

COHESION AND DIVISIVENESS IN THE
KANSAS LIVESTOCK ASSOCIATION

by

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
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Chapter 1

Group Cohesion: The Nature of the Problem

Introduction

David Truman points out in The Governmental Process that certain "assumptions" or "conclusions" are made when interest groups declare that they speak for a unified, cohesive membership.¹ Truman states that "...in effect such expressions take it for granted that the degree of cohesion in these groups is perfect."² The assumption of interest groups enjoying perfect cohesion has grown into an effective myth which is often utilized as a political tool in elections and in public policy formulation. Often, scholars have approached interest group behavior as if the groups possess perfect cohesion.³ Neither E. E. Schattschneider in Politics, Pressures, and the Tariff nor Raymond A. Bauer et al., in American Business and Public Policy: The Politics of Foreign Trade allows for a variable dealing with division of opinion within the membership in their analyses. This lack of emphasis on the rank-and-file membership can be attributed, at least in part, to the dominance of elite behavior theories of decision making.⁴ That is, it really does not matter what the rank-and-file membership of a particular interest group feels about a candidate or issue since the elite in the group would eventually make the final decision or so the argument goes.⁵ The tendency then is to keep the level of analysis on

a level that emphasizes the study of interest group elite behavior rather than interest group behavior. In relation to final policy output, this level of analysis may be all that is necessary. However, the assumption of interest group theorists-- namely, Arthur F. Bentley, Mancur Olson Jr., and Robert T. Salisbury-- that the individual is an unimportant unit of study when examining group behavior is, in all probability, overly simplistic as it denies conflicting demands within the organization.

Bentley states, with Olson concurring, that "...there is no group without its interest."⁶ The conclusion drawn by the above mentioned theorists is that common group interest is equal to a cohesive rank-and-file membership. Bentley emphasizes the example of early interest groups' clashes with taxpayers in the form of teamster's wagon being required to use wider tires to avoid damaging the roadways.⁷ Immediately, the reader is to assume that because of the narrow, special interest orientation of the teamsters, they were united in their battle not to use wider tires. Again, this is too simplistic a notion. One must remember that although one is a member of a special group, one is also a member of a larger group, society, that must be "consulted" before making final judgment. This overlapping membership with society in general, coupled with memberships in other special interest groups as well as with idiosyncratic and demographic factors lead to the necessity of examining interest groups in more detail with emphasis on the individual members. This paper will

explore the concept of cohesion in relation to a number of different issues, which are discussed below, by examining a sample of the rank-and-file membership of an interest group, the Kansas Livestock Association (K.L.A.).

To deny the variable of rank-and-file attitudes would be, in effect, to deny the existence of interest groups. Donald E. Stokes in Voting Research and the Businessman in Politics says that "...wheat farmers may respond in unison to a drop in the price of their crop, without needing a farm organization to tell them that their pocketbook has been touched."⁸ The membership of an organization can survive, if not prosper, without the organization, but the reverse is certainly not true. Coinciding with this argument is Harmon Ziegler's statement that "...it is beyond the abilities of an organized group to guarantee, with any degree of certainty, that its members will automatically respond to the suggestion of the leaders."⁹ In an implicit manner Stokes refutes the perfect cohesion assumption, and in a more direct, explicit manner Ziegler doubts its utility.

The performance of a democracy is contingent upon a number of factors. Among these critical factors is the importance of competing factions with divergent ideas. When these factions are referred to, and studied as monolithic structures, the examinations ignore the complexity and richness of the membership and disregard the impact of individual divergent viewpoints. This ignorance may be a useful tool for the game of power politics, but may be a dangerous one in the

articulation of authentic pluralist demands and the preservation of democracy.

Nature of the Research Problem

This study involves the attitudes on specific agricultural issues and the general political orientations of a sample of the membership of the K.L.A. The aggregate opinions of the rank-and-file membership are useful tools in attitudinal research as it illustrates the complexity of the individual members and, coupled with the issue orientation of the organization, is a powerful tactic in examining the assumption of perfect cohesion in secondary groups.

The nature of the problem, therefore, involves not only a critical survey of membership attitudinal data, but also the determination of prescribed K.L.A. stands on various agricultural issues. Only in this comparative manner can the question of perfect cohesion be answered. This is particularly important as the issues that are under consideration are ones that in the livestock industry tend to be:

- (1) relevant to individual members' political and economic well-being;
- (2) highly publicized by the K.L.A. via their periodic publications;
- (3) considered at length by the K.L.A. decision-making bodies at the annual conventions; and
- (4) represent definite attitudes toward either maintaining the status quo or desiring to see some change in the nature of the industry.

The K.L.A. attempts to be the representative and

spokesman for what, upon initial examination, would seem to be a very homogeneous group of individuals. In reality, however, the association represents a diverse grouping of livestock producers with great variation in, among other things, age, educational level, size of agricultural operation, income, and degree of experience in the livestock industry and with the K.L.A. Despite this wide range of socio-economic background found among the membership, the common trait of being intimately involved with the production of livestock binds them together and accounts for this voluntary membership in the Kansas Livestock Association. These two factors, common occupation and membership in a common group, should manifest itself in common attitudes about specific issues confronting them as livestock producers. If it does not, then intervening variables to account for such a deviation must be searched for. These intervening variables are crucial as one of the purposes of the K.L.A. is to make conditions for livestock producers as conducive as possible to making a profit at the marketplace. If certain of the membership disagrees with prescribed K.L.A. stands, then the deviants either do not care about making a living from livestock production (which is highly unlikely) or are viewing the issues from a different perspective. The design of this study will concentrate on socio-economic factors as possible intervening variables. Other variables, such as perceptions of the K.L.A., will be integrated as found to be necessary and informative. The nature of the research problem must

be expanded, at this point, to include focusing on the deviant cases in the sample and attempting, within the bounds of the data, to explain this deviance.

It is important in reviewing the nature of the research problem to note that likemindedness or deviation must be examined in light of different "arenas of conflict." Theodore Lowi in his review article "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political Theory" discounts the importance of group and elite theories of decision-making and emphasizes the idea that each public policy decision is made in the context of relevant groups, rather than all groups or a collusion between all elites.¹⁰ When a matter of public policy affects groups A, B, and C directly, but groups D, E, and F are neither indirectly or only nominally affected or not concerned with the decision at all, then the decision will be made in the context of groups A, B, and C's orientation. This is neither a startling nor a novel revelation. It is introduced to emphasize the fact that, in terms of the K.L.A. membership surveyed in this work, all have relevant interests and concerns over the agri-business issues covered in the survey. These interests fall into one of the three basic categories or arenas devised by Lowi in the above mentioned article.

Lowi states that

...politics works in the short run, and in the short run certain kinds of government decisions can be made without regard to limited resources. Policies of this kind are called 'distributive' ...easily extended to include most contemporary public land and resource policies....¹¹

Policies of a distributive nature are generally narrow in their impact and favor one particular class; those that are disfavored tend to be few in number and dispersed over a broad enough range so as to make it difficult to single them out and labeled as a class.

The second area of policy emphasis is that of the regulatory arena.

Although the regulatory laws are stated in general terms, the impact of regulatory decisions is clearly one of directly raising costs and/or reducing or expanding the alternatives of private individuals....¹²

Regulatory policies contrasted with distributive policies show that regulatory issues affect a broad class as to "who will be indulged and who deprived."¹³ Policies of this nature become general rules and cannot be applied differently as is the case with distributive policies.

Redistributive policies constitute the third classification in Lowi's framework.

The aim involved in redistributive politics is not use of property but property itself, not equal treatment but equal possession, not behavior but being. The nature of a redistributive issue is not determined by the outcome of a battle over how redistributive a policy is going to be. Expectation about what it can be, what it threatens to be, are determinative.¹⁴

The influenced in this classification tend to be even larger than in the preceding classification. It tends to be a battle between the "haves and the have-nots."

These three categories will be employed in the study.

Broadly speaking, they are usually viewed as being economic in nature, but the distribution, regulation, and redistribution of political power is also a relevant factor. Both economic and political issues are covered in the survey, and each question will be examined in light of one of the three arenas of conflict. Designing the research in this manner will aid in establishing relationships in categories of issues rather than merely establishing likemindedness or deviance on specific questions.

Justification of the Research Problem

Kansas is an agricultural state dominated economically by agricultural dollars. In 1973 total cash receipts from the marketing of farm commodities reached over \$437 million. Over sixty percent of this figure represents the income from livestock procedures.¹⁵ Thus, livestock production accounts for the biggest share of the largest industry in the state of Kansas. Yet, there remains a certain sense of ignorance surrounding the people who constitute this segment of the Kansas economy. The general belief is that these individuals tend to be Republican in political orientation and conservative in overall philosophy. These are things that we think we are sure of. These conclusions are drawn basically from: (1) voting patterns in the state; (2) media characterization of farmers and farm families; and (3) the traditional picture of the slightly backward, undereducated "county bumpkin." These conclusions are, for the most part, subjectively derived

and are rarely subjected to any empirical test.

According to John Meetz, Executive Vice-President of the K.L.A., their membership have never been surveyed with respect to their overall political orientation and are only casually canvassed on attitudes concerning specific agricultural issues. A void exists with respect to the traits of an important segment of the Kansas population. To understand the ideological orientation of this group should aid in understanding the nature of Kansas politics in general. This is not to imply that this research will serve as an index by which to judge all political questions in Kansas, but, with respect to distributive, regulatory, and redistributive questions, some insight will be gained as to the orientation of one segment of the population and, with certain limitations, generalized to other parts of the population by replication of the study.

In short, the K.L.A. was chosen as a research subject because it, as mentioned above, attempts to be the spokesman for the livestock producers of Kansas. It also represents a secondary group that is necessary by which to test the perfect cohesion assumption. Finally, the group has never been surveyed, at least for academic research, prior to this work.

Major Research Questions

Although this inquiry represents a general survey of livestock producer attitudes, it will focus primarily on

cohesion and division among the membership and between the membership and organization stands. How cohesive or like-minded are the respondents with respect to the arenas of conflict mentioned earlier? This research question will be explored extensively not only on economic issues, but also on political issues. How do the respondents compare with prescribed K.L.A. policies? This question will be posed in order to test the assumption of perfect cohesion. If there is deviation from prescribed K.L.A. policy, what might account for the deviation? This question is introduced as a possible guide for future inquiry into agricultural organization behavioral research. That is, because of the scarcity of this type of data, it is necessary to explore a number of possibilities with reference to explaining deviant attitudes in second groups. In summary, this study will attempt to probe (1) the perfect cohesion assumption; (2) why people in a similar occupation have different outlooks on the relevant issues; (3) the K.L.A. rank-and-file membership in relation to the three above mentioned arenas of conflict.

Research Procedures

Research Population

The research population consists of all members in good standing (dues paid) of the Kansas Livestock Association as of March, 1975. This figure is approximately 5,500 individuals.

A sample was drawn from this population by the staff of the K.L.A. Every tenth name was recorded for the survey except in cases where the member was a financial institution, feed processor, or some other individual who was not directly involved in the day-to-day production of livestock. This procedure was utilized because the study was designed to focus on those most intimately involved with the livestock industry, the producer.

Research Instrument

The research instrument was a mailed questionnaire consisting of four basic sections. Section one was devoted to relevant demographic data about the respondents. These data were necessary to obtain because of the "unknown quality" nature of the research population. The socio-economic data were vital because to ascertain possible reasons for deviant cases in the sample, a "measuring stick" had to be established with which to compare cases. Section one contained questions relating to age, education, length of time in livestock production, size (in acres) of agricultural operation, and number of head of livestock usually kept on hand.

