A REVIEW OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION IN INDIA

by

MUDUMBAI NAGARATNA

M.A., Osmania University, 1955

———— ——

A MASTER'S REPORT

submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Political Science

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas

1975

Approved by:

Major Professor

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

ILLEGIBLE

THE FOLLOWING
DOCUMENT (S) IS
ILLEGIBLE DUE
TO THE
PRINTING ON
THE ORIGINAL
BEING CUT OFF

ILLEGIBLE

CHAPTER 1

STUDY OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION

Party identification is one of the most important aspects
of political behavior. It refers to the psychological sense
of affinity with a party. It is a state of mind, the pre-
sence or absence, intensity and direction of what James Barber
has called "a rather indefinite sense of allegiance to a
rather indefinite organization."[1] It is the "psychological
attachment" or "affective orientation" to a party. The party
here becomes a reference group and in identifying with it,
people are defining themselves politically.

The significance of such identification is that a parti-
san approaches political decisions not wholly as an objective
and unbiased observer but as belonging to one party or the
other. It affects his political attitudes and behavior. For
instance, people who identify with a party are very likely
to vote for its nominees for office and thus pull a "particu-
lar lever" on election day. It also colors their evaluation
of qualities of their party's candidate. Beyond elections,
party identification has a powerful effect on people's evalu-
ation of government performance. Further it helps people in
a democracy to respond meaningfully to the political issues
and make choices with lower levels of information. In other

---

[1]James D. Barber, Readings in Citizen Politics: Studies
of Political Behavior (Chicago: Markham, 1969), p. 51.

1

words, it is some sort of an "economizing device for enabling the people to be good citizens without costly outlays of time and energy."[2] Donald Stokes has called it "a great psychological convenience"[3] for this very reason. Moreover, it has an impact[4] on the political involvement (participation) of the partisan, though the causal understanding of this relation is far from clear. It has been found by empirical evidence that the stronger the individual's sense of attachment to one of the parties, the greater is his involvement in political affairs.[5]

The greatest interest in party identification was initially American. Hence, most of the studies pertain to the American public. The pioneer effort in this regard was made by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan in 1952. The major reports of these studies are The American Voter and Elections and The Political Order.[6]

_____

[2]Benjamin I. Page and Raymond Wolfinger, Readings in American Political Behavior (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1970), p. 288-299.

[3]Donald E. Stokes, "Party Loyalty, Deviating Elections," in Angus Campbell, Elections and Political Order (New York: Wiley, 1966), p. 127.

[4]For a detailed examination of the impact of party identification, see Campbell, American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960), pp. 120-145.

[5]The association has been found by investigators of voting behavior. See, Bernard Berelson, Paul F. Lazerfield and William N. McPhee, Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), pp. 25-27. See also Robert Agger, "Independents and Party Identifiers: Characteristics and Behavior in 1952," in American Voting Behavior, ed., Eugene Burdick and Arthur Brodbeck (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959).

[6]Angus Campbell, The American Voter and Elections and the Political Order (New York: Wiley, 1966).

The findings of these studies suggest that party identification in the West is something of a habit. It is learned early in life through parental transmission and is highly resistant to change. There is strong evidence to support this thesis in all of the studies carried out in the United States.[7] Moreover, the party preference and continuity is maintained even as adults because of social reinforcements. Party loyalties have roots in many social groupings-- occupational, religious, ethnic and regional. Upward social mobility

[7]For an analysis of the acquisition of party identification and their durability, see Angus Campbell, The American Voter (especially chapter 7, pp. 147-167). Campbell argues that most Americans have this sense of attachment with one party or another. There is correspondence between the preference of the children and their parents, thus suggesting family socialization in party identification. There is also greater stability in the partisan preference between elections. Moreover, the strength and direction of party identification are influential in directing attitudes and behavior.
For a good discussion of the role of the family in socialization, see Fred I. Greenstein, Children and Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 55-84; see also, Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children (Chicago: Aldine, 1967); David Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain: Forces Shaping Electoral Choice (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971), Chapter 3; Norris R. Johnson in his study of six counties in rural Kentucky suggests that the "data substantiates the many previous findings that the overwhelming factor influencing youth's political party preference is the preference of their parents". See Public Opinion Quarterly (Spring 1972), pp. 48-55; Jack Dennis and Donald J. McCrone writing in Comparative Political Studies (July 1970), pp. 243-263, suggests that in the four western democracies -- France, United States, United Kingdom and Germany-- there is generally a consistent pattern of growth of partisan feeling well before voting age and that it is a result of parent to child transmission. For France, see Phillip E. Converse and Georges Dupeux, "Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United States," Public Opinion Quarterly (Spring 1962), pp. 1-23 reprinted in Angus Campbell, Elections and the Political Order, pp. 269-291; David R. Cameron in his article, "Stability and Change in French Partisanship," Public Opinion Quarterly (Spring 1972), pp. 19-30, traces the changes that have occurred between 1958-1968, contributing to greater party identification.

increase in education, social status and income and is not accompanied by commensurate party change. There is thus a sizeable proportion of followers of all broad social groups in both parties.[8]

In India research to enquire into the public mind is recent and as such, acquires special meaning. Generally in many of the Indian Universities (even now) and research centers (till very recently), the emphasis has been on the study of political institutions. The behavioral approach got real attention only during the later 1960's, thanks to the Center for the Study of Developing Societies and scholars like Rajni Kothari, Samuel Eldersveld, Dwaine Marvick, John Field and others.

In this regard, the 1967 General Elections may be considered as a turning point in the behavioral study of the Indian Electorate. The post-1967 period witnessed scholarly analyses[9] dealing with different aspects of political behavior in general and party identification in particular. The reason for this added interest may be explained by the fact

---

[8]V. O. Key, Jr. and Frank Munger, "Social Determinism and Electoral Decision: The Case of Indiana," in American Voting Behavior, ed., Eugene Burdick and Arthur J. Brodbeck.

[9]November 1970 issue of Asian Survey is devoted exclusively to 1967 Elections and Party Politics in India. For the election outcome, see Seminar, #94, June 1967. January 1971 Annual Economic and Political Weekly deals with voting trends, party identification and its significance. See also, Iqbal Narain and S.P.P. Verma, Voting Behavior in a Changing Society (Delhi: Nation, 1973).

the 1967 elections signalled many changes in the polity,[10] that led scholars to inquire into the public mind. Scholars like Rajni Kothari and Morris Jones have suggested that 1967 marked a "new and irreversible mood of electoral awareness and a more active phase of politics."[11]

---

[10]Changes were registered both at the elite as well as at the level of the electorate. At the elite level the dominance which the Congress party maintained for 20 years was broken. Congress strength dropped from 73.1 percent of the seats in the Lokh Sabha to 56.6 percent. Non Congress governments were formed in Eight States.

[11]See Morris Jones, "India Elects for Change and Stability," Asian Survey (August 1971), pp. 719-741, and Rajni Kothari, "Political Change of 1967", Economic and Political Weekly (Annual Number 1971). In this paper Kothari suggests that the voters were becoming aware of the problems of policy and performance. The emerging political behavior he describes as "Dimension of Allegiance" or firm party commitments in the electorate, and "Dimension of Deliberation" or critical evaluation of the party's performance by the electorate.
Applying Campbell's classification of elections and V.O. Key's characteristics of a "critical election", Eldersveld examines whether 1967 can be called a critical election. The three characteristics suggested by Key are-- greater voter involvement as a result of grave concern, considerable change in party loyalties and new patterns of cleavage. Eldersveld argues that "although more voters participated in the 1967 elections than ever before...the data do not reveal a massive surge of new voters to the polls deeply concerned about their society and using their vote to communicate their concern. So far as the emergence of new patterns of cleavage is concerned, the evidence does not point to 1967 as a critical election although it resulted in important changes in the party system. Similarly it does not stand up to the basic index of critical election namely deep and extensive change in party loyalties. It is true that 27 percent of the 1962 Congress voters voted for another party, counterbalanced in part by 24 percent of the non-congress voters in 1962 who switched to Congress. But this is not necessarily an abnormally large defection for a modern democracy. Similarly, the new voters of 1967 (who had stayed home in 1962) were not mobilized to non-Congress at an abnormally high rate (46% voted Congress and 54 % non-Congress)." See SAmuel Eldersveld, "The 1967 Elections: Patterns of Party Regularity and Defection," Asian Survey (November, 1970).

India as a focus of study assumes special significance because it may provide a model for the developing countries where modern political institutions are to be reconciled with traditional societies. In this setting, an examination of the influence of traditionalism and modernity on the politics and political behavior in general and party identification in particular becomes a valuable scholarly exercise. Moreover, among the developing countries, India is fortunate to have many of the conditions that go a long way both for the development and also help in the examination of this phenomena. First, India has been and still appears to be an open society with competitive party systems.[12] It is also fortunate to have a well institutionalized party[13] (Congress party), whose origins go back to the nineteenth century. In many of the Western political systems (especially American) party identification had been examined in the context of well institutionalized two party system. India provides a test case to examine partisanship in the context of developing but less institutionalized multi-party system. It can also contribute much to an examination of such identification where one party is dominant and well institutionalized.

---

[12]Myron Weiner, Party Politics in India: The Development of the Multi-Party System (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). For a select bibliography on political parties in India, see Indian Journal of Political Science, No. 1 (January-March, 1971), pp. 114-123.

[13]Myron Weiner, Party Building in a New Nation: The Indian National Congress (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967).

Second, India has had more than two decades of electoral politics.[14] Regular elections at the national, state and local levels suggest the stability of electoral politics and legitimacy of elections. This may provide the data for an analysis not only with regard to electoral behavior (party identification being one aspect of such behavior) at a single point of time but also the examination of political development of the electorate over a long time period.

---

[14]For a select bibliography on Elections in India see, Indian Journal of Political Science, No. 1 (January-March, 1971), pp. 105-114. See also, "Our Political Parties," Seminar, No. 124 (December 1969); Election Outcome", Seminar, No. 94 (June 1967); "The Nineteen Seventy-one Election," Seminar, No. 144 (August 1971), and "State Elective," Seminar, No. 153 (May 1972).
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for International Studies are publishing a series of four volumes on Electoral politics in the Indian States, eds., Myron Weiner and John Osgood Field. Volume 1. The Communist Parties of West Bengal (Delhi: Monohar Book Service, 1974), Volume 2. Three Disadvantaged Sectors (Manohar Book Service), Volume 3. Impact of Modernization (in press, Manohar Book Service), Volume 4. Party Systems and Cleavages (in press, Manohar Book Service). See also, Muslim Political Behavior (forthcoming, Manohar Book Service). K.L. Kamel, Party Politics in an Indian State: A Study of Rajastan (Delhi: Chand and Co., n.d.); Iqubal Naram, ed., State Politics in India (Mareet-Meenakshi Prakashau, n.d.); K.G. Kreshna Murthy and G. Lakshwana Rao, Political Preferences in Kerala (New Delhi: Radha Krishna, 1968). The First General Elections had received attention in the studies of Kogekar and Richard Park. The Second General Elections in the studies of Margaret Fisher and Joan V. Bandurant. The Third General Elections in the studies of Rajni Kothari and Myron Weiner. The Fourth General Elections in the studies of the Center for the Study of Developing Societies and Indian Council of Social Science Research. See also, Asian Survey (November 1970) for "1967 Elections and Party Politics in India"; Economic and Political Weekly (January 1971) for "Elections and Voting in India." The Fourth General Elections has received attention in a series of articles in Asian Survey issues of August 1971 and December 1971.

Thus, the Indian study provides an opportunity to examine party identification in the context of less institutionalized multi-party system, the stability of such identification, the relation between party preference and participation, the influence of non-secular factors on party identification and the role of different factors in inducing people to partisanship.

Apart from the theoretical value, the study of party identification in India acquires a practical value. To the individual citizen, party identification makes involvement in the politics of the country meaningful and relevant. To the leadership of the political parties, it provides an understanding of their socio-economic and demographic support in the society. This has implication for their strategies and goals. In India where democracy and democratic institutions are still an experiment, the stability of the system contributes much to its survival. In this regard, party identification can contribute much because partisans feel they have a stake in the stability of the system. It may also "predispose people to certain basic beliefs and attitudes concerning conduct of political affairs and hence contribute to the

cultural institutionalization of democracy."[15] From the point of view of the electorate, party identification is an indication of the level of politicization and the political development of the electorate.

In the pages that follow an effort will be made to examine

1. findings of Indian and foreign scholars on the extent of party identification, its intensity and direction;

2. the relationship between party identification and social background characteristics, with special consideration of its relationship to caste;

3. similarities and differences between patterns of party identification and voter participation.

Party identification is one of the important ways in which people relate to politics in a democracy. The extent of party identification indicates the relevance of competitive politics and democratic procedure to the people in the society. Similarly the intensity of partisanship is functional not only to the acquisition of other political orientations and attitudes, but also to a greater involvement in political affairs. This has been found in the studies of John Field, D.L. Sheth, Sidney Verba and others.[16] In other words, partisanship has implications for participation in

---

[15]John Field, "Politicization and System Support in India: The Role of Partisanship," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois (August-September, 1974), p. 4.

[16]See John Field, Partisanship in India (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1973), p. 386 and D.L. Sheth, "Partisanship and Political Development," Economic and Political Weekly (January 1971), pp. 261-268. See also, Almond and Verba, Civic Culture (Boston: Little Brown, 1963), and Verba, Ahmad, and Bhatt, Caste, Race and Politics (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications 1971).

general. This means partisans are likely to be more interested and more informed about political affairs than non-partisans. They are also likely to be more active in politics than others. In Chapters 2 and 3 an attempt will be made to examine the extent of party identification, the distribution of intensity of party identification according to social structure variables and the levels of party support based on party preference and party vote.

Many studies relating socio-economic variables to participation have found better education, higher income and higher status contributing to greater participation. We assume party identification to such social status variables in similar ways. In Chapter 2, an attempt will be made to compare relationships found between socio-economic variables and party identification with those observed between such variables and voter participation. When we observe differences in the pattern, we can speculate upon and suggest possible explanations. Caste structures and caste identities form an important aspect of the social system in India. Parliamentary government and political parties are modern political institutions which have to work in such a society. Some scholars have stressed the evils of caste cleavage manifesting themselves in party and electoral politics. Others have stressed the integrating role of caste in politics. This being the case, it becomes useful to examine the relation of caste to party identification and voter participation. A rational perspective of the role of caste in politics can contribute

to better appreciation of this social structure in India. Chapter 4 will be dealing with the relationship of caste to partisanship and participation.

