

THE U.S. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF: A CATALYST FOR SERVICE UNIFICATION
LEGISLATION BUT A FAILURE IN UNIFYING THE SERVICES

by 1050 718

FRED ROOKS POPE

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
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Approved by:


Major Professor

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During 1964, I had the pleasure to serve in Europe with Major General Robert G. Gard, Jr. During our conversations, the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff was frequently discussed, thus stimulating my interest in the organization. The ensuing years and the relationship of the JCS to the armed services and the nation served only to strengthen my interest and concern. I would like to acknowledge the guidance and assistance of Doctor Donald J. Mrozek of Kansas State University, the U. S. Army for allowing me the opportunity to complete the Master's program, and most of all my wife Pat, whose faith, understanding and assistance was so instrumental in the final completion of this study.

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INTRODUCTION

From 1789 to 1798, the United States managed all military functions under a single Department of War. During 1798 the Congress decided to establish a Department of the Navy and to operate two separate military departments. The separation lasted until 1947, when by Act of Congress the armed forces were again unified into a single Department of Defense.

It is difficult to locate a starting point to the political and military movements toward service unification. A number of historians have identified it with the movement for air autonomy within the Army Air Corps.¹ Others have dated it with the reorganization of the Federal Government, the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, and the military organization which resulted from World War II. Within the Army, unification meant a merger of all services, wearing one uniform, directed by a single chief of staff, under the President as Commander in Chief. The Navy at first desired to change nothing; but, once the pressure by the Army to merge gained sufficient strength and support from members of Congress to require Congressional Hearings, the Navy sought unification by coordination. Coordination implied maintaining the separate services, each with specific roles and missions to secure the nation's defense. These are approaches to unification, but they do not adequately define the word. A dictionary definition refers to

it as "the act, process or result to make one, to make a unit." The issue of unification has been the struggle to bring the Army and Navy together as one. Inherent within the struggle was whether unification would be accomplished by the Army's view of unification or the Navy's view of coordination. The controversy over unification then took the defense organization through a full cycle from 1798 to 1947, when the Army and Navy were again united into a single department and a third element officially established which was the United States Air Force.

The maintenance of two separate armed services was relatively simple, provided they were small and the nation did not need to use military force to advance diplomacy. Once these conditions changed, economical operation of two large services became virtually impossible, as each service tended to duplicate the other. The waste of funds, duplication of effort, and inefficiency became serious problems to those responsible for raising and maintaining the armed forces.

During the years preceeding World War II, there were efforts to unify the armed forces; but none resulted in any remedial legislation. The first unit to recognize that something must be done to maintain sufficient military strength and prevent a repetition of Pearl Harbor was the Army. The Army was also aware that America had traditionally reduced its military strength immediately following war. To avoid a similar postwar reduction the service planned to unify the two services in the hope of securing sufficient military strength to insure the nation's defense, to secure appropriations to support such

force, and to gain a more prominent role in the over-all defense establishment. The Navy opposed unification by merger, fearing Army control. Each service was extremely suspicious of the other's possible attempt to absorb its roles and missions. The Army's main interest was control of the appropriations for defense, by unification the services would then divide funds made available. The division of funds would insure balance of the services, therefore unification was a viable proposal by the Army.

The study that follows concerns the struggle between the Army, Navy, and the Army Air Force to achieve what each perceived as unification during the period 1943 to 1950. The argument among the services centered on this question: could one man adequately control the armed forces, or would a committee be more efficient and equitable in respecting roles, missions, and traditions? The study focuses on this controversy starting with the wartime evolution of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The Joint Chiefs of Staff emerged as the catalyst for unification during 1943 and 1944 and is of major concern. Through its organization, which prior to 1947 had no statutory law, charter, or Executive Order to support it, analysts of the defense organization found a basis for the National Security Council. Americans unfamiliar with the nation's defense system considered the struggle for unification terminated with the passage of the National Security Act of 1947 and its amendment in 1949. The purpose of this study is to show that,

although these acts were passed, unification was not a reality at the start of the Korean War.

CHAPTER I

EVOLUTION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, AND EARLY SERVICE ATTEMPTS FOR UNIFICATION

As a result of the near disaster of the Spanish-American War, the Army and Navy acknowledged that they needed a closer understanding of each other's capabilities and limitations. By voluntary agreement between the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, a Joint Army-Navy Board was established in 1903.¹ The Joint Board was a direct result of Theodore Roosevelt's demands to correct weakness in command and control and related logistical arrangements which had appeared during the war.² The Joint Board consisted of four high-ranking officers from the Army and four from the Navy.³

From 1903 to 1942, the Joint Board varied somewhat in its composition, and it was suspended by President Wilson from 1914 to 1919. Yet the principles upon which it was founded remained the same. The weakness of the Board was its role of rendering advice only. The Board had no command authority and no permanent staff. The Board concluded that there were two principles available to the two services to coordinate their responsibilities for defense. The first, was primary service interest, assigning tasks to the service that had dominant assets to accomplish the mission. The second was unity of command. In joint operations, the service with primary interest would command the entire operation.⁴ The Board was

formally established by the Dick Act and was to meet and reach common conclusions and recommendations concerning differences between the two services, thus achieving unity while seeking a decision from the Commander in Chief.⁵

To carry out its responsibilities, the Joint Board established the Joint Planning Committee (JPC), which was to serve as a sounding board for all items of mutual interest relating to the functions of the Army and the Navy: coastal defense, communications, air components of both services, war plans against major forces of other nations, and providing the service Secretaries and the President with military advice.⁶ Members of the JPC were principal staff officers within their respective service staffs and had JPC responsibilities as an additional duty. With the staff planners primarily concerned with their respective service interests instead of joint plans and interest, the Joint Board nonetheless attempted to coordinate military policy and planning. The Board seldom received guidance from the President. Nor did it solicit or receive assistance from the State Department in foreign policy. As an advisory board, without the power of action, positive results came only when directed by the President; and even then its recommendations had to be unanimous, from the two service Secretaries.⁷ Under these circumstances, unanimity was not a virtue. It served only to create surface compromise, not unified effort for the best defense. Each of the services continued to stress a single view for defense, an Army view and the Navy view, not a unified military vision. The Joint

Board failed to stem interservice rivalry. Its failure was understandable.

The military after World War I had demobilized rapidly to a mere skeleton force. The service Secretaries were not particularly competent to administer military activities. Military installations were small and scattered throughout the nation, having no appreciable influence upon the economy. Professional officers were generally apolitical and content to remain aloof from society. The Army during the period of the Depression was primarily committed to domestic improvements, while the Navy continued to sail the oceans, maintaining the American belief that control of the seas was the best approach to defense of the mainland. During the early part of Franklin Roosevelt's first administration, adjustments in appropriations began, and each of the services was eager to obtain as much as possible.⁸

Even with an increase in military appropriations and the existence of the Joint Board, military planning was conducted in a vacuum. The Army planned tactically. It did not envision engagement with any force outside the continental United States, Alaska, and Hawaii. The Philippine Islands were under U.S. protection; but in all practicable analyses they were written off as indefensible. The Navy focused its attention on the Pacific, and generally eliminated any consideration of allies. The Navy would "go it alone" in the Pacific; thus the two services had separated in their plans for a defense line. The Army considered defensive influence

only through the Alaska-Oahu-Panama line, while the Navy extended its plans to include the Philippines.⁹ By the middle of Roosevelt's second term, America was beginning to consider the Navy defense line as possible; and faith in the idea of isolation from world affairs was beginning to crumble.

Increasing military assistance from Axis states and offers of military advisors to build South American armed forces during 1937-38, drew action from Secretary of State Cordell Hull. He requested that a committee composed of the second ranking officers of the State, War, and Navy Departments review the developments in South America. Roosevelt endorsed Hull's proposal and substituted the Army Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations for the second ranking officers. The group was designated the Standing Liaison Committee (SLC) and was the first formal high-caliber civil-military agency for integrated national policy since the defunct Council of National Defense of 1916.¹⁰

Meanwhile the Spanish Civil War amply demonstrated the offensive power of modern aircraft. Germany and the strength of its Luftwaffe posed a serious threat to England and France. William Bullitt, U.S. Ambassador to France, reported to Roosevelt that the main source of German confidence and of the greatest fear in England and France was the German air power.¹¹ Roosevelt immediately began to expand the Army Air Force, thus giving the Army increased appropriations to offset the previous increase for naval shipbuilding. In order to control an expanding military organization, Roosevelt issued

an Executive Order in July 1939, which placed the Joint Board and other military agencies under his direction and supervision as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy. The President, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of Naval Operations then directed military planning and bypassed the two service Secretaries.¹² Cordell Hull elected to remain aloof from military planning and permitted the two service chiefs of staff to prepare national objectives in the event of war. The military chiefs became second only to the President in governmental power. That the military was in control and by 1940, preparing to enter the war was evident in the increase of means with which to wage war. The Army received Congressional approval for a peacetime strength of 280,000 men. Later its authorization was increased to 375,000 men along with sufficient equipment to maintain an Army of 755,000 men. Congress also passed the Burke-Wadsworth Bill reinstituting federal conscription for one year. The Bill provided for unified command structure by returning to the World War I concept of a General Headquarters for all the Army with the chief of staff directing the field forces. Finally, the same Congressional legislation authorized a two-ocean naval force.¹³ By the end of 1940, General George C. Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff, and Admiral Harold R. Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations, had devised various plans of action for war. The basic plan called for a "strong offensive in the Atlantic and a defensive in the Pacific."¹⁴ Completing their initial plans for war the President and his military aides then prepared to discuss coalition warfare with

Great Britain.

Conferences between the military leaders of Great Britain and the United States took place during all of 1941. The most important of these joint meetings prior to actual U. S. involvement in the war was at Argentia, Newfoundland during August 9-12, 1941. This was the first meeting between the President and Prime Minister Churchill and their principal military staffs. The conference was concerned more with political questions than strictly military ones, but there was constructive liaison and the exchange of ideas regarding the waging of large land mass war on the European continent. In this respect, the meeting served as a rehearsal for later wartime collaboration.¹⁵

As the year drew to a close, it was clear that the U. S. would assume an ever increasing role in the war raging in Europe and the Pacific. To support such a move, the Roosevelt Administration needed the support and approval of the nation, a nation primarily convinced that the war was not hers and that only actions short of war were permissible.¹⁶ When the U. S. finally entered the war, her armed forces, despite limited mobilization, were still ill-prepared, ill-equipped, ill-trained, and insufficiently organized. The war required that the two services work together to achieve a common goal, but the long delay since there had been joint actions had not prepared the two to form solid contingency plans.

Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the

British and American political and military leaders met in Washington to review their war plans, including the production and distribution of war materials.¹⁷ The American military chiefs, while preparing plans, were not jointly ready to engage in war of such magnitude. The situation was such that one author later remarked:

the military establishment had grown into a loose federation of agencies--the General Staff, the Special Staff for Services, the Overseas Departments, the Corps Areas, the exempted stations. No where in this federation was there a center of energy and directing authority. Things were held together by custom, habit, standing operating procedure, regulations and a kind of general conspiracy among the responsible officers. In the stillness of peace the system worked; but in the turmoil of war the system disintegrated in 1917 as it did again in 1941, and it was not a system that could be used to prepare an army effectively for war.¹⁸

As the President and the Prime Minister engaged in political conversations, the military staffs attempted, through a series of twelve meetings in the Federal Reserve Building, to reach an agreement on military problems before submitting them to the President and the Prime Minister. During the early stages of the military meetings, it became clear that a composite body representing all the nations fighting the Axis Powers had to be formed. General Marshall also proposed a unified command for the Pacific. His plan called for a superior Allied Agency which would direct the war under a single commander in charge of all allied forces in the theater.¹⁹ Marshall, in his plea for a single command, recalled the Supreme War Council of World War I.

I am convinced that there must be one man in command of the entire theater--air, ground and ships. We cannot manage by cooperation. Human frailties are such that

there would be emphatic unwillingness to place portions of troops under another service. If we can make a plan for command now, it will solve nine-tenths of our trouble.²⁰

Marshall pressed for and won his case for unified commands.²¹

To provide joint command and control in the Pacific, the Combined Chiefs of Staff, including the military chiefs of Great Britain and United States, was formed and located in Washington. In order to provide input to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, American Military Leaders formed the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and assumed corporate leadership of the nation's war effort.²²

By 1943, the turning point of the war had been reached and the allied nations were aware they would win. It was only a question of how long the Axis nations would continue to fight. Once the outcome was apparent, interservice rivalry again surfaced as it had in the earlier years. The issue of service unification would linger until some agreement was reached. All of the previous attempts had resulted in defeat.²³

Service harmony did not materialize before, during, or after the war. There were numerous disputes over command and control, supply and procurement, finances for weapons and forces, and research and development. There were five interservice conflicts that critically affected the movement toward unification between 1941 and 1943. The first involved Naval reorganization during the early months of the war. By executive order, President Roosevelt combined the offices of Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and Commander in Chief, United States Fleet (COMINCH) under Admiral Ernest J. King.