Section two, though introduced as information relating to experience with the K.L.A., also included a question dealing with affiliations with other agricultural-related organizations. This question was included to determine possible reasons for deviant cases in the data and also for general survey purposes. The remainder of section two had questions relating to length of time in the K.L.A., what, if any,

K.L.A. offices or K.L.A. committees the respondent had held or served on during the past five years, respondents' feelings of efficacy toward the K.L.A., and respondents' perception of how well the K.L.A. represents their interests.

The third section of the survey dealt specifically with agricultural issues. As mentioned above, these issues are highly publicized by the K.L.A. and discussed at length by officers and relevant committees in the organization. Basically, the questions in section three were along the line of Lowi's distributive, regulatory and redistributive framework. This section also contained questions that were used as dependent variables for the purpose of data analysis.

Section four was introduced to the respondent as "...questions about political matters and government in general." Indeed, all but one of the questions did deal with the respondents' feelings of efficacy and representativeness of the government, national issues on busing and health care, party identification, and political philosophy. However, the last question asked the respondent to divulge his "average annual livestock income."

The questionnaires were mailed from the K.L.A. headquarters in Topeka and returned to the same. No mention was made, either in the cover letter, supplied by the K.L.A., or in the questionnaire, about the data being utilized for academic research. This was again done in the hopes of gaining the confidence of the respondents, as it was felt the sample would be more likely to respond to a K.L.A.

sponsored study rather than to a university oriented survey. For a detailed examination of the questionnaire and cover letter, see Appendix I.

Chapter two will, along with a general survey of the K.L.A. membership, deal in detail with how the respondents "line up" in terms of the above mentioned Lowi framework.

Chapter three will focus in detail on the deviant cases found in the data. It will be attempted, within the bounds of the data, to explain these deviant cases.

The final chapter will detail the conclusions and implications drawn from the data and other relevant sources.

Chapter 2

The Membership: A General Survey and a Closer Look

Introduction

In the United States there are three major types of economic interest groups: business-industry, labor, and agriculture.¹ Of these three dominant groups, agriculture has the greatest difficulty in maintaining a united front concerning major issues.² A good deal of the conflict that occurs between various segments of the agriculture sphere is explained in terms of competing commodities, geographical location (regionalism), and different concepts as to how a certain product should be distributed and marketed.³ It should not be surprising to learn that the interests of the Wisconsin dairymen run counter to the interests of the Texas soybean producers. Their respective commodities compete for the same margarine market. The nature of the land the producers inhabit respectively demand that they raise their respective products and not each other's. With this premise, one would assume that their individual attitudes would reflect a narrow interest dictating a common desire to make their economic and political atmosphere as conducive as possible for the farmer's productive activities.

This narrow interest often manifests itself in voluntary association in secondary groups representing the producer's desires. One would assume that, because of the multitude of

farm organizations representing both broad classifications of farmers (American Farm Bureau Federation, National Farmer's Organization, National Farmer's Union, etc.) and narrower commodity interests (National Wool Growers Association, American Quarter Horse Association, American National Cattleman's Association, etc.), the individual producer would choose to align himself with the group or groups that are most compatible with his specific interests. Because of this multiplicity and broad spectrum of groups, the farmer has to choose from, one would, upon initial examination, subscribe to the expectation that most of these organizations enjoy nearly perfect cohesion among the membership. The focus of this chapter is to examine cohesion in a voluntary agricultural organization.

Although most voluntary organizations never achieve perfect cohesion among rank-and-file members, it is necessary for most of the membership to be in agreement on key issues in order to maintain some semblance of a group.⁴ It is also important that there be harmony between prescribed organization stands and rank-and-file attitudes.⁵ This chapter will compare and contrast organization stands in relation to rank-and-file attitudes. Thus, the K.L.A. sample respondents will be examined in three manners. First, a general survey of the sample will be undertaken with emphasis on membership attitude trends in relation to specific agricultural questions. Second, the membership's attitudes will be matched against the prescribed stands of the K.L.A. Third, the application

of the Lowi framework (discussed in Chapter 1) dealing with arenas of conflict will be utilized to further test for cohesion on broader categories of issues.

The K.L.A. Membership: A General Survey

Socio-economic data for the K.L.A. respondents show a wide range of individual situations. For example, ages range from a minimum of twenty years to a maximum of eighty. In the education category, one finds the K.L.A. sample dominated by those who either have had some college experience or hold a baccalaureate degree, but there is a sizeable percentage (31 percent) who have a high school education or less. Livestock incomes of the K.L.A. respondents range from less than \$2499 per year (5.4 percent) to over \$100,000 per year (14.7 percent). The income category is dominated by those in the middle range composed of those individuals having a livestock income of \$10,000 to \$39,999 (34.3 percent) and \$40,000 to \$99,999 (28.9 percent). One can see that over sixty-three percent of the K.L.A. sample would be considered in the upper-middle income range of the entire farm population.⁶ The table below presents mean figures for relevant socio-economic data in relation to the K.L.A. respondents and comparable figures for their counterparts in farming in the general population of the state of Kansas.

As Table 2.1 indicates, the typical K.L.A. respondent is slightly younger, somewhat better educated, and generally has a larger land holding than his counterpart in the general

Table 2.1

Mean Socio-Economic Figures for K.L.A.
Members and General Farm Population

	K.L.A.	General Farm Population
Age	49	51
Education	Some college	12.3 years
Income	\$10,000-39,999	\$26,250
Size of operation (acres)	1,000-1,499	691
Years producing livestock	31	not available
Approximate number of cattle on hand	600	not available

farm population. One could extrapolate (because of the similarity in ages) that the number of years involved in raising livestock would be comparable between the two groups. The income figures from the K.L.A., while stated in categorical terms, are nearly identical to that of the general farm population of the state. This comparison is drawn to show the similarities and differences between the two groups.

The utility of any study involving a select group is often judged by its ability to be generalized to the entire population that the select group is a part of. Although there are some minor differences with regard to socio-economic characteristics between the two groups, the similarities are formidable enough to speculate that issue orientation in relation to socio-economic variables would be alike. The significant difference between the two groups issue orientation would be affiliation with the K.L.A. This distinguishing factor should be the dominant element in orientation formulation.

K.L.A. Membership: The Issues and Group Cohesiveness

In the third section of the research tool there were fifteen dependent variable questions. The table below represents the specific issues surveyed, the percent that were in favor, percent against, percent uncommitted, and the percent who had no opinion on the issue. The important factor to note on this particular table is the extremely high degree of cohesion within the group on most of the issues. Only on questions two and thirteen is there a significant degree of intra-group conflict.

Table 2.2

Dependent Variable Questions and Respondent Data Counts

Question	(N) % Agree*	(N) % Opposed*	(N) % Uncom- mitted*	(N) % No opi- nion*
1. Land Assessment	(178) 87.3	(13) 6.4	(6) 2.9	(7) 3.4
2. January 1 option	(78) 38.3	(69) 33.8	(36) 17.6	(21) 10.3
3. Tax Shift	(137) 67.2	(46) 22.5	(14) 6.9	(7) 3.5
4. Workmen's Compensation	(33) 16.2	(133) 65.2	(21) 10.3	(17) 8.3
5. Drug Restrictions	(42) 20.6	(132) 64.7	(12) 5.9	(18) 8.9
6. Slaughter Restrictions	(18) 8.9	(162) 79.5	(12) 5.9	(12) 5.9
7. Corporate Farm Restrictions	(123) 60.3	(55) 27.0	(19) 9.3	(7) 3.4
8. Export Restrictions	(173) 84.8	(21) 10.3	(5) 2.5	(5) 2.5
9. Ten Cent Checkoff	(172) 84.2	(12) 9.3	(8) 3.9	(5) 2.5
10. Beef Referendum	(120) 58.8	(50) 24.6	(19) 9.3	(15) 7.4
11. Wage & Price Cont.	(12) 5.9	(170) 83.4	(8) 3.9	(14) 6.9
12. Federal Regulation of Land	(5) 2.5	(190) 93.1	(3) 1.5	(6) 3.0
13. Interests of large overrepresented	(72) 35.3	(41) 20.1	(55) 27.0	(36) 17.7
14. Reorganization of legislature	(8) 4.0	(187) 91.6	(3) 1.5	(6) 3.0
15. Farmer's Co-ops.	(132) 64.7	(36) 17.6	(27) 13.2	(9) 4.4

*Percent in agreement arrived at by combining first and second foils on each question; percent opposed arrived at by combining fourth and fifth foils on each question; noncommitted represents third foil while no opinion represents sixth foil.

As mentioned in Chapter one, these issues are relevant to the livestock producer's interest and are highly publicized by the organization through periodic publications and convention resolutions. Hence, because of common occupation, common geographical location, and common membership in the K.L.A., cohesiveness on these issues is to be expected.

It is important, at this point, to explain the conflict on the two issues where cohesiveness was lowest. It is vital to discover the underlying causes of diversity on question two and thirteen as they represent exceptions to the general rule in the K.L.A. These are the only two issues in which a majority of the membership are not likeminded, and since this section of the paper is examining cohesion, the level of analysis must include an explanation of these exceptions.

Question two deals with the "January 1 option". The January 1 option is a method of declaring the number of livestock one has on hand for tax assessment purposes. At present, a producer can take his livestock to market at the end of the calendar year and on January 1 declare, for tax purposes, that his capital holdings are small in comparison to the rest of the year. The change proposed in some sectors has been to close this tax loophole and force the producer to average his monthly holdings of livestock and be taxed on that average rather than on his January 1 holdings. A tax advantage such as the January 1 option obviously aids those who can afford to suffer some degree of loss at the

marketplace. When producers flock to the marketplace at the end of the year to liquidate their capital holdings, it has a price depressing effect. Obviously, the depressed market price for livestock represents a more attractive option than paying taxes on large capital holdings. This is the viewpoint of the producers who can absorb the loss at the end of the year. The smaller producer, still wanting to avoid a high tax on holdings, has to absorb a loss also. One would expect to find that income differentials account for some of the division on the January 1 option. An examination of the data show a very low correlation between income and the desire to eliminate the January 1 option. The chi square significance on this particular cross classification between the independent variable income and the dependent variable desire to eliminate the January 1 option is only .1792 and the gamma correlation is -0.04487. Both indicate a very low relationship between the two variables.

Since the January 1 option represents a somewhat complicated scheme of taxation, one might speculate that educational levels are important in the explanation of low cohesion. That is, the higher educated individual may be more likely to oppose the loophole because of its obvious advantage to larger producers and vice versa. When the cross classification between the independent variable education and the dependent variable desire to eliminate the January 1 option is examined, one again finds a very low statistical correlation. The chi square test reveals only a .7486 level of

significance, while the gamma test indicates a relationship between the variables of .03652. Both levels are too low to assume a relationship between the variables.

As mentioned above, this tax advantage would tend to favor the large producer. After income was examined and shown to have little effect on the desire to eliminate the option, one would look to the number of cattle on hand for a possible relationship. The significance level between the independent variable number of cattle on hand and desire to drop the option is considerably more indicative than either income or education. The smaller the producer is in terms of head of livestock, the more likely he is to favor the elimination of the option. Statistically, the relationship is not staggering as the chi square reveals a significance level of .0210, but it indicates more of a relationship than the other aforementioned variables.