Thus, the idea behind this study is to make a systematic review of the findings on party identification and voting behavior in order to help in the broader understanding of Indian politics, to dispel some misconceptions regarding the functioning of certain social structures, and to point out the discrepancies between the findings of different scholars. In short, an attempt will be made to examine the relation between party identification, participation and political parties.

CHAPTER II

EXTENT OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION

India as a transitional society is attempting to experiment with democracy on a large scale. Indian democratic structure has to work in a traditional set-up. In this process an interaction takes place between traditional behavior in the society with the secular functioning of modern political institutions. The result is that the political institutions acquire traditional symbols and traditional institutions in the society become modernized and politicized.

The successful working of democratic institutions depends on the politically conscious and developed electorate in the society. One of the ways of expressing political consciousness is to identify with political organizations that are organized to aggregate and articulate the interest of the society. These organizations are the connecting link between the society and the structures of authority. It is through these organizations that a congruence is brought about between the political culture on the one hand, and governmental institutions on the other. In short, in a democracy, it is through political parties that cultural institutionalization of democracy takes place.

Meaningful participation of the citizens is yet another condition for democracy to be real. This is especially so in a country with diversity like India where societal cleavages

may manifest themselves in party and electoral politics.
Thus, a participant society with secular identification to-
ward institutionalized political parties goes a long way in
contributing to the stability of democratic institutions.

The development of party identification (extent, inten-
sity and direction) is related to two very important con-
ditions-- the length of democratic experience and an insti-
tutionalized competitive party system. The longer the demo-
cratic experience, the more likely the citizens are to develop
dispositions toward political parties, crystallize such
loyalties and develop the intensity with which they hold
these loyal ties. Similarly, an institutionalized competitive
system, while mobilizing and educating citizens, enlists
support for different parties. In this process, they not
only make partisanship salient to a large number of people,
but also help to crystallize the intensity of such support.

It is sometimes argued that in India, democratic
experience with a competitive party system is too brief to
make citizens develop dispositions toward political parties
in greater number, that to the less literate and less involved
section of the electorate, competitive politics has little
meaning and significance and that Indian voters are a mass
of floating voters who would respond to inducements at time
of elections. These arguments, though forceful, are not
fully supported by the findings of various studies that have
been conducted in India. The empirical evidence, though very
limited, suggests that there had been a relatively fast
politicization process taking place in India and under these

circumstances, competitive politics and all that is associated with it, has become salient to the majority of Indians.[1] This chapter attempts to examine whether partisanship has become relevant to the Indian electorate, despite the short duration of competitive politics. We shall also see whether existing studies report any relation in the behavior pattern among the supporters of different parties to partisanship on the one hand and participation on the other.

In India as in other democracies,[2] few people (5 percent) actually belong to the party in the sense of being formal members. On the other hand, partisanship in the sense of subjective affinity is widespread. John Field, in the Cross National Project Study (C.N.P.) of 1966, found that 53 percent of the sample said that they support a party and among these, 41 percent considered themselves to be strong supporters of their party. Further, among the respondents who answered negatively on further questioning whether they might prefer any party "if you had to choose", another 9 percent indicated a party preference, thus making a total of 62 percent. Table 2.1 shows Field's findings.

Similarly, in the National Elite-Mass study of 1967, Samuel Eldersveld found that 70 percent of the Indian electorate identified with a party. In comparing this figure with the

---

[1]Samuel J. Eldersveld, "Party in India in Comparative Perspective," Comparative Political Studies (October 1973), p. 274.

[2]Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, Civic Culture (Boston: Little Brown Series, 1965), Table X:2. Membership in various Types of Organizations; by Nation, p. 247.

Table 2.1

Partisanship in India: The Distribution
of Sentiment (in percentages)

Partisans	62.1	(5911)
Strong 41.1		
Mild 21.1		
Non-partisans	15.1	(1443)
Partisan parochials	22.8	(2167)
	100.0	(9521)

Source: John Field, Partisanship in India (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1973), p. 166, Table
II.1.

figures for the United States and six other countries, he

observed "that Indian adults are no more reluctant than those

in other countries to indicate a party choice when asked to

do so." Table 2.2 indicates India's party identification

in a comparative perspective. It also suggests that 51 per-

cent are strong partisans and 19 percent are weak partisans.

Table 2.2 shows Eldersveld's findings.

Table 2.2

The Extent of Party Identification in India
and some Western Systems

	Total Identifying	Strong	Weak
India	70%	51%	19%
United States	73	35	39
England	90	71	19
Norway	66	25	34
France	45		
Germany	77		
Brazil	78		
Italy	75		

Source: Samuel J. Eldersveld, "Party Identification in
India in Comparative Perspective," Comparative Political
Studies (October 1973), p. 276, Table 1.

Sheth, basing his analyses on the 1967 survey data, operationalized the concept of partisanship to include both attitudinal and behavioral measures.[3] Sheth's findings suggest that 70 percent are partisans. Table 2.3 shows Sheth's findings.

Table 2.3

Partisanship in India in percentages

Partisans	70	(1380)
Strong Partisans	36	(710)
Weak Partisans	34	(670)
Non-partisans	30	(591)
Total sample	100	(1971)

Source: D.L. Sheth, "Partisanship and Political Development," _Economic and Political Weekly_ (Annual Number, January 1971), p. 261.

---

[3]Attitudinal means psychological identification with a party. Beahvioral means voting for a particular party. Sheth operationalized in this way to differentiate Strong partisans from the weak ones and from non-partisans. A strong partisan is one who (1) felt close to a specific party, (2) expressed that his attachment for the party was very strong, (3) voted for that party in 1967 (at the Assembly level), and (4) was not disinclined to vote for the same party in the next election.

A weak partisan is one who (1) invariably felt attached to a specific party, (2) if he voted for that party, expressed that his attachment was not very strong, (3) did or did not vote for the party he felt attached to in 1967, and (4) in the future, might or might not vote for the same party.

A non-partisan is one who (1) invariably lacked in psychological identification with any specific party, (2) might have voted in 1967 election for a specific party and might have expressed a desire to vote for the same party in the next election, (3) or might have voted for a non-party candidate in 1967, and/or (4) did not vote at all or if voted, could not relate the name of the party (or its symbol) or the candidate he voted for.

These figures are consistent with the results of other surveys conducted in India. For instance, the National Polls taken by the Gallup-affiliated Indian Institute of Public Opinion in 1964 and 1967, came out with the findings that 63 and 64 percent of the people interviewed respectively, indicated party preference.[4]

Again, in the Kerala study of 1965,[5] Eldersveld found 60 percent of the sample to be partisans, with 44 percent claiming to be strong partisans. All these studies show that to the Indian electorate, party identification has become relevant and that there has been a general increase in partisanship.

The second question concerning party identification is the behavior pattern of the party identifiers with respect to participation. In short, an attempt will be made to examine the relation between party identification and participation among the Indian electorate. (See Table 2.4)

In general, partisanship appears to be distributed among all sections of the society, without reference to socio-economic and demographic considerations. But when we look

---

[4]Calculated by John Field, from marginals presented in M. Lal Goel, "Social Bases of Party Support and Political Participation in India," (unpublished manuscript, The University of West Florida), p. 17.

[5]Eldersveld, "Party System and the Citizens in Kerala," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago 1967, p. 2.

Table 2.4

Distribution of Partisanship According to Social
Structure Variables (in percentages)

S.S.V.		Strong	Weak	Non	N
Age	21-30	33.5	38.0	28.5	654
	31-40	40.0	30.0	30.0	538
	41-55	37.0	31.5	31.5	485
	55 plus	33.0	36.0	31.0	294
Income	less than 100 Rs.	33.6	34.1	32.3	684
	100 - 200 Rs.	38.3	31.3	30.4	556
	200 - 400 Rs.	40.1	37.2	22.7	339
	400+	36.3	37.4	26.3	179
	N.A.	31.0	32.8	36.2	213
Caste	Upper	33.9	38.3	27.8	595
	Middle	36.0	25.0	39.0	303
	Low	36.7	35.1	28.2	390
	Harijave & Tribes	36.5	33.2	30.3	406
	Muslims	39.3	35.1	25.6	211
	Other Religions	38.1	31.7	30.2	63
	N.A.	33.3	0.0	66.7	3
Education	Illiterate	35.2	32.2	32.6	950
	Low	39.4	33.7	26.9	667
	Middle	36.5	34.5	29.0	201
	High	23.0	50.0	27.0	119
	N.A.	35.3	29.4	35.3	34
Rural/Urban	Rural	38.0	31.9	30.1	1528
	Urban	29.0	41.5	29.5	443
Occupation	Professional	18.9	45.3	35.8	53
	Business	39.4	36.4	24.2	132
	White Collar	25.5	43.8	30.7	153
	Cultivator	39.0	31.7	29.3	899
	Skilled factory	34.8	40.6	24.6	69
	Unskilled factory	42.4	27.9	29.7	165
	Unskilled non-factory	27.8	39.0	33.2	187
	Ag. Landless	38.7	28.5	32.8	256
	N.A.	22.8	45.6	31.6	57

Calculated from marginals in the Tables 6 to 11 of D.L.
Sheth's, "Partisanship and Political Development", Economic
and Political Weekly (January 1971), pp. 269-273. For expla-
nation of the measures used by Sheth to ascertain strong and
weak partisans, see footnote 3 in this chapter.

at the behavior pattern of different categories under each
variable certain patterns are noticeable. For instance, the
young between 21-30 years have the highest proportion of
partisans among all the age groups in the society. However,
the proportion of weak partisans seem to be higher than
strong partisans. Similarly, those above 55 years also have
a higher proportion of weak partisans compared to strong
partisans and non-partisans. The highest proportion of
strong partisans are in the age group 31-55 years. Under
income, those who earn Rs. 100-400 appear to be more strong
partisans than weak partisans. Those who earn above Rs. 400
seem to have a higher percentage of weak partisans. Under
caste, the Table suggests that the upper caste have a higher
percentage of weak partisans as compared to strong partisans.
All other caste groups appear to have a higher percentage
of strong partisans. Under education, illiterates and people
with little education seem to show greater partisan intensity.
This contrasts with those at the highest level who appear
to be more weak partisans. Again, the percentage of weak
partisans in urban areas seems to be higher than strong part-
isans. This contrasts with the rural areas where the per-
centage of strong partisans are higher. An important obser-
vation is, overall there is very little difference in the
proportion of partisanship between rural and urban areas.
This suggests that politicization has reduced the gap between
rural and urban areas. Myron Weiner, while examining Indian
urban constituencies observes that "it is no longer accurate

to talk of a pronounced urban-rural cleavage in electoral participation." "By late 1960's the rural areas had also witnessed a substantial increase in turnout, thereby narrowing, eliminating or reversing the gap between the two."[6] What Weiner suggested for participation seems to be true even for partisanship. Under occupation, the profession, white collar, skilled factory workers and unskilled factory workers have a higher percentage of weak partisans as compared to strong partisans. The proportion of non-partisans for profession appear to be the highest among all occupational categories. The other occupations, like business, cultivators, unskilled factory workers and agricultural landless appear to be more strong partisans than weak partisans.

To summarize the observations in the table: the youth, though proportionately more partisan, are equally weak partisans in their party loyalty. Income in general contributes to higher partisanship. Minority groups have a greater inclination to partisanship than other groups. This is probably because of the greater mobilization of these groups by the parties and also because of the realization that bettern concessions can be derived by aligning themselves with political parties. Indian democracy through universal adult franchise has opened up greater opportunities for all, including the

---

[6] Myron Weiner, "India's Urban Constituencies," paper presented at the Seminar on Electoral Patterns in the Indian States, Boston, Massachusetts, June 1972.

illiterate. Politicization and mobilization by parties had further improved the opportunity for the illiterates to associate themselves with the political parties in the country.

The result is illiterates are equally inclined toward partisanship. But education makes a difference quantitatively as well as qualitatively. The most interesting observation is the equal proportion of partisanship between the rural and urban areas. The question arises: do these people who express greater loyalty to the political parties, also participate in greater number? Is there. consistenty in the behavior pattern of these people with respect to partisanship and participation? In the pages that follow, an attempt will be made to examine the behavior pattern of partisans (under socio-economic and demographic variables) relative to party identification and voting.

John Field's observations based on the Cross National Project data of 1966, analyzed the partisan loyalty of the Indian electorate. Similarly, Sheth using National Sample Survey data had analyzed party identification of the Indian electorate. The present discussion will be based on the findings of these two scholars. First, an attempt will be made to compare the findings of these two studies to party identification and then, to examine the relationship of their findings to voting behavior. (See Table 2.5)

As the Table indicates, the findings of the two participation studies seem to be in disagreement with each other. The CNP findings show a curvilinear relationship in partisan-

Table 2.5

Age -- Partisanship and Voter Participation
(in percentages)

C.N.P. 1966*		N.S.S. 1967**		N.S.S. 1967***	
Age	Partisanship	Age	Partisanhip	Age	Partisan-ship
N=9429		N=1971		N=1971	
21-25	60	21-30	71.5	21-25	75.4
26-35	64	31-40	70.0	26-30	76.1
36-45	66	41-55	68.5	31-35	74.4
46-55	64	55	69.9	36-40	76.6
56	55			41-50	73.4
				51-60	70.4
				61	67.7

* Field's findings based on Cross National Project Study 1966 (CNP)
** Sheth's findings based on National Sample Survey Study 1967 (NSS). The percentages in this column for all tables are cal-culated from the marginals.
*** Rajni Kothari's findings based on National Sample Survey Study 1967.

ship with younger people being less party identifiers than the age group 26-55. Again, partisanship is falling after 55 years. This shows that among the very young and very old, partisanship is less. The highest proportion of partisans are in the age group 36-45. This group is consistent in behavior pattern, that is, they are more partisan and also participate more. Overall partisanship shows an increase from 26-45 and from 45 it decreases. If we compare the voting figures, between 26-40 there is a general increase in participation with a little setback at 31-35. From 41 onwards, participation also declines.

