

PENNSYLVANIA'S PERFORMANCE UNDER THE OLD MONEY
REQUISITION SYSTEM DURING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

by

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
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INTRODUCTION

During the American Revolution the Continental Congress struggled with the problem of financing the war. Early economic historians have generally maligned the Congress for the ways in which it attempted to finance the war effort. Of the various methods that Congress employed, the old money requisition system was never adequately explained by the early economic historians. Congress utilized the requisition system to determine and levy quotas on the states. Invariably, these historians have incorrectly criticized not only Congress but also the states for unwillingness to contribute towards the support of the central government and a united war effort.

Albert S. Bolles established the accepted views on state taxation and the requisition system in his Financial History of the United States from 1774 to 1789 (1879). "Throughout the entire period from 1774 to 1789", wrote Bolles, "only very small sums flowed into the general treasury from the state coffers." Bolles further maintained that the states "neither contributed as they should to sustain the National Government nor raised much to support their own local organizations." Davis R. Dewey echoed these views on state taxation and the requisition system in his The Financial History of the United States (1902). "The art of taxation as then developed in America was not prepared to solve" the problem of raising enough money for the war effort because "the taxing systems in local operation were of simple character designed only for small peace expenditures." According to Dewey, the states "feebly honored" congress-

ional requests for money and did not meet their quotas. Of the \$95,000,000 in continental currency levied on the states in the four continental old money requisitions, Dewey asserted that the states paid only \$54,667,000. Accordingly the requisition did not succeed because "it lacked any well organized plan of assessment." Edward Robinson has added his voice to the chorus in his study of the administration of the Continental Treasury. Robinson declared that "little of the money collected found its way into the Continental Treasury." The states appropriated the money "for their own use" and seldom passed on any surplus. "Indeed, there is nothing to show that Continental receipts from taxation were appreciable anywhere before 1780."¹

Robinson may be correct in affirming that receipts from the states were not appreciable before 1780 but the states may also have ultimately collected a greater proportion of their continental quotas for the use of the United States. Pennsylvania is a case in point. The experience of this state does not conform to the assertions of the above economic historians on state taxation and state performance under the congressional old money requisition system. Pennsylvania expanded its collection machinery and managed to raise large sums of money with which to pay its four continental quotas.

Historians have overlooked an important point in arguing that the states did not adequately contribute to the support of the central government during the war years because they did not want to exchange one subordinate status for another. During the convention to write the Articles of Confederation the representatives from each state did

not argue over whether or not to pay taxes to a central authority. Rather they debated what constituted the most equitable method of levying such taxes on the states. The argument resulted in the compromise "that each state's contributions to the common cause were to be based upon the value of its lands and improvements." Article 8 gave Congress the power to determine the quotas for the states and the time when the taxes should be paid. In turn, the states were to levy and collect the taxes and turn the monies over to the Continental Treasury within the determined time period. As the war dragged on, most Pennsylvanians, however reluctantly, accepted taxes and a growing debt as necessary prerequisites for independence. While the military need for support existed, the Pennsylvania state government endeavored to collect
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taxes.

Most historians also say that the basic weakness of the government under the Articles of Confederation was its lack of a taxing power. This view needs to be qualified. Congress did have a taxing power of sorts. Considering communication and transportation problems and the difficulties accompanying the formation of a brand new central levying and collection system, it made perfect sense for Congress to disperse the collection effort among the states. Besides, the states had had experience with tax matters as colonies. Pennsylvania had a good record in meeting its tax obligations during the French and Indian
3
War.

Problems with tax collections cannot be explained by the unwillingness of Pennsylvania to contribute. A more correct picture can be

drawn by examining the intricacies of the levying and collecting procedures that Pennsylvania established to deal with the continental taxes. The state and county governments both encountered and overcame problems in establishing procedures to deal with recalcitrant officials and delinquent taxpayers. In addition, Pennsylvania and the other states were unable to keep up with the inflation of the old continental currency. Not until April 1781 did Pennsylvania establish a scale of depreciation and official rates of exchange between specie, old continental currency, and Pennsylvania state money.

Despite the increased number of taxes and higher rates of assessment during the American Revolution, the Pennsylvania counties managed to pay a sizable proportion of their quotas but were often months and even years behind in their payments. Upon receiving a requisition from Congress the state government would in turn levy a quota on each county. Much of the money collected from the counties was credited to an account at the state treasury for the use of Congress. Congress would then write drafts on this account and instruct the state to honor them. In addition, beginning in May of 1780 the Congress allowed the states to credit properly liquidated Quartermaster and Commissary certificates against their continental quotas under the old money requisition system.

In general, the early economic historians not only have failed to connect the use of a congressional account at the state treasury with the old money requisition system but also they have ignored the accounting procedures utilized by the states to record their trans-

actions with the central government. These historians, however, presented totals that only include the amounts they maintain were actually turned into the Continental Treasury, thus intimating that this method of payment was the only allowable procedure. In reality, the states employed other options which were more convenient than physically transferring currency from their treasuries to the Continental Treasury. Pennsylvania collected a larger percentage of its taxes than has been commonly believed. The question is how much did this state actually collect, how much did it credit to the account of the United States at the state treasury, and how much in certificates did Congress allow Pennsylvania to credit against its old money quotas under the requisition system.

Chapter 1

CONGRESSIONAL FINANCE

Those few men who gathered together in Philadelphia for the Second Continental Congress faced many problems. Even before July 1776, there existed a need to mount a viable military effort or at least a show of force sufficient to convince the British of the seriousness of American intentions. Such an effort required extensive funds, funds which were not readily available to the delegates. Since there was not time to negotiate large foreign loans and since many of the delegates considered that it would be politically inexpedient to ask the states to raise taxes, Congress initially resorted to issuing paper money. Many of the colonies had employed paper money as a medium of exchange with varying degrees of success during periods of economic distress and the colonial wars. But while the individual colonial governments could issue currency, they also possessed the power to tax, a power the Continental Congress did not formally have. Thus, Congress had to issue continental bills of credit in anticipation of taxes in order to pay government creditors. E. James Ferguson designated this method as currency finance.¹

Congress could not rely solely on specie as a medium of exchange because the relatively small amount in circulation was insufficient to meet the needs of a war-time economy. There have been several estimates of the total amount of money in circulation in the colonies in 1775. According to Alexander Hamilton, the amount was "thirty

millions of dollars of which about eight might have been in specie."²
Pelatiah Webster, a contemporary of Hamilton, maintained that between
ten and twelve million circulated in the colonies, with at least four
million in coin.³ Certainly most of the specie went to England in
the years before 1775 to pay for imports and debts, but the amount
Americans hoarded is a matter of conjecture. The supply of specie
was replenished by foreign loans, the purchase of provisions by French
and British soldiers, and profits from trade with the West Indies.
After the continental currency system collapsed in 1781, Robert
Morris managed to put the national finances back on a specie basis,
at least until the end of the war.

Meanwhile in order for Congress to maintain a sound currency
system, it needed to levy taxes to tap the money in circulation.
However, in 1775 and '76, most citizens were not favorably disposed
to continental taxes. Opposition to taxation, after all, was one of
the patriots' rallying cries. And who can forget Thomas Paine's
critique of arbitrary taxation in Common Sense, the widely published
and read pamphlet that welded public opinion behind independence?
Considering the time and the fact that up until July of 1776, the
Congress could not even agree to declare independence, currency
emission was the most expedient solution. Consequently on June 22,
1775, the Second Continental Congress decided to issue \$3,000,000 in
bills of credit.⁴

Congress resolved that the notes would be payable in "Spanish
milled dollars or the value thereof in gold or silver." Congress

chose the Spanish milled dollar as the standard instead of the English shilling. The dollar was " the only currency common to all the states," and its value varied less than the shilling from New Hampshire to Georgia. In Pennsylvania the Spanish dollar was worth 7 shillings and 6 pence, or 90 pence. This fact influenced Congress to divide the dollar into multiples of one-ninetieth to provide a basis for fractional notes in its February 1776, currency issue. In addition to the larger denomination notes, a total of 1,000,000 dollars was printed in the smaller values of $1/9$, $1/6$, $1/3$, $1/2$, and $2/3$ of a dollar. Each state had different standards and valuations which precipitated exchange problems. For example, New York rated the dollar at 96 pence while South Carolina rated it at 72 pence. The depreciation of continental currency beginning in late 1777 further complicated the already
5
complex problem of exchange rates.

The problem of accountability immediately surfaced and continued to plague the central government throughout the war years. At first, Congress just turned large sums of money over to its agents for disbursement. Initially these persons did not even keep accounts of the transactions. Congress failed to establish proper accounting procedures at first because of a myriad of other problems that clamored for attention and because of the confused state of the administrative structure. There were only 55 delegates, and many were often absent for long periods. Congress conducted most of its business by committee and each delegate served on several. After some months the delegates addressed themselves to the confused state of the finance. They

established a Continental Treasury, a Committee of Claims, and regular
procedures to follow for the disbursement and recording of transactions. 6

Although French military aid helped to bolster the patriot cause, Congress relied almost exclusively on currency finance to run the war effort. Until October, 1777, the several emissions of continental bills of credit circulated at or near par with specie. In the war's early stages, most Americans exhibited confidence in using continental paper money for business purposes. The value of the continental currency hinged on three interdependent factors: the confidence of the public, the military situation, and currency inflation. Congress continued to issue paper currency until late 1779 because this method provided the delegates the maximum degree of flexibility.

The states also issued paper money in order to meet current expenses. The combination of both levels of government issuing money contributed to inflation which was mild according to Jackson Turner Main because the expanding economy absorbed the paper money emissions. However, by late 1777 continental currency no longer circulated near par with specie. In spite of Horatio Gates's victory at Saratoga, the overall military situation worsened in the fall of 1777. The British defeated General Washington at the battles of Brandywine and Germantown. The Continental Army then retreated into winter quarters at Valley Forge. An alliance with the French continued
7
to elude the American representatives at Paris until February 1778.

In late 1776 Congress resorted to other methods of raising money. The central government established loan offices in each state where government agents issued certificates to citizens in exchange

for continental currency. These loan office certificates are an early version of present day government bonds. The lowest denomination certificate cost \$200 and paid 4 per cent interest in paper money annually. Only the relatively well-to-do profited from these certificates. In spite of restrictions on their use, loan office certificates began to circulate like money. Oftentimes government creditors and agents of the various departments would only accept these certificates in payment for goods, services, or salaries.

Even though the loan offices did poorly after 1777, the certificates proved useful in that they provided another option in the pool of paper instruments that Congress could draw upon as public confidence in continental currency decreased. The loan offices found it increasingly difficult to encourage people to loan their money because of the high initial investment and especially because of the low interest rate relative to inflation. Congress debated the problem and finally decided in February, 1777, to increase the interest rate to 6 per cent.⁸

The central government implemented the congressional requisition system in 1777, another revenue gathering method, "which became the constitutional mode of raising federal revenue under the Articles of Confederation."⁹ No longer did Congress consider taxes politically inexpedient. Even though Congress could not force the states to pay, that body did strongly "recommend" and exhort the states to meet their obligations. The congressional requisition system resembled the requisitions employed by the British during the French and

Indian War. During that conflict the British government in London set quotas in money and supplies for its American colonies to meet. Congress followed a similiar procedure by levying quotas on the states, and it was each state's responsibility to collect the money with which to honor its individual quotas.¹⁰

Under the congressional requisition system Congress levied four sets of quotas on the states payable in old continental currency: the 5 million tax on November 22, 1777; the 15 million tax on January 2, 1779, the 45 million tax on May 21, 1779; and the first eight monthly tax (15 million a month for eight months) on October 6, 1779. Congress modified the latter tax in January of 1780 to extend the time period another eight months, and this was commonly referred to as the second eight monthly tax. Two months later on March 18, Congress further modified this tax. No longer would the states collect money for the use of Congress. Instead Congress decided to destroy the paper money collected by the states in order to counter the inflation that was rampant during late 1779 and early 1780.¹¹

The old continental bills of credit depreciated almost to worthlessness by March 1780. The paper money had maintained its value until October of 1777, but began a downward spiral thereafter except for a brief resurgence in July of 1778.¹² Congress experienced difficulties in obtaining supplies because of the lack of purchasing power. To overcome this problem many agents of the Quartermaster and Commissary General Departments resorted to a form of confiscation known as "impressment". These agents would take

the supplies they needed and issue Quartermaster or Commissary certificates to the owner which could be redeemed in the future. The states also seized hoarded goods and as early as the summer of 1777 Congress called for "general confiscation laws which would cover all goods useful to the army." In fact, impressments had occurred from the very beginning of hostilities but became more prevalent after
 13
 1777.

On May 26, 1780, the Congress passed a resolution recommending the states to empower their collectors of the continental tax to receive unpaid Quartermaster and Commissary certificates for payment on the four congressional requisitions. Four days later the Pennsylvania Assembly passed a resolution allowing its citizens to use these certificates in payment of continental and state
 14
 taxes. This process became complicated when the Quartermaster and Commissary agents began to compete with the purchasing agents of the state governments. The problem became especially acute after Congress changed its requisition system from levies in continental money to "a plan for the direct requisition of 'specific supplies' on the
 15
 states."

