

THE RELATIONSHIP OF DIALECTIC TO ARGUMENTATION

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CHLOE E. REXROAD

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Major Professor

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CHAPTER I

The study of dialectic is a matter to which many philosophers as well as laymen have addressed themselves. The amount of literature devoted to the subject during a particular time span seems to correspond to the esteem which dialectic was given in that particular era. The high esteem and monumental importance attributed to dialectic in the Greek and Roman era is demonstrated through the writings of such noted philosophers as Plato, Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian. Plato used the dialectical form extensively throughout his writings in addition to using the subject as a topic of discussion between his main characters. In the Republic he states that the training of the philosopher-king is to be concluded with dialectic.¹ Aristotle devoted his entire treatise Topics to the subject area of dialectic.

The continuing importance of dialectic is evidenced through Cicero and Quintilian in the Roman era as both devoted portions of their works to the subject. Cicero in DE Inventione sets forth principles for conducting dialectic as does Quintilian in Institutes of Oratory both of which are similar to those set forth by Aristotle though less complete and detailed. In both the Greek and Roman periods, dialectic was an absolute essential in the training of either a philosopher or gentleman. Following these periods many academic endeavors lost prominence in the educational realm and did not regain this prominence until the early nineteenth century. Dialectic was among this group of studies. An examination of the history of dialectic as well as the entire field of logic from the classical time until the beginning of the modern period demonstrates no new concepts of real significance, however during this period a trend to formalize logic

appeared and the discipline was restricted to one special aspect of knowledge.²

The formalization of logic resulted in the development of five different approaches to the field of logic throughout the time span between Aristotle and Bacon. The first of these is the Peripatetic School which was represented by Theophrastus and Eudemus. This school basically followed the principles set forth by Aristotle, however it recognized the hypothetical and disjunctive proposition or syllogism in itself. The second school of thought is that of the Epicurean and Stoic logics. Both groups regarded logic as a practical theory of knowledge. The Stoic, however represents the first group to propose a purely formal discipline based on an entirely empirical theory of cognition. Third there existed the period of general acceptance of the field of logic by the Romans. This period, as previously mentioned, differed in no significant way from the approach taken by Aristotle. Scholastic logic comprises the fourth group which added a vast amount of verbal subtle distinctions in the area of logic which eventually made up the body of the Parva Logicalia. In addition they also attempted to divide immediate understanding from discursive thought. The final group to develop between the time of Aristotle and the modern era was the humanistic modification of logic and reaction against Aristotelianism. During this period Valla, Agricola and Vives severely criticized the Aristotelian approach to logic and offered in turn a "Rhetorico-grammatical logic" similar to Cicero's eclectic reproduction of Stoicism. Along with this reaction against Aristotle there was also a break with the extremely formal approach to logic. Francis Bacon and Decartes were the next philosophers to devote time to the general area of logic but neither differed greatly from the approach taken by Aristotle.³

The appearance of the philosophic writers Immanuel Kant and somewhat later, Georg W. F. Hegel who addressed themselves to the general subject of logic, a part of which was dialectic, brought the field of logic back into prominence. Kant directs his approach to the area as existing on two levels; 1) that of experience and 2) that of the ideal.⁴ In other words, when one experiences something he is in the world of experience thus the knowledge which he has acquired from that experience is not as valid as if it had been obtained through the world of the ideal which is definitely outside the realm of experience. This approach to the study of logic is vastly more metaphysical in orientation than are those previously mentioned. That is to say, dialectic to Kant was a small process functioning in accordance with his concept of the total universe. Hegel pursues this concept in his study of logic and extends it to encompass the idea that all things which exist have exact opposites and contradictions. To him, dialectic exists in these opposites and contradictions in the physical world. Engels subscribes to this theory of dialectic in addition to which he applied the theoretical concepts to specific situations existing in the world around him. Since this time few philosophers or laymen have addressed themselves directly to the subject of dialectic. Among these few are M. J. Adler and Stephen A. Toulmin who appear to approach dialectic basically in accordance with the early Greek and Roman theory.

In recent times the study of dialectic has been excluded from the educational realm as being in opposition to scientific discipline and at the same time it is being replaced by the study of empirical logic. Even though inductive and deductive reasoning are utilized extensively in the empirical realm, the study of logic as a discipline has not acquired the degree of importance or popularity in the modern circumstance that dialectic

held in the classical period. Logic, in fact, is no longer considered essential to the training of the scientific mind but rather an accessory to this training. It is evident that the study of dialectic is no longer held in as high esteem as it has been in past years. The attitudes of individual scholars in this area have encompassed everything from extremely favorable to extremely unfavorable. Due to the scope and number of approaches to dialectic, an exhaustive study of the topic would not only be an unlikely endeavor but, in addition, an extremely dull one. For this reason, it would seem reasonable to limit this investigation of the topic to; 1) an examination of the key philosophers in dialectic reasoning from the classical period, 2) an examination of the key philosophers in dialectic reasoning from the modern period and 3) an evaluation of the connection of each of the two schools of thought and the process of argumentation. It will then be demonstrated that both the classical school of dialectic and the modern school of dialectic are germane to the field of argumentation. At this point, dialectic may be defined as a process of reasoning through question and answer. Through this examination, however, this writer hopes to achieve an operational definition of dialectic according to each of the four philosophers examined.

The key philosophers selected for examination in this study are Aristotle, Hegel, Engels, and M. J. Adler. These four men were selected because of their position in history, the scope of their approaches, and difference in applicability of their principles of the dialectic method. The words of other philosophers will be used to illustrate specific concepts in dialectic but none of these will be dealt with extensively. Specifically, the writings of Karl Marx will be used illustratively to provide examples of dialectic in use in society. Aristotle was selected because he was the first philosopher

to set forth systematically commonplaces which one could employ when engaged in dialectic. To this subject he devoted his entire treatise the Topics. Plato, although he does not agree totally upon the acceptable uses of dialectic, he coincides with Aristotle upon the necessary constituents of dialectic.

Hegel and Engels were selected because of their position in the modern school. They seem to be the key figures of their era who have expounded upon the subject. The decision to examine the writings of Adler was arrived at because he is contemporary and is among a very small group of people who have recently devoted any writing at all to the subject area of dialectic. From a rather extensive examination of the writings of M.J. Adler this writer would place him in the classical school of dialecticians as he closely follows those concepts set forth by Aristotle. For this investigation of the various approaches to dialectic an historical approach is demanded and then a critical approach will be used to evaluate the connection between the two schools of dialectic and the process of argumentation.

History is the only link one has with events which have occurred prior to his lifetime. These come to us then through documents written in that particular period or through reports written by those persons who have studied that particular period. Because of the reliance upon human beings for the writing and transmission of past events, they inherently contain the particular author's bias and are therefore not totally objective. For this reason, when studying history, one must realize that what he is viewing is not the absolute truth of a situation but rather a subjective report of a situation. In order to obtain a view which is as accurate as possible, one should read from many different sources of material and then attempt to formulate an attitude or perspective which is as accurate as possible. In conducting this examination

we have drawn from a variety of sources in preliminary reading and then selected the specific materials to be utilized extensively. Realizing that this selection cannot be totally objective, we have attempted to select a wide range of secondary sources which are cited in chapter two of this study.

In addition to being historical, the current study will also incorporate a critical aspect in that the writer will attempt to evaluate the various schools of dialectic in their connection with the field of argumentation.

The critical evaluation which will be made in this study will be based upon the effectiveness of achieving its purpose through a mode. In other words, each school of dialectic will be evaluated on the effectiveness in the argumentation situation.

CHAPTER II

The resource materials available in the general topic area of dialectic are boundless and vary in source from ancient Greek philosophers who dedicated the major portion of their time to the subject to slightly known college professors who happen to employ the term occasionally. The approach taken by each of these authors varies from the extremely abstract to the highly formalized. An examination of the entirety of these materials would require years of time and reams of paper; therefore this review of the literature will be limited to an examination of the significant works in four major areas of the topic. These areas are: Primary sources in the classical school of dialectic; Secondary sources about classical dialectic; Primary sources in the modern school of dialectic; Secondary sources about the modern dialectic.

I. Primary Sources in the Classical School of Dialectic.

Aristotle, Organon. This is the logical works of Aristotle grouped together and edited by the later Peripatetics. It consists of Topics, Categories, Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, Propositions and Sophistical Refutation. The Topics is his treatise which is devoted entirely to the subject of dialectic. It is in this treatise that he sets forth the commonplaces by which dialectic may be conducted and discusses general concepts such as definition, the common topoi, propositions and problems. The remainder of the works in this group deal with his formal system of logic and the development of his formal syllogism. This is an extensive work and detailed as to the explanations of Aristotle's concepts concerning logic.

Adler, Mortimer J. Dialectic. M. J. Adler, lecturer in Psychology at Columbia University, describes dialectic in his book to be a kind of thinking

which occurs when persons enter into dispute. He essentially follows the same approach as does Aristotle and makes only the additional extension that dialectic may occur within the boundaries of a single mind. Adler's book is very complete in the discussion of the subject area and contains a large number of examples.

SECONDARY SOURCES FOR CLASSICAL DIALECTIC.

Ross, Sir David, Aristotle. In this book Ross deals with the major topic areas to which Aristotle addressed himself such as Logic, Philosophy of Nature, Biology, Psychology, Metaphysics, Ethics, Politics and Rhetoric. In each of these areas he discusses the specific treatise which Aristotle wrote on the subject. Chapter two is especially helpful to the current study as it deals with Aristotle's logical works and gives an account of all treatises included in the Organon. Because of the conciseness of this chapter, it is by necessity an overview with an absence of many details, however provides a sufficient general background for further reading in Aristotle's works.

Jaeger, Werner, Aristotle. A history of Aristotle's life and achievements while at the academy, in his travels, and after his settlement in Athens is provided by Jaeger in this book. The specific subject area of dialectic is not discussed in detail, however, it is discussed in relation to other areas of Aristotle's works. A detailed view of the circumstances of the time in which Aristotle worked along with an evaluation of his influence upon modern thinking and his students provides the reader with a valuable perspective from which to study individual works of Aristotle.