In the NSS findings, the relationship is the opposite,

with younger people being more partisan and followed by a
progressive decline (however, the variation is not much), in
partisanship and again rising at the extreme end of 55 years.
Compared to the age group 31-40, the proportion of increase
for 55 is less. This means that partisanship is greater
between 21-40. The voting figure also shows similar patterns.
This observation is true in the CNP findings.* If we
collapse the voting figures for 21-30 years and 31-40 years
and take the average, there appears to be consistency in
partisanship and participation. This means between 31-40
years, not only is there a decrease in partisanship, there
is also a decrease in voting.

Can the difference between the two studies be explained
by the post-1967 charged atmosphere, in which the survey was
conducted? The over-all observation is, in general, that
there is a relationship between partisanship and participation
between the ages of 21-40. This is not to say that there
would necessarily be such a relationship if one looked at
individual behavior.

---

* In the U.S. generally speaking, the proportion of voters
to non-voters is lowest among those who have just attained
voting age. It increases in each successively older group,
through the thirties, forties, and fifties and reaches a peak
among people in their late fifties and early sixties (45-64
years). In other words, it indicates a curvilinear pattern.
This contrasts with the figures for the different age groups
in India. As the table indicates, there is very little
variation in partisanship and participation for the various
age groups.

Table 2.6

Income -- Partisanship and Voter Participation
(in percentages)

CNP 1966		NSS 1967		NSS 1967	
Income	Partisanship	Income	Partisanhip	Income	Reported Voters
N=8419		N=1971		N=1971	
Less than		Less than		Less than	
Rs. 100	61%	Rs. 100	67.7%	100	72.6%
Rs. 100-200	71	100-200	69.9	100-200	75.4
Rs. 200-300	70	200-400	77.3	200-400	76.4
Rs. 300-400	68	400 plus	73.7	400 plus	79.3
Rs. 400 plus	70				

The CNP findings show a curvilinear pattern in partisan-
ship with the highest in the income bracket of Rs. 100-200.
However, with regard to voting, though there is an increase
in voting, it is not the highest. Similarly, the NSS findings
also show a curvilinear trend in partisanship. But the
highest partisanship is in the income bracket 200-400. Here
also it shows an increase in participation, but not in the
absolute sense. Between 100-200 and 200-400, there is a
difference of 8 percent increase in partisanship but only one
percent increase in participation. Both the studies agree
that partisanship is less after 400 plus. Though at this
level partisanship falls, participation is the highest.

Overall, both partisanship and participation are con-
sistent with increase of income in the sense that higher
income contributes to greater partisanship as well as parti-
cipation. Does this suggest that partisanship and participation

increase because of objective conditions and facilities associated with them, or is it because partisanship contributes to greater participation? The difference in the proportion of partisanship between those who earn less than Rs. 100 and those who earn more than Rs. 400 is only 11 percent in CNP and 6 percent in NSS. Does this indicate the level of mobilization by different parties and consequently greater politicization?

Table 2.7

Education -- Partisanship and Voter Participation
(in percentages)

CNP 1966 Education Partisanhip N=9466		NSS 1967 Edu. Partisanhip N=1971		NSS 1967 Edu. Partisanhip N=1971	
Illiterate	52%	Illiterate	67.4	Illit.	70.8
Some primary	78				
Primary complete or some middle	85	Low	73.1	Low	78.4
M.S. completed or some high	83	Middle	71.1	Middle	74.5
High completed	89				
Some college	88				
College degree	75	High	73.0	High	74.6

The CNP findings shows a curvilinear pattern in partisanship, both the illiterates and highly educated tending to be less partisan. The interesting fact is a steep increase of 26 percent in partisanship with some education. It also suggests that a good proportion of partisans come from the levels who had completed high school and those that had some college education. Overall education seems to be a very

important inducement to partisanship.[7] At the highest level,
however, partisanship is less. Does this suggest disenchant-
ment with party politics leading to indifference on the part
of the highly educated or does it indicate a sense of alien-
ation suggesting serious repurcussions? If we compare
partisanship to participation, the pattern shows curvilinear,
little education contributing to greater participation and
partisanship but at the highest level both decreasing. These
observations are supported by the findings based on the
data collected by the Indian Institute of Public Opinion in
1961, 1964 and 1967[8] and also the All India political poll
data for 1957 obtained through Kansas State University
Computer Center.[9]

In the NSS findings, education shows a positive effect
on partisanship. At the low and high levels of education,
partisanship is highest. Does this suggest that after 1967
the educated have started taking greater interest in party
politics? Partisanship appears to be consistent with parti-
cipation at the low level of education. Not only is

---

[7]Lester W. Milbrath, Political Participation (Chicago:
Rand McNally, 1965); Almond and Verba, Civic Culture, pp. 315-
324.

[8]M. Lal Goel, "Education and Political Participation,"
Comparative Political Studies (October, 1970), pp. 333-346.

[9]All India political poll data purchased from Survey
Research Center, University of California, Berkeley and
analyzed at the Kansas State University Computer Center by
James Dorton.

partisanship highest at this level but so is participation.
Overall education has a positive effect on partisanship and
participation.

Table 2.8

Rural/Urban -- Partisanship and Voter Participation
(in percentages)

CNP 1966 Rural/Urban	Partisanship	NSS 1967 R/U	Partisanship N=1971	NSS 1967 R/U	Partisanship N=1971
Small village	57%	Rural	69.9%	Rural	75.8
Large town	73	Urban	70.4	Urban	68.5
City	74				

In the CNP findings the relationship between urbanization
and partisanship seems to be positive and linear. However,
there seems to be little difference between large town and
city. On the other hand, in the NSS findings the gap between
the proportion of partisans in rural and urban areas seems to
be very little. In comparing with voting, the pattern
indicates that rural vote is more than urban. Do these deve-
lopments suggest that rural India is going to play a dominant
role in Indian politics or does it indicate the significance
of politicization through political penetration and moderni-
zation? The little difference in urban partisanship can it
be explained as because of education rather than urbanization?[10]

---

[10]Myron Weiner, "India's Urban Constituencies"

In the CNP study there appears to be no relation between
partisanship and voting. Can the difference in rural vote
be explained as the difference due to greater mobilization
by parties, vote banks, patron-client relations? Does less
urban turnout despite higher proportion of partisanship,
suggest political apathy and alienation on the part of the
urbanites?

Table 2.8

Occupation -- Partisanship and Voter Participation
(in percentages)

CNP 1966 Occupation Partisan-ship N=8876		NSS 1967 Occupa. Partisan-ship N=1971		NSS 1967 Occupa. Partisan-ship N=1971	
Modern Sector					
Professions Executive, Mana-ger, Ádminis.	85%	Profession	64.2%	Profession	69.8%
White collar, sales and clerical	79	Business	75.8	Business	78.7
Skilled and		White collar	79.3	White collar	66.8
Semi-skilled labor	66	Skilled fac-tory	75.4	Skilled worker	77.3
Unskilled labor	54	Unskilled factory		Unskilled work	67.0
		Unskilled lab.	66.8		
Traditional Sector					
Land owning farmer	67	Cultivator	70.7	Cultivator	76.5
Tenant farmer	72	Landless		Agriculture	
Farm labor	50	labor	67.2	labor	72.4
Priest and		N.A.	68.4		
beggar	50				

The findings of CNP study suggests that among the modern
sector, the professionals are more partisan than others. More-

over, compared to the traditional sector, the extent of parti-
sanship is greater among the modern sector occupations. If
the professions and white collar occupations are excluded,
the difference between modern and traditional sectors is not
much. Does this mean that partisanship is associated with
educational attainments? In comparing with participation,
there appears to be no relation between partisanship and
participation.

In the NSS findings, the skilled factory workers, cul-
tivators, unskilled factory workers, landless and unskilled
labor have greater proportions of partisans (about 70%) com-
pared to professions, business and white collar occupations
(around 60%). Does this suggest the growing participation of
the mass culture as compared to elite culture? In this
study the relation between partisanship and participation
seems to be consistent in such occupations as business,
skilled workers and cultivators. Among the various occupa-
tions, the least proportion of partisans are in professions,
but in voting it is the white collar. This point further
strengthens our observation that there is a growing partici-
pation of mass culture in India. Further, the fact that
cultivators, unskilled factory workers and landless labor
constitute a good percentage of partisans, the majority of
whose earnings are within the first two levels of income (up
to Rs. 200) shows that partisanship has become relevant not
only to the highly educated, urban and well-placed, but also
to the poor, illiterate and rural people.

As closing remarks to the chapter, the following observations may be made. The fact that people in the age group of 21-40 participate more in Indian politics suggests that those who were children at the time of independence, have been socialized into politics in greater number. There is evidence to suggest that in India, apart from social mobilization and political penetration, the family socialization and political agitations also contribute to induce people into party politics.[11] The induction of young people in greater numbers has a two way effect. It may not only supply the vitality necessary for maintaining the system by socializing the young, it can also work the opposite way. The most volatile section in any society is the youth. The greater participation of the young may create greater strain on the system. The political events since the later part of 1960's clearly suggest that the emerging new generation cannot be kept content with the glory of the past, and that the vitality and future of Indian democracy rests on the government's ability to solve problems. Moreover, the fact that better income contributes to both partisanship and participation suggests that the legitimacy and stability of the Indian democracy depends to a greater extent on the economic

---

[11] John Field, Partisanship in India (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1973), especially Chapters 2-4 for social and political mobilization; Samuel Eldersveld, "Party Identification in India," Comparative Political Studies, for family socialization, and Shanto Iyengar, "Childhood Learning of Partisanship in a New Nation: The Case of Andhra Pradesh," for family socialization, "The Development of Political Agitators: Political Socialization in an Indian State," for participation in political agitations as a factor in influencing children to partisanship.

progress in the society. Samuel Huntington's argument that
modernization in developing countries would result in insta-
bility unless institutions are created[12] to cope with parti-
cipation, has to be accepted with an additional rider that it
is the better economic conditions that can contribute to
both participation as well as institutionalization. Further,
education in general contributing to greater participation
and partisanship suggests that an enlightened citizenry is a
sine qua non for the successful working of democracy in a
developing country like India. Modernization and greater
politicization may help in making politics relevant to the
periphery, but it is education that can moderate the influence
of primordial considerations in politics. Finally, while
comparing partisanship to participation, it had been observed
that for the most part, these two forms of political behavior show
parallel patterns when related to socio-economic variables,
but are notably different in their urban/rural patterns.
This suggests the significance of politicization of the rural
areas through political penetration and modernization.
Elections and political parties seem to have contributed to
greater awareness of democratic politics in the rural areas
and thus greater mobilization in terms of partisanship and
participation.

---

[12]Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing
Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 5.

CHAPTER III

PARTY PREFERENCE AND PARTY VOTE

Party politics in India can be roughly divided into three periods. The first one till the achievement of independence, the second period between the establishment of the Republic through 1967, and the third period after 1967. In the first period, most of the opposition groups which existed were within the National Congress and they all functioned in a common cause to achieve independence from the British. In the second period, many of these opposition groups formed into opposition parties. These were as it were breakaway groups from the parent body and forming themselves into opposition parties. For instance, the Praja Socialist Party is the result of the split of the Congress Socialist Party from the Congress in 1948 and merger of the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party (another breakaway group) in 1952. During this period, the party system of India was dominated by a single party, the Congress party. Political scientists explained this system as "one party dominance system." According to this view, the Congress party was considered as "a party of consensus" in which many factions within the party provided "in-build correction" to meet the challenge coming from the opposition and the opposition parties were considered as "parties of pressure." For nearly two decades this system provided stability and change to the politics of the country. The success of the Congress

party as a party of consensus owes much to the towering per-
sonality of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. Nehru's death opened
opportunities for the various factions within the Congress
to challenge the leadership. To this was added the appeal
of non-congressism that appeared in various parts of the
country. The third period started with the Fourth General
Elections in 1967. The non-congress parties for the first
time emerged from parties of pressure to one which could form
alternate governments. In a number of states, the opposition
parties came out victorious. Thus 1967 saw in the states a
shift from dominance to competition. Even at the center,
though the Congress party continued to be in power its
strength was considerably eroded.

In the post-1967 period, new theories were suggested.
One view stated that the 1967 Elections ushered in an era
when Congress' power of dominance was coming to an end.
Another view stated that the 1967 Elections polarized the
country's political structure and voting proportions closer
to the distribution of seats. As the various United Fronts
began to crack up, the polarization theory gave place to frag-
mentation thesis. The period between 1967-1971 saw the most
fluid of alignments. The most objectionable of party
practices like "floor crossing", "toppling game", "negative
coalition", and heterogeneous coalition of parties became
common.[1] The result was "President's Rule" in many states

---

[1]Floor-crossing means crossing the floor of the legis-
lature. That is, a member of the ruling party joining the
opposition or a member of the opposition joining the ruling

followed by delinked mid-term elections for the Lok Sabha in 1971, when Congress party came back to power with a good majority in the parliament, leaving the 1967 Elections, as Morris Jones says "an odd one act", "an abberation rather than a watershed." He continues, "while 1967 marked a new irreversible mood of electoral awareness, 1971 could still restore pre-1967 structure without in any way reversing electoral attitudes." This is exactly what happened. Both parties to the Left (PSP) and parties to the Right (Swatantra) became shadows of their former selves. In 1972 Assembly elections the same story was repeated.

Thus, almost all the opposition parties vis a vis the Congress party seem to be less institutionalized. In this chapter an attempt will be made to analyze, on the basis of party identification and poll performance, the distribution of support for different parties in India. The unavailability of state-level empirical evidence on party identification restricts the examination only to the national level. (See Table 3.1)

---

[1](continued) party.

Toppling game is a political maneuver by which the opposition encourages defection from the ruling party, with a view to swell its ranks and thus reduce the ruling party to a minority and force it to resign.

Negative coalition means forming coalition not on the basis of a common agreed upon program, but with the intention of removing Congress from power.

Heterogeneous coalition means coalition of divergent parties.

President's Rule is an arrangement provided for in the Constitution which allows for takeover of the administration of the State by the Central Government, when the Constitutional machinery of the State cannot function normally.

