decision-making behavior (R. Bolan), political roles (Burke),³ and social dimensions of planning (Dyckman).⁴ The methods employed by them to reach theoretical relationships, are largely comparative analysis, empirical generalizations and conceptual approaches.

3. By empirical or case study

This approach focuses on detailed orderly descriptions of particular case histories or special events and problems that are limited in generality or not generalized at all. Their implicit methodological strategies are based on something like inductive logic: tentative analytical relationships could be

established by generalizations from particular case study. The best known among them are those of Boston (Keyes),⁵ Chicago (Meyerson and Banfield),⁶ Minneapolis-St. Paul (Altshuler)⁷ and New Jersey (Rabinovitz).⁸ The methods they used are mostly descriptive skills and statistical techniques. The potential of case studies for theoretical formulations in general is quite significant, but carrying the inductive logic to an excess will lead to a bad form of sheer empiricism. As J. Friedmann has pointed out:

Where the earlier theorists erred in ignoring planning practice, the new empiricists are leading too much in the other direction: they simply look at activities called planning and describe what they see. Although this is leading to the collection of much information, it is also giving rise to unwitting distortions when basic preconceptions have not been made explicit.⁹

Methodologically speaking, all three strategies are scientifically sound. They are continuous sectors in the spectrum of scientific method. As noted earlier, they have differing potential of theoretical relevance.

But the general deficiency to which all three strategies are actually exposed at the present stage of planning theory is that the lack of systematic frameworks considerably weaken their capacity to arrive at the specificity of formulation. And, therefore, no determinate analytical relationships can be adequately established. The main significance of systematic frameworks for all three strategies is that systematization can bring about the specificity of formulation and, thus, facilitate the

process of establishing analytical relationships.

As noted at the beginning of this paper, the main concern of this study is the clarification of the meaning of systematic frameworks and the investigation of the significance of such a concept for planning theory. After the concept has been sufficiently clarified in preceding chapters, it is time now to enter into the concluding phase of this paper--to evaluate the significance of the concept of systematic frameworks for the prospect of planning theory. Its significance can be approached from three different perspectives: logical, orientational and methodological.

A. Logical Significance for Planning Theory

As long as planning theory is characterized as a task of scientific study of planning behavior, a systematic framework should aid in the theorizing process of different sectors in the continuous spectrum of theoretical approaches to planning behavior.

First, it provides a framework of general reference and orientation for visualizing the planning process, which confers meaning of relevance and sets direction on particular experiences and generalizations. It is the general setting in terms of which all conceptual, empirical and special approaches to planning take shape and make sense.

Secondly, it sharpens the notational or semantic tool of these approaches in a progressive and systematic manner. It

provides a system of multi-schemes for describing the complex phenomenon which characterizes the planning process. For example, at the end of "Emerging Views of Planning" Bolan writes:

From this discussion, the emergence of a framework for exploring more sophisticated views of the planning process can now be visualized; one in which the planner might more precisely gauge and influence his community's capacity for making social choices which more closely approximate "planned" solutions.¹⁰

It enables one to view each of the relevant areas of study as structurally related to one another. Thus, it offers firm ground for structural analysis and identification of analytical properties.

Finally, as a theoretical tool, it furnishes a structural context for attaining specific variables and determinate relationships among them. It facilitates the process of establishing analytical relationships and of deriving meaningful hypotheses.

To be sure, the specification and clarification of concepts, the description of facts, the attribution of general properties and the structural analysis of certain aspects, are all indispensable phases of theoretical work. But separately they do not constitute theory. It is only when all these phases are interrelated in a systematic way that a theory begins to emerge. Concepts and descriptions only constitute the definitions of what is to be observed. They are the variables from which empirical relationships are to be sought. When properties are logically interrelated on the basis of a theoretical context, a theory

has been instituted.¹¹

A systematic framework is such a context for interrelating different theoretical phase in systematic way. The significance of this context for a new branch of social science, such as planning in its logical dimension, is quite apparent. Its potential for future development of planning theory consists in its capacity to bring the partiality of existing frameworks to a higher level of systematization. Thus it will accelerate the speed of the evolution of planning theory toward the final aim of scientific discipline.

B. Orientational Significance for Planning Theory

Except for its logical relevance, the concept of systematic frameworks, with its theoretical infra-structures, has other profound effects on the general outlook of the development of planning theory.

