

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF  
SOUTH AFRICAN APARTHEID

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
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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

This study describes the Republic of South Africa's unique behavior in the international system and analyzes the ideology of South Africa's leadership in relation to both domestic and international problem management.

International political theory derives from generalizations and generalized patterns of behavior, but the Republic of South Africa is a unique actor in the international system. The ruling group consists of members of a white minority and their ideology or value system is forced upon the non-white majority of the nation. The Republic's apartheid<sup>1</sup> ideology of racial segregation and discrimination against blacks and other colored people has caused every member of the United Nations to take a stand on resolutions condemning the nation. The nation maintains that it has the right to run its own domestic affairs and that Article 2, paragraph 7, of the United Nations Charter prohibits United Nation intervention in the domestic affairs of member states. The nation has withdrawn or been expelled from most major world organizations since the National party gained a majority of seats in parliament in 1948 and began its stringent policy of domestic apartheid. The Republic is a so-called non-aligned country although it is anti-communist and does


consider itself to be a western nation. South Africa is the dominant state in the subordinate state system or region of Southern Africa,<sup>2</sup> which contains the nine states of South Africa, South-West Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, Rhodesia and Malawi. (See Map 1). However, it has no written defense alliances with any nation. South Africa has achieved independence and security plus protection of its economic interests in the last twelve years. The Republic provides an excellent example of a nation that has attempted to exercise its sovereignty within the international system and has had to come to grips with the influence of a world organization which opposed its policies.

South Africa does not adhere to many norms of national behavior of international politics. For example, it should strive to establish diplomatic ties with as many nations as possible, especially developed countries, to enhance its economic and security stance in a competitive world community. South Africa does not try to do so. Most nations seek multiple regional and international organizational memberships in order to build effective acceptance in the world community of nations. South Africa does not try to do so. It withdrew from the Commonwealth of nations shortly after it obtained independence from Great Britain. Symbolically, it has withdrawn from the

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MAP 1  
SOUTHERN AFRICA



World Council of Churches and even the international Boy Scouts organization. When the United Nations voted to impose sanctions and embargo upon Rhodesia, South Africa increased her trade with that nation.

At the same time that the Republic was isolating itself from the rest of the world, it began to increase the size and strength of its security establishment without defining clear criteria of security. In the face of world opposition it expanded its army, navy, air force, citizens force, Commando organization, active police, police reserves and intelligence agencies to a point where one of every fourteen whites in the country is a member of one of these branches to service or agencies.

This study shows two analytically separate but functionally related factors which seem to explain the Republic of South Africa's non-conformist behavior in policies bearing on the nation's international relations: tradition and ideology, and apartheid. Tradition and ideology support apartheid and apartheid requirements dictate much that is distinctive about the Republic of South Africa's foreign policy and security establishment.

If the substantive core of international relations is the interaction of governments of sovereign states,<sup>3</sup> then the Republic of South Africa and her foreign policy must first be isolated and analyzed in the international

environment. Karl Deutsch has stated that "the foreign policy of every country deals first with the preservation of its independence and security, and second with the pursuit and protection of its economic interests (particularly those of its most influential interest groups)"<sup>4</sup> and Joseph Frankel believes that "foreign policy consists of decisions and actions which involve to some appreciable extent relations between one state and others."<sup>5</sup> Charles Burton Marshall explains that "the state is an abstract expression representing a body of people occupying a defined territory and politically organized so as to be capable of acting collectively with respect to matters both within that territory and beyond it. Government is the apparatus of decisions and execution for such action. . . The state -- and this is true also of its agent, government -- remains, in Plato's phrase, man written large."<sup>6</sup> To the question of whether man in society could best be understood by studying man or by studying society, Kenneth R. Waltz says that "the most satisfactory reply would seem to be given by striking the word 'or' and answering 'both'."<sup>7</sup>

### Design of the Study

The purposes of this study are three-fold. The first purpose suggests relationships among the origins of apartheid,

and its philosophic base, and the rationality of contemporary South African political leadership and foreign policy in relation to its dominant value system. The second purpose is to illustrate how the military demands imposed by the maintenance of apartheid policy have affected the Republic's major foreign policy objectives during the period 1960-1971. The third purpose is to assess South Africa's military capability to defend apartheid policies in context of internal and external forces which pose a potential danger to the nation.

The inquiry has been ordered and analyzed around ~~three~~<sup>two</sup> major questions: (1) How has the ideology of apartheid developed in the Republic of South Africa and how does this ideology affect the country's leadership? (2) ~~Why was an~~ expanded military establishment pursued during the past decade in the face of world opposition? <sup>2</sup>(3) What is South Africa's capability to continue its apartheid policies in the face of continued opposition?

This analysis proceeds with three major assumptions. The first assumption is that the nation-state is the fundamental decision-making unit in the international system. Although the state's autonomy has declined in some areas of public policy, global organizations, regional organizations and other international governmental and non-governmental organizations depend upon the sovereign political

identity of the nation-state. South Africa's decision to expand its defense establishment, and its ability to do so in the face of United Nations opposition to its racial policies reflect this assumption.

The second assumption is that the subordinate state system<sup>8</sup> or regional system<sup>9</sup> encompassing a nation-state will have a greater effect on the nation than will an organization of larger magnitude encompassing most of the nation-states in the international system. Michael Brecher identifies two broad levels of analysis in international relations, the unit level (nation-state) and the systems level. The system level has three distinct foci of attention -- in ascending order, subordinate systems, the dominant system (bipolar bloc), and the world or global political system.<sup>10</sup> In this respect, the Republic of South Africa is considered to be the dominant actor in the nine nation subordinate state system or region identified previously as Southern Africa. Within this context the decision-makers will weigh more heavily decisions affecting foreign policy in their own region than those affecting the international system as a whole.

Third, the study of foreign policy and international politics should start with an understanding of the ideology of the men who act as decision-makers for the government.

To some scholars, this approach might be classified

as a "classical approach"<sup>11</sup> or "wisdom approach"<sup>12</sup> and not compatible with the "scientific approach."<sup>13</sup> If one can understand the ideology of the decision-maker as would the decision-maker himself, then the analyst can, in part, determine the reasoning of the decision-maker when he is confronted with problems regarding the security and economy of his country. This study establishes how the ideology of apartheid has originated and how it has been expanded to its present status. References are drawn from Calvin's religious influence on apartheid leaders toward prediction of the "rational" behavior of the decision-makers when confronted with problems regarding the security or economy of the country.

The conceptual scheme developed was one which relates the ideology of the nation's decision-makers to the perceived environment of the early 1960's. The operational environment in which the decision to expand South Africa's military establishment was made has been reconstructed to analyze the factors which were probably considered in making this decision. The interaction of nations or actors, both regional and world-wide, was analyzed to show the connection between domestic and foreign policy objectives imposed by apartheid.

The scheme described above represents a shift of perception from level to level. In the first case, the level was restricted to the historical origin of the

Nationalist party and its apartheid ideology as it affects the decision-makers in South Africa. As the Nationalist party does not represent all of the population of South Africa, the Party and its apartheid ideology was considered as a sub-system within the international system.

The shift of level method<sup>14</sup> isolates the South African decision-makers and their apartheid ideology in the first portion of the study, shifts to domestic considerations -- economic, military and political -- which influenced the decision-makers in expanding the nation's defense establishment in the 1960's, and then shifts to the effects that regional and international organizations have had on the nation. Other nations involved with South Africa, either in cooperation or conflict, are examined only insofar as their policy outputs affect relations with South Africa.

Apartheid is a critical independent variable which determines South Africa's relations with the other nation-states of the world and specifically governs her military capabilities. This study has examined several independent variables to determine their influence on South Africa's decision-makers by:

- (1). Identifying the actors and events within the nation which have made major contributions to the evolution of the current apartheid ideology.

- (2). Describing the framework of interactions among

the various elements or independent variables of apartheid.

(3). Applying findings from this identification and description to the 1960's in order to understand the rationale of South African political leaders at the time current foreign policy objectives were being formulated.

Once the relationships among the origins of apartheid, its philosophic base, and the rationality of contemporary South African political leadership are described, the analysis shifts levels to the nation-state and examines these actors and interactions within the nation which contributed to its foreign policy formulation and decision to expand its military and policy forces in the early 1960's. There is some injection of non-domestic considerations in this portion of the analysis but only in the context in which the decision to increase the armed forces was reached. The analysis shifts to South Africa's foreign policy objectives and the costs and rewards of maintaining apartheid. Lastly, South Africa's military capability to defend its apartheid regime is examined under hypothetical challenges to the autonomy of white supremacist regimes.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>For an excellent overview of apartheid ideology, see, A. James Gregor, Contemporary Radical Ideologies, (New York: Random House, 1968), pp. 221-76. Webster's New World Dictionary, College edition, New York: The World Publishing Company, 1961, defines apartheid as "the policy of strict racial segregation and discrimination against the native Negroes and other colored peoples as practiced in the Republic of South Africa."

<sup>2</sup>Larry Bowman, "The Subordinate State System of Southern Africa," International Studies Quarterly, (Sept. 1968), pp. 231-61.

<sup>3</sup>E. Raymond Platig, "International Relations as a Field of Inquiry," in International Politics and Foreign Policy, ed. by James N. Rosenau (New York: The Free Press, 1969), p. 16.

<sup>4</sup>Karl W. Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960), p. 87.

<sup>5</sup>Joseph Frankel, The Making of Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 1.

<sup>6</sup>Charles Burton Marshall, The Limits of Foreign Policy, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 14.

\* <sup>7</sup>Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), p. 5.

<sup>8</sup>Bowman, op. cit., pp. 321-35.

<sup>9</sup>Linda B. Miller, "Regional Organization and the Regulation of Internal Conflict." World Politics, 19 (July 1967), pp. 582-600, and Karl W. Deutsch, op. cit., pp. 181-182.

<sup>10</sup>Michael Brecher, "The Subordinate State System of Southern Asia", in International Politics and Foreign Policy, ed. by James N. Rosenau (New York: The Free Press, 1969), p. 156.

<sup>11</sup>Hedley Bull, "International Theory: The Case For a Classical Approach," World Politics, 18 (1965-66), pp. 361-71.

<sup>12</sup>Charles A. McClelland, "International Relations: Wisdom or Science?" in International Politics and Foreign Policy, ed. by James N. Rosenau (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 3-5.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid.

<sup>14</sup>Andrew M. Scott, The Functioning of the International System (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1970), pp. 27-36.

## CHAPTER II

## APARTHEID IDEOLOGY AND SOUTH AFRICAN LEADERSHIP

Values loosely combined into value-systems are often called ideologies.<sup>1</sup> These values perform at least four functions for the values-holder, as follows:

(1). They determine the relevance of the various elements of the operational environment and assist in the formation of the psychological one.

(2). They combine the relevant elements of the psychological environment and form what might be called a vision of the good life, meaning a state of affairs which the values-holder would find most desirable.

(3). They determine objectives (or goals, ends) which might be considered as values in action, and also the less concrete principles of behavior.

(4). They influence the choice of means with which the values-holder pursues the objectives in the form of programs or policies.<sup>2</sup>

The first three functions of values will be developed in the study of apartheid ideology to support their effects on the behavior of the political leadership of South Africa. The fourth function, though discussed in the ideological portion of this study, will be further developed as the study progresses into its foreign policy and

defensive capability analysis.

Thomas C. Schelling says, when discussing his theory of interdependent decision, that a "theory that is based on the assumption that the participants coolly and 'rationally' calculate their advantages according to a consistent value system forces us to think more thoroughly about the meaning of 'irrationality'." <sup>3</sup> In this study, the consistency of the apartheid value system is explored, and basic elements of South African leaders' Calvinist beliefs coupled with the psychological environment perceived by South African leaders form the hypothesis concerning the "rationale" of leadership. The emphasis of the study will follow Joseph Frankel's assertion that "values are chosen and value-systems have been established not by the process of reasoning but through tradition, and the influence of these values is due to their emotional impact and not to their rational explanation." <sup>4</sup>

#### Foundations of Apartheid

"Only Calvinist national Afrikaners should rule South Africa." <sup>5</sup> This statement was not made by a former Dutchman who immigrated to South Africa three centuries ago. It was made by an English-speaking South African in a speech addressed to the South African Parliament in April 1969. The statement seems to be out of step with the times.