Table 3.1

Distribution of Partisanship and Poll Performance of All India Political Parties

NAME OF THE PARTY	1 Partisan- ship All India Political Poll 1961 N=1522 Total Partisan- ship 43%	2 Votes Polled 1962 National Elections	3 Partisan- ship Cross National Project Survey 1966 N=9521 Total Partisan- ship 62.1%	4 Partisan- ship Nat'l Sample Survey 1967 N=1971 Total Partisan- ship 70%	5 Votes Polled 1967-- State Assem- blies	6 Votes Polled 1967-- Lok Sabha	7 Votes Polled 1971-- Lok Sabha Elec- tions	8 Votes Polled 1972-- Assembly Elections
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Congress	70.2	44.7	54.8	43.1	42.3	40.7	43.1	44.7
Socialist Party		2.7				4.9	2.4	
Praja Socialist Party	4.1	6.8	1.4	4.9	8.3	3.1	1.03	2.6
Communist Party of India					4.4	5.2	4.7	3.58
Community Party Marxist	10.0	9.94	2.3	4.1	4.3	4.2	5.1	4.38
Swatantra	2.2	7.9	1.4	5.1	7.1	8.7	3.1	1.1
Jana Sangh	1.3	6.4	1.7	7.1	8.2	9.4	7.4	7.9
Congress (O)							10.7	4.6
Others	10.8	10.4	.5	5.5	6.0	10.4	22.7*	11.0

Source:
Column 1--All India Gallup Polls 1961, calculated from the marginals in the codebook.
Column 2--Seminar June 1967, p. 19. Appendix 3.
Column 3--John Field, Partisanship in India, p. 202, Table II.10.
Column 4--Rajni Kothari, Politics in India (Boston: Little Brown, 1970), p. 202, Table V-6.
Column 5 & 8--Seminar, May 1972, pp. 12-13, Table 2.
Column 6 & 7--Seminar, August 1971, pp. 14-15, Table 1.

* Includes Independents.

In the last chapter we found an impressive proportion
of Indian electorate being partisan. How is partisanship
distributed among the various parties? What is the actual
vote support for various parties at the Elections? In
other words, how does partisanship distribution for different
parties compare with the distribution of actual vote support
at the elections? This may provide a clue to the under-
standing of the level of institutionalization of political
parties. According to All India Political Poll of 1961[2]
nearly 70 percent identified with the Congress party. The
findings of this Survey are noted in the first column of
Table 3.1. Nearly three fourths of the electorate show a
liking for the Congress party though in the 1962 Elections
(column 2) only 44.7 percent voted for it. The difference
may be explained by the fact that in the first decade of
democratic experience, the Indian voters were not highly
politicized so as to make them crystallize their party iden-
tification. Moreover, the memory of the Congress, being a
legacy of revolutionary movement, was still fresh in the minds
of many. Added to this was the organizational strength of the
party and charisma of Nehru might have been the factors
attracting people to Congress. However, at the time of
elections, considerations other than party loyalty may have
been the factors influencing the electoral decision, especially

---

[2]All India Political Poll 1961. Calculated from margi-
nals in the codebook. The question asked was "Which party
appeals to you"? The number of people interviewed were
The level percentage who answered positively were 43 percent.

among the weak partisans. The election studies made by
Kothari and Weiner[3] support this thesis. There is also the
possibility of over reporting for the government party and
under reporting for the opposition. Moreover, factional
disputes within the Congress has often led some to withdraw
from the Congress and contest in the elections as indepen-
dents. This resulted in voting for the independents, though
the voters continued to identify with the Congress. Overall,
the Congress party in 1962 was not only the party that
appealed to most, but also the party that registered the
highest percentage of votes. The only other party whose
party identification and voting support correlates is the
Communist party of India and "other parties".

The picture changes after this. The disenchantment with
the Congress, because of its failure to solve the growing
economic problems and also because of better institutionali-
zation of other parties, coupled with greater enlightenment
among the electorate,[4] there appears to be a greater crystal-
lization of partisanship in India. Party identification for
different parties in 1966 (Cross National Project findings)
and 1967 (National Sample Survey findings) are noted in
columns three and four. The figures indicate that though the

---

[3]Kothari and Weiner, Indian Voting Behavior (Calcutta:
Mukhopadhaya, 1965).

[4]Rajni Kothari, "Voting in India" Competitive Politics
and Electoral Change," Economic and Political Weekly (January
1971), pp. 229-230; "The Political Change of 1967," Economic
and Political Weekly (January 1971), ppl 231-250.

Congress party continues to be the party for which identi-
fication is the highest, the other parties have improved their
position, especially the rightist parties like Jana Sangh
and Swatantra.

For the Congress party in 1967, not only was its base
reduced from 54.8 percent to 43 percent, a reduction of 11.7
percent, but also the loss of additional new party identifiers
(7.7 percent) who were attracted to the opposition parties.
A word of caution must be noted. The 1967 elections being
unusual (the N.S.S. was conducted immediately following the
1967 elections), it requires further study to confirm this
trend. But as according to the figures available, the trend
indicates a greater crystallization of identification for
different parties. The votes actually polled by the Congress
Jana Sangh and "other parties" at the Assembly level in 1967,
nearly correspond to the proportion of party identification
of the respective parties (see column five). At the National
level (see column six) the Swatantra, Jana Sangh and "other
parties" seem to have performed better at the polls. The
identification for the leftist parties, though less, their
performance both at the Assembly and National levels seem to
be good. In the 1971 Elections, Congress and Jana Sangh
performance at the polls appears to correspond to their res-
pective party identifications. (Congress 43.1% partisanship-
43.1% votes and Jana Sangh 7.1% partisanship - 7.4% votes.)
In the 1972 Assembly Elections, the Congress party improved
its position further and the Jana Sangh managed to maintain

its position. All other parties had a severe setback, esp-
ecially the Swatantra, Congress (O) and the Socialist parties.
The Communist strength was also reduced but not much. Over-
all, there appears to be a core of 40 percent Congress party
identifiers who support the party at the elections. As a
hindsight on the basis of what happened in 1971 and 1972, can we
suggest that 1967 was only a deviating election, when the
Congress voters disenchanted with the party, wanted to give
a chance to non-congress parties (as a first step at the
state level) to form the government and that, on realization
that implementing radical measures to solve urgent problems
could be possible only by the Congress,[5] did they revert back
to support the Congress.[6] Does this suggest greater con-
sistency between identification and voting for the Congress
party?

Kothari in the National Sample Survey[7] found 50 percent
of those who identified with Congress party as party regulars

---

[5]In the monthly public opinion survey, May 1972, a
motivational analysis of Indian political behavior was made
with regard to profiles of leading parties. In the interview,
respondents overwhelmingly supported Congress-- 62% considered
Congress to represent the interest of all; 46% considered
that Congress could solve employment problems; 49% considered
that Congress can eradicate poverty; 60% suggested that
Congress can protect the interest of minorities; 61% interests
of Harizans; 38% said that it can bring about equal distri-
bution of wealth.

[6]The events since June 1975 suggest that like the 1967
elections, the coming Lok Sabha elections may be another
watershed in the electoral politics of the country.

[7]Rajni Kothari,"Political Change in India", Economic
and Political Weekly (January 1971), p. 243, Table 14.

compared to 38.7 percent for the Communists, 19.6 percent Jana Sangh, 12 percent Swatantra, 15.8 percent Socialist and 33 percent for other parties. Similarly, Eldersveld found 73 percent of Congress voters expressing that they would vote for the same party in the future, compared to 60 percent for the opposition. Another interesting point to be noted is that though a voter may identify with a party, based on the saliency of local issues, he may vote for another party. For instance, according to the National Sample Survey (1967) only 5.5 percent identified themselves with "other parties" but on the basis of voting, their strength is either doubled as in 1967 (10.4 percent) or considerably increased as in 1971 (22.7 percent). This includes figures for Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (D.M.K.), Telengana Praja Samithi (TPS), and Independents.

Thus politicization in the sense of party identification has greatly increased in the Indiana electorate. Institutionalization of political parties in the sense of a viable opposition as an alternate choice seems to be still not certain.[8] Does continuing Congress support mean centrist approach of the Indian electorate to party politics? How does the growing dissatisfaction with the Congress fit in with this? Bases of party support in the society may

---

[8]DMK in Tamilnadu is the only party that could form the government by itself. However, at the center, its strength cannot be considered as a viable alternative.

provide a partial answer to these questions. Kothari and Sheth, using the 1967 survey data, have analyzed the support base for different parties among party identifiers. An attempt will be made to relate party preference to vote preference. The voting intentions are based on the findings of the Indian Institute of Public Opinion (I.I.P.O.).[9] Variables used to examine this relation are age, education, income and occupation.

Age

Table 3.2

Age -- Party Preference

N=1377

Age	Sample Norm	Congress	Swatantra	Jana Sangh	Communist	Socialist	Regional Parties
21-25	(16.7)	16.0	20.0	18.8	25.0	15.8	21.8
26-35	(30.7)	27.6	28.0	35.5	35.0	43.2	36.3
36-45	(21.9)	22.6	21.0	23.9	20.0	16.8	21.0
46-55	(15.5)	16.7	18.0	11.6	8.8	8.4	10.5
55+	(15.0)	17.0	12.0	8.0	11.2	15.8	10.5
NA	(0.2)	0.1	1.0	2.2	0.0	0.0	0.0

Source: D. L. Sheth, "Partisanship and Political Development," Economic and Political Weekly (January 1971), p. 279, Table 1.

---

[9]Party preference indicates a psychological sense of affinity toward a party. It may or may not be followed by actual vote for the same party. Similarly vote preference suggests the voting intention of a person to a party. He may or may not identify with the party he intends to vote. It is a choice of a party in response to the question, "if there is an election tomorrow, for which party would you vote for in the Lok Sabha?" See, All India Political Poll (Indian Institute of Public Opinion), "Structuring of Voting Intentions," (October 1970), p. 5. All India Political Poll (IIOP), "An Analysis of Indian Political Behavior: Structure of Voting Preferences," (January-February 1971), pp. 19-21. All India Political Poll (IIPO), "Voting Intentions and the Congress Leadership," (April 1973), Blue Supplement to the Monthly Public Opinion Surveys, p. 2.

Table 3.3

Age -- Vote Preference

Age	Number of respondents (R)	Congress (R)	Congress (O)	Jana Sangh	Swatantra	S.S.P.	B.K.D.	C.P.I.	C.P.M.	Other Parties & Independents	Total
21-35	3591	34	10	10	4	4	2	4	6	26	100
36-50	2956	35	12	10	3	4	2	4	5	25	100
Above 50	1653	35	11	9	3	3	3	4	3	29	100
Total	8200	34.7	11.0	9.6	3.7	3.8	2.0	4.2	5.0	26.0	100.0

Source: All India Political Poll (I.I.P.O.) December 1970, January-February 1971, "An Analysis of Indian Political Behavior Structure of Voting Preference," p. 19.

As Table 3.2 indicates, party preference for the Congress is highest among the old voters, followed by the middle aged voters. Its support is lowest among the age group 21-35. The voting preference in January, 1971 political poll suggests that Congress has equal support in the age group 36-50 and above 50 (see Table 3.3) (35 percent). However, in April 1973 poll, the vote preference shows that Congress is preferred more by the above 50 age group (51 percent) followed by 36-50 years (40 percent). Does this suggest that Congress is slowly a dying party unless it makes inroads into the younger age groups? Do developments since 1967 show any change in the vote preference of the young?

In the 1967 elections not only was the defection from the Congress (12.8 percent higher than that from the opposition, 2.5 percent), but also the new voters voting for the Congress were fewer (10.2 percent) compared to the opposition (12.2 percent). However, since 1967 there appears to be a change in the voting preference of the young. In 1970, All India Political Poll, 30 percent of the age group 21-35 supported the Congress. This increased to 34 percent (within a margin of a few months) in January-February 1971 political poll. In April 1973 the party registered further increase in the support to 39 percent. This shows that the young, who were disenchanted with the Congress, not only came back into the fold but it also suggests positive trend among the new voters who voted for the first time in the 1971 Elections. Moreover, the Congress voting preference among all the age groups rises

from 30 percent in October 1970 to 34.7 percent in January 1971 to 41 percent in April 1973.

The Swatantra identifiers come mostly from the age group 21-25 followed by the age group 46-55 years. The voting preference in January 1971 indicates correlation with identification of these groups. An interesting observation is the overall voting preference for the party which is reduced from 5 percent in October 1970 to 3.7 percent in January 1971 to one percent in April 1973.

The Jana Sangh identifiers are generally in the age groups 21-45 but mostly in the age group 26-35 years. As for the voting preference, there seems to be a correlation between identification and vote preference. This relation continues even in the April poll of 1973. Overall Jana Sangh support is constant and identification and voting preference is consistent. In October 1970, 15 percent expressed voting preference for the party and in April 1973 the same figure continues to support the party.

The Communist identifiers are generally more in the age group 21-35, but mostly in the age group of 21-25. If we combine the voting preference of CPL and CPM, the figure suggests that there is a relationship between party preference and voting preference. Overall the party support seems to range from 9 to 11 percent of votes. For instance, in October 1970, 11 percent expressed voting preference for both the wings of the communist parties. In February 1971 it was reduced to 9.2 percent and again in April 1973, it rose to 10 percent.

The Socialist party identifiers are concentrated in the age group 26-35. In the political poll survey the figures available are only for the SSP which indicates that voting preference fairly corresponds to party preference. Among the leftist parties, the Socialist party seems to have lost its greatest strength. In October 1970 voting preference for SSP for all the age groups was 2 percent and in 1973 for the merged party, the strength is one percent. Compared to this the communist party voting preference in 1970 was 11 percent and in 1973 it was 10 percent. This shows that communist parties have a constant support in the society among all the age groups. The regional parties have a strong support base in the age group 21-35, but mostly in the age group 21-25. However, in voting preference there seems to be no consistent pattern. For instance, in October 1970 it was the age group 36-50 that registered the highest percentage voting preference (19 percent) to the "other parties".[10] In January 1971, the highest preference was in the age group above 50 (29 percent) and in April 1973 it was again in the age group 36-50 (19 percent). One peculiar feature of the regional parties in India is that they are mostly transitional and ephemeral in nature. Nonetheless, they draw a large percentage of votes in any election based on the saliency of immediate issues.

