

POLITICAL PARTIES AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
IN THE ARAB WORLD: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
OF TUNISIA, MOROCCO, EGYPT AND LEBANON

by 632

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INTRODUCTION

The popular and scholarly attitude toward the importance and the influence of political parties upon a society's destiny has been undergoing considerable change since the advent of the era of independence, which immediately followed the second world war. A brief survey of over a hundred nations presently constituting the world community, shows that nearly every one of them can be said to have a political party of some kind. Political parties are now considered a major and necessary vehicle in the developmental efforts of the new states. They could play a greater role in such efforts than they did in the earlier, and more gradual phases of political development in the western states.

The main objective of this thesis is to examine the role of political parties in the process of political development, as experienced by the emerging states, and to test the hypothesis that only broadly-based political parties, possessing a substantial measure of freedom in both external operations and internal structures, can play a major constructive role in this essential process. This proposition is to be studied through the examination of the activities of political parties in four major Arab countries--Tunisia, The United Arab Republic, Morocco, and Lebanon.

The choice of countries for this study was influenced by the existence of genuine differences in their party system, and

shaping the structures of these parties, the type of membership they solicited, as well as their effectiveness in the political process. It was found that the greater the independence of the party, the greater was its success in the process of political development.

It was also evident that none of these parties was overly successful as an instrument of political change. Their failure stemmed from structural weaknesses, as well as social and political pressures imposed either by the society within which they operated, as was evident in Lebanon and to a lesser extent in Morocco, or by the leadership of the country, as was clearly the case in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco. All the parties studied demonstrated a lack of independent operation, and strong enough structures that would enable them to mobilize popular support, independently of charismatic or traditional appeal to emotional values.

In the parties examined, an obvious need for the development of new roles, as well as increased capabilities, seemed to exist. If improvements in their operation do not take place in the near future, the utility of these parties will continue to decrease as a result of apathy and lack of popular confidence and support.

CHAPTER I

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL PARTIES

Winning independence is only the first and probably the easiest step in building a state. Independence plunges the whole nation into a complicated and often agonizing process of economic, cultural and political development. Of this conglomerate, political development is the most cherished goal of the new states. Indeed, the attainment of political development is a pre-condition for the attainment of economic development, which requires the stability and capable leadership that only a politically developed community can provide.

The term political development is finding increasing acceptance among political and social scientists. They, however, have not been able to produce a comprehensive and acceptable definition for this important concept. For most of the emerging nations, development means the achievement of a level of social and political progress equivalent to that of the west.¹ This proposition is clearly supported by the goals and standards set up by the leaderships of most of the former colonies of Western countries. Consequently when dealing with these states, one has to view political development in the light of Western ideas.

¹Rupert Emerson, Political Modernization: The Single Party System (The Social Science Foundation and Department of International Relations Monograph series in World Affairs, University of Denver, Number 1, 1963-1964), p. 4.

Political development² implies not only the achievement of a structurally differentiated, nationally integrated and strongly participant polity, but also requires the development of effective social, economic and political organizations which are capable of socializing the population into the mainstream of political life, as well as generating and coping with continuous peaceful change.³

Structural differentiation or the development of specialized structures is an important indicator of political development. It enhances the capabilities of the political system as well as its ability to make decisions and coherent rules.⁴ Structural differentiation enhances the capabilities of the decision makers to respond to and satisfy the demands of a wider range of elements within a society. It also means that a wider range of claims can be taken into account and satisfied without overburdening the decision making structures. Thus structural differentiation reflects greater responsiveness and effectiveness of the political system.⁵

²"Political development" and "modernization" will be used interchangeably in this study.

³S. N. Eisenstadt, Modernization: Growth and Diversity (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1963), p. 5.

⁴Gabriel G. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), p. 101.

⁵Ibid., p. 105.

National integration is the incorporation and amalgamation of the various religious, cultural, social, regional and ethnic elements into a single nation-state. The degree of integration reflects upon the capacity of government to control the territory under its rule as well as generate a willingness among the various elements of the population to place national over primordial interests.

Political participation or the demand for it is characteristic of political development. Individuals who have been denied entry to the political process during the pre-development era now attempt to enter the mainstream of political activity. Whether they are admitted or repressed can provide a good indication of the degree of development a particular society has achieved.

Political development in the new states is also dependent upon their ability to create effective political organizations capable of mobilizing popular support as well as harnessing demands. Without such organizations the majority of the population have very little power, and without power they can exert but little influence over the political process. Organizations are the foundations of political stability as well as a precondition for political development.⁶ Although the vacuum of power in modernizing political systems may be filled by charismatic leadership or

⁶Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 461.

military force, it can only be filled permanently by political organizations.⁷

Peaceful change, in a society undergoing political modernization, is dependent upon the level of institutionalization of its political organizations. Institutionalization is the "process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability."⁸ The institutionalization of political organizations is especially important in developing areas because political organizations act as arbitrators of the myriad of demands that arise in such an environment. If these political organizations are institutionalized (e.g., recognized by the different groups as valuable procedures to arbitrate demands) more harmonious interaction can be achieved.

In modernizing political systems, the various segments of the society are being affected by political and social issues that are unfamiliar and often contrary to traditional norms. Consequently conflicts tend to multiply and the traditional institutions (church, family, clan or chief) and procedures for managing and resolving such conflicts are no longer adequate. A need arises for more flexible institutions that can effectively control and direct the forces of change, and pave the way for their eventual acceptance and for the evolution of a system with more complex and effective organization. Societies capable of

⁷Ibid., p. 46.

⁸Ibid., p. 12.

creating stable and modern political institutions that can control and resolve conflicts, as well as direct the demands for change, tend to be more stable than societies which lack such capabilities. Political parties are such institutions. A well established political party is one of the most important institutions in a developing society, and can play a major part as an instrument of political and social change. Furthermore, it is a major channel through which political interaction can take place in either developed or under-developed systems.⁹

Many and varied definitions of political parties can be found. Sigmund Newmann claims that a political party is "the articulate organization of society's active political agents, those who are concerned with the control of governmental power and who compete for popular support with another group or groups holding divergent views--it is the great intermediary which links social forces and ideologies to official governmental institutions and relates them to political action within the larger political community."¹⁰ A second definition is presented by E. E. Schattschneider who believes that "a political party is first of all an organized attempt to get (political) power."¹¹

⁹Michael Curtis, Comparative Government and Politics (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 135.

¹⁰Sigmund Newmann, Modern Political Parties (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 396.

¹¹E. E. Schattschneider, Party Government (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1942), p. 35.

A more appropriate definition for the purpose of this study is the one introduced by Roy Macridis. He believes that a political party is "an association that activates and mobilizes the people, represents interests, provides compromises among competing points of view, and becomes the proving ground for political leadership."¹² This definition is more appropriate for the study of political parties in the non-western world because it is less rigid and formalistic. It does not exclude the many parties which deviate from the western norms of party organization and function.

The transition from parochial and personal competition for power to institutionally organized competition is certainly one of the most important characteristics of political development. When such a transition takes place parties often become the means through which ambitions and demands are channeled, and through which the previously disinherited elements of society can acquire the necessary amount of popular support which would enable them to attain or wrest power from traditionally established elites. At the same time the party, by organizing the masses, can also become an instrument for involving the masses in the affairs of government. Thus, a party can act, not only as a means for gaining power, but also as a means of promoting political participation as well.¹³ By helping to expand mass participation, parties can

¹²Roy C. Macridis, editor, Political Parties: Contemporary Trends and Ideas (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 19.

¹³Andrew J. Milnor, editor, Comparative Political Parties: Selected Readings (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1969), p. 2.

preempt or divert anomic or revolutionary political activities, and moderate the attitudes and demands of the newly mobilized and organized masses in such a way as not to disrupt the stability of the political system. Thus a political party may provide the institutionalized organization and procedures for assimilating new groups into the newly established political order.

It would be naive to claim that the party approach to the study of political development is the ultimate one, or that party studies are applicable to all nations; certainly many new states do not have sufficiently well organized parties that can play a decisive role in the political process. Furthermore parties can only help in creating conditions conducive to political development, rather than political development itself; political development is a complex process, and its achievement is dependent upon many variables.¹⁴

Many aspects of party activity and competition, in the new states, tend to hinder the process of development by contributing to the aggravation of an already heated and tense political atmosphere. This is especially true during the early phases of transition in pluralistic societies, where a national identity is lacking and parties tend to form along linguistic or ethnic lines, thus increasing inter-group hostility and posing as

¹⁴ Educational development as well as social and communication development play crucial roles in the process of development. Progress in these areas is essential to the development of political organizations.

obstacles to the creation of a viable political community. Second, parties in new states, are innovations that threaten the traditional base of political power. Their demand for popular participation in the decision making process often brings about a violent reaction from the traditional elite which is accompanied by repression and increased tension and instability.¹⁵ Nevertheless as political parties become institutionalized and their base of popular support increases, they can play a constructive role in the process of development, a role which counterbalances the disruptions that have accompanied their earlier formation.

New states attempting to create a new and unfamiliar order experience a series of crises: (1) a crisis of legitimacy; (2) political integration; (3) political participation; (4) political socialization; (5) conflict management; (6) and political recruitment. When the existing structures fail to cope with these crises, which often occur simultaneously, a need arises for new structures that can moderate as well as provide satisfactory solutions for them. Political parties, by virtue of their contact with the masses as well as the institutions of government, are well suited to play a major role in the solutions of these crises. How well they carry their responsibility greatly affects the stability of the political system, as well as their survival and the direction of political development.

It is necessary to probe each of the above mentioned

¹⁵Huntington, op. cit., p. 397.

crises in order to better understand their relationship to political development and party activity.

Legitimacy

The most serious and immediate concern of the leadership of a new state is the establishment of a sense of political legitimacy. Unlike the older nations which command a degree of traditional legitimacy, the new states, whose establishment meant a break with the traditional values and beliefs that had justified the existence of the old political system, have to fight for acceptance and survival.¹⁶

Legitimacy according to Seymour Martin Lipset, "involves the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society--legitimacy is evaluative. Groups regard a political system as legitimate or illegitimate according to the way in which its values fit with theirs."¹⁷

A crisis of legitimacy is a crisis of change, it occurs during the period of transition to new political and social structures. Such a change threatens the traditional values and institutions and signals the adoption of a new culture with

¹⁶Seymour Martin Lipset, The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective (New York: Basic Books Incorporated, 1963), pp. 16-17.

¹⁷Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (New York: Doubleday and Company, Incorporated, 1963), p. 64.

acceptable values and rituals.¹⁸ The development of such institutions, values and beliefs, combined with an early demonstration of the system's efficiency and stability are essential for political survival. For not only do people demand acceptable values, but they seek a government that will promote stability and be able to convince them that it is the best means for the achievement of national welfare.

Institutionalized political parties could be an important aid in the establishment of political legitimacy. Their value, in this area, stems from the important role they play in organizing participation, aggregating interests, and serving as a link between the masses and the government. The type of role they will play in providing legitimacy and stability in modernizing political systems will vary with the type of institutional inheritance of the system. If traditional political institutions survive into the era of modernization, parties will only play a secondary role. They will tend to help reinforce the legitimacy of these institutions by working within the system and adapting to its principles. In such a case, however, they will not in themselves be a source of legitimacy. Their own legitimacy will be derived from the contributions they will make to the political system.¹⁹

If the surviving traditional institutions are weak, or if no major institutions manage to survive as is the case with most

¹⁸Gabriel Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," Journal of Politics, Vol. 18, Number 3 (August 1956), pp. 391-409.

¹⁹Huntington, op. cit., pp. 90-91.

newly established states, the role of the party is entirely different. In such situations a strong party organization will play a more critical role as an independent source of legitimacy. In the absence of acceptable traditional sources of legitimacy, new sources are sought through ideology, charisma and popular sovereignty. If a political party can incorporate each of these principles it can become a source of legitimacy because it will then be viewed as the institutional embodiment of national sovereignty and popular will.²⁰

Political Participation

Political participation is a major characteristic of political development. The creation of the first "popular" government in a developing nation is always accompanied by expectations and demands for an increased role in government. The degree of popular participation in the affairs of a country distinguish modern from traditional societies, and is brought about by increased literacy, urbanization, and exposure to mass media.