Calvin died in 1564. His works and thoughts are studied in modern times by political theorists who associate him with the Protestant Reformation and with the origin of democracy and Christian asceticism. The contemporary political significance of the phrase "Calvinist national Afrikaners" requires some searching into the history of the settlement of South Africa.

The Dutch East India Company established a colony in Table Bay at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652. Twenty-four years later approximately 200 French Huguenot exiles joined the colony. These Frenchmen could not return to their homeland and, faced with this realization, set about developing a colonial, nationalistic spirit among the Dutch. The French brought needed agricultural skills to the colony and were interspersed among the Dutch. This interspersion prevented the development of a French community and, within three generations, the Dutch absorbed the French. Frequent wars between the Hottentot and Bushmen tribes and the Dutch occurred during the next few years causing the Dutch to form "commando" military organizations, a type of militia, to protect lands that they had obtained during their northward push inland from the settlement. The colonists began gradual expansion of their land areas and those who blazed the trail of the new frontiers were known as Trekboers or "farmers who travel by ox-wagons."<sup>6</sup>

These Trekboers, as well as the other colonists, were members of the Dutch Reformed Church or Calvinist Church and they survived. They turned their backs on the Dutch East India Company and continued their expansion or treks further inland pushing the natives further north toward the equator. These Trekboers were law-abiding at home, but they made their own laws when faced with the dangers, challenges and opportunities of Africa.<sup>7</sup>

Officials of the Dutch East India Company complained of the lack of laborers available to do menial chores within the colony as the Trekboers emigrated northward and slaves were imported into the Cape. Given an extremely low female to male ratio among the European colonists, miscegenation led to today's Colored people who are located primarily in Cape Colony.<sup>8</sup>

After 125 years under the administration of the Dutch East India Company, some 400 freemen petitioned the company demanding a written constitution to establish and guarantee their rights and to give them a part in making and administering the laws under which they were governed. The company had made some concessions in 1783, but the American War of Independence was having an effect on politics in Holland and the rest of Europe. The petitioners, now descendents of the original colonists, became impatient with the company and the Dutch bureaucracy. In 1795 they revolted

against the company and established their own government. The French invaded Holland and this government was short lived. Holland's Prince of Orange, preoccupied with the French armies, asked the British to occupy his colonial possessions until he regained power. The British invaded the Cape, toppled the new colonist government, and occupied the colony from 1795 to 1803. During British occupation, the importation of slaves ended. This reform was very unpopular with the colonists. The colony was returned to the Batavian Republic in 1803 but it was reinvaded and recaptured by the British in 1806. British rule further disenchanted the colonists. The slave emancipation movement and activities of the British missionaries caused the burghers or freemen slowly to reach what they considered the limit of their cooperation with the British. By September 1837, shortly before the slaves were freed in 1838, entire families began moving into the north country out of reach of British controls. This movement is known as the Great Trek, meaning great travel, and those who took part were called Voortrekkers.<sup>9</sup>

During the period of British rule prior to the Great Trek, the settlers developed set prejudices against the Hottentot and Bushman natives and imported slaves. The white settlers referred to themselves as Christians and to non-whites as heathen. The mastery of the white race was the

axiom on which the settler's political and social systems were based. The settler's new ideology began to form when he lost touch with Europe, his parent church and was completely absorbed with his new environment.<sup>10</sup>

Armed with his weapon and a Bible, the Voortrekker continued his journey to the north and the Calvinist idea of a closely knit theocracy was replaced by his desire for freedom from the British. The Voortrekkers wanted land, not a tightly managed kingdom. Once they found and claimed land north of the Orange River, later named the Orange Free State and Transvaal, their own constitutional laws took on a sacred character. This sacred character was developed as a result of the Calvinist pastors or Predikants assisted by the schoolmasters during the Great Trek when they told and retold stories stating their purpose on earth was that of building a new Afrikaner nation in accordance with the divine will of God.<sup>11</sup> Descendants of the original European settlers who participated in the Great Trek to escape English controls claims the name "Afrikaners" as a means of national identification.

While the Voortrekkers were searching for new land, the British freed the slaves and equality for all persons regardless of color was enjoyed by every inhabitant of the Cape Colony. The British had established English as the official language some ten years earlier. Afrikaan, an

off-shoot of Dutch, was spoken by the Afrikaners.

The British concern with Trekkers' acquisition of land along the Indian Ocean prompted them to establish a garrison in Natal before the Trekkers reached the sea. The British established a small garrison at Durban and the Boers or farmers in that area, angry about the British presence, attacked the garrison. This attack ultimately resulted in the British annexing the land between the Vaal and Orange River for the Crown. The territory was named the Orange River Sovereignty. To maintain peace with the Boers north of the Vaal River, the British made a compact with the Boers recognizing the right of the emigrant farmers north of the Vaal to manage their own affairs. Thereby, Transvaal became an independent Boer state in 1852. Due to unrest in the Orange River Sovereignty, the British gave independence to the 12,000 Boers who resided there, and in 1854, the area became the Orange Free State.<sup>12</sup>

At this point the skeleton of the present Republic of South Africa began to take form. The British had the Cape Colony and Natal. The Boers had their own government in the Orange Free State and the Boers across the Vaal river, in an area called Transvaal, had their own independent state.

Constant conflict between the Orange Free State and the Basuto tribe caused the British to intervene again and, in 1868, annex Basutoland. This set a boundary between the

Orange Free State and Basutoland causing considerable animosity between the Boers and the British. The Boers disliked the boundary because it limited their push northward for grazing land for their herds of cattle. The British wanted to halt the Boers' expansion to the north and to restore peace in the area. On April 12, 1877, Britain annexed Transvaal. In December 1880, the rebellious Transvaal Boers rose against the British. The First Boer War lasted only a few months and resulted in an armistice. Complete self-government was given to the Boers in Transvaal and the province was renamed the South African Republic.<sup>13</sup>

Friction between the South African Republic and the British continued for years. Finally, Britain brought in troops and stationed them in Natal. This action caused the Boers in the Republic to declare war on Britain. The Second Boer War included the Orange Free State which had a defense pact with the South African Republic. The War lasted from 1899 until 1902. It took 250,000 British troops three years to defeat 87,000 Boers. On 26 March 1902, Transvaal and the Orange Free State became colonies of Britain by conquest.<sup>14</sup>

A movement toward federation began soon after the end of the War. The natives outnumbered the whites four to one and a Zulu rebellion in 1906 made each colony feel that it was dangerous to pursue its own separate course. By

agreement of all four colonies -- Cape Colony, Natal, Orange Free State and Transvaal -- the Union of South Africa was formed on 31 May 1910. It became an independent state in 1931 although it recognized the King of England as the King of South Africa. This association lasted until April 1961 when the Union Parliament, controlled by the National Party, passed an act declaring South Africa to be a republic. The act was voted on when presented to the white electorate in referendum and was accepted by a narrow majority. Only 52.05 percent voted in favor of the Act and 47.95 voted against the declaration of a republic.<sup>15</sup>

What the Boers had lost in battle in 1902 was gained by the Afrikaners in the peace that followed. Today the Afrikaner dominated National Party controls the South African Parliament and, consequently, the whole of the Republic of South Africa.

#### Afrikaner Calvinism and Nationalism.

Afrikaner nationalism derives its "philosophy, its inspiration and its granite resistance to the pattern of world change from Calvinism."<sup>16</sup> This Calvinist legacy pervades the organization and control of the South African Dutch Reformed Church regarding members of the Afrikaner dominated National Party.

Calvinism. There are three main groupings of the

Dutch Reformed Church in the Republic of South Africa: the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk (N.G.K.); the Nederduits Hervormde Kerk (N.H.K.); and the Gereformeerde Kerk. Their combined membership is about half of the white population of South Africa. To "keep Sunday holy" the churches advocate and demand that there be no dancing, public swimming or any other recreation on Sunday. The Churches have attempted to prevent South African aircraft from leaving the country on Sunday. These churches have strong influence on politics within the county. Almost all Cabinet members belong to the church and 95 percent of the members of Parliament belong to one of the three churches. When the National Party won a majority of Parliament seats in 1948, Dr. D. F. Malan, a Predikant or minister of the church, became the Prime Minister.<sup>17</sup>

The Church traces its origins to Holland of the 17th Century. Although the Church in Holland has liberalized its views over the last four centuries, the South African Church has not made any concession to liberalism. Having been cut off from contact with Holland after the British invasion in the 19th Century, the South African Churches "have maintained the stern and uncompromising dogmas characteristic of militant Protestantism during the Reformation."<sup>18</sup>

The Calvinist Afrikaner can be seen today as a

revolutionary, regrouping his resources to meet the challenges of the present. After four centuries, the Calvinist has not changed in his determination to construct a world with a reformed human society. A comparison with today's Calvinist Afrikaner can be made with the Calvinist who contributed to the cause of the English Revolution in 1640.

Michael Walzer discusses Calvinist activities during the Reformation and summarizes their work in 16th Century England:

[T]hese eminent men were revolutionaries in their time; they had first of all to construct a world in which their efficiency and concern would be respectable -- and to attack an older world that had made them both objects of mockery or disdain. In politics as in religion the saints were oppositional men and their primary task was the destruction of traditional order. But they were committed after that to the literal reforming of human society, to the creation of a Holy Commonwealth in which conscientious activity would be encouraged and even required. The saints saw themselves as divine "instruments" and theirs were the politics of wreckers, architects, and builders -- hard at work upon the political world. They refused to recognize the natural resistance to their laborers. They treated every obstacle as another example of the devil's resourcefulness and they summoned all their energy, imagination, and craft to overcome it. Because their work required cooperation, they organized to carry it through successfully and they joined forces with any man who might help them without regard to the older bonds of family and neighborhood. They sought "brethren" and turned away if necessary from relatives; they sought zeal and not affection. Thus there arose the leagues and covenants, the conferences and congregations which are the prototypes of revolutionary discipline. In these the good work was carried

forward; at the same time, new saints were trained and hardened for their unremitted labor. The result of the labor can best be seen in the English Revolution of 1640.<sup>19</sup>

R. H. Tawney saw Calvinism as an "active and radical force. It was a creed which sought, not merely to purify the individual, but to reconstruct Church and State, and to renew society by penetrating every department of life, public as well as private, with the influence of religion."<sup>20</sup> Based on the members of Calvinist Afrikaners in Parliament, the penetration of the government appears to be completed. It can be seen that the Calvinist Afrikaner does not devote all of his time and energies to the worship of God, but he takes an active part in reconstructing the government according to what he considers the will of God.

When examining the Calvinist's idea of what type of government South Africa should maintain, the Afrikaner believes he is following Calvin's wishes. Calvin wrote in the Institutes:

"For of the three forms of government which philosophers discuss be considered in themselves, I will not deny that aristocracy, or a system compounded of aristocracy and democracy far excels all others."<sup>21</sup> .

The Republic of South Africa has a government which compromises, to some extent, Calvin's idea. The Afrikaner in the National Party forms an aristocracy or a privileged ruling

group and democracy exists only for the white people as non-whites have no voice in government and can not own property except in areas or reserves designated by the whites.

Calvinism's influence on property and social distinctions is strongly felt. It follows his acceptance of property distinctions without scruple or discrimination. The whites of South Africa inherited property from their ancestors. The ancestors had battled the heathen for possession of the land, therefore they consider the land rightfully theirs. When discussing property, Calvin justified property distinction by asking, "Why then does God permit some to be rich and others to be poor on earth if not that he wants to give us occasion to do good?" Reinhold Niebuhr considers this catechism a "foundation for hypocrisies of bourgeois and plutocratic idealism in which charity becomes a screen for injustice."<sup>22</sup> Niebuhr's thought may be true in South Africa as charity is freely given but apartheid laws restrict the mobility of non-whites in job opportunities.

If one questions the Calvinist Afrikaner's apartheid policies, the official organ of the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk, Die Kerkbode, has a ready answer:

"God is the great Divider, who found it good to establish boundaries between people and groups of people. We believe that whites and non-whites in South Africa, in light of different cultural peculiarities, psychological

differences, biological differences and difference in political aspiration as well as group affiliation, stand under different laws of life."<sup>23</sup>

The Calvinist Afrikaner firmly believes that he has been chosen by God to lead South Africa. He draws this conviction from Calvin's writings concerning predestination:

"Chapter III [of God's Eternal Decree], No. 3. By the decree of God, for the manifestation of His glory, some men and angels are predestined unto everlasting life and others foreordained to everlasting death."<sup>24</sup>

The Calvinist has faith that he has been chosen through his implicit trust in Christ. It is the absolute duty of the Calvinist to consider himself chosen and to combat all temptations of the devil.<sup>25</sup>

Four conclusions can be drawn from Afrikaner Calvinism which have great influence in the political field by affecting the behavior of Afrikaner political leadership.