---

[10]Includes Independents.

Education:

Table 3.4

Education -- Party Preference

N=1377

Education	Sample Norm	Cong-ress	Swat-antra	Jana Sangh	Commu-nist	Socia-list	Regi-onal Par-ties
Illiterate	(36.4)	49.6	50.0	39.1	47.5	49.5	28.2
Low	(35.4)	34.5	35.0	34.1	27.5	35.8	47.6
Middle	(10.3)	10.0	6.0	11.6	10.0	7.4	16.9
High	(6.2)	4.4	7.0	14.5	15.0	7.4	2.4
NA	(1.6)	1.5	2.0	0.7	0.0	0.0	4.8

Source: D.L. Sheth, "Partisanship and Political Development," Economic and Political Weekly (January 1971), p. 279, Table 2.

As Table 3.4 indicates, the Congress identifiers, though distributed among all levels of education, have highest strength among the group of illiterates. But when voting preferences are examined, we find the greatest amount of fluidity between 1970-1973. For instance, in 1970, the highest voting support came from those with primary education or less (41 percent). In January 1971, it was from the "some secondary" category (37 percent) and in April 1973, it was both primary or less and university degree holders (both 43 percent). The overall support from all educational levels to Congress has increased from 30 percent in October 1970 to 34.7 percent in 1971 to 41 percent in 1973. Moreover, though the Congress has the lowest proportion of party identifiers from the highly educated, it registered an increase in vote preference from

Table 3.5

Education -- Voting Preference

Education	No. of Respon-dents	Con. (R)	Con. (O)	J.S.	Swat-antra	SSP	BKD	CPI	CPM	Other Parties & Inde-pendents	Total
Illiterate including Primary or less	4282	34	11	9	3.	4	3	3	4	29	100
Some Secondary	1586	37	11	11	3	3	1	4.	5	25	100
Secondary completed or some University	1469	36	11	10	4	3	1	4	8	23	100
University Degree or more	863	32	11	9	5	5	-	5	7	26	100
Total	8200	34.7	11.0	9.6	3.7	3.8	2.0	4.2	5.0	26.0	100.0

Source: All India Political Poll (I.I.P.O.), December 1970, January-February, 1971, "An Analysis of Indian Political Behavior Structure of Voting Preferences," p. 19.

32 percent in 1971 to 43 percent in 1973 from this group.

From the Swatantra party, the highest proportion of party identifiers are among the illiterates, followed by the highly educated category. As for voting preference, the highest proportion of support is from the category of university degree holders (5 percent). But in 1973, the Swatantra support from this group was reduced from 5 percent to one percent. 80 percent reduction in the voting preference of this group does it suggest disenchantment with Swatantra conservatism or to put it the other way, does it suggest the growing radicalization of the highly educated?

The Jana Sangh basis of support is among the middle and high levels of education. The highest party preference is from the highly educated group. The voting preference suggests that its strength lies in the middle level (11 and 10 percent). In 1973, the highest voting support came from the university degree holders (18 percent) and also from the primary or less group (16 percent). Does this suggest that Jana Sangh (which is considered as a party of the educated and urbanites) has made inroads into the illiterate and rural people? Overall, Jana Sangh voting strength among the various levels of education shows that it has maintained its strength. In 1970 its overall support was 15 percent and in 1973 it continued to have the same percentage of support -- 15 percent.

With regard to Communist parties, the highest proportion of party identifiers are in the highly educated category, followed by the illiterate group. If we combine the voting

preference for both the wings, the highest proportion is in the third and fourth levels (both 12 percent). In 1973 the preference rises to 17 percent for this group. Does this affirm the poverty literacy thesis of communist support in India? The illiterate who are more likely to be poor and the highly educated because of radicalization. Similar trend can be observed in the party and voting preference for the socialist parties. However, the party that could get 3.8 percent overall preference in 1971 could get only one percent in 1973. Does this mean, like the liberal party in England (whose strength was reduced because of the liberal policies of the labor party), that the strength of the Indian Socialist party is reduced because of the socialist ideology of the Congress party?

With regard to regional parties, the support base is the low and middle levels of education, but in relation to voting preference, it is among the illiterate. Does this mean that the Indian illiterate voters could easily comprehend and express voting preference for a regional party or candidate based on the saliency of issues rather than express identification which requires a minimum awareness of different parties?

Income:

Table 3.6

Income -- Party Preference

N=1377

Income	Sample Norm	Cong- ress	Swat- antra	Jana Sangh	Commu- nist	Socia- list	Regi- onal Par- ties
Lowest	(36.6)	34.4	30.0	23.2	36.3	37.9	29.2
Low	(28.0)	27.9	18.0	27.5	25.0	32.6	36.2
Middle	(19.0)	19.3	17.0	23.9	16.3	15.8	14.4
High	(9.6)	7.7	14.0	16.7	16.3	7.4	8.1
NA	(9.8)	10.8	11.0	8.7	6.2	6.3	8.1

Source: D.L. Sheth, "Partisanship and Political Development," Economic and Political Weekly (January 1971), p. 283, Table 6.

Party preference for the Congress seems to be more in the middle income category followed by the low category. But when it comes to voting preference, it is the lowest and middle categories (both 36 percent). In 1973, the proportion of voting preference is highest in the high income category (41.3 percent) following by the low income category (40 percent). In other words, between 1971 and 1973 the Congress party support increased in almost all the income groups. There is a jump of 11 percent in the vote preference between 1970 (30 percent) and 1973 (41 percent) among all the income groups. This is reflected in the increased proportion of votes polled by the Congress in 1971 Lok Sabha Elections and the 1972 State Assembly Elections.

Table 3.7

Income -- Voting Preference

Income (Monthly in Rs.)	No. of Resp.	Con. (R)	Con. (O)	Jana Sangh	Swat-antra	SSP	BKO	CPI	CPM	Other Parties and Independents	Total
Up to 150	2943	36	11	8	4	4	1	4	5	27	100
151 - 300	2313	35	10	10	3	4	3	3	5	27	100
301 - 500	1388	36	11	10	3	3	3	4	5	25	100
501 - 750	495	31	10	12	5	4	2	5	5	26	100
751 - 1000	214	33	13	9	3	6	1	4	4	27	100
Above 1000	244	37	13	14	5	4	2	3	2	20	100
Unspecified	603	31	12	9	3	3	-	5	8	29	100
Total	8200	34.7	11.0	9.6	3.7	3.8	2.0	4.2	5.0	96.0	100.0

The Swatantra party has the largest proportion of party identifiers in the lowest income group, followed by the highest income group. The voting preference seems to be the other way, with highest vote preference coming from the highest income group followed by the lowest income group. In April 1973 a new development seems to have taken place. The voting preference is limited to the high income group only. According to the NSS findings, the Swatantra base of support is predominently rural and even there its support is confined to the land-owning cultivators and their clients among the landless labor. The change in the voting preference in 1973, does it imply that in the rural areas the influence of land-owning group to act as vote banks to muster the strength for the party from the landless labor (based on owner-client relationship) has been reduced? In other words, does this indicate the decline in the role of vote banks and emergence of direct voter linkages?[11] Further, the Swatantra party which could get 5.0 percent vote preference in 1970, could get only 3.7 percent in 1971 and 1.0 percent in 1973. A steep fall indeed!

For the Jana Sangh, the highest party preference comes from the high income group followed by the middle income group. The voting preference shows consistency with party identification. This relationship continues in 1973. In 1970

---

[11]D. L. Sheth, "Political Development of the Indian Electorate," Economic and Political Weekly (November 1970), pp. . See also, S.P. Verma and Iqbal Naram, Voting Behavior in a Changing Society (Delhi: Nation, 1973).

the overall vote preference for the party was 15 percent and in 1973 it continued to be 15 percent. The party's poll performance in 1971 (7.39 percent) is also consistent with party preference (7.1 percent). In the 1972 Elections to the Assemblies, the Jana Sangh polled 7.87 percent votes. This suggests that the party has a core of nearly 7 percent identifiers who regularly vote for the party.

For the Communists, the largest proportion of party identifiers come from the highest income group. Though little less than the sample norm, the party has a fairly good proportion from the lowest income group as well. This position is similar to that of Swatantra party which stands ideologically opposite to the Communist party. Does this mean ideological sophistication has not become pervasive in the Indian electorate or does it only mean, like the educated elite who found against social injustices, the economic elite intend to fight economic injustices? The voting preference for the Communist party (the figures were combined) indicates that except among the low income group, the party has equal (9 percent) support among all other income groups. In 1973 its highest support came from the middle income group. Overall, the party vote support from all the income groups in 1970 was 11 percent, in 1971 was 9.2 percent, and in 1973 was 10 percent. This suggests that the Communist parties have support ranging from 9 to 11 percent. As has been already stated, among the leftist parties the Communist party is the only party that could keep poll performance at the same level.

In 1967, for the Lok Sabha the votes polled were 9.4 percent and in 1971 they were 9.8 percent. For Assembly Elections it was 8.7 percent in 1967 and 8 percent in 1972. Another significant fact to be noted is that in 1961 the Communist party had 10 percent party identifiers. The split in 1964, followed by violence on the part of a third group (Naxalites) might have been the factors for the reduction in the strength of partisanship in 1967 to 4 percent. It may also be due to under reporting as suggested by Kothari. However, at the polls, the party seems to have maintained a constant position, that is, 9.9 percent in 1962 to 9.4 percent in 1967 to 9.8 percent in 1971 (see Table 3.1).

The Socialist party seems to be mostly preferred by the lowest and low income groups. The voting preference figures in 1971 shows that it has a high proportion of support among all the income groups (4 percent) except the middle. However, in 1974 the voting preference is limited to the low income group. As a hindsight, by looking at the poll performance of the Socialist party in 1967 (8 percent) and in 1971 (3.5 percent) for the Lok Sabha and figures for the Assembly Elections in 1967 (8.3 percent) and in 1972 (2.6 percent), can we suggest that between 1970-1973 the attitudes of the Indian electorate toward the Socialist party had taken a different trend? Or, is it because the centrist policies of the Congress with a bias toward radicalism that had eroded the support base of the Society party? After all, the Socialist party was once part of the Congress!

The regional parties have the greatest proportion of party preference among the low income group, and the voting preference from the low and lowest income groups. The fact that regional parties are preferred by the young, with little education and low income suggests the vulnerability of these groups to regionalism and localism.

Occupation*:

Table 3.8

Occupation -- Party Preference
N=1377

Occupation	Sample Norm	Cong-ress	Swat-antra	Jana Sangh	Comm-unist	Soci-alist	Regi-onal Par-ties
Professional	(2.5)	2.9	1.0	2.9	3.8	1.0	0.8
Business	(7.3)	7.9	4.0	8.0	1.3	7.4	8.9
White collar	(7.6)	6.4	4.0	13.8	12.5	7.4	8.9
Cultivators	(46.0)	47.3	64.0	44.9	35.0	41.0	35.5
Skilled-factory	(3.8)	3.0	3.0	2.2	10.0	1.0	9.7
Unskilled-factory	(8.4)	8.7	3.0	8.0	11.3	7.4	10.5
Unskilled-NF	(9.1)	9.5	5.0	4.3	11.3	9.5	12.9
Ag landless	(12.4)	12.3	13.0	9.4	12.5	20.0	10.5
NA	(2.9)	2.1	3.0	6.5	2.5	5.3	2.4

Source: D.L. Sheth, "Partisanship and Political Development," Economic and Political Weekly (January 1971), p. 281, Table 4.

*The non-availability of information concerning occupation-wise distribution of voting preference has made it necessary to compare 1967 party preference with the 1967 party vote reported for these groups. This is done with a view not only to understand the support base of different parties but also the attitude of these groups toward various parties. In other words, the party receiving the highest percentage of votes from a given occupation is likely to be the party toward which the members have greater positive attitudes.

As the Table indicates, the Congress has a relatively more heterogeneous and differentiated support among the various occupations. Except for the white collar, skilled factory and agricultural landless, in all other occupations its party preference is above the sample norm. The Swatantra party identifiers are mostly among the cultivators and agricultural landless. The Jana Sangh identifiers are mostly among the white collar, business and professional. Among the cultivators it is close to the sample norm. The highest party identifiers for the Communist parties are among the skilled factory workers, followed by white collar and unskilled workers. The Socialist parties have the highest party identifiers among the agricultural landless. For the Regional parties, the highest percentage of party identifiers are in the category of skilled factory worker (however, this figure is lower than for the Communists). (See Table 3.9)

In order to understand the attitude of each occupation toward a particular party, we have to examine party preference and party vote by occupation. As Tables 3.8 and 3.9 indicate, the professions overwhelmingly identify with and have voted for the Communist parties. Similarly, there is similarity of behavior pattern among the business toward the regional parties, among unskilled workers toward Communist parties, among the cultivators toward the Swatantra party, and among the agricultural landless toward the leftist parties. However, there appears to be discrepancy between identification and voting among white collar and skilled workers. The former

Table 3.9

1967 Party Vote, by Occupation
(Percentages)

Parties	Pro-fessional	Bus-iness	White Collar	Skilled Worker	Unskilled Worker	Owner Culti-vator	Agri-cul-tural Worker	Unem-ployed
Congress	1.8	6.6	5.3	10.9	9.3	49.2	13.4	3.6
Swatantra	0.0	2.0	2.0	2.9	3.9	73.5	11.8	3.9
Jana Sangh	3.5	6.3	12.0	7.7	6.3	50.7	7.0	6.3
CPI	1.7	1.7	6.7	6.7	10.0	53.3	15.0	5.0
CPM	4.3	4.3	8.5	25.5	14.9	25.5	10.6	6.4
SSP	4.2	8.3	5.6	12.5	13.9	25.0	20.8	9.7
PSP	1.4	5.6	6.9	26.4	6.9	34.7	15.3	2.8
DMK	1.2	3.7	1.2	15.0	6.2	55.0	15.0	2.5
Other parties	2.2	15.2	21.7	28.3	4.3	13.0	4.3	10.9
Independents	0.7	6.7	7.5	10.4	10.4	46.3	12.7	5.2
Did not vote	2.2	6.5	10.9	12.2	13.5	32.6	15.7	6.5
DK, NA, etc.	2.3	3.0	11.3	9.0	9.0	45.1	9.0	11.3

Source: Rajni Kothari, Politics in India (Boston: Little Brown, 1970), p. 212, Table V.11.

overwhelmingly identify with the Jana Sangh and Communist parties, but have voted for the Regional parties. Only the next highest vote had gone to the Jana Sangh. The latter overwhelmingly identify with the Communist and Regional parties. But the votes were shared by Regional and Leftist parties. Does this suggest the salience of local issues for these groups? Or, is it because of less intensity of party loyalty? (Among the white collar and skilled workers, the proportion of weak partisans are more than strong partisans.)

