

Planning for conflict transformation after U.S. military intervention

by

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AN ABSTRACT OF A DISSERTATION

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Abstract

This dissertation investigates how U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) planning for post-conflict stability operations affects conflict transformation following military interventions. The persistent challenges associated with post-conflict stabilization efforts following U.S. military interventions in fragile and/or failed states underscore a critical gap in understanding how military planning influences conflict transformation. Conventional academic discourse largely attributes the failures of U.S. military stabilization to inadequate problem comprehension or the deterioration of civil-military relations. This dissertation posits an alternative perspective: the root cause of these shortcomings lies in an uninformed understanding of the intricate process by which planning genuinely transforms conflict into durable peace, one that cultivates a stable and strengthened representative government. Using conflict transformation literature, the research uses expectations derived from literature to focus on three core components – understanding the conflict, establishing an inclusive and synchronized planning framework, and creating and sustaining national mechanisms of governance.

The study employs fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) to assess whether the presence of these planning conditions leads to successful conflict transformation, defined as the emergence of a stable and strengthened representative government. Using fsQCA to systematically examine eight instances of U.S. military intervention from 1989 to 2003, the analysis tests four hypotheses linking planning elements to post-conflict outcomes. The dissertation also provides detailed case studies of U.S. interventions in Afghanistan (2001), Haiti (1995), and Iraq (2003) to explain the analysis specific to historical case studies. The findings suggest that understanding the conflict is a necessary condition for conflict transformation and that two distinct pathways: one where understanding conflict is combined with efforts to build

national mechanisms and another where understanding is combined with the absence of a fully integrated framework are sufficient for the outcome.

By bridging planning doctrine with conflict transformation theory, this dissertation provides a novel theoretical framework and methodological approach for evaluating and improving U.S. military planning for stability operations. The research contributes to both academic scholarship and policy development, emphasizing the need for comprehensive, adaptive planning strategies to guide future U.S. military interventions and post-conflict engagements.

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Dedication

To my beloved in-laws, Gary and Nancy Smith, whose unwavering love and selflessness made my husband and I's service possible. Through multiple combat deployment, you not only supported us but also stepped in to take care of Sam, Dylan, and Finn with boundless care and devotion. Your sacrifice, strength, and generosity will never be forgotten. This work is dedicated to your memory with deepest gratitude and love.

Chapter 1 - Introduction

“Perhaps the most difficult problem posed by contemporary warfare, all in all, is the difficulty of achieving a stable, secure ending to it.” – James Turner Johnson, *Morality and Contemporary Warfare*

“In preparing for battle I have always found that plans are useless, but planning is indispensable” – Dwight D. Eisenhower

Problem and Purpose

In the three and a half decades since the end of the Cold War, the United States has stood alone as a unipolar hegemon. The aftermath of the Cold War left a geopolitical landscape marked by the emergence of fragile states, ethnic conflicts, and power vacuums caused by the collapse of authoritarian regimes. The United States, recognizing the potential for instability to give rise to future conflict and threaten global security, adopted new paradigms to transform conflict and promote stable, representative governments (Barnett, 2006; Fukuyama, 2004). No longer were the Cold War paradigms prioritizing the spread of communism over promoting democratic values deemed acceptable (Ikenberry, 2020).

From 1990 to early 2001, liberal internationalism and democratic peace theory produced new liberal paradigms of international security within the United States (Ikenberry, 2011; Talentino, 2005; Trubowitz & Burgoon, 2023). The U.S. government, no longer focused on the singular acute security challenge of the Soviet Union, shifted its security prioritization to humanitarian military interventions and multilateral and post-conflict state building operations (Biscop, 2021; Olson-Lounsbery & Pearson, 2020; Toft & Kushi, 2023). These new paradigms focused less on specific threats and more on a desire to create stable and strengthened representative governments.

Al-Qaeda's terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and the subsequent War on Terror significantly reoriented the United States' national security strategy. While the liberal internationalist ideals that characterized the early post-Cold War era – such as democratization, multilateral cooperation, and peacebuilding – were not entirely abandoned, they were increasingly reframed through a securitized lens (Miller & Rubinovitz, 2020; Toft & Kushi, 2023). The new strategic paradigm emphasized the perceived dangers posed by weak and fragile states, not only as internal humanitarian or governance concerns but as external threats capable of exporting instability and harboring transnational terrorist networks. The international community defines fragile states as those where the state has lost or is not capable of establishing its monopoly of public power and public coercion during conflict and fails to meet its responsibilities toward its citizens (Krause, 2024; Mazarr, 2014).

As a result, U.S. security policy began to treat state fragility as both a direct threat to national interests and a focal point for military engagement. The objective extended beyond defeating adversaries on the battlefield to include efforts aimed at transforming conflict-ridden societies into stable and strengthened representative political systems, thereby reducing the likelihood of conflict recurrence and terrorist resurgence (Cawthra & Luckham, 2003; Olson-Lounsbery & Pearson, 2020; Rotberg, 2004; Toft & Kushi, 2023). This dual imperative – countering immediate security threats while promoting long-term political stability – has since become a defining feature of U.S. military interventions and post-conflict stabilization efforts in the 21st century.

Following the Cold War, a growing body of scholarship across history, political science, and international relations began to examine the evolving character of U.S. military intervention (Antizzo, 2010; Bacevich, 2005; Barma, 2017; Finnemore, 2003; Malkasian, 2017; Mansoor,

2013; Talentino, 2005; Von Hippel, 2000). A general consensus emerged that U.S. military interventions had undergone a qualitative transformation, shifting from conventional, state-centric warfare to more complex operations involving intrastate conflict, humanitarian crises, and post-conflict reconstruction. Scholars have proposed varying explanations for this shift. Some, like Finnemore (2003), emphasize systemic-level changes such as the rise of multilateral norms, international law, and evolving institutional frameworks. Others point to a broadening of the security agenda, in which threats no longer solely defined in terms of interstate aggression but increasingly include internal instability, civil conflict, and human insecurity (Barma, 2017; Talentino, 2005). From both historical and theoretical perspectives, understanding this transformation is essential for improving Department of Defense planning practices and identifying the conditions under which military interventions are most likely to succeed (Antizzo, 2010; Malkasian, 2017; Suri, 2011; Von Hippel, 2000). The American public's evolving expectations have also played a significant role in shaping the political context of military action. As Bacevich (2005) and Toft & Kushi (2023) argue, the U.S. public increasingly expects that military force will not only neutralize threats but also contribute to broader international stability and democratic governance. Interventions involve considerable investment of human and material resources and affect the fate of individual leaders as well as the political, social, and economic fortunes of both the intervening and the target countries (Jentleson & Levite, 1992; Olson-Lounsbery & Pearson, 2020; Mansoor, 2013).

As the U.S. government shifted its security prioritizations and strategy for military intervention after the Cold War, the role of the U.S. military evolved accordingly. The new paradigms, geared toward transforming conflict and the prevention of future conflict through strengthened and representative governance, fundamentally altered the role and focus of the U.S.

military. The military, once structured primarily for combat against peer adversaries, had to adapt to new missions, stability operations, that required skills in nation-building, state-building, and interagency cooperation (Davis, 1993; Cerami & Boggs, 2007). Military operations no longer focus solely on defeating enemy forces, but also on providing security and support environments conducive to political transition and economic recovery. Military strategy changed to formally recognize an expanded range of military operations and recognition that the U.S. military must plan for post-war stability (Department of Defense [DoD], 1993, p. 7).

In the early 2000s the U.S. military incorporated these post-war stability operations and activities into its core set of military missions.¹ Subsequently clearly defining its fundamentals of stabilization to help military commanders develop plans to achieve the broader political objective of stable and strengthened representative governments. These fundamentals – conflict transformation, unity of effort, building host-nation capacity and capabilities, and host-nation ownership and legitimacy – create the foundation for long-term stability, guiding military planning and execution of its operations (Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], 2022, I-19). Conflict transformation is the process for addressing the underlying causes of violent conflict while reducing sources of instability and strengthening mitigators across political, security, rule of law, economic, and social spheres, while building host-nation capacity to manage political and economic competition through peaceful means (JCS, 2022, p. I-19). Unity of effort is the collaboration of the diverse array of actors involved in stabilization operations (JCS, 2022, p. I-20). Host-nation capacity is the ability of host-nation to provide security, governance, economic

¹ See the Department of Defense, Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept, September 2004; Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, November 2005; U.S. Army FM 3-07, Stability Operations, October 2008; and Joint Chiefs of Staff JP 3-07, Stability Operations, September 2011.

development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical government functions to its population (JCS, 2022, pp. I-19-20). While host-nation ownership and legitimacy are ensuring those systems are constructive and legitimate in the eyes of its population (JCS, 2022, p. I-20).

Every military operation begins with a plan. Military planning is not merely a procedural task; it is a fundamental component of conducting military operations, serving as the critical bridge between national strategic objectives and the execution of military action on the ground (JCS, 2020, I-1). Effective planning ensures unity of effort, coherence across military and civilian components, and responsiveness to evolving conditions in conflict environments. Without a deliberate and structured planning process, military operations risk becoming disjointed, reactionary, and detached from broader policy goals. Sound planning provides the analytical rigor, organizational framework, and strategic foresight necessary to ensure the military actions are not only effective in defeating threats but are also aligned with longer-term political objectives, including stabilization (JCS, 2020). As the U.S. increasingly recognizes the strategic risks posed by weak and fragile states, the integration of stabilization principles into military planning becomes a strategic necessity. Planning for a security strategy that addresses both the threat of instability in fragile states and the imperative to transform conflict-affected societies into stable and strengthened representative governments requires military planners to embed stabilization fundamentals into their military plans. A coherent post-intervention strategy/plan is not ancillary – it is essential to the success of conflict transformation and the prevention of conflict relapse (Flavin, 2018; Robinson et al, 2014).

Post-Cold War U.S. military intervention tested the Department of Defense's ability to operationalize this evolving security strategy. Confronted with increasingly complex conflicts, the U.S. military adapted its doctrinal frameworks to both conventional threats and transforming

war-torn societies after conflict. These interventions reflected a growing recognition that success on the battlefield did not equate to strategic success unless it contributed to the stabilization and political transformation of the host nation. Military operations in the Western Hemisphere, Europe, the Middle East, and the Horn of Africa in the 1990s and early 2000s offered valuable lessons for how to integrate stability operations into planning processes. These experiences should have culminated in more effective post-conflict planning during the U.S. military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, both conflicts revealed enduring institutional and conceptual challenges. Despite years of operational learning, the U.S. military struggled to effectively plan, thereby undermining its ability to set the conditions necessary for conflict transformation (Barma, 2017; Bensahel, 2006; Myerson, 2016; Rathmell, 2005; Serafino & Weiss, 2006).

These less-than-ideal efforts necessitate a critical inquiry: given the continued prevalence of fragile and failing states, and the inconsistent outcomes of previous planning efforts, how can the U.S. military improve its planning processes to more reliably set the conditions for durable peace and representative governance following intervention? The stakes are significant. Inadequate planning and execution of post-conflict stabilization jeopardizes not only the host nation's recovery but also broader U.S. national security interests. Conversely, successful conflict transformation reinforces global stability, supports allied legitimacy, and reduces the probability of future military interventions. As scholars have noted, failure to transform conflict after intervention is one of the most significant predictors of renewed violence and long-term instability (Barma, 2017; Call & Wyeth, 2008; Krause, 2024).

Addressing this challenge necessitates a foundational understanding of the U.S. military's role in conflict transformation. That responsibility emerges from the operational reality that once

United States political leaders decide to militarily intervene in another country, the U.S. military becomes the primary instrument for bridging the gap between active conflict (defeating the threat) and the reconstruction of post-conflict, war-torn societies (stabilization) (Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], 2016, p. I-1). This transition requires the military to play a significant role in both planning for and conducting stabilization after military intervention (Baylis et al., 2022; Robinson et al., 2014; Schadlow, 2017; Serafino & Weiss, 2006; Suri, 2011). In the wake of the United States invasions into Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States government commissioned several studies to assess the planning of the post-conflict stabilization phase of those military interventions. Most of the studies indicated that a lack of effective planning prior to the execution of U.S. stabilization efforts severely hampered that effort (Bensahel, 2006; Olson-Lounsbery & Pearson, 2020). Despite these critiques, there remains a notable gap in scholarly literature: no comprehensive study has yet established a quantifiable relationship between Department of Defense planning processes and the achievement of conflict transformation outcomes in post-intervention contexts.

The United States has a long and varied history of conducting stability operation, including significant efforts before the end of the Cold War (Buss, 2005; Dobbins et al., 2003; Marr, 2018; Orr, 2004; Taw, 2018). The purpose of this dissertation is not to examine the U.S. policy reasons or resourcing decisions involved in designating the U.S. military as the lead entity for planning post-conflict stabilization. Rather its contribution lies in examining how the Department of Defense plans for stability operations once national leaders make the decision to militarily intervene.

The central aim of this dissertation is to explore the extent to which Department of Defense planning influences the success of conflict transformation following U.S. military

interventions. This paper hereto defines conflict transformation as a comprehensive process by which a nation's political, social, and institutional structures are reshaped to reduce or eliminate the root causes of violent conflict, thereby enabling the emergence of a stable and strengthened representative government (Miall, 2004; Paris, 2004; Paris & Sisk, 2009). Conflict transformation theory identifies three essential building blocks to transforming conflict into a stable and strengthened representative government: understanding the conflict (Lederach, 2003; Miall, 2004; Myerson, 2016; Robinson et al., 2014), the framework of the intervenor (Ramsbotham et al., 2016), and the creation and sustainment of appropriate national mechanisms (Bakke et al., 2018; Brinkerhoff, 2005; Paris, 2004). This dissertation aims to address a critical gap in current security studies literature by examining how these elements' articulation in the U.S. military's planning processes affect the outcome of a stable and strengthened representative government. In doing so, it contributes to a policy-relevant and theoretically grounded understanding of the link between planning and conflict transformation in the context of American military interventions.

Conceptual Issues

In the changing landscape of U.S. military interventions, particularly in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 eras, the concepts of nation-building, state-building, and post-conflict stabilization have emerged as central yet often conflated terms. While authors frequently use each of these terms to describe U.S. efforts to reconstruct war-torn societies, they embody distinct theoretical foundations, operational objectives, and institutional responsibilities. Understanding their differences and intersections is critical for clarifying what the U.S. military is expected to plan for, execute, and sustain in post-conflict environments. Moreover, these concepts are intimately connected to broader approaches to conflict engagement, namely conflict

management, resolution, and transformation, which frame how stability operations are implemented in security studies. Together, these frameworks influence not only the ends of U.S. interventions but also the means through which those ends are pursued, particularly within the Department of Defense's planning architecture. This section outlines the conceptual boundaries and operational implications of all these terms and examines the historical theoretical underpinnings of U.S. military planning.

State-building vs. Nation-building vs. Post-Conflict Stabilization

Paris & Sisk (2009) define state-building as the strengthening or construction of legitimate governmental institutions in countries that are emerging from conflicts. While their frame of reference is stabilizing states after civil war, their definition of state-building comes from examining the dilemmas related to the task, transcending the type of conflict proceeding the need for post-conflict stabilization and its successful outcome. Paris & Sisk describe post-conflict state-building as a complex and demanding task combining three separate yet simultaneous transitions: a social transition from internecine fighting to peace; a political transition from wartime government (or the absence of government) to postwar government; and an economic transition from war-warped accumulation and distribution to equitable, transparent postwar development that in turn reinforces peace (p. 1). They conceive of post-war state-building as an inherently contradiction-filled enterprise rather than as a sequence of mutually reinforcing steps (p. 13). Finally, Paris & Sisk provide an a priori list of "core" state functions legitimate government institutions must perform for a successful outcome: the provision of security, the rule of law (including a codified and promulgated body of laws with a reasonably effective police and justice system), basic services (including emergency relief, support for the

poorest, and essential healthcare), and at least a rudimentary ability to formulate and implement budget plans and to collect revenues through taxation (p. 15).

In contrast, nation-building, as defined Suri (2011), emphasizes a more human-centric and socio-political process. Nation-building is an endeavor to construct a civil society, a constant and tortured struggle to arbitrate between the local and the global, to balance competing claims, interests, and cultures (p. 100). Suri argues nation-building is not new to the United States – the United States has a long history of this activity – beginning after the American Civil War and continuing to the present day. He contends that only by understanding the human choices Americans made in pursuing nation-building in the past can one calibrate expectations for how Americans will pursue and succeed in nation-building moving forward. He claims the story of nation-building is the story of both political and institutional change (p. 9) with partnerships, process, problem-solving, purpose, and people as themes running through American nation-building efforts. Suri notes that while Americans have made more wars than many others, they have also tried more often than anyone else to build nations after battle (p. 8). Their efforts, however, rarely possessed even the most rudimentary knowledge of how to build democratic nations; success came only when they possessed the resources and resolved to adjust their efforts (p. 36). Suri contends that in the twenty-first century, as in earlier periods, the question is not whether the United States should nation-build, but rather how (p. 253). Seeing nation-building as a partnership and process involving problem-solving, purpose, and people should encourage citizens to test their assumptions, examine their actions, and ask what they can do better (p. 276). For Suri, nation-building is less about what one does and more about how one accomplishes the task.

For the purposes of this paper, post-conflict stabilization refers to those operations executed outside the United States and its territories after military intervention across the five stability sectors. In the United States, official government policy says the responsibility for post-conflict stability operations generally falls to both the Department of Defense and the Department of State. In practice, it is the Department of Defense that bears primary responsibility for planning and initiating stabilization activities during and immediately following conflict operations. The Department of Defense defines stabilization as “the process by which military and nonmilitary actors collectively apply various instruments of national power to address drivers of conflict, foster host-nation resiliencies, and create conditions that enable sustainable peace and security.” (JCS, 2016, p. ix). It further defines stability actions as those activities outside the United States to minimize, if not eliminate, economic and political instability and other drivers of violent conflict across five stability sectors – security, justice and reconciliation, humanitarian assistance and social well-being, governance and participation, and economic stabilization and infrastructure (p. ix). In this way, post-conflict stabilization incorporated elements of both state-building and nation-building but remains distinct in its practical scope and institutional ownership, particularly within the U.S. military planning apparatus.

Conflict Management vs Conflict Resolution vs Conflict Transformation

Within the security studies literature, particularly in the context of military stability operations, understanding the conceptual distinctions between conflict management, conflict resolution, and conflict transformation is critical for shaping post-conflict planning. Though frequently conflated in policy discourse, these three frameworks differ significantly in their assumptions, goals, and operational approaches.

Conflict management is primarily a pragmatic strategy designed to contain violence and prevent escalation. It operates on the assumption that conflict is inevitable and must be regulated through diplomacy, ceasefires, or military deterrence (Wallensteen, 2019). This approach is typically state-centric and aligned with realist perspectives, emphasizing balance of power and strategic interests (Ramsbothan et al., 2016). It does not aim to solve the conflict but rather to manage its immediate effects. Prime examples of this type of military intervention are the Korean War Armistice and U.S. presence in South Korea, Operation Provide Comfort in Iraq from 1991-1996, and Operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq and Syria from 2014-present. The Korean War Armistice prevented escalation through a balance of power, without transforming the underlying inter-Korean rivalry or ideological divide. Operation Provide Comfort managed the immediate consequences of internal repression without challenging the sovereignty or internal power structure of the Iraqi state. And Operation Inherent Resolve aims at only degrading a non-state actor threatening regional and global security but not addressing the broader political roots of the conflict in Iraq or Syria. When the U.S. military engages in conflict management, it contains violence, uses heavy military deterrence, and targets a very specific threat; it does combine military intervention with stability operations to resolve the root causes of the conflict.

In contrast, conflict resolution seeks to address the root causes of conflict through political negotiation, diplomacy, and consensus-building. In the context of military-led stability operations, this might include facilitating dialogue between warring parties or supporting political settlements under international guidance (Ramsbotham et al., 2016). This approach draws from liberal institutionalism, advocating cooperative frameworks and long-term political solutions to armed conflict. U.S. military operations with the NATO-led Implementation Force

and Stabilization Force in Bosnia was an example of conflict resolution. The U.S. military operations in Bosnia was an intervention coupled with long-term diplomatic and institution-building efforts with root cause engagement through a negotiated settlement and international peacekeeping. When the U.S. military engages in conflict resolution, it emphasizes inclusive political settlements, institutional reform, and often involves multilateral engagement.

Conflict transformation is the most ambitious of the three, pursuing structural and relational changes that go beyond ceasefires or peace accords. It involves reconfiguring power dynamics, addressing historical injustices, and transforming political institutions to promote inclusive governance (Lederach, 2003). In military terms, this aligns with the whole of government strategies where U.S. military forces support governance reform, development, security, and rule of law, often in partnership with civilian agencies. The U.S. intervention in Haiti in 1994, Afghanistan in 2001, and in Iraq in 2003 exemplify conflict transformation. These interventions incorporated stability operations focused on building inclusive institutions and addressing long-term sources of conflict and grievances with civil-military integration.

Planning

The Department of Defense clearly defines planning and has a clearly defined process for planning, but the theoretical underpinning of planning often flows from the DoD civilian leader. The Department of Defense defines planning as the deliberate process of determining how to use military capabilities in time and space to achieve objectives (JCS, 2020, p. xi). Planning translates national level guidance into specific activities aimed at achieving national and military objectives and involves the functions of providing guidance, concept development, plan development, and plan assessment (p. xii). The process of planning revolves around the military commander, due to the commander's knowledge, experience, and judgment. The process

encompasses a series of steps initiating the development of military options, the reason for acting, potential ways to use military capabilities, analyzing those ways to refine the use of military capabilities, determining which course of action best achieves the desired result, and then producing a written document describing how one integrates and synchronizes the actions of components and supporting organizations (JCS, 2020). In its Stability publication, the DoD devotes an entire chapter to stabilization planning (JCS, 2016), emphasizing how various military and civilian stability efforts interrelate, that there is no separate planning process for stability from that used for combat operations, and how joint planning must consider the key element of conflict transformation – how joint, interagency, and multinational actions can transform the factors producing violent conflict over time (p. IV-1). The aforementioned definition of planning and clearly defined process for planning serves the DoD well in strictly military operations. However, the changing nature of military intervention and post-conflict stabilization operations has given way to a lack of a valid and defined theoretical underpinning for current DoD stability planning.

The end of the Cold War and the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States led in 2005 to then Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, noting today's environment demands a system that quickly produces high quality plans that are adaptive to changing circumstances (Fitzsimmons, 2006, pp. 131-2). Rumsfeld envisioned a revolution in planning which would take the U.S. military from its Cold War planning model, emphasizing static conventional threats and little strategic change during a two-three year planning cycle, to more contemporary planning, emphasizing dynamic/global unconventional and conventional threats and a shortened planning cycle, with continuous reassessments of the plan (Gregor, 2010). The

United States military adapted its planning processes to incorporate Rumsfeld's variations to its previous understanding of the demand-based planning approach.

In the early 2000s, that new way of planning and operating derived from the concept of Effects-Based Operations. The idea of effects-based operations has its roots in airpower theory² and the wartime experiences of young U.S. Air Force officers appalled by the ineffective use of airpower in Vietnam (Davis, 2001, p. 1). At the core of the endeavor to develop an effective contemporary planning system, was the U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) planning system developed effects-based operations (Gregor, 2010, p. 100). The concept of effects-based operations emphasized the utilization of all or selected elements of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and/or economic) in concert to achieve strategic goals and national objectives (Admiral, 2005, p. 9). The effects-based approach had four primary components: knowledge superiority, an effects-based planning process, dynamic execution, and accurate, timely effects assessment (U.S. Joint Forces Command [USJFCOM], 2004, p. 9).

The U.S. military achieved knowledge superiority through a process called operational net assessment, which was supported by a system of systems analysis (Gregor, 2010, p. 101). This system of systems analysis required understanding of the adversary's political, military, economic, social, and information systems and the associated infrastructure (USJFCOM, 2004, pp. 10-11). Using operational net assessment supported effect-based planning by helping military planners create the necessary understanding of the operating environment, to see the enemy as an adaptive entity within that environment, and to see how military forces could most effectively and efficiently influence a potential adversary's perceptions, capabilities, behavior, and decision making (USJFCOM, 2004, p. 11). Within this framework, a Joint Interagency Coordination

² See Beagle, T.W. (2000), Effects-Based Targeting: Another Empty Promise?

Group served as a multi-functional advisory element to facilitate sharing, planning and coordination, and political-military synthesis across the interagency community for the military commander (USJFCOM, 2004, p. 12).

The second component of the effects-based approach, effects-based planning process, aimed to develop a campaign plan that matches strategic aims with a particular military operation's objectives (USJFCOM, 2004, p. 16). The planning process enabled military planners to propose military forces needed to achieve those objectives, decide which joint military actions would create those effects, and to incorporate joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities needed to execute the actions (USJFCOM, 2004, p. 17).

The third and fourth components of the effects-based approach focus on the actual execution of the operation and its assessment. Dynamic and adaptive execution, the third component of the effects-based approach, involved joint force components supporting the planned operation with specific capabilities, synchronizing their activities at the point of action (USJFCOM, 2004, p. 17). Effects assessment determined the operational effect of an action (USJFCOM, 2004, p. 17). These two components emphasize four areas of effects-based thinking – the importance of linking all actions (political, diplomatic, economic, and military), continuous assessment of the effect and adaptation of plans and action, thinking about the implication of actions and operations in terms of their second, third, and nth order effects, and thinking about the implication and consequences of effects over time (Admiral, 2005, p. 23).

The effects-based approach encouraged military planners to change the way they viewed the enemy, U.S. military capabilities, and what they included and emphasized in the planning process (Admiral, 2005, p. 47). It was the primary approach used by the Department of Defense in planning for the transition to stability operations after combat ended in both Afghanistan and

Iraq. However, in 2008, General James Mattis assumed command of USJFCOM and directed, “Effective immediately, USJFCOM will no longer use, sponsor, or export the concepts related to EBO, ONA [operational net assessment], and SoSA [system of systems analysis] in our training, doctrine development, and support of JPME [joint professional military education]” (Mattis, 2008, p. 23). The effects-based approach to planning died a quiet death as the approach’s four primary components failed to provide the strategic military successes envisioned (Kelly & Kilcullen, 2006; Mattis, 2008; Van Riper, 2009; Vego, 2006). No valid and defined theoretical underpinning for planning replaced the effects-based approach.

Significance of the Study

"Studying the past is no sure guide to predicting the future. What it does do, though, is to prepare you for the future by expanding experience, so that you can increase your skills, your stamina – and, if all goes well, your wisdom” (Gaddis, 2004, 257). Understanding the intertwining history of U.S. military interventions and past stabilization efforts is essential for expanding the experience and thus the wisdom of future interventions and stabilization efforts by the U.S. military. The experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq made clear planners failed to heed many of the lessons learned in previous experiences. Understanding how planning can lead to success is crucial for the United States because the United States will continue to use military force to underpin stabilization (Olson-Lounsbery & Pearson, 2020; Toft & Kushi, 2023), much as it has throughout the post-Cold War period.

As researchers and academics examine the two most recent (instances) of U.S. military intervention with stability operations, the consensus is the United States planning failed on both accounts (Byman, 2008; Corera, 2004; Crane & Terrill, 2003; O’Hanlon, 2004/2005; Rathmell, 2005). But disagreement abounds on the cause of the failure. Corera (2004) and Rathmell (2005)

argue the cause of failure resides in a dysfunctional interagency process for planning. LTG(R) Jay Garner, the Director of the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (OHRA) for Iraq in 2003, explains in an interview with Corera (2004) that it was bureaucratic rivalry that stymied effective planning (p. 30). Organizations failed to communicate with one another and used their individual planning processes rather than an interagency process (p. 33). Rathmell (2005) describes how the military's desire for unity of command to ensure unity of effort is a challenge in civil-military operations, where no government agency wants to be subordinate to another in the process (p. 1030).

This contrasts with Crane and Terrill (2003) and Byman's (2008) belief that structural conditions are the primary cause of post-conflict stabilization failure in Iraq and to a lesser extent Afghanistan. Crane and Terrill (2003) describe the structural conditions that allowed the situation in Iraq once combat ended to swiftly deteriorate as an inability of Westerners to understand the political and socio-economic culture of Iraq (p. 41). Byman (2008) furthered Crane and Terrill's (2003) argument with his observation that the U.S. military's (and by extension the U.S. government) lack of planning exacerbated the structural problems of weak institutions, nationalism, and a failed state in Iraq (p. 621).

The final reason noted by several authors for the failure of planning post-conflict stabilization in Iraq and Afghanistan was the failure of the United States to link strategy to military operations. O'Hanlon (2004/2005) contends the United States failed to recognize how strategy and military operations work in concert with one another (p. 35). Rathmell (2005) argues the same, noting that in Iraq the U.S. military leadership failed to conceptualize the plan as an integrated political-military effort. In his analysis, Byman (2008) claims U.S. military and civilian leadership did not produce a comprehensive plan for postwar Iraq and that the plans they

developed were not in sufficient detail. Schadlow (2017) summarizes the failure by contending military intervention requires American leaders to develop a strategy that defines what that intervention seeks to achieve, how they expect to achieve consolidation of military gains politically.

The significance of all the aforementioned sources is to show that America has a strong history of military intervention followed by nation-building, but that Americans remain overall dissatisfied with the results of those efforts. Improving U.S. planning for and outcomes in future interventions requires a fundamental change in the way that the United States plans for war. Failing to transform conflict perpetuates rather than reduces threats to national and international security. In essence, this study argues that when political leaders chose to militarily intervene in a fragile state, the U.S. military must set the conditions for success in post-conflict stability by planning the transition to and execution of post-conflict stability operations through the lens of conflict transformation.

In sum, this study will add precision to our understanding of how planning influences the success of post-conflict stability operations. It moves beyond descriptive accounts of planning and lays out a clearly specified theory to explain how planning influences post-conflict stability. It tests the theory using a more rigorous method than has been used in the literature to date. This dissertation is also methodologically significant. Unlike previous studies on military intervention with post-conflict stabilization that have only relied on anecdotal evidence and limited qualitative analyses, this dissertation uses a qualitative comparative analysis. Because instances of military intervention followed by stability operations are intrinsically complex, multi-faceted with blurred boundaries, and naturally limited (Small-N), they require a strategy aimed at

gathering in-depth insight into different instances to capture their complexity, while still attempting to produce some form of generalization.

Limitations and Assumptions

As in any research, the availability of data on U.S. military interventions limits the study, in most cases actual planning documents. Thus, public U.S. government records provide the source of the data on military forces, planning, interagency involvement, and stability operations. Where feasible, I made every attempt to obtain primary historical records from the military.

The scope of this study limits it to military intervention and post-conflict stability operations by the United States. As the most powerful (India is of course much larger by population) mature democracy, it is prudent to begin the debate using the United States as a model for further study. However, limiting the study to the United States exposes a weakness in generalizing the findings across other post-conflict operations.

The period examined in the qualitative comparative analysis is limited to 1989 - 2003 since data are readily available from public records. The focus of the data collection is from U.S. Department of Defense records. Meanwhile, this study acknowledges that other elements of the U.S. government executive branch also contribute to planning and executing post-conflict stability operations. The U.S. Department of Defense will always initiate planning ending conflict and transitioning to post-conflict stability operations and habitually conducts after-action reviews, therefore providing a record of actions taken and results achieved.

This study assumes that the United States will continue to militarily intervene internationally and engage in post-conflict stability operations. However, the United States government is not an isolated actor and is influenced by multiple multilateral, intergovernmental, and non-governmental actors that have influence on post-conflict stabilization. Likewise, the

United States military is not an isolated actor; instead, one must view the post-conflict environment as a complex adaptive system composed of many individuals, interests, and entities each competing in a highly complex environment. Furthermore, this study acknowledges that the U.S. defense priorities fluctuates over time, that U.S. DOD personnel is a finite resource, and that the United States is likely to be involved in future conflicts.

Organization of the Dissertation

The dissertation is organized into seven additional chapters. Chapter 2 reviews the current state of the literature on planning and develops a framework for examining planning's effect on transforming conflict. Chapter 3 introduces the methodology and case studies. Chapter 4 explains the methodological approach (QCA) used to examine the cases and presents the analysis. Chapters 5 through 7 explain the analysis specific to historical case studies: Chapter 5 examines Operation Enduring Freedom, the 2001 U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan to secure the country and develop Afghan security forces. Chapter 6 examines Operation Uphold Democracy, the 1995 U.S. military intervention to restore democratic governance in Haiti. Chapter 7 examines Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 2003 U.S. military intervention in Iraq to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Chapter 8 concludes the dissertation, provides a more detailed summary of the main arguments and findings, and limitations and briefly highlights future research.

Chapter 2 - Literature Review and Theoretical Background

Introduction

This chapter lays the groundwork for understanding how U.S. military planning can foster conflict transformation through post-conflict stability operations following American military intervention. While the U.S. military possesses a robust tradition of conducting after-action reviews and documenting the historical record of military interventions and stability operations³, a critical gap remains in both military and academic spheres: a systematic exploration of the intrinsic link between military planning processes and the broader goals of conflict transformation achieved through post-conflict stability operations. Given that the United States has a vested interest in the success of post-conflict stabilization and that military planning serves as the critical mechanism by which the strategic objective of a stable and strengthened representative government is translated into the operational methods for attaining conflict transformation, it is peculiar no researchers have developed a theoretical framework to explain the linkage.

Existing literature on military planning documents the dissatisfaction noted in Chapter 1 with the results of military intervention followed by nation-building in achieving stable and strengthened representative governments. However, it tends to be descriptive, lacking a rigorous examination of how specific planning elements directly influence conflict transformation. Such descriptive work nonetheless provides implicit arguments about the variables one can use to evaluate a planning process to achieve conflict transformation. A comprehensive understanding

³ See the U.S. Army Center of Military History, <https://history.army.mil/index.html>; Center for Army Lessons Learned, <https://usacac.army.mil/organizations/mccoe/call>; and the National Archives – Archives Library Information Center, <https://www.archives.gov/research/alic/reference/military/american-military-history.html>.

of the literature detailing past post-stabilization planning failures provides the basis for the construction of a theoretical framework. What then follows is the presentation of a clearly defined theoretical framework allowing for theory-driven analysis essential in exploring the linkage between planning and conflict transformation.

Literature Review

Military strategists and commanders have long understood the importance of planning in the conduct of war and military operations. What is not always clear is their understanding of its importance in stability operations and how to interact with other U.S. government entities who have a vested interest in those operations. A broad review of planning doctrine from the Department of Defense shows military doctrine does not treat planning for stability operations differently than planning for combat operations (JCS, 2016; JCS, 2017). Even though the United States military, other U.S. government entities, and many international organizations invest significant resources, both intellectual and time, into planning, there is very little scholarly study of the process. The available literature on planning as it relates to stability operations after U.S. military intervention categorizes planning failures into two main themes – the failure of the U.S. military to understand the nature of the problem (Corera, 2004; Crandall, 2006; Gray, 2015; Imlay & Toft, 2006; Rathmell, 2005; Robinson et al., 2014) and the existence of tensions between civilian and military entities (Byman, 2008; Crane & Terrill, 2003; Flavin, 2018; O’Hanlon, 2004/2005).

The first of the two themes – the failure of the U.S. military to understand the nature of the problem – details four main reasons for the failure of the U.S. military in planning for stability operations – uncertainty (Alberts & Hayes, 2007; Fitzsimmons, 2006; Imlay & Toft,

2006; Robinson et al., 2014), bad assumptions (Rathmell, 2005), a lack of understanding cause and effect (Gregor, 2010), and a denial syndrome (Schadlow, 2017).

For those authors who contend uncertainty is the cause for the failure of the U.S. military in planning for stability operations, the uncertainty results from a lack of information, clear guidance from national leaders, and/or a lack of shared awareness among the various participants executing stability operations on behalf of the U.S. government. Imlay and Toft (2006) assert uncertainty is one of the few certainties for contemporary military planners (p. 2). They contend a lack of information, guidance, and shared awareness in six areas cause uncertainty – historical shifts and changes, the interstate system, the nature of political systems, civil military relations, bureaucratic politics, and individual planner’s particular social, political, and institutional contexts (pp. 4-8). Imlay and Toft’s (2006) perspective is that flawed understanding on the part of the planners result in the failure of stability operations because the basic plan is flawed. Fitzsimmons (2006) argues uncertainty creates conditions where a lack of clarity and an abundance of ambiguity in planning allows decision-makers to use intuition or wishful thinking (p. 135).

In their analysis of complex planning endeavors between military and civilian entities, Alberts and Hayes (2007) defined uncertainty as a lack of shared awareness. Uncertainty resulted from the individual development of plans among the participants in relative isolation. Insufficient levels of information sharing and collaboration denied planners the ability to properly assess potential effects and create the awareness required for collective action (p. 11). Uncertainty prevents an in-depth understanding of the situation, precludes knowing who needs to decide and when, fails to show an appreciation for what is known and not known, and limits synchronized action (p. 110).