(1). The Afrikaner Dutch Reformed Churches believe in separation of the races.

(2). Compromise of ideas is unacceptable because it would indicate a lack of faith which runs counter to ideas of predestination.

(3). Listening to another person's point of view is unacceptable due to the other's mistaken arguments.

(4). Change of any kind is impossible as change would indicate that the elect of past generations were wrong in

their beliefs. God expressed His will in the Bible one time and there is no need for new interpretations.<sup>26</sup>

The Broederbond or Association of Brothers is currently the strength and conscience of the National Party. This underground organization also firmly connects the Dutch Reformed Church to the political and military apparatus of the National Party. The Broederbond was formed after World War I and operated openly until 1924 when it went underground. The Broederbond is organized on the Nazi model of the cell system with cells, groups, ministers and leaders. It has permeated almost every institution in South Africa. Each of the three Prime Ministers that have held office since the National Party was voted into power in 1948 has been a member of the Broederbond. Within this organization exists an inner secret society called the Afrikaner Order. The Order consists of Twelve Apostles, and each Apostle oversees a separate portion of national activity such as religion, education, communications, and other major public activities. A Trinity of three men are at the very top of the organization. The aim of the Broederbond is to have "a Christian Nationalist Calvinist Afrikaner Republic." Currently the whole Cabinet and over eighty percent of the Parliament are said to consist of Broederbond members.<sup>27</sup>

A secret organization known as the Ossewa Brandwag or

O.B. (The Path of the Ox) was organized in 1938 as a cultural organization to develop an Afrikaner spirit of nationalism in the descendants of the colonists. Their organization had a quasi-military character and recruited heavily from the armed forces prior to World War II. At the outbreak of the war, the organization began a campaign of sabotage to hinder the war effort. O.B. members were found in every branch and activity of the government. Thousands were apprehended and interned for their activities during the war. The members of this organization greatly admired the Nazi theory of supremacy of the white race. The present Prime Minister, Balthazar Johannes Vorster, was a general in the O.B. during the war and made the following statement in 1942:

"We stand for Christian Nationalism which is an ally of National Socialism. You can call this anti-democratic principle dictatorship if you wish. In Italy it is called Fascism, in Germany German National Socialism, and in South Africa Christian Nationalism."<sup>28</sup>

The National party opposed the war openly in the House of Parliament as the Opposition party. The O.B. sabotaged the military-industrial complex throughout the war. At the end of the war the O.B. merged with the Afrikaner party and the Afrikaner party in turn joined the National party in 1947. The combined strength of the former O.B. members and supporters of the Afrikaner party when joined with the

Nationalists provided sufficient votes to defeat the United Party at the polls in 1948.<sup>29</sup>

Afrikaner Nationalism. Anti-colonialism is the seed of Afrikaner nationalism. On the African continent, Ethiopia has been autonomous for centuries and Liberia was founded in 1847 as an independent state. However, South Africa is the first African country to free itself from colonial rule.<sup>30</sup>

The Afrikaner first declared his independence when he left British rule and established Transvaal in 1843. Two wars with the British in 1876 and 1899 kept the nationalistic fires alive. After the Second Boer War, General Louis Botha, a Boer, became the first Prime Minister of the Union in 1910. General James Barry Munnick Hertzog, another Boer, organized the National party in 1914 with a platform based on Afrikaner nationalism. The Constitution of 1910 guaranteed equal language rights for the Dutch and the English. From Dutch sprang the new tongue of Afrikaans.<sup>31</sup>

These three phases of nationalism have been identified in South Africa with the country presently in the third and last phase. The first phase contained the broad ideological spectrum emphasizing charismatic leadership in pursuit of national identification. Generals Both and Hertzog provided that leadership from the early 1900's

until the outbreak of World War II. The second phase saw an extension of nationalism from the elites to a broader base of the white population with emphasis on economic issues. Dr. D. F. Malan, a former Predikant or minister in the Dutch Reformed Church and later Prime Minister, helped achieve that by a political victory obtained by bringing a purely Afrikaner party into office at the polls in 1948. Phase three emphasizes a high national identification, professionalized political parties, and a greater concern with external communications with other nations. Prime Minister B. F. Vorster is leading the National party in this phase.<sup>32</sup>

The history, the traditions, the religion, and Afrikaner nationalism appear to be the keys to understanding the value system of the political leaders in the Republic of South Africa. The apartheid ideology is considered to be a "specific social and political ideology -- of the Afrikaner volk (people)".<sup>33</sup> Though the preceding discussion may tend to show apartheid as a theological belief, it is a secular ideology which animates a mass movement. It is a part of the Afrikaner's national philosophy of life and any Afrikaner who does not accept apartheid and its leaders is considered to be a traitor to the volk. In this respect, apartheid is totalitarian. But it does not try to incorporate or unite all of the diverse peoples -- white, colored,

Asian and Negroid. Apartheid affects all of the people in South Africa but it does not seek to unite them. Apartheid seeks to build a federation, a confederation of separate people with the government led by the National party eventually changing its position from trustee or guardian to become the senior member of a group of separate communities.<sup>34</sup>

The actual origin of the word apartheid can be traced to the Suid-Afrikaanse Bond Vir Rassestudie (South African Group for Racial Study), a group of Afrikaner specialists who broke away from the South African institute of race relations in 1935. The Bond opposed General Hertzog's segregation proposals in 1936 and wanted a rasse apartheid (racial separation) as the solution to South Africa's racial problems. From the Bond, which was short lived, their proposal was quickly accepted and published by the Federasie van Calvinistiese Studente Verenigings (Federation of United Calvinist Students). A chain reaction occurred in which the Calvinist churches, the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs and the National Party accepted the idea and it became a united platform for action.<sup>35</sup>

Apartheid developed as an ideology only when a clear and coherent program which provided for a solution to South Africa's racial policies became a nationwide policy. Former Prime Minister Dr. H. F. Verwoerd characterized

apartheid as fundamentally an antiliberal doctrine. It rejects the individual as the significant unit of analysis and recognized a collectivity or community as the really important element in society. He claims that man can not live apart from his community, his background, or his home. To give up one's identity with the former constitutes a danger of destroying one's own life.<sup>36</sup>

The primary element in the ideology of apartheid which affects the political behavior of current South African political leaders is the value placed in the traditions of the Afrikaner, his church and his language. An attempt to change the Afrikaner or his way of life draws a united reaction from the government, the churches and other Afrikaner dominated institutions. Apartheid differs from other totalitarian ideologies in that the collectivity with which the individual is identified is defined differently. Fascism identified that collectivity as the nation-state; Leninism chose the economic class; National Socialism identified itself with a biological race; and apartheid identifies its collectivity with the volk or people.<sup>37</sup>

The Afrikaner associates "volk" with an organically integrated multitude with a common language, culture and history. An individual is born into this community. The community has its own folkways and mores, laws and institutions. The individual can not escape the influence

of this environment. It is the responsibility of the community or volk to school the individual and develop him into the likeness of themselves to where there is a sameness of thought which transmits from the community to the individual. Therefore the individual becomes a reflection of his community. The volk is not a term restricted to the Afrikaner. It applies to any group with a common language, culture and history whether they are English-speaking South Africans, a Bantu (native black African) tribe, or an Indian settlement. The Afrikaner rationalizes that each collectivity or volk may face three different threats -- political, cultural, or biological which can jeopardize the integrity of the community. It is the announced policy of the National party to allow each of the different volkish communities to pursue its own course and development with the Afrikaner National party acting as overseer or guardian until each community gains maturity and is capable of self-rule. South Africa, as a result, would become a series of small independent states instead of one nation composed of various communities.

The division of the country into volk communities is referred to as "vertical" apartheid.<sup>38</sup> Vertical apartheid is hindered by several domestic problems. First of all, the Bantu homelands are incapable of supporting populations as the areas are overpopulated and overgrazed. Secondly, Bantu laborers are flowing in increasingly large numbers

into urban centers. Lastly, the Bantu sees a discrepancy between wages paid white laborers and wages paid to non-whites. The latter is part of a "horizontal" apartheid, an elaborate system of restricting the upward mobility of non-white workers. The urbanization of the Bantu makes the likelihood of vertical apartheid seem highly improbable. The urban Bantu are becoming completely separated from their tribes and traditional culture and are becoming permanent urban workers.<sup>39</sup>

Some features in apartheid ideology explain why South Africa is not a one party state and distinguishes South African apartheid from other totalitarian ideologies.

(1). The volk is primary.

(2). Race is a product of volkish integrity and continuity.

(3). The concept nation, understood in its political sense, has become a commonwealth of nations under the impact of volkish preference. The nation is thus subordinate to volk.

(4). South Africa is conceived to be a collection of autonomous nations or, more precisely, autonomous volk.<sup>40</sup>

The National Party, as the state within the confines of the Afrikaner volk, is essentially totalitarian. There is no aspect of public life that is excluded from the party's influence. The three main areas in which the party's

influence is felt are education, economics and censorship of all means of communications. Children are educated according to the dictates of the state and the child is considered to be an instrument to further the aims of the volk. Second, economic interests are served by locating industry near Bantu reserves to obtain labor and, at the same time, maintain political apartheid. The state owns or controls communication, transportation, electric power, printing, arms and ammunition manufacturing, production of iron and steel, heavy engineering, oil, gas and chemicals from coal, and fertilizers. The state also controls the Industrial Development Corporation which obtains foreign investors and locates new industries within the country.

Finally, the state maintains strict censorship of news media and cultural and recreational publications. Legislation approved by Parliament provides authority to implement these censorship policies.

In 1948 the National Party saw a need to develop a highly organized, centralized political authority to protect the cultural and economic status of the Afrikaner volk and other white South Africans. One of the major pieces of apartheid legislation was the passage of the Population Registration Act of 1950. This legislation effectively categorized people into four groups: whites, Bantu (native), colored and Asian. This classification caused many

hardships, divorces, and much humiliation. Families were broken up due to diverse classification of members. The Immorality Act of 1927 was amended in 1950 to prohibit extra-marital relations between Europeans (white) and colored. The original Act covered only Europeans and natives. In 1959 the government extended the segregation of elementary education to higher education and separate universities were established. In 1960 indirect native representation was abolished and in 1968 the colored in Cape Colony were denied the franchise. The Suppression of Communism Act of 1950 bans organizations and persons who may further the aims of Communism. Banning amounts to internment or house arrest of persons involved in what is considered Communist activities. To record, publish or disseminate speeches made by banned persons is a criminal offense and banned persons can not work as lawyers, teachers or journalists. The Criminal Procedure Amendment Act of 1956 in essence enables the government to detain a suspected person 180 days and then rearrest him for another 180 days as soon as the first period has ended. The Terrorism Act of 1967 allows the government to detain persons indefinitely for interrogation. These are only a few of the laws enacted since 1948 by the Nationalist government to implement apartheid.<sup>41</sup>

From the preceding historical, cultural, philosophical and traditional analysis of apartheid ideology, these

analyses provide keys to understanding the behavior of the government leadership in the Republic of South Africa.

To determine what a decision-maker's response would be to a threat to the country's security or economy, the following considerations must be taken into account.

(1). The Afrikaner National party controls the government of the Republic.

(2). The National party is dominated by the Calvinist Broederbond.

(3). The Broederbond interlocks the government, the party, the Calvinist Church, educational institutions, and the religious, cultural and news media within the Afrikaner volk.

(4). The Afrikaner volk are a united, totalitarian group who advocate, as their supreme value the establishment of an apartheid nation divided into substates of different volk. Tenets of their belief are:

(a). Separation of races into volk or homogeneous communities or people.

(b). The Divine right of the Calvinist Afrikaner to act as guardian or overseer of the nation and all of its people while the separation of races is taking place.

(c). Any act which would hinder the Afrikaner from achieving his aim is due to the resourcefulness of the devil.

(d). Compromise of the traditional beliefs of the Afrikaner is impossible because it would run counter to ideas of predestination and would indicate that past generations were wrong.

(e). Suppression of opposition is necessary to achieve apartheid aims.