Congress implemented this change in December, 1779, because of the increasing shortage of paper money and because of the pressing needs of the continental army. The revised system went into effect on February 5, 1780, in all the states except British occupied Georgia. Instead of being responsible for collecting tax money for the use of the central government, the states now had to procure

supplies for the continental army. Quotas under the modified requisition system called for beef, pork, Indian corn, flour, salt, rum, rice, tobacco, and forage. Congress tailored the quotas to match the agricultural products of the individual states. Table 1 indicates Pennsylvania's quota of the specific supplies for 1780.

Table 1

40,000 barrels of flower <u>/flour/</u>
14,189 bushels of salt
24,423 gallons of rum
1,700 tons of hay
200,000 bushels of <u>/Indian/</u> corn or short forage equivalent

In September, Congress further requested that Pennsylvania supply
16
fifteen hundred head of cattle.

Calling for specific supplies instead of inflated continental bills of credit proved more successful in theory than in reality. The collection process proved difficult and the transportation problems staggering; the collected supplies had to be moved to distant military units. Other problems included profiteering, graft, and the low quality of much that was collected. In October, 1781, Robert Morris declared that this system was almost useless to the central
17
government.

The requisition system as revised only lasted one year. Morris wanted to return to a money system but one based on specie payments.

Morris desired "hard money revenues" in order to revamp the domestic financial position of the United States and to maintain America's international credit rating. Morris needed specie to make interest payments and to sink the principal of the various foreign loans. Quartermaster and Commissary certificates were not acceptable for this requisition except in extreme cases. Morris did make an exception for South Carolina which directly supplied Nathanael Greene's army in 1781. The decision not to allow certificates on the requisition for specific supplies may have precipitated Congress's decision to use these certificates as part of their March 18, 1780, quotas in order to retire the old continental currency. All these expedients represented Morris's efforts to restore public confidence in the country's financial system. Being an extreme Nationalist, Morris wanted to reactivate some of the mechanisms of the old money requisition system. He wanted the states to collect the specie and then turn it over to the central government for disbursement so that Congress could regain the prerogatives it lost when it modified the requisition system to accommodate specific supplies. Congress employed specie requisitions from 1781 to 1783 but encountered difficulties in persuading the states to meet their quotas. The assumption of state debts and the struggle for dominance between the states and Congress became a factor here. In any case Congress gradually abandoned specie requisitions and "slid back into acceptance of state-oriented finance."

It is difficult to determine an accurate balance sheet, credits and debits, between the states and the central government. Many factors

are involved in the settlement of state accounts. One must remember that any payments to the Continental Treasury or the honoring of warrants for the use of the United States at the state treasury comprise just one item for consideration in the settlement. Credit for the Quartermaster and Commissary certificates on the congressional old money quotas comprise another item. See Appendix J for Pennsylvania's
19
accounts with the United States.

During the Confederation period the states and Congress differentiated between the settlement of state accounts and the public debt. Controversy surrounded this issue with the debate centering on two main points: what qualified as legitimate state entries in the settlement with the central government, and how would the states be respectively assessed for delinquent payments or compensated for overrages? The latter problem proved to be the lesser of the two. Even though the participants had not formally agreed to an established procedure, they generally assumed that after the quotas were set and compared to state totals, those states who had not met their quotas would
20
compensate those states which had.

The former problem initiated much concern in the various states, whose governments wondered how the central government would define efforts towards the "common defence of the general welfare." State expenditures were to be grouped into the "common charges". Initially the state accounts included: payments on old money, specific supply, and specie requisitions; the March 18, 1780, quota to retire continental currency; maintenance of militia units and state units in the

Continental Army; and back pay and depreciation notes. Some states attempted to include locally sponsored military operations in the settlement. However, in many cases the states neglected to receive congressional authorization specifying that such operations could be included in the "common charges". Except for South Carolina, the southern states kept at best minimal financial records and subsequently chafed under the restrictions Congress required for the validation of state accounts. Without receipts or other proof of disbursement these states found it difficult to clear their accounts with the three man board of commissioners assigned by Congress. Congress began the settlement of state accounts in 1782, but the above complications delayed its completion until 1793.²¹

Congress employed many methods to raise money to finance the war effort: foreign loans, loan office certificates, impressment or confiscation of goods, and variations of the requisition system. The last method proved versatile if not immediately productive. Congress revised the requisition system to collect continental currency, specific supplies, and then specie. The states attempted to meet their quotas, but payments invariably lagged, forcing Congress to institute many changes to meet the needs of the military effort. In May of 1780 Congress allowed partial payments in Quartermaster and Commissary certificates, an option Pennsylvania utilized to honor a portion of its old money quotas. By late 1781, however, old continental currency ceased to exist as a circulating medium thus rendering, according to E. James Ferguson, the old money requisition system "a mere device for draining off currency and certificates."²² But the redemption of these certificates must be

considered a part of Pennsylvania's support of the war and the national government.

One might argue that state performance under the old money requisition system became a dead letter by 1781 since Congress resorted to different methods of financing the war. Nevertheless, an assessment of Pennsylvania's efforts indicates one state's attitude towards the financial relationship that existed between the two levels of government. This attitude was especially important after 1783 when domestic political concerns such as the assumption of the public debt became an important factor in the settlement of state accounts. In spite of the fact that continental currency ceased to circulate after 1781, Pennsylvania made a viable effort to discharge its obligations by²³ collecting overdue county quotas up until the mid 1780's. As the tax records clearly indicate, Pennsylvania eventually honored a larger percentage of its quotas under the old money requisition system than hitherto supposed. Pennsylvania kept good records, perhaps because the state government realized that it was in the best interests of the Commonwealth to get its financial house in order before the final accounting took place.

Chapter 2

PENNSYLVANIA'S PERFORMANCE

During the American Revolution, the state of Pennsylvania expanded its collection machinery and managed to raise large sums of money with which to pay its quotas under the old money requisition system. The questions to be answered include: how much did this state actually collect; how much did it credit to the account of the United States at the state treasury; and what proportion of Pennsylvania's quotas were deducted by Congress as "tax credits"?¹

Pennsylvania politics during the early war years affected tax collection efforts. The Republican faction was generally composed of those men influential in political affairs before 1775, whereas, the radical faction comprised those men committed to the revolutionary cause.² By the beginning of 1776 the political balance of power had shifted from the three older eastern counties of Bucks, Chester, and Philadelphia -- the stronghold of the Quakers--to the newer western counties. Each of the eleven counties received an additional representative and the city of Philadelphia gained four extra seats. The radicals, however, were not satisfied. By the time that the convention elected to draft the new state constitution met in mid-summer, each county had equal representation. The counties retained equal representation in the new assembly that met on November 26, 1776.³

The adoption of the new state Constitution of 1776 created notable difficulties. Many Republicans had either been eased out of office, resigned in protest, lost at the polls, or had their influence minimized by the representational schemes that the radicals championed. The Republicans

attempted to regain their influence by agitating for more favorable reapportionment. This faction, however, soon adopted a strategy of "nullification" or active non-support of the newly elected state government. Those Republicans who were elected in November of 1776 refused to take their seats in the Assembly and on the Supreme Executive Council, which functioned as Pennsylvania's plural executive. As a consequence the legislative and executive bodies accomplished little because quorums seldom were attained. Many months passed before the Supreme Executive Council began to function. In the interim the Council of Safety, which evolved into the Board of War, often conducted the executive business of the state. In addition, the constitutional convention conducted the legislative business of Pennsylvania from May until September. By late 1776, only the Council of Safety continued to operate in an efficient manner. The inability of the state government to function hindered the collection of state taxes. However, the year 1777 brought a return to effective government as both the Supreme Executive Council and the General Assembly began to meet on a regular basis.⁴

The Continental Congress enacted four old money requisitions between November 1777 and October 1779. (See Appendix A for Pennsylvania's quotas.) This chapter will examine Pennsylvania's performance on each of the four requisitions.

On November 22, 1777, the Continental Congress resolved that \$5,000,000 be levied on the states to finance the war effort during 1778 and set Pennsylvania's quota at \$620,000. Four months later on March 27, 1778, the General Assembly of Pennsylvania passed a law for the assessing, levying, and collecting of the money with which to honor this quota. It also apportioned quotas in continental bills of credit on the eleven counties within the state. The state government expected each county to meet its own corresponding

quota for the 5 million tax, as it was commonly called, within the time set down in the statute for this tax. (See Appendix B for the county quotas that the General Assembly levied in response to the four continental requisitions.) On or before October 1, 1778, the county treasurers were to turn their quotas into the state treasury. The money would then be turned over to the continental treasury or would be credited to an account at the state treasury for the use of the Continental Congress. If a county paid more than its quota, the state treasury would give "credit plus interest on the taxes subsequently levied for the use of the United States."⁵

The tax system functioned fairly efficiently. The experience of Berks County with the 5 million tax, for example, illustrates how Pennsylvania's tax collection process worked. After receiving its own quota, the General Assembly determined the county quotas on the basis of the number of taxable people and an approximation of the value of the real and personal property within each county. The Assembly set the quota for Berks County at £16,544. According to the statute, the county commissioners and county assessors had to perform two main duties before May 4, 1778. First, these officials had to nominate and appoint two freeholders from each township, ward, and district to serve as assistants to the local assessor. Meanwhile, the local assessors were to compile lists of all real and personal property within their jurisdiction. The county commissioners and assessors used these lists in performing their second duty, determining quotas for each township, ward, and district in Berks County. These quotas varied according to the value of real and personal property and the number of taxable people.⁶ The Berks County commissioners then sent the local quota to each local assessor, who together with his two assistants levied an equal rate of assessment on all taxables in his jurisdiction. In addition, all single freemen over twenty-one

years of age and at least six months out of servitude and not otherwise held accountable under the 5 million tax paid an assessment of £3. The law exempted single freemen currently in the military from this poll tax.

The local assessor and his assistants also appointed a separate official to collect these various assessments. This office was very unpopular, especially since the statute provided fines for those who refused to serve as collectors, assessors, or commissioners. However, these offices carried an exemption from military service. The county commissioners instructed the collectors to turn the money over to the Berks County treasurer at Reading before September 1, 1778. The county treasurer had until October 1 to pay the state treasurer.⁷

None of the counties met this timetable. (See Appendix C.) Lancaster was the only county to make even one payment before October 1. Berks County did reasonably well by meeting its quota on January 16, 1779. Some of the counties took as long as three years to meet their quotas. The fact remains, however, that the counties ultimately paid 100 per cent of the 5 million tax into the state treasury for the use of Congress. By August of 1781 seven of the eleven counties had paid their entire quotas into the state treasury. Cumberland paid its quota by February 1782. As for the three frontier counties, the General Assembly exonerated or waived all or a portion of the continental taxes for certain townships. For instance, the Assembly completely exonerated Westmoreland County's continental taxes because Indian attacks drove many of the settlers back into the eastern part of the state and because of unresolved border problems with Virginia.⁸

On January 2, 1779 the Continental Congress agreed that \$15,000,000 would be needed to finance the war effort during 1780. Congress set Pennsylvania's quota at \$1,900,000. The nature of the 15 million tax differed

from that of the 5 million tax in that the state government levied the earlier tax on its counties exclusively as a continental tax. The Pennsylvania Assembly, however, incorporated the 15 million quota into a larger tax package in order to provide money to meet anticipated expenses in running the state government during 1780. The Assembly thus passed a law on April 3, 1779, for the raising of \$4,000,000.⁹

The collection process for the 15 million tax was similiar to that for the 5 million tax except that more paper work was involved and the statute modified the procedure for the selection of the collectors. Previously the local assessor and his assistants appointed a collector. The county assessors now appointed a collector for each township, ward, and district.¹⁰

Under the provisions of this law, the collector could demand that the assessments be paid. If the person taxed did not comply within thirty days, the collector assisted by the sheriff could break into the delinquent's home and 'sequester' a portion of his property. If the person still did not pay, the sheriff could sell the 'sequestered' goods in order to raise the tax money. Because most people were already behind in their payments, the county officials never rigorously enforced this provision.

As might be expected, Pennsylvania taxpayers often complained about assessment rates and over-zealous county officials. The more harrassed of the citizenry even sent petitions to the Supreme Executive Council. For example, in July, 1779, the Council read a remonstrance filed by several people in Germantown who declared that "they would not pay their taxes on account of some indulgence shown" to other people. The Council disapproved of the "mode" of the complaint because it feared such actions would provoke disorder in the community. The Supreme Executive Council, however, did advise the petitioners to send their complaints in the future to the Assembly

or to seek redress through the courts. The following February, Quakers from Philadelphia, Chester County, and Bucks County also complained about their respective tax collectors. The Council expressed its concern about official abuses and recommended that people with complaints file them with
 11
 the Attorney General.

In both cases the local officials submitted the remonstrances to the Supreme Executive Council. This at least indicates the existence of an informal process for handling complaints. A cynic might well argue that this is an example of bureaucratic buckpassing. Yet, might it not instead indicate the desire of the state government to establish a fair system of levying taxes and an appeal process? Moreover, it also indicates that taxes were being collected and that such complaints were not the rule but the exception.

The county commissioners usually handled cases of appeal on assessment rates. Many citizens appealed and occasionally the commissioners reduced
 12
 or remitted their taxes entirely. The 15 million tax law required the commissioners to establish an appeal date within thirty days after determining the quotas on the townships, wards, and districts. The local assessor also attended the appeal proceedings. In examining each case, the commissioners had the power "to diminish or add to the person's rate or assessment." If the person did not pay within forty days after appeal, the commissioners would sell his property, but only after publicly advertising the sale for three months. Naturally, the person could pay his taxes during this period and retrieve his property. However, little property was sold under this law because so many taxpayers were behind in their payments. The county treasurers usually carried the collectors on their books as delinquent until they collected these back taxes. This law also required

the collectors to keep their own books and to pay the county treasurer every six weeks. The collectors had three months after the day of appeal in which to pay the full amount of the local quotas into the county treasury.