In his examination of the efficacy and appropriateness of the planning for the U.S. invasion into Iraq, Rathmell (2005) argues planning fails due to bad assumptions. In the military planning process, planners make and brief their assumptions (unknown facts) to the commander to continue planning. Rathmell contends that both planners and decision-makers make bad assumptions when no one effectively challenges the assumptions they make, based on their own limited understanding and optimism, in the planning process. Plans fail when the difference between the reality of the operation and the assumed situation differ sharply (p. 1032). Rathmell asserts planners make better assumptions by having a process to challenge them (p. 1038).

An instructor at the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies, a military school designed to educate military officers in campaign planning and strategic thinking, Gregor (2010) provides one of the most comprehensive analyses on military planning systems and stability operations. Gregor explains how traditional military planning methods are not adequate for stability operations, because planners predicate them on reacting to an enemy who will react with a specific action; in stability operations the human response to an action is not predictable (p. 103). An absence of universal social laws and the complexity of the social world mean inferring from observations that one condition is the cause, and another the effect, may simply be an artifact of a planner's education or their own political culture (p. 106). For the military planning system to produce a successful outcome, it needs to understand the political, social, economic, and cultural context of the operation (p. 111). Gregor argues military planning for stability operations requires both planners and decision-makers to incorporate an understanding of actions taken and results observed, from previous operations, to determine if the desired effect will produce a successful outcome.

In her book, *War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating Combat Success into Political Victory*, Schadow (2017) provides one of the most thorough historical analyses of United States military stability operations, demonstrating how the military has failed to learn from their past successes and failures. Schadow makes three major assertions within her theory that planning failures stem from the American denial that military forces overwhelmingly perform governance operations during war. First, military planning should first and foremost support the desired political end state. Second, US military and political leaders must devote the appropriate attention and resources to organizing for the political requirements of military interventions. Third, history repeatedly demonstrates that it will be the military [particularly the Army] charged with implementing key governance tasks (p. 6). While expertise in governance operations may reside elsewhere within the U.S. government, civilian organizations are not capable of operating in conflict zones in sufficient scale over time (p. 275).

Though the nature of post-conflict stability operations and historical evidence demonstrates the need for a strong linkage between the U.S. military and other U.S. government entities in coordinating and cooperating for the execution of these operations, it was not until after Operation Iraqi Freedom that the linkage was codified. In 2005 two documents codified the relationship, National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44) and Department of Defense Directive 3000.05.⁴ These two documents were meant to ensure a common U.S. strategy rather

⁴ NSPD-44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, signed December 7, 2005 by President Bush, was to promote the security of the United States through improved coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife. <https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.pdf>

DoD Directive 3000.05, Military Support to Security, Stability, Transition and Reconstruction Operations, issued November 2005, established stability operations as a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall

than a collection of individual departmental and agency effort (Szayna et al., 2009, p. xiii).

Whether that codification results in successful future stability operations is yet to be seen.

Current literature claims the existence of tensions between civilian and military entities is another reason the U.S. military fails in planning for stability operations. The literature details two main reasons for why U.S. military planning fails to achieve conflict transformation through stability operations after U.S. military intervention. The first is that differences in planning methodology inhibits needed cooperation (Crane & Terrill, 2003; Hayes & Wheatley, 1996) and the second is the failure to recognize the link between policy and military operations (Byman, 2008; O'Hanlon, 2004/2005). While the failure of civil-military relations relates closely to and often intertwines with the failure of the U.S. military to understand the nature of the problem, the available literature focuses on larger institutional differences between the DoD and other government agencies which could assist the DoD with planning. The planning methodology and capabilities of the DoD versus other government agencies expose differences at different echelons of each. The lack of interagency cooperation reveals how the culture of each organization influences cooperation. Finally, the failure of both the DoD and other government agencies to understand the linkage between policy and military operations disconnects the two in planning, one of the most critical junctures, to achieve conflict transformation through stability operations after U.S. military intervention.

The first explanation for how the existence of tensions between civilian and military entities impacts U.S. military planning is the inherent inability for the DoD and other U.S.

be prepared to conduct and support and be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities. <https://policy.defense.gov/OUSSDP-Offices/ASD-for-Special-Operations-Low-Intensity-Conflict/Stability-and-Humanitarian-Affairs/DoD-Capabilities/#:~:text=These%20efforts%20are%20guided%20by,prepared%20to%20conduct%20and%20support.>

government entities to understand one another's planning methodologies. In their examination of interagency political-military planning of Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, Hayes and Wheatley (1996) argue that while interagency dialogue was adequate at the strategic [general] planning level it did not carry through to those executing stability operations after the invasion (p. 16). The two attribute the lack of carry through to the differences in how civilian and military organizations plan. The fundamental approach to planning is different for civilian and military organizations. Planning is an integral part of military operations, and they plan in detail, civilian agencies do not have a similar cadre of experienced planners and what they do plan is in generalities (p. 23). This led to U.S. military planners being surprised that their civilian counterparts were not immediately ready with nation-building programs, while development planners were upset the military refused to plan for those same nation-building efforts, efforts civilian agencies lack sufficient authority and accountability to plan for after U.S. military intervention (p. 17). Hayes and Wheatley (1996) contend that while the Haiti operation was generally successful, the differences in planning methodologies between the DoD and civilian agencies resulted in initial confusion and considerable frustrations during the transition from combat to stability operations (p. 14). Crane and Terrill (2003) reinforced the idea of different planning methodologies impacting the transition from combat to stability operations, noting that in the planning for both Operation Promote Liberty in Panama and Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti military planners excluded many civilian agencies from the DoD planning (p. 5).

The second explanation for how the existence of tensions between civilian and military entities impacts U.S. military planning is the failure of the military and civilian agencies to heed the link between policy and military operations. Civilians and military personnel must encroach

on each other's policymaking territory (O'Hanlon, 2004/2005, p. 35). The political goals of the nation's conflicts and the assumptions of senior civilian and political leader fundamentally affects the tactics and operational plans of the military, meaning military planners must think about and understand policy (O'Hanlon, 2004/2005, p. 35). Policy is America's desired political goals for the military intervention – stabilizing nations, assisting traumatized populations, and rebuilding societies and institutions (Arnas et al., 2005, p. 2). O'Hanlon effectively argues that in Iraq the U.S. military failed to recognize the link between policy and military operations and in doing so provided a seriously flawed and incomplete plan for the transition between combat operations and post-conflict stability (p. 36). Daniel Byman (2008) takes the policy and military operations argument one step further, contending that not only must military planners heed the link between policy and military operations, but that they must also recognize that a lack of planning can exacerbate the structural problems of weak institutions and nationalism within failed states. Policy informs military operations, and military operations can inform changes or adjustments in policy.

The existing literature provides an important foundation for understanding how U.S. military planning may or may not have advanced conflict transformation through post-conflict stability operations after American military intervention. The literature's explanations for why the U.S. military fails to understand the nature of the problem and how tensions arise between civilian and military entities during planning offers a descriptive overview, but not one informed by theory. The explanations do, however, inform my theoretical model regarding how to transform conflict to achieve a stable and strengthened representative government for international stability.

Conceptual Foundations for Conflict Transformation

The changing nature of military intervention described in Chapter 1 requires an understanding of how to transform conflict after U.S. military intervention to achieve a stable and strengthened representative government for international stability. While scholars have studied conflict resolution with a focus on conflict transformation and peace-building since the end of the Cold War (Armstrong & Chura-Beaver, 2010; Brahimi, 2007; Call & Wyeth, 2008; Covey et al., 2005; Flavin, 2003; Fukuyama, 2004; Kriesberg, 2009; Muggah, 2014; Orr, 2004; Paris, 2004; Rathmell, 2005;), to my knowledge not a single theoretical nexus exists between U.S. military planning for post-conflict stability operations and conflict transformation after military intervention. What follows are the conceptual foundations of conflict transformation theory that inform my theoretical model to help bring understanding to how military planning for post-conflict stability operations affects conflict transformation.

What is conflict transformation theory? Conflict transformation is a new theory that focuses on the processes of moving from conflict-hardened systems to peace systems. Conflict transformation theorists argue that contemporary conflicts require more systematic and innovative approaches than those inherent in conflict management and conflict resolution theories. A definitive conceptual framework for what is meant by the term does not currently exist. Thus, the framework for this paper draws on a variety of conceptual building blocks and assumptions by theorists within the conflict transformation field, informed by the existing literature on planning for post-conflict stability operations after U.S. military intervention, to define conflict transformation. The conflict transformation framework, as defined here, moves

conflict-habituated systems to the right on the autocracy-democracy continuum⁵ through the process of intervenors understanding the conflict, using an inclusive and synchronized framework, and creating and sustaining national mechanisms that empower a stable and strengthened representative government. What follows is the conceptual underpinnings of each of these components of conflict transformation theory.

The changing nature of military intervention requires the U.S. military to understand and plan for the complex nature and system of conflict which remains during post-conflict stability operations. Defeating a military threat does not eliminate violence. Understanding conflict forms the basis of conflict transformation. This paper defines understanding conflict as planners knowing and recognizing the structural and cultural roots of violence, appreciating the causes and transformers at different levels of the international system, and employing a method to continuously analyze the conflict.

Johan Galtung's work describing models of conflict, violence, and peace underpin how one can recognize the structural and cultural roots of violence to understand conflict (Jeong, 2005; Lambourne, 2004; Miall, 2004; Ramsbotham et al., 2016; Sandole, 2010; Wallensteen, 2012). The works of Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall (2016) within conflict resolution and Miall (2004) are an important basis for appreciating the causes and preventor at different levels of the international system and how changes at different levels influence one's understanding of conflict. And one's ability to analyze the conflict as it evolves and not a concrete point in time, predicates understanding conflict (Coleman, 2003; Covey et al., 2005; Ramsbotham et al., 2016).

⁵ For a full discussion of the autocracy-democracy continuum see the V-Dem Institute's Democracy Report 2023, *Defiance in the Face of Autocratization*, <https://www.v-dem.net/publications/democracy-reports/>.

At the core of understanding conflict through knowing and recognizing structural and cultural roots of violence is the foundational work done by Johan Galtung in describing models of conflict, violence, and peace. Structural roots of violence occur when a group is disproportionally disadvantaged or harmed by institutions, laws, or other general structures of society (Galtung, 1990). Cultural roots of violence are those aspects of culture that are used to justify or legitimize violence (Galtung, 1990). The importance of Galtung's model resides in his understanding of negative peace, the absence of physical violence, as distinct from positive peace, the absence of structural and cultural violence. Galtung argued that too often the international community used negative peace as the measure of success in conflict, while ignoring/downplaying the need for positive peace in moving a nation towards a sustainable democracy. Galtung expanded upon his earlier work to show how post-conflict stabilization should work to change the attitudes of the main protagonists, lowering destructive behavior and overcoming contradictions which lie at the root of the given conflict (Galtung, 1996).

Contemporary conflict transformation scholars furthered Galtung's concept of positive peace in their own descriptions of how conflict, violence, and peace intersect and inform the structural and cultural roots of violence (Jeong, 2005; Lambourne, 2004; Miall, 2004; Ramsbotham et al., 2016; Sandole, 2010; Wallensteen, 2012). Of particular importance to planners is how these scholars describe human dynamics, contradictions in society, and constantly evolving structures, attitudes, and behaviors, which is the first step in recognizing their existence. Functional interdependencies between these roots of violence demand those desiring to transform conflict acknowledge the subjective environments created by and through human interactions (Jeong, 2005). Conflict is a dynamic process, structures, attitudes, and behaviors constantly change and influence one another. Changing conflict behavior, removing

structural contradictions and injustices, and changing attitudes are necessary to end direct, structural, and cultural violence (Rambotham et al, 2016; Sandole, 2010; Wallensteen, 2012). The recognition of these intersections and interdependencies lies at the heart of understanding positive peace and serves as the cornerstone of understanding conflict.

The second sub-component of understanding of conflict is the interplay of causes and transformers at all the different levels of the international system and using those in transforming conflict. This allows planners to understand what factors are exacerbating and restraining the conflict and the context within which the conflict is situated. In the 1st edition of their work on Contemporary Conflict Resolution, Miall, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse (as cited in Rambotham et al., 2016) identify five different levels at which issues can cause contemporary conflicts: the global, regional, societal, conflict party, and individual/elite. Those working to transform conflict must be able to identify who and what is causing conflict at each level. Hugh Miall (2004), building on that previous work, describes five transformers of conflict – context, structure, actor, issue, and personal/elite. Context transformations result from changes in the global or regional environment which alter the conflicting party's perception of the conflict (p. 9). Structural transformations result from changes to the basic structure of the conflict, to either a set of actors, the society, economy, or the state in conflict (p. 9). Actor transformations are when a set of actors changes their goals or later their approach to the conflict (p. 10). Issue transformations are the reformulations of positions (p. 10). Personal/elite transformations are when those with decision-making power have a change of heart or mind (p. 10). One's understanding of the interplay of causes and preventors at all the different levels of the international system, allows one to analyze and evaluate conflict transformation practices and to

consider the gaps and weaknesses in one's capacity for handling conflict at each of the various levels.

An understanding of conflict analysis is the final sub-component of understanding conflict. Conflict analysis establishes the way forward in every conflict, allowing those who desire to transform violent conflict to post-conflict stability to understand and manage the complexities of conflict and stability. Miall (2004) defines it as the examination of a conflict at multiple levels, giving intervenors the ability to track the changing dynamics of a conflict over time. Coleman et al. (2005) explain conflict analysis as the process of identifying interrelated elements that exhibit non-linear relations. For the purposes of this study, the method of conflict analysis is not important; rather that the intervenor understands that doing conflict analysis is necessary to understand and manage the complex interactions in planning for stability operations after military intervention.

The second component of conflict transformation describes how an intervenor creates an inclusive and synchronized framework to transition from conflict to a stable and strengthened representative government. As described in the preceding chapter, the changing nature of military intervention of fragile states in the post-Cold War stresses the multitude of actors now involved, including nation-states, multiple agencies with those nation-states, security alliances, intergovernmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations to name a few. The framework of the intervenor must be inclusive of all entities and parties to the conflict. Many of these actors subscribe liberalization as the means of achieving their ends, but do not appreciate that they must start with the assumption that the liberalization process without coordination can undermine the very peace they intend to uphold (Paris, 2004, p. 152). Covey et al., (2005) conclude that achieving a viable peace calls for coherent action by all (p. 245). Paris and Sisk

(2009) meanwhile argue that getting state-building agencies to work smoothly together, while a necessary condition for successful international action, requires striking a balance between competing imperatives, imperatives shaped by the characteristics of the environment and of the actors they are coordinating (p. 53). They all contend that a nation achieves successful post-conflict stabilization when it develops and implements an appropriate strategy and framework for execution.

The complex nature of stabilization operations requires a framework that speaks to its difference from military combat operations and inclusion of elements outside the Department of Defense. Flavin (2003) writes that successful post-conflict peace operations depend on the civil and military leadership recognizing that the end of conflict is as critical as the conduct of the war. He further states that nations should develop and enable mechanisms and organizations to synchronize the military, political, economic, and informational aspects of the operation as well as harmonizing the interagency, combined, and civilian participation (p. 111). Arnas, Barry, and Oakley (2005) contend that the United States has been involved in stabilization and reconstruction operations for the past 15 years with mixed success because of the ad hoc nature of pulling together interagency resources (p. 1). Egnell (2006) reinforces that view, stating that in stabilization operations, the U.S. government confronts problems that are beyond the capacity of any single department or agency to deal with; however, it rarely develops comprehensive policies that span across the whole spectrum of government (pp. 1049-50).

The final component of conflict transformation centers on the creation and sustainment of appropriate national mechanisms in the failed state to empower a stable and strengthened representative government. One of the first scholars to recognize the connection between the strengthening of government institutions and successful post-conflict stability, Paris (2004)

argued quick elections and an expressed interest in democracy are not sufficient, only a more controlled and gradual approach to liberalization, combined with the immediate building of governmental institutions would achieve the successful outcome desired by those intervening (pp. 7-8). Appropriate national mechanisms consist of the bureaucratic structures of civil service, judiciary, policy, and the armed forces (Chesterman et al., 2005; Covey et al., 2005; Fukuyama, 2004). Their creation and sustainment require linking capacity and legitimacy (Call & Wyeth, 2008) and in enabling their self-sustainment (Fukuyama, 2004). These national mechanisms are important for re-establishing security, rebuilding effectiveness, and reconstituting legitimacy (Barnett, 2006; Brinkerhoff, 2005; Covey et al., 2005).

The available literature demonstrates a long history of intervenors creating national mechanisms which are not sustainable once those involved in post-conflict stability operations depart (Paris, 2004). Creating sustainable national mechanisms requires a controlled and gradual approach, considering how the transition may create further instability. Reconstituting legitimacy refers to acceptance of a governing regime as correct, appropriate and/or right (Brinkerhoff, 2005, p. 5). Re-establishing security has two factors, dealing with ex-combatants and governance. The ex-combatants must be disarmed, demobilized, and reintegrated. On the governance side, the status, capacity, and actions of security forces are crucial (Brinkerhoff, 2005, p. 6). Rebuilding effectiveness means providing functioning and capable public sector services. Conflict transformation occurs when the created national mechanisms are sustainable upon the withdrawal of U.S. military and civilian personnel.

For U.S. military intervention followed by stability operations, conflict transformation centers on three necessary conditions. First, to transform conflict, one must begin with understanding the conflict. Second, the framework of the intervenor influences conflict

transformation. Lastly, conflict transformation centers on the creation and sustainment of appropriate national mechanisms in the failed state to empower a stable and strengthened representative government.

Limitations of current literature

What does all this mean for understanding how planning affects the success of post-conflict stability after military intervention? Why should the American people and policy makers care how or why the U.S. military plans for post-conflict stability? Does planning impact a fragile state's transition from violent conflict? The answer is yes, the American people and policy makers should care because how the military plans does affect the success of post-conflict stability. The United States invests blood and treasure in these operations, and their outcomes can affect global and regional security. If they are undertaken, the U.S. population should want the Department of Defense to carry them out effectively. The literature reviewed in this chapter aims to synthesize available information and publications on why U.S. military planning for stability operations has not assisted in achieving successful post-conflict stabilization. However, there are a number of limitations. Primarily, the literature reveals no already defined theoretical framework for examining how planning affects the success of post-conflict stability after military intervention. The available literature provides no empirical evidence to support a linkage between how U.S. military planning influences stability operations, they simply assume a linkage. This study will add precision to the understanding of how U.S. military planning affects the success of post-conflict stability after military intervention.

Expectations Derived From Literature

This dissertation starts with the assertion that the U.S. has a vested interest in the success of post-conflict stabilization and that previous efforts were not ideal. Improving U.S. military

planning for stability operations to transform conflict in future interventions requires measuring the military planning process against the components of conflict transformation. However, none of the available literature on U.S. military post-conflict stabilization planning provides a theoretical framework for this measurement. This prevents those who wish to execute the best possible military planning from achieving optimal conflict transformation.

As noted earlier, U.S. military planning is the deliberate process of determining how the military implements strategic guidance to use military capabilities to achieve U.S. political objectives (JCS, 2020, p. xi). Military planning consists of four fundamental elements – strategic guidance, concept development, plan development, and assessment. Strategic guidance is where the military initiates planning, based on directives from the U.S. President or Secretary of Defense, and begins the process of developing shared understanding. Shared understanding in the military is a common understanding of an operation’s purpose, problems, and how to approach solving problems encountered in planning (Department of the Army [DA], 2019, p. 1-8). In concept development, the refinement of the shared understanding allows the military to develop options for military operations. Plan development results in a feasible plan or order, briefed to the Secretary of Defense (or a designated representative) for approval, dictating the execution of military operations. Finally, the assessment function allows military commanders to continually review and evaluate the plan during planning and execution for refinement and adaptation based on changing conditions.

Specifically, stability operations planning requires military planners understand the operational environment, understand the National Security Council and President’s strategic guidance across multiple U.S. government entities, develop an integrated and comprehensive approach, and plan an effective transition to the host-nation. According to military doctrine,

gaining a comprehensive understanding of the operational environment requires deciphering the true nature of the problem, identifying the diverse causes of instability, and seeking information and subject matter experts (JCS, 2022). Understanding strategic guidance for stability operations and developing an integrated and comprehensive approach requires the integration and synchronization of military plans with other U.S. government departments and agencies. The final component of stability operations planning is the planned transition to the host-nation to consolidate the gains from military activities.

The process of U.S. military stability operations planning, as described above, easily lends itself for measurement against the components of conflict transformation. This study uses the three components of conflict transformation – understanding the conflict, a framework which synchronizes and integrates efforts, and an emphasis on the creation and sustainment of national mechanisms as its theoretical framework for evaluating military planning. These components align with the stability operations planning components of understanding the operational environment, developing an integrated and comprehensive approach, and planning an effective transition to the host-nation. Allowing me to use the components of conflict transformation theory to measure whether or not incorporating them into U.S. military planning results in a more stable and strengthened representative government after U.S. military intervention and post-conflict stabilization operations.

This theory defines understanding conflict as the recognition of structural and cultural roots of violence, recognition of the causes and preventors at different levels of the international system, and continuous analysis of the conflict. It defines a framework which synchronizes and integrates efforts as a planning framework inclusive of U.S. interagency partners, international governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the host-nation (the nation

within whose borders the military intervention occurs). Finally, it defines the creation and sustainment of national mechanisms as efforts to create and sustain apolitical bureaucratic structures in civil service, rule of law, economy, and security.

Improved military stability planning, as the desired outcome of this theoretical inquiry, is defined by its ability to set the conditions for a stable and strengthened representative government following U.S. military intervention. Drawing from conflict transformation theory, I can measure this outcome through the integration of its three core components. First, improved planning must demonstrate a comprehensive understanding of the conflict. Second, effective planning must operationalize a synchronized and integrated framework. Third, improved planning should result in the creation and sustainment of national mechanisms within the host nation. By aligning military planning with these three dimensions of conflict transformation, this framework enables a theoretically grounded evaluation of how well U.S. military planning supports the broader political objectives of post-conflict stabilization and transforming conflict.

Based on this theoretical framework, this paper focuses on four hypotheses:

H1 – The greater the degree to which U.S. military stability planning demonstrates a comprehensive understanding of the conflict, the greater its ability to set the conditions necessary for establishing a stable and strengthened representative government following U.S. military intervention.

H2 – The more U.S. military stability planning incorporates a synchronized and integrated framework, the greater its effectiveness in facilitating the development of a stable and strengthened representative government after U.S. military intervention.

H3 – The more U.S. military stability planning supports the creation and sustainment of national mechanisms, the more likely it is to contribute to the emergence of a stable and strengthened representative government following U.S. military intervention.

H4 – U.S. military stability planning that effectively integrates a comprehensive understanding of the conflict AND a synchronized and integrated framework AND the creation and sustainment of national mechanisms, the more likely it is to set the conditions necessary for the successful transformation of the post-conflict environment into a stable and strengthened representative government following U.S. military intervention.

Chapter 3 - Introduction to Methodology and Case Studies

Methodology


The purpose of this dissertation is to understand the linkage between planning and successful post-conflict stabilization through the lens of conflict transformation. As discussed previously, the changing nature of military intervention requires the U.S. military to both defeat the threat and set the conditions for transforming conflict. Planning underpins every action of the U.S. military. Thus, it is important to understand how planning contributes to conflict transformation. Because DoD policy speaks specifically to transforming conflict, conflict transformation theory provides a sound theoretical basis for understanding how U.S. military planning for post-conflict stability operations after military intervention influences stabilization. As also discussed previously, the existing research on planning is descriptive. Descriptive research provides a foundational basis for identifying planning conditions thought to influence conflict transformation. But it does not analyze those conditions.

Because instances of military intervention followed by stability operations are intrinsically complex, multi-faceted with blurred boundaries, and naturally limited (Small-N), they require a strategy aimed at gathering in-depth insight into different instances to capture their complexity, while still attempting to produce some form of generalization. Having only descriptive research as a basis, but also a desire to understand the causal links between planning and successful post-conflict stability operations leading to conflict transformation, requires a method to identify both cause and effect relationships and the nature of these relationships. This method should provide for greater understanding and improve planning for future post-conflict stability operations following military intervention.

Thus, Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) is the most appropriate research approach and analytical technique for this study. QCA is both a research approach and a data analysis technique, having a set of research tools that combines detailed within-case analysis and formalized cross-case comparisons (Legewie, 2013). Additionally, the approach is useful for identifying patterns of casual combinations that link to an outcome (Sedgwick, n.d.). Finally, QCA brings together qualitative data derived from cases to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for an outcome, advantageous for analyzing how planning through the lens of conflict transformation theory influences conflict transformation.

QCA is a set-theoretic method. Set-theoretic methods are those which analyze social reality by placing data into set membership scores, modeling social phenomena in terms of set relations, and whose results point to sufficient and necessary conditions and emphasize casual complexity in terms of Insufficient but Necessary (INUS) and Sufficient but Unnecessary (SUIN) causes (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 6). Set-theory is the mathematical theory of sets. The theory defines a set as a collection of objects called members, or elements of the set. The diagram below depicts the theoretical sets and their relationships studied in this paper.

Figure 3.1. Theoretical Sets and Relationships



Set-theoretic methods use Boolean algebra and fuzzy logic to describe set membership. Boolean algebra uses logical operations with binary variables, representing these variables as binary numbers to represent truths: 1 = true and 0 = false (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). In set-theory, these truths allow researchers to define an element as either a member of the set or not, with clear and strict membership criteria. The theory calls these “crisp sets”. Crisp sets require a dichotomization of the concepts they represent, applying the “Rule of the Excluded Middle”, meaning an element can either be a member or a set or a member of its complementary set, but not a member of both (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). The second means of describing set membership, Fuzzy logic, allows for partial set membership, assigning more gradual membership values, ranging from 0 to 1. Fuzzy logic, developed by Lotfi Zadeh, is necessary for understanding complex and imprecise concepts (Mello, 2021). The fuzziness does not derive from imprecise empirical information, but rather from non-sharp conceptual boundaries (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). A membership score of 0.5 represents the cross over point, the point of maximum ambiguity (fuzziness) regarding the membership of an element to the concept

(Ragin, 2009). Depending on the researcher's design, fuzzy sets can use three, four, or six values for membership scores to a fuzzy set.⁶ Both Boolean algebra and fuzzy logic require the researcher to specify what membership to a set means in qualitative terms.

As the methodological tool most directly associated with set theory, QCA offers three distinct advantages – causal interpretation, truth tables, and the principle of logical minimization (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). Causal interpretation in QCA allows researchers to theorize and examine how conditions – attributes or characteristics of a case that describe or explain an outcome – interact (Mello, 2021). QCA models the casual relationships as subset or superset relations between the conditions and the outcome, allowing the researcher to express them in terms of necessity and sufficiency. Truth tables, which sort the cases into logical combinations based on conditions, allow researchers to visualize and analyze equifinality, conjunctural causation, and the presence of INUS or SUIN conditions (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). Finally, QCA uses the principle of logical minimization, a process allowing the researcher to express empirical information in a parsimonious yet logically equivalent manner looking for commonalities and differences among cases that share the same outcome (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012).

QCA offers solutions for the challenges posed by case studies and provides a useful analytical tool for translating research into recommendations. QCA is applicable to my study because (1) it models equifinality, which is the ability to identify more than one causal pathway to an outcome (or absence of the outcome); (2) it identifies conjunctural causation, which means

⁶ Three-value fuzzy-set: 0=full non-membership, 0.5 neither non nor full membership, and 1=full membership. Four-value: 0=full non-membership, 0.33=more out than in, 0.67=more in than out, and 1=full membership. Six-value: 0=full non-membership, 0.1=mostly but not fully out, 0.4=more or less out, 0.6=more or less in, 0.9=mostly but not fully in, and 1=full membership. (Ragin, 2009).

that single conditions may not display their effects on their own, but only in conjunction with other conditions; and (3) it implies asymmetrical relationships between causal conditions and outcomes, which means that causal pathways for achieving the outcome differ from causal pathways for failing to achieve the outcome (Kane et al., 2014). QCA asks what conditions – alone or in combination with other conditions – are necessary or sufficient to produce an outcome (Kane et al., 2014).

This study will use Fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA), a combination of fuzzy logic and set theory, to analyze the complex relationships described in the Condition and Outcome and Calibrations sections below. Because planning for stability operations after military intervention is unique in every instance, with complex and imprecise concepts employed in how the planning understood the conflict, the framework employed, and the national mechanisms created, it calls for a more nuanced analytical approach. At its core, fsQCA aims to address the limitations of binary logic inherent in traditional QCA, using fuzzy logic. Fuzzy logic introduces the notion of partial membership, allowing for a more flexible representation of conditions and outcomes (Ragin, 2008 as cited in Scheider & Wagemann, 2013). This is particularly valuable in the available cases, where the conditions may exhibit degrees of membership rather than strict dichotomies. Using a more nuanced approach helps to mirror the complexity of how planning stability operations after military intervention may influence conflict transformation. The goal is to capture how the identified conditions may influence the outcome to varying extents. The following sections will explain the methodology in detail.

To achieve conflict transformation, this dissertation theorizes that DoD planning must understand the conflict, synchronize efforts through the framework of the intervenor, and emphasize the creation and sustainment of national mechanisms in post-conflict stability

operations. This work presents an empirical investigation, aiming to corroborate these theoretical propositions. It focuses on those three conditions to examine if incorporating them into the planning methodology used for U.S. military intervention followed by stability operations can transform the conflict. The subsequent paragraphs will describe the procedure fsQCA uses to analyze the complex configurations described above. The first step is the case and condition selection and outcome definition. The second step is calibration. The final step involves understanding the analysis and questions QCA can help answer about planning and conflict transformation.

Case Selection and Data Sources

An integral part of any research design is the selection of cases. Mello (2021) describes five ways for how a researcher can select cases for QCA. Cases can come from a given population, scoped by conditions, purposefully selected, a random sample, or a stratified sample (Mello, 2021, pp. 23-25). I purposefully selected cases. The changing nature of military intervention in the post-Cold War era, where political administrations and the American public expect the United States to follow military intervention with stabilization efforts, makes conflict transformation a necessary outcome of military intervention. Conflict transformation occurs when at the end of U.S. military involvement, a sovereign polity exists with centralized bureaucratic structures that are both effective and legitimate and there is an elected government. Because this study focuses on how planning by the U.S. military assists the American government to transform the conflict and enable the stable and strengthened representative government desired by American policymakers, the selected cases must accurately reflect military planning resulting in conflict transformation. Thus, the study maintains unit homogeneity by selecting all instances of military intervention with evidence of military

planning for stability operations after 1989, the end of the Cold War, where the U.S. goal was a stable and strengthened representative government.

Purposefully selecting cases comes with both strengths and limitations. The strengths of purposeful selection for case selection for this study are unit homogeneity and explaining the specific phenomena of how military planning may influence conflict transformation. Unit homogeneity is found because the actor remains consistent throughout analysis, the U.S., thus controlling for homogeneity. Purposefully selecting cases allows me to measure how the inclusion or exclusion of conflict transformation theory conditions in planning influence conflict transformation across the cases. One of the identified limitations of purposefully selecting cases for case selection is the possible introduction of bias (Mello, 2021). This study minimizes biases by including a negative case in the set. Because understanding the causal mechanisms in negative cases is analytically useful and the negative case meets all the same criteria for selection as those with positive outcomes, its inclusion minimizes bias.

The inclusion of the negative case results from Mahoney and Goertz's Possibility Principle. The case shown in Table 3.1 where conflict transformation did not occur is relevant because the outcome of interest is possible if there is a positive relationship with at least one of the necessary conditions for conflict transformation (Mahoney & Goertz, 2004). My conflict transformation theoretical framework posits that conflict transformation occurs when the intervenor understands the conflict, has a synchronized and integrated framework for intervening, and creates and sustains national mechanisms. Mahoney and Goertz's Rule of Exclusion made irrelevant any instances of military intervention after the Cold-War era not followed by stability operations as there is no possibility of conflict transformation in those cases.

The final factor in case selection is ensuring heterogeneity. In QCA, one achieves heterogeneity through the ratio between cases and conditions or the empirical distribution of cases across truth table rows (Mello, 2021, p. 27). Mello argues for using a ratio of at least four cases per condition to achieve consistency. I assumed risk in heterogeneity by having a ratio of 2.7 cases per condition.

The following section describes the data sources I used for purposeful case selection. As a review, I purposefully selected cases occurring after the Cold War, where stability operations followed military intervention, where the stated U.S. political goal was a stable and strengthened representative government, and where conflict transformation occurred or was a possible outcome. Thus, the data sources selected need to satisfy the following criteria – covers the specific time period under study, post-Cold War (1989 to present); ability to classify military interventions scales (specifically combat operations/war); and annotate/classify political goals and/or outcomes. After reviewing the available military intervention datasets, I determined Sullivan and Koch (2009)'s Military Intervention by Powerful States (MIPS) project, Kisangani and Pickering (2009)'s International Military Intervention Dataset, and Kushi and Toft (2023)'s Military Intervention Project serve as a combined comprehensive basis for purposeful case selection. The three datasets met the criteria specified and allowed me to validate the case selection across multiple sources. Of the three datasets, Sullivan and Koch's definition for military intervention – “a use of armed force that involves the official deployment of at least 500 regular military personnel (ground, air, naval) to attain immediate-term political objectives through action against a foreign adversary”, provided the most comprehensive one in line with the study (Sullivan & Koch, 2009, p. 709).

As all three datasets only identify instances of military intervention without a definitive categorization of instances of U.S. military stability operations (a limitation with all available military intervention datasets), I used additional data sources to identify cases of military intervention followed by stability operations. The DoD defines stability operations as “those activities outside the U.S. to minimize, if not eliminate, economic and political instability and other drivers of violent conflict across five stability sectors – security, justice and reconciliation, humanitarian assistance and social well-being, governance and participation, and economic stabilization and infrastructure” (JCS, 2016, p. ix). Several secondary data sources identified political objectives⁷ which required U.S. military forces to execute activities in one or more of the listed stability sectors. Political objectives demanding regime change/removal (Sullivan & Koch, 2009), strategic or humanitarian intervention (Kisangani & Pickering, 2009), use of American military in the political administration of the target nation (Pei & Kasper, 2003), sustained levels of effort put into democratic transformations (Dobbins et al., 2003), and promoting democracy and building institutions (Kavanagh et al., 2019) all result in military stability operations. The MIP case narratives illustrate objectives with sources and documentation to assist with validating the above political objectives resulting in U.S. military forces executing stability operations (Kushi & Toft, 2023). The MIP dataset with sources and documentation is extremely valuable for QCA, as the methodology and analytical process demand the researcher have intimate knowledge of each case. These data sources resulted in a list of eight instances, where in-depth case study of primary and secondary sources further

⁷ This paper uses the definition of political objectives put forth by Sullivan and Koch (2009) – “a political objective is the allocation of a valued good (e.g. territory, political authority, resources, security) sought by the political leaders of a state or of a non-state organization.” (p. 710).

verified military activities in line with the DoD definition of stability operations and demonstrated an element of DoD planning for stability operations.

The political objectives referenced above also serve as the data source for the stated political objective of each instance being the establishment of a stable and strengthened representative government. Chapter 1 clearly established the existence of a post-Cold War paradigm whereby the goal of all U.S. military interventions followed by stability operations have as their goal a stable and strengthened representative government. This paradigm, paired with how the authors listed above explicitly code their political objectives, demonstrates a U.S. political goal of a stable and strengthened representative government at the conclusion of U.S. involvement. The only outlier from this stated political goal was Kuwait after Operation Desert Storm. While Kuwait was representative of a military intervention followed by stability operations and an instance where the DoD planned the transition from combat to stability operations and did exhibit the desired outcome, the stated goal of the U.S. was never a stable and strengthened representative government. However, an U.S. government emphasis on human rights during the planning and initiation of reconstruction efforts supports an objective of a strengthened representative government (Fishel, 1997).

Table 3.1. Case Selection

Country	Date of Intervention	Intervention followed by stability ops ⁸	DoD planned transition to stability ops	Conflict Transformation occurred
Panama	1989 - 1990	Yes ^{1,2,4}	Yes	Yes
Kuwait	1990 - 1991	Yes ^{1,4}	Yes	Yes
Somalia	1992 - 1994	Yes ^{1,3,4}	Yes	No

⁸ Secondary source labeling case as military intervention followed by stability operations – 1 (Sullivan and Koch, 2009), 2 – (Pei and Kasper, 2003), 3 (Dobbins et al., 2003), and 4 (Kavanagh et al., 2019).

Haiti	1994 - 1995	Yes ^{1,2,3,4}	Yes	Yes
Bosnia	1995 - 2004	Yes ^{3,4}	Yes	Yes
Kosovo	1999 - Present	Yes ^{3,4}	Yes	Yes
Afghanistan	2001 - 2021	Yes ^{1,2,3,4}	Yes	Yes
Iraq	2003 - 2011	Yes ^{3,4}	Yes	Yes

As noted earlier, I rejected the use of other datasets because they did not meet my criteria for use. I rejected the Correlates of War (COW) Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) dataset, as it does not offer detailed descriptions or sources in the dataset, making other datasets more appropriate for my methodology and analysis. The limited timeframe of Fordham and Sarver (2001)'s revised listing, updated only up until 1995, made it only partially applicable to my desired timeframe.