First, it provides a developmental orientation to the history of planning theory and its future prospect. This orientation offers a reasonably realistic scale to continually assess the current conditions of planning theory, the ways in which it has been developed and the direction for future progress. Thus, it enables one to view planning theory as a total body of theoretical knowledge which undergoes uninterrupted fusion and interpenetration. Beyond the diversifications between theories, a spectrum of continuity and convergence still can be revealed as

the fertile soil for future fruitions. A slight shift in vision will change the notorious reputation of planning theory described by some pessimists, and restore a modest confidence in its potential. This aspiration of an active and productive orientation toward planning theory relies chiefly on just such a slight change in vision.

Secondly, in light of the concepts of continuity and convergence of thought, the infra-structures of systematic frameworks provides a specific context and also a general orientation for codifying the existing theories. Through orientation to meaningful and relevant codifications, it helps promote the process of cumulative growth of theoretical knowledge and makes manifest the implicit interconnections among items of existing theories which are available in a scattered, fragmentary form. Also it helps to fix pertinent attention on points where future work must be done. Moreover, codification facilitates selection of problems.

Finally, the concept of systematic frameworks suggests an interdisciplinary orientation. A joint of cooperative of several disciplines is often required for the task of formulating planning theory in terms of systematic frameworks. It refers to an interdisciplinary approach and not to any single conventional field of study such as economics, public administration or sociology. In short, its approach is behavioristic and unified in nature. Any one-sided invasion by a single discipline should be prevented, for the domination by a particular field of study usually

provides only partial frameworks for understanding the variations exhibited in the total process. For example, it is worthwhile to note how the definition of planning theory has been narrowed down by the constricting effects of economics on the choice theory put forward by Davidoff and Reiner. It has seemed to them necessary to define the purposes of planning largely in terms of economic functions: efficiency and rational action. But planning, apparently, may serve quite other purposes far removed from the economic sphere.

Such an interdisciplinary orientation can facilitate the control of biases of formulation and interpretation which are presently fostered by departmentalization of education and research in the planning field.

C. Methodological Significance for Planning Theory

The concept of systematic frameworks opens up a methodological dimension for theoretical consideration in planning. The distinction between research technique and methodology, or the logic of scientific procedure, should be clearly noted. As

T. Parsons has observed:

Methodology...its reference is not primarily to methods of empirical research such as statistics, case study, interview and the like. These latter it is preferable to call research techniques. Methodology is the consideration of the general grounds for the validity of scientific propositions and systems of them.¹²

Or as R. Merton has observed:

The problems of methodology transcend those found in any one discipline, dealing either with those common to groups of disciplines or, in more generalized form, with those common to all scientific inquiry.¹³

Planning theory, if it is expected to be in line with progress being made in other areas of social science and become scientifically more mature, must include methodological dimension as one of the chief items of its theoretical infrastructure. Its importance is the same as that of empirical measurement and logical consistency.

As has been pointed out earlier, the concept of systematic frameworks is essentially a methodological device in which all design of investigation, nature of inference and requirements of a theoretical system should be taken into account. This focus of attention upon the logics of procedure has its patent function for planning theory, since such considerations can play a critical role in guiding and assessing relevant theoretical and empirical inquiries. As a methodological device, the concept of systematic frameworks brings into the open an array of assumptions, concepts and logical strategies employed in the conceptual formulations of planning theory. Thus, it provides relatively specific criteria for distinguishing well-formed theoretical structures from organized descriptive data, empirical generalizations or hypotheses which remain logically disparate and unconnected.

Owing to the complexity of its subject matter and relative immaturity as a new scientific discipline, many theoretical effort in planning are apt to hide the procedure of their inquiry behind seemingly illuminating comments of thoughts, thus, getting lost in the veil of words. The paradigm of systematic frameworks will reduce this tendency of methodological blindness. By its logical arrangement, the paradigm may provide ground for the systematic cross-tabulation of significant concepts and can thus sensitize planning theorists to some theoretical and empirical problems which they might otherwise overlook.

Finally, by opening various assumptions and procedures to critical scrutiny, and setting forth provisional criteria for the requirements of a well-formed theoretical structure, it can serve as a guiding light directing the future development of planning theory in general.

CONCLUDING REMARK

B. Harris has said, "There is a good deal of popular jargon which tends to imply that practical activities are useful, while activities dealing with theory tend to be non-productive."¹ This paper intends, mainly by methodological analysis of theoretical conceptualizations, to restore a modest confidence in planning theory in respect to its long-range potential for both the academic and professional spheres.

Empirical-oriented prudence toward theory should not be taken as total repudiation of relevant conceptual approaches, especially in a practical-oriented field such as planning which already has been institutionalized to be somewhat indifferent to theoretical efforts.

