

IBN KHALDUN AND MACHIAVELLI:
AN EXAMINATION OF PARADIGMS

by

JOHN H. MILLER

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Approved by:


Major Professor

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"Time wears us out . . . But He lasts and persists."

Ibn Khaldun, 1377

"I love my country more than my soul."

Niccolo Machiavelli, 1527

"Studying the thinkers of the past becomes essential for men living in an age of intellectual decline because it is the only practicable way in which they can recover a proper understanding of the fundamental problems."

Leo Strauss, 1952

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem

Ibn Khaldun, an Islamic political thinker living in the fourteenth century, and Niccolo Machiavelli, an Italian political thinker of the fifteenth century, both chose to observe affairs objectively. Both men distinguished themselves from their scholastic contemporaries by treating social affairs within a frame of reference which emphasized actual, rather than ideal, behavior. However, there is an essential difference between the two men which influences how each, ultimately, perceived "everything political." Machiavelli rejected idealism for realism, whereas Ibn Khaldun acknowledged the validity and importance of both.¹

Machiavelli considered "what ought to be" as an inappropriate and inadequate guide for conducting "business" in a world of "what is done." To Ibn Khaldun, "what ought to be" is as valid as "what is," and the two should never be separated if the quality which is prescribed in the ideal is to constitute the practical conduct of "business." This

distinct difference in the constitution of both men's political world views ultimately affects how each thinker perceived things. The conceptual difference explains why Machiavelli could condone any action (even if morally reprehensible) that would accomplish his political goals. Much of what Machiavelli sanctioned, Ibn Khaldun, who was faithful to Muslim ethics, would have seen as evil and bound to recoil not only on the offender but on the state as a whole.

In a narrow sense, both Machiavelli and Ibn Khaldun can be seen as sharing an "impartial empiricism" in their observation of politics. Both men, in this respect, sought truth by examining political reality. Their similar effort to observe reality empirically was unique in their times.² Yet, no scientist enters any study of things political without having his intellectual pursuits influenced by concepts.³ Both men sought truth in their observations of political reality, but the truth which each man apprehended largely was a function of how he conceptually understood things. Their values cannot be totally excluded from an assessment or judgment of things observable. All factual propositions developed by Ibn Khaldun and Machiavelli depended upon the world view or concept which each thinker brought to his situation. Therefore, what each man saw as political behavior in his society's present and past, and the political behavior which each prescribed, are both functions of what is accepted and employed conceptually.⁴

Ibn Khaldun and Machiavelli saw that it was necessary for the political communities to aspire to what each concept endorsed as a "concrete end" for its own practical good. The thinkers differed, however, in whether the practical end was an end unto itself--as in Machiavelli's case--or whether the practical end of the community must

further answer to a higher philosophical or religious Good--as with Ibn Khaldun. The character of these values--either sacred or profane--not only shows how different political "physicians" go about healing the patient differently but also, in the end, will determine the quality of the "health" of each political "patient."

To the modern political philosopher Leo Strauss, political paradigms--what he refers to as "regimes"--are the internal ordering of a political community by what purposes will be pursued.⁵ Like Strauss, Sheldon Wolin also sees the political society itself as a paradigm of "an operative kind." The society or paradigm in this sense is to be understood as a coherent whole "in the sense of its customary political practices, institutions, laws, structure of authority and citizenship, and operative beliefs being organized and interrelated."⁶ The political paradigm gives its citizens a "vision," a full-scale way of understanding the world of politics in which they live. Wolin writes:

A politically organized society contains definite institutional arrangements, certain widely shared understandings regarding the location and use of political power, certain expectations about how authority ought to treat the members of society and about the claims that organized society can rightfully make upon its members . . . In saying that the practices and beliefs of society are organized and interrelated, that its members have certain expectations and share common beliefs, one is saying that the society believes itself to be one thing rather than another . . . This ensemble of practices and beliefs may be said to form a paradigm in the sense that the society tries to carry on its political life in accordance with them.⁷

Sheldon Wolin, thus, enlarges upon Thomas Kuhn's concept of scientific paradigms and their processes to describe social conditions of political behavior and beliefs.

Because political paradigms are primary to behavior and the conditions of knowing, this thesis will address the paradigms with which Ibn Khaldun and Machiavelli concerned themselves. In looking at these different paradigms which both thinkers either created or reformed, we shall see how common features in each society, such as authority, the political community, and history took on different meanings, ways of knowing and seeing things. This thesis will attempt to demonstrate that Ibn Khaldun and Machiavelli used history in very different ways to justify their different political paradigms and to address practical political matters--such as authority--in their political communities.

Thesis Design

In this study there are three progressive and interconnected themes. The first theme deals with paradigmatic frameworks, problems in these political formulations, and how Ibn Khaldun and Machiavelli either articulated or changed their respective societies' political paradigms. In Chapters II through IV the objective is to see problems in the existing world views, to see how challenges brought about rejection or retention of these paradigms, and finally to see how paradigms change either by a process of evolution or revolution.

The second theme deals with the use of history. In Chapter V, history is seen as both a scientific and creative medium within two different kinds of paradigms. History becomes the tool in providing general laws either to develop paradigms or even to create values in new paradigms. In a symbiotic way, history addresses practical matters under the paradigmatic frameworks.

The third theme is that of practical prescription and how practice reflects the paradigm. In Chapter VI, history is seen as joining the two themes of paradigm and practice.

Because this hypothesis primarily addresses political thought, the evidence will be taken principally from such primary sources as Machiavelli's The Prince and The Discourses and Ibn Khaldun's The Muqaddimah (An Introduction to History).

Review of the Literature

Machiavelli, as a political theorist and writer, is well known to students of Western political thought, having been variously described as the father of modern political science, a father of modern Italian nationalism, a rationalist, an existentialist, a proto-fascist, or a proto-Marxist.⁸ According to Leo Strauss, Machiavelli is "the man who is more responsible than any other man for the break with the Great Tradition [of political thought] . . . and that Machiavelli is a deliberate advocate of evil with a structured and complete philosophical system."⁹ Strauss' work remains controversial, although Hannah Arendt agrees in identifying Machiavelli as the political scientist most responsible for the modern condition of cultural anomie, the thinker who divorced political action from the necessity and rigor of traditional philosophical and religious restraint.¹⁰

As John Geerken points out, two central problems have occupied recent Machiavelli scholarship: his concepts of virtu and of history.¹¹ Neal Wood's study identifies virtu as primarily a militaristic quality,¹² while I. Hannaford's study delineates virtu's political essence.¹³ Russell Price succeeds in arguing that Machiavelli used virtu

in its "nonmoral (i.e., capacitative and functional) senses, and therefore, its military and political manifestations."¹⁴ J. H. Whitfield's essay on Machiavelli's use of Livy points out Machiavelli's debt to the Roman historian in using history to deduce moral lessons.¹⁵ But scholars generally are no more agreed on Machiavelli's use of history than on his meaning of virtu. Felix Gilbert's analysis concludes that Machiavelli's cyclical theory of historical decay and renewal provides the relationship between antiquity and modernity, resulting in the moral for Italy of redemption through force.¹⁶

Regarding the concept of Machiavellianism, the amoral practice of politics, there are two schools of thought. One, represented by Benedetto Croce (and Leo Strauss above), argues that Machiavelli separated the political process from the prevailing paradigm of Christian ethics so that political action would be evaluated solely in terms of political efficiency.¹⁷ Isaiah Berlin has countered that Machiavelli was a moralist, albeit a pagan one, who adopted an ethical framework designed to assure stability of the state, teaching there was "more than one solution to the question of how men should live."¹⁸

The Machiavellian Moment by J. G. A. Pocock represents a departure from other studies in that the author takes a structuralist view of Machiavelli's times and writings to adduce "a transition from Florentine to English and American republicanism."¹⁹ Pocock seeks to move from the particular to the universal in identifying "the moment in conceptualized time in which the republic was seen as confronting its own temporal finitude, as attempting to remain morally and politically stable in a stream of irrational events conceived as essentially destructive of all systems of secular stability."²⁰ Pocock's work is valuable in isolating

and clarifying Machiavelli's thought in response to his particular environment.

Machiavelli was a prolific author, not only of political treatises, but also of drama and poetry. This study relies on two of his works, The Prince and the The Discourses. Machiavelli wrote The Discourses in an effort to study Roman history to discern its profit for his own use in formulating a stable republic to deduce what constitutes political strength and stability.²¹ Arguing that from a knowledge of man as he is and always has been and from the same knowledge of states, past and present, the political scientist could then identify the causes of success and failure, of greatness and decline, of efficiency and stability. It is in The Discourses that Machiavelli at length discusses virtu, his elusive concept of military and political individual spirit. In The Discourses, Machiavelli is seen as anti-clerical, not anti-religious, equating religion as another kind of virtu.²² The Discourses argues for republican government as the more stable and enduring form of government.

On the surface, Machiavelli's advice to an absolute ruler, The Prince, would appear contradictory to his embellishments on citizen virtu and republican government in The Discourses. But Machiavelli was a scientist of the art of the possible; if republican government was preferred but not possible, then the autocracy of The Prince had its advantages, and whatever the form, Machiavelli argued for efficient exercise of power. In the final chapter, Machiavelli appeals to the Medici to unite Italy against the foreigner. Once liberation was accomplished, energies could be turned toward the establishment of a stable regime. The Prince is real advice to a real prince, addressing

the exigencies of the day. The Discourses is an examination of history to find out how men could realistically order their affairs.

Where Machiavelli has become a stellar figure, the object of a multitude of detailed scholarly examinations, Ibn Khaldun has been recognized, with a few notable exceptions, only in a rather cursory fashion. For example, no less a historian than Arnold Toynbee wrote, "He [Ibn Khaldun] has conceived and formulated a philosophy of history which is undoubtedly the greatest work of its kind that has ever yet been created by any mind in any time or place," while characterizing Ibn Khaldun "as the one outstanding personality in the history of a civilization whose social life on the whole was solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short."²³ This thesis does not intend to pick up the gauntlet of charges of the Edward Said school that rampant Orientalism in Western scholarship has skewed Western appreciation and evaluation of Islamic or Oriental thought. There can be little argument that, were it not for such "orientalists" as Ernst Rosenthal and H. A. R. Gibb, Ibn Khaldun would be even less accessible and known to modern Western scholars. Still, Western ignorance of Islamic culture and scholarship exists and is only beginning to be remedied.

Review of the scholarship on Ibn Khaldun indicates a scarcely broached field of inquiry. Ernst Rosenthal emerges as the foremost scholar. His translation of The Muqqadimah is the standard text.²⁴ His numerous books and articles are a pioneering effort to identify and define Ibn Khaldun's thought and position within his Islamic culture.

Charles Issawi has produced a useful compendium of selections from The Muqaddimah, categorized by topics.²⁵ Published in 1950, his book had to rely on the M. Quatrimere, Paris, 1858, Arabic-to-French

translation of The Muqaddimah. Thus, his text differs from Rosenthal's later translation.

Muhsin Mahdi's examination of Ibn Khaldun's philosophy of history stands as the foremost example of recent scholarship on Ibn Khaldun. Through close textual analysis, Mahdi dissects Ibn Khaldun's science of culture in terms of Greek and Islamic philosophers who influenced his thought and in terms of Ibn Khaldun's own philosophical arguments.²⁶

Ibn Khaldun's major work, The Muqaddimah, is known by other titles: the Prolegomena, the Universal History, or the 'Ibar. Ibn Khaldun's own title is intricately constructed: "The Book of the 'Ibar, the Record of the Origins and Events of the Days of the Arabs, Persians and Berbers, and of those of their Contemporaries who were Possessors of Great Power." His careful phrasing would indicate the seriousness and scope of his intent in writing: to construct a science of culture, a complete examination of his world to find its nature and causes. Ibn Khaldun writes:

. . . The contents of this book fall into six sections:

The first deals with human society in general, its kinds and its geographical distribution;

The second, with nomadic societies, tribes and savage peoples;

The third, with States, the spiritual and temporal powers, and political ranks;

The fourth, with sedentary societies, cities, and provinces;

The fifth, with crafts, means of livelihood, and economic activity;

The sixth and last, with learning and the ways in which it is acquired.

I have begun with the nomadic form of society because it is prior to the others, as will be shown later; for the same reason I mentioned the State before towns and provinces. Economic activity was put before learning because the former is a necessity, the latter a luxury; and necessities precede luxuries. Crafts were included under economic activity because, in certain respects, they pertain to it . . .²⁷

Ibn Khaldun sought to write a history of the world in order to provide data for his new science of human society. His precise structure and analysis, given the scope of his knowledge and data, was remarkable for his time.

While Mahdi refers to a hypothetical historical connection between Ibn Khaldun and Machiavelli,²⁸ my research failed to find any studies of Ibn Khaldun and Machiavelli together.

Obviously, the weight of Western scholarship has fallen to Machiavelli. What, then, is the reason to consider Ibn Khaldun and Machiavelli in tandem, as it were? Issawi points out that, had Ibn Khaldun lived a few centuries earlier, he might have been translated into Latin and, thus, would have been accessible to European thought.²⁹ (Indeed, the original, animating premise of this research was to establish a direct influence of Ibn Khaldun's work on Machiavelli. Due to scholarly limitation, personal and material, attention was refocused.) Or, had Ibn Khaldun lived two centuries later, he might have been influenced by European thought.³⁰ While it has been established that Ibn Khaldun was educated in Aristotelian philosophy and knew of and was influenced by Al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, and Averroes, he went far beyond his mentors and times in creating his new science of culture.³¹ That Machiavelli, a century and a half later, also "stepped back" to analyze history objectively and to apply it to his own culture remains interestingly coincidental. The temptation to posit Ibn Khaldun's influence on Machiavelli is there; the evidence is not.

For too long Western scholarship has failed to recognize this towering Islamic oriental thinker who pre-dates the "father of political science" by a century and a half. Ibn Khaldun and Machiavelli are

wonderfully similar in their life experiences. Only after surviving (in the most literal sense) years of service in various political coalitions, did each reflect and write, and the writings of each man ring true to the twentieth-century student educated in the science of rationalism which was just beginning to exert its influence in Ibn Khaldun's and Machiavelli's times. The linkage of Ibn Khaldun and Machiavelli in this study largely is heuristic and is intended to expand the field of focus for students of political science, to point out how two political thinkers, one preceeding the other, the latter independent of the former, scientifically observed their cultures (in an age of nonscience) to distill political truth from general observation. That their truths differed is a consequence of the different values each brought to bear on his work.

FOOTNOTES

¹Erwin I.J. Rosenthal, Political Thought in Medieval Islam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), pp. 107-108.

²Fuad Baali, Ibn Khaldun and Islamic Thought Styles (Boston: G.K. Hall and Co., 1981), pp. 21-22.

³Richard S. Rudner, Philosophy of Social Science (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1966), pp. 15-19.

⁴Thomas A. Spragens, Understanding Political Theory (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976), pp. 102-106.

⁵Leo Strauss, National Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), pp. 135-138.

⁶Spragens, p. 1.

⁷Sheldon Wolin, "Paradigms and Political Theories," in Preston King and B.C. Parekh, eds., Politics and Experience (London: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 149.

⁸John H. Geerken, "Machiavelli Studies Since 1969," Journal of the History of Ideas, 37 (April, 1976), p. 358.

⁹Leo Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli (Glencoe: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1958), p. 120.

¹⁰Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future (New York: Viking Press, 1971).

¹¹Geerken, p. 360.

¹²Neal Wood, "Machiavelli's Concept of Virtu Reconsidered," Political Studies, 15 (June, 1967).

¹³I. Hannaford in Geerken, p. 362.

¹⁴Russell Price, ibid.

¹⁵T.H. Whitfield, Discourses on Machiavelli (Cambridge: W. Heffer and Sons, 1969).

¹⁶Felix Gilbert in Geerken, p. 363.

¹⁷Benedetto Croce, ibid., p. 365.

¹⁸Isaiah Berlin, ibid., p. 365.

¹⁹J.G.A. Pocock, "The Machiavellian Moment Revisited: A Study in History and Ideology," Journal of Modern History, 53 (March, 1981), p. 55.

²⁰Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. viii.

²¹W.B. Allen, "Theory and Practice in the Founding of the Republic," Interpretation, 4 (Winter, 1974), p. 452.

²²Norman F. Cantor, Renaissance Thought: Dante and Machiavelli (Waltham, Ma: Ginn-Blaisdell, 1969), p. 261.

²³Arnold Toynbee quoted by Charles Issawi, An Arab Philosophy of History (London: John Murray, 1950), p. ix.

²⁴Franz Rosenthal, trans., The Muqaddimah Vols. I, II, III by Ibn Khaldun (New York: Pantheon Books, 1958).

²⁵Charles Issawi, An Arab Philosophy of History (London: John Murray, 1950).

²⁶Muhsin Mahdi, Ibn Khaldun's Philosophy of History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957).

²⁷Ibn Khaldun quoted by Issawi, p. 26.

²⁸Mahdi, p. 6.

²⁹Issawi, p. 25.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹Mahdi, p. 10.

CHAPTER II

CHALLENGES TO EXISTING WORLD VIEWS

Crisis and Political Theory

Every society requires a sense of its own uniqueness, its own coherent self-understanding under a generally agreed upon conceptual, paradigmatic, or theoretical structure. Conceptual frameworks allow individuals and society as a collective a general plan or "mazeway" through which both individual and public life can satisfactorily function. Thomas Spragens, in Understanding Political Theory, points out that no political society is:

merely an event [or] something that happens . . . [it] is also a framework of ordered relationships within which we are enabled to live together and to satisfy our communal wants and needs . . . [Political society] is a meaningful human enterprise . . . , an intentional creation, devised and directed to accomplish important practical goals . . .¹

The adequateness and stability of the concepts behind any society as a human enterprise are usually reflected by the stability or

instability in its practical affairs. Montgomery Watt, in Muhammad, observed that the conceptual stability is demonstrated by how individuals see meaningfulness and significance in their practical affairs:

In a stable society, when the social system is satisfactorily adjusted to the material environment, there is a corresponding set of religious and other ideas. The acceptance of these ideas produces, in the members of the society, certain conscious attitudes towards the society and its environment. Without these conscious attitudes, the life of the society would be much less satisfactory. At many points it is unnecessary for the members of the society to be conscious of what they are doing, but it is usually essential, for example, that they should believe that life of their society as a whole is meaningful and significant.²

However, when a society begins to see a lack of significance and meaning in practical affairs, certain members do begin consciously to question religious and other ideas governing their society. Certain members, such as political theorists, recognize and begin to relate problems of the practical with problems in the conceptual. These individuals usually come under chronic stress and begin to explore ways to correct the theoretical, religious, or conceptual world views of their societies. High stress and disillusionment with distorted concepts usually lead to changes in concepts.

Political theories are like pearls: they are not produced without an irritant. Most political theories . . . are written as attempts to deal with some very real and urgent problems. These problems demand the attention of the theorist; they don't merely invite inquiry. The theorist writes out of compelling practical necessity--the need to understand a political situation that is causing real trouble and real pain to those caught within it.³

Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) and Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527) are two men who lived in two very different cultures and who were both compelled

by practical necessity to involve themselves in political theory. Though both men lived in different worlds, many biographical and conditional circumstances are strikingly similar. Each man came from very similar family and intellectual backgrounds. The practical problems seen by both men in their respective worlds evolved largely because of the religion's--Christianity's and Islam's--unresponsiveness to practical affairs. These were the prevailing concepts for both societies. Hence, both worlds were beginning to question the conceptual legitimacy of both theologies. Ibn Khaldun and Machiavelli did not see practical necessity from a distance. Both men attained first-hand experience of the problems; both lived in the dilemma through their careers as politicians.

Ibn Khaldun's Life

Islamic theology and philosophy which ordered Ibn Khaldun's world drew from the strengths of tribal society to govern and guide the urban populations. When in 610 A.D. the Prophet Muhammad received the first of his divine revelations in a cave near Mecca (revelations which would together make up the Quran), nomads wandered across the harsh deserts and social organization was a complex tangle of clans. Intense kinship demands resulting from what Ibn Khaldun was to call asabiya--the power of their group consciousness--and the imperative duty of the blood feud established the cohesion of the organization.⁴ In the cities, merchants' entrepreneurial greed unfairly exploited the people. Urbanization was quickly eroding any equilibrium provided by basic desert society. Muhammed understood that the transcendent demands of Allah and the social forces which had ordered pre-Islamic society--both

in the city and the desert--must be reconciled. The city and the desert had to submit to the higher demands of Allah.

Submission to Islam required Muslims to surrender to the transcendent demand of Allah. The demands of pre-Islamic social conditions were to take on expanded meaning, while the run-away opportunism in the cities was to be curbed by the purity of desert ethics. Muhammad's puritanism imposed restrictions on the Bedouin and the urbanite's licentiousness. Islam liberated the Bedouin nomad from his narrow social loyalties into a level of ethical transcendence. Muslims surrendered to the transcendent demand of Allah that broke through the constraining obligations of kinship and the blood feud to the eternal feud between the Muslim community (umma) and the unbeliever.⁵ Thus, the narrower kinship alliances were expanded to incorporate alliance among all believers under Islam. Conflict and feuding were to be externalized outside the realm of Islam (dar-al-Islam) between the Muslim community and the unbeliever.⁶

In the early days of the Islamic empire, the community was very zealous in efforts to coopt the unbeliever. The Holy War against the old Empires began when Muhammad sent three thousand men to attack the frontier of the great empire of Byzantium, and by 647 A.D. the Arab army had appeared on the frontiers of Tunisia.⁷ Arab conquest of the Maghrib to the west continued in 670 A.D. by Uqba ibn Nafi, and shortly thereafter Musa ibn Nussair claimed Spain for Islam.⁸ The most civilized state in Western Europe, Islamic Spain, and especially Seville, was a center for art and learning. Its prominence in learning allowed it to be a place for innovative ideas on classical rationalism, religion, and philosophical debate.