Conditions

QCA uses the term condition to describe the attributes, characteristics, or features of a case that describes and/or explains the outcome (Mello, 2021, p. 202), rather than independent variables. And the term outcome to describe the dependent variable. This section explains the conditions and outcome for this study. Using my conflict transformation theoretical framework as the theoretical framework for determining how planning influences the outcome of conflict transformation, confines the available conditions to understanding the conflict, having a synchronized and integrated framework for intervening, and creating and sustaining national mechanisms. The selection of conditions follows the single-model approach for selection, applying a stable set of conditions through the analysis of the outcome and nonoutcome (Mello, 2021, p. 31).

The following paragraphs explain the balance between the substantive components of U.S. military planning processes and the theoretical components of conflict transformation.

Balancing those two components required a systemic dialogue between ideas and evidence. To provide a more quantitative expression of each causal condition and the outcome, I explain the choice of documentary sources for both in the below paragraphs.

The first condition, understanding the conflict, requires evidence military planners took steps to recognize structural and cultural roots of violence, causes and preventors at different levels of the international system, and analyzed the conflict. These sub-components of understanding the conflict in conflict transformation theory become indicator-level dimensions. Military planners show evidence of recognizing structural and culture roots of violence when there is evidence of a comprehensive situation assessment and their plans take actions to change the attitudes of the main protagonists and to measure the contradictions in the structure of the nation's society (Covey et al., 2005). I will measure these by identifying planning inputs from multiple sources regarding culture, threats, and the current political situation. Military planners show evidence of understanding the causes and preventors at different levels of the international system when their plans show evidence of what is causing conflict at the global, regional, societal, conflict party, and individual/elite levels (Fitzsimmons, 2006; Imlay & Toft, 2006). I will measure this by identifying the levels U.S. planning addressed when examining the threat and whether the planning effort identified gaps in knowledge and understanding at the different levels (Miall, 2004). Finally, military planning needs to demonstrate conflict analysis. I will measure this by identifying times the plan changed throughout the intervention (Coleman et al., 2005; Miall, 2004). The indicator-level dimensions for understanding conflict are situation assessment, changing attitudes of the main protagonists, causes and preventors at different levels, and plan changes.

Designing and implementing a systemic and inclusive approach as a framework for stability operations requires military planners to be inclusive to all entities and parties to the conflict. Military planners must demonstrate they have struck a balance between competing imperatives and synchronizing the military, political, economic, and informational aspects of the plan; harmonizing the inter-agency, combined, and civilian participation (Flavin, 2003). The plan must incorporate comprehensive policies that span across the whole spectrum of government. I will measure this by identifying instances and types of joint civilian-military planning structures (Crane & Terrill, 2003; Hayes & Wheatley, 1996), any evidence of international governmental organization (IGO) or non-governmental organization (NGO) inclusion in planning, or any evidence of host-nation inclusion in planning (Covey et al., 2005; Paris & Sisk, 2009). These entities are the indicator-level dimensions for framework.

The military plan must demonstrate a plan for creating national mechanisms – apolitical bureaucratic structures, such as civil service, rule of law, economy, and security. Furthermore, the plan must show how it will reconstitute legitimacy, re-establish security, and rebuild effectiveness (Paris, 2004). I will measure civil service as any effort to establish legitimate government institutions (Chesterman et al., 2005). The measurement for rule of law includes any efforts to establish laws, police forces, courts, and/or jails (Fukuyama, 2004). The measurement for economy is any evidence planners assessed the nation's economy and/or incorporated economic strategies (Paris, 2004). Finally, I will measure security by any evidence of planning to build and/or rebuild the nation's armed forces (Brinkerhoff, 2005). The indicator-level dimensions for national mechanisms are civil service, rule of law, economy, and security.

In QCA one can use crisp sets for sub-level indicators and fuzzy sets for the conditions (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). In crisp sets, cases are either fully in or fully out of a set (represented

Military Intervention Planning	Situation Assessment	Changing Attitudes	Causes & Preventors	Plan Changed	Computed Variable
Panama	1	1	1	1	4.00
Kuwait	1	0	1	1	3.00
Somalia	0	0	0	0	0.00
Haiti	1	0	0	1	2.00
Bosnia	1	1	1	1	4.00
Kosovo	1	1	1	1	4.00
Afghanistan	1	1	0	1	3.00
Iraq	1	0	1	1	3.00
Framework					
Military Intervention Planning	Joint Civ-Mil	IGO Inclusion	NGO Inclusion	Host-Nation Inclusion	Computed Variable
Panama	0	0	0	0	0.00
Kuwait	1	0	0	1	2.00
Somalia	1	1	0	0	2.00
Haiti	1	1	0	0	2.00
Bosnia	1	1	0	1	3.00
Kosovo	1	1	0	0	2.00
Afghanistan	1	1	1	1	4.00
Iraq	1	0	0	0	1.00
National Mechanism					
Military Intervention Planning	Civil Service	Rule of Law	Economy	Security	Computed Variable
Panama	1	1	1	1	4.00
Kuwait	1	1	1	1	4.00
Somalia	0	1	0	1	2.00
Haiti	0	0	0	1	1.00
Bosnia	1	1	1	1	4.00
Kosovo	1	1	1	1	4.00
Afghanistan	1	1	1	1	4.00
Iraq	1	1	1	1	4.00

Case Study Overviews¹⁰

Each military operation has specific entities involved in stability operations planning based on the Department of Defense command structure. The President gives his guidance to the Secretary of Defense who then gives guidance to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Unified Commands (also known as Combatant Commands), and Military Departments. Each Combatant Command is a joint military command established to provide command and control of all U.S. military forces, regardless of branch of service, during peace or war time in their area of responsibility, either geographic or functional. The Combatant Commands have a headquarters' staff and component commands and units to assist with planning and the execution of operations. Within the Combatant Command headquarters' staff, the J5, Strategy, Policy, and Plans Directorate, is typically responsible for translating national-level guidance into strategic plans to shape the environment or for a specific operation. Of particular importance to stability operations planning are those units responsible for executing civil military operations.

Title 10 of the United States Code and further Department of Defense Directives, establish that the Department of Defense must maintain a capability to conduct civil affairs operations. Civil affairs personnel and units are responsible for the civil component of a plan and operation, conducting military government operations and providing civil considerations expertise (JCS, 2018). Some component commands and units are habitually associated with a particular combatant command, while the Joint Staff may temporarily assign others, depending on the plan or operation. At the combatant command level that civil affairs capability is typically

¹⁰ To supplement this research, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests were filed seeking original documents concerning military orders and Department of State planning. No records were released in response to these inquiries.

a U.S. Army Civil Affairs Brigade, who has a habitual relationship with its supported combatant command and is responsible for planning and executing stability operations within the Combatant Command area of operations. Civil affairs expertise and availability below the Combatant Command level varies based on the military operation's force structure.

This may give the impression that only civil affairs units concern themselves with civil considerations or stability operations. A historical analysis of U.S. military doctrine shows this was mostly the case through the 1990s and into the early 2000s. In 2001 doctrine started to define stability operations as one of the core missions of full-spectrum operations. How the U.S. military organizes to conduct stability operations after military intervention is dependent on force structure for the overall intervention. No two military operations have the same force structure.

There may be the perception that the DoD plans in a monolithic manner. It does not. The DoD plans and executes military operations at three echelons – strategic, operational, and tactical. Each echelon creates its own plans for execution with more specificity for its area of operations, often in parallel with the higher echelon and depending on the circumstances particular to the planning effort, without receiving the detailed information which informed the higher echelon's plan. Stability operations planning is most often a single phase of a larger operations plan. Depending on the mission given to the operational and tactical levels, the headquarters responsible for planning may have focused a great deal or very little on stability operations planning.

In the sections that follow, I provide a brief description of the case studies. The description of the U.S. military interventions with stability operations planning offers an overview of the operation, who did the planning, and a description of the planning. As established in the previous chapter, I made value judgements based upon primary and secondary

sources for coding the indicator-level dimensions for each of the three conditions of conflict transformation theory. After a brief overview of the military intervention and stability operations planning for each of the case studies, I provide the justification for those value judgements by detailing the available sources.

Understanding the conflict requires evidence military planners took steps to recognize structural and cultural roots of violence, causes and preventors at different levels of the international system, and analyzed the conflict. I transformed knowing and recognizing structural and cultural roots of violence into two distinct indicator-level dimensions – a comprehensive situation assessment and efforts to change attitudes and measure contradictions. Military planners show evidence of recognizing structural and culture roots of violence when there is evidence of a comprehensive situation assessment and their plans take actions to change the attitudes of the main protagonists and to measure the contradictions in the structure of the nation's society (Covey et al., 2005). Military doctrine provides a sound basis for how planning provides a comprehensive situation assessment and changes attitudes. The assessment must describe and understand the operational environment , encompassing the human, physical, and informational dimensions where military forces deploy to conduct operations. Planning efforts demonstrate efforts to change attitudes and measure contradictions when they describe how to influence government and military leaders and the population to accept the desired changes in their environments (JCS, 2022, p. IV-3). Military planners show evidence of understanding the causes and preventors at different levels of the international system when their plans show evidence of what is causing conflict at the global, regional, societal, conflict party, and individual/elite levels (Fitzsimmons, 2006; Imlay & Toft, 2006). Military doctrine describes the different levels as levels of war – strategic, operational, and tactical . Military planning

demonstrates continuous analysis of the conflict revising the plan throughout the intervention (Coleman et al., 2005; Miall, 2004). Military doctrine describes this as the continuous refinement and adaptation of the plan based upon identified changes in the operational environment (JCS, 2020).

Designing and implementing a systemic and inclusive approach as a framework for stability operations requires military planners to be inclusive to all entities and parties to the conflict. Military planners must demonstrate they have struck a balance between competing imperatives and synchronizing the military, political, economic, and informational aspects of the plan; harmonizing the inter-agency, combined, and civilian participation (Flavin, 2003). The planning effort should show evidence of joint civilian-military planning structures or evidence of IGO or NGO or host-nation inclusion in planning. Military doctrine describes the human component as the most important component in the operating environment in planning for stability operations. As such, collaborative planning should include interagency, international organization, nongovernmental organization, and host-nation government participants to assist military planners focus their efforts on the development of the conditions that support a stable, lasting peace (JCS, 2022, p. IV-3-9).

Finally, the military plan must demonstrate a plan for creating national mechanisms – apolitical bureaucratic structures, such as civil service, rule of law, economy, and security. Any effort to establish legitimate government institutions, establish laws, police forces, courts and/or jails, and any assessment of the nation’s economy or economic strategy demonstrates the creation of civil service, rule of law, and the economy. Furthermore, the plan must show how it will reconstitute legitimacy, re-establish security, and rebuild effectiveness (Paris, 2004). The researcher measured security by any evidence of planning to build and/or rebuild the nation’s

armed forces (Brinkerhoff, 2005). Military doctrine reinforces the above as part of its Joint Stability Functions (JCS, 2022, p. III-1).

Panama

Operation Just Cause, launched by the United States in December 1989, was the invasion of Panama aimed at ousting the country's dictator, General Manuel Noriega. The United States viewed Noriega's regime as increasingly authoritarian, with drug trafficking connection, and a sharply deteriorating relationship with the United States (Yates, 2008). Manuel Noriega had risen through the ranks of the Panamanian military, eventually becoming the de facto leader of the country. While a valuable ally to the U.S. due to his anti-communist stance, Noriega's involvement in drug trafficking and human rights abuses made him an increasing liability (Behman, 2018). Relations worsened after the 1981 death of General Omar Torrijos, a key figure in negotiating the Panama Canal Treaties and the de facto leader of Panama (Yates, 2008). His death cleared the way for Noriega's rise. Tensions escalated through the 1980s. The U.S. imposed economic sanctions, while Noriega annulled presidential elections, increased repression, and allegedly threatened the Panama Canal's neutrality (Cole, 1995). A failed Panamanian coup attempt supported by the U.S. increased the sense of urgency. In December of that year, the killing of a U.S. serviceman and the assault on another and his wife by Panamanian forces became the final trigger for U.S. intervention (Cole, 1995; Yates 2008).

President George H.W. Bush cited four primary goals for the U.S. military intervention: protecting American lives, safeguarding the Panama Canal, defending democracy in Panama, and bringing Noriega to justice (Yates, 2008). The invasion on December 20th, 1989, was the largest U.S. combat operation since Vietnam, involving around 27,000 troops (Cole, 1995). The operation unfolded swiftly. Key targets included Panamanian Defense Force (PDF)

headquarters, military installations, and strategic airfields (Cole, 1995). U.S. forces used overwhelming power, including stealth aircraft, to neutralize PDF resistance (U.S. Army South Panama, 1991). Noriega, initially evading capture, eventually took refuge in the Vatican Embassy before surrendering to U.S. forces (Fishel, 1992a).

In the aftermath of Operation Just Cause, the United States military embarked on a complex mission of stability operations in Panama. The goals were ambitious and ambiguous: to restore democracy, foster economic development, and build a stable security apparatus in a country deeply scarred by the Noriega dictatorship (Conley, 2001; Fishel, 1992a; Schultz, 1993). The following paragraphs give a brief overview of the planning process and describe specific planning actions and efforts associated with the conflict transformation conditions.

As noted above, Operation Just Cause was a complex military operation aimed at capturing General Manuel Noriega, restoring democracy, and securing the Panama Canal. The U.S. military followed Operation Just Cause with Operation Promote Liberty, a civil-military restoration of Panama beginning in January 1990 and ending in December 1990 (U.S. Army Special Operations Forces [ARSOF], 1991). Operation Promote Liberty aimed to address the political, economic, and security challenges occurring in Panama following the capture and extradition of General Noriega. The key objectives of the stability operation were to establish a democratic government, restore law and order, rebuild the Panama Public Force (PPF), and revitalize the economy through civil-military coordination (Fishel, 1992a; Schultz, 1993).

Planning for the U.S. military intervention in Panama began with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Planning Order of February 28th, 1988 (Bennett, 1991). The United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), the Department of Defense combatant command responsible for the southern hemisphere, developed a plan, eventually named Operation Just Cause, focusing on

building up combat forces and combat operations. Following JCS approval of this initial plan, the Commander of USSOUTHCOM directed planners to develop an additional phase addressing the restoration of Panamanian government and government services in the wake of combat operations against the PDF (ARSOF, 1991). The USSOUTHCOM Commander's guidance to the planners was for the restoration to be short term and based on the assumption that civil government would not break down significantly outside Panama City (Fishel, 1992a, p. 8). The Commander's guidance resulted in an outline, which his staff planners relinquished to the 361st Civil Affairs Brigade to draft a full plan, becoming Operation Promote Liberty (Fishel, 1992a). The 361st based their stability plan on a significant degree of expertise on Panama gained through their participation in joint and combined exercises over a 5-year period, though the TOP SECRET close hold distribution system employed by the Department of Defense meant that the civil affairs planners had no access to the combat plan preceding their stabilization plan (Fishel, 1992a, p. 10). Thus, limiting the linkage between the two plans.

USSOUTHCOM produced an Operations Plan (OPLAN) for Operation Promote Liberty from the initial planning done by the 361st Civil Affairs Brigade and the USSOUTHCOM staff. USSOUTHCOM provided the OPLAN to the XVIII Airborne Corps, the military unit designated by Joint Chief of Staff as responsible for the final planning and execution of the operation (Fishel, 1992a). XVIII Airborne Corps, which became Joint Task Force – South (JTF-South) for the operation, actively worked to abdicate its responsibility for restoring law and order by not including a stability phase in their operations order (Fishel, 1992a). Ultimately the JCS approved a plan creating a Civil Military Operations Task Force (CMOTF) under USSOUTHCOM responsible for conducting stability operations for Panama, which eventually became Joint Task Force – Panama (JTF-PM) with about 7,000 ground forces (infantry, Marines, and military

police) and a Military Support Group (MSG) comprised of civil affairs and special operations forces (Fishel, 1992a). A constantly evolving military command structure made planning and executing stability operations difficult as the U.S. military transitioned from combat operations to stability.

Understanding Conflict

The available planning information provides strong evidence of military planners understanding the conflict in Panama in their planning efforts. U.S. military planning demonstrates the incorporation of all four sub-indicators of understanding conflict. U.S. military records and compilations of historical interviews show it had a long and cooperative relationship with the Panamanian government and its military leaders, with U.S. troops based in Panama and conducting regular exercises there, and getting support from a civil affairs unit with regional, functional, and country expertise, allowing for a strong understanding of the culture, threats, and current political situation in the country (Fishel, 1992a; Taw, 1996). Twenty-two months of planning for the U.S. military invasion, and to a more limited extent stability operations, in addition to a large constant presence of U.S. forces in Panama allowed for a unique understanding of the threat and the environment (Schultz, 1993).

U.S. military planners recognized both the need to change attitudes in the Panamanian military and political leadership, and how both of those institutions were causes of conflict, as part of their planning efforts. USSOUTHCOM planners were familiar with the out-sized influence of the Panamanian Defense Forces as both a fighting force and political institution and planned for its removal from power (Schultz, 1993). The planners also understood the need to minimize the influence of the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) which had effectively controlled all the governing institutions in the country (Schultz, 1993). Lieutenant General Carl

Stiner, the XVIII Airborne Corps Commander, describes in his oral history interview with Dr. Robert Wright, Jr. how JTF-South and USSOUTHCOM made decisions on how to purge and reconstitute the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) and support the new Panamanian government under Guillermo Endara, the newly elected President (Stiner, 1990). At the strategic level, the PRD apparatus was the biggest cause of conflict, their removal and U.S. military support for the new Panamanian government prevented additional conflict during stability operations. At the operational and tactical levels, JTF-South's purge and initial training of the PDF removed the cause of conflict and prevented renewed fighting during stabilization.

Finally, there is ample evidence from historical records detailing the continued refinement of the military stabilization plan from conception to execution. USSOUTHCOM planners used the work the 361st Civil Affairs planners did in support of the original order, Blind Logic, into Operation Promote Liberty which put the USSOUTHCOM J-5 in charge of the CMOTF (Fishel, 1992a; Gann, 1990). The arrival in country of U.S. Army special forces, which conducted preliminary medical and engineer assessments and surveys, refined the plan (Taw, 1996). Eventually, the MSG, reacting to several obstacles identified at the tactical and operational levels, created a new plan to assist the new Panamanian government with democracy, internationally recognized standards of justice, and professional public services (Gann, 1990; Schultz, 1993).

Creating an Inclusive and Synchronized Framework

The available planning information provides no evidence military planners created an inclusive and synchronized framework for stability operations in Panama. U.S. military planning incorporated none of the sub-indicators of an inclusive and synchronized framework. The U.S. military alone planned the stability operation in Panama, denying the State Department and the

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) the opportunity to provide input and information. Secondary sources show that at the Joint Staff and Combatant Command levels, military planners understood the need to coordinate with the Department of State; however senior military leaders told the planners they could not coordinate with the Political Counselor at the Embassy in Panama because the DoD classified and compartmented it to remain exclusively in DoD channels (Fishel, 1992a). Historical records also note that while the USCENTCOM Commander, General Thurman, placed the Commander of the Civil Military Operations Task Force under the operational control of the Charge d' Affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Panama, the embassy did not have a plan or the resources in country to lead the effort (Fishel, 1992a).

Creation and Sustainment of Appropriate National Mechanisms

The available planning information provides strong evidence of military planners creating and sustaining appropriate national mechanisms for stability operations in Panama. U.S. military planning incorporated all four of the sub-indicators of the required national mechanisms in its stability planning for Panama. Compilations of historical interviews with participants and historical records detail how the U.S. military planned for creating national mechanisms in Panama during Operation Promote Liberty. The primary focus of military planners was the reconstitution of the Panamanian Defense Forces and support for the fledgling Panamanian government under Guillermo Endara. As shown in the Understanding Conflict paragraphs above, military planners created plans to recreate the PDF as a police force and advising the Panamanian government on judicial reforms and providing essential services (Fishel, 1992a; Gann, 1990; Schultz, 1993; Stiner, 1990; Taw, 1996).

Kuwait

The Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm) was a major conflict that took place in 1990-1991 between Iraq and a coalition of forces led by the United States. The war began when Iraq invaded and annexed Kuwait, a small country on the Persian Gulf. In the early hours of August 2, 1990, Iraqi forces crossed the Kuwaiti border, swiftly occupying the small, oil-rich nation. Saddam Hussein's motivations were rooted in territorial claims and economic interests, with Kuwait accused of overproducing oil and driving down global prices (Fishel, 1997). This invasion drew immediate condemnation from the international community, as it violated the principles of sovereignty and non-aggression. The United States, under President George H.W. Bush, responded decisively to the invasion, denouncing Iraq's actions and mobilizing a coalition of nations to counter the aggression (Fishel, 1997).

The military response by the United States was codenamed Operation Desert Shield, initially focusing on the deployment of troops to the region to deter further Iraqi aggression and protect Saudi Arabia from potential invasion (Stewart, 2010). As diplomatic efforts continued, it became evident Iraq was not willing to comply with the UN resolutions (Stewart, 2010). Consequently, the United States and its allies initiated Operation Desert Storm, the military phase of the response, on January 17, 1991. The ground phase of the operation commenced on February 24, 1991, with a massive coalition force launching a ground assault to liberate Kuwait. The Iraqi military, already weakened by the sustained air campaign, faced overwhelming force. The ground offensive was highly successful, swiftly pushing Iraqi forces out of Kuwait and effectively ending the occupation. The aftermath of the Gulf War saw Kuwait liberated, and a ceasefire declared. However, the conflict left a lasting impact on the region, with ramifications that reverberated for years. Most important was the rebuilding of Kuwait.

Kuwait is a complex story of how a small, independent country recovered in record time from the devastating effects of a seven-month occupation by Iraqi troops (McDonnell, 1999). Kuwait is not now and was not a democratic nation when Iraq invaded in 1990. However, it did and does have an indigenous democratic tradition centered on the assembly, which makes it an acceptable partner to the United States (Fishel, 1997). Despite the devastation wreaked on Kuwait by the Iraqi invasion, the DoD did not initiate the plan for the rebuilding of Kuwait. In October of 1990, the emir of Kuwait sent President Bush a letter requesting planning assistance from DoD assets (Fishel, 1997). Though it floundered within the bureaucracies of the State Department and Department of Defense for about six weeks, the DoD activated the Kuwait Task Force (KTF) as a planning cell for Kuwaiti restoration in December 1990 (Fishel, 1997).

Of note, unlike similar planning efforts by the U.S. military, the KTF was not under the command of USCENTCOM, nor was it in the chain of coordination for USCENTCOM planning for the actual liberation of Kuwait (Fishel, 1997, p. 130). This made integration of stability planning efforts more complicated than normal, confusing normal command responsibilities and coordination. Instead of providing guidance, USCENTCOM handed the responsibility for planning civil military operations to U.S. Army Central Command (ARCENT), its subordinate Army HQ, making coordination with the KTF more difficult (Fishel, 1992b). Despite these added complications, the United States and its allies provided significant assistance to Kuwait in its efforts to rebuild in the aftermath of the war. The plan called for the restoration of Kuwait's infrastructure, the rehabilitation of its oil industry, and the development of its economy (Fishel, 1992b). The plan also called for the training of Kuwaiti personnel to maintain and operate the restored infrastructure (Fishel, 1992b). In the wake of the 100-hour ground war against Iraq, the

US Army mounted the largest civil-military reconstruction operation since WWII to restore the shattered country of Kuwait (McDonnell, 1999).

As the U.S. military liberated Kuwait and occupied southern Iraq, it became apparent to the ARCENT Commander that the execution of stability operations required a dedicated organization for execution. ARCENT created Task Force Freedom (TF Freedom), with the task force incorporating the previously disparate elements planning stability operations – the Combined Civil Affairs Task Force (comprised of members from the 352nd Reserve Civil Affairs unit), the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (an active-duty unit under the operational control of ARCENT), the KTF, and the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Fishel, 1992b). TF Freedom operated out of Kuwait and provided the critical interface with the Kuwaiti government and U.S. civilian agencies (Fishel, 1992b).

Understanding Conflict

The available secondary source planning information provides a fair amount of evidence of military planners understanding the conflict in Kuwait for their planning efforts. U.S. military planning demonstrates the incorporation of three of the four sub-indicators of understanding conflict. U.S. military planners planned with a strong comprehensive situation assessment, understanding the causes and preventors at each level, and knowing when and how they needed to refine their plans. There is, however, no evidence the U.S. military planned to change the attitudes of the Kuwaiti government, military, or populace towards a more representative government. While the U.S. military had not had a long-standing or previous extensive cooperative agreement with Kuwait, the direct involvement of the exiled Kuwait government officials and opposition fighters inside Kuwait were instrumental in providing the U.S. military a strong comprehensive situation assessment (McDonnell, 1999). Exiled Kuwaiti government

officials helped the DoD Joint Staff planners understand the Kuwaiti culture and current political situation (Barlow, 2010; Carlton, 1993). While Kuwaiti opposition fighters in Kuwait provided USCENTCOM an understanding of the threat to stability operations (McDonnell, 1999). The cooperative relationship with the Department of State, established as part of the Kuwait Task Force planning efforts, provided the U.S. military planners an understanding of the causes and preventors of conflict at the strategic level. This included discontent with the ruling Al Sabah family and political turmoil within the country prior to the Iraqi invasion (Barakat & Skelton, 2014). At the operational and tactical levels, civil affairs military members operating in Kuwait identified human rights abuses causing conflict at the societal and individual levels (McDonnell, 1999).

Creating an Inclusive and Synchronized Framework

The available planning information provides minimal evidence military planners created an inclusive and synchronized framework for stability operations in Kuwait. U.S. military planning incorporated only two of the four sub-indicators of an inclusive and synchronized framework in stability planning. Planning for Kuwait demonstrated joint civilian-military and host nation inclusion, but not IGO or NGO inclusion. As noted previously, the State Department and exiled Kuwaiti government officials played an instrumental role in U.S. military planning efforts for stability operations in Kuwait (Barlow, 2010; Carlton, 1993; Carlton, 1994; Fishel, 1992b; McDonnell, 1999). The extensive involvement of the State Department provides clear evidence of joint civil-military efforts in the U.S. military designing and implementing a systemic and inclusive approach as a framework for Kuwaiti stability operations. Additionally, the direct involvement of Kuwaiti government officials demonstrates host-nation involvement for the inclusive approach. Carlton (1993 & 1994) and Barlow (2010) were direct participants in

the U.S. military planning efforts involving the State Department and Kuwait government, both serving as military officers on the Joint Staff. While secondary sources do confirm IGO and NGO involvement during the actual execution of the stability operations (Brinkerhoff et al., 1991; McDonnell, 1999), there is no evidence to support their inclusion in U.S. military planning prior to execution.

Creation and Sustainment of Appropriate National Mechanisms

The available planning information provides strong evidence of military planners creating and sustaining appropriate national mechanisms for stability operations in Kuwait. U.S. military planning incorporated all four of the sub-indicators of the required national mechanisms for stability planning in Kuwait. Available secondary sources provide evidence of U.S. military planning for assisting Kuwait with rebuilding civil service institutions, firming up its rule of law, rebuilding its economy, and strengthening its security forces. As Kuwait was not a failed or fragile state at the conclusion of its occupation by Iraq, U.S. military planning focused on assessing and repairing critical infrastructure to allow Kuwaiti civil service mechanisms to resume governance. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, as part of the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office, planned for the restoration of electricity and water supplies, the rebuilding of bridges and roads, and the repairing of communication networks (McDonnell, 1999). U.S. Army Reservists serving as military planners in the Kuwait Task Force used their civilian expertise to plan for the reestablishment of the rule of law. The Kuwait Task Force ensured the Government of Kuwait understood the U.S. would not tolerate Kuwait exacting retribution on the Iraqis and suspected collaborators, adhering to U.S. human rights laws in all agreements with the Government of Kuwait (Brinkerhoff et al., 1991, pp. 50-51). Planners also recognized restoring Kuwait's economy, particularly its vital oil industry, was essential for long-term stability.

Military planners within Task Force Freedom, U.S. Army Central Command's Civil Affairs element, prioritized repairing ports, roads, and airports to help restore the country's economic life (McDonnell, 1999, p. 84). Finally, military planners within ARCENT also created plans to keep roughly 5,000 soldiers in Kuwait to help provide security and planners with the Joint Staff worked on efforts for selling military equipment to Kuwait (McDonnell, 1999).

Somalia

Following the end of the Cold War, Somalia, a hollow shell of a nation state, crumbled. In January 1991, Somalia opposition forces successfully deposed General Mohammed Siad Barre following a three-year guerilla war. Somalia institutions and infrastructure, destroyed during the heavy fighting, dissolved any ability for the nation to function as a cohesive society. The void in leadership created violent internal clan and sub-clan conflict further destabilizing the fragile country. In the face of famine, food became a source of power as warring clans quickly seized control of all food aid supplies (Baumann & Yates, 2004). By January 1992, the International Red Cross warned starvation was overtaking hundreds of thousands of refugees in southern Somalia (Alexander, 2013). The President, through the advice of the National Security Council and Department of Defense, limited the initial U.S. support to Somalia to providing humanitarian assistance.

By the end of 1992, the National Security Council had prepared three options for the President for intervening in the worsening situation in Somalia (Baumann & Yates, 2004). President Bush approved the option recommended by the Joint Chief of Staff which would deploy an American-organized and led multi-national force with armed U.S. troops playing the predominant role. Codenamed, Operation Restore Hope, the strategic planning for the operation fell to the United States Central Command. Within the space of a week, General Joseph Hoar,

the USCENTCOM commander in chief (CINCENT) prepared an estimate of the situation for the President using their Gulf War experience, a generic plan that covered humanitarian problems and natural disasters, and the command's continuing experience with Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq (Baumann & Yates, 2004).

The USCENTCOM plan executed Operation Restore Hope in four phases (source?). Phase I involved the deployment of coalition forces to Mogadishu, Somalia's capital, to create a security zone around the airport and port facilities to protect the humanitarian relief supplies. Phase II required coalition forces to secure the lines of communication leading to the major relief centers in USCENTCOM designated humanitarian relief sectors. Phase III was stabilization operations, the necessary precursor to Phase IV, which was the transition to a United Nations peacekeeping force.

The USCENTCOM plan designated the I Marine Expeditionary Force as the headquarters for Joint Task Force (JTF) Somalia, the military organization physically present in Somalia to execute the operation. Once notified, the I MEF commander sent planners to work with the USCENTCOM staff to ensure synchronized plans (Baumann & Yates, 2004). The 10th Mountain Division out of Fort Drum, New York provided the Army forces for the operation. A company from the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion from Fort Bragg, North Carolina provided the civil affairs support to the JTF.

Understanding Conflict

The available planning information provides no evidence of military planners understanding the conflict in Somalia for their planning efforts. U.S. military planning fails to demonstrate any incorporation of the sub-indicators of understanding conflict in its stability planning for Somalia. The U.S. military's planning for Operation Restore Hope revealed

significant misunderstandings of the conflict, with no evidence the military had completed a comprehensive situation assessment, was taking action to change attitudes, that they understood what was causing conflict at the different levels, or that they refined their plan as conditions changed. The failure to understand the conflict at a fundamental level in planning was disastrous in execution and ultimately contributed to the U.S. not transforming the conflict in Somalia.

The available scholarly resources and limited primary sources show no evidence military planners adequately understood any of these considerations. One major issue was the planner's insufficient understanding of Somalia's historical and cultural context (Baumann & Yates, 2004). Somalia's history of colonialism, clan dynamics, and post-independences struggles played a crucial role in shaping the conflict. The planners underestimated the depth and significance of these historical factors, factors which contributed to the fragmented nature of Somali society (Baumann & Yates, 2004). The planners lacked a nuanced understanding of Somalia's intricate clan structure. Their failure to grasp the complexities of these relationships led to a simplistic view of the conflict as merely a power struggle between warlords. The planners also failed to understand the threats present in Somalia, underestimating the power and influence of the warlords and incorrectly assuming traditional military strategies and negotiations would easily subdue them (Baumann & Yates, 2004; Poole, 2005). Military planners underestimated the capabilities and resolve of Somali militias, failing to understand both their tactical proficiency and ability to mobilize rapidly. Finally, U.S. military planners failed to understand the extent of the breakdown of the current political situation and how that impacted the scale and complexity of the humanitarian crisis the military would operate in.

There is also no evidence U.S. military planners took efforts to change attitudes by influencing either Somali government officials or military leaders (or in this case clan leaders) or

had a plan to get the population to accept desired changes in their environment. The failure of the U.S. military to establish safe and reliable aid distribution networks undermined the mission's humanitarian goals and exacerbated local resentment towards foreign troops (Cahill, 1993; Poole, 2005). The U.S. military's failure to engage meaningfully with local leaders and communities alienated the population. Military planners often sidelined the traditional elders and community leaders, who held significant influence, in favor of dealing directly with warlords (Center for Army Lessons Learned [CALL], 1993). This approach ignored the social fabric of Somali society and undermined efforts to build local support for the mission.

The last two components of understanding conflict are understanding the causes and preventors of conflict and the adaptation or refinement of the original plan. The lack of understanding of the culture, threats, and current political situation led to an inability of military planners to understand the causes and preventors at the strategic, operational, and tactical level of operations when planning. Not until the horrific events of October 3rd and 4th of 1993 in the Battle of Mogadishu did military planners grasp how their underestimation of General Mohammed Siad Barre, a Somali warlord, could have detrimental effects on military operations (Baumann & Yates, 2004). Eventually this failure to understand the causes and preventors at different levels led to significant gaps in knowledge that led to a flawed intervention that ultimately failed to achieve its objectives. Lastly, the available scholarly resources and limited primary sources show no evidence the U.S. military refined or adapted their plan for Operation Restore Hope during the operation.

Creating an Inclusive and Synchronized Framework

The available planning information provides minimal evidence military planners created an inclusive and synchronized framework for stability operations in Somalia. U.S. military

planning incorporated only two of the four sub-indicators of an inclusive and synchronized framework in its planning for Somalia. Military planning shows significant civilian-military and IGO inclusion as part of its framework, but no evidence of including NGOs or the host-nation in stability planning. After-Action Reports and compilations of historical interviews with those involved in planning at USCENTCOM shows the planning process involved extensive interagency collaboration, particularly between the DoD, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Department of State (Cahill, 2023; CALL, 1993). USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) played a pivotal role in assessing humanitarian needs and coordinating aid efforts with UN agencies (Cahill, 2023). A company from the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion established a Civil Military Operation Center (CMOC) to facilitate coordination between military forces and civilian organizations (Cahill, 2023). The CMOC served as a hub for information sharing, planning, and resolving issues related to humanitarian operations. However, no evidence exists that military planners included NGOs or Somali nationals in their planning for stability operations.

Creation and Sustainment of Appropriate National Mechanisms

The available planning information provides minimal evidence of military planners creating and sustaining appropriate national mechanisms for stability operations in Somalia. U.S. military planning demonstrated the incorporation of only two of the four sub-indicators of the required national mechanisms in its stability planning. Military planners planned for the creation of rule of law and security, but not civil service or economic development. Research by Baumann and Yates (2004) confirms the U.S. military assisted the United Nations with advising a newly formed Somali police force and providing advice on penal and judicial system reforms. Additionally, U.S. military forces planned for using these same police forces as Somali security

forces, protecting aid supplies traveling through Somalia (Stewart,2003). No evidence exists, nor do compilations of historical interviews conducted by other researchers and authors suggest, that the U.S. military planned to create or sustain either civil service or economic mechanisms to transform the conflict in Somalia.

Haiti

The early 1990s in Haiti saw a great deal of political instability and turmoil. In 1990, the Haitian people elected Jean-Bertrand Aristide president in Haiti's first free and fair election. In September 1991, General Raoul Cedras, overthrew Aristide by a military coup, resulting in widespread violence and human rights abuses. The United States, under President George H.W. Bush and later President William Clinton, initially responded with diplomatic and economic sanctions. However, the situation continued to deteriorate, with reports of escalating violence and a burgeoning refugee crisis as thousands of Haitians fled to the United States (Kretchik et al., 1998).

In September 1993, President Clinton authorized a military intervention in Haiti to remove the military regime installed by the 1991 Haitian coup d'état that overthrew the elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. In January 1994, the Clinton administration authorized the establishment Joint Task Force 180 under the U.S. Atlantic Command, and a Joint Planning Group convened to begin invasion planning. Codenamed Operation Restore Democracy, the operation aimed to restore democracy in Haiti by removing a military junta and reinstalling the democratically elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

In addition to allowing the Department of Defense to plan a forceful invasion, President Clinton also pursued a diplomatic solution through former President Jimmy Carter. This diplomatic mission coincided with the deployment of U.S. troops, creating a situation where

military force backed up negotiations. The dual approach proved successful. The Carter delegation secured an agreement with Cedras for his resignation and Aristide's return, rendering the Operation Restore Democracy plan no longer valid.

No longer a full-scale military invasion, the Department of Defense changed the operation's name to Operation Uphold Democracy and created a new plan. Having met the primary objective of Operation Restore Democracy, the restoration of the democratically elected government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, U.S. Atlantic Command shifted its plan to a set of secondary objectives from the original plan. These were ensuring a peaceful transition to power, stabilizing the security situation in Haiti, facilitating humanitarian assistance, and supporting the establishment of democratic institutions and the rule of law (Ballard, 1998).