Conclusion

In this chapter we observed that the 1967 election was a watershed for various reasons. The most important was the temporary but severe decline in the dominance of the Congress party. Opportunity was given to the opposition parties to institutionalize and establish themselves as a viable alternative. In other words, the electorate gave a sense of confidence to the opposition that Congress strength was not formidable. However, the institutionalization of the opposition parties did not take place at a uniform rate. Among the opposition parties, Jana Sangh and Communist parties seem to have well entrenched themselves, both from the point of view of permanent bases of support in the society and also in the sense of being supported at the polls. The Swatantra and Socialist parties appear to have received a severe set-back at the polls in 1971 and 1972 (the merger of the Socialist parties in 1972 did not in any way improve its position in 1972). Though 5.1 percent identify with the Swatantra party,

only 3.1 percent supported the party at the polls in 1971 and
1.1 percent in 1972. Similarly, among 4.1 percent who iden-
tified with the Socialist parties, only 3.4 percent supported
the party at the polls in 1971 and 2.6 percent in 1972.
Congress (O) which emerged as an independent party after the
1969 Congress split secured 10.7 percent in the 1971 Elections
but in the 1972 State Assembly elections its strength was
reduced to 4.6 percent. Thus, there appears a constant
support for Congress, Jana Sangh and Communist parties in
India.[12] Does this suggest conformity to the ideological
spectrum of center, right and left of the Indian electorate?
Or, does this provide a clue to the future institutionaliza-
tion of a three-party system in India? Among all the parties
the Congress has a relatively more heterogeneous and diff-
erentiated support in the society. Moreover, the consistent
relation between identification with and voting for the party
suggests a fair amount of maturity on the part of the Indian
electorate.

---

[12]The events since June 1975 suggest that like the 1967
Election, the coming Lok Sabha Election may be equally signi-
ficant, in that it will be a keenly contested election between
the Congress on the one hand and the opposition parties on the
other. The Jana Sangh and other opposition parties have formed
into a larger coalition called the Barathiya Lok Dal.

CHAPTER IV

CASTE -- PARTISANSHIP, PARTICIPATION

Caste structures and caste identities form an important
aspect of the social system in India. Parliamentary govern-
ment and political parties which are modern institutions are
to work in such a society. The interaction between the
traditional institutions in the society with the modern poli-
tical institutions is resulting in what Rajni Kothari calls
"secularization of the social system." This apart, people
often see a dichotomy between politics and caste and complain
about "casteism in politics" or "caste-ridden politics." For
instance, the ubiquitous caste system in elections if fre-
quently noted.[1] It is argued that elections based on adult
franchise have strengthened caste solidarity and made caste
emerge as the major agency in winning electoral system and
thus elevating it to a position of power. In other words,
voting has increased group consciousness. It is also argued
that by constitutionally guaranteeing reservation of seats
for scheduled castes and tribes, the role of caste and tribe
has been further strengthened. All these have induced not
only the creation of caste and communal based parties, but

---

[1] Rajni Kothari, Politics in India (Boston: Little Brown,
1970), especially Chapter 6, pp. 224-249. See also, Lloyd I.
Rudolph and Susanne H. Rudolph, The Modernity of Tradition:
Political Development in India (Chicago: The Chicago Univer-
sity Press, 1967) and A. H. Somjee, "Caste and the Decline of
Political Homogeneity," The American Political Science Review.
(September 1973), pp. 799-816.

even secular parties have often resorted to caste and communal
appeals to win electoral support. In other words, group con-
sciousness is being used in electoral politics. The prophets
of doom argue that the result would be distrust and strife
in the society, ultimately posing a threat to democracy. In
this chapter an attempt will be made to examine the relation
of caste and religion to partisanship and parties on the one
hand and voting behavior on the other, with a view of under-
standing the role of caste and religion in the politics of
the country.

Though caste might have been considered along with other
social structure variables in the last chapter, it is given
special attention here because a rational perspective of the
role of caste in politics can go a long way in utilizing the
caste structures as instruments of modernization, thus bridging
the gap between traditional structures and modern political
institutions. Further, caste viewed in the sense of political
infra-structure can contribute to a greater rapport between
the society on the one hand and the political system on the
other, thus contributing to congruence between society and the
political system. Moreover, age and socio-economic variables
are not considered as obstacles to democratic politics but as
normal order of things. Caste, however, is often considered
dangerous to democratic politics because societal cleavages
may manifest themselves in party and electoral politics. This
has led scholars to stress the "replacing of caste as a
secular entity." But as Kothari suggests "no society lives

without traditions and the essential challenge of modernity
is not the distruction of tradition but the traditionalization
of modernity." He continues, "in the caste politics inter-
action, it is not politics that gets caste-ridden, it is caste
that gets politicised." "It is through the political arti-
culation of particular identities that a more stable pattern
of integration becomes possible." Thus, when caste is viewed
as a changing concept it will become "another variable in
politics along with many other variables. It will come down
from being a determinant of politics to an ethnic variable."[2]

Table 4.1

Caste -- Partisanship and Voter Participation

CNP 1966 Caste	Partisan- ship	NSS 1967 Caste	Partisan- ship N=1971	NSS 1967 Caste	Reported voting N=1971
Twice Born	70%	Upper	72.2%	Upper	73.2%
High	61				
Middle	65	Middle	61.0	Middle	76.3
Low	63	Low	71.8	Low	69.2
Harijans &		Harijans	69.7	Harijans	74.6
Muslims	52	Muslims	74.4	Muslims	76.7
N=8605					
Religion					
Hindu	62				
Muslim	64	Other		Other	
Christian	71	Religions	69.9	Religions	85.6
Other	64				
N=9456					

In the CNP findings, among the Hindus, partisanship seems
to be more in the upper caste groups compared to middle and low.

___

[2]Harold A. Gould, "Changing Political Behavior in Rural
Indian Society," Economic and Political Weekly (Special Number,
August, 1967).

When religions are compared, the proportion of partisans for
the minority religion appears to be more. Similar trends can
be observed in the findings of the NSS study. For instance,
the proportion of partisans is highest for the Muslims.
Among the Hindus, the upper caste has the highest proportion
of partisans, though as compared to low caste the difference
is not much. There seems to be discrepancy between the findings
of CNP and NSS with regard to the middle caste. In the CNP
study, the difference between the middle and the twice-born
is only 5 percent. But in NSS study, the gap is 11 percent.

With regard to participation in election, the findings
suggest that Muslims not only have a higher proportion of
partisans, they also participate more in elections. Does
this suggest greater political consciousness on the part of
the minority groups? Or does it indicate community solidarity,
enbloc voting and mobilization by the parties?

Among the Hindus, though, partisanship is highest for the
upper caste in relation to participation in the middle caste
and Harijans represent a higher proportion.[3] Does this suggest
a greater mobilization by the dominate caste against the high

---

[3]Sidney Verba, Bashiruddin Ahmed and Anil Bhatt, Caste,
Race and Politics: A Comparative Study of India and United
States (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1971), found that
Harijans differ least from caste Hindus in relation to parti-
cipation in elections in particular, in terms of voting.
Voting frequencies (both regularly and occasionally) for caste
Hindus being 82 percent and for Harijans 86 percent. For
Harijans they suggest partisan mobilized model as a path to
participation. With regard to partisanship, they found Harijans
about as partisan as caste-Hindus-Harijans 56 percent and caste-
Hindus 68 percent.

castes and consequently, the changing power balance in the
society? Does greater participation of the backward caste,
the result of mobilization in reserved constituencies? Does
the less participation of the upper caste mean apathy and
alienation on the part of the upper caste?

Table 4.2

Party Support by Caste
(N-1377)

Caste	Sample Norm	Cong- ress	Swat- antra	Jana Sangh	Commu- nist	Socia- list	Regi- onal Par- ties
Upper	(31.2)	31.0	36.0	50.0	26.2	31.6	10.5
Middle	(13.4)	12.4	7.0	13.8	13.8	8.4	29.0
Low	(20.3)	20.0	28.0	15.9	33.8	24.2	8.9
Harijans & Tribals	(20.5)	21.0	13.0	18.1	17.5	29.5	21.0
Muslims	(11.3)	12.4	16.0	2.2	6.3	6.3	17.7
Other reli- gions	(3.2)	3.1	0.0	0.0	2.5	0.0	12.9
NA	(0.1)	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

As the Table indicates the Congress has a hetereogeneous
social base. Its supporters come proportionately more or less
equally from the various caste groups in the society. The
Swatantra has a higher support base in low caste groups com-
pared to upper caste. The support from the Muslim community
for the party seems to be higher than that for the Congress.
The Jana Sangh draws its predominant support from the upper
caste. Next to the Regional parties, the highest percentage
of support from the middle caste goes to Jana Sangh and the
Communists. The Communists parties have the largest supporters
from the low caste. The Socialist support is distributed

between the upper caste, lower caste and Harijans. However, its highest support base is among the Harijans and the Tribals. For the Regional parties, the support comes from the middle caste among the Hindus and other religious groups and Muslims among the non-Hindus.

In short, the Jana Sangh has the highest support in the upper caste, the Swatantra from the low caste, the Communist party from the low caste, the Socialist party from the Harijans and Tribals, and the Regional parties from the middle caste, Muslims and other religions.

Samuel Eldersveld in his Elite mass study of 1967,[4] found that those who were most aware of caste and had most caste consciousness revealed the highest proportion of strong partisans. There is nearly 30 percentage points difference between those for whom caste is not relevant (38 percent) and those for whom caste is salient (67 percent). In the National Sample Survey findings, except for the upper caste, the proportion of strong party identifiers are higher for all other castes, including the Muslims and other religions. The proportion of difference between the strong partisans and weak partisans for the different castes are[5] middle caste 11 percent, Harijans and Tribals 3.3 percent, low caste 1.6 percent, Muslims 4.2 percent and Other religions 6.3 percent. The fact that middle caste (11 percent), other religions (6.3 percent) and

---

[4]Samuel Eldersveld, _Comparative Politics Studies_, 1973.

[5]See Table 2.4, p. 18.

Muslims (4.2 percent) have a higher proportion of
strong identifiers and that these groups identify
with the regional parties in greater proportion, does it
indicate that in addition to saliency of local issues, the
regional parties are mostly caste and communal oriented?

Let us examine the nature of DMK party as an example of
caste and Akali Dal in Punjab and Muslim League in Kerala as
examples for religion. The DMK is the offshoot of the
Dravidian Movement in Madras. The forerummer of this movement
is the Justice party. The Dravidian movement is a socio-
religious revolt against Hinduism. It posits a theory of
racial origin of the Tamil speaking non-Brahmin. It lays
stress on the fact of conflict between immigrant Aryans and
the native Dravidians. The Brahmins are considered as racially
different from the non-Brahmins since they are the descendants
of the Aryan race. Thus DMK started as an anti-Brahmin move-
ment.[6] To this was added the issue of language, the Hindi
imperialism and the domination of the North over the South.
So by focussing the grievances of the south against the domi-
nation of the north and Hindi, the party soon became a rallying
point of opposition to the Congress. Since 1957 the DMK has
matured into a leading party. In 1957 it had 15 members in
the legislative Assembly. This increased to 50 in the 1962

---

[6]Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., The Dravidian Movement (Bombay:
Popular Prakashan, 1965). In Mysore and Andhra, though, there
is anti-Brahaminism; it is not so strong as it is in Madras
and Maharashtra.

elections, making it the main opposition party in Madras Legislative Assembly. In 1967, out of 234 seats, it could secure 142 seats, thus establishing itself as the majority party in the Assembly. In these years as it became more politically entrenched, the DMK has shed much of its original anti-Brahmanism. This is probably because other castes have won access to power and resources and also because "the DMK has become sufficiently self confident and politically pragmatic to solicit Brahmin support, and the Brahmins have been willing to reciprocate these advances."[7]

In contrast, Punjab has been frequently dominated by communal conflicts. All important political problems of the state are marked by communal approach, whether it is the problem of language or the reorganization of the state. The Sikh community in the Punjab are mobilized by the Akali Dal, the Hindu communal and conservative forces are mobilized by the Jana Sangh, and the secular forces among the Sikhs and Hindus by the Congress party and the Communist parties. The minority group of Scheduled caste are mobilized by the Republican party. Over time many changes have taken place in Punjab party politics. These changes are a decline of Congress domination and the increased strength of the Akali Dal and Jana Sangh, the near elimination of the Scheduled caste parties and the

---

[7] Lloyd I. Rudolph, Modernity of Tradition. Andre Beteille also refers to this development in his "Caste and Political Group Formation in Tamilnad," in Rajni Kothari, ed., Caste in Indian Politics (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1970), p. 271.

decline of independents and communists. Under these conditions of fluidity as Paul Brass suggests, "there are three types of political forces interacting: first, the communal parties laying claim to the exclusive support of a single community, second, the secular parties trying to combine support from both the communities, and, third, failure of parties to maintain internal cohesion." All these factors he suggests is contributing to "politics of accommodation in which the Congress follows the strategy of the aggregative party in its organizational structure and maintains an inter-communal character in both the electoral and legislative arenas. The communal parties base their organizations and electoral appeals on one community but form electoral alliances with each other during the elections and governing coalitions afterwards....In this process, the political parties do not merely reflect the pre-existing cleavages of the society but they shape, deflect and accommodate them."[8] Thus, in Punjab, the ethnic cleavages are channeled into politics of accommodation, thus reducing the intensity of communal conflict.