Owen, G. E. L. ed. Aristotle On Dialectic. This book contains the proceedings of the Third Symposium Aristotelicum at Oxford in 1968. This

symposium is held each year for the examination and discussion of controversial aspects of Aristotle's works; 1968 being devoted to the Topics of De Sophisticus Elenchis. Representative of a truly scholarly endeavor, the material presented here is very precise and complex. The second section is especially useful in establishing the relationship of Aristotle and Plato in the area of dialectic. This relationship is discussed in detail and is the only section in the book which is written in English. The sections on the "Equipment of Aristotelian Dialectic" and "The Subject Matter of Particular Books" are written nearly in their entirety in French. A valuable insight could be gained into the technical aspect of Aristotle's dialectic by a reader fluent in French.

Lloyd, G.E.R., Aristotle: The Growth and Structure of His Thought. Lloyd in this book presents Aristotle's personal history and traces his intellectual development throughout his lifetime. The degree of influence which Plato yielded over Aristotle was discussed in detail in chapters two and three. It is here that Lloyd discusses Aristotle's encounters with the dialectical process in the Platonic Academy. Part two of the book deals with seven major areas to which Aristotle addressed himself. These general areas are: Logic and Metaphysics, The Physics of the Heavenly region, the physics of the sublunary region, Psychology, Ethics, Politics, and lastly, Literary Criticism. The information given by Lloyd in each of these chapters is useful in obtaining an overview of Aristotle's thought but is not very explicit nor detailed in dealing with specific treatises written by Aristotle.

PRIMARY SOURCES FOR MODERN DIALECTIC

Hegel, G.W.F. Hegel's Logic. Hegel presents to us a comprehensive view of philosophy from the ancient Greeks to the implementation of his method. The first eleven chapters are useful to the reader for general orientation to the nature and character of Hegel's thought in general. Chapters twelve

through thirty are directly applicable to the current study of dialectic because he discusses his dialectical system as it functions in the world. It is in these chapters that Hegel presents the elements for the triadic structure which is pictured at the end of chapter four of this study. Though this book reads easily, the content is obscure and requires the use of secondary sources for clarification.

Engels, Frederick, Anti-Duhring was written in response to Herr Duhring, who was at that time attempting to reform socialism in Germany. He had challenged many of the ideas set forth by Engels thus the book is devoted to a refutation of those attacks. For this reason the book covers a wide range of subject matter of which dialectic is one. Chapter twelve, thirteen, and the Appendix are all devoted to the subject area of his three laws of dialectic and are helpful in illuminating the general area of dialectic. Having been written in response to an attack, this book contains many personal invectives which are irrelevant to the actual subject matter being dealt with and are somewhat distracting to the reader.

Engels, Frederick, Dialectics of Nature is the more helpful of Engels' two books dealing with the subject area of dialectic. This book consists of a series of articles and incomplete notes from other articles which Engels wrote describing and illustrating his laws of dialectic. The examples utilized by Engels are designed to discredit the capitalistic method of operation and further the system of dialectical materialism which was later more fully developed by Engels and Marx. Throughout the book in addition to discussing dialectic, Engels employs it in the madun sense thus using it as a means of persuasion to gain approval of his theories.

Hegel, G.W.F. Early Theological Writings. This book consists of a series of Hegel's early writings and is helpful in attaining a wider under-

standing of his approach to the world in general. It is divided into two parts; 1) "The Positivity of The Christian Religion" and 2) "The Spirit of Christianity And Its Fate". It is not especially enlightening on the subject of dialectic but rather provides insight into the way in which Hegel viewed the world around him.

SECONDARY SOURCES FOR MODERN DIALECTIC

Findlay, J.N. Hegel: A Re-Examination. In this book Findlay discusses the major concepts of Hegel's such as the notion of being, the notion of essence, the phenomenology of the spirit and the dialectical method. These concepts are discussed in depth and the work serves to clarify to a great extent the ideas set forth by Hegel. The third chapter and the appendix are devoted entirely to an explanation of the dialectical method. The history and background presented by Findlay provides insight into the factors which influenced Hegel in formulating his ideas.

Hook, Sidney. Reason, Social Myths, and Democracy. In this book Sidney Hook discusses many types of governments and the reasons for the rise and fall. His discussion provides a great deal of enlightenment which enhances understanding of these different systems. He devotes chapter nine and eleven entirely to the discussion of dialectic as it has been viewed by the modern school. He analyzes each of the three laws of dialectic set forth by Hegel and proceeds to criticize these. This book is extremely helpful in acquiring a multi-sided view of the modern dialectic.

Kaufmann, Walter. Hegel. A large portion of this book is devoted to relating the personal background of Hegel and analyzing the influencing factors upon his concepts. Kaufman traces Hegel's life from early childhood until the time of his death and incorporates in this biography an account of

those early writings of Hegel's which are not frequently studied. The author also attempts to relate the philosophy of Hegel to other disciplines of his time such as literature and drama. The book gives a good general understanding of the life, works and influencing factors within the life of Hegel. The personal incidents which the author relates provides the reader with a more vivid impression of Hegel as a person in touch with the world around him.

CHAPTER III

Aristotle is the first of the four philosophers whose dialectic will be examined in depth in this study. His book the Topics, which is his treatise devoted specifically to dialectic, is included among those writings grouped under the title of logical works. Other members comprising this group are: Categories, Prior and Posterior Analytics, Propositions and Sophistical Refutation. This group of writings was collected and edited by the later Peripatetics under the general title of Aristotle's Organon.⁵ The Topics is believed to have been written prior to discovery of the formal syllogism. Aristotle did not refer to the study of logic as such but rather the study of analytic.

This study was a preoccupation of the philosopher and a direct outcome of discussions on scientific method held in the Platonic Academy.⁶ Aristotle conceived logic as a tool or instrument to correct thinking rather than a separate branch of study or science within itself. To him it was a part of general culture which everyone should undergo before attempting to study any of the sciences.⁷ This concept, as will be demonstrated later in this paper, differs greatly with that of Hegel and Engels and the modern school of dialectic. Aristotle indirectly distinguishes between logic and each of the other studies with which it has been confused by asserting the idea that it is a study not of words but of the thought of which words are signs; of thought not with reference to its natural history but with reference to its success or failure in attaining truth; of thought not as constituting but rather as apprehending the nature of things.⁸ Dialectic was then, divorced from the content or subject matter being discussed and analyzed only on the basis of the actual thought process occurring. From this concept of logic

Aristotle set forth extremely rigid stipulations for the formation of a valid syllogism. This procedure was not easily understood in his own period and time has done little to make his writing more easily understandable. A contributing factor to this lack of understanding could be its general interest level. As Will Durant states in his book The Story of Philosophy, "There is nothing as dull as logic, but nothing as important. It is difficult and ruthlessly tests the mind, but once done it is half of any task." Its value was similarly considered by Aristotle as he believed that one could only find the truth of a subject by reasoning from sound principles in a systematic fashion. The logical system was, in effect, his answer to the problem of the relation of the structure of language to the process of thought and the nature of reality.

Aristotle's dialectic, or arguments based upon conversation, has its basis in principles derived from the nature of the thought process which does not stem from objective experience. Essentially these arguments consist of opinions either of the many or of the wise, or at least the most famous of the wise as he did not believe that the general public would accept readily those opinions of the minority or of the unwise. This is reflected in Aristotle's purpose for writing a treatise on dialectic when he states it is to "discover a method by which we shall be able to reason from generally accepted opinions about any problem set before us and shall ourselves, when sustaining an argument, avoid saying anything self-contradictory." Dialectic deals with a dialectical syllogism unlike the demonstrative or scientific syllogism which is based upon premises that are true and immediate. It rather is based upon premises that are probably, however it is distinguished from the contentious syllogism as it reasons from premises which are truly

probably rather than reasoning from premises which only seem probably or simply reasoning incorrectly. The traditional example of a scientific or demonstrative syllogism is:

"All men are mortal
Socrates is a man
Socrates is mortal"

In this type syllogism one may establish the truth or falsity of the premises and conclusion immediately. If it were to be false it would still be categorized as a scientific or demonstrative syllogism because of its verifiability. The dialectical syllogism would be demonstrated by:

Men benefit from a college education
Joe is a man
Joe will benefit from a college education.

The major premise of the above syllogism represents an opinion held by the wise as well as by the majority of persons in our society. It is not however a verifiable concept as some men definitely would not benefit from a college education, and its degree of truth or falsity cannot be definitely determined as we do not know what type man Joe is nor what type education he would be receiving at a particular college. On the other hand, it is much more probable than a contentious syllogism which does not demonstrate a true probability such as:

All women are inferior to men
Jane is a woman
Jane is inferior to men.

This syllogism demonstrates an opinion which is not held by the wise nor the majority of persons in our society and therefore does not demonstrate any significant degree of probability and is thus distinguished from the dialectical syllogism. Dialectic, even though it does not claim the high degree of verifiability that belongs to the realm of science, it is not however reduced to the low status of eristic or argument only for the sake of argument.

Aristotle relates to us that dialectic may be employed for three main reasons: 1) for mental training; 2) for general conversations or being able to argue validly with those persons we meet. Because having familiarized oneself with the opinions of the majority we will be better able to approach them on their own ground; and 3) the last reason is for application to the sciences. If one has argued a question both pro and con he is in a better position to recognize truth and falsehood about that particular subject.⁹ A more detailed examination of the Topics will further clarify the dialectical reasoning process.