The emergence of "popular" governments, does not necessarily mean that the ruling elite will welcome expanded participation. The elite of the new states have reacted with varying emotions to such demands. One reaction, and the most common one in the new states, is that of limited admission or participation. This is accomplished through the creation of an image of participation by allowing a limited degree of discussion and free

²⁰ Ibid., p. 91.

expression. It should be remembered, however, that even such limited participation has an important effect on political development. It is an important tool in creating new loyalties and a feeling of competence and national identity.²¹ Participation contributes to the effectiveness of the political system as well as to its legitimacy. It is a sign of a democratic trend, since democracies are maintained by active citizen involvement and concern with civic affairs. The value of participation becomes even more apparent when one realizes that a society with a greater proportion of its population remaining outside the political arena is potentially more explosive than one which has provided its people with a sense of involvement in the destiny of the nation.²² Political parties, by virtue of their function as mobilizers of public support, establish rational ties between the individuals and the political system thus transforming the members of a society from alienated by-standers into involved citizens.

Political Socialization

Political socialization is the "process by which individuals acquire attitudes and feelings toward the political system and toward their role in it."²³ This includes "what one

²¹Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston, Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), pp. 39-40.

²²Lipset, op. cit., p. 184.

²³Pye, op. cit., p. 46.

knows about the political system under which he lives, and the way he feels about it and about his participating function in it."²⁴ A political system, possessing institutions capable of socializing young citizens into politics in such a way that they grow up to identify with the system and its institutions, successfully performs this function, at least from the point of view of the system itself.

The degree of political socialization in a society is dependent upon the amount of trust, empathy and freedom from anxiety which prevails within the society. A "properly" socialized polity is one which eliminates the mistrust and suspicion that so often hinder cooperation and the development of a feeling of community in the new states; cooperation helps to eliminate the major sources of conflict and pave the way for stability and orderly progress. Empathy, or the capacity to place oneself in the other man's situation is indispensable in a modernizing society.²⁵ It enhances the ability of individuals to easily adapt themselves to new roles and relationships, and facilitates cooperation and consensus, which are essential elements of stability.²⁶ Anxiety results in frustration and alienation from the political system. An alienated public is more susceptible to agitation and extremist behavior; elements that pose a

²⁴Ibid., p. 46.

²⁵Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (New York: The Free Press, 1958), p. 50.

²⁶Ibid., p. 50.

threat to the survival of the system.

The study of political socialization is one of the better approaches to understanding political development and political stability. It is through the process of socialization that individuals are inducted into the political culture which determines their values, symbols and commitments.²⁷ The political socialization of any society may be latent or manifest in nature. It is manifest whenever it involves the explicit communication of values or information toward political objects. It is latent whenever the communication involves non-political attitudes which will eventually affect attitudes toward roles and objects within the political system.²⁸

The home and school are primary instruments for the development of political attitudes. It is in the home that the youngster first shapes his attitudes and ideas, which are greatly influenced by the opinions of his parents. The school may help to increase the sense of political efficacy in the student. As the student grows in his understanding of the political system and his role in it, his feeling of being a part of it should also grow. In the educational systems of the developing countries, however, youngsters are introduced to new ideas that are secular, and often contrary to the traditional ideas they have been imbued with in the home. Thus, the schools tend to impair rather than reinforce the family socializing function in changing

²⁷Almond and Powell, op. cit., pp. 64-65.

²⁸Ibid., pp. 65-66.

societies. This often results in individuals who view society as bewildering and incoherent. As a consequence a need arises for institutions that would eliminate some of the resulting confusion.

Modern political parties, which are in a constant state of communication with a substantial portion of the population, especially those with some formal education, act to reinforce the more modern ideas taught in the schools and encourage the abandonment of most of the traditional ideas taught in the home. Furthermore, by virtue of their incorporation of individuals with varying backgrounds and by providing for direct communication between them, parties contribute to the evolution of common ideas and goals that can contribute to the development of a sense of common loyalty and destiny.

National Integration

National integration is the process of incorporating the various elements within a society into a viable nation. This involves both territorial integration, with the reduction of cultural and regional differences, and political integration which narrows the gap between elite and masses in an effort to create a functioning and cooperative community.

The crisis of national integration is a crisis that faces every new nation experimenting with new social and political strategies that threaten the traditionally accepted values and institutions. To successfully overcome such a crisis of integration is of the utmost importance for the future of development

within a society. A fragmented political community renders the achievement of basic consensus, an element which is very essential for the survival and stability of a political system, an impossibility. A society torn by strife can hardly concentrate on effective measures that will help to build a nation.

Political parties can perform a major role in the process of national integration. By organizing people that belong to the various sections and strata of the population and by increasing the political and social interaction among them, parties help in lessening the hostilities and suspicions which are the major causes of dissensions. Lowering the level of tension and conflict among the various groups is essential for party growth as well as building a viable nation. Only in an atmosphere of relative peace and harmony can a party expect to attract the support that is necessary for increasing its base of power and its bargaining capabilities in the political system. To increase its power a party has to recruit and gain the support of elements from every major group in society. Only then can it claim representing the society and perform effectively both in relation to the people and the government.

Conflict Management

Open but moderate cleavage is an essential part of any development-conscious atmosphere. The erosion of traditional institutions and the advent of political awareness mean an increase in constantly shifting demands and conflicts where control is essential for political survival.

The lack of other institutions with similar flexibility and mass contact again makes political parties important instruments for the management and control of conflict, especially in the earlier stages of nation-building. For a party to be successful in such an effort, it must be able to attract cadres from all sections of society and allow them to air their views. Debate helps in releasing some of the tensions and frustrations that contribute to a breakdown of political systems, in addition to generating an atmosphere of sympathy and understanding that can result in views and policies that could contribute to relieving some of the tensions and conflicts.

Political Recruitment

Recruitment in its broadest connotation implies solicitation for membership and the training for leadership. This process involves extensive indoctrination, public exposure and competition for party and public offices.

Few leaders in a society, with a political party system, can attain public offices without real or professed support from a political party. The army and bureaucracy often provide political leaders; their rise to power, however, is an indication of a breakdown in the party system.²⁹

Political parties of all types play major roles in political recruitment. They serve as training camps for future party elite and provide them with a degree of experience and

²⁹Roy C. Macridis, Political Parties: Contemporary Trends and Ideas (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 19.

discipline--assets that are necessary for future success. Active participation in party affairs gives the cadre a deeper understanding of their role in the party as well as the political arena.

A party that has been instrumental in the achievement of independence can be an effective instrument for recruitment. Whether it will be successful or not, however, is greatly dependent upon the internal procedures by which it recruits its own leaders; the degree of internal competition, training, and participation in party affairs, will greatly influence the ability and success of its leaders in national offices.³⁰

³⁰ Almond and Powell, op. cit., p. 119.

CHAPTER II

TUNISIA

Tunisia's political development began in the 1880's when the French allowed Tunisians to have elected councils and modern educational institutions in the major cities.¹ Political parties, however, did not develop until 1920 when the Destour party appeared on the national scene and started mobilizing the masses for the struggle of independence. On March 2, 1934, as a result of disagreements between the younger and the older leadership of the Destour, a split occurred and the Neo-Destour emerged as a separate party. The triumph of the younger, more progressive elements, meant the triumph of the advocates of progress and development.

The Neo-Destour established contacts with and recruited members from all sectors of the population, including those living in some of the most isolated sections of the country. Assured of a strong mass support, the leadership began to concentrate its efforts on the achievement of independence, which it demanded should occur in an evolutionary manner. First, the Neo-Destour leaders wanted a voice in the government of the protectorate; then autonomy; and finally full independence. The Neo-Destour achieved its goals in this manner after great effort

¹I. W. Zartman, Government and Politics in North Africa (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 66.

and a long fight. By 1956 Tunisia acquired full independence under the leadership of Habib Bourguiba and his party. Bourguiba was appointed prime minister under the monarchy which was finally abolished by the elected Constituent Assembly, and he was then elected president.

Bourguiba, realizing that the great majority of his people were not ready to assume a full role in the political system, decided to adopt a paternalistic attitude in which he and his elite would decide what was or was not good for his people. As a result of such a policy, he subordinated the party to the state.

Political Legitimacy

Political development, as envisioned by Habib Bourguiba, means seeking changes within the mold of a single party. The main function of such a party is not to govern but to mobilize popular support and enhance the legitimacy of the regime.² The Neo-Destour, by virtue of its history as the leading organization in the struggle for independence, and its unquestionable loyalty to Bourguiba, was a perfect tool for this first step in development.

The fact that the Neo-Destour is not a major force in actual policy formulation and execution has not decreased the party's prestige among the masses. To most Tunisians the party

²Douglas A. Ashford, National Development and Local Reform (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 70.

is still an arm of the government that represents their interests and aspiration. The concern of the party with such interests is a sincere one, and is constantly stressed throughout the elaborate party apparatus, where local aspirations and problems are debated and discussed with the hope of bringing them to the attention of the government.

Although the government of Tunisia, under the leadership of Bourguiba, enjoys extreme popularity, city dwelling Tunisians as well as peasants do not always accept governmental authority and policies. The urban population as a result of decades of experience as an opposition to the colonial government had developed a sense of political awareness that necessitated the explanation of major policies and goals.³ The peasantry, on the other hand, has always been suspicious of the central authority. This suspicion has been caused by centuries of exploitation and neglect by the government elites. Such an atmosphere of suspicion and opposition provided the Neo-Destour with a challenge that it handled adequately, through continuous and detailed explanations of goals and policies. It was always ready and willing to defend its leader and his actions by presenting the alternatives and consequences in a professional and convincing manner.

³Charles A. Micaud, Tunisia: The Politics of Modernization (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965), p. 32.

National Integration

The relatively small country of Tunisia contains within its boundaries numerous groups divided on the basis of tribal, village, or regional suspicions. Such divisions and suspicions presented the government with a formidable hindrance to development, a process that requires a certain degree of cohesion and consensus. Bourguiba has always been aware of the value of his prestigious party as an instrument of national integration and has been using it in his efforts to bring a closer contact and cooperation among the various classes, tribes, and regions, as well as bringing himself and his associates into closer contact with the masses. Such contact between the masses and the elite is seen as necessary for bridging a wide gap between a closely knit leadership, sharing similar social and educational backgrounds, and the majority of rural Tunisians.

The Neo-Destour regards itself as the major instrument of social integration. Its leaders believe and claim that the party represents the whole population. Consequently, they regard the task of reconciling and bringing the disparate elements of society into a harmonious organizational framework as a necessity for maintaining the party's prominence and strength. The 1958 reorganization of the party was a major step in the direction of national integration. All branches based upon family or village ties were abolished. The new branches were organized along geographic lines with each branch representing areas that were traditionally divided by feuds, rivalries, and jealousies. The

new branches also represented the various classes of society. Within their framework, they included not only agricultural groups, but labor, commercial, intellectual and youth associations. By bringing these groups together, under strong supervision and making them cooperate on local projects beneficial to all, the party hoped to create a sense of trust and mutual destiny that promised to rid the various local communities of dissension. They were successful in this attempt.

The party has also had a measure of success in bringing the elite into contact with a number of rural communities and their problems. Such contact was greatly facilitated by the smallness of the country and by the presence of a fairly efficient communication network that linked the areas of higher economic value and population density. This contact resulted in a close and often intimate relationship between leaders and followers.⁴ In spite of this relative success in lessening the gap between the elite and the majority of the population, obvious deficiencies still exist in the party's approach to integration. The party has yet to demonstrate some initiative in contributing to the integration of the less advanced areas with the rest of the country. Such areas continue to be inaccessible and politically ignored in spite of political promises for improvement. The party has not concentrated on either financial help or on sending trained cadres to those areas.

⁴Richard M. Brace, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 142.

The continued success of the Neo-Destour as an instrument of political integration is hard to predict. Future success will depend on whether the party succeeds in bringing the disinherited areas into the mainstream of Tunisian nationhood and on the new generation of young leaders.⁵

Political Participation

The leaders of the Neo-Destour, like their counterparts in other developing countries, have publicly committed themselves to the propagation of mass participation in the affairs of government. The sincerity of this public commitment, however, is of a limited nature and depends on the level of involvement.

Whereas the elected members to the national assembly have very little power except in reviewing the budget, the atmosphere is completely different at the local levels. Almost all Tunisians can join the party. The party branches, which number a thousand at the present time, emphasize the equality of all members, and their right to criticize, debate or convince others of their views. Even the cells which are controlled by dedicated commissions, encourage initiative and the employment of democratic procedures in decision making.⁶ Members of the local branches conduct free elections for their executive committees, and are

⁵Ibid., p. 142.

