The effect of the US troop deployments on conflict initiation and diplomatic relations

by

Jahanzib Masjidi

B.A., State University of New York at Cortland (SUNY Cortland), 2019

A THESIS

submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Political Science
College of Arts and Sciences

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas

2021

Approved by:

Major Professor
Dr. Michael E. Flynn

Copyright

Abstract

Since the end of the World War II, the United States has deployed hundreds of thousands of troops to foreign countries. The purpose of the US troop deployments is to deter adversaries, protect US allies, and to signal America's commitment to a particular region. There is an emerging body of research that investigates the effects of the US troop deployments on the host state's foreign policy. However, we still need to examine the influence of the US troop deployments on some other policy areas. In particular, the existing research does not explain how the US troop deployments affect the relations between the host states and their neighbors. Since US troop deployments have an effect on a range of issues in the host state, it is possible that these deployments might also have a positive or negative influence on the relations between the host state and its neighbors. Thus, it is important to examine whether the presence of US troops alter the behavior of the neighboring countries toward the host state. This study contributes to the scholarship about US troop deployments in two important ways. First, it examines how the deployment of US troops affect the likelihood of conflict onset between the host state and its neighboring state. Second, it investigates what impact do US troop deployments have on the diplomatic behavior of the host states and their neighbors. This thesis makes two central arguments: (1) the deployment of US troops represent a credible commitment by the US for the protection of the host state, which in turn decreases the likelihood of conflict initiation by the neighboring state against the host state, (2) US troop deployments can improve economic ties and cooperation between the host state and its neighbors, which make the neighboring countries prone to align with the host state on diplomatic issues. To empirically examine these propositions, this study examines the relationship between military deployments, conflict onset, and UN voting patterns.

Table of Contents

List of Figures

List of Tables

Acknowledgements

This thesis is dedicated to everyone who helped me along the way. First, I would like to thank my family for all their support. Most importantly, thanks to my father, who has been a source of motivation and strength. Without the support and encouragement of my father, I would not have been able to pursue my academic goals.

Also, special thanks to my thesis advisor, Dr. Michael E. Flynn, who has been an amazing advisor and an excellent mentor. Dr. Flynn has been a great source of encouragement, advice, and critique. His excellent mentorship and guidance made the completion of this project possible. I am extremely grateful to Dr. Flynn for all his feedbacks, support, and guidance. Finally, thanks to my amazing committee members, Dr Carla Martinez Machain and Dr. Sabri Ciftci for their guidance and invaluable comments.

Chapter 1 - Introduction

Troop deployments have served as a vital foreign policy tool of the United States. While US troop deployments to conflict-affected states such as Iraq and Afghanistan receive significant media and public attention, the United States also deploy hundreds of thousands of noncombat troops to foreign states that have close ties with the US. The United States deploy troops to overseas locations for various reasons; however, the general purpose of noncombat US troop deployments is to deter adversaries and protect US allies. Although the existing literature explore the effects of US troop deployments on a range of issues in the host states, we still do not know how US troop deployments affect the relations between the host state and its neighbors.

Existing research investigates the effects of US troop deployments on economic development, trade, and FDI in the host states (Biglaiser and DeRouen, 2007; Jones and Kane 2012; Heo and Ye 2019). Other studies explore the effect of US troop deployments on crime, human rights, and public opinion in the host states (Allen and Flynn 2013; Bell et. al 2017; and Flynn et. al 2019). In addition, there is an emerging body of research that investigates the effects of the US troop deployments on the host state's foreign policy. As such, Martinez Machain and Morgan (2013) examine how US troop deployments affect the host state's troop level, military spending, and conflict involvement. Allen, Flynn, and VanDusky-Allen (2016) examine how alliance ties condition the effect of US troop deployments on host states' defense spending. While these studies significantly expanded our knowledge regarding US troop deployments, scholars have not yet explored whether US troop deployment have any influence on the relations between the host states and their neighbors. How do US troop deployments affect the relations between the host state and its neighbors? How does the deployment of US troops affect the likelihood of conflict between the host state and its neighbors? And what influence do US troop

deployments have on the diplomatic behavior of the host states and their neighbors? The existing literature do not address these important questions.

Although US troop deployments have an influence on a range of issues in the host states, there are theoretical and historical reasons to argue that the effects of US troop deployments are not just limited to the host states. These deployments can have spillover effects for the neighboring countries, which can cause changes in the relations between the host state and its neighboring countries. Since US troop deployments alter the distribution of capabilities and are correlated with economic growth in the host states, they can improve economic ties and cooperation between the host state and its neighbors, which in turn can affect the likelihood of conflict and diplomatic relations between the host state and its neighboring countries. For instance, US troop deployments to Kuwait can increase trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) in that state, which make Kuwait a valuable trading partner for the neighboring states. When the economic ties improve between Kuwait and its neighbors due to the economic benefits of US troop deployments, the likelihood of conflict can decrease between these states and it is also possible that they would align with each other on diplomatic issues.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of US troop deployments on the relations between the host state and its neighbors. Specifically, I analyze whether US troop deployments reduce the likelihood of conflict between the host states and their neighboring states and whether these deployments make the neighboring countries prone to align with the host states on diplomatic issues. Using data on US troop deployments for the years 1950 to 2020, I examine the effect of US troop deployments on the likelihood of militarized interstate dispute (MIDs) between the host state and the neighboring states. In addition, I explore the UN voting

patterns of the states to explain whether US troop deployments lead to similarity in the diplomatic behavior of the host state and its neighboring countries.

This study contributes to the scholarship about US troop deployments in two important ways. First, it examines how the deployment of US troops affect the propensity of conflict between the host state and its neighboring state. Second, it investigates what impact do US troop deployments have on the diplomatic behavior of the host states and their neighbors. This thesis makes two central arguments: (1) the deployment of US troops represent a credible commitment by the US for the protection of the host state, which in turn decreases the likelihood of conflict initiation by the neighboring state against the host state, (2) US troop deployments can improve economic ties and cooperation between the host state and its neighbors, which make the neighboring countries prone to align with the host state on diplomatic issues.

I find that US troop deployments have a statistically significant effect on the likelihood of Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) across the different types of dyads. First and most importantly, the findings indicate that US troop deployments affect the likelihood of MIDs between the host states and their neighbors, which imply that US troop deployments can have an influence on the relations between the host state and its neighboring countries. The results show that in dyads where one neighboring state hosts US troops and the other does not, roughly 4.9 percent of the dyads experience MIDs. However, the likelihood of MIDs decreases when both neighboring states host US troops. As such the results indicate that in dyads where both states host US troops, roughly 4 percent of the dyads experience MIDs, which is a smaller percent as compared to the dyads where only one state host US troops. Accordingly, these results lend some support to my first hypothesis which states that the presence of US troops decreases the likelihood that the host states' neighbors will initiate an MID against the host states. In addition,

the findings suggest that US troop deployments correlate with decreased ideal point distance in the UN voting across dyads where one neighboring state hosts US troops but the other does not. As such, the presence of US troops seems to be a factor that contributes to diplomatic alignment in the UN between the host states and their neighboring countries. Thus, the results also show some support for my second hypothesis, which states that US troop deployments will correlate with greater similarity in the diplomatic behavior of the host states and their neighbors. The findings of this study offer greater insight into whether US troop deployments have any implications for the relations between the host states and their neighbors. These findings inform scholars about the regional effects of US troop deployments and open new avenues for further research. In addition, the policy implications of this study can guide US foreign policy makers regarding the regional ramifications of US troop deployments.

Figure 1- Presents the locations of US military bases around the world (Source: Vine 2015).



Chapter 2 - Literature Review

The deployment of US troops to overseas locations has been a key element of the United States foreign policy for decades. US troop deployments support the security and foreign policy interests of the United States. The United States deploy troops to foreign countries for various strategic aims; however, the purpose of the US troop deployments is to protect US allies, deter adversaries, and support the liberal international order. Although the US government use troop deployments to pursue these goals, US military presence also have significant impact on a range of issues in the host states. While the deployment of US combat troops to conflict-affected nations such as Iraq and Afghanistan receive significant public attention, most of the deployed US troops are noncombat forces that are stationed in countries that have close ties with the US. Although this study is mainly focused on explaining the effect of US troop deployments on interstate conflict initiation and the diplomatic behavior of the host state and its neighbors, the existing literature has explored the effect of US troop deployments on a range of issues. So, what does the existing research tell us about the intended and unintended consequences of the US troop deployments?

2.1 US Troop Deployments and Economic Development

Biglaiser and DeRouen (2007) have explored the relationship between US troop deployments and US foreign direct investment (FDI). They used panel data for 126 developing countries between 1966 and 2002 to examine the impact of US troop deployments on FDI in the host states. Their findings indicate that US troops in foreign countries are positively correlated with US FDI inflows. They assert that the investment stability provided by US troops in the host

states has a “follow the flag” effect, which encourage US multinational enterprises (MNEs) to invest in developing countries that host US troops.

The link between US troop deployments and US FDI inflows suggests that US troop deployments can have an impact on the economic conditions of the host states. In another study, Biglaiser and DeRouen (2009) examine the effect of US troop deployments on trade. They find that trade and troop levels reinforce each other: the deployment of US troops lead to increased bilateral trade between the host countries and the US. In addition, US exports increases from the countries that host US troops. These scholars contend that deployed US noncombat troops provide political stability that promotes FDI, which in turn, increases bilateral trade flows. Their analysis also suggests that bilateral trade has a positive effect on US troop deployments. Therefore, they argue that US is more likely to deploy noncombat troops to developing countries that have strong commercial ties with the US. These studies are mainly focused on the relationship between US troop deployments and trade. They offer compelling analyses, which indicates that US troop deployments have significant influence on bilateral commercial ties.

However, this literature raises another question: do US troop deployments have an effect on other economic areas? The following studies moved the research toward understanding the effect of US troop deployments on economic, human, and infrastructural development. Jones and Kane (2012) have focused on studying the economic benefits of the US troop deployments. They evaluated the relationship between US troop deployments and economic growth in the host states. Their theoretical model shares the same assumption first introduced by Biglaiser and DeRouen (2009) that the presence of the US noncombat troops creates political stability in the host countries. So, Jones and Kane (2012) contend that the political stability provided by the US troops fosters economic activity, which in turn, leads to increased economic growth in the host

states. They found that US troop deployments have significant and positive correlation with economic growth in the host countries. Their findings indicates that the presence of the US troops led to higher economic growth in the host states during the second half of the 20th century. Furthermore, Heo and Ye (2019) also investigated how the presence of substantial US military (more than 100 troops on average) affect the economy of the host nation. In particular, they examine what impact US troop deployments have on the host's state GDP, trade, investment levels, and democratic development for the period from 1960 to 2014. They argue that the presence of US troops supports stable and investment friendly environment, which in turn, increases economic growth in the host nations. In addition, they claim that the liberal free market based economic growth supported by US troop deployments promotes democratization, thus the presence of the US troops indirectly contributes to democratic development in the host nations. They found that US military deployments have significant positive impact on the economies of the host nations. According to their analysis, each additional 100 US troops deployed leads to approximately 21 million US dollar increase in total foreign and domestic investment in the host state. They also found evidence that indicate US troop deployments are positively correlated with the host state's GDP and trade level. However, their results suggest that the presence of US troops does not have a significant positive effect on democratic development in the host states (Heo and Ye, 2019).