Essential to the understanding of dialectic states Aristotle, is an understanding of the differences between a proposition and a problem, the former being the sentence from which arguments arise such as: "Is animal the genus of man?", the latter, on the other hand, are the subjects of reasonings such as: "Is a talking animal a definition of man or not?" The propositions and the problems are logically equal in number because a problem can be made from any proposition by changing the way in which it is stated. Every proposition as well as problem indicates either a definition, a genus, a property or an accident.¹⁰ These are referred to as the predicables and are present in all propositions or problems. Which one of these four predicables a problem or proposition represents will be dependent upon the particular way in which that particular subject is being employed. Definition, according to Aristotle, was an essential aspect of understanding dialectic. Only when all concerned are aware of what is being discussed can there occur successful and meaningful discourse. 'Definition' was designated as a phrase indicating the essence of a particular object or concept while the remaining part of the explanation was to be termed 'property'. The definition is asserted either as a phrase used in place of a term or as a phrase used in

place of a phrase; for it is possible to define some things which are indicated by a phrase. The definitions set forth by Aristotle are frequently very lengthy and accompanied with a great deal of exemplification. The complete understanding of a definition alone, however, is not adequate for the successful use of dialectic. One must in addition, be able to employ the definition in an argumentative situation. He demonstrates that to be successful in discourse it is not enough for the construction of a definition to simply show that one thing is the same as another; however by demonstrating that one thing is not the same as another one presents sufficient evidence to destroy a definition and likewise an argument.

Definition is only one of the four predicable of a proposition. The other three are: property--something which does not show the essence of a thing but belongs to it alone and is predicated convertibly of it; genus--that which is predicated in the category of essence of several things which differ in kind; and accident--that which is none of the four previously mentioned things but still belongs to the thing. These four predicables, according to Aristotle, are found in one of ten different categories: essence, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, activity and passivity.¹¹

The use of dialectic necessitates a dialectical thesis which is a conception contrary to general opinion but propounded by someone famous as a philosopher or it may concern matters about which we hold a reasoned view contrary to received opinions. From these dialectical theses emerge dialectical arguments. According to Aristotle, there are four main sources of arguments; 1) the provision of propositions; 2) the ability to distinguish in how many senses a particular expression is used; 3) the discovery of differences, and; 4) the investigation of similarities. Each of the arguments or propositions will be either ethical, logical or physical in nature. When engaged in

dialectic one should be aware of the type proposition with which he is dealing in order to approach it in the most effective manner. To enhance success in dialectic one should also be aware of the sources of ambiguity in propositions. In knowing these one cannot only be certain to avoid them himself thus resulting in stronger arguments but also he will be able to cope with them more successfully when used by the opposition. This ambiguity in propositions can result from:¹²

1. Contraries expressed in different words.
2. Contraries which are the same word but different in kind.
3. Contraries existing for one sense of a term but not for another sense of that same term.
4. Meanings of terms and their contraries may have intermediate meanings which are not consistent.
5. One term employed in more than one sense will have an opposite employed in more than one way.
6. Inflected forms of a term may be employed in several different senses.
7. The predicates of a term may be different in different cases.
8. The term being used may be classed under more than one genera.
9. The contrary of a term may be classed under more than one genera.
10. A term in a composite phrase may have a different meaning when separated from that phrase.
11. A particular definition itself may be ambiguous.
12. Term may not be comparable in respect to greater or similar degree.

The actual techniques which should be employed in constructing or destroying an argument are set forth by Aristotle in book II of The Topics. These techniques are referred to as commonplaces because they can be applied to many different subjects. The commonplaces, are: First, examine whether your opponent has assigned as an accident something which belongs in some other way. This mistake is usually committed in respect to genera, for example, if someone should say that white happens to be a colour; for white does not happen to be a colour, but colour is its genus. Another commonplace lead one to reason that "since all of those things which possess that genus, must also possess one of its species, grammatical knowledge, or musical knowledge, or

some other kind of knowledge is predicated of him.¹³

2. Examine instances in which a predicate has been said to belong to all or none of a particular thing, and to look at them according to species and not in their infinite number.
3. Make definitions both of the accident and of that to which it belongs, either of both separately or one of them, and then see if anything untrue has been assumed as true in the definition.
4. Turn the problem for oneself into a proposition and then raise an objection to it.
5. Define what kinds of things should be called as the majority call them, and what should not.
6. If a term is used with more than one meaning and it has been stated that it belongs to or does not belong to something, we ought to demonstrate one of the several meanings.
7. Substitute for a term one that is more familiar, for example, using clear instead of exact.
8. Examine what necessarily exists if the subject exists.
9. Look to see if discrepancy of time occurs.
10. The Sophistic method can be used for leading on an opponent to make an assertion which can easily be refuted.
11. An assertion can be demolished, if a consequence of it can be subverted.
12. Where of necessity only one of two predicates must be true, if we have a supply of material for one side of the question we also have it for the other.

These commonplaces set forth the basic rules by which a questioner or an answerer may validly construct or destroy an argument. If a person did not violate any of these rules he would have a logically valid argument which would be undefeatable on the basis of structure. One must remember, however, that these arguments are dialectic in nature and inherently dependent upon opinions of the majority or the wise for their value. The arguments constructed from opinions do not necessarily represent the ultimate in truth. As evidenced here, one can see that rhetoric had developed extensively since the time of the earliest Greek philosophers for prior to the time of Aristotle arguments based upon anything less than truth were considered unworthy and those supporting this kind of argument were thought less than respectable.

Aristotle points out in Book VIII-5 that a difference exists in the aim of those who discuss in the spirit of inquiry and those who discuss in the spirit

of competition. He states that no formal rules have been set forth for those who discuss in the spirit of inquiry so they are relatively free in their techniques. Those who discuss in the spirit of competition, however, are bound closely to those principles which will best further the aim of each individual speaker. For example: "If a questioner's proposition is one which is generally rejected absolutely, the answerer ought not to concede what is thus absolutely rejected, or what is accepted indeed, but less generally than the conclusion aimed at."¹⁴

In examining the dialectical reasoning process set forth by Aristotle in the Topics this writer has been made aware of many differences in the logic employed here and the logic employed in the scientific realm. The main difference is that the dialectical syllogism is understood to employ propositions expressing probabilities and opinions; the conclusions, resulting from these propositions, even though formally valid, must of necessity claim nothing more than probability. The scientific realm must deal with specific concepts common to that particular field whereas the dialectical reasoning deals basically with techniques which can be applied to any field. The scientific reasoning should not properly be a debatable matter because there should be only one side to a scientific question examined by a truth-seeker rather than an advocate. Dialectic has sometimes been described as the method of speculative thinkers. Aristotle, according to Grote, sees the value of dialectic as being three fold: first, argumentation is valuable and stimulating as an intellectual exercise, and if methodized procedure be laid down, both parties will be able to conduct it more easily as well as efficaciously. Secondly, it is useful for our conversation with the multitude, for the procedures direct us to note and remember the opinions of the multitudes, and thirdly, it accustoms us to study both sides of every question.¹⁵

The process of dialectic was further analyzed by Mortimer J. Adler, lecturer in Psychology at Columbia University in 1927, in his book Dialectic. Adler generally considers dialectic to be a kind of thinking taking place when human beings enter into dispute, or when they carry on in reflection the polemical consideration of some theory or idea. He seems to approach it as a methodology being significantly different from that of the empirical sciences. According to Adler's definition dialectic is an intellectual process in which all men engage in so far as they undertake to be critical of their own opinions or the opinions of others, and are willing to face the difficulties that come about in communication because of the opposition and conflict of diverse insights. The application of dialectic is important not only in situations of disagreement but also of agreement in that agreement is only relative to the situation in which it occurs.¹⁶ Adler, unlike Aristotle, specifically states that dialectic can occur within the boundary of a single-mind as long as there is a diversity or duality, an opposition or conflict.

Dialectic, in this analysis, is viewed as having three sources of non-rationality. This term stems from a distinction made by Adler between thinking and reasoning. He views thinking as being only a process of rationalization because it entails giving reasons for, and/or justification of actions, beliefs or opinions already held on the basis of other reasons. Reasoning, on the other hand, is a cause of thinking in which the conclusion, belief or opinion is reached and held only by way of the reasons which are discovered and considered in the process of thinking. This assumes that thinking serves a purpose which will itself not be submitted to thought or reasoned about.¹⁷ Because dialectic is inherently a kind of argumentation or disputation, the opportunity for emotions to become heavily relied upon instead of reasoning is highly probable.

The three sources of non-rationality are: 1) an argument is usually motivated by the desire to convince one's opponent or at least silence the opposition. This indicates partisanship and to the same degree partisanship is prejudiced; 2) certain propositions are sometimes invoked in argument as having a supra-cogitative source. Since these are derived from some supra-rational considerations such as intuition or faith they cannot be evaluated by reason; and 3) certain propositions are denied because of lack of insight.¹⁸ It would seem to this writer that notice should be taken of the fact that these non-rationalities are not necessarily inherent in the process of dialectic but rather possibilities of the process when it is not employed with skill. In other words, one should not condemn the process itself as irrational but rather those who employ it irrationally.

Adler subscribes to the concept that dialectic is a methodology and believes it to be involved with subject matter only secondarily. Dialectic is seen to exist only in the realm of discourse which excludes specific concepts or processes of the physical world. Controversy or contradiction on some specific subject matter is seen to exist in order to give rise to discourse or dialectic. Without subject matter, of course, dialectic could not exist but it is not this subject matter itself which is dialectical. According to this writer's interpretation of Adler's writings, dialectic would exclude from its boundaries actual social situations, the physical processes of nature and all other disciplines in their non-oral form. For example, one could be engaged in the dialectical process concerning the most successful method of teaching a physics class, however, the dialectic would occur not because the subject matter proposed by each advocate was opposite in nature but rather because of the way in which each of the persons involved in the discourse was participating in the process. Like Aristotle, Adler

seems to be discussing dialectic as it exists in the intrinsic or immaterial world which demands that something be demonstrated rather than viewed as opposed to the extrinsic world of 'objects'. From its inherent nature dialectic requires the presence of two differing opinions on a specific matter. Thus there must exist a partisanship regarding that subject on the part of each advocate. The controversy between these two advocates will be resolved when one surrenders his partisanship or at least resigns to being silent. At the basis of much controversy lies a lack of understanding of the specific terms being discussed. Like Aristotle, Adler believed it essential if successful dialectic is to occur that each advocate know exactly the meaning of the terms in their discourse. Definition, as we see once again, is a primary factor of dialectic. In this process of definition the definition arrived at by the two advocates involved may be extremely arbitrary; this is acceptable for the process of dialectic, though it should be remembered that the conclusions which are arrived at in this situation must be qualified as to their source. Because of the arbitrary nature of the definition being dealt with, the actual process of dialectic reasoning must remain impartial to the specific solution arrived at in a particular controversy. It is only recognized that "if-this-then-this follows" but "if-that-then-that follows". Until a specific solution can be determined as being true outside the realm of dialectic this impartiality must exist in order to have a true dialectic situation. At the time of resolution of the controversy both the partisanship and the need for impartiality ceases. The introduction of true facts into the dialectical process will, in effect, terminate the argument. Once facts are established there is no longer ground for a controversy.