⁶Clement Henry Moore, "The Neo-Destour party of Tunisia: A Structure for Democracy?" World Politics (April 1962), Vol. 14, No. 3.

allowed to criticize local but not presidential policies, or the president himself.

The party claims that at least one out of every five male Tunisians belong to it or its affiliated organizations. In spite of this claim, however, apathy is slowly developing among the population, especially the youth. This is partly due to the fact that the old sense of mission is now missing from the party atmosphere, and partly to the relative deterioration, since independence, of the party's deliberative organs. Cadres have begun to wonder if their debates and criticisms are taken seriously at the top. Furthermore they have been aware that more messages are relayed downward rather than upward. In 1961, out of two million youth, under the voting age of twenty, only about a hundred thousand belonged to youth association, and fewer yet were actually active.⁷

In order to redeem public confidence in its effectiveness, the party has to change its policies and attitude toward participation. Effective channels through which local demands and grievances are transmitted to the national leadership have to be established and used. Furthermore fewer messages and demands should come from Bourguiba and his political bureau if the public is to continue to be satisfied with the party's role.

⁷ Clement Henry Moore, Tunisia Since Independence (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965), p. 132.

Political Socialization

The Neo-Destour is determined in its effort to gradually change Tunisian society into an advanced and predominantly urban and secular one. Mobilizing the population, especially the peasantry and the workers, and bringing them into closer contact with the government is a major concern of the Neo-Destour and its leaders. Such contact, it is believed, will dispel the mistrust that separate ruler and ruled in traditional societies. Bourguiba and his associates realize that the creation of trust between the government and the masses is an essential prerequisite for the success of any radical changes they are going to impose.

By virtue of its large membership and its involvement at all levels of Tunisian life, the Neo-Destour has been able to play a major role in political socialization. It has been instrumental in the introduction, and the acceptance of new motives and symbols, as well as discrediting many of the traditional structures of society.⁸ The party found itself well established in the midst of a largely illiterate society, wasting the major portion of its time and energy on religious fanaticism and solidarity. Education was the major tool with which the party planned to combat such an obstacle. Consequently it sent its party leaders and cadres into even the smallest of hamlets, in an effort to teach

⁸ Clement H. Moore, "Political Parties in Independent North Africa," In State and Society in Independent North Africa, Leon Karl Brown ed. (Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1966), pp. 23-24.

the people the basics of reading and writing. Youth and women's organizations were also used in this program of mass education with a considerable degree of success. Not only did such organizations teach people how to read and write, but they have become centers of training in civil responsibility and the propagation of Bourguiba's programs for de-emphasizing the role of religion. This final effort has demonstrated that Neo-Destour is a truly secular organization, devoid of religious fanaticism; a major weakness that is still plaguing most of the nationalist parties in the new states.⁹

The fact that the Tunisian nationalist movement has been developing steadily for over half a century, has given the Neo-Destour the expertise and patience that are necessary for political socialization.¹⁰ Even its branches are very well equipped to train the youth for responsibility within the national party apparatus. As a result of such effective channels for political education, the Tunisian youth are acquiring, at an early age, a solid political education and loyalty to the state and the regime, in addition to acquiring political confidence and becoming more secularly minded.¹¹

⁹Lorna Hahn, North Africa: Nationalism to Nationhood (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1960), p. 19.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 209.

¹¹Charles Gallagher, The United States and North Africa (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 172.

In addition to direct effort at political and social education, the party is very active in community projects which contribute to the promotion of social pride, awareness, and the betterment of local communities. It organizes annual health and sanitation campaigns, and fund raising drives for Tunisian development. To further stimulate development, the party branches, beginning in 1959, were called upon to draw up finance and complete projects that were needed in their communities. Some built schools while others built cooperatives and medical centers. Such an interest in the welfare of the masses combined with the influence of the party press, which is fully utilized for the propagation of the goals and ideals of the regime, contributed to creation of confidence in the government. It is no longer regarded as an exploiter but a friend seeking the promotion of public welfare.

Conflict Management

The Tunisian political scene is dominated by its only legal party, the Neo-Destour. Elements of the old Destour as well as Arab nationalists and a small communist party are also active, though in a non-legal capacity.

The Neo-Destour, under the charismatic leadership of Bourguiba, is so strong at all levels of Tunisian life, that continuous repressive measures against the opposition were never deemed necessary.¹² The leadership of the party, however,

¹²Macridis, op. cit., p. 111.

strongly believes that since other organizations have not contributed to the national liberation, and since their activities will eventually create an atmosphere of antagonism that will only hinder national development, they should not be allowed to share the power. Their role, they add, which is to constructively criticize through rational and open discussion, is already fulfilled by the discussions and debates that take place within the framework of the party.

Convincing as this defense may be to many Tunisians, an objective glance at the operation of the Neo-Destour reveals the absence of any formal deliberative structures that can effectively debate issues and criticize the policies or methods of the president and his political bureau. It is true that the branches can debate and criticize, within understood limits, but even here criticism is sporadic and ineffectual as a result of the absence of structures entrusted with the task of formulating such opinions and criticisms into rational policy alternatives, and channeling them to the political bureau.

The forcefulness of Bourguiba's personality and his popularity have contributed to the acceptance of Neo-Destourian domination of Tunisia's political life, although it did not succeed in the elimination of all opposition. Even within the framework of the party and its various organizations a variety of ideas and goals are found, and resistance to the policies of the regime is often open. A good example of such resistance took place in 1958 when Bourguiba first prepared a drastic revision in

the party structure. He planned to replace the provincial committees, consisting at the time of local party leaders and influential citizens, with centrally appointed officials. The objections to his plans were so strong that he was forced to postpone the party congress until the spring of 1959, by which time he managed to remove or pacify the centers of opposition.

Bourguiba's personal influence and interference, though the major force against strong opposition, is not the only one. The party under his leadership has also developed a very flexible policy toward its opponents. Rather than drive them underground and force them into clandestine and vigorous defiance of the regime the party has often allowed the more articulate, but acceptable members of the opposition, in addition to many independents, to run on the party ticket or to hold positions within the government. This approach has given the opposition a form of representation, while at the same time, they are kept under control.¹³ Special interest groups and organizations, such as the Labor Union and the General Union of Tunisian students (UGET), are also allowed to function within the framework of the party. Some of these interest groups, and especially the Labor Union, play the role of pressure groups and their officers are often consulted by the administration and the party on relevant legislation and policies, before they are adopted. This type of behind-the-scene consultation is frequently taking place, and is encouraged by the president. The U.G.E.T. on the other hand is

¹³Zartman, op. cit., p. 78.

the hub of opposition to the administration and the Neo-Destour. In 1963, for example, the Paris bureau passed a resolution condemning the lack of freedom of expression and the press. The leftist and Arab Socialists defeated the right-wing loyalists and split the U.G.E.T. Such opposition demonstrated student resentment against being manipulated for political purposes.¹⁴

Although the dissident elements were later unseated, the episode clearly demonstrated that differences can be brought up publicly; a situation not welcomed by a regime that claims unanimity at the national level.

The regime's concern with unanimity in decision making forced it to sacrifice individual initiative and limited its capabilities to effectively adjust to increased public demands.¹⁵ The party and the regime have yet to adopt a more workable and realistic attitude in this area. Increased public awareness and demands can destroy a rigid structure.

Recruitment

Since its inception the Neo-Destour has recruited its members from all segments of Tunisian society. The party, unlike parties of other underdeveloped countries has made a special effort to establish itself in remote areas.

During the first years of independence, party militants were exercising their influence to secure positions and appointments

¹⁴Dwight L. Ling, Tunisia from Protectorate to Republic (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967), p. 217.

¹⁵Ashford, op. cit., p. 89.

for family members and friends. This practice resulted in widespread inefficiency and corruption and necessitated better organization and restraints. The reforms of 1958 resulted in the formation of branches that were under the control and supervision of the political bureau. This important revision in the party structure resulted in greater efficiency in training and promotion. Cadres demonstrating ability usually acquire the confidence of the commissioner and members of the Political Bureau and are recommended for better positions in the party or the government.¹⁶ The party leadership has been broad-minded enough, in its recruitment policies, to keep and recruit capable non-party men into the civil service. Party members, however, are still given the more responsible positions. Their policy is clearly achievement-oriented, and has resulted in a small but efficient administration, in spite of certain shortcomings caused by a lack of the necessary delegation of authority at the higher levels of government.¹⁷

¹⁶Moore, Tunisia Since Independence, op. cit., p. 152.

¹⁷Macridis, op. cit., pp. 92-93.

CHAPTER III

MOROCCO

Morocco attained its independence on March 2, 1956. For forty-four years this nation had been divided into Spanish and French protectorates; Tangier was an international zone. Moroccan existence as a political unit, however, extends back over several centuries with but few interruptions.

The formulation of Moroccan national consciousness did not materialize until 1926 when Allal al-Fasi founded a club at Fez to purify Islam. Not until the 1930's did a major step in nationalist development occur. Prior to that time the Moroccan intellectuals and businessmen, who composed the driving force of al-Fasi's movement, had no clearly defined goals. The French dahirs (edicts) of 1930, which intended to create a distinction between the Arab and Berber populations by placing the Berber under the French court system instead of Moslem religious jurisdiction, enabled the leadership to easily convince the people that the French were anti-Islam.¹ It was then that the nationalist awakening and resistance began to crystallize.

The first major organization was the Moroccan Action Committee (CAM) under the leadership of al-Fasi and Muhammad al-Quazzani. By 1937, however, the personal rivalry of the two

¹Brace, op. cit., pp. 76-77.

leaders forced the dissolution of the group. Quazzani formed the Popular Movement and al-Fasi organized the Moroccan Movement for the Plan of Reform. Other personality and regional movements were also formed in the same year. By 1944 the factions in the Spanish Zone and Ahmad Belafrej, one of al-Fasi's supporters, succeeded in creating the Istiqlal or independence movement, under the leadership of al-Fasi.² This movement was destined to become the prime agitator for independence; it had the support of the Sultan, Muhammad Ben Youssef. (Al-Fasi gained the Sultan's favor in 1937.)

The Istiqlal movement was followed by the Moroccan National Front in 1951 which loosely united the four major nationalist factions under the old CAM leadership of 1930's. By 1951, as a result of this unity, nationalist agitation and demands gained greater momentum and force. The French, in their efforts to discredit the nationalists, tried to force the king to publicly denounce them. Failing to gain his cooperation, the French Commissioner, General Guillaume, deposed the king and replaced him with the more cooperative and elderly Siddi Ban Arafa.

The deposition of the Sultan, who was also a descendent of the prophet Muhammad and the religious leader of all Moroccans, resulted in a great deal of bitterness and resentment. Even the Berber, who allegedly opposed the Sultan, rallied if not to the support of Istiqlal which took up the cause of restoration of the legitimate ruler, then to the Sultan himself.

²I. W. Zartman, Morocco (New York: Atherton Press, 1964), p. 15. Brace, however, states that 1942 was the year of its formation.

More than any other act by the French the deposition made the people more consciously Moroccan.³ Resistance mushroomed into armed violence and guerilla fighting, but the French refused to yield to the nationalists. Not until 1955 when the fighting in Algeria became intense did the French decide to accede. Muhammad V was restored to his throne on November 17, 1955. The next step, independence, was finally achieved in 1956 by the declaration of La Celle-St. Cloud.

During the resistance years most nationalist groups acknowledged the leadership of al-Istiqlal. Following the independence declaration, political groupings began to reappear. The Istiqlal split because of incompatibility between the old leadership and the young progressives. The young progressives first formed the Democratic Istiqlal Party, then reorganized into the National Union of Popular Forces (NUPF) under the leadership of Mehdi Ben Baraka. The Popular movement was also established in the Berber area. These three major parties eventually represented the principal social divisions of the country. Istiqlal was the party of the traditional urban bourgeoisie and religious groups. The NUPF was the party of the city workers. The Popular Movement, which never gained much strength, represented Berber particularism and rural discontent.⁴

³Brace, op. cit., p. 79.

⁴Gallagher, op. cit., pp. 129-130.

Political Legitimacy

Although the Istiqlal played a vital role in the struggle for independence and the restoration of the Sultan, Muhammad V was the actual symbol which gave the liberation movement its drive and unity. The Sultanate has always been the accepted office of leadership, deriving its power from the traditional and religious heritage of the country.