Admiral King elected to keep the two staffs separate. The COMINCH staff, a sea-going staff capable of moving with the Admiral on a moment's notice, supervised the day to day operations of naval fighting forces. He delegated supervision of the CNO staff to Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Vice Admiral Frederick J. Horne. The CNO staff was charged with long-range planning and over-all administration of the Navy. Consequently, in 1943 a large portion of Naval postwar planning reflected more of Admiral Horne's thoughts than King's. The Army's reorganization of 1942 placed General Marshall in a position similar to that of Admiral King.²⁴

Second, the relationship between Marshall and King was strained. The Admiral viewed the General as "distinctly cool and not particularly cordial."²⁵ King resented the treatment of Admiral Stark after Pearl Harbor and the fact that Marshall apparently received no admonishment by the President as did Stark. Marshall and King disagreed over the proper roles of the Army and Marine Corps and over amphibious warfare. King feared that the Army, by use of "unified commands", would eventually place the Navy under the Army in a single unified command structure in Washington. The question of how the services aviation was to be organized and employed, constituted another major problem among Marshall, King, and eventually President Truman.²⁶

A third problem was the bitter struggle between the two Chiefs over antisubmarine warfare. This controversy stemmed from the Navy's interpretation of the 1935 Joint Board

decision on aircraft for submarine warfare. The Navy felt that it had a claim on Army Air Force aircraft as replacements for naval aviation units engaged in submarine warfare. The difference between the two services was not resolved by 1943, when President Roosevelt referred the annual Navy and Marine Corps aircraft program budget to the JCS for resolution. The JCS could make no determination until the roles and missions of the services were adequately defined. Within the JCS there were five studies to define roles and missions in an attempt to resolve the problem; each failed to achieve any success.²⁷

A fourth area of interservice conflict involved the Navy's attitude toward planning and fighting a coalition war, this affected not only relations with the British but the JCS as well. When planning emphasis shifted to the Pacific the Navy made clear its preference that the British remain out of the action. Their ships were too slow and short-ranged to operate effectively with U.S. ships, and so the Navy preferred to "go it alone."²⁸

Finally, the two services clashed within the JCS. The different opinions of the Army and Navy on planning and organization surfaced in the two commands constructed for Europe and the Pacific. European forces were unified under the command of General Eisenhower, while in the Pacific a line was drawn across the area and two commands created. Part of the Pacific was to be reconquered under the command of General MacArthur, the other under Admiral Chester Nimitz. When plans were made for the final assault against Japan, each of the commanders in

the Pacific submitted a plan to the JCS for the assault. Failing to reach agreement on the two plans, the JCS resolved the problem by compromise--each commander would assault using his own plan.²⁹ Thus by 1943, there were several points requiring joint service attention.

In 1943, when the services' postwar planners concerned with unification began their work, they had to consider two basic concepts of staff organization drawn from the Prussian and British models. The Prussian system was characterized by an all powerful chief of staff and a strong, but subservient, general staff. Normally, this system emphasized the strength of one service, one weapon system, and one plan of grand strategy. The British system was characterized by the principle of coordination. The British Chiefs of Staff Committee, representing land, sea, and air forces, remained free to express respective views regarding employment of forces and strategy. Within the British system, those who made plans and strategy were responsible for their execution under civilian control. In the Prussian system, once plans were made, the responsibility for their execution was delegated to subordinates. In the United States, a struggle ensued over which model to emulate. Under each system, the JCS would assume a different role. Realizing that the JCS had evolved successfully during the war to coordinate joint strategy, both services incorporated this body into their postwar plans.

On July 27, 1943, Acting Secretary of War Robert Patterson forwarded to Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox a

secret memorandum informing him that the Army had established a Special Planning Division (SPD) in the spring of that year.³⁰ Patterson requested that War and Navy planners collaborate on matters of common interest. This did not occur until 1946 when President Truman urged the two service secretaries to work out their differences. Service planning during 1943 represented divergent views: unification within the Army and coordination in the Navy.³¹ Unification to the Army meant a single military Chief of Staff with command authority over both the Army and Navy, or a single defense department, or both. The Army felt that the Navy was duplicating the Army Air Force's role in strategic bombing and that the Marines were duplicating Army roles and should be limited. Unification was also a way to eliminate the large drain of funds required to operate the Army Air Force. Under unification the single Chief of Staff would direct funds for all requirements. If this plan failed, the Army was prepared to support the Army Air Force in their movement for an independent service. The Navy felt unification would reduce them to a third rate service behind the Army and the Army Air Force. The Navy's proposed coordination would retain separate services, and not create the rigid structure which the Army desired. The Navy was "looser" in organizational principles and was afraid that the Navy might have to serve under an Army officer serving as the single Chief of Staff who would be completely ignorant of naval potentialities and requirements.³² The issue of unification or coordination reached the JCS during November 1943,

when General Marshall forwarded and endorsed a proposal entitled "A Single Department of War in the Postwar Period."³³ The JCS was unable to resolve the issue, and it became the subject of a Congressional Hearing in 1944.

In April 1944, the House of Representatives began hearings on a proposal to establish a single Department of the Armed Forces. Chaired by Representative Clifton A. Woodrum of Virginia, a Select Committee convened to investigate "postwar military policy."³⁴

Lieutenant General Joseph T. McNarney, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff and an Army aviator, presented in detail the views of the War Department to the Woodrum Committee. General McNarney outlined their plan's three basic premises: first, a single department of the armed forces with a civilian secretary to head the department and advise the President and the Congress; second, a JCS with a Chief of Staff, with the JCS also advising the President and reporting directly to him on strategy and budget requirements; third, general legislation permitting administration and decentralization of the department to evolve over a period of time.³⁵ The most important facet of this plan, other than its all powerful Chief of Staff, was its budget proposal which was to eliminate waste and duplication and guarantee more comprehensive and adequate military planning. The plan would give Congress a means of considering a single military budget at one time. The Chief of Staff and the JCS would assemble all requirements for the military and present an integrated package.

These two proposals met immediate opposition from Under Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal.³⁶ He agreed with the War Department on the complexity of unification and the need for time to study it adequately, but he opposed undertaking any reorganization during wartime and rejected the idea that the JCS have power over the budget. The Army had also stated that they desired no immediate unification until after the war. They desired to present the recommendation in "principle" only for the Committee to study. The Committee decided that the time was inopportune to consider detailed legislation, even if consolidation was finally determined to be a wise and fruitful course of action.

The JCS realized that the Woodrum Committee had failed to achieve any results. On May 19, 1944, the Chiefs directed a special committee composed of two officers each from the Army and the Navy to study problems of unification and to submit their recommendations to the JCS.³⁷ The JCS Special Committee for Reorganization of National Defense was chaired by Admiral J. O. Richardson and included Admiral M. F. Schoeffel, Major General W. F. Tompkins, Major General H. L. George, and Colonel F. Trubee Davison, an Army alternate. The Army had pushed for Richardson to head the Committee to reflect their impartiality in the matter, moreover, there was a three to two ratio since Richardson had favored unification. The Committee submitted its findings to the JCS in April 1945.³⁸ Since the Committee was split, it presented both a majority and minority report. The majority report, signed by all members except

Richardson, stated that a majority of Army and almost exactly half of the Navy officers interviewed favored a single department, thus warranting unification in the eyes of many service members.³⁹ The majority recommended a single department system of organization of the armed forces and recommended that the change be put into effect by the President six months after the close of the war.

Since constitutionally, control of the armed forces rests with the President as Commander in Chief, the proposed Secretary of the Armed Forces was to have a command line to the military commander of the Armed Forces. In turn, the military commander also had direct access to the President by serving as Chief of Staff to the Executive. Command lines, direct command and control, were also designed into the plan between the Secretary, an Undersecretary, and Assistant Secretaries. Unique in the majority report was the dual post of Commander of the Armed Forces and Chief of Staff to the President, who was to be superior to the Service Commanders and the Unified Command Commanders. The Service Commanders (chiefs of staff) and the Commander of the Armed Forces would constitute the U. S. Chiefs of Staff (similar to the JCS) and would advise the President. Since the Service Commanders worked for the Commander of the Armed Forces, their views would probably have to be consistent with those of the Commander.

The Committee claimed that this strong organization would save money. The Undersecretary would function as a business manager for the Department, although the Secretary

of the Armed Forces was to retain control of the budget. Since the Commander of the Armed Forces/Chief of Staff to the President was to retain a direct link to the President for budget information and guidance, the Undersecretary and the Secretary would suffer some limitations on their control.

The Richardson Committee acknowledged wartime efforts to bring the services together and the role the JCS played in them. Acceptance of the principle of unity of command in the field by the JCS reflected a movement toward effective integration of land, sea, and air. But even in this regard the Committee observed that "complete integration of effort had not yet been achieved because we are still struggling with inconsistencies, lack of understanding, jealousies and duplications--in all operations."⁴⁰ To achieve complete integration, the Committee recommended three conditions that needed to be met:

1. all of the components must owe their allegiance and loyalty to the same organization.
2. every component must be trained to have a true knowledge and appreciation of the capabilities and limitations of the others.
3. all the components must be governed, supplied, and serviced by similar administrative procedures and similar systems.⁴¹

The majority report of the Richardson Committee asserted that the JCS was defective as organized because the individual service chiefs would prevent realization of the three fundamental conditions of integration. Consequently, the majority recommended that the JCS be discarded in favor of a single Commander of the Armed Forces.

Richardson, the senior member of the Committee and the lone dissenter, presented the minority report. He enumerated five reasons for rejecting the majority report: first, the current organization was sufficient and the JCS was satisfactory; second, war organization must be properly analyzed before making changes; third, postwar strength of the services was unknown; fourth, reorganization at the end of the war when faced with demobilization was unwise; and, finally, many officers' opinions were not available due to their preoccupation with fighting the war.⁴² He did not believe that the ten months spent in the field to interview officers, had given adequate consideration to a single department under one secretary and one military commander. In his opinion, such an organization would result in a vast military bureaucracy in Washington.

Although the Woodrum Hearings and Richardson Committee both failed to yield legislation to unify the services, they did continue the controversy. Secretary of the Navy Forrestal successfully delayed the War Department's move for unification in principle until the Navy was ready to present a viable plan that took into account the Navy's fears and expectations of unification. The service was ill-prepared for the Woodrum Hearings, and it is of interest that Richardson initially favored unification of the services. What caused him to change his mind is a matter of conjecture. Forrestal and King might have played a major part in that decision, as a number of other Navy officers also changed to coordination.

Forrestal was alarmed at the War Department's campaign

to press for legislation. On September 2, 1944, he wrote his friend Palmer Hoyt, a newspaper publisher in Denver: "I have been telling King, Nimitz and company it is my judgement that as of today the Navy has lost its case, and that either in Congress or in public the Army's point of view will prevail."⁴³ In early May 1945, Forrestal attempted to settle the issue of unification without public hearings. His attempts proved unsuccessful, but he did determine through his conversations with Marshall the Army's reasoning behind their plan for unification. Forrestal's opinion was that the Army would not allow postwar organization to place the Army in a position of receiving smaller financing than the Navy. Also Forrestal felt the Army would establish an alliance with Army aviators by supporting their movement for service autonomy. Forrestal realized that a showdown with the Army, principally the Army Air Force, was ahead; and he began to search for a more effective Navy counter strategy to unification.⁴⁴

Forrestal was assisted in his search by Senator David I. Walsh, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs. He expressed the concern of many of the Navy's friends. On May 15, 1945, he wrote to Forrestal suggesting that a study be made to determine the desirability of a Council of National Defense as an alternative to the consolidation proposal of the JCS majority report.⁴⁵

On May 27, 1945, Forrestal replied to Senator Walsh: "The Navy Department," he said, "cannot be in the position of merely taking the negative in this discussion, but must come

up with positive and constructive recommendations."⁴⁶ He felt that the Navy had gained sufficient strength (mainly through Admiral Richardson's conversion of Admirals Nimitz and Halsey from support of unification in a single department), to launch an offensive against the War Department plan.⁴⁷

Taking Senator Walsh's suggestion, which coincided with his wish for a more comprehensive study, Forrestal authorized a study under the direction of Ferdinand Eberstadt. The formal directive to Eberstadt, dated June 19, 1944, asked for answers to the following three questions:

1. would unification of the War and Navy Departments under a single head improve our national security?
2. if not, what changes in the present relationships of the military services and departments has our war experience indicated are desirable to improve our national security?
3. what form of postwar organization should be established and maintained to enable the military services and other government departments to provide for and protect our national defense?⁴⁸

Forrestal desired the study to reflect more than just the unification issue, feeling that to rush into unification without study would be to the detriment of national security by reducing emphasis on sea power.

During September 1945, Eberstadt's findings were submitted to the Secretary. Several recommendations directly touched on the JCS and unification. Replying in order to Forrestal's questions, Eberstadt reported: first, unification on the whole appeared highly plausible, but it lacked convincing support in actual practice; therefore, under the existing conditions unification of the Army and Navy would not

improve national security. Second, the experiences during war had revealed weaknesses in service cooperation but they were susceptible to cure without dangerous experiments to over-all organization. Third, the goal for any organization must be to bind the military, civilian, government, and private interests together to achieve the most productive and harmonious whole.⁴⁹

Eberstadt's report recommended several changes to the nation's defense organization. The major recommendation of the report called for establishment of a National Security Council (NSC) which would coordinate the nation's defense program⁵⁰ It also called for three service departments, Army, Navy, and Air, each with a Secretary who would be part of the President's cabinet. While the report recommended a separate Air Force, it recognized the requirement for the Army and Navy to retain organic air elements. The report recommended a National Security Resources Board, Military Munitions Board, and study and regrouping of joint service committees. Eberstadt recommended that the JCS be retained and established by law which would clearly specify its duties and responsibilities. The JCS would provide the NSC military advice and prepare strategic plans based upon guidelines from the NSC.⁵¹ Other recommendations that affected the JCS called for clarifying the relationship of the JCS to the civilian secretaries; close liaison between the JCS and the State Department, and agencies handling scientific research, war production, and planning; establishing a joint staff to support the JCS, and a chief of the joint staff; providing for a chief of staff to the President, if the Executive so desired;

and establishing a separate joint agency of coequal stature and authority with the JCS to handle coordination of procurement and production among the services.⁵² By following these recommendations, Eberstadt felt that the JCS would be improved both as a planning agency and as the central military administrative unit.