Adler sets forth eight theses which reveal his particular definition of the dialectical method. These are:

1. Dialectic is in part a process of definition. And through definition, it achieves clarification of its issue.
2. Dialectic is in part a process of recognizing the opposition by assumptions and definitions; and it seeks to resolve this opposition by formulating a third set of propositions to include the conflicting ones.
3. Resolution can only occur within a single universe of discourse; it is qualified and limited thereby. Resolution occurs when the two disparate universes of discourse, which created the conflict, are unified, thus making translation between the original realms possible.
4. The conflicts with which dialectic is concerned are oppositions in discourse, either between propositions in a given universe of discourse, or between universes of discourse. Dialectic may be said to originate in the fact of opposition.
5. Controversies often end in the agreement of the parties involved. Such agreement is not necessarily equivalent to dialectical resolution, though it may be.
6. Facts, that is, non-discursive elements, are never determinative of dialectic in a logical or intellectual sense; but certain facts, emotions, desires, purposes, economic circumstances, religious affiliations, personal eccentricities and the bounds of personal experience, etc., are often causally responsible for the origin of human controversies, and are often further responsible for the choice between certain alternatives in the course of the argument. They even limit individual comprehension or occasion ineffaceable differences in insight. They may make it impossible, in other words, for two individuals to talk in the same universe of discourse. Such facts are relevant to dialectic as a human enterprise, and must be included in the description of it; but they must be given a causal rather than a logical status in that description.
7. In the course of its development of any argument, dialectic is faced with certain dilemmas or alternatives. These dilemmas are ultimately determined by the propositions which state the original contradictions or dilemma. The choice of any given subsequent alternative is similarly determinative of still subsequent choices. In this sense, dialectic may be described as a process of dealing with co-implicated dilemmas.
8. There is great variety in actual human conversations. The practice of dialectic, in other words, never perfectly manifests the theoretical formulation of process. Human conversations with oneself, or external with other persons; they may start with what appears to be agreement and end in the *clarified state of disagreement*; such agreement may or may not be equivalent to resolution of the issue. They may arise because two meanings are

attached to the same term, or because two terms or vocabularies are being used to express the same set of meanings. They are usually incomplete, stopping short of thorough dialectic in one respect or another; they are never complete in the sense that dialectic has been exhausted.¹⁹

To exemplify his concept or definition of dialectic Adler uses an argument which occurred between William of Champeaux and Peter Abelard concerning the reality of universals. Throughout this discourse one will be made aware of specific aspects of dialectic and how it can be successfully employed.

William is lecturing on dialectics. He asserts the reality of universals. They have being as substances, and have a real status independent of the mind. Triangularity is a universal; triangularity is real and substantial, and that or this particular triangle can exist as a triangle only by participating in, and absorbing, as it were, the reality and substance of universal triangularity. The universal is prior in being to the particular whose character derives from such participation in it. There is, however, an order of priority among universals, and an order in created things. God, the creator, is the highest universal, the primary substance, and His creatures descended from Him in an order established by the logical relationships which obtain among the universals, determining their character. Universals are related, as classes are, either by being included in or by being inclusive of. The universals having a greater inclusiveness, have higher intension in the order of being. The universal, moreover, is indivisible; it passes into the individual, or the particular concrete thing, without division of its nature. Socrates is a man by reason of his participation in the substance of humanity, and that substance, humanity, enters wholly into Plato and Aristotle as well as into Socrates, without partition of itself, "much as the divine substance exists wholly and undivided in each member of the Trinity."

Abelard interrupts, "Is the whole of humanity in Socrates?"

"Yes," says William, "that was the intention of my statement."

"If it is wholly absorbed by Socrates, then, it cannot be at the same time immanent in Plato or in Aristotle. Therefore, if Plato and Aristotle are human, they must be so by participation in the Socratic nature. This would seem absurd. I agree that the universal, whether it be humanity or triangularity, has some reality; but I should assert that it has the reality of a concept. Let me ask you this question, 'Has the universal the status of a concept or of a substance?'"

"Of a substance."

"Such substances are divisible or indivisible?"

"Such substances are absolutely indivisible. To deny the existence of such substances, or their energetic force, is to deny the existence of all the individuals created by their energy."

"I do not deny the energy of God, Sir, nor of man's free will, but I do deny the energy of all other substances or universals. You assert that universals are indivisible and that they give form to the species in which they inhere and to the individuals of the species."

"Yes, I so contend."

"You have often used the analogy of an octahedron crystal, each of whose eight faces is a perfect equilateral triangle, and with regard to which you have insisted that it is the energy of the triangle, of the concept, or as you would prefer it, of the substance of triangularity, which gives form to the triangle?"

"The energy of the line."

"And of the line?"

"The infinite in extension."

"And this?"

"It ultimately depends upon the energy of God, as the substance of all things so depends."

"But you have said that the substance of a universal is indivisible, and that its energy, therefore, passes wholly and impartially into the individuals it informs. If that is so, then the substance of the Godhead is not only possessed perfectly by each of the three persons of the Trinity, but as well by triangularity and humanity, and finally, the ultimate energy must be resident in and identical with the substance of the face of the octahedron and in the person of Socrates....."²⁰

This dialogue first of all possesses the characteristic which Adler designates as non-rationality because it relies upon supra-rational considerations for its resolution. It cannot be evaluated by means of reason. The two advocates did not accept a definition of the terms involved in order to facilitate the understanding of what was being discussed and thus three different definitions of universals were employed in the duration of the entire discourse. By failing to arbitrarily define the term universal the participants in this discourse were actually operating in two different universes of discourse. This concept Aristotle referred to as designating something as the whole which in actuality is only part of the whole. Each of the participants was designating a part of the whole such as substance, concept, and sign as the whole entity rather than a part of the concept of a universal. It must be remembered that definitions

are important at this point as general concepts rather than a specific meaning of a term as dialectic is not concerned with subject material relating to the extrinsic world. This controversy, as can readily be observed, did not end in agreement but rather a willingness to remain silent by one of the advocates. For this reason it was not a dialectical resolution.

Adler argues that dialectic can be described in terms of the empirical, the logical and the metaphysical areas. He views it as being empirical in that it requires human language as well as human thinking in order to occur. In this area language and thinking have the possibilities for exhibiting dialectic. It is logical in that its formal actuality is possible only through the process of logical reason. It is only potentially dialectic until the thinking is an abstract process exhibiting relations in discourse. It is metaphysical in the aspect that it can be analytic and definitive rather than ontological. This, in effect, is a dialectical description or definition of the dialectic process in that the empirical description represents a possible dialectic and the logical description represents the actual process taking place. These represent the thesis and antithesis while the metaphysical description represents the synthesis between the two partial systems by determining a set of definitions and postulates. This resulting set of definitions and postulates becomes the doctrine of dialectic.²¹ In concluding, Adler presents the theorms which he has formulated in regard to the nature of dialectic and the universe of discourse.

1. The relation of contradiction does not obtain in the universe of discourse.
2. The universe of discourse is, therefore, ontologically a realm of possibility.
3. Dialectic is, therefore, entirely restricted to the universe of discourse.
4. Dialectic, therefore, cannot treat the relation between the ontological realms of discourse and existence.
5. Any opposition in discourse can be resolved.

6. Any dialectical resolution is partial and inconclusive.
7. Potentially dialectic is absolutely inconclusive.
8. Actually dialectic is relatively inconclusive.
9. Dialectic can realize only an intrinsic truth value and such truth value can never be finally established.
10. Any isolated proposition is neither true nor false intrinsically in discourse; and in some system, any proposition is true.²²

This writer finds the works of Adler in dialectic to be thorough in a theoretical sense. He approaches dialectic very methodically and sets forth a great many guidelines toward establishing what exactly dialectic is. He however does not apply it to any great extent to the field of argumentation. By this, is meant, that he did not give an operational or "how-to-do-it" definition so as to facilitate the effective use of dialectic as a methodology. His works, combined with those of Aristotle define and illustrate the concept of dialectic as it was conceived and employed in the classical era.

CHAPTER IV

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, the next dialectician to be dealt with in this study, was born in 1770 in South Germany. The period in which he lived was a significant and eventful time in history. This was referred to as the great age of German literature because of such works and authors as: Nathan by Lessing; Gotz, Werther, Faust, and Iphigenia by Goethe; Wissenschaftslehre by Fichte; Don Carlos by Schiller; Hyperion by Holderlin, and the philosophical writings of Kant. Hegel read the writings of these men extensively and through them experienced the two significant trends of German classicism and romanticism. In addition, Hegel was a close friend to Schelling and Holderlin and a speaking acquaintance with several of the others which increased the degree of their influence upon his ideas. In his youth, Hegel was especially attentive and stimulated by the writings of Kant which is reflected in their influence upon his theory or concept of dialectic.