The apartheid ideology places emphasis on resisting change of any type. The elites of the National Party, the Calvinist Churches and other institutions are placed in their hieratical positions through the Calvinist Broederbond. There is a sameness about all of these leaders that has been passed on from the Afrikaner volk which makes their behavior predictable. They are charged with the responsibility of creating and maintaining a Calvinist Nationalist Afrikaner Republic for the Afrikaner volk and acting as guardians while other groups are developing into separate nations. Examples of their determination to maintain their ideology in the face of seemingly insurmountable opposition can be seen in examining the formulation and application of their present foreign policy and security policy.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Joseph Frankel, The Making of Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 112-113.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 113.

<sup>3</sup>Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 16.

<sup>4</sup>Frankel, op. cit., p. 111.

<sup>5</sup>Amry Vandebosch, South Africa and The World (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1970), p. 20.

<sup>6</sup>Alexander Hepple, South Africa (London: Praeger, 1966), pp. 42-51.

<sup>7</sup>Douglas Brown, Against the World (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1968), p. 11.

<sup>8</sup>David L. Niddrie, South Africa: Nation or Nations? (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, Inc., 1968), p. 41.

<sup>9</sup>Hepple, op. cit., pp. 54-60.

<sup>10</sup>Arthur Kepple-Jones, South Africa (Tiptree: The Anchor Press, 1953), pp. 41-42.

<sup>11</sup>Brown, op. cit., p. 175.

<sup>12</sup>Hepple, op. cit., pp. 60-68.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., pp. 85-86.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., pp. 87-92.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 103.

<sup>16</sup>Tom Hopkinson, South Africa (New York: Time Incorporated, 1964), p. 107.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., pp. 107-108.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 108.

<sup>19</sup>R. M. Kingdon and R. D. Linder, Calvin and Calvinism (Lexington: D. C. Heath and Co., 1970), pp. 63-64.

<sup>20</sup>R. H. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism, (New York: New American Library, 1947), p. 91.

<sup>21</sup>Reinhold Niebuhr, The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness (New York: Charles Scribners' Sons, 1960), p. 94.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 95.

<sup>23</sup>Hopkinson, op. cit., p. 109.

<sup>24</sup>Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York: Charles Scribners' Sons, 1958), p. 100.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., pp. 108-111.

<sup>26</sup>Hopkinson, op. cit., pp. 109-110.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., pp. 107-108.

<sup>28</sup>Brian Bunting, The Rise of the South African Reich (Maryland: Penguin Books, Inc., 1969), p. 98.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., pp. 83-98.

<sup>30</sup>Edwin S. Munger, Afrikaner and African Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 4.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., pp. 4-5.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., pp. 57-82.

<sup>33</sup>James A. Gregor, Contemporary Radical Ideologies (New York: Random House, 1968), pp. 221-222.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., p. 223.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., p. 225.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., p. 236.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., p. 237.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., pp. 242-53.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., pp. 253-262.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., pp. 265-66.

<sup>41</sup>Vandenbosch, op. cit., pp. 228-233.

### CHAPTER III

#### FOREIGN POLICY

The ideology of apartheid significantly affected South African decision-makers who, faced with a potential insurgency and the possibility of international conflict, chose to use and maintain armed force to quell the insurgency and deter potentially hostile nations and international organizations. This portion of the study shows how the operational and psychological environment of the early 1960's affected the South African decision-makers choice of actions when confronted with organized opposition to apartheid policies. The nation's determination to use and maintain armed force to protect apartheid from both potential domestic and foreign enemies is illustrated in the discussion of the National party's major foreign policy objectives. Within the discussion of foreign policy objectives, South Africa's major concern with its immediate neighbor nations shows a distinct interest in the formation of a regional organization encompassing the nations of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Rhodesia, South West Africa and Swaziland which are subservient to South Africa's economic and security interests. It is shown how decisions affecting South Africa's foreign policy objectives show concern for states with the southern Africa region.

Operational Environment (1960-61)

Apartheid ideology espoused by the National party and Afrikaner-dominated institutions gained their most influential spokesman and decision-maker when Dr. Hendrik F. Verwoerd became Prime Minister on 2 September 1958. Verwoerd, a psychologist, was a man of immense popularity with the Afrikaner people and was also known as a man of action. He began immediately -- two days after he became Prime Minister -- to put apartheid theory into practice. His first action was to consolidate support to terminate indirect African representation in Parliament. He gained a necessary majority and passed an amendment to the Native Representation Act which terminated indirect African representation effective with the expiration of the then current representatives terms on 30 June 1960. This one action, more than any other, can be assumed to be responsible for causing 1960 to become one of the most depressing and discouraging years in South African history.<sup>1</sup>

Two Bantu or black South African organizations, the Pan-African Congress (P.A.C.) and the African National Congress (A.N.C.), gathered forces to oppose the loss of representation in Parliament and, by the end of 1959, riots and smaller disturbances were widespread throughout the Union. In late 1959 a riot in a Durban slum resulted in the murder of four whites and five African policemen. The

P.A.C. chose this highly explosive situation to launch its campaign to resist pass laws. It appeared that the course was set toward a larger crisis.<sup>2</sup>

Verwoerd saw an opportunity to increase the strength of the National party by emphasizing the crisis which could develop if the swelling seas of black nationalism were not checked. He needed to obtain votes from the English-speaking United party. On 20 January 1960, Verwoerd announced that he intended to hold a referendum on the conversion of the Union to a republic as soon as legislation could be enacted to establish the machinery for the referendum. Conversion to a republic would give South Africa the sovereignty it needed to create an apartheid nation and it would separate the English-speaking South Africans, who claimed dual citizenship in England, from their ancestral homes.<sup>3</sup>

On 21 March 1960 groups of Africans presented themselves to police stations asking to be arrested for violation of pass laws. At Sharpsville, near Johannesburg, police fired on demonstrators, killing 67 persons and wounding 186. In other areas, guns were used by the police and by the end of the day 83 demonstrators had been killed and 365 injured.<sup>4</sup>

Verwoerd never waivered. It can be assumed that he knew that the news would spread quickly around the world

and that it would seriously damage South Africa's image but he was committed to apartheid and to the Afrikaner volk. It was the time for action. The armed forces were immediately mobilized, a general state of emergency was declared, and thousands of persons were detained. Meetings in urban areas were prohibited, and the A.N.C. and P.A.C. were outlawed. Police and troops raided homes in African townships making house-to-house searches. In only 46 days, 20,000 arrests had been made for alleged law violations and 1,600 of those apprehended were held under emergency regulations. These actions carried alarm throughout the Union. Frightened foreign investors stayed away from investing during such chaotic times and South Africa's booming economy suddenly collapsed as workers stayed away from their jobs.<sup>5</sup>

On 9 April 1960 an insane white South African farmer attempted to assassinate the prime minister by firing two bullets into his head. Verwoerd was rushed to a hospital, underwent surgery and within two months was fully recovered.<sup>6</sup> After Verwoerd recovered, he wrote a letter to each of the eligible white voters pleading for their support in order to create a South African republic and to prevent the biological assimilation of white South Africans by the blacks. The voters responded favorably on 5 October 1960. Although only 1,800,748 whites were entitled to vote from

the country's 16 million population, 1,663,87 voted. Those in favor of a republic totalled 850,468 and those opposed were 775,878. The National party had created a republic by a majority of only 74,580 votes although the predominantly English-speaking province of Natal had voted against the republic by 135,598 votes to 42,299.<sup>7</sup> In short order the Republic was provided with a legal constitution which became effective on 31 May 1961. A president of the Republic replaced the Governor-General. Verwoerd flew to London to attend a Commonwealth prime ministers conference at which time he asked to remain in the Commonwealth. Non-white prime ministers openly opposed South Africa's application and Verwoerd withdrew his request and returned home to a hero's welcome.<sup>8</sup>

#### Psychological Environment (1960-61)

On assessing his assets at this time, the Prime Minister had control of Parliament through his National party seats, a republic, and the belief that God was guiding him in the affairs of state. Forces opposing him were the two outlawed African Congresses, 48 per cent of the white electorate, a large share of world opinion, the English Commonwealth and the nation's own troubled economy.

How could a nation expect to survive without some concession to its apartheid idealism? Having declared itself

a republic, to whom could it turn for assistance while faced with a stagnant economy and a possible insurgency? The very value-system of the volk was being challenged. During the next nine years the reasoning and determination of apartheid leaders would be dramatically emphasized by their decision to suppress dissident domestic opposition, disregard world opinion espoused in the United Nations General Assembly and build a formidable military organization as a precaution to possible external intervention from real or imagined enemies.

#### The Use of Force

Charles A. McClelland states that a nation-state has three types of fundamental policies it can pursue in its struggle for power and influence. These are (a) maintenance of the status quo, (b) expansion, and (c) acquisition of prestige.<sup>9</sup> Hans Morgenthau's assertion that the nation-state is the significant unit in the international system and that it is always in a struggle for power with other states<sup>10</sup> appears to be compatible with Verwoerd's actions in 1960-61. Three factors existed which set the stage for Verwoerd's domestic and international policies.

First, the government of the state consisted predominantly of Broederbond members in the National party and they desired apartheid.

Second, the National party wanted the support of the English-speaking South Africans and they needed to create a republic to sever the latter's loyalty to England in order to achieve this support.

Third, the National party wanted to demonstrate the power it had congregated in their tenacious volk in order to achieve prestige at home as well as abroad. Expansion or status quo could not be considered policies for power achievement by the National party as their immediate interests were concerned with a domestic crisis developing from black nationalism and a collapsing economy.

The traditional responses of the Afrikaner to crises situations were to use force or to emigrate. At this point, in 1960, with the crisis caused by the Sharpsville massacre, fear of a black revolution and economic ruination, Dr. Verwoerd, as the Afrikaner spokesman entrusted with the heritage of the Afrikaner volk, responded in the only way he saw open to him. Emigration was ruled out. The Afrikaner's home was South Africa. He had no dual citizenship rights as the English-speaking South African had in England. He had no other place to go. He felt that his very survival was at stake and that concession to the black nationalists of the P.A.C. or A.N.C. would show a weakness which would signal his doom. As did the Afrikaners of previous generations, the Afrikaner Nationalist chose to

fight. But this time, he considered himself not as a revolutionary but as the legitimate government challenged by revolutionary forces.<sup>11</sup>

South Africa's decision to expand its military establishment to protect its domestic apartheid policies and the actions it took to implement this decision proved effective in changing the direction of the black revolutionary movements inspired by the P.A.C. and the A.N.C. and also restored the confidence of foreign investors whose capital was required to maintain a viable economy.

In March 1960 the armed forces were mobilized to assist the police in suppressing the black nationalism movements after the Sharpsville incident. They have never been reduced to their pre-Sharpsville strengths. A police reserve of approximately 20,000 has been created since 1960 and, by 1967, the police budget was doubled over the 1960-61 amount. During a period of 10 years from 1960 to 1970, total defense expenditures have multiplied to six times their pre-Sharpsville levels. Force, to the Afrikaner, is a necessity to gain power or to maintain power. The decision to use force to halt the blacks from continuing their nationalistic, revolutionary movements had a dramatic effect on the sputtering economy. While the blacks had leaders to organize protests, disturbance, riots, and stay-at-home-from-work movements, the economy lacked manpower

previously afforded by the Bantu. After the state of emergency was declared and the armed forces were mobilized, lightening raids and arrests were made to isolate the Bantu leaders from their masses. With the leaders in jail or in house arrest and prohibited from contacting either their white supporters in the Opposition party or their own followers, the Minister of Justice had all urban areas sealed off to prevent anyone from entering or leaving. The Bantu stay-at-home movement faltered and, as they ran out of food, they returned to work. With powers granted by the emergency regulations, the police and armed forces proved to be wholly adequate to control the leaderless Bantu.<sup>12</sup>

The Military's Effects On Internal Security and the Economy.

One could hypothesize that the expansion of the military establishment during the period 1960 through 1969 has had no slowing effect on the economy but, rather, has stimulated it.