An appeal process was necessary because the state government had to deal with the efforts of certain groups of citizens who were unwilling to pay their taxes. For example, a comparatively large number of Tory sympathizers lived in Pennsylvania, and some naturally attempted to evade or at least frustrate the collection of taxes that would ultimately be used against the British. In addition, the state government had to cope with Quakers, Mennonites, and members of other religious denominations which often refused to pay taxes if the monies were to be used for war. Oftentimes the Quakers insisted that their taxes be employed to sustain the state government but not be used to procure war material. Ironically, the Quakers often paid the highest tax rates because they were successful
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farmers.

Even though the counties paid late, they did manage to pay a large percentage of the 15 million tax. An examination of the material in Appendix D shows that Berks County made its final payment into the state treasury in February, 1780, only 10 months after the Assembly passed the law. By August Bucks, Lancaster, and Northampton had also paid. By the following August, Philadelphia had paid, but Chester still owed £4,941. Cumberland paid by February, 1782, but York County still owed £10,105 in May of 1782. Six counties out of eleven paid in full, while Chester and York only owed a small percentage of their quotas in mid-1782. Again, the frontier counties of Bedford, Northumberland, and Westmoreland did not pay at all. The Assembly exonerated a portion of their 15 million tax quotas because of

Indian troubles. Nevertheless, the other eight counties paid £1,353,322 on their respective quotas which totaled £1,368,368, for a remarkable 98.9 per cent. Even including the entire quotas of the three frontier counties, the eleven counties taken all together paid £1,353,322 of the total quota of £1,501,944, for a respectable 90.1 per cent.

While the county officials in Pennsylvania went about levying and collecting the 15 million tax, Congress resolved on May 21, 1779, that the states raise an additional \$45,000,000 for defense for the year 1780. The states were to pay their quotas into the continental treasury on or before January 1, 1780. Pennsylvania's quota was \$5,700,000.

In response the General Assembly passed on October 10, 1779, "An Act for \$5,700,000 for the current year 1779." This was exclusively a continental tax. The tax package did not include a sum for the maintenance of the state government as had the earlier statute of 1778 for the 15 million requisition, though the Assembly assessed the counties at the same proportion as before.¹⁴ In the new tax statute, the Assembly required that all taxable persons take an oath that the revised list of their real and personal property was accurate. The statute listed specific penalties for those who either falsified a list or refused to submit one.

During the war years the state government had to deal with the continental and state currency. The British themselves printed considerable sums both to aggravate inflation and to purchase supplies. Tory sympathizers, as might be expected, actually paid a portion of their taxes with counterfeit money. Hoping to benefit from the war, a third group composed of the opportunistic and the unscrupulous also printed and passed bogus money. The punishments for such activities were severe and many persons arrested and prosecuted for counterfeiting were hanged. In November of 1779 the Supreme

Executive Council called for the Assembly to establish uniform punishments. This problem arose because the death penalty accompanied the counterfeiting of the early currency issues, whereas there were lighter punishments for the later issues.

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Perhaps because of such difficulties in collecting taxes Pennsylvania did not meet the January 1, 1780, deadline. In fact, the counties did not even begin to forward their payments to the state treasury until May, 1780. The data in Appendix E indicates that only Bucks and Lancaster paid by the end of the year. Five more counties also managed to pay by August, 1781, 20 months after the deadline. Only York County was still in arrears at the end of 1781. Even if late the taxables clearly paid their assessments for the 45 million tax.

For a third time in 1779 Congress utilized its requisition system and levied quotas on the states in order to meet anticipated expenses for defense in 1780. The runaway depreciation of the continental bills of credit necessitated this measure. On October 6, Congress called for the states to pay a monthly quota totalling \$15,000,000 for eight months beginning on February 1, 1780, to the continental treasurer "or to the order of Congress for the support of the federal army and navy." Pennsylvania's quota was \$2,300,000 a month. The General Assembly responded on November 25, 1779, with a law to raise \$2,500,000 a month to supply the Treasury of the United States with the additional \$200,000 a month for the maintenance of the state government.

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Since payments to the continental treasurer were to begin within ten weeks. The General Assembly decided to employ the tax list for the 45 million tax, then being calculated by the local assessors, as the basis on which to compute the monthly quotas for each county. The Assembly then

determined that each county had to pay one-half of its quota for the 45 million tax each month for eight months. The collectors were to pay their respective county treasurers at the end of each month beginning in January, 1780, so that the money could go to the state treasurer, who in turn would pay the continental treasurer by the first of the next month. The first eight monthly tax law provided that in case of delay the same sums would be levied and collected as soon as it became expedient to do so. Later in 1780 Congress extended this requisition for an additional eight months. The Assembly usually referred to this extension as the second eight monthly tax.

Tax collection efforts during the spring of 1780 were hampered by Congress's request to the states on March 18 that they assist in redeeming the ailing continental currency. Congress had determined that the country could only absorb \$200,000,000 in paper money. By early 1780 Congress had surpassed that amount by \$35,000,000. The combination of a surfeit of paper money in circulation and the counterfeiting of the national currency had contributed to rampant inflation and a corresponding loss of confidence in this form of paper as a medium of exchange. This situation adversely affected tax collections.

Depreciation of the continental currency seemed to be the only answer. Congress proposed that the old currency be exchanged for new notes at the rate of 40 to 1. The new notes were payable six years from the date of issue in either gold or silver. As an added inducement to encourage the exchange of currencies, Congress decided to pay 5 per cent interest on the new notes annually. Congress hoped that this exchange would both combat
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inflation and increase confidence in the central government.

In effect the measure decreased the paper money portion of the domestic debt from more than 200 million dollars to little more than 5 million.

The measure also reduced the amount of paper currency available with which to pay the four continental requisitions. To effect the exchange, Pennsylvania set a time limit. After June 1781 the old issues of continental currency would no longer be legal tender.

The question remains, how much did Pennsylvania collect and pay on its quotas and in what form was the payment? It is at this point that the tax accounting process becomes complicated. The \$95,000,000 total used by Dewey and Robinson comes from the four continental requisitions: the 5 million, the 15 million, the 45 million, and the first eight monthly taxes. As for the last tax, just the \$15,000,000 a month for January and February was included. Congress instructed the states that beginning in March, 1780, and for the next 14 months (the last 6 months of the 1st 8 monthly tax and the entire run of the 2nd 8 monthly tax), the states were to destroy the currency that they collected after redeeming it for new bills of credit at the rate of 40 to 1.¹⁸

The county and state tax records for Pennsylvania do not separate the 1st and 2nd monthly quotas and payments into an account for January and February and another account for the last 14 months. The tax records merely indicate the amounts paid on each tax (see Appendices F and G). Pennsylvania's quotas on its four requisitions totaled \$12,820,000. One must keep in mind that the state levied \$15,320,000 on the counties; the 15 million and the 1st 8 monthly tax statutes included money for the maintenance of the state government. One can, however, approximate how much the state collected from two other pieces of information.¹⁹

First, the grand total of all the continental taxes, which includes all 16 months of both 8 monthly taxes, amounts to £20,997,589 which is equivalent to \$50,320,000 (See Appendix H). The tax records indicate (See Appendix

H) that by December 31, 1781, Pennsylvania had collected from its counties 78.21 per cent of the grand total and 90.88 per cent or \$45,730,816 by
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 January, 1785.

Second, by December, 1786, Pennsylvania had paid \$28,771,100 of the \$29,900,000 required by Congress in the requisition for redeeming the old continental bills of credit. Subtracting \$28,771,100 from \$45,730,816 leaves a balance of \$16,959,716 collected. The latter figure indicates that at least the \$15,320,000 levied by the Assembly on the counties was collected. It is evident that the counties eventually collected and paid enough money into the state treasury so that Pennsylvania could have honored the \$12,820,000 called for by the four continental requisitions. The tax records, however, do not indicate how much Pennsylvania transferred to the contin-
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 ental treasury.

Davis R. Dewey did not provide a state by state breakdown in his figures on the continental requisitions. Edward Robinson did include a chart detailing this information, but his figure for the total paid by the states differs from Dewey's by approximately five million dollars. According to Robinson's calculations based on figures from continental treasury reports, the states paid \$49,476,539 of the \$95,000,000 total, and Pennsylvania paid \$6,454,004 on its four quotas which totaled \$12,820,000. The figure \$6,454,004 appears in two columns, respectively titled "estimated receipts thru June 26, 1780" and "total receipts". This information is not a reliable indicator of how much Pennsylvania actually paid. Robinson's table on "Receipts under the Continental Requisitions of 1777-1779" gives the impression that the \$6,454,004 is the amount that Pennsylvania paid into the continental treasury. But as we have seen, the \$6,454,004 is the total amount that Pennsylvania paid of the warrants issued by Congress on its account at the state
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 treasury (See Appendix I).

The later continental requisitions provided that the states in lieu of or in connection with paying the continental treasurer could credit the amount for the use of the United States. In the first eight months of 1780 alone the Supreme Executive Council, after being presented with various orders from Congress, instructed the state treasurer to pay, outright or as he received the funds from the county treasurers, almost \$5,000,000 to various representatives of the central government. According to documents in the state archives, Pennsylvania paid \$6,554,004 (which is \$100,000 more than the Robinson figure) on warrants written by Congress between October, 1778, and January, 1781 (See Appendix I).²³

The orders of Congress to the state invariably included the phrase "being part of the monies raised by the State of Pennsylvania for the use of the United States." The president of the Supreme Executive Council in turn instructed the treasurer to pay the sum "and charge the same to the United States" against the quotas the state raised or would raise on the continental requisitions. Even if the repetition of these and other phrases indicates a standard format for such instructions it also, and more importantly, indicates an often overlooked aspect of the financial relationship between state and central government. Pennsylvania had an alternative in honoring its requisitions. Congress decided how much and to whom the monies would go, and it was Pennsylvania's responsibility to gather the wherewithal to pay the drafts. This was a useful expedient, especially if the state had not yet raised the money. Instead of the continental treasury being deprived of funds and unable to purchase needed supplies, Pennsylvania had to honor the drafts written by Congress on its account at the state treasury.

Did Pennsylvania ever pay any part of its \$12,820,000 quota into the

continental treasury? Pennsylvania did honor \$6,554,004 at the state treasury, leaving a balance of \$6,365,995 to be accounted for. As for the disposition of the latter sum, a document from the Papers of the Continental Congress, dated March 5, 1781, provides a clue. According to this document, Pennsylvania paid two drafts or warrants on July 1, 1780, "in favour of" Michael Hillegas, the Continental Treasurer, in the amounts of \$1,796,950 and \$4,569,045. These two figures add up to the missing \$6,365,995. However, the following note appears in the margin of the document, "the treasurer informs he hath not received any part of the warrants drawn in his favour the 1st July last as of Continental taxes." ²⁴ No further mention is made concerning the warrants.

The fate of the missing money can be partially cleared up by examining additional information, which also further illuminates the accounting measures employed by the state of Pennsylvania and by Congress to maintain a record of the payments and tax credits for the requisition system. Joseph Reed, the president of Pennsylvania, maintained that the state had met the \$12,820,000 quotas even while the county officials levied and collected the ²⁵ 45 million tax. President Reed used other financial considerations besides payments of paper money on congressional warrants in order to balance the continental old money account between the state and Congress. Reed specifically mentioned that Pennsylvania paid \$3,000,000 for meat that was not carried in the above account, nor were the certificates for the debts of the Quartermaster and Commissary General that were now receivable for continental taxes carried into the account. Reed went on to state that the certificates already collected "will far over balance the quotas of this state." ²⁶

On 26 May 1780, Congress passed a resolution stating that its states could collect unpaid Quartermaster and Commissary certificates from its tax- ²⁷ ables along with continental money on the four continental taxes.

Congress had acted in part to a petition from the General Assembly of Pennsylvania,²⁸ which stated that tax collections lagged because continental money was in short supply. The petition intimated that Congress could alleviate this situation by paying the principle of the Quartermaster and Commissary certificates owed to the citizens of Pennsylvania, who incidentally held \$14,000,000 worth. Congress, operating with an almost depleted Treasury, proved receptive to having the states assume the burden of unpaid principle of the certificates. This relieved Congress of the necessity to pay the individual holder of the certificate. To compensate the states, Congress would allow them to deduct the dollar amount of the certificates cleared through the appropriate agencies from their respective state quotas²⁹ under the old money requisition system. Accordingly, Congress allowed Pennsylvania £62,074 (approximately 2 million dollars) credit in certificates that the state had received in taxes.

It seems that Pennsylvania at least made an effort to honor its total quotas. However, I have not yet determined the final balance between the state and Congress. Nevertheless, an assessment of Pennsylvania's performance under the requisition system can still be made.

Much to the detriment of a sound currency system, Congress and the states conjured up increasingly greater amounts of paper money. Both levels of government operated primarily on a paper money system insufficiently backed by specie and based on a promise to pay all debts 'sometime' in the future. When Congress requisitioned money, Pennsylvania had to find the means to meet its obligation to the central government. The ever-depreciating continental currency sounded the death knell of the old money requisition system. Tax assessment and collection could not keep pace with the rampant inflation that characterized the paper money system between 1778

and 1781. The requisition system did fail because it was tied to inflated paper money.