Of all the parties in Kerala, the Muslim League is the most religiously-oriented. It proclaims itself as the sole protector of Muslim interests. A fairly high percentage of Muslims compared to other communities in Kerala and the concentration of Muslims in certain areas (Malabar) gives the Muslim

---

[8]Paul Brass, "Ethnic Cleavages and Punjab Party Politics," paper presented at the New York meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, March, 1972. See also Baldev Raj Nayar, Minority Politics in the Punjab (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).

League a significant position in the politics of the state. Between 1957-1967, the Muslim League has risen from a minority party into a major partner in the United Front Government. However, though the Muslim League happens to be a very important factor in Kerala politics, at the All India level, many Muslims have been identifying with and supporting the parties other than Muslim League. For instance, the proportion of Muslims identifying with Congress, Swatantra and other leftist parties together, is higher than that of those identifying for the regional parties (see Table 4.2). Similarly in 1972 Elections, the Muslim votes in states where Muslims form a substantial percentage of voters, have voted for the Congress and other secular parties.[9] Does this reflect the trend toward the secularization of the political behavior of Indian Muslims?[10]

---

[9]

State	Constituencies with substantial Muslim votes	Con (R)	Con (O)	M.L.	CPI	CPM	Ind	Soc	Other Parties
Assam	29	20				1	7	1	
Bihar	17	8	2		2		3	2	
W. Bengal	64	40		2	3	12	2		5
M.P.	5	4			1				
Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Mysore, Punjab, Rajasthan	47	40		5	2				

Source: Gropal Krishna, "Muslim Parties," Seminar (May 1972), p. 21.

[10]See Gopal Krishna, "Muslim Politics,", pp. 18-24 and Imtiaz Ahmad, "Secularization", Seminar (August 1971), pp. 22-26.

Let us examine the Jana Sangh party at the All India level to see its caste and religious composition. According to Table 4.2, the Jana Sangh's highest party identifiers are from among the upper caste. The party has support in the middle caste but it is only .4 percent above the sample norm. Even though Muslims identify with the Jana Sangh, the proportion (2.2 percent) is much below the sample norm. As for other religions, the support is nil. With the result, it is predominantely a Hindu party. To this extent, it can be considered as communal in composition, but it does not restrict its membership to Hindus alone. Moreover, a party aspiring to be a national party, it must be politically pragmatic in soliciting support of different groups in the society. It is this question of "open membership" that led to the failure of a merger between the Jana Sangh and Hindu Mahasabha.[11]

A number of empirical studies on the role of caste in electoral politics have been made over the years. Myron Weiner and Ranji Kothari conducted a study at the constituency level in 1962.[12] In 1967 the Center for the Study of Developing Societies and the Indian Council of Social Science Research carried out an extensive study at the District and

[11]Myron Weiner, Party Politics in India: The Development of Multi-Party System (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). See also, Craig Baxter, A Biography of an Indian Political Party: Jana Sangh (London: Oxford University Press, 1969).

[12]Myron Weiner and Rajni Kothari, Indian Voting Behavior.

State levels.[13] Based on the 1967 National Survey of Voting Behavior, Bashiruddin Ahmed examines the relation of caste to electoral politics.[14] All these studies help to link together the micro and macro levels of operation of caste politics relationships.

The findings of the 1962 voting behavior study suggests that though caste, ethnic and organizational factors played an important role in the electoral behavior, other secular factors like considerations of party loyalty too had successfully competed with these traditional loyalties. The studies of 1967 also suggest the influence of caste considerations but the intensity of these primordial considerations has been greatly reduced as a result of greater party identification and urbanization. The findings of the different studies suggests that the saliency of caste differs according to

    1. whether it is a rural or urban constituency;

    2. socio-economic differences among the caste members.

Bashiruddin Ahmed on the basis of a sample of 1971 respondents collected in 1967 examines the saliency of caste in electoral politics. His findings suggest[15] that there is a

---

[13]Center for the Study of Developing Societies, <u>Context of Electoral Change: 1967 General Elections</u> (Bombay: Academic Books 1969). See also Indian Council of Social Science Research, <u>Studies in Fourth General Elections</u> (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1972).

[14]Bashruddin Ahmed, "Caste and Electoral Politics," <u>Asian Survey</u> (November 1970), pp. 979-992. For a general study of caste political relationship, see Rudolphs, <u>The Modernity of Tradition</u> and Rajni Kothari, <u>Caste in Indian Politics</u>. See also, Myron Weiner, <u>The Politics of Scarcity</u> (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962), chapter 3.

[15]Bashruddin Ahmed, Caste and Electoral Politics," p. 984.

Table 4.3

Percent Giving Caste Related Responses
to Beliefs and Attitude

(N=1971)	Percentage
1. Voting Pattern Own Caste	68
2. Party best protecting interest of own caste	47
3. Party own caste leaders support	42
4. Block voting by other castes	43
5. Legislators protect the interest of their own caste	47
6. Agrees with caste leaders party choice	35
7. Considers legislators caste role important	26
8. Considers it important to vote the way caste votes	20

Source: Bashruddin Ahmed, "Caste and Electoral Politics,"
Asian Survey (November 1970), p. 984, Table 1.
Reports caste relevant answers only. "Don't Know" responses
and responses which indicate that caste has no saliency are not
included.

high degree of awareness of the voting pattern of one's own

caste (68 percent). Similarly, 43 percent perceived bloc

voting by other castes. 47 percent of the respondents linked

the interest of their caste to a particular party. Again, 47

percent saw members of state and Federal legislature acting

as protectors of the caste they represent, 42 percent indicated

awareness of which party their caste leaders supported. With

regard to the extent of predisposition to act in caste related

way in politics, the findings suggest 35 percent agreeing with

caste leaders party choice, 26 percent consider legislative

caste role important and 20 percent consider it important to

vote the way caste votes. Overall though, there is greater

awareness of saliency of caste in politics, however, when it

comes to voting, only 20 percent consider it important to vote

the way caste votes. Moreover, the findings also suggest that urbanity tends to weaken the hold of caste loyalties and identities. Whereas there is no difference in the awareness of the voting pattern of ones own caste, perception of legislators caste campaigning role and linking the interest of their caste with a specific party in both rural and urban constituencies, there is a difference with regard to the attitude on involvement of caste in politics, especially with regard to the question of voting the way ones own caste votes. Further, there is also difference in the perception of caste voting as a bloc. In urban areas, it is 14 percent whereas for the rural, it is 27 percent. This fact supports the thesis that the pressure to vote enbloc is greater in rural areas than in urban areas. Overall, caste influence becomes significant in the face to face political community of the village than in the more impersonal settings of the urban city. Even though caste provides an important basis for mobilizing support for parties both at the rural and urban contexts, ideological and "programmatic appeals" becomes more relevant at the urban level. Moreover, the attitudes of the individual in general changes from the rural, in the city context. He feels more independent.[16]

The second question examined by Bashruddin is the saliency of caste among the member of caste communities that are differentiated internally on socio-economic divisions. In other

---

[16]O.P. Goyal, "Caste and Politics-- A Theoretical Framework", paper presented at Punjab Studies Conference, held at the University of Pennsylvania, May, 1971.

words, as Kothari puts it, "differences in education, in income and occupation and in general life styles reduces the area of shared interests within the caste community and expose its members to other non caste groupings and cleavage pattern in society."[17]

As Table 4.4 indicates, the respondents are classified into socio-economically heterogeneous caste and socio-economically homogeneous castes. Seven indicators are used to measure political salience of caste. As for the first indicator "party best protecting the interests of own caste", the findings indicate that for the first three groups in the heterogeneous classification, it ranges between 35 to 40 percent. For the same indicator in the homogeneous classification, for the four groups it ranges between 52 to 69 percent, seventeen percentage point differences in the minimum as well as maximum. For the second indicator "party own caste leaders support" for the three groups, it varies between 33 to 35 percent and for the remaining four groups, it varies between 44 to 58 percent, indicating a difference of 11 to 13 percentage points. For the third indicator "bloc voting by other caste" the findings suggest that for the first three groups it varies between 30 to 47 percent and for the second four groups, it varies between 38 to 52 percent, indicating that both homogeneous and heterogeneous caste perceive bloc voting by castes. For the fourth indicator "legislators protect the interest of their caste" for the former three groups it ranges between 41

---

[17]Kothari, Politics in India, p. 238.

Table 4.4

Percent of Caste Relevant Responses and Heterogeneity of Castes*

(N=1971)

Indicators of Political Salience of Caste	Socioeconomically Heterogeneous Castes			Socioeconomically Homogeneous Castes			
	Brahmins [a]	Non-Agr.[b] Upper Caste	Backward[c] Castes	Dominant[d] Castes	Scheduled[e] Castes/Tribes	Muslims	Other Non-Hindu Religious groups
Party best protecting interst of own caste	40	35	39	53	52	69	57
Party own caste leaders support	34	33	35	47	44	58	53
Block voting by other castes	30	47	41	48	38	52	46
Legislators protect the interest of their caste	50	41	43	49	42	51	27
Agrees with caste leaders' party choice	24	29	29	41	36	53	50
Considers legislator's caste role important	17	22	25	26	31	36	16
Considers it important to vote the way caste votes	13	10	16	23	24	29	33

*Caste relevant responses only.

a. Iyengars, Chatturvedi, Trivedi, Namboodari, etc.
b. Al1 Vaisya sub-castes, plus Kayasthas, Khattris, etc.
c. Ahirs, Kurmis, Nadars, Vanniyars, etc.
d. Rajputs, Reddys, Kammas, Vokkaligas, Lingayats, Marathas, Patidars, Jats
3. For the Scheduled Caste, the census classification was followed.

Source: Bashiruddin Ahmed, "Caste and Electoral Politics," Asian Survey (November 1970), p. 988 , Table 4

to 50 percent and for the latter four groups it ranges between 27 to 51. Here also it indicates that there is no difference in the predisposition of homogeneous and heterogeneous castes toward "legislators protecting the interest of the caste they represent". For the fifth indicator "agrees with caste leaders party choice" it varies between 24 to 29 percent for the former three groups, 36 to 53 percent for the latter four groups. There is a difference of 12 to 14 percentage points. For the sixth indicator "considers legislator caste role important", for the heterogeneous groups it ranges between 17 to 25 percent and for the homogeneous groups it is 16 to 36 percent. Here again, both the classification of groups behave in a similar way and perceive legislators caste role important. With regard to the last indicator, "considers it important to vote the way caste votes" for the first three groups, it various between 10 to 16 percent and for the second four groups 23 to 33 percent, a difference of 13 to 17 percentage points. Overall, the findings suggest that out of seven indicators to measure the difference, on three indicators, socio-economic differences does not make any difference. In other words, in their perception of other castes and also with regard to the perception of interests of their own caste, socio-economic differences do not count. It means the members of the caste, irrespective of rural and urban settings or socio-economic differences, perceive caste interests to be of primary importance. But on the other indicators specifically with regard to the way the caste votes, it does mean a difference. This suggests that

socio-economic differences contribute to lessen the intensity
of the role of caste in politics. So as urbanization
increases, along with other interveneing variables like edu-
cation, social mobilization and economic development, could
contribute to the decline in the saliency of caste in politics.
Moreover, it must be emphasized that a distinction must be
made between caste as an ethnic unit and caste as a political
unit. In viewing the caste in the latter sense, we are attri-
buting to the caste the role of an interest group.[17] The
part caste consciousness plays is not to further caste tra-
ditions and customs, but by rallying the community, and through
political power, attempt is made to further the interest of
the caste in the society just like any other interest group.
It is in this perspective that we should view the caste
associations in India. As Rajni Kothari observes "a highly
diffuse and plural society is here found to come to terms with
the centralizing tendencies of a modern polity. By inducing
social strata to enter into larger identification and by pro-
viding to political leaders significant communication channels
and a relatively stable loyalty structure, such a reorientation
of the caste system fills an important place in the emerging
infra-structure of modern India."

As a conclusion to this chapter, it may be argued that
many factors have contributed significantly to erode the dis-
ruptive effect of caste in politics and channeled their energies

---

[18]Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne H. Rudolph, "The Political
Role of India's Caste Associations," in Political Modernization,
ed., Claude E. Welch, Jr. (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Co.,
1971), pp. 63-82.

for the mutual benefit of both politics and caste. The role
of caste can be better appreciated if we view the relation
between caste and politics as not static but as continously
changing one. In this regard, factors contributing to such
development may be emphasized. First, modernization has
created new ways of social differentiation based on educa-
tion, occupation and income that cut across traditional caste
differentiation. So as caste becomes more and more heterogeneous
in terms of income, occupation and education, new status groups
based on modern criteria are likely to compete with caste for
people's loyalties, and thus erode the importance of caste
loyalties. Second, politicization had brought about changes
in the attitude and approach of the caste group in politics.
For instance, the caste group has to compete along with other
types of groups in the society for political power. In this
process they not only become secularized (in the sense of
having to depend on other groups for support) but as Kothari
puts it "by drawing in caste system into its web or organization,
politics finds materials for articulation and moulds it into
its own design." In other words, political parties by sub-
suming castes to their larger ideological and programmatic
purposes, have secularized the caste groups. Third, factional
politics too have contributed to a certain extent in eroding
the saliency of caste in politics. Brass shows how alliances
are often made across caste for the pursuit of political
objectives thus cutting across caste loyalties.

Thus, it is argued that caste and politics are functionally

related and it is a bias to suggest "casteism", "caste ridden" or "one sided determination of politics". It is further argued, that by integrating the various castes in the society, opportunity is provided for better participation and consensus, thus contributing to greater legitimacy, systematic support and stability of the political system.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In this report, while reviewing the findings on the
extent, intensity and direction of party identification, we
have been interested in testing the relation of social status
variables to party identification and in comparing relation-
ships found between socio-economic variables and party
identification with those observed between such variables
and voter participation.

Observations

The findings of different studies are agreed as to the
fact of a high proportion of partisanship among the Indian
electorate. In testing the relation of socio-economic status
variables to partisanship we observed that income and educa-
tion in general have a positive correlation to partisanship
and voter participation. In other words, the findings suggest
that higher levels of income and education contribute to a
higher proportion of partisanship and voter participation.