In another relevant study, Kane (2012) investigated what impact the deployment of US troops has on human development in the host countries. By focusing on the relationship between US troop deployments and three human development indicators including children mortality rate, life expectancy, and telephone lines, Kane (2012) found that countries with larger US troop presence had faster increases in life expectancy, greater reductions in child mortality rates, and

faster development in telephone lines per capita. These studies contributed significantly to the existing literature about US troop deployments by offering empirical evidence that indicates US troop deployments are positively correlated with economic and human development in the host nations.

2.2 US Troop Deployments and the Host-country Crime

While the above studies expanded our knowledge about how the deployment of US troops affect the economic conditions in the host states, other research has focused on what impact US troop deployments have on crime rates in the host countries. Nelson (1987) notes that drug abuse was a widespread problem among US troops in West Germany. In addition, some countries reported rape cases perpetrated by US soldiers against civilians in the host countries (Nelson, 1987). Another study suggests that drug abuse was also a rampant problem among US military forces in Vietnam, which in turn, contributed to criminal activities such as drug trafficking in the host country (Baker, 2004). Both Nelson (1987) and Baker (2004) contend that the rampant drug abuse problem among US troops significantly increased drug trafficking in West Germany. These studies suggested that there could be a link between the presence of US soldiers and increased crime rates in the host countries, however, researchers still needed to systematically evaluate this relationship.

Allen and Flynn (2013) have focused on whether the presence of US troops abroad creates negative externalities that can cause problems for the local communities. In particular, they examine the effect of the US troop deployments on reported crime the host countries. Using cross-national crime statistics from the host countries and data about US troop deployments, they asses what influence the presence of US troops has on reported crimes in the host nations. Their

findings offer mixed evidence that US troop deployments are correlated with increased reported crimes in the host countries. They contend that the conditional effect of the US troops on crime is generally statistically insignificant, however, positive relationships do exist in some cases. In addition, they note that the effect of US troops deployment on some crime categories is conditional on the host county's GDP. Less wealthy states seem to experience increases in some types of crimes as the levels of the troops deployed to these states increase, however, as the host country becomes wealthier, the link between US troops and such crimes becomes statistically insignificant. Finally, these scholars note that the relationship between US military deployments and the host-state reported crime becomes negative and is not statistically significant once they control for other explanatory variables. These studies enhanced our understanding about whether US troop deployments exacerbates criminal activities in the host nations.

2.3 US Troop Deployments and Human rights

Scholars have also focused on explaining the influence of US troop deployments on human rights practices. In particular, Bell et. al (2017) examine whether the deployment of US noncombat troops abroad promote greater respect for human rights in the host country. They note that the presence of the US troops can have either positive or negative consequences for human rights practices in the host state. According to their analysis, host states may choose to restrict the repressive activities of their agents for two particular reasons. First, if the host is less salient for the US security and foreign policy interests, the host government may fear the withdrawal of the US troops and the economic and security benefits associated with the presence of the US military. Thus, such a state might have greater respect for human rights in order to maintain US military presence and military aid. On the other hand, the US government has

increasingly linked its foreign policy decision-making process to human rights concerns. So, it makes little sense for US to maintain troops in states that display greater human rights violations. Second, international human rights advocacy organizations are likely to target the relationships between large democracies such as the US and countries that benefit from hosting US troops. Thus, if the host state engages in significant violations of physical integrity rights, the US government might face domestic and international pressure to withdraw its troops from that country or indirectly force that state to improve its respect for human rights (Bell et. al, 2017).

As such, these scholars note that based on these two reasons, the host state has an incentive to change its human rights behavior in order to maintain the US military presence and the benefits that come with US troop deployments. Thus, they contend that if the presence of the US troops is of greater importance to the host state than the US, then US troop deployments are likely to lead to improvements in the human rights practices of the host state. However, US has shown a willingness to provide military assistance to countries that have greater security and strategic importance, even when those states have engaged in human rights violations. As such, the authors argue that when the host state is central and vital for the foreign policy objectives of the US, US troop deployments might not improve human rights in the host state and their presence can be even correlated with human rights violations. Their empirical findings largely support some of their arguments and indicate that in the post-Cold War era, when human rights trainings were increasingly incorporated into the US troops' training, US troops deployments are largely correlated with better human rights practices in the host countries. However, during the Cold War, in states with high security salience for the US, the presence of the US troops did not have statistically significant effect on the human rights behavior of the host states (Bell et. al, 2017). While this particular study has expanded our knowledge about the effect of US troop

deployment on human rights practices, the following literature has focused on explaining the impact of US troop deployments on public opinion.

2.4 US Troop Deployments and Public Opinion in the Host States

Considering the effects of the US troop deployments on a range of issues, we could also expect that the presence of US troops may affect public opinion in the host states. Recent research has focused on investigating the impact of US troop deployments on public opinion in the host state. In particular, Flynn et. al (2019) examine what effect the US humanitarian and civic-assistance troop deployments can have on public opinion in the host state. The authors assert that "Though the military is generally thought of as an instrument of hard power, it can also be used to build soft power by improving popular perceptions of the United States abroad." (Flynn et. al, 2019). According to their theoretical model, US military can alleviate the sufferings of the people abroad and improve popular support for the United States by providing humanitarian and development aid to local communities in the host states. By focusing on a specific subset of the US military deployments, the humanitarian and civic-assistance troops, the authors evaluate how these deployment affect individual's attitudes across three areas: (1) the US military, (2) the US government, and (3) the US influence. Peru represents significant variation in exposure to such deployments and it hosts various types of US humanitarian and civic-assistance troops, which makes it an ideal case to study. As such, these scholars have used individual-level public opinion survey data and face-to-face interviews from Peru to analyze the effect of US humanitarian and civic-assistance deployments on public opinion. Their findings indicate that Peruvians from the locations that host US humanitarian and civic-assistance deployments are more likely to express positive and favorable opinions

regarding the US government, US military, and the US influence in Peru. These scholars note that their empirical findings show correlation, not causality, however, their study suggests that US noncombat humanitarian and civic- assistance deployments can improve public perceptions of the United States.

Allen et. al (2020) has expanded the research about the effect of US troop deployments on public opinions in the host states. This study evaluates how social and economic interactions with US military personnel affect individuals' perceptions of the US military presence, the US government, and US population. The authors make two central arguments: (1) they contend that interactions with US military personnel may improve the public attitudes towards the United States, which in turn, increases US soft power. (2) the economic benefits associated with the deployment of US military personnel have a positive influence on individuals' opinions about the United States. Using original survey data from 14 host countries, the authors examine how exposure to and interaction with US military personnel affect individuals' opinions towards US military presence in a country (Allen et. al, 2020). According to the theoretical framework of this study, people who had direct contact with the US military personnel are more likely to have positive opinions about the US military, people, and government. Furthermore, individuals who receive economic benefits from US military presence are more likely to have positive perceptions of the US military, government, and people. Overall, the empirical findings of this study support these arguments and indicate that direct and network contact, economic benefits, and network benefit correlate with more positive attitudes toward the US military, US people, and the US government. However, some results suggests that interpersonal contract with US military personnel can lead to both positive and negative perceptions of the US military. These studies expanded our knowledge about the effect of US

military deployments on public attitudes towards the United States, we still need to understand what impact US troop deployments have on the security and foreign policies of the host states.

2.5 US Troop Deployments and the Host-country Security and Foreign Policies

There is an emerging body of research that is focused on explaining the effects of US troop deployments on the host state foreign policy and military spending. Lake (2009) investigates what impact regional hierarchy has on the behavior of dominant state and the subordinate state. He argues that a subordinate state, which feels more secure under the protective umbrella of a dominant state spend less on defense than non-subordinate states. Lake contends that one of the main indicators of security hierarchy is the deployment of military forces by one state to another state. He notes that the deployment of US troops helps the United States to influence the security policies of the host country. In particular, he asserts that US troop deployments correlate with decreased military spending in the host states. Since US troop deployments can affect military spending of the host states, we could expect that there might be other variables that may affect or condition that effect of US troop deployment on the host state military spending. As such, Allen et. al (2016) has explored how alliance ties condition the effect of US military presence on host state's military spending. This study also investigates how regional concentrations of deployed US troops around a state, affect the defense spending of a state. Using data about US troop deployments from 1951 to 2003 and spatial measures of US troop deployments, Allen et. al (2016) empirically examine these relationships. The empirical findings indicate that: (1) non-allied states tend to reduce their military spending when the United States station troops within their borders. (2) NATO allies consistently increase their

military spending in response to the presence of US troops within their borders. (3) most states decrease their defense spending when the United States station troops near their borders. This study offers empirical evidence that the presence of US troops can affect the military spending of the host states and other states that have US troops near their borders. However, we still need to understand how the deployment of US troops affect the foreign policy behavior of the host states. In particular, we should know how the deployment of US troops affect the host state's involvement in conflict and its relations with neighboring countries.

To date, only Martinez Machain and Morgan (2013) have explored how US troop deployments affect the host state's involvement in conflict. This particular study examines the effect of US troop deployment on the host state's troops level and conflict involvement. These scholars contend that the presence of US troops should affect the conflict involvement and troop levels of a host state for the following reasons. First, they argue that in most situations, the United States deploy troops to foreign countries to protect those countries from adversaries and provide security for the host state. Therefore, host states have an incentive to reduce their military spending and troops level because they enjoy the security provided by the presence of the deployed US troops. Second, they assert that the deployment of US troops enhances the security of the host states, therefore, host states can allocate their resources to other foreign policy areas. Thus, the presence of US troops should lead to an increase in the resources the host state allocates to other foreign policy areas, which in turn, can encourage the host state to initiated militarized interstate dispute (MID). The authors contend that host state should be more likely to initiate MID against another state. Third, these scholars argue that the presence of US troops can also affect the behavior of third-party states. Since deployed US troops enhance the

security of the host states and they are intended to deter the attacks of other states against the host states, third-party states should be less likely to initiate militarized interstate dispute against the recipient of the deployed US troops. Martinez Machain and Morgan (2013) find that US troop deployments consistently correlate with reductions in the troop levels of the host states. They also find some empirical evidence for states being more likely to initiate militarized interstate dispute as the number of deployed US troops increases there. However, their findings indicate that the presence of the US troops does not make the host state less likely to be a target of militarized interstate dispute by another state. Their results suggests that the presence of US troop does not deter attacks against the host state, however, they note that this might be due to a selection problem for which they do not control. Or it could be due to the behavior of the host state that includes reductions in troop levels and military spending, which can increase the probability of that state being a target of an MID.