Ibn Khaldun's family was Spanish-Arab of Berber heritage. The family settled in Seville where they and other Muslim merchant dynasties established local oligarchies which produced generations of learned scholars and astute politicians. By the thirteenth century, however, mounting Christian military pressure on this Islamic intellectual center forced evacuation of Spain. Just before the fall of Seville in 1248, Ibn Khaldun's ancestors fled en masse to North Africa. Consequently, Islamic power fell into the fragmented new dynasties of the Hasfids in Tunisia and Merenids in Fez.⁹ Ibn Khaldun later served both dynasties.

Ibn Khaldun's homeland, fourteenth-century North Africa, was characterized by stagnation in intellectual life and continuous political instability. The Arab Muslim Empire was already in decline and, as a result, local powers as miniature states succeeded one another. Three hundred years of social, economic, and political decline had weakened the Maghrib before Ibn Khaldun's birth in 1332. The Hasfid and Merenid dynasties in North Africa were unsuccessfully attempting to replicate the brilliant civilization that had been lost in Spain. Rivalry, intrigues, plots, and upheavals were common features of political life and consequently ideal conditions for ambitious power seekers.¹⁰ Similar circumstances which were to exist later in Renaissance Italy also motivated Machiavelli towards a new world view.

Ibn Khaldun's grandfather held minor political offices with the Hasfids, while his father led the private life of a gentleman-scholar studying the Quran and the law. Ibn Khaldun received a basic education in religion, philology, poetry, logic, and philosophy. At twenty, Ibn Khaldun was given a significant position in the court of Abu Mohammad Ibn Tafrakin as seal bearer.¹¹ The position required him to write

"Praise be to God" in large letters heading the text of official documents.¹² Upon Ibn Tafrakin's defeat by Abu Zaid, Ibn Khaldun escaped west to Fez. In Fez, he joined Abu Iman the Merenid ruler of Morocco who was actively gathering an imposing circle of intellectuals to strengthen his rule. Ibn Khaldun, appointed secretary and seal bearer, later confessed in his writings that he considered the appointments inferior to his worth.¹³

His ambitious desire for greater authority and power led him to engage in political intrigues and conspiracy against the sultan who suspected Ibn Khaldun was trying to help a predecessor, Emir Abu Abdallah Mohammad, regain his throne with the promises of then becoming prime minister. Also, the incumbent ruler also suspected Ibn Khaldun of retaining total loyalty to the Tunisian Hasfids. Consequently, when the Moroccan Sultan Abu Iman invaded Tunisia, Ibn Khaldun was immediately ordered to be chained in a medieval version of preventive detention. Ibn Khaldun spent two years (1357-1358) in prison. Upon Abu Iman's death in 1359, Ibn Khaldun was released and decided to support the new sultan of Morocco, Abu Salim, who appointed him secretary of state and judge. After the death of Abu Salim, and because of court intrigues, Ibn Khaldun decided to leave Morocco in 1361.¹⁴

When serving as secretary to Abu Salim, Ibn Khaldun had helped Muhammad V and his prime minister of Granada, Ibn al-Khatib, establish his rule while living as a fugitive in Fez. After leaving Morocco, Ibn Khaldun was warmly received by Muhammad V in Granada. In 1364, Ibn Khaldun was dispatched as Muhammad V's ambassador to the Christian court of Pedro the Cruel of Castile to ratify peace between the warring Muslims and Christians. Pedro the Cruel, impressed with Ibn Khaldun,

attempted to coopt his services by offering the former Khaldun family estates in Seville. Ibn Khaldun declined.

Meanwhile, in Granada, Ibn al-Khatib was becoming displeased with Ibn Khaldun's increasing power in the court. Because of these pressures and jealousies within the Granada court, Ibn Khaldun joined the court of the Hasfid, Abu Abdallah Mohammad.¹⁵ Although within months Abu Abbas overthrew Abu Abdallah Mohammad, Ibn Khaldun "managed all affairs vigorously, calming dissension skillfully and wisely, and going about the dangerous task of collecting taxes from Berber clans in the mountains by the force of his sagacity and influence."¹⁶ Later he lost the confidence of Abu Abbas and so left for Biskra. From there Ibn Khaldun was instrumental in organizing Berber tribes against Abu Abbas.¹⁷

Ibn Khaldun, insecure and undecided, was repelled by what he called "the morass of politics."¹⁸ In 1375 he retreated to a small village in Algeria where he stayed nearly four years writing a universal history of the world--The Muqaddimah. From there he returned to Tunis. His career in Tunis as a professor of law encountered dangerous opposition--Abu Abbas had made himself master of Tunis. On the pretext of making the hadj to Mecca, Ibn Khaldun was able to leave for Egypt in 1382.¹⁹ In Cairo, he soon obtained positions as professor, college president, and Malikite judge. Appointments, dismissals, and reappointments depending on the whims of political circumstance and personal rivalry were frequent. On a military mission to Damascus, Ibn Khaldun met Tamerlane in 1401. His death in 1406 came a few days after he had once more been reappointed to the Malikite judgeship.²⁰

Ibn Khaldun had the unique capacity to enter diagonally and to observe and study every stratum of Maghribi society, but came to be known only in modern times for his acute abilities to evaluate critically how and why a society ticks. Ibn Khaldun was deeply bothered by "historians as nomads, wandering through time"²¹ and observed "the posture of stupidity is unwholesome for mankind."²² The stupidity of most of what passed for history among medieval Muslims came from their uncritical repetition of legends and tales of wonder.²³ Most scholars of the time, relying excessively on theological resources, attributed any important event to supernatural marvels and miracles. There was a total absence of any genuine theory of historical change providing a more serious explanation. The Muqaddimah contains a well-reasoned discussion of the physical, psychological, intellectual, and social factors which go into the making of human society and history. It is considered the first comprehensive study of sociology and the philosophy of history ever written.²⁴

As seen in his biographical background, Ibn Khaldun had a unique history of working directly with all elements of the society. He had intimate relationships and close friendships within the highest offices of the sultanate, with religious scholars, and with Berber tribal chieftains, various Maghribi sultans, as well as Pedro the Cruel, Christian kings, and Tamerlane.²⁵ His relationships with these various elements were not superficially casual. Encounters usually involved crucial issues: rivalry and intrigue in political office, dialogue concerning theological and philosophical controversy, and political-cultural matters between government and the dissident.²⁶ Ibn Khaldun seemed to have been able to approach each group without difficulty.

Ibn Khaldun followed his own advice in how he wished historians to behave; he emphasized objective observation and developed a genuine personal ability to penetrate the attitude of others and to understand their deep-seated values. In his zeal for objectivity, Ibn Khaldun disputed what he refers to as the "facile truth provided by theology." Truth to Ibn Khaldun was regarded as a highly complicated phenomenon, impossible to be seen entirely from a single perspective. In Karl Mannheim's words: "Truth may be likened to a multi-faceted pyramid. No one is able to see all of its sides at the same time while standing in one place."²⁷ The truth can be grasped, as Karl Mannheim commented in his Ideology and Utopia, through a generalized view which synthesizes all the various particular views.

Machiavelli's Life

Niccolo Machiavelli as a young man lived in Florence when Lorenzo de Medici, "the most Florentine of Florentines,"²⁸ had inherited the city. The Medici dynasty of bankers-turned-princes had ruled Florence since Cosimo de Medici had seized the government in order to protect his wealth from rivals. Florence, like most Italian Renaissance cities, had a long record of civic turmoil and endemic social conflict. The cosmos to most Renaissance Italians did not extend outside their cities. Medieval Italy was a land of cities, a legacy from Roman times. And, as in Roman times, the medieval Italian town lived in close relation to its surrounding rural area (contado). This surrounding rural land was retained by those living in the cities and passed through family generations.²⁹

The cohesiveness in these Italian cities was intense and resistant to social hierarchal change. Nobles, merchants, and skilled craftsmen lived, worked, and fought side by side. Social hierarchy existed, yet there was no simple division between noble and commoner or between landed and commercial wealth. Political action against a common enemy (who was often anyone outside the city introducing almost any foreign issue) tended to fuse townspeople with a sense of community, defense, and civic loyalty.³⁰ The civic patriotism was evidenced by Renaissance Italians enjoyment of classical literature which praised the Roman city, its origins, and its mission.³¹ While this attitude spawned autonomy and freedom from religion and overlords, it also fostered fragmentation and a growth of rivalries between neighboring communities.³²

The city's obsession with autonomy and protectiveness of the contado's confrontational attitude with neighbors paradoxically encouraged limited expansionism, introducing city-states. Expansion into the neighboring countryside resulted in the submission of smaller and weaker towns to the larger and stronger.³³ Institutionalization evolved; activity of the towns became more complex; arbitrary political action was replaced by permanent civic institutions. For example, an executive magistracy established juridical autonomy and consequently a feeling of permanent officialdom which extended power beyond the city walls into the contado and neighboring satellite towns.³⁴

Again, ironically, the establishment of city institutions brought conflict within the cities. Most of what had previously been externalization of conflict towards neighboring cities was now being internalized by intra-city political action brought to life by institutionalized government.³⁵ The citizenry, determined by property

and other qualifications, took part in debate, legislation, and the selection of officials. City republics were small enough (1300 Florence, the largest city, had 100,000 people; Padua, nearer the average, had 15,000 people)³⁶ to allow most of the population to participate in public affairs. The city-state had introduced two directions of conflict--conflict with neighboring city-states and internal strife induced by formal institutions building and its legislative process.³⁷

The decline in the ability of both the empire and papacy to continue to dominate Italian affairs left each city-state free to pursue its own goals within the limits of its resources.³⁸ The defeat of the emperor in his struggle with the Pope involved a breakdown of the universal political conceptions of the Middle Ages.³⁹ Correspondingly, a growth in humanist attitudes influenced the concept of citizenship, patriotism, and civic history.⁴⁰

Yet, despite these liberal influences, the Italian fourteenth century city-state had not shaken certain remnants of feudalism.⁴¹ Because of internal strife caused by the politics of the new city, many cities were turning from direct citizen involvement or republicanism to the rule of one man (signoria).⁴² The signore was usually a member of a local feudal family which was also a power in the commune. Acceptance of the signore was normal to most citizens because most signore chose to rule through existing republican institutions.⁴³ Nevertheless, by the late fourteenth century, hereditary lordship--encouraged by nepotism--became common while free republicanism became proportionately the exception.⁴⁴

With the decline of the old empire and papacy, Italy lost its universal instincts. City-states, with their formulation of internal politics and inter-city rivalries, were becoming progressively egocentric.⁴⁵ City-state goals were inevitably the security and power of each state vis-a-vis its neighbors. Diplomacy became a skilled game of experts; rivalries were deadly; warfare was endemic; and mercenary troops replaced citizen militias. The city-state began to take over many of the functions formerly performed by associations of private citizens--kinship groups and the guilds--leaving individuals to confront the state alone without intermediaries. Italy's feudal survivals and organizations of society were centrifugal; cities were chief sites of power which gravitated diametrically away from centralization.⁴⁶

The tenacity of Italian local power impeded Italian growth in contrast to European world-wide economic expansion.⁴⁷ City-states of northern Italy and of Germany established countryside control. Their centralization of efforts assured food supplies, fielded armies and concentrated on industry, trade, and commerce. Manufacture was expanded to the general market, and trade was developed in money as well as goods. Long-distance trading was enhanced by ship and land convoys. By the fifteenth century those city-states which invested in dynamic forms of politics and economy were becoming world-wide markets.⁴⁸ City-states which energized the new economy also possessed and practiced outmoded methods, becoming self-induced liabilities. For example, guild restrictions which once insured quality in products in a less sophisticated economy, now, by maintaining traditional privileges of members, were restricting the income of new workers and capital.⁴⁹ City-states could not police transportation routes, guard sea lanes, or deal

with forces in the countryside. Demands for a modern nation-state were evolving to resolve the conflict of growth versus tradition.⁵⁰ Italy faced a choice: either follow the old ways and regress or follow the path of France and England--unify and organize as a nation.

In this period of Italian stagnation and retrogression, neighboring European countries, in a stage of nationalistic energy, were competing among one another on a higher and more sophisticated level.⁵¹ Italy was thrown back on herself; larger city-states consolidated their power by overthrowing and incorporating the weaker. Within Italy there was a significant redistribution of power; the powerful became more powerful.⁵² Within dominating city-states, political action also took a corresponding change: power and power politics tended to accede to one or a few families. The democratic wave with which the fourteenth century began was followed by a period of reaction. In the beginning of the fifteenth century, autocracy became the predominant form of government in Italy.⁵³ Venice tended to preserve the forms of republican aristocracy. The Visconti firmly established autocracy in Milan. Florence saw the rise of Medici who preserved the appearance of a republican form of government but gradually succeeded in gathering all the essentials of power into their hands.⁵⁴

Born in 1469 in Florence, relatively little is known of Niccolo di Bernardo Machiavelli's life before 1498. Yet Machiavelli came from an established middle-class family which made his future prospects modest at best. Apparently, Machiavelli's extended family had held an impressive number of offices in Florentine government including twelve terms as gonfaloniere (standard-bearer) and fifty-four turns as prior.⁵⁵ Niccolo's father, Bernardo, was not one of the more prosperous within

the Machiavelli family. Therefore, it was improbable that Niccolo would ever achieve the wealth or influence of greater Florentine patrician families such the Ridolfi, the Rucellei, the Strozzi, or the Guicciardini.⁵⁶ Nevertheless, Bernardo Machiavelli was intellectually a man of his time. He had an intense interest in books, particularly the Latin classics. Niccolo shared his father's intellectual interests and studied such classics as Flavio Biondo's Decades, Justin's works on history, and Livy's history of republican Rome.⁵⁷

Machiavelli served in government from 1498 to 1512. Based on his observation of Italian Renaissance politics in action, Machiavelli was able to formulate what many cite as modern political theory.⁵⁸ His work provided him with a close knowledge of the operation of government and the whole spectrum of attitudes and activities of contemporary Italian politics at a time of great vitality and stress. In 1512 the overthrow of the republican government by the Medici cost Machiavelli his post. For the remaining fourteen years of his life he tried unsuccessfully to get back into government, filling his years of involuntary retirement with study and writing.⁵⁹

Machiavelli entered the Florentine chancery in 1498, only a few days after the execution of Savonarola,⁶⁰ an inspired Florentine monk who attempted to rally Florentine citizens towards an ideal republic under the theme of anti-aristocratic theocracy. Savonarola was a simple, incorruptible, intensely Puritanical Christian. His efforts to bring forth an ideal republic of virtue were to include enforcement of both morality and charity by a system of censorship and economic controls.⁶¹ For a time Savonarola's success was considerable. Cathedrals were filled with sinners weeping with repentance. Florentine

street gangs became moral vigilantes who confiscated the luxuries of paintings and jewelry of the wealthy. As a Church official, Savonarola promulgated his dramatic reforms in the name of the Church.⁶²

However, the Church was deeply disturbed by the mass hysteria which Savonarola incited. The Church as an institution somewhat represented the demon which Savonarola sought to destroy. The people's fascination of Savonarola partly lay in his radical antithesis to social inequity and partly in his mystical Church affiliation. When Savonarola was excommunicated from the Church, people began to also turn away. When Savonarola realized that his popularity was mystical, he offered to prove that his mission was authentic by passing unharmed through a fire. When Savonarola refused to perform this miracle, the same crowd which had once followed him burned him at the stake.⁶³

Machiavelli, who was twenty-eight when Savonarola died, developed several life-time perceptions about Christianity, its limits in practical affairs, and the realistic character required for effective leadership. Machiavelli developed a deep lack of sympathy for Savonarola's naivete. Savonarola's goals or ends were partly acceptable; yet Machiavelli considered Savonarola's means, being restricted to inapplicable transcendent ethics, were doomed to failure. Savonarola's fall left Machiavelli acutely conscious of the ineffectiveness of the "unarmed prophet."⁶⁴

Machiavelli rejected any standards of behavior--Christian or otherwise--which did not allow his prophet a means to operate in the real world on the terms of the real world. Machiavelli was not concerned with how men do live merely in order to describe it; his intention was rather, on the basis of knowledge of how men do live, to

teach princes how they ought to rule and even how they ought to live. Politics involved itself in the real world of man. Machiavelli came to see the need of politics to rely on the sword as well as the word, or of the need in politics to rely on the inevitable nature of violence of man and his organizations.⁶⁵

The Papacy during Machiavelli's time, because of its failing involvement in the secular Empire, was weak as a universal authority. Many Italian nationalists, such as Machiavelli, objected to the Papacy on patriotic grounds. To the Italian nationalist, the Pope was too weak to unite Italy under his own leadership but strong enough to stop Italy from being united under any other leadership.⁶⁶ Machiavelli held this commonplace nationalistic objection plus the objection to the ineptitude of Christianity in the secular political sphere. For Machiavelli, Christianity taught the wrong virtues of humility, resignation, denial of the flesh, turning of the other cheek, and abeyance on one's aspirations for joy in the life after death.

Government service, beginning with lessons from Savonarola and the various functionary and diplomatic duties, allowed Machiavelli to form not only ideas of appropriate ideals in politics but also how the prince and his community should practice politics.⁶⁷ Machiavelli's duties in the Second Chancery often overlapped with duties of more important and prestigious First Chancery. Chancery work involved Machiavelli in domestic and foreign affairs which included war and defense. The chanceries helped to provide the Florentine republic with continuity and stability while being offset by rapid succession in other government affairs. Chancery service also permitted Machiavelli to observe European political figures of the period.⁶⁸ In 1500, Machiavelli was

sent abroad on his first diplomatic mission to the court of Louis XII, King of France. Other diplomatic missions of consequence required Machiavelli to visit Cesare Borgia (1502-1503), Pope Julius II (1506), and the Emperor Maximilian (1507-1508).

Cesare Borgia was the bastard son of the Borgia Pope Alexander VI. Machiavelli was impressed with Cesare's ruthlessness and treachery. Cesare's objective was ultimately to overthrow the feudal ruler of Italian Romagna and to found a new and united state that would dominate papal Rome.⁷⁰ Although Cesare Borgia failed to achieve his goals, Machiavelli agreed with his aims because Cesare Borgia marched "on weak noblemen, quicker to despoil their subjects than to govern them well."⁷¹

Machiavelli's encounters with Cesare Borgia were important in the formation of his ideas. Machiavelli served Florence as a diplomatic liaison when Cesare delivered an ultimatum to Florence: "This government in Florence does not please me, and you must guarantee the observance of what you have promised me; otherwise you will understand in a very brief time that I do not wish to live in this manner; and if you do not desire me as a friend, you will find me an enemy."⁷² This style of diplomatic approach taught Machiavelli a lesson in power politics he would never forget. Machiavelli's diplomatic experiences had a direct influence upon the development of his political theory. His own diplomatic observations provided a ready source of examples to compare against those in his favorite classical authors.⁷³

Many scholars have described Machiavelli as the first "scientist" of politics. He is viewed as basing his social themes upon empirical judgements in a manner similar to that employed by Galileo in the natural sciences. Machiavelli's acquisition of "general laws" from the

classics and his observation in his own diplomatic duties provided an "experimental laboratory."⁷⁴ He could measure his emerging theories against the yardstick of observable political behavior.

Environment for Paradigmatic Change

By looking at Ibn Khaldun's and Machiavelli's biographical background it is evident that members of both societies were doubting the significance and relevance of their practical affairs. But in both worlds both men were also living when conceptual matters were already being questioned. Until the tenth century the conceptual worlds of both Christianity and Islam were explained completely in theological terms. Both Christian and Islamic theologies were viewed as conceptual schemes which must govern (or attempt to govern) all actions in peoples' lives, including secular affairs. Theology was presented in a form that could be demonstrated to and understood by all community members. Theology generally emphasized the necessity of people accepting religious beliefs without involving themselves in rational inquiries. Theologians felt that rational inquiry only exposed the shortcomings of human reason which in itself remained far too inadequate to comprehend the true meaning of divinely revealed law.

Centuries before either Ibn Khaldun or Machiavelli was to be caught in a quandary of practical political problems, philosophy challenged theology's notion of ascertaining truth. Ironically, the Arab world came upon philosophy quite accidentally. And afterwards the West acquired philosophy from the discovery of the Arabs. Islamic scholars interpreted classical manuscripts or philosophy in an effort to translate discoveries in the natural sciences.⁷⁵ Ninth-century Muslims

had a passionate desire to learn about Greek discoveries. Muslim interest was primarily in practical matters in the works of Greek physicians, astronomers, mathematicians, and geographers. In the same texts with practical discoveries, Greeks wrote much about philosophy. Although at first Muslims felt Greek philosophy had no value, it was translated because of its textual integration.⁷⁶

Muslim philosophers later realized that philosophy was a practical way of looking at all knowledge. It extends itself as a logical inquiry into all knowledge without presuming preconditions. Muslims realized that philosophy appeared to be the science of all sciences in that it sought to understand the whole of knowledge out the parts of the whole of knowledge and the place of the parts within this whole. As Muslim philosophers were gaining these philosophical insights, Western (European) scholars sought to learn about the Islamic rediscovery of practical Greek knowledge. Consequently, philosophy also reemerged in the West as an exponent of practical knowledge as it had done earlier in the Arab world.