Several studies have reported that persons of higher
status occupations are more likely to participate in politics,
that among the specific occupations, professionals are highly
participative and that among the different occupational
groupings, farmers tend to have the lowest levels of political
participation. The patterns observed in India seem to be in
contrast with the above findings. For instance, in the NSS

findings, the lowest status occupation (landless labor) is as partisan as the highest status occupation (professions). One way to explain this is by suggesting greater mobilization of these groups by the political parties or because of mobilization based on patron-client relation that exist in rural areas. Similarly, the high proportion of partisanship among the unskilled factory workers as compared to professions may be explained by mobilization of trade unions affiliated to political parties. Moreover, the high proportion of partisanship and voter participation among cultivators (more than professions and white collar) suggest the increasing role of rural people in the Indian politics.[1] The low level of interest in partisanship and participation among the professions, coupled with the fact that this group has a higher percentage of weak partisans (see Table 2.4), does suggest a sense of alienation or aloofness on the part of a highly educated section of the society.

In comparing patterns of relationship of party identification and voter participation to socio-economic variables, we observe that for the most part, these two forms of political behavior show parallel patterns. However, they are notably different in their urban/rural patterns. The higher proportion of partisanship of the urbanites may be explained because of the ecological stimuli provided in the urban centers and the

---

[1]In a review of the social characteristics of members of Parliament in the Fourth Lok Sabha, Ratna Dutta found traditional dominance of parties and legislatures by lawyers being displaced by farmers and agriculturists. See, "The Party Representative in Fourth Lok Sabha," Economic and Political Weekly, Nos. 1 and 2, January, 1969.

fact of less participation because of apathy and a sense of alienation. Similarly, the higher proportion of voter participation among the rural people may be the result of mobilization by political parties, and "linkage structures" or Vote Banks.[2]

Discrepancies and Further Investigation

There are certain areas in which the findings of different studies show discrepancy, indicating thereby the need for further research. Discrepancy can be observed with regard to the findings relating partisanship to age and occupation. Similarly we find discrepancy in the findings between the patterns of party identification and voter participation for the income and rural/urban variables.

Recent literature on Indian politics has emphasized that the Indian electorate have entered into a more active phase of politics that voters are becoming aware of the problem of policy and performance and that the voters in India have come to vote on the basis of deliberation and critical evaluation of the party performance. If this is true, the impact of "vote banks" and "group consciousness" would decline, ushering in a more secular and rational basis of party support. This

---

[2]Vote banks are in the hands of caste leaders, landlords, Princes and influential people in the locality. For the significance of vote bank, see Rajni Kothari, Indian Voting Behavior; Center for Developing Societies, Contest of Electoral Change; Jitendra Singh and Satish K. Arora, "Vested Interests Over-rated," Seminar, No. 144 (August 1971), pp. 27-37; Kusum Bhargave, "Rajasthan Politics and Princely Rulers," Indian Journal of Political Science (October-December, 1972), and William L. Richter, "Electoral Patterns in Princely India," a paper presented at the Seminar on Electoral Patterns in the Indian States, Boston, Massachusetts, 1972.

is a field requiring further investigation because it is of great consequence for the political development of the Indian electorate.

It had been observed in the findings* that the highly educated, the high income groups, the urbanites and the highest occupational group seem to be less interested in politics. What contributes to this disinclination or aloofness? This is another field requiring further research because it is of great consequence for the developing countries attempting to modernize.

We observed in Chapter IV that the socio-economic differences within a caste group contributes to a decline in the saliency of caste in politics. But we also observed that the rate of difference among the heterogeneous castes varies. Does this suggest that there are intervening variables like level of education, income and the like that contribute to this difference? This area requires further research. Similarly, the impact of ideology and electoral system on the communal politics are two interesting and fruitful areas of further research.

In the Western democracies, party identification has roots in the family. It is through the family that the child learns the first lessons of partisanship. India being a developing country, scholars have emphasized and researched the factors of modernization and political mobilization as contributing to partisanship. Family socialization has only

* These are also high in being weak partisans (see Table 2.4).

received attention very recently.[3] In a recent (1972) survey,
research on school children in Adhra Pradesh[4] (India), Shanto
Iyengar found that among the first generation of post-indepen-
dent Indians (born between 1955 and 1964), 40 percent were
being socialized in the family. This suggests that family
socialization had become relevant to the Indian electorate.
This is a field requiring greater research. The same scholar
also found that "apart from the family, agitations also function
as agents of socialization." In other words, research on
agitational politics contributing to partisanship is very
significant, especially in the context of Third World countries
where agitations have been a method not only for achieving
independence from foreign rule, but also an important "ingredient
of political articulation."[5]

In conclusion, a word on research methods may not be out
of place. Many of the findings based on single surveys, case
studies, and opinion polls are tentative. Follow-up surveys,
panel studies and aggregate data analysis are needed to confirm
these findings. Moreover, generalization to a vast country with
much diversity requires multi-level and cross-regional comp-
arative study, that is comparative study between national beha-
vior on the one hand and regional (state) and local on the
other. It also necessitates study of inter-generational develop-
ment of attitudes and behavior.

---

[3]Samuel Eldersveld, Comparative Political Studies, pp. 278-
288.

[4]Shanto Iyengar, "Childhood Learning of Partisanship in a
New Nation: The Case of Andhra Pradesh". American Journal of
Political Science, (November 1976).

[5]Rajni Kothari, Politics in India, p. 219

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Almond, Gabriel A. Political Development. Boston: Little Brown, 1970.

_____, and Verba, Sydney. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.

Apter, David E. The Politics of Modernization. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965.

Baxter, Craig A. A Biography of an Indian Political Party: Jana Sangh. London: Oxford University Press, 1969.

Butler, David, and Stokes, Donald. Political Change in Britain: Forces Shaping Electoral Choice. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969.

Campbell, Angus; Converse, Phillip E.; Miller, Warren E.; and Stokes, Donald E. The American Voter. New York: Wiley, 1960.

_____. Elections and Political Order. New York: Wiley, 1966.

Center for the Study of Developing Societies. Party System and Election Studies. Bombay: Allied, 1967.

_____. Context of Electoral Change in India: General Elections 1967. Bombay: Academic Books, 1969.

Coleman, James S. "The Political System of the Developing Areas." The Politics of the Developing Areas. By Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960.

Dahl, Robert A. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971.

Dawson, Richard, and Prewitt, Kenneth. Political Socialization. Boston: Little Brown, 1969.

Greenstein, Fred I. Children and Politics. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965.

Hardgrave, Robert L. The Dravidian Movement. Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1965.

Hess, Robert D., and Torney, Judith V. The Development of Political Attitudes in Children. Chicago: Aldine, 1967.

Huntington, Samuel P. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.

Indian Council of Social Science Research. Studies in Fourth General Elections. Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1972.

Kothari, Rajni. Politics in India. Boston: Little Brown, 1970.

_____. Caste in Indian Politics. Delhi: Orient Longman, 1972.

_____, and Shah, Gansham. "Caste Orientation of Political Factions: Modassa Constituency." The Indian Voting Behavior. By Myron Weiner and Rajni Kothari. Calcutta: Mukhopadnayay, 1965.

LaPalombara, Joseph, and Weiner, Myron. Political Parties and Political Development. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966.

Milbrath, Lester W. Political Participation. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965.

Narayan, Iqbal. State Politics in India. Meerut: Meenakshi Prakasham, n.d.

Nayar, Baldev Raj. Minority Politics in Punjab. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966.

Page, Benjamin I., and Wolfinger, Raymond E. "Party Identification." Readings in American Political Behavior. By Raymond E. Wolfinger. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970.

Rudolph, Lloyd I., and Rudolph, Susanne H. The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India. Chicago: The Chicago University Press, 1967.

Srinivas, M.N. Caste in Modern India and Other Essays. Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1962.

Verba, Sidney; Ahmed, Bashiruddin; and Bhatt, Anil. Caste, Race and Politics: A Comparative Study of India and the United States. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1971.

_____; Nie, Norman H.; and Kim, Jae-on. The Modes of Democratic Participation. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1971.

Weiner, Myron. The Politics of Scarcity: Public Pressure and Political Response in India. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1962.

_____. Party Building in a New Nation: The Indian
National Congress. Chicago: The Chicago University
Press, 1967.

_____. The Communist Parties of West Bengal. Delhi:
Manohar Book Service, 1974.

_____. Party Politics in India: The Development of Multi-
Party System. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1957.

_____, and Kothari, Rajni. Indian Voting Behavior.
Calcutta: Mukhopadhayay, 1965.

Welch, Claude E., Jr., ed. Political Modernization: A Reader
in Comparative Change. Belmont, Ca.: Wadsworth
Publishing, 1971.

Public Documents

Government of India. Election Commission. Report on the
First, Second, Third and Fourth General Elections in India.
Vol. 2 (1955, 1959, 1962, 1968).

Published Articles

Ahmed, Bashiruddin. "Caste and Electoral Politics." Asian
Survey (November, 1970), 979-992.

Brass, Paul R. "Political Participation, Institutionalization
and Stability." Government and Opposition (Winter, 1969),
23-53.

Deutsch, Karl W. "Social Mobilization and Political Develop-
ment." The American Political Science Review (September,
1961, 493-514.

Eldersveld, Samuel J. "The 1967 Indian Election: Patterns of
Party Regularity and Defection." Asian Survey (November,
1970), 1015-1030.

_____. "Party Identification in India in Comparative
Perspective." Comparative Political Studies (October,
1973), 271-293.

Gould, Harold A. "Changing Political Behavior in Rural Indian
Society." Economic and Political Weekly (August 1967).

Huntington, Samuel P. "The Change to Change: Modernization,
Development and Politics." Comparative Politics (April,
1971), 283-322.

Inkeles, Alex. "Participant Citizenship in Six Developing
Countries." The American Political Science Review (December,
1969), 1120-1141.

Iyengar, Shanto. "Childhood Learning Patterns in a New Nation: The Case of Andhra Pradesh." American Journal of Political Science (November 1976) forthcoming.

_____. "The Development of Political Agitators: Political Socialization in an Indian State." Youth and Society (September 1975), 27-48.

Kothari, Rajni. "Congress System Revisited: A Decennial View." Asian Survey, (December 1974), 1035-1054.

_____. "Party Politics and Political Development." Economic and Political Weekly (Feburary 1971), 1-22.

_____. "Tradition and Modernity Revisited." Government and Opposition (Summer, 1968), 273-293.

_____. "Continuity and Change in India Party System." Asian Survey (November 1970), 937-948.

_____. "Voting in India: Competitive Politics and Political Change." Economic and Political Weekly (Annual Number 1971), 229-230.

_____. "Political Change of 1967." Economic and Political Weekly (Annual Number 1971), 231-250.

Madsen, Douglas. "Solid Congress Support in 1967: A Statistical Inquiry." Asian Survey (November 1970), 1004-1014.

Morris-Jones, W.H. "The Indian Congress Party: A Dilemma of Dominance." Modern Asian Studies (1967), 109-132.

Narain, Iqbal. "Democratic Politics and Political Development in India." Asian Survey (Feburary 1970), 88-99.

_____. "Ideology and Political Development: Battle for Issues in Indian Politics." Asian Survey (Feburary 1971), 185-196.

Raghavendra, Rao. "Caste, Secularism and Democracy in India." International Journal of Comparative Sociology (March 1966), 197-208.

Rudolph, Lloyd I. "The Modernity of Tradition: The Democratic Incarnation of Caste in India." American Political Science Review (December 1965), 975-989.

_____, and Rudolph, Susanne H. "The Political Role of India's Caste Association." Pacific Affairs (March 1960), 5-22.

_____. "Consensus and Conflict in Indian Politics." World Politics (April 1961), 385-399.

_____. "Continuities and Change in Electoral Behavior: The 1971 Parliamentary Elections in India." Asian Survey (December 1971), 1119-1132.

Seminar Issue. Number 94. Symposium on "Election Outcome." (June 1967), 10-55.

_____. Number 124. Symposium on "Our Political Parties." (December 1969), 10-35.

_____. Number 144. Symposium on "The 1971 Elections." (August 1971), 10-41.

_____. Number 153. Symposium on "State Elections." (May 1972), 10-32.

Singh, L.P. "Development or Political Decay in India." Pacific Affairs (Spring 1971), 65-89.

Sheth, D.L. "Partisanship and Political Development." Economic and Political Weekly (Annual Number 1971), 259-274.

_____. "Political Development of the Indian Electorate." Economic and Political Weekly (November 1970),

_____. "Profiles of Party Support in 1967." Economic and Political Weekly (Annual Number 1971), 275-288.

Somjee. "Caste and Decline of Political Homogeneity." The American Political Science Review (September 1973), 799-816.

Weiner, Myron. "The 1971 Elections and the Indian Party System." Asian Survey (December 1971), 1153-1166.

Unpublished Materials

Brass, Paul R. "Ethnic Cleavages and the Punjab Party System." Paper presented at the New York meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, March, 1972.

Field, John O. "Partisanship in India." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1973.

Richter, William L. "Electoral Patterns in Princely India." Paper presented at the Seminar on Electoral Patterns in The Indian States, Boston, Massachusetts, June, 1972.

Weiner, Myron. "India's Urban Constituencies." Paper presented at the Seminar on Electoral Patterns in the Indian States, Boston, Massachusetts, June 1972.

A REVIEW OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION IN INDIA

by

MUDUMBAI NAGARATNA

M.A., Osmania University, 1955

AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S REPORT

submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Political Science

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas

1975

Party identification is one of the important ways in which people relate to politics in a democracy. The extent, intensity and direction of party identification is related to competitive politics and participation in the society. Many studies relating socio-economic variables to participation have found a high correlation between these two.

This paper attempts to examine (1) findings of Indian and Foreign scholars on the extent, intensity and direction of party identification; (2) the relationship between party identification and social background characteristics, with special consideration of its relationship to caste, and (3) similarities and differences between patterns of party identification and voter participation.

The main reason behind this study is to highlight the discrepancies in the behavior pattern between social structure variables and party identification on the one hand and voter participation on the other.

The method of examining is comparison of findings of scholars with emphasis on the period after 1967. This study makes use of the findings of the Cross-National Project Survey of 1966, National Sample Survey of 1967, Studies of Electoral Politics made by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the Political Poll Surveys conducted by The Indian Institute of Public Opinion and the poll performance of all India political parties in the General Elections based on the Election Results.

Such a review discloses some discrepancies among findings

of various studies as well as differences in Rural/Urban
and other patterns of partisanship and voter participation.