2.6 Limitations of the Existing Literature

How do US troop deployments affect the relations between the host state and its neighbors? How does the deployment of US troops affect the likelihood of conflict between the host state and its neighbors? And what influence do US troop deployments have on the diplomatic behavior of the host states and their neighbors? While the existing literature that is reviewed in this study explains the effects of US troop deployments on a range of issues, the above questions still remain unanswered. As I explained in the above section, some of the existing studies investigate the effect of US troop deployments on economic development, trade, and FDI in the host states (Biglaiser and DeRouen, 2007, Jones and Kane 2012, Heo and Ye 2019). Other studies have focused on explaining the effect of US troop deployments on reported

crime, human rights, and public opinion in the host states (Allen and Flynn 2013, Bell et. al 2017, and Flynn et. al 2019). In addition, some studies investigate whether troop deployments affect the host states' troop levels, defense spending, and conflict involvement (Lake 2009; Morgan and Martinez Machain 2013). Most recent literature has explored whether alliance ties condition the effect of US troop deployments on host states' defense expenditure, and what impact US troop deployments have on the defense spending of the states surrounded by US troop deployments (Allen et al., 2016). Although these studies have significantly expanded our knowledge about the effects of US troop deployments on a range of issues in the host states, the main gap of the existing literature is that it does not examine whether these deployments influence the relations between the host state and its neighbors. The extant literature cannot explain if US troop deployments cause any changes in the relations between the host states and their neighbors. In particular, none of the existing studies examine whether US troop deployments affect the likelihood of conflict between the host state and its neighbors and if these deployments have any influence on the diplomatic relations between the host state and its neighbors. Therefore, the central aim of this study is to fill this gap in the literature by focusing on the effects of US troop deployments on the relations between the host states and their neighbors.

Previous studies about US troop deployments offer several implications for future research, which also suggest that the effects of US troop deployments are not just limited to the host states. It is possible for US troops deployments to have spillover effects. For instance, Allen et al. (2016) found that larger US troop deployments affect the defense spending of the states surrounding the host state. Their findings indicate that non-allied states increase their defense spending when the number of deployed US troops in their neighborhood increases. In addition,

some scholars found that US troop deployments lead to increased economic growth and FDI in the host states (Biglaiser and DeRouen 2009, Heo and Ye 2009). Thus, it is very much possible for the economic growth associated with US troop deployments to have spillover effects for the neighboring states. Some existing studies indicate that FDI inflows and economic growth in the host state can spillover to the neighboring states. For instance, Boly et al. (2019) found that an increase in FDI inflows in the host state also stimulates the FDI inflows of its neighboring countries, which suggest that FDI inflows can improve trade and investments in the states surrounding the host states. Other studies also indicate that FDI and trade are vital channels of international economic growth spillovers (Hejazi and Safarian 1999; Pietrucha and Zelazny 2017). Accordingly, increased FDI and economic growth in the host states can improve commercial ties and cooperation between the host state and its neighbors.

In addition, the existing literature on the effects of trade and economic growth on conflict initiation suggests that increased economic interdependence can reduce the likelihood of conflict between states. Several existing studies indicate that trade and economic interdependence promote peace and reduce the likelihood of conflict between states (Barbieri 1996; Souva and Prins 2006; Hegre, Oneal, and Russett 2010). As such, the economic growth associated with US troop deployments can have spillover effects for the neighboring states, which in turn can affect the likelihood of conflict and diplomatic relations between the host state and the neighboring countries. Therefore, it is vitally important to examine whether US troop deployments affect the relations between the host states and their neighbors.

This study focuses on how US troop deployments affect the relations between the host state and its neighbors and contributes to the scholarship about US troop deployments in two important ways. First, it examines how the deployment of US troops affect the propensity of

conflict between the host state and its neighboring state. Second, it investigates what impact do US troop deployments have on the diplomatic alignment between the host state and its neighbors. This thesis makes two central arguments: (1) the deployment of US troops represent a credible commitment by the US for the protection of the host state, which in turn decreases the likelihood of conflict initiation by the neighboring state against the host state, (2) US troop deployments can improve economic ties and cooperation between the host state and its neighbors, which make the neighboring countries prone to align with the host state on diplomatic issues.

Chapter 3 - Theoretical Framework

This section is divided into three parts. In the first part, I discuss why the United States deploy troops to foreign states. In the second part, I explain my theory about how US troop deployments can affect the relations between the host state and its neighbors and derive my first hypothesis regarding the effect of US troop deployment on conflict initiation. In the third part, I discuss my theory and arguments regarding why we should expect US troop deployments to affect the diplomatic behavior of the host states and their neighbors, which will allow me to derive my second hypothesis.

3.1 Why does the United States Deploy Troops to Foreign Countries?

The traditional theories of foreign policy, particularly the realist school argues that the only goal of a state in the international system is to maintain its security. Other theories such as the two-good theory of foreign policy assumes that states can pursue multiple goals through their foreign policies (Morgan and Palmer, 2010). All of these theories emphasize that a vital element of states' foreign policies is to maintain their security. Although security is an abstract and vague goal, the deployment of US troops to overseas locations is a form of foreign policy action that supports the security interests of the United States. US troop deployments help the United States to deter adversaries, protect allies, and maintain the international liberal order. After World War II, the United States deployed troops to countries where it was involved in a conflict or wanted to prevent the host states from remilitarizing. For instance, the deployment of US troops to Germany and Japan after World War II were aimed at preventing these states from remilitarizing, so the US troops were stationed there to provide them security (Hosokawa, 1993). US troop deployments serve as the United States credible commitment for the security of the

host states, thus host states such as Japan rely on these troops for external security. In addition, US troop deployments alter the distribution of capabilities and reduce information asymmetries, which reduce the likelihood of external attacks against the host states. Since US troop deployments were expected to enhance the security of the host states by deterring external attacks against them, it was also expected that the deployment of US troops would create stability in the regions to which they were deployed (Holbrooke, 1991).

Scholars assert that one of the central goals of the US troop deployments is to deter the attacks of third-party states against the host states (Martinez Machain and Morgan, 2013). Powerful countries such as the United States station troops in foreign countries to send a credible signal that it will protect the host state if third-party states initiate an attack against it. Therefore, countries like the United States use troop deployments for the purpose of extended deterrence (Kane 2006, and Biglaiser and DeRouen 2007). Most of the existing literature that is reviewed in the above section suggests that US troop deployments enhance security and political stability in the host states, which in turn, lead to economic benefits (Jones and Kane, 2012). However, the theoretical model that I describe in the following sections explains how the presence of US troops can affect the propensity of conflict between the host state and its neighbors and the diplomatic behavior of the host states and their neighbors.

US Troop Deployments and Interstate Conflict

Although Morgan and Martinez Machain (2013) suggest that the presence of US troops does not prevent potential attackers from initiating a militarized interstate dispute (MID) against the host state, there are theoretical, historical, and empirical reasons to argue that their assertions will not hold for all types of potential attackers. The host state's neighboring countries have

specific characteristics and can have distinct behavior toward the host state as compared to other third-party states. In addition, it is important to note that Morgan and Martinez Machain (2013) have used a monadic approach to examine the effect of US troop deployments on conflict initiation, however, in this study I am taking a dyadic approach to evaluate the influence of US troop deployments on the likelihood of conflict between the host state and its neighboring states. As such, the relations between the host state and its neighbors could be either friendly or hostile. If the host state is facing a threat or hostility from its neighbors, the presence of US troops can have a profound effect on the propensity of conflict between the host state and its neighbors. Therefore, the theoretical model that I present here focuses on the effect of US troop deployments on the relations between the host state and its neighbors to explain how the presence of US troops can reduce the likelihood of conflict between the host state and its neighbors. Therefore, I adopt a bargaining framework to explain how US troop deployments can reduce the likelihood of conflict between the host state and its neighbors, which will lead to my first hypothesis.

3.2 Bargaining Framework about the Effect of US Troop Deployments on Interstate Conflict Propensity

Assuming that the United States station troops in the host state to protect it against external attacks, why should we expect US troop deployments to affect the relations between the host state and its neighbors? I argue that that the presence of US troops in the host state can change the relations between the host state and its neighbors in the following areas.

US troop deployments lead to increased economic growth in the host state, which can make the host state a potential valuable trading partner for the neighboring states. As I explained

in the literature review section, the existing research indicates that US troop deployments lead to economic growth in the host states. Biglaiser and DeRouen (2009) found that US troop deployments correlate with increased foreign direct investment (FDI) in the host states. In addition, Heo and ye (2009) offer evidence that shows that US troop deployments have a significant positive effect on the trade level and FDI in the host nations. If the presence of US troops increases trade and investment in the host states, the host state neighbors can also seek economic opportunities through their relations with the host state. If the trade level between the host state and its neighbors was low or even if there were no commercial ties between them prior to the deployments, it is very much possible that the increased economic growth and FDI in the host state created by US troop deployments will improve economic relations between the host state and its neighbors. For example, increased FDI in the host state can encourage the neighboring states to export raw materials or other types of goods to the host state, which in turn might increase the trade level between the host state and its neighbors. In addition, increased FDI can also encourage the host state to import more goods from its neighbors for domestic consumption as its economy and labor become more involved in the production of goods for foreign countries. As such, US troop deployments improve economic growth and FDI in the host states, which in turn can make the host state a valuable trading partner for the neighboring states. Therefore, US troop deployments can indirectly improve commercial ties between the host state and its neighbors.

The bargaining framework that I develop in this section incorporates the existing theories regarding foreign policymaking, conflict initiation, crisis bargaining, and military alliances to explain how the presence of US troops can affect the likelihood of conflict between the host state and its neighbors.

I draw upon Powell's (1993) analysis regarding the guns-versus-butter problem, which can help us understand how US troop deployments can affect the distribution of military capabilities. According to the guns versus butter analysis, state leaders need resources to be able to pursue their foreign policy goals. Although they can allocate resources to all of their domestic and foreign policy programs, they face budget constraints which compel them to make tradeoffs when allocating resources to different policy areas. In particular, they must make some trade-offs in the allocation of resources for two vital goods: guns (external security or military) and butter (social policies for domestic constituency). Thus, every state should decide how to divide its limited resources between guns and butter. Powell asserts that the more resources a state allocates to its military, the stronger it will be relative to other states in the international system and the easier it should be for that state to conquer additional resources. In addition, his model assumes that states must continually decide about whether to attack another state. As such, the probability that a state will prevail in an interstate war depends on three important factors: (1) the amount of resources state A allocated for its military, (2) the amount of resources state B allocated for its military, (3) and the balance between offensive and defensive advantages of the two sides. Powell's analysis suggests that a state defense capability has a significant influence on the probability of whether that states prevails in a war. This analysis lends support to my first argument, which is that US troop deployments increase the military resources available for the host state to defend itself against an external attack. As such, US troop deployments alter the distribution of capabilities between the host state and a potential attacker (the neighboring state). We expect states to take into account the information regarding the military capabilities and alliance ties of their potential targets. Thus, the enhanced security and defense capability provided by US troop deployments can have an influence on the calculations of the neighboring

states regarding whether to initiate a militarized interstate dispute (MID) against the host. Assuming that conflict is equally likely between all states, how do US troop deployments alter the calculations of the neighboring states regarding initiating an MID against the host state?