Interest in Greek thought gave rise to a daring, innovative Muslim theological school known as the Mu'tazilite. Its spokesman, the philosopher al-Kindi argued, "We should not . . . be ashamed to recognize truth and assimilate it, from whatever quarter it may reach us, even though it may come from earlier generations and foreign people."⁷⁷ The Mu'tazilites began to apply reason and logic to examine concepts previously accepted on faith alone, utilizing Greek philosophy as a method of argument in advocating their dogma.⁷⁸

Eventually this exposure to Greek philosophy had a profound influence on Islamic thought. No longer were Islamic scholars concerned

only with the systematization and codification of Muslim theology, based primarily on the revelations of the Quran and the Hadith (traditions). Greek speculative philosophy, grounded in ability to reason, was brought to bear on Muslim theology.⁷⁹ To some Muslims, such as al-Ghazali, the consideration of reason verged on heresy. At the other extreme, some Muslim theologians even posited that doubt was the first requirement of knowledge. But to many orthodox Muslim intellectuals the logical methods of Greek rationalism were seen as a tool that could be used effectively to clarify Islamic doctrine and to defend their faith against heretical ideas being introduced by non-Muslims.⁸⁰

Later, in the Christian world, Gregorian reforms of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries contributed a revitalization of Western thought in much the same way the Mu'tazilites had accepted reason in the Islamic world. Perhaps the most distinctive attribute of this creative period was the method of reasoning known as scholasticism.⁸¹ As in the Islamic world, scholasticism was profoundly shaped by the writings of Aristotle. These writings came to Europe in Latin translations from Arabic which were provided in commentaries of such Islamic philosophers as Ibn Rushd (Latin transliteration: Averroes).⁸² In the Muslim world, Ibn Rushd had continued the work of the Mu'tazilites and other philosophers by challenging theological authority which controlled the limits of intellectual adventure. The Latin scholastics were disturbed by these intellectual encounters with pagan antique values and with the Muslim and Jewish doctrines which were beginning to show the compatibility of reason and revelation. The scholastics devised an institution to deal with this dilemma--the university.

The most outstanding product of the university was the work of Thomas Aquinas (1226-1274). Thomas argued that man could arrive at truth by the two roads of revelation and reason.⁸³ Revelation, he said, appeals to logical assent through the rigorous discipline of philosophy. He further argued that the final statements of these two methods cannot really contradict one another, since both derive ultimately from God. Thomistic scholasticism never won universal assent even among the Catholic clergy. Paralleling the intellectual revival inspired by universities, there occurred a spiritual revival which was antagonistic to Aquinas' synthesis.⁸⁴ In Western Christendom a new piety created an emotional fervor finding outlets in an emphasis on love, devotional practices, and the cults of the Virgin Mary.

So, Ibn Khaldun and Machiavelli tried to order worlds which were in the tumult of practical and conceptual upheavals. From the thirteenth to the end of the fifteenth century, the Maghrib and Italy were affected by strikingly parallel historical events. In Europe there was the destruction of Byzantium and the rise of its successors while in the Arab world the great western Islamic empire was collapsing and withdrawing from Spain to North Africa. While most of Europe was evolving into rational monarchies, Italy tenaciously remained fragmented under feudal lords and systems while being dominated externally. In the Maghrib, Berber tribal dynasties were dominating the landscape. In both worlds the universality and involvement of the religious in the practical was fading. In Europe there was a progressive decline of the papal temporal influence over the emerging national monarchies and the reduction of its spiritual authority over individual Christians. In the Arab world enormous debates centered around succession and authority of religion's temporal leadership.

In both worlds theologians, as defenders of their science, were seeing philosophy as potentially destructive and revolutionary to their religions. Such ideas called into question the extent to which grace and the channels of grace are necessary in the conduct of earthy affairs. All these conditions presented the greatest incentives for Ibn Khaldun and Machiavelli to involve themselves in reformulating the conceptual frameworks of their societies.

Political theorizing, in the classical tradition, has always received its greatest impetus from crisis and disorder. The challenge of crisis is something which compels political thinkers into conceptual debate. As political thinkers, both men would eventually attempt to identify the nature of crisis (the underlying disorder) and then make some explicit efforts in prescribing change. This process of change is what Thomas Spragens refers to as "imaginative reconstruction" or the shaping of a symbolic picture of some desirable alternative to the present disorder. The process of reconstruction does not necessarily imply a complete break with the past in order to see the new.⁸⁵ Conceptual changes may be evolutionary as well as revolutionary. Tradition is often the source of innovation. What is required is to take a fresh look at tradition and learn from it by example or reshape it to fit changing circumstances.

FOOTNOTES

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¹⁸Brown, p. 20

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²⁰Baali, p. 3.

²¹Brown, p. 22.

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- ²⁴Rosenthal, pp. ix-xii.
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⁸⁴Ibid., pp. 300-304.

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CHAPTER III

PHILOSOPHY'S EFFECT ON CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM

Ibn Khaldun and Machiavelli realized that problems in practical affairs were only effects of causes coming from conceptual problems. Understanding the problems, finding the problems, and correcting the problems was to be found in the conceptual and not the practical end of politics. So as political thinkers, both men concerned themselves with practical political matters as symptomatic indicators of problems which were to be discovered in conceptual sources.

Nature of Paradigmatic Revolutions and Evolutions

In the Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn talks about how paradigms come to be, how they are accepted, how they become more refined, how they encounter challenges to their validity, and how old paradigms are supplanted by new paradigms. Kuhn addresses concepts by demonstrating how natural scientists work as a community (or disagree as individuals) under a given scientific paradigm. To Kuhn, a mature

science is governed by a single paradigm which sets the standards or values for legitimate work within the science. Scientists, or individuals living under a society's conceptual frame, develop a common dialogue in language, symbols, assumptions, laws, and practices in conducting their business. The paradigm, with its inherent values, coordinates and directs the "puzzle-solving" activity of scientists working within its measures.

Within a paradigm, scientists go about their daily routine business in practicing what Kuhn refers to as "normal science." Normal science merely involves attempts to articulate a paradigm. This articulation seeks to exactly connect what the paradigm sets forth with nature--how things actually exist. Normal science is, then, a "puzzle-solving" exercise governed by the rules of the paradigm. Nature or reality continually presents the scientists with puzzles to solve under the paradigm. If puzzles are continually solved under the paradigm, it evolves into a broader, more resilient structure of ideas with more definition in its corps of rules. "Normal science consists in the actualization of that promise, an actualization achieved by extending the knowledge of those parts that the paradigm displays as particularly revealing, by increasing the extent of the match between those parts and the paradigm's predictions, and by further articulation of the paradigm itself."¹

Kuhn also sees paradigms progressing in a revolutionary manner rather than incrementally as in normal science. Kuhn's scheme of revolutionary conceptual replacement moves through the following stages: normal science, crisis, revolution, then new normal science. Revolutions in science have one paradigmatic scheme being abandoned in

favor of a new incompatible paradigm. As scientists progress, more and more puzzles are presented by nature (and by man's advancement through nature) to be resolved by scientists in line with the paradigm. In this process of making the paradigm more and more definitive, anomalies will emerge which cannot be solved in line with the prevailing paradigm. For the paradigm to be in danger, however, these anomalies must challenge the validity of the fundamental assumptions of the paradigm. "The more far-reaching the paradigm is, the more sensitive an indication it provides of anomaly."² Eventually, the number and seriousness of the difficulties with which a paradigm is faced will increase and "one can appropriately describe the fields affected . . . as in a state of growing crisis."³ When the mismatch between anomaly and paradigm becomes unexplainable and irreconcilable, crisis develops and sets the stage for revolution in paradigms. Anomalies which grow more real in their validity for irreconciliation tend to generate "pronounced professional insecurity" among scientists. "The scientist in crisis will continually try to generate speculative theories that, if successful, may disclose the road to a new paradigm . . ."⁴

Here, Kuhn refers to another type of science where scientists involve themselves with the theoretical level of finding a new, more suitable paradigm. This is "extra-ordinary science." "Normal scientists begin to engage in philosophical and metaphysical disputes and try to defend their innovations by philosophical means."⁵ The seriousness of a crisis deepens when a rival paradigm makes its appearance. "The new paradigm, or a sufficient hint to permit later articulation, emerges all at once, sometimes in the middle of the night, in the mind of a man deeply immersed in crisis."⁶ Kuhn likens

paradigmatic changes for scientists with a gestalt switch or a religious conversion. Crisis states are characteristically followed by the emergence of a new paradigm as quantum mechanics emerged from Newtonian physics. Radical changes in paradigms constitute a scientific revolution. "The normal science tradition that emerges from a scientific revolution is not only incompatible, but incommensurable with what has gone before."⁷ To Kuhn, when concepts change in a revolutionary manner, our whole sense of logic is restructured. Consequently, how we look at the same facts and what we see in the same facts are different apprehensions through different concepts.

In Machiavelli's and Ibn Khaldun's worlds, philosophy--as a way of paradigmatically explaining reality--came on the normal science (theology) and presented itself as a puzzle to be solved by the prevailing concepts of Islam and Christianity. One thinker found philosophy as a puzzle which could be articulated into and more fully explicate the dominant religious paradigm. The other thinker found philosophy to be irreconcilable and, therefore, involved himself with developing a paradigm suitable for answering his particular puzzles in nature. Thomas Kuhn noted that acceptance or rejection of a paradigm is a function of environmental conditions. "Later scientific theories are better than earlier ones for solving puzzles in the often quite different environments to which they are applied."⁸

Examining the record of past research from the vantage of contemporary historiography, the historian of science may be tempted to conclude that when paradigms change, the world itself changes with them. Led by a new paradigm, scientists adopt new instruments and look in new places. Even more important, during scientific revolutions, scientists see new and different things when looking with familiar instruments in places they have looked before. It is rather as if the professional community had been suddenly transported to another planet where familiar objects are seen in a different light and are joined by familiar ones as well.⁹

Nature of Philosophy

In their interests to acquire what the Greeks had learned in practical matters--medicine, astronomy, mathematics, geography--Muslims unintentionally also revived Greek philosophy. Although philosophy seemed to lack immediate practical value, it did show an undeniable relation to the sciences. In fact, as Muslim philosophers later realized, philosophy, as a way of looking at all knowledge, was actually the science of sciences. As such, theologians regarded philosophy as a reckless discipline which extended itself into realms which were outside the proper limits of intellectual investigation. However, the Greeks taught that it was elemental that the philosopher not restrict his inquiry on any preconditions. The philosopher was to ask questions about relations between science and common belief, between science and religion, and between science and philosophy. Philosophy extends itself as a logical inquiry into all knowledge. Philosophy seeks universal comprehensive knowledge. It seeks to understand the whole of knowledge and the parts of the whole of knowledge and the place of the parts within this whole.¹⁰ Likewise, the various sub-disciplines of philosophy--political philosophy, philosophy of science, philosophy of history--all seek to understand the totality of knowledge within their respective fields.

Philosophy is both a certain knowledge and a certain way through which rational knowledge should be gained. Aristotle was the first to clarify and organize the problems of the way of knowledge. He discussed ways of achieving certainty and opinions both in regard to the form and the matter of syllogistic reasoning. Demonstrative reasoning which proves assertions conclusively through reason is the proper way to

philosophic knowledge because it is the most perfect formal method devised by human reason and because it corresponds to and abstracts the true nature of things. It leads to certainty because it aims at the "identity between the definition and the thing defined."¹¹

Philosophy, in its quest for truth, does not defer to any preconditions of knowledge . . . Philosophy, as quest for wisdom, is quest for universal knowledge, for knowledge of the whole . . . Philosophy is essentially not possession of the truth, but quest for the truth, . . . the philosopher "knows that he knows nothing" . . . [the philosopher] would choose to be a philosopher by evading the questions concerning these things or by disregarding them because they cannot be answered.¹²

Philosophy seeks the truth through logical reasoning by replacing opinions with knowledge. Philosophy, in the most general sense, is the search for the underlying causes and principles of reality.

[The philosopher's] quest for knowledge of "all things" means quest for knowledge of Good, the world, and man--or rather quest for knowledge of the nature of all things: the natures in their totality are "the whole" . . . This quest would not be necessary if such knowledge were immediately available. The absence of knowledge of the whole does not mean, however, that men do not have thoughts about the whole: philosophy is necessarily preceded by opinions about the whole. It is, therefore, the attempt to replace (or improve) opinions about the whole by knowledge of the whole.¹³

When Muslim philosophers saw how natural science demonstrated the true nature of things physical, they also saw philosophy's larger practicality in explaining the nature of all things.

The Encounter of Philosophy with Theology

The governing paradigm of Ibn Khaldun's and Machiavelli's worlds was religious; theologians were that paradigm's normal scientists. Growing awareness of and interest in classical philosophy threatened the

theologian's hegemony. To these theologians the most important thing was to live the kind of life prescribed by divine law. To theologians in both worlds, theology was to be a precondition to any philosophical questioning. Theologians worked to interpret the statements of divine law consistently, to explicate answers to questions from the fundamentals of the faiths. Such statements established a spiritual context in which all other worldly relations (nature and history) and the mental processes (reason and logic) could operate. According to theologians, everything, including rational science or philosophy, should be pursued only to the extent necessary to promote the life of faith and virtue. Divine law provided everything to conduct life in this and the next world. Because philosophy posited rationality as opposed to spirituality as the proper means to seek truth, theologians perceived philosophy as a threat (an irreconcilable anomaly) to basic principles in their paradigm.

Islamic and Christian theologians claimed that their theologies were responsible to God who initiates thinking, speaking and witnessing. The revealed laws were cited as proof that this initiation was supernaturally delivered by God. Philosophy, on the other hand, based its argument on the ground of timeless evidence, on evidence with which autonomous reason understands itself to be confronted. What followed, during the same time in both the Islamic and Christian worlds, was enormous intellectual debate as to how to justify the relationship of these two paradigms, theology and philosophy. In the Islamic world, Muslim philosophers were theoretically successful in positing philosophy under fundamentals of the religions. However, for late medieval Christians the controversy was highly problematic and never reached the syncretistic levels provided by Muslim philosophers.¹⁴

In the Christian world arguments were conducted under what was known as Scholasticism: a process of painstaking arrival at logical conclusions through questioning, postulating, examining and arranging details into a system of logic. Christians were interested in acquiring the practical knowledge Muslims had acquired through translation of the classics. In seeking practical knowledge, the Christians were led to philosophy in much the same fashion that Muslim's accepted philosophy. Ibn Rushd (Averroes), who in the Maghrib had reasoned philosophy into Islam, now traveled Europe with the same message. Some leading Christians began to doubt the revelations.¹⁵

The Church dispatched Thomas Aquinas, a Dominican monk, to resolve Christianity's paradigmatic crisis. Thomas honored reason above all other human attributes; he was distinguished for both his fidelity to the Church as well as his scholarship. He saw no conflict between faith and knowledge that could not be reconciled by reason. Rather than completely denounce what Aristotle had to say about philosophy and what Ibn Rushd had to say about the relationship of philosophy and theology, Thomas attempted to justify ideas on a case-by-case basis under Christianity. These Christian views on logic, metaphysics, theology, psychology, ethics and politics are expressed in his enormous work Summa Theologia. Thomas attempted to separate the sciences of theology and philosophy and have them ascend independently toward God. He used the Aristotelian principle that every effect has a cause, every cause has a prior cause, and so on, back to the First Cause. Thomas Aquinas said in his Philosophical Texts, "The ultimate end of everything is its completion . . . Man's last end, therefore, does not consist in the total and collective good of the universe, but in

God . . . [and] . . . the love of God is the end of all human activity and desire . . ."¹⁶ The existence of God, to Thomas, could be traced back to the Divine Cause or First Cause. To most scholars this could not be adequately justified in Christianity. The theologians by reasoning within the faith more convincingly showed that all necessary knowledge came by divine revelation and not by reason. Therefore, it was more essential to seek salvation through purity of heart rather than through clarity of mind. For mortal men, it was impossible to arrive at the rational knowledge of God in Christianity.¹⁷ However, according to Muslim philosophers, it was theoretically possible for all Muslims to arrive at spiritual truth rationally.

Machiavelli and Christianity: The Ideal as Discrete from the Public Domain

Machiavelli cannot be charged with cancelling Christianity for something else. Yet, he can be credited with adding another dimension to seeing the world--instituting a paradigm whereby puzzles could be solved within highly realistic terms. Although Machiavelli had his preference, he did not actively seek to dispose of Christian world views. Independent of any such contest which would establish paradigmatic dominance, Machiavelli sought to resolve what he saw as misalignment between private, Christian ethics and public, political science. In doing so he created what Benedetto Croce saw as the "question which perhaps will never be closed: the problem of Machiavelli."¹⁸ Machiavelli allowed the circumstances for Western man to have a pluralistic paradigm with values of two distinctive antecedents: ideals from the medieval monistic Judeo-Christian paradigm and humanistic ideals developed from Roman antiquity. These rival and

ultimate solutions to how men should live are charged with moral values that are not necessarily compatible with one another.¹⁹

As Benedetto Croce indicated in Politics and Morals, Machiavelli had discovered "the necessity and autonomy of politics, which is beyond, or rather below, moral good and evil, which has its own laws against which it is useless to rebel, politics that cannot be exorcised and driven from the world with holy water."²⁰ Machiavelli took the traditional and monolithic Christian world view as preached by Savonarola--a paradigmatic world view of which not only political, but also economic and social activity had been theologically justified--and separated out the political process.²¹ Machiavelli declared that the elements of politics were to be evaluated solely in terms of political ends and means, without reference to any extrapolitical values.²² Questions regarding origins of power, its legitimization and purpose--which were answered theologically--were not to be considered outside the political which would be animated by its own laws, values, and vocabulary.

Machiavelli has been unfairly criticized by academics for rejecting all morality in establishing the autonomy of politics. As a consequence of Machiavelli's action in separating politics from Christianity, it is a mistake--perhaps even reactionary--to conclude that there are now two separate realms: that which is political and that which is moral. There are two arguments, one historical and one theological, which contradict this facile conclusion.²³

Machiavelli was not alone in seeing that the medieval Christian world view could not accommodate questions posed. History has revealed that the same Christian paradigm, which was jolted by Machiavelli in the

sphere of politics, received similar treatment from other activities within Western society. Merchant-bankers and other early capitalists challenged the Christian world view of economics in the application of usury. The nature and purpose of literature and art--as they stood in the Christian paradigm--was contested and changed. In astronomy, the earth's location was rearranged in the universe by mathematicians and scientists. In these areas, the controlling Christian world view was challenged and redefined by rival values. These rival claims proved their assertions by various means: experience, pragmatism, observation, experimentation, the study of classic models and precedents. Emerging cultural pluralism was a hallmark of Western society: "There is more than one world and more than one set of virtues: confusing them is disastrous."²⁴

The other argument which helps to explicate Machiavelli's reasons for extracting politics from Christianity emerges from the Christian theology itself: the separation of what is Caesar's and what is God's and the insistently individual and apolitical nature of Christianity.²⁵ Coincidentally, this separation of grace from the mundane and the insistence on valuing individual virtue over community morality is different from Quranic instruction which integrates religious precepts into daily life and subordinates the individual to the community ethos. The New Testament establishes a moralism which is so intensely private and individualistic as to be apolitical. This sort of moral paradigm neither prescribes nor judges the political conditions.²⁶ The kingdom of Caesar is graceless; the Kingdom of God is the realm of grace. What is Caesar's is impersonal, concerned with appearances and publicity; what is God's is intensely private, personal and interior. Caesar's

realm cultivates pride and competition for power over men; God's realm celebrates humility and community among men. To Caesar belong taxation, law suits, war and violence; to God belong worship, peace, and blessing one's enemies. Being this-worldly, the kingdom of Caesar views all things sub specie utilitatis and, therefore, attends to the changes in circumstances and contingencies in states, nations, class and wealth. However, the Kingdom of God transcends the circumstantial by holding to unchanging principles and, therefore, ignores the partisan in favor of the universal fellowship, is blind to the difference of Jew and Gentile, and male of female. Christ declared in John 18:36, "My kingdom does not belong to this world . . . If it did, my followers would be fighting to save me from arrest. . . ."27

Secondly, beyond separating the world of grace from the world of mundaneness, practicality and utility, the Christian ethic of the New Testament offers little for the world of community affairs or even corporative morality. The Scriptures only address individual relationships between man and men, and man and God. Except for the admonition to obey rulers, there are no standards of conduct for the community or of the individual within the community. Salvation is personal and individual for the Christian. The prince cannot, by wisdom of his own insight, use his corporate powers in guiding the "unknowing" towards the "right way" without contravening the Christian ethic. Later, in his Institutes of the Christian Religion, John Calvin commented on the inappropriateness of Christianity in public affairs: "No express declaration on this subject (war and politics) is to be expected in the writings of the apostles, whose design was not to organize civil government, but to describe the spiritual kingdom of Christ."28

Similar to what Machiavelli observed and experienced in Italy, Ibn Khaldun also observed that the universe of Islam beginning to disintegrate centrifugally into fragmented interests and powers in the Maghrib. In Italy, Machiavelli believed that the world view of Christianity did not, nor could not, be matched to man's political nature.²⁹ Machiavelli was convinced that this mismatch could not be reconciled through further efforts of "normal science" within the Christian paradigm. However, unlike Machiavelli, Ibn Khaldun saw that Islamic values had relevancy to the conduct of the secular community. To Ibn Khaldun these values had proven themselves to be coincidental to how the community could politically inspire general welfare. In Muhammad's time seeking the religious values somehow automatically brought on healthy secular political endeavors. Ibn Khaldun felt that Maghribi problems in politics could be addressed and articulated through normal science within the general formula of Islam.