In its revised plan for U.S. military intervention and stability operations, U.S. Atlantic Command incorporated four main concerns. First was the need for political sensitivity, U.S. military forces would need to conduct the operation in a way that minimized casualties and avoided excessive force. Second, planning and operations needed to consider Haiti's terrain, infrastructure, and political situation, all of which posed unique challenges for military forces. Third was the recognition that the operation would require coordination with international partners and the United Nations. Finally, planning and operations had to ensure the protection of civilians and provide humanitarian aid.

U.S. Atlantic Command divided the operation into four phases (U.S. Atlantic Command, 1995a). Phase I, the Preparation Phase, involved deploying forces. Phase II involved the rapid deployment of forces to key locations in Haiti, with airborne and amphibious assaults planned to secure critical infrastructure, like the Port-au-Prince airport and the seaports. Phase III shifted the focus to stabilization activities, specifically disarming the military and paramilitary groups and

establishing a secure environment. The final phase, Phase IV, was the transition phase with stability operations focused on supporting the establishment of democratic institutions and the rule of law as U.S. forces prepared to handover control to international peacekeeping forces.

On September 19, 1994, U.S. forces began deploying to Haiti. Joint Task Force 190, led by Lieutenant General Hugh Shelton, was responsible for executing the operation in Haiti. The 82nd Airborne Division was the primary ground force, while Special Operations Forces (SOF) secured key installations and apprehended military leaders. Military forces encountered little resistance, with the rapid and overwhelming presence of U.S. forces helping to quickly stabilize the situation. Key military operations included securing Port-au-Prince, helping establish a sense of order and authority; disarming militias, preventing sabotage and ensuring a smooth transition to power; and humanitarian assistance, providing food, water, and medical assistance to the Haitian population (U.S. Atlantic Command, 1995a). Operation Uphold Democracy returned President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power and the United States officially handed over the operation to the United Nations in March 1995.

Understanding Conflict

The available planning information provides minimal evidence of military planners understanding the conflict in Haiti for their planning efforts. U.S. military planning demonstrates the incorporation of two of the four sub-indicators for understanding conflict. The military's planning for Operation Uphold Democracy revealed an attempt at a comprehensive situation assessment and the adaptation of their plan to changes, but no evidence of planning to change attitudes or understand the causes and preventors of conflict at different levels. Historical compilations of interviews with planners and historical records offer evidence that military planners had a surface-level understanding of Haitian culture, threats, and political situation for

planning Operation Uphold Democracy (Fishel, 1997; Hayden, 1995a; Hayden, 1995b; Stahl, n.d). There was a sense of understanding among military planners that Haitian culture, particularly respect for religious leaders and elders, would influence the ability of the U.S. military to conduct stability operations (McClintock, 1997). The U.S. military had a strong understanding of the role of the Forces Armee d’Haiti (Fad’H) and the threat it posed to stability after the military invasion (McClintock, 1997). And finally, given the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Haiti and removal of President Aristide, military planning understood how the political situation would influence stability operations (McClintock, 1997).

Secondary sources confirm the U.S. military had no plans for changing attitudes among political leaders, the military, or the Haitian elite; nor were military planners interested in understanding the causes and preventors at the strategic, operational, or tactical levels (McGrady & Ivancovich, 1998). This lack of planning for changing attitudes and understanding causes and preventors would cause significant issues during the execution of the operation. LTG Fisher, the commander of Joint Task Force – 180, noted how the military’s underestimation of the population’s deep hatred of the Fad’H provided significant obstacles to U.S. efforts to assist with building security forces post-conflict (McGrady & Ivancovich, 1998).

Compilations of historical interviews and historical records also provide insights into how U.S. military planners changed the plan based on new information (Ballard, 1998; Fishel, 1997; Kretchik et al., 1998). Initially military planners assumed they would provide minimal assistance to Haitians following the invasion, believing Aristide’s return would negate the need. As the situation in Haiti became clearer after the initial invasion, planners revised their assumptions and hastily changed their plans for stability operations (Ballard, 1998; Fishel, 1997).

Creating an Inclusive and Synchronized Framework

The available planning information provides minimal evidence military planners created an inclusive and synchronized framework for stability operations in Haiti. U.S. military planning incorporated two of the four sub-indicators of an inclusive and synchronized framework. While compilations of historical interviews with military planners and senior military commanders; historical accounts, and DoD funded research reports all detail the interagency planning in Haiti as less than optimal, there is ample evidence joint civilian-military planning did occur (Bentley, 1996; Fishel, 1997; Girard, 2004; Hayes & Wheatley, 1996). There is also evidence U.S. military planners coordinated with the United Nations Task Force in Haiti, thereby including an intergovernmental organization in their planning efforts (Dworken & Siegel, 1997; Kretchik et al., 1998). However, there is no evidence from either primary or secondary sources which speak to efforts to include non-governmental organizations currently operating in Haiti or the Haitian government into the U.S. military stability planning.

Creation and Sustainment of Appropriate National Mechanisms

The available planning information provides almost no evidence of military planners creating and sustaining appropriate national mechanisms for stability operations in Haiti. U.S. military planning incorporated one of the four sub-indicators of the required national mechanisms. Compilations of historical interviews with military planners and senior military commanders; historical accounts, and DoD funded research reports all reveal the U.S. military had no intention of nation-building in Haiti as part of Operation Uphold Democracy. Therefore, military planners did not plan for creating or sustaining appropriate national mechanisms, with the exception of security forces. Kretchik et al. (1998) specifically identify five assumptions made by military planners which the planners reported to them they expected someone else to plan for, including local and national governance, judiciary reform, and revitalization of the

Haitian economy. U.S. military forces eventually planned for and helped establish an interim police force from the Fad'H when it became apparent civilian organizations could not do so in a timely manner (McGrady & Ivancovich, 1998).

Bosnia

The Soviet Union's demise in December 1991 ended the Cold War and tumbled a bipolar world order 50 years in the making. Such a tumultuous occurrence prompted numerous security-based organizations and military headquarters to reexamine their charters and missions. The UN viewed the event as freedom to end future conflict through preventive diplomacy and, under the leadership of Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali, embarked on an aggressive scheme to do so, while the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) also revised long-held views of how the alliance conducted military operations by developing military staffs capable of planning peace operations and out-of-sector deployments (Baumann et al., 2004).

In a complex series of diplomatic and political maneuvers, four of the six republics—Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia—separated from Yugoslavia between 1991 and 1992. Existing government contested each secession, with the most horrific destruction and violence occurring in centrally located Bosnia-Herzegovina. The civil war directly affected at least half of the entire population, more than two million people, lasting from April 1992 to November 1995. Those engaged in violence ignored efforts by the United Nations and the European Union, failing to honor cease-fires, massacring civilians, and destroying entire villages (Phillips, 2005). The ethnic cleansing that ravaged the country defied any semblance of restraint or responsibility.

In November 1995, after extensive diplomatic efforts, the warring parties signed the Dayton Peace Agreement. The Agreement, which established a framework for peace and set the

stage for international military intervention, required military forces to enforce the accords. A NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) was to oversee the cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of combatants, and the maintenance of a secure environment (Phillips, 2005).

Operation Joint Endeavor, the codename for the U.S. military operations in support of the NATO-led intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina, aimed at enforcing the Dayton Peace Agreement and bringing an end to the Bosnian War. The operation was the first major out-of-area deployment in NATO's history and involved extensive planning and coordination by the United States European Command (USEUCOM). The primary objective of Operation Joint Endeavor was to enforce the terms of the Dayton Peace Agreement. There were four secondary objectives (Baumann et al., 2004). First, to ensure the withdrawal of the warring factions to designated areas. Second, to establish and maintain a secure environment for civilian populations. Third, to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid. Fourth, to support the establishment of democratic institutions and the rule of law. NATO significantly assisted the U.S. military planning efforts, developing a comprehensive plan for the deployment and operations of IFOR, emphasizing multinational cooperation and integration (Baumann et al., 2004).

In planning the U.S. military intervention and stability operations, USEUCOM incorporated four main considerations. First was a consideration of the complex operational environment. Bosnia's rugged terrain, winter weather conditions, and destroyed infrastructure posed significant challenges. Second was multinational force integration, with the operation requiring the seamless integration of forces from multiple NATO member states and partner countries to achieve unity of effort. Third were clear and robust rules of engagement (ROE), allowing forces to deal with potential threats while minimizing civilian casualties. Finally, U.S.

military planners recognized protecting civilians and facilitating humanitarian assistance must be part of the plan.

Understanding Conflict

The available planning information provides strong evidence of military planners understanding the conflict in Bosnia in their planning efforts. U.S. military planning demonstrated the incorporation of all four sub-indicators of understanding conflict in stability planning for Bosnia. Historical records and compilations of historical interviews with U.S. military planners at NATO and USEUCOM show planners had a clear understanding of the culture, threats, and current political situation in Bosnia for Operation Joint Endeavor (Baumann et al., 2004; Phillips, 2005). For the threats, planners had a clear understanding of the brutal tactics employed by various factions, particularly the Bosnia Serbs. Part of the planning involved the U.S. military obtaining detailed maps of troop movements, ethnic distributions, and areas of conflict to inform the planning efforts (CALL, 1997a; CALL, 1997b). The U.S. military had already documented numerous human rights violations, understanding these acts were part of a deliberate strategy to terrorize and displace non-Serb populations.

Causes and preventors at different levels – U.S. military planners at NATO, USEUCOM, and 1st Armor Division understood the conflict in Bosnia involved multiple factions, with the Bosnian government forces, Bosnian Serb forces, Bosnian Croat forces, and various paramilitary groups vying for control. After Action Reports document an understanding of the causes and preventors at different levels. U.S. military planners at NATO, USEUCOM, and 1st Armor Division understood the conflict in Bosnia involved multiple factions fighting for control, with the Bosnian government forces, Bosnian Serb forces, Bosnian Croat forces, and various paramilitary groups vying for control (CALL, 1997a; CALL, 1997b). U.S. military planners also

understood the broader geopolitical implications of the conflict, with the United Nations and European Community interested in the outcome and attempting mediation prior to the conflict. Russia, a traditional ally of Serbia, also had a vested interest in the conflict, requiring planners to consider the potential for broader geopolitical tensions between NATO and Russia.

Creating an Inclusive and Synchronized Framework

The available planning information provides a fair amount of evidence that military planners created an inclusive and synchronized framework for stability operations in Bosnia. U.S. military planning incorporated three of the four sub-indicators of an inclusive and synchronized framework in planning for Bosnia. Historical records document the U.S. military understanding that the success of Operation Joint Endeavor required close cooperation between military and civilian agencies. Integrated planning and coordination occurred between military planners and the United Nations, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the European Community (Baumann et al., 2004; Phillips, 2005). Congressional Research records and Central Intelligence Agency reports provide information on U.S. military planning with civilian agencies for stability operations in Bosnia Herzegovina, specifically for gaining situation understanding and training forces and reconstruction of infrastructure (Central Intelligence Agency, 1994; Kim, 1997; Kim, 1998; Lamb et al., 2014). The creation of the U.S. Interagency Task Force allowed for the sharing of intelligence to gain a better situation understanding between military and civilian counterparts for planning stability operations. The joint State and DoD Train and Equip program, allowed both entities to plan for the creation of Bosnian federal forces. After Action Reports provided details of military planners speaking with local Bosnia-Herzegovina leaders before planning stability operations (CALL, 1997a; CALL, 1997b).

Creation and Sustainment of Appropriate National Mechanisms

The available planning information provides strong evidence of military planners creating and sustaining appropriate national mechanisms for stability operations in Bosnia. U.S. military planning incorporated all four of the sub-indicators of the required national mechanisms in stability planning for Operation Joint Endeavor. The U.S. military recognized that peace and stability in Bosnia would require a long-term commitment supporting political, economic, rule of law, and security efforts. The U.S. military focused on training and supporting local security forces, this included the restructuring and training of the Federation Army and the Republika Srpska Army, aiming to transform them from warring factions into professional, apolitical defense forces (Lalor, 2008; Lamb et al., 2014). The U.S. military supported strengthening the rule of law by planning support for the International Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in apprehending indicted war criminals and providing intelligence, security, and logistical support for the ICTY operations (Swain, 2003). Civil Affairs planners played a crucial role in supporting governance support, helping and training newly established government bodies from the municipal to national level (Phillips, 2005). Military planners assisted economic development by planning the rebuilding of critical infrastructure damaged during the war (Phillips, 2005).

Kosovo

The Kosovo War, part of the broader Yugoslav Wars, began in 1998 and culminated in 1999. Kosovo, an autonomous province within Serbia (which was then part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), had a majority Albanian population. The 1990s saw a rise of Serbian nationalism under Slobodan Milosevic, the elected leader of Serbia, resulting in a violent campaign of ethnic cleansing against Kosovo Albanians. The Albanians, a predominantly

Muslim population, used the broader Yugoslav Wars to seek greater autonomy (Wentz, 2002).

Tensions between the Albanians and Serbs steadily escalated, fueled by historical grievances and Serbian nationalism under Milosevic.

The war involved intense fighting between the Serbian forces and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), an Albanian separatist group, with widespread human rights abuses and the ethnic cleansing of the Kosovar Albanians (Phillips, 2007). Mass killings, forced displacements, and widespread atrocities caused hundreds of thousands of Kosovo Albanians to flee their homes, creating a massive refugee crisis (Phillips, 2007). After international pressure and diplomatic efforts failed to achieve a ceasefire, NATO intervened militarily in the conflict in March 1999 with Operation Allied Force, a bombing campaign against Serbian military targets (Phillips, 2007). The operation aimed to halt the atrocities and force the withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo (Fritz, 2018). A subsequent United Nations resolution established Kosovo as a UN protectorate, with NATO deploying a Kosovo Force (KFOR) to provide security. The mission marked the second time that NATO led a peacekeeping force in the former Yugoslav territory.

As a lead actor in both the conflict and subsequent stabilization, the United States military intervention was codenamed Operation Joint Guardian. The operation aimed to create a secure environment, foster political and economic development, and pave a path toward a stable, democratic, and multi-ethnic Kosovo (Phillips, 2007). The primary objectives of Operation Joint Guardian were to ensure the withdrawal of Serbian military and paramilitary forces from Kosovo; facilitate the return of displaced persons and refugees; disarm the KLA and other armed groups; and support the establishment of democratic institutions and the rule of law (Phillips, 2007).

U.S. military planning for the insertion of a peacekeeping force began in 1998, as conditions in Kosovo continued to deteriorate despite the air bombing campaign against the Serbian forces. The military planners assumed they would enter an operational environment like the one they entered in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with an agreement comparable to the Dayton Peace Accords in place prior to deployment (Phillips, 2007). The failure to obtain a negotiated settlement made military planners reconsider the size of their force structure and assume Serbian forces would oppose their entry into Kosovo (Phillips, 2007). An absence of clear guidance from the President and National Security Council meant that the U.S. European Command's planners had to guess when and where the U.S. would obligate military forces (Phillips, 2007). Despite the continued uncertainty, in the Spring of 1999 USEUCOM directed U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) to focus its unit training on peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations and freeze training in preparation for movement into Kosovo (Phillips, 2007).

By June of 1999 USAREUR had designated the 1st Infantry Division as Task Force FALCON to provide peace enforcement in Kosovo. The task force combined aviation elements, a U.S. Marine Corps Expeditionary Unit, and elements of 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (Fritz, 2018). Because the U.S. military had not expected a ground invasion into Kosovo, military planners had little time to plan for the operation and less time to consider the stability operations plan (Fritz, 2018). Planners based most of the plan on their experiences in Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia and Herzegovina (CALL, 2000).

Understanding Conflict

The available planning information provides strong evidence of military planners understanding the conflict in Kosovo in their planning efforts. U.S. military planning demonstrated the incorporation of all four sub-indicators of understanding conflict in stability

planning for Kosovo. As with Bosnia and Herzegovina, U.S. military planners at NATO and USEUCOM understood the culture, threats, and current political situation in Kosovo for Operation Joint Guardian having watched the situation build for years prior to actual military intervention (Nardulli et al., 2002; Phillips, 2007). Considerable Balkans experience in the U.S. military intelligence organizations allowed for a detailed understanding on the warring faction in Kosovo, providing valuable information for military planners in understanding the threats (CALL, 2000; Wentz, 2002). After Action Reviews and compilations of historical interviews with military planners made clear planners understood the need to change the attitudes of political and military leaders and Kosovars (CALL, 2000; Wentz, 2000). A long familiarity with the region gave military planners strong insights into the causes and preventors of conflict at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. They understood the broader Balkans conflict, the Albanians' and Serbians' conflict in Kosovo, and the hatred between the two entities at the local level (Nardulli et al, 2002; Wentz, 2000). Additionally, as with Bosnia and Herzegovina, after action reviews and compilations of historical interviews show military planners adjusted their plans as senior political leaders provided more guidance (Wentz, 2000).

Creating an Inclusive and Synchronized Framework

The available planning information provides a minimal amount of evidence that military planners created an inclusive and synchronized framework for stability operations in Kosovo. U.S. military planning incorporated only two of the four sub-indicators of an inclusive and synchronized framework for stability planning in Operation Joint Guardian. The military's recent experience in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia and Herzegovina allowed military planners to understand the importance of incorporating interagency civilians into the planning for stability operations. In Kosovo, military planners from U.S. Army Europe and the 1st Armor Division

both incorporated civilian expertise into the plan The United Nations Security Council passed resolution 1244, authorizing Operation Joint Guardian, allowing U.S. military planners to coordinate their efforts with the United Nation Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) (Nardulli et al., 2002). There is no evidence supporting U.S. military coordination with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in planning for stability operations, even though over 200 NGOs operated in Kosovo during Operation Joint Guardian (Holshek, 2002). It was not until well into the operation that civil affairs personnel coordinated with NGOs to assist in providing essential services (Holshek, 2002). There was also no evidence military planners incorporated the host-nation in planning for stability operations, as no definitive government existed in Kosovo as the military planned for Operation Joint Guardian.

Creation and Sustainment of Appropriate National Mechanisms

The available planning information provides strong evidence of military planners creating and sustaining appropriate national mechanisms for stability operations in Kosovo. U.S. military planning incorporated all four of the sub-indicators of the required national mechanisms in stability planning for Operation Joint Guardian. Though not part of the initial planning, U.S. military planners eventually created a plan for how to support governance, security, judicial reform, and economic development in Kosovo (Wentz, 2002). U.S. military planners worked closely with the UN Mission in Kosovo to organize elections and create local governments (CALL, 2000). Security planning focused on the disarmament of former combatants, dismantling paramilitary structures, and reintegrating the ex-combatants into civilian life (Nardulli et al., 2002). U.S. military planners also created plans to support the establishment of judicial institutions (CALL, 2000). Finally, there is evidence military planners also planned for rebuilding essential infrastructure, including roads, schools, and hospitals (Wentz, 2002).

Afghanistan

Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the U.S. launched a military intervention into Afghanistan. Codenamed Operation Enduring Freedom, the goals were to dismantle al-Qaeda and remove the Taliban regime. The strategic objectives of the invasion were clear: destroy al-Qaeda's infrastructure in Afghanistan, remove the Taliban from power, capture or kill key al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders, and prevent Afghanistan from being a base for terrorist operations (Collins, 2011).

Execution of the invasion centered on three main components – an air campaign, special operations, and a ground campaign. The invasion began with a concerted air campaign. On October 7, 2001, U.S. and British forces launched air strikes targeting Taliban air defenses, command and control centers, and al-Qaeda training camps (Collins, 2011). By late October Special Operations Forces (SOF) were on the ground linking up with Northern Alliance forces to plan and organize for a ground offensive. The ground campaign commenced in earnest in November 2001, with Northern Alliance forces, supported by U.S. air power and SOF, launching offensive operations against Taliban positions (Collins, 2011).

By December 2001, the initial invasion had largely achieved its objectives. The Northern Alliance, supported by U.S. SOF and conventional Army forces, had effectively dismantled the Taliban regime with the key cities of Kabul and Kandahar under their control. U.S. SOF had destroyed many of the al-Qaeda training camps and either killing or forcing key operatives into hiding. Additionally, the Bonn Agreement had established an interim Afghan government, paving the way for stability operations.

The initial planning of U.S. military stability operations in Afghanistan began almost concurrently with the military operations to dismantle al-Qaeda and remove the Taliban regime.

The U.S. understood the efforts were crucial for ensuring the vacuum created by the removal of the Taliban did not lead to chaos and further instability (Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction [SIGAR], 2021). The primary objectives of the stability operations were to establish a secure environment across Afghanistan, support the creation of effective and legitimate Afghan governance structure, and promote economic development and reconstruction to improve the living conditions of the Afghan people and reduce any potential support for insurgent groups within the country (SIGAR, 2021).

In 2003, the USCENTCOM Commander, General John Abizaid, chose Lieutenant General (LTG) David Barno to command a newly devised Combined Joint Task Force – 180 (CJTF-180). LTG Barno would concentrate on the Afghan people, not the Taliban, working to defeat terrorism and deny sanctuary, enable the Afghan security structure, sustain area ownership, enable reconstruction and good governance, and engage regional states (Collins, 2015).

Understanding Conflict

The available planning information provides a fair amount of evidence of military planners understanding the conflict in Afghanistan in their planning efforts. U.S. military planning demonstrated the incorporation of three of the four sub-indicators of understanding conflict in its stability planning for Operation Enduring Freedom. Because the U.S. military had fought in Afghanistan for several months before planning stability operations, military planners had a fair understanding of the culture, the threat, and the current political situation. Historical accountings demonstrate military planners understood tribal and ethnic diversity in Afghanistan and the socio-economic differences between the rural and urban populations in planning stability operations (Flavin, 2003; Wright et al., 2010). There is substantial evidence military planners

understood and incorporated U.S. political guidance striving to change attitudes of Afghan political and military leaders and the average Afghan citizen (SIGAR, 2021). Primary sources provide no concrete information that U.S. military planners understood the causes and preventors of conflict in Afghanistan. While several secondary sources detail the numerous failures of military planners to understand those causes and preventors, from not understanding the ability of the Taliban to wreck the peace process, Afghan political elite willing to maximize their personal or communal gains, and the tenuous state of governance in several of Afghanistan's neighbors (Durch, 2003; Stedman, 2001). Finally, there is also evidence that military planners adjusted their plan repeatedly to meet changing conditions. The initial guidance given to USCENTCOM by political leaders said the U.S. military would not participate in nation building. Almost a year after the initial military invasion, the shift toward stability operations began. (Flavin, 2004).

Creating an Inclusive and Synchronized Framework

The available planning information provides strong evidence military planners created an inclusive and synchronized framework for stability operations in Afghanistan. U.S. military planning incorporated all four of the sub-indicators of an inclusive and synchronized framework for its stability planning in Operation Enduring Freedom. Although not included in the initial planning for Afghanistan, by 2004, the U.S. military became increasingly aware of the need to include civilian governmental and nongovernmental actors in efforts to stabilize Afghanistan and support the Afghan people (Oliker et al., 2004). The U.S. State Department and USAID, already present at USCENTCOM headquarters, supporting stabilization efforts argued for the inclusion of the NGO consortium InterAction, along with the United Nations in planning (Oliker et al., 2004). The resulting framework was one of the most inclusive for U.S. military intervention in

planning stability operations. Unlike many of the previous military invasions with stability operations, the Interim Afghan government was a key player in making decisions regarding stabilization in Afghanistan (Flavin, 2004). The Interim Afghan government provided distinct input in developing the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS), a five-year plan for reconstruction and development in Afghanistan which promotes international engagement and coordination (DoD, 2010).

Creation and Sustainment of Appropriate National Mechanisms

The available planning information provides strong evidence of military planners creating and sustaining appropriate national mechanisms for stability operations in Afghanistan. U.S. military planning incorporated all four of the sub-indicators of the required national mechanisms in its stability planning for Operation Enduring Freedom. As with other military interventions, the U.S. was slow to plan for the creation and sustainment of national mechanisms. However, once the Department of Defense made the decision to shift its emphasis to stability and support operations, there is ample evidence of their planning in support of civil service, rule of law, the economy, and security forces. DoD planning from USCENTCOM and CJTF-180 demonstrate support to civil service and rule of law through Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). PRTs were small, multi-agency teams deployed to provincial capitals in Afghanistan to assist with governance (civil service) and rule of law (SIGAR, 2018). The PRTs served as a way for the transitional Afghan government to extend its influence to remote and rural areas in Afghanistan while promoting good governance practices (Wright et al., 2010). Additionally, the most important governance mechanism planned for by the U.S. military was the Afghan constitutional loya jirga, signifying tremendous political progress by the Afghan National government (Wright et al., 2010). Military planners also created a plan for the training and equipping of the Afghan

National Security Forces (ANSF) (SIGAR, 2018). The U.S. military planned to rebuild the Afghan National Army into a professional fighting force loyal to the democratically elected government of Afghanistan (Wright et al., 2010). Finally, there is significant evidence detailing how the U.S. military planned to assist economic development in Afghanistan through the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds (Johnson et al., 2013; Martins, 2005).

Iraq

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was a military campaign conducted by the United States and its coalition allies in 2003, aiming to overthrow the regime of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. The impetus for OIF was rooted in the post-9/11 geopolitical climate, concerns over Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), and the desire to establish a democratic government in Iraq. The Bush administration's strategic objectives for OIF included dismantling Saddam Hussein's regime, eliminating Iraq's alleged WMD capabilities, and creating a stable, democratic Iraq that could serve as a model for the region (Rayburn & Sobchak, 2019).

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, the Bush administration identified Iraq as a potential threat to U.S. national security. Intelligence reports suggested that Iraq possessed WMDs and had links to terrorist organizations. These concerns, coupled with Saddam Hussein's defiance of United Nations resolutions, set the stage for a military intervention.

The military plan for the invasion of Iraq aimed to rapidly degrade the Iraqi military capabilities and topple Saddam Hussein's regime. The U.S. Central Command planned the invasion. The U.S. Army's V Corps and the 1st Marine Expeditionary Unit (I MEF) spearheaded the ground component of the operation. USCENTCOM divided the invasion plan into four

operational phases – transporting forces and capabilities into theater, shaping the battlefield, defeating Iraqi forces, and post-hostility operations (Bensahel et al., 2008). USCENTCOM planners developed a detailed plan for Iraqi Reconstruction and stability operations. The plan focused on rule of law, security, civil support, emergency humanitarian assistance, and the restoration of critical life support infrastructure (Bensahel et al., 2008). USCENTCOM gave the U.S. Third Army primary responsibility for stability operations. Unlike other U.S. military interventions, there is significant evidence military planners placed special emphasis on planning for stability operations in Iraq. Additionally, sources demonstrate the military planned for stability operations at all levels, from the strategic to the tactical.

Understanding Conflict

The available planning information provides a fair amount of evidence of military planners understanding the conflict in Iraq in their planning efforts. U.S. military planning demonstrates the incorporation of three of the four sub-indicators for understanding conflict in stability planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Primary and secondary sources offer evidence that military planners understood Iraqi culture and the political situation, but severely underestimated the threat, in planning for Phase IV – Stability in Iraq. Unlike Afghanistan, the U.S. military had twelve years of intensive focus and intelligence collection on the Persian Gulf region and portions of Iraq in particular, to assist them in understanding the Operation Iraqi Freedom conflict (Perry et al., 2015). Compilations of historical interviews with planners at USCENTCOM and Third Army show an awareness of the deep-rooted sectarian and ethnic divisions amongst the Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish populations within Iraq (Bensahel et al., 2008). Secondary sources detail the U.S. military's understanding of Saddam Hussein's authoritarian regime, its brutal repression and patronage networks (Perry et al., 2015). While military planners

had a clear understanding of Iraq's military forces, they underestimated the strength and resistance offered by both insurgent and militant groups during the stability phase (Gordon & Trainor, 2006). Both primary and secondary sources confirm the U.S. military had no plan to change the attitudes among Iraqi political leaders, the military, or the Iraqi elites, believing Iraqis would see the U.S. as liberators and support its presence in Iraq (Bensahel et al., 2008; McCool, 2006). There is substantial evidence military planners understood the causes and preventors of conflict at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. U.S. military plans described sectarian and ethnic tensions, decades of authoritarian repression, economic hardship, and the external influence of Iran as causes of conflict while recognizing sectarian and ethnic cooperation and Ba'athist government officials could help prevent a complete destabilization of the nation (U.S. Central Command [USCENTCOM], 2003a.). Finally, multiple sources detail the adaptation of the plan for stability operations in Iraq as Third Army refined USCENTCOM's plan under the realization of changing conditions, gaps in knowledge, and bad assumptions became evident (Bensahel et al., 2008; McCool, 2006; Gordon & Trainor, 2006).

Creating an Inclusive and Synchronized Framework

The available planning information provides almost no evidence military planners created an inclusive and synchronized framework for stability operations in Iraq. U.S. military planning incorporated only one of the four sub-indicators of an inclusive and synchronized framework in stability planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Compilations of historical interviews with military planners at the DoD and Joint staff level, plus compilations of historical interviews with State Department officials, show the U.S. Department of State was the only entity, outside of the DoD, participating in planning for postwar Iraq (Bensahel et al., 2008). Compilations of historical interviews with former State Department officials indicate that State identified many of

the reconstruction and governance problems the U.S. military would face in Iraq during stabilization, but that military planners did not incorporate them into the plan (Bensahel et al., 2008). No record exists showing USCENTCOM or its subordinate commands collaboratively planned with international organizations, non-governmental organizations, or Iraqi nationals for stability operations (Bensahel et al., 2008).

Creation and Sustainment of Appropriate National Mechanisms

The available planning information provides strong evidence of military planners creating and sustaining appropriate national mechanisms for stability operations in Iraq. U.S. military planning incorporated all four of the sub-indicators of the required national mechanisms in stability planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Before the military intervention in Iraq began, the Department of Defense stood up the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) to plan for the postwar administration of Iraq. ORHA was responsible for humanitarian affairs, civil administration, and reconstruction. Compilations of historical interviews with ORHA officials and military planners at USCENTCOM and Third Army, plus available after-action reports from tactical units deployed to Iraq, articulate planning efforts designed to establish the foundational elements of a new Iraqi state (USCENTCOM, 2003a.); Phillips et al., 2006; Bensahel et al., 2008; Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction [SIGIR], 2013). Those same documents provide evidence of DoD facilitating the formation of the Interim Iraqi Government, a plan to restore essential economic functions and the rule of law.

Conclusion

This chapter introduced the QCA methodology and provided a brief overview of the eight cases studies I use for my study. As noted in earlier chapters, this is the first time a researcher has attempted to definitively link planning with an outcome. The brief case overviews allow the

reader to understand the evidence I use to support the indicator-levels for each of my conditions. Using Boolean algebra with binary numbers to represent the truths: true or false, the evidence demonstrates the existence or lack thereof of planning for each of the indicator-levels. In a sense, QCA conditions are matched with outcomes in a process similar to congruence tests commonly used in qualitative methods (George & Bennett, 2005). To better understand the various empirical pathways that link such conditions to outcomes, I present process tracing case studies in later chapters. After reading this chapter, readers should have a more concrete understanding of how I analyzed the cases to support the true or false designation in Table 3.2 – Sub-Conditions Dataset.

Chapter 4 - Analysis

This chapter operationalizes the primary outcome variable of the study – conflict transformation – to assess whether U.S. military stability planning has successfully set the conditions for the emergence of stable and strengthened representative governments following military interventions. Consistent with the conflict transformation theoretical framework developed in earlier chapters, I define this outcome not merely as the cessation of violence or the restoration of order, but as a measurable shift in political, institutional, and societal structures that support democratic governance, rule of law, and civil liberties. In keeping with the literature on conflict transformation (Lederach, 2003; Paris & Sisk, 2009), the outcome is conceptualized and measured through three independent dimensions: (1) the extent to which the planning process reflects an understanding of the conflict; (2) the degree to which planning incorporates a synchronized and inclusive framework involving interagency and international cooperation; and (3) the presence of credible, functioning national mechanisms that support civil service, rule of law, the economy, and security.

To systematically evaluate this outcome across selected cases, I employ a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) methodology. The chapter begins by justifying the selection of the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Dataset, specifically its Liberal Democracy Index (LDI), as a valid proxy for assessing conflict transformation over time. Following the establishment of the outcome score, I proceed to the calibration process, converting raw data into fuzzy-set membership values based on empirically justified thresholds. This step is necessary for incorporating the outcome variable into the QCA truth table and performing sufficient and necessity analyses. The remainder of the chapter walks through each analytic step, from constructing the truth table and testing for necessary and sufficient conditions to conducting

logical minimization and interpreting solution terms. The chapter concludes by comparing the results of the empirical analysis to the theoretical expectations outlined in the study's hypotheses, evaluating the extent to which U.S. military planning, across the three components of conflict transformation theory, has successfully influenced post-intervention outcomes. QCA not only defines and measures the dependent variable of this study but also serves as the empirical foundation for testing whether military planning for stability operations plays a casual role in shaping the democratic trajectories of weak and/or fragile states after U.S. military intervention.

Outcome

The outcome accounted for in the set-theoretic analysis is conflict transformation. As with case selection, I justify my selection of a dataset measuring conflict transformation based on specific criteria – timeframe, sensitivity to stable and strengthened representative government indicators, and recognition as a valid representation of change in those indicators over time. The data source selected must provide data for every case identified in Table 3.1 for the year prior to military intervention to five years post intervention. The year prior to the intervention serves as the baseline to measure change, five years is both a logical interval analysis and valid indicator of change. In my judgment, a period of less than five years does not allow for the maturation of democratic processes/institutions and longer than five years minimizes the direct effects of planning. This is supported by the work of Nord et. al in their working paper for the Varieties of Democracy Institute on episodes of democratic turnarounds (Nord et al., 2024). In addition to providing the data, the dataset must also demonstrate a valid representation of change in the indicators defined below over time.

While Chapter 1 defined a stable and strengthened representative government as one where centralized bureaucratic structures [governing and judiciary] are effective and legitimate

and there is an elected government, it did not provide indicators. As this study is specific to the United States, I used the U.S. Department of State standardized program structure evaluation criteria for its democracy, human rights and governance category (U.S. Department of State, n.d.). Democracy, human rights, and governance measures a nation's establishment, consolidation, and protection of democratic institutions, processes, and values; key components include participatory and accountable governance, rule of law, political competition, civil society, human rights, and the free flow of information. The dataset I chose must incorporate these indicators in its analysis and score.

Given the criteria defined above, I chose the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Dataset to measure conflict transformation, specifically the V-Dem's liberal democracy index (LDI). The V-Dem Dataset uses innovative methods to aggregate expert judgments into estimate values on indicators which the dataset groups into Lower-Level and Mid-Level Democracy and Governance Indices and ultimately groups into Democracy Indices (Coppedge et al., 2025a). Specifically, the LDI measures how a nation constitutionally protects civil liberties, strength of its rule of law, its level of independent judiciary, level of effective checks and balances, and its level of electoral democracy (Coppedge et al., 2025a, p.47). The V-Dem Dataset provides yearly LDI scores for over 202 countries from 1789 to 2024, providing data for each of the selected cases. The V-Dem Dataset scales the LDI to vary between 0 and 1, with 0 representing lowest levels of democracy and 1 the highest (Nord et al., 2025).

This study measures conflict transformation by a statistically substantial increase in a nation's LDI score five years after the beginning of the military intervention. Using the V-Dem Dataset, I measured the change in the LDI by subtracting the five-year interval score from the

year prior to the intervention interval score. The Democracy Report (Nord et al., 2025) describes a substantial increase as one where the difference is greater than 0.05 (p. 16).

Table 4.1. Outcome Dataset (Raw Data)

Liberal Democracy Index		
Year	Country	Interval
1988	Panama	0.07
1994	Panama	0.54
	change over 5 yrs	0.46
1989	Kuwait	0.13
1995	Kuwait	0.28
	change over 5 yrs	0.15
1991	Somalia	0.04
1997	Somalia	0.03
	change over 5 yrs	-0.01
1993	Haiti	0.09
1999	Haiti	0.27
	change over 5 yrs	0.19
1994	Bosnia and	0.07
2000	Bosnia and	0.42
	change over 5 yrs	0.35
1999	Kosovo	0.14
2004	Kosovo	0.36
	change over 5 yrs	0.23
2001	Afghanistan	0.04
2006	Afghanistan	0.23
	change over 5 yrs	0.19
2002	Iraq	0.1
2008	Iraq	0.28
	change over 5 yrs	0.18

Table 4.1 shows statistically substantial change for Panama, Kuwait, Haiti, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. In each of those cases the amount of change is

greater than 0.05. Somalia does not meet the criteria for a statistically substantial change as the amount of change is negative. This analysis provides the basis for the Yes or No indicated in Table 3.1 under the Conflict Transformation occurred column.

The combined raw dataset for the conditions and outcome follows.