Despite its having no direct bearing on practical problems, the analyses and inquiries set forth in this paper still may contribute to a better understanding, and provide a classification scheme of the structures of planning theory for the students of planning theory course.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. See Section C, Chapter II.

CHAPTER I.

1. J. Keller, "Notes on the Stucture of Planning Theory" unpublished. .
2. Ibid.
3. B. Harris, "The Uses of Theory in the Simulation of Urban Phenomena" AIP Journal, Vol. 32, Sept. 1963, pp. 258-259.
4. Ibid., p. 259.
5. J. Keller, op. cit.
6. J. Friedmann, "A Conceptual Model for the Analysis of Planning Behavior" Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 12, 1967, p. 250.
7. J. Friedmann, "The Study and Practice of Planning" International Social Science Journal, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1959, p. 327.
8. Ibid.

CHAPTER II

1. R. S. Bolan, "Community Decision Behavior: The Culture of Planning", AIP Journal, Vol. 35, 1969, pp. 301-400.
2. L. L. Haworth, "An Institutional Theory of the City and Planning", AIP Journal, Vol. 23, 1957, pp. 135-143.
3. J. Friedmann, "A Conceptual Model for the Analysis of Planning Behavior", Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 12, 1967, pp. 225-252.
4. J. E. Bebout and H. C. Bredemeier, "American Cities as Social Systems", AIP Journal, Vol. 29, 1963.
 T. N. Clark, Community and Decision-Making: Comparative Analyses, Chandler: San Francisco, 1968.
 I. T. Sanders, The Community: Introduction to a Social System. New York: Ronald, 1958.

5. P. Daviddoff, "Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning", AIP Journal, Vol. 31, 1965, p. 335.
6. L. L. Haworth, "An Institutional Theory of the City and Planning", op. cit., p. 135.
7. Ibid., p. 136.
8. A concise description of this model will be found in E. Banfield's "Note on Conceptual Scheme", in M. Meyerson and E. C. Banfield (ed.), Politics, Planning and the Public Interest: The Case of Public Housing in Chicago. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1955, pp. 303-330.
9. For a critique of the rational model, see D. Braybrooke and C. E. Lindblom, A Strategy for Decision: Policy Evaluation as a Social Process. The Free Press of Glencoe, New York, 1963, pp. 48-57.
10. For the approaches to planning as a basic social-administrative process, see
 Y. Dror, Public Policymaking Reexamined. San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1968.
 Y. Dror, "Policy Analysts: A Professional Role in Government Service", Public Administration Review, Vol. 27, No. 3, 1967.
 For the institutional forms of planning, see
 J. Friedmann, "The Institutional Context", in B. M. Gross (ed.), Action under Planning. New York, McGraw Hill, 1966, pp. 31-67.
11. J. Friedmann, "A Conceptual Model for the Analysis of Planning Behavior", op. cit., p. 227.
12. Y. Dror, "The Planning Process: A Facet Design", International Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol. 24, 1963, p. 46.
13. R. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure. The Free Press, New York, 1968, p. 135.
14. J. Friedmann, "A Conceptual Model for the Analysis of Planning Behavior", op. cit., p. 226.
15. Ibid., p. 226.
16. R. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure. p. 143.

17. J. Friedmann, op. cit., p. 250.
18. Y. Dror, "Dimensions of Planning", Public Policy, Vol. 7, Cambridge, Mass., 1956, p. 112.
19. Ibid., p. 112.
20. Y. Dror, "The Planning Process: A Facet Design", International Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol. 24, 1963, p.47.
21. R. S. Bolan, "Community Decision Behavior", op. cit., p. 301.
22. R. S. Bolan. "Emerging Views of Planning", AIP Journal, Vol. 33, 1967, pp. 233, 243.
23. For a summary of the point of views of those authors, see J. Hughes and L. D. Mann, "Systems and Planning Theory", AIP Journal, Vol. 35, 1969, pp. 331-332.

CHAPTER III

1. A. Schutz, Collected Papers, Vol. 1, Nijhoff, The Hague, 1962, p. 4.
2. D. Walsh, "Sociology and the Social World", in P. Filmer, M. Phillipson, D. Silverman and D. Walsh (ed.) New Directions in Sociological Theory. The MIT Press. Cambridge, Mass., 1973, p. 16.
3. K. Popper, Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach. Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1972, p. 345.
4. A. Gouldner, The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology. Avon Books, The Hearst Corporation, 1971, p. 31.
5. M. Meyerson and E. Banfield, op. cit.
6. H. Simon and J. March, Organizations. New York: Wiley, 1958.
7. P. Davidoff and T. Reiner, "A Choice Theory of Planning" AIP Journal, May, 1962.
8. L. Haworth, "An Institutional Theory of the City and Planning", AIP Journal, op. cit.
9. H. Simon and J. March, op. cit.
10. P. Davidoff, "Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning" op. cit.
11. W. Weaton, "Metro-allocation Planning" AIP Journal, Vol. 33, pp. 103-107.