In this model, I consider states as unitary rational actors that seek to maximize their absolute gains in the anarchic international system through various methods including war. The following are the three rationalist explanations for why pre-war bargaining fails: (1) bargaining fails due to rational miscalculation about information, (2) it fails due to commitment problems (3) bargaining fails due to issue indivisibility (Fearon, 1995). Assuming that all the above causes of bargaining failures are valid, US troop deployments can reduce the problems that cause bargaining failures and war, which in turn can decrease the propensity of an MID between the host and its neighbors. In the following paragraphs, I explain how US troop deployments can decrease the causes of pre-war bargaining failure and war.

US troop deployments reduce information asymmetries

US troop deployments convey credible information regarding the commitment of the United States towards the host state (Schelling 1966; Brown 2013, 2014; Lake 2009). When state A (the host state's neighboring country) is considering whether to initiate an MID against state B (the host state), state A is likely to take into account the information about the military alliances and capabilities of state B. The presence of US troops in state B offers vital information regarding the costs of initiating an MID against state B. The United States deploy troops to foreign states to protect them against external attack, and by placing its troops in "harm's way",

the United States sends a credible signal to other states that an attack on the host state will be considered an attack on the United States (Morgan and Martinez Machain, 2013). Therefore, US troops deployments serve to reduce information asymmetries and uncertainty. As the rationalist explanations of the causes of bargaining failure suggest, war occurs due to miscalculation about information. US troop deployments reduces this problem by signaling that the costs of conflict initiation will be extremely high, which in turn can decrease the likelihood of an MID between states A and B. I want to further develop this argument by explaining some literature on military alliances, which also lends support to the argument that US troop deployment can deter third-party attacks.

Arguments regarding the deterrence ability of military alliances are also applicable to US troop deployments. Alliances are formal agreements among states that require states to cooperate militarily in the event of conflict. One of the most important aims of alliance is deterrence. States that form multilateral and bilateral military alliances expect that their alliances should protect them against external attacks. Defensive alliance treaty requires member states to defend each other in cases where the territorial integrity or sovereignty of a member state is attacked (Leeds et. al, 2000). States that have alliance commitments and expect allied military support should be less likely to be targets of militarized interstate dispute (MID). Leeds and Johnson (2011) examine whether defensive pacts indeed reduce the likelihood of MIDs, and they find that defensive alliances have a robust deterrent effect on the initiation of militarized interstate disputes. Their findings indicate states that have defensive alliances are less likely to be a target of MID. Therefore, the existing literature offers extensive empirical evidence, which indicates military alliances are effective deterrent and they can be credible signals of commitment

(Morrow 1995, Leeds 2003, Johnson, and Leeds 2011, Fuhrmann and Sechser 2014, Wright and Rider 2014).

While defensive pacts are formal alliances between states, I argue that US troop deployments have deterrence effect similar to defensive alliances. US troop deployments deter third-party attacks against the host state through the same mechanism, in which defensive alliances deter attacks against members of the alliance. We expect potential attackers to consider the defensive alliances of a potential target. However, what characteristics influence the deterrence ability of military alliances? The existing literature has already explored this question to an extent. Successful general deterrence requires a potential attacker to believe that the defender is able and credibly committed to make conflict initiation costly. Johnson, Leeds, and Wu (2015) investigate whether certain factors make alliances successful in achieving general extended deterrence. They find that stronger allies such as the United States and allies that have similar policy positions with the targets are more successful in general extended deterrence. In addition, military alliances that call for greater peacetime military coordination are more likely to deter MIDs. These findings indicate that some types of military alliances can be indeed successful at general extended deterrence. These factors that make alliances credible and capable at deterrence are also applicable to US troop deployments. The deployment of US troops indicates strong military partnership between the host state and a powerful state (the US), and these deployments can also lead to greater peacetime military coordination between the host state and the US. If these characteristics make alliances successful at deterrence, then US troop deployments should also achieve extended general deterrence. However, it is important to note that the size of the US troop deployment could also matter. Larger US troop deployments can

exert greater influence on the behavior of potential attackers, and they have more deterrence effect than smaller deployments.

While military alliances are written agreements that allow member states to cooperate militarily only under certain conditions or in the event of external attacks, US troop deployments represent military cooperation in action. According to the National Military Strategy of the United States, the deployment of US troops to foreign countries is the United States' most powerful form of commitment (The National Military Strategy..., 2011). Thus, the deployment of US troops to a foreign state indicates strong military partnership between the United States (a strong ally) and the host state. In addition, countries that host US troops also engage in more peacetime military coordination and military exercises with the United States. For example, the US military often conducts exercises and drills with the militaries of Japan and South Korea, which also happen to be two of the states that host a significant number of US troops (Exercise FOAL EAGLE 2019, and Japan-US military exercise, 2017). Since the characteristics of defensive military alliances that are successful at deterrence are present in the deployment of US troops, we can also expect US troop deployments to be successful in deterring the neighboring states from initiating an attack against the host state.

US troop deployments reduce miscalculations regarding the relative power of the Host states

Scholars assert that leaders consider the efficiency and capability of their militaries if they are planning to attack another state. If a potential target state has certain type of defense capacity or military alliances, we can expect potential attackers to consider that their militaries could be inefficient or weak during an attack against such a state (Martinez Machain and

Morgan, 2013). The presence of US troops enhances the security of the host state. Thus, we should expect the host state's neighboring countries not to attack the host state because in the event of a conflict, deployed US troops can significantly reduce the efficiency of the attacker's military. In addition, when the United States provides security to states by stationing its troops within their borders, the host states feel secure to the extent that they reduce their military spending (Lake 2009, Allen et al. 2016). The reductions in the military expenditure of the host states suggests that the United States indeed provide credible commitment to defend the host state in the event of an external attack. The presence of US troops also suggests that if potential attacker (the host state's neighbor) wants to escalate to a war with the host state, the costs of escalation should be extremely high. The costs of conflict initiation should be high particularly due to the reason that the United States has credibly committed for defending the host state against external attack by stationing its troops within its borders. If potential attacker escalates to war with the host state, it should incur significant costs. Therefore, US troop deployments can offer vital information regarding the relative capability of the host state in the event of an external attack, which should prevent the potential attacker (the host state's neighbor) from miscalculating the relative power of the host state and the strength of the allied support that it will receive in a potential war.

In contrast to other third-party states, the host state's neighbors are sharing borders with the host country. So, the neighboring countries are located in very close geographic distance to the host state. The geographic proximity of the neighboring states to the host state has a number of implications that can prevent these states from miscalculating the relative power of the host state in the event of an external attack. When the United States stations troops near the borders of another state or in the neighborhood of state, we should expect such states to perceive the

presence of US troops more credibly than other states that are located further away from the US military bases. If the host state's neighbors are considering a potential attack against the host state while US troops are present there, we should expect these neighboring states to take into account the probability that in the event of conflict, US troops can respond militarily faster to their attack and they can also cause greater destruction to the attacker's infrastructure due to the fact that US troops are just across their borders. In addition, deployed US troops often share military bases with the militaries of the host states, thus an external attack on the host states' military could also draw in US military personnel. We expect potential attackers, particularly the host state's neighbors to take this information into account because they can incur significant costs if they enter into a militarized dispute with the US military. Thus, the above analysis suggests that US troop deployments should decrease miscalculation regarding the relative power of the host states in pre-war bargaining, which in turn can reduce the likelihood of MIDs between the host and its neighbors.

US troop deployments reduce commitment problems

Lake (2009) contends that varying degree of authority and hierarchy shape the relationships between states in the international system. Since the beginning of the Cold War, the United States has developed hierarchal relations with weaker states to negotiate for itself greater authority over the foreign policy of these states. Under these hierarchical relationships, the United States provide certain types of goods such as security to these states in exchange for influence over their foreign policy (Allen et al., 2016). As such, the United States deploy troops to the host states for two vital reasons; (1) to protect the host state against external attack, and (2) to maintain stability in the host region. In exchange, the hosts provide the United States some

authority over their foreign policy. For instance, when Saudi Arabia accepted US troops to protect itself against Iraq in 1990, in exchange Saudi Arabia allowed the United States to dictate its policies towards Kuwait and Iraq (Lake, 2009). Assuming that US troop deployments are used for maintaining stability in the region, and US gains influence on the foreign policy of the host states in exchange for these deployments, I argue that these deployments reduce commitment problem as a cause of pre-war bargaining failure. I explain my reasoning for this argument through the following bargaining model.

The commitment problem emerges when state A believes that state B will exploit its increasing military capabilities in the future to attack state A. As I explained in the above sections, US troop deployments can alter the distribution of capabilities. In particular, US troop deployments increase the military capability of the host state, which the host state can exploit against another state. As such, if state A (the potential attacker and the host state's neighbor) is considering an attack against state B (the host state), will the presence of US troops in state B reduce the commitment problem in pre-war bargaining?

First and most importantly, the United States serve as a check on the increased military capabilities of the host state when US troops are stationed in the host state. Serving as protégé of the United States, the host states is less likely to exploit its increased military capability, which in turn can reduce pre-war bargaining failure. Assuming that the United States has deployed troops to state B (the target state) because it is committed to maintaining stability and security in that state, state A (the potential attacker) should realize that US troops in state B show the strong commitment of the United States for the stability in the host state. In addition, State A should realize that the host state gives significant influence over its foreign policy to the United States in exchange for getting the security provided by US troops. As such, the foreign policy decisions of

state B (the target) are going to be influenced or even dictated by the United States. If the United States is committed to stability and security in the host state, it is very unlikely that the US will support the host state's decision to initiate a conflict against its neighbors or violate the terms of a pre-war bargain. Thus, US troop deployments convey a type of assurance to state A (the potential attacker) that state B (the target) should not exploit its increased military capability and it will be committed to the terms of a pre-war bargain. The above analysis suggest that US troop deployments can reduce commitment problem in pre-war bargaining by signaling to potential attackers that the United States serve as a check on the increased capabilities of the host state (protégé).

US troop deployments reveal private information

US troop deployments can communicate private information regarding the capability of the host states. In the bargaining model of war, pre-war bargaining fails because states cannot trust each other due to the lack of private information (Fearon, 1995). As such, the lack of information regarding the military capabilities and alliance ties of states makes it difficult to attain war-avoiding bargains. However, there are theoretical reasons to argue that US troop deployments can communicate private information regarding the military capabilities of the host states. In the following first paragraphs, I explain how US troop deployments can address the lack of credible deterrent (or lack of private information) as a cause of escalation to war.