Right after independence, al-Istiqlal seemed to be the one political party which possessed most of the attributes required of a party in a developing nation if it is to gain leadership, since its leaders seemed to have charisma, organization and accountability to a large constituency.⁵ Upon independence the party engaged in a very active campaign seeking to substantiate its claim of great popular support. The refusal of the king to be relegated to the background of the political arena and his objection to diminution by any one political party or personality resulted in his refusal to give al-Istiqlal the sole leadership of the government.

This decision contributed to an early split within party ranks; the old leadership seemed content with participation in a coalition government as long as they had a satisfactory number of suitable posts. They had no sympathy with the younger leadership who wanted a written constitution and more rapid

⁵Halpern, op. cit., p. 295.

development and reform.⁶ As a result of this split in 1959, Istiqlal could no longer claim to speak with a single emphatic voice on the political destiny of Morocco, and its chances for establishing a predominant ruling party were destroyed.⁷

Party resentment toward the monarchy developed after independence as a result of the king's refusal to delegate power to regional and central officials. Several parties, especially NUPF, also began questioning the intentions of the monarchy in delaying the formulation of the promised constitution. The introduction of the constitution and the 1962 referendum, revealed what subsequent elections were to confirm; the monarchy still manipulated the principal factors of Moroccan unity and stability in spite of the fastgrowing opposition.

The monarchy continued to enjoy great prestige as a result of the leadership and policies of Muhammad V. Most of the social, educational and economic reforms were initiated by the monarchy, rather than by any of the political parties that were involved with rivalries which caused a great deal of governmental instability. Similar policies have been continued by the present king who was determined to control and rule the political parties as well as the Moroccan people. Hassan II has been manipulating the political parties in such a way as to take credit for governmental successes himself and to blame the

⁶Barbour, Morocco (London: Thames and Hudson, 1965), p. 214.

⁷Brace, op. cit., p. 119.

parties for failures in the hope of weakening their power.⁸

Hassan's attitudes have created a growing opposition to his policies, especially by the NUPF. NUPF continues to question his authority to impose a constitution without consulting a national assembly, claiming that he had no right to do so. At the present time, however, only the opposition seem to concern itself with the legality and origin of the Constitution. The majority of the people voted for the monarchical institution, for the king's continuing authority, for Islam, and for giving the king a substantial victory. The rural areas, especially, indicated their preference for the authority of the king rather than for a political party.⁹ There is presently no other force in the country more capable of assuring national solidarity than the monarchy.

Political Integration

Morocco entered the twentieth century with a medieval social structure; for hundreds of years it had been divided according to tribal units with the jmaa or councils acting as the supreme authority in each tribe. The councils, which organized a democratic system of representation within the tribe, also fostered tribal particularism, a great obstacle to Moroccan unity. Tribal allegiance usually proved stronger than loyalty to the

⁸Zartman, Government and Politics in Northern Africa, op. cit., p. 25.

⁹Barbour, op. cit., p. 215.

state, and French distinction of Arabs and Berbers strengthened these feelings.¹⁰

A second obstacle to Moroccan integration was that of unifying the French, Spanish and international sectors. Upon independence, each sector had a different political background and different political organizations. The third obstacle to integration was the wide gap existing between the overwhelmingly rural population and the more politically conscious urban centers. There were also great divisions and antagonisms (personal and otherwise) which existed among the political elites. The elites united during the struggle for independence, but when freedom was achieved they discovered radical differences in their ideas of ruling Morocco.

The king and the political parties realized that political development and economic planning could not be achieved without political cohesion. This, in turn, was dependent upon the successful erosion of restrictive tribal ethno-centricities. The diverse members of the population, such as the restless Berbers, were somehow to be accommodated if the nation was to reach its goals of stability and success.¹¹

Independent Morocco hoped to sever the old tribal loyalties by building up rural communes organized along

¹⁰Rom Landau, Morocco Independent under Muhammad the Fifth (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1961), p. 234.

¹¹William H. Lewis, "Rural Administration in Morocco," Middle East Journal, vol. 14, number 1 (Winter 1960), p. 47.

geographic and economic lines rather than purely ethnic and tribal considerations. These communes were given authority to manage the affairs of a given community with the hope that they would form the nucleus for true democratic cooperation among the rural people. Such efforts on the part of the monarchy are commendable. At the present, however, animosities nourished by traditional concepts and rivalries still persist and might flare up at any time, thus retarding the hope for immediate integration. This does not by any means preclude the certainty of final integration in the future. Continuing at the present rate, Moroccan integration will not be the result of any efforts on the part of political parties which concentrate their efforts among particular segments of the population, but rather as the result of the tremendous prestige and appeal of the monarchy.¹²

Today the central administration has virtually ended tribal dissidence in Berber areas. Modern means of transportation, the spread of communication and education are all aiding the integration of a nation first united by the struggle for independence. The speed and ultimate success of these efforts are still largely dependent upon the extent to which the urban elite can become accustomed to the task of leadership in formerly dissident areas.

Efforts at nationwide party activities continue to be small. The Istiqlal, the logical party to undertake such a project after independence, did not exert much effort in that

¹²Barbour, op. cit., p. 205.

direction. And the slight efforts exerted by the other parties, in Berber areas, as well as the rest of rural Morocco has not made a significant impression on the attitude of those areas as yet.¹³

Political Participation

Political parties are designated as the most important organs of public participation in any nation. Their position in the government of Hassan II provides the key to an understanding of Moroccan government and politics.

By virtue of the very important role played by the Istiqlal in the struggle for independence the Sultan, although the dominant national figure, was to be less than an absolute monarch. He had promised a constitutional monarchy and free elections. Once in power, however, only a semblance of democracy was allowed; all the real powers rested legally in his hands.

In 1956, a consultative assembly, members of which were chosen by the various organizations, was established. Although the country by this time had universal suffrage it remained without national elections, an elected parliament, or popular limitations on the ruler's activities or decisions. Elections were prominent promises of nearly every government. Muhammad V, who was sympathetic to local self-government finally promised local elections in 1957. There followed a great debate on the feasibility of elections for that year, with the Istiqlal being

¹³Gallagher, op. cit., p. 130.

the main force behind the opposition. Such an opposition did not surprise anyone for an important characteristic of Moroccan political parties is that they seem to clamor for elections when they are out of power but are not at all interested in being controlled by popular choice when they are in power. The parties in power tend to procrastinate and even repudiate the electoral process once they are in control.¹⁴

The second step in mass political participation was to take place in 1962 with a vote on a constitution. Meanwhile Muhammad V died and was succeeded by his son Hassan II. The referendum was held as scheduled. Five political parties were allowed to campaign and participate: the Istiqlal, NUPF, The Popular Movement, the Liberal Independents, and the Constitutional Democratic Party (PDC). Citizens were encouraged to participate in the voting. The illegal Communist Party, which was allowed to function at the time, was not granted permission to take part.

The NUPF and PDC opposed the constitution because it gave too many powers to the king and because the legislative assembly was limited to an advisory role. The king could dissolve the assembly at will or he could bypass the assembly by appealing to the people through referendums. These two parties sought more power for the assembly and wanted the power of the king curtailed and his position reduced to that of a figurehead. Therefore they boycotted the referendum in the hope of blocking approval of the

¹⁴Douglas E. Ashford, "Elections in Morocco: Progress or Confusion," Middle East Journal, vol. 15, number 1 (Winter 1961), p. 4.

constitution. This boycott resulted in a victory that resembled a mandate for Hassan.

The third step toward representative government was taken in 1963 with the parliamentary elections. As a result of these elections the king's party (FDIC) suffered a psychological defeat; it only secured about one-half of the seats. Consequently, shortly before the elections of the local councils, which would determine the composition of the Senate, about 130 leaders of NUPF were arrested for allegedly conspiring against the king. This confirmed an earlier prediction that the king intended to follow a Gaullist pattern; very little room was to be allowed for the opposition.¹⁵

The imprisonment and flight of the NUPF leadership and the withdrawal of the labor union (UMT) from the party shortly afterwards left only a mere passive skeleton to assume the role of an opposition. By 1966 only a semblance of democratic participation was allowed in Morocco.

What little participation existed seemed to be an urban phenomenon in spite of governmental encouragement for participation in elections. Morocco must yet go far before it can claim true and effective mobilization of the entire population.

Political Socialization

Ahmad Guedira, the leader of the Defense of the Constitutional Institutions (FDIC), the royalist "party," publicly stated

¹⁵Gallagher, op. cit., p. 130.

that the heart of Morocco's productivity and development problems stemmed from the traditional Muslim attitudes. Modern attitudes toward government and politics as well as modern concepts of work, saving and investment seem foreign to the traditional Moroccan. This has to change before any concrete progress will be achieved.¹⁶

Moroccans did not become politically conscious until the 1930's and even then this consciousness was limited to a few activists. This was due to the French policy of repression, Arab-Berber antagonism and the fact that Morocco was ruled by two different nations plus an international body. Political socialization was further hindered by the cynical attitude of the rural population toward all governments and toward the urban population. Today members in the political parties active in these areas are also included on the lists of suspicious characters.¹⁷

Political socialization is further hindered by a legacy from the French; an attitude of servility toward those in authority. Under French rule the gulf separating those in authority from the others became greater than ever before. The present central authorities and party hierarchies seem to be perpetuating such an attitude.¹⁸

Morocco, compared with other underdeveloped nations, contains a great deal of natural wealth. But what it needs

¹⁶Brace, op. cit., p. 153.

¹⁷Barbour, op. cit., p. 205.

¹⁸Landau, op. cit., p. 53.

presently for the proper utilization of this wealth is a greater urgency in government, a greater sense of responsibility among the political leadership, more technically skilled workers, and a wider-reaching educational system. King Hassan seems well aware of his nation's problems and encourages education, both formal and political. The rural communes are encouraging more responsible and experienced citizenship. The king and communes are helping the rural inhabitants to gradually realize that their destinies are closely linked with the development of the nation.¹⁹

Most political parties seem to have neglected their responsibilities as instruments of political socialization. The Istiqlal, seeing itself as the instrument of political, social and cultural education for all of Morocco, has tried to help in this respect by placing at least one literate officer in each of the party cells. This officer was to read the party's internal bulletin and give literacy lessons. The lack of capable literate members has impeded progress in this direction.²⁰

Until the Charter of Liberties was introduced in the fall of 1958, there were no guarantees for the rights of assembly, speech or organization for political purposes. Democratic political development demands the protection of such basic rights.²¹ The charter was not the result of party efforts; it

¹⁹Brace, op. cit., p. 152.

²⁰Halpern, op. cit., p. 295.

²¹Zartman, Morocco, op. cit., p. 205

originated with Muhammad V. In fact, Istiqlal was more desirous of guarantees for its own protection and ascendancy and was less than enthusiastic about the king's proposal.²²

In recent years the greatest contribution to political socialization in Morocco has been the conduct of various local and national elections. The serious campaigns carried on by the government and political parties alike have contributed greatly to the education of the people in the meaning of the democratic process. Both the population in general and the political parties have benefited. The parties have discovered their areas of strength and weakness, a fact which hopefully will stimulate more activity in the rural areas, which have been long neglected by all.²³

Moroccans have shown that they are mature enough to understand and participate in elections, especially at the local level. The crucial question is: How ready are the Moroccan leaders for democracy? The success of any new government depends, above all, on the ability of its leadership to put the skills and resources of the country to work while utilizing the enthusiasm and support of its people which neither King Hassan nor the political party leadership has yet wholeheartedly attempted.²⁴

²²Ibid., p. 217.

²³Ashford, "Elections in Morocco: Progress or Confusion," op. cit., p. 5.

²⁴Zartman, Morocco, op. cit., p. 239.

Conflict Management

The party leadership of independent Morocco hoped that the king would remain aloof from any active political involvement and that he would reign but not rule. The king, however, refused to see the monarchy driven into political obscurity. The conflict that developed among the party leaders hastened the emergence of the monarchy with its tremendous prestige as the ultimate stabilizer and mediator between the various organizations and segments of the population.

With King Hassan and his belief in personal leadership, the role of the monarchy was greatly strengthened. He first tried to discredit and crush his opposition legally through the referendum of 1962. The overwhelming victory he received from the voters gave him a sense of confidence and a stronger determination to become the country's chief modernizer as well as political figure.²⁵ This attempt at dominance, however, forced him to openly tangle with the opposition parties. He arrested the leadership of NUPF, and his supporters are believed to have aided in the kidnapping and murder of Mehdi Ben Baraka the leader of that party, in exile in 1966. His harsh tactics have succeeded in weakening the opposition and driving them underground, although he has not been able to crush them.