The January 1 option is highly publicized by the K.L.A. Therefore, possibly the longer a respondent has been a member of the K.L.A., the less likely he would be inclined to favor the elimination of the option. The K.L.A. passed a resolution at their 1973 Convention that "...stands opposed to the elimination of the January 1 option of assessing livestock."⁷ Since how large a producer is, how substantial his income, or his level of education did not account for divisiveness, possibly length of membership would make the respondent tend to agree with K.L.A. policy. The mean figure for number of years in the organization was eleven years. Using this

eleven year figure as a cutoff point, one finds that, of the thirty-eight percent who favor eliminating the option, slightly over half (54 percent) are in this eleven year or less membership category. Above this eleven year cutoff point, the membership becomes very dispersed and no pattern is ascertainable. This finding is significant as one can speculate that the factor of length of membership has the effect of bringing the member closer to organization stands.

Hence, the divisiveness on the January 1 option is best explained by two factors. First, the larger the producer, in terms of head of livestock on hand, the more likely he is to be opposed to the elimination of the option. Second, the shorter the length of membership (eleven years and below), the more likely the respondent is to be in favor of dropping the option.

These two variables fall far from explaining completely the division represented in the membership over this question. With the data available, these two independent variables of size of operation and length of membership answer the question better than any other of the independent variables.

Question thirteen dealt with the perception of the members concerning how governmental and legislative figures represent large and small producers. The question was posed "Some people believe that legislative and governmental officials represent the interests of the large commercial feedlot operator more than the interests of the smaller private feeder." Slightly over 35 percent of the sample agreed

with this statement. Twenty percent of the respondents disagreed with the premise. For the same reasons stated in relation to the January 1 option, it is important to examine the membership in detail to establish possible reasons for divisiveness.

In many respects the question of large interests vs. small interests is quite comparable to the January 1 option issue. That is, basically the same kinds of factors should come into play because of the economic connotations of the question. Factors as income, size of operation, education, and length of time in the organization should be the important variables to examine to explain the non-cohesiveness of the membership. The following table represents the relevant independent variables and their statistical significance when cross-tabulated with the dependent variable of respondents attitudes toward the larger producer being overrepresented in policy making.

Table 2.3

Significance levels of socio-economic variables on questions of large vs. small interests

Independent socio-economic variables	Chi Square	Chi Square significance
Age	314.667	.3633
Education	54.541	.0245
Income	39.102	.1235
Years in K.L.A.	173.157	.2618
Size of operation	88.271	.2009

As the table indicates, only the respondent's level of education approaches a significance level which could be considered as representing a relationship between the two variables. Examining the cross-tabulation between education and large vs. small interests further, one finds that of the thirty-five percent of the respondents that agreed with the proposition, nearly eight percent had at least a high school education. Among the respondents who have college experience, the data indicate that sixty-five percent believe the interests of the large producer are overrepresented in policy consideration. This particular finding was unexpected as the general premise is that more educated individuals tend to be in a higher socio-economic class and thus more concerned with the maintenance of their class position. The data instead show a concern of the higher educated for the smaller producer's interests. The most logical conclusion that can be drawn from this cross tabulation is that the higher educated respondents realize that, in reality the interests of the large producer are considered before the smaller producer and thereby agreed with the proposition as stated in the survey.

This conclusion is substantiated by reference to Table 2.3. Income and size of operation had no significant statistical relationship to the proposition that large interests are overrepresented in policy determination. The data revealed that lower income groups and smaller producers did not feel that their interests were underrepresented. This

is the relationship that one would expect to discover in relation to the question. Rather, education turned out to be the significant independent variable. The perception of the respondents with more than high school education enabled this group to see a disparity of interests in relation to policy making.

The Organization and the Membership:
A Study in Cohesiveness

In an organization such as the K.L.A., the interests of livestock producers are of dominant importance to the leadership. Rarely does the organization's publication deal with issues outside the agricultural sphere. This may indeed account for the extremely high agreement ratio between rank-and-file members and the organization's prescribed stand on specific issues. That is, as a specialized commodity interest organization ventures into policy areas not directly involved with the membership's occupational interests, the diversity of interest and attitudes about those interests is bound to increase. The K.L.A., being a state based organization representing basically a single occupational group, can afford to keep interest areas rather narrow and restricted to agricultural issues. Indeed, the organization probably finds it most prudent to keep interest areas narrow. If the K.L.A. were to engage in articulating interests in the international sphere, for instance, there would, no doubt, be more conflicting interests among the membership. The data presented below will illustrate this commonality of interests

more clearly.

In general, the survey indicates a very close relationship between prescribed stands of the K.L.A. and the membership's attitudes. The issues that are compared in the table below were derived from K.L.A. resolutions drawn up at their 1973 convention. These resolutions were published in booklet form and are consistently mentioned in K.L.A. publications. Hence, the awareness level of the respondents in relation to these issues should be relatively high because of this exposure.

Table 2.4

Comparison of Respondents agreeing and disagreeing
with prescribed K.L.A. policies

Issue	% in Agree- ment with K.L.A.	% not agree- ing with K.L.A.	% non- comm- itted	% no opinion
1. Land Assessment	87.3	6.4	2.9	3.4
2. January 1 option	38.3	33.8	17.6	10.3
3. Workmen's Compensation	65.2	16.2	10.3	8.3
4. Drug Restrictions	64.7	20.6	5.9	8.9
5. Ten Cent Checkoff	84.4	9.3	3.9	.5
6. Beef Referendum	58.8	24.6	9.3	7.2
7. Federal Regulation of land	93.1	2.5	1.5	3.0
8. Reorganization of legislature	91.6	4.0	1.5	3.0
% average in Agreement with K.L.A. stands = 72.9				
% Average in Nonagreement with K.L.A. stands = 14.6				

One can readily see that on most issues there is significant agreement between rank-and-file attitudes and prescribed K.L.A. stands. The exceptions to this are the January

1 option, the workmen's compensation issue, the question dealing with drug restrictions, and the beef referendum. The next section will attempt to explain some of this deviation.

As mentioned in the first section of this chapter, the issue of eliminating the January 1 option was a divisive one among the membership. The explanation for this deviation between membership and organization can be explained in basically the same terms. That is, the members that oppose the January 1 option tend to be smaller producers in terms of head of livestock on hand. There is no statistical relationship on this question between efficacy and representativeness and the desire to eliminate the option. This fact by itself deserves expansion. Since it is prescribed K.L.A. policy to oppose any legislative action aimed at dropping the January 1 option, one would assume that those members in favor of dropping the option would feel a low degree of representativeness. Rather, the data show a chi square statistical significance of .82 with the gamma test revealing an equally low relationship with a significance level of .04044. The efficacy factor was not significant on this question either. The independent variable efficacy toward K.L.A. was cross-tabulated with desire to eliminate the January 1 option. The significance level of chi square was .85. Thus, efficacy and representativeness were not factors accounting for membership deviation on the January 1 option.

The next issue which will be examined deals with

compulsory workmen's compensation. While a very high number (65.2 percent) agree with the prescribed K.L.A. stand in opposition to the implementation of compulsory workmen's compensation, sixteen percent of the respondents deviated from their organization's stand. The data show no particular bloc of the membership that stands opposed to the K.L.A. on this issue. The independent variables age, education, size of operation, length of time in K.L.A., and other agricultural organizational membership all failed to establish any statistical correlation when cross-tabulated with desire to implement compulsory workmen's compensation. In the last section of the survey, there were several questions that dealt with the respondents' attitudes toward various national issues. One of these issues was the implementation of National Health Insurance. When the issue of National Health Insurance was treated as an independent variable and cross-tabulated with the dependent variable workmen's compensation, one would expect to find a very high statistical relationship. Logically, if a respondent is in favor of compulsory workmen's compensation, one would expect that same respondent to tend to favor a National Health Insurance plan.

The data reveal only a very weak relationship between these two variables with the chi square significance at .03 and a gamma relationship of only .1. This cross-tabulation, along with weak or nonexistent relationships in relation to the above mentioned independent variables, leads to the conclusion that the opposition to the K.L.A. stand is very

dispersed throughout the sample. No socio-economic bloc or coalition stands out in the sample to indicate cohesiveness or common characteristics among the opposition.

Agricultural production in the United States has recently become heavily dependent on livestock chemicals and drugs as an aid to increase yields. Various studies have shown that some of these chemicals and drugs may have harmful side effects.⁸ Therefore, the producer is torn between the adoption of these additives and his concern with their negative side effects. While nearly sixty-five percent of the respondents agreed with K.L.A. policy for more permissive restrictions on the use of additives, over twenty percent agreed that more stringent controls on certain drugs and chemicals are needed. Again, it is important to examine the data for blocs of respondents that favor restrictions and thus run counter to prescribed K.L.A. policy.

By far the most visible bloc of respondents that favor stricter controls over the use of chemicals and drugs are those in the higher education bracket. That is, the more education one has, the more likely he is to be in opposition to the organization on this particular issue. The chi square relationship between the independent variable level of education and the dependent variable of controls on drugs and chemicals is .0013. This is by far the strongest relationship between any of the independent variables and the control of drugs question. Indeed, none of the other cross-tabulations showed any strong or even moderate relationships.

The livestock industry, like other economic concerns, finds it necessary to promote itself. Unlike many industries, most of the money that is designated for consumer education, product promotion, and livestock research comes from the individual independent producer. These funds manifest themselves in the form of "checkoffs". When the producer takes his livestock to market, ten cents per head is automatically deducted from the market price and set aside for the beef industry promotion and research. The question dealing with the ten cent checkoff shows a very high degree of agreement between rank-and-file members and prescribed K.L.A. stands on the issue. Both the membership and the organization agree that the ten cent checkoff is a good idea. The question immediately following in the survey deals with an additional checkoff proposal. This checkoff would be to raise between thirty and forty million dollars for the purpose of livestock industry promotion and research. While well over half (58.8 percent) of the respondents favor an additional checkoff, opposition to the measure is considerably higher than on the already existing ten cent checkoff. Only nine percent of the respondents disagreed with the K.L.A.'s stand on the ten cent checkoff, but the level of disagreement reaches nearly twenty-five percent on the additional checkoff.

The distinguishing characteristic of those that oppose the additional checkoff are their age and the number of head of livestock the producer usually has on hand. With respect to the independent variable age, the data show that nearly

seventy percent of those that are in opposition to the additional checkoff are in the forty-five and over age category. This breakdown becomes more important when examined in light of the chi square statistical test. Even with an extremely high number of degrees of freedom (324), the significance level between the independent variable age compared with attitude toward the additional checkoff is .004. The older the respondent is, the less likely he is to look on the additional checkoff in favorable terms.

The other distinguishing characteristic of those respondents that oppose the imposition of additional checkoff, is their size in terms of head of livestock. Apparently, the smaller producer feels he has less to gain by such promotion and more to lose. The data indicate that, of those in opposition to the additional checkoff issue, over half (59 percent) are in the three smallest categories of producers. The greatest concentration of this fifty-nine percent lies in the smallest category of producers. Although the statistical relationship between the two variables is not as strong as the age variable was, it is significant enough (.019 chi square) to suspect a correlation between the two variables. The subsequent examination of the data supports this conclusion.

In summarizing this section dealing with rank-and-file orientation in relation to prescribed organization stands, one must conclude that, although deviations are noticeable on some issues, overall, the group's cohesiveness is the

dominant characteristic. The percent agreeing with prescribed stands (72.9) on all issues, overwhelm the minority (14.6 percent) that are in disagreement. Also, the lack of significant socio-economic blocs of opposition would point to overall group cohesiveness. If certain groups (socio-economic in particular) emerged as consistently in opposition to prescribed stands, one would have reason to suspect the cohesion of the group. The data revealed no such blocs, and thus it must be concluded that most of the time, on most issues, the K.L.A. and its membership are very closely aligned.