Hegel was not essentially concerned with the past events of the world or history as he did not believe the philosopher's obligation to be in this area. He states: "...It is not the philosopher's business to prophecy. As far as history goes, we must rather deal with what has been and what is--in philosophy, on the other hand, with what neither merely has been nor merely will be but with what is and is eternally: with reason, and with that we have enough to do."²³ In other words, Hegel believed that a philosopher would be confronted by an immense task in dealing only with those matters which are presently and will be eternally. The vastness in scope of that which is and will be eternally will be evident in Hegel's notion of dialectic.

From the two previously examined dialecticians we should recall that an element of controversy or opposition between two ideas or concepts was inherent in the system. This element of opposition between two extremes also serves as an integral part of Hegel's system, however he expanded this concept to include the physical existing entities and processes of the world as well as the thought processes. The examination and explanation of the 'dialectical philosophy' of Hegel is an exacting endeavor because of the Protean way in which he discusses the topic in his various words. Obscurity is certainly not reduced greatly through an examination of the vast quantity of secondary sources who seem to condemn the system in a nebulous manner. This writer has found that essential to the understanding of Hegel's dialectical philosophy is an understanding of his concept of the world process.

The entire process of the world is viewed by Hegel to be a self development of the spirit and is expressed in three distinct stages:²⁴

Stage 1. The World-Spirit (Weltgeist) is in a state of 'being-in-itself' (an-sich-sun).

Stage 2. The World-Spirit reaches a state of "alienation", "self-estrangement" or "otherness".

Stage 3. The World-Spirit returns from self-estrangement to itself in a state of 'being-in-and-for-itself' (an-und-fur-sich-sein).

In stage one of this process the World-Spirit exists in itself. The philosophical discipline which Hegel cites as describing this stage is the Philosophy of logic. The second stage is essentially a state of withdrawal and self-examination during which the alienation of the Spirit passes into nature which is rooted in time and space. The discipline corresponding to this stage is the Philosophy of nature. In the third and final stage the Spirit returns from the estrangement period in a state of being-in-and-for-itself which corresponds to the discipline of Philosophy of the spirit. Hegel himself experiences this process in his life in that stage one consisted

of his attending the German and Latin schools and the Symnasium in Stuttgart and his studying to become a Master of Philosophy. During this time he studied various subjects to gain a working knowledge of facts and concepts about the world and life. After having acquired some knowledge he withdrew himself from active participation in the world for approximately ten years to enable himself to contemplate and philosophize about the knowledge which he had obtained. Having done this he was able to return from his self-estrangement and assume an active role in the education of students and produce the major works accredited to him. Perhaps this cycle can be seen to be a foreshadowing of the nature of his dialectical philosophy or method.

"Dialectic", states Hegel, "is the principle of all the movement and of all the activity we find in reality.... Everything that surrounds us can be treated as an instance of Dialectic. We know that all is finite, instead of being stable and ultimate, is rather changeable and transitory; there is no other than the dialectic of the finite whereby being implicitly other than itself, is driving beyond what it immediately is and turns into its opposite."²⁵ This system of change in Hegel's method of dialectic is seen to occur as a result of having an object or a state of being and then in opposition to this having its antithesis. For example, a healthy person could be viewed as an original state while its contradictory or antithesis is seen to be a diseased person. The original need not be present or have been present in order to have the contradictory not achieving the ideal state. There is a process which occurs between these two states which we will entitle "the synthesis". For example, it would be the state which a person would encounter while becoming diseased or becoming well. This then completes the triadic structure in which Hegel's dialect exists. For our purposes we will label

the original object or concept as the "thesis" stage of dialectic, its contrary as the "antithesis" stage and the process between as the "synthesis". These are terms which Hegel used but not to the extent to which they are popularly attributed to him, however they were employed extensively by Fichte.

The following schematic representation based upon the ideas as discussed by Hegel in his Encyclopedia of Logic will demonstrate the functioning of his system. (See diagram 1.) The thesis or original idea upon which this system is based in the Science of Logic, its antithesis is the Philosophy of Nature with the synthesis being the Philosophy of Spirit. Each of these concepts has a dialectical system of its own which functions in a like manner. For example, the Science of Logic is composed of the thesis of the Doctrine of Being, its Antithesis the Doctrine of Essence and the Doctrine of Notion as the synthesis. Each of these then function in its own dialectical system etc.... It must be noted at this time that the thesis, antithesis and the synthesis do not always represent the same relationship to one another in his concept of the dialectical philosophy.

The relationship among the three stages is dependent upon the particular concept with which Hegel is dealing at the moment. An examination of the dialectical system of the Doctrine of Essence will reveal that Essence is first seen to have an inner quality which is totally indifferent to the antithesis or outwards manifestation of appearance. This absurd concept then is modified by the synthesis which is the state of actuality in which both inner and outer essence match each other. In some cases a thesis involves an incompleteness which is supplied in the form of a complement by the antithesis and the synthesis represents the desired end which the means was aiming toward. This is explicative of the process involved in the Philosophy

of the Spirit in which the subjective spirit represents the thesis, the objective spirit the antithesis and the absolute spirit is the desired end or synthesis. In other cases the antithesis and synthesis merely represent a more explicit explanation of some characteristic obscurely manifested by the thesis which is the case with the concept of willing (volition) and thinking (cognition) being more explicit explanations of the self-adjusting purposive unity of life. In yet another instance the process represents the passage from talk which obeys certain rules, to metalinguistic talk about that talk and its rules. This is the case with Being (thesis) and Nothing (antithesis) and Becoming, which is the actual process which occurs and is itself the subject for a new category. Finally, in other cases the relationship among the thesis, antithesis, and the synthesis is representative of a philosophical joke which aims to reduce everything to the spiritual or non-existent level in the physical world. The changing relationship of the elements in the dialectical process is admitted by Hegel but he never does explicitly state the frequency or structure of these changes.²⁶ In fact, Hegel states that he has no merely subjective, no merely linguistic or conceptual view of the relationship among the contradictions involved in dialectic. He does not limit them to misapplied or misguided notions or principles but rather goes further to attribute them to 'the world'. This explanation is typical of Hegelian obscurity and is one of the most bitterly assailed of his doctrines.²⁷

In the Science of Logic Hegel contends that in his system of dialectic he is not attempting to build a deductive system such as was employed in the mathematics of his era and as we employ in our system of symbolic logic.²⁸ In other words, he does not attempt to establish set definitions or specific concepts and then relate all other parts of a system to the original definition

or concept. Nor does he attempt to fit original concepts into a few axioms or primitive presuppositions, from which all the other prepositions of the system are deduced, according to definite and inflexible rules.²⁹ He did not aim at establishing such a deductive system because he viewed it as being too rigidly structured to promote productive philosophical thought. This does not, however detract from its usefulness in the scientific realm in which objects can be viewed as single units which can be externally ordered and assembled. It is possible and useful to this type of scientific endeavor to establish hard, fast and precise concepts which are not applicable to the philosophical realm.

The type of thought process which is involved in the formal deductive or scientific system was regarded by Hegel as the Understanding which he characterized with great fixity and certainty of notions involving independence of one notion from another.³⁰ The attitude toward this concept of Understanding was not particularly favorable nor was it unique to Hegel but rather commonly held by nearly all the German idealists. Kant, for example, rigorously opposed Understanding as being extremely base in its dealings only with the finite principles and categories of the world and favored the "higher" concept of Reason which sought to synthesize all experience and finite categories into the infinite. Hegel and later idealists did not bitterly oppose Understanding because they viewed it as constituting an integral part of knowledge as it involved the finite knowledge from which principles and categories evolved, proceeded through the dialectical process and on to the "higher" form of thinking known as Reason. Without this level of Understanding, the infinite world of Reason would have no practical applications. In the circular structure, which has been previously illustrated,

the thesis would be Understanding, its antithesis would be Reason and the synthesis would be Dialectic.³¹ In other words, Understanding presents individual concepts and principles for the world, dialectic then examines and structures these concepts and principles in relation to each other either as contradictory or complementary and then Reason unifies these concepts and principles into a system of harmony. J. N. Findlay likened this process to a film in which the individual frames demonstrate Understanding, the process of motion (dialectic) then gives the unifying appearance to the combined frames (Reason). Without the process of motion the movies or reconciled state of Reason could not exist.

From the above examination it is readily recognizable that Hegel did not view his dialectical philosophy as being an end in itself but rather a means to achieving a desirable end. The way in which he utilized this method of contradiction and opposition can be seen from an examination of an excerpt from his essay "Materials For A Continuation of Part I".

Every nation has its own imagery, its gods, angels, devils, or saints who live on in the nation's traditions, whose stories and deeds the nurses tell to their charges and so win them over by impressing their imagination. In this way these tales are given permanence. In addition to these creatures of the imagination, there also live in the memory of most nations, especially free nations, the ancient heroes of their country's history, i.e., the founders of liberators of their states scarcely less than men of valor in the days before the nation was united into a state under civil laws. These heroes do not live solely in their nations' imagination; their history, the recollection of their deeds, is linked with public festivals, national games, with many of the state's domestic institutions or foreign affairs, with well-known houses and districts, with public memorials and temples. Every nation which has its own religion and polity, or which has made wholly its own any part of the religion and culture it has acquired from other peoples, has had its own national imagery of the kind; consider, for example, the Egyptians, the Jews, the Greeks, the Romans. The ancient Germans too, the Gauls, the Scandinavians, had their Valhalla as well as their heroes who lived in their songs, whose deeds inspired them in battle or filled their souls with great resolves on festal occasions; and they had their sacred groves where these deities drew nearer to them.³²

In the previous excerpt Hegel points out to us that a nation's hero is not a god, angel, devil or saint who lives in the nation's tradition, the tales about which are made permanent by impressing the imagination of youngsters through repetition from one generation to another. A hero is, conversely, a person such as a founder or liberator of the nation and a man of valor. A hero is a reality because he lives in history books as well as in public festival whereas the imaginary characters exist only in the realm of unreality. The dialectical aspect of this passage comes not from its form but rather from its content. Were it not for the subject matter this would not demonstrate the methodology of dialectic in any respect. He continues in this passage to discuss Christianity and attempts to arrive at a definition of it.