Unlike Machiavelli, Ibn Khaldun did not view his task as discarding one paradigm for another in order to address more adequately immediate political problems. But, rather, the Islamic political philosopher saw his task as articulating or connecting Islam's ultimate and relevant values to the Maghrib's "puzzles in nature." To see more clearly what Ibn Khaldun was doing, we must generally examine what Ibn Khaldun saw as a problem in the Maghrib and what in Islam convinced Ibn Khaldun that it could provide a solution. How and why were "Maghribi scientists" differing from the prevailing Islamic paradigm? And what in the Islamic paradigm convinced Ibn Khaldun and other Muslim philosophers that its values had eternal pervading relevancy?

Pre-Islam and Islam; Pre-Science and Science

The transformation of pre-Islamic society into Islamic society can be seen under the process of what Thomas Kuhn described as pre-science moving into science. Pre-science is characterized as a state of disorganization without formal procedure. Pre-science, just as the social conditions of pre-Islam, were characterized by the fact that there was vast disagreement among scientists (individuals of the society) about the conceptual nature of things. "In the early stages of the development of any science different men confronting the same range of phenomena, but not usually all the same particular phenomena, describe and interpret them in different ways."³⁰ The attitude of scientists towards optics before Newton is an example provided by Kuhn. "Being able to take no common body of belief for granted, each writer in physical optics felt forced to build his field anew from its foundation."³¹ But the transition from pre-science into science has the diversity of opinion being abandoned for commonality of opinions under a generally agreed upon concept. In science, all scientists (believers) become convinced to order themselves under a common concept for practicing science.

A.F.C. Wallace's notions on revitalization movements describes Kuhn's dynamics of scientific concepts in religious terms. According to Wallace, a revitalization movement is a "deliberate, organized, conscious effort by members of a society to construct a satisfying culture."³² The process, which can be either evolutionary or revolutionary, is usually more subtle under the more gradual cultural changes such as drift, diffusion, historical change and acculturation. These processes do not usually depend on the deliberate intent of the

members of the society. Two conditions are generally responsible for generating revitalization movements: high stress for individual members of the society and disillusionment within a distorted cultural Gestalt. The revitalization process is organized into five somewhat overlapping stages: (1) Steady State, (2) Period of Individual Stress, (3) Period of Cultural Distortion, (4) Period of Revitalization (conceptual reformation, adaptation, cultural transformation, and routinization), and (5) New Steady State. On its own Islam did not independently create a set of standards and ideals by which Muslim society was to function. It did, however, unify a community under a "common science" by standardizing and revitalizing previous values already formed. Islam set out to take what had already been proven in practical efforts of people living together and make those lessons and values universal for Muslims.³³

Pre-Islamic Arab society has been characterized as a "collection of groups rather than a collection of individuals."³⁴ Kinship was the cohesive force which produced the high degree of social solidarity characteristic of pre-Islamic tribal life. Custom demanded that an individual rely on his group for support, justice, and if need be, revenge. Moral prescription rested not on the notion of individual worth, that one should refrain from harming his neighbor because of a shared humanity, but rather on the more immediately practical reality that his neighbor's community (family, clan, tribe) was entitled to immediate retribution. Similarly, an individual was expected to consider his community's interest before his own. Under this ancient quid pro quo system, the individual's loyalty to the group was rewarded by the community's loyalty to the individual.³⁵

Lex talionis (an eye for an eye) was basic law in pre-Islamic tribal life. To fulfill its imperatives, communal structures at times had to be enlarged. In exchange for an oath of allegiance, a group could agree to protect a client individual, neighboring tribes could agree to a pact of mutual protection, or a federation of common interests could be forged to create a balance of power.³⁶ Later, Muhammad's strong reliance on such customary tribal law created an eternal and mutual dependence between religion and social order. The relation of the individual to community and community to individual is an integral weave in the fabric of Islam: "The solidarity engendered by Islam stems not from a rallying institution or figure but from pride of belonging."³⁷ Yet, before Islam, power resided in the many centers of tribes and not under a central sense of obligation. By moral persuasion, and by coercion when called for, Muhammad won Arabia over to the worship of the one and only God. He instilled in its wild tribes the will to fraternize rather than to continue their fratricidal war. Muhammad, under Islam, coalesced all these factions under one "normal science" which had no such precedent for universal cohesion in Arabia.

Some scholars believe that Muhammad was moved by two imperatives in achieving universality: a need to collect the centers of power from the tribes into a community of believers and by economic necessity. Trade and its inherent aspect of entrepreneurship was an important factor in shaping Islam.³⁸ In Muhammad's time Mecca was fast becoming rich as the urban center for marketing and financial operations. Merchants from the Quraysh tribe, who were but a generation or two removed from nomadic pastoralism, were amassing great wealth. A radical differentiation in the economic basis of life, from pastoralism to commerce, in the span of

a couple of generations adversely affected the community. From the larger tribes and clans to the basic family unit, group solidarity weakened.³⁹

Islam was central in changing the setting of a social order previously determined primarily by kinship and ethnic homogeneity of origin into an "order in which the function of kinship now served to mask a developing division of society into classes characterized by considerable ethnic diversity."⁴⁰ When the Quraysh attained wealth and power, the economic gulf separating its component clans widened. Eventually the clans of Mahkzum and Umayya--which were later instrumental in spreading Islam--became predominant. Muhammad came from one of the poorer clans which had moved to the outskirts of Mecca. The political power and influence of the rich merchants of the Quraysh profoundly conflicted with the primal Arab prerequisites of leadership. Islam gathered the various values which provided social cohesion, provided for general welfare and incorporated the meaning of these values to apply to the Islamic community at large.⁴¹

The Shari'a

For the Muslim--including all Muslim philosophers--the foundation from which all discussion of government or political science starts is the law of God, the Shari'a. Eternal, it represents absolute good. The law is prior to the community and the state: "The community exists to bear witness to God amid the darkness of this world, and the function of its government is essentially to act as the executive of the law."⁴² No Muslim political theory of state, therefore, asks the question why the state exists. The starting point is the assumption that rights and

obligations are determined and revealed by God and that, therefore, He--or the divine law He reveals--is the ultimate sovereign.⁴³

Islam teaches the divine origin of government. All of man's activities are judged in accordance with God's divine law. Therefore, political science for Islam is not an independent discipline aspiring to the utmost heights of intellectual speculation; political science is considered a department or branch of theology. The distinction between secular and spiritual for the Muslim has no meaning. For the Muslim, the only distinction regarding faith is between believer and unbeliever. Human beings cannot change the divine law, the Shari'a; they can only know or not know it, obey or disobey it. The prerequisite for knowledge of the Shari'a is an acknowledgement of its established sources, the principles or roots of religion. Yet, the ultimate source of authority is God.⁴⁴

In its appeal to all believers, the divine law (Shari'a) abstracted values which were common among tribes into general tenets of the faith. As in Kuhn's science, Islam evolved as a paradigm maintaining values common to all. The Shari'a is not a lawbook in the Western sense of the word, but rather a discussion of the duties of the Muslim. It regulates, in theory, all aspects of public and private life and commercial and business affairs and forms the basis of political theory. The Shari'a is, therefore, practical advice as to how the individual should act within the community and how both should act under God.⁴⁵ The prophet received the divine law which responds to the problems of general welfare which pre-Islamic Arab society faced. The Shari'a obliges believers of the community to obey its tenets as an act of faith and submission to Allah's will and for the ancient pre-Islamic

imperative--the good of the tribe which became the community of believers. The Shari'a never addresses itself to specific prescriptive operations of government.⁴⁶ Yet, the notion of general welfare came to be inherently codified as a logical extension of Allah's beneficence to those who followed the Shari'a.⁴⁷ What Muhammad had observed as an abused societal imperative in pre-Islamic society--general welfare--was later revitalized and institutionalized as the essence of Islam. Temporal authority acts as an exponent of both the divine law and the imperative of community general welfare. Temporal authority, the law, and community all revolve around general welfare of the community.⁴⁸ In human terms, the message of Muhammad was to resolve imperfections and differences discovered between Bedouin and urban life.⁴⁹ Islam meant Muslims were to submit to the transcendent demands of Allah that broke through the constraining obligations of kinship and blood feud to the eternal feud between the Muslim Umma (community) and the unbelievers.⁵⁰

The Maghrib: Need for a More Developed Paradigm

In the Maghrib, nearly six centuries after tribal social values had been universalized into Islam, Ibn Khaldun observed a similar antagonism among tribes and between city and tribe. Once more, tribes were factionalizing into many centers of power; Islam's universal presence was correspondingly declining; societies in cities and the countryside were becoming heterogeneous.⁵¹ Ibn Khaldun argued that there existed a tragic antithesis between civilization and social cohesion. Only cities have civilization; only tribes have social cohesion. Thus, only tribes can provide the basis for the political order, which cities and civilization need but do not engender. Tribes, in their efforts to

provide political order in the cities, destroy themselves. Ibn Khaldun discovered that the civilization and complexities of the city had moved to more particular problems which were not particularly addressed in Islam's Shari'a or Sunna. Tribal political organization and administration had changed little from the seventh to thirteenth centuries. The Shari'a and Sunna, as revealed to Muhammad, were germane to the social and political questions of the thirteenth-century Berber tribe. Since the eleventh century, local Berber dynasties had centralized government and assumed the responsibility for defense of urban and settled communities. The structure of governments had remained tribal since political authority was built on and sustained through the bond of solidarity uniting members of the tribal ruling group.⁵² But government, to deal with cities, had to go beyond tribalism and justify itself in terms of upholding, or appearing to uphold, the authority of the Muslim law.

Ibn Khaldun noted that social, political and economic distance between the ways of the city and tribe created the means for destruction of tribal government. Berber rulers who succeeded the Almohads were conscious of their illegitimacy in an Islamic sense. These rulers were Berber, not Arab, and consequently could not establish a caliphal authority which the majority of Muslim thinkers still reserved to Arabs. Instead, the tribal rulers of the Maghrib began patronizing men of religion as a means of legitimizing their authority. In this way the Islamic consciousness (as a consciousness transcending the tribe) was heightened, a consciousness which politically was incompatible with the tribal system of government.⁵³

Yet, in other ways the tribes and cities represented different levels of political and social development under the same truth of Islam. The destructive difference in this secular development lay in the fact that the political stability which tribal governments finally provided allowed further growth in urbanization and expansion of agriculture. The two processes are connected. The growth of large urban communities, which were dependent on internal and external trade for their prosperity and on the flow of agricultural produce from the rural areas around them, was an important factor in undermining the tribal political structure. The tribal system not only excluded the urban leadership from exercising political authority, but also plunged the society into periodic conflicts which were particularly harmful to the economic welfare of the towns and settled rural communities. The inability of tribal politics to adapt to the evermoving ways in which people lived in their cities required creation of a non-tribal political authority reflecting the interests of the urban communities.⁵⁴

To Ibn Khaldun, the fundamental formula laid down in the seventh century because of similar problems between the Quraysh merchant and Bedouin was still valid in his day. Old values could be reprovén. However, because of the more complex circumstances of contemporary nature, articulation of the general paradigm was necessary to connect more exactly the paradigm of Islam with the nature of civilization. Ibn Khaldun's insightful ideas on the rise and fall of states and the role of religious doctrines as instruments of political cohesion substantiated rational science's place as an articulating element within Islam. Ibn Khaldun's conceptual framework assumed the dependence of urbanization on political centralization where the conflicting concepts

played out were between the fragmentation of the tribe and the universals of Islam. Two further assumptions implied by Ibn Khaldun are that Islam is an urban religion capable of encountering social dynamics and that Islam encourages political centralization.⁵⁵

While Islam exhibited all these preferences in political activity, it gave no directions in achieving these ends. In the generation following Muhammad's death the foundation of the Islamic legal system was laid. This task was not accomplished by legal scholars but by men who applied Quranic moral norms to the customary law they found. Thus, Islamic law was created as a moral code directly out of religious precepts which later were put into practice by secular authorities. Islamic law was developed not in close connection with practice, but as the expression of religious ideals in opposition to practice.⁵⁶

Ibn Khaldun, along with other Muslim philosophers, recognized this as a gap between ethical precept and legal regulation resulting in no clear continual connection between ideal and fact. Governmental power is not exactly tied to the ethical system. Some Muslim theologians were resistant to accommodating the ideal to this reality of social life. In the Maghrib, since the conduct of politics was not directly attached to Islam, tribes found reason once more to localize their power away from the universalizing intentions of Islam.⁵⁷

There is no need for Islamic political thought to concern itself with the dynamics of the state in the abstract, or with comparative institutions. Islam in the state simply becomes a systematic description of government and the statement of its normative doctrine. Islam can envision the fortunes of the state in terms of one relation only: its prosperity, decay or fall depend entirely on the extent to which it conforms to the extrinsic divine norms. The good state could not be established on any basis other than the virtue and good will of government and community in their compliance with norms of the Law. Artificial mechanisms, checks and balances, guarantees and controls, equilibrium of interests will always remain alien.⁵⁸

Religious leaders worked to ensure that, however the political fortunes of the state might change, Islamic jurisprudence would remain immutable and intact. This separation is argued to be a source of strength; some observe that had Islam committed itself to a detailing of prescriptions in government practice, it would have become vulnerable to man's culpabilities and to oppressive states.⁵⁹

Here lies an important distinction between Ibn Khaldun's and Machiavelli's views concerning the state's authority, how laws are derived from the state, and how political science stands relative to ethics. The state as a source of authority and law, so important for Roman political thinkers, played a very little part in Islam's political thought. Yet politics was closely connected to ethics for both Roman and Islamic political thinkers. Consequently, Machiavelli treated political science in terms of pragmatic morality, whereas Muslim thinkers discuss it in terms of theology. Both Machiavelli and Islamic thinkers see common action being related to moral action: the good of the individual is the same as the good of society.⁶⁰ A whole moral society is seen in both cultures as pursuing the full good which can be realized by common action. Morality in common action takes on a different meaning because one man relates the action to the ethical good while another to the practical good. For Machiavelli, political action was a trilogy consisting of the state, a theory of morals, and a theory of law; all three were objects of worldly creation and, therefore, not immutable. In Islam, political science and the state are preceeded by the law; both, as well as everything else, exist for the sole purpose of maintaining and enforcing the immutable law.

Positing God, therefore, caused important differences between Machiavelli's Roman and the Islamic ideal. Islam is different from Rome because the community had God as its head; the law cannot be other than the will of God revealed to the prophets. God is thus the sole legislator, and human will and thought are excluded from legislation. The law is always immutable. The state exists to carry out the law.⁶¹

Both Ibn Khaldun and Machiavelli were concerned about community welfare because political science is concerned about how people can more effectively live together in their cities. Political science, though it is concerned with community welfare, entered as an anomaly for the two prevailing paradigms of Islam and Christianity. Political science, as a rational science, sought investigation and demonstration outside of how both Islamic and Christian theologians practiced their science under religious law. Islam theoretically succeeded in accepting a science grounded in improving the community's lot. The divine law of Islam intrinsically concerned itself with the organized community. However, when Christian precepts for the Kingdom of God were applied to the secular city, the paradigmatic rift between ideal and real widened.

In conclusion, certainly the paradigmatic evaluation for Muslim philosophers and probably the paradigmatic revolution for Machiavelli took place partly because of, and with the help of, philosophy. Yet, what finally crystallized as values considered in each paradigm is quite different. Again, Machiavelli revolutionized his paradigm to address just "how people do live." Muslim philosophers believed otherworldly values and human reason could be connected, allowing people to behave "as they do" in accordance with "how they should live."

To Machiavelli, time and space contain the only reality, and the truth is correspondent to that reality. However, the Muslim philosophers and Ibn Khaldun justified rational pragmatism within "transcendental philosophy," and provided for the ascendance of realism and rationalism towards "transcendental philosophy." Muslim philosophers did not see natural science as the last word--there was more Truth to be found.

Machiavelli, as a pragmatist, thought that facts about how spatio-temporal things worked was all the truth there was. Medieval Christianity could not conceptually accept either practical politics or philosophy, within its conceptual doctrine. The profane--what is Caesar's--could not be understood in terms of the sacred--what is God's. The Kingdom of God deliberately transcends the circumstantial by holding to principles that do not change. Moreover, the Christian ethic is not a corporative morality. It only addresses individual relationships between man and man, and man and God. But, political philosophy is concerned with what is Caesar's: taxation, lawsuits, war and violence. And because Christianity addresses the categorical and unchanging only in principle, it could not address the ever-changing realm of political circumstances and contingencies.⁶²

FOOTNOTES

¹Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Second Edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 24.

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⁴Ibid., p. 86.

⁵Ibid., p. 88.

⁶Ibid., p. 91.

⁷Ibid., p. 103.

⁸Ibid., p. 200.

⁹Ibid., p. 206.

¹⁰Ralph Lerner, Medieval Political Philosophy: A Sourcebook (Glencoe: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 4-5.

¹¹Leo Strauss, What is Political Philosophy? (Glencoe: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1959), p. 9.

¹²Ibid., p. 11.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴T.J. DeBoer, The History of Philosophy in Islam (New York: Dover Press, 1965), pp. 211-212.

¹⁵Jerome Blum, et al., The European World: A History (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970), p. 25.

¹⁶Thomas Aquinas quoted by Erwin I.J. Rosenthal in Political Thought in Medieval Islam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), p. 13.

¹⁷Blum, p. 26.

¹⁸Benedetto Croce in John H. Geerken, "Machiavelli Studies Since 1969," Journal of the History of Ideas, 37 (April, 1976), p. 365.

¹⁹Myron P. Gilmore, ed., Studies on Machiavelli (Florence: Sansorri, 1972), pp. 197-198.

²⁰Croce, p. 365.

²¹Leo Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli (Glencoe: Free Press of Glencoe, 1958), p. 112.

²²Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 178-179.

²³Gilmore, pp. 197-198.

²⁴Gilmore, p. 184.

²⁵John H. Geerken, "Machiavelli Studies Since 1969," Journal of the History of Ideas, 37 (April, 1976), p. 366.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Ibid., p. 367.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Gilmore, p. 183.

³⁰Kuhn, p. 13.

³¹Ibid.

³²Anthony F.C. Wallace, "Revitalization Movements," in Reader in Comparative Religion, William Lessa, ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 503.

³³Wallace, pp. 506-509.

³⁴W. Montgomery Watt, Muhammad (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 6.

³⁵Watt, Islam and the Integration of Society (Bristol: The Burleigh Press, 1961), pp. 150-151.

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷Caesar E. Farah, Islam: Beliefs and Observances (New York: Barron, 1970), p. 10.

³⁸Watt, Islam, pp. 150-151.

³⁹Ibid., pp. 6-11 and pp. 43-50.

⁴⁰Farah, p. 33.

⁴¹Watt, Muhammad, p. 59.

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⁴³Lambton, p. xiv.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 1.

- ⁴⁵Ibid., p. 2.
- ⁴⁶Joseph Schacht, ed., The Legacy of Islam (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1974), p. 404.
- ⁴⁷Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (Baltimore: John Hopkins), p. 22.
- ⁴⁸Schacht, p. 422.
- ⁴⁹Irene Coltman Brown, "Ibn Khaldun and the Revelation from the Desert," History Today 31 (June, 1981), p. 21.
- ⁵⁰Watt, Islam, p. 35.
- ⁵¹Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 131-136.
- ⁵²Ibid., p. 11.
- ⁵³Ibid.
- ⁵⁴Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, Vol. I, translated by Franz Rosenthal (New York: Pantheon Books, 1958), p. 279.
- ⁵⁵Abun-Nasr, p. 12.
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- ⁵⁸Nadav Safran, Egypt in the Search of Political Community (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1961), pp. 17-18.
- ⁵⁹Morroe Berger, The Arab World Today (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1962), pp. 268-273.
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CHAPTER IV

MACHIAVELLI'S NEW PARADIGM AND IBN KHALDUN'S MORE DEVELOPED PARADIGM

If Machiavelli and Ibn Khaldun found their political situations to be disordered, how should a well-ordered paradigm function? Creative perceptions of political thinkers which allow improvement through new concepts first require seeing disorder and problems in old terms.

In order to be "seeing" part of current politics as disordered, [the political theorist] must be relying upon a conception of order . . . [and] he must . . . articulate the underlying paradigm of human order which has provided him with the foundation for his vision . . . To perceive a particular political situation as somehow wrong, he now relies upon his perception of disorder as the basis for attending to his conception of right order . . . As in a Gestalt switch, background [the right order] and foreground [disorder] exchange places [in the thinker's mind]; though, as before, they still compose one whole picture.¹

The thinker who thinks in terms of paradigmatic innovation or revolution is constructing a vision of what society would be like. Therefore, he must partially rely on his imagination. He begins by describing the way the world is to demonstrate paradigmatic problems.

But the political thinker not only describes the problem. He must also describe what he sees as possibilities; he must go on to describe the world as it could be. "Political theorists provide us with a way of looking at politics which adds up to a symbolic picture of an ordered whole."²

To Machiavelli, the problems of disorder stemmed from concepts which permitted political ineptness and chaos--"imagined kingdoms." Machiavelli perceived order as good, and order could only be obtained by people pursuing values and truth which were possible in their attainability. This idea was something new. To Leo Strauss, Machiavelli started a new frontier by becoming "the founder of modern political philosophy . . ."³ Machiavelli developed a new way of thinking where values were possible in their attainability, and values could be fully articulated to practical politics. The manner in which Machiavelli construed the term virtue (virtu) is a key to his intention in political philosophy. Virtue to the scholastics, such as Thomas Aquinas, signified moral perfection; but to Machiavelli, virtu means virtuosity. Politics is not a means whereby persons might be directed to a just life of civic friendship. It is a molding of history by whatever means necessary to win greatness and glory. In Machiavelli's politics, prudence and power are paramount considerations in a never-ending struggle with chance (fortuna). Machiavelli's realistic conceptual break from the cosmological concepts of Christian scholastics was dramatic.