By persecuting his opponents Hassan II has committed his biggest mistake. He has not left them any alternative but to

²⁵Willard E. Beling, "Some Implications of the New Constitutional Monarchy in Morocco," Middle East Journal, Vol. 18, Number 2 (Spring 1964), p. 178.

resort to force; a tactic that has been part of the Moroccan political scene since the turn of the century.²⁶ The king's repressive police tactics and the use of force by the opposition may result in dangerous repercussions for the Moroccan political system.

Political Recruitment

All important political offices in Morocco are appointed by the king. Muhammad V, however, tried to consult the political parties and maintain a balance among them in the allotment of the important positions.

King Hassan II, who resents any form of opposition from political parties, tries to assure the top positions to his loyal supporters. Nepotism is a common practice among the royalists; each top administrator tries to secure as many lesser positions as possible to his relatives or friends. Inefficiency and corruption are common as a result of such practices.

Each of the Moroccan parties has been concentrating its efforts among a particular segment of the population. NUPF, the only party trying to recruit followers on a national basis, was suppressed and finally dispersed when its main base of support, UMT, left it in 1963. Ben Baraka tried to form a closely knit alliance of young middle class progressives and laborers in addition to the nationalists who migrated to the cities after independence; he hoped to integrate peasants and laborers with

²⁶Ibid., p. 179.

the emerging middle class. It is difficult to assess the chances of Ben Baraka's success in such an attempt, since he was never allowed to operate freely.²⁷

Until the king demanded a stronger role in public affairs any changes in government usually wrought havoc in the administration. The change from an Istiqlal government to one led by another party or vice-versa usually resulted in a reshuffling of officials from governors and caids in the provinces to civil servants in Rabat. Such maneuvering resulted in insecurity among all officials. Efficiency and political neutrality, two essential requirements in any civil service, consequently did not develop.²⁸

Hassan has attempted to improve the recruitment procedures in the government. The lack of capable men and the need for support, however, have forced him to ignore the achievement criteria that he has set. His domination of Moroccan politics, however, had eliminated the insecurity of government officials and, consequently, some of the fears that have hindered the effective conduct of governmental affairs.

²⁷Halpern, op. cit., p. 297.

²⁸Landau, op. cit., p. 55.

CHAPTER IV

EGYPT

Egyptian political organizations began to appear in the later half of the nineteenth century. The first political party was established in 1879 and was known as the Egyptian National Party. This party was established with the encouragement of Khedive Ismail who hoped to harness the national sentiments in an effort to rid the country of foreign rule. The Egyptian National Party was poorly organized, however, and as a result failed to become an effective instrument of national mobilization. Not until 1918 did well-organized and effective political parties begin to play a role in Egypt's political destiny. The Wafd party under the leadership of Sa'ad Zaghlul was the first of these parties. In spite of the formation of a dozen or more other organizations in the following four decades, the Wafd continued to be the dominant force in Egyptian politics until the July 23rd revolution of 1952.

Like most nationalist movements that were directed against colonial rulers, the Wafd concentrated all of its efforts on one target: the British Colonialists. In so doing it neglected the formulation of the necessary constructive programs for the

social and economic welfare of the people of Egypt.¹ This neglect was due to short-sightedness on the part of the Wafd leadership in the early stages of party development, and was later aided by the development of the party into an organization that was controlled by the urban rich and the landed aristocracy, two groups that did not favor such programs for fear of losing their privileges and prestige. In spite of this major discriminatory drawback, and in spite of widespread corruption within the party organization and leadership, many Egyptians continued to identify themselves with this party.²

The only other party that posed a challenge to the supremacy of the Wafd was the well organized and fanatical Muslim Brotherhood which was established in 1928 by Hassan Al-Banna. Al-Banna's program for reviving an Islamic society in Egypt appealed to the urban proletariat as well as the impoverished peasants, youth groups and numerous officers in both the police and army. The extreme fanaticism of the Brotherhood, as well as its inability to capitalize on several unfavorable developments in Egypt's history, especially the army's defeat at the hands of the Israelis in 1948, and the scandals of Farouk's faulty arms purchases, caused the Brotherhood to lose its chances for political victory and dominance.

¹Don Peretz, The Middle East Today (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 210.

²Ibid., p. 142.

By 1950 the general disorganization of Egyptian political and economic life had reached the point of crisis. It became clear that neither these two parties, nor the dozen or more others that existed in the country were strong or sincere enough to achieve reform and rid the country of its problems. The army was the only group that had the organization and the capability that were necessary for the accomplishment of a change in the situation. In 1952 a group of young officers under the leadership of Jamal Abd Al-Nasser engendered a bloodless coup that toppled the monarchy, and signaled an era of change that proved to be a turning point in Egyptian development.

The officers established a Revolutionary Command Council (R.C.C.), which immediately suspended all party activities and ordered them to temporarily disband. The R.C.C. promised, however, that the parties would be able to operate again after they had purged themselves of all corrupt elements.

By 1953 all attempts at political party reforms seemed to have failed. This failure gave the R.C.C. an excuse to prohibit all political parties and confiscate their funds. The R.C.C., however, was aware that the absence of parties would create a political vacuum that could prove to be fatal to the new regime. Consequently, the leadership decided to create a political organization which would involve all segments of the population and give them a semblance of political importance. The first attempt at the establishment of such an organization was the formation of the Liberation Rally whose publicized purpose

was to organize the people and create better citizens. Unlike any other party that previously existed in Egypt, it was intended to become an instrument of unity through which R.C.C. brought together student organizations, agrarian groups, labor organizations and other special groups. The Liberation Rally failed as a political and social organization and was replaced by the National Union which was entrusted with the achievement of similar goals. The National Union was dissolved in 1962 as a result of the separation of Syria from the United Arab Republic.

In spite of the failure of the first two attempts at creating a viable party structure Nasser continued to view large scale organizations as the main vehicle for progress in Egypt. This strong belief was the by-product of a distrust of individuals pursuing particularistic self interest. This he believed only increased conflict, impaired the efficiency of government and hindered the development of the economy which is the key to the solution of Egypt's problems.³ The establishment of a large national party capable of incorporating all groups within the society and providing them with the means of mass participation and indoctrination was viewed essential to his administration. Only through such a grass-roots party, which would promote conformity and harmony, could the regime achieve the support that would enhance its legitimacy as well as its capability to carry

³James Heaphy, "The Organization of Egypt: Inadequacies of a Non-Political Model for Nation-Building," World Politics, Vol. 18, Number 2 (January 1966), p. 179.

out the changes that are deemed necessary for the country's progress.

Nasser also believed that unless Egypt developed such a party its future would be in doubt.⁴ Egypt needed a viable large scale organization to provide it with a more permanent source of legitimacy than Nasser and his associates. This is why he relentlessly pursued this objective by forming the Arab Socialist Union in 1962. The purpose of the A.S.U., according to the by-laws, is "to represent the Socialist Vanguard of the revolution which leads the people, expresses their will, directs national action, and undertakes effective control of the purposes of such action, within the framework of the principles of the National Charter."⁵ This organization has continued to be the only recognized political party in the country and the major force in rural politics. It, however, like the Liberation Rally and the National Union before it failed to realize that harmony is hard to achieve in a large organization of such dimension. Harmony might easily be maintained in a small group but in a large organization conflict and the pursuit of self interest are hard to control, let alone eliminate.⁶

⁴Ibid., p. 190.

⁵U.A.R.: The Yearbook 1964 (Cairo: Information Department Press), p. 22.

⁶Heaphy, op. cit., p. 191.

Legitimacy

When the revolution took place in 1952, the majority of Egyptians had very little identification with the government. Governments were looked upon with suspicion and connected with exploitation and tyranny. Such an attitude has been perpetuated by centuries of exploitation on the part of the government and the landed aristocracy.

Nasser and his associates realized that the survival of the revolutionary regime necessitates the cultivation of support among the masses. Such an attempt meant convincing the suspicious majority of the disinherited poor of their good intentions and sincerity. Various attempts were immediately undertaken by the new regime in an effort to more closely associate the people with the government through the introduction of social and representative organizations associated with the national party.

The Liberation Rally, the National Union and A.S.U. have been used extensively in the regime's efforts at harnessing loyalty and mass support. They have been very active in organizing demonstrations and rallies; interpreted as symbols of solidarity. They have also been active in familiarizing the majority of rural Egyptians with the regime's plans for their welfare and the improvement of their conditions, in the hope of generating patience and needed cooperation for the success of these plans.

The party's efforts at associating the population more closely with its activities have not been as successful as the

regime had hoped. A large segment of the population remains skeptical about the effectiveness of the new system and about their role in it. Personal loyalty for Nasser, who has always been highly regarded by most Egyptians, rather than a belief in the effectiveness of party activity or organization have served as the main source of legitimacy for the regime. It is because of his charismatic leadership rather than his party's appeal that most middle class and poor Egyptians, both urban and rural, have become more liable to identify themselves with the government and the new national symbols. This is not to say that they have fully identified themselves with all acts of government. For most of them the affairs of government are still a private domain of President Nasser and his close associates. The public is well aware that for an outsider to have a say in major policy decisions is quite impossible.⁷ Nevertheless the regime of Nasser is trusted and his policies enjoy the confidence of most Egyptians.

The collapse of the United Arab Republic somewhat shook public confidence in Nasser and his regime. Nasser combatted this situation by a frank exposition of national difficulties to a preparatory national Congress in January 1962. This detailed exposition reassured many Egyptians of the President's sincerity and of his awareness of the faults of the system. The favorable public response to his exposition prompted him to declare the

⁷Leonard Binder, "Egypt: The Integrative Revolution," in Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba, Eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 400.

charter of National Action, in which he publicly condemned excessive executive power. The fact that the public was aware that Nasser was not condemning himself, but the aides who were surrounding him, did not lessen the effectiveness of the Charter. Whatever the people previously felt about the regime, they now began to feel that the president was honestly trying to establish some form of democratic control of national officers.⁸ The fact that the people consider Nasser's regime to be solidly Egyptian and free of foreign control has also added to increased public support, and decreased the chances of a successful challenge to its existence.

National Integration

Egypt has always had a gap between those who rule and those who are ruled. The Egyptian bureaucrats felt that they were a class apart from the common Egyptian, and that they are entitled to special privileges. This feeling has been one of the major sources of public alienation from the old regime, and Nasser intended to eliminate it. Welding the population into a nation with primary loyalties to the state has therefore been a priority on Nasser's list of essential accomplishments.⁹

The A.S.U., and its predecessors, through the incorporation of people from all segments of Egyptian society, and

⁸Tom Little, Modern Egypt (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), p. 23.

⁹U.S. Army Handbook for the United Arab Republic (Department of the Army Pamphlet, December, 1964), p. 239.

through its assurance for equitable representations for all, provides an excellent instrument for the future social and political integration of the Egyptian society. This future success, however, depends upon the role the A.S.U. will play. If it actually becomes a forum for the free expression and exchange of ideas, and if it facilitates effective communication between the ruler and the ruled, its chances of success in this area will undoubtedly be excellent.

The achievements of the national parties, especially the A.S.U., which is the best organized of the three attempts at party building, have been moderately successful in this area. Through work on projects related to the improvements of sanitation and health conditions, and the promotion of cooperatives and school building, the A.S.U. has been bringing the masses of peasants into closer contact with administrative personnel appointed to supervise the completion and operation of such projects. The election of representatives to the national congress has also been helpful in providing stimulus for integration. Contact with representatives from other communities as well as those representing other groups within the society will eventually lessen the hostility and resentment that has been present among the various strata of Egyptians.

The fact that the nationalist regime is honestly working for the development of the country in both the industrial and agricultural sectors will undoubtedly help the process of integration. The A.S.U. is already entrusted with a major portion of

the government's rural reform program and many small industrial projects in rural areas, both of which are contributing to the rise of a new class of citizens aware of major and distinct problems that will drive them into closer cooperation with the other segments of society, in an effort to solve them.

Some elements of the Wafd, the Muslim Brotherhood and a small communist group are active illegally. The A.S.U. has so far eliminated their danger by mobilizing the majority of the masses on the side of the regime and making them unavailable to opposition groups.¹⁰ Whether it will continue to do so, however, depends on the future incentives the party will provide, as the masses increase their demands and expectations.