The Membership and Arenas of Conflict

The study, up to this point, has emphasized the relationship among the members and between the members and the organization. These relationships have been in the context of specific agricultural issues. Although this level of analysis, which emphasizes specific issues, is important, it is critical to determine what these specific issues represent in a broader sphere. The cohesion or disintegration on the specific issues covered in the survey is apparent as illustrated above. Relationships among members and between rank-and-file membership and the organization, with respect to the specific issues, reach a degree of cohesion that is significant enough to conclude that a replication of the study would reveal very similar results.

There are exceptions to the cohesion and the intent of this section is to determine the kinds of issues the

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membership has the highest degrees of cohesion and which kinds of issues the greatest degree of division. To facilitate this analysis, the Lowi framework will be employed. The Lowi framework divides issues into distributive, regulatory, and redistributive arenas of conflict. By determining each question's area of conflict, one can see which issue area has the most agreement/disagreement on among the rank-and-file membership. The overall character of the rank-and-file will become clearer as this level of analysis emphasizes not the intent of the specific issue in question but rather its impact on a broader plane.

The first step in this analysis is the classification of the survey questions into their respective categories. Table 2.5 illustrates the classifications of the dependent variable question with respect to the Lowi framework.

Table 2.5

Classification of Dependent Variable Questions
into Arenas of Conflict

Distributive
8. Export Restrictions
9. Ten Cent Checkoff
10. Beef Referendum
11. Interests of large overrepresented
Regulatory
4. Workmen's Compensation
5. Drug Restrictions
6. Slaughter Restrictions
7. Corporate Farm Restrictions
11. Wage and Price Controls
Redistributive
1. Land Assessment
2. January 1 option
3. Tax Shift
12. Federal land regulation
14. Legislative Reorganization
15. Farmer Cooperatives

Questions one, two, and three all deal with methods of taxation and assessment. Because the nature of taxation involves the redistribution of wealth and also because these questions fit the criteria of redistributive issues covered in Chapter one, questions one, two, and three shall be placed in the redistributive arena.

The next three questions on the survey are in the regulatory issue arena. Lowi states that regulatory issues either raise costs or affect the alternatives an individual has.⁹ Questions four, five, and six deal with compulsory workmen's compensation, restriction of certain agricultural drugs and chemicals, and the restriction of private slaughter and packaging of meat. The nature of these issues and the manner in which they are approached warrant their classification in the regulatory arena. Question seven was also determined to be of a regulatory nature, but for somewhat different reasons. The issue involves the restriction of non-family farm corporations. Respondents may not feel the need to place controls on themselves in this case, but rather have regulations enforced by a governmental body to protect their individual interests. Because the corporate farm restrictions would reduce the alternatives for some producers, the question was placed in the regulatory arena.

Question eight asks the respondents about whether or not export restrictions should be dropped so U.S. agricultural products could be traded freely and internationally, including communist bloc nations. Because the dropping of

restrictions would tend to benefit only one class (the agricultural sphere), while deprivation would be over a very broad segment of the population, this question was placed in the distributive arena. Question nine and ten were also determined to be distributive in nature as their benefits would be spread over only those in the livestock industry. The deprivation involved with the checkoff questions would be spread over consumers in general with no single segment of the population being deprived any more than any other. Also the checkoff issues tend to be of a "short-run" nature which is also one of Lowi's criteria for classification.

The control of wages and prices is a regulatory question. For the reasons stated above (raising costs and/or reducing alternatives), question eleven, dealing with wage and price controls, was determined to be in the regulatory arena. Wage and price controls are also broad in their impact in that they are not applied specifically but rather on a universal basis.

The federal regulation of lands was covered in question twelve. Lowi states that redistributive policies involve "...haves and have nots, bigness and smallness, bourgeoisie and proletariat."¹⁰ The federal regulation of lands implies that it is possible for some individuals to gain and others to lose. Therefore, the question was placed in the redistributive sphere. In theory, federal land utilization policies would disregard the economic characteristics of those the policy affect and determine the best policy with

respect to land usage. One would speculate that the consequence would be the breaking up of large individual landholdings and the redistribution of land to other individuals-- a redistribution of land.

Question thirteen, dealing with the interests of large producers as compared to the interests of smaller producers was determined to be a distributive issue. When one examines interests, it is usually in the form of individual policies enacted or rejected. Taken over the long run and examined in aggregate fashion, one would be able to see how certain segments of the livestock industry were aided and others deprived. The short-run examination, however, reveals the ease that distributive policies can be "...disaggregated and dispersed unit by small unit...."¹¹ Hence, in a question dealing with policy makers considering the needs of large producers before small producers, the issue becomes one of individual policies (or favors) being granted one segment over another segment.

Up to this point, redistributive policies have emphasized the redistribution of entities in the economic sphere. Question fourteen deals not with economic wealth, but rather the redistribution of political power. Respondents were asked whether or not they favored a reorganization of the state legislature to give urban areas more representation. This is, again, a question of haves vs. have-nots and because of this factor, the issue is categorized in the redistributive arena. In terms of political power redistribution, question

fourteen stands alone in the midst of economic issues. Over the longrun, even this question would have obvious economic consequences for the agricultural sphere. Not only would the urban areas have more political power, but their votes would, conceivably, appropriate funds that traditionally go to the agricultural sphere.

The final question in section three of the survey asks the respondent about a reorganization of distribution and marketing policies concerning the producer's own commodities. Farmer owned and controlled operations set up to bypass the "middleman" in marketing is really a question dealing with basic redistribution of wealth. Operations of this nature would have the effect of either providing for larger profit margins for the producer or lower prices for the consumer. Because of this restructuring of marketing policies, question fifteen was placed in the redistributive category.

All fifteen of the dependent variable questions could have been placed in any of the three categories. For example, any of the questions could have been determined to be regulatory in nature or they would reduce the alternatives or raise the costs for someone involved. Some of the measures would raise the costs of food, thereby limiting the options of consumers. The rationale for placing the questions in their respective categories was how they related to the relevant agricultural interests involved.

Table 2.6 represents how the membership stands on distributive, regulatory, and redistributive issues. The

percentage figures represent mean scores derived by examining the data counts for each question in the respective arenas of conflict and taking their average.

Table 2.6

Respondents Orientations in Relation to Arenas of Conflict

	Mean % Cohesive	Mean % Noncohesive	Mean % Uncommitted	Mean % No opinion
Distributive	68.3	13.8	11.0	7.5
Regulatory	70.6	15.7	6.8	6.6
Redistributive	74.2	12.8	10.9	4.6

The distributive arena is characterized by highly individualized decisions. The questions that related to this arena were issues that, either through enactment or rejection, stood to aid the respondents economically. The respondents were in agreement sixty-eight percent of the time on distributive issues. This finding should not be surprising. One would have a great deal of difficulty finding a segment of the population that did not support having individualized decisions favor them. The dropping of export restrictions would raise the price of commodities the producer receives at the market place. Though the ten cent checkoff and beef referendum questions cost the producer initially, over the long run, through media exposure and improved technology, his economic standing will improve, making the checkoffs a sound investment. One can see a potential cleavage emerging on these issues though. The distributive arena should be the

one area that cohesion is the highest, rather than the lowest. Individualized policies and favors should be perceived as aiding all producers. The case is, rather, that because of the question dealing with the interests of the large producer vs. the small producer, the mean percentage is lower than the other two arenas of conflict. The mean percentage figures in Table 2.6 could have been considerably smaller had some individual questions been excluded. However, this would have seriously jeopardized the integrity of the operationalization.

Apparently, not all respondents feel that these individualized decisions are in their best interests. By virtue of question thirteen, on the survey, one finds a potential area of conflict and cleavage. The data, however, cannot be denied. An overwhelming majority are in agreement with reference to distributive issues, but, it is indeed surprising that the percentage total is not even greater considering the high degree of cohesion found in the other dependent variable questions.

The regulatory arena included questions that gave the respondents the choice of raising their costs through workmen's compensation, forcing the producer to pay a commercial packer to process his commodity instead of doing it privately (and cheaper), and restricting his use of certain drugs and chemicals, thus reducing his options. Corporate farm restrictions raise his costs by having to compete with corporate interests advanced technology, availability of capital, and

marketing procedures.¹² Slightly over seventy percent of the respondents were in agreement on regulatory issues. The question that pulled the average down was the drug restriction issue. This is an excellent example of the conflict that arises when special interest orientations clash with broader societal concerns. The teamster example in chapter one is nearly parallel to the drug issue here. One would assume that because of narrow special interest orientation, the respondents would be united in their stand to use the chemicals if it aids in their production. This, apparently, is not completely the case. While the majority of respondents shunned the restrictions, a significant number possibly felt the cross-pressures from societal values and opted for potentially lower production rather than possibly damaging the environment or the organisms in the environment.

Overall, the respondents were cohesive on regulatory issues when viewed in total. The category was dominated by responses that favored regulatory measures (corporate farming) when those actions would either aid or maintain their economic standing. Respondents were generally unified in opposition to measures (workmen's compensation, slaughter restrictions, and drug restrictions), that would raise their costs of production or limit their alternatives.

Of the three arenas of conflict, the redistributive arena was the most cohesive. The question that presented the most division in the redistributive sphere was the January 1 option issue. The data reveal that the respondents were

split almost evenly on this particular issue. However, the other five questions dealing with redistributive issues saw the respondents generally very unified in their orientations. The respondents were in favor of issues that would aid their economic standing, such as shifting the tax burden away from their capital investments (marketing, livestock) and toward personal income. Taxes would also be lower, generally, if land was assessed on its ability to produce income rather than on the basis of land sales. Farmer's cooperatives also appealed to the respondents as cooperatives would give them more leverage at the marketplace. Contrast these favorable responses with issues as federal regulation of land and a reorganization of the legislature. These two issues were met with resounding opposition from the respondents. The conclusion one draws from this is similar to the conclusions drawn with respect to the other two arenas of conflict. Generally, the respondent is oriented toward his own special interest while society wide issues are seen as infringing on his economic territory and threatening his dominance in state politics. The respondents were in favor of a redistribution of wealth when the redistribution was in their direction. When the redistribution was in another direction, the respondents tended to be unified in their opposition.

This conclusion is reinforced when one examines data relating to societal questions on the survey. When asked whether or not they favored a plan for National Health Insurance, over sixty-six percent voiced opinion in opposition to

such a plan. Another question dealing with the redistribution of educational opportunities met with similar results. When asked if they favored busing to achieve racial equality, eighty-eight percent of the respondents said they were against any such plan.

Hence, the redistributive arena is the most cohesive, and for good reason. The measures the respondents favored would either aid or maintain their economic and political status. Issues that could detract from their status were consistently opposed. It is interesting to note that Lowi's statement of redistributive issues boiling down to a battle of haves vs. have nots is quantified so conclusively here.

Though there is little difference between the three categories of conflict, this does not undermine the utilization of the framework. The high degree of agreement among the respondents is another indication of cohesion. However, the Lowi framework is valuable in determining relationships on broader categories of issues.

Conclusions

The K.L.A. rank-and-file is very cohesive. When the data are treated in three different manners, the weak links that it revealed were few in number. The nature of the organization accounts for much of this likemindedness among members and between members and organization stands. The K.L.A. is a single commodity organization which has to be considered a factor in unity. Geographical proximity also

accounts for cohesiveness. That is, the common occupation, common problems faced, and common membership in a voluntary organization, are all factors explaining such a high degree of cohesion.

The interesting question remains as to why there should be such a commonality of views between divergent socio-economic classes. Income, education, size of operation, and age very rarely showed up as determining factors in issue orientation.

Finally, even with extremely high degrees of cohesion, there are exceptions to the dominant trend within the sample. A detailed examination of these deviants will be taken up in Chapter 3.