South Africa's economy not only relies heavily on inexpensive Bantu laborers to work in industrial and mining jobs but it is dependent upon foreign capital investments. When the 1960 emergency disrupted the routine, reduced the efficiency of the non-white workers and the country appeared to be seriously confronted with an insurgency, foreign

investors began to pull their capital out of South Africa.<sup>13</sup> This situation was changed when foreign investors began to realize what actions the Afrikaners were taking to prevent a racial war from occurring. After the initial arrests were made and thousands were jailed, Verwoerd's Minister of Justice, Balthazar John Vorster, rooted out conspirators and dissidents to break completely the back of the black nationalist movement. Verwoerd won the referendum for a republic in October 1960 and on 31 May 1961 the Republic of South Africa left the Commonwealth. South Africa had demonstrated to its foreign investors, and to the world, that it was an independent nation which sought no alliances as it was capable of directing and managing its own domestic affairs. It had proven that the Afrikaner volk were organized and willing to use force to suppress any movement which might conflict with apartheid idealism.

Since 1960 the National party has continuously raised its national budget expenditures each year for security and law and order. These expenditures have risen to six times the amount spent prior to the Sharpsville incident and presently consume nearly 25 percent of the entire national budget. These monies were used to build up the armed forces, expand defense industries, strengthen police operation of the prison system, and administer the courts.<sup>14</sup>

It appears that South Africa can maintain its present

level of spending for security and law and order. South Africa spends approximately 2.4 percent of the Gross National Product (GNP) for defense. When compared to Western European countries that are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, South Africa's defense expenditure in relation to GNP is less than any of those countries with the exception of tiny Luxembourg. South Africa's defense expenditure in percentage of GNP is much less than Portugal's 6.1 percent GNP expenditure.<sup>15</sup>

The Afrikaner's determination to maintain its apartheid policy by force was summarized by Dr. P.G.J. Koornhof, Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and foreign secretary of the Broederbond, in a speech to the House of Assembly in June 1968.

"Supremacy and integration are like oil and water; they do not mix and they never will mix. We have the courage of our convictions and we say that we stand for white supremacy in the white areas and that we shall do so for all time to come and that we shall maintain and defend it by force."<sup>16</sup>

The military establishment, in conjunction with the police, provides South Africa's National party with sufficient forces to easily provide internal security under apartheid. The nation has over 34,000 active police and 19,000 reserves as its main line of defense against an insurgency. The armed forces serve as a backup force to the police if called upon for assistance. The 45,800 man active force can be

augmented with 40,000 additional men in two days and can mobilize a total force of 200,000 men in two weeks without assuming wartime footing. This force provides South Africa with a ratio of one white male combatant for every 15 non-white male personnel of military age.<sup>17</sup>

An interdepartmental committee provided for in the 1961 Defense Act coordinates internal security operations between the police and the military. Part-time Citizen Force and civilian Commando units were authorized by a 1963 amendment to the Defense Act to act as policemen in times of emergency without presidential proclamation or ministerial order. This action was taken to provide a rapid response to combat the element of surprise which most subversive elements depend upon. These Citizen Force and Commando units are used in small towns and rural communities having few police. This action requires the approval of the defense minister within four days after activation.<sup>18</sup>

#### Foreign Policy Objectives

One of South Africa's most evident foreign policy objectives has been pursued since force was used to prevent an open insurgency from occurring as a result of the Sharpsville incident in 1960. The first foreign policy objective of the National Party is:

- (1) The preservation of the security of and full

control over its own territory and that of South West Africa.

It has been established in the previous discussion that South Africa has obtained sufficient forces to provide its own internal security and what it has cost to achieve this amount of security.

South West Africa is considered by the South African government to be its fifth province although it does recognize that the territory has special status in international law. It denies that the United Nations has jurisdiction over South West Africa.<sup>19</sup> In 1960 Ethiopia and Liberia, the only African states that had been members of the League of Nations, requested that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) end the league mandate for South West Africa's administration by South Africa as South Africa had not provided material and moral welfare as required in the mandate's terms. In 1962 the court in a vote of eight to seven made a decision that it did not have jurisdiction over the matter. In July 1966 the court in a seven to seven tie vote rejected other complaints from the two countries by ruling that Ethiopia and Liberia had not established legal interest entitling them to bring the case to the court. In October 1966 the United Nations General Assembly voted 114 to 2 to terminate the mandate and to give the United Nations direct responsibility for the territory. In May 1967 an eleven-member United Nations Council for South West Africa was established to arrange

South West African independence by June 1968 and to administer the territory. South Africa stated it did not recognize the competence of any international body to rule on its administration of South West Africa. In 1969 the United Nations General Assembly requested the Security Council to take measures to remove the Republic from the territory. It also changed the name of the territory from South West Africa to Namibia. The Security Council met and passed two resolutions. The first one was aimed at establishing that South Africa was controlling and administering South West Africa illegally. The second resolution was to consider means to force South Africa to withdraw from South West Africa by 4 October 1969. The United States, Great Britain and France abstained from the vote and South Africa refused to recognize the validity of the resolutions. No further action was taken by the Security Council to force the withdrawal without the three abstainers' support.<sup>20</sup>

South Africa considers South West Africa vital to its own security and has one of its eleven regional military commands established in the Walvis Bay area. A large air base was constructed in the eastern tip of South West Africa near Zambia's southern border. This finger of land is known as the Caprivi Strip and it is shaped like a spear aimed at Zambia. The air base provides South Africa with a combat air strike potential near three of its most hostile black African neighbors -- The Democratic Republic of the

Congo, Tanzania and Zambia. The armed forces and police organizations presently organized and garrisoned in both countries, coordinated and controlled by the Republic of South Africa, preserve the policy of apartheid. South Africa's major foreign policy objective appears to be identical with its domestic policy of maintaining apartheid.

The South African economy had been growing steadily since the end of World War I until its collapse in 1960-61. As the armed forces and police tightened their controls over the non-white population and foreign investors returned, South Africa began a period of unprecedented growth. At the beginning of 1971, Dr. G.S.J. Kuschke, Chairman of the Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa, Ltd., made the following observation and prediction:

"South Africa's economy has advanced to the stage where its future growth depends on secondary industrial activity. Continued industrialization will be characteristic of the future source of events. The industrial sector contributes 28 percent to the Gross National Product. In thirty years time it is projected to be 36 percent which will give the South African economy a structure comparable to that of the industrially advanced countries today. By the turn of the century the per capita Gross National Product is expected to be the same or higher than the present levels achieved in the majority of the Western European countries. There is no doubt as to our potential to achieve this. In the last decade South Africa's real growth rate of six percent per annum was second only to those of Japan and Western Germany. The factors responsible -- savings, investments, natural resources, law and order, and first

class entrepreneurs -- will continue to support a high rate of growth. Sufficient earnings in foreign exchange will depend on our ability to achieve and maintain a rate of increase in the exports of manufactured products in areas of our past performance. This means enhanced international trade, in particular with industrially advanced countries."<sup>21</sup>

Kuschke's statement assesses South Africa's growth rate during the past decade and establishes the necessity for South Africa to further develop international trade with industrially advanced countries. His statement can be coupled with the nation's desire to maintain apartheid and its determination to use force to do so to examine the military demands imposed by apartheid to determine if they are complemented by, contradictory to, or identical to the government's foreign policy objectives. Kuschke's statement, as interpreted by the U.S. State Department, takes on a clearer and more definable meaning and becomes the second of five primary foreign policy objectives espoused by the South African government:

(2). The maintenance and improvement of economic and political relations with the United States, Western Europe, and other developed countries important to the Republic as markets and sources of essential goods.<sup>22</sup>

If this objective is of paramount importance to the Republic of South Africa in its forceful pursuit of apartheid, then it appears to be contradictory to the military demands

placed upon the nation. This is based on both political and economic factors that hamper the nation in achieving its goal.

Politically, South Africa's apartheid policy has caused the United Nations General Assembly to make resolutions condemning the country for its dogma for racism. The overwhelming majority of that international organization have voted to terminate the mandate involving South Africa's continued administration of Namibia (South West Africa). The United Nations imposed an embargo on supply of arms to South Africa leaving France as the only major supplier of arms to the Republic. These actions alone may have adversely affected political relations with the United States, Western Europe and other developed countries as the interests of these countries in South Africa are minimal when compared to the rest of the world. Political considerations involving support of South Africa's white regime and South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth in 1961 left the Republic with no western alliances or alliances with other developed countries which could assist South Africa with military forces if it were attacked. Other than white minorities in adjacent countries within the southern African region which either support or at least do not criticize South Africa's apartheid policies, South Africa must stand alone to explain and defend apartheid.

Political ramifications overlap with the economic

objectives of the nation. United States investments in South Africa total \$755 million, or 1.1 percent of total foreign United States investments. The 1.1 percent of investments in South Africa represents 25.4 percent of United States investments on the African continent. This total investment percentage has not altered much from 1961 to 1971 although the dollar value has increased materially as the gross national product of both nations have risen. The United States investment represents about 14.6 percent of the total foreign investments made by all nations in South Africa.<sup>23</sup> The United States government neither encourages nor discourages private investments in South Africa but it does discourage American private investment in Namibia.<sup>24</sup> About 64 percent of total foreign investment is from the sterling area -- principally the United Kingdom -- in the amount of \$2,699 million. Frances' investment is 5.6 percent and Switzerland's is 4.0 percent. Other countries account for 11.9 percent.<sup>25</sup> All countries, other than France, cut off arms shipments to South Africa as a result of the United Nations embargo imposed in 1963.<sup>26</sup> This embargo caused the South African government to expand its own defense industry to produce military hardware that was previously purchased from the United States and Western nations.<sup>27</sup>

If military hardware can be defined as "essential goods" required by South Africa, then the foreign policy

objective of maintaining and improving economic and political relations with the United States, Western Europe and other developed countries has been eroded by South Africa's determination to use force to maintain its apartheid policy. Apartheid has also placed additional demands on South Africa's defense industry to produce these military goods domestically.

In 1965 the Foreign Affairs Special Account Act provided the Minister of Foreign Affairs a fund to be used for services of a confidential nature. The Minister stated that the fund would not be used for any form of espionage or for any undermining activities in other countries but would be used in matters involving cooperation with other countries where secrecy was desirable. A Tanzanian newspaper commented: "The likelihood is that the sums are intended to buy sympathy from African countries of dubious loyalty to the cause of African liberation. The other likely object would be to align South Africa's neighbors to it, so that they may prove impervious to the surge of freedom fighters into South Africa."<sup>28</sup> Restated, the third of five major foreign policy objectives was publically introduced with the passage of this act:

(3) The maintenance of a cordon of friendly states to the north.

South Africa has managed to maintain a cordon of friendly states to its north and this can be considered as a complementary effect to military demands placed upon the

country. Five states are of primary consideration: South West Africa, Botswana, Rhodesia, Mozambique and Swaziland.

South West Africa underwent de facto unification of the territory with South Africa after World War II. The 1949 South West Africa Amendment Act gave it representation in the South African House of Assembly with six delegates elected by registered white voters of the territory and representation in the South African Senate with four members -- two elected by members of the territorial Legislative Assembly and two appointed by the South African government. The Administrator of the territory is also appointed by the South African government. The military demands imposed by apartheid are identical for both countries regardless of the legality of their unification.

Botswana and Swaziland, former British protectorates, form a portion of the northern cordon of friendly states and, along with the state of Lesotho which is located within the interior of South Africa, pose no military threat to South Africa. No additional military forces or police are required to influence the behavior of these states. Good will among these states and South Africa has been maintained by special economic relationships with the republic. The three states form a common monetary and customs area with the Republic of South Africa and South West Africa by all using the South African rand. Customs revenue provide these states with an extremely important source

of funds for development and other national needs as their tax base is very limited. A new customs agreement was negotiated in 1969 which increased each of the three states share of revenue from the total pool of revenue collected from customs and sales or excise taxes based upon the level of imports, production of dutiable or taxable goods, and the duty paid. The formula used to divide this revenue was based on the proportion each state contributed to the pool in 1967. Under the new agreement Botswana received a 14 percent increase, Lesotho received a 60 percent increase and Swaziland received a 68 percent increase from previously established fixed percentage distributions.<sup>29</sup> The former protectorates represent more than means to show a good neighbor policy on the part of South Africa. The three territories constituted, at one time, a vital part in South Africa's grand design for separate development. The favorable relations among all of these nations show that whites and non-whites can live together in adjacent communities. South Africa maintains that apartheid can achieve the same results within the Republic of South Africa.

Rhodesia, after unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) on 11 November 1965, was beset with monetary problems. On 12 November, 1965, the United Nations branded the Rhodesian government and UDI illegal and asked member states not to recognize the Rhodesian regime. In 1966 the United

Nations Security Council imposed mandatory economic sanctions on most of Rhodesia's primary exports and called for embargos on arms, aircraft, motor vehicles and petroleum to Rhodesia. In 1968, the Security Council broadened the sanctions by imposing a virtual total embargo on all trade, investments in or transfers of funds to Rhodesia. The gross national product was about \$1 billion in 1965 and fell sharply in 1966.