New Paradigm: The Founding, Virtù, and Law

Machiavelli rejected classical political philosophy which sought to define what is ultimately good for people in this and the next world. By rejecting philosophy and political philosophy, the state no longer had a moral end or purpose. Politics was an end unto itself which created the best practical conditions for the citizen's self-preservation, security, and happiness. Machiavelli purposely lowered his horizons to practical possibilities in order to get results. Machiavelli justified his demand for this kind of "realistic" political philosophy by considering just the real, the immanent, and the immediate condition of people within a civil society. Necessity rather than moral purpose would then determine what is in each case the sensible and realistic course of action. Necessity, thus, becomes the cohesive force which directs citizens towards a common and real goal.⁵ Civil society cannot aspire simply to be just. Virtù was something fundamental to people (both individually and collectively) which allowed a dynamic encounter with the challenges of necessity.⁶ But it was something to be found outside of contemplation in religion or philosophy. Florence had produced good, law-abiding citizens like Savonarola and Soderini who did not possess sufficient virtù to contend with the corruption of their age. Machiavelli saw the one hope for Italy in the person of Cesare Borgia who took the initiative to strike down fortuna (chance) before the reverse could occur.⁷ Machiavelli's people of virtù are predominantly "warrior citizens" who triumph in circumstances of extreme danger, hardship and chance.

If one can see morality in survival, Machiavelli may seem a "moralist." Rome was the prime historical example of a state which

embodied the two major Machiavellian values of stability and greatness. Rome had succeeded in adapting itself to a variety of internal and external threats, creating the most durable "dynamic equilibrium" known to man.⁸ Machiavelli's societal goal of "greatness" is attained by institutions' capacity to serve the general community and their capacity for temporal endurance. A "great" society is one which is successful in attaining relative stability for a long period of time, and long periods of stability are allowed through a government which best serves the general welfare for the people.⁹ The community having Roman ideals was an organization which insured continual adaptation and, thus, historical success. Under Roman law, the group or citizenry conferred the rights of citizenship and demonstrated its own democratic influence.

Machiavelli regarded virtu as a trait possessing qualities from its ethos in military behavior. He then applied virtu to a contemporary attitude of how citizens should behave politically.¹⁰ Machiavelli had the old theme of virtu take on a more appropriate involvement with the conditions existing in Renaissance Florence. Machiavelli had the skill to apply creatively the lessons of antiquity to contemporary problems. Virtu takes substance from attitudes demonstrated in military regimen and ultimately develops into the psychological posture of the individual citizen in both public and private life, and the dynamics within the body politic, the thematic structure of civil laws. Machiavelli saw virtu as a militarization of citizenship. His most original contribution to the republican theory is the convergence of military and social behavior to encourage a condition of freedom, civic virtu, military regimen and discipline--the articulation of warrior behavior and public life all under the same competitive structure which moves on conflictual dynamics.¹¹ Men must make use of the beast in man.¹²

Machiavelli distinguished between virtu of the leader and the virtu of the community. Theoretically, if not always in practice, position in the hierarchy corresponds to merit. The rank and file, the non-commissioned and commissioned officers, and the commander are of different positions but unified against the same odds. Virtu refers to a style of conduct of all warriors from simple soldier to great general. At the top, overall objectives are determined and tactics are established by the commander and his staff. But those rules, devised for a particular military operation, can be only of the most general nature if they are to be applied successfully. In the application, during the course of changing battle conditions, plans would be modified and even discarded. Virtu of the individual and community must be like that of the soldier and his army in combat. Battles and campaigns are highly fluid in changing conditions. Dynamic situations have great uncertainty; the severest hardships and most pressing physical dangers are confronted, endured and mastered.¹³ Machiavelli's contests are seen as a struggle between the courage and rationality of virtu and the irrationality of chance (fortuna).¹⁴ The solidarity and energy of the republic relies on its citizens having this attitude of "control over the situation" as both an individual and collective virtue.

Machiavelli's virtu as a fundamental characteristic in his homo militans is the very opposite of the feudal egocentric man of the early Italian Renaissance. Homo oeconomicus of the city-state was a self-seeking individual aiming at ascending economically through a life of commerce. Homo militans is desirous of immortality, permanence in his cosmos, acceptance by his contemporaries. Machiavelli's model for the best government is most adequately secured by the ends of good

government in general.¹⁵ The foundation of good is based on its capability to encounter external foes which internal security must provide for the citizens' life, family, property and honor. General economic prosperity is important but not at the expense of capitalism in the hands of a few. Individual acquisition and conspicuous consumption are to be strictly regulated. Machiavelli emphasizes the significance of rule of law as a guarantee to citizen liberty and security.¹⁶

The key to what caused community unity and direction is understood by how Machiavelli related two antithetical terms: ozio, meaning indolence, idleness, a lack of energy, and necessita, necessity. Greater virtu occurs when human actions are determined by necessity.¹⁷ In military affairs, Machiavelli reveals a close relation between necessita and virtu. The necessity of not being defeated inspires virtu. Pagan religion imposed upon the ancients the absolute necessity of self-defense, much more so than in the modern world in which Christianity had humanized war. Pagan values demonstrated necessity by how war was to be fought: the defeated in battle were either killed or enslaved; captured cities were demolished or dispersed.¹⁸ Christianity, however, made survival more possible if an army were defeated.¹⁹ Total annihilation was no longer inevitable for the loser. The incentive to do virtuous things was lost. The result was a decline of military discipline and decrease in virtu. Men were less compelled to take control, and, thus, fortuna came to govern circumstances more.²⁰

A society might have to use its intellect and energy ingeniously to make infertile land productive or win a war against formidable odds. Necessity, to Machiavelli, could result either from what naturally occurred, or necessity could appear in how a society challenged itself

by skillfully devising and vigorously executing laws. Roman laws--as a means of producing necessity--were established to insure the community's welfare rather than the individual's welfare.²¹

"Liberty" meant the liberty of each to participate in a common activity. Political or public liberty cannot be confused with the concept of private "civil liberty"--the security of one's rights and property and the protection from the domination of others. Public liberty is much closer to what Hannah Arendt calls political freedom, or the "participation in public affairs, or admission to the public realm."²² Public liberty is not identical to political action, but one cannot be enjoyed without the other. Apathy means the death of political liberty.

For peace and stability, Machiavelli relies upon conflict waged internally and resolved by political means. Republican politics is not domination versus subordination or winning versus losing. It is more like a common project among a group of strong-willed and opinionated people differing profoundly on how to proceed.²³ They argue endlessly, but are committed to working together. They search for common ground after starting from very different places. This all happens through what Machiavelli sees as internal productive conflict.²⁴

Political conflict is necessary to energize the polity. Machiavelli believed that an active conflict is the life force of public liberty and civic virtue. Conflict is natural or inevitable among men free to express their interests and values. A politically successful people must be able to keep fundamental questions open and to respond flexibly to new situations. In accepting conflict as a paradigmatic condition for politics, Machiavelli rejected Aristotle's contention that

the fundamental constitution must be beyond political action. Machiavelli believed that there could be no permanently good institutions or good laws even for one polity. What was once suitable would no longer be so as the situation and people changed. Crisis and conflict create the general character of the political situation. Power confronting power creates a political situation.²⁵

Machiavelli had to deal with the gaps which existed because of the paradigmatic changes between Christian transcendent values and secularity of the Roman republic, between his newly discovered ethical sphere of virtu and the state, animated by virtu on one hand, and the old Christian sphere of religion and morality on the other. Machiavelli realized that his idea of virtu contained a certain quality of barbarity (ferocia).²⁶ Here Machiavelli's limited horizon of dealing only in the real and practical caused him problems. If there were no transcending values or no natural order, then people were left only two alternatives--order or violence. If people's values are solely created by mortals and chosen, then people must resolve issues among themselves. There is no avenue for deference to anything else or higher. Without transcendence there is no reasoned or certain basis for values or for judgement and agreement on them. To raise fundamental political questions is merely to invite disagreement, conflict and resolution through violence and domination.²⁷ Machiavelli condemned the public involvement of private answers allowed by Christianity.²⁸ Ironically, individual answers or "imagined kingdoms" contributed certain measures of apathic stability within political orders. Machiavelli saw the need to place limits on the "vitality" of his new forces in virtu. He considered that virtu ought not to remain a mere unregulated natural

force. Virtu should be raised into a virtu ordinata of rationally and purposely-directed code of values for rulers and citizens.²⁹

Law, for Machiavelli, partially helped deal with the problems of losing transcendent values and restraining ferocia within virtu. Law provided the conceptual means of replacing transcendent values and also connecting the conceptual with the particulars of the secular world. For Machiavelli, the universal could exist in secular particularity because of the fact that the law combined the behavior required in virtu with the universal dimensions of rationality, deductibility, and generality with the particular aspects of custom, circumstantiality, and peculiarity which were validated by usage in time.³⁰ Rome achieved greatness when it ceased to be a regal military regime and became a secular community supported by institutionalized conflict politics and a public-spirited citizenry.³¹ The Roman Republic was virtuous in Machiavelli's eyes because it reconciled many conflicting elements over a long period of time without allowing situations to degrade to a point where violent action became necessary in internal affairs. Rome achieved peace through authoritative republican politics in which law ultimately appeared as an artificial necessity.³²

Law of the founding was to have purposes other than producing the virtuous life or of safeguarding the natural right of each citizen. Because Machiavelli's man was left to order himself, his highest achievement could only be efficiency of state which most effectively provided for the general welfare. Because this achievement could be had, and the way to the achievement had been demonstrated in the Roman Republic, Machiavelli chose Roman law over Greek law.³³ The difference of seeking to achieve community welfare as opposed to seeking what is

ultimately necessary for the individual is demonstrated by differences in Greek and Roman laws.³⁴

Machiavelli's contribution to the well-being of founding can be seen by contrasting Greek and Roman forms of law. Greeks saw citizens producing the state; Romans saw the state causing the citizens. The Roman state, because of its character based on law, is more the state "for the people" than "by the people." The Roman Republic was less concerned if only a few should rule. Rome was more concerned with who should rule and how they were to rule as an embodiment of the community.³⁵

The concept of Machiavelli's Florentine citizenship was developed from Roman citizenship. The paradigm primarily relied on the relationship of civic duties, liberty and the employment of political virtu. Conceptually, in Florence as in Rome, civic duty and liberty came to mean the same thing. Roman citizenship and individual liberty were things acquired only by the individual demonstrating responsibility in the collective. They were not inherently natural and personal rights as in Greece. The right to be free, to govern, and to hold office was not only an inherent, universal right, but was also an acquired civic right.³⁶

Roman law, as opposed to Greek law, is not viewed philosophically or doctrinally, but functionally and practically. Roman liberty is a consequence of public responsibility. Yet, the freedom, in contrast to Greek definitions, tend to be defined negatively and narrowly because the community is assumed to be prior in all cases. To insure that the community maintains its liberty, a qualified few who override the liberty of the individually many are charged with overseeing and

maintaining civic well-being. Roman liberty, acquired after community participation, allows freedom from absolute monarchy or arbitrary despotism. Because liberty can only be enjoyed under law, it was never a private or individual benefit. Liberty was a social and public benefit belonging to the citizen within the organized community of the Roman state.³⁷

Articulated Paradigm: Islam and Muslim Philosophy

Muslim philosophers were interested in making philosophy, natural science and history fulfilling parts of Islamic theology. They sought to reconcile philosophy with Islamic theology and jurisprudence. The philosophers inevitably subordinated philosophy to Islamic theology as a method of completing divine revelation. In so doing, theology remained supreme and all aspects of philosophy became subordinate.³⁸ They regarded political philosophy as a branch of philosophy; but they also regarded political theology as a branch of political philosophy. Muslim philosophers saw philosophy as an understanding of the whole and the parts of the whole and the place of the parts within the whole. Likewise, political philosophy seeks to understand the principles of political life, the relation of these principles to each other, and the relation of political things to all other things.³⁹ Political theology is an integral part of theology. Muslim philosophers regarded theology as sacred theology. As such, its inquiries into divine things were based on divine revelation whose highest principles are transcendent and, therefore, not accessible to the unassisted human mind. Political theology, under sacred theology, seeks to understand political matters which are based upon divine revelations.⁴⁰

At one point or another, medieval political philosophers (both Muslim and Christian) had to reconcile the relationship between political philosophy and political theology. Each way (political philosophy and political theology) claimed to present a comprehensive account of things political. All Muslim political philosophers chose to consider political theology within the framework of political philosophy. But all forms of philosophy were to be considered under and responsive to Islamic divine law. The predominant medieval Christian practice, represented primarily by theologians, considered political philosophy within the framework of political theology. How political philosophy and political theology are hierarchically ordered to one another will determine fundamental differences in how a society will conceptually order itself.⁴¹

Muslim philosophers considered political theology within the framework of political philosophy. This approach held that philosophy alone is capable of giving a comprehensive account of the highest principles and understanding of all political concepts. This included political teaching of the divine law, which occupies an honored place within political philosophy. The Muslim philosophers justified their philosophical inquiry into the nature of politics in the following way. The principles of political theology were derived from a particular revelation of divine law. As such, political theology had to accept, not question, these principles. Political philosophy, on the other hand, did not accept any political principles prior to inquiry.⁴² Political philosophy broadened its horizons to question the intentions of the Lawgiver, how those intentions affect man in his place within the whole, and the general nature of political affairs. Political

philosophy became a higher and more comprehensive science than political theology because it inquired into concepts that political theology accepted as its unquestioned point of departure. The Lawgiver intended to establish particular religious community. He regarded the beliefs as best for people of his community.

The Muslim philosophers unanimously maintained the superiority of the divine law to both political philosophy and political theology. Yet, these philosophers believed that the political teachings based on such beliefs could not be presumed final without a full probe of all kinds of polity--both religious and non-religious.⁴³ By integrating philosophy into Islam, the Muslim philosophers held that all Muslims should receive and understand the revealed law through the highest human capacity of thinking--rational understanding. Likewise, all facilities of human knowledge--practical sciences, theology, political philosophy--should be examined under the most comprehensive extent of human knowing--philosophy.⁴⁴

Muslim philosophers felt that political theology could be more fully understood if rationally investigated under political philosophy. Furthermore, political philosophy would justify and complete philosophy and philosophy would justify and complete Islam.⁴⁵ Muslim philosophers had argued the entire philosophic metaphysics to a point-by-point of correspondence with Islamic theological belief. The philosophers were confronted with the problem of establishing a mutual relationship between religion and philosophy. Either there was a double truth (as argued by Thomas Aquinas), one apprehended by philosophy, the other by religion, or the truth was unitary but appeared now in rational, and again in a metaphysically imaginative form. To the philosophers, the

alternative of two truths did not seem rationally possible.⁴⁶ What did seem rational and practical to both philosophy and religion was to consider religious truth explainable and perceptible through rational truth. But instead of expressing itself in rational formulas, religion was to manifest itself in imaginative symbols. Imaginative symbols in the revelation could address the multitudes in literal terms as to improving their earthly life. The revelation of divine law is to assure the happiness of all members of the community. This requires that everyone profess belief in the basic principles of Islam as enumerated in the Quran, the Hadith, and the consensus of the learned. Beyond this fundamental requirement, the only requirement is for each to pursue and comprehend knowledge to his highest rational capacity. Philosophers could pursue their rational inquiries under the divine law to sophisticated levels of human reasoning, and the multitudes could also live to their rational capacity according to Islam. Because beliefs would then be accessible to all citizens at large, the multitudes and philosophers could rationally live within fundamentals of the law and Hadith. The way in which the philosophers allowed for levels of rational religious apprehension accounted for its effectiveness among the masses. Thus, Islam could function as both philosophy and religion for the masses.⁴⁷

As a religion, Islam revitalized certain practical pre-Islamic social forces and incorporated some of pre-Islam's resilient social practices. Such practices were founded on rationality; therefore, the essence of Islam is partially formed by reality and rationality.⁴⁸ Islam seems to incorporate what Aristotle referred to as "nature and convention" into the religious ideal. Rationality was readily accepted

in Islam, not just because of advocacy by the Islamic philosophers, but also because it became an explanation to problems emerging during the times of Muslim philosophers. Because of this necessity, philosophers fundamentally concerned themselves with how to justify philosophy within its Islamic theology. As a general way of systematizing and studying knowledge, philosophy became an imperative in providing answers to religious and social problems after the prophet's death: the interpretation of the Quran, the political organization, the nature of the caliph's powers, the administration of justice. To early Islamic philosophers, philosophy could be recast into a new framework conforming to and assisting Islam. Furthermore, physical sciences could be organized within a philosophic framework so that logic, physics, mathematics, and metaphysics culminated in political science, political philosophy, philosophy, and Islam.⁴⁹

Muslim philosophers saw God transmitting everything to the prophet in one "dense formula." To them, mortals were to spend their time and effort apprehending this formula by themselves, within the circumstances of their time and their endowment of rationality. Muslim philosophers began dealing with philosophy where the Greeks had left off. The objective for Muslim philosophers in "articulating" the concept of divine law essentially became reconciling Platonic and Aristotelian notions. In this light, Muslim philosophers began to logically reason such Platonic concepts as creation of the world, the substantiality of things spiritual, and the immortality of the soul with the more popular Aristotelian emphasis on reason and the consequent subordination of the spiritual and ethical to the rational process. All of this was argued in respect to the ultimacy and unchanging nature of Islamic divine law.

Muslim philosophers stressed the virtue of knowing which consequently emphasized the importance of intelligence ('aql) as the next most important determiner after God."⁵⁰

A series of Muslim philosophers built upon one another to integrate classical philosophy into and under divine law. Al-Farabi (870-950) recast philosophy in a new framework analogous to that of Islam. Ibn Sina (Avicenna) (980-1037) shaped Islamic philosophy into a powerful force. Ibn Rushd (Averroes) (1126-1198) developed a solution to the problem of relating philosophy to the theology of the theologians. Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) established history as a branch of philosophy and removed history as an expression of political theology.

Al-Farabi

Islam is founded on a concern for the community. Revealed law defined actions required of community members if they were to attain earthly and other worldly happiness. To Al-Farabi, philosophy could not understand the framework of Islam as long as it confined rationality to individual ethics and personal salvation. Under Islam, political philosophy became an aspiration of how to attain happiness as citizens rather than isolated human beings. In establishing this philosophic framework, Al-Farabi permitted philosophical inquiry into all elements contributing to the Islamic community: the prophet-lawgiver, intentions of divine law, the legislation of beliefs as well as actions, the role of the successor to the founding legislation, the grounds of the interpretation or reform of the law.⁵¹

Al-Farabi, in ordering philosophy under Islam, also had to connect philosophy and man's capacity to reason God's message. If philosophy's

task is to complete God's message, how does man maintain receptivity to God's transcendency? Al-Farabi believed man had the capacity to receive "intelligible forms": sensations, imagination and "possible intellect." All people could eventually receive, through a hierarchy, intelligible forms from God. These forms were transmitted by man's active intellect which is the lowest condition within a hierarchy of intelligence emanating from God. Through his intellect man becomes intelligent, wise and philosophical.⁵²

If one's imagination is particularly lively, he will transpose intellectual knowledge into perceptible visions. This is the case of the Prophet Mohammad who expressed intelligible forms through images based in truth. Al-Farabi, in demonstrating this residency of philosophy within religion, further argued that the true prophet-lawgiver ought to be the same as the philosopher-king. The philosopher must return to the "cave" (or people in their cities), talk to the inhabitants in a manner they comprehend, and devise in ways of improving their lot.

Ibn Sina

Ibn Sina (980-1037), through imagination and inventiveness, shaped philosophy into a powerful force which gradually penetrated Islamic theology and mysticism. His contribution mostly consisted of refining Al-Farabi's earlier thoughts. Ibn Sina put precision into Al-Farabi's assertion of God's hierarchial relationship to man and endeavored to establish a precise relation of man, the celestial intellects and God. In his thinking, the intellects derived their existence from God and were subsequently arrayed in a descending ontological and normative

hierarchy corresponding to the proximity to God. God is the Prime Mover and the cause for all things, yet celestial intellects were responsible for teleological or overall causes in worldly affairs. Man differed from the celestial in that he had a material aspect which qualified him for direct influence over the particulars in his immediate world. Neither God nor the celestial intellects had direct influence and could know worldly particulars only in a universal way.⁵³

God gave Mohammad the law as one "dense formula"; man's task was to complete this revelation in his own circumstance using his intellect as a means of more clearly knowing. This tasking accounted for the essential importance of all philosophers in their efforts to join more adequately divine law and the masses through the assistance of rational science. Theoretical knowledge resided in the reception of intelligibles from the Active Intelligence which is ultimately God. Man was inherently incapable of attaining theoretical knowledge. The essence of what corresponded to theoretical knowledge was shown to man through the revealed law. Man could, therefore, live a pure life by adhering to the commands of the revealed law. Philosophers were essential so that people in their cities could be connected more closely by rational science to what the law prescribed. In this way, God remained transcendent from man, but God's will and message cascaded down to man through various levels of intellectual exchange.⁵⁴ Man's rational exchange with the divine world justified philosophy's participation within Islam.