Table 4.2 Condition and Outcome Raw Dataset

Stability Operations Planning	Understanding Conflict	Framework	National Mechanisms	Outcome
Panama	4.00	0.00	4.00	0.46
Kuwait	3.00	2.00	4.00	0.15
Somalia	0.00	2.00	2.00	-0.01
Haiti	2.00	2.00	1.00	0.19
Bosnia and Herzegovina	4.00	3.00	4.00	0.35
Kosovo	4.00	2.00	4.00	0.23
Afghanistan	3.00	4.00	4.00	0.19
Iraq	3.00	1.00	4.00	0.18

QCA Calibration

In QCA, calibration is the transformation of qualitative raw data into membership scores for the sets. The assignment of set-theoretic scores and calibration requires plausible and consistent rules, content validity, and the definition of external criteria (Mello, 2021, p. 80). The preceding section provided the initial basis for the plausible and consistent rules corresponding to the underlying concept – conflict transformation – that the target set will reflect. The preceding paragraphs detailed the formal expression of how I assigned set-theoretic scores. As no previous qualitative or quantitative studies exist measuring how military planning influences the outcome of a stable and strengthened representative government, I established content validity by my close adherence to my conflict transformation theoretical model. Additionally, to

delineate external criteria for the set-theoretic calibration, I used individual expertise knowledge accumulated in the study of military intervention followed by stability operations and my own experiences with military planning.

I utilized qualitative calibration to justify the process of assigning membership scores to each of the identified conditions. Qualitative calibration is essential in fsQCA in this study because it bridges the gap between the qualitative nature of the data and the quantitative analysis required for causal complexity analysis. The imprecise, multi-faceted, and context dependent concept of planning and conflict transformation make this method of calibration appropriate for this study. By explicitly defining and justifying the established membership score, I provide a clear rationale for my choices, making it easier for others to replicate the analysis or assess the robustness of the finding (Mello, 2021). This transparency is crucial in maintaining the credibility and trustworthiness of this research, as the calibration process involved some subjectivity. This subjectivity does not, however, undermine the validity of the method, as I ground the calibration in my conflict transformation theoretical model and empirical evidence (Ragin, 2008).

I used quantitative data derived from the V-Dem Dataset to assign membership scores to the outcome. The membership score for each case in the outcome column stems from the change calculations performed in the outcome dataset. To reiterate, the membership score is the amount of change in the LDI from the year prior to the military intervention and the LDI at the five-year point from the start of the intervention.

Once the conditions and outcome have quantifiable values, QCA has three possible approaches to calibration – the manual approach, the direct method, and the indirect method (Mello, 2021). This study employs the direct method. The direct method of calibration uses a

software-based routine to transform raw data into the fuzzy set data, then into the degree of membership in the outcome set (Ragin, 2008). In the direct method, the researcher must determine three qualitative anchors. These anchors correspond to the thresholds for full membership of cases in the outcome (1), full non-membership of cases in the outcome (0), and the cross-over point (0.5), also known as the point of maximum ambiguity, where a case is neither a member nor non-member (Mello, 2021). Though since I am basing the method on a logistic function, the actual anchors correspond to the fuzzy score of 0.95 for full membership, 0.05 for full non-membership, and 0.5 for the point of maximum ambiguity (Schneider & Wagemann, 2013). The table below represents three numerical columns, which are merely different representations of the same values, starting with degree of membership.¹¹

Table 4.3. Metrics for the Direct Method of Calibration

Empirical Anchor	Degree of Set		
	Membership	Associated Odds	Log Odds
Full set membership	0.95	19.000	2.944
Crossover	0.50	1.000	0.000
Full set nonmembership	0.05	0.053	-2.944

For each of the three conditions – understanding conflict, systematic and inclusive framework, and creation and sustainment of national mechanisms, the empirical anchors are 4 for Fully In, 1.95 for Crossover, and 0 for Fully Out for the raw data values. These anchors derive from my conflict transformation theoretical model and my knowledge of the context of

¹¹ In line with Ragin (2008), the following formulas depict how to calculate the odds of full membership and the corresponding log odds:

$$\text{Odds of membership} = \frac{(\text{degree of membership})}{(1 - \text{degree of membership})}$$

$$\text{Log odds} = \ln \frac{(\text{degree of membership})}{(1 - \text{degree of membership})}$$

my cases (Basurto & Speer, 2012). My conflict transformation theoretical model, based on existing literature, does not place more importance on any one component or sub-component of the theoretical model. As this study seeks to examine if planning influences conflict transformation with no previous work to guide selection of the empirical anchors, I determined the crossover point must involve evidence of planning in a little less than half of the indicator-level dimensions, choosing 1.95 as the anchor. The crossover point being the point of maximum ambiguity in the assessment of whether a case is more “in” or “out” of a set (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009, p. 90).

For the purposes of this research, the anchors for the outcome must capture both significant change and demonstrate democratic resilience. Therefore, for the outcome – conflict transformation, the empirical anchors are 0.50 for Fully In, 0.099 for Crossover, and 0.049 for Fully Out for the raw data values. These anchors originate from the Democracy Report (2023)’s metric to capture which countries are autocratizing or democratizing, measuring the difference between the country’s score on the LDI for two specific years (p. 19). Following the report’s metric, I chose 0.099 as the cross-over point because the report’s sliding scale for moving along the autocracy to democracy continuum changes in 0.1 increments. Thus, a difference of 0.1 places a nation in a less autocratic or more democratic position. I chose 0.20 for fully in to denote democratic resiliency. As available literature does not provide a specific value for democratic resiliency, I used a nation moving two places along the autocracy to democracy continuum to denote democratic resiliency. As the report noted that a change of 0.05 is substantial, I chose 0.049 as fully out because the change is insignificant.

Using the anchors and the calibration scales detailed above, the fsQCA 4.1 software automatically calculates the calibration (Ragin et al., 2017) on a continuous scale. The

continuous scale denotes 0.95 as Fully in, $0.5 < X_i < 1$ as More in than out, 0.5 as Neither in nor out, $0.5 > X_i > 0$ as More out than in, and 0.05 as Fully out. Table 4.4 portrays the calibration of the three conditions and outcome.

Table 4.4. Calibration of Conditions and Outcome in Fuzzy Sets

Stability Operations Planning	Understanding Conflict	Framework	National Mechanisms	Outcome
Panama	0.95	0.05	0.95	0.94
Kuwait	0.82	0.52	0.95	0.59
Somalia	0.05	0.52	0.52	0.00
Haiti	0.52	0.52	0.19	0.66
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.95	0.82	0.95	0.87
Kosovo	0.95	0.52	0.95	0.73
Afghanistan	0.82	0.95	0.95	0.66
Iraq	0.82	0.19	0.95	0.65

QCA Truth Table

A central analytical tool for QCA is the truth table. The truth table shows the number of logically possible combinations of conditions included in a study (Mello, 2021, p. 53). Truth tables stem from formal logic, with each row in the truth table representing one of the logically possible AND combinations between the conditions (Schneider & Wagemann, 2013, p. 92). As each single condition can occur either in its presence or its absence, formal logic calculates the total number of truth table rows by the expression 2^k , with the letter representing the number of conditions used and 2 the two different states (presence or absence) in which the conditions can occur (Schneider & Wagemann, 2013, p. 92). The figure below shows a basic truth table for the conditions in this study. In this figure the 1 denotes the presence of the condition and the 0 denotes its absence. Asterisks denote Boolean AND, the logical operator which denotes the

intersection between two sets, the case membership in that intersection equals the minimum membership score across the respective conditions. For example, $U^* \sim F^* N$ represents the combination of understanding conflict being present, the absence of a systematic and inclusive framework, and creating and sustaining national mechanisms being present.

Table 4.5. Basic Truth Table

Rows	Understanding Conflict	Framework	National Mechanisms	Combination Formula
1	1	1	1	$U^* F^* N$
2	1	0	1	$U^* \sim F^* N$
3	1	1	0	$U^* F^* \sim N$
4	0	1	1	$\sim U^* F^* N$
5	0	0	0	$\sim U^* \sim F^* \sim N$
6	1	0	0	$U^* \sim F^* \sim N$
7	0	1	0	$\sim U^* F^* \sim N$
8	0	0	1	$\sim U^* \sim F^* N$

While the fsQCA software will produce the fuzzy set truth table (displayed in the Truth Table Analysis section below), it is helpful to understand the underlying process. The construction of the fuzzy set truth table below involves several intermediary steps. As stated above, truth table rows indicate both the presence or absence in which conditions can occur. Therefore, one must first construct a table of set membership scores and their complements (also known as negation or Boolean NOT and represented by tilde sign ($\sim$)). Complements show the membership of a case in the negation of a set, calculated using the equation: $1 - (\text{set membership score}) = \text{complement}$. The next step involves constructing a set membership score table, identifying the degree to which each stability planning operation belongs to the subset of planning combinations of conflict transformation conditions present or absent in planning (See Table 4.6). The rules of formal logic and Boolean algebra identify the degree to which planning

for the military intervention with stability operations has or does not have a given combination of conflict transformation components present in the set membership table. Fuzzy sets establish a qualitative difference between cases in each of the sets (conditions), those cases with a set membership score above 0.5 are more in than out of the set and those with a score below 0.5 are more out than in. The scores highlighted in yellow show where a case is outside of a particular set. Somalia is not in the set of Understanding Conflict, nor is it a member of the Outcome set, hence why it shows as a strong member of not having conflict transformation (the negative outcome). Panama and Iraq are not members of the Framework set. Nor is Haiti a member of the National Mechanisms set.

Table 4.6. Fuzzy Set Membership Score Table

Stability Operations Planning	Understanding Conflict X_1	Framework X_2	National Mechanisms X_3	Outcome Y	Negative Outcome $\sim Y$
Panama	0.95	0.05	0.95	0.94	0.06
Kuwait	0.82	0.52	0.95	0.59	0.41
Somalia	0.05	0.52	0.52	0.00	1.00
Haiti	0.52	0.52	0.19	0.66	0.34
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.95	0.82	0.95	0.87	0.13
Kosovo	0.95	0.52	0.95	0.73	0.27
Afghanistan	0.82	0.95	0.95	0.66	0.34
Iraq	0.82	0.19	0.95	0.65	0.35

The above steps result in every stability planning operation having a set membership score for one of the combinations of conditions. The truth table displayed below displays the Fuzzy Set Membership Score Table as a Truth Table. Displaying the cases as a Truth Table allows the researcher to establish that no case has membership in both the Outcome and Negative Outcome sets, which would create a logical contradiction. A logical contradiction refers to a

situation where a configuration of conditions leads to both the outcome being present and absent within the same case or set of cases (Mello, 2021).

Table 4.7. Cases displayed as Truth Table

Stability Operations Planning	Understanding Conflict	Framework	National Mechanisms	Outcome	Negative Outcome
	X ₁	X ₂	X ₃	Y	~Y
Panama	1	0	1	1	0
Kuwait	1	1	1	1	0
Somalia	0	1	1	0	1
Haiti	1	1	0	1	0
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1	1	1	1	0
Kosovo	1	1	1	1	0
Afghanistan	1	1	1	1	0
Iraq	1	0	1	1	0

The final step in constructing the truth table is determining sufficiency for the outcome. To determine sufficiency, one must examine the degree to which planning's membership in the combination of conditions is a subset (less than) of their membership in the outcome of interest. If the membership score is less than or equal to the outcome set membership score for all the cases in that combination formula, then that formula is sufficient for the outcome. The fsQCA software does a two-stage minimization procedure, which draws upon the truth table algorithm to minimize expressions and to derive solution terms. This section purely covers the construction of the truth table, the last section in the chapter will provide the analysis.

While the truth table shows possible configurations, it also provides information about the empirical distribution of cases and their connection to the outcome. As such, each row of the truth table also becomes a statement of sufficiency. Sufficiency exists whenever the condition is

present and so is the outcome, hence sufficient conditions explain success, as they always lead to the outcome (Mello, 2021). As seen in the truth table, the eight stability operations planning cases exhibit only four combination formulas. The next two sections will provide more detailed analysis of the truth table by utilizing fsQCA software tools.

Measures of Fit

Rarely does analysis show perfect set relations in the social sciences. This research design should have resulted in a truth table with eight rows and ideally at least one case in each of the logically possible combinations of the conditions. As evidenced above, there are four logically possible combinations not included in the truth table, QCA calls these logical remainders. Logical remainders prevent researchers from determining if the respective configurations would consistently lead to the outcome. Hence Charles Ragin put forth the measures of fit consistency and coverage to help researchers assess imperfect set-theoretic relationships in empirical data. (Mello, 2021, p.106). Consistency measures the degree to which an empirical relationship between a condition or combination of conditions and the outcome comes close to set-theoretic necessity and/or sufficiency (p. 107). Coverage measures the empirical importance or relevance of a condition or combination of conditions (p. 107). Because consistency and coverage do not detect issues that may occasionally arise in empirical data Schneider and Wagemann (2012) recommend an additional metric – proportional reduction in inconsistency (PRI) – which addresses simultaneous subset relations.

The fsQCA software measures both consistency and coverage using the Necessary Conditions procedure, producing consistency and coverage scores for the individual conditions.¹² Each formula divides the sum of the minimum set membership scores for the condition and the outcome by the sum of the scores for the outcome (for necessary conditions), or by the sum of the scores for the condition (for sufficient conditions) (Mello, 2021, p. 109). Schneider and Wagemann (2012) recommend using a consistency threshold of 0.90 for necessary conditions (p. 278). However, the small number of cases in this study justify using a slightly higher 0.95 threshold to prevent false positives (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009).¹³ For necessary conditions, coverage helps distinguish between relevant and trivial necessary conditions. Each formula takes the sum of the minimum values across the condition and the outcome and divides it by the sum of the values for the condition (for necessary conditions), or by dividing the sum of the minimum values across the condition and the outcome by the sum of the values for the outcome (for sufficient conditions) (Mello, 2021, p. 115). As coverage is about the fit between a condition and the outcome, a high threshold is essential in identifying relevant necessary conditions. The small number of cases in this study justify the formula – relevant necessary conditions coverage score $\geq 0.70 < \text{trivial necessary conditions}$.

¹² The software calculates the consistence of necessary and sufficient conditions with the follow two formulas (Ragin, 2008):

$$\text{Consistency}_{\text{Necessity}} (Y_i \leq X_i) = \frac{\sum \min (X_{ij}, Y_{ij})}{\sum Y_i} \quad \text{Consistency}_{\text{Sufficiency}} (X_i \leq Y_i) = \frac{\sum \min (X_{ij}, Y_{ij})}{\sum X_i}$$

¹³ The software calculates the coverage of necessary conditions with the following two formulas (Ragin, 2008):

$$\text{Coverage}_{\text{Necessity}} (Y_i \leq X_i) = \frac{\sum \min (X_{ij}, Y_{ij})}{\sum X_i} \quad \text{Coverage}_{\text{Sufficiency}} (X_i \leq Y_i) = \frac{\sum \min (X_{ij}, Y_{ij})}{\sum Y_i}$$

Lastly, proportional reduction in inconsistency (PRI) provides researchers with a measure to identify simultaneous subset relations in the analysis of sufficient conditions (Mello, 2021, p. 116). A simultaneous subset relation can occur with fuzzy-set data when a condition or combination of conditions is both a subset of the outcome and a subset of the nonoutcome, creating a logical contradiction (Mello, 2021, pp. 116-117).¹⁴ The PRI value allows the researcher to determine if a condition is a valid sufficient condition for the outcome or the nonoutcome. A PRI score of 1 makes it a valid sufficient condition for the outcome.

Analysis

For the purposes of this paper, fsQCA serves as the analytical technique. fsQCA will apply the assumptions of set theory and the rules of Boolean algebra to help the researcher examine the unspecified relationships among the conditions in reference to the outcome. Using fsQCA helps to identify the minimal number of logical statements and allows for the investigation of relationships in terms of necessary and sufficient casual conditions. fsQCA analysis begins with the assignment of fuzzy set membership score, as the researcher must determine when a case is fully in, fully out, and at a point where it is neither in nor out of the individual condition sets and outcome set. Once I have compiled the membership scores, I can then analyze the compiled data for necessity and sufficiency. The following sub-sections explain the analysis and results for the fsQCA performed.

¹⁴ The software calculates PRI with the following formula (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 242):

$$PRI = \frac{\sum \min(X_i, Y_i) - \sum \min(X_i, Y_i, \sim Y_i)}{\sum X_i - \sum \min(X_i, Y_i, \sim Y_i)}$$

Fuzzy Set Membership Scores

The most significant methodological hurdle in compiling the fuzzy set membership scores was determining the cross-over point for the empirical anchor for the conditions and the fully-in point for the outcome. As each of the conditions selected for analysis contain four indicator-level dimensions, the initial logical cross-over point was two. Qualitatively, based on my intimate knowledge of the planning processes, my initial inclination said only those efforts indicating the plan displayed two or more of the indicator-level dimensions would validate the influence of the planning on the conditions. For the outcome, the fully-in point presented a methodological hurdle as no reference exists for how much change indicates conflict transformation. As the 0.5 point on the scale denotes where a nation goes from being a less autocratic state to a less democratic one, I chose it as the score for a case to demonstrate being fully in the set of conflict transformation.

To validate the above reasoning for the conditions, I calibrated the data with 2 as the crossover point and 1.5 as the crossover point. The result was minimal differences among the calibrated scores for the cases in the conditions. More importantly, the consistency and coverage scores for the conditions in relation to the outcome remained consistent. Only moving the crossover point to 2.5 or 0.5 significantly changed the consistency and coverage scores. I rejected these options though as setting the bar too high or too low for planning efforts. To validate my empirical anchors for the outcome set, I calibrated the data with 1 (the highest score available on the LDI) as the fully-in point. As with the conditions, the result was some variation among the calibrated scores for the cases in the outcome, but not enough to change a case from showing the outcome to no longer showing the outcome. More importantly the consistency and coverage scores for the conditions in relation to the outcome again remained consistent. The next

sub-section will explain consistency and coverage scores in the analysis of necessity. Having confidence in the calibration of the fuzzy set scores, I can now explain the significance of the scores for the cases.

As explained earlier in the chapter, QCA is a set-theoretic method, placing data into set membership scores and modeling social phenomena in terms of set relations. To provide context to Table 3.6, one can think of the scores as how much each of the stability operations planning efforts emulated the components of my conflict transformation theoretical model. Panama, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo's stability operations planning efforts all fully understood the conflict. Whereas Kuwait, Afghanistan, and Iraq's mostly understood it; Haiti understood it more than it did not understand it; and Somalia's planning effort mostly did not understand the conflict. For the Framework component of my conflict transformation theoretical model, only the Afghanistan planning effort fully designed and implemented a systemic and inclusive approach as a framework. Bosnia and Herzegovina mostly did; while Kuwait, Somalia, Haiti, and Kosovo designed and implemented more of a systematic and inclusive approach as a framework than it did not. Iraq planning mostly did not include a systematic and inclusive approach and Panama is outside the set completely. The National Mechanisms component of my conflict transformation theoretical model shows Panama, Kuwait, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq planning efforts fully demonstrated planning for creating national mechanisms; the Somalia planning effort demonstrated more planning for creating national mechanisms than not; and Haiti's mostly did not. The above descriptors help provide meaningful variations between the cases.

Analysis of Necessity

Set-theoretic analysis tests individual conditions and combinations of conditions for their necessity and/or sufficiency. fsQCA does these tests separately, beginning with the analysis of necessary conditions. As explained in the Measure of Fit section, consistency and coverage measure necessary and sufficient conditions. Depicting the set-theoretic relationships of necessity in visual terms using an X-Y plot demonstrates that of the three conditions, only Understanding Conflict comes close to showing set-theoretic necessity. It is not a perfect subset of the outcome, as Afghanistan does not populate on or below the diagonal line. Therefore, I must calculate consistency to determine necessity. The analysis done through the fsQCA software results in the scores annotated in Table 3.9. The analysis confirms that Understanding Conflict is a necessary condition, meeting the threshold of 0.95 in consistency and 0.70 in coverage to designate it as a relevant necessary condition. I further confirmed the result using a Relevance of Necessity (RoN) test, a standard indicator in testing for the relevance of necessary condition (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012).¹⁵ The calculated score for the RoN is 0.70, which falls above the 0.50 threshold required according to Mello (2021), further confirming Understanding Conflict as a necessary condition. Neither Framework nor National Mechanisms meet the consistency or coverage thresholds for designation as a necessary condition, making further calculations unnecessary. Additionally, I confirmed none of the conditions were necessary for the nonoutcome, nor did the negation of any of the conditions show as necessary for the nonoutcome. However, adding the three conditions together also showed the combination

¹⁵ The formula for the calculation of RoN is (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 236):

$$\text{Relevance of necessity} = \frac{\sum (1 - X_i)}{\sum (1 - \min (X_i, Y_i))}$$

of all three to be a necessary condition for the outcome. Further analysis will determine if this remains valid.

Figure 4.1. Understanding Conflict (Necessary Condition) X-Y Plot




Figure 4.2. Synchronized and Integrated Framework Condition X-Y Plot




Figure 4.3. Creating and Sustaining National Mechanisms X-Y Plot




Table 4.8. fsQCA Necessary Conditions Analysis

Conditions	Outcome		~Outcome	
	Consistency	Coverage	Consistency	Coverage
Understanding Conflict	0.97	0.82	0.72	0.35
Framework	0.64	0.80	0.78	0.55
National Mechanisms	0.91	0.72	0.78	0.35
Understanding Conflict+Framework+National Mechanisms	0.97	0.74	0.83	0.36

Analysis of Sufficiency & Truth Table Analysis

Once I have completed the analysis of necessary conditions, I can move to the truth table procedure, directed at testing for sufficient configurations. The core of QCA, as an analytical method, is the truth table analysis. As a reminder, the truth table represents the number of combinations that are logically possible with the selected number of conditions. The three conditions in this study result in eight rows of configurations. These rows of configurations provide information about the empirical distribution of cases and their connection to the outcome. This makes each row of the truth table also a statement of sufficiency. The truth table

analysis assists me in understanding which rows may consistently lead toward the outcome, which show the phenomenon of interest, and which rows have no cases that show the outcome. The analysis may also identify contradictory rows, rows where some of the cases have a positive outcome and others have a negative outcome.

Table 4.9. Initial fsQCA Truth Table

Stability Operations Planning	Understanding Conflict	Framework	National Mechanisms	Combination Formula	Sufficient for Outcome
Kuwait, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan	1	1	1	$U * F * N$	1
Panama, Iraq	1	0	1	$U * \sim F * N$	1
Haiti	1	1	0	$U * F * \sim N$	1
Somalia	0	1	1	$\sim U * F * N$	0
no cases	0	0	0	$\sim U * \sim F * \sim N$	0
no cases	1	0	0	$U * \sim F * \sim N$	?
no cases	0	1	0	$\sim U * F * \sim N$	0
no cases	0	0	1	$\sim U * \sim F * N$	0

The initial construction of the truth table displays all the logical possible configurations based on the three conditions and allocates the cases across those configurations, three of which consistently led toward the outcome (the first three rows). The fourth row, $\sim U * F * N$, is not sufficient of the outcome because as the earlier necessary analysis demonstrated Understanding Conflict is necessary for the outcome. Of the four empty rows, also termed logical remainders, only the configuration $U * \sim F * \sim N$ could possibly lead to the outcome for the same reason. Determining whether it is sufficient for the outcome requires further analysis and logical minimization, to which I will return in the next sub-section. The initial analysis did not identify any contradictory rows. However, it did identify the configuration $U * F * N$ as irrelevant because it captured only 50% of the cases residing in the vector space. To further explain, I go back to the earlier discussion on the fuzzy set membership scores, if you imagine the configurations as three-dimensional spaces you want the scores of the cases to occupy the same space in that three-

dimensional model. While Kuwait, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Afghanistan membership scores meet the threshold for inclusion in the set, Kuwait and Kosovo do not occupy the same vector as Bosnia & Herzegovina and Afghanistan because they just barely implement more of a systematic and inclusive approach as a framework than not. Ragin (2017) says in general, the configurations selected should capture at least 75-80% of the cases in a particular vector.

Logical Minimization

The final step in the analysis is logical minimization. The fsQCA software uses a two-stage procedure for analysis. The first step created the truth table from the fuzzy data, including specifying the outcome for each configuration and determining which configurations to include in the analysis. The second step involves specifying the causal conditions and outcomes to minimize. It uses Boolean minimization, a pairwise comparison of Boolean expressions, to remove irrelevant elements and attain simpler expressions (Mello, 2021). Then it derives solution terms based upon the Quine-McCluskey (QMC) algorithm.

Once complete with the first stage of the minimization procedure, the truth table algorithm, the second stage, standard analyses, derives three solution terms. The solution terms help me explain the logical remainders – those rows in the truth table which contained no cases. The fsQCA software derives the conservative, parsimonious, and intermediate solution terms.

The conservative solution term, also called the complex solution, works only with the empirical rows associated with a positive outcome above the specified consistency and frequency thresholds (Mello, 2021, p. 134). This solution treats all logical remainder rows as false (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 162). fsQCA returned the $U^* \sim F^* N$ and $U^* F^* \sim N$ configurations as sufficient for the outcome.

The Parsimonious Solution considers all truth table rows with logical remainders and uses those that allow it to derive a less complex solution (Mello, 2021, p. 135). fsQCA returned the $U^* \sim F^* \sim N$ configuration as sufficient for the outcome. This configuration was a question mark in the initial fsQCA Truth Table and is a difficult counterfactual. Difficult counterfactuals are logical remainders for which there is a conflict with theoretical or substantive knowledge (Mello, 2021, p. 143). Theoretically, my conflict transformation theoretical model suggests all three conditions must be present for conflict transformation to occur. A consistency score of 0.82, lower than desired, and the conflict with the theoretical basis of conflict transformation theory allow me to reject this as a counterfactual.

The Intermediate Solution includes only those logical remainders deemed sensible (Mello, 2021, p. 135). fsQCA returned the same configurations as the complex solution for the intermediate solution.

Table 4.10 summarizes the findings of the solution terms from the fsQCA software.

Table 4.10. Solution Term and Solution Paths

Solution Terms	Path	
	1	2
Understanding	●	●
Framework	●	
National Mechanisms		●
Consistency	0.9	0.81
Raw Coverage	0.64	0.81
Unique Coverage	0.06	0.33
Covered cases/uniquely covered cases (underlined)	Kosovo	<u>Panama</u>
	Kuwait	Kuwait
	<u>Haiti</u>	Kosovo
	Bosnia	Bosnia
	Afghanistan	Afghanistan
		<u>Iraq</u>
Solution consistency	0.82	
Solution coverage	0.97	

At the end of Chapter 2, I proposed four hypotheses:

H1 – The greater the degree to which U.S. military stability planning demonstrates a comprehensive understanding of the conflict, the greater its ability to set the conditions necessary for establishing a stable and strengthened representative government following U.S. military intervention.

H2 – The more U.S. military stability planning incorporates a synchronized and integrated framework, the greater its effectiveness in facilitating the development of a stable and strengthened representative government after U.S. military intervention.

H3 – The more U.S. military stability planning supports the creation and sustainment of national mechanisms, the more likely it is to contribute to the emergence of a stable and strengthened representative government following U.S. military intervention.

H4 – U.S. military stability planning that effectively integrates a comprehensive understanding of the conflict AND a synchronized and integrated framework AND the creation and sustainment of national mechanisms, the more likely it is to set the conditions necessary for the successful transformation of the post-conflict environment into a stable and strengthened representative government following U.S. military intervention.

The QCA analysis in this chapter allowed me to confirm or disprove each of these hypotheses. The analysis allowed me to verify my first hypothesis. Not only does understanding the conflict in planning increase the chance of conflict transformation, QCA demonstrates it is necessary for it to occur. The analysis disproved my remaining hypotheses. Because conflict transformation occurred in cases where a synchronized and integrated framework was present and cases where it was not, I cannot confirm the more planning creates a synchronized and integrated framework the greater a chance for conflict transformation. QCA also disproved my

third hypothesis for the same reason, with cases where creating and sustaining national mechanisms was present and cases where it was not exhibiting the outcome of conflict transformation. Finally, while QCA initially indicated the combination of understanding conflict, creating a synchronized and integrated framework for intervening, and creating and sustaining national mechanisms in planning could be sufficient for conflict transformation, further analysis shows it does not capture enough of the cases to remain valid.

Understanding Conflict – A Necessary Condition

QCA substantiated understanding conflict was a necessary condition for conflict transformation to occur after U.S. military intervention. In virtually all cases where conflict transformation occurred after U.S. military intervention, the military plan for stability operations had a high degree of understanding conflict. The one case where the military plan for stability operations had a low degree of understanding conflict, Somalia, conflict transformation did not occur. In practical terms this means conflict transformation after U.S. military intervention will not occur unless military planners demonstrate an understanding of the conflict when planning stability operations. This is not to say that understanding conflict causes conflict transformation, because the QCA analysis shows the other conditions influence the outcome, but that understanding conflict is a prerequisite to conflict transformation after U.S. military intervention.

Sufficient Condition Combinations

QCA revealed two sufficient condition combinations as possibly sufficient for conflict transformation. The first was the combination of understanding conflict and creating a synchronized and integrated framework. The second was the combination of understanding conflict and creating and sustaining national mechanisms. These two combinations are sufficient to explain the success of conflict transformation, as having one of these combinations almost

always leads to conflict transformation based on the available cases. Five of the seven cases of military intervention followed by stability operations with conflict transformation exhibit an understanding of the conflict and a synchronized and integrated framework – Kosovo, Kuwait, Haiti, Bosnia, and Afghanistan. Six of the seven cases of military intervention followed by stability operations with conflict transformation exhibit an understanding of the conflict and the creation and sustainment of national mechanisms – Panama, Kuwait, Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

Conclusion

This chapter established the operationalization and measurement of conflict transformation as the central outcome of this study, using the V-Dem Liberal Democracy Index (LDI) as a theoretically useful and empirically robust proxy for assessing progress toward stable and strengthened representative government. The findings confirmed “understanding the conflict” as a necessary condition for conflict transformation, while also identifying two sufficient condition combinations (pathways) involving the presence of either a synchronized and integrated framework or the creation of national mechanisms alongside conflict understanding. These results provide initial empirical support for key propositions of the conflict transformation theoretical model and offer a foundation for the causal inferences explored in the next three chapters. The next three chapters will analyze each of the conditions – understanding conflict (Afghanistan), creating an inclusive and synchronized framework (Haiti), and creation and sustainment of appropriate national mechanisms (Iraq) through a specific case study with process-tracing analysis to further assess how and why certain planning conditions influenced democratic outcomes in instances of U.S. military intervention following by stability operations.

Chapter 5 - Understanding Conflict in Afghanistan

Historical Overview of Afghanistan

Understanding the history of Afghanistan is essential for comprehending the complex operational environment U.S. military forces faced in planning for Operation Enduring Freedom. Situated at the crossroads of Central and South Asia, Afghanistan has long been a nexus of cultural, political, and military interaction. Its strategic location has rendered it vulnerable to external invasions, internal fragmentation, and cycles of resistance that have shaped its identity and governance structures over centuries (Ewans, 2002).

Afghanistan's modern history is marked by persistent struggle to maintain sovereignty in the face of foreign interference and internal power struggles. In the 19th century, the country became a buffer state in the "Great Game" between the British and Russian Empires. While Afghanistan retained nominal independence, British influence shaped its foreign affairs until the country gained full independence in 1919 (Ewans, 2002). The early 20th century was characterized by attempts at modernization under leaders such as King Amanullah, though such efforts often met resistance from traditional and tribal faction, highlighting the enduring divide between urban elites and rural populations (Ewans, 2002).

The 1970s marked a turning point in Afghan history. In 1973, the monarchy was overthrown, and in 1978 a Marxist coup brought the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) to power. The PDPA's radical reforms and repression led to widespread unrest and insurgency, prompting the Soviet Union to invade in 1979 (Ansary, 2012). The ensuing decade-long conflict between Soviet forces and Afghan mujahideen fighters, backed by the United States, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, devastated the country and laid the groundwork for long-term

instability (Ansary, 2012). The Soviet withdrawal in 1989 left a power vacuum, resulting in civil war throughout the 1990s.

The rise of the Taliban in the mid-1990s was a direct consequence of this fragmentation. Promising order and Islamic governance, the Taliban seized control of most of Afghanistan by 1996 and imposed a strict interpretation of Sharia law (Giustozzi, 2008). Their regime became internationally isolated, but more significantly, it offered sanctuary to transnational jihadist groups, most notably al-Qaeda.

Operation Enduring Freedom Background

The invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, known as Operation Enduring Freedom, was a pivotal event in modern U.S. military history, setting the stage for a protracted conflict that spanned two decades. The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, orchestrated by al-Qaeda, fundamentally altered the global security landscape. The U.S. government, led by President George W. Bush, identified the Taliban regime in Afghanistan as a primary enabler of al-Qaeda, which had used the country as a base of operations. The attacks galvanized international support for a decisive response against terrorism, leading to the formation of a broad coalition willing to support military action against the Taliban.

The President of the United States made clear during planning meetings that the United States would depose the Taliban and ensure Afghanistan could not again serve as a safe haven for terrorists. The primary objectives of the invasion of Afghanistan were to dismantle the al-Qaeda terrorist network and to remove the Taliban regime that provided it sanctuary (Wright et al., 2010). Secondary objectives included establishing a stable and democratic government in Afghanistan, ensuring that the country could no longer serve as a haven for terrorists, and contributing to broader efforts to combat global terrorism (Wright et al., 2010).

The U.S. military designed Operation Enduring Freedom to be swift and decisive, leveraging superior airpower, special operations forces, and the support of the local Afghan opposition groups to achieve rapid results (Collins, 2011). The military planning effort divided the operation into four distinct phases: the air campaign, the deployment of special forces, the ground invasion, and stabilization and reconstruction. The air campaign, as the first phase of the operation, involved a sustained air campaign to degrade the Taliban's military capabilities and create conditions for the insertion of ground forces. The second phase of the operation, deploying special operation forces, focused on providing training, equipment, and strategic guidance to the Northern Alliance and other anti-Taliban factions. The ground invasion, the third phase of the operation, involved the deployment of conventional ground forces to secure key areas, support the efforts of special operations teams, and provide stability in liberated regions. The final phase of the operation, stabilization and reconstruction, aimed at establishing a stable and democratic government, rebuilding infrastructure, and providing humanitarian aid to the Afghan population.

The ground invasion began in earnest in November 2001, with the deployment of conventional forces (Wright et al., 2010). By December 2001, the Taliban regime had largely collapsed. The capture of Kandahar, the Taliban's spiritual stronghold, marked a significant milestone in the invasion as the Taliban's control of the country rapidly collapsed (Collins, 2011). The combination of airstrikes, ground operations, and support to the Northern Alliance forces resulted in the capture of Kabul, with key cities like Jalalabad falling soon after (Collins, 2011). Taliban leaders, including Mullah Omar, went into hiding, and al-Qaeda operatives, including Osama bin Laden, retreated to remote areas or crossed into Pakistan (Collins, 2011). By mid-2002, the U.S. military ground invasion had achieved its goals, enabling the military to focus its efforts on stabilization and reconstruction.

The final phase of the operation, stabilization and reconstruction, presented significant challenges for the U.S. military in both planning and execution. As noted above, one of the primary objectives of the invasion was to establish a stable and democratic government in Afghanistan. The Bonn Agreement, signed in December 2001, laid the groundwork for the creation of an interim government (Dobbins, 2008). The agreement appointed Hamid Karzai as the head of this interim administration, tasked with leading the country through a transitional period (Collins, 2011). Despite the swift military victory, Afghanistan remained unstable. Insurgent groups, including remnants of the Taliban and newly formed entities, continued to pose a threat (Collins, 2011). Towards the end of 2002, coalition forces transitioned to a role focused on securing key areas, protecting the population, and building the capacity of Afghan security forces (Wright et al., 2010).

The transition was haphazard and fraught with inconsistencies. As much of the U.S. military became consumed with planning for the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the DoD downsized the number of forces operating in Afghanistan. Disparate organizations had responsibility for stabilization and reconstruction. The Office of Military Cooperation (OMC) had the mission of building the Afghan National Army (ANA) and some other political-military tasks (Barno, 2007). The U.S.-led combined and joint civil-military operations task force (CJCMOTF) had created four provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), with four more planned to stand up in the next year, to help with rebuilding infrastructure and provide services to the population (Barno, 2007). U.S. military forces were also still engaged in fighting remnants of the Taliban and other insurgent groups, with an increasingly deteriorating security situation.

As noted in Chapter 4, in 2003, the USCENTCOM Commander, General John Abizaid, chose Lieutenant General David Barno to command CJTF-180, the senior U.S. military

headquarters in Afghanistan. USCENTCOM gave CJTF-180 the responsibility for consolidating gains and laying the groundwork for a new Afghan government (Barno, 2007). LTG Barno understood the transition required a delicate balance between maintaining security and promoting governance, economic development, and rule of law. He developed a five pillar strategy for Afghanistan. The five pillars were defeating terrorism and denying sanctuary (maintaining pressure on the enemy), enabling the Afghan security structure (extending and accelerating the training of the ANA), enable reconstruction and good governance (extending the reach of the central government), sustain area ownership (making subordinate military units for specific geographic regions and holding them accountable for improvements in the other pillars), and engaging regional states (interacting with senior security leaders from Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan). Underlying these five pillars was LTG Barno's emphasis on the Afghan people as the center of gravity and unity of purpose with interagency and international partners. This meant everything U.S. military forces did had to convince the Afghan people to commit to their future and needed to be done in concert with civilian input and coordination (Barno, 2007).