South Africa and Portugal have refused to implement the United Nations sanctions and permit trade to be carried through their countries -- in the case of Portugal, through Mozambique. In 1969, the gross national product had risen to \$1.2 billion, however the per capita share had not increased appreciably since 1965 due to inflation and increase in population.<sup>31</sup>

No country has formally recognized the Rhodesian government after UDI. Only South Africa and Portugal maintain consular representation in Rhodesia. Portugal has made it clear that it still recognizes the legal sovereignty of the British Crown. Rhodesian officials are in Portugal, Mozambique and South Africa.<sup>32</sup>

South Africa has been Rhodesia's principal trading partner since 1965. South African police units have been stationed in Rhodesia to assist Rhodesian security forces to combat guerrilla activity.<sup>33</sup>

Rhodesia's dilemma complements South Africa's economy by providing a market for South African manufactured goods and military supplies. It also provides a training ground for South African police units to perfect tactics to be used in counter-guerrilla operations. By giving police assistance to help Rhodesia combat guerrilla operations, South Africa gains a buffer zone from insurgent and guerrilla activities and improves her trade relations with Rhodesia.

Mozambique, on South Africa's northern border, is considered by Portugal to be one of its overseas provinces. Portugal has tried to eliminate guerrilla organizations in Mozambique since September 1964. One organization, called the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo), is sponsored by the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.) and has its headquarters in Tanzania. A second organization which appeared in 1965, the Mozambique Revolutionary Committee (COREMO), is based in Zambia.<sup>34</sup>

Portugal's Angola, bordering South West Africa and separated from Botswana by the narrow Caprivi Strip, has three subversive movements: The Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (GRAE) operating from Okinshasa, Congo; the Movement for Liberation of Angola (MPLA) operating from Brazzoville, Congo; and the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) operating from Zambia.<sup>35</sup>

Some similar problems and interests have drawn South Africa and Portugal close together:

(1). Both nations have been threatened by or are engaged in guerrilla wars inspired and financed in part by the O.A.U.

(2). Both nations claims their problems on the African continent are domestic problems and should not concern the United Nations.

(3). Both nations are strongly anticommunist and perceive liberation movements as communist inspired plots to eliminate European (white) influence from the African continent.

(4). Though opposed ideologically, with South Africa practicing apartheid and with Portugal advocating a multi-racial, pluri-cultural society in its territories, they do not criticize each other's policies in public.

(5). Joint economic planning has been conducted to build hydroelectric plants in Angola and Mozambique and South Africa has furnished security forces to guard the worksite in Mozambique.

(6). Joint police operations, and possibly military operations, have been conducted between Portugal and South Africa in Angola and Mozambique.

There is no defense treaty or alliance between South Africa and Portugal. When questioned concerning the lack of a written treaty, Prime Minister Vorster stated that "South Africa and her friend Portugal understand each other very well and I need say no more on that subject. No

treaties are needed between friends. They know their duty when a neighbor's house is on fire."<sup>36</sup>

The maintenance of friendly relations with Portugal and the provinces of Mozambique and Angola effectively places another buffer zone between South Africa and O.A.U. sponsored insurgent groups, reduces the likelihood of a surprise attack, and gives South Africa more flexibility if forced to react to an invasion or an O.A.U. inspired insurgency. Trade with Portugal, Mozambique and Angola should more than offset any defense spending exclusively used to support present South African police and/or military operation in Portuguese provinces.

The friendly cordon of nations to South Africa's north effectively gives the nation an unwritten defense alliance in which it is the principal recipient and complements South Africa's defense establishment. South Africa's courtship with these nations does not compromise in any way the Nationalist government's domestic apartheid policies.

A fourth foreign policy objective is to:

(4) Participate in the defense of the Cape route and Southern Africa in general against a communist threat.

The Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.) has a Defense Commission which has stated its purposes are to cooperate for defense and security of member states and to defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence

of its members. All internationally recognized independent African states, except South Africa, are members of the O.A.U.<sup>38</sup> Three of the members of the O.A.U. -- the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Tanzania, and Zambia -- are actively attempting to eliminate Portuguese influence in Angola and Mozambique which border South West Africa and South Africa.

South Africa perceives the insurgent support offered by the three nations as a communist inspired threat to its own security. In 1962, the South African defense minister pleaded for and obtained increased defense funds to build and equip modern forces to counter this threat. After the British withdrew its forces east of the Suez, the Republic prepared to defend the vital Cape shipping route against any possible communist move to deny its use to Western nations.<sup>39</sup>

At the end of 1967, Simonstown Naval Base in South Africa became less important to Great Britain as her defense commitments in the East were reduced. South Africa did not renew the usage treaty, which would give Britain base rights at Simonstown and South African shores, when the old treaty expired in 1968. South Africa, although committed to defend the Cape Route, does not want to be dragged into Britain's wars. Although ten percent of all of Britain's trade is with South Africa and 35 percent of all South Africa's exports go to Britain and 30 percent of the imports

received by the Republic are from Britain,<sup>40</sup> South Africa is increasing its trade with African nations to lessen its dependency upon Britain. The British have found no new trading partners to replace South Africa. This dilemma may be beneficial to South Africa in that British economic interests in South Africa effectively guarantees some security from Great Britain based on foreign investments and international trade considerations.<sup>41</sup>

To what extent South Africa would defend the Cape route and southern Africa from a communist threat is not known. Communism runs counter to the ideology of apartheid, therefore it is anticipated that if the Republic's commitment to "participate" was seriously tested, it would do so with force. At this time there is no indication that the Soviet Union has any intention of mounting a military attack upon South Africa specifically or southern African in general. There is a remote possibility of the Democratic Republic of China's doing so through the black African states of Tanzania, Zambia and Congo but China's Red Guard movements during the cultural revolution have left her with many changes in leadership and with economic problems which effectively limit her direct participation in "People's Wars of Liberation."<sup>42</sup> Also, direct participation in hostilities in Africa might distract China from two of its apparent foreign policy objectives: bridging the ideological gap between the United States and China, and building a

formidable defense against an attack from the Soviet Union.

A more realistic external communist threat to South Africa would be communist infiltration and take over of revolutionary movements operating from Tanzania, Zambia and the Congo. So far South Africa's participation in the defense of southern Africa has been limited to economic support of the nations attempting to suppress the revolutionaries and by giving those countries token police and military forces to establish the credibility of its deterrent force. The decisive moment has yet to come. When white lives are taken either in Rhodesia or South Africa by the revolutionary organizations, the retaliations will be demanded. Retaliation can take several forms. In 1968 in retaliation against the death of a watchman who had been bayoneted to death in an area where guerrillas had been active, a large bridge across the Luangwa River in Zambia was blown up only three miles from the site of the murder. A series of sabotage raids or commando groups using military helicopters could be used to punish a sanctuary nation for its intransigence. Such actions could topple a new Africa nation's government or cause serious strains within the government which might favorably affect future policy toward southern Africa.

This foreign policy objective complements the military demands of apartheid. The Afrikaners' reliance on the use

of force has been evident in the pursuit of this objective beginning with increased defense spending in 1961 to the present policy of joint small unit operations and selective retaliation against O.A.U. supported revolutionary movements.<sup>43</sup> So far as friendly southern African nations are concerned, it can be assumed that South Africa's pursuit of this objective of halting communism's spread in Southern Africa assists these nations in their own desire to remain free of alignment with communist countries.

The last of the five major foreign policy objectives of the National party concerns a policy to develop friendly associations with other African States:

(5) To implement an "outward movement" policy in order to develop friendly associations with African states through trade and aid with a view to eventual establishment of diplomatic relations.

Beginning in 1964 a firm policy was established by Verwoerd showing South Africa's willingness to cultivate cordial relations with African states and the rest of the world -- but this policy was restricted by his refusal to seek friends by modifying her racial policy. On 27 April 1964, he stated in the House of Assembly:

"The crux of the problem is whether it is more important to be in the good books of world opinion than it is to make up your mind as to how best you can ensure your survival as a white race in this country. I do not want to push aside the nations

of the world. I should not like to be on hostile terms with them; I should like to seek the friendship of others; but I can seek friendship only within the limits of the right that South Africa herself must have to formulate her own policy in respect of what is to happen within South Africa."<sup>44</sup>

When B. J. Vorster succeeded Verwoerd after Verwoerd's assassination in 1966, the former British protectorates made it clear that they wanted to live in peace with South Africa. To the north, the state of Malawi, under the lead of Dr. Kamuzu Banda refused to share in the general ineffective boycotts aimed at South Africa. Under Verwoerd the National party had the appearance of a solid granite wall as it held rigidly to the apartheid line and did not yield under pressure. Under Vorster the first division appeared -- not one which relaxed apartheid but one that divided the Afrikaners into two groups. The first group were the status quo Afrikaners who wanted to maintain apartheid as it was under Verwoerd. They were called the "verkrampsts" or narrow-minded. They espoused the old party line defense of the Afrikaans language; preservation of Afrikaner traditions; adherence to Christian-National policies; and rejection of anything foreign. Vorster was identified as a "verligte" or enlightened person. He was given that identification due to his mid-1968 outward diplomatic exchange and trade with other African states and due to a slight relaxation of the color bar in sports.<sup>45</sup> It was

believed that Vorster would return South Africa to politics of pragmatic opportunism but this was not the case. There was a change of style from that used by Verwoerd but there was no discernible change in direction. Political apartheid was carried further by the prohibition of multi-racial political parties. The Liberal Party was dissolved and the Progressives continued without their non-white members.<sup>46</sup>

Apartheid in South Africa and black African nationalism have hindered South Africa in its outward movement policy. Malawi has been the first black African nation, other than the former British Protectorates of Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland which are bordering on or are inside South Africa, to establish diplomatic relations with the Republic. Malawi receives favorable economic aid and trade relations with the Republic. In return South Africa has been allowed to use the large airfield at Malawai's capital. This airfield is strategically important to the Republic in the event of war with Zambia.<sup>47</sup>

The island of Malagasy, formerly Madagascar, has not been overlooked by South Africa in its move toward expansion. It is conceivable that Malagasy may be the next independent African state after Malawi to enter diplomatic relations with South Africa. Though President Philibert Tsiranana in an interview in October 1968 said that as long as South Africa maintained its policy of apartheid there could be no recognition of the country, events have occurred which raise

questions as to his determination to maintain this stance. A four-man trade delegation from Malagasy visited South Africa in 1967. In 1968 the Sunday Express, a South African newspaper commented that "it is believed that negotiations for diplomatic representation between the two countries have been in progress for more than a year." Also an agreement between South Africa and Magalasy gave South African airplanes landing rights in the case flights to and from Australia had to be re-routed. Air Madagascar makes weekly flights between the two countries.<sup>48</sup>

Though the policy of apartheid thwart South Africa's efforts to quickly achieve this foreign policy objective, Malawi's defection from the Organization of African Unity to South Africa complements the Republic's defense establishment by providing base rights north of its borders.

### Summary

The foregoing discussion illustrates South African decision-makers' determination, and ability in maintaining apartheid during the sixties. The behavior exhibited by South African leaders in their effort to obtain control of the South African Parliament, to suppress a movement toward black South African nationalism, to obtain independence from England, to withdraw from the Commonwealth and to build and maintain a South African military establishment may be seen as a reflection of the tenacity of the National party and

the Afrikaner volk.

The amount of monies and human resources devoted to South Africa's defense establishment may be seen as South Africa's answer to criticisms to her apartheid policies. These armed forces are critical in the nation's attempt to prevent an insurgency from occurring within her border and those of South West Africa. Force is used domestically to suppress and eliminate opposition to the National party.

South Africa's major foreign policy objectives appear to be designed to spread the Republic's influence within southern Africa in order to create a subservient Southern African Region. Economic dependency of most of the nations in the Southern African Region upon South Africa is more evident each year as trade among these nations and South Africa increases and trade with Britain and other Commonwealth nations decrease. South Africa is providing a substantial portion of development capital required by these nations to strengthen their weak economies. This economic assistance, through both trade and aid, has created an atmosphere for cooperation between these nations and South Africa in matters pertaining to the Republic's security problems. Arms, ammunition, military equipment and, in some instances, police and military forces have been provided to nations on South Africa's northern border. This may be seen as a friendly gesture of South Africa to assist these nations in their battle against revolutionary forces

within their own boundaries. More realistically, it may be seen as South Africa's concern with maintaining a buffer zone of friendly states to prevent surprise attacks from hostile black African nations or from insurgent forces which could operate from the sanctuary of an adjacent nation which might fall to revolutionary forces.