Economic historians such as Albert S. Bolles, Davis R. Dewey, and Edward Robinson are correct in saying that the requisition system failed. But they attribute its failure to the wrong reasons. The answer cannot be found in the simple nature of local tax collection, the lack of a continental taxing power, or inadequate state support. The tax collection effort in Pennsylvania was organized and reasonably efficient considering the nagging problem of inflation. The requisition system seemed to be taxation by another name even though the central government could not force the states to pay. Finally, Pennsylvania not only collected enough from its counties to pay the full amount of the four old money quotas, but also honored more than has been generally assumed.

Chapter 3

Watchmen on the Walls: Pennsylvania's Dissaffected Respond to Continental Taxation

Historians of the financing of the American Revolution have invariably used certain erroneous generalizations to help explain Pennsylvania's supposed poor performance under the old money requisition system. Despite the fact that the historians based these generalizations upon a minimum of primary evidence, the myths they created are still generally accepted. One myth is that large groups of Pennsylvanians, specifically Quakers, Mennonites, and loyalists, interfered with the operation of the state government in general and with the collection of taxes in particular. A number of historians assert that the Quakers and the Mennonites were large cohesive groups that refused for reasons of conscience to bear arms and pay taxes to an illegal government engaged in war.¹ The historians also state in another generalization that the loyalists took advantage of every opportunity to obstruct the course of legitimate government in the state. The imprecise estimates of the number of active loyalists in Pennsylvania has contributed to the proliferation of these inaccurate generalizations concerning state support of the war. These misconceptions arose, in part, from the incorrect use of evidence: that is, the use of isolated incidents involving individual church members and active loyalists to support generalizations about entire groups.

Historians often cite the Yearly Meetings of the Quakers early in the war as evidence to prove that this denomination did not support the state government. The Council of Elders at the 1775 Yearly Meeting in Philadelphia adopted a "testimony", or official position paper, which called upon all church members to refuse to take the oath of allegiance to the state government and to "restrain from aiding and abetting the Revolutionary cause by force of arms or by supplies to the army."² One of the Council's duties

was to provide spiritual and secular guidelines in times of trial, and certain basic religious precepts of the Quakers precluded swearing oaths and contributing to any war related activities. However, the 1775 Yearly Meeting proved divisive for the denomination. Shortly thereafter the Quakers split into two groups. The majority supported a more conservative traditional line while the minority supported the patriot cause. As the war progressed, the Monthly Meetings disowned an increasing number of its members who actively supported the war effort. By 1781 many of the dis-³owned in Philadelphia had formed a denomination called the Free Quakers.

In his study of Chester County, Pennsylvania, John Hartman maintained that the Quakers and the Mennonites "refused to sell supplies to the Contin-⁴ental Army" because they would be paid in depreciated continental currency. Historians have invariably utilized such an incident as this as proof of disloyal behavior while neglecting to take other considerations into account. Did the Quakers and Mennonites refuse to sell supplies because it would be immoral to profit from war or because payment would consist of paper money? Another consideration was the Quakers' and Mennonites' distaste for all forms of paper currency because they possessed no "real" or intrinsic value. Both groups considered the exchange of a piece of paper for a man's labor as immoral. Nevertheless, Mary Johnson has argued that the Mennonites did sell their goods because they felt that they had raised the food "so let God⁵ decide who should eat it." But more important is the fact that agents for the Continental Army and various government departments purchased or impressed supplies and gave in exchange Quartermaster and Commissary certificates⁶ and not paper currency. The point is that these historians have incorrectly interpreted this position on continental currency as proof that the Quakers and the Mennonites did not support the state government during the

war years.

As for bearing arms, it is again necessary to differentiate between official policy and individual actions. Even though the great majority of the Quakers attempted to remain neutral, individual Quakers joined the patriots and fought the British. Allan Nevins maintained that "by the fall of 1777, about one-fifth of the adult male Quakers in Philadelphia had joined the American army or taken patriot offices." ⁷ One-fifth of an unknown number is still an unknown, but the proportion itself is indicative of the fact that individual Quakers did support the patriot cause.

When can a Quaker really be considered a Quaker? There are documented cases of men joining the army or paying militia fines and then being disowned or "turned out" by their respective congregations for promoting measures contrary to official teachings. As the war lengthened into its sixth and seventh years, more and more Quakers actively supported the patriot effort. The Gwynedd and Abington Monthly Meetings, located in Philadelphia County, turned out more than one hundred and fifty members during the war years for various offenses. ⁸ A different Monthly Meeting in the city of Philadelphia read Thomas Mifflin out of the congregation in July, 1775, because of his activity "in the promotion of military measures." ⁹ The Continental Congress subsequently appointed Mifflin the first Quartermaster General of the Continental Army. Another interesting case involved William Whitaker of Chester County. His congregation disowned him for his various military activities: he enlisted in the Continental army, deserted, went over to the British, deserted, rejoined the Continental army, and swore to ¹⁰ the oath of allegiance to the United States. Whitaker might have been one of those people who had their names listed in different meetings for social ¹¹ reasons but who were not practicing Quakers.

In spite of scattered Quaker support for the war, many patriots still abhorred the official Quaker position and accused the Friends of Toryism. The state government, however, did not react with hostility at first. Don Higginbotham maintained that before the British occupied Philadelphia in September, 1777, the Quakers "usually experienced harsh public criticism¹² rather than actual persecution." After the British occupation, the state government followed a tougher policy which was probably intended to placate the more radical patriots. In the fall of 1777, the General Assembly exiled twenty-two Quakers to Virginia, ostensibly for refusal to take the oath of allegiance. The majority vindicated themselves and returned to Penn-¹³sylvania within a few months. Speculation over the government's motive suggested that the action was intended to serve as an object lesson for all pacifist sects. Even so, one incident involving the exile of twenty-two Quakers from among the estimated 20,000 living in southeastern Pennsylvania during the war suggests considerable government restraint, especially considering the numbers involved and the uncertainty of the times.

Many of the derogatory statements about the Quakers refer to their failure to pay taxes and to their general lack of support for the war effort. Historians have invariably used examples from the years 1775 to 1777 and on them based sweeping generalizations. These historians have failed to consider the Quakers' positions on legally constituted authority and on the payment of taxes as they changed during the course of the war. When the radicals in Pennsylvania pressed for independence, the inherent conservatism of Quaker traditions as espoused in the Yearly "testimony" of 1775 forced the individual church members into an unpopular position with respect to rebellion against established authority, in this case the British government. It would not only be immoral but also illegal to support the unlaw-

ful patriot government. Moreover, many Quakers did refuse to pay militia fines and local taxes in the early years of the war. The early economic historians have inaccurately assumed that because the Quakers had an official policy on taxes and because there were incidents involving individual Quakers who did not pay their taxes between 1775 and 1777, that they did not pay any taxes during the entire war. There is a quantum jump from the attitudes of the Quakers as a group as reflected in official policy in the late spring of 1775 to the actions of individual Quakers two years later. Historians cannot expect to project Quaker attitudes throughout the war years from the known attitudes in 1775. By 1780 most Americans accepted their respective state governments and the Continental Congress as legitimate and thus recognized the necessity or were finally coerced into contributing to the maintenance of both. John Pemberton, a prominent Philadelphia Quaker, wrote in February 1778, that "Members were not disowned for the simple payment of taxes unless they were specifically war taxes or were exacted in him of ¹⁴ of him in lieu of personal service." Perhaps the Quakers only opposed the militia fines the state government levied on those who refused to bear arms for conscience sake. Much evidence exists to prove that the Quakers did pay their continental taxes which Pennsylvania began collecting in November, 1777.

The Chester County, Pennsylvania, tax accounts indicate that the majority of Quaker taxables did pay. For example, on January 2, 1779, the Congress passed the 15 million tax and set Pennsylvania's quota at \$1,900,000. The Pennsylvania Assembly responded three months later on April 3, by levying \$4,000,000 in taxes on the eleven counties. The Assembly ¹⁵ intended to utilize the additional revenue for state expenses.

In 1779, approximately 6,378 taxables lived in Chester County. ¹⁶ James

Lemon, a noted authority on early southeastern Pennsylvania, calculated that in 1782 the population of Chester County was 34,450. He also estimated that in 1790, 30 per cent of the county residents were Quakers.¹⁷

Assuming that the same percentages held true for 1779, then approximately 30 per cent of the 6,378 taxables or 1,913 were Quakers. The quota for Chester County on the 15 million tax totaled £157,987. Thus, each taxable owed an average tax of £24.15.5. By August 1781, Chester County

had paid £153,046 into the state treasury leaving a balance owed of £4,941 (See Appendix D).¹⁸ One can compute the number of taxables who did not

pay by dividing the average tax into the balance owed. Assuming that the

200 taxables were all Quakers then the other 1,713 Quakers (89.5 per cent) paid the average tax. Of course this is the one extreme with the

other being that all the taxables paid £23.19.11, which is 15½ shillings

below the average tax. Another important factor to consider is that the

total tax for each taxable varied greatly depending on his real and per-

sonal property. Nevertheless, tax averages are helpful indicators of pro-

bable payment especially since James Lemon has shown that not only did the

"Quakers and Mennonites dominate the top tax brackets in the most productive

areas" of Chester and Lancaster Counties in 1782 but also that the Quakers

were the leading taxpayers in the poorer areas of both counties.¹⁹ In any

case, it is doubtful that the Scotch-Irish in Chester County paid the taxes

for their Quaker neighbors in addition to their own.

The Mennonites in Pennsylvania have been subjected to many of the same charges of not bearing arms or paying taxes that have been made about the

Quakers. The Mennonites also had an official policy that opposed paying

finer to a "waring government". However, as Mary Johnson has speculated

"no doubt when fines were strictly enacted, the Amish and Mennonites paid

them without too much bickering."²⁰ Even though continental taxes are dif-

ferent than militia fines, the statistics dealing with the record of Lancaster County on the continental taxes indicate that the above charges about the Mennonites not paying taxes are in need of revision.

James Lemon has estimated that 68 per cent of the 47,000 people who lived in Lancaster County in 1792 were German speaking, and that 25 per cent²¹ of the population in 1790 were Mennonites. Assuming that the same percentage held constant for 1779, then approximately 25 per cent of the 8,433²² taxables or 2,108 were Mennonites. The quota for Lancaster County on the 15 million tax totaled £213,819. By August 28, 1780, the county treasurer had paid the full amount to David Rittenhouse, the state treasurer (See²³ Appendix D).

In addition to the Quakers and the Mennonites, the loyalists comprised the third group which purportedly interfered with the operation of the state government in Pennsylvania in general and with the collection of taxes in particular. American loyalists who did support the British cause obviously created many problems not only for the Continental Congress but also for the state governments. The early economic historians coupled this fact with various estimates of the number of Tories and members of the pacifist sects to explain Pennsylvania's difficulty with tax collections. The use of these imprecise estimates accounts, in part, for the erroneous generalizations made about Pennsylvania's contributions under the old money requisition system. Few historians who wrote about the Tories presented specific figures as to the number of loyalists in America, much less in Pennsylvania, during²⁴ the war years.

Who to include under the rubric of "Loyalist" is difficult to determine. Most historians concerned with the American Revolution have been too slavish to the dictionary definition of a "Tory" as someone "who advocated or active-

ly supported continued allegiance to Great Britain." ²⁵ The first part of this definition is invalid in the context of the question of paying state taxes. No doubt thousands of Pennsylvanians were genuinely sympathetic to the British cause. However, what proportion actively supported the British? It would be a mistake to identify people as loyalists who merely passively supported the British because it is obvious that many Pennsylvanians who advocated allegiance to Great Britain also paid taxes to the state government at some point during the war.

Between 1778 and 1781 the state of Pennsylvania declared 453 people traitors for joining the British. The majority, 349, lived in the city of Philadelphia and in the three original counties of Bucks, Chester, and Philadelphia. Accordingly, Wallace Brown maintained that loyalism was a ²⁶ "southeastern phenomenon" in Pennsylvania. These figures, of course, do not reflect the passive support for the British. At this point two other factors are important in assessing the extent of loyalism in Pennsylvania. First, a list of 453 people cannot be interpreted as indicative of an epidemic considering that representation in the 1779 General Assembly was based on 54,000 taxables. Second, even if loyalism was a "southeastern phenomenon," the three original counties and the city of Philadelphia had good records on their continental taxes.

Historians have intimated that those farmers who sold supplies to the British were actively supporting the enemy and thus were Tories. There were numerous incidents of Pennsylvania farmers selling their goods to the British in Philadelphia. However, it would be difficult to determine the number of farmers with loyalist sympathies as opposed to the number more interested in the fact that the enemy paid specie instead of paper money ²⁷ for supplies. Nor are the two groups mutually exclusive. The British

in America had a constant source of specie to draw upon. The government in London annually shipped at least £500,000 in specie to its agents in America, most of which went for food and other necessities.²⁸ No doubt much of the specie paid to Pennsylvania farmers during the British occupation of Philadelphia eventually found its way into the various county treasuries in payment of continental taxes.

Despite problems associated with currency depreciation, British depredations, the appeals process, recalcitrant local officials, and a simple aversion to paying taxes, the majority of Pennsylvania taxables somehow managed to pay their continental taxes. The supply of continental money in Pennsylvania began to dry up by late 1779 primarily because of the depreciation of the currency. The depreciation became especially acute the following spring when Congress resolved to repudiate the old continental bills of credit at the rate of 40 to 1. This further hindered the efforts by the counties to collect continental taxes.