Political Participation

Nasser constantly claims that his government is committed to the creation of a fully participant Egyptian society. His A.S.U., as a result, encourages the enrollment of people from all backgrounds in its various organizations, with the intention of providing them with grass-roots training for political participation in the future.¹¹ The government as well as the party believe that the masses, at the present time, are poorly prepared for full participation. This necessitates that Nasser

¹⁰Leonard Binder, "Political Recruitment and Participation in Egypt," in Political Parties and Political Development, Joseph LaPolambara and Myron Weiner, Editors (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 227.

¹¹U.S. Army Handbook for the United Arab Republic, op. cit., p. 189.

and his elite, who have the welfare of the masses in mind, personally formulate national goals and carry them out with the minimum possible degree of opposition and disruption. All major decisions, therefore, remain the domain of higher officials.

In 1956 the national assembly, which represented the various groups and organizations within the party, was authorized to initiate or amend legislation as well as summon and censure ministers. The members of the assembly were encouraged to express their opinions with relative freedom. It was tacitly understood, however, that the true sources of authority would remain with the government and that debates and discussions can proceed to a certain limit, but then they have to cease.¹² The political culture of the educated Egyptians is still determined by this understanding. They are well aware of the fact that they cannot participate in the major decisions of government; they can only respond to them in a favorable manner. Such restrictions have considerably hindered the efforts of the party among the more aware portions of the population. They continue to be skeptical and resentful of governmental restrictions on the popularly elected organizations.

The party has been successful in creating a sense of involvement on the part of the poorer and previously neglected masses. Peasants and laborers for the first time find themselves appealed to by the government and the party. The local councils

¹²Binder, "Egypt: The Integrative Revolution," op. cit., p. 402.

of the A.S.U. provide them with the opportunities to air their demands and complaints. The availability of 29,000 elected positions within the A.S.U. and the fact that such positions are hotly contested during the elections, adds to this feeling of involvement; a feeling that was not to be found in the old regime.

Political Socialization

The parties of monarchical Egypt, as demonstrated by the powerful Wafd, did not encourage social reform because of the opposition of its members.¹³ This lack of concern with the welfare of the masses was a major cause for the officer's revolt in 1952. The young officers were ill-prepared, however, and lacked a plan for social and economic reforms in the early years of the revolution. The task facing the R.C.C. seemed formidable, since the majority of the population had inherited a distrust of governments of all types. Social and political awareness among the majority of poor Egyptians was hardly developed and always overshadowed by religious fanaticism.

The new leadership was secular rather than Islamist in orientation, a factor that was to result in drastic changes in Egypt's social outlook. In spite of the fact that the early programs carried out by the R.C.C. were plans laid out by the Wafd party, the R.C.C. began to innovate and introduce drastic

¹³Binder, "Political Recruitment and Participation in Egypt," op. cit., p. 225.

changes in the outlook of the government and the society.¹⁴ On January 17, 1956 a new constitution was announced, and Egypt was declared a welfare state with a one party political system.

The establishment of the first national party marked the beginning of an elaborate attempt at political socialization. The Liberation Rally, however, had set its goals too high. Instead of slowly attempting to build a core of socially aware and politically involved citizens that could eventually fill the gap resulting from the lack of experienced social organizers, it attempted to mobilize millions within a few months.¹⁵ It, however, achieved some success in mobilizing popular support for the new government and was very instrumental in pioneering health and social welfare programs as well as relief work throughout some 1,200 Liberation Rally Centers. Unlike the Wafd and most other parties in the old regime the Liberation Rally had active youth centers that were involved in nationwide mass education programs, as well as political indoctrination. Such programs have been stressed more strenuously in the Arab Socialist Union, Nasser's latest attempt at party building. The U.S.U. with its doctrines of Arab Socialism which emphasize rapid social as well as economic growth greatly stressed mass political indoctrination that attempt to promote personal sacrifices for the benefit of the community. The masses are being persuaded that, in Egypt, no

¹⁴Binder, "Egypt: The Integrative Revolution," op. cit., p. 399.

¹⁵Halpern, op. cit., pp. 309-310.

one can make a gain unless the collectivity can make a gain first.¹⁶

The family and schools continue to be the major means of socialization in Modern Egypt. The A.S.U. and its branches, however, are becoming a major force in the political socialization of its members, especially the younger generation and the peasants. It is here that the new political symbols and standards of loyalty to the nation are explained and discussed. The A.S.U. is the main instrument of political involvement in rural communities. It stresses equality and helps solve local problems. Members from all walks of life are gradually learning to recognize the same symbols, for the first time in the country's modern history, as a result of the efforts of the A.S.U. Many have been convinced of the importance of discipline and sacrifice as aids to national progress and solidarity. Such attitudes were not present because the national symbols and goals have not been very well understood. This is not to contend that a majority of the people of Egypt do recognize the new symbols and understand the national goals. On the contrary, most of them do not understand them very well.¹⁷ The A.S.U., however, is achieving some progress in this area.

The role of the A.S.U. as an instrument of political socialization can be greatly strengthened by increasing its

¹⁶Heaphy, op. cit., p. 177.

¹⁷Zartman, op. cit., p. 123.

independence at the local levels and by increasing the role of the locally elected officials. Such a move will eventually result in increased political confidence on the part of local officials and party members; it is by creating politically socialized villages, towns and provinces that national loyalty and stability is guaranteed.

Conflict Management

The R.C.C. established a one party autocratic state. It abolished all opposition parties on January 16, 1953. Nasser and his aids believed that the numerous Egyptian parties that existed before the coup were the cause of unnecessary conflict within the society. They were a symbol of the corrupt past that had to be destroyed before they could spread their subversive and reactionary ideas among the members of the new regime. The ban on party activities did not necessarily mean that they were completely out of the political scene. Small elements of some of the old parties still operate, though clandestinely. Their following, however, is very small and constantly decreasing (except for the communist party whose membership fluctuates depending on Soviet-Egyptian relations).

The A.S.U., like the parties before it, has very little to do with moderating conflicts on the national level. The small elite that is working closely with President Nasser are in full charge. They channel demands as they see fit within the framework of national interests as conceived by the president. Although they allow limited discussions and moderate criticisms

of cabinet officials, they frown upon, to say the least, any strong opposition directed toward the president's policies. This strict control on the national level is counter-balanced by a semblance of democratic leniency on the local level. Here local representatives of the A.S.U. can initiate, debate or oppose local policies at will.

The police measures, applied by the government against its major opponents, have driven most of them underground. Seventeen years of effective control has resulted in the disintegration of most organized opposition, except for the Muslim Brotherhood which is still successful in generating limited support among the religious and traditional elements of the society. The Brotherhood, however, has been greatly weakened by constant police harassment.

The upper middle class and rich landlords, have, for a long time, been a major source of opposition to Nasser's socialist policies. By concentrating on improvements that were meant to benefit the poor, and by stripping the rich of the mainstay of their power, their land and properties, Nasser managed to neutralize their effectiveness. This skillful and experienced master tactician has also been successful in eliminating opposition within his ruling elite. Periodical purges have nearly eliminated any possibility of disobedience in the upper hierarchy of Egyptian politics.

Political Recruitment

The membership of the A.S.U. is recruited from all segments of the population. The 1964 Constitution specifically states that the national assembly has to be composed of at least half peasants and workers. Two members have to be elected from each of the 175 geographical constituencies and in cases where at least one is not a peasant or worker another election will have to be held. The elected members of the assembly have to be active in the A.S.U. for at least one year. In addition to the 350 elected members there are ten that are appointed by the president.

Nasser's regime forbids a few of the old rich, the army, members of the Civil Service, and the judiciary from joining the A.S.U. This policy seems to be intended for the preservation of fairness in elections at all levels of political activities. Nasser believes that the rich and members of the army, judiciary and bureaucracy could wield influences that would render elections unfair.

The highest levels of recruitment by the A.S.U. is not to the administration, but to the national assembly. Very few of the higher administrative leaders, so far, have risen through party channels. At the present time the army and bureaucracy seem to overshadow the A.S.U. as an important channel for filling administrative and advisory positions.

A change is necessary in the recruitment policies of the regime if the A.S.U. is to escape the fate of the previous two

parties of revolutionary Egypt. Incentives in the form of prestigious and influential positions in government are necessary for the reward of efficient and capable members of the party. The lack of such rewards will drive capable and ambitious members to concentrate their efforts on other more rewarding channels of success.

CHAPTER V

LEBANON

The present state of Lebanon was created by France in 1920. Within the boundaries of this state the French included over fifteen ethnic and religious groups. The last census, which was taken in 1932 showed that the largest groups were the Maronite Christians (30%), Sunni Muslims (22%), Shi'a Muslims (18%), Greek Orthodox Christians (10%), Druz (6%), Greek Catholics (6%), while the rest included a variety of ethnic and religious minorities.¹ The 1932 census indicated the presence of a slight Christian majority. The Muslims at the present time are insisting on a new census, which they believe will establish them as the majority group in the country. The Christians oppose a new census for the same reason.

Religious and ethnic differences are not the only striking features of the Lebanese state. The extreme regionalism of the country is equally important, especially when one takes into account the fact that the various religious communities are concentrated in small traditional areas. Lebanon's regional differences are further accentuated by differences in the stages of

¹Ralph E. Crow, "Religious Sectarianism in the Lebanese Political System," Journal of Politics, Vol. 24, Number 3 (August 1962), p. 519.

economic development. Mount Lebanon, excluding the Chouf region is by far the most advanced; followed by South Lebanon and Beka'a.²

In order to ensure equitable representation in a country that lacks a dominant majority, the leadership of the country as represented by Bishara el-Khoury, the Maronite President, and Riad es-Solh, the Sunni Premier agreed upon a "National Pact" in 1943. This agreement was to become the unwritten document that regulated Lebanon's political activity ever since. It allocated all government and representative offices on the basis of six Christians to five Muslims.

Lebanon's confessional division has greatly hindered the development of effective national parties. Confessionalism necessitates that sectarian interests should be placed ahead of any other interest or ideology. The first parties in Lebanon were formed around members of leading families in the various confessions. Not until the late 1940's did parties with ideologies and concrete party platforms begin to be slowly accepted. Parties such as the Syrian Social National Party (PPS), Communists, Ba'athists, and Arab Nationalists have rarely succeeded in enlisting significant national support. The fact that

² As cited in Michael W. Suleiman, Political Parties in Lebanon: The Challenge of a Fragmented Political Culture (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1967), p. 26. This observation was pointed out through a study conducted by the Irfed Institute in Paris. Its findings were published in Summary Form in Arabic under the title, Lubnan Yuwajih Tenmiyatuh (Lebanon Faces Its Development) (Beirut: Ma'had At-Tadreeb ala-Inma', 1963).

they are not strictly Lebanese in allegiance resulted in restrictions on their activities and a refusal to grant them a legal status in Lebanese politics. Such restrictions have contributed to minimizing their influence and curbing large successful membership recruitment.

Political Legitimacy

The Lebanese political system enjoys what might be called neutral legitimacy. Confessionalism is not strongly approved nor strongly opposed.³ The system is accepted by the various sects because of the realization that any solution that would favor one sect over another will never be accepted.

All the exclusively Lebanese parties have accepted the political system although they continuously try to initiate changes, within its framework in an effort to tip the scale of influence in their favor. The transnational parties, on the other hand, have not accepted the system at all and are continually trying to change Lebanon into a completely different entity.⁴

³Leonard Binder, "Political Change in Lebanon," in Politics in Lebanon, Leonard Binder, Editor (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966), p. 309.

⁴Michael W. Suleiman, op. cit., divides Lebanese parties into four categories: (1) Transnational Parties: Non-Pan-Arab Organization. This includes: The Lebanese Communist Party (LCP), and The Syrian Social Nationalist Party (PPS); (2) Transnational Parties; Arab Resurrection Socialist Party (Ba'ath), and The Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM); (3) Religious and Ethnic Organizations. This group includes the Dashnak Party, The Hunchak Party, and The Ramagavar Azadagan Party; (4) Exclusively Lebanese Parties, which he divides into two groups (a) Parties with Muslim Druz Preponderance. This group includes An-Najjada Party, The Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), and the National appeal and National Organization Parties; (b) Parties with Christian

This open refusal to accept Lebanon as it is has resulted in a refusal to grant such parties a charter that would entitle them to work freely. The illegal nature of these parties, combined with the fact that loyalty to political organizations in Lebanon comes next to loyalty to the family and the religious groups, has resulted in confining their influence and effectiveness.⁵

The exclusively Lebanese parties, by virtue of accepting to work within such a specified governmental structure, have indirectly given this unique system, an aura of legitimacy. Out of these parties, the Christian-oriented ones, usually, demonstrate a greater inclination to preserve Lebanon's confessional character. The Muslim parties of Lebanon, on the other hand, accept confessional Lebanon with a hope that some day they will gain a majority that will enable them to peacefully change it.⁶

Political Integration

The establishment of "Greater Lebanon" in 1920, though it brought the country closer to achieving economic viability, has caused it to lose its internal cohesion. Although Lebanon is a very small country, and although the majority of its population is ethnically and linguistically Arab (except for a minority of Armenians and Kurds), social and religious cleavages have posed a

Preponderance. This group includes Phalanges Libanais (Al-Kataib), The Constitutional Union and National Bloc Parties, and the National Liberal's Party.