Eberstadt's lengthy report became a part of the Navy's plans for service coordination as against unification, and an influential document in drafting the National Security Act of 1947. Forrestal was aware of the major issues involved in unification such as control of the military establishment by the services. But he was even more deeply concerned with problems of national policy and its formation and the effect of it upon sea power. The Eberstadt report gave him not simply material to defeat the War Department's pressure for unification but rather "positive and constructive" recommendations in the entire field of security policy.⁵³

Eberstadt's analysis of the Richardson Committee stressed one major difficulty in the majority report. Concerning the proposed organization of the JCS, Eberstadt stated:

the position of the United States Chiefs of Staff presents something of a dilemma. If, as the majority states, the body is to have a 'check and balance' effect upon any excess of power in the Commander of the Armed Forces, the question arises whether an organization so conceived may impinge on the powers and the authority of the Secretary. At other points, the majority stresses the purely advisory function of the Chief of Staff limited even in that respect, to the consideration of matters of Presidential concern. On this score, doubts may arise as to the solidity of the 'check and balance' system vis-a-vis the single military commander.⁵⁴

In the Richardson Committee's system, the JCS disappeared as a

super chief of staff emerged. Eberstadt felt that the wartime functioning of the JCS, while not without problems from within and without, had "proved its worth and should be continued."⁵⁵

Although he accepted the desirability of close and thorough examination of the military establishment in both operations and procurement, Forrestal rejected the idea of a single department. He opposed the creation of a separate Air Force, as the Navy considered aviation as important to Naval operations as surface vessels or submarines and sought to retain an air arm. Finally, regarding the proposed Secretary of National Defense, Forrestal felt there was no one man capable of "sitting on top of all that."⁵⁶

By early October 1945, both the War and Navy Departments were prepared to submit plans for postwar military organization. Drawing on the work of the Woodrum Hearing and the Richardson Committee majority report, the War Department produced a modified plan, named for its principal architect General J. Lawton Collins. The Navy Department relied on the Eberstadt Report. In both plans, the major apparatus for military control would be the JCS or a similar organization.

CHAPTER II

CONGRESSIONAL AND PRESIDENTIAL INFLUENCE 1945-1946

On October 17, 1945, the Senate began hearings on two bills to unify the Armed Forces. Senate Bill 84 provided for a Department of Armed Forces, Secretary of the Armed Forces, and Under Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air. Senate Bill 1482 was to establish a Department of Military Security to consolidate therein the military security activities of the United States and achieve other purposes.¹ The Eberstadt report was completed by mid-October, in time for Forrestal to present it to the Senate. Significantly, neither Bill created a single military commander of the armed forces as the Richardson Committee had recommended. Senate Bill 1482, proposed similar military organization to Senate Bill 84, but used a different name.²

Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson was first to testify before the Senate Committee. He supported the War Department's preference for a single department of defense and a single military commander. Patterson gave five reasons for unification of the services: integration of our military program, economy, efficiency, research and development, and organizational preparedness.³ Secretary Patterson suggested that the proposed legislation would not destroy the identity of the Army, Navy, and a separate Air Force. Distinctive traits would be retained if consonant with efficiency and

economy. Patterson again sought unification "in principle" and through evolution of the system when he urged the Committee: "do not permit the great objectives of unification at this time be obscured by a cloud of details." Secretary Patterson was convinced that "if we attain the objective, the details will fall into proper perspective."⁴ This idea of allowing problems to work themselves out without firm legislation had previously been presented and rejected by the Woodrum Hearings in 1944.

General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, appeared next. His opinion of the JCS, a staff he had favorably endorsed during the early period of the war, had changed considerably by 1945 as he noted:

with the end of the war there is no longer a compelling necessity to reach at least compromise agreements on major matters. Current events have reinforced my view that the Joint Chiefs of Staff could not be genuinely effective in peacetime as a coordinating agency. For example, the Congress is now seriously considering similar legislation covering the postwar strength of the Navy and Marine Corps, on which the War Department has been neither consulted nor informed.⁵

Marshall's testimony was representative of all the branches' attempts to retain identity in the postwar period. Since 1943, the Navy had developed a firm program calling for some 600,000 men, 371 combat ships and approximately 5000 auxiliaries, landing craft, and similar smaller vessels, and about 8,000 operating aircraft. The Army Air Force had planned to be a separate service with seventy air groups, staffed by 400,000 regulars. By contrast the Army had made no concrete plans.⁶ The Army was interested in Universal Military Training (UMT) as a source of trained personnel. General Marshall thought this single measure

would allow the Army to raise 4.5 million men on short notice. During 1943, both services had activated postwar groups within their planning sections, but neither conferred with the other regarding plans, missions, or probable service strengths and budget requirements. Marshall had directed studies of the regular Army but nothing specific came from the studies. The Army planners were limited to planning for UMT, and the Chief of Staff elected to keep his figures "in his mind."⁷

President Truman, an old Army man and admirer of General Marshall, made a major contribution to the War Department's efforts in an article written for Collier's magazine in August 1944. Then a senator from Missouri and Democratic Vice-Presidential nominee, Truman announced in the article entitled "Our Armed Forces Must be United" that there would be economy through a single military department under a single chief of staff to direct the nation's offensive and defensive military forces.⁸ With a unified national armed force, Truman stated, "there would be an undivided command."⁹ Concerning the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Senator stated:

there, then you have one team with all the reins in one hand and, as a further aid to intelligent driving, a General Staff at the Secretary's right hand. Not a Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the conciliation of independent commands as a principal duty, but a General Staff in full charge of tactics and strategy, viewing the nation's offense and defense as an indivisible whole, and totally unconcerned with service rivalries.¹⁰

In the 1945 Senate hearing, Marshall echoed Truman's words. In explaining to Senator Warren R. Austin of Vermont what the function of the staff, whatever its form, would serve to the Secretary of the Armed Forces, Marshall responded by

recommending a replacement for the JCS:

we do not need a large General Staff; we do not want what is called a great General Staff. There is no necessity for it in time of peace. The principal general staff in a unified department should be an operating staff such as we have in the Army Corps and in the different theaters, rather than the overall policy staff. The two, so far as possible, should not be confused.¹¹

The General wanted a unified staff that would not be representative of Army, Navy, and Air views separately but rather a common armed force view. The unified staff, in the General's opinion, was the only means for eliminating service rivalry. He urged retaining a JCS but denying it administrative or operational responsibilities. It would serve only to submit to the President through the Secretary of the Armed Forces recommendations on matters affecting policy, strategy, and budgetary requirements. Several War Department officials and well-known generals testified after Marshall. Predictably, their testimony was in accord with that of the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff.

For the first five days of hearings, the War Department had advanced its plans for unification. But on October 22, Secretary Forrestal appeared on behalf of the Navy. In his opening remarks, the Navy Secretary began a counter-thrust:

Mr. Chairman, I do not appear here simply in opposition to unification of the War and Navy Departments. I prefer here to present a comprehensive and dynamic program to save and strengthen our national security. I do not feel that unification of the services meets these requirements.¹²

He also appealed to the Senators by raising the perennial dangers of the "man on horseback":

civilian control over the military establishment is exercised through the President, through the civilian Secretaries and through Congress. The influence of each of them would be severely diluted by unification of the services. The plan advanced by certain proponents of unification in effect amounts to an isolation and derogation of civil authority.¹³

The Secretary had hit a sore spot with most who were interested in military problems, the threat of a military coup d'etat. Then Forrestal submitted the Navy's proposal.

The plan represented significant revisions in Navy thinking. Since Admiral King had emphasized aircraft carriers in 1943, the Navy was no longer convinced that ships fought only other ships. The carriers were now considered all-purpose weapons and the backbone of the Navy. Conflict with the Army Air Force thus had to be resolved, and all indications were that the creation of a separate air element was inevitable. Naval concern rested upon the fear of Air Force dominance of the defense establishment. Concern for the ratio of Army and Navy representation on the JCS also fueled the Navy's argument with the War Department. If the Air Force did not remain within the Army, there would be a 2:1 ratio on the JCS.¹⁴ Admiral Arthur Radford proposed that two Naval officers be assigned to the JCS, one of them to match the Chief of Staff of the Air Force.¹⁵

Secretary Forrestal was aware that most Congressmen supported unification. With more and more sentiment for action, the Navy needed to turn opinion around. The Richardson Committee impressed upon Forrestal that the majority of flag and general officers supported some kind of service unification. The

Eberstadt Report was to be the vehicle to overcome these difficulties. It gave the impression of supporting unification by proposing a single Secretary of Defense to preside over the three services. (Although Forrestal was not prepared to agree with three services.) It accepted Air Force autonomy as de facto and provided for a National Security Council (NSC). The National Security Council organization recommended by Forrestal was quite similar to that of the JCS, and would link the State Department to the three services and correlate all four.¹⁶

Forrestal supported the existing JCS, stressing that the argument for a single chief probably would have prolonged the last war, had it been conducted during the conflict. While the Army was concerned with victory in Europe, the Navy under Admiral King turned toward the Pacific, a division of attentions that Forrestal thought ultimately shortened the war. He added:

the conception of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has proved successful. It has been one of the great developments of the war and I think that no one can gainsay the fact after a look at the captured documents of the German Wehrmacht that the Chiefs of Staff functioned more effectively.¹⁷

Admiral King followed Secretary Forrestal and presented the most enlightening statement of the hearings. After he had enumerated the great land, sea, and air victories of American forces during the war, King told the Senators:

in spite of these victories, in spite of the security of this country as maintained by means of the present military organization, and in spite of the fact that we are currently engaged in an all-out effort of demobilizing and reconversion, proponents of the bill now before this committee assert that our military organization is so basically ineffective, inefficient, and deficient that it must be recast immediately--recast not by orderly processes of study, discussion and evolution, but by the method of

assuming the answer, and then, it seems working out the problem--backwards.¹⁸

After receiving the testimony of the Service Secretaries and the Military Chiefs, the Senators proceeded to the War Department plan, commonly referred to as the Collins plan. This was a synthesis of all previous War Department plans. The Collins Plan closely followed the Richardson Committee majority report of 1944. In essence, command of the armed forces originated with the President and flowed down. Commanding the armed forces would be a single chief of staff, with the respective service chiefs reporting directly to him. The plan also called for a Director of Common Supply and Hospitalization to manage all supplies used in common by the services and reduce overall costs.

A United States Chiefs of Staff was to replace the JCS. It would be composed of the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces; and the Chiefs of Staff of Army, Navy, and Air Forces would report to the Secretary of the Armed Forces only to make recommendations. The basic differences between this Staff and the old JCS were the name and the number of officers who were members. The proposed U. S. Chiefs of Staff would limit their recommendations to strategy, military policy, and budgetary matters. General Collins made it clear that the Chief of Staff to the President and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces would not be from the same service at any one time and that their terms of service should be prescribed by law. The budget for military forces under the Collins plan originated with the President, who approved the over-all military policy. Fiscal requirements to

implement policy would be initiated by the three service chiefs and pass through the chain of command to the U. S. Chiefs of Staff, who would eliminate duplication or conflicting demands. Ultimately, they would forward an integrated program to the President through the Secretary of the Armed Forces, who could only comment and recommend changes. The Secretary possessed no authority to alter the fiscal program. In the event of dissent by any member of the Chiefs of Staff, the dissenting member would submit a minority report to the President, again through the Secretary. If and when the President approved the budget, it would then be returned to the services down the chain of command. Congress would naturally still control the final authorizations, but there would be only one military budget, instead of separate service budgets appearing before Congress at different times.¹⁹

Conflict between the Army, Navy, and Army Air Force continued on into December 1945. It was apparent to all parties concerned that no agreement would be reached, thus repeating the failure of all previous unification hearings. Aware of the service conflict, President Truman prepared to send Congress a request for action on the matter of unification. During November 1945, Truman favored a single department and a single chief of staff. On 13 November, Judge Samuel I. Rosenman, Special Counsel to the President, sent the President a memorandum seeking to learn the President's intentions:

I understand you wish to send a message up and I assume you wish to adopt the Army view--if so, I shall if you wish, prepare a draft of such message to go up after the health message.²⁰

The actual drafting of the President's message was done by Harold D. Smith, Director of the Budget, and edited by Judge Rosenman for the President. Judge Rosenman received the first draft November 30, 1945. Smith transmitted the draft to the Judge with a quip: "with your editorial touch it would of course become literature."²¹ Rosenman made comments on the draft and submitted it to the President in early December. One major recommendation, which the President followed in his December 19 message to Congress concerned the JCS. Apparently referring to the Collins Plan, Judge Rosenman recommended that the Chief of Staff be rotated among the services whenever practical and advisable.²²

Admiral Leahy, elected to remain out of the squabble as much as possible because of the confidential nature of his advisory relationship to the President. However, his comment to Judge Rosenman on December 14, 1945 reflects his sentiment:

while I of course will not take issue with the President in this matter it is still my opinion that a single department will not be advantageous to the national defense. It will almost certainly be disadvantageous to the Sea Defenses which I naturally believe to be more vital to the safety of America than the Army.²³

The Admiral's comments indicated the services visions of each other, each considering itself more important to national defense than the other and thus deserving public favor. In fact, the issue of unification involved not so much the military and economic advantages of a combined force, but the loss of service identity, roles, and missions. Without separate identity, the services were convinced they would lose the public support, so vital for appropriations.