Ibn Rushd

Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina had done much to integrate philosophy into Islam. Yet, neither had addressed how philosophy was to regard theology and the theologians. If philosophy was to remain in deference to theologians, it would never be capable of seeking answers outside of what was literally described in religious terms. Ibn Rushd's legal background and his thorough understanding of theology permitted him to posit logically a direct connection of philosophy to the divine law.⁵⁵ He argued that it was the intention of the divine law to assure the happiness of all members of the community. This required everyone to profess belief in the basic principles of Islam as illustrated in the Quran and the Hadith, the consensus of the learned, and to perform all obligatory acts of worship. The few who were capable of pursuing the highest form of knowledge--philosophy--were obligated to pursue this wisdom. The divine law, according to Ibn Rushd, authorized philosophers to pursue its interpretation according to the highest form of wisdom: reasonable conclusive proof through demonstration.⁵⁶ To Ibn Rushd, theologians were merely scientists who only knew what divine law alone literally conveyed in the "dense formula." And as dialecticians, theologians wrongfully proceeded to interpret things political just on their religious understandings. To Ibn Rushd, theologians excluded philosophy and knowledge outside of theology which limited their claim to truth solely within the science of theology.⁵⁷

Ibn Khaldun

Of the philosophers, Ibn Khaldun was most closely affiliated with the thoughts of Ibn Rushd.⁵⁸ Ibn Khaldun was displeased with the

theologian's perspectives of history and "historians" who deferred to theologians. History was not a scientific effort in either pursuing knowledge or completing the divine law.⁵⁹ If, like the theologians, one assumed immediate reality should follow literal readings of the Quran and Hadith, then man had no reasonable way of projecting himself into the ideal. Theologians of Ibn Khaldun's times believed that customary ways of life, by which the masses lived, should have been drastically reformed or entirely replaced by the ideal time of the Prophet. For the theologian there was a clear-cut dichotomy of good versus evil; customary ways of life were evil, while all good was solely seen in terms of the ideal. To Ibn Khaldun there was no such dichotomy. Good and evil are two aspects of one reality.⁶⁰ The law and sacred traditions should not be treated as absolute and eternal--above and beyond the effects of time and space. Divine law was something having practical application to everydayness. Mohammad did not want the law to be followed exactly without looking at the reason behind it. Everything the Prophet said or did with regard to the affairs of this world should be taken with its temporal and relative context. Ibn Khaldun's concept of time is a fundamental contrast to that of the theologian:

[If the historian] trusts historical information in its plain transmitted form and has no clear knowledge of the principles resulting from custom, the fundamental facts of politics, the nature of civilization, or the condition governing social organization, and if, furthermore, he does not evaluate remote or ancient material through comparison with near or contemporary material, he often cannot avoid . . . deviating from the high road of truth. . . .⁶¹

Ibn Khaldun sought not only historic truth but history as the way to truth. In the Preface to The Muqaddimah, Ibn Khaldun criticized other Muslim historians as only seeing the surface of history as no more

"than information about . . . political events . . . they overlooked its inner meaning, . . . [which] involves speculation and an attempt to get at the truth, subtle explanation of the causes and origins of existing things, and deep knowledge of the how and why of events."⁶² For Ibn Khaldun, history is firmly rooted in philosophy and deserves to be a branch of philosophy.

In their own political careers, Ibn Khaldun and Machiavelli realized that political problems demonstrated that there were disparities between the practical and the paradigmatic. Both men understood the necessity of having a conceptual frame which carried a relevant and practically applicable scheme--man's practical behavior had to be realizable under what is claimed as paradigmatic values. Both thinkers concerned themselves with how both concept and practice could be satisfactorily connected, and how both concept and practice could effectively operate in the same real world.

Machiavelli drew on the Roman lessons of pragmatism. The Romans recognized that necessity was induced by such things as hostile enemies, problematic environments, and disorganized social setting. And necessity compelled heroic responses (virtu) seeking resolution. Romans set to confront these necessities with the audacity of virtu. To Romans, as with Machiavelli, history was constantly moving through cyclic periods from stability to decay to regeneration to stability again. The continual struggle between virtu and change accounted for the flux in history. By aggressively anticipating chance and using their virtu to encounter the probable, the community could create a glorious achievement just like the Romans.

To Ibn Khaldun, history showed cause and effect; history also verified that problems were encountered when people deviated from the divine law. All lessons to be learned from people's past mistakes and how people should act in the future could be learned from revealed law. But philosophy was one way of bridging man's real world with the revealed law. Philosophy, to the Muslim philosophers, was essentially the key to connecting how man ought to live with how man tends to live in his mundane world.

FOOTNOTES

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²Sheldon S. Wolin, quoted by Spragens, p. 1.

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⁴Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 178.

⁵Ibid., pp. 178-179.

⁶Niccolo Machiavelli, The Discourses II, 1.

⁷J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 175-177.

⁸Neal Wood in The Political Calculus, Anthony Parel, ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1972), pp. 36-38.

⁹David E. Ingersoll, "Machiavelli and Madison: Perspectives on Political Stability," Political Science Quarterly, 85 (June, 1970), pp. 593-594.

¹⁰Neal Wood, "Some Reflections on Sorel and Machiavelli," Political Science Quarterly, 83 (March, 1968), pp. 71-79.

¹¹Ezio Raimondi, "Machiavelli and the Rhetoric of the Warrior," Modern Language Notes, 92 (June, 1977), pp. 5-7.

¹²Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. by Leo de Alvarez (Irving: University of Texas Press, 1980), p. 18.

¹³Neal Wood, "Machiavelli's Concept of Virtu Reconsidered," Political Studies, 15 (June, 1967), p. 170.

¹⁴Machiavelli, Prince, 24-25; The Discourses II, 20.

¹⁵Wood, "Some Reflections on Sorel and Machiavelli," p. 81.

¹⁶Wood in Parel, op.cit., p. 43.

¹⁷Wood, "Machiavelli's Concept of Virtu Reconsidered," pp. 166-167.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 168.

¹⁹Machiavelli, The Discourses II, 2.

²⁰Machiavelli, Prince, 24 and 25; The Discourses II, 29.

- ²¹Machiavelli, The Discourses I, 4.
- ²²Hannah Arendt quoted by Marcia L. Colish in "The Idea of Liberty in Machiavelli," Journal of the History of Ideas, 32 (July-September, 1971), p. 347.
- ²³S.M. Shumer, "Machiavelli: Republican Politics and Its Corruption," Political Theory, 7 (February, 1979), p. 15.
- ²⁴Ibid.
- ²⁵Ibid., pp. 16-17.
- ²⁶Friedrich Meinecke in Renaissance Thought: Dante and Machiavelli by Norman F. Cantor (Waltham, MA: Ginn Blaisdell, 1969), p. 225.
- ²⁷Shumer, p. 20.
- ²⁸Harvey C. Mansfield, "Machiavelli's Political Science," American Political Science Review, 75 (June, 1981), pp. 302-303.
- ²⁹Meinecke in Cantor, op.cit., p. 225.
- ³⁰Pocock, p. 63.
- ³¹I. Hannaford, "Machiavelli's Concept of Virtu in The Prince and The Discourses Reconsidered," Political Studies, 20 (June, 1972), pp. 188-189.
- ³²Wood, "Some Reflections on Sorel and Machiavelli," p. 90.
- ³³Machiavelli, The Discourses I, 2.
- ³⁴John H. Geerken, "Pocock and Machiavelli: Structuralist Explanation in History," Journal of the History of Philosophy, 17, p. 314.
- ³⁵Ibid., p. 315.
- ³⁶Ibid., pp. 315-316.
- ³⁷Colish, pp. 327-328.
- ³⁸Majid Fakhry, A History of Islamic Philosophy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), pp. 56-63.
- ³⁹Ralph Lerner and Muhsin Mahdi, eds., Medieval Political Philosophy: A Sourcebook (Glencoe: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), p. 7.
- ⁴⁰Ibid.
- ⁴¹Ibid., pp. 8-9.

⁴²Joseph Schacht, ed., The Legacy of Islam (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1974, pp. 355-357.

⁴³Lerner and Mahdi, p. 8.

⁴⁴Fazlur Rahman, Islam (New York: Doubleday, 1966), p. 142.

⁴⁵Schacht, p. 358.

⁴⁶Fakhry, pp. 8-10.

⁴⁷Rahman, pp. 141-142.

⁴⁸Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press), pp. 19-21; also, Schacht, p. 404.

⁴⁹Rahman, pp. 139-142.

⁵⁰Caesar E. Farah, Islam: Beliefs and Observances (New York: Barion, 1970), p. 198.

⁵¹Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey, History of Political Philosophy (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1972), p. 183.

⁵²Ibid., p. 184.

⁵³Ibid., pp. 175-179.

⁵⁴Ibid., pp. 169-175.

⁵⁵Ibid., pp. 302-303.

⁵⁶Ibid., pp. 308-310.

⁵⁷Ibid., pp. 311-313.

⁵⁸Muhsin Mahdi, Ibn Khaldun's Philosophy of History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 32-33.

⁵⁹Ibid., pp. 92-93.

⁶⁰Fuad Baali, Ibn Khaldun and Islamic Thought Styles (Boston: G.K. Hall and Co., 1981), pp. 78-80.

⁶¹Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, Vol. I, trans. by Franz Rosenthal (New York: Pantheon Books, 1958), p. 37.

⁶²Ibn Khaldun, Preface to Muqaddimah, pp. 10-11.

CHAPTER V

USE AND MISUSE OF HISTORY

Like Ibn Khaldun and Machiavelli, Thomas Kuhn (The Structure of Scientific Revolutions) and Karl Mannheim (Ideology and Utopia) believed that an individual's knowledge--how he came to know things--was a function of his social environment. An individual's understanding of objectivity--how he knows things to be true--is a function of the paradigm or world view under which he lives. The individual's knowledge about the world is part of a sociological scheme in which knowledge is developed. Therefore, the individual mind cannot be regarded as separate from the group: "Knowledge is a cooperative process of collective life."¹ Knowledge within the community is more or less conditioned by social forces. To Mannheim, the sociology of knowledge "intentionally does not start with the single individual and his thinking . . . rather [it] seeks to comprehend out of individually differentiated thought which only very gradually emerges. . . . Strictly speaking, it is incorrect to say that a single individual thinks.

Rather it is more correct to insist that he participates in thinking further what other men have thought before him."²

Thomas Kuhn in his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions reinforces the idea that individuals possess knowledge which is a product of sociological conditions and prevailing conceptual framework. Kuhn demonstrates this assertion by showing how scientists go about their work in scientific communities. The paradigm sets the standards for scientific work and directs the "puzzle-solving" activity of scientists. Scientists, by working in a paradigm like most members of any society, all come to accept a single paradigm or a conceptual set of values. "When the individual scientist can take a paradigm for granted, he need no longer, in his major works, attempt to build his field anew, starting from first principles and justifying the use of each concept introduced."³ Much of the scientist's knowledge, like Mannheim's individual in the collective, will be implied under the general concept. Scientists acquire this knowledge, as individuals growing in their societies, through a scientific education. By solving standard problems, an aspiring scientist becomes acquainted with the methods, the techniques and the standards of a paradigm. "Nor do scientists normally aim to invent new theories, and they are often intolerant of those invented by others."⁴ Rather, the scientist will be involved with puzzles, the solution of which is necessary for the articulation of a paradigm. "Many of the greatest scientific minds have devoted all their professional attention to demanding puzzles of this sort."⁵ Mannheim believes individuals of a societal concept, having values like Kuhn's scientists who work under a particular paradigm, develop their knowledge socially under the society's value-laden conceptual scheme. Mannheim

believed that the only knowledge acceptable as universal is analytic reasoning. For instance, everyone everywhere believes that two plus two equals four, regardless of the social setting. But knowledge and truth are not universal; Mannheim argued that objectivity is possible when objectivity is viewed as generally accepted truth rather than a general truth. To Mannheim, this is fundamentally why people think differently throughout the world.

Mannheim recognized only mathematics and logic as universal knowledge. All other knowledge was particular knowledge which accounted for people seeing things differently throughout the world. Mannheim's views on epistemology--how people see their knowledge as correct--is explained by what he calls this notion of "particularization." A notion which further explains Mannheim's sociology of knowledge, particularization insists "that it lies in the nature of certain assertions that they cannot be formulated absolutely [such as Kuhn's scientists might see their paradigm as obsolete in explanation] but only in terms of the perspective of a given situation."⁶ The sociology of knowledge analyzes the structural relationships to a given social situation, attempting "not merely to establish the existence of the relationship, but at the same time to particularize its scope and the extent of its validity." Mannheim used an illustration of a peasant boy emigrating to the city: "The rural mode of living and thinking ceases to be something taken for granted . . . that which, within a given group, is accepted as absolute appears to the outsider conditioned by the group's situation and recognized as partial."⁷ In other words, someone moving from the rural to the urban setting ceases to recognize rural conditions as solely the only way to live. Mannheim makes the

point here that mere demonstration of a proposition, such as either rural living or urban living, does not in itself confirm a higher plane of validity or of universal acceptance: ". . . mere factual demonstration and identification of the social position of the assertor as yet tells us nothing about the truth-value of his assertion, [it does] imply the suspicion that this assertion might represent merely a partial view."⁸

History's Justification of Limited Propositions

In many ways, why and how history is explained differently by different people follows the notion of "particularization" and the sociology of knowledge described by Mannheim. A historical record does not represent a universal record of how different people will see the same past. But rather, like those seeing validity in the rural or urban setting, history justifies a limited proposition of how a limited segment of people see things. Therefore, historians are generally seen as imposing "structures" on the past which never truly existed; past events are seen through "value-laden" eyes. As events compel the historian to involve "ethical and aesthetic consideration," he can never bring to his work a neutral mind. Those who say that history can be reconstructed exactly as it was are considered historical positivists. Those who generally see history being based on knowledge which is relative to the limited nature of the mind and the conditions of knowing are historical relativists.⁹

Those who generally oppose the positivist claim--in disagreement over explanation--usually do so on the grounds of how historians conceive things. Again, when history is compared with different

branches of investigation such as chemistry or biology doubts as to achieving objectivity arise. By contrast with such inquiries, the historian's procedure, including the manner in which he conceptualizes his data and the principles of argument he employs, may be governed by subjective or culturally-determined predilections, which are essentially contestable. The "unscientific" deficit of history, in that it permits many standards of value, can be seen by two examples. First, the subject matter of history is itself value-charged. Secondly, the selection the historian makes in constructing a historical account is value-guided.¹⁰ History is not a formalized discipline; it has no cognitive terms which form a common meaning and symbols of description. History has been an attempt to understand the past in the same terms as those in which the ordinary man attempts to understand his present. The historian seems to be condemned on just his use of value-laden language. He must use words like "victory," "treason," and "order," which are the common jargon for historical description. However, they are not merely descriptive because they intrinsically have values.¹¹

The historian cannot write about anything unless he is able to recognize its nature. He cannot grasp such objects of study without placing a value upon them.¹² How can we say that justifiable light has been shed on features of historical inquiry that are easily missed or ignored by theorists in the grip of some powerful dogma? Machievelli's and Ibn Khaldun's objectivity was tempered by dogma. Like the scientists in their paradigm of science, they were members of society functioning under different paradigmatic world views. The worlds of both men were similar in that they were moving away from paradigms which were solely based on theology.

Theologians acted as scientists for the divine law. Their paradigms were explained by revealed law or how theologians interpreted the law. For the theologians, it was most important to live the kind of life prescribed by divine law. Theologians worked to represent the statements of divine law consistently, to explicate answers to questions from the fundamentals of the faiths.¹³ Such statements established a context in which all other worldly relations (nature and history) and the spiritual processes (reason and logic) could operate. According to theologians, everything, including rational science or philosophy, should be pursued only to the extent necessary to promote the life of faith and virtue.¹⁴ Divine law provided everything to conduct life in this and the next world.

Therefore, history as a condition of knowledge was also a condition of theology. According to the theological method, history is theocentric, and worldly glory subordinate to the glory of God. The human universe is a moral universe which is governed by norms of divine law, natural law and providence. The solutions to moral evil are sacramental, not scientific. Christian and Islamic theologies could not go so far to concede the rational basis of politics having full autonomy. For both theologies, the legitimate state is the religious state; valid political ethics must never depart from morality expressed only in theological terms. The theological solutions for the conflict between morality and politics were something to be resolved solely on the matters of highest ethical principles--not scientifically.¹⁵ History, then, was significant only in how it was viewed under its larger context or conceptual bounds of theology. Historical events were perceived only in the medieval theological terms of experience, custom, prophecy, and grace.

The Christian and Islamic time schemes denied any possibility of secular fulfillment. God was ultimately rational; there was no connection of man's rationality to God's. Everything was ultimately affected by providence; man could do little outside theology to influence his own condition. Under theology, any reference to the temporal was seen as chaos of uncontrolled events outside the influence of supreme divine forces. Therefore, no meaning was derived from the temporal plane unless its random particulars could be hierarchically coordinated with the more intelligible and ultimately rational universals.¹⁶ Like Thomas Kuhn's scientists who displace old scientific concepts with new ones, both Ibn Khaldun's and Machiavelli's societies were beginning to establish new paradigmatic frameworks. Particular behavior, outside of theological explanation, was challenging both Muslim and Christian theological paradigms. Ibn Khaldun and Machiavelli had to deal with the question of reconciliation or the irreconciliation of things practical with religious transcendent ideals.

Machiavelli as "Partisan Artist"

Karl Mannheim and Machiavelli had similar notions concerning the conditions of knowing and philosophy of history. To both men, there was to be an intimate connection between the paradigm and practice. Both believed in the importance of actual social behavior--how men do act. Discovery of these values in the real was not dependent upon a possession of some unchanging capacity for eternal insight. To Mannheim, history demonstrates how people approach problem-solving on an existential basis. He argued that "the approach to a problem, the level on which the problem happens to be formulated, the stage of abstraction,

and the stage of concreteness that one hopes to attain, are all in the same way bound up with social existence."¹⁷ To Mannheim, as with Machiavelli, ultimate values could be eventually grasped in what was empirically discoverable. And history could lead to this discovery.

Machiavelli had to realign his conceptual values, his dedication to the possible, with his ultimate goal of unifying and stabilizing Italy. This central goal of founding influenced how, and why he used history for justification. Machiavelli's philosophy of history, if compared with the contemporary view of scientific practice, suggests that his use of evidence was much less than scientific.¹⁸ Many scholars see Machiavelli as having been selective or having constantly distorted Livy's account of Rome. Machiavelli's science was a great mixture of practices neither completely inductive nor deductive. Machiavelli looked to history, both ancient and modern, not for data from which to draw general laws, but for examples with which to illustrate "laws" or objectives which he had already formulated through his own creativity.

Machiavelli seldom appeared interested in an objective examination of political reality, but rather in axioms concerning the nature of man. Machiavelli emerges as the "artist-hero of pure politics who combined the charm and detachment of an artist with the pathos and the rectilinear logic of a hero."¹⁹ His science was formulated on perceptions, so that he could move from the particular to general by sublimating more often than reasoning.²⁰ Like the painters of the Renaissance, Machiavelli took refuge from a disagreeable reality in a "dream," and he "transfigured" the whole he could not change into a "thing of beauty" to be contemplated but not put into practice.²¹ Machiavelli, in other words, is not a scientist in the sense of one who

arrives at his conclusions by a process of careful induction. Rather, he is an artist, "one who saw the general to be immanent in the particular, and who reinforced it with vivid portraits and plastic images."²² His political philosophy is based on art of the artist and the object of the art which is the foundation.²³

In his preface to The Discourses, Machiavelli announced that he had "resolved to start upon a road hitherto untraveled by anyone."²⁴ Machiavelli regarded the past failure of historians as the inability to understand the study of history and see its practical value. He believed that positive knowledge could be attained by seeing things as they are without fear or preconceptions. Machiavelli continually worked to make politics a highly realistic and practical affair by stressing the necessity of transforming politics into a science, by stressing the significance of history for political practice, and by stressing the ancients.²⁵ Machiavelli based practical politics on the lessons of history which he creatively selected and interpreted.

As the "partisan," Machiavelli fundamentally differed from Ibn Khaldun in how he used history. Ibn Khaldun saw history as an effort to ascertain the facts of the past objectively and then relate them in terms of cause and effect. Ibn Khaldun's endeavor inevitably led him to state conclusions in the form of ever wider generalizations. These ever wider generalizations, however, still remained as "details" completing the dense formula or divine law of Islam. To Ibn Khaldun, history could not teach values; it could only confirm the values already revealed by Islam. Machiavelli capitalized on his ability to selectively interpret history to instruct his reader in virtu. This difference emerged chiefly in Machiavelli's attitude toward history. The historical

material which Machiavelli used in The Prince came chiefly from Machiavelli's contemporary scene; in The Discourses most of the illustrations are from ancient history. Machiavelli's method was deliberate; his selective and creative use of history would be the medium (both practical and normative components) which would complete his piece of art--the foundation of the political system.