South Africa's disregard for ineffective United Nations sanctions on trade and arms embargo is reflective of the Afrikaner's disdain of foreign interference of any type which affect the nation's domestic apartheid policies. In the face of almost unanimous opposition by United Nations members, South Africa built a formidable defense establishment to protect apartheid within South Africa. The next discussion shows the capabilities South Africa's security establishment has to deal with domestic and external forces bent on overthrowing its apartheid regime.

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## CHAPTER IV

### CAPABILITIES OF SOUTH AFRICAN ARMED FORCES

South Africa is a nation that has decided to use force to solve her domestic problems. Kenneth D. Waltz explains that a state pursues its own interests in ways it judges best within systematic and environmental limits. Force remains one of the means of achieving the external ends that the state desires and of reconciling the conflicts of interest among states. A foreign policy that incorporates the use of force is neither moral nor immoral but expresses a response to the world that we are in.<sup>1</sup>

The organization, size and relative strength of South Africa's armed forces represent a formidable military power that would have to be dealt with by nations or international organizations bent on coercing the Republic into abandoning its apartheid policies. The Republic of South Africa maintains that it will not be so coerced either by internal revolutionary movements or by foreign governments. The Afrikaner's propensity to use military power can be documented by the many wars with the black Africans during the settlement and expansion of the Cape Colony to the creation of the present Republic of South Africa and its propensity to use force in attempts to settle its disputes with Britain. The quick and drastic measures the Republic used to quell the black African nationalistic movements in

the early sixties adds credibility to the National party's claim that South Africa's armed forces and police organizations will fight to protect apartheid.

The Afrikaners, in a battle with a black tribe during the Great Trek, offered covenant to God if He would help them defeat the superior enemy force. The Afrikaners defeated their enemy and believe that God accepted the covenant. They take this belief from a quotation of the Lord in Genesis: "And I will establish My covenant between Me and thee and they seed after thee in their generations, for an everlasting covenant, to be a God unto thee and thy seed after thee. And I will give unto thee and thy seed after thee the land wherein thou art a stranger, all the land of Canaan for an everlasting possession: and I will be their God." This belief is considered to have given the Afrikaners strength to fight on and finally establish a republic despite their military defeat and surrender after the Boer Wars.<sup>2</sup>

The organization, size and capabilities of South Africa's armed forces and police organization have been compared with those of other nations and organizations which represent the most likely threats to the Republic of South Africa in 1972-73.

#### The Security Establishment

Command and Control. South Africa's army, navy and air

force constitute what the republic defines as its Defense Force. However the Defense Force is functionally integrated with the Police Force and the Security Branch, an intelligence organization, to provide an instantaneous reaction force to curb internal unrest and to prevent hostile forces outside of South Africa from succeeding in a surprise attack in the republic. Each of these major organizations has a mission. The Security Branch penetrates the entire country, and probably adjacent countries, to filter out and to neutralize dissident organizations and their leaders. The Police Forces constitute the country's first line of defense for internal security and the Defense Forces provide the back-up punch, if necessary, to curb internal disturbances.<sup>3</sup> Though the stated purpose for the creation of these forces is to insure domestic peace and to dispel external aggression, the size and composition of these forces when viewed collectively, tend to give South Africa the appearance of having a putative external capability which some black African nations, notably Zambia, perceive as a threat.<sup>4</sup> The Prime Minister, B. J. Vorster, and his Defense Minister, P. W. Botha, have been instrumental in creating the current military establishment in the Republic of South Africa but neither of these men is, by law, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. This title is reserved for the Chief of Staff of the Defense Forces, Commandant-General R.C. Hiemstra. The commander-in-chief, given personnel and

logistical resources, is responsible for the training and preparedness of the defense forces.

General Hiemstra once resigned his commission when asked to fight outside South Africa's borders as part of the Allied Forces during the Second World War. He was given his present position by the National party after a purge of United party military leaders in the years following the last war. Hiemstra, as Commander-in-Chief of the Defense Forces, commands the army, navy, air force, Citizens Force and Commandos (see Table 1).<sup>5</sup> Through this command linkage, he has established the army in a modified corps organization with three divisions operating in ten military regions in South Africa and one region in South West Africa (see Table 2).<sup>6</sup> As part of the Defense Force, Citizen Force personnel on active duty for training supplement the Permanent Force or regulars in each of the three branches of service.<sup>7</sup> Those who have finished active duty training are designated as filler personnel or are placed in reserve units to be called on active duty in case of national emergency. The Commandos are local or neighborhood units relatively stabilized in their region and, when activated, fight as a rural militia with designated men or small units assigned to guard strategic installations.<sup>8</sup>

The police forces contribute significantly to South Africa's security establishment. The police force is

Table 1  
DEFENSE FORCE ORGANIZATION





Table 2  
ARMY ORGANIZATION




organized under a separate ministry, possibly as a check against the military's gaining excessive political power, and are controlled and supervised by the Minister of Police and his Chief of Police. The police force receives partial logistical support from the defense force commander. Paramilitary police units respond to a chain of command originating with the Minister of Police, through the Chief of Police, through the Commissioner of Police at provincial level to the 1,000 police reporting posts within the republic (see Table 3).

The Security Branch is listed as part of the police force but it operates autonomously. The Security Branch is a cross-cutting organization that has its own intelligence organization and directly commands the intelligence agencies of the police, army, navy and air force (see Table 4). If any one person were ranked second in the chain of command behind Prime Minister Vorster it would be his close friend and Chief of the Security Branch, General H.J. van den Bergh. Van den Bergh is also titled as Security Officer to the Prime Minister and can bypass the defense and police ministers to report directly to the Prime Minister. Both the Prime Minister and the Chief of the Security Branch were interned together for O.B. activities during World War II. General van den Bergh was elevated to the rank of full general when given his present post.<sup>9</sup>

Table 3

POLICE ORGANIZATION





### The Size and Composition of the Armed Forces

The Republic of South Africa has produced the most formidable armed forces in sub-Saharan Africa. Both in active and inactive duty status, there are approximately 288,150 trained and armed white personnel available for immediate mobilization in both the defense force and the police force. Of these personnel, about 65,000 are on continuous active duty (see Table 5).<sup>10</sup>

Approximately 15,000 non-white police are on active duty. These personnel are armed with clubs or spears, but are not issued firearms. About 2,600 non-white personnel constitute the remainder of the police reserve (see Table 6).<sup>11</sup>

Collectively 305,670 white and non-white personnel are available for immediate duty in this military and police establishments (see Table 7). This total is only 41,000 fewer than the combined active duty military strength of the thirteen black African nations in sub-Saharan Africa which have national armed forces of more than 4,500 personnel.<sup>12</sup>

Manpower, Recruitment and Training. South Africa's population is estimated at about 20 million and of that number approximately 3.8 million are white. Only whites are recruited into the armed forces with the exception of a very small number of non-whites employed as laborers.<sup>13</sup>

Table 5  
WHITE PERSONNEL

<u>Active Duty Personnel</u>		<u>Trained Reserve Personnel</u>	
ARMY			
Permanent Force	10,000	Commandos	100,000
Citizen Force	22,300	Citizen Force	89,200
	<u>32,300</u>		<u>189,200</u>
NAVY			
Permanent Force	2,250		
Citizen Force	1,250	Citizen Force	5,000
	<u>3,500</u>		<u>5,000</u>
AIR FORCE			
Permanent Force	5,000		
Citizen Force	3,000	Citizen Force	12,000
	<u>8,000</u>		<u>12,000</u>
POLICE			
Regular Active	16,755	Reserve	17,388
Citizen Force	3,000		
	<u>19,755</u>		<u>17,388</u>
Total Active	64,555	Total Reserve	223,588
Grand Total Active and Reserve:		288,143	

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Table 6  
Non-White Police

<u>Active Duty Personnel</u>		<u>Trained Reserve Personnel</u>	
Black Police	13,044		
Colored Police	1,371	Non-white Police	2,612
Indian Police	600		
	<u>14,915</u>		<u>2,612</u>
Grand Total Active and Reserve:		17,527	

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Table 7  
Total Available Forces

White (Military and Police):	288,143	(Table 5)
Non-White (Police):	<u>17,527</u>	(Table 6)
	305,670	

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The Defense Amendment Act of 1967 established compulsory military training for all white youths reaching seventeen years of age. The youths are trained on active duty with the Permanent Forces of the army, navy and air force from nine to twelve months then they are assigned to either a standby Citizen Force unit or to a replacement detachment. They are recalled to active duty for three months each year for three years following their active duty training. Liability for training in the Citizen Force is ten years.<sup>14</sup>

The Commandos consist of recruits, volunteers, and able-bodied men who were not previously members of the Permanent Force or the Citizen Force. Every able-bodied white citizen is required to receive, over a four year period, Commando training in small unit tactics adaptable to rural areas. Liability for training in the Commandos is for 20 years.<sup>15</sup>

Para-military forces are recruited directly through Public Service into the national police force. Approximately 3,000 men have been formed into tactical police units and garrisoned in areas suspected of being most vulnerable to unrest. These units are interconnected through the use of an extensive radio network with approximately 1,000 police posts.<sup>16</sup>

Armament and Logistics. The South African army has sufficient Centurion Mark 5, Sherman and Comet tanks to equip

approximately six tank battalions. Proportionally, each division would receive two tank battalions to increase its mobility. Approximately 500 armored cars, incorporated with the tanks, give the army a fully mobile armor capability for 15 to 20 percent of its combat units. This number of armored vehicles gives the South African army a superior armor force to the combined armored forces of all of the black African nations in sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>17</sup>

The republic's navy has two helicopter carrying destroyers and 23 other ships ranging from coastal minesweepers to a fleet replenishment tanker. France has sold South Africa three Daphne-type submarines in the past year. South Africa's navy is over twice as large as Nigeria's navy. Nigeria is the only other country in sub-Saharan Africa with a navy large enough to compare with South Africa's. South Africa also has the only submarines in sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>18</sup>

The South African air force has an approximate two-to-one superiority in the numbers of combat aircraft over the combined aircraft of black African nations in sub-Saharan Africa. The Congo has the largest number of combat aircraft of any black African nation with 21 aircraft. South Africa, with 240 combat aircraft, has about an eleven-to-one advantage over the Tanzanian air force in total numbers of combat aircraft available.<sup>19</sup>

Logistically, South Africa appears to be self-sufficient

in the manufacture of rifles, mortars, grenades, aerial bombs, explosives, armored cars, parachutes, and other auxilliary equipment. The South African Mint, defense ordnance factories and three factories set up by African Explosives and Chemical Industries, Ltd. produce these war materials. The African Explosives and Chemical Industries, Ltd. had 150 chief contractors and 800 subcontractors involved in military production. An expansion of the war materials industries has occurred rapidly in the past 10 years. In 1963 a National Institute for Rocket Research was established to produce ground-to-air missiles. In 1965 the government established the Atlas Aircraft Corporation to produce the Italian designed Macchi M.B. 326 light combat aircraft now flying under the South African name of Impala. In August 1968 South Africa launched the 4,500-ton Tugela, the largest ship made by any African nation.<sup>20</sup> In July 1970 Vorster announced that his nation had developed a new uranium enrichment process and was setting up a plant to produce nuclear fuel.<sup>21</sup>

### The Security Challenge

The armed forces of South Africa could encounter three types of challenges in 1972-73: (1) an insurgency within its borders, (2) an overt attack by the three most militant members of the Organization of African Unity -- the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Tanzania and Zambia, and (3) an

overt Communist or Communist-inspired attack on the Cape route and southern Africa.

Internal Defense Capability. Since 1966, it has been estimated that the strengths of the South African armed forces and security forces have been sufficient to deal with any attempted revolt. The non-white masses were leaderless and subservient. The former protectorates of Buchuanaland, Basutoland, and Swaziland, now called Botswana, Lesotho and Swzailand, have cooperated with the Republic in security and control measures by voicing no opposition or criticism to South African apartheid policies.<sup>22</sup>

The command and control structure, beginning with the Prime Minister and terminating with one of the 1,000 police reporting posts, provides South Africa's National party leaders with current, accurate information pertaining to non-white unrest. The Security Branch is present in every branch and function of the government and is relentlessly seeking out dissidents and possible non-white leaders before they can organize the masses in opposition to the white government.