The United States practice extended deterrence since 1945 to protect itself and its allies from external attacks (Huth and Russet, 1984). For extended deterrence to succeed, a potential attacker must believe that the defender is credibly committed to protecting the target state and is

willing to make conflict initiation costly. In the context of an alliance, for deterrence to work, a potential challenger must believe that an ally will support the target state militarily during a war. Since US troop deployments are in most cases used to protect the host states against external attacks, several researchers assert that the United States use troop deployments for extended deterrence (Kane 2006; and Biglaiser and DeRouen 2007; Lake 2011; Morgan and Martinez Machain 2013). Furthermore, Fearon (1997) contends that leaders can choose between two types of strategies to credibly signal their resolve towards other states in grand strategy and in crisis bargaining. (1) they tie their hands by creating audience costs that they can suffer if they do not fulfill their commitment, or (2) they can sink costs ex ante by taking costly actions such as stationing troops in a foreign state. Most importantly, he notes that leaders never bluff with either type of strategy; they respond when challenged because they incur costs in the first place. Thus, the deployment of US troops is the second type of strategy, which the United States uses to signal its commitment toward the host state. In addition, the United States incurs significant costs associated with troop deployments, however, it still uses troop deployments to signal its commitment toward the host states. Since troop deployments are costly and they represent a strong military partnership between the US and the host state, it can be plausibly argued that US troop deployments function as the United States credible signaling of resolve toward the host state, which in turn can reduce the likelihood of conflict between the host state and its neighbors. Therefore, US troop deployments communicate reveal information regarding the military support that the host state can receive during an external attack. Potential attackers can take this information into account prior to escalating to war with the host state.

In addition, Huth and Russet (1984) found that successful immediate deterrence (situations where a potential attacker has already threatened the target with the use of force) depends on the strength of the economic and military ties between the defender and the target. Increased economic engagement and strong military ties with the protégé (target state) compel the defender to provide military support to the protégé during an external attack. US troop deployments represent strong military ties between the US and the host states. Furthermore, US maintains strong economic ties with the states that host US troops (Biglaiser and DeRouen 2009, Heo and Ye 2009). Since US troop deployments lead to stronger economic and military ties between the US and the host states, we can expect deployments to be also successful at immediate deterrence. As I noted in the above paragraphs, when a potential challenger does not realize that the potential target has credible commitments from a third state, it is more likely to initiate an attack against the target. Thus, one of the causes of escalation to war is the lack of credible signaling of deterrence. However, the above analysis suggest that US troop deployments communicate vital information regarding the capability and alliance ties of the host state, which can prevent third-party attacks against the host state. In particular, US troop deployments eliminates the lack of credible deterrent as a cause of escalation to war, which in turn deters the host state's neighbors from initiating MIDs against the host state. The theoretical expectations and bargaining models that I presented in the above section yields my first hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1: *US troop deployments decrease the probability that the neighboring countries of the host state will initiate an (MID) against the host state.*

3.3 US Troop Deployments and Diplomatic Relations

In this section, I explain my arguments regarding why we should expect US troop deployments to influence the diplomatic relations between the host state and its neighbors. The theory that I present here regarding the effect of US troop deployments on the diplomacy of the states is an extension of the theoretical model that I developed in the above section. The above theoretical framework suggests that US troop deployments can improve the relations between the host state and its neighbors. In particular, US troop deployments can improve economic ties between the host state and its neighbors. In addition, the presence of US troops can change the conflict behavior of the neighboring states toward the host state.

Assuming that US troop deployments improve cooperation and economic ties between the host and its neighbors, it is possible that US troop deployments will also have an influence on the diplomatic relations between the host state and its neighbors. If increased economic growth and FDI facilitated by US troop deployments lead to stronger economic ties between the host state and its neighbors, the neighboring states might be also prone to align with the host state on diplomatic issues. As I noted my theoretical model, the increased economic growth and FDI in the host states associated with US troop deployments can have spillover effects for the neighboring countries. For instance, increased FDI can encourage the host state to import more goods from the neighboring states for domestic consumption as its economy becomes more dependent on FDI. In addition, increased FDI associated with US troop deployments can encourage the host state to host labor from the neighboring states. All these dynamics can improve economic ties and cooperation between the host and its neighbors. The existing studies also indicate the increased FDI and economic growth in the host state can have spillover effects

for the neighboring states (Hejazi and Safarian 1999; Pietrucha and Zelazny 2017; Boly et al. 2019).

Increased economic ties between the host state and its neighboring countries can lead to closer diplomatic relations between these states due to the following reasons. First and most importantly, the existing literature suggests that economic interdependence and trade can promote peace and reduce conflict propensity between states (Barbieri 1996; Souva and Prins 2006; Hegre, Oneal, and Russett 2010). When economic interdependence between the host state and its neighbors increases due to US troop deployments, the neighboring states should be more likely to align with the host state on diplomatic issues. Also, as I noted in the above section, the purpose of US troops is to support stability in the region to which they are deployed. Thus, US troop deployments can encourage friendly diplomatic relations between the host state and the neighboring states.

As such, US troop deployments can have an indirect effect on the diplomatic behavior of the host state and its neighbors. In addition, the bargaining models that I presented in the above sections, suggests that US troop deployments reduces the likelihood of conflict between the host state and its neighbors. Assuming that troop deployments decrease the propensity of conflict between the host state and its neighbors, it is possible for the neighboring states to develop friendly diplomacy towards the host state in the long term. Closer diplomatic relations between the host state can encourage neighboring states to have diplomatic views similar to the host state in the international arena. Therefore, the above analysis leads to my second hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2: *US troop deployments will correlate with greater similarity in the diplomatic behavior of the host state and its neighboring countries.*

Chapter 4 - Research Design

To test the hypotheses outlined above, I use dyad-year unit of analysis, selecting states that are contiguous. My two dependent variables of interest are Militarized Interstate Dispute Onset (MIDs Onset) and Diplomatic Similarity. To test my first hypothesis, I employ my dependent variable MIDs Onset. To operationalize this variable, I use the Correlates of War (COW) MID dataset, which provides data on the instances of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) in the period between 1816 and 2014. A MID is measured as whenever one state threatened, displayed, or used force against another state (Ghosn et. al, 2004). The COW MID dataset includes information about the various characteristics of the MIDs, however, I am interested in measuring the onset of MIDs between neighboring states. Thus, my dependent variable *MIDs Onset* is to capture the onset of MIDs across the different types of dyads. It is a dummy variable coded as 1 and 0. It is coded 1 when one of the contiguous state initiated a MID against the other contiguous state in the dyad, and it is coded 0 when no MID has occurred between two neighboring states in a dyad.

To test my second hypothesis, I employ the dependent variable Diplomatic Similarity. To operationalize this variable, I use the absolute ideal point distance in the UN voting of the states. I use UN voting as a proxy for measuring similarity in the diplomatic behavior of the neighboring states because UN voting represent states' preferences and diplomatic alignment. To operationalize my dependent variable Diplomatic Similarity, I use Bailey et al. (2017) measure of similarity in UN voting. I take the absolute value of the difference between the UN voting of state A and state B, which indicates the extent to which these states align with each other diplomatically. Bailey et al. (2017) examines states' UN voting between 1946 and 2012 to estimate the ideal point distance in the UN voting behavior of the

states. Accordingly, this measure represents the extent to which states' diplomatic views align which each. Therefore, this is an appropriate measure to use for measuring my dependent variable Diplomatic Similarity.

My main independent variable is the number of US troops deployed to an observed country. Since I want to examine whether US troop deployments reduce the occurrences of MIDs between the host state and its neighbors and if these deployments affect diplomatic relations between neighboring states, I use the Correlates of War's Direct Contiguity data (Stlnnett et al., 2002) to identify neighboring states. Thus, I use the Direct Contiguity data to limit my simple to all states that are contiguous, broadly defined by the COW dataset. The Direct Contiguity data range from 1 to 6, where 1 = direct land contiguity, 2 = separated by 12 miles of water of fewer, 3 = separated by 24 miles of water or fewer (but more than 12 miles), 4 = separated by 150 miles of water or fewer (but more than 24 miles), 5 = separated by 400 miles of water or fewer (but more than 150 miles), 6 = separated by more than 400 miles of water. Therefore, all the observations are for Contiguity scores > 0.

My independent variable of US troop deployments has three levels. The first level (troops1) captures dyadic observations where one of the state hosts US troops and the other state does not. The second level (troops2) captures dyadic observations where both states host US troops. The third level (troops3) capture dyadic observations where none of the two neighboring states host US troops. I create all the three levels of my independent variable using Flynn et al. (2020) troop dataset, which includes data on US troop deployments to all countries around the world for the years 1950 to 2020. I include dyads where neither state host US troops because I can compare the effects of US troops on MIDs in these dyads with the effects of US troop

deployments on MIDs in the two other types of dyads, where either one or both neighboring states host US troops. Therefore, the inclusion of dyads where neither of the neighboring state host US troops helps me explain whether US troop deployment affect the relations in dyads where either one or both neighbors host US troops.

4.1 Methodology

I operationalize my independent variables using Flynn et al. (2020) dataset because it includes country-year observations about US troop deployments. In addition, I use the Correlates of War (COW) dataset to operationalize my first dependent variable (MIDs) because it captures the onset of MIDs and ongoing MIDs between states. However, I use the ideal point distance in the UN voting of the states as calculated by Bailey (2017) for my second dependent variable (Diplomatic Similarity) due to the following reasons.

As I noted in my literature review, the existing literature indicates that US troop deployments have an effect on a range of issues in the host states. Thus, I developed a theory regarding why we should expect US troop deployments to affect the relations between the host states and their neighbors. My theorical model suggests that US troop deployments can also affect the diplomatic behavior of the host state and its neighbors. In particular, increased economic growth associated with US troop deployments can improve economic ties and cooperation between the host state and its neighbors, which in turn can make the neighboring states prone to align with the host state on diplomatic issues. As such, I need to employ a variable that captures the diplomatic behavior of the states. The most appropriate existing method to measure similarity in diplomatic behavior of the states would be to analyze states voting patterns in the UNGA. The United Nations (UN) is an important international organization, where states can reveal their preferences and diplomatic alignments. In addition,

many scholars use UN voting data to measure similarity in the foreign policy behavior of the states (Bailey et al. 2017; Martinez Machain 2021; Ferdinand 2014). Therefore, I use the ideal point distance in the UN voting of the states as calculated by Bailey (2017) because it captures the extent to which states align with each other diplomatically as revealed through their UN voting. The absolute ideal point distance in the UN voting ranges from 1 to 5. Accordingly, the larger the absolute ideal point distance between two states, the less diplomatic alignment between them, however, the smaller the distance, the closer the diplomatic alignment between the given states.

In order to empirically evaluate my two hypotheses, I take two approaches. First, I look at the relationship between deployments' levels and outcomes of interest. Second, I use a linear regression to assess whether or not there are differences in the outcome variables across different types of host combinations. To visualize the relationship between the variables of interest, I plot my independent variables against my outcome variables. In one of my regression models, I also control for the minimum (Polity) scores of the dyads. I control for the minimum polity scores of the dyads for two reasons. First, as the Democratic Peace literature suggests democratic states are less likely to go to war with each other, so the polity score of the states can have an effect on their involvement in conflict and their diplomatic relations with other states. Second, I expect regime type to be a confounder. Thus, I control for the minimum polity (Politymin) variable, which is an indicator for how non-democratic the least democratic member of a dyad is. By including this variable in my model, I should be able to explain the extent to which minimum polity score of the dyads have an influence on my two dependent variables: MIDs Onset and Diplomatic Similarity. In addition, I can explain whether the minimum polity scores of the dyads cause any changes in the effect of US troop deployments on the two outcome

variables. However, it is important to note that the (Politymin) variable has a number of limitations. It does not tell us anything about whether or not the dyads are mostly non-democratic. Also, it cannot tell us whether or not one democratic state is paired with one very non-democratic state.