Chapter 3

Comparative Characteristics of Deviants and Norm Group

Introduction

The Kansas Livestock Association has a number of factors responsible for the high degree of cohesion found in Chapter 2. Among these factors are a narrow commodity (livestock) interest and geographical proximity of the members. On most of the dependent variable issue questions, consensus was extremely high. Save for two questions, the outlook of the rank-and-file membership was likeminded. The orientation of rank-and-file membership was generally harmonious with prescribed organizational stands. One concludes from the analysis in Chapter 2 that cohesion is high in the K.L.A., yet there exist significant exceptions to this conclusion.

In a group that enjoys such a high degree of overall likemindedness, the deviants tend to be rather noticeable. One questions the motivations of these members that constitute this minority. What are the socio-economic characteristics of this group? The question arises as to whether or not a bloc or faction really exists, or whether the deviant cases on each dependent variable question breakaway from the group norms occasionally only to return on the other questions.

It is important to attempt to identify these deviant blocs because if their existence is quantified, the conclusion that the K.L.A. enjoys high degrees of cohesion among

its members must be somewhat tempered. The purpose of this paper is to examine the cohesiveness of a secondary group. Chapter 2 confirmed that most of the time on most questions, the membership tends to react alike. If the same respondents consistently stray from the organizational fold, one can speculate that cohesion is in danger. If, on the other hand, the results find that divisiveness is diffuse and inconsistent, the conclusion that the K.L.A. has a high degree of cohesion will be reinforced.


Thus far, the level of analysis has stressed the concept of cohesiveness within this secondary group. Cohesiveness is critical to regime maintenance and system persistence.¹ David Easton in A Framework for Political Analysis, draws a number of similarities between political systems such as formal governments and "parapolitical systems" as the K.L.A. Parapolitical systems are those subgroups or factions that are a part of the larger societal system, but whose behavior and actions resemble the larger, all encompassing political system.² Political and parapolitical systems both maintain power relationships between and among members and leadership, decision making processes, communication flows, and, to differing degrees, the ability to make authoritative decisions and allocations.

Parapolitical groups, as Easton points out, are not always viewed as being strictly political in nature.³ Social groupings, such as family units, fraternal organizations, and educational and economic groups, all qualify as para-

political systems.⁴ Clearly, in all these parapolitical groups, a hierarchy exists through either explicit choice by the membership, as in interest groups, or by tacit resignation, as is the case with a family group. This hierarchy is responsible for reacting to demands placed upon it and attempts to elicit support through appropriate actions.

Easton's system model of politics is best illustrated by the following diagram.⁵ The box labeled "The Political System" is analogous to the above mentioned hierarchy. Demand and support arrows on the input side of the diagram are those variables dependent on membership attitudes.

Figure 3.1



As the diagram indicates, the political system reacts to demands and supports and makes authoritative decisions in relation to the input variables. It is a logical assumption that, as demands are acted upon favorably, the support level will be high. When authoritative decisions and acts are not favorable with a particular constituency, the support level will most likely drop. Each component in Easton's model is

vital for maintenance of the system. Therefore, the political system (or regime) is in danger when supports drop to the point where decisions and acts are designed to coerce support.

In a voluntary organization such as the K.L.A., coercion is an unlikely alternative for eliciting membership support. Rather, support is gained by decisions and actions that meet favorably with rank-and-file membership. As has been stressed previously, the K.L.A. apparently has the support of the vast majority of its membership. Singular deviations among the membership are not particularly significant in an organization of over 5,000 members. However, if a number of members consistently deviate as a bloc, the demand and support input variables become significant. If the members of this bloc would unilaterally withdraw support or make demands counter to K.L.A. philosophy, the parapolitical system of the K.L.A. would feel the stress.

The theoretical intent of this chapter will be to single out those respondents who deviate on dependent variable questions and determine if, by socio-economic characteristics, they constitute a bloc or faction within the K.L.A. As in the previous chapter, socio-economic data will be treated as independent variables. Responses to survey questions in section three of the questionnaire (See Appendix), are dependent variables and represent the support and demand arrows (see diagram above) on the input side of the diagram.

While the K.L.A. generally satisfies the membership demands and thus receives high degree of support, the monitoring of input variables remains important. Easton states

that inputs

Sum up and reflect the changes taking place in the environment of a political system, communicate these changes or disturbances to the system, and in turn are acted upon by the system as a way of coping with potential stress.⁶

This conception of inputs is even more important when placed in the context of a generally harmonious group. When a system is unaccustomed to dealing with stress caused by conflicting demands and inconsistent supports, the possibility of systemic breakdown exists as stress becomes more prevalent. This is most critical when conflicting demands and inconsistent supports are loud enough to be heard against the background of harmony caused by high cohesion. The volume then depends upon how many individuals are consistently at odds with each group norms.

The method for selecting this subsample was determined by examining each dependent variable issue question in section three of the questionnaire and the corresponding non-cohesive percentage. The average percentage of the sample that was non-cohesive on the dependent variable question was 15.3. Hence, any dependent variable question that had more than 15.3 percent of the respondents deviating from the norm was designated for detailed examination. This particular method was deemed appropriate as the questions that fell below the non-cohesive average of 15.3 percent contained too few cases for in-depth study. Also, socio-economic blocs of members within the sample are more likely to be identifiable within

the designated questions.

A 1927 American Political Science Review article by Stuart A. Rice entitled, "The Identification of Blocs in Small Political Bodies," is one of the initial attempts at identifying distinctive groups within a single organization.⁷ Rice's measuring devices consisted of an index of likeness between two groups and an overall measure of group cohesion.⁸ The comparison to be utilized here will resemble Rice's technique. The cohesive, dominant group in the K.L.A. will be treated as a control group, while the deviants on the dependent variable questions will be examined in an experimental light. Comparisons will then be made between the two groups on relevant socio-economic data. The comparative analysis will be done in two manners. First, on each of the designated questions respondents will be examined with respect to the above mentioned socio-economic data. Second, the deviant cases will be treated in total to determine if they share commonalities with respect to socio-economic data.

As mentioned earlier, the systems model inputs are easily dominated in the K.L.A. by the cohesive group that tends to be likeminded on most issues. Also, for the deviants to hope to have their demands acknowledged by the K.L.A. system, it would help to have some group identification. That is, if the deviants from the sample are in a lower socio-economic stratum, there may be a case for K.L.A. unrepresentativeness.

This particular comparative technique does have a

shortcoming. The weakness lies in the fact that even if a socio-economic bloc is detected, the strength of the bloc remains in question. Rice points out in his work, Quantitative Methods in Politics, that

the existence of a group made up of certain individual members must be postulated before the tests of cohesion and likeness can be applied. The methods cited will not serve to determine automatically the effective groupings that actually exist within the body....For example having guessed or postulated in advance the presence of alignments within a state senate based upon party, occupation, rural or urban habitat, or the economic interests of the constituents, and having tested the cohesion of each alignment, we might still fail to discover the most cohesive groupings.⁹

Hence, socio-economic groupings within the K.L.A. membership may be evident, but still not account in full for deviance. In addition to socio-economic characteristics, intervening variable categories such as communication patterns, socialization experiences, and competing interests may account for deviance. These intervening variables are particularly important if the comparative analysis fails to discern any major cleavages based on socio-economic variables.

Table 3.1

Cohesive and Non-Cohesive Percentage Totals
for Designated Questions

Question	(N)	% Cohesive	(N)	% Non-Cohesive
2. January 1 option	(78)	38.3	(69)	33.8
3. Tax Shift	(137)	67.2	(46)	22.5
4. Workmen's Compensation	(133)	65.2	(33)	16.2
5. Drug Restrictions	(132)	64.7	(42)	20.6
7. Corporate Farm Restrictions	(123)	60.3	(55)	27.0
10. Beef Referendum	(120)	58.8	(50)	24.6
13. Int. of large overrep.	(72)	35.3	(41)	20.1
15. Farmer's Cooperatives	(132)	64.7	(36)	17.6

Characteristics of Deviants Compared with Non-Deviants

According to the systems model of government, inputs monitor the environment of which the system is a part. The input variables, when homogeneous, cohesive, and united, tend to be handled rather easily by the system. It is when conflicting demands and inconsistent supports are prevalent that the systems model is most likely to feel stress. The stress will be even greater if it is derived from a particular class, sub-group, or other sub-classifications that regularly disagree with the political system's outputs. Then, conflicting demands and inconsistent supports take on an identity of their own and become points at which these sub-classifications rally around to gain support from other members of the larger group.

The eight questions designated for detailed examination detected no clear cut socio-economic class cleavages. No particular income group was consistently at odds with the group norms, though on two questions the deviants averaged lower incomes. Income is traditionally the socio-economic category that indicates class cleavages among social groupings. Income groupings, along with size of operation variable, fit the Weberian determination of classes criteria.¹⁰ Weber points out that a class exists

when (1) a number of people have in common a specific causal component of their life chances, in so far as (2) this component is represented exclusively by economic interests in the possession of goods and opportunities for income, and (3) is represented

under the conditions of the labor or commodity markets.¹¹

Weber later states that "property and lack of property are, therefore, the basic categories of all class situations."¹²

To illustrate the basic void that exists within the K.L.A. sample with respect to classes, the examination will turn to the comparison of data between respondents who agreed with the group norms and those who deviated from the norm on the designated questions.

The table below represents the comparative socio-economic data from respondents in relation to the question dealing with the January 1 option. Group norms in this particular case dictated the retention of the option, while deviants were in favor of its elimination.

Table 3.2

Comparison of Mean Group Norm and Deviant Socio-Economic Data on January 1 Option Question

	Group Norm	Deviants
Age in years	51.1	45.5
Education	5.5*	5.0*
Income	\$40,000-99,999	\$40,000-99,999
Size of Operation	3.9*	3.7*
Years in K.L.A.	13.4	10.3

* See Codebook in Appendix II for explanation of codes.

The January 1 option issue did not generate data that were different for the two classifications. Although there are some minor differences, the Weber property and economic categories are nearly identical. A question such as this

with obvious economic connotations, should draw out those who are dissatisfied with their socio-economic position; yet the data indicate that deviants have similar socio-economic characteristics as their counterparts who hold to the group norms. The detailed examination of the January 1 option question in Chapter 2 indicated statistical relationships between size of operation, length of time in K.L.A., and the desire to drop the option. The data presented in Table 3.2 do not conflict with earlier findings, but neither are they wholly supportive. One should note that the figures in Table 3.2 are mean figures derived from averaging the norm group and deviant group respondents in total. The Chapter 2 findings indicate statistical tendencies, rather than comparisons of strict groups.

Question three on the survey dealt with the respondents feelings toward shifting tax emphasis to income and relieving the tax burden on property. The data indicate that 67.2 percent (N=137) favored such a proposal, while 22.5 percent (N=46) opposed the change. Table 3.5 illustrates the comparison between the deviant group norm's socio-economic data and similar data for the 22.5 percent who deviated.

Examination of the table indicates a potential class cleavage that fits the Weberian criteria. Income and size of operation data show a wide division between the two groups on this particular question. Not only does the group norm average income far outdistance their counterparts in the deviant group, but property holdings for the norm

Table 3.3

Comparison of Mean Group Norm and Deviant Socio-
Economic Data on Tax Shift Question

	Norm Group	Deviants
Age in years	50.5	53.2
Education	5.5*	3.2*
Income	\$40,000-99,999	\$2,500-9,999
Size of operation	5.3*	1.6*
Years in K.L.A.	12.4	9.0

* See Codebook in Appendix II for explanation of codes.

group tend to be nearly four times as large as the deviants.¹³ Generally, the comparison on the question represents a class difference. As mentioned, income and property as class indicators are evident in the comparison. Added to the economic factors is the education level. Respondents in the group norm category had a mean education level of 5.5 which represents at least some college. The deviant's level of 3.2 means that, on the average, people in this category have something less than a high school education. This question is the most indicative of all of the designated dependent variable questions in terms of illustrating class cleavages among the membership.