On December 17, 1945, Judge Rosenman forwarded to Secretary Forrestal a copy of the President's message. Attached to the message was the following note:

the President knows, of course, that you are opposed to this whole project, and I would, therefore, suggest that in your report you do not go into the merits of the propositions.²⁴

Forrestal returned his comments the following day and requested that "the President send no message and take no stand on this matter until the hearings are completed."²⁵ That the President's draft supported the Collins Plan must have shocked Forrestal. For in earlier conversations with the President he believed the President supported some of his own ideas for service unification and government reorganization.²⁶

Meanwhile, on December 18, Commander Clark Clifford, also a Special Counsel to the President and heir apparent to Judge Rosenman, received a bootleg copy of the final draft of the President's message from Charles G. Ross, Presidential Secretary. Clifford was aware of Forrestal's attempt to gain the President's support for coordination, but the President's proposal did not support Forrestal. The President listed his reasons for service unification: it permitted integrated strategic plans and a unified budget; it encouraged economy by unified control of supply and service functions; it provided the best organization for coordination between the military and the government; it offered the strongest means of civilian control of the military; it gave parity for air power; it encouraged the best combined training on land, sea, and air; it facilitated the best allocation of limited resources; it provided unity of

command in outlying bases, and would provide consistent and equitable personnel policies.²⁷

With the services deadlocked and Senate bills 84 and 1482 pigeonholed in committee, President Truman submitted his plan to Congress on December 19, 1945. He expected it to resolve the controversy. The plan called for reorganization into a single department along several broad lines. Truman desired a single department of National Defense charged with full responsibility for national security. To head the department, he wanted a civilian, who would be a member of the cabinet, and designated the Secretary of National Defense. Within the department, there would be three coordinated branches, one for land forces, one for the naval forces, and one for the air forces. The President and the Secretary would be empowered to establish central coordinating and service organizations, when required. He desired a Chief of Staff of the Department of National Defense, and a Commander for each of the three component branches--Army, Navy, and Air. The Chief of Staff and the commanders of the three branches would constitute an advisory body to the Secretary and to the President (similar to the JCS). Finally, Truman's plan called for key staff positions to be filled with officers drawn from all services, and the post of Chief of Staff, rotated among the services, so that thinking in the department would not be dominated by one or two of the services.²⁹ With the President's recommendations, the Chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, Elbert D. Thomas of Utah, appointed a subcommittee to compose a new bill for service

unification following the President's guidelines. The new bill was Senate Bill 2044.

The 1945 Senate Hearings revealed several changes from previous unification efforts. The Eberstadt Report had contended that the major problem was not one of service coordination, but coordination of military policy with national policy.

The Report also suggested greater confidence in the ability of the JCS to make decisions than wartime experience justified. But most damaging to the War Department's plan was the Report's association of unification proposals with German, Japanese, and Italian military failures. Similar association had proven successful in opposing previous military reform efforts.³⁰

The Army dropped its proposal for an all powerful chief of staff and settled for an enlarged United States Chiefs of Staff.³¹ In all Army efforts prior to the Collins Plan, the Army had held a steadfast line for the all powerful Chief. In compromising its position for a single chief of staff, probably due to the thoroughness of the Eberstadt Report, the Army lost its initiative in behalf of unification.

Starting with the 1945 Senate Hearings and the end of the war, unification became more than a simple battle between services. It broadened into a major political controversy. United States Senators and Congressmen began to take sides with the service of their choice, and civilian industrial leaders joined in the conflict. While the issues were being batted back and forth, the JCS retained the same structure that it

originally had in 1942. The unchanging JCS became a central figure in the Navy plans for the next round of legislation.

The Navy's position during the controversy placed Secretary Forrestal in an awkward position. There are indications that the Secretary possibly instructed the Naval Flag Officers to accept his philosophy or resign. Admirals King and Richardson were also busy changing Navy opinion for unification.³² Forrestal strongly opposed the dominant attitude within the Army and Army Air Force and to a degree even within the Navy for unification. His beliefs placed him in direct opposition to President Truman and his efforts to achieve unification. The President's influential December message to Congress resulted in new efforts to bring the services together. During the hearings on the new bill, the President called the service Secretaries to the White House and instructed them to compromise.

The Senate Hearings of 1945, assisted in defining the respective positions of the Army and Navy. They further revealed the President's support for the War Department's plan of unification, and his attitude toward the single Chief of Staff, as opposed to the CCS. Senator Thomas, with the assistance of other Senators, military representatives, and advisors from the executive branch, proceeded to draft a new unification bill. After numerous drafts attempting to compromise service differences, the new bill was ready for public hearings.

Senate Bill 2044, designed to "Promote the Common

Defense by Unifying the Departments and Agencies of the Government Relating to the Common Defense," was commonly referred to as the Thomas Bill. The military officers who had been assigned to assist in its preparation were Major General Lauris Norstad and Vice Admiral Arthur W. Radford.

The new bill was ready by April 9, 1946. It fused portions of the Eberstadt Report and the Collins Plan. It called for a general reorganization of the entire national security structure with the inclusion of a National Security Council, a Central Intelligence Agency, and National Security Resources Board. Like the Collins Plan, the bill called for a single Department of Common Defense, a Chief of Staff of Common Defense, and a Joint Chiefs of Staff composed of the Service Chiefs and the Chief of Staff of the Common Defense. The powers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Common Defense were less than those proposed by Collins. Responsibility for preparing the military budget, which Collins would have assigned to the Joint Chiefs, would become the responsibility of the Secretary of Common Defense.³³

On March 14, 1946, Forrestal had spoken with Senator Thomas, about the new bill. He was ready to accept a Secretary of Common Defense, provided the Secretary and the Assistants limited themselves to staff and coordinating functions and did not interfere with service administration. Forrestal sensed that Senator Thomas was preparing the new bill as he perceived President Truman desired it.³⁴ Four days later, Forrestal discussed his ideas with the President. Earlier Forrestal and

Secretary Patterson discussed the proposed bill and the problems they foresaw in relegating the Secretaries of War, Air, and Navy to what they considered as positions of relative unimportance. President Truman expressed to Forrestal his concern that the U. S. armed forces were headed toward the same conclusion that England had experienced in her defense reorganization by allowing the Royal Air Force to assume all air responsibility. During the discussion with President Truman, Secretary Forrestal mentioned that if he were President and involved with service bickering, he would in a week or ten days tell both services to stop lobbying and get rid of the discussion and propaganda.³⁶ Ironically, thirty days later the President did just that.

On April 30, 1946, Senate Bill 2044 was referred to the Senate Committee for Naval Affairs. During the hearings, Naval witnesses attacked the bill, expressing fear that the bill, if enacted, it would strip the Navy Department of its air and Marine elements.³⁷ It became clear that the Thomas Bill did not provide the compromise that its drafters had hoped for. Consequently, on 13 May 1946, President Truman called Secretaries Patterson and Forrestal to a conference at the White House. He urged them to resolve the problem of unification.³⁸ The President made it clear that, while not committed to either Department's position, he no longer favored the establishment of a single chief of staff and considered it too militaristic.³⁹

The Thomas Bill, in its haste to preserve what the President desired and to reach compromise between the Army and Navy, retained the JCS as it was originally constructed in 1942.

In retaining the JCS in that form, the legislation proposed was anything but an act of unification.⁴⁰ Although the hearings in the Thomas Bill assured its doom, they revealed certain trends toward agreement and understandings that formed the basis of the National Security Act of 1947.

There were two factors affecting the JCS in the bill:

1. a chief of staff of the common defense, appointed by the President with the advise and consent of the Senate for a period of three years. The chief of staff of the common defense would rank all officers in all services on active duty. The position would be rotated among the various services if the President so desired. The chief of staff would advise the President and secretary of common defense and perform such other duties, assigned by the President and secretary.⁴¹
2. the joint staff of the armed forces, composed of the chief of staff of common defense, the commanding general of the Army, chief of naval operations, and the commanding general air forces would meet from time to time, but at least once a year to submit to the President through the secretary of common defense its proposals on military policy, strategy, and budgetary requirements of the armed forces, including the composition of the budget.⁴²

Under the Thomas Bill, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy would have been abolished. In their places were to be Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to serve under the Secretary of the Common Defense. Forrestal was afraid that the service Secretaries would be "stuck off" in some annex without responsibility for their respective services. This proposal was one of Secretary Forrestal's arguments against the bill.

Although the service Secretaries met frequently, attempting to resolve their disagreements according to the Presidents instructions, they failed. On May 31, they submitted

a summary of their agreements and differences. The paper listed each Secretary's opinion in opposite columns for easy comparison.⁴³ The secretaries agreed on several points: a council of common defense to integrate foreign and military policies and to enable the military services and other agencies of government to cooperate more effectively on matters involving national security; a national security resources board; the Joint Chiefs of Staff; formation of a central intelligence agency; a joint agency for procurement and supply; and agency to coordinate research; and an agency to review the system of education and military training. The Secretaries disagreed on four main points: the single military department; three coordinate branches; the duties and functions of aviation; and the duties and functions of the Marines.⁴⁴

After the President reviewed the split paper, he made a second proposal for settlement of the controversy. He urged setting up a single department of national defense under a secretary of cabinet rank. Three equal departments of Army, Navy, and Air were to be headed by civilians of non-cabinet rank. Although the War Department's provisions for aviation would be followed for the most part, Naval aviation would also be explicitly protected. The Navy's proposal to guarantee the future of the Marines would be adopted.⁴⁵

With service differences hopefully "ironed out", the President's second proposal incorporated into the Thomas Bill, and the two Secretaries able to reach some agreement regarding the President's proposal, the Senate Naval Affairs Committee

resumed hearings on July 2, 1946. Whatever hope for settlement of the unification issue during 1946, died when Ferdinand Eberstadt appeared before the Committee on July 3. He asserted:

my basic views on this subject, as well as my views with respect to the bill that is before you, have not changed in essence from the expressions that I think that the bill contains little change, with one exception, that the chief of staff has been eliminated.⁴⁶

Following Eberstadt's lead, Navy witnesses opposed the revised version, which led to postponement of further consideration until 1947, when the 80th Congress convened.

Senate Bill 2044 served to confirm in both Congressional and military minds one factor which continually arose in unification hearings. The Joint Chiefs of Staff or an organization like it was always supported. Admiral King in his testimony on May 7, remarked to the Committee:

my experience in Washington has been that over-all military control of the armed forces can best be exercised by a body such as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which is inherently a military agency of the President--Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

King's views concerning the unanimous decision rule of the JCS further justified the status quo:

when the history of the Joint Chiefs of Staff comes to be written, the record will show how many proposals --including some of my own--had to yield to cogent reasoning--or the different views--of one or more members.⁴⁷

Eberstadt himself summarized:

the strategic plans and military direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the last war were of such extraordinarily high quality that every proposal for unification, with which I am familiar, pays it the tribute of including, in some form or another, a counterpart of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This bill is no exception.⁴⁸

The Senate Naval Hearings terminated on July 11, 1946.

They had forced the two services to consider each other's views. The Service Secretaries, by the insistence of Truman, had begun to attempt some settlement of their differences. To assist in preparation of future unification bills, the Secretaries appointed two more officers, General Norstad and Admiral Forrest Sherman, to develop a blueprint for such legislation. The results of their efforts pointed toward the National Security Act of 1947.

CHAPTER III

PAPER UNIFICATION: THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947-1949

By the end of 1946, controversy between the Army and Navy reached the point where the issue of unification had to be resolved simply to save the orderly functioning of the military. Unification had assumed several characteristics by the time the Secretaries of War and Navy assigned Admiral Sherman and General Norstad to develop a unification blueprint. Unification under a strong Secretary coordinating three separate services and the issue of military force as an extension of diplomacy were also proposals to be settled by the Congress.

National defense had to consider three elements: budgetary, strategic, and diplomatic. The first was related to the size of the nation's military force, the second to the composition and deployment of that force, and the third to its actual use.¹ In all legislative hearings prior to the National Security Act of 1947, these elements were considered by the Congress and the military, but the emphasis was how to achieve unification.

Secretary Forrestal was probably concerned with these three elements when, on September 7, 1946, he wrote to Clark Clifford that "unification is not merely a matter of Army and Navy and Air Forces...it is the whole complex of our National, economic, military, and political power."² Forrestal stated in the letter that the Army was still convinced that the

problems between the services could be resolved by a simple chart and lines of command, whereas the Navy believed that any plan, chart, or system was only as good as the men using them.³

Forrestal and Patterson, who were aware of the President's desire to get the controversy resolved so that he could propose legislation to Congress, met with Truman on September 10, 1946, in order to settle their differences. During the conversation, plans for a "merger" were discussed.⁴ The major element of the discussion centered on the responsibilities of the proposed Secretary of Common Defense. The Secretary, in Forrestal's opinion, must be "a man of imagination on a bicycle with a dustpan...[The job] will not get done by the simple drawing of a chart."⁵ Although there were difficulties between them on unification, they began to develop a compromise on the four points of conflict that they had listed in their May 31 letter to Truman. During the remaining months of 1946, both Secretaries worked hard to reach an agreement.

On January 16, 1947, they forwarded their agreement to the President.⁶ The Secretaries supported a JCS consisting of the military heads of the three services and the Chief of Staff to the President should that office be retained. Subject to the authority and direction of the Secretary of National Defense, the JCS would: formulate strategic direction of the military forces of the U. S., formulate strategic plans and assign logistic responsibilities to the services, integrate the military requirements for and direct the military budget.⁷ Truman was delighted with the agreement and, on January 17, notified

Senator Arthur Vandenberg of the agreement and reported that a proposal for unification would follow.

After some redrafting, the proposed bill was forwarded to Congress on February 26, 1947.⁸ Agreement between the Army and Navy concerning the single chief of staff resulted in retention of the JCS.