In The Prince, history serves as an example; it illustrates a general statement. But in The Discourses, history provides the material from which a general conclusion is drawn.²⁶ In the introduction of The Discourses, Machiavelli remarked that "the civil law is nothing but a collection of decisions, made by jurists of old, which the jurists of today have tabulated in orderly fashion for our instruction; nor, again, is medicine anything but a record of experiments performed by doctors of old, upon which the doctors of our day base their prescriptions."²⁷ In The Discourses, then, Machiavelli advocated the grasp of general rules from ancient practice. History provided The Discourses with the material from which a general conclusion is drawn, and a theoretical statement arises from observing empirical facts of history. However, in The Prince, "political laws" were derived from historical deduction. Both sets of laws are derived differently and from different periods of history.²⁸ Aside from the unsystematic nature of Machiavelli's method, he relied on undeniable experience and attempted to proceed as far as possible by either induction or deduction from the observation. However partially and unscientifically faulty this method appears in the political sphere, it clearly had and has had great validity for the political actor willing and able to use it. Essentially, Machiavelli hoped for the political actor and political community which could ably understand the situation, then take action to command the situation.²⁹

To Machiavelli, the political actor's ability rests on his ability to create and manipulate illusions, and, in the end, Machiavelli's theory of a republic rests on the fact that citizens can be educated to see the world in a certain way. To J.G.A. Pocock, Machiavelli's scheme of republic politics rested on "ideas about the occurrence of contingent events of which time was the dimension, and about the intelligibility of the sequences of particular happenings that made up what we should call history . . . These ingredients all moved to form Machiavelli's conceptual framework within which the doctrine of the vivere civile--the ideal of active citizenship in a republic--must struggle to maintain itself."³⁰ Parenthetically, he depicts history as generating new norms and values.³¹ Being out from under the unchanging theocentric view of history, Machiavelli lived in a conceptual world where fortuna was both unpredictable and recurrent. Machiavelli used the term virtu to denote the creative power of action to shape events and overcome fortuna.³²

Machiavelli's history and time were synonymous with decay and change. Chance never slept, and only virtu could provide a remedy for the fragility of human affairs always "in a state of perpetual movement, always either ascending or declining."³³ Only the skills which flowed from his creative principles for organizing the body politic, his "new route" would be successful within the limitations of any human act.³⁴ Machiavelli recognized that "all the things of this world have a limit to their existence," but that they can at least "run the entire course ordained for them by Heaven if they do not allow their body to become disorganized."³⁵ Thus, people who have audacity have influence over their destiny.

Machiavelli knew that the lessons of history were difficult to apply and that this was part of the whole problem of action in time. Machiavelli believed that the Romans had created virtu as a creative power of action to shape events. Virtu was further refined to behavior which constituted a notion or system of morality in action. Machiavelli's ruler is an individual seeking to shape events through the audacious use of his own virtu. The road Machiavelli set out to travel greatly differed from the previous paradigm of the good Christian who sought to adapt himself to events through prudence. To Machiavelli, each man in the community assesses the role of armed virtu and of arms together as a cause of virtu. Machiavelli saw virtu as the rudimentary basis for values in civic humanism. To Machiavelli, virtu was the special ingredient for "politics of the possible"; general welfare was contingent on the people's ability to control their environment by arms.³⁶

Machiavelli used politics and history as a source to legitimize values and practice in politics were treated in their own autonomous terms. Politics and the history supporting it were divorced from theology, philosophy, and any discernable patterns of science. The state was no longer viewed as having a moral end or purpose. Politics and history, in a symbiotic relationship, were not in the business of shaping human souls or pointing the way to trans-historical principles. Politics and history were to create the conditions enabling people to fulfill their basic desires of self-preservation, security and happiness.³⁷

Ibn Khaldun: Investigator of Cause and Effect

The primary difference between Machiavelli's and Ibn Khaldun's philosophies of history can be seen in how each chooses to be either selectively scientific or faithfully scientific, to be either the partisan or non-partisan. Ibn Khaldun chose to see history as a sociologist and used science in much the same way social scientists use the methods of science today. Like modern sociologists, Ibn Khaldun did not discard the possibility of using the scientific method in the investigation of causes in historical events.³⁸ To Ibn Khaldun, the variables of social conditions possessed the same potential for scientific study as variables in the physical world. The social world was not to be removed from scientific study; social facts were no more "unique" than physical facts.³⁹ All facts--both social and physical--are unique: one thing, whether it is physical or social, is different from all others. Of any two different things--whether physical or social--there will be at least one characteristic that one of the items possesses which the other does not. In this sense, all things--social things, physical things, or events in moments of time--are unique.⁴⁰ Therefore, a distinctive employment of methodology between the physical and social worlds, to Ibn Khaldun, could not be assumed on the ground of uniqueness among variables. The practice of regulating variables and attaining general laws could be performed in sociology through the use of history as legitimately as the chemist who studies natural elements.

Therefore, the purpose of Ibn Khaldun in writing his history was not merely to record events. It was rather to interpret history and reveal its secrets through comparison, theoretical construction and the

analysis of the nature and causes of historical events from which the general laws which lay behind them were to be derived.⁴¹ Ibn Khaldun saw history concerning itself with the nature and causes of actual existence. In understanding actual events, the historian must ascertain and explain historical causes in their particularity and concreteness. He does not concern himself immediately with generalized patterns. But the social scientist does concern himself with generalized patterns and not actual historical existence.⁴² The scientist concerns himself with identifying principles of behavior which underlie the particular events (The Muqaddimah I, 57-63).⁴³ The questions which Ibn Khaldun set out to answer in his new science were: How does history come to be what it is, and what social phenomena underlie the evolution of political and social communities? In doing this, Ibn Khaldun removed history from a theocentric orientation. But, unlike Machiavelli, he was not removing history from trans-historical values.

God in revelation is the teacher of ontological causes. His revelation introduces the limitless, but reason can grasp the limited or particular phenomena. Therefore, reason can perceive historic causes, not ontological causes.⁴⁴ Muhsin Mahdi, a scholar of Muslim philosophy, points out that Ibn Khaldun's use of the word 'ibra' in connection with history "indicated essentially the activity of looking for the unity of the plan underlying the multiplicity of events, of grasping the permanence pervading their ever-changing and destructible character, and of using the results of such reflections in the management of practical affairs. Consequently, for a Muslim to understand history and learn its true 'ibra', meant a spiritual training, obedience to God, and the preparation for the final accounting."⁴⁵ Thus, Ibn Khaldun broke with

his tradition and his contemporaries not only in his determination to record events accurately, but in his dedication to philosophic or scientific investigation to understand those events.⁴⁶ It is this concern with the scientific analysis and the philosophical and religious fulfillment that distinguishes Ibn Khaldun's history from Machiavelli's history.

Scientific and Partisan Differences

The respect for scientific inquiry, philosophical involvement, and non-partisanship sets Ibn Khaldun's history apart from Machiavelli's. This distinction is illustrated by how a follower of Machiavelli's political thought described the scientist in political reality. Antonio Gramsci was sentenced to a twenty-five year prison term in Mussolini's fascist Italy. Gramsci wrote Notes on Machiavelli which is an analogy on how his "modern prince"--the Party--would be a collective saviour in Mussolini's Italy. Gramsci agreed with Machiavelli's political science. He agreed that "creative conceptual designing" should look at doing things that are possible through partisan politics. Gramsci favored the notion of a political thinker's being actively involved in the concept he espouses:

. . . it is absurd to think of a purely "objective" foresight. The person who had foresight in reality has a 'programme' that he wants to see triumph, and foresight is precisely an element of this triumph . . . Moreover, one can say that only to the extent to which the objective aspect of foresight is connected with a program does this aspect acquire objectivity: (1) because only passion sharpens the intellect and cooperates in making intuition clearer; (2) because since reality is the result of the application of human will to the society of things . . . to put aside a very voluntary element and calculate only the intervention of other wills as an objective element in the general game is to mutilate reality itself. Only those who strongly want to do it identify the necessary elements for the realization of their will.⁴⁷

But Gramsci disagreed with two concepts of political realism: that scientific laws analogous to those of natural science govern political foresight and that a political person must limit his conceptual framework to effective reality, to the realm of "what is," not "what should be":

. . . the scientist must only move inside effective reality in so far as he is merely a scientist. But Machiavelli is not merely a scientist; he is a partisan, with mighty passions, an active politician who wants to create new relations of forces and because of this cannot help concerning himself with "what should be," though certainly not in the moralistic sense . . . The active politician is a creator, an awakener, but he neither creates from nothing nor moves in the turbid void of his own desires and dreams. He bases himself on effective reality, but what is this effective reality? Is it something static and immobile, or is it not rather a relationship of forces in continuous movement and change of equilibrium? To apply the will to the creation of a new balance of the really existing and operating forces, basing oneself on that particular force which one considers progressive, giving it the means to triumph, is still to move within the sphere of effective reality, but in order to dominate and overcome it.⁴⁸

In Ibn Khaldun's terms, Machiavelli's partisan involvement in history was the foremost cause for historical error. But Ibn Khaldun does not stop with partisanship; he goes on to mention other factors Machiavelli was to use to distort the true nature of history.

. . . All records, by their very nature, are liable to error--nay, they contain factors which make for error. The first of these is partisanship towards a creed or opinion. For when the mind receives in a state of neutrality and moderation any piece of information, it gives to that information its due share of investigation and criticism, so as to disengage the truth it contains from the errors. Should the mind, however, be biased in favor of an opinion or creed, it at once accepts every favorable piece of information concerning this opinion. Therefore, partisanship acts as a blinker to the mind, preventing it from investigating and criticizing and inclining it to the reception and transmission of error.

The second factor conducive to error is over-confidence in one's sources. Such sources should be accepted only after thorough investigation involving the criticism of falsehoods and the correction of distortion.

A third factor is the failure to understand what is intended. Thus, many a chronicler falls into error by failing to grasp the real meaning of what he has seen or heard and by relating the event according to what he thinks or imagines.

A fourth source of error is a mistaken belief in the truth. This happens often, generally taking the form of excessive faith in the authority of one's sources.

A fifth factor is the inability rightly to place an event in its real context, owing to the obscurity and complexity of the situation. The chronicler contents himself with reporting the event as he saw it, thus distorting its significance . . .⁴⁹

FOOTNOTES

¹Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968), p. 3.

²Ibid., pp. 34-4.

³Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Second Edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), pp. 19-20.

⁴Ibid., p. 24.

⁵Ibid., p. 38.

⁶Mannheim, p. 254.

⁷Ibid., p. 253.

⁸Ibid., p. 255.

⁹William H. Dray, Philosophy of History (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 21.

¹⁰Dray, Philosophical Analysis and History (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), pp. 1-2.

¹¹Dray, Philosophy of History, p. 24.

¹²Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 50-51; 56-57.

¹³Anthony Parel, ed., The Political Calculus (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1972), p. 15.

¹⁴John H. Geerken, "Pocock and Machiavelli: Structuralist Explanation in History," Journal of the History of Philosophy, 17, p. 312.

¹⁵Parel, p. 15.

¹⁶Geerken, p. 15.

¹⁷Mannheim, p. 260.

¹⁸Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future (New York: Viking Press, 1971), p. 137.

¹⁹Eric W. Cochrane, "Machiavelli: 1940-1960," Journal of Modern History, 33 (June, 1961), p. 121.

²⁰Ibid., p. 121.

- ²¹Ibid., p. 122.
- ²²Herbert Butterfield, The Statecraft of Machiavelli (New York: McMillan Co., 1956), p. 29.
- ²³Ibid., pp. 29-32.
- ²⁴Niccolo Machiavelli, Dedicatory Letter to Discourses.
- ²⁵Butterfield, pp. 29-30.
- ²⁶Felix Gilbert, "The Composition and Structure of Machiavelli's Discorsi," Journal of the History of Ideas, 14, p. 154.
- ²⁷Machiavelli, op.cit.
- ²⁸Gilbert, p. 154.
- ²⁹Ibid., p. 158.
- ³⁰J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 265.
- ³¹Ibid., p. 271.
- ³²Ibid.
- ³³G.W. Trompf, The Idea of Historical Recurrence in Western Thought (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), p. 256.
- ³⁴Ibid., pp. 256-257.
- ³⁵Machiavelli, The Prince, 2.
- ³⁶Pocock, pp. 269-270.
- ³⁷Neal Wood in Parel, op.cit., p. 38.
- ³⁸Abdul Ali, "Ibn Khaldun as Founder of Modern Historiography," Quarterly Review of Historical Studies, 3, pp. 189-109.
- ³⁹Ibid., p. 190.
- ⁴⁰Richard S. Rudner, Philosophy of Social Science (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 70.
- ⁴¹Muhsin Mahdi, Ibn Khaldun's Philosophy of History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 225-228.
- ⁴²Ibid., p. 227.

⁴³Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, Vol. I, translated by Franz Rosenthal (New York: Pantheon Books, 1958), pp. 57-63.

⁴⁴Ibid., Vol III, p. 29; see also Mahdi, p. 78.

⁴⁵Mahdi, pp. 63-72.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 171.

⁴⁷Antonio Gramsci quoted by Margaret Leslie in "In Defence of Anachronism," Political Studies, 18 (1970), p. 440.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Ibn Khaldun, Vol. I, p. 11.

CHAPTER VI

THE PARADIGM IN PRACTICE

Machiavelli and Ibn Khaldun had very similar experiences in their political careers but arrived at very different perspectives as political thinkers. Both men began by noting failures in the existing social paradigms; both worked to find what sources in the paradigms were causing practical problems; each man proceeded to reconstruct world views; and finally, each thinker made certain prescriptions in practical affairs.

New visions of the world can exert tremendous influences on the behavior of normal people. However, the degree of influence of a paradigm on people is proportionate to how firmly people are convinced of the paradigm's truthfulness and practicality. Social paradigms which convince and also have profoundly comprehensive views of the world have important consequences in people's practical behavior. Social paradigms which connect the "ought" to the "is" will inevitably have a vaster acceptance by a society's members. The prescriptive parts of a paradigm

are "inferences for fitting proper, sane, rational responses to a world which is seen to be constructed in a particular way."¹ Theodore Roszak has written:

Our action gives voice to our total vision of life--of the self and its proper place in the nature of things. For most of us, this world view may elude the grasp of words; it may be something we never directly attend to. It may remain the purely subliminal sense of our condition that spontaneously forms our own perceptions and our motivations. Even before our world view guides us to discriminate between good and evil, it disposes us to discriminate between real and unreal, true and fake, meaningful and meaningless. Before we act in the world, we must conceive of a world; it must be there before us, a sensible pattern to which we adapt our conduct.²

Spirit of Individual Involvement

Both Ibn Khaldun and Machiavelli acknowledged the need for political organization, but each saw the individual participating in the group in different ways. Machiavelli posited a radically pessimistic view of human nature, a psychological perspective intimately related to his political philosophy: "Man is somewhere between angel and beast; but Machiavelli says that the ruler is somewhere between man and beast. The ruler 'must know how to use both natures, and that the one without the other is not durable.'"³ Machiavelli's science then is a manipulation of science in philosophy. His philosophy of man, which is substantiated by his philosophy of history, is not based on the totality and capacity of the human spirit for goodness and badness. Machiavelli is an extremist in that his man is the opposite of goodness.⁴

In The Discourses, Machiavelli states that "goodness" in action is to be understood in terms of what promotes the welfare of individuals which, in turn, rebounds on community welfare as a whole. "Common good" and "welfare" begin from what is important to the individual. But the

morality of politics cannot be that of private life. Machiavelli argued that man is always ready to act in a manner detrimental to the community if he sees advantage for himself. In ordering the state this fact must always be assumed: "All those who have written upon civil institutions demonstrate that whoever desires to found a state and give it laws must start with assuming that all men are bad and ever ready to display their vicious nature. . .";⁵ "Men will always show themselves wicked unless they are compelled to goodness";⁶ and "The ligament of obligation is a thing which, men being the poor creatures they are, is broken upon every occasion for their own personal profit."⁷

To Machiavelli, man's nature constituted a central problem for politics and government. The private citizen was seen as acting for himself while government acts for all. So, "goodness" was whatever serves the interests of all individuals.⁸ And the political actor must learn "how not to be good" to sometimes achieve this "goodness." Paul Ricoeur reflects on why necessity has wedded morality to immorality and refers to it as political alienation; it is the estrangement existing between the imperatives of personal morality and the necessities of political action for the sake of human welfare.⁹ Such a view denies the presence of any eternal or transcendent law. Man's nature and will must be conceived as anti-social and anarchical: this fact constitutes the central problem of politics, the problem for the political actor, and the difficulty of actual government. Political success is bound by pragmatism where the political actor must be ready to seek value through what is practically best. He must be ready "to deceive or to slaughter and in fact to commit any atrocity"¹⁰ within the morality of the isolated state.

It is the good of the whole community in which the individual finds his own good and not the exclusive good of a class or of a particular individual. To Machiavelli, man's use of intellect is determined by necessity, or by the necessity he will have the prudence to recognize and foresee.¹¹ Men may choose, but only prudent choice is anticipation of necessity. To Machiavelli, acting under necessity was the highest challenge to the human mind and spirit.¹² The contest of the human spirit was to engage only so far as solving the actual would permit; the more esoteric problems in metaphysics of how men were to seek Truth and Goodness in organizing their cities were outside of this usefulness. Acting under necessity, Machiavelli substituted what he called animo (mind) for anima (soul). Anima never occurs in The Prince or The Discourses; animo frequently does. Animo is to be taken as a spirited defense of one's own; animo defends a body and is satisfied with that body. Where anima always attempts to transcend the body, animo never does. Animo is the perfect energy for politics having "possibility within the city as ends and means."¹³

As Leo Strauss correctly stated, the private aspirations of individuals are the raw material with which Machiavelli's political actor must deal. To Machiavelli, the theme of ordering individual interests into public participation was central.¹⁴ In the realm of "politics of the possible," Machiavelli's creativity rests on achieving actualized equality. Struggle and political violence are just below the surface for a good reason. There is an understood reciprocity between citizen and ruler: the citizen agrees to be governed if the ruler will protect the citizen's interests.¹⁵ For both prince and community, an active devotion to public good can lead to positive acts of dedication,

but it requires something worth dedicating oneself to. Machiavelli, in The Prince, saw an end to chaos and creation, but in The Discourses saw maintenance and an exchange in sharing the power of polity. As such, the citizen also knows he is an effective part of polity.¹⁶

Private aspirations are what the maintained state is to live on. Because of this, Machiavelli was compelled to examine closely the "raw material" of politics: people and their motivation.¹⁷ People, to Machiavelli, are subject to a variety of forces, some which individuals can control, others which they cannot. People are always liable to fortune which may be anticipated and used, but never totally mastered. People are subject to historical forces which seem to show that no state, however well constructed, can endure for long periods of time. People are somewhat malleable; they are capable of change and adaptive to their environment, and to this extent they may control some aspects in their lives.¹⁸ From Machiavelli's political perspective on people, however, they seem to be highly ambitious creatures dedicated to advancing themselves individually while remaining within the collective. Machiavelli's works are full of illustrations of the attempts of individuals to maximize their power. Through all these attributes of individuals in the political, Machiavelli saw the possibility of a "firm science" pitted against necessity and overcoming necessity. Though Machiavelli recognized the community as being basic for the common good, he more profoundly viewed that it was the individual working for himself which provided for what Machiavelli perceived as "common good."¹⁹

Machiavelli presumed that the individual's natural behavior must be controlled to establish the organization and the common good beneficial to the organization. Ibn Khaldun, on the other hand, began by assuming

the existence of cooperative behavior or groups. Seldom did Ibn Khaldun digress into individual psychology of how to manage the individual into cooperative behavior. Machiavelli made a notable effort to comment on achieving equality and common good in a real and practical sense, whereas Ibn Khaldun presumed common good and equality in their real and rational forms, but sought to connect the existential to what is prescribed ideally.

Prominence or lack of prominence of the individual in Machiavelli's and Ibn Khaldun's political thinking is noteworthy. What is largely absent in Machiavelli that is present in Plato and Ibn Khaldun (and all the Muslim philosophers) is the concept of psyche. Machiavelli speaks in terms of a "soul-less" philosophy. His conception of psyche rests on the individual considering oneself as ultimately the only thing "common." In Islamic political thought, which has a religious basis and conceives of the state as a religious community, there was an assumption of solidarity in religion and politics. Since the individual and the state, or the religious community, are broadly at one in their moral purpose, the individual, or the examination of his psyche, is not prominent. Parenthetically, the individual's rights are not dwelled upon. Islam does not, in fact, recognize the legal personality of the individual in which his rights are secured to him and vested in him by law.²⁰ In Islam, unlike the republic of Machiavelli, the antithesis between the individual and the state or the government is not recognized. No need is therefore felt to reconcile and abolish this antithesis as in Machiavelli's management of conflict.

Throughout history Muslim Arab communities have been collections of groups rather than of individuals. The family and the tribe have been

the social units through which the individual has related himself to others and to governments. The individual's rights have been expressed through the medium of groups. This exercise of individual rights through one's groups was retained by Islam from previous Arab social organizations. It is this group basis of individual rights that permitted Ibn Khaldun and Arab society to assume and stress equality among individuals. Since social differences are expressed between groups, equality can be urged between individuals.²¹

Individuals acting commonly, which gave a basis for political action, was provided by divine sanction. The basis for political structure was the umma, the "community," an assemblage of individuals bound to one another by ties of Islam. Within the umma all were on an equal footing. There were no distinctions of rank, only of function. God alone was the head of the community, and His rule was direct and immediate. The community's internal organization was defined and secured by a common acceptance of, and a common submission to, the divine law and the temporal head of the community.²² Obedience to rulers was laid down in the Quran in the phrase, "O true believer, obey God, and obey the Prophet and those who are in authority among you." "Medieval thinkers (those concerned with religion and philosophy), Muslim, Jewish and Christian alike, conceived of this happiness [aspiring towards Aristotelian "highest good"] in relation to God . . . They were, with few exceptions, concerned not so much with the individual and his perfection but rather with the group, the religious society in the state governed by divine law."²³

The Necessity for Political Organization

Machiavelli and Ibn Khaldun shared the understanding that man was a political creature. Both thinkers saw the need to study "how man does actually live." In this sense, Machiavelli and Ibn Khaldun shared an "impartial empiricism" in their observation of politics. Both men chose to observe political affairs realistically, and both men distinguished themselves from scholastic contemporaries by treating social affairs within a highly realistic frame of reference.²⁴ However, what distinguished Machiavelli and Ibn Khaldun from each other was how and where each man placed these real circumstances within a scheme of values. Machiavelli saw the real as both an end and as a means to this end.