With a few exceptions, agriculture has been untouched by traditional labor issues such as better pay, working conditions, and workman's compensation. At present, there is a move in some state legislatures to make agricultural producers provide compulsory workman's compensation for all farm laborers. This proposal was not received too well by

the K.L.A. respondents. Only 16.2 percent (N=33) favored compulsory workman's compensation, while 65.2 percent (N=133) rejected the proposal. Table 3.4 shows the comparative socio-economic breakdown between those respondents who favored the compulsory workman's compensation proposal and those who rejected it. One should note that the group norm, in this instance, is negative toward the proposal while the deviant cases are those who favored it.

Table 3.4

Comparison of Mean Group Norm and Deviant Socio-Economic Data on Compulsory Workmen's Compensation Question

	Group Norm	Deviants
Age in years	49.3	44.9
Education	5.0*	5.0*
Income	\$10,000-39,999	\$10,000-39,999
Size of operation	5.0*	3.3*
Years in K.L.A.	12.1	11.0

* See Codebook in Appendix II for explanation of codes.

As Table 3.4 indicates, the most important difference between those who were negative toward compulsory workmen's compensation and those who favored it is the size of operation factor. Although the differential is small in terms of the data on the table, when one converts those figures to what they represent in property holdings they become more significant. The group norm figure of 5.0 is equivalent to a property holding of 2,000 to 2,499 acres. This figure is contrasted with the deviant property holdings of 3.3 which is equal to 1,000 to 1,499 acres. Hence, the larger property

holders were more likely to be negative toward this particular proposal. This is not as indicative of class cleavages as the tax shift question was, but one cannot ignore this revealing factor between the two groups.

The next question designated for detailed examination was the issue dealing with agricultural drug and chemical restrictions. The analysis in Chapter 2 in reference to this question pointed out the educational factor as being a determinant variable in issue orientation. Table 3.5 indicates that the deviants have a slightly higher education level than their norm group counterparts. Thus, the statistical relationship established in Chapter 2 is confirmed in this comparison. Note in the table that the norm group is oriented toward relaxing stringent restrictions on agricultural drugs and chemicals, while the deviants favor the restrictions.

Table 3.5

Comparison of Mean Norm Group and Deviant Group Socio-Economic Data on Restrictions of Agricultural Drugs and Chemicals

	Norm Group	Deviants
Age in years	50.3	49.7
Education	5.0*	5.5*
Income	\$40,000-99,999	\$40,000-99,999
Size of operation	5.0*	3.2*
Years in K.L.A.	12.6	13.1

* See Codebook in Appendix II for explanation of codes.

As in the two previous questions, the contrasting factor between the two groups is size of operation. The average

difference between the norm group's size of operation and the deviant's is 1,000 acres. This property holding factor is, again, important in determining class cleavages within the group. Even though average income of the two groups were the same, in terms of capital holdings, the norm group is in a higher economic class according to this data.

One of the most heated issues, both nationally and on the state level of agriculture, is the creeping influence of non-agricultural oriented corporations buying land and engaging in agricultural production. Most of the respondents in the K.L.A. sample (60.3 percent, N=123) approved of restrictions limiting non-agricultural corporations hegemony in the field of farming. Yet, 27 percent (N=55) of the sample was against any restrictions. Table 3.6 indicates two basic economic differences between the norm group and the deviants. Incomes of the norm group tend to be somewhat higher. The size of the norm group's operation also is slightly higher than their deviant counterparts. The other major difference is that of education. Norm group respondents have an average education level of 5.0 which is equivalent to some college experience. The deviant's average education level is 5.0 which corresponds to a high school diploma.

Although the three categories where differences occur between norm group respondents and deviants are relatively minor, they do follow the trend seen in the other questions covered above. That is, with respect to economic variables

Table 3.6

Comparison of Mean Norm Group and Deviant Group Socio-Economic Data on Restrictions on Corporate Farming

	Norm Group	Deviants
Age in years	50.1	52.2
Education	5.0*	4.0*
Income	\$10,000-39,999	\$2,500-9,999
Size of Operation	5.1*	4.0*
Years in K.L.A.	11.2	14.2

* See Codebook in Appendix II for explanation of codes.

deviants tend to be either smaller in their size of operation, or have lower incomes, or both. Although these are not wholly determinative of status or class cleavage, again one must note this consistency in the comparison between the two groups.

Question ten on the survey dealt with respondent's feelings toward the beef referendum. As explained in Chapter 2, the beef referendum is an additional checkoff to raise money for beef industry promotion and research. This particular checkoff will supplement the already existing ten cent checkoff also discussed in Chapter 2. In contrast to the comparisons drawn above, the socio-economic differences between norm group respondents and deviant respondents are minimal. Table 3.7 shows how little difference there is between the two groups. On this particular question there is no evidence of class cleavage based on socio-economic data.

The analysis of the beef referendum question in Chapter

Table 3.7

Comparison of Mean Norm Group and Deviant Group Socio-Economic Data on Beef Referendum Question

	Norm Group	Deviants
Age in years	52.3	54.5
Education	5.3*	5.2*
Income	\$10,000-39,999	\$10,000-39,999
Size of operation	4.5*	4.2*
Years in K.L.A.	11.4	12.9

* See Codebook in Appendix II for explanation of codes.

2 cited age of the respondent and the size of his operation as determining factors in issue orientation. It was concluded that the older and smaller the respondent, the less likely he was to support the referendum. Those conclusions are reaffirmed here since the deviants tend to be slightly older and tend to have smaller operations than those supporting the beef referendum. Although the difference in size is not a large one, it should be noted that again the deviants have a smaller land holding than the norm group. However, the difference is not enough to speculate that there is a class cleavage. The difference does coincide with the general trend exhibited in the previous questions.

If the data were to indicate a class cleavage based on property holdings, the question dealing with the respondent's feelings about large producers being overrepresented should show a difference between the two groups with respect to size of operation. The analysis in Chapter 2 indicated that there was no statistical relationship between a respondent

perceiving that the interests of large producers were over-represented and the size of the respondent's operation. Table 3.8 shows a very small difference in the size of operation between the two groups. The average size of operation of the respondents who agreed with the proposition in the survey was 4.2. The deviants in this case are those who disagreed with the statement. Their average land holding was 4.9. These data indicate little substantive difference between the respondents. Education was indicated as being one of the determinants of issue orientation in Chapter 2. The norm group's education is slightly higher as the table indicates.

Table 3.8

Comparison of Mean Norm Group and Deviant Group Socio-Economic Data on Question of Interests of Large Producers Overrepresented

	Norm Group	Deviants
Age in years	55.1	51.6
Education	5.2*	5.0*
Income	\$10,000-39,999	\$10,000-39,999
Size of operation	4.2*	4.9*
Years in K.L.A.	10.9	14.7

* See Codebook in Appendix II for explanation of codes.

The final question to be examined in this section is one dealing with the respondents' feelings toward establishing farmer owned and operated cooperatives to bypass the middle-man in commodity distribution. This particular concept has been established in some regions of North Dakota and Minnesota

and has met with only limited success.¹⁴ The reason these cooperatives have not been more successful is that not all producers chose to support cooperatives.¹⁵ Cooperatives tend to help the smaller producers, since, by joining with other small producers, they can exert more pressure on the market by collectively withholding their commodity. The K.L.A. respondents were generally in favor of this proposal with 64.7 percent (N=132) responding positively. The deviants on this issue comprised 17.6 percent (N=36) of the sample.

Table 3.9 has similar data characteristics when compared to Table 3.8. That is, the deviants in this case are larger landholders and, one may speculate, probably not as interested in banding together with other producers to bargain collectively. This difference in size of operation is the only substantive difference illustrated in Table 3.9. This difference follows the trend that was established earlier in relation to property holdings determining class cleavages.

Table 3.9

Comparison of Mean Norm Group and Deviant Group Socio-Economic Data on Question of Farmer's Cooperatives

	Norm Group	Deviants
Age in years	49.7	51.7
Education	5.7*	5.5*
Income	\$10,000-39,999	\$10,000-39,999
Size of Operation	3.5*	4.5*
Years in K.L.A.	11.0	12.5

* See Codebook in Appendix II for explanation of codes.

The difference between the two groups with respect to land holdings and these variables indicate implications for class cleavage in speculative examination of the data. The data show differences in terms of property holdings, but the differences are often not large enough to infer that definite classes of landholders exist within the sample.

The analysis will turn now to a brief examination of all deviant cases. Table 3.10 represents the mean socio-economic data for both groups on all the designated questions. The differences between the two groups are rather subtle, but worthy of discussion.

Table 3.10

Comparison of Mean Norm Group and Deviant Group Socio-Economic Data on All Designated Questions

	Norm Group	Deviants
Age in years	51.0	50.4
Education	5.25*	4.6*
Income	\$40,000-99,999	\$10,000-39,999
Size of Operation	4.4*	3.5*
Years in K.L.A.	11.4	12.6

* See Codebook in Appendix II for explanation of codes.

The age differential between the two groups is so slight that, for all practical purposes, the respondents in each group are the same with respect to age.

Education levels are significant as the norm group of 5.25 is equivalent to some college experience. The deviant group averaged just slightly more than a high school education. Hence, those that belong to the norm group tend to be slightly

better educated than the deviant group. It is difficult to declare that such a small difference lends itself to a class cleavage.

Differences in income between norm group respondents and deviant group respondents again are too small to warrant labelling one class as being dominant and one class as being subordinate. The same conclusion holds for the differences in size of operation. Size of operation differences by itself cannot be thought of as a wholly determinative factor in declaring a class cleavage. However, the norm group's higher education level coupled with their consistently higher income and larger operations lends credence to the argument that some sort of class cleavage exists within the sample respondents. One can speculate that this class cleavage is a causal factor in issue orientation. The differences are not striking in the group, and one would be hard pressed to conclude that these factors are evidence of a class cleavage. It is interesting to note that the differences do exist though. It is also difficult to assess how much stress that the differences will place on the K.L.A. as a political system. Quantitatively, the stress at present would be thought to be minimal. If large and small producers begin to take on distinct identities, the potential for stress will increase. However, at this point, because of the small number of deviants and their relative closeness in socio-economic terms to the norm group, the stress factor is probably rather low.

Conclusions

When the K.L.A. is viewed as a political system within the criteria of David Easton's model, it appears that input variables are determined on the basis of something other than socio-economic factors. When the norm group is compared with deviants on dependent variable questions, the socio-economic data show a great deal of similarity between the two groups. The outstanding exception to this conclusion is the consistent difference between the two groups land holdings. Deviants generally ranked lower in terms of size of their operations.

In Weberian terms this basic difference would probably constitute a class cleavage. It is indeed tempting to declare that issue determination is a direct result of land ownership. This argument is supported, to a degree, by the data. The difference between the norm group and the deviants, however, is too small to be conclusive as a causal factor in issue orientation. Yet, the consistent difference cannot be ignored. One is tempted to speculate that size of operation is one of the determining factors in issue orientation. As the data reveal, incomes of the deviant group were, as a general rule, smaller than their counterparts who conformed to the group norm. Again, the difference is too small to either declare a class cleavage or that income is, by itself, a causal variable. These two Weberian factors indicate not an existing class cleavage, but rather the potential for one.

When one adds the independent variable, education, to

the economic factors, the argument for a potential class cleavage becomes stronger. The data show that the norm group's education level was somewhat higher than deviants. Again, however, the difference was so minor that one would be hard pressed to declare a class cleavage on the basis of this factor alone.