To assist the JCS, a joint staff of 100 officers representing the Army, Navy, and Air Force would be established. The Navy successfully presented Eberstadt's proposal for a National Security Council (NSC), whose responsibility was to link the military establishment with foreign policy, the national budget, and allocation of resources. Although the NSC was to remain outside of the National Military Establishment, its functions would in effect integrate it into the over-all defense.⁹ The JCS would not be represented on the NSC, but would advise on military matters. The JCS would also assist the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board in planning and would control or "coordinate" the separate military branches. The agreement rested upon a compromise on the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense and upon the Army's acceptance of the Navy's version of service roles and missions. The Secretary would not have a department, he would only preside over the Military Establishment. Each of the separate service Secretaries would still exist but without cabinet rank. The service Secretaries would retain access to the President, have budget responsibility for their respective services, and sit as members of the NSC. The JCS would simply continue to perform

as it had during the war as a federation. In appearance, the proposed bill offered everything to everyone. But the proposal did not unify the services; it served only to federate them. The NSC was acceptable to all the services, while the JCS was the compromise.

The Senate began hearings on the new bill, (Senate Bill 758) during March 1947, and continued through early May. There was considerable debate regarding the influence of the Bureau of the Budget and its relationship to the NSC.¹⁰ The House of Representatives Committee on Expenditures in Executive Departments held hearings on H. R. 2319, the House version of Senate Bill 758. They started during April, 1947, with generally the same witnesses. The Senate Hearings produced the most meaningful testimony relating to unification struggle and the duties of the JCS.

The specific duties of the JCS prescribed by the Act included: strategic planning and direction of the armed forces, the preparation of joint logistic plans, the establishment of unified commands and joint policies for training, the reviewing of material and personnel requirements of all services, the representation of the military at the United Nations, and the advising of the President and Secretary of National Defense. The duties and requirements of the JCS later served as a focal point in the B-36 and supercarrier controversy of 1949; however, the proposed bill was the first in a long series of Congressional Bills to prescribe by law what was expected of the JCS.¹¹ Although the proposal did specify duties, it did not indicate

how the JCS would better serve unification.

Even the Secretaries were wary of the term "unification" since they were unsure how it would affect the services. Secretary Forrestal described unification as somewhere between to unify, integrate, and coordinate; but it was unclear to him which had the strongest meaning.¹² Forrestal used unification to imply integration of the military, diplomatic, and economic sectors for national defense. Secretary Patterson, appearing before the Senate Committee, had the same difficulty in relating what unification meant. When asked by Senator Styles Bridges of New Hampshire whether the services were going to "merge" as the public assumed or merely effect a very narrow integration, Patterson replied: "take your choice."¹³ Without clear definition, the Senate Hearings proceeded in this "take your choice" atmosphere. Not only were the services confused; the Congress and the American public experienced the same problem.

On March 25, General Eisenhower appeared before the Senate Committee and strongly supported the principle of a single civilian head of the armed forces who could devote his entire attention to the nation's defense. Eisenhower opposed detailed legislation to define a pattern of unification, feeling that it needed to evolve gradually.¹⁴

The notion of evolution was nothing new to Congress. All plans submitted by the Army had called for a period of time to facilitate an evolution of the relationships among the services. The problem of roles and missions had plagued military operations for over a hundred years, and yet the Army

retained confidence in a period of adjustment. The roles and missions of the three services were to become a major concern of the new Secretary of Defense upon passage of the National Security Act.

The ability of the JCS to direct and supervise the three separate services caused concern among some of the Senators. Senator Leverett Saltonstall of Massachusetts expressed his concern over the proposed bill, since so much emphasis had been placed upon the single chief of staff concept during 1946. Eisenhower responded that he had served as a kind of Secretary of National Defense during 1944-45, when elements of the several services all worked directly under him. Eisenhower personally believed in a single chief of staff and had previously supported that concept; but by 1947 he said that "it was one of those argumentative points that should be eliminated from the bill, as not being of great importance."¹⁵ The General felt that the JCS could perform its functions simply because the bill placed the Secretary of Defense in a position superior to the JCS; and he would resolve any differences of opinion concerning strategy, service direction, scheme of operation, or anything else.¹⁶ Eisenhower concluded his testimony in the same haze over the term unification as had Forrestal and Patterson:

I am not going to quarrel with Noah Webster as to the meaning of words...but there is a centralized responsibility which is necessary, in my opinion, to bring to the Congress and to the President a rounded picture of the security needs...whether it is integration or unification I do not know, but my own word would be unification, because that is what we are struggling for. We are not struggling for an amalgamation and merger, and certainly we don't want a

loose coordination. We have had too many examples in government and in military life of what you get when we say, "we will just coordinate, and nothing else."¹⁷

Admiral Nimitz, like General Eisenhower, had previously supported a single chief of staff; but by 1947 he had changed his mind and expressed support of the JCS as the central agency for control of the services.¹⁸ Nimitz admitted that he had made an error by supporting the single chief, but he did not consider all the ramifications in comparing a single commander in the field to a single commander in Washington. Decisions in the field did not afford the commander ample time to debate issues. Since time was not the vital concern of the JCS, its correct structure depended on other considerations. He felt that the military needed not a unified command but expert top management.¹⁹ Nimitz was convinced that top management in the form of a single secretary, the various boards, and the JCS was capable of providing necessary leadership for proper utilization of military planning and resources.

There were eight redrafts of the original bill written by Sherman, Norstad, and others.²⁰ These amendments of the original bill caused considerable concern to Senators Bridges and Millard Tydings of Maryland.²¹ The bill as originally presented was actually the work of Sherman, Norstad, and Charles Murphy, a representative of the White House, and Stuart Symington.²² A major concession concerned the possibility that the President, by heading the NSC might become a captive of its policy and thus be unable to change it.²³ The revised bill, with a few minor changes, was passed by Congress and

approved by Truman on July 26, 1947. The bill became the National Security Act of 1947 and public law 253. In order to implement the law, the President, on the same date, signed Executive Order no. 9877 which gave the services their respective duties and functions. Truman apparently felt that the Act had "put an end to the long and costly arguments over the principle of unification, and, for the first time in the history of the nation, an over-all military establishment was created."²⁴

The President, both service Secretaries, and the leading Admirals and Generals of the new Military Establishment knew that the bill was a compromise; yet, they hoped it would resolve service differences. Testimony given during the hearing indicated that the compromise by the Secretaries extended to the majority of those called before the committee, for without it the bill would never have passed. Both Secretaries were aware that many officers within the services were extremely bitter.²⁵ Fear that the Act would not be readily acceptable to the rank and file of all branches had surfaced when Brigadier General Frank Armstrong of the Army Air Force, on March 20, 1947, made an off-the-record statement in Norfolk, Virginia.²⁶ Addressing a group of Naval officers, Armstrong remarked: "you gentlemen had better understand that the Army Air Force is tired of being a subordinate outfit, and is no longer going to be a subordinate outfit." He further complicated the problem with the Army and Marines by calling the Marine Corps, "a small, fouled-up Army, talking Navy lingo" and suggesting that they be placed in the regular Army to make efficient soldiers of them.²⁷ Armstrong's

words verified the fears of Navy personnel and their expectations from unification, that their branch of the armed forces was being overshadowed by the emerging separate Air Force and that the Navy would have no mission in the National Military Establishment.

With the final passage of the National Security Act and its description of service functions, these fears were somewhat submerged. It contained a weak and departmentless Secretary of Defense (National was dropped), and deprived the services of none of their traditional roles. The bill eliminated the single chief of staff and charged the JCS with direction and planning; and with the supporting Executive Order, it protected Naval aviation and the Marine Corps. The Secretary of War was satisfied with the compromise, and hopefully all concerned with defense were appeased. The problem was to find someone capable of "sitting on top of all that."

Truman first asked Patterson to head the new National Military Establishment, but he refused. He subsequently asked Forrestal who accepted.²⁸ The same day that the bill was signed and Forrestal nominated, word came to the U. S. that Great Britain was virtually bankrupt. Events regarding the tense situation in Greece and Turkey soon placed the U. S. and the new Military Establishment in a position of free world leadership and justified rearmament.²⁹

Forrestal wasted no time in establishing his new office. In order to reflect the importance of the position of Secretary of Defense, he asked to be sworn in separately from the three

service Secretaries.³⁰ Forrestal was sworn in by the Chief Justice, Fred M. Vinson, on September 17, 1947. The President was aboard the USS Missouri returning from Brazil and unable to perform the ceremony. The three service Secretaries were Kenneth C. Royall, Secretary of the Army; John L. Sullivan, Secretary of the Navy; and W. Stuart Symington, Secretary of the Air Force. Within a month after taking office, Forrestal had accumulated a staff of ninety civilians and sixteen military personnel.³¹

The order for which so many had hoped from unification failed to emerge. Debate in the Senate Armed Services Committee regarding Universal Military Training (UMT) and the work of the Finletter Commission, concerning U. S. air policies and the seventy-group Air Force, fostered the notion that by increasing financial support to the Air Force there would be no necessity for UMT.³² This controversy worsened Forrestal's problem of preparing the integrated budget for the Military Establishment. The JCS failed to provide sufficient data to the Secretary for preparation of the budget, apparently due to the service Chiefs desire to increase their service's appropriations in order to implement perceived roles and missions. Forrestal indicated to the President that, unless the JCS soon resolved the conflict of interest on Executive Order 9877, he would do it himself.³³

The JCS did not resolve their differences; consequently, Forrestal called them to Key West, Florida for a "roles and missions" conference, held from March 11 to 14, 1948. The conference resulted in the preparation of a "Functions Paper"

to replace the assignment of functions embodied in Executive Order 9877 and part of the Act of 1947. This new agreement was subsequently implemented as Executive Order 9950.³⁴ It allowed the Secretary of Defense to promulgate the functions of the services with the understanding that he could change them from time to time if conditions warranted. In a rather lengthy paper, the services were told what their duties entailed and how they were to be executed. The National Security Act had given the services basically the same functions, but the new agreement made them more explicit. In all there were twelve functions assigned to the JCS. The eleventh gave firm guidelines for JCS input into the Military Establishment's budget:

11. to prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense for his information and consideration in furnishing guidance to the Departments for preparation of their annual budgetary estimates and in coordinating these budgets, a statement of military requirements which is based upon agreed strategic considerations, joint outline war plans and current national security commitments. This statement of requirements shall include: tasks, priority of tasks, force requirements, and general strategic guidance concerning development of military installations and bases, equipping and maintaining the military forces, and research and development and industrial mobilization programs.³⁵

The requirements placed upon the JCS called for it to maintain close and continuous liaison with the NSC, and to serve as a unified voice for the separate services. The conference, while enumerating the powers and functions of the JCS, failed to resolve service roles and missions. Forrestal had overestimated the ability of the JCS as individual service Chiefs to resolve

their differences. The Agreement gave the various services only obvious primary functions; land, sea, and air. But the actual point of service controversy rested in secondary missions that overlapped. For example, if the Navy were to protect only the sea it would require only limited aviation with nuclear capability, but if the Navy were to launch carrier based aircraft against enemy territory, then a requirement existed for large numbers of aviation assets armed with nuclear weapons.

The Service Chiefs were aware that whoever controlled the majority of nuclear delivery means would also become the dominant service, thus receiving the largest portion of the defense budget.³⁶ Failure to reconcile secondary missions either by the Service Chiefs or by Forrestal, meant the Key West Agreement was not a service agreement at all. The Air Force disagreed in principle even before Forrestal announced, on March 28, 1948, that almost all crucial service issues had been settled. Forrestal felt each service had been given a specific function in which it had a clear-cut responsibility, but he failed to settle the issue of Naval aviation. The services merely continued their rivalry regarding size, strength, and allocation of means of implementation of functions.³⁷

In order to resolve these new confrontations, Forrestal called another conference with the JCS at Newport, Rhode Island during August 20 to 22, 1948.³⁸ The second conference was designed to clarify service responsibility and authority in primary and secondary functions. The JCS agreed that there was a clear understanding of the exclusive role of the Air Force in

strategic air warfare; and, conversely, the intent of the Air Force was to seek all the assistance possible from Naval air. The Navy was assigned exclusive role for antisubmarine warfare, and to seek assistance from the Air Force. The decisions reached were intended to build mutual service confidence.³⁹

Upon completion of the second JCS conference on roles and missions, the Service Chiefs each publicly announced what appeared to be an end to interservice conflict. Admiral Louis Denfeld, Chief of Naval Operations, said: "I venture to predict that when the history of the early days of the National Military Establishment is written, these conferences will be marked as the turning point, the time when the services actually were brought together by their first Secretary of Defense." General Omar Bradley, the Chief of Staff of the Army, declared: "the need of some clear agreement on our roles and missions does not come solely as a result of unification. In my opinion it would be just as necessary for us to spell out our duties if we had three separate services, rather than a single unified one." Following the other Chiefs, General Hoyt Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, added: "prior to this more definitive statement, or interpretation of primary responsibility, each service has been more or less on the defensive to prevent possible encroachment on its sphere of interest. This defensive attitude has manifested itself in unhealthy, perhaps on occasion even unfriendly, contest or competition between the services. I believe this agreement can be a basis for the elimination of much of this trouble."⁴⁰

The National Security Act of 1947, was an important contributor to national security, but even at its best it did not unify the armed services. Truman was aware that the Act might not bring to a successful culmination all the facets of national defense. Even before signing the Act into law on July 26, 1947, he had ordered an investigation into the Executive branch of government by former President Herbert Hoover. Ferdinand Eberstadt was appointed to head the Task Force investigation into the National Security Organization. The Task Force Report was completed during November, 1948, but is dated January 13, 1949, which is the date on the entire Hoover Commission Report.⁴¹

The Commission found that "the National Security Organization, established by the National Security Act of 1947, was on the whole soundly constructed, but not yet working well."⁴² The cost of maintaining the military of \$15 billion was found to be unduly high, in terms of the economy to support it and the dollar return, as measured by military strength and effective national security. Contributing factors to the weakness of the Military Establishment were: the youth of the organization, the lack of clear firm policy guidance to the organization from superiors and the continuance of intense interservice rivalries.⁴³