⁵Fuad I. Khuri, "The Changing Class Structure in Lebanon," Middle East Journal, Vol. 23, Number 1 (Winter 1969), p. 40.

⁶Suleiman, op. cit., p. 294.

tremendous obstacle to any efforts at national integration. Religious groups still concentrate in traditional regions. Only Beirut can claim to represent a cross-section of the population. This regional concentration of religious groups has often bolstered isolationist and secessionist tendencies. The Sunnis, until recently, have often threatened to break away and join Syria. Some Maronites, on the other hand, still advocate turning Mount Lebanon into a Christian preserve under Western protection.⁷

From the first years of independence conflicts have been both regional and religious. The major groups in these conflicts have been the Sunni Muslims and the Maronite Catholics; the other minorities have held and maintained the balance between them.⁸ Suspicion, hatred and intrigue, however, are not confined to Christian-Muslim relations, but abound among the various sects of both religions.

Not only is Lebanon divided along religious and ethnic lines, present day Lebanon is also plagued by class antagonism and suspicion. Half of the country's population receives only 18% of the national income, while 4% receives 32%. Such a wide disparity in income and social standards would normally create tensions and upheavals that would threaten the political system.

⁷Ibid., p. 27.

⁸Ibid., p. 17.

In Lebanon such tensions have been buried and forgotten because of religious and ethnic hostilities.⁹

The Confessional and class divisions are reflected in the compositions of the parties. Lebanon's political parties are divided along class and religious lines. As a result of such divisions the Lebanese parties have not been able to transform the society, but rather, by adapting its archaic structures have reinforced the existing social patterns of division. Most of the Lebanese parties are a hindrance to, rather than instruments of, national integration.

National integration in Lebanon is still a difficult goal to achieve. The political parties of the country have occupied themselves with traditional jealousies and conflicts and in the process deprived the Lebanese body politic of a basic mechanism for integration and development. The restrictions placed on the activities of ideological parties by the government, and by a population that is more concerned with religious and family ties, have impeded the development of such parties into a political force capable of attracting a cross-national following.

The Lebanese society, as a result of family, regional and religious allegiances, has been driven further apart instead of becoming integrated.¹⁰ This trend toward disintegration is

⁹Ibid., p. 275.

¹⁰Binder, "Political Change in Lebanon," op. cit., p. 303.

not limited to inter-confessional relations, but extends within each sect, especially in connection with elite-mass relations. Only the Maronite elite have succeeded in developing strong links with their masses.¹¹

Political Participation

The confessional arrangement in Lebanon resulted in a serious attitude toward politics. Most members of the various confessions found it necessary to get politically involved, and to compete vigorously for public office. They found out that taking an active role in the political process is essential for the protection of their particular interests.

Lebanon is a unique entity in the Middle East. It is one of the few states, in the area, that guarantees the freedom of association and expression.¹² Every Lebanese is free to join any one of more than seventeen political parties or blocs. This permissive attitude, however, is limited in nature. Transnational parties are not legal, and are periodically harassed by the government. Only those who accept the status quo are allowed to participate in the political process.

A closer look at the Lebanese political picture reveals a second weakness in its process of participation. Although the Muslims in Lebanon constitute at the present time a majority, the distribution of administrative and representative offices is

¹¹Ibid., p. 299.

¹²Edward Shils, "The Prospect for Lebanese Civility," in Binder, Editor, Politics in Lebanon, op. cit., p. 1.

still based on a multiple of eleven, giving the Christians six seats to every five for the Muslims. This distribution is based on the 1932 census, which is no longer indicative of composition of the populations. Muslims have been known to have a higher rate of population growth and many Christians have been emigrating to the Americas, Australia and Africa.

A third weakness in the participation process is the result of traditional influences. Modern Lebanon in spite of its affluence is still a traditional society. Political parties are still dominated by traditional zu'ama (leaders), belonging to traditionally prominent families. It is they who control the destiny of the country in the name of the different religious groups. The fact that none of the political parties controls a majority in parliament, leaves the president with the power of decision in the appointment of a premier, as well as other high offices. Members of parliament, who are basically zu'ama, are therefore apt to sacrifice the welfare of their constituents in their efforts to gain his favor.

Recent trends have shown considerable improvements in the channels of access to power. In 1964, for instance, the Lebanese went to the polls in record numbers. Voting increased by 14% over the total of 1960, and many of the zu'ama were defeated by a new class of professionals.¹³ Increased education

¹³Michael C. Hudson, "The Electoral Process and Political Development in Lebanon," Middle East Journal, Vol. 20, Number 2 (Spring 1966), p. 179.

and a dissatisfaction with the status quo have been major causes for this trend. The extension of suffrage to women, in 1953, has also helped in increasing the number of voters. This increase is not a recent trend. However, voter turnout has been increasing about equally in all sections of the country since 1953.¹⁴ Participation, unfortunately is limited to the polls. Individuals remain skeptical about their role in the affairs of government, and confessional parties continue to play upon and dominate the sentiments of the people.

Political Socialization

Upon independence, in 1943, the Lebanese leadership found itself confronted with a population divided religiously as well as regionally. The various groups within the country were extremely conscious of their distinct identities and generally lacked a feeling of unity and belonging, except in relation to the family, sect or region. All other groups and institutions were regarded with utmost suspicion. Individuals were taught to seek, primarily, the interests and welfare of their own groups.

Confessional antagonisms and manipulations by traditional zu'ama have resulted in cynicism toward politics and ideologies. To be serious about politics one has to take ideas seriously. To most Lebanese, however, ideas are something to talk about rather than try to accomplish. Such an attitude toward politics and ideology has been strengthened by the fact

¹⁴Ibid., p. 284.

that most ideologies oppose family, sectarian and regional ties--the ties that most Lebanese trust.¹⁵

Lebanese political parties tend to reinforce the fragmentation of the society. To a great extent, the press is dominated by the various political parties and interest groups, thus resulting in the absence of a neutral system of communication.¹⁶ The role of the parties play in the process of socialization is more of a particularistic rather than a universalistic one. The Lebanese is constantly reminded that the welfare of his region, family or sect is more important than that of the political system.¹⁷

Confessionalism has inhibited the evolution of a genuine party system in Lebanon, and divided the country in rigid lines.¹⁸ Such a rigid confessional division in political competition has resulted in the lack of a dominant party in the legislature. None of Lebanon's parties has been able to capture enough seats to enable it to form a strong enough bloc capable of remolding and redirecting the country's destiny.¹⁹ At times, some political combinations are formed. They, however, pursue limited and expedient objectives, but usually disappear once

¹⁵Khuri, op. cit., pp. 40-41.

¹⁶Suleiman, op. cit., p. 285.

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 284-285.

¹⁸Fahim Qubain, Crises in Lebanon (Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1961), p. 21.

¹⁹Suleiman, op. cit., p. XV.

those objectives have been achieved. The absence of well-organized parties with a large cross-sectional and inter-sectarian following has hindered the development of amity and cooperation within the community.

To this date the Lebanese political parties have paid very little attention to political education and socialization on a national basis. Their only interest has been the perpetuation of the influence of particular confessions. An exception can be made in regard to transnational parties. Such parties, however, have not been very successful in breaking the religious barriers.

The exclusively Lebanese parties seem to be working for political socialization within their own groups, thus increasing particularistic loyalties and views. They are usually propagating rigid views that do not allow for meaningful and permanent solutions.²⁰ Suspicions and competition for power have indirectly contributed to the development of the country. All groups compete for educational achievement as well as economic improvements. Such competition has contributed to the creation of an affluent society. As the economic situation improves, the country's achievements will undoubtedly become a symbol of pride that might bring the nation together.

²⁰Ibid., p. 286.

Conflict Management

Lebanon's multi-religious society necessitated the development of a flexible and compromising administration that would be capable of coping with particularistic demands. This flexibility within the administration, rather than the influence of political parties, kept the country from breaking up.²¹ This is not to say that the leadership of the parties did not approve of such flexibility. They have found it necessary, especially since parliament is not designed to efficiently cope with severe conflicts and solve them before they endanger the stability of the country.

Even a flexible administrative structure often collapses when faced with the type of conflicts that plague Lebanon. Lebanon's confessional groups, in order to strengthen their position, have often allowed regional or international interests to exert influences on their operations. Such outside interference has often added to the inter-confessional aggravation and resulted in internal chaos, as exemplified by the 1958 civil war. To further complicate the situation the country is faced with problems resulting from the presence of about 200,000 Palestinian refugees. This group is not allowed to participate in Lebanese political life. The Palestinian community has its own leadership and does not seem to be concerned with the preservation of the confessional balance that places restrictions on its activities.

²¹Peretz, op. cit., p. 329.

Conflict in Lebanon, as mentioned before, is not limited to inter-confessional relations. It is present within each sect because of the intensive rivalry for parliamentary and administrative positions. Such positions are craved for their lucrativeness and for the privileges they accord to the leaders.²² The administration managed to increase the number of legislators from sixty-six to ninety-nine members in an effort to reduce intra-sectarian conflicts. By increasing the number, it was hoped, the top leaders would be appeased.

Sectarian hostilities have, undoubtedly, been on the decrease. This decrease, however, has been the result of individual efforts on the part of the growing middle class, rather than the parties or sects; collectively there still are profound differences in the aspirations and goals of the various groups. The Maronites feel that the rising tide of Arab nationalism poses a grave threat to the Lebanese identity that they have tried to preserve; they believe that Lebanese independence should be preserved at all costs. Some extremists are even willing to relinquish the predominantly Muslim regions in order to preserve a Christian Lebanon.²³ The more moderate Christians strongly disagree with such extremist views and believe that Lebanon's prosperity and viability can only be maintained by its ability

²²Leila M. T. Meo, Lebanon: Improbable Nation (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966), p. 117.

²³Hisham Sharabi, Government and Politics of the Middle East in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: D. Van Norstrand Company, Inc., 1962), p. 137.

to accommodate itself within the Arab World.²⁴ Moderate leaders of the other sects are also inclined to promote such a view.

Political Recruitment

Confessional parties tend to confine their recruitment activities to members of their own confession. Recently Lebanese parties have been attempting to enroll members of other sects within their organizations, however. Even the Phalangist Party has been urging Muslims to join its ranks. Confessional parties, like the transnational parties before them, have only been moderately successful in this area.

Only the national parties are allowed to run candidates for the legislatures. The candidates they nominate are usually influential zu'ama, since the leadership of political parties is reserved for members of old established families around which the sectarian parties have been formed. The exuberant cost of an electoral campaign has also contributed to such a domination. In the absence of strong mass parties the average individual found himself unable to compete with the resources of the established elite.²⁵ The domination of Lebanese parliament by the zu'ama is clearly demonstrated by the fact that out of ninety-nine deputies only a small minority can be labeled as true party representatives, belonging to the professional class.²⁶ The rise

²⁴Ibid., p. 138.

²⁵Suleiman, op. cit., p. 48.

²⁶Arnold Hattinger, "Zu'ama in Historical Perspective," in Binder, Editor, Politics in Lebanon, op. cit., p. 85.

of a middle and professional class in recent years, however, has threatened the domination of the zu'ama. Though most of the old sectarian leaders have been retained in recent elections, many of them have been seriously challenged by a new element of a younger and more progressive generation.²⁷ Future elections will undoubtedly bring in a larger number of middle class professionals that might present a greater challenge to the existing order.