To help remedy the situation, Congress recommended in May that the states collect unpaid Quartermaster and Commissary certificates as payment on Continental taxes. Congress agreed to apply the total amount of the cleared certificates against the state quotas due on the four continental old money requisitions. Pennsylvania taxpayers could now draw on these certificates as another source of "paper money" with which to pay their individual taxes. Congress's resolution placated those persons who possessed adequate funds but were reluctant to pay taxes because they had not previously received remuneration for their certificates.²⁹ Congress owed the holders of these certificates for the principle as well as the interest.

British depredations in Philadelphia and throughout the surrounding countryside during the occupation of the city continued to affect tax collections for the next two years, especially the collection of the 45 million

tax during 1780. Consequently the state government decided to compile a new set of county property evaluations. The old set did not reflect the changes in property holdings and property owners since the occupation. In accordance with the statute for the 45 million tax, the local assessors instructed each taxable to fill out his own property return and swear to its accuracy. The obvious drawbacks to this modification of the assessment procedures no doubt mitigated the advantage of the time saved.³⁰ Even so, much time passed before the new returns could be given to the collectors because of the severity of the winter of 1779-1780.

Joseph Reed, the president of Pennsylvania in 1780, delineated other problems besides British depredations which specifically hindered the collection of the 45 million tax.³¹ President Reed described the problem of the taxpayers who made no "voluntary payments" and who exhibited "real or pretended disaffection." Reed maintained that the government used compulsion but still encountered delays with the collection of taxes because of: the appeals days; the collection of fines for the non-acceptance of local offices or for the neglect of duty; and the depreciation of the continental currency. The fact that the four state tax statutes provided for appeals days in itself lends legitimacy to the collection process. However, if the government grants its citizens an opportunity to remonstrate, then they will crowd the appeals docket in order to save a few dollars, that is, a few Spanish milled dollars or an equivalent sum in continental currency. Those taxpayers who did pay a fine for not accepting an office provided the county government with an additional source of revenue. But the county officials had to contend with the time consuming problem of finding different local officials.

Depreciation on the other hand is a more nebulous problem. A taxpayer could gain a decided advantage if he paid his taxes late with "cheap", that

is, depreciated money. However, the Supreme Executive Council of Pennsylvania attempted to prevent potential tax delinquents from taking advantage of the new exchange rates. The Council instructed the collectors to receive payments only from those taxpayers who were "willing to pay them continental taxes at the rate in at which they were originally laid."³² The tax records do not indicate the amounts collected under these revised guidelines.

The consideration of other historian's work on state taxation during other periods will help set the lagging collection of continental taxes during the American Revolution in better perspective. C. H. Martin, in an article about federal taxes for the War of 1812, maintained that tax delinquency was a question of attitude, specifically, it was more an aversion to paying taxes than active non-support of the government. Sounds applicable to contemporary America! Martin went on to say that federal revenues had not been collected in many states excluding Pennsylvania because payments "were not generally enforced throughout the Union."³³ Blake Nicholson, in his study of the collection of local taxes for 1927 and 1928 in Pennsylvania, provided an appendix that indicates that a small percentage of each year's taxes during the 1920's were generally in arrears.³⁴ It would actually be unrealistic to expect the collection of 100 per cent of all state and continental taxes. No matter if the year is 1779, 1814, or 1927, one has to consider many factors to explain lagging tax collections.

A familiarization with the many problems that the 54,000 Pennsylvania taxables encountered in 1779 and 1780 helps set the lagging tax collections in their proper perspective. Currency depreciation, the lingering effects of British depredations, the appeals process, recalcitrant local officials, and a simple aversion to paying taxes hindered the prompt collection of taxes. However, while the old money requisitions remained unpaid, the state of Pennsylvania made every effort to collect and to meet its obligations. Moreover,

many Pennsylvanians who were either members of pacifist sects or were sympathetic to the British or both apparently paid their continental taxes. Many historians have generally failed to properly incorporate these considerations into their studies of the financing of the American Revolution. It is time these historians reexamined state taxation and state support of the war.

CONCLUSION

Granted, the continental money system created many problems for the central and state governments during the American Revolution. The early economic historians principally confined themselves to those problems most prevalent with paper money.¹ These historians emphasized the inflation accompanying the numerous issues of paper money, the corresponding depreciation in value, the hardships endured by persons on fixed incomes, and the fact that the Congress repudiated the continental money portion of the domestic debt.

Albert S. Bolles's account of Pennsylvania during the American Revolution is unfortunately typical of past and present scholarship concerning state support of the war. In Pennsylvania...1609 to 1790(1899), Bolles reiterated the generalizations on state support and on the evils of paper money that he made in an earlier study of the financial history of the country.² Bolles maintained that unfortunately for Pennsylvania "the system of taxation broke down at the very beginning, affecting not only the value of paper money, but also the credit of the state." Pennsylvania "continued to authorize the raising of its quotas, though it failed like the other states in fully honoring the continental requisitions." Bolles apparently based these remarks on incorrect data; "The Assembly ordered the collection of more than \$35,000,000 of taxes between the years 1776 and 1781, but only a small portion was ever collected."³ This is another example of a historian using a situation that existed early in the war as the basis on which to make sweeping generalizations for the entire war.

The General Assembly of Pennsylvania actually levied far more than \$35,000,000. The quotas of the four continental old money requisitions of 1777 and 1779 by themselves, as modified by the Assembly to include money

for the state government, amounted to more than \$50,000,000. The counties paid \$37,000,000 or 75 per cent of this amount into the state treasury by December 31, 1781 (See Appendix H). The data compiled from the tax accounts for the state and the individual counties clearly indicates that the inhabitants of Pennsylvania paid more than a "small portion" of their taxes.

Albert S. Bolles also overrated the utility of a specie based tax system because he failed to consider the paucity of hard money in circulation during 1775 and 1776. Even if the reported four to eight million in specie did exist in the colonies in 1775, that amount by itself would not have been sufficient to meet the needs of an expanding war-time economy.⁴ The necessity existed for an infusion of paper currency into the circulating medium.⁵ A paper money system based on a promise to pay all debts sometime in the future proved to be absolutely vital for the continuation of the war and the maintenance of functional government at the national and state levels.

In spite of accompanying problems the Continental Congress and the states used paper money as a medium of circulation until 1780. Continental money remained at par with specie until early 1777, but Congress had only issued 25 millions by that time. Moreover, the paper currency would have resisted inflation and depreciation better if the states had fulfilled their role in the financial system. While Congress issued the paper money, the states were supposed to pass timely tax laws in order to redeem the money, thus, keeping the total amount issued within manageable proportions.⁶ This the states failed to do.

Why then did the early economic historians maintain that the states did not pay their taxes? The answer, for Pennsylvania, probably can be found in the types of evidence the historians cited and in the basic fact that the state government did experience great difficulties while attempting

to collect taxes. Historians have invariably cited the following sources: newspaper and private accounts of individual tax delinquents; official position statements by pacifist sects against the payment of taxes; imprecise estimates as to the numbers of disaffected citizens who exhibited pro-Tory sentiment; and, pronouncements by the state government about lagging tax collections. The early economic historians presented seemingly logical arguments using the above evidence in conjunction with tables of figures from continental treasury reports that detailed the balances due by the individual states. Moreover, the historians accepted these tables at face value without delving into the complex and often chaotic accounting procedures that existed between the national government and the states. The multiplicity of paper instruments coupled with rampant inflation and currency depreciation not only complicated the financial relationship between the two levels of government during the war years, but also hindered the subsequent examinations of the problems associated with the financing of the American Revolution. The accounting processes, as they evolved, merit consideration because they are somewhat sophisticated considering the volume of paper-credit transactions and the initial lack of systematized accounting procedures at both levels of government to record these financial transactions.

Few historians mention the state tax accounts of Pennsylvania, and none of them mention the tax accounts of the individual counties. The historians have also neglected two accounting procedures that are important for understanding state performance under the old money requisition system. First, Congress could write warrants on its account at the state treasuries. The states would then credit the warrants against their continental quotas. Second, Congress agreed in May, 1780, to allow the states also to credit the amount of unpaid Quartermaster and Commissary certificates properly cleared

with the appropriate agency against their continental quotas on the four old money requisitions.

It is time to re-examine state taxation in general and state support of the American Revolution in particular. Historians have not only unduly emphasized the amounts not collected but also have incorrectly estimated those amounts. Sufficient data is available so that historians can calculate more precisely how much the inhabitants of Pennsylvania paid on their taxes and how much the state honored on its old money quotas.

NOTES

Abbreviations

CRP	Colonial Records of Pennsylvania
JCC	Journals of the Continental Congress
PA	Pennsylvania Archives
PCC	Papers of the Continental Congress

Introduction

¹Albert S. Bolles, The Financial History of the United States from 1774 to 1789(New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1879), pp. 194-195; See also Davis R. Dewey, Financial History of the United States(New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1902), pp. 44-45; and Edward Forbes Robinson, "Continental Treasury Administration, 1775 to 1781," Diss. Wisconsin 1969, pp. 94-95.

²Merrill Jensen, Articles of Confederation(Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1970), p. 149; See also Jackson Turner Main, The Sovereign States 1775-1783(New York:New Viewpoints, 1973), p. 394.

³Richard Lester, Monetary Experiments, Early American and Recent Scandinavian(Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1939), pp. 91, 111.

Chapter 1

¹E. James Ferguson, The Power of the Purse: A History of American Public Finance, 1776-1790(Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1961), pp. 8, 18; See also Bray Hammond, Banks and Politics in America, from the Revolution to the Civil War(Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1957), pp. 12-14; and Richard Lester, Monetary Experiments, Early American and Recent Scandinavian(Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1939), pp. 91, 111.

²E. James Ferguson, The Papers of Robert Morris 1781-1784, I(Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 1973), 35; See also Neil Carothers, Fractional Money: A History of the Small Coins and Fractional Paper Currency of the United States (1930; reprinted New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1967), p. 40.

³Pelatiah Webster, Political Essays on the Nature and Operation of Money(Philadelphia, 1791), p. 11.

⁴Eric P. Newman, The Early Paper Money of America(Racine, Wisconsin: Whitman Pub. Co., 1967), pp. 13, 30.

⁵Carothers, Fractional Money, pp. 38-39; See also Arthur Nussbaum, A History of the Dollar(New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1957), p. 36. Nussbaum refers to the Spanish milled dollar as the common circulating medium but he also states that the dollar's value varied in the different colonies.

⁶Edward Forbes Robinson, "Continental Treasury Administration, 1775 to 1781," Diss. Wisconsin 1969, pp. 24, 33-36.

⁷Don Higginbotham, The War of American Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practice, 1763-1789(New York: The Macmillan Co., 1971), pp. 185-198, 231.

⁸Ferguson, Power of the Purse, p. 35.

⁹Ferguson, Power of the Purse, pp. 33-34.

¹⁰Clarence L. Ver Steeg, Robert Morris, Revolutionary Financier(1954; reprinted New York: Octagon Books, 1972), p. 44; See also William Graham Sumner, The Financier and the Finances of the American Revolution, I(New York: Dodd, Mead, and Co., 1891), 25.

¹¹JCC, IX, 955-956(22 Nov. 1777); XIII, 21(2 Jan. 1779); XIV, 626(21 May 1779); XV, 1147(6 Oct. 1779).

¹²Ferguson, Power of the Purse, pp. 31-32; See also Newman, Early Paper Money, p. 359. Newman's table of depreciation comes from the American State Papers. Ferguson's data comes from the books of a Philadelphia merchant during the war years and is an abbreviated version of a table in Anne Bezanson's Prices During the Revolution. Newman shows that the exchange rate for Pennsylvania state money dropped from 5 to 4 in June and July, 1778, but the exchange rate for continental currency increased from 2.30 in May, 1778, to 2.65 in June, and then to 3.01 in July. Ferguson's table indicates that continental currency dropped from 6.0 in April, 1778, to 4.0 in July, and back up to 5.0 in October.

¹³JCC, XVII, 455, 463-465(26 May 1780).

¹⁴Albert S. Bolles, Pennsylvania...1609 to 1790(Philadelphia: J. Wanamaker, 1899), p. 69. According to a March 1781 report compiled by Joseph Reed, David Rittenhouse, and John Bayard, the citizens of Pennsylvania held an estimated \$14,000,000 in certificates for "seizures". The following table gives a partial breakdown by county:

Bucks	300,000
Chester	600,000
Lancaster	3,000,000
York	105,000
Cumberland	2,925,000
Berks	1,200,000
Northampton	900,000

¹⁵James A. Huston, The Sinews of War: Army Logistics 1775-1953 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1966), p. 67; See also Ferguson, Power of the Purse, p. 67.

¹⁶Robert L. Brunhouse, The Counter-Revolution in Pennsylvania 1776-1790 (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical Commission, 1942), p. 85; See also PCC, item 26, "Reports of Committees on Treasury and Finance 1776-88," roll 33, p. 118 (Feb. 9, 1780, "States called for quotas of supplies"): other examples of state quotas include,

	Virginia	South Carolina	Connecticut
hund. wt of beef	47,000	16,000	78,400
barrels of flour	1,278		
bushels of salt	10,700	5,000	1,011
gallons of rum	100,000	120,000	68,558
tons of hay	400	800	500
bushels of corn	200,000	80,000	
hogsheads of tobacco	6,000		
hund. wt. of rice		52,000	

¹⁷Sumner, Financier and the Finances, I, 239-246; See also Huston, Sinews of War, p. 63. Huston relates the story that the Pennsylvania state government collected 5,000 cattle for the Army but could not have them butchered because of a lack of salt to preserve the meat.