The Commission's recommendations were that nothing new be designed to replace the National Security Organization, but that ways be found to build on what existed in a firm and intelligent manner.⁴⁴ For example, it recommended that the Secretary of Defense appoint a Chairman of the JCS from among

its members, who would exercise no command over the other chiefs of staff but would expedite JCS business and perform other tasks as assigned by the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary would have a military assistant, who would be junior in rank to any of the members of the JCS; during the Secretary's absence, the assistant would present and interpret the Secretary's points of view, and bring to the attention of the Secretary any "split decisions" of the JCS for resolution.⁴⁵ In analyzing the JCS as organized in 1948, the Commission found four areas of weakness. First, the JCS kept itself too remote from the other parts of the National Security Organization and too detached from the vitally important political, economic, and scientific sectors that must enter into all valid strategic plans. The NSC was also faulted for failing to keep the JCS informed on policy determinations. The second weakness was that the individual Chiefs of Staff allowed themselves to be influenced by service particularism and aggrandizement, and failed to recognize and accept their responsibilities as an integrating agency of National Military policy. The third weakness was that the JCS was too burdened with departmental obligations, which diverted their time and thoughts from their broader duties as members of the JCS. Fourth, the JCS was burdened with too many minor matters.⁴⁶ The inherent weakness of the JCS was, according to the Commission, the inability of the several members to cope effectively with service rivalries and service differences.⁴⁷ This weakness was to be corrected, in the Commission's opinion, by the appointment of a chairman of the JCS and a military

assistant for the Secretary. The Commission found that even with a single Department of Defense, there were within the department many problems yet to be resolved. The JCS was one of the problems as three of the four members of the JCS (the chief of staff to the President still existed) were spokesmen for the separate services. The Secretary had only "general" authority over the services and an inadequate voice in budget requirements for the National Military Establishment; the JCS as a unit reported to the Secretary and the President, but as individuals the chiefs reported to the Secretary, the President, and their respective service Secretaries. Each tended to answer more to the service Secretary, who was the service chief's direct superior, than to the single policies of the JCS. Finally, budget requirements were not drawn with care for cost factors, and the Commission was unable to review the budget adequately, since each service used different accounting classifications and procedures.⁴⁸

To correct these over-all deficiencies, the Commission recommended broader and better defined control by the Secretary, reduction of the service Secretaries authority, and the direct responsibility of the service Secretaries to the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense would be assisted by an Under Secretary and would work for better relations and coordination among all agencies that composed the National Security Organization. Although the recommendations were much more detailed, the Commission felt that these provisions would insure full control and accountability of the National Military

Establishment and subordination of the military to civilian control. Interservice rivalry would be reduced by placing fresh emphasis on the singleness of purpose of the total military effort.⁴⁹

Judge Robert P. Patterson, the former Secretary of War and now a member of the Commission, entered a dissenting letter from the majority report. Patterson recognized Forrestal's difficulty as Secretary of Defense, in administering and controlling the three separate services and the service Secretaries, who were generally independent. He recommended establishing a single executive department with the three branches of the armed forces under the Secretary of Defense, thus establishing a Department of Defense. The Secretary of Defense required broad power to manage and direct the Department, which should be similar to any other cabinet post. The military establishment would have a Chief of Staff, selected from the services by the Secretary to advise the Secretary and the President. The Chief of Staff would not command the military forces but would preside over and cast the deciding vote in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chief of Staff would have his own staff composed of officers from the three services and separate from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The post of Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, a historical accident, would be abolished.⁵⁰

While the Hoover Commission's Task Force on the National Security Organization was completing its study, Secretary Forrestal was preparing his first report as Secretary of Defense. The Report was published December 29, 1948, just a few days

after the Commission's recommendations. Forrestal recommended the creation of an Under Secretary of Defense to perform duties assigned by the Secretary. He felt that this would strengthen the statutory authority of the Secretary and insure responsibility for exercising "direction, authority, and control" over the departments and agencies of the National Military Establishment. These recommendations corresponded to the ones in the Hoover Commission. The Act of 1947 provided the Secretary with "general direction, authority, and control." His request was for specific authority.⁵¹ Forrestal's recommendations pertaining to the JCS were the deletion of the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, the designation of a responsible head for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and removal of the limitation of the size of the Joint Staff.⁵² Addressing the broad problem of unification Forrestal stated: "the mere passage of the National Security Act did not mean the accomplishment of its objectives overnight."⁵³ According to him, the most difficult part of unification was to bring conflicting ideas into harmony. In that regard he added that: "the nerve center of unification lay with the Joint Chiefs of Staff."⁵⁴ Also in his report Forrestal had made some recommendations regarding the National Security Council. He suggested reduction of the statutory membership of the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to provide only membership for the Secretary of Defense as the representative of the National Military Establishment.⁵⁵

The Hoover Commission, by pointing out four faults of the JCS, had identified some of the difficulty in heading a

large organization that had separate branches, each seeking autonomy. The Commission also recommended a chairman of the JCS and an increase in the Joint Staff from its statutory limit of one hundred to two hundred and ten officers. Both the Commission's recommendations and those of Forrestal were designed to correct difficulties with the JCS and the Service Secretaries.

Forrestal thought the services had reached agreement on roles and missions at Key West. He assumed that the services would accept the military strengths he had recommended. The Air Force was to operate with fifty-five groups instead of seventy, and the Army was to maintain 782,000 men.⁵⁶ But the Army and the Air Force recommended to Congress increases above the figures given by the Secretary of Defense. Moreover, Secretary Symington delivered an "off-the-cuff" speech in Los Angeles on July 16, 1948, assailing "ax-grinders dedicated to obsolete methods of warfare," again stressing the need for a seventy-group Air Force. Forrestal told President Truman that he felt forced to ask for Symington's resignation.

Difficulties between the two were resolved when Symington explained that he had been misquoted by the press.⁵⁷ But it became clear as a result of the Symington incident that the area of disagreement between the Air Force and the Navy was exceedingly wide and that it involved strategic warfare and the atomic bomb. As Hanson W. Baldwin commented: "Unification becomes a joke when the Secretary of the Air Force goes over the head of the Secretary of Defense and of the President himself."⁵⁸

Forrestal therefore directed all civilian and military chiefs of the three departments to submit statements containing references to controversial subjects to his office for review prior to publication.⁵⁹

President Truman reviewed both the Hoover Commission Report on the National Security Organization and Secretary Forrestal's first report during January and February 1949. On March 5, 1949, he forwarded to Congress recommendations to change the National Security Act of 1947, based upon the recommendations of the two reports. Truman felt it was clear that the National Security Act should be amended to define and strengthen the authority of the Secretary, to authorize an Under Secretary of Defense, to provide the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a chairman, and to remove the service Secretaries from the NSC, leaving only the Secretary of Defense to represent the military and to attend to any administrative corrections required in the Defense organization.⁶⁰

Soon after issuing his first report, Forrestal was replaced by Louis Johnson as Secretary of Defense. Forrestal had gotten into serious difficulty with the services in attempting to retain his concept of balanced forces. He had allowed Secretary Symington and Air Force Chief of Staff Spaatz to continue their demands for the full seventy-groups, which they contended could be done for only an \$800 million supplement to the defense budget. To satisfy the Air Force, Forrestal asked the JCS to plan for additional personnel and equipment requirements in order to balance the Army and Navy with the

seventy-groups. The JCS replied with a recommended budget supplement of \$9 billion, which was impossible during early 1949 for political reasons and far above the \$1.5 billion Truman was prepared to support.⁶¹ The \$9 billion recommended by the JCS was to balance the armed forces with the seventy-group in keeping with Forrestal's desire to maintain balanced forces. The JCS did not give a break down for the proposed supplement and left Forrestal with the responsibility of any modification. Forrestal scaled down the supplement to approximately \$3 billion, and received Truman's support provided the services would not spend the entire supplement. The JCS recommended "phasing" the remainder of the \$9 billion into the budget during the following years.⁶² During the final months that he served as Secretary, Forrestal attempted to operate under Truman's budget ceiling of \$14.4 billion.

To Louis Johnson fell the task of presenting Forrestal's recommendations to Congress for Defense Department changes. Johnson who was also determined to reduce military expenditures reduced the fiscal 1950 budget from \$14 billion to \$13 billion. Thus, while Forrestal had augmented his first budget by phasing up, Johnson reduced his first by phasing down. When Johnson assumed leadership of the National Military Establishment, he faced a President who wanted a defense program within a specified budget, an Air Force desiring a seventy-group organization, an Army striving for Universal Military Training, and a Navy desiring a super-carrier that was capable of launching Navy attack bombers armed with atomic bombs.⁶³ Each service had sup-

porters among the public and in Congress; thus Johnson could expect support in his position only in relation to the support he gave the service. In the middle of this confused setting lay the JCS, committed on the one hand to giving advice to the Secretary and on the other to the interests of their respective services.

The Senate and House each conducted hearings on the proposed amendments to the National Security Act.⁶⁴ In the House, Carl Vinson, Chairman of the Hearings, questioned why the bill was actually before the House. He felt the President and the Secretary could institute the desired changes without Congressional approval, except for budgetary and fiscal changes of the armed forces. Vinson's concern with the bill was that Congress, specifically individual leaders within Congress, appeared to be losing any influence that they might possess with the services and that the bill should be amended to keep Congress a part of the team.⁶⁵ Vinson had previously supported the Navy, having served as Chairman of the House Committee on Naval Affairs prior to the National Security Act of 1947, which had combined the old Military Affairs and the Naval Affairs Committee into the House Armed Services Committee. In January 1949, Vinson indicated that he would lead the fight to get Congressional approval for the Air Force's seventy-group program. Vinson had dropped the Navy in favor of the Air Force. With the proposed changes to the Defense Department and increased strength given to the Secretary, Vinson stood to lose part of his influence with the Air Force. Ironically, the Navy still

considered him as the Navy's leader within the House.

During the Hearings, Congressman Vinson asked Johnson about the right of the service chiefs of staff to appear before Congress, Johnson replied: "it is not intended so far as the Congress is concerned to keep any member of the military establishment from exercising his constitutional rights to come and talk to Congress any time on any subject."⁶⁶ While his statement did not reflect it, Johnson was attempting to show that the power of the Secretary had to be increased to prevent any member of the services from addressing Congress and possibly increasing interservice rivalry without first presenting the problem to the Secretary.⁶⁷ Freedom of the service chiefs and secretaries to speak out, prior to presenting controversial issues to the Secretary had plagued Forrestal and would plague Johnson.

The Secretary had no objection to the Chairman of the JCS presenting both sides of a "split-decision" of the JCS and offering his own views, as Admiral Leahy and General Eisenhower had done in years past. Congressman Vinson then stated; "you polish up the chairman but as a matter of fact, and in reality he becomes practically a chief of staff."⁶⁸ Vinson had, by his statement to Johnson, done exactly what he had warned the committee not to do. He had brought up a point of major contention in the struggle for service unification. Vinson had at first told the committee not to reopen the old fight on unification. The problem now was to make it work to produce an effective combatant team.⁶⁹

The Congressman's remarks widened the dispute over the chairman's becoming merely a chief of staff when he stated:

When I started out studying this bill I had two objectives in mind. One was to keep Congress from being pushed out of the picture...the other to fix it so there would never be a chief of staff just around the corner. But the committee seems to have drifted to the thought that we should have a chief of staff.⁷⁰

The role of the chairman was discussed in considerable detail and was severely criticized by some members of the committee and by some members of the armed forces. Discussions centered on authority and rank, relation to the Secretary, and the value of having a chairman at all. General Bradley added to the dispute when he stated:

With reference to this arriving eventually at a chief of staff, I have said at various times that I believe you will demand a single chief of staff some day. It may be 20 years from now, but it will come--not necessarily from the military but from you people who are interested in economy and efficiency. I think it will never come until you do want it. It can't come until you do want it.⁷¹

On August 10, 1949, Truman approved the amendments to the 1947 Act. The chairman became a non-voting member of the JCS. He would direct and set the agenda for JCS meetings, but the JCS as a unit would remain the principal military advisors to the President and the Secretary. The JCS, not the Secretary, would continue to assign logistic responsibilities, prescribe training for joint forces, and plan the national military strategy and direct the armed forces.⁷² The National Military Establishment was converted into a single executive department, and the service Secretaries were removed from the NSC and placed directly under the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense was given an Under Secretary and a greater staff to

assist in performing his duties. Budget control and preparation were also strengthened by adding a comptroller for the Department of Defense and one for each of the three services.⁷³

The increased strength of the Secretary was an extremely controversial issue during the hearings. Forrestal had asked for more power, and the President had supported his proposal. Yet, Eberstadt, in his testimony before the House stated that he knew of no time when the Secretary's authority had been challenged. Although the hearings and subsequent amendments did strengthen the Department of Defense, they revealed also that the Secretary did indeed require more power to control the service Secretaries, since they were still pressing for roles that placed all three services in conflict. What Forrestal had hoped for after Key West and Newport soon exploded in another series of Congressional hearings over the B-36 and the Navy's super-carrier.

During April 1949, Johnson became involved in a controversy over the Navy's super-carrier, the USS United States. The Secretary and the JCS, with Congressional approval, had authorized the Navy to construct the carrier. During the early stages of construction, the press began to query the Secretary on costs and the ultimate worth of the carrier for defense. Johnson then asked the JCS to render another report of their views which resulted in a 2to1 recommendation that the carrier be cancelled.⁷⁴ Indications are that the Secretary failed to allow proper presentation by Navy Secretary Sullivan. On April 18, Johnson had asked Sullivan for his opinion, only to

interrupt him during his presentation. Sullivan forwarded a memorandum the following day outlining the Navy's position and asking for additional time to present his views. Before Sullivan could secure an appointment with the Secretary, Johnson received the JCS views. He immediately informed Truman of their differences and cancelled construction on April 22.⁷⁵ Upon hearing that the Secretary had cancelled the carrier Sullivan resigned on April 23. Secretary Johnson then recommended Francis Matthews, a Truman supporter, for Secretary of the Navy. Matthews made it clear that he supported Johnson and the economy drive within the Defense Department. The Chief of Naval Operations also supported the new Secretary of the Navy, but the majority of the Navy opposed him, thus bringing conflict to the entire Naval Department.