The recruitment of administrative personnel is not regarded as a function of political parties despite its close relation to the functions of competition in normal party government. Here again confessional representation is strongly observed. The Personnel Law of 1959 reiterated the constitutional provision for equitable representation of the religious communities, though it advised the civil service council to follow a new formula of appointing one Muslim to one Christian. This revision did not help all of the Lebanese communities. Overrepresentation of the two larger religious sects, the Maronites and the Sunnis, is still the case, and is accomplished at the expense of other religious groups.²⁸ Recruitment policies though ostensibly concerned with both the preservation of confessional balance as well as acquiring capable administrators tends to stress the preservation of balance, hence national harmony, at the expense of acquiring capable administrators.

²⁷Sharabi, op. cit., p. 142.

²⁸Crow "Confessionalism, Public Administration, and Efficiency in Lebanon," in Binder, Editor, Politics in Lebanon, op. cit., p. 172.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Political development in any society is greatly dependent upon the nature of the political institutions, with which it attempts to control public demands. Political parties have been recognized as necessary institutions in any viable political system. They could, by virtue of providing channels of two-way communication, act as principal agents in assuring: the legitimacy of the political system; its integration; popular political participation in the process of decision-making; the political socialization of the greater segment of the population; the peaceful management of conflict; and the recruitment of elites into the policy and decision-making apparatus.

Political development is also dependent upon the ability of a system to develop reasonably well-organized political parties capable of capturing a wide base of popular support, and involvement early in the struggle for political development. Parties that succeed in such an effort are likely to be successful in coping with the crises of political development and assuring a stable and viable political system; political stability is closely related to the development of effective political institutions and the mobilization of new social forces into the service of the society as well as the political system.

It is also evident that the functioning and contributions of political parties to the developmental process vary with the social and political pressures that have been imposed upon them, both internally and externally. Such pressures are major factors in shaping the structure of the parties, the type of membership they solicit, and their political effectiveness.

The party-systems that have been dealt with experienced varying degrees of success in coping with the related aspects of political development. The mass political parties of Tunisia and Egypt, for instance, seem to have successfully coped with the crisis of legitimacy. A new order has been successfully instituted and the regimes of Bourguiba and Nasser seem to command the loyalty of the majority of their respective populations. A closer look at both regimes, however, reveals that such loyalty has not been accorded as a result of the conscious efforts of the political parties, but because of the popularity and charismatic appeal of Habib Bourguiba and Gamal Abdul Nasser. The rank and file in those two countries identify themselves with the leaders more than they do with the party structure.

In Morocco and Lebanon, on the other hand, one finds a lack of consensus about legitimacy. Lebanon exists, and will continue to exist in the near future, not because the poorly organized sectarian parties have contributed to its acceptance, but because there is no other acceptable alternative to the present form of government, whose change would result in civil disorder and violence. The lukewarm acceptance of the Lebanese

system of government by the antagonistic sects (represented by the various parties) is not adequate in the face of growing internal and external pressures. Lebanon needs to rid itself of the confessional character of its parties, and replace them with parties that can appeal to and capture national support if it is to become viable and assure future stability.

Morocco has had a monarchy that enjoyed and continues to enjoy traditional legitimacy. The Istiqlal, as well as the other parties in the country, did not challenge the monarchy at the outset of independence, and were willing to work within its framework. The refusal of the monarchy, under Muhammad V, to delegate power to party officials and the subsequent repressive policies of Hassan II, have created resentment among some of the newly established parties, especially the NUPF, which began to question the desirability of the monarchical institutions. The legitimacy of the monarchy, however, had not been challenged by the majority of the population and wide support continued to be prevalent, especially in the rural areas and among most of the traditional party leaders, who continue to compete for the king's favor. The continuation of repression against the king's opponents and challengers, however, poses a threat to the stability of the regime. The leadership of the parties that have demanded a constitutional monarchy have either been arrested or driven into hiding and clandestine resistance. Such groups are gaining wider support among the disenchanted newly educated youth, who are demanding a bigger voice than the monarchy is willing to grant them at the present.

The parties of Tunisia and Egypt have been more effective instruments of political integration at the lower levels of society. They have, through conscious, cooperative efforts, succeeded in bringing previously antagonistic regions, villages and groups into a working relationship that greatly reduced their traditional feeling of hostility and mistrust. The Neo-Destour of Tunisia also succeeded in establishing closer and continuous contact between the masses and elite. However, it has yet to successfully bring the disinherited and inaccessible areas of the country into the mainstream of Tunisian politics. Failure to do so might prove detrimental to stability and to orderly development. The A.S.U. of Egypt, in spite of its success in bringing the masses closer together, has not been as successful in bridging the gap between the masses and elite who continue to confine themselves to activities in the major cities, and resent working or consulting with the uneducated villagers. This lack of contact will undoubtedly have far reaching consequences, when Nasser, the idol of the peasants, leaves or is replaced by a less popular leader.

The Lebanese and Moroccan parties have experienced what resembles total failure in this area. The party structures in both countries have not been conducive to integration. The political parties of these countries continue to espouse particularistic goals, and generate demands that strengthen the feelings of alienation and competition among the various ethnic, religious, or social groups within the society. As a consequence, hostility

and a lack of interaction continue to be major elements in the political process.

In all four countries, in spite of a growing tendency to participate in elections, these elections continue to be meaningless semblances of democracy. In order for them to be meaningful they require competence and a degree of influence on the choice of candidates and on the formulation of policies and decisions; two prerequisites that have been absent in all of them. A semblance of participation was allowed and encouraged at the local level in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco. These local political activities, however, were not allowed to interfere with the national decision-making process, which was and continues to be controlled by a distinct group of elites directly responsible to Bourguiba, Nasser, or King Hassan II. In Lebanon the electorate was restricted in its choice to a few traditional representatives, who were later free to bargain for their own benefits, within a prescribed political framework rather than the framework of public interest. The fact that none of the regimes that have been dealt with has responded to popular demands threatens to increase public apathy and resentment, especially among the urban masses. The attitudes of the present elites have to change; elected officials should be given a bigger voice in the decision-making and policy formulation processes, if continued support is to be guaranteed.

The parties of Tunisia and Egypt have been most successful as instruments of political socialization. They have been

very active at all levels of society, propagating the goals, symbols and ideals of their respective regimes, and have succeeded in creating a greater sense of confidence in government. To the majority of rural Tunisians and Egyptians, the government is no longer an exploiter but a trusted guardian of their interests. The success of the Neo-Destour and A.S.U. in this area was due to a large extent to the identification of Bourguiba and Nasser with the national party, and to the fact that the parties were given great human and financial subsidies, as well as a great degree of incentive and freedom, in order to achieve this goal.

This has not been the case in the multi-party systems of Morocco and Lebanon, where parties have been more involved in the advancement of particularistic interests, rather than the propagation of national symbols or political confidence in the government. The party leaderships of these countries have not deemed the socialization process as essential to the survival of the state or the regime.

The Neo-Destour party of Tunisia, and the parties of Lebanon seem to be reasonably successful in the area of conflict management. Although the Lebanese parties are not specifically involved in the process of accommodating conflicting interests, and the incorporation of a variety of constituent demands into meaningful party programs, a function often found in the Neo-Destour, the fact that the leaderships of the various parties are forced to compromise and accommodate individual and confessional demands for fear of disturbing the delicate political balance in

the system, gives the Lebanese parties an important role in this area.

In both Morocco and Egypt, on the other hand, authoritarian measures, rather than party accommodations have been the main instruments for minimizing conflict. Although open violence against members of the opposition has been more of a factor in Moroccan than Egyptian politics, the Egyptian elite have not been hesitant in using repressive measures to silence any major opposition to the national government. Such measures have not been conducive to the institutionalization of effective mechanisms for the peaceful solution of conflict, an essential element in the process of political development in any society.

The Neo-Destour was the only party that played a significant role in the political recruitment process. Promotions to higher civil service positions have always been open to active and capable party members. Bourguiba has been successful in convincing his "old guard" to share power with the new and educated party members. In Morocco, Lebanon, and Egypt, recruitment to the bureaucracy, as well as other administrative positions, was not based upon party affiliation and activity. In Egypt the highest positions that could be acquired through the A.S.U. is election to the ineffective National Assembly, while members of the army and bureaucracy are given preference in the higher and more responsible positions. In Lebanon, on the other hand, recruitment was strictly based upon religious affiliation, while Moroccan

political recruitment was plagued by nepotism and the demand for loyalty to the king.

The weakness of the parties discussed in the previous chapters stems from both internal and external factors that have to be remedied if they are to fulfill the expectations and needs of these under-developed countries. Substantive political development cannot take place without political parties; political parties are essential mechanisms for political involvement and awareness within a modern institutional framework that is capable of aggregating as well as effectively channeling political action. The parties discussed above do not adequately fulfill such requirements. They were either narrow parties based on elitist, religious or social interests (Lebanon, and Morocco), or mass parties that were hampered by both internal and external restrictions (Tunisia and Egypt). Consequently the parties in these countries not only revealed many deficiencies in both organization and utility, but also a clear indication that unless drastic changes take place in the near future, these parties are not likely to develop the organizational capabilities that will allow them to play a major and constructive role in the promotion of orderly political development.

What is needed in these societies is a change of approach toward politics in general, and political development in particular. The governments of Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt and Lebanon seem to be convinced of the need for rapid political mobilization, but are not willing to change their views regarding the

organizational structure and functions of their political institutions. Societies attempting to break away from the traditional modes of behavior that have continuously resisted change require more flexible and independent parties that can easily adjust to the rapid and genuine demands for change that are characteristic of developing societies. Such parties cannot be based on limited appeal to distinct groups within a society (as one finds in Lebanon and to some extent in Morocco), nor can they be imposed upon society in the hope that they will fill a vacuum that should be filled by grass roots parties reflecting the needs of the society as a whole rather than its elite (as is the case in Egypt).

What is needed in those countries are parties that have distinct and popular ideologies, platforms and programs; parties that can act not merely as a mouthpiece for a distinct group within society, but as a genuine promoter of the interests of a variety of groups reflecting all facets of social commitment and inclination. The parties discussed earlier demonstrated weaknesses that can only be remedied if they are allowed more freedom both from traditional interests and government interference. This will enable them to adopt programs entailing drastic structural changes that would increase their organizational capabilities and enable them to ward off illegitimate governmental pressures.

A great need exists, therefore, for highly organized, complex, and institutionalized parties that cannot only influence but direct political development. Parties of this type are

necessary for the aggregation of interest and the moderation of demands for change; only then can they direct demands into acceptable patterns of political behavior. Without parties, demands would be more intense and disorganized, hence less effective if not dysfunctional to political development.

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POLITICAL PARTIES AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
IN THE ARAB WORLD: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
OF TUNISIA, MOROCCO, EGYPT AND LEBANON

by

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POLITICAL PARTIES AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE ARAB WORLD

Political development in any state, whether new or old, is greatly dependent upon the nature and function of its institutions. Political parties could be counted among the most important of these institutions by virtue of their proximity to the public and by virtue of serving as channels of two-way communication within the society.

It was the purpose of this thesis to examine the assumption that only broadly-based political parties, possessing a substantial measure of freedom in both external operation and internal structures, can play a major role in the process of political development. Four dissimilar party systems of Middle Eastern and North African Arab states (Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt and Lebanon) were examined in relation to: (1) political legitimacy; (2) political integration; (3) political participation; (4) political socialization; (5) conflict management; (6) political recruitment, in an effort to determine the validity of the above-mentioned assumption.

The parties examined have experienced varying degrees of success in coping with the demands of political development. This variation in effectiveness was congruent with differences in the social and political pressures exerted upon the parties, both externally and internally. Such pressures have been decisive in

by their public espousal of elaborate schemes for the development of their respective societies, of which political development is an integral part.

Of the countries chosen, Tunisia and the United Arab Republic have one party political systems. Tunisia's single party has been an integral part of the country's political scene long before independence. Its long history, and major contributions to the struggle for independence, have given it the status, experience and confidence that enable it to play a major role in all aspects of Tunisian life. The United Arab Republic, on the other hand, has a single party that is relatively new, and that has been imposed upon the nation by the ruling hierarchy.

Morocco and Lebanon both possess multiparty political systems. These two systems are also completely different. In Morocco the Istiqlal controls a majority of popular support by virtue of its struggle for independence and its support of the monarchy. Lebanon, on the other hand, has numerous sectarian parties, none of which can command a clear majority of popular support.

The lack of sufficient recent information necessitated the utilization of party developments and activities that have occurred prior to 1966. It is the author's belief, however, that a definite pattern of development has already been established to make conclusions possible and applicable to the future.