The remainder of this Chapter will explain how the U.S. military understood the conflict and environment in Afghanistan as they planned for stabilization and reconstruction and implementing LTG Barno's five pillars.

Understanding Conflict

In conflict transformation, understanding conflict requires an intervenor to know and recognize structural and cultural roots of violence, appreciate the causes and transformers at different levels of the international system, and continuously analyze the conflict. Structural and cultural roots of violence occur when groups are disproportionately disadvantaged or harmed by a nation's institutions, laws, or other societal structures or when a nation uses culture as a basis for

violence against a particular group within the nation. Appreciating the causes and transformers at different levels of the international system, is essential to understanding the factors which exacerbate and restrain the conflict and the context within which the conflict is situated from a national, regional, and international perspective. Finally, an intervenor continuously analyzes the conflict when they examine the conflict at multiple levels and over time to track and adjust to the conflict's changing dynamics. The ensuing paragraphs will describe how military planners understood the conflict in Afghanistan.

Situation Assessment

As explained in Chapter 3, military planning recognizes structural and cultural roots of violence when planners develop a comprehensive situation assessment and plan to change the attitudes and measure contradictions within the society in which they are intervening. A comprehensive situation assessment encompasses planners understanding and describing the nation's culture, threat actors, and the current political situation. They change and measure contradictions in a nation's society when they build plans to change societal attitudes regarding conflict and understand how the current political situation facilitates or prevents that change.

Culture

Afghanistan's history is a complex tapestry of ethnic, tribal, and religious affiliations. The country is home to a diverse population, including Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, and others, each with distinct cultural and historical backgrounds. Tribal affiliations and local power dynamics play a crucial role in Afghan society, influencing governance, social interactions, and conflict. As stabilization and reconstruction planning began, the U.S. military's experiences in Afghanistan provided a solid foundation for extensive analyses of Afghan history, culture, and social structures to inform their planning (Fosher & Mackenzie, 2021). LTG Barno's pillar of

area ownership considered it important to have military commanders and units understand the culture in distinct geographic areas (Barno, 2007). Additionally, LTG Barno's previous experience allowed him to understand and communicate the importance of cultural understanding to his planners (Koontz, 2008).

This is not to say that military planners had a complete understanding of culture and its influence. Military planners often viewed Afghanistan through a Western-centric lens, failing to appreciate the importance of tribal dynamics, local governance structures, and the influence of religious leaders (Fosher & Mackenzie, 2021). This lack of understanding hindered the development of effective plans built with strategies for engaging with Afghan communities and gaining their support (SIGAR, 2021). Additionally, failing to understand the importance of cultural sensitivity in stability operations, planners did not prevent the execution of military practices and actions that many Afghans perceived as disrespectful or offensive, inadvertently fueling anti-American sentiment and insurgent recruitment (Fosher & Mackenzie, 2021).

Threats

The security environment in Afghanistan was often complex and became increasingly dynamic as the U.S. military transitioned to focusing on stability operations. Identifying the threat for the initial invasion was easy, using the same template for identifying the threat in stability operations was not. The initial military focus on dismantling Al Qaeda and ousting the Taliban gave way to a more complex threat environment as Afghanistan and the U.S. military transitioned to stability operations. Planners had to address two primary threats to stability. The first was insurgent groups who quickly adapted and launched a resurgence of conventional military violence (Collins, 2011). The second was the hostile and unstable social and political environment military units found themselves operating in (Collins, 2011).

Military planners in Afghanistan faced formidable challenges in responding to resilient and adaptive insurgent groups as they planned stability operations. Planners understood the Taliban and other insurgent groups were a threat to the secure environment necessary for stability operations to occur as the group's core areas of operation expanded steadily in 2003 and 2004 (Cordesman, 2018). What they could not understand, because they lacked available data for most of the country, was where the Taliban and other insurgent groups had significant portions of the population who supported or were sympathetic to them (DoD, 2010). Therefore, planners developed plans to counteract a threat to conventional military operations and not a threat to stability operations.

As military planners became increasingly engaged in planning stability operations in Afghanistan, they gradually recognized the significant threat posed by the country's volatile social and political environment. To address these challenges, planners began integrating intelligence and information from a broader range of sources, including Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), cooperative non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the United Nations (Koontz, 2008). Civil affairs units contributed through civil reconnaissance and engagement activities, providing real-time insights to U.S. military commands, while conventional forces offered situational awareness through reports from key leader engagements (Perito, 2005; Koontz, 2008). Despite these efforts, the understanding that planners developed remained incomplete. Deep-seated ethno-tribal grievances, intricate local political dynamics, and historical power struggles, often inaccessible to Western analysts and deliberately concealed by Afghan actors, continued to shape the operational environment and fuel instability (Beral, 2016).

Current Political Situation

U.S. military planners had a suitable understanding of the political situation in Afghanistan as they transitioned to stability operations. Planners knew the military invasion had fragmented the political landscape in Afghanistan and that a lack of central authority had existed immediately following the invasion (Collins, 2011). However, the inauguration of the interim Afghan Government within a year led most to believe that military forces with interagency and international support and newly built Afghan Security Forces could help gradually extend stability to the rest of the country (Beral, 2016). Information provided by the PRTs helped planners comprehend the political situation in the provinces where they were present (SIGAR, 2018). What would eventually become evident though, is that a suitable understanding was not sufficient for balancing that understanding with western notions of governance in executing the plans.

Two distinct problems arose in executing stability operations which planners did not foresee in understanding the current political situation in Afghanistan. The first was the United States' own values and notions of governance and the second was a limited understanding of informal governing bodies. The U.S. military approach to rebuilding Afghanistan is a direct reflection of the U.S. government's approach, which is one heavily influenced by Western models of governance and democracy. Efforts to establish a centralized government with a strong executive, parliamentary system, and national army were at odds with Afghanistan's historical preference for decentralized power structures (SIGAR, 2021). The imposition of Western-style institutions often alienated local leaders and communities, who felt marginalized and disconnected from the central government in Kabul (SIGAR, 2021). Informal governing bodies, tribal leaders and local councils, known as jirgas or shuras, have historically played a crucial role in conflict resolution and community decision-making in Afghanistan (Dempsey &

Coburn, 2010). There is little evidence that military planners planned for the engagement and empowerment of these local institutions, reducing the legitimacy and sustainability of military and development efforts.

Efforts to Change Attitudes

The U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan aimed not only to dismantle al-Qaeda and overthrow the Taliban but also to establish a stable and democratic Afghan government. Achieving these goals required influencing Afghan government and military leaders, as well as the broader population, to accept and support the desired changes in their environment. The following paragraphs explore the strategies and methods employed by U.S. military planners to influence these key stakeholders.

In July 2003, the Joint Staff directed USCENTCOM to refine its stabilization plans, developing a political influence strategy (Degen & Reardon, 2021). U.S. military planners provided substantial support to the Afghan political process, spending significant time and resources to influence its formation. DoD guidance to USCENTCOM and subordinate commanders was to ensure their plans assisted Afghanistan in building a government that was ‘representative of all responsible elements of Afghan society through the political participation of the Afghan people’ (Degen & Reardon, 2021). The constitutional Loya Jirga in 2003 and the presidential elections in 2004 were critical planning efforts. U.S. advisors worked closely with Afghan leaders to ensure the successful implementation of those processes, aiming to build a government perceived as legitimate and representative by the Afghan people (Collins, 2011).

Military planners also developed plans to influence Afghan military leaders. Their military plans established training and mentoring programs for the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police designed to make both more professional and respected institutions

(Brooks, 2010). The plans embedded advisors and liaison teams within Afghan military units to provide support and guidance (Collins, 2011). These advisors played a crucial role in influencing Afghan military leaders, sharing best practices, and fostering a professional ethos. U.S. military planners understood building trust and strong relationships with Afghan military leaders was vital to both U.S. and Afghan interests in stabilizing the country (Brooks, 2010).

Winning the “hearts and minds” of the Afghan population was a central component of the U.S. stability operations plan. This involved addressing the needs and grievances of the local population to undermine support for insurgent groups and build support for the Afghan government and shaping the public’s perceptions of U.S. military operations and Afghan security forces (Degen & Reardon, 2021). Planners linked an emphasis on development projects and the use of PRTs to those regions they wanted to influence the most (Degen & Reardon, 2021). They also planned for the use of various media platforms, including radio, television, and print, to disseminate messages that promoted the legitimacy of the Afghan government, countered insurgent propaganda, and highlighted the benefits of cooperation with coalition forces (Munoz, 2012).

Causes and Preventors at the Different Levels of the International System

The second sub-component of understanding of conflict is the interplay of causes and transformers at all the different levels of the international system and using those in transforming conflict. This allows planners to understand what factors are exacerbating and restraining the conflict and the context within which the conflict is situated. Military plans appreciate the causes and preventors at different levels of the international system when their plans show evidence of what is causing conflict at the global, regional, societal, conflict party, and individual/elite levels. A planner’s understanding of the interplay of causes and preventors at all the different levels of

the international system allows the planner to analyze and evaluate conflict transformation practices and to consider the gaps and weaknesses in one's capacity for handling a particular conflict. As I noted in Chapter 3, there was no evidence military planners appreciated the causes and preventors at either the global, regional, societal, conflict party, or individual/elite levels to consider the gaps and weaknesses in their OEF stabilization plans.

Military planners failed to understand and develop plans for Afghanistan as a global and regional entity. As a landlocked country bordering Pakistan, Iran, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and China, Afghanistan had a long history of conflict and isolation from global politics. From a global perspective, its only interest to the United States had been as a proxy for the U.S. fight against the spread of communism. U.S. military planners had no appreciation for how the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989) left a lasting impact on Afghanistan, with the country's infrastructure devastated and societal divisions deepened (Malkasian, 2021). The war gave rise to various mujahideen factions, which later evolved into powerful warlords and led to a power vacuum, resulting in a brutal civil war and the eventual rise of the Taliban in the mid-1990s (Malkasian, 2021). The Taliban's regime, marked by strict adherence to their interpretation of Islamic law and suppression of ethnic and sectarian minorities, further complicated the sociopolitical landscape (Collins, 2011). This period of conflict deeply affected Afghan society, creating a complex web of grievances, loyalties, and power dynamics, with no evidence military planners understood or considered this when forming their stabilization plans. From a regional causes and preventors perspective, the military's stabilization plans gave no suggestion they understood how tribal affiliations and regional power dynamics cut across the borders Afghanistan shared with all its neighbors. External influence and support for insurgent groups, particularly from Pakistan, posed a significant challenge, complicating U.S. efforts to stabilize

Afghanistan (Collins, 2011). Additionally, the regional powers – Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iran, India, Russia, and China – were not interested in providing information or support to American planning efforts (Collins, 2011).

As I noted earlier, U.S. military planners' understanding of Afghan culture was incomplete, never more so than in their appreciation for societal causes and preventors of conflict. Planners ignored or elected not to address several societal factors in planning stability operations in Afghanistan. First, they failed to grasp the power of ethnic, tribal, and local power structure influences on Afghan citizens, often treating them as a monolithic group. The distinct cultural and historical differences often led to tensions and rivalries in competition for influencing American support for local leaders and reconstruction projects (Malkasian, 2021). Planners also failed to anticipate and acknowledge that a lack of language skills and cultural understanding among those military personnel executing stability tasks would hinder effective communication and interaction with Afghan communities (Fosher & Mackenzie, 2021). The reliance on interpreters, often mistrusted by local populations, further complicated efforts to build relationships and gather intelligence (Koontz, 2008). Finally, planners did not foresee how misinterpretations of local dynamics and alliances, with local informers and power brokers having their own agendas, could complicate stability operations (SIGAR, 2018).

The second societal cause of conflict military planners failed to grasp involved how Afghans would trust or not trust security forces. The U.S. military effort to build and train Afghan security forces faced numerous challenges rooted in cultural and societal differences. The rapid expansion of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) often overlooked the need for proper vetting, training, and integration of recruits from diverse ethnic backgrounds. Issues such as corruption, factionalism, and loyalty to local power brokers

undermined the effectiveness and cohesion of Afghan security forces, limiting their ability to provide security and stability independently (SIGAR, 2021).

The final societal cause of conflict military planners misunderstood in building stability plans was economic. Poverty, unemployment, and lack of access to basic services were significant drivers of conflict in Afghanistan (Sopko, 2019). While the military designed plans to invigorate the Afghan economy, their lack of understanding of economic instability doomed many to failure. Three misunderstandings in particular hampered U.S. military stability operations. First, planners focused on providing aid to those areas where the insurgency was the strongest instead of where they could make the most economic improvement (Collins, 2011). Second, they spent inordinate attention on eradicating the nation's poppy production while failing to understand the region's heavy reliance on it and to provide them with opportunities for sustainable development (Collins, 2011). Finally, planners did not anticipate how socioeconomic grievances made many Afghans susceptible to recruitment by insurgent groups, who would exploit these vulnerabilities by offering financial incentives and a sense of purpose (Kilcullen, 2009).

The results of the failure of the U.S. military to understand the causes and preventors at the different levels and incorporate that understanding into their plans was significant. Because planners did not fully grasp the causes of conflict at the global, regional, societal, and economic levels, they were not able to plan for preventors which could minimize the effects of the causes. Understanding causes and preventors should give planners a more complex and deeper understanding of their environment and the ability to think through second and third order effects of their plans.

Conflict Analysis

Military doctrine inherently requires planners to do conflict analysis. As part of the planning process, planners must assess and refine the plan at multiple levels and re-evaluate its effectiveness during execution to see what they must or should change. The key to conflict analysis within conflict transformation is understanding the changing dynamics involved in one's plan and planning over time. Over the course of the military intervention in Afghanistan, there is substantial evidence the U.S. military's strategy and objectives in Afghanistan evolved in response to shifting conditions in the country, changing political directives, and the emergence of new challenges.

The first re-evaluation of the plan occurred once U.S. combat forces ousted the Taliban from power. This re-evaluation shifted planning focus towards stabilization and nation-building. The goal was to create a secure environment that would enable the establishment of a democratic Afghan government and prevent the return of terrorist groups (Collins, 2011). When the United Nations established the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in December 2001 to support security and assist in rebuilding efforts, U.S. military planners helped introduce Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) as a key element of the stabilization plan (Wright et al., 2010).

The second re-evaluation of the plan occurred with the USCENTCOM Commander, General Abizaid, assigning LTG Barno as the CJTF-180 and Combined Forces Command – Afghanistan (CFC-A) Commander. LTG Barno redesigned the whole campaign plan, focusing on counterinsurgency and oversaw a substantial redirection of military planning towards stability operations (Barno, 2007; Degen & Reardon, 2021). LTG Barno's re-evaluation came as the security situation in Afghanistan began to deteriorate. The Taliban and other insurgent groups,

regrouping in Pakistan's tribal areas, launched a resurgence that highlighted the limitations of the existing military strategy and the need for adaptation (Neumann et al., 2021). The evolving threat environment prompted a renewed focus on stability operations, particularly on training Afghan security forces, with U.S. forces playing a crucial role in training and mentoring (Collins, 2011).

These are two of the major re-evaluations in the initial plans for stability operations. The expansive timeframe of the war in Afghanistan resulted in many re-evaluations which are outside the scope of this study. Among the components of understanding conflict as it pertains to conflict transformation, conflict analysis is the most inherent for how the U.S. military already plans. The problem in Afghanistan was not whether military planners were doing conflict analysis, but how well they understood the actual changing dynamics.

Conclusion

The examination of U.S. military planning in Operation Enduring Freedom reveals that while efforts were made to incorporate stability operations into strategic and operational planning, these efforts were constrained by an incomplete understanding of the Afghan sociopolitical landscape. As evidenced in the qualitative comparative analysis presented in Chapters 3 and 4, planning documents and case data demonstrated a disconnect between military intentions and the complex local realities shaping conflict transformation outcomes. The persistent challenges in aligning U.S. objectives with Afghan societal structures – particularly in terms of local governance, tribal dynamics, and political legitimacy – underscore the analytical findings that effective conflict transformation requires not only integrated planning but also nuanced contextual awareness. The Afghanistan case illustrates that while planners increasingly recognize the need for civil-military coordination and broader stakeholder inclusion, their ability

to operationalize those insights was limited by the institutional blind spots and doctrinal rigidity identified earlier in the dataset.

Despite the initial military successes achieved with large scale combat operations, the U.S. military faced numerous challenges in achieving long-term stability and security in Afghanistan with its stability operations. While the initial invasion was successful in achieving its primary objectives, Afghanistan remained embroiled in conflict for years. The Taliban regrouped and launched an insurgency against the Afghan government and coalition forces. The legacy of the invasion of Afghanistan is complex. While it succeeded in removing the Taliban from power and disrupting al-Qaeda's operations, the long-term stability and development of Afghanistan remain uncertain. The conflict highlighted the difficulties of military stabilization planning and operations and the importance of addressing the underlying causes of instability.

A planning approach which incorporates an understanding of the conflict with military stability operations is essential for achieving long-term stability. The U.S. military's limited understanding of Afghanistan's social, cultural, and political contexts contributed to the ultimate inability of the United States to leave Afghanistan with a stable and strengthened representative government. Future military interventions should prioritize cultural competence and local engagement to build trust and legitimacy. The experience in Afghanistan highlights the complexities of modern conflict and underscores the need to plan for a nuanced and integrated approach to achieving sustainable peace and stability. The lessons learned from Afghanistan are crucial for informing future military interventions with stability operations and ensuring conflict transformation.

The above conclusion may seem contradictory to the QCA data presented in Chapter 3. The data presented in that Chapter demonstrated military planners evidenced recognition of

structural and cultural roots of violence and conflict analysis. It also showed a statistically substantial change in Afghanistan's liberal democracy index (LDI) score five years after the start of the military intervention. With a calibrated fuzzy set membership score of 0.82 in Understanding Conflict and a substantial change in its LDI, one could easily assume this case study should only highlight how military planners achieved a significant understanding of the conflict. So why am I not?

I am not, because QCA, as a methodology in this study, is about achieving a greater understanding and improving planning for future post-conflict stability operations following military intervention. As a reminder, the calibrated fuzzy set membership score is where a particular case resides on a continuous scale from 0.95 denoting a case as fully in and 0.05 denoting a case as fully out. A score of 0.82 does not denote those military planners understood the conflict in Afghanistan perfectly, it means their planning allowed them a better understanding of the conflict as compared to the other cases with regards to the outcome. Future research and analysis may find researchers need to weight more heavily understanding causes and preventors, a realm military planners neglected in understanding Afghanistan. Finally, the purpose of this study was not to identify significant longitudinal changes. The substantial change in LDI, given Afghanistan's starting point, may be an imprecise measurement of its eventual progress towards a strengthened and representative government.

Chapter 6 - A Lack of an Inclusive and Synchronized Framework in Haiti

Historical Overview of Haiti

Haiti became the world's first Black republic and the second independent state in the Western Hemisphere after its successful slave revolution against French colonial rule, culminating in independence in 1804 (Fatton, 2007). However, the post-independence period was marked by diplomatic isolation, economic sanctions, and internal divisions that hindered state-building. France's demand for reparation, which Haiti agreed to pay in 1825, crippled the economy for more than a century and entrenched systemic underdevelopment (Dubois, 2012).

Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, Haiti experienced frequent political upheavals, characterized by short-lived governments, power struggles between elites, and militarization of politics. The U.S. occupied Haiti from 1915 to 1934 under the pretext of restoring order and protecting American interests. While infrastructure was developed during this period, the occupation also entrenched authoritarian governance practices and centralized power in the military (Schmidt, 1995).

In the post-occupation period, political instability persisted. The most notorious regime was that of Francois "Papa Doc" Duvalier and his son Jean-Claude "Baby Doc", who ruled from 1957 to 1986. Their dictatorship was marked by brutal repression, corruption, and the use of paramilitary forces to suppress dissent (Abbott, 2011). The Duvalier era left a legacy of fear, a weakened civil society, and hollowed-out institutions, all of which contributed to the fragility of Haitian democracy.

Following the removal of Jean-Claude Duvalier in 1986, Haiti entered a tumultuous period of attempted democratization, but democratic institutions remained weak. In 1990, Jean-

Bertrand Aristide, a former Catholic priest and proponent of liberation theology, was elected president in Haiti's first free and fair election. His populist agenda and anti-elite rhetoric provoked backlash from powerful sectors of society, including the military. Aristide was deposed in a violent coup d'état in September 1991, only months after taking office (Fatton, 2007).

Operation Uphold Democracy Background

In the early 1990s, Haiti found itself engulfed in a political and humanitarian crisis that threatened the stability of the Caribbean region. The crisis reached a critical point after the 1991 military coup ousting the democratically elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. The overthrow of President Aristide by the Haitian military led to widespread violence, human rights abuses, and economic decline (Hayes & Wheatley, 1996). The international community condemned the coup, and the UN, under the auspices of the Organization of American States (OAS), imposed economic sanctions to force the military junta to restore constitutional order. The junta refused and the situation in Haiti continued to deteriorate, with thousands of Haitians fleeing the country by boat, creating a refugee crisis (Kretchik et al., 1998). This caused the international community, led by the United Nations and the United States, to become increasingly involved in resolving the situation.

As the crisis deepened, both the UN and the United States took joint and parallel actions to resolve the impending crisis. The UN Security Council passed several resolutions aimed at restoring democracy in Haiti, resulting in little change to the political and humanitarian crisis. Security Council Resolution 867, passed in September 1993, established the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) (United Nations Mission in Haiti [UNMIH], n.d.). UNMIH's mandate was to assist in modernizing the armed forces of Haiti and establish a new police force (UNMIH, n.d.). Ultimately the intransigence of the military junta in Haiti caused the Security

Council to pass Resolution 940, adopted on July 31, 1994, authorizing the use of force to remove the military regime and reinstate Aristide as president (Benton & Ware, 1998). This marked the first time the UN authorized a multinational force to restore a democratically elected government.

While the UN worked to resolve the situation in Haiti diplomatically, President William J. Clinton took additional actions. President Clinton authorized CIA operations and the Department of Defense to begin planning for a military intervention. Shortly after the military coup ousting President Aristide in September 1991, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF), pairing up with the CIA, began running black operation missions into Haiti – small teams in civilian clothes engaged in recon and site surveys (Shacochis, 1999). Both the U.S. SOF command and CIA claimed these operations would provide real-time, accurate information to the U.S. government as it planned for intervention in Haiti. The intervention planning by the DoD would forcibly remove the military regime installed by the 1991 Haitian coup d'état that overthrew the elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

In Haiti, as with many other military interventions, there is not linear progression in planning. Time and changing circumstances do not allow the highest echelons of the government and military commands to finish its strategy and guidance for plans before lower echelons begin their planning efforts. Thus, while the National Security Council and Department of Defense were still developing their strategy and guidance in the Fall of 1993, the DoD Joint Staff gave U.S. Atlantic Command a preliminary notice to develop a plan for a forcible entry of Haiti (Kretchik et al., 1998). In the late months of 1993, U.S. Atlantic Command developed two preliminary plans for the forcible entry, one with military specific objectives for a combat

operation and the other a political-military plan synchronizing interagency cooperation for a Haitian incursion after combat operations (Kretchik et al., 1998).

As the situation in Haiti deteriorated and the possibility of a military invasion became more likely, the Department of Defense approved a plan in early 1994 with combat operations followed by stability operations, with the plan laying out the purpose of the operation, the endstate, and defined criteria for success, along with what U.S. Atlantic Command expected the interagency to contribute to an operation in Haiti (Kretchik et al., 1998). This proposed political-military plan was a first, with numerous government agencies and the military contributing to its creation at the National Security Council level (Hayes & Wheatley, 1996). To facilitate further planning and interagency involvement, the Joint Staff convened a Joint Planning Group at the Joint Staff level in May 1994. They also examined U.S. Atlantic Command's plans and authorized the establishment Joint Task Force-180 (JTF-180) under U.S. Atlantic Command to begin operational planning (DoD, 1997). The Joint Task Force-180 would serve as the headquarters for the military forces executing the invasion. The result was a conceptual idea of interagency planning at the strategic level with no specific civilian support identified at the operational level to facilitate JTF-180 planning.

The U.S. Army's XVIII Airborne Corps served as the Headquarters for JTF-180, developing the operational plan for the invasion. The primary objectives of the Operational Plan (OPLAN) were to neutralize the Forces Armee d'Haiti (Fad'H) and police; to protect U.S. citizens, third country nationals, designated Haitians' interests and property; to conduct a Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) as required; to restore civil order; to establish essential services; assist in the reorganization of the Haitian armed forces and police; and to set the conditions for the re-establishment of the legitimate government of Haiti (Kretchik et al., 1998).

The OPLAN separated the operation into five phases. Phases One and Two involved the deployment of combat forces to neutralize the FAd'H and police, secure key facilities, restore civil order, and begin internal defense with rebuilding Haitian security forces (Kretchik et al., 1998). Phase Three involved force buildup and initial civil-military operations to establish relations with local Haitian leaders, reorganizing the FAd'H, and preparing to receive follow-on U.S. or multinational forces (Kretchik et al., 1998). Phase Four was civil-military operations allowing for a full transition to the follow-on force, expanding civil-military operations throughout Haiti, and reorganizing the Haitian Police (Kretchik et al., 1998). The final phase was the redeployment of JTF-180 forces.

In addition to allowing the Department of Defense to plan a forceful invasion, President Clinton also pursued a diplomatic solution through former President Jimmy Carter. Thus, in May 1994, the JCS notified U.S. Atlantic Command, who then notified XVIII Airborne Corps, to start planning to enter Haiti permissively with a faster than previously planned handover to the United Nations Mission in Haiti. The new operational plans deleted the neutralization of the FAd'H and Haitian Police from the previous planning efforts (Kretchik et al., 1998). However, they retained the reestablishment of a legitimate Haitian government as an objective (Kretchik et al., 1998). The evolving dynamic political situation made it uncertain for military planners whether military forces would enter Haiti forcibly as an invasion force or permissively as a peacekeeping force. However, because military planners assumed a longer employment timeframe for a peacekeeping force, the new permissive plan necessitated the creation of a subordinate joint task force. U.S. Atlantic Command and JTF-180 gave JTF-190, with the 10th Mountain Division from Fort Drum, New York serving as its headquarters, the tactical mission of planning for the permissive entry peacekeeping force.

As tensions with Haiti escalated, President Clinton tried a final diplomatic solution, sending a delegation of former President Carter, Senator Sam Nunn, and General Colin Powell in September 1994 to try to negotiate a peaceful exit for the Haitian military leadership (Benton & Ware, 2001). With the Haitian military junta initially rebuffing the delegation's attempts at negotiation, President Clinton addressed the American public. He announced he was directing the Department of Defense to call up reservists and positioning two aircraft carriers in the region to address the Haitian military junta defying the United States and United Nations resolutions (Kretchik et al., 1998). JTF-180 prepared to execute its plan to invade Haiti. As it prepared, the abovementioned diplomatic negotiation team arrived in Haiti for its last attempt at a peaceful negotiation of the crisis. This diplomatic mission coincided with the deployment of U.S. troops, creating a situation where military force backed up negotiations. The dual approach eventually proved successful. The Carter delegation secured an agreement with the military junta for their resignation and Aristide's return, rendering the planned military combat invasion operation unnecessary.

Initially planned as a large-scale invasion, U.S. military forces ultimately landed under mostly peaceful conditions to begin executing only stability operations. No military plan had envisioned the uncertain environment into which the U.S. military found itself. While willing to give up power, the military junta would remain in power for several weeks before President Aristide could return to lead the country (Kretchik et al., 1998). Thus U.S. military planners had less than twelve hours to develop a plan which allowed U.S. forces to enter Haiti quickly, gain the trust of the Haitian people, and stabilize the population, but not in an overly aggressive manner (Kretchik et al., 1998). Ultimately the plan directed U.S. forces to restore and preserve civil order; protect U.S. citizens and interests and designated Haitians and third-party nationals;

create a secure environment for the restoration of the legitimate government of Haiti; securing known heavy weapons caches and the Port-au-Prince airfield; and rapidly buildup the U.S. military presence in Haiti (Kretchik et al., 1998).

The following sections will describe how the U.S. military employed some elements of an inclusive and synchronized framework and failed to employ others during planning for Operation Uphold Democracy. In Operation Uphold Democracy, U.S. military planners included U.S. civilian agencies and the UN in planning, while failing to integrate nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the host nation. Compilations of historical interviews with military planners and senior military commanders; historical accounts, and DoD funded research reports all detail the interagency planning in Haiti as less than optimal, but there is ample evidence joint civilian-military planning did occur (Bentley, 1996; Fishel, 1997; Girard, 2004; Hayes & Wheatley, 1996). There is also evidence U.S. military planners coordinated with the United Nations Task Force in Haiti, thereby including an intergovernmental organization in their planning efforts (Dworken & Siegel, 1997; Kretchik et al., 1998). Ultimately, the available planning information provides minimal evidence military planners created an inclusive and synchronized framework for stability operations in Haiti with regards to integrating NGOs and Haitian government officials.

An Inclusive and Synchronized Framework

Joint Civilian-Military Planning

Chapter 2 described an inclusive and synchronized framework as one where coherent action strikes a balance with competing imperatives and planning encompasses all involved, determining an appropriate strategy and framework for execution. Utilizing compilations of historical interviews from the Department of Defense and Department of State participants of

Operation Uphold Democracy and recently declassified National Security Council documents, the available evidence shows the National Security Council and Department of Defense took steps to integrate interagency coordination. But while the U.S. government touted the planning for Haiti as the first for political-military planning cooperation, the historical record does not support a fully integrated and synchronized effort at the operational level. Why? Because a fully integrated and synchronized framework must be one where the military creates shared understanding, understands their interagency partners frameworks for planning, and makes valid assumptions in their own planning about interagency support.

Shared Understanding

The Joint Stabilization Activities (2022) publication describes shared understanding as a “comprehensive approach to stabilization through close, continuous coordination, and cooperation” and the focusing of activities toward common policy objectives (p. II-1). Shared understanding helps build trust between civilian and military entities and helps clarify who is responsible for what during planning. To achieve shared understanding one must share information, dialogue with others, and have a collective assessment of the situation (JCS, 2022). The U.S. military took some actions during planning to help facilitate shared understanding and took others that negated that understanding.

Despite the National Security Council focus on joint civilian-military planning for Haiti, the finalized military plans at the point of execution contained very little civilian-military coordination. Historical records repeatedly emphasize the lack of sharing information and dialogue with others as contributing factors to the lack of coordinated efforts in Haiti. How did planning efforts, which took deliberate steps to integrate interagency coordination, fail to fully integrate and fall short in execution? As historical documents and other evidence demonstrate,

shared understanding in joint civilian-military planning must occur at every level, strategic to tactical, to achieve an inclusive and synchronized framework.

At the strategic level, joint civilian military planning for Haiti was mostly successful. From the perspective of the military, they were on a substantial path towards shared understanding. There was open communication and coordination, especially apparent in the National Security Council Interagency Working Group. The IWG brought together representatives from all government agencies involved in the planning and policy development process for operations in Haiti. The IWG developed and coordinated the political-military planning among all participants (Kretchik et al., 1998). For Haiti, the Executive Committee coordinated planning in May 1994 with representatives of the Departments of Defense (to include the Joint Staff), State, Justice, and Treasury (Kretchik et al., 1998). After general guidance had been issued, the various departments began detailed planning (Kretchik et al., 1998). A week prior to the execution of Operation Uphold Democracy, the Interagency Working Group concerned with Haiti met at National Defense University to discuss the plan. The documents show the military briefed their plan, including areas such as humanitarian assistance and the training of the new police force, to civilian counterparts in other agencies, and attempted to ensure that those agencies were prepared to execute their part of the operation (United States Atlantic Command, 1995b).

The operational and tactical levels of planning were not as successful at creating shared understanding. When the Secretary of Defense instructed the Department of Defense to start interagency planning in the winter of 1994, U.S. Atlantic Command was already six months into its planning efforts. Not until September of 1994 would U.S. Atlantic Command chair an interagency meeting to brief the military plan and coordinate interagency efforts (Hayes &

Wheatley, 1996). At that point though, U.S. Atlantic Command had already developed their plans and were only waiting on Joint Staff approval. Once Atlantic Command completed their plan and identified Joint Task Force-180 as the XVIII Airborne Corps from Fort Bragg, North Carolina as the unit who would execute the mission, the Chairman, General Shalikashvili, specifically directed that Haiti planning remain “close hold”, meaning the planners were not to discuss the plan outside of a very strictly controlled list of individuals. The Chairman did not want the plan leaked to the press at a time when the United States was downplaying military actions and still emphasizing diplomatic solutions.

This “close-hold” restriction ensured that Atlantic Command could develop military plans without an adverse impact on the diplomatic efforts to return Aristide; however, it also effectively limited the amount of coordination done by the planners (Ballard, 1998). This meant that no one informed several key general officers on the Joint Staff, some who were intimately involved in the diplomatic and support actions for Haiti, of the work the planners in Norfolk and Fort Bragg were accomplishing. This restriction of information would also add significant burdens on those few who were privy to the details, because they could not leverage the knowledge of all their fellow staff members to accomplish their work (Director of Central Intelligence, 1995). This would eventually affect how both the Joint Staff, in the Pentagon, and the office of the Secretary of Defense facilitated support from other government agencies for the planning effort.

The Department of Defense “close-hold” restriction eventually led to only the primary attendees of the National Security Council knowing certain portions of the military plan and effectively limited the amount of shared information, dialogue, and coordination each of those members could direct within their own organizations. Opening the plan to other U.S. agencies, to

address clearly the plethora of details that characterize modern politics when two nations are at odds, was lacking (Ballard, 1998). The NSC meetings made clear other elements of the government were already heavily engaged in multiple issues crossing jurisdictional and bureaucratic boundaries (National Security Council, 1994a; NSC, 1994b). The State Department was in the process of coordinating international support for the Caribbean Command Contingent (CARICOM) (National Security Council [NSC], 1993). Additionally, the State Department expressed concern that the continuing crisis in Haiti had expanded the use of the country by drug traffickers, emphasizing that the added corruption drugs could bring to Haiti's seat of power – the Haitian Armed Forces (Department of State [DoS], 1992). However, the “close-hold” nature of the plan prevented those below the deputy level from coordinating with one another.

In stark contrast, when the Chairman gave Atlantic Command guidance in early 1994 to develop another iteration of the plan as a limited intervention with a lower classification level, the military significantly increased the ability for interagency coordination at lower levels. In effect, the second iteration, with a lower classification level, permitted the State Department and other planners, working with the United Nations and foreign nations not normally privy to the highly classified elements of the previous plan, to coordinate. For example, the DoD informed the State Department's International Criminal Investigation and Training Program (ICITAP), a key element to the reform of the Haitian police force, of important planning factors so that its directors could better prepare for its role in the plan (Ballard, 1998). The same was true for several other organizations, including the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (Ballard, 1998). The State Department now coordinated its earlier coordination with CARICOM with the Department of Defense. Planners at Atlantic Command now coordinated

directly with the State Department, which gave them authorization to speak directly with embassy personnel in the respective Caribbean nations about their force contribution to a CARICOM Contingent (Kretchik et al., 1998). This was a significant improvement towards shared understanding, but not the comprehensive effort required.

The reality of how the different government entities comprehended shared understanding would prove disappointing to the military as the President moved towards engagement in Haiti and it finalized its tactical operations plan. As noted above, the culmination of interagency coordination in support of the planning effort was a National Security Council meeting on September 11, 1994, with participation of the Haiti Interagency Working Group (IWG). The purpose of the meeting was to conduct a final walk through of the political-military plan as agreed to earlier in the year. The senior Atlantic Command plans officer briefed the Haiti invasion concept to the entire IWG for the first time. Another Atlantic Command planner in the room noted that many members of the working group stared in disbelief as this was the first time many of the deputies in the room had heard the plan. The lack of true synchronization was evident to those in attendance. At one point, when the senior plans officer turned to the Department of Justice representative to explain just how that department was going to train and equip the new Haitian Police force, the Department of Justice representative stated that his department could not handle the mission. Instead of working through the issue at the last minute, Atlantic Command gave the mission to another of their plan's officers to address with military resources (Kretchik et al., 1998). The military planners left the meeting with their illusions of shared understanding shattered.

The final disillusionment with shared understanding came as U.S. military forces entered Haiti. The SOF and CIA efforts mentioned previously should have given the U.S. military lead

organization, Atlantic Command, significant insights into the situation in Haiti. Yet no dialogue or collective assessment occurred between those entities and U.S. Atlantic Command or the forces conducting the intervention. Thus, what would become increasingly clear as U.S. forces flowed into Haiti, the mission leaders would later report, was that JTF-180 was operating in a political climate that they had neither predicted nor planned for prior to arrival (Shacochis, 1999).

Consequently, the joint civilian-military planning for the U.S. intervention in Haiti has a mixed result for shared understanding. Historical documents and compilations of historical interviews with those present for the planning show a desire at the strategic level for the military to integrate, dialogue, and have a collective assessment of the situation in Haiti for U.S. government stabilization efforts. However, the nature of military planning at the operational and tactical levels meant shared understanding faltered at those levels based on military decisions for secrecy and the military understanding of capabilities of civilian agencies. Shared understanding was only one of the necessary elements for inclusive and synchronized joint civilian-military planning, understanding planning frameworks and making valid assumptions also matter.