12. A. Altshuler, "The Goals of Comprehensive Planning". AIP Journal, Vol. 31, pp. 186-195.
D. Holleb, Social and Economic Information for Urban Planning. The University of Chicago Press, 1970.
13. L. Mann, "Practicable Planning Theory" Processed.
14. Y. Dror: a. "Dimensions of Planning" and
b. "The Planning Process: A Facet Design". op. cit.
15. R. Bolan: a. "Community Decision Behavior" and
b. "Emerging Views of Planning". op. cit.
16. R. Bolan, "Community Decision Behavior". op. cit., p. 308.
17. Cf. T. Parsons on "Unit Concept" in his The Structure of Social Action. The Free Press, New York, Vol. I, 1968, p. 35.
Also, A. Etzioni on "Unit Analysis" in his The Active Society: A Theory of Societal and Political Processes. The Free Press, New York, 1964.
18. A. Etzioni, op. cit.,
19. Y. Dror, "Dimensions of Planning" op. cit., p. 124.
20. J. Friedmann, "A Conceptual Model for the Analysis of Planning Behavior" op. cit., p. 251.
21. Cf. T. Parsons on "Analytical Concept" or "Analytical Element" in The Structure of Social Action. pp. 34-35. Also, A. Etzioni on "Emergent Properties" in The Active Society.
22. J. Friedmann, "The Institutional Context" in B. Gross (ed.), Action under Planning. New York, McGraw Hill, 1966. p. 41.
23. R. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure. op. cit., p. 102.

CHAPTER IV.

1. J. Keller, op. cit.
2. T. Parsons, The Structure of Social Action. op. cit., p. 7.
3. A. Gouldner, The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology. op. cit., p. 29.

CHAPTER V.

1. For concrete example see R. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure. op. cit., p. 151.

2. R. Bolan, "Emerging Views of Planning" op. Cit., p. 244.
3. E. Burke, "Citizen Participation Strategies" AIP Journal, Vol. 34, pp. 287-294.
4. J. Dyckman, "Social Planning, Social Planners and Planned Societies" AIP Journal, Vol. 32, pp. 66-67.
5. L. Keyes Jr. The Rehabilitation Planning Game. Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, 1969.
6. M. Meyerson and E. Banfield, op. cit.
7. A. Altshuler, The City Planning Process. Ithaca, Cornell University, 1965.
8. F. Rabinovitz, City Politics and Planning. New York, Atherton, 1969.
9. J. Friedmann, "A Conceptual Model for the Analysis of Planning Behavior" op. cit., p.226.
10. R. Bolan. "Emerging Views of Planning" op. cit., p. 243.
11. R. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure. op. cit., p.143.
12. T. Parsons, The Structure of Social Action. op. cit., pp. 23-24.
13. R. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure. op. cit., p. 140.
- 14.

CONCLUDING REMARK

1. B. Harris, "The Uses of Theory in the Simulation of Urban Phenomena" op. cit., p. 258.

REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Bebout, J. E. and Bredemeier, H. C. "American Cities as Social Systems". AIP Journal, Vol. 29, 1963.
2. Black, G. The Application of Systems Analysis to Government Operations. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968.
3. Bolan, R. S. "Emerging Views of Planning", AIP Journal, Vol. 33, 1967.
4. _____ "Community Decision Behavior: the Culture of Planning", AIP Journal, Vol. 35, 1969.
5. Braybrooke, D. and Lindholm, C. E. A Strategy for Decision: Policy Evaluation as a Social Process. The Free Press, 1963.
6. Catanese, A. J. "Urban System Planning: Retropect and Propect", High Speed Ground Transportation Journal, Vol. 3, 1969.
7. Carzo, R. Jr. and Yanouzas, J. N. Formal Organizations: A Systems Approach. Homewood, Ill.: Irwin, Inc., 1967.
8. Churchman, C. W. "Decision and Value Theory", Proceedings of Operations Research Society, Vol. 5, 1961, John Wiley, N. Y.
9. Dakin, J. "An Evaluation of the 'Choice Theory of Planning'" AIP Journal, Feb. 1963.
10. Daviddoff, P. and Reiner, T. "A Choice Theory of Planning", AIP Journal, May, 1962.
11. Daviddoff, P. "Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning", AIP Journal, Vol. 31, 1965.
12. Dror, Y. Public Policymaking Reexamined. San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1968.
13. _____ "Dimensions of Planning", Public Policy, Vol. 7. Cambridge, Mass., 1956.
14. _____ "The Planning Process: a Facet Design", International Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol. 24, 1963.
15. _____ "Policy Analysts: A Professional Role in Government Service", Public Administration Review, Vol. 27, No. 3, 1967.
16. Dyckman, J. W. "Planning and Decision Theory", AIP Journal, Nov. 1961.