Christianity has emptied Valhalla, felled the sacred groves, extirpated the national imagery as a shameful superstition, as a devilish poison, and given us instead the imagery of a nation whose climate, laws, culture, and interests are strange to us and whose history has no connection whatever with our own. A David or a Solomon lives in our popular imagination, but our country's own heroes slumber in learned history books, and, for the scholars who write them, Alexander or Caesar is as interesting as the story of Charlemagne or Frederick Barbarossa. Except perhaps for Luther in the eyes of Protestants, what heroes could we have had, we who were never a nation? Who could be our Theseus, who founded a state and was its legislator? Where are our Harmodius and Aristogiton to whom we could sing scolia as the liberators of our land? The wars which have engulfed millions of Germans were wars waged by Princes out of ambition or for their own independence; the people were only tools, and even if they fought with rage and exasperation, they still could only ask at the end: "Why?" or "What have we gained?" The reformation, and the bloody vindication of the right to make reforms in religion, is one of the few events in which a part of the nation took an interest, an interest which did not evaporate, like the interest in the Crusades, as the imagination cooled, but which was animated by a sense of an abiding right, the right in matters of religious opinion to follow one's own self-wrought or self-acquired conviction. But apart from the usual annual readings of the Augsburg confession in some Protestant churches (readings usually wearisome to every hearer) and apart from the dull sermon which follows these, what

is the festival which celebrates the memory of this event? It looks as if the authorities in church and state were content that the memory of how our forefathers had a sense of this right, how thousands could stake their lives to vindicate it, should slumber in our hearts and not be retained in any living fashion.

Anyone who did not know the history of the city, the culture, and the laws of Athens could almost have learned them from the festivals if he had lived a year within its gates.³³

As is evident, Hegel continues throughout the passage defining concepts such as Christianity, and an educated man by showing what its opposite consists of. This system of opposites or 'dialectic' was also termed by Hegel as speculative thinking. According to Hegel it is the only kind of thinking which can go beyond the distorting mechanisms of the prevailing state of being. It, in effect, compares the present characteristics of a thing with those characteristics and traits which that thing could possibly possess in the ideal state. This was the case in the example of the diseased man being the opposite of the well man even though the state of good health had never been present. In this process the essence of a particular thing is distinguished from its accidental state of being.³⁴ Hegel argues that this method of thinking is one of 'conceptual cognition' which rationally examines the process whereby a thing came into being or existence as we know it.

According to Hegel, every thought which is real or true has three separate aspects to it: 1) The abstract or rational form which states what a thing is; 2) the dialectical negation which states what a thing is not; and 3) The speculative form or concrete comprehension which states that a particular thing is also not that thing (A is non-A).³⁵ It is in this state that the two are unified or reconciled. The dialectical method of Hegel then does not deny truth but rather denies only that any particular thing in the finite world exists absolutely in and of itself. This, of course, does not imply that "nothing is", but rather that essential opposites

in the world are all part of each other. It links essential being as part of finite existence, simplicity as part of complexity, being educated as part of being vulgar, etc. In other words, Hegel's dialectical method does not exist as a mere method or form or argument but rather as being inherently constructed through the subject matter of a particular argument.

The dialectic of Engels will be the final approach examined in this paper. In the examination of the writings of Engels, Sidney Hook, has been able to separate seven different concepts or meanings of the term 'dialectic' according to the way in which Engels employed it. These seven aspects of dialectic are:

1. Dialectic as universal and objective.
2. Dialectic as the logic of transition.
3. Dialectic as the logic of disjunction.
4. Dialectic as polar opposition.
5. 'Subjective' dialectic.
6. Dialectic as organic interrelation.
7. Dialectic as scientific method.³⁶

A closer examination of each of these definitions will clarify Engels approach to the general field of dialectic. The first definition of dialectic as being laws which are both universal and objective fits very closely in conjunction with Hegel's concept of dialectic. This entails the belief that every field of knowledge, known objects as well as the process by which they are known, is seen to be influenced by the laws of dialectic. Engels states in Anti-Duhring that "the dialectic is nothing more than the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society, and thought."³⁷ Through his discussion of these laws Engels does not seem to mean that one must be consciously aware of the laws in order to use them anymore than someone who is aware of them can automatically gain mastery over a particular subject through his mere knowledge of the laws of dialectic. He indicates, however, that one is more equipped to deal with a particular subject if he is aware of

the universal laws of dialectic and when deliberately disregarded one cannot hope to be successful in his endeavor with a particular subject. The second aspect of dialectic, that of being the logic of transition implies that the dialectical method can be applied to situations in which there are no definite boundaries. It seems to be an area of twilight zones and arbitrary divisions.

He stages in Dialectics of Nature:

"For those stages in natural science, where all oppositions are bridged by intermediate steps, the old metaphysical method of thought no longer suffices. The dialectic which recognizes no hard and fast lines, no unconditionally valid either-or, which transforms fixed metaphysical differences into each other, mediates opposites and puts at the correct place besides the either-or the this-as-well-as-that, is the only method of thought eminently suited to such situations. For daily use, for scientific retail, the metaphysical categories retain their validity."³⁸

Thirdly, dialectic is seen as the logic of disjunction. In other words, some dialectical situations are characterized by the logic of exclusive and exhaustive disjunction. Fourth in the aspects of dialectic is that of polar opposition which is much like that of Hegel. This concept assumes that for every object or term existing which is directly opposite to the first. There are, in effect, two aspects to the existence of any particular thing or concept. The fifth aspect of dialectic views the process as a constitutive principle within the realm of the mind. It seems to be a method of analyzing concepts rather than as a method of proof or discovery. Sixth in Hook's list of Engels' meanings of dialectic is that of an organic interrelation which implied that all things in the universe are organically interrelated thus being a part of one great totality. In other words, no object can be sufficiently explained without relating it to other categories. "The totality is such that all of its elements are in continuous interaction with each other so that cause and effect are are abstracted, partial phases of an interlocking, developing whole."³⁹ Lastly,

dialectic is viewed as a scientific method. It was labeled as such because it is a method by which new truths may be discovered. Engels views dialectic as an organized procedure of inference and prediction where by man extends the boundaries of knowledge.

Whether all scholars would agree upon the interpretation of Engel's works made by Hook is unknown. It does, however, supply one view of the work and should be seen as such. Engels himself presents three laws of dialectic which will now be examined.

The first law is that of identifying the contradictions. Engels believed contradictions to be objectively present in all things and processes. He states:

"...as soon as we consider things in their motion, their change, their life, their reciprocal influence on one another. Then we immediately become involved in contradictions. Motion is itself a contradiction: even simply mechanical change of position can only come about through a body being at one and the same moment of time both in one place and in another place, being in one and the same place and also not in it. And the continuous origination and simultaneous solution of this contradiction is precisely what motion is.

Here, therefore, we have a contradiction which is objectively present in things and processes themselves and can be met with in so to speak corporeal form."⁴⁰

He also demonstrates life to be a contradiction because it constantly originates and resolves itself and as soon as this process of contradiction ceases, life also ceases and death steps in. Engels, it would seem to this writer is attempting to demonstrate that in order to employ the dialectic method and understand the extrinsic world one must be aware of the contradictions which exist within the world. A disregard for the contradiction of something is, in effect, a disregard for part of the original thing.

The second law proposed by Engels is that of transition of quantity to quality and vice versa. This is to say that at a certain point quantity becomes

quality and vice versa. In support of this theory Engels cited an example of water changing at 0°C . from liquid into the solid state, and at 100°C . from the liquid state into the gaseous state. The quantitative change of temperature brings about a qualitative change in the condition of the water. Several other examples were given which, in a like manner, supported this theory or law of dialectic.

The last law of dialectic proposed by Engels is that of negation of the negation. This in effect is stating that things change in time and that what would seem to be an opposite at one moment is not an exact opposite at another moment. An example used by Engels to support this was of a butterfly which springs from the egg by a negation of the egg, passes through certain transformations until it reaches sexual maturity, pairs and in turn is negated, dying as soon as the pairing process has been completed and the female has laid its eggs. Other examples were also cited in Anti-Dühring which demonstrated this law of dialectic to be valid.

In the theoretical sense the dialectic of Engels was not far removed from that of Hegel. Engels contends that few situations lend themselves to hard and fast lines of discipline or to a black and white type decision. There are more frequently situation involving intermediate positions between the two opposite ends. The process occurring between the two opposites would be considered the dialectical process of nature or the physical world. However, in practice, Engels employs the dialectical process in a less pure form which involves basing an argument on probability and then arguing from the original thesis as though it were fact. Each additional argument proceeds directly from the original thesis and actually results in a conclusion which is extremely similar to the thesis instead of being a synthesis of the two concepts. The following excerpt from the Dialectic of Nature will illustrate the way in which employed dialectic.

Causa finalis-matter and its inherent motion. This matter is no abstraction. Even in the sun the different substances are dissociated and without distinction in their action. But in the gaseous sphere of the nebula all substances, although separately present, become merged in pure matter as such, acting only as matter, not according to their specific properties.

(Moreover already in Hegel the antithesis of causa efficiens and causa finalis is sublated in reciprocal action.)⁴¹

Primordial matter. "The conception of matter as original and preexistent, and as naturally formless, is a very ancient one; it meets us even among the Greeks, at first in the mythical shape of chaos, which is supposed to represent the unformed substratum of the existing world." (Hegel, Encyclopedia, I, p. 258). We find this chaos again in Laplace, and approximately in the nebula which also has only the beginning of form. Differentiation comes afterwards.⁴²

Gravity as the most general determination of materiality is commonly accepted. That is to say, attraction is a necessary property of matter, but not repulsion. But attraction and repulsion are as inseparable as positive and negative, and hence from dialectics itself it can already be predicted that the true theory of matter must assign as important a place to repulsion as to attraction, and that a theory of matter based on mere attraction is false, inadequate, and one-sided. In fact sufficient phenomena occur that demonstrate this in advance. If only on account of light, the ether is not to be dispensed with. Is the ether of material nature? If it exists at all, it must be of material nature, it must come under the concept of matter. But it is not affected by gravity. The tail of a comet is granted to be of material nature. It shows a powerful repulsion. Heat in a gas produces repulsion. Etc.⁴³

From the above example one can readily see that the appearance of discussion or consideration for two opposite sides to a question is given, however the conclusion is not a synthesis of the opposites but rather identical to the original thesis. Thus we have examined the dialectic of the modern era and found Hegel and Engels to be very similar in their theoretical approach to dialectic but somewhat different in practice.