Frameworks for Planning

While not obvious at the time, the second failure of the U.S. military in stability planning was its failure to recognize how its framework for planning differed from those of other U.S. government agencies. The available evidence suggests other U.S. government agencies and the Department of Defense used two distinct frameworks for guiding their stability operations planning efforts in Haiti, which led to a desynchronization of planning efforts. Almost all U.S. government agencies applied a conceptual and coordinating framework while the military utilized a detailed and coordinated framework. The following paragraphs examine these two

distinct frameworks and demonstrate how they influenced the planning and execution of stability operations.

Other U.S. government agencies, particularly the Department of State, applied a conceptual and coordinating framework in planning for stability operations in Haiti. This framework allowed these agencies to address the complex, multi-faceted operations in Haiti, marked by uncertainty and rapidly changing dynamics, and further allowed them to remain adaptable and adjust their strategy as the situation evolved (DoS, 2022). Conceptual and coordinating planning prioritized the development of guiding principles that would drive subsequent actions (DoS, 2022). The framework did not dictate every action or resource allocated, but rather a high-level roadmap. And for agencies with limited personnel and budgets, coordinating in planning meant they were giving a general agreement for action, not committing to specific actions.

In 1993 and the early months of 1994, President Clinton lacked a definitive plan for Haiti. His public statements and meetings with senior officials detail an unwillingness to move beyond allowing diplomatic pressure to run its course (NSC, 1993). Therefore, planning in the National Security Council for Operation Uphold Democracy began with a vague notion that its objectives would be the restoration of democracy, the staunching of the refugee flow to the United States, and the enhancement of credibility of the United Nations and Organization of American States (OAS), as well as the United States (Fishel, 1997). The National Security Council initially defined Democracy simply as the restoration of President Aristide to office and the subsequent holding of elections (Fishel, 1997). Thus, planning efforts among the other U.S. government agencies remained conceptual to allow them to adjust their strategy as the situation evolved.

Starting in January 1994 though, the White House planning cells on Haiti began meeting regularly with the National Security Council (NSC), the National Security Agency (NSA), State, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs, and every deputy they could find, known collectively as the NSC IWG (Shacochis, 1999). However, in the early stages of planning, documents show that no one ever clearly defined the objective of the Haiti intervention for the IWG. Eventually, the stated objective of the operation became a secure and stable environment for the transition to United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). Having a stated objective moved the planning efforts of each of the civilian agencies into the coordinating framework for planning. They had a general agreement for action, but none saw themselves as committing to specific actions.

In contrast, the Department of Defense utilized detailed and coordinated planning for stability operations in Haiti, translating strategic objectives into concrete operational steps. Detailed planning involved military planners developing specific, measurable, and time-bound tasks in their plans (JCS, 2020). Their approach defined specific missions, logistical requirements, and contingency plans (JCS, 2020). And the U.S. military viewed coordination in definitive terms. For them, an action tasked or agreed upon was one that the two entities had coordinated, and they expected a definitive plan for action as a result.

Having a stated objective for the operation allowed the Department of Defense to move from generalized planning to specific mission planning within the constraints of national policy. As noted earlier, the lead organization given the responsibility for planning a military option for the Department of Defense was the U.S. Atlantic Command. On January 6, 1994, General Sheehan, the Joint Staff's Operations Officer, provided U.S. Atlantic Command with two charters for their planning; the employment of a large force centered on Port-au-Prince, and the

establishment of an enclave in Haiti to return Haitian migrants. The enclave tasking was in response to piqued National Security Council interest in the numbers of Haitian migrants taking to sea, a concern intimately linked with all Uphold Democracy planning and execution (Ballard, 1998). The operational-level plan, which U.S. Atlantic Command would name OPLAN 2370, planned for a forcible military invasion of Haiti. On January 7, 1994, U.S. Atlantic Command sent a message to Lieutenant General Hugh Shelton's XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters at Fort Bragg, NC, including a mission statement and his designation as the prospective Joint Task Force (JTF) commander for OPLAN 2370, to begin the tactical-level planning (Ballard, 1998). Both the operational and tactical planning efforts included specific, measurable, and time-bound tasks in their plans.

As XVIII Airborne Corps developed and refined its tactical plan, U.S. Atlantic Command was facilitating interagency coordination with the NSC Haiti Interagency Working Group to help coordinate interagency support. The U.S. Atlantic Command staff hosted several small-scale interagency planning meetings during the months of June and July of 1994 to advance coordination among the various organizations that were important to success in Haiti (Ballard, 1998). A U.S. Atlantic Command planner, Major Michael Sutton, noted that they briefed the interagency (State, INS, Justice, etc) on multiple occasions on their Haiti planning efforts (McClintock, 1997). And as the United States moved closer to military intervention in Haiti, Admiral Paul D. Miller, Commander in Chief, US Atlantic Command, directed his staff to channel assets, coordinate interagency support, maintain strategic management of the theater, and otherwise orchestrate the many collateral and multinational efforts required for success (Ballard, 1998). On September 11, 1994, Admiral Miller held a meeting he believed was a milestone with the CIA Director, a deputy from Defense, a deputy from the Department of State,

USAID, and others, offering each the opportunity to be part of the joint task force and set up the coordination mechanisms they needed to, none of those entities availed themselves of the opportunity (McClintock, 1995a). U.S. Atlantic Command viewed their briefings and coordination activities as activities that the entities had coordinated and believed each of the interagency partners were building specific plans for action, those interagency partners did not.

There is substantial evidence that U.S. government agencies did perform actions in support of Operation Uphold Democracy, but on their own timeline and not in coordination with military operations. Mr. Robert Maxim, the Political Advisor (POLAD) and Special Assistant for International Affairs at U.S. Atlantic Command reinforced the interagency partners differing planning framework view in a command historian interview after the military intervention. In describing how the interagency planning process worked from his perspective, he noted, the meetings were ones that had never happened before, and that they identified gaps in coordination and issues that needed to be addressed, tasking out different responsibilities; but some of the agencies just did not have the resources and could not respond the way the military thought (McClintock, 1995a). In September 1994, the USAID/Office of Transition Initiatives designed a program to demobilize the Haitian armed forces and assist in their reintegration into Haitian civilian society (Dworken et al., 1997). USAID/OTI then provided the International Organization for Migration (IOM) with a grant to implement the program. This Demobilization and Reintegration Program (DRP) became operational in November 1994, after the U.S. military handed over operations to the United Nations. Ambassador William Swing, the U.S. Ambassador to Haiti, reinforced the view that agencies came on board for Operation Uphold Democracy on their own timeline and in their own manner. “One of the weaknesses since September 19 has been that the other resource agencies on the civilian side have been much slower to get involved

in Haiti, or passive altogether. In effect it's been the Pentagon, the State Department, and the USAID who had to bear the brunt of the entire Haiti effort." (Hayden, 1995a).

The failure of the U.S. military to recognize how its framework for planning differed from those of other U.S. government agencies hampered having a fully inclusive and synchronized framework in planning stability operations for Haiti. This does not, however, negate the tremendous strides the U.S. military and U.S. civilian government agencies made both in coordination and attempting to coordinate. The lessons both entities learned would be useful in future military endeavors and firmly establish the precedent of cooperation in planning stability operations after military intervention.

Assumptions

Every plan involves making assumptions, they are necessary for continuing planning when dealing with unknowns. However, the final failure of the U.S. military in creating a fully inclusive and synchronized framework between the military and its civilian interagency partners in planning for Haiti was to make erroneous assumptions they could not validate. Military planners made very flawed assumptions at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels about both the environment they would encounter in Haiti and the cooperation they would receive from their civilian interagency partners.

As previously mentioned, the evolving political situation with Haiti necessitated significant changes in the military's plan for intervention with ever-shifting objectives. In the span of nine months, the U.S. Atlantic Command and JTF-180 planned for a hostile entry, a permissive entry, and finally for one taking place in an uncertain environment. By September 1994 none of the previous DoD planning had envisioned that the junta would not only be in

power after U.S. forces arrived, but that military forces would have to deal with it for several weeks before Aristide returned (Kretchik et al., 1998).

The first erroneous assumption military planners made in planning for Haiti harks back to the previous section's discussion on how the military and their civilian interagency partners have different planning frameworks. U.S. Atlantic Command assumed because they briefed their civilian interagency partners in the Interagency Working Group within the National Security Council what the military expected to contribute to an operation in Haiti that those agencies would then plan for those activities (Kretchik et al., 1998). In *A Concise History of the US Army in Operation Uphold Democracy*, Kretchik et al. (1998) identify five assumptions made by military planners that someone else in the interagency would plan for based upon the U.S.

Atlantic Command briefing in early September 1994:

- Provisions for police forces in Haiti.
- Interim security and the training and establishment of a new police force.
- That once the economic embargo was lifted investment dollars would flow into Haiti.
- That relief agencies would initiate large scale nation building projects.
- That US assistance dollars would be provided to assist in nation building projects.

Ultimately the military did not validate the assumptions made during that brief. Nobody planned for those assumptions and ultimately it fell to the military to mitigate those assumptions during the execution of the operation.

U.S. Atlantic Command passed their assumptions on to their subordinate headquarters. JTF-180, the initial invasion force, assumed their higher headquarters had coordinated all their interagency support. But as the military intervention in Haiti commenced, JTF-180 would realize

U.S. Atlantic Command had not validated any of their assumptions about interagency coordination and it would directly affect their operations in the country. JTF-180 soon understood there was no plan for what he should do with the current police forces in Haiti, how he should establish interim security, or who was responsible for establishing a new police force. Lieutenant General Hugh Shelton, the JTF-180 Commander, found himself having to conduct direct, peaceful negotiations with the Cedras regime, which only hours earlier he had expected to remove by force (Hayden, 1995a). Compelled to choose a course of action, Shelton opted to err on the side of caution, balancing impressive displays of military power with a civil but firm personal demeanor (Kretchik et al., 1998). However, the unfolding scenario in which American liberators appeared to be cooperating with Cedras and the FAd'H (Armed Forces of Haiti) proved confusing and disillusioning to many Haitians.

The abrupt change in the plan of JTF-180 resulted in the invalidation of many of their original planning assumptions regarding security. JTF-180 planners had assumed that the interagency would provide a vetted list of police officers and FAd'H individuals with whom they could work, and that the U.S. military would be in charge. Instead, the initial guidance directed that US troops would not supplant the FAd'H in maintaining public order in Haiti; nor would they intervene in "Haitian-on-Haitian violence" (Ballard, 1998). The painful result was a loss of prestige and legitimacy among the US and Multinational Force, not to mention their initial failure to establish order in Port-au-Prince.

Additionally, because of the negotiated entry, soldiers received briefings to the effect that the FRAPH (Revolutionary Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti), the paramilitary henchmen of the junta who U.S. forces were to quickly neutralize in the original plan, they should now consider representatives of a legitimate opposition political party (Ballard, 1998).

This portrayal differed sharply from intelligence assessments preceding the mission. As a practical matter, the FAd'H, for all its grave faults, remained the only fully functioning public institution in Haitian society, which had, by default, conferred on the FAd'H far-reaching civil and judicial authority (Ballard, 1998). Its immediate dissolution would have the American forces in Haiti to fill the void, a role for which their previous planning had not adequately equipped them to perform, due, among other things, to a shortage of Creole linguists and lack of cultural familiarity (Ballard, 1998). The planners' assumption, even after the American arrival, that the FAd'H could maintain order in Haiti without resort to its customary methods of terror and intimidation proved unsound.

JTF-180 planners had assumed they only needed military specific information for their operations in Haiti. This led to divergent points of view by different commands on how to proceed in the uncertain environment created by the Carter negotiations. Without doubt, the diverging points of view held by U.S. commands stemmed in part from a collective shortage of knowledge about Haiti and Haitians. Though armed with considerable intelligence on Haitian politics, heavy weapon stocks, and port facilities, the Americans' cultural understanding of Haitians was generally superficial (Ballard, 1998). Former acting ambassador to Haiti, Barry Watson, offered advice on the likely behavior of the Haitian public to the Americans on their arrival, as did LTG Shelton's aide, Haitian-American linguist Captain Berthony Ladouceur to help mitigate the superficial understanding (Kretchik et al., 1998).

Compilations of historical post-intervention interviews with many of the JTF-180 primary planners revealed frustrations with the planning process. Some believed U.S. Atlantic Command should have pulled in representatives from the Department of Justice and Department of State to provide strategic and operational level guidance when the environment shifted to

include more stability operations (Hayden, 1995a). Others claimed they had asked critical questions about funding for stability operations that neither U.S. Atlantic Command nor the civilian interagency partners could answer prior to the intervention (Hayden, 1995a). The result was a lack of direction at the highest levels resulted in JTF-180 executing operations on an ad hoc basis rather than with a plan and vision for what the result would look like.

There is strong evidence the assumptions made by each echelon in planning directly influenced their experiences in execution. While JTF-180 expressed frustration with interagency coordination during the planning process, there is substantial evidence that JTF-190 experienced a significant amount of interagency cooperation during their execution of Operation Uphold Democracy. The cause for this may have been the very different planning assumptions made by the planners in the development of their plan. JTF-190 designed their plan with decisive Civil Military Operations (CMO) as their primary task and had the Joint Staff's understanding that they would be the focus for long term CMO and interagency coordination (Hayden, 1995b). Compilations of historical interviews with the division staff members show that in early September, the Division conducted a meeting to gain consensus and understanding with many of the key players from the interagency (Stahl, n.d.). Invitees included the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance – Disaster Assistance Response Team (OFDA-DART) team leader, International Criminal Investigative and Training Assistance Program (ICITAP)/DOJ representative, Mr. Kevin Kennedy from the United Nations, Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC) and Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) teams, Ms. Lauren Landis Guzman from INTERAVTION (a leading organization of the NGO/POV community) and COL Carl Farris from the Peace Keeping Institute (Stahl, n.d.). The division staff reviewed

the overall plan of action to ensure that key players were familiar with the tentative plan and verified that critical players were online with designated responsibilities.

The 10th Mountain Division (JTF-190) after action report (AAR) details the close coordination effected early in the planning process with the OFDA-DART team assigned to the mission. An integral part of the team, the OFDA-DART personnel provided keen insight into the workings of not only USAID and the US Embassy, but also the total spectrum of NGO/PVO/IO working in Haiti (Stahl, n.d.). An invaluable source of information, the DART team not only understood the concepts of disaster assistance but could also provide insight to the command group in the working relationships between the Government of Haiti, US Government and NGO/PVO/IO's working in country. The AAR notes that the OFDA-DART arrived early in the planning process and brought critical knowledge of the NGO/POV/IO community in Haiti. Not only did they deploy early in the flow from Fort Drum, but they also brought their own communication package that allowed the Multinational Force (MNF) to establish communications with critical NGO/POV/IO nodes quickly (Stahl, n.d.). Across the Division, JTF-190 staff elements understood the critical nature of interagency coordination and took it upon themselves to validate the assumptions they made about interagency support in stability operations.

Ironically, in the summer of 1993 as options for dealing with the Haitian migrant crisis became more urgent, President Clinton declared his intent to restore Haitian President Jean Bertrand Aristide to power, and Haitian strongman Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras refused to cede power or allow human rights monitors to enter the country, the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas published a paper, Planning for Haiti (Mendel & Stewman, 1993). While ostensibly a guide for military planners, the paper remarked, "the social, political,

and religious factors as they exist now in Haiti will have an impact on military planning for Haitian contingencies, as will the military establishment” (Mendel & Stewman, 1993). The paper described Haiti as a country requiring more than a strictly military intervention. In 1993 Haiti was a broken country, one where every institution and government function was non-functioning and needed help.

The paper described five specific areas that will require consideration during planning – health, poverty, politics and religion, Haitian Armed Forces, and narcotrafficking. While only one of these, the Haitian Armed Forces, is a traditional military concern, the authors contended the other four would directly affect U.S. military operations. Military planners would need to understand the widespread AIDS epidemic in the country; how the sixty percent unemployment, urban crowding, and discrimination affected the population; and how both politics and religion played a key role in the maintenance of power within the nation (Mendel & Stewman, 1993). All of which played into the fact that the Haitian Armed Forces lacked the resources and training to affect the restoration of the national infrastructure and needed a restructuring, to include equipment, training, and professional education. Additionally, supporters of President Aristide, along with Amnesty International, ascribed to Haitian security forces a “human rights nightmare” of detention, beatings, and torture as the means of maintaining order in the society (Mendel & Stewman, 1993). What the military assumes and does not assume in planning has a direct impact on how inclusive and synchronized their framework is for planning.

While the available evidence confirms the U.S. military took definitive steps to work towards an inclusive and synchronized framework in their planning for stability operations after military intervention in Haiti, there is still room for improvement. Military planners still have work to do on improving shared understanding, recognizing and appreciating the differences in

the respective frameworks for planning, and in validating their assumptions. Only then will they achieve coherent action that strikes the balance between competing imperatives and an appropriate strategy and framework for stability operations after military intervention.

Planning with an Intergovernmental Organization

Historical documents and personal accounts of the U.S. military operations in Haiti consistently detail inclusion of the United Nations in the military planning for stability operations in Haiti. This inclusion occurred at two distinct points in the U.S. military involvement. The first was prior to the military invasion and the second was after the invasion, with the focus on stabilization at both points.

The UN establishment the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) overseeing the stabilization of Haiti had two purposes. The first purpose was to monitor and retrain the police while simultaneously removing them from military control (Benton & Ware, 1998). The second purpose was to conduct military training and to provide both humanitarian/civic action programs in support of Haitian democratization, under UN operational control (Benton & Ware, 1998). The U.S. Special Operations Forces provided integral support and led the effort responsible for the second purpose, what became known as Joint Task Force Haiti (JTF Haiti) prior to the military intervention. After the intervention, one of the key elements of the inclusion of the UN was the unified shift from the U.S. led Multinational Force to the UNMIH.

In the Fall of 1993, at the same time as U.S. Atlantic Command and JTF-180 were doing their parallel planning, JTF Haiti entered Haiti to support the two UNMIH purposes. JTF Haiti appointed liaison officers to coordinate and plan with the following UN entities – the Deputy for Peacekeeping Operations at the UN, the International Police Monitors, and the International Civilian Mission (Epstein et al., 1994). Additionally, Special Operations Forces, with CIA

support, put together a survey team to evaluate the Armed Forces of Haiti (FAD'H) for the United Nations, ascertain their training needs, and figure out what everybody wanted (Shacochis, 1999). The JTF Haiti military planners and their UN counterparts believed they were going to operate in a permissive, cooperative environment (Epstein et al., 1994). What they found when they arrived in Haiti was a hostile, uncooperative environment which required a more robust security presence from the U.S. military than either element had anticipated. Thus, while planning between the Special Operations Forces and UN entities did occur, the unstable security environment in Haiti halted their planned stability operations almost a year prior to the larger military intervention with combat forces.

The passing of UN Security Council Resolution 940 in July 1994 helped ensure that once the Joint Staff designated the 10th Mountain Division as JTF-190, the lead for the Multinational Force headquarters, they understood the need to plan in coordination with the UN for the transition between the Multinational Force and UNMIH. JTF-190 assumed control of operations in Haiti in January 1995, relieving JTF-180, the initial military intervention force. They focused their planning efforts on maintaining the secure environment established by JTF-180 and for transitioning operations in Haiti to UNMIH (Benson & Thrash, 1996). JTF-190 passed all their plans for the transition to the UN staff to assist the UN's own planning efforts (Benson & Thrash, 1996).

The most important component of the plan shared by JTF-190 with the UN was the mission, the what of the operation, and intent, the why of the operation. This allowed coherent action between the two organizations, which struck a balance between their competing imperatives and helped them determine an appropriate strategy and framework for execution.

The mission stated that the UN would maintain a secure and stable environment and conduct a peaceful transition of responsibility to the government of Haiti no later than the end of February 1996 (Benson & Thrash, 1996, p. 73). The intent was to allow the government of Haiti to maintain a functional government that allowed social and economic development, free elections, and a peaceful transition to the government of Haiti (Benson & Thrash, 1996, p. 73). Cooperation between the two meant the military operation, focused on stabilizing the country and restoring order, seamlessly transitioned into a peacekeeping operation aimed at supporting long-term stability and development.

The integration of U.S. military forces with the UN mission in Haiti was not without its challenges. One of the primary challenges was ensuring the coordination between the U.S. military's operational objectives and the UN's broader goals of political stabilization and humanitarian assistance (Hayden, 1995b). The U.S. military had to balance their focus on security and rapid response with the UN's emphasis on long-term development and institution-building (Hayden, 1995b). The two entities mitigated these challenges by including each other in their planning efforts and synchronizing their planning.

The military's inclusion and synchronization of their planning efforts with the UN was not unique to the military intervention in Haiti. Elements of the Department of Defense have long included the United Nations in their stabilization planning efforts. Knowing from the start they would hand over military stabilization efforts to the UN may have assisted this inclusion and synchronization in Haiti. By sending liaison officers to the United Nations, military planners created the shared understanding and inclusive framework and validated their assumptions to create an inclusive and synchronized plan for conflict transformation.

Planning with Nongovernmental Organizations & the Host Nation

Historical documents provide no evidence U.S. military planners included or attempted to synchronize either nongovernmental organizations or the host nation in their plans for stability operations. There were two main contributors to this lack of inclusion and synchronization. The first was the previously mentioned “close-hold” nature of the military planning. The second was the uncooperative environment established by the Cedras government and FAD’H when JTF Haiti deployed to Haiti in the Fall of 1993. These two contributing factors meant that the U.S. military would not involve either NGOs or the government of Haiti in their planning and would only integrate with either after military stability operations were already underway.

Conclusion

The analysis presented in this chapter on Operation Uphold Democracy demonstrates how the U.S. military’s planning approach, while nominally aligned with stability and governance objectives, was shaped by a narrow operational lens that limited its transformative potential. As the qualitative comparative analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 revealed, effective conflict transformation requires the deliberate integration of political, social, and institutional dynamics into the planning process. In the case of Haiti, planners had the advantage of a clearly defined political objective – restoring an elected leader – but the broader structural issues that undermined governance and fueled instability received comparatively less attention. This reflects a recurring theme in the dataset: U.S. military planning often emphasized near-term stability at the expense of long-term transformation. The case reinforces the findings from the qualitative comparative analysis that when local context, historical grievances, and institutional fragility are insufficiently addressed in the planning phase, the prospects for sustained conflict transformation remain limited.

By all accounts Operation Uphold Democracy was a success. Operation Uphold Democracy returned President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power and the United States officially handed over the operation to the United Nations in March 1995. Touted as the first integration of political-military planning into military operations, the military should have learned valuable lessons from the 1994 invasion of Haiti and applied them to future military interventions. Operation Uphold Democracy should have been a watershed in interagency coordination and intergovernmental organization inclusion. The political-military plan was a first and should have yielded a degree of interagency cooperation not seen hereto in a military operation. The intergovernmental organization inclusion should have cemented the importance of synchronization in conflict transformation.

Why did the military not see it as a success then? A careful analysis of the evidence demonstrates there were three primary reasons the military did not see Operation Uphold Democracy as a successful integration of interagency efforts. First, the military failed to realize they lacked shared understanding with their interagency partners, limiting the coordination they thought was occurring with them. Second, the military and their interagency partners do not define “planning” in the same way. While the evidence shows that the interagency was working on stabilization efforts when President Clinton made decisions regarding Haiti, they were not working future support of the military plan until during or after the military executed its operation. Finally, the military made significant incorrect assumptions about how much and to what degree the interagency would plan for post-invasion stability operations in Haiti. The military planners made assumptions they could not validate or invalidate prior to execution. Ultimately, Haiti provides an example of how the various agencies view interagency coordination differently and how cooperation may affect post-conflict stabilization.

The problems and successes described in the preceding sections are emblematic of many military stability operations planning efforts. By and large, the U.S. military does not employ an inclusive and synchronized framework in planning stability operations. In planning stability operations, the U.S. military struggles with shared understanding and different planning frameworks between itself and non-military entities which leads the military to make erroneous and invalid assumptions in their own planning. Operation Uphold Democracy could have and should have been a trove of valuable lessons learned in planning for stability operations to achieve conflict transformation.

Chapter 7 - Planning for the Creation of National Mechanisms in Iraq

Historical Overview of Iraq

Iraq was established as a modern state in 1920 under British mandate following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Though nominally granted independence in 1932, the British retained significant influence, particularly in military and economic affairs (Sluglett, 2007). The monarchy, backed by Britain, was overthrown in 1958 in a military coup, ushering in a series of republican governments marked by instability, coups, and the eventual rise of the Ba'ath Party in 1968.

The Ba'athist regime, under the leadership of Saddam Hussein from 1979 onward, imposed a centralized authoritarian state that relied heavily on internal repression, state surveillance, and manipulation of ethnic and sectarian identities to consolidate power (Tripp, 2007). Saddam's regime sought to present Iraq as a secular and modern Arab power, but his leadership was characterized by brutal purges, genocidal campaigns against the Kurdish population, and suppression of Shi'a dissent.

Iraq's geopolitical position and oil wealth made it a central actor in regional politics. Saddam's invasion of Iran in 1980 led to an eight year war (1980-1988) that devastated both countries and contributed to Iraq's economic decline (Hiro, 1991). Two years later, Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, prompting the Gulf War and a U.S.-led coalition that expelled Iraqi forces. The aftermath included severe international sanctions and the imposition of no-fly zones, which weakened Iraq's economy and infrastructure while entrenching authoritarian rule (Dodge, 2003).

Throughout the 1990s, Saddam Hussein maintained a defiant posture against international pressure, while internal divisions – particularly between Sunni Arabs, Shi'a Arabs,

and Kurds – intensified. U.S. policy toward Iraq increasingly framed Saddam’s regime as a threat to regional security and U.S. interests, particularly following the 9/11 attacks, when Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and purported links to terrorism became focal points of concern (Pollack, 2002). By 2003, Iraq was internationally isolated, internally fragmented, and governed by a coercive state apparatus with little legitimacy among its people.

Operation Iraqi Freedom Background

As the U.S. military embarked on its mission to rebuild Iraq in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion, it faced a daunting challenge in establishing a functioning civil service, upholding the rule of law, reviving the economy, and ensuring functioning host-nation security forces within the war-torn nation. The rapid defeat of the Iraqi army and the subsequent looting and destruction of state institutions left a power vacuum the U.S. was ill-prepared to fill. The U.S. Central Command Phase IV Reconstruction Brief, Phase IV Campaign Brief, and Operations Plan (OPLAN) 1003V, in addition to the Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) ECLIPSE II Mission Analysis Brief and V Corps OPORD Final Victory, show the U.S. military’s planning for post-Saddam Iraq became a monumental undertaking fraught with complexities. The challenges in planning, having a limited understanding of Iraqi society, politics, and history and balancing military security operations with stability operations, would play out as the execution of stability operations gave way to an underestimation of the depth of sectarian division and the resilience of the insurgency in a rapidly evolving situation in Iraq (Bensahel, 2006; Bensahel et al., 2008; O’Hanlon, 2004/5).

A great deal of the analysis for the U.S. military invasion and post-conflict stability operations claims the U.S. military failed to plan for post-conflict stability operations in Iraq (Lebovic, 2019; O’Hanlon, 2004/5; Shimko, 2010). A review of the U.S. Central Command

Phase IV Reconstruction Brief, Phase IV Campaign Brief, and Operations Plan (OPLAN) 1003V, in addition to the Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) ECLIPSE II Mission Analysis Brief and V Corps OPORD Final Victory, and further analysis indicate it was not a failure to plan, but rather a lack of coordination on the many entities planning for post-conflict stabilization in Iraq that amplified the problems in executing stability operations. This background section details the efforts of the many military entities planning for post-conflict stabilization to clarify their roles and efforts.

As President George W. Bush and the national security apparatus planned for the invasion of Iraq in early 2002, two competing views shaped the post-invasion stabilization planning at the national level. The Department of Defense predicated their planning on the belief an interim Iraq government would take over after initial military-led humanitarian operations (SIGIR, 2009, p. 7). Thus, there was no need to administer the functions of government. The Department of State, however, assessed the competition between Iraq's sectarian and ethnic groups would necessitate a multi-year transitional period to build the national mechanisms required for Iraqis to govern their country (SIGIR, 2009, p. 8). The two competing views, and the administration's insistence on keeping post-invasion planning secret, to avoid the negative perception of post-invasion plans while they were issuing demands pre-invasion, meant various government entities conducted disjointed post-invasion planning efforts. These disjointed efforts would waste resources and expertise at the highest levels of planning, giving entities a singular rather than holistic view of planning challenges.

Not until December 2002, when President Bush declared war was inevitable to the National Security Council, would the administration resolve the issue of the two competing national level views. At Secretary Rumsfeld's request, and Secretary of State Powell's

concurrence, the President gave all post-invasion planning and responsibility to the Department of Defense (SIGIR, 2009, p. 33). This directive, encapsulated in National Security Presidential Direction 24 (NSPD 24), created the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) within the Department of Defense to manage the immediate post-conflict phase in Iraq (SIGIR, 2009, p. 34).

While NSPD-24 settled which executive branch entity had responsibility for the post-conflict phase, there remained a struggle within the Department of Defense over primacy for the planning framework and priorities. The Department of Defense had four separate and uncoordinated entities vying for primacy in planning for post-invasion stabilization operations – U.S. Central Command; a Joint Staff created Joint Task Force (JTF)-IV, the newly created ORHA, and 3rd Army, the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC). Of the four entities only U.S. Central Command and CFLCC had a clearly defined relationship, with CFLCC directly subordinated to U.S. Central Command for the purposes of executing land operations in Iraq. Though each of the four had varying time and effort for planning for stabilization operations the challenges mentioned earlier would drastically impact their ability to execute their plans.

In the summer of 2002, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) published a planning order for possible military operations against Iraq. The planning order directed the U.S. Central Command to develop a plan for the military invasion of Iraq. This military plan, Operations Plan (OPLAN) 1003V, included four phases of operations – Preparation, Shaping the Battlespace, Decisive Operations, and Post-Hostilities (USCENTCOM, 2003b). U.S. Central Command had the advantage of having several months' time to plan, but with very little of it focused on stabilization. U.S. Central Command published its plan in October 2002 requesting

only 160,000 combat soldiers, two-thirds less than planners suggested for maintaining post-invasion security (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [CJCS], 2003; SIGIR, 2009, 35).

Military planners categorize those activities the military conducts after decisive combat operations to stabilize and reconstruct a nation as “Phase IV Operations”. U.S. Central Command planned in a limited manner for Phase IV operations in Iraq. Not until January 2003, two months before combat operations commenced, would U.S. Central Command dedicate any significant effort to Phase IV planning. OLAN 1003V provides limited direction and guidance for stability operations. The OPLAN limited the Civil Military Operations line of operation to “developing and maintaining interagency and IO/NGO unity of effort, minimizing and controlling dislocated civilians, and providing emergency relief as required” (USCENTCOM, 2003b). Further postulating that proactive support to the population and Coalition Forces posturing to assist in initiating and coordinating recovery reconstruction efforts would allow Coalition Forces to set the conditions for a rapid transition from war to peace.

The U.S. Central Command military objectives for Phase IV operations in Iraq were essential Iraqi infrastructure and social services rapidly restored; reformed Iraqi military and security institutions capable of performing legitimate defense and public security missions; government functions and services necessary to stabilize Iraq and initiate reconstruction of the country are established; and public order and safety maintained (USCENTCOM, 2003a, p. 4). U.S. Central Command planning efforts broadly addressed Rule of Law, Civil Administration, Governance, Economic Development, and Security, with generic milestones under each of the categories to assist them with meeting their military objectives. Their plan was essentially a loose framework the planners hoped to further develop after combat operations ended. They envisioned a distributed planning effort for stabilization operations, with U.S. Central Command

acquiring the resources and deconflicting timelines while CFLCC assessed the Iraqi situation at the national level, and the tactical units assessed the situation at the regional level and executed reconstruction at the local level. The U.S. Central Command headquarters and planning staff did not understand how complicated the war was, how complex it would get, and how to dedicate the right resources to planning (Crane, 2004).

Not confident U.S. Central Command was devoting enough effort to planning for stability operations, in January 2003, the CJCS published a Phase IV execution order directing U.S. Joint Forces Command to stand up an ad hoc Joint Task Force (JTF), designated JTF-IV, for Phase IV planning and operations (CJCS, 2003). JTF-IV was the result of Joint Staff observations at USCENTCOM's 2002 Internal Look exercise, a major planning wargame which enabled the U.S. Central Command Commander and his staff to practice executing the plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Joint Staff was worried the plans for the operation did not include enough detailed planning for the postwar period (Bensahel et al., 2008). The Joint Staff subordinated JTF-IV to U.S. Central Command for stability planning. The U.S. Central Command staff, not happy to incorporate another element as it prepared for combat operations, eventually subordinated it to the 3rd Army Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC).

While assigned to U.S. Central Command, JTF-IV's planning efforts focused on how to organize a command structure for executing stability operations and how to assess the governance, rule of law, economic, and security needs of post-conflict Iraq. JTF-IV's plan for post-conflict stability divided Iraq into seven multinational sectors, with each sector responsible for stabilization activities. The task force further identified several policy issues needing answers to provide guidance for those executing stability operations – who would the U.S. allow to

participate in the interim Iraqi government, what legal system would Iraq be under, what currency was legal, who controlled funding at the national, regional, and local levels, and what criteria was there for vetting and employing security forces (Bensahel et al., 2008). The ad hoc nature of the task force and its subsequent inability to effectively integrate with either the U.S. Central Command or CFLCC planning elements resulted in JTF-IV not creating any viable plans for post-conflict stabilization. JTF-IV would only last ten weeks, deactivating prior to the start of the invasion.

In January of 2003, as U.S. military troops moved into Kuwait in preparation for the Iraq invasion, the Bush administration created the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance within the Department of Defense to manage the immediate post-conflict phase in Iraq. Headed by retired Lieutenant General Jay Garner and created under the direction of National Security Presidential Directive 24 to oversee the transition to Iraqi self-governance and manage stability operations in Iraq, its structure reflected a military approach to stability (Rudd, 2011). ORHA was to act as a caretaker administration until Iraq could form a civilian government. In keeping with Secretary Rumsfeld's view of post-conflict stabilization, ORHA was to transition responsibility for governance and service delivery to Iraqi authorities as quickly as possible (Rudd, 2011).

The OHRA staff consisted of seven major components – three functional pillars, three region elements, and a military support staff (Rudd, 2011, p. 148). The three functional pillars were humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, and civil administration. The interagency process used to create the OHRA organizational chart envisioned each of these pillars being led by a senior U.S. government official and staffed by lower-level civilian experts in each area. The three regions, North, South, and Central (Baghdad) Iraq, were responsible for ORHA oversight

in those designated areas. The OHRA task organization did not make clear if the regions were meant to be led/coordinated by civilian or military personnel. The military support staff was responsible for executing the traditional support staff functions – personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, planning, communications, engineer, and comptroller.

When Lieutenant General (Retired) Garner and the ORHA staff arrived in Iraq in April 2003, they found a tenuous security situation, a lack of capacity within Iraqi institutions, and numerous challenges setting up a functioning and legitimate Iraqi government (Rudd, 2011). ORHA's actual control of stabilization was short-lived. Coalition forces forced Saddam Hussein and his regime to vacate Baghdad on April 9, 2003. On April 15th and 26th ORHA held meetings with Iraqis of varying ethnicities and ideologies to name an interim Iraqi administration (Katzman, 2005). Garner's overarching plan was to put Iraqis in charge of their country within a few months (Rudd, 2011, p. 232). The Department of Defense would not give Garner time to implement his overarching plan.

As conditions inside Iraq quickly deteriorated after the end of combat operations, the Bush administration would make drastic changes to how it executed stabilization activities from a U.S. national security perspective. DoD's pre-war planning assumptions, upon which ORHA was based, proved overly optimistic, underestimating the extent of the damage to Iraq's infrastructure, the scale of humanitarian needs, and the challenges of maintaining security (Rudd, 2011). ORHA lacked sufficient personnel with expertise in civilian administration, development, and humanitarian assistance. Nor was it integrated into the larger military structure in Iraq, which prevented it from coordinating or influencing decisions on security as related to stabilization activities. The Department of Defense swiftly decided ORHA was ill-equipped to handle the

complex realities on the ground. By June 2003 the Bush administration gave responsibility to the newly formed Coalition Provisional Authority for stabilization in Iraq.