¹⁸Ferguson, Power of the Purse, pp. 64, 141-142.

¹⁹Pennsylvania, RG4 - Records of the Office of the Comptroller General, 1762-1810, "United States Accounts, Ledgers, 1775-88," Ledger AB, p. 312, "General Abstract of Accounts, The State of Pennsylvania against the United States," (no date). Note: the entry entitled "Monies paid to the Continental Requisitions of Congress" amounts to 190,169.37 in specie, which is equivalent to \$6,554,005, the amount Pennsylvania paid on warrants of Congress drawn on the state treasury. See Ledger AB, pages 306 to 309 for a breakdown by individual warrant.

²⁰Ferguson, Power of the Purse, p. 211, fn 16.

²¹Ferguson, Power of the Purse, p. 203.

²²Ferguson, Power of the Purse, p. 67.

²³PA, 1st ser., I, 80(9 Nov 1778): "...although the common defense has obligated Congress to issue very great sums in bills of credit, creating a debt on the United States which we are bound jointly with them to extinguish. Honour, interest, /and/ duty urge us to perform our share."

Chapter 2

¹Brook Hindle, David Rittenhouse(Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1964), pp. 175-187, esp. 183-185.

²Robert L. Brunhouse, The Counter-Revolution in Pennsylvania 1776-1790 (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical Commission, 1942), pp. 9-13.

³J. Paul Selsam, The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776(1936; rpt. New York: Octagon Books, 1971), pp. 31-39, 137, 187-188.

⁴Brunhouse, Counter-Revolution, pp. 18-24; See also Selsam, Pennsylvania Constitution, pp. 226-230.

⁵Congress levied its requisitions on the states in Spanish milled dollars but payable in continental bills of credit at the rate of £1 equivalent to 2.665672 dollars. For convenience as well as a lack of specie in circulation, the state of Pennsylvania levied quotas on its counties in these same continental bills of credit. For the text of the tax law see, Pennsylvania, The Acts of the General Assembly(Philadelphia, 1782), pp. 118-123, (Evans #17656; hereafter cited by this number). For the only roll call vote on a continental requisition see, Pennsylvania, Minutes of the Second General Assembly (Lancaster, 1778), p. 68, (Evans #15973). The vote went 39 to 6.

⁶Pennsylvania, Comptroller-General, State of the Accounts of the Taxes of Berks County from 1776 till 1790(Philadelphia, 1790), p. 5, (Evans #23682). See Evans #17656 for the table of fees.

⁷Evans #17656, p. 123. Collectors could be fined up to £50 and county commissioners and assessors up to £100 for not accepting the appointment to a local office. See also PA, 3rd ser., VII, 317-321; Issac Snowden, the treasurer

of Philadelphia, received £24,540 in fines from persons who refused to serve as collectors and assessors on the four continental taxes.

⁸See the footnotes to Appendix C for citations for the individual counties. For convenience sake I did not include shillings and pence in the Appendices on the payment of the four continental taxes. For information on the 5 million tax and on problems with the collection effort see Evans #17656, p. 323; see also Pennsylvania, Laws Enacted in the Third Sitting of the Third General Assembly(Philadelphia, 1779), p. 229. (Evans #16429); and Pennsylvania, Comptroller-General, State of the Accounts...of Westmoreland County(Philadelphia, 1790), p. 3, (Evans #45956); and Boyd Crumrine, "The Boundry Controversy Between Pennsylvania and Virginia, 1748-1785," Annals of the Carnegie Museum, I(1902), 418-419.

⁹Evans #17656, pp. 198-208.

¹⁰Evans #17656, pp. 198-208, includes a list of taxable property and a revised schedule of fees.

¹¹CRP, "Minutes of the Supreme Executive Council," vol. 12(Harrisburg, 1855), pp. 53-54, 244-245.

¹²Roll 200, Microfilm edition of documents of the Revolutionary period (1773-1786) from the general manuscript collections of the Historical Society of Berks County, Reading, Pennsylvania, c. 1973. The following information came from a letter dated February 11, 1779, and written in Reading, the county seat of Berks County, Pennsylvania: Adam Witman/county commissioner/ wrote Jacob Shoemaker /county treasurer/ asking to allow John Klingsonan /collector of taxes for Robeson Township in Berks County/ certain deficiencies on the First Continental Tax/the 5 million tax/. These deficiencies totaled £34.8.0.

¹³Mary A. Johnson, "The Attitudes of the Leading Religious Sects of Pennsylvania Towards the Revolution," Theses, Temple 1936; See also James Lemon, The Best Poor Man's Land: A Geographical Study of Early Southeastern Pennsylvania(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1972), pp. 188-189, "Quakers and Mennonites dominated the top tax brackets in the most productive areas of the two counties /in 1782/....Even in the poorer parts of Chester and Lancaster, Quakers were the leading taxpayers."

¹⁴Evans #16429, pp. 257-259. Pennsylvania, Minutes of the Third General Assembly(Philadelphia, 1778), p. 152, (Evans #15974).

¹⁵Kenneth Scott, Counterfeiting in Colonial America(New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1957), pp. 253-263; See also CRP, vol. 12, p. 168.

¹⁶Pennsylvania, Minutes of the First Session of the Fourth General Assembly(Philadelphia, 1779), p. 171, (Evans #16477); See also Evans #17656, pp. 239-241.

¹⁷Benjamin M. Nead, A Brief Review of the Financial History of Pennsylvania, 1682-1881(Harrisburg: Lane S. Hart, 1881), p. 15; See also E. James Ferguson, The Power of the Purse: A History of American Public Finance, 1776-1790(Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1961), p.

¹⁸Davis R. Dewey, Financial History of the United States(New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1902), p. 44; See also Edward Forbes Robinson, "Continental Treasury Administration, 1775 to 1781," Diss. Wisconsin 1969, p. 336.

19	620,000	620,000
	1,900,000	4,000,000
	5,700,000	5,700,000
	4,600,000	5,000,000
	<u>\$12,820,000</u>	<u>\$15,320,000</u>

20	620,000	
	4,000,000	
	5,700,000	
	5,000,000	
	<u>35,000,000</u>	14 mo. @ 2,500,000 to retire old currency
	\$50,320,000	

²¹Pennsylvania, Comptroller-General, A View of the Debts and Expenses of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, 1786), p. 2, (Evans #19904).

²²Dewey, Financial History, pp. 44-45; See also Robinson, "Continental Treasury," pp. 336-337.

²³CRP, vol. 12, pp. 232, 235, 238-9, 359, 381, 395, 396, 462; See also Pennsylvania, RG4 - Records of the Office of the Comptroller General, 1762-1810, "United States Accounts, Accounts Current 1775-1791," Box No. 1, doc. XXX, entitled "The United States to the State of Pennsylvania dr. for sundry payments on account of the Continental Money Requisitions of Congress made between October 1778 and January 1781" [] lists the figure \$6,554,004 as does the following reference []; "United States Accounts, Ledgers, 1775-88," Ledger AB, pp. 306-309, entitled "The United States to the State of Pennsylvania Dr. for cash paid on warrents of Congress on Account of the Continental Requisitions for Carrying on the war."

²⁴PCC, Item No. 141, II, pp. 14-15.

²⁵PCC, Item No. 69, II, pp. 265-267.

²⁶PCC, Item No. 69, II, p. 268.

²⁷JCC, vol. 17, 455, 463-464 (26 May 1780).

²⁸PCC, Item No. 69, II, pp. 320-321.

²⁹JCC, vol. 17, 465.

Chapter 3

¹Allan Nevins, The American States During and After the Revolution 1775-1789(New York: The Macmillan Co., 1924), p. 429. Most frequently read are variations of the statement that "the Quakers will not serve nor pay the fine."

²John S. Hartman, "The Contributions of Chester County to the Revolutionary Cause, 1774-1783," Thesis, Penn State 1936, p. 28.

³Robert L. Brunhouse, The Counter-Revolution in Pennsylvania 1776-1790 (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical Commission, 1942), p. 119.

⁴Hartman, "Contributions," p. 32.

⁵Mary A. Johnson, "The Attitudes of the Leading Religious Sects of Pennsylvania Towards the Revolution," Thesis, Temple 1936, p. 88.

⁶James A. Huston, The Sinews of War: Army Logistics 1775-1953(Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1966), p. 67.

⁷Nevins, The American States, p. 252; See also Kenneth R. Rossman, Thomas Mifflin and the Politics of the American Revolution(Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1952), p. 41. Rossman writes that "a large number of Quakers" were among the three thousand young men drilling in Philadelphia in late spring of 1775. The Quakers subsequently formed a company of light infantry named "The Quaker Blues."

⁸L. Gertrude Fryburg, "Fighting Quakers of Pennsylvania," National Historical Magazine, LXXVI(February, 1942), 145-147.

⁹Rossman, Thomas Mifflin, p. 41. However, the Quakers as a group generally supported Mifflin in his election as governor of Pennsylvania in 1790.

¹⁰Hartman, "Contributions," p. 30.

¹¹Johnson, "Attitudes," p. 49. Mary Johnson uses the phrase "real Quakers."

¹²Don Higginbotham, The War of American Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practice, 1763-1789 (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1971), pp. 275-6.

¹³Brooke Hindle, David Rittenhouse (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1964), p. 190. This is the only incident of the transportation of Pennsylvania Quakers that I have found.

¹⁴Johnson, "Attitudes," p. 49. Pemberton is probably referring to militia fines.

¹⁵JCC, XIII, 21(2 Jan 1779); See also Pennsylvania, The Acts of the General Assembly (Philadelphia: Francis Bailey, 1782), pp. 198, (Evans #17656). I do not know to what extent the sheriffs confiscated property. I did not see any mention of tax delinquency cases while examining court records at the Berks County Historical Society in Reading, Pennsylvania.

¹⁶Register of Pennsylvania, vol. 4, pp. 12, 13.

¹⁷James Lemon, The Best Poor Man's Land: A Geographical Study of Early Southeastern Pennsylvania (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1972), pp. 79, 83. Also in 1782, 63 per cent of the population of Chester County was of English extract.

¹⁸John Nicholson, A Brief View of the Accounts of the Treasury of Pennsylvania... (Philadelphia, 1784), pp. 212, 230, (Evans #18679).

¹⁹Lemon, Poor Man's Land, pp. 188-189.

²⁰Johnson, "Attitudes," pp. 85-86. Much money was collected under the category of militia fines throughout the war years despite the complaints to the contrary by the county lieutenants. See footnote number 7 for chapter 2.

²¹Lemon, Poor Man's Land, pp. 79, 83.

²²Register of Pennsylvania, vol. 4, pp. 12, 13.

²³Pennsylvania, Comptroller-General, State of the Accounts of the Taxes in Lancaster County(Philadelphia: Robert Aitken, 1788), p. 12, (Evans #45323).

²⁴Paul H. Smith, "The American Loyalists: Notes on Their Organization and Numerical Strength," William & Mary Quarterly, 3rd series, XXV(April, 1968), 259-277.

²⁵College Edition, Webster's New World Dictionary(New York: The World Publishing Company, 1966), p. 1539.

²⁶Wallace Brown, The King's Friends: The Composition and Motives of the American Loyalist Claimants(Providence: Brown Univ. Press, 1965), pp. 138-139.

²⁷Hartman, "Contributions," p. 55.

²⁸R. Arthur Bowler, Logistics and the Failure of the British Army in America 1775-1783(Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1975), p. 18.

²⁹PCC, Item No. 69, II, pp. 320-322(19 Dec 1780 [sic 1779]); See also JCC, vol. 17, 455, 463-464(26 May 1780).

³⁰PCC, Item No. 69, II, p. 265(5 Aug 1780).

³¹PCC, Item No. 69, II, pp. 258-289(5 Aug 1780).

³²CRP, "Minutes of the Supreme Executive Council," vol. 12(2 May 1781), p. 716.

³³C. H. Martin, "Early Federal Revenues of Lancaster County, Pennsylvania," Lancaster County Historical Society Papers, vol. 26(1922), 30.

³⁴Blake Nicholson, "The Collection of Local Taxes in Pennsylvania," Theses Univ. of Pennsylvania 1932.

Conclusion

¹See note number one to the Introduction.

²Albert S. Bolles, The Financial History of the United States from 1774 to 1789 (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1789), pp. 194-195.

³The three quotes are from Pennsylvania...1609 to 1790 (Philadelphia: J. Wanamaker, 1899), pp. 71, 70.

⁴See Chapter 2, footnote 2.

⁵The following remark appeared in the Pennsylvania Packet (March 14, 1780) in an article entitled "Remarks on the Currency": This is a war of finance "and the longest purse aided by the best schemes for raising or creating revenue, will in a great measure determine the point."

⁶Pennsylvania Packet (July 31, 1779), p. 1, "For the Pennsylvania Packet, Number III" by "A Virginia Farmer". Timely taxation by the states "to lessen the quantity" of paper money in circulation was a part of the "system of finance which was wisely adopted in the beginning of this contest with Great Britain."