At present, judging by the data, the K.L.A. system probably is not subject to a great deal of stress. If the economic factor of size and income should continue to be important as causal variables in issue orientation, the potential for stress is more likely. This stress will probably not be too formidable as long as the gap between the two groups remain as narrow as it is presently. As the gap widens and smaller, lower income groups identify themselves as a separate class, the potential for stress on the system is considerably greater.

Chapter 4

The K.L.A.: Dominance of Cohesion with Traces of Division

V.O. Key, Jr. argued in Public Opinion and American Democracy that when an interest group leader attempts to threaten a legislator or public official with claims that he can control his member's votes, the leader is "usually pointing an unloaded gun at the legislator."¹ In the case of the Kansas Livestock Association, there is every reason to expect that the "gun" is loaded. The data revealed that although the rank-and-file membership is far from being on an equal plane economically, its perceptions of issues are generally homogeneous. Also, the overwhelming majority of the membership was consistently in agreement with prescribed organization stands on agricultural issues. Because of this basic likemindedness, the argument V.O. Key makes with reference to the "unloaded gun" is probably not valid here.

The conclusions of homogeneity and cohesion between rank-and-file and organization are not particularly surprising when viewed in the context of the K.L.A.'s intent and environment. The K.L.A.'s interests are limited basically to representing livestock producers. The issues the K.L.A. deal with are agricultural and, more specifically, livestock in nature. Potentially divisive social issues as governmental health care, abortion, busing to achieve racial equality, etc., are never mentioned in K.L.A. convention

resolutions. Hence, by limiting the scope of the issues, the K.L.A. also limits the potential for conflict among members and between members and organization. If the K.L.A. were to venture into these social issue areas such a move would probably have the effect of lowering cohesion and in turn, place more stress upon the K.L.A. system. There is already potential for stress just within the scope of the issues covered in the survey. If issues that crossed religious, ethnic, and social lines were added, stress would almost surely result.

The potential for stress lies in the subtle differences between those members who are likeminded and those who differ from group norms. It becomes not a matter of the specific issues the groups differ on, nor even the kinds of issues (distributive, regulatory, redistributive), but rather the reason for the differences between the two groups. Although socio-economic data inferred some relationship in the form of income and size of operation variables, the data did not reveal distinct socio-economic cleavages. The most concrete conclusion that can be drawn from the examination of the data is that some respondents deviate from the group norm and that these same respondents consistently had lower incomes and smaller land holdings. These data by themselves are not particularly striking, especially when one notices that the differences were generally quite small in terms of dollars earned and number of acres owned. Indeed, a different kind of class cleavage may be identifiable here. Max

Weber states that "Property and lack of property are...the basic categories of all class situations."² The respondents, in this case, are not propertyless and by most "world" standards are rather well-off. The fact remains, however, that respondents who deviated from the group norm had smaller operations and lower incomes. In an age when land is a valuable commodity, the more property one owns, the more insulated one is from economic peril. The data indicated this type of notion. According to Weber, no class cleavage should exist between those respondents who conformed to the group norm and those who deviated from it.

T.H. Marshall has argued that competition also qualifies as a condition for class cleavage.³ The K.L.A. respondents are in the same secondary group, but, they are also in competition with each other in the livestock industry. Marshall states that "in the case of competition, it is the similarity that divides....That is, because of the common occupation, competition has the potential of breeding antagonism."

When one combines Weber's argument with Marshall's, the potential for class cleavages existing within the K.L.A. sample becomes even more plausible. The producers who cannot compete on as large a scale are at a disadvantage in terms of obtaining capital, credit, and integrating technological advancements.⁴ What appears now to be competition (and possible antagonism) between economic groups, would develop into distinct social classes if the larger producer continued to grow and gain predominance over the smaller

producers.

One cannot ignore the basic cohesion that exists within the group. The most revealing data configuration is that of the respondents' attitudes in relation to the arenas of conflict. The lowest degree of cohesion in the arenas of conflict was 68.3 percent in the distributive arena. This coupled with 70.6 percent and 74.2 percent cohesion levels in the regulatory and redistributive arenas, respectively, make for a powerful argument that potential claims K.L.A. staff members make to public officials about controlling their member's votes are not idle claims. Any discussions of class cleavages or class conflict within the K.L.A. must be tempered with the fact that, in general, the group is highly cohesive and likeminded on most kinds of issues.

[The relationship between the organization and the rank-and-file members seems to be as cohesive as the membership's attitudes toward agricultural issues]. When the membership's issue orientations were compared with prescribed organization stands, it was found that an average of 72.9 percent of the membership agreed with the parent organization on agricultural issues. This particular finding also lends credence to the "loaded gun" notion of the K.L.A.'s influence in Kansas politics. If the K.L.A. can present evidence to legislators or public officials that over 70 percent of their membership is united on issues, the public figure involved will probably tend to pay attention to K.L.A. demands. This does not imply that the K.L.A. organization controls

membership demands or attitudes. Rather, it illustrates that the two groups tend to be likeminded on most issues and this likemindedness may manifest itself in legislative power and governmental influence.

In terms of the systems model, the membership can be examined in two manners. When the legislator views the K.L.A., he sees a cohesive, close-knit group that represents a considerable influence in terms of Kansas Politics. This perception is fostered by viewing the outputs of the K.L.A. system. Membership demands and attitudes are acted upon by the system and presented to the legislators in the orientation of the Kansas Livestock Association. The legislator reacts to this policy output and may adjust his actions accordingly. His reaction is with respect to prescribed organization stands, not necessarily to the demands of the membership. Indeed, this reaction is not totally unfounded, as illustrated by Robert Lane in Political Life.

Socially homogeneous groups have a greater political influence upon their members than do heterogeneous groups. This is true because political loyalties tend to follow income, occupational, residential, and ethnic lines.⁵

The legislator sees the K.L.A. as homogeneous because on most of Lane's criteria, the rank-and-file membership is similar. The data show, however, that there is a certain degree of divisiveness with respect to income lines. When the K.L.A. presents a proposal to the legislator, it is expected that the membership is united behind it. This is because only the

output variable is important in interactions at this level of government.

What this study has attempted to illustrate is the importance of the input variable with respect to the systems model. What the data showed was overall cohesion with traces of division. Therefore, the second manner in which to view the K.L.A. is from the input side with its variation in socio-economic characteristics and attitudes on issues. As has been stated previously, it is critical to realize the importance of this variable for without its consideration, the study of interest groups becomes an examination of policy outputs.

In the case of the K.L.A., policy outputs resemble membership attitudes. This phenomenon is probably not true with all interest groups. The more heterogeneous a group is, the less likely cohesion levels will be high. Lane states that heterogeneous groups are less likely to be effective because they cross those income, occupational, residential, and ethnic lines.⁶ Hence, the value of this method of study is not lost because the data did not reveal an ideological or attitude gap between membership inputs and system policy outputs. As Lane points out, secondary groups which are less homogeneous are more likely to experience intra-group conflict with respect to membership attitudes and prescribed organization stands.

The study of interest group membership attitudes must be continued. The K.L.A. is subject to membership divergence in spite of homogeneity with respect to occupation, residence

and common group affiliations. One can imagine that groups such as national labor unions and national farm organizations among others, are all subject to intra-group conflict to a higher degree than that which was found in the K.L.A. Comparisons must be made between input variables consisting of membership attitudes and prescribed organization stands.

Considering the importance placed upon interest group inputs in policy formulation, the membership attitudes are given precious little attention. As was emphasized in Chapter 1, the study of interest groups is often little more than the study of interest group outputs or interest group elite behavior. If this approach had been employed in the study of the K.L.A., the variety of membership attitudes would have been lost. In terms of policy consideration, this is the tactic that is usually employed in the examination of interest group output. It is quite possible that, in many interest groups which deny membership attitudes, the interests of the members are being misrepresented. If this notion is quantified through studies such as this, then the study of outputs and elite behavior takes on even more importance. That is, output variables are only as important as the inputs that shape them. If the input and output variables are compatible, then the case for paying attention to interest group considerations in policy formulation is reinforced. If the case is, rather, that the input and output variables conflict, then the interest group's right to help shape public policy should be seriously questioned.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter 1

1. David A. Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1951), p. 111.

2. Ibid.

3. For example, see Paul Jacobi and Saul Zandau's analysis of the Students for a Democratic Society in The New Radicals (New York: Random House, 1966), pp. 27-41; and John H. Bungel in "The National Federation of Independent Business", The American Small Businessman (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1962), pp. 69-83. Although these two articles are about two distinct organizations with different objectives, membership, etc., they both employ the same tactics for analysis. Bungel relies upon examination of the organization's founder and sales tactics to portray the N.F.I.B. Jacobi and Zandau take an historical approach in examining the S.D.S. along with pertinent "policy" statements from the S.D.S. hierarchy. These two examples are not all inclusive of the methods of studying interest groups but, they are quite representative. The information they present is necessary, but still denies the basic richness and complexity of rank-and-file membership attitudes and orientations.

4. See C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), and Kenneth Prewitt and Alan Stone, The Ruling Elite (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1973).

5. Elite decision makers often realize the dangers and responsibilities of their role. For a sketch of one such process see Graham Allison, Essence of Decision (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1970). Though Allison does not attack this theory of governing, he does examine the agony that often accompanies the role of decision-maker.

6. Quoted from Mancur Olson, Jr. The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 118.

7. Ibid., p. 120.

8. Donald E. Stokes, Voting Research and the Businessman in Politics (Ann Arbor: The Foundation for Research on Human Behavior, 1960), p. 15.

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APPENDIX I

Questionnaire

I. First, we'd like to ask you some questions about your background.

1. What is your age? _____ years
2. What level of education have you completed?
 _____ Some grade school, _____ Grade school graduate,
 _____ Some high school, _____ High school graduate,
 _____ Some college, _____ College graduate, _____ Advanced
 work or advanced degree
3. How long have you raised livestock? _____ years
4. How large is your livestock raising operation?
 _____ acres
5. How many head of livestock do you usually have on
 hand? _____ cattle, _____ hogs, _____ sheep

II. Now we'd like to know something about your experience with the Kansas Livestock Association.

1. How long have you been a member of the Kansas Livestock Association? _____ years
2. During the past 5 years, what offices or committees connected with the Kansas Livestock Association have you held or served on? 1. _____
 2. _____ 3. _____
 4. _____
3. Would you please rate how much impact you feel you have on Kansas Livestock Association policy?
 A. much impact, B. _____ a great deal of impact,
 C. _____ some impact, D. _____ not much impact, E. _____ no impact
4. Would you please rate how well you feel the Kansas Livestock Association represents your interests.
 A. _____ represents interests very well, B. _____ represents interests fairly well, C. _____ represents interests adequately, D. _____ does not represent your interests very well, E. _____ does not represent your interests
5. What other agriculturally related organizations do you belong to? 1. _____ 2. _____
 3. _____ 4. _____