Table 1 presents summary statistics for all the variables that are included in the models and analysis.

Table 1- Summary Statistics

Variable Name	Min.	1st Qu.	Median	Mean	3rd Qu.	Max.
Troops1 (dyads with one host state)	0	4	17	18743	77	2338379
Trooops2 (dyads with both host states)	0	3	15	4558	59	537377
MIDs Onset	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.04383	0.00000	1.00000
UN Voting Ideal Point Distance	0.0000	0.1454	0.3846	0.6723	0.8645	5.1432
Minimum Polity Score	-10	-7	-3	-0.719	7	10

Chapter 5 - Results and Analysis

In this section, first, I present and discuss some descriptive statistics. Second, I analyze the results of my linear regression models. Third, I discuss whether or not the results provide any support for my two hypotheses.

Figure 2 is a histogram, which represents the frequency of the values for the absolute ideal point distance (absidealpointdistan) variable. The values in the histogram represent the absolute ideal point distance in the UN voting of the states across the observed dyads. It indicates that the frequency of the smaller values is significantly higher than the larger values. As such, the number of the dyads that have small distance in the UN voting is considerably higher than the number of the dyads that have larger distance in the UN voting.

Figure 2- UN Voting Ideal Point Distance Histogram



Figure 3 is another histogram, which simply shows the frequency of the values for the MIDs Onset variable. The value 1 indicates the occurrence of a MID, and the value 0 represent the absence of MID. The histogram shows that MIDs are absent in most of the observed dyads, however, there are some dyads where MIDs occurred.

Figure 3- Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) Histogram



Figure 4 is a histogram for the variable (Politymin), which indicates the frequency of minimum polity scores for the observed dyads. It shows that the minimum polity scores of the dyads fall within different ranges. However, it is important to note that we cannot draw any substantive conclusions from these histograms. I will discuss and analyze my plots and the results of the regression models in the following paragraphs.

Figure 4- Minimum Polity Score Histogram



In order to visualize the relationship between my independent variable and outcome variables of interest, I plot the variables against one another in the following figures.

Figure 5 plots the two levels of my independent US troop deployments variable against one another, where the green dots indicate the occurrence of a MID, and the red dots indicate the absence of MIDs. The (State A Troops) level of variable captures dyadic observations in which one of the state hosts US troops. The (State B) level of variable captures dyadic observations in which both states host US troops. In addition, Figure 6 plots the two levels of independent variable of US troops against one another, where the dots represent the absolute ideal point distance in the UN voting of the states. The X and Y axis scales in these two figures display the log of troop deployments.

Figure 5- Scatterplot of Troops and MID Onset



Figure 6- Scatterplot of Troops and Absolute Ideal Point Distance in UN Voting



Figure 5 indicates that more MIDs are present between states that host smaller number of US troops. However, the number of MIDs decreases as the number of deployed US troops increases in the dyadic observations. Most of the MIDs are concentered in the left side of the plot, where the size of US troop deployments is smaller in the observed dyads. However, the number of the MIDs are significantly lower as we move to the right side of the plot, where the size of the deployments is larger. Accordingly, this plot suggests that the size of the US troop deployments correlate with their deterrence ability because as the size of the deployments increases, the number of the MIDs decreases in the dyads. Therefore, this plot offers some preliminary support for my first hypothesis- US troop deployments decrease the probability that the neighboring countries of the host state will initiate an (MID) against the host state. However, the plot suggests that in some cases the ability of the US troop deployments to protect the host states against external attacks could depend on the size of the deployments.

Figure 6 indicates that the absolute ideal point distance in the UN voting is smaller in dyads where both states are hosting US troops. In addition, the smallest distance value (1) is more visible in the dyads where either one or both states host US troops. However, when we move to the very right side of the plot where the size of the deployments increases, there are several instances of larger distance in the dyadic observation. As such, it appears that the absolute ideal point distance in the UN voting of the dyads increases as the size of the deployments increases. In general, this plot shows that the instances of smaller absolute ideal point distance in the UN voting are significantly higher than larger distance across the dyads where one or both states host US troops. We still cannot draw credible conclusions from these plots. The results of the regression models that I analyze in the following paragraphs will help us

understand to what extent US troop deployments correlate with the likelihood of MIDs onset and absolute ideal point distance in the UN voting across the dyads.

Figure 7 presents the results of my first linear regression model, which estimates whether or not my independent variable (US troop deployments) causes any changes in the two outcomes variables across different types of the host combination. The variable (host combination neither) represents dyads where neither of the states in the observed dyads host US troops. In addition, the variable (host combination One) captures dyads where one of states in the observed dyads hosts US troops and the other does not. And the intercept represents the coefficient for dyads where both neighboring states host US troops.

While I explain the results of my regression models, I focus on two vital aspects of the results; (1) whether or not the effect of US troop deployments is statistically significant on the outcome variables, (2) the size or magnitude of the change that US troop deployments cause in the two outcome variables across different types of host dyads. Figure 7 offers mixed findings regarding the effect of US troop deployments on MIDs Onset and absolute ideal point distance (UN Voting). To start with the baseline, the intercept coefficient in Figure 7 indicates that US troop deployments have a statistically significant and positive effect on the likelihood of MIDs onset in dyads where both states host US troops. As such, the intercept represents the conditional mean value of my dependent variable (MIDs Onset) for the "Both Host" category of troops variable, when all my independent variables equal 0. Thus, in dyads where both states host US troops, roughly 4 percent of the dyads experience MIDs, when both x variables equal 0.
The coefficient values represent the change in percentage point from the intercept to the two other categories of troop variables. Thus, it appears that US troop deployments correlate positively with the likelihood of MIDs in dyads where one state hosts US troop and the other

does not. As we move to the "One" host troop variable, the conditional mean value for this variable increase and it indicates that roughly 4.9 percent of these dyads experience MIDs, which is higher occurrence of MIDs as compared to the dyads where both states host US troops. When we move to the "Neither" host troop variable, it appears that US troop deployments have a negative effect on MIDs Onset, but it is not statistically significant. As such, dyads where neither state host US troops, roughly 3.6 percent of the dyads experience MIDs, which is smaller than the percent of MIDs in the other two types of dyads. Accordingly, dyads where one or both states host US troops are more likely to experience MIDs than dyads where neither state host US troops. However, the coefficient for the dyads where both states host US troops is smaller than the coefficient for the dyads where only one state hosts US troops, which suggests that MIDs are less likely to occur between two neighboring states if both states host US troops.

Although the results of the regression indicate that US troop deployments correlate with positively with MIDs onset, they also show that dyads where both states host US troops experience less MIDs than dyads where one of the state hosts US troops. Accordingly, US troop deployments can reduce the occurrence of Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) between neighboring states if both states host US troops. Therefore, the results in Figure 7 offer some support to my first hypothesis- US troop deployments decrease the probability that the neighboring countries of the host state will initiate an (MID) against the host state.

The results of the regression as presented in Figure 7 also offer mixed findings regarding the effect of US troop deployments on UN voting across different types of host dyads. The results indicate that US troop deployments have a statistically significant and positive influence on the UN voting of dyads where both states host US troops. As such, the conditional mean

value of the absolute ideal point distance for the “both” category of the troop variable is 0.702, when all other X variables equal 0. However, the findings indicate that US troop deployments have a statistically significant and negative effect on the distance in the UN voting of the dyads where one state hosts US troops and the other does not. As such, the conditional mean value for absolute ideal point distance 0.202 as we move to the “One” host category of the troop variable. According to these results, dyads where both states host US troops are less likely to have significant similarity in their diplomatic behavior, but dyads where only one state host US troops are more likely to align with each other on diplomatic issues. Since smaller absolute ideal point distance indicates more diplomatic alignment, the findings also offer some support to my second hypothesis- US troop deployments will correlate with greater similarity in the diplomatic behavior of the host state and its neighboring countries.

Figure 7- Presents the Results of First Regression

	MID Onset	UN Voting
(Intercept)	0.042***	0.702***
	(0.002)	(0.006)
hostcombinationNeither	-0.006	-0.202***
	(0.005)	(0.020)
hostcombinationOne	0.007***	-0.064***
	(0.003)	(0.012)
Num.Obs.	28222	25581
R2	0.000	0.005
R2 Adj.	0.000	0.004
AIC	-9438.4	60654.5
BIC	-9405.4	60687.1
Log.Lik.	4723.187	-30323.261
F	5.085	58.545

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Figure 8 presents the results of the regression, in which I control for the minimum polity score of the dyads. As I noted in my research design, the variable (Politymin) captures how non-democratic the least democratic member of a dyad is. Although there are some limitations to this variable which I explained in the research design, it can still help us understand whether the minimum polity scores of the dyads cause any changes in the outcomes of interests, and if the minimum polity scores change the effect of US troop deployments on the outcome variables.

The result of this regression model indicates that when we control for the minimum polity score (Politymin), US troop deployments have positive but a statistically insignificant effect on MIDs onset in dyads where one state hosts US troops and the other does not. Under control for the minimum polity score, only 4.6 percent of the dyads where one state hosts US troops and the other does not experience MIDs. This is an important finding because in the previous regression without the control variable, deployments had a statistically significant effect on MIDs onset in the dyads where one state hosts US troops and the other does not. Other coefficients are roughly in the ranges as they were in the model without the control variable. However, under the control for the minimum polity score, the coefficient for the distance in the UN voting for dyads where one state hosts troops and the other does not remains statistically significant but decreased from -0.64 percentage point to 0.100 percentage point. As such, it appears that the effect of US troop deployments on UN voting in the given dyads decreases when we control for the minimum polity score of the dyads.

Furthermore, the results in Figure 8 indicates that the control variable (Politymin) have a statistically significant and negative effect on the two dependent variables. Accordingly, a one unit increase in the value of the variable (Politymin) decreases the likelihood of MIDs onset by 0.002 percentage point across the observed dyads. In addition, a one unit increase in the

minimum polity score of the dyads decreases the absolute ideal point distance in the UN voting across dyads by 0.020 percentage point, which is an extremely small decrease.