CHAPTER V

From an examination of the previous chapters of this study one would realize that vast differences exist between the classical concept of dialectic and the modern concept of dialectic. These differences vary in scope and significance and have been generally revealed in chapters three and four of this study. The current chapter will discuss the differences in aims, modes, and structure of dialectic according to each school and then reveal the distinguishing characteristics of both the classical and the modern schools of dialectic.

The classical method of dialectic was employed as a method of discovering "Truth" or at arriving at a point of agreement which was better than the two original points of view. Aristotle stated that one could only arrive at truth by reasoning from sound principles in a systematic fashion. Through the dialectical method according to the classicists, a person would have his beliefs and concepts modified by the other half of the argument. This new position of his belief would presumably be nearer to "Truth" than his original belief. However this presumes both persons involved in the dialectical method to be rational and to a certain degree, knowledgable beings. Aristotle himself recognized the fact that the dialectical method could only be as good as those persons involved in it. The philosophy upon which this dialectical method of a modification of ones beliefs is based is typical of a large portion of Greek philosophical thought in the classical period as it was believed that to be too far out on either end of the scale was not acceptable. It was more acceptable to be well-rounded in ones beliefs as well as his activities. For example, Isocrates permitted his students to engage in eristic argument, after having mastered other areas, to broaden their exposure but would not


allow them to engage in it often enough to dull their senses. Plato, likewise, in the Republic set forth the ideal education as exposing the students to a variety of formal disciplines in addition to active political life. The dialectical method, then is a reflection of this idea of moderation in all things'.

The modern dialectic is not a method of arriving at a "Truth" but rather a method of describing the processes involved in the physical world and philosophical concepts. This method, as proposed by the theorists such as Hegel, was primarily descriptive and on a high level of abstraction. The position at which specific concepts arrive after having proceeded through the dialectical method is somewhere between the two extreme ends of the line. This at first would seem to possess an extreme similarity to the classic approach, however the difference lies in the material with which each is concerned. For example, the dialectical process exists, for Hegel, in the metaphysical concept of "Being" as the original thesis, "Essence" as the antithesis and "Notion" as constituting the synthesis or that point which seems the most logical in the realms of the continuing system. In other words, it is not useful to distinguish whether an object or idea gained "Being" or "Essence" first but rather it is useful to operate on the assumption that this object or idea gained "Being" and "Essence" only when it appeared to someone as a "Notion". An identical situation exists with the concepts of "Being" as the thesis, "Nothing" as the antithesis and "Becoming" as the synthesis. In this way modern dialectic is descriptive and exists outside the realm of discourse whereas classical dialectic exists only in discourse and is prescriptive in that Aristotle set forth commonplaces by which the dialectical method could be validly conducted irrespective of a particular subject matter.


The commonplaces of Aristotle could be applied to any subject matter which the participants in the method chose. It was then, as Adler suggests, only secondarily concerned with subject matter because the process could be studied separately without a specific subject, however, to employ the dialectical process one must be concerned with a subject. The content itself is not dialectical as it is in the modern school of dialectic but rather it is the method itself which is dialectical.

Another difference which exists between the classical school of dialectic and the modern school lies in the realm of theory and practice. The situation being with the classical school that the practice of dialectic as we have related to us through writings was highly consistent with the theory set forth by Aristotle. The dialogues of Plato demonstrate the principles or commonplaces set forth in the Topics. In other words Aristotle was not formulating a category of dialectic which was not actually employed in that period of time. The situation with modern dialectic, however is not the same. Hegel proposed the dialectical system and such persons as Engels and Marx subscribed to the theory but employed it in a much different manner. They accepted the idea of opposites and forced this into the realm of social situations and used the triadic scheme to give the appearance of a synthesis. The synthesis which was arrived at by these practitioners was identical to the original thesis from which they started so that in actuality there was no synthesizing of the two principles at all. The appearance, however, of synthesizing was thought and evidenced to make the original thesis more acceptable to those involved with the system and hence the dialectical method became utilized primarily as a persuasive device. A schematic of each of the schools of dialectic is as follows:


Classical Dialectic
(theory)




Classical Dialectic
(practice)



Modern Dialectic
(theory)



Modern Dialectic
(practice)



CHAPTER VI

The term "Argumentation" is one which has frequently been looked upon with scorn. It is not uncommon in our everyday lives to hear an associate make the comment "now don't start an argument" and then proceed to exclude anything further which we might assert on that particular subject. This concept is not one which is unique to the twentieth century or even to the modern period though it was not stated in these exact terms, many of the Greeks regarded it in a like manner. Plato criticised argumentation because he considered it in the popular sense only to be eristic in nature and to have no other purpose or value than mere disputation. Many of his dialogues are illustrative of this as they picture two persons engaged in argumentation concerning issues which are reduced to the absurd. There are those, however, throughout history who do not subscribe to this concept of argumentation.

Among those persons who do not believe argumentation to be void of value are those dialecticians, Aristotle, Adler, Hegel, and Engels, whose concepts we have examined previously in this study. These men each believe argumentation to possess a distinct purpose or value; Aristotle believed its chief value was that of discovering a new concept which is more accurate than one's originally held belief. Adler, belonging to the classical school of dialectic, also viewed argumentation as having this value though he emphasized the successful use of the process more heavily than did Aristotle.

Hegel and Engels also recognized an element of value in the process of argumentation, however, it was not in the vein of 'truth-seeking' but rather in the vein of persuading others to accept those concepts not previously accepted. The classical dialecticians were concerned, in effect, with helping individual man adjust to his environment through argumentation there by more

fully understanding the different sides or aspects to different concepts. The modern dialecticians, conversly, were more interested in having the environment change to suit a limited few by changing the beliefs of the general populace to fit into a structured pattern.⁴⁴

Argumentation, as can be seen from the above discussion, of necessity involves the advancement of two opposing concepts or points of view. In order for a man to arrive at a point of view which is more enlightened than his original belief, he must be exposed to a view point which is contrary to that original belief. Likewise, in order to successfully persuade persons to accept concepts which are different from their currently held ones they must be artfully introduced to the opposing concept. Thus an element of conflict or controversy must be present for the process of argumentation to occur. The process of argumentation also inherently involves an awareness on the part of each advocate of the position held by the opposition. Without an awareness of the opposition one could not consider adapting his original belief or concept in accordance with the opposition. Thus opposition or controversy may occur through oral discourse, written work or within the boundaries of an individuals own mind. In other words, a person, in addition to being able to argue with others who have opposing beliefs he may also argue with himself over a belief which is not definitely resolved within his own frame of reference. The process may also occur in private between two persons or in front of an audience be it a single reader or a group of people. With this concept of argumentation in mind we will next examine the specific relationship of each of the schools of dialectic to the process of argumentation.

The classical approach to dialectic was directly involved with the process of argumentation for several reasons: The first reason stemming from the existence of a controversy or at least two differing points of view toward a particular subject. Without two differing points of view neither the process

of argumentation nor classical dialectic could occur. Adler, however, states that the dialectical process according to the classicists, could only be secondarily concerned with the specific controversy as it is not the content itself which is considered to be dialectical in nature but rather the process or form in which it occurred. The actual exchange of ideal from one source to another or within one's self is considered to be the process of dialectic in operation. Without content, however, which contains a controversy or opposition this exchange of ideas would remain in the intrinsic or immaterial world rather than in the practical realm.

The modern school of dialectic is also seen to exhibit a direct relationship to the process of argumentation though it is somewhat different in some respects from that existing in the classical school. Like the classicists the modernists concept of dialectic involves an element of controversy and as we should recall, was discussed both by Hegel and Engels in terms of the existence of direct opposites. These opposites, according to their system, exist in the actual content of the particular subject being dealt with. Through the process of argumentation or through assertion of a particular position concerning a specific subject they persuade their audiences to accept a predetermined point of view. In this situation the arguments are heavily weighted on one particular side of the question. An example of this can be found in chapter one of the book entitled German Ideology written by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Throughout this chapter the authors are attempting to persuade the reader that German ideology is the best possible manner in which to view concepts of the world. In each argument the reader is given a contrasting view to that of the Germans; however, these are not focused upon or considered in depth. This consideration for the contrasting view seems only to be utilized in order to build the credibility of the position taken by Marx and Engels.

The original thesis asserted by the authors in chapter one is:

The social organization and the state constantly arise from the life process of definite individuals, of those individuals not as they or other people imagine them to be, but as they are really, ie. as they act, as they materially produce, consequently as they are active under definite material limitation, provisions and conditions which do not depend on their free will...⁴⁵

In other words, the authors are telling us that a social organization or a state arise and reflect those persons within it as they are in their material productivity. This concept we would not readily disagree with as it is the wealthy country whose people are highly productive and also wealthy. The next step to which Marx and Engels proceed however, is that of assuming or inferring that the German philosophy or ideology is the only one which is acceptable in its approach to viewing persons as they really are. It is at this point that we begin to question the doctrine; perhaps our questioning is due primarily to the culture in which we were raised. Those persons in Germany at that particular time probably readily accepted this notion. The argument was presented as;

In direct opposition to German philosophy, which comes down from heaven to earth, here there is ascension from earth to heaven. That means that we proceed not from what men say, fancy or imagine, nor from men as they are spoken of, thought, fancied, imagined in order to arrive from then at men of flesh and blood; we proceed from the really active men and see the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of their real life-process as proceeding from that life-process. Even the nebulous images in the brain of men are necessary sublimates of their material, empirically observable, materially preconditioned, life-process. Thus, morals, religion, metaphysics and other forms of ideology and the forms of consciousness corresponding to them no longer retain their apparent independence. They have no history, they have no development, but men, developing their material production and their material intercourse, with this, their reality, their thinking and the products of their thinking also change. It is not consciousness that determines life, but life that determines consciousness. In the first view one proceeds from consciousness as from the living individual; in the second, inconformity with real life, from the real living individuals themselves, considering considering consciousness only as their consciousness....⁴⁶

From the previous passage one can recognize that a dialectical form exists to the extent that concepts which oppose the German ideology are taken into account or mentioned. These concepts are not given credence but rather simply serve the function of demonstrating an awareness of the opposition. The reader is made aware of the fact that a philosophy exists which proceeds from what people say or think of themselves or what others may say or think of them but no positive aspects of this philosophy were presented. In effect, the conclusion which is drawn is identical to the original thesis that the German ideology is the only viable philosophy from which to work.