III. Next we'd list to ask you questions that are about some specific issues you might have an interest in.

1. It has been argued that land should be assessed and taxed on its ability to produce income rather than on the basis of land sale. How do you feel about such a change? A. ☐ strongly in favor, B. ☐ somewhat in favor, C. ☐ neither for nor against, D. ☐ somewhat opposed, E. ☐ strongly opposed, F. ☐ no opinion
2. Some people believe that the January 1 option of assessing livestock should be eliminated forcing livestock to be assessed on the average monthly inventory basis. How do you feel about this? A. ☐ strongly in favor of eliminating it, B. ☐ somewhat in favor, C. ☐ neither for nor against, D. ☐ somewhat opposed to its elimination, E. ☐ strongly opposed, F. ☐ no opinion
3. Some people believe that livestock and agricultural machinery should be exempt from taxation and the burden of taxation be shifted to personal income. How do you feel about shifting the burden to personal income? A. ☐ strongly in favor, B. ☐ somewhat in favor, C. ☐ neither for nor against, D. ☐ somewhat opposed, E. ☐ strongly opposed, F. ☐ no opinion
4. Several commissioners and committees have suggested that all agricultural workers be covered by Workmen's Compensation. How do you feel about such compulsory coverage? A. ☐ strongly in favor, B. ☐ somewhat in favor, C. ☐ neither for nor against, D. ☐ somewhat opposed, E. ☐ strongly opposed, F. ☐ no opinion
5. Recently there have been numerous measures, both taken and proposed, to restrict the use of certain agricultural chemical, livestock drugs and feed additives. Generally, how do you feel about these restrictions? A. ☐ strongly in favor, B. ☐ somewhat in favor, C. ☐ neither for nor against, D. ☐ somewhat opposed, E. ☐ strongly opposed, F. ☐ no opinion
6. Recently there have been restrictions concerning the right of individuals to slaughter and package meat for their own use because it has not been inspected by representatives of the Kansas Department of Agriculture. How do you feel about these restrictions? A. ☐ strongly in favor, B. ☐ somewhat in favor, C. ☐ neither for nor against, D. ☐ somewhat opposed, E. ☐ strongly opposed, F. ☐ no opinion

7. Some people believe that corporations that were not organized for the express purpose of engaging in crop or livestock production (that is non-family corporations) should not be allowed to participate in crop and livestock production. How do you feel about placing restrictions on non-family corporation farming? A. strongly in favor, B. somewhat in favor, C. neither for nor against, D. somewhat opposed, E. strongly opposed, F. no opinion
8. There has been talk recently of dropping all export restrictions so that the United States producers could sell their agricultural products to Communist bloc nations as well as other nations. How do you feel about dropping these restrictions? A. strongly in favor, B. somewhat in favor, C. neither for nor against, D. somewhat opposed, E. strongly opposed, F. no opinion
9. It has been argued that the ten cent checkoff per head of livestock to promote the livestock industry is a good way to represent the livestock producers interests in the consumer, carry on research, education, etc. How do you feel about the ten cent checkoff? A. strongly in favor, B. somewhat in favor, C. neither for nor against, D. somewhat opposed, E. strongly opposed, F. no opinion
10. Recently bills have been introduced in Congress which would allow a producer referendum for the purpose of voting on a national three-tenths of one percent legislated beef industry checkoff which would raise \$30 to \$50 million for beef promotion, education and research. How do you feel about such an effort? A. strongly in favor, B. somewhat in favor, C. neither for nor against, D. somewhat opposed, E. strongly opposed, F. no opinion
11. Some government and labor leaders have said that wage and price controls would be a good thing if some products, beef in particular, would be brought to parity by federal price supports. How do you feel about this proposition? A. strongly in favor, B. somewhat in favor, C. neither for nor against, D. somewhat opposed, E. strongly opposed, F. no opinion
12. Some people in the federal government believe that the utilization of land resources should be directed by the federal government so that these resources will meet the needs of the people. How do you feel about such a federally directed program of land use planning? A. strongly in favor, B. somewhat in favor, C. neither for nor against, D. somewhat opposed, E. strongly opposed, F. no opinion

13. Some people believe that legislature and governmental officials represent the interests of the large commercial feedlot operator more than the interests of the smaller private feeder. How do you feel about this? A. strongly in favor, B. somewhat in favor, C. neither for nor against, D. somewhat opposed, E. strongly opposed, F. no opinion
14. Many people seem to favor a reorganization of the state legislature to give urban, heavier-populated areas greater representation. How do you feel about such a proposal? A. strongly in favor, B. somewhat in favor, C. neither for nor against, D. somewhat opposed, E. strongly opposed, F. no opinion
15. For many years there has been talk of organizing farmer-owned and controlled operations to sell commodities directly to retailers thereby passing the "middlemen." How would you feel about such operations? A. strongly in favor, B. somewhat in favor, C. neither for nor against, D. somewhat opposed, E. strongly opposed, F. no opinion

IV. Last we'd like to ask you some questions about political matters and government in general.

1. Within the past 5 years, have you done any of the following? Check as many as apply. A. gone to political meetings or rallies, B. done campaign work for a candidate or party, C. worn a campaign button or put a campaign sticker on your car, D. made a contribution to a party or candidate.
2. Which of the following describes you best? A. strong republican, B. moderate republican, C. independent, D. moderate democrat, E. strong democrat
3. Which of the following terms would come the closest to describing your philosophy? A. conservative, B. rather conservative, C. moderate, D. rather liberal, E. liberal
4. About how much of the time do you think you can trust the government to do what is right? A. always, B. just about always, C. some of the time, D. just about never, E. never
5. Concerning what the government in general does, would you say that you have A. quite a lot to say, B. some say, C. not much say at all
6. There is a possibility that Congress will pass a bill which provides for national health insurance. How do you feel about this type of insurance? A. strongly in favor, B. somewhat in favor, C. neither for nor against, D. somewhat opposed, E. strongly opposed, F. no opinion

7. Busing of school children to achieve racial equality has been an important issue lately. How do you feel about busing? A. ☐ strongly in favor, B. ☐ somewhat in favor, C. ☐ neither for nor against, D. ☐ somewhat opposed, E. ☐ strongly opposed, F. ☐ no opinion
8. How do you feel about President Ford's plan to place tariffs on imported oil? A. ☐ strongly in favor, B. ☐ somewhat in favor, C. ☐ neither for nor against, D. ☐ somewhat opposed, E. ☐ strongly opposed, F. ☐ no opinion
9. What is your average annual livestock income?
A. ☐ less than \$2,499, B. ☐ \$2,500 to \$9,999,
C. ☐ \$10,000 to \$39,999, D. ☐ \$40,000 to \$99,999,
E. ☐ \$100,000 and over

APPENDIX II

Codebook

Column #	N.A.=Not Ascertained N.App.=Not Applicable		
1.	Study Number		
2,3,4.	Questionnaire Number		
5,6.	Age in digits N.A.= 99		
7.	Education, Some Grade School= 1; Grade School Graduate= 2; Some High School= 3; High School Graduate= 4; Some College= 5; College Graduate= 6; Advanced Work or Advanced Degree= 7; N.A.= 8.		
8,9.	How long raised livestock- 88= N.A.; 99= N.App.		
10,11.	How large livestock raising operation- divided into numerical categories		
	01= 1-499 acres	08= 4000-4999 acres	
	02= 500-999 acres	09= 5000-5999 acres	
	03= 1000-1499 acres	10= 6000-6999 acres	
	04= 1500-1999 acres	11= 7000-7999 acres	
	05= 2000-2499 acres	12= 8000+ acres	
	06= 2500-2999 acres	88= N.A.	
	07= 3000-3999 acres	99= N.App.	
12,13.	Number of cattle= divided into numerical categories same as Column #'s 10,11.		
14,15.	Number of hogs= divided into numerical categories		
	01= 1-24 head	04= 100-199 head	
	02= 25-49 head	05= 200+ head	
	03= 50-99 head	99= N.A.	
16,17.	Number of sheep= divided into numerical categories same as Column #'s 14,15.		
18,19.	Member of K.L.A. (years in digits) 99= N.A.		
20,21,	Offices or committees held or served on in past		
22,23,	5 years; 99= N.A.		
24,25,	0= Office held	1= Major Committee	2= Minor Comm.
26,27.	01= President	11= Legislative	21= Building
	02= Sec. Treas.	12= Tax	22= Convention
	03= Chrmn. City Comm.	13= Resolutions	23= Brand
	04= County Board Member	14= Cattle feeders	24= Labor
	05= District Director	15= Range and Conservation	25= Animal Health
		16= Marketing and transportation	26= Pork and Sheep
		17= Meat Promotions and P.A.	27= Membership
		18= Beef Cattle Improvements	28= Scholarship
		19= ANCA Membership	29= Insurance
28.	Impact on K.L.A. Policy 1,2,3,4,5 6= N.A.		
29.	K.L.A. representativeness 1,2,3,4,5 6= N.A.		

30-31, Other Ag. related organizations 99= N.App.
 32-33, 01= K.F.B.; 02= N.F.O; 04= K.F.U.; 03= K.W.G.A.;
 34-35, 05= A.N.C.A.; 06= K.Q.H.A.; 07= Local Coop.;
 36-37, 08= Am. Hereford Assn.; 09= Ks. Hereford Assn.;
 10= Am. Range Management Soc.; 11= Farm Management
 Assn.; 12= S.C.S.; 13= Grain Sorghum Prod.; 14= K.
 Sheep Assn.; 15= O.L.A.; 16= Taxpayers Assn.;
 17= Colo. Hereford Assn.; 18= Grange; 19= Young
 Farmers & Ranchers; 20= Nat. Corn Growers Assn.;
 21= Texas Cat. Food Assn.; 22= Ks. Pork Prod.;
 23= AVMA

38. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7= N.A.
 39. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7= N.A.
 40. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7= N.A.
 41. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7= N.A.
 42. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7= N.A.
 43. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7= N.A.
 44. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7= N.A.
 45. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7= N.A.
 46. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7= N.A.
 47. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7= N.A.
 48. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7= N.A.
 49. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7= N.A.
 50. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7= N.A.
 51. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7= N.A.
 52. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7= N.A.

53. Political Participation Index
 Worn Campaign Button or displayed Bumper sticker= 1
 Contribution to party or candidate

Gone to meetings or rallies= 2

Done Campaign work

3= N.A.

4= N.App.

54. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6= N.A.
 55. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6= N.A.
 56. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6= N.A.
 57. 1, 2, 3, 4= N.A.
 58. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7= N.A.
 59. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7= N.A.
 60. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7= N.A.
 61. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7= N.A.

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COHESION AND DIVISIVENESS IN THE
KANSAS LIVESTOCK ASSOCIATION

by

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B.S., Kansas State University, 1974

AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S THESIS

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Relevant policy makers, legislators, and scholars often assume that interest groups enjoy nearly perfect cohesion. The dominant interest that binds a group of individuals together does not necessarily mean that the membership is likeminded on all issues. Nor does the interest variable guarantee that rank-and-file members will always agree with prescribed organizational stands. In terms of systemic studies of political organization, to avoid stress, the input variable (membership attitudes and orientation) should be compatible with the groups output variable (prescribed stands).

✓ The Kansas Livestock Association represents a political system and was utilized in this study to test for cohesion in a secondary group and a comparative examination of input and output variables. An organization such as the K.L.A., logically, should be among the most likeminded groups because of its single commodity interest orientation. Because of the lack of competing commodity interests, the K.L.A. should be able to approach problems with a unified cohesive rank-and-file membership.

✓ Contrast this organizational unity with respect to issues, with the wide range of socio-economic classification represented by the K.L.A. sample. Do common occupation and common memberships in a secondary group have the ability to override differences in socio-economic standing with respect to issue orientation? The data reveal that, generally, the rank-and-file are in agreement among themselves on issues and the rank-and-file inputs resemble very closely organizational outputs.

This cohesion can be attributed, in part, to the single commodity interests of the respondents and the organization.

✓ There are exceptions to this high degree of cohesion.

The respondents that differed with the norm group on dependent variable questions, were found to have somewhat smaller landholdings and slightly lower incomes. The socio-economic differences between the two groups were slight and therefore could not be determined to be causal variables in terms of issue orientation. However, the consistency of the differences leads one to speculate that cohesion is in potential changes based upon socio-economic cleavages.