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APPENDIX A - CONTINENTAL REQUISITIONS 1777-1779¹

State	requisition ² 22 Nov 1777	requisition ³ 2 Jan 1779	requisition ⁴ 21 May 1779	requisition ⁵ 6 Oct 1779
New Hampshire	200,000	500,000	1,500,000	400,000
Massachusetts	820,000	2,000,000	6,000,000	2,300,000
Rhode Island	100,000	300,000	750,000	200,000
Connecticut	600,000	1,700,000	5,100,000	1,700,000
New York	200,000	800,000	2,400,000	750,000
New Jersey	270,000	800,000	2,400,000	900,000
Pennsylvania	620,000	1,900,000	5,700,000	2,300,000
Delaware	60,000	150,000	450,000	170,000
Maryland	520,000	1,560,000	4,680,000	1,580,000
Virginia	800,000	2,400,000	7,200,000	2,500,000
North Carolina	250,000	1,090,000	3,270,000	1,000,000
South Carolina	500,000	1,800,000	5,550,000	1,200,000
Georgia ⁶	60,000	-	-	-
Totals	\$5,000,000	\$15,000,000	\$45,000,000	\$15,000,000

¹Edward Forbes Robinson, "Continental Treasury Administration, 1775 to 1781," Diss. Wisconsin 1969, pp. 94-95.

²Pennsylvania's quota is 12.4 per cent of the total. The Continental Congress levied these requisitions on the states in Spanish milled dollars. Pennsylvania, however, in turn levied its eleven counties in continental bills of credit. That is, the state government converted its continental requisitions to pounds and levied the counties in pounds.

³Pennsylvania's quota is 12.66 per cent of the total.

⁴Pennsylvania's quota is 12.66 per cent of the total.

⁵Pennsylvania's quota is 15.33 per cent of the total. Pennsylvania, Minutes of the Second Sitting of the Sixth General Assembly /February 11 - April 16, 1782/ (Philadelphia, 1782), p. 571. (Evans #17295) A group of Pennsylvanians sent a petition to the General Assembly on February 25, 1782, which requested the Assembly to insure that the state be not unduly assessed in the state quotas.

⁶Pennsylvania Packet (June 10, 1779), p. 2. The following item was an extract from the Journals of the Continental Congress concerning the 45 million tax. The Packet and the other Philadelphia newspapers frequently reprinted such extracts. "Georgia being invaded is hereafter to raise her proportion."

APPENDIX B - COUNTY QUOTAS FOR THE FOUR CONTINENTAL TAXES

County	5m tax ¹	15m tax ²	% ³	45m tax ⁴	1st 8 mo ⁵	Total ⁶
Philadelphia	76,533	497,596	33.13	709,075	2,836,301	6,955,829
Bucks	15,141	98,419	6.55	140,248	560,993	1,375,796
Chester	24,305	157,987	10.52	225,133	900,534	2,208,496
Lancaster	32,895	213,819	14.24	304,693	1,218,722	2,988,952
York	18,327	119,126	7.93	169,754	679,018	1,665,244
Cumberland	17,225	111,968	7.45	159,555	638,220	1,565,190
Berks	16,544	107,540	7.16	153,245	612,981	1,503,293
Northampton	9,524	61,907	4.12	88,218	352,874	865,398
Bedford	5,222	33,939	2.26	48,363	193,453	474,431
Northumberland	10,417	57,712	3.84	82,240	328,963	808,297
Westmoreland	6,452	41,925	2.79	59,743	238,972	586,663
Totals	232,586	1,501,944	99.99	2,140,271	8,561,086	£20,997,589

¹Pennsylvania, The Acts of the General Assembly (Philadelphia, 1782), p. 119.
(Evans #17656; hereafter cited by Evans number)

²Evans #17656, p. 198.

³These percentages are each county's percentage of the total for the last three taxes. The percentages for the 5 million tax varied very slightly.

⁴Pennsylvania, Laws Enacted in the Third Sitting of the Third General Assembly (Philadelphia, 1779), p. 259.

⁵Evans #17656, p. 239.

⁶John Nicholson, A Brief View of the Accounts of the Treasury of Pennsylvania... (Philadelphia, 1784), pp. 229-232. (Evans #18679; hereafter cited by this number)
The total for each county includes the quota for the Second Eight monthly tax (2nd 8 monthly tax), which was in each case equal to the quota for the First Eight monthly tax.

APPENDIX C - PAYMENT OF THE 5 MILLION TAX

County	time span of payments	number of payments	quota ¹	total paid	balance
Philadelphia ²	27 May 1779- 25 Nov 1779	3+	76,533	76,533	0
Bucks ³	9 Nov 1778- 25 Aug 1780	11	15,141	21,624	+6,483
Chester ⁴	Feb 1779- Aug 1781	-	24,305	-	0
Lancaster ⁵	10 Sep 1778- 3 Mar 1779	5	32,895	35,233	+2,338
York ⁶	22 Mar 1779- 8 Nov 1780	3	18,327	18,327	0
Cumberland ⁷	Sep 1778 Aug 1781	-	17,225	-	0
Berks ⁸	5 Nov 1778- 16 Jan 1779	2	16,544	16,544	0
Northampton ⁹	17 Sep 1778- 24 Apr 1779	-	9,524	9,344	-179

¹John Nicholson, A Brief View of the Accounts of the Treasury of Pennsylvania... (Philadelphia, 1784), pp. 229-232. (Evans #18679; hereafter cited by this number) See Appendix H for information on Bedford, Northumberland, and Westmoreland Counties.

²Evans #18679, pp. 229, 211. "Accounts of Treasurers, Philadelphia County," Pennsylvania Archives, 3rd series, VII(Harrisburg), pp. 317-318.

³Pennsylvania, Comptroller-General, Account of the Taxes of Bucks County(Philadelphia, 1787), pp. 7-11. (Evans #20634; hereafter cited by this number) Bucks County paid £15,994 by 31 May 1779.

⁴Evans #18679, pp. 230, 212. £4,941 due on the 5 million and the 15 million tax. I entered the amount due on the appendix (D) for the 15 million tax.

⁵Pennsylvania, Comptroller-General, State of the Account of the Taxes in Lancaster County(Philadelphia, 1788), p. 9. (Evans #45323; hereafter cited by this number)

⁶Pennsylvania, Comptroller-General, State of the Accounts of the Taxes of York County(Philadelphia, 1791), p. 9. (Evans #23683; hereafter cited by this number)

⁷Evans #18679, pp. 231, 213. First payment September 1778.

⁸Pennsylvania, Comptroller-General, State of the Accounts of the Taxes of Berks County from 1776 till 1790(Philadelphia, 1791), p. 5. (Evans #23682)

⁹Pennsylvania, Comptroller-General, State of the Account of the Taxes of Northampton County(Philadelphia, 1790), pp. 6, 7. (Evans #22777; hereafter cited by this number) The total paid included £456 credit in exonerations.

APPENDIX D - PAYMENT OF THE 15 MILLION TAX

County	time span of payments	number of payments	quota ¹	total paid	balance
Philadelphia ²	13 Dec 1779- 14 Aug 1780	-	497,596	-	0
Bucks ³	6 Dec 1779- 7 Jun 1780	6	98,419	101,190	+2,771
Chester ⁴	by Aug 1781	-	157,987	153,046	-4,941
Lancaster ⁵	22 Sep 1779- 28 Aug 1780	7	213,819	213,819	0
York ⁶	Jan 1780- 11 May 1782	8	119,126	109,021	-10,105
Cumberland ⁷	by Feb 1782	-	111,968	-	0
Berks ⁸	Jan 1780- Feb 1780	2	107,540	107,540	0
Northampton ⁹	8 Dec 1779- 28 Aug 1780	2	61,907	67,758	-5,851

¹For complete references on the Evans numbers see the footnotes to Appendix C. The quotas for the 15 million tax are from Evans #18679, pp. 229-232. See Appendix H for information on Bedford, Northumberland, and Westmoreland Counties.

²Evans #18679, pp. 229, 211. Pa. Archives, 3rd ser., VII, p. 319.

³Evans #20634, p. 13.

⁴Evans #18679, pp. 230, 212. The £4,941 was due on the 5 million and the 15 million taxes. I included the full amount here.

⁵Evans #45323, p. 12.

⁶Evans #23683, pp. 9-10.

⁷Evans #18679, p. 213.

⁸Evans #23682, p. 6. The total paid included an order from the state treasury for £100,000 in favor of Ephraim Blaine, the Commissioner of General Purchases. See Appendix I.

⁹Evans #22777, pp. 7, 8. The total paid includes £6,033 in exonerations.

APPENDIX E - PAYMENT OF THE 45 MILLION TAX

County	time span of payments	number of payments	quota ¹	total paid	balance
Philadelphia ²	14 Apr 1780- 14 Aug 1780	-	709,075	709,075	0
Bucks ³	7 Jun 1780- 17 Nov 1780	3	140,248	140,248	0
Chester ⁴	by Aug 1781	-	225,133	225,133	0
Lancaster ⁵	24 May 1780- 14 Oct 1780	4	304,693	304,693	0
York ⁶	9 Nov 1780- 17 Dec 1781	3	169,754	136,754	-33,000
Cumberland ⁷	by Aug 1781	-	159,555	-	0
Berks ⁸	21 Jun 1780- 6 Apr 1781	5	153,245	153,245	0
Northampton ⁹	26 May 1780- 24 Jan 1781	7	88, 218	88,218	0

¹Evans #18679, pp. 229-232. For complete references on the Evans numbers see the footnotes to Appendix C. For information on Bedford, Northumberland, and Westmoreland Counties see Appendix H.

²Evans #18679, pp. 229, 211. Pa. Archives, 3rd ser., VII, p. 319.

³Evans #20634, p. 17.

⁴Evans #18679, pp. 230, 212.

⁵Evans #45323, p. 16.

⁶Evans #23683, p. 11. See page 28; the comptroller-general may have balanced part of this account with credits from the first and second eight monthly taxes.

⁷Evans #18679, pp. 231, 213.

⁸Evans #23682, p. 6.

⁹Evans #22777, pp. 8, 9, 13. This total does not include £12,566 in exoneration for seven of Northampton's frontier townships.

APPENDIX F - PAYMENT OF THE 1ST 8 MONTHLY TAX

County	time span of payments	number of payments	quota ¹	total paid	balance
Philadelphia ²	19 Jun 1780- 23 Apr 1781	-	2,836,301	2,836,301	0
Bucks ³	25 Aug 1780 Aug 1781	12	560,933	561,424	+431
Chester ⁴	by Feb 1782	-	900,534	-	0
Lancaster ⁵	10 Aug 1780- 29 Jun 1781	7	1,218,772	1,446,044	+227,272
York ⁶	9 Nov 1780- 9 Aug 1781	4	679,018	739,544	+60,526
Cumberland ⁷	by Feb 1782	-	638,220	-	0
Berks ⁸	9 Oct 1780 28 May 1782	6	612,981	879,886	+266,905
Northampton ⁹	3 Aug 1780- 8 Nov 1781	9	352,874	475,025	+122,151

¹Evans #18679, pp. 229-232. For complete references on the Evans numbers see the footnotes to Appendix C. See Appendix H for information on Bedford, Northumberland, and Westmoreland Counties.

²Evans #18679, pp. 229, 211. Pa. Archives, 3rd ser., VII, p. 320.

³Evans #20634, p. 21.

⁴Evans #18679, pp. 230, 212.

⁵Evans #45323, p. 20. The figures are blurred. The total paid could range to £1,446,944.

⁶Evans #23683, p. 12.

⁷Evans #18679, p. 213.

⁸Evans #23682, pp. 9-10. The payment of an order from the state treasury dated August 8, 1780, for £120,000 was spread over the 45 million tax and the 1st 8 monthly tax, with £50,995 credited to the former account and £69,004 to the latter account.

⁹Evans #22777, pp. 9, 10, 13, 14. The total paid is a tentative figure since the account for Northampton is confusing. The total, however, does include £50,256 in exonerations.

APPENDIX G - PAYMENT OF THE 2ND 8 MONTHLY TAX

County	time span of payment	number of payment	quota ¹	total paid	balance
Philadelphia ²	23 Mar 1781- Nov 1781	5+	2,836,301	2,836,301	0
Bucks ³	4 Aug 1781- 30 Dec 1782	8	560,993	551,307	-9,686
Chester ⁴	by Nov 1783	-	900,534	-	-159,369
Lancaster ⁵	22 May 1782- 2 Apr 1783(?)	4	1,218,772	1,824,008	+605,236
York ⁶	17 Dec 1781- 5 Aug 1786	5	679,018	527,863	-151,155
Cumberland	by Jan 1785	-	638,220	-	-327,634
Berks ⁸	31 May 1781- 17 Dec 1787	17	612,981	582,499	-30,482
Northampton ⁹	22 Aug 1781- 22 Oct 1783	3	352,874	286,435	-66,439

¹Evans #18679, pp. 229-232. For complete references on the Evans numbers see the footnotes to Appendix C. See Appendix H for information on Bedford, Northumberland, and Westmoreland Counties.

²Evans #18679, pp. 229, 211. Pa. Archives, 3rd ser., VII, p. 322.

³Evans #20634, pp. 24-28.

⁴Evans #18679, pp. 230, 212. Pennsylvania, Comptroller-General, State of the Accounts of the Treasury...from October 1782 to January 1785(Philadelphia, 1785), p. 123. (Evans #19165; hereafter cited by this number)

⁵Evans #45323, p. 23. The state treasury credited the surplus to Lancaster County for the tax on effective supplies for 1781.