The military establishment, and the police, give South Africa's National party sufficient forces to easily provide internal security under apartheid. The nation has 34,000 active police, both white and non-white, and 19,000 police reserves as its main line of defense against an insurgency.

The armed forces serve as a backup force to the police if called upon for assistance. The 45,800 man active force can be augmented with 40,000 additional men in two days and can mobilize a total force of 200,000 in two weeks without assuming wartime footing. This force provides South Africa with a ratio of one white male combatant for every 15 non-white male personnel in the military age group of 14 to 49 years of age. The non-whites are not organized, trained or armed giving the armed forces an overwhelming advantage over the non-whites if they attempted an insurgency.<sup>23</sup>

Defense Capability Against Militant Black African States. The combined armed forces of the Congo, Tanzania and Zambia have a total force level of 53,000 men. These men may be grouped in the following organizations.<sup>24</sup>

Army organizations. Only 20 of the Congo's 32 battalions are suitable for duty outside that nation. No command and control structure exists for action outside the country's own borders. Internally, the Congo's forces are assigned to one of eight provincial groupments for control purposes. The Congolese army has about 55 armored cars but they are interspersed among the various battalions without forming an effective combat organization.

Tanzania has four infantry battalions and 12 Chinese light tanks which could form one understrength tank company. They have a limited number of armored personnel carriers,

approximately enough to carry one infantry company.

Zambia has one brigade group consisting of three infantry battalions, one reconnaissance squadron with ferret scout cars, a battery of 105 mm gun-howitzers, an engineering company and supporting signal and logistic services. Zambia alone has a command and control organization adequate to control forces operating outside its own national boundaries.

South Africa's army has three divisions which are 15 to 20 percent armored and fully mobile. The armed forces are strategically employed in eleven military regions in both South Africa and South West Africa. The nation produces most of its own arms and ammunition. It has a logistical base capable of supporting the army in extended combat.

Air force organizations. Zambia and Tanzania have no combat aircraft and the Congo has only 21 combat aircraft. The superiority of the South African air force over Tanzania's requires little comparison. With a ratio of 11 to 1, South Africa dwarfs the three nations' air forces combat air capability.

Navy organizations. The navies of the Congo and Tanzania have only 14 patrol boats. Zambia has no navy. Each navy has only 100 personnel assigned. They have such a small organizational base, expansion would require years to build a hostile capability which could endanger South Africa. South Africa's navy, though small, is organized

to form a flotilla complete with destroyer escorts , hunter-killer submarines and a replenishment tanker.

Militarily the total dependence of the Congo, Tanzania and Zambia on their ground forces reduces their flexibility and ability to employ surprise, long considered principles of war.

South Africa's active ground forces, deployed in 11 military regions and supported by modern attack bomber squadrons, have superior firepower in every respect to that of their potential adversaries. Without an insurgency concurrent with an invasion South Africa would probably be able to defeat these three nations without mobilizing its Commando and Citizen Forces. South Africa's armed forces are sufficient to deter an attack by these nations in 1972-73.

Prime Minister Vorster has commented that if guerrilla raids from Zambia continue, South Africa will "hit Zambia so hard she will never forget it."<sup>25</sup> South Africa has the forces to do so.

Capability of South Africa to participate in the defense of the Cape route and of southern Africa in general against an overt Communist attack.

South Africa has no defense alliances with other nations and has never committed itself to what extent it would participate in the defense of southern Africa or the

Cape route. Their token forces in Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia shows a willingness to assist in countering what they consider communist guerrilla organizations.

The Republic could activate a 200,000 man armed force in two weeks without assuming wartime footing or seriously disturbing its economy. An additional 735,000 white males of military age are available in the total manpower pool and could be mobilized in a total war.

Petroleum and petroleum products are South Africa's only lacking natural resources and sufficient amounts of these products have been stockpiled to last between two and five years.

Based on South Africa's Boer War with Britain from 1899 to 1902 when it took 250,000 British soldiers three years to defeat 87,000 Afrikaner Boers at a ratio of approximately three to one, this ratio will be assumed to be valid for 1972-1973 to determine the capability of South Africa to defend southern Africa and the Cape route against a communist threat. It is also assumed that South Africa will not build nuclear weapons and that communist powers will not use nuclear weapons on South African installations or forces. If the Communists used nuclear weapons, then they risk the possibility that the non-selective heat, radiation and blast effects would kill non-whites and turn the nations of black Africa against the powers using these

weapons.<sup>26</sup> It would cost South Africa \$4 million per day to maintain a 200,000 man force in combat.<sup>27</sup> This cost amounts to \$1.46 billion per year or 9.1 percent of its gross national product. This percentage is well under the percentage that Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Syria and Egypt each spends on defense in their Middle East dispute.<sup>28</sup>

If the ratio of three to one to defeat one South African soldier is still valid, then it would require over 600,000 soldiers three years to defeat militarily South Africa and gain control of southern Africa at a total cost of \$13.14 billion. The costs of maintaining 600,000 soldiers in combat against South African forces at \$4.38 billion per year equals five percent of the total current combined defense expenditures of the United Soviet Socialist Republic and all of the members of the Warsaw Pact<sup>29</sup> and equals almost the entire defense expenditures of the Peoples Republic of China.<sup>30</sup> Based on cost effectiveness, it would not seem feasible for communist countries to overtly intervene in southern Africa in 1972-1973 when faced with South Africa's military and economic potential.

South Africa has built her armed forces to their present strength in the face of world opposition. The nation is in no immediate danger of an insurgency although the apartheid ideology of the whites has presumably planted the seeds for an insurgent movement. Presently their armed forces can cope with any foreseeable internal movement. The militant

black African nations which advocate liberating South Africa's black majority are so militarily inferior in relation to the well equipped, well trained South African forces that they do not represent a real danger to the Republic. No major Communist power can be considered to represent an immediate threat to the Republic. To wage war against South Africa, a Communist nation would have to allocate a large share of its defense budget to that war. The long term gains a Communist nation might achieve by militarily defeating South Africa and the whole of Southern Africa might be largely offset by the immediate high costs of such an action.

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15. Bunting, ibid., p. 416.
16. Leo Marguard, The People and Policies of South Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 104-106, and Leiss, op. cit., p. 141.
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## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSIONS

Personality, traditional and psychological factors in foreign policy making continue sometimes to be decisive factors in contemporary international politics. The assumption that world community norms affect a nation's behavior is negated in part by South Africa's political, economic and military behavior from 1960 to the present. A ruling racial minority decided to exercise national sovereignty by imposing their values on the remainder of the nation and by flaunting them in the faces of the rest of the world.

These individuals represent the Afrikaner volk, a small majority of the white minority of the nation. These Afrikaners believe that God has given them the mission, and the right, to create a republic consisting of groups of separate nations or communities -- apartheid. The tenets of Calvinism, as understood and practiced by the members of the three Dutch Reformed Churches of South Africa have become a part of the traditional Afrikaner's political ideology. The Churches' influence on politics can be traced forward from the settlement of South Africa's Cape colony to the nation's present foreign policy.

South African political leaders -- born, selected, and prepared for leadership responsibilities by the Afrikaner

volk's tenacious Broederband, propagate the ideology of apartheid with relentless energy. The volkish community of the Afrikaner, led by the National party, is totalitarian but it does not seek to unite all of the peoples of Africa. The National party desires to oversee the separation of the Republic of South Africa into volkish communities of Indians, Bantu and colored as well as their own Afrikaner volk.

The former colonists of the Republic of South Africa, when opposed by foreign forces, have traditionally sought to emigrate or to use force to free themselves from foreign influence. The present Afrikaner has no other country to claim as his ancestral home. He can not emigrate. His home has been carved from the hostile southern African countryside over the last three centuries. He has his own language, traditions and church. He perceives hostile world opinion as the workings of the devil to deny the Afrikaner volk the land of Canaan. He feels he is misunderstood but that he is right in pursuing apartheid as the solution to the white and non-white issues on the African continent. In the face of an increasingly hostile environment in the early 1960's, the Afrikaner decided to create a republic to free himself from some of the complexities and entanglements caused by foreign alignments and treaties with Britain and other Commonwealth nations which hampered the creation of an apartheid nation. With

the help of a domestic crises which developed as a result of the Sharpsville massacre, the nationalist Afrikaners squeezed out a small majority of voters in referendum to create their long desired republic. The National party, led by Prime Minister Verwoerd, has used the crises to obtain the support needed to expand their armed forces, to pass apartheid legislation and to obtain absolute control over the whole of the nation. In order to strengthen their hold on the country, foreign policy objectives were carefully built to pull neighboring nations into a subordinate state system which was subservient to the Republic. South Africa obtained an economic stranglehold on the smaller and weaker nations and used both economic and security measures to snare the larger, more strategically important neighbors on its northern borders.

South Africa is unique. It has developed as an independent, sovereign nation in a period of twelve years since leaving the British Commonwealth. It has realigned its foreign policy from dependency upon Britain and western nations to a foreign policy chiefly aimed at the eight nations within its sphere of influence in southern Africa. It has remained aloof and, in reality, hostile to world opinion as expressed in the United Nations. The country has no written treaties with any nation and has withdrawn or has been expelled from most major world organizations. South Africa remains an example of a nation

that, against long odds, has exercised its sovereignty in modern times when bipolar blocs, defense communities and world organizations are allegedly reducing the nation-state's sovereignty. Though agreed that the sovereignty of the nation-state has diminished, South Africa is a country in which the political leaders have demonstrated that the nation-state remains the sole significant political actor capable of sustained effect on the international scene. Yet the nation-state is controlled by a government consisting of men. In South Africa's case, the state is represented by a collectivity of people called the Afrikaner volk. To understand the rationale of South Africa's decision-makers, it is necessary to understand the value system or ideology of the Afrikaner volk. By placing oneself in the ideological setting perceived by the Afrikaner, South Africa's actions become almost rational as value-maximizing behavior. If the morality of South Africa's apartheid practices were not at issue within the world community, then South Africa's actions make sense. The nation has achieved independence and security plus protection of its economic interests. The nation-state remains the most significant actors in the international system. It has a strong influence on other nation-states within its geographic region by either its cooperating economically and in matters of security or by opposition which may cause conflict to occur. If the

normative theory that world organization may replace the nation-state as the significant actor in the international system has any validity, then nations such as South Africa, Israel, Portugal, Pakistan and India, to list only a few, will have to be dealt with separately because their behavior does not conform to passive acceptance of regional, bipolar bloc or world organization authority. The behavior of these states varies importantly with the ideology of the ruling group.

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INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF  
SOUTH AFRICAN APARTHEID

by

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B.S., Texas A&M University, 1955

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AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S THESIS

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requirements for the degree

MASTER OF ARTS

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This study describes the Republic of South Africa's unique behavior in the international system and analyzes the effects of the ideology of South African leadership on both domestic and international problem management.

A three-level system analysis was applied to the three major questions regarding South Africa's relations with other nations. At the first level, apartheid ideology was developed to draw out and make assumptions regarding the "rational" behavior of South African political leaders when faced with crisis situations involving the security or economy of their nation. At the second level the operational and psychological environment in 1960-61 was established to test the determination of South Africa's National Party ruling group to maintain apartheid policies by force in the face of a possible insurgency and United Nations criticism. The third level involves both the present foreign policy objectives of South Africa and her capability to maintain apartheid ideology.

To understand the rationale of South Africa's decision-makers, it is necessary to understand the value system or ideology of the Afrikaner volk. If the morality of South Africa's apartheid practices were not at issue within the world community, then South Africa's action --

and behavior -- makes sense. South Africa has achieved independence and security plus protection of economic interests in a period of twelve years. It has had a strong influence over other nation-states within its geographic region by giving those nations economic and security assistance.

If the normative theory that world organizations may replace the nation-state as the significant actor in the international system has any validity, then nations such as South Africa, Israel, Portugal, Pakistan and India, will have to be dealt with separately because their behavior does not conform to passive acceptance of regional, bipolar bloc, or world organization authority.

The use of the ideology of a nation's ruling group as a major independent variable in studying the nation's international politics appears to have merit and may be useful to political scientists involved in the study of international politics.