When the President signed the 1949 amendments to the Act of 1947, the military services were not any closer to agreement than they had been in 1943. The Army and the President still desired UMT; the Air Force and its Secretary were pressing for the long-range B-36, seventy-groups, and sole use of the atomic bomb; the Navy was split with the majority of the Navy continuing to press for the carrier and a role in strategic air warfare and the atomic bomb without the backing of their Secretary or their Chief of Naval Operations. Again the JCS was in the middle. The controversy could not be resolved by the JCS as each service chief had a different view. The Secretary of Defense did not intervene, nor did the President elect to resolve differences in his military establishment.

Any strengthening of service unification by the 1949 amendments was simply an illusion. The only positive accomplishment had been stated in Baldwin's words that service unification was a "joke". By the absence of positive action, the Executive branch allowed the Congress to enter the controversy over the B-36 bomber and the super-carrier.⁷⁶

The Congressional investigation in the B-36 controversy appeared at first to concern procurement and capabilities of the long range aircraft. But the hearings rapidly revealed that the real issue was again a duel between the Air Force and the Navy and their perceived roles and missions. To complete the rivalry circle, the Army and Marine Corps continued their struggle over amphibious warfare. Diverse opinions of service unification regarding roles and missions reflected that the previous agreements at Key West and Newport were in fact not agreements at all.⁷⁷ The results of the hearing served only to further divide the three services. The Navy lost confidence in their Chief, their Secretary, and the President; the Air Force only cleared the B-36 from false charges; and the Army and Marines were still uncertain who was responsible for amphibious warfare. The argument led directly to another Congressional investigation of defense unification and strategy.

The House closed their hearing on the B-36 October 5, 1949, and the following day began their hearing on unification and strategy. Admiral Denfeld was in a precarious position as Chief of Naval Operations. He supported the super-carrier but at the same time felt obligated to support the Navy Secretary.

Matthews in turn supported Johnson's economy program and the carrier's cancellation. The other Naval flag officers consequently, considered Denfeld as a figure head and not representative of Naval views. Admiral Arthur W. Radford assumed leadership of the Navy's argument against the B-36 and Naval strategy. On October 7, 1949, Radford appeared before the House Committee and stated that:

unification, like proper habits of thought and morale, cannot be brought about by legislation alone. Unification requires a sound legislative framework, but the framework by itself will not suffice. Real unification must depend, in the ultimate, on leadership, mutual trust, understanding and respect.⁷⁸

Radford felt that the Navy had been prevented from presenting its views regarding National Defense for over two years. Silence, in his opinion, was brought on by the urge to obtain unification or to make it appear that there was complete unification.⁷⁹ Radford continued his testimony by indicating that the leadership of the Navy had not presented the true view of Navy requirements to the Secretary of Defense and had allowed the other services to make decisions affecting Navy weapons and finances.⁸⁰ In his attempt to obtain support for the Navy, Radford sought the backing of Carl Vinson. Vinson had long been referred to by the Navy as "Admiral" and believed himself the father of the modern Navy.⁸¹ Radford indicated that the Navy was upset with the President's withholding of appropriations for the super-carrier. Vinson suggested that the National Security Act might require amendment to require expenditure of funds once they were appropriated. Vinson was however more in favor of the Air Force funds than the Navy's

at this time, but apparently Radford was unaware of Vinson's switch. Radford replied to Vinson's suggestion by stating: "Mr. Vinson, I think I speak for the whole Navy when I say that we have great confidence in you and the members of this committee."⁸² Radford also noted that the JCS restricted the Navy's budget proposals. He did not support Matthews view that the JCS was a fair court in which to express Navy views since the JCS was too concerned with other duties to analyze properly the essential weapons, such as the super-carrier.⁸³ The Naval officers who followed Radford expressed their support of the Admiral's findings relating to the Navy. The Committee, continuing to allow the Navy to express its views, called Denfeld. To the surprise of all, Denfeld supported Radford and the Navy. Denfeld finally and openly expressed his feeling regarding the carrier, by doing so he opposed Matthews. His failure to support Matthews cost him his job.⁸⁴ Denfeld told the committee that the roles and missions of the services had received an adequate definition, but that by persistent attempts to make changes and modifications the roles had been altered. These conditions served only to create instability with the JCS. Denfeld also questioned the authority of the JCS to override the decisions of the Congress to construct the carrier. In Denfeld's opinion, instability was reflected in the JCS reversal of its original position because of the public outcry that the carrier infringed upon the Air Force's role in strategic bombing. He said that he had been informed within forty minutes after delivering the 2to1 altered JCS recommendation that the carrier

was cancelled. The action of the JCS, in Denfeld's opinion, did not reflect the intent or spirit of unification. He concluded unification to mean coordination of effort, not "merger, absorption, or elimination."⁸⁵

In contrast to the Navy, Army and Air Force officers testified in favor of unification, but they made little effort to accomplish this difficult task. The fact was that in nearly seven years, nothing had really changed in terms of interservice relations. The JCS had the distinction of being the catalyst for service unification, but whatever unification existed was only on paper. The JCS needed political guidelines to make strategic plans and to direct properly the three services. Guidance was not given by the NSC, the Secretary of Defense, or the President. The end result was that each service remained largely independent of the other and vied for a bigger portion of the defense dollar. After the debate, public outcry, legislation, and Presidential direction that the services unify, there was in 1950 no real change from 1943. During the long controversy of unification of the armed forces there were several agencies created that were worthwhile: the National Security Council, the National Security Resources Board, the Central Intelligence Agency and others. Yet, the effort to unify the services into a single coherent force had resulted in absolutely nothing. The services were brought together only by the Korean War, which like World War II required unification of effort to accomplish a mission of vital importance. Service unification then has been realized during periods of war, but not during peace.

CONCLUSION

Attempts to unify the armed services from 1943 to 1950 followed these patterns: retain the status quo, establish a single military organization with an all powerful chief of staff, or a single department with subdivisions for the Army, Navy, and Air. The result was a compromise that created a single department of defense, with three separate services headed by a Secretary of National Defense without sufficient authority to control the department, and a Joint Chiefs of Staff with dual functions. During the period the various spokesmen for the armed forces were sincere in their attitudes toward unification or coordination to strengthen the military services. The Army, Navy, and later the Air Force feared financial and strength reductions in their respective services, following the war, would reduce national defense capabilities.

In 1943, the Army initiated plans for unifying the services into a single department. Prior to 1943, the Army had opposed unification just as vehemently as the Navy. Post-war unification proposals for the two services began as a fluke by Army planners, attempting to design postwar military organization. Their plan was brought to the attention of General Marshall who forwarded it to the JCS. The plan called for a single military department and a single chief of staff. The JCS was unable to resolve service roles and missions in the Army plan without guidance from the President and Congress.

The JCS required guidance on proposed postwar military strengths. That guidance failed to materialize, therefore, the services attempted to design their own strengths. The services failed to settle their differences consequently, a series of legislative hearings began that eventually led to the National Security Act of 1947. The Act alleged to unify the armed services.

The Army desired to merge all the armed forces in order to achieve unity of command, a principle that had served as a key to success in the field. Unity would provide a combined budget for the armed forces, and give a well rounded description of the needs for national security. The Army felt unified command could be achieved by a single chief of staff of the armed forces. Under his direction would be a Chief of Staff of the Army, a Chief of Naval Operations, and, if provided, a Chief of Staff for the Air Force. The Navy opposed the Army plan for fear it would lose control over aviation so vital to the new Naval strategy of depending on carriers, instead of battleships, to control the seas. The Army Air Force favored unification since it would grant them equal status with the Army and Navy.

While each service favored unification, or in the case of the Navy, coordination, all were sincere in their beliefs that the United States must remain strong and secure. The opponents of a unified department did not oppose the principle of service unity, but the manner in which it would be done. The JCS was the catalyst that allowed the services to compromise their differences over a single chief of staff or committee

leadership of the armed forces. Most of the service proposals for unification from 1944 until the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, envisioned making permanent the wartime status of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Organized in 1942, the JCS had become more than just a military command and control agency. It directed the nation's war efforts, it considered matters ranging from foreign policy to economic mobilization; it was, in other words, a political and a military organization. The National Security Act stripped the JCS of part of their wartime power and attempted to give them a purely military function.

Congress refrained from placing the Secretary of National Defense on the JCS and from establishing a civilian chairman of that body. In attempting to regain civilian control, the National Security Council assumed responsibility for advising the President on over-all national military policy--policy, that for five years had unquestionably been the responsibility of the JCS. The new Secretary of National Defense was most restricted by the National Security Act. He was charged with civilian control of the military, under the President, but he was not given the means to perform adequately those responsibilities. Forrestal's first report as the Secretary and the Hoover Commission, clearly indicated that the Secretary's power had to be increased if civilian control over the military was to be regained.

The 1949 amendments to the National Security Act, increased the Secretary's authority, established the Department

of Defense, and provided for a military chairman of the JCS. The chairman was to aid the service Chiefs in rising above service loyalties and to insure mutual agreement, thus aiding unification. The chairman was also to be the link between the President and the JCS. The JCS continued to perform their dual functions as individual chiefs of staff for their respective service, and collectively, as advisors to the President, Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council.

Military advise normally has been primarily related to foreign policy rather than domestic policy. The division within Truman's administration, between strong advocates of each policy placed the JCS in the middle of a political power struggle. Louis Johnson who replaced James Forrestal as Secretary of Defense, favored unification for reasons of economy and domestic policy. The JCS, as individual service chiefs had aligned themselves with different weapons systems designed to make the best use of the atomic bomb. The Air Force was deeply committed to a long-range bomber, while the Navy sought a super-carrier. The controversy relating to the two systems resulted in the Secretary of the Navy resigning, the Chief of Naval Operations being fired, and the Secretary of the Air Force opposing the Secretary of Defense over the value of air power. With Johnson as Secretary, the Department of Defense and the State Department were extremely hesitant to continue inter-department coordination. The controversy was resolved only by the President's appointing new officials to his cabinet, and the Korean Conflict which soon followed.

In view of the controversies on service roles and missions both prior to and after the National Security Act, it is apparent that there was not, nor has there been, service unification. The JCS was instrumental in bringing about the compromise which allowed the passage of the National Security Act, but the JCS was not a unified staff. The three component parts of defense: budget, strategic, and diplomatic, followed their separate views and failed to establish a coherent defense program. The expectations of a member of the JCS to serve his dual functions equally well, proved difficult for most who served as members of the JCS. Each Chief of Staff must see to it that his branch of the military receives adequate appropriations, and public support, but collectively, the JCS is charged to provide sound and economically feasible military advice to the President, the Secretary of Defense and the National Security Council. Their problem like the problem of unification rests with too much expectation for the means available. The expectation that the members of the JCS could individually direct their respective service and yet, collectively render sound military advice is, in my opinion, impossible. If unification of the Armed Forces is truly desired by the government and supported by the American public, some other means must be found.

ENDNOTES

INTRODUCTION

¹Walter Millis, Harvey C. Mansfield, and Harold Stein, Arms and the State: Civil Military Elements in National Policy (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1958), p. 149.

CHAPTER I

¹Paul Y. Hammond, Organizing for Defense: The American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961), Hammond gives detailed analysis of why coordination between the Army and Navy was required, see chapters 2 and 3.

²Ibid.

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⁴Ibid.

⁵Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (New York: Macmillan Co., 1956), p. 159.

⁶Ibid., pp. 405-406.

⁷Mark S. Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations, Vol. I, War Department of the United States in WWII (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 79.

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⁹Ibid., pp. 26-27.

- ¹⁰Watson, Chief of Staff, p. 379.
- ¹¹Millis, Arms and the State, p. 35.
- ¹²Ibid., p. 44.
- ¹³Weigley, History of the U. S. Army, pp. 425-428.
- ¹⁴Watson, Chief of Staff, pp. 118-124.
- ¹⁵Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope 1939-1942 (New York: The Viking Press, 1965), pp. 142-145.
- ¹⁶Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), p. 365.
- ¹⁷Winston S. Churchill, The Grand Alliance, Vol. III, The Second World War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1950), pp. 608-610.
- ¹⁸John C. Ries, The Management of Defense: Organization and Control of the U. S. Armed Services (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1964), p. 22, quoting from Elting E. Morison, Turmoil and Tradition: A Study of the Life and Times of Henry L. Stimson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1960).
- ¹⁹Pogue, Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, p. 277.
- ²⁰Ibid., p. 276.
- ²¹The Unified Command was called the ABDA Command for American, British, Dutch, and Australian Forces. A Unified Command is multiple nations or forces under a single commander to accomplish a specified mission.
- ²²Hammond, Organizing for Defense, pp. 159-185. Hammond gives an excellent evaluation of the JCS organization during World War II.
- ²³Ibid., pp. 101-106.
- ²⁴Vincent Davis, Postwar Defense Policy and The U. S. Navy, 1943-1946 (Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1962), p. 5. For the Army's reorganization see Hammond,

Organizing for Defense, pp. 113-120, and John C. Ries, The Management of Defense: Organization and Control of the U. S. Armed Services (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1964), pp. 23-30.

²⁵E. J. King and W. M. Whitehall, Fleet Admiral King (New York: W. W. Norton, 1952), p. 319.