Figure 8- Presents the Results of Second Regression

	MID Onset	UN Voting
(Intercept)	0.042***	0.705***
	(0.002)	(0.006)
hostcombinationNeither	-0.005	-0.213***
	(0.006)	(0.023)
hostcombinationOne	0.004	-0.100***
	(0.003)	(0.012)
politymin	-0.002***	-0.020***
	(0.000)	(0.001)
Num.Obs.	27153	24577
R2	0.006	0.031
R2 Adj.	0.006	0.031
AIC	-8698.9	58010.0
BIC	-8657.9	58050.5
Log.Lik.	4354.468	-28999.994
F	55.288	262.986

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Overall, the above results indicate that the effects of US troop deployments are not just limited to the host state. These deployments can affect the relations between the host state and its neighboring countries in different areas. The findings of the regression models show that US troop deployments correlate positively with the likelihood of Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) between host states and their neighbors. The likelihood of MIDs is lower in dyads where both neighboring states host US troops as compared to dyads where one state hosts US troops. Accordingly, US troop deployments can reduce the likelihood of MIDs between neighboring countries if both states host US troops. This finding lends some support to my first hypothesis. In addition, the results of the regression indicate that US troop deployments also correlate with absolute ideal point distance in the UN voting of states across different host combination. In particular, the results seem to suggest that US troop deployments decrease absolute ideal point distance in the UN voting of dyads where one state hosts US troop and the other does not. Although the decrease is very small, it offers some support for my second hypothesis. While the findings of this study offer some insight about whether US troop deployments affect the relations between the host state and its neighbors, there are some limitations to my statistical analysis and modelling, which I explain in the following sections.

5.1 Limitations of the Study

One of the main limitations of my statistical analysis is that I do not control for some variables that can affect the relationship between US troop deployments and the two outcome variables. Some of the control variable that might affect the relationship between US troop deployments, MIDs onset and UN voting include bilateral trade, military capability, territorial dispute, regime type, military alliances. All these variables can affect the relations between the

host state and its neighboring countries. It is also possible for these control variables to condition the effect of US troop deployments on MIDs onset and UN voting across different types of host dyads. For instance, if the volume of bilateral trade is significantly high between two neighboring states, it is possible that the likelihood of MIDs will be lower between these two states and they might be aligned diplomatically regardless of the presence of US troops in any of these states. In addition, some of the variables that I did not control for might serves as confounders for my statistical analysis. For instance, regime type is a variable that affect both my independent variable and outcome variables. As such, it is possible for the regime type of the host state to have an influence the size of US troop deployments to that state, and it is possible for regime type to affect the likelihood of MIDs and UN voting across the different types of dyads. Although I control for the minimum polity score (Politymin) variable which indicates how non-democratic the least democratic state of the observed dyad is, a variable that capture the exact type of regimes across dyads might confound the results of my regression models. The lack of some control variables in my statistical models suggest that there might be endogeneity problem in my modelling. Endogeneity problem might be present in my analysis because my two dependent variables- MIDs Onset and distance in UN voting could be related to other variables that I did not control for in the models such as regime type, territorial dispute, or rivalries in the dyads.

While the regression results indicate that US troop deployments slightly increase the likelihood of MIDs in dyads where both states host US troops and in dyads where one state hosts and the other does not, it is possible that there might be some factors about some specific states across the dyads that make them more likely to be targets of MIDs. Weak military and weak state capacity are potential factors that might make some states in the dyads more likely to be targeted

with MIDs. Accordingly, the other limitation of my statistical analysis is that I am not controlling for such factors. Lastly, it is possible that there might be an inverse relationship between US troop deployments and MIDs onset. The United States might be deploying troops to states that are more likely to be targeted with MIDs. If that is the case, then the finding that US troop deployments slightly increase MIDs between neighboring states might be due to selection bias. However, it is important to note that according to the results in Figure 7, there is no clear or substantial difference between the coefficients of MIDs for dyads where neither state host US troops and coefficient of dyads where both states host US troops. Since there is not a clear difference between the two types of dyads, the sample selection might not be a problem. Although there are some limitations to this study as I described in the above section, but the findings of this study offer novel insight regarding the effect of US troop deployments on the relations between the host state and its neighbors. In addition, this study has some implications for future research regarding US troop deployments.

Chapter 6 - Conclusion

US troop deployments have been a costly foreign policy tool for the United States since the end of World War II. However, these deployments support the security and foreign policy interests of the United States. Scholars have explored the consequences of US troop deployments and the research in this area has grown over time. Most of the existing literature investigate the effects of US troop deployments on a range of issues in the host states and how these deployments affect the relationships between the US and the host nations. To date, no study has been conducted to examine the effects of US troop deployments on the relations between the host state and its neighboring countries. As such, this study fills the gap in the literature by focusing on whether US troop deployments have any influence on the relations between the host states and their neighbors.

More narrowly, this study offers two important contributions to our understating about the regional effects of US troop deployments. First, it explores whether US troop deployments decrease the likelihood of conflict between the host states and their neighbors. Second, it examines if these deployments lead to greater similarity in the diplomatic behavior of the host state and its neighbors. I argue that US troop deployments alter the distribution of capabilities, reduce information asymmetries, and decrease commitment problem as a cause of pre-war bargaining failure, which can reduce the likelihood of conflict between the host state and their neighbors. In addition, I contend that the economic benefits of US troop deployments in the host states can improve economic ties and cooperation between the host and its neighboring states, which in turn can lead to greater diplomatic alignment between these states and make the neighboring states less likely to initiate militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) against the host state.

This study offers mix findings regarding the effect of US troop deployments on the likelihood of Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) between host states and their neighbors. First and most importantly, the findings indicate that US troop deployments affect the likelihood of MIDs between the host states and their neighbors, which imply that US troop deployments can have an influence on the relations between the host state and its neighboring countries. As such, the results shows that US troop deployments have a statistically significant effect on the likelihood of MIDs across different types of dyads. In dyads where one neighboring state hosts US troops and the other does not, roughly 4.9 percent of the dyads experience MIDs. However, the likelihood of MIDs decreases when both neighboring states host US troops. As such the results indicate that in dyads where both states host US troops, roughly 4 percent of the dyads experience MIDs, which is a smaller percentage as compared to the dyads where only one state host US troops. Accordingly, these results lend some support to my first hypothesis which states that the presence of US troops decreases the likelihood that the host states' neighbors will initiate an MID against the host states. In addition, the findings suggest that US troop deployments correlate with decreased ideal point distance in the UN voting across dyads where one neighboring state hosts US troops but the other does not. As such, the presence of US troops seems to be a factor that contributes to diplomatic alignment in the UN between the host states and their neighboring countries. Thus, the results also show some support for my second hypothesis, which states that US troop deployments will correlate with greater similarity in the diplomatic behavior of the host states and their neighbors. Therefore, the findings and analysis presented in this study suggest that US troop deployments can also have regional effects. This study compliments the existing literature about US troop deployments and suggests that the

influence of US troop deployments is not limited to the host states, these deployments can lead to some changes in the relations between the host states and their neighbors.

6.1 Policy Implications and Recommendations for Future Research

This study offers two vital policy implications regarding US troop deployments. First and most importantly, the findings of this study indicate that the effects of US troop deployments are not limited to the host states. These deployments can have spillover effects for the neighboring states in the region. In particular, the presence of US troops can affect the likelihood of conflict between the host state and its neighbors. In addition, these deployments can affect the diplomatic behavior of the neighboring states toward the host state.

Second, the present study and previous studies (e.g.-Martinez Machain and Morgan, 2013) indicate that US troop deployments do not reduce the likelihood of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) against the host states. There could be various reasons for why the deterrence effect of US troop deployments is not significant according to the statistical models, however, these studies call for greater research that should investigate the specific factors that diminish the deterrence effects of US troop deployments. If the central purpose of US troop deployments is general extended deterrence, then the US government should invest more in research to investigate the conditions under which US troop deployments fail to deter external attacks against the host states.

It is important to note that the present study suggests that US troop deployments reduce the likelihood of MIDs in dyads, where both states host US troops as compared to dyads where one state hosts US troops and the other does not. In addition, the results indicate that US troop deployments correlate with greater alignment in the UN voting of the neighboring states, where

one state hosts US troops and the other does not. Therefore, the main takeaway is that US troop deployments can affect the relations between the host states and their neighbors. There can be various mechanisms through which these deployments alter relations between host state and neighboring states, however, I argue that the economic growth and increased FDI associated with US troop deployments can improve economic ties between the host state and its neighbors, which make the neighboring countries more likely to align with the host state on diplomatic issues.

While this study offers some insights regarding the effects of US troop deployments on the likelihood of conflict between the host states and their neighbors and the diplomatic relations between such states, it also calls for further research in this area. Future studies can investigate the specific conditions under which US troop deployments fail to deter external attacks against the host states. In addition, scholars can explore the various mechanisms through which US troop deployments alter the relations between the host state and its neighbors. This study explains some of the implications of US troop deployments for the relations between the host state and its neighboring countries. Further research can examine the other intended and unintended consequences of US troops in the regions to which they are deployed.

References

Vine, David. 2015. “Base nation: How U.S. military bases abroad harm America and the World.” Metropolitan Books, Washington, D.C.

Biglaiser, G., & DeRouen Jr, K. (2007). Following the flag: Troop deployment and US foreign direct investment. *International Studies Quarterly*, *51*(4), 835-854

Biglaiser, G., & DeRouen Jr, K. (2009). The interdependence of US troop deployments and trade in the developing world. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, *5*(3), 247-263.

Jones, G., & Kane, T. (2012). US troops and foreign economic growth. *Defence and Peace Economics*, *23*(3), 225-249.

Heo, U., & Ye, M. (2019). US military deployment and host-nation economic growth. *Armed Forces & Society*, *45*(2), 234-267.

Kane, T. (2012). Development and US troop deployments. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, *8*(3), 255-273.

NELSON, DANIEL J. *(1987) Defenders or Intruders? The Dilemmas of US Forces in Germany*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Baker, A. P. (2004). *US soldiers overseas: The global military presence*. Greenwood Publishing Group.

Allen, M. A., & Flynn, M. E. (2013). Putting our best boots forward: US military deployments and host-country crime. *Conflict management and peace science*, *30*(3), 263-285.

Bell, S. R., Clay, K. C., & Martinez Machain, C. (2017). The effect of US troop deployments on human rights. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *61*(10), 2020-2042.

Flynn, M. E., Martinez Machain, C., & Stoyan, A. T. (2019). Building trust: The effect of US troop deployments on public opinion in Peru. *International Studies Quarterly*, *63*(3), 742-755.

Allen, M. A., Flynn, M. E., Martinez, C. M., & Stravers, A. (2020). Outside the wire: US military deployments and public opinion in host states. *US Political Science Review*, *114*(2), 326-341.

Lake, D. A. (2009). Regional hierarchy: authority and local international order. *Review of International Studies*, 35-58.

Allen, M. A., VanDusky-Allen, J., & Flynn, M. E. (2016). The localized and spatial effects of US troop deployments on host-state defense spending. *Foreign policy analysis*, *12*(4), 674-694.

Machain, C. M., & Morgan, T. C. (2013). The effect of US troop deployment on host states' foreign policy. *Armed forces & society*, *39*(1), 102-123.

Morihiro Hosokawa, ‘‘Are U.S. Troops in Japan Needed? Reforming the Alliance,’’ Foreign Affairs 77, 4 (1993): 2-

Richard Holbrooke, ‘‘Japan and the United States: Ending the Unequal Partnership,’’ Foreign Affairs 70, 5 (1991): 41-57.