In addition to employing the dialectical structure the previously cited passage also employs terms or phrases which illustrate contradiction or opposition in actual subject content. For example Marx and Engels demonstrate a direct contrast in the concepts of German philosophy descending from heaven to earth while others accent from earth to heaven. The same modern dialectical technique is used to demonstrate that life is not determined by consciousness rather that consciousness is determined by life. This illustrates argumentation over specific concepts and ideas, however, the information presented to the reader is heavily weighted toward the authors' original thesis or point of view.

From an examination of the relationship of each of the schools of dialectic to argumentation it would appear to this writer that classical dialectic tends to be a form or method of thinking. Just as a skeletal outline is a structure of organization into which content may be fitted so is classical dialectic a structure for thinking. Modern dialectic on the other hand, seems to be employed as a method of presenting and persuading. The modernists used the structure of the classicists in an artificial

way to enhance the effectiveness of their persuasion. They simply give the appearance of consideration of both sides of a question.

If the two methods of dialectic were to be correlated to practices of argumentation which we use in the academic realm this writer would view classical dialectic as being most closely related to the practice of group discussion in which the members are considering different points of view within their own minds as well as a unit and are attempting to formulate a true synthesis of several ideas. Modern dialectic, on the other hand, seems to be most closely related to our practice of debate in which each member presents a point of view and remains with that original position throughout the debate. There is never a true synthesizing of ideas or concepts. Each side attempts to persuade the other side of its validity. Both methods of dialectic have seen they are somewhat different.

From the previous examination of dialectic we should realize that the topic area is a vast one and the approaches taken toward it are also numerous. We have examined two basic approaches to dialectic, that of the classicists and that of the modernists. These two approaches have been demonstrated to differ from each other in several aspects which were discussed in chapter four of this study. Through the previous examination of the works concerning dialectic of Aristotle, M. J. Adler, G. W. F. Hegel and Engels in chapters three and four we have been able to establish four main conclusions about the theory and practice of dialectic. The first of these was that the process of classical dialectic is more a method of thinking than a method of presenting. Aristotle and likewise Adler were establishing and subscribing to a method whereby persons would be better equipped to consider more than one side of any question or issue. The way in which the classicists presented dialectic one

could view a skeletal form of dialectic without giving consideration to the content matter involved. In other words, the classicists only secondarily concern themselves with content as they believe that the dialectic when employed successfully remains indifferent as to the particular solution reached. Hence, classical dialectic served as a means of "truth-seeking" and thinking.

The second conclusion to be drawn is that modern dialectic is employed as a method of persuasion. The form of the classicists was utilized in a superficial manner in that opposing arguments are mentioned to provide the audience with a feeling of synthesis having been reached. In fact, however, through the modern approach to dialectic the resulting conclusion evolving from an argument is identical to the original thesis set forth. There is no attempt made on the part of the advocate to modify his position as was demonstrated by the excerpt from German Ideology by Marx and Engels. The intent for using the dialectic structure is merely to enhance the effectiveness of persuasion. This results in a primary concern of being with the content itself. It is the actual ideas which represent contradiction and opposition.

A third conclusion which may be drawn from this study of dialectic is that the classical form of dialectic is most nearly like our present day academic field or practice of argumentation in group discussion. Through this method members are exposed to at least two different ways of viewing an issue through oral discourse with one another or within an individual's own mind there comes about a synthesizing of ideas. This synthesis is theoretically nearer the 'truth' of a situation than either of the original extremes would be.

A fourth conclusion to be drawn centers in the area of modern dialectic and its application to the field of argumentation. The way in which it is

employed more nearly correlates to our present practice of argumentation in debate. In this form each advocate presents his own point of view and although he is confronted with an opposing view, he does not modify his own particular position. The decision which is arrived at after the process of argumentation has occurred is identical to one of those views originally presented. In this respect the theoretical sense of modern dialectic as presented by Hegel is somewhat different from the actual practice of it by Marx and Engels. Hegel envisioned it as a circular process in which all physical entities in the world were in a process of a synthesizing which is illustrated in diagram I of chapter four.

From this current examination of dialectic and through the conclusions which have been reached we can see that both classical and modern dialectic are germane to the process of argumentation.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹Plato, The Republic (New York, 1955), p. 53.
- ²Adamson, Samuel, A Short History of Logic (New York 1964), p. 80.
- ³Adamson, p. 81.
- ⁴Adamson, p. 83.
- ⁵Forester, E. S., "The Place of the Topics in the Organon", (Cambridge, Massachussetts, 1960), p. 264.
- ⁶Forester, E. S., p. 265.
- ⁷Forester, E. S., p. 268.
- ⁸Ross, Sir David, Aristotle (New York, 1964), p. 111.
- ⁹Aristotle, Topics I-2 (Cambridge, Massachussetts, 1960).
- ¹⁰Aristotle, I-4.
- ¹¹Aristotle, I-10.
- ¹²Aristotle, I-10.
- ¹³Aristotle, II-4.
- ¹⁴Aristotle, VII-5.
- ¹⁵Hunt, Everett L., Dialectic: A Neglected Method of Argumentation, Q JS, Vol. VII, 1921. p. 215.
- ¹⁶Adler, M. J., Dialectic (New York, 1927), p. V.
- ¹⁷Adler, p. 12.
- ¹⁸Adler, p. 13.
- ¹⁹Adler, p. 75.
- ²⁰Adler, p. 66.
- ²¹Adler. p. 215.
- ²²Adler. p. 216.
- ²³Hegel, G.W.F., Die Vernunft in der Geschichte, Hoffmeister trans. 1955, p. 209L.

- ²⁴Weidmann, Franz. Hegel (New York, 1968), p. 50.
- ²⁵Hegel, G.W.F. Logic (London, 1929), p. 190-193.
- ²⁶Findlay, J.N. Hegel (New York, 1958), p. 73.
- ²⁷Findlay, p. 65.
- ²⁸Hegel, G.W.F., Science of Logic (London, 1929), p. 278-319.
- ²⁹Findlay, p. 59.
- ³⁰Findaly, p. 60.
- ³¹McTaggart, John; McTaggart, Ellis. A Commentary on Hegel's Logic (Cambridge, 1910), p. 299.
- ³²Hegel, G.W.F., Early Theological Writings (Chicago, 1948), p. 145.
- ³³Hegel, Ibid., p. 146.
- ³⁴Marcuse, Herbert. Reason and Revolution (New York, 1954), p. 46.
- ³⁵Hegel, op. cit., p. 31.
- ³⁶Hook, Sidney. Reason, Social Myths and Democracy (New York, 1940), p. 184.
- ³⁷Engels, Frederick. Anti-Duhring (Moscow, 1959), p. 194.
- ³⁸Hook, p. 186.
- ³⁹Hook, p. 192.
- ⁴⁰Engels, p. 166.
- ⁴¹Engels, Frederick. Dialectic of Nature (Moscow, 1954), p. 288.
- ⁴²Engels, p. 288.
- ⁴³Engels, p. 289.
- ⁴⁴Marx, Karl and Engels, Frederick. German Ideology "Chapter I", (New York, 1964), p. 73.
- ⁴⁵Marx and Engels, Ibid., p. 73.
- ⁴⁶Marx and Engels, Ibid., p. 74.

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THE RELATIONSHIP OF DIALECTIC TO ARGUMENTATION

by

CHLOE E. REXROAD

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The study of dialectic is an endeavor to which many philosophers as well as laymen have addressed themselves over the centuries. The esteem with which it has been regarded by these men varies from the extremely favorable attitude of the Greeks to the generally unfavorable attitude of most modern scholars. The Greeks considered dialectic to be an essential tool in the training of their philosophers as well as gentlemen which modern scholars tend to exclude it from the educational realm as being an unnecessary accessory to the training of the scientific mind.

In order to conduct this study the writer has employed basically an historical-critical approach. Since history is the only link one has with the past we must rely upon documents written in a particular period or upon reports written by persons who have studied that particular period. Because of this reliance upon human beings for the writing and transmission of past events, there inherently exists a bias of a particular author and hence a study of this nature cannot be totally objective. In conducting the current study a variety of sources have been utilized in an attempt to obtain as accurate a view of both the classical and the modern approach to dialectic.

It is the purpose of this study to examine dialectic both as it was viewed and employed by the classical school and as it is viewed and employed by the modern school of dialectic. The current study does not attempt to be exhaustive in its examination of philosophers belonging to each of the schools of dialectic but rather focuses upon an in depth examination of Aristotle and M. J. Adler both of whom are representative of the classical approach and a detailed study of G.W.F. Hegel and Frederick Engels who are representative of the modern approach to dialectic. These four philosophers were selected

because of their position in history, the scope of their approaches, and the applicability of their principles of the dialectic method.

After having established a definition of the process of dialectic according to each of the schools of dialectic this study proceeds to make an evaluation of the connection between each of the approaches to the process of argumentation. The current study concludes that both the classical and the modern approach to dialectic are germane to the process of argumentation though in somewhat different ways.