17. Dyckman, J. W. "The Practical Uses of Planning Theory", AIP Journal, Vol. 35, 1969.
18. _____ "Social Planning, Social Planner and Planned Societies", AIP Journal, Vol. 32, 1966.
19. Etzione, A. The Active Society: A Theory of Societal and Political Processes. The Free Press: New York, 1964.
20. Friedmann, J. "The Study and Practice of Planning", International Social Science Journal, Vol. 11, 1959.
21. _____ "The Institutional Context", in Gross, B. M. (ed.), Action under Planning. New York, McGraw Hill, 1966.
22. _____ "Planning as Innovation: The Chilean Case", AIP Journal, Vol. 32, 1966.
23. _____ "A Conceptual Model for the Analysis of Planning Behavior", Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 12, 1967.
24. Harris, B. "The Uses of Theory in the Simulation of Urban Phenomena", AIP Journal, Vol. 32, 1962.
25. Haworth, L. L. "An Institutional Theory of the City and Planning", AIP Journal, Vol. 23, 1957.
26. Hill, F. G. "Wesley Mitchell's Theory of Planning", Political Science Quarterly, Mar. 1957.
27. Mann, L. D. "Practicable Planning Theory", processed.
28. Meyerson, M. and Banfield, E. C. Politics, Planning and the Public Interest. New York: The Free Press, 1955.
29. Merton, R. K. Social Theory and Social Structure. New York: The Free Press, 1968.
30. Nagel, E. The Structure of Science. N. Y. Harcoat, b. & world 1961.
31. Popper, K. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Harper Torchbooks, 1968.
32. _____ Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. Harper Torchbooks, 1968.
33. Popper, K. Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach. Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1972.

34. Parsons, T. The Structure of Social Action. New York, The Free Press, 1968.
35. Peterson, W. "On Some Meanings of Planning", AIP Journal, May, 1966.
36. Sanders, I. T. The Community: Introduction to a Social System. New York: Ronald, 1958.
37. Seeley, R. "What is Planning?", AIP Journal, May, 1962.
38. Zwick, C. J. Systems Analysis and Urban Planning. Chicago: The Rand Corporation, 1963.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The author wishes to express his sincere thanks and appreciation to his major professor J. W. Keller for his suggestion and assistance during the preparation of this report.

The help of R. B. Weisenburger and C. A. Keithley is also highly appreciated.

**SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE POSSIBILITY AND SIGNIFICANCE OF
FORMULATING PLANNING THEORY IN TERMS OF SYSTEMATIC
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS**

by

CHAN-CHI CHO

B. S., College of Chinese Culture, 1969

AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S REPORT

**submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree**

MASTER OF REGIONAL AND COMMUNITY PLANNING

Department of Regional and Community Planning

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY

Manhattan, Kansas

1974

The main effort of this paper is directed toward a methodological clarification of the meaning of "systematic conceptual frameworks" as it has been vaguely conceived by some planning theorists in their theoretical inquiries and a relevant evaluation of the significance of such a concept for the prospects of planning theory. In chapter I and II, the problem of systematic formulation in planning field was delineated against its general background and the task of formulating planning theory in terms of systematic frameworks was identified as the new phase toward which future theoretical efforts will take shape.

In chapter III and IV, the meaning of systematic frameworks has been clarified by means of a analysis of logical functions of its four component elements (axiomatic, descriptive, structural and analytical schemes) and an explanation of three levels of systematization. (partial frameworks, systematic frameworks and theoretical systems). Most of the present theoretical works in planning, with respect to their explicit formulation, are, thus, classified as merely partial frameworks. To be arising to the level of systematic frameworks, planning theory at the present stage as a system of partial frameworks has to fulfill certain prerequisite requirements.

In chapter V, the last chapter, the significance of adopting the concept of systematic frameworks as a working paradigm for all kind of approaches, general theory, middle-range theory and particular study, was explained. Specifically, it was approached from three different and mutually related angles: logical, orientational and methodological.