Tim Kane, Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950-2005 (Center for Data Analysis Report #06-02, The Heritage Foundation, 2006)

‘‘The National Military Strategy of the United States of America,’’ Joint Chiefs of Staff Official Website (February 8, 2011), accessed March 29, 2021, http://www.jcs.mil//content/files/2011-02/020811084800_2011_NMS_ _08_FEB_2011.pdf.

Johnson, J. C., & Leeds, B. A. (2011). Defense pacts: A prescription for peace?. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, *7*(1), 45-65.

Wright, T. M., & Rider, T. J. (2014). Disputed territory, defensive alliances and conflict initiation. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, *31*(2), 119-144.

Powell, Robert. (1993) Guns, Butter, and Anarchy. US Political Science Review 87 (1): 115–132.

Morgan T. Clifton, and Glenn Palmer. (2000) A Model of Foreign Policy Substitutability: Selecting the Right Tools for the Job(s). Journal of Conflict Resolution 44 (1): 11–32.

Ghosn, F., Palmer, G., & Bremer, S. A. (2004). The MID3 data set, 1993–2001: Procedures, coding rules, and description. *Conflict management and peace science*, *21*(2), 133-154.

Bailey, Michael A, Anton Strezhnev & Erik Voeten. 2017. "Estimating dynamic state preferences from United Nations voting data." Journal of Conflict Resolution 61(2):430–456.

Boly, A., Coulibaly, S., & Kéré, E. N. (2019). *Tax policy, foreign direct investment and spillover effects*. African Development Bank.

Hejazi, W., & Safarian, A. E. (1999). Trade, foreign direct investment, and R&D spillovers. *Journal of International Business Studies*, *30*(3), 491-511.

Pietrucha, J., & Żelazny, R. (2020). TFP spillover effects via trade and FDI channels. *Economic research-Ekonomska istraživanja*, *33*(1), 0-0.

Barbieri, K. (1996). Economic interdependence: A path to peace or a source of interstate conflict?. *Journal of Peace Research*, *33*(1), 29-49.

Souva, M., & Prins, B. (2006). The liberal peace revisited: The role of democracy, dependence, and development in militarized interstate dispute initiation, 1950–1999. *International Interactions, 32*(2), 183-200.

Hegre, H., Oneal, J. R., & Russett, B. (2010). Trade does promote peace: New simultaneous estimates of the reciprocal effects of trade and conflict. *Journal of Peace Research, 47*(6), 763-774.

Brown, J. N. 2013. "The sound of silence: Power, secrecy, and international audiences in US military basing negotiations." Conflict Management and Peace Science 31(4):406–431.

Brown, Jonathan N. 2014. "Immovable Positions: Public Acknowledgment and Bargaining in MilitaryBasing Negotiations."SecurityStudies23(2):258–292.

Schelling, Thomas C. 1966. Arms and Influence. New Haven, CT:: Yale University Press.

Johnson, J. C., Leeds, B. A., & Wu, A. (2015). Capability, credibility, and extended general deterrence. *International Interactions, 41*(2), 309-336.

Exercise FOAL Eagle. (2021). Retrieved from https://web.archive.org/web/20110305095319/http://www.7af.pacaf.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=14093

Gady, Franz-Stefan. (2017). US, Japan Conduct Military Exercise in Hokkaido. *The Diplomat.* Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/tag/japan-us-military-exercise/

Leeds, Brett Ashley. 2003b. "Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes." US Journal of Political Science 47(3): 427–39.

Morrow, J. D. (1994). Alliances, credibility, and peacetime costs. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 38*(2), 270-297.

Fearon, J. D. (1997). Signaling foreign policy interests: Tying hands versus sinking costs. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *41*(1), 68-90.

Huth, P., & Russett, B. (1984). What makes deterrence work? Cases from 1900 to 1980. *World Politics: A Quarterly Journal of International Relations*, 496-526.

Bailey, M. A., Strezhnev, A., & Voeten, E. (2017). Estimating dynamic state preferences from United Nations voting data. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *61*(2), 430-456.

Ferdinand, P. (2014). Rising powers at the UN: an analysis of the voting behaviour of BRICS in the General Assembly. *Third World Quarterly*, *35*(3), 376-391.

Martinez Machain, C. (2021). Exporting Influence: US Military Training as Soft Power. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *65*(2-3), 313-341.

Stinnett, Douglas M., Jaroslav Tir, Philip Schafer, Paul F. Diehl, and Charles Gochman. 2002. "The Correlates of War Project Direct Contiguity Data, Version 3." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 19(2):58-66. Vine, David. 2015. “Base nation: How U.S. military bases abroad harm America and the World.” Metropolitan Books, Washington, D.C.

Biglaiser, G., & DeRouen Jr, K. (2007). Following the flag: Troop deployment and US foreign direct investment. *International Studies Quarterly*, *51*(4), 835-854

Biglaiser, G., & DeRouen Jr, K. (2009). The interdependence of US troop deployments and trade in the developing world. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, *5*(3), 247-263.

Jones, G., & Kane, T. (2012). US troops and foreign economic growth. *Defence and Peace Economics*, *23*(3), 225-249.

Kane, T. (2012). Development and US troop deployments. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, *8*(3), 255-273.

NELSON, DANIEL J. *(1987) Defenders or Intruders? The Dilemmas of US Forces in Germany*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Baker, A. P. (2004). *US soldiers overseas: The global military presence*. Greenwood Publishing Group.

Allen, M. A., & Flynn, M. E. (2013). Putting our best boots forward: US military deployments and host-country crime. *Conflict management and peace science*, *30*(3), 263-285.

Bell, S. R., Clay, K. C., & Martinez Machain, C. (2017). The effect of US troop deployments on human rights. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *61*(10), 2020-2042.

Flynn, M. E., Martinez Machain, C., & Stoyan, A. T. (2019). Building trust: The effect of US troop deployments on public opinion in Peru. *International Studies Quarterly*, *63*(3), 742-755.

Allen, M. A., Flynn, M. E., Machain, C. M., & Stravers, A. (2020). Outside the wire: US military deployments and public opinion in host states. *US Political Science Review*, *114*(2), 326-341.

Lake, D. A. (2009). Regional hierarchy: authority and local international order. *Review of International Studies*, 35-58.

Allen, M. A., VanDusky-Allen, J., & Flynn, M. E. (2016). The localized and spatial effects of US troop deployments on host-state defense spending. *Foreign policy analysis*, *12*(4), 674-694.

Morihiro Hosokawa, ‘‘Are U.S. Troops in Japan Needed? Reforming the Alliance,’’ Foreign Affairs 77, 4 (1993): 2-

Richard Holbrooke, ‘‘Japan and the United States: Ending the Unequal Partnership,’’ Foreign Affairs 70, 5 (1991): 41-57.

Tim Kane, Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950-2005 (Center for Data Analysis Report #06-02, The Heritage Foundation, 2006)

‘‘The National Military Strategy of the United States of America,’’ Joint Chiefs of Staff Official Website (February 8, 2011), accessed March 29, 2021, http://www.jcs.mil//content/files/2011-02/020811084800_2011_NMS_ _08_FEB_2011.pdf.

Johnson, J. C., & Leeds, B. A. (2011). Defense pacts: A prescription for peace?. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, *7*(1), 45-65.

Wright, T. M., & Rider, T. J. (2014). Disputed territory, defensive alliances and conflict initiation. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, *31*(2), 119-144.

Powell, Robert. (1993) Guns, Butter, and Anarchy. US Political Science Review 87 (1): 115–132.

Morgan T. Clifton, and Glenn Palmer. (2000) A Model of Foreign Policy Substitutability: Selecting the Right Tools for the Job(s). Journal of Conflict Resolution 44 (1): 11–32.

Ghosn, F., Palmer, G., & Bremer, S. A. (2004). The MID3 data set, 1993–2001: Procedures, coding rules, and description. *Conflict management and peace science*, *21*(2), 133-154.

Bailey, Michael A, Anton Strezhnev & Erik Voeten. 2017. “Estimating dynamic state preferences from United Nations voting data.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 61(2):430–456.

Boly, A., Coulibaly, S., & Kéré, E. N. (2019). *Tax policy, foreign direct investment and spillover effects*. African Development Bank.

Hejazi, W., & Safarian, A. E. (1999). Trade, foreign direct investment, and R&D spillovers. *Journal of International Business Studies*, *30*(3), 491-511.

Pietrucha, J., & Żelazny, R. (2020). TFP spillover effects via trade and FDI channels. *Economic research-Ekonomska istraživanja*, *33*(1), 0-0.

Barbieri, K. (1996). Economic interdependence: A path to peace or a source of interstate conflict?. *Journal of Peace Research*, *33*(1), 29-49.

Souva, M., & Prins, B. (2006). The liberal peace revisited: The role of democracy, dependence, and development in militarized interstate dispute initiation, 1950–1999. *International Interactions*, *32*(2), 183-200.

Hegre, H., Oneal, J. R., & Russett, B. (2010). Trade does promote peace: New simultaneous estimates of the reciprocal effects of trade and conflict. *Journal of Peace Research*, *47*(6), 763-774.

Brown, J. N. 2013. "The sound of silence: Power, secrecy, and international audiences in US military basing negotiations." Conflict Management and Peace Science 31(4):406–431.

Brown, Jonathan N. 2014. "Immovable Positions: Public Acknowledgment and Bargaining in MilitaryBasing Negotiations."SecurityStudies23(2):258–292.

Schelling, Thomas C. 1966. Arms and Influence. New Haven, CT:: Yale University Press.

Johnson, J. C., Leeds, B. A., & Wu, A. (2015). Capability, credibility, and extended general deterrence. *International Interactions*, *41*(2), 309-336.

Exercise FOAL Eagle. (2021). Retrieved from https://web.archive.org/web/20110305095319/http://www.7af.pacaf.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=14093

Gady, Franz-Stefan. (2017). US, Japan Conduct Military Exercise in Hokkaido. *The Diplomat.* Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/tag/japan-us-military-exercise/

Leeds, Brett Ashley. 2003b. “Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes.” US Journal of Political Science 47(3): 427–39.

Morrow, J. D. (1994). Alliances, credibility, and peacetime costs. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *38*(2), 270-297.

Fearon, J. D. (1997). Signaling foreign policy interests: Tying hands versus sinking costs. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *41*(1), 68-90.

Huth, P., & Russett, B. (1984). What makes deterrence work? Cases from 1900 to 1980. *World Politics: A Quarterly Journal of International Relations*, 496-526.

Bailey, M. A., Strezhnev, A., & Voeten, E. (2017). Estimating dynamic state preferences from United Nations voting data. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *61*(2), 430-456.

Ferdinand, P. (2014). Rising powers at the UN: an analysis of the voting behaviour of BRICS in the General Assembly. *Third World Quarterly*, *35*(3), 376-391.

Martinez Machain, C. (2021). Exporting Influence: US Military Training as Soft Power. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *65*(2-3), 313-341.

Stinnett, Douglas M., Jaroslav Tir, Philip Schafer, Paul F. Diehl, and Charles Gochman. 2002. "The Correlates of War Project Direct Contiguity Data, Version 3." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 19(2):58-66.