⁶Evans #23683, p. 13.

⁷Evans #18679, p. 213. Evans #19165, pp. 123-124.

⁸Evans #23682, pp. 11-12. On December 22, 1785, £61 is Pennsylvania state money was equivalent to £4,621 in continental bills of credit.

⁹Evans #22777, pp. 14, 15.

County	total - 4 ¹ cont taxes	amount pd ² 31 Dec 1781	total paid	balance % owed	additional ³ amt pd by 1 Oct 1782	new balance % owed	additional ⁴ amount pd by Jan 1785	new balance % owed
Philadelphia ⁵	6,955,829	6,955,829	6,955,829	0	0	0	0	0
Bucks	1,375,796	1,261,379	1,261,379	-114,417 8.32%	none	-114,417 8.32%	28,324 ⁶	-86,093 6.26%
Chester ⁷	2,208,496	4,941 1,792,039 137,954	1,934,935	-273,561 12.39%	68,977	-204,584 9.26%	45,215 ^{7a}	-159,369 7.22%
Lancaster ⁸	2,988,952	1,150,085 1,209,378	2,359,463	-629,488 21.06%	691,075	+61,587 0%	0	- 0%
York ⁹	1,665,244	468,010 785,037	1,253,048	-412,196 24.75%	94,116 ^{9a}	-318,080 19.10%	none	-318,080 19.10%
Cumberland ¹⁰	1,565,190	678,929 316,998	995,927	-569,263 36.37%	155,506 ^{10a}	-413,757 26.43%	86,122	-327,635 ^{10b} 20.93%
Berks ¹¹	1,503,293	8,697 510,396 368,853	887,947	-615,346 40.93%	327,295 ^{11a}	-288,051 19.16%	80,608	-207,433 ^{11b} 13.80%
Northampton ¹²	865,398	333,602 439,431	773,034	-92,364 10.67%	44,694	-47,670 5.51%	102,566 ^{12a}	+54,896 0%
Bedford ¹³	474,431	-	-	-	-	-	39,896	-434,534 91.60%
Northumberland ¹⁴	808,297	-	-	-	-	-	310,999	-497,298 61.52%
Westmoreland ¹⁵	586,663	-	-	-	-	-	586,663	0 0%
TOTALS	£20,997,589	16,421,562	16,421,562	-4,576,027 21.79%	1,381,663	-3,194,364 15.21%	1,279,793	-1,914,571 ¹⁶ 9.12%

Footnotes To Accompany Appendix H

¹John Nicholson, A Brief View of the Accounts of the Treasury of Pennsylvania... (Philadelphia, 1784), pp. 229-232. (Evans #18679; hereafter cited by this number) The following note is from page 232: "The assessments which have been made in the several counties, and the monies which have been collected from the people for the charges of assessing, levying and raising the taxes, likewise the abatements and exonerations made by the Commissioners, have not been exhibited in the accounts published."

²Evans #18679, pp. 229-232.

³Evans #18679, pp. 211-214.

⁴Pennsylvania, Comptroller-General, State of the Accounts of the Treasury, October 1782 - January 1785 (Philadelphia, 1785), pp. 123-124. (Evans #19165; hereafter cited by this number)

⁵Evans #18679, pp. 229, 211.

⁶Pa. Archives, 3rd ser., V, p. 361. The £28,324 was paid in on December 30, 1782.

⁷Evans #19165, p. 123. £4,941 paid in December 1778 but not before credited. Evans #18679, pp. 230, 212. The Chester County treasurer paid £206,931 to the state treasurer between September 1781 and February 1782. For this chart I assumed that the average monthly payment was £34,488. Four months equals £137,954 and two months equals £68,977.

^{7a}Pa. Archives, 3rd ser., V, p. 361. The £45,215 was paid between November 1782 and November 1783.

⁸Evans #18679, pp. 230, 212. £1,900,454 was paid between June 1781 and April 1782 (11 months). The assumed average monthly payment is £172,768. Seven months equals £1,209,378 while four months equals £691,075.

⁹Evans #18679, pp. 231, 213. Four payments totaling £787,881 were made between August 1781 and April 1782. However, according to State of the Accounts of the Taxes of York County (Philadelphia, 1791), pp. 10-13, the county treasurer made six payments to the state treasurer during this period: two in August and two in December 1781 totaling £785,037 and two on April 16, 1782 totaling £94,116.

^{9a}Evans #23683, p. 13. Two payments on April 16, 1782, totaling £94,116.

¹⁰Evans #18679, pp. 231, 213. £443,797 paid between August 1781 and February 1782. The assumed average monthly payment is £63,399 for seven months.

^{10a}See footnote #10 for the origin of the £126,799. According to Evans #19165, pp. 123-124, the county treasurer paid £114,829 into the state treasury between February 1782 and January 14, 1785. Since I could not locate a statement of accounts for Cumberland County for this time period, I decided to compute an assumed average monthly payment. The period stretches over 36 months. February to October 1782 is 9 months so I multiplied £114,829 by 9/36 or .25. This totals £28,707, which I added to the £126,799. The remaining .75 or £86,122 I included in the January 1785 statement of accounts.

¹¹Evans #18679, pp. 231-232, 213. £696,149 paid between September 1781 and September 1782. According to State of the Accounts of Berks County from 1776 to 1790(Philadelphia, 1791), pp. 10-11(Evans #23682), the county treasurer made three payments during this period: £368,853 on September 20, 1781; £277,967 on May 28, 1782; and £49,327 on September 10, 1782. These three payments add up to £696,149.

^{11a}Evans #19165, p. 123; £89,306 paid between May 1781 and February 1784. An investigation of Evans #23682, p. 11, reveals that the county treasurer paid this sum in six payments: £168 in February 1781; £2,625 on May 21, 1781; £5,904 on May 31, 1781 in two payments; £71,625 on June 19, 1783; and £8,983 on February 26, 1784. The payments made in 1781 are entered in the December 31, 1781 column and the last two payments are entered in the January 1785 column.

^{11b}Pa. Archives, 3rd ser., V, p. 361. £89,306 paid from May 1781 to February 1784. Balance due is £207,442.

¹²Evans #18679, pp. 232, 214. £484,125 paid between August 1781 and May 1782. According to State of the Accounts of the Taxes of Northampton County (Philadelphia, 1790), pp. 6-15(Evans #22777), the county treasurer paid the following amounts into the state treasury: £167,122 on August 22, 1781; an additional £250,000 on August 22; and £22,309 on November 8, 1781. This totals to £439,431 which is £44,694 short of £484,125. The accounts for Northampton are somewhat confused.

^{12a}Evans #19165, p. 124. £2,054 paid. Evans #22777, pp. 14, 15: lists £50,256 as the amount of the exonerations for the first eight monthly tax and the same amount for the second eight monthly tax.

¹³I could not find a separate account for Bedford County with which to check against the state tax accounts. However, an examination of the state accounts reveals conflicting information. According to Evans #18679, pp. 232, 214: Bedford County did not make any payment into the state treasury. But Evans #19165, p. 124, indicates that the county paid £39,896 between May 1781 and June 1783, leaving a balance of £434,534.

¹⁴Evans #19165, p. 124. £310,999 in payments and exonerations. This agrees with the figures in State of the Accounts of the Taxes of Northumberland County(Philadelphia, 1790), pp. 5, 6. (Evans #45955) The county paid £6,388 on August 13, 1783, and £353 on November 4, 1783; and the state credited the county with £304,257 in exonerations. There is one discrepancy in that this latter account lists the total for the continental taxes at £753,591.

¹⁵Evans #19165, p. 124, credits Westmoreland County with nothing and gives a figure for the new balance that is identical with the initial quota. However, according to State of the Accounts...of Westmoreland County(Philadelphia, 1790), p. 3(Evans #45956): the General Assembly of Pennsylvania exonerated entirely the quotas of the four continental taxes. "The five shilling tax, the 5 million tax, 15 million tax, 45 million tax, and the first and second eight monthly taxes are exonerated to the inhabitants of said Westmoreland county, in the agreement with the state of Virginia respecting disputed boundaries, none of the aforesaid taxes were assessed...." Someone examining the state tax accounts for January 1785(Evans #19165) solely would be left with a false impression.

¹⁶Pennsylvania, Comptroller-General, A View of the Debts and Expenses of...Pennsylvania(Philadelphia, 1786), p. 16. County arrearages totaled £2,328,582.

APPENDIX I

The United States to the State of Pennsylvania Dr. for Sundry Payments on Account of The Continental Money Requisitions of Congress made between October 1778 and January 1781.

Date		Emmissions		
		dollars	90"	8"
1778				
Oct 23	General Count Pulaski	10,000		
Oct 23	The Marine Committee	5,000		
1779				
May 24	Francis Hopkinson Esq. Treasurer of Loan	166,000		
Jun 10	ditto	73,600		
Dec 16	Jeremiah Wadsworth, Com. Gen Purchases	100,000		
1780				
Jun 13	Charles Pettitt, Quarter-Master Gen	298,604	60	
Jan 4	ditto	200,000		
Jan 31	ditto	200,000		
Mar 9	ditto, on acct. of MGen Greene	300,000		
Mar 22	Ephraim Blaine, Comm. of Gen. Purchases	1,000,000		
Jan 21	Jeremiah Wadsworth	250,000		
Jun 12	William Palfrey, Paymaster General	20,000		
Jul 1	Charles Pettitt	13,333	30	
Jul 6	ditto	136,666	60	
Aug 28	William Henry, of Lancaster County	100,000		
Jun 2	James Wilkinson, Cloathier General	40,000		
Aug 31	ditto	300,000		
Aug 31	Charles Pettit	85,671		
Sep 8	Ephraim Blaine	1,496,757		
Sep 15	Benjamin Flower, Comm Gen of Mil Stores	717,364		
Nov 7	Charles Pettitt	114,329		
Dec 27	Benjamin Flower	282,636		
1781				
Jan 5	Ephraim Blaine	444,043		
		6,454,004	60	
	Wilkinson	100,000		

Reference: RG 4 - Records of the Office of the Comptroller General, 1762-1810, "United States Accounts, Accounts Current 1775-1791." Box No. 1. doc. XXX.

APPENDIX J

The General Abstract of Accounts The State of Pennsylvania against The United States.

Pay of The Army	57,290
Depreciation of Pay of The Army	1,565,244
Recruiting the Army	282,154
Monies Paid to the Continental Requisitions of Congress	90,169
Monies Paid sundry Officers of the United States	68,052
Pay of Militia	683,056
Flying Camp	32,666
Specific Supplies	779,189
Provision	73,673
Transportation	4,821
Forage	96
Cloathing	24,050
Contingent Expences	30,241
Horses Purchased in 1778	14,196
Ditto in 1780	90,336
Quarter Masters and Commissary's Certificates	62,074
Disbursements in the Quarter Master Dept.	20,664
Ditto in the Hospital	8,547
Ditto for Prisoners of War	472
Militia Pensioners	2,018
Expencc of Deserters	244
Commissary of Issues Dept.	370
Arms Ammunition and Ordnance Stores	261,337
Fortifications	117,569
Continental Powder Works	19,200
Gunlock Factory and Salt Petre Works	82,522
Naval Armament for Defence of the Bay River	449,928
Depreciation of Pay of the Navy	32,603
Sundry Disbursements (Blended)	72,556
Amount	5,025,348

Reference: RG 4-Records of the Office of the Comptroller General, 1762-1810,
 "United States Accounts/Ledgers, Ledger AB, p.312.

PENNSYLVANIA'S PERFORMANCE UNDER THE OLD MONEY
REQUISITION SYSTEM DURING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

by

THOMAS ROBERT VELEKER

B.A., Mansfield State College, 1973

AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S THESIS

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During the American Revolution the state of Pennsylvania had to maintain its own governmental apparatus and sustain a local war effort as well as contribute to the maintenance of the Continental Congress and the central war effort. Historians, who follow the lead of such economic historians as Albert S. Bolles and Davis R. Dewey, generally criticize Congress for being unable to finance the war. In addition, the historians unjustly criticize the states for inadequately contributing towards the support of the central government and a united war effort. The often chaotic financial conditions and the complex accounting procedures employed has obscured the financial relationships that existed between the two levels of government during the war years.

Problems with the collection of the continental taxes cannot be properly explained by unwillingness of Pennsylvanians to contribute to the support of the war. Even though Pennsylvania was often behind in its payments, it collected enough money with which to honor its entire quotas. Upon receiving a requisition from Congress, the state government would in turn levy quotas on each county. As the monies percolated into the state treasury, the majority was credited to an account at the state level for the use of Congress. Congress would then write drafts on this account and instruct the state to pay them. Many historians have ignored this entire procedure in their studies of Revolutionary War financing and have presented totals that only include the amounts they maintain the state actually turned into the Continental Treasury. In addition, the examination of state and county tax records and a knowledge of congressional and state accounting procedures indicate that beginning in May 1780 Pennsylvania could

credit unpaid Quartermaster and Commissary certificates, properly cleared with the appropriate agency, against its congressional old money quotas. The early economic historians also have ignored this procedure. Moreover, an examination of the tax records indicates that Pennsylvania collected enough money from its eleven counties by May, 1782, to pay its entire quotas under the congressional old money requisition system. Many Pennsylvanians who were either members of pacifist sects or were sympathetic to the British apparently paid their continental taxes.