²⁶Davis, Postwar Defense and U. S. Navy, p. 6.

²⁷Hammond, Organizing for Defense, p. 190. See also Davis, Postwar Defense and U. S. Navy, p. 51.

²⁸Davis, Postwar Defense and U. S. Navy, p. 9.

²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 7.

³⁰James V. Forrestal, The Forrestal Diaries, ed. Walter Millis with E. S. Duffield (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), p. 12.

³¹Hammond, Organizing for Defense, pp. 10-106. Hammond outlines explicit details of Army and Navy reorganizations.

³²*Ibid.*

³³Davis, Postwar Defense and U. S. Navy, p. 53.

³⁴Millis, Arms and the State, p. 146.

³⁵U. S. Congress, House, Select Committee on Postwar Military Policy, Proposal to Establish a Single Department of Armed Forces, Hearing, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess., June 1944 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1944), p. 4. Hereafter cited as Woodrum Committee.

³⁶Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox died April 28, 1944. He initially favored unification along lines of the War Department's plan. Upon his death, Secretary of War Stimson realized he could not obtain legislation for unification, as Forrestal did not agree with the plan.

³⁷Woodrum Committee, p. 3.

³⁸U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, Department of Armed Forces: Department of Military Security,

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³⁹Ibid., p. 415.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 413.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 416.

⁴²Ibid., pp. 434-435.

⁴³Forrestal, Diaries, p. 60.

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵Eberstadt Report, p. 1.

⁴⁶Forrestal, Diaries, p. 61.

⁴⁷Millis, Arms and the State, p. 150.

⁴⁸Forrestal, Diaries, pp. 63-64.

⁴⁹Eberstadt Report, pp. 1-5.

⁵⁰Alfred D. Sander, "Truman and the National Security Council: 1945-1947," Journal of American History, LIX (September 1972), pp. 369-388. See also George A. Wyeth, Jr. "The National Security Council," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. VIII (1954), pp. 185-195. Sander's analysis of the NSC is excellent.

⁵¹Eberstadt Report, pp. 4-8.

⁵²Ibid., pp. 56-83.

⁵³Millis, Arms and the State, p. 150.

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⁵⁶Arnold A. Rogow, James Forrestal: A Study of Personality, Politics and Policy (New York: Macmillan Co., 1963), pp. 210-213.

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²Ibid., pp. 2-3.

³Secretary Patterson's Comments in detail see Senate Hearings 1945, pp. 12-17.

⁴Senate Hearings 1945, p. 22.

⁵Ibid., p. 50

⁶Walter Millis, Harvey C. Mansfield, and Harold Stein, Arms and the State: Civil Military Elements in National Policy (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1958), p. 147. For detailed analysis see Vincent Davis, Postwar Defense Policy and the U. S. Navy, 1943-1946 (Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1962), especially chapters 5 and 6.

⁷Millis, Arms and the State. p. 147.

⁸Truman's Article is printed in, Senate Hearings 1945, pp. 192-197, as well as Colliers August 16, 1944.

⁹Senate Hearings 1945, p. 196.

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 196-197.

¹¹Ibid., p. 57.

¹²Ibid., p. 97.

¹³Ibid., p. 101.

¹⁴For the Navy's views on the 2:1 JCS ratio see Senate Hearings 1945, testimony of Admiral Charles M. Cooke, Jr., pp. 274-275, and Admiral Arthur W. Radford, p. 595.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Alfred D. Sander, "Truman and the National Security Council: 1945-1947," Journal of American History, LIX (September 1972), pp. 369-388.

¹⁷Senate Hearings 1945, p. 103.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 120.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 158.

²⁰Samuel I. Rosenman, Folders on Unification of the Armed Services (Truman Library), folder no. 1, November 13, 1945, Memorandum to President Truman. Hereafter this collection is cited as Rosenman Papers. The remark about the health message refers to military hospitals and VA benefits.

²¹Rosenman Papers, Harold D. Smith's draft of President Truman's address to Congress on December 19, 1945, folder no. 1, November 30, 1945.

²²Rosenman Papers, based on personal correspondence between Rosenman and President Truman, folder no. 1, December 17, 1945.

²³Rosenman Papers, Memorandum from Admiral William Leahy, folder no. 1, December 14, 1945.

²⁴Rosenman Papers, folder no. 2, and also in the Clark M. Clifford Papers on Unification of the Armed Forces (Truman Library).

²⁵Rosenman Papers, Memorandum from James Forrestal, folder no. 3, December 18, 1945.

²⁶Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. 2, (Garden City, N. J.: Doubleday and Co., 1956), p. 49. Also see related comments in Walter Millis, Harvey C. Mansfield, and Harold Stein, Arms and the State: Military Elements in National Policy (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1958), p. 49, and James V. Forrestal, The Forrestal Diaries, ed. Walter Millis with E. S. Duffield (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), p. 120.

²⁷Clark M. Clifford Papers on Unification of the Armed Forces (Truman Library), Unification Folder, draft of President Truman's message to Congress on December 18, 1945. Hereafter this collection is cited as Clifford Papers.

²⁸There are conflicting dates for Truman's message to Congress. Forrestal Diaries cites it as December 20, p. 119. Truman's Memoirs and the Congressional Record (Vol. 91, p. 12399) gives the date as December 19. This study uses December 19.

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³⁰Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (New York: Macmillan Co., 1956), p. 492.

³¹Ibid., pp. 492-493.

³²Arnold A. Rogow, James Forrestal: A Study of Personality, Politics and Policy (New York: Macmillan Co., 1963), p. 220.

³³U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Naval Affairs, Unification of the Armed Forces, Hearing, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess., S. 2044, to promote the Common Defense, April 30 . . . , July 11, 1946 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 1. Hereafter these Hearings will be cited as Naval Hearings S. 2044.

³⁴Forrestal, Diaries, p. 49. See also John C. Ries The Management of Defense: Organization and Control of the U. S. Army Services (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1964), chp. 5, and Franklyn Arthur Johnson, Defense By Committee (London: Oxford University Press, 1960).

³⁵Forrestal, Diaries, p. 149.

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷Naval Hearings S. 2044, Secretary Forrestal's testimony pp. 31-56, Fleet Admiral C. W. Nimitz's testimony pp. 77-102, and General Alexander A. Vandergrift, Commandant of the Marines, pp. 105-119.

³⁸Truman, Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 50.

³⁹Millis, Arms and the State, p. 171, see similar comments in Forrestal, Diaries, p. 161.

⁴⁰Weigley, History of the U. S. Army, p. 437.

⁴¹Naval Hearings S. 2044, p. 3.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Clifford Papers, Correspondence General, give the actual arrangement of the "split paper" in the letter from Secretaries Patterson and Forrestal to the President, May 31, 1945, and Millis, Arms and the State, p. 171.

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵Truman, Memoirs, Vol. II, pp. 50-51, see also Naval Hearings S. 2044, pp. 203-207.

⁴⁶Naval Hearings S. 2044, p. 239, for Mr. Eberstadt's previous testimony see pp. 165.

⁴⁷Ibid., pp. 139-140.

⁴⁸Ibid., pp. 165-188.

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¹Samuel Huntington, "Radicalism and Conservation in National Defense Policy," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 8 (1954), p. 207.

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¹¹Senate Hearing 758, p. 16, see sec. 111.

¹²Ibid., p. 27. Secretary Forrestal's reply to Senator Bridges on the meaning of the word "integration."

¹³Ibid., p. 64

¹⁴Ibid., p. 91.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 99.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 109.

¹⁸Senate Hearing 758, see Admiral Nimitz's entire testimony, pp. 129-152.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 145.

²⁰Ibid., p. 166.

²¹Clifford Papers, Correspondence General, contains copies of the 8 drafts of the bill prepared by Norstad and Sherman and others.

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²⁴Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. 2, (Garden City, N. J.: Doubleday and Co., 1956), pp. 51-52.

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²⁷Ibid.

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³²Arnold A. Rogow, James Forrestal: A Study of Personality, Politics and Policy (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1963), pp. 286-287.

³³Forrestal, Diaries, p. 389.

³⁴Rogow, James Forrestal, p. 287. See also "Blueprint for Teamwork: Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff," Army Information Digest, Vol. 3 (May 1944), pp. 41-53.

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³⁶John C. Ries, The Management of Defense: Organization and Control of the U. S. Armed Services (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1964), p. 125.

³⁷Rogow, James Forrestal, p. 287.

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⁴²Task Force Report, p. 3.

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 10.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 56.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 66.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 67.

⁴⁸"The National Security Organization: Extracts from the Hoover Commission Report," Army Information Digest, Vol. 4 (May 1949), p. 33.

⁴⁹Ibid., pp. 34-39.

⁵⁰Task Force Report, pp. 101-103.

⁵¹U. S. National Defense Establishment, First Report of the Secretary of Defense 1948 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948).

⁵²Ibid., p. 4.

⁵³Ibid., p. 11.

⁵⁴Ibid.

⁵⁵Ibid.

⁵⁶Rogow, James Forrestal, p. 289.

⁵⁷Forrestal, Diaries, p. 463.

⁵⁸Hanson W. Baldwin was a leading military critic during this period. His remarks apply to Sec. Symington's appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 80th Cong., 2nd. Sess., 1948, but are equally applicable to the Los Angeles statement, see Forrestal, Diaries, p. 415.

⁵⁹National Defense Establishment, First Report 1948, p. 8.

⁶⁰Truman, Memoirs, Vol. 2, p. 53.

⁶¹Walter Millis, Harry C. Mansfield, and Harold Stein, Arms and the State: Military Elements in National Policy (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1958), p. 216. See also Paul Y. Hammond, "Super-Carriers and B-36 Bombers: Appropriations, Strategy and Politics," in Harold Stein, ed. American Civil-Military Decisions (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press for Twentieth Century Fund, 1963), pp. 476-479.

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⁶⁵Ibid., p. 2686.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 2687.

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 2706. Johnson wanted statutory authority written into the amendment to prevent any member of the Defense Department from making statements without clearance by the Secretary of Defense if the statement would be controversial.

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⁷⁶Ibid. Hammond presents the entire controversy in an unbiased and exemplary manner.

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⁷⁸House, Unification and Strategy, p. 41.

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⁸⁰Ibid., pp. 87-88.

⁸¹Hammond, "Super-Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 553.

⁸²House, Unification and Strategy, p. 92.

⁸³Ibid., p. 94.

⁸⁴Ibid. See Admiral Denfeld's entire testimony, pp. 349-364

⁸⁵Ibid., p. 360.

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THE U.S. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF: A CATALYST FOR SERVICE UNIFICATION
LEGISLATION BUT A FAILURE IN UNIFYING THE SERVICES

by

FRED ROOKS POPE

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ABSTRACT

This thesis analyzes the effect of the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) on armed service unification legislation and the failure to unify the services during the period 1943-1950.

Unification of the armed forces meant entirely different things to the various interest groups who from 1943 to 1947 attempted to insure enactment of laws, explicitly designed to accomplish what each conceived as unification. The Army intended unification as a means to merge the War and Navy Departments into a single service with a single chief of staff. The Navy opposed the Army's single service concept, and desired to retain the services as separate and distinct, each with different roles and missions. The JCS was established during 1942, as an expedient staff to meet an organizational emergency caused by U. S. participation in coalition warfare. The JCS emerged as the catalyst for service compromise regarding the single chief of staff.

In 1943 the Army and Navy began to consider their post-war military organization. Both were unable to project adequate military strength or respective roles and missions without some guidance from the Executive and Legislative Branches of the Government. During 1944, the unification controversy between the Army and Navy became an issue before the Congress. The Congress attempted to resolve service roles and missions that

the JCS had been unable to accomplish. The Woodrum Committee and a Special Committee of the JCS both failed to achieve unification, as the Army desired, or coordination, the goal of the Navy.

During 1945 and 1946, Congressional and Presidential influence upon the two service Secretaries and their respective services implied that some form of unification was desired. The services then prepared plans that followed separate thoughts: there would be a single department with subdivisions for the Army, Navy, and Air; the services would remain separated; or there would be three separate departments. Within each of the services there was fear that each would lose its traditional identity and its importance to defense. President Truman directed the two departments to reach a compromise. The result of the President's influence was a bill that incorporated parts of both service plans without actually resolving their ideological differences--the National Security Act of 1947.

Before the ink on the compromised Act dried, the services were again engaged in controversy over roles and missions relating to strategic air warfare. The JCS again failed to resolve the differences, as each of the service Chiefs, while a member of the JCS, was also the Chief seeking clarity of roles and missions. The Act had not given the Secretary of Defense sufficient power to direct compromise; consequently, additional legislation was required. The subsequent amendments of 1949, reflecting the recommendations of James Forrestal and the Hoover Commission's investigation into the National Security

Organization, did strengthen the office of the Secretary of Defense; however, they did not eliminate service rivalry which again surfaced over the B-36 bomber and the Navy's super-carrier.

There were several key references that formed the base of this study. Paul Y. Hammond's Organizing for Defense: The American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century; John C. Ries, The Management of Defense: Organization and Control of the U. S. Armed Services; Russell F. Weigley's, History of the United States Army; and Vincent Davis's Post War Defense Policy and the U. S. Navy, 1943-1946. Additionally, The Forrestal Diaries, edited by Walter Millis, Harry S. Truman's Memoirs, and the Samuel I. Rosenman and Clark Clifford Papers located in the Truman Library are critical to any evaluation of service unification. Finally, the various hearings by the U. S. Congress relating to unification and Annex G. of the Hoover Commission's Report on Government Organization are invaluable.

The conclusion that I have reached is that the JCS as organized is incapable of unifying the armed forces since the members are confronted with conflicting dual functions. If unification of the armed forces is truly desired within the United States, some other organization other than the JCS will be required.