The long-standing military structure constructed for military operations in Iraq placed responsibility for land operations with the Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC). As such, U.S. Central Command's OPLAN 1003V gave CFLCC the primary responsibility for detailed planning of Phase IV – stability operations. CFLCC began their planning for both war and stabilization activities in January 2002 in parallel with U.S. Central Command. As part of its efforts CFLCC's Director of Policy, Plans and Strategy, COL Kevin Benson, met in the early parts of 2002 with people in government and academia who were involved in projects that examined issues associated with postwar Iraq (Benshael et al., 2008). Over the next year CFLCC would develop a plan, designated as COBRA II, signed on January 13, 2003, by Lieutenant General David McKiernan, for the war and which would briefly address Phase IV stability operations. CFLCC's Phase IV stability operations plan had two sub-phases to stabilize Iraq. The first sub-phase, beginning immediately after major combat operations ended, focused on stability, security, and the emergency restoration of essential services. The second sub-phase, reconstruction, marked a handover from CFLCC to Combined Joint Task Force – Iraq and focused on providing support to a coalition-led transitional civilian agency. CFLCC's planning anticipated four primary security problems – sabotage of Iraq's oil fields, refugees fleeing combat and creating a humanitarian crisis, a large number of Iraqi prisoners of war, and ethnic violence (Benshael et al., 2008, p. 82).

The CFLCC planning staff recognized in February 2003, after a series of wargaming efforts designed to test COBRA II's assumptions and identify potential shortcomings, that their plan was not sufficient to confront the numerous challenges they anticipated as CFLCC

transitioned from combat operations to stability operations (Benshael et al., 2008). While not willing to change the current plan so close to execution, LTG McKiernan directed his staff to begin work on a sequel plan, OPLAN ECLIPSE II. This sequel plan assumed coalition forces would not be in a position to address the immediate security challenges brought about by the collapse of the Iraqi government (Benshael et al., 2008). However, this plan did not challenge the original assumptions that Iraqi civil authorities would continue to provide local and regional essential services, the existing legal system would remain, and that Iraqis would also provide security in the transition period between combat operations and stabilization activities. As late as April 2003, CFLCC was still providing subordinate military commands with revisions to OPLAN ECLIPSE II.¹⁶ As those units began their execution of stability operations the unchallenged and incorrect assumptions and lack of a comprehensive and coordinated planning effort for Phase IV – Stability Operations would prove disastrous for coalition forces in Iraq.

Creation and Sustainment of National Mechanisms

The following paragraphs detail the specific planning efforts the U.S. military engaged in for civil service, rule of law, the economy, and security.

¹⁶ At the end of Phase III combat operations, U.S. Central Commander changed the order of battle (organizational structure) for land forces in Iraq. In May 2003, U.S. Central Command designated CFLCC as Combined Joint Task Force – Iraq (CJTF-I), which then changed to CJTF-7, to command the operational level of military operations. CJTF-7 commanded the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force and U.S. Army V Corps, who constituted the tactical level of military operations. CJTF-7 and its subordinates were to bolster the capabilities of OHRA for Phase IV stability operations. In June 2003, the Coalitional Provisional Authority (CPA), led by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, would replace OHRA as the civilian lead for Iraq's reconstruction and establishment of a new Iraqi Government. At the same time CPA replaced OHRA, the DoD ordered CFLCC to redeploy and designated the U.S. Army's V Corps as the CJTF-7 lead. CJTF-7, under the command of V Corps, created five Multi-National Division sectors (West, Baghdad, Central-South, North, and South-East) which served as the tactical level of military operations.

Civil Service

This paper measures planning for civil service as any effort to establish legitimate government institutions. There is strong evidence the U.S. military planned at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels for establishing legitimate Iraqi government institutions. The military planners mainly focused on helping Iraqi's rebuild their governance capabilities at each level and national elections. The planners at every echelon assumed a return to Iraqi governance would happen quickly and seamlessly.

At the strategic level, the Department of Defense created Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, led by LTG(R) Gardner, developed an initial plan calling for the rapid establishment of an interim Iraqi government, followed by elections to legitimize the new political order. Key elements of the plan included removing Saddam Hussein's regime's influence from government and society; disbanding the Iraqi Army, creating an Interim Governing Council, and drafting a new constitutional framework for a new Iraq state (Rudd, 2011). The Bush administration's close ties to particular Iraqi exile groups, many of whom envisioned themselves as governing Iraq through the interim government, strongly influenced the initial plan (Bensahel et al., 2008).

ORHA planned for political liberation in five phases. The first would be proclamations of the Coalition's intentions for political liberation and the Iraqi role within it. The second was the establishment of Iraqi consultative and judicial councils to begin the government transitions. The third was Iraqi bureaucracy reform. The fourth was municipal elections and a constitutional convention with several hundred Iraqi delegates. And the final phase was national elections. ORHA envisioned local elections preceding national elections, with the local elections providing

a delegate base for a constitutional convention, with the constitution providing the form of a new government (Rudd, 2011, p. 99).

At the same time OHRA was developing its plan, U.S. Central Command was also finalizing its own Phase IV Reconstruction Plan. One of its military objectives being the establishment of government functions and services necessary to stabilize Iraq and on order, to transfer those functions and services to a transitional U.S. or international administration (USCENTCOM, 2003b). The U.S. Central Command plan depicts both Civil Administration and Governance milestones with goals of having a functioning civil system and a viable, representative government. Their plan was highly conceptual though with planners in January 2003, just two months before combat operations commenced, noting the way ahead involved beginning coordination with U.S. government agencies and standing up a Combined Joint Task Force to begin planning the efforts associated for each milestone (USCENTCOM, 2003b).

At the operational level, CFLCC plans for Phase IV stabilization operations were to provide governance and civil administration through the exercise of military authority (V Corps, 2003a). Its successor, Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) – 7, gave subordinate military commanders generalized guidance to establish regional and local governance councils when it took over for CFLCC in the summer of 2003 (SIGIR, 2009, p. 116). CJTF-7 envisioned these teams as the primary point of contact with local government officials, helping to restore order and establish town councils where they did not exist and facilitating the transition from coalition force guidance to an interim Iraqi authority.

At the tactical level, CFLCC and CJTF-7 gave senior military commanders at the Division and Brigade levels guidance to work with the regional and local councils to develop governance in their areas of operations. Local military commanders helped Iraqis structure local

governing authorities in their regions to keep city governments running (SIGIR, 2009). Not having a comprehensive and coordinated plan at the strategic and operational levels meant there was a somewhat haphazard variety of means for establishing local governments with elections in some areas and appointments by coalition military forces in others, confusing and frustrating the local populations (Bensahel et al., 2008). The guidance CJTF-7 gave tactical level commanders was vague and limited, as they believed OHRA would soon replace the military commanders with civilian governance support teams. Changing circumstances during the execution of the civil service stability tasks would keep tactical level commanders engaged in these tasks long after the original plan dictated.

Several critical shortcomings characterized the U.S. military's planning for civil service reform. First, the U.S. military at every level lacked a comprehensive understanding of the intricate workings of the Iraqi government structure, its internal dynamics, and the complexities of its administrative processes. This knowledge gap hampered effective planning for a smooth transition to a new administrative system at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Second, the U.S. military placed significant trust in Iraqi exiles, many of whom had been out of the country for decades and detached from the realities on the ground. Their input into the planning process often proved to be inaccurate or impractical. Third, the OHRA, tasked with administering Iraq in the immediate post-invasion period, was severely understaffed and lacked personnel with the necessary expertise in Iraqi culture, language, and governance. Finally, U.S. military planners at every echelon made their plans believing Iraqi government ministries would continue to function much as they had pre-invasion because they assumed they were largely effective state structures. These shortcomings, coupled with vague and uncoordinated planning, proved disastrous and time consuming in reestablishing civil service in Iraq.

Rule of Law

This paper measures planning for rule of law as those efforts to establish laws, police forces, courts, and/or jails. There is strong evidence the U.S. military planned in a generalized way for rule of law at the strategic and operational levels prior to the military intervention in Iraq. And there is even stronger evidence that the operational and tactical levels focused concerted efforts on planning for rule of law as military forces transitioned to stability operations. Reconstituting the Iraqi police and judicial systems, which disintegrated in the wake of the defeat of the regime, would become a critical challenge for U.S. military forces in Iraq.

At the strategic level, OHRA and U.S. Central Command both recognized the rule of law as a critical component of their strategy for stabilizing post-invasion Iraq. Military planners acknowledged establishing the rule of law was essential for stabilizing Iraq. As noted in the previous section, one of OHRA's phases for political liberation was the establishment of Iraqi judicial councils. The pre-war planning recognized the importance of a functioning judicial system and security apparatus for transitioning Iraq towards a more democratic and stable future. U.S. Central Command's Reconstruction Model, briefed as part of their Phase IV Campaign Brief, depicts 'Maintain Rule of Law' as a line of operation with an objective of law enforcement and compliance (USCENTCOM, 2003a, p. 13). Milestones under the Rule of Law line of operation involved functioning prisons, a judicial system, police, and a concerted effort to prosecute persons indicted for war crimes (USCENTCOM, 2003a, p. 15). Unfortunately, both entities assumed they could rely on the institutions of the Iraqi state, most notably the police and courts, to keep functioning and maintain order after combat operations (Jones et al., 2005).

At the operational level, CFLCC's OPLAN ECLIPSE II made vague mention of Rule of Law as one of its Lines of Operations. Originally conceived as a line of operation that would

‘exercise control through the existing legal system and operate in accordance with international law’ by ‘imposing and maintaining public order and safety, employing existing local and regional law enforcement, and dismantling former regime’s internal security apparatus’ (V Corps, 2003b) by April 2003 CFLCC published revised guidance recognizing the existing systems no longer existed. CFLCC’s new guidance directed subordinate units to recall local police to duty and enforce the rule of law (Rayburn & Sobchak, 2003, p. 116).

When the U.S. military transitioned into stability operations, establishing the rule of law became paramount to stabilizing post-invasion Iraq. The collapse of the existing judicial system and the proliferation of armed groups soon created a security vacuum and an environment of lawlessness (Rayburn & Sobchak, 2003; Jones et al., 2005; SIGIR, 2009). An immediate change to the plan had Lieutenant General Scott Wallace, Commander of the Army’s V Corps, tasking the 18th Military Police Brigade with organizing and mentoring the Iraqi police in Baghdad. Within just a few more months further planning had Lieutenant General Sanchez, CJTF-7 Commander, directing the recruitment of an additional 30,000 new police officers and new milestones under the Rule of Law Line of Operation (SIGIR, 2009, p. 126). Key components of their plan involved re-establishing courts and training new judges; creating a new police force free from Baathist influence, addressing the growing threat of insurgency and terrorism, and protecting the rights of all Iraqi citizens (Jones et al., 2005, pp. 115-6).

There is little evidence military planners at the tactical level planned for operations involving the rule of law. As noted above, the disintegrating security situation in the country eventually required Division commanders at the tactical level to take responsibility for organizing and mentoring local police forces. Most of these tactical level commanders used military police battalions to support the establishment of local police forces. These military

police battalions worked with the Iraqi police to focus on community policing, building positive public perceptions, establishing detention systems for criminals, and preparing them to take on security responsibilities (CALL, 2004).

Economy

This paper measures planning for the economy by evidence planners assessed the nation's economy and/or incorporated economic strategies into their plans. While there is not strong evidence planners assessed the nation's economy and/or incorporated economic strategies into their plans, there is evidence military planners incorporated some economic considerations as part of their plans. The military planners mainly focused on incorporating those economic considerations of immediate concern following combat operations, concentrating their efforts on limiting American expenses and instantaneous relief. Eventually, incorrect assumptions regarding security and rule of law would severely hamper their limited economic plans.

At the strategic level, the U.S. military recognized rebuilding Iraq's economy was essential for long-term stability in Iraq. OHRA plans focused on first rebuilding and increasing production of Iraq's oil infrastructure; then assisting with infrastructure development; and finally encouraging entrepreneurship and foreign investment in Iraq (Rudd, 2011). They grounded all their subsequent plans on the belief construction projects would improve the infrastructure, particularly electric and water systems, and provide employment for Iraqi citizens. Additionally, ORHA planned for economic reconstruction with the intentions of reforming the Iraqi banking system and standardizing its currency to allow for the eventual financial progression to a free-market system (Rudd, 2011, p. 99). The Department of Defense and OHRA predicated most of their planning on the premise that Iraq's vast oil reserves could independently finance its

reconstruction, thereby minimizing the financial burden on the American taxpayers (SIGIR, 2009).

In the fall of 2002, the Pentagon had directed the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) to establish a task force responsible for restoring Iraq's oil infrastructure. Task Force Restore Iraqi Oil (RIO) developed extensive plans to repair and restore Iraq's oil infrastructure should U.S. or Iraqi military forces damage or destroy it during combat operations. TF RIO's planning and coordination with U.S. Central Command resulted in minimal damage and no destruction of the oil infrastructure during the invasion (SIGIR, 2009). The success of this planning was short-lived, however, as neither U.S. Central Command nor TF RIO had planned for the organized insurgent campaign that erupted in the aftermath of the invasion to sabotage Iraq's oil infrastructure and deny the interim Iraqi government its revenues.

While their stated plans were aspirational, several factors hampered the U.S. military's plans for economic reconstruction in Iraq. The first was the effect of combat operations on economic reconstruction. U.S. military planners at OHRA and U.S. Central Command incorrectly assumed much of Iraq's infrastructure would remain intact because the military designed their campaign to damage as little of it as possible (Bensahel et al., 2008). However, extensive looting after combat operations ceased and a decade of neglect by Saddam Hussein prior to the intervention left much of Iraq's infrastructure severely damaged. The U.S. military failed to appreciate the challenges the security situation, corruption, and the lack of skilled labor would pose in the execution of their plans.

There is little evidence military planners at the operational or tactical level planned for operations involving incorporating economic strategies. As previously noted, the disintegrating security situation forced tactical level commanders to engage in local implementation of the

national mechanisms. At the local level, this implementation played out with Coalition forces guarding, transporting, and distributing wages and pensions to government employees, pensioners, and demobilized soldiers (Bensahel et al., 2008). They also guarded banks with military police units (CALL, 2004).

Security

This paper measures planning for security by evidence planners had a plan to build and/or rebuild the nation's armed forces. Of all the national mechanisms, military planners were the most secure in their ability to rebuild Iraq's armed forces as they planned stability operations prior to the military intervention in Iraq. However, they predicated their belief on the assumption that they could leverage some level of Iraqi security forces, both Army and police, to provide immediate local security during stability operations and that it would eventually form a core for the rebuilding of the Army (Wright & Reese, 2008, p. 79). Military planners at every echelon would realize as combat operations ended how unduly optimistic those assumptions were. A rapidly deteriorating security environment disintegrated Iraqi security forces, and widespread criminality and political violence would make rebuilding Iraqi security forces (ISF) imperative and require extensive additional planning.

At the strategic level both OHRA and U.S. Central Command devoted planning efforts towards addressing security. ORHA devoted significant time to addressing security and Iraqi participation in it. Their plans disbanded the secret police, the special and intelligence court systems, and the Republican Guard formations; but planned to keep the civil police and much of the regular army in place (Rudd, 2011, p. 99). Specifically, OHRA's plans focused on demobilizing the Ba'athist army, establishing a new Iraqi police force, and creating a locally recruited security force intended to fill what OHRA believed would be a security vacuum. In

early 2003, U.S. Central Command's Phase IV plan listed reforming Iraqi military and security institutions so they could perform legitimate defense and public security missions as a military objective (USCENTCOM, 2003a, p. 4). None of the U.S. Central Command planning documents describe in significant detail how they planned to reform the military and security institutions, though.

Ultimately both OHRA and U.S. Central Command's planning for post-invasion security reform for Iraqi military forces would prove rudimentary at best. Both planners at OHRA and US Central Command incorrectly assumed a stable environment would exist for security sector reform and that the institutions of the Iraqi state would largely remain intact and only need minor reforms (Jones et al., 2005, p. 111). After the invasion significant levels of criminality, lawlessness, and insurgency and the unexpected disbanding of all former military members by the newly appointed Coalition Provisional Authority resulted in a new plan from U.S. Central Command (Wilcke, 2006). Their new plan for building the new security force focused on training and equipping the new force, vetting them for loyalty and competence, and centering the force on counterinsurgency operations to protect the population. Responsibility for training the new Iraqi army fell to Major General Paul Eaton in June 2003. Major General Eaton commanded the newly created Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT) under U.S. Central Command. MG Eaton would find no planning document existed for manning, training, equipping, or employing the new Iraqi army, requiring he develop a plan as he executed the rebuilding of the Iraqi Army.

At the operational level, initial planning by CFLCC demonstrates only that they should be prepared to support the reorganization of the Iraqi military. The Draft ECLIPSE II order from February 2003 indicates they envisioned the reorganization as only making the Iraqi military

more representative of the ethnic components of the country. The goal was to enable the Iraqi military to maintain its territorial integrity. Notably lacking in their assumptions and tasks was any mention of building or rebuilding Iraq's security forces. The catastrophic success of combat operations in Iraq and the unanticipated total collapse of the Iraqi regime from top to bottom, along with the swift redeployment of CFLCC, with operational control of forces transitioning to CJTF-7 meant operational level planners had to create a plan for security while executing stability operations, not before.

CJTF-7 planning for building and rebuilding Iraq's Security Forces (ISF) focused on rapidly developing competent ISF units to assume responsibility for internal security. Their plan concentrated on three key ISF components: the Iraqi Police Service (IPS), the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC), and the revision of the Iraqi Army. The U.S. military initially provided only local support for the Department of State efforts to reform the IPS; however, a year later President Bush would give the Department of Defense primacy as the Department of State efforts were not sufficiently effective (Jones, 2007, p. 93). Iraqi Civil Defense Corps developed from the need for coalition commanders to identify Iraqis who could perform a range of functions, including static defense and human intelligence collection, and to have Iraqis alongside them on patrols (Bensahel et al., 2008, p. 147). Finally, planners normally planned for the creation of three Iraqi Divisions, focused on conventional warfare capabilities with the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team taking on that responsibility.

At the tactical level, there is no evidence military planners planned for building or rebuilding Iraq's Security Forces. An After Action Report by the 3rd Infantry Division notes that CFLCC failed both to anticipate the collapse of the Iraqi military and to adequately resource tactical level military units to help rebuild them when they did (Fontenot et al., 2004). Eventually

the U.S. military would deploy Military Transition Teams (MiTTs) at the tactical level to focus on advising, teaching, and mentoring the Iraqi Security Forces.

The biggest failure in the military's planning for security was its failure to assign responsibility and resources for providing security in the transition period from combat operations to stability operations. Military planning did not account for the insurgency that ultimately emerged in Iraq or the fact that its security apparatus would essentially disintegrate and prove incapable of providing security. This would leave the tactical level forces at a distinct disadvantage when it came to incorporating Iraqi security forces into their post-conflict stability operation.

Conclusion

The analysis of planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom similarly reflects the broader themes identified in the qualitative comparative analysis finds of Chapter 3 and 4, that planning frameworks often failed to fully internalize the conditions necessary for long-term conflict transformation. While Iraq offered a different geopolitical and cultural context from Afghanistan and Haiti, all three cases highlight how U.S. planners struggled to translate strategic goals into adaptive, locally responsive planning mechanisms. The qualitative comparative analysis revealed that although key planning documents referenced governance and reconstruction priorities, there was a limited integration of local knowledge, historical grievances, and societal fault lines into operational plans. These gaps, consistently identified across the data, were evident in Iraq's post-invasion instability, where weak institutions and a lack of inclusive political arrangements fueled sectarian divisions. Thus, the findings from Chapter 3 and 4 are reinforced here; without a grounded, iterative planning process that incorporates the drivers of conflict and the local

capacity for transformation, military interventions risk producing fragile or unsustainable outcomes.

Though a great deal of the analysis for the U.S. military intervention and post-conflict stability operations claims the U.S. military failed to plan for post-conflict stability in Iraq, this chapter illustrates that is not the case. U.S. military planning for national mechanisms in Iraq following the 2003 invasion did however reveal a deeply fragmented and overly optimistic approach to post-conflict stability operations. Historical documents indicate that U.S. military plans did include support for establishing the national mechanisms of civil service, rule of law, the economy, and security prior to military intervention. However, their plans were vague and quickly superseded by the rapid success of combat operations. As demonstrated repeatedly, the U.S. military's planning for stability operations was still ongoing as military forces began executing the very operations they were trying to plan.

The U.S. Central Command Phase IV Reconstruction Brief, Phase IV Campaign Brief, and Operations Plan (OPLAN) 1003V, in addition to the Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) ECLIPSE II Mission Analysis Brief and V Corps OPORD Final Victory, show it was not the U.S. military's failure to plan, but rather its lack of coordination within the Department of Defense's various echelons involved in stability operations planning. Competing views at the national level between the Department of Defense, which anticipated a rapid handover to an interim Iraqi government, and other U.S. government entities led to disjointed efforts that wasted resources and expertise. Although President Bush eventually assigned responsibility to the Department of Defense and created OHRA, their planning efforts were inadequate. Lacking personnel with the necessary expertise in civilian administration, development, and Iraqi culture, they were also not well-integrated into the larger military

planning apparatus at U.S. Central Command. Adding to OHRA's own disfunction was the multiple uncoordinated efforts of military units – U.S. Central Command, JTF-4, and CFLCC.

Across all four of the national mechanisms examined, civil service, rule of law, the economy, and security, U.S. military planners undermined their own efforts with incorrect assumptions. Planners at every level assumed a quick and seamless return to Iraqi governance and that existing government ministries and institutions would largely continue to function post-conflict. The lack of understanding of the environment inside Iraq, coupled with their desire not to engage in significant stabilization activities, meant planners provided vague or limited guidance for stabilization.

The rapid disintegration of Iraqi institutions and the emergence of an insurgency following combat operations invalidated many of the military planners' assumptions, forcing operational and tactical units to have to adapt in the middle of their execution of stability operations. For civil service and rule of law, military forces had to establish local councils haphazardly and organize and mentor police forces amidst lawlessness, requiring significant unplanned effort. For the economy, the failure to account for widespread looting and the insurgency targeting infrastructure undermined limited reconstruction plans, forcing tactical units into guarding banks and distributing funds.

While flawed, the planning efforts of the U.S. military did promote positive change in Iraq. As demonstrated in Chapter 3, Iraq showed positive change five years after military intervention according to the Liberal Democracy Index. The U.S. military made efforts to plan across all four of the national mechanisms. As with the other case studies, the problems and successes described here are emblematic of U.S. military stability operations planning efforts.

Operation Iraqi Freedom should be a trove of valuable lessons learned in planning for stability operations to achieve conflict transformation.

Chapter 8 - Conclusion

“...the harsh historical reality is that the world’s greatest nation-building institution, when properly resourced and motivated, is the American military, especially the Army. And as much as military forces would like to quickly win wars and go home, there has rarely been any accomplishment of long-term U.S. policy goals from any conflict without an extended American military presence to ensure proper results from the peace.” – Terrill Crane (Phase IV Operations: Where Wars are Really Won)

The challenge of achieving conflict transformation after large scale military intervention represents perhaps the most difficult problem posed by modern conflict. The failure to secure a stable outcome after military intervention stands as one of the worst risk factors for renewed conflict, underscoring the necessity of a post-intervention plan. Despite this critical need, scholarly work on Department of Defense planning for post-conflict stability operations after U.S. military interventions has not yet demonstrated a systemic, theoretically informed linkage between planning efforts and the desired outcome of conflict transformation. This dissertation was undertaken to address this significant gap in the literature, specifically aiming to understand how DoD planning for post-conflict stability operations in U.S. military interventions influences conflict transformation.

Over the past three and a half decades, the United States’ perspective on transforming conflict has evolved, influenced by both new liberal paradigms of international security and global governance that emphasize norms of democracy, human rights, human security, and development and a need to protect the security of the United States. This evolution includes the recognition of the dangers posed by weak and fragile states and the understanding that the reconstruction of post-conflict and war-torn societies is now central to international relations and

security agendas. However, the U.S. interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan highlighted significant deficiencies, with several studies indicating that a lack of effective planning prior to the execution of stabilization efforts severely hampered their success. This failure to transform conflict risks perpetuating rather than reducing threats to national and international security.

This study defined conflict transformation as moving conflict-habituated systems to the right on the autocracy-democracy continuum through the process of intervenors understanding the conflict, using an inclusive and synchronized framework, and creating and sustaining national mechanisms that empower a stable and strengthened representative government. It assumes that when political leaders choose to militarily intervene in a fragile state, the U.S. military must set the conditions for success in post-conflict stability by planning the transition to and execution of post-conflict stability operations. Furthermore, the theoretical framework for this research was grounded in the assumption that U.S. military planning can influence conflict transformation in cases of military intervention in failed or failing states followed by post-conflict stabilization. Drawing upon conflict transformation theory, the study focused on three key conditions hypothesized to be critical elements of conflict transformation that military planners must incorporate into planning to achieve a stable and strengthened representative government.

To investigate the relationship between planning and conflict transformation, this dissertation employed Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), specifically fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA), as the primary research method and analytical technique. QCA is well-suited for understanding complex relationships in a limited number of cases (small-N), allowing for the identification of casual combinations and the assessment of necessary and sufficient conditions.

Unlike previous descriptive studies or those relying solely on anecdotal evidence, this approach offered a more systematic method to discern how planning influences conflict transformation.

The study purposefully selected eight cases of U.S. military intervention followed by stability operations in the post-Cold War era (1989 and beyond) where the stated U.S. political goal was the establishment of a stable and strengthened representative government, and where conflict transformation occurred or was a possible outcome. Conflict transformation, the outcome variable, was operationalized and measured using the change in a nation's Liberal Democracy Index (LDI) score from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Dataset five years after the intervention began compared to the year prior to it beginning. A statistically substantial and significant increase in the LDI score indicated the presence of the outcome.

In constructing the dataset, the study operationalized the three conditions by coding indicator-level dimensions in each of them. The study derived these indicator-level dimensions using a systemic dialogue between the theoretical ideas and evidence in military planning. I made value judgments based upon primary and secondary sources and my own expertise with military planning. These indicatory levels were assumed to be additive. Fuzzy set membership scores were assigned to both conditions and the outcome through a calibration process, using qualitative anchors based on theoretical knowledge and empirical evidence. Since the analysis of social science concepts rarely shows perfect set relations, the study also employed QCA measures of fit. These measures allowed me to assess the imperfect set-theoretic relationships in the empirical data.

Summary of Key Findings

The fsQCA analysis allowed for the testing of the study's hypothesis regarding the inclusion of conflict transformation components in planning on achieving a stable and strengthened representative government:

Hypothesis 1 – The greater the degree to which U.S. military stability planning demonstrates a comprehensive understanding of the conflict, the greater its ability to set the conditions necessary for establishing a stable and strengthened representative government following U.S. military intervention. The QCA analysis confirmed this hypothesis. Understanding Conflict was found to be a necessary condition for conflict transformation. A necessary condition is one that must be present for the outcome to occur. The analysis showed a high consistency score (0.97) and coverage score (0.82), meeting the established thresholds for a relevant necessary condition. This finding underscores that even if other elements of planning are present, without an adequate understanding of the conflict, the desired transformation is unlikely to be achieved.

Hypothesis 2 – The more U.S. military stability planning incorporates a synchronized and integrated framework, the greater its effectiveness in facilitating the development of a stable and strengthened representative government after U.S. military intervention.

Hypothesis 3 – The more U.S. military stability planning supports the creation and sustainment of national mechanisms, the more likely it is to contribute to the emergence of a stable and strengthened representative government following U.S. military intervention.

Hypothesis 4 – U.S. military stability planning that effectively integrates a comprehensive understanding of the conflict AND a synchronized and integrated framework AND the creation and sustainment of national mechanisms, the more likely it is to set the

conditions necessary for the successful transformation of the post-conflict environment into a stable and strengthened representative government following U.S. military intervention.

The analysis disproved Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 as originally stated. Neither the Framework condition nor the National Mechanisms condition were found to be necessary conditions on their own. Furthermore, while the combination of all three conditions (Understanding Conflict, Framework, and National Mechanisms) was also found to be a necessary condition, the analysis of sufficiency revealed a more nuanced picture.

The truth table analysis and logical minimization identified specific configurations or combinations of conditions that were sufficient for conflict transformation. A sufficient condition is one whose presence guarantees the outcome. The fsQCA analysis identified two primary sufficient paths (referred to as solution terms) that lead to conflict transformation in the studied cases.

Understanding Conflict (U) AND Framework (F) – This path indicates that conflict transformation can occur when planning includes a strong understanding of the conflict and utilizes a fully synchronized and integrated framework involving joint-civilian military cooperation, IGOs, NGOs, and host nations. This path covered cases such as Kosovo, Kuwait, Haiti, Bosnia, and Afghanistan.

Understand Conflict (U) AND National Mechanisms (N) – This path indicates that conflict transformation can occur when planning includes a strong understanding of the conflict and emphasizes the creation and sustainment of national mechanisms (civil service, rule of law, economy, and security). This path covered cases such as Panama, Kuwait, Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

The overall solution consistency for these paths was 0.82, and the solution coverage was 0.97. While a consistency of 0.82 is below the ideal 0.90 threshold for sufficiency, it still indicates a strong relationship, especially given the complexity and a small number of cases. The high coverage (0.97) indicates that these two paths account for almost all instances of conflict transformation in the dataset.

These findings demonstrate that **understanding the conflict is a non-negotiable element** for successful post-conflict transformation after U.S. military intervention. However, the results regarding the Framework and National Mechanisms conditions challenge the initial assumption that all three must be present or that a robust, integrated framework is always necessary. Instead, the analysis suggests two distinct, empirically supported pathways to conflict transformation: one where understanding is combined with a fully synchronized and integrated framework, and another where understanding conflict is combined with efforts to build national mechanisms. The specific mechanisms through which these combinations operate would require deeper casual process tracing within the individual cases, which the case study chapters aimed to provide.

Addressing Research Aims

The primary aim of this research was to understand how Department of Defense planning for post-conflict stability operations influences conflict transformation after U.S. military interventions. By framing this question through the lens of conflict transformation theory and utilizing QCA, the study moved beyond mere description to propose and test a theoretical linkage. The study's findings directly address this aim by identifying specific elements of planning that are empirically linked to the outcome:

- The analysis established that **understanding the conflict is a necessary antecedent** that U.S. military planning must incorporate for conflict transformation to occur.
- It demonstrated that conflict transformation is achievable through **alternative combinations of planning conditions**, specifically planning that incorporates understanding the conflict alongside either a fully integrated and synchronized framework (U*F) or the planning for national mechanisms (U*N).
- The study's analytical approach allowed for the identification of these specific configurations, providing a structured answer to the "how" question by detailing the conditions that, when present in combination, are sufficient for the outcome in the studies cases.

Thus, the research aims were addressed by identifying specific, empirically supported pathways linking elements of DoD planning to conflict transformation conditions (Understand Conflict, Framework, National Mechanisms) as measured by the outcome of a stable and strengthened representative government.

Study Contributions

This dissertation makes several significant contributions to the literature on U.S. military interventions, stability operations, and conflict transformation. The study contributes to furthering scholarship, employs methodological rigor, and contributes to a nuanced understanding of planning success. These are small but important steps in improving military planning to achieve conflict transformation.

The study fills a scholarly gap. It directly addresses the lack of scholarly work demonstrating a quantifiable linkage between DoD planning for post-conflict stability operations and conflict transformation. By explicitly formulating and testing hypotheses about how planning influences this outcome, the study moves beyond previous descriptive accounts. This

study develops and tests a theory on planning. The dissertation proposes and tests a clearly specified theory linking planning operationalized through conflict transformation theory to the outcome. This theoretical framework provides a novel way to analyze the complex relationship between military planning and post-conflict outcomes.

This study employs methodological rigor. By employing Qualitative Comparative Analysis, specifically fsQCA, the study introduces a more rigorous analytical method to this research area that has been previously used. QCA's ability to model complex causality, equifinality (multiple pathways to the outcome), and conjunctural causation (conditions matter in combination) is particularly valuable for understanding stability operations, which are intrinsically complex and multi-faceted. The use of fuzzy sets allowed for a more nuanced representation of conditions and the outcome than traditional binary approaches. This study provided empirical evidence for linkages. This empirical evidence supported the linkage between planning elements and conflict transformation, a linkage previously largely assumed but not systematically tested. The identification of necessary and sufficient conditions offers concrete insight into which aspects of planning are crucial.

Finally, this study contributes to nuanced understanding of planning success. The finding offers a nuanced understanding of what constitutes "successful" planning for conflict transformation, suggesting that while understanding the conflict is essential, success might not strictly require a perfectly integrated interagency framework, so long as understanding is high and potentially coupled with efforts on national mechanisms. In sum, the study adds precision to our understanding of how planning influences the success of post-conflict stability operations and provides a foundation for further empirical investigation using rigorous methods.

Limitations and Weaknesses

Like any research endeavor, this study has several limitations and inherent weaknesses that warrant consideration. The primary limitation was the availability of data on U.S. military interventions and, specifically, actual planning documents. The study relied heavily on publicly available U.S. government records, reports, and secondary sources to reconstruct planning efforts and their link to the outcome. While every attempt was made to obtain primary historical records, access was limited. Second, the study's scope was limited to U.S. military interventions and post-conflict stability operations. This focus, while allowing for in-depth analysis of a specific actor, limits the generalizability of the findings across post-conflict operations conducted by other nations or multilateral organizations. Third, the focus of data collection was predominantly on U.S. Department of Defense records. While acknowledging that other elements of the U.S. executive branch contribute to planning and execution, the study's primary source base reflects a military-centric view, which may not fully capture the nuances of interagency planning or the contributions of non-governmental actors. Fourth, the process of calibrating qualitative data into fuzzy sets for the conditions and determining empirical anchors for the outcome involved subjective value judgments by the researcher. While the judgments were grounded in conflict transformation theory and knowledge of the cases, subjectivity is inherent in this process. Efforts were made to minimize this by testing alternative anchors, but it remains a potential weakness. Fifth, the study assumed that the indicator-level dimensions within each condition were additive in their influence on the outcome. Without empirical studies on the relative importance of these sub-components, this assumption was necessary but might not accurately reflect their true interaction or weighting in real-world scenarios. Finally, the QCA analysis resulted in logical remainder rows in the truth table where no empirical cases existed.

The treatment of these remainders, particularly the handling of difficult counterfactuals in the derivation of solution terms, introduces a degree of analytical uncertainty. These limitations highlight areas where future research could build upon this study's findings and methodological approach.

Recommendations for Future Research

Based on the findings and limitations of this dissertation, several avenues for future research are recommended. Future research could aim to include a larger number of U.S. military interventions and stability operations to improve the case-to-conditions ratio, thereby increasing the statistical power and potentially refining the QCA results. Second, future research should extend the analysis to include post-conflict operations conducted by other nations or multi-lateral organizations, like NATO. A comparative QCA study incorporating non-U.S. cases could test the generalizability of the findings and identify whether different planning approaches or national/organizational characteristics lead to different pathways to conflict transformation. Third, efforts should be made to access more primary planning documents and internal after-action reviews from the DoD and other relevant government agencies. This would provide more direct evidence of the planning process and potentially allow for a more precise coding of the indicator-level dimensions. Fourth, while this study identified necessary and sufficient configurations, future research could delve deeper into the casual mechanisms within individual cases. Detailed case studies could explore how understanding the conflict, the absence of a framework, or the emphasis on national mechanisms actually operate to produce conflict transformation in specific contexts. Fourth, further research could explore alternative approaches to calibrating the fuzzy sets, perhaps incorporating expert weighting of the indicator-level dimensions to move beyond the assumption of additivity. Developing more standardized and

validated measures for planning quality and condition presence across different interventions would also strengthen future studies. Fifth, it should investigate how the influence of planning elements might change over time or at different stages of a stability operation. Conflict is a dynamic process, and planning effectiveness might vary depending on the phase of intervention and reconstruction. Sixth, future research should explore the role of external actors, conducting research specifically examining the influence of multilateral organization, intergovernmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations on U.S. planning and the subsequent outcomes. While acknowledged as influential, their specific impact was outside the primary scope of this study. Finally, future research should analyze the impact of fluctuating U.S. defense priorities, finite resources, and the linkage between strategic policy decisions and operational planning for stability operations. The source notes policy informs operations, and future work could explore this interaction within the planning context.

The failure to plan for and adequately resource stability operations have serious repercussion for the United States in large scale combat operations. Wars do not end when major conflict ends, they end when the intervening military force set the conditions for the creation of new political circumstances that are more favorable to the United States. Post-conflict stabilization falls to those forces on the ground at the time, as the case studies provided show, U.S. military forces do not have the luxury of waiting for others to show up for stabilization activities. The way conflict unfolds greatly influences the situation that emerges and evolves after combat operations. There is a dangerous artificiality in planners trying to make a hard distinction between combat operations and stability operations. They are not distinct phases, nor are they strictly sequential, military actions in one phase directly influence military actions in the other.

In conclusion, military planning must start with a view of the desired outcome of the war – not the outcome of major combat operations, but the creation of the desired political circumstances that signal the true end of the war. Military planners must start with stabilization activities in mind and plan combat operations from there. Planners must know where they want to be when the war ends and work backwards from there. This dissertation provides empirical support for the critical role of planning in conflict transformation after U.S. military intervention, demonstrating that understanding the conflict is necessary and identifying two specific combinations of planning conditions that are sufficient for success in the cases studied. The findings contribute a rigorous, theory-driven analysis to a field previously dominated by descriptive accounts. While limitations exist, the study offers a foundation for future research to build upon, refining our understanding of how planning can better contribute to achieving stable and secure endings to future conflicts.

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