Machiavelli saw the whole of Roman history and mentality [as depending] upon the experience of foundation and he believed it should be possible to repeat the Roman experience through the foundation of a unified Italy . . . the eternal body politic for the Italian nation . . . Like the Romans, Machiavelli . . . felt founding was the central political action, the one great deed that established the public-political realm and made politics possible; but unlike the Romans, to whom this was an event of the past, [Machiavelli] felt that for this supreme "end" all "means" and chiefly the means of violence, were justified.²⁵

Ibn Khaldun, like the Romans, regarded the founding as important, but not conceptionally important.²⁶

Ibn Khaldun started from the assumption that man is a political being and that history through the divine law substantiates this view. Man's physical needs lead him--under necessity--to associate with others. Ibn Khaldun paced through history showing the development of social organization and the purposes of structure. After social organization comes into existence, needs are satisfied through division

of labor. Once basic needs are acquired, humans proceed into activity which is not fundamentally dedicated to preservation of life.²⁷ They begin to transgress against one another and over-reach their limits. The result is conflict. It then becomes necessary to curb such motives and order human relations. The community can be preserved "only when men are ruled by the most powerful and most able among them who has the capacity to restrain and reconcile them. He forces them to follow his directions, and in so doing, he becomes their ruler and institutes kingship (mulk) and the state (dawla). The state is, thus, natural and necessary because society is natural and necessary and because society cannot continue to exist except through the state."²⁸

Both the Prophet and Ibn Khaldun saw the inevitability of association among people. Muhammad saw it in pre-Islamic society; Ibn Khaldun saw it again in the Islamic Maghrib. The environment necessitates tribal organization. This in turn creates a consolidating force, asabiyya. It bases itself on relationships among people, which in turn is based on blood ties, alliances or clientship. "Respect for blood ties is something natural among men. . . . It leads to affection for one's relations and blood relatives, the feeling that no harm ought to befall them or any destruction come upon them. . . . It makes for mutual support and aid and increases the fear felt by the enemy . . ."²⁹ Asabiyya, deriving from alliance or from clientship, results from attaching persons of one descent to a group of another descent through inter-marriage, protection or similar social relations.

Asabiyya alone, in Ibn Khaldun's view, is insufficient to insure a great foundation. Here, Machiavelli's and Ibn Khaldun's difference as to what is ultimate in values is again evident. To Ibn Khaldun, an

additional force is needed to buttress and enhance the consolidating force or solidarity of the group and to eliminate their shortcomings. This force is provided by religion, which also needs a consolidating force or solidarity for its establishment.

It has, therefore, to rise, and it usually does rise, among a group with strong solidarity that propagates it by fighting for it. Once religion is adopted and supported by such a group, it becomes a highly effective force. It creates new loyalty, absolute belief in, and obedience to, the demands of the Law and the religious leader. This is the source of a solidarity superior to, and more lasting than, the solidarity based merely upon natural kinship and world desires . . . Second to natural solidarity and based on it, religion is the most powerful force in the creation of civilization, and it commands the most effective instrument for preserving it.³⁰

The necessity of social association is the binding force in Ibn Khaldun's society. Asabiyya expresses the corporate will of the group. It enables the group to realize their united will in political action, and specifically to found and maintain the state. In this sense, asabiyya as a collective effort of society to take decisive action in political and social life is roughly equal to Machiavelli's civic virtu.³¹ But this collective effort takes on a different nature for each thinker because of what each political philosopher deemed as ultimate ends and values. Nevertheless, Ibn Khaldun was a realist as well as a idealist. Those who had no asabiyya had no authority over their own affairs and could not protect themselves and were dependent on others. Ibn Khaldun demonstrates that the science of politics and living together should be lived under the law but not administered by those who only study the law--the ulama, the jurists. The practice of politics is a practical affair:

How then could they [the jurists] participate in councils of government, and why should their advice be taken into consideration? Their advice as derived from their knowledge of the religious laws is taken in consideration only in so far as they are consulted for legal decisions. Advice on political matters is not their province because they have no group feeling which constitutes asabiyya and do not know the conditions and laws which govern group feeling. To pay honor to jurists and scholars is an act of kindness on the part of rulers and armies. It testifies to their high regard for Islam and to their respect for men who are in any way concerned with it.³²

Civic virtue and asabiyya only have commonality in so far as both represent collective and secular activities. Civic virtue, to Machiavelli, evolves because each individual is drawn into a cooperative action for what he can ultimately derive for himself. To Ibn Khaldun, individuals fundamentally gather and cooperate because it is only through membership that the individual can achieve equality and benefit from the group's strength of collective action.

Necessary Authority and Best Authority

Just as both political thinkers recognized the need for real political organization, both also acknowledged the necessity of actual political authority. Interestingly, Machiavelli and Ibn Khaldun also perceived authority in terms of "necessary political authority" and "best political authority." Both men had reasoned the best form of political authority: what form it should take, how it should convene, and what validated its existence. But as we have seen, both thinkers lived in worlds where authority had deviated from the prevailing values. This condition made both Machiavelli and Ibn Khaldun aware that the political environment must always be subject to necessary authority and power politics. How each political thinker regarded "necessary" and

"best" authority, again, is a function of each man's values. Machiavelli's values did not extend beyond realism. It is, therefore, understandable that the genesis and function of authority can be found in either the ruler, the community, or the institutions both provide.

Machiavelli viewed his "necessary authority" as being in the prince. The prince was seen as a deliberate actor having the immediate tasks of liberating Italy from the external influences, establishing the founding, guiding the state by overcoming chance, and establishing the way for stability through public welfare. To the prince, the interests of his subjects should be his own, and the interests of his subjects should be the consolidation of all dominions of the community. To Machiavelli, expulsion of the enemy to reunite Italy was possible and necessary. Italy was ready and eager to follow a prince: "You see how she prays to God daily to send someone to deliver her from the cruelty and insolence of the barbarians. You see how fain and ready she is to follow the banner if only it were set up?"³³ A prince capable of deliverance would be the first step to the founding of the state: "I am not able to express with what love he would be welcomed in all the provinces that have suffered from this alien inundation, with what thirst for vengeance, with what stubborn fidelity, with what devotion, with what tears. What gates would be closed against him? Who would refuse him obedience? What jealousy would oppose itself? What Italian would deny him homage?"³⁴

The highest prince must first rid his state of chaos. He who is the highest prince is, in the fullest sense, the moral or political philosopher who establishes the opinions in which the lesser princes operate. If public and private immorality must be controlled by the

political necessity of acquiring and maintaining a state, then the highest prince is the political philosopher who brings new "modes and orders" for the sake of preservation. Even for the common benefit of each human being, the prince must learn how to be not good but audacious in politics. Overcoming chance, to Machiavelli, was imperative for the new state. People's hopes were wrecked by failure to adapt to circumstances. Machiavelli's prince was to be greatest if he possessed both audacity and caution. If authority could not possess both, then it is better to be audacious than merely prudent: "Fortuna is a woman and to be kept under must be beaten and handled roughly."³⁵

The chief interest of the prince should be the common good, for it is on this that stability ultimately rests. "It is above all things necessary that a prince should retain the affection of his people, otherwise in any crisis he has no remedy."³⁶ The only solid foundation for the prince's position is the common need for him. The prince "should think out means whereby in all manner of times and occasions his subjects may have need of the state and of him and they will then ever be loyal."³⁷

Because people are malleable, the prince is to remold the people by establishing habits which are more conducive to stability. Machiavelli felt that the masses (plebians) would be preferred to the patrician class as a stable power base on which to build the republic. The masses, by nature, he argued, had less desire to dominate, more desire to benefit from the stability of a government. Plebians would want to preserve their gains of economic and social well-being, not disrupt the system that provided for them:

. . . one should always confide any deposit to those who have the least desire of violating it: and doubtless, if we consider the objects of the nobles and of the people, we must see that the first have a great desire to dominate, while the latter have only the wish not to be dominated, and consequently a greater desire to live in the enjoyment of liberty, being less disposed to encroach upon it, they will of necessity take better care of it.³⁸

In a modern sense, Machiavelli saw the need of legitimate government institutions which would give the three classes of citizenry (the prince, nobility and plebians) representation for grievances and provide a balance of power. Just as his initial emphasis on the proper foundation for the new republic based on the Roman model required Machiavelli to advocate the aggressive, amoral leader in The Prince, his concern for the maintenance and longevity of the republic required Machiavelli to alter the model of the prince to that of sagacious lawgiver: "The welfare then, of a republic or a kingdom does not consist in having a prince who governs it wisely during his lifetime, but in having one who will give it such laws that it will maintain itself even after his death."³⁹ Thus, the common good is better served and insured by satisfying the welfare of the masses to insure a power base: ". . . although one man alone should organize a government, yet it will not endure long if the administration of it remains on the shoulders of a single individual; it is well, then, to confide this to the charge of many, for thus it will be sustained by the many."⁴⁰ Here, Machiavelli shows an obvious preference for the masses as the major stabilizing force within the state. A prince may be necessary to impose order in a chaotic situation, but ". . . the people are superior in maintaining those institutions, laws, and ordinances"⁴¹ . . . A well regulated republic, therefore, should open the door to public honors to

those who seek reputation by means that are conducive to the public good"42

More than anything else, Machiavelli appears to say that the strength of the state depends on the amount of public spirit generated. He equates this public spiritness with virtu. Each individual possesses virtu; collectively, individual virtu appears as civic virtu. Civic virtu has the same features of Roman military brotherhood of men uniting against a hostile foe, not for the sake of the commander, but for themselves. Again, Machiavelli recognizes the individual as raw material for the state. Goodness is simply that which subserves, in the long run, the interests of the mass of individuals.⁴³ Public spirit of citizens rests on the sure foundation of their own self-regard.

Ibn Khaldun saw people ordering and associating themselves (asabiyya) as a natural response to their environments. Likewise, he regarded temporal authority growing from asabiyya as an accommodation for better organization. Yet, unlike Machiavelli, the standards for which authority was to strive were not limited to actual reality. Authority, like everything else, existed under the ideal. Kingship (mulk), then, was a natural quality of man and absolutely necessary to mankind. Mulk naturally evolved from assabiyya.⁴⁴ Yet, Ibn Khaldun demonstrated how the ideal is connected and operates with the practical by addressing the ideal ruler and state and the practical ruler and state, and how both converge.⁴⁵ The Islamic community owed its existence to a prophet. This differentiated it from temporal communities and required special provision for its government on the death of the prophet. Thus, Ibn Khaldun states, when the prophet (al-nabi) disappears there is need of a substitute (qa'im) who will cause

the community to carry out the religious ordinances and will be among them as the khalifa (vice-regent) of the prophet in that he urges upon them the duties which the prophet had imposed on them.⁴⁶ Khilafa then in distinction to Machiavelli's "man as beast," is man as God-guided and God-centered human association: the ideal, the best way to the fulfillment of man's destiny in this world and the next.⁴⁷ In this light, Ibn Khaldun proceeds to associate khilafa and mulk as a basis of authority:

In political associations it is imperative to have recourse to imposed laws, accepted and followed by the masses . . . , and no state can establish itself and consolidate its control without such laws. If these laws are laid down by men of intelligence and insight, the polity is founded on reason. But if they are laid down by God and promulgated by an inspired Lawgiver, the polity is founded on religion and is beneficial both for this world and the next Revealed laws have been sent to lead men to observe that conduct which will bring them felicity in the future life, in all their affairs, whether of worship or of mutual dealings, and even in matters of kingship--which is a phenomenon natural to human society--so that it would be conducted on the pattern of religions, in order that the whole body may be protected by the supervision of the Revealed Law.

That state, therefore, whose law is based on violence and coercion and gives full play to the irascible nature is tyranny and injustice and in the eyes of the Law blameworthy, a judgement in which political wisdom concurs. Furthermore, that state whose law is based upon rational statecraft and its principles, but lacks the supervision of the Revealed Law, is likewise blameworthy, since it is the product of speculation without the light of God. For the Lawgiver knows best the interests of men in all that relates to the other world, which is concealed from them. The principles of rational government aim solely at apparent and worldly interests, whereas the object of the lawgiver is men's salvation in the hereafter. It is imperative, therefore, by the very nature of Revealed Laws, to bring the whole people to conform themselves to their ordinances in all matters of this world and the next. And this rule is the rule of the Lawgivers, that is to say, the caliphs, and this is the true meaning of the caliphate.

Natural kingship, then, forces the people to conform to the private ambitions and uncontrolled desires of the ruler. Political government induces the people to conform to the insight of the Revealed Law in regard to their interests and the warding off of evils. The caliphate leads the people to

conform to the insight of the Revealed Law in regard to their interests both in the world to come and those in this world which relate to it, since all the affairs of this world are assessed by the Lawgiver in the light of their relation to the interests of the future life. Thus, it is truly an office of replacement (khilafa) of the promulgator of the Revealed Law in the guardianship of the Faith and the government of the world by its provisions.⁴⁸

Ibn Khaldun argued that it is the combination of religious conviction and political power which determines the nature and purpose of khilafa. And by the same study of the ideal and the practical, Ibn Khaldun showed how there is an eventual transformation of the khilafa into the mulk which is natural and inevitable. Through his analysis of mulk in The Muqaddimah, he further differentiates mulk into Islamic mulk and mulk as a mere power state. First, he addresses the evolution of khilafa into mulk. Since political association in Islam originally took the form of khilafa, its significance and character is preserved in the transformation into mulk: "Therefore, if mulk is Islamic, it comes second in rank after khilafa, and they are linked together. But mulk is isolated if it is outside the religious community."⁴⁹ Mulk is capable, therefore, of looking after the best welfare of man--in this world and the next. The Shari'a shall always be pertinent since the prophet knows what is best for man in both mundane and religious matters. Therefore, khilafa is preserved in mulk if government is good.

. . . the restraining authority (wazi), which had been religion (din), was replaced by the 'Asabiya and the sword. This was the case in the time of Mu'awiya, Merwan and his son Abd-al-Malik, as well as in the early days of the Abbasid caliphs, up to the period of (Harun al-) Rashid and some of his sons. Then the characteristics of the khilafa disappeared, nothing but its name remained, and the state became a mulk pure and simple. The condition of subjugation reached its peak and was used for purposes of force, a variety of desires and sensual pleasures. Such was the case under the sons of 'Abd-al-Malik and the successors of Harun al-Rashid

among the Abbasids. The name khilafa remained, thanks to the continuance of the Asabiya of the Arabs. Khilafa and mulk intermingled with each other in the two phases, but then the characteristics of the khilafa disappeared with the disappearance of the Arabs, the destruction of their tribes, and the ruin of their affairs . . . It is, therefore, evident that the khilafa at first existed without mulk, then their character became intermixed, and finally the mulk alone remained, isolated from the khilafa at the moment when its 'Asabiyya became separated from that of the khilafa.⁵⁰

As government is only practical, it cannot be good unless it aspires to the ideal. Likewise, the prophetic lawgiver is best and is superior to the human lawgiver. The human lawgiver is guided only by reason:

. . . this world alone is not man's goal, for it is altogether useless and vain, since its end is death and destruction. God says: Do you think that we created you for sport? (Sura XXIII, 117). What is intended for man is his religion, which lets him attain happiness in the hereafter as the way of God . . . The laws came which placed an obligation upon him in all his affairs, like service of God, trade and association, so that they [the laws] lead the rule towards the ways of God and everything is within the reach and range of the Shari'a.⁵¹

Authority and Community Within the Paradigm

To both Ibn Khaldun and Machiavelli, authority, like politics, was a human dimension and, therefore, fallible. Correspondingly, both thinkers understood that appropriate longevity and stability of authority would be a function of how authority validated itself. Again, authority was a practical matter and, therefore, its validation had to be a function of the prevailing values. In a modern sense, Machiavelli saw the need of legitimate government institutions which recognized representation of the citizenry: the prince, nobility and plebians. These representations would, in the stable community, act as a balance

of power safeguarding what was ultimate--the foundation: ". . . there is combined under the same constitution a prince, a nobility, and the power of the people, then these three powers will watch and keep each other reciprocally in check."⁵² Again, the politics of Machiavelli are only based on the possible. There are no transcending values, and there is no natural order. If men's interests and values lead to conflict, then, in fact, the choice is "order or violence." If Machiavelli's values are man-created and chosen, then, as Leo Strauss observes, the world beyond is silent, leaving man to conflict both within and outside his cities:

They [the pragmatists] admit the necessity of encouraging inventions pertaining to the art of war . . . they had to admit that the moral-political supervision of invention of the good and wise city is necessarily limited by the need of adaptation to the practices of morally-inferior cities which scorn such supervision because their end is acquisition or ease. They had to admit, in other words, that in an important respect, the good city has to take its bearings by the practice of bad cities, or that the bad impose their law on the good. Only in this point does Machiavelli's contention that the good cannot be good because there are so many bad ones prove to possess a foundation.⁵³

But Machiavelli ultimately argued in The Prince and The Discourses--to authority and community--"Anything whatever that is to the advantage of the state and promotes its general well-being, may and should be done."⁵⁴ The business of a prince and his people are to make themselves secure against all possible enemies, and to do this, both must often act wickedly because the world is so wicked that they cannot otherwise attain their end. "When the safety of our country is absolutely at stake, there need be no question of what is just or unjust, merciful or cruel, praiseworthy or disgraceful; but all other considerations aside, that course alone is to be taken which may save our country and maintain liberty."⁵⁵

Ibn Khaldun began validating authority by restating the necessity of societies and by restating the necessity of kingship as a natural extension of people in association. Yet, Ibn Khaldun hastily reminds us that authority can never just be solely concerned with man's existential plight. The Prophet and his successors are to preserve and protect the well-being of man in this world and the next. Consequently, authority's concern is to govern for both domains:

As to religion he governs in accordance with the obligations of the Law which he [the Legislator] is ordered to convey and make people practice them. As to governance in the affairs of this world, he rules with a view to attending to their common good in human cultures. We have mentioned that this culture is necessary for men and so is attending to their common good. For if this is ignored, culture would disintegrate. We have also mentioned that kingship and its power are sufficient for the realization of this common good. Yes, it would be more perfect if it were in accordance with the commands of the Law, since it the Law knows best what this common good is.⁵⁶

Ibn Khaldun distinguished between the ruler of the regime of law and the rulers of rational regimes (similarly between caliphs and kings). There is a distinction of claims of authority. Caliphs have a claim to divine law directly and kings establish obligation from the community because of rule aligned with divine law. Although those two connections differ--one being circuitous and one direct--they both seek the same source for legitimacy: the divine law. And both forms of rule rely on consensus of the community (ijma):

The office of Caliph owes its existence to the consensus; and since consensus is one of the sources of the Law in Islam, the office can be called 'obligatory.' This obligation to recognize and obey the Caliph is a 'legal obligation' and not rational necessity. Because its source is the consensus of the community, the true Caliph will have to rely on the active consent of the community. But a community which consents to be ruled by a Caliph must be a community which admires and cherishes his way of life. The office of the Caliph 'demands

perfection in attributes and manners,' and only the community which recognizes and gives allegiance to a man of this description is worthy of living under the regime of Law.⁵⁷

While the ruler's authority was legitimate from the divine source; under him there could still be good and bad government of mulk. The only good government was that which promoted divine law. As the ruler governed according to the expected behavior prescribed in the Shari'a, the ruler was justified as the political authority, and the Shari'a was legitimized as the practical expression of the ruler's source of power. The power enabled the authority which validated a theoretical coalition of religion, temporal authority and community, all obeisant to God. In this coalition, temporal authority was responsible to the divine law as well as the community. His practice of mulk was to be judged in how it fulfilled divine law. The community had redress to bad mulk:

Many religious people who follow the ways of religion come to revolt against unjust amirs. They call for a change in, and prohibition of, evil practices and for good practices. They hope for a divine reward for what they do. They gain many followers and sympathizers among the great mass of the people, but they risk being killed, and most of them actually do perish in consequence of their activities as sinners and unrewarded because God had not destined them for such activities as they undertake.⁵⁸

In seeing what both men endorsed for political practice, the distinction in values becomes more apparent. Probably the greatest value distinction between the men evolved from how each sees the relevancy or irrelevancy of traditional political philosophy in political thought. Machiavelli regarded traditional political philosophy as irrelevant to real politics, lacking the capacity to validate political behavior. Consequently, to Machiavelli, the horizon of values had to be lowered from religion or philosophy to a level

expressing the attainable. The attainable for Machiavelli consisted of images of his own making and substantiated by what he selectively extracted from history. In this sense, Machiavelli became an artist erecting signposts allowing his community to travel the shortest route towards his destination--the unification of Italy.

Ibn Khaldun was less a partisan and more a scientist than Machiavelli. Ibn Khaldun was, of course, influenced by values, but his objectivity in history and contemporary events seems closer to the modern scientific method. In most cases, Ibn Khaldun seeks neither to praise nor to blame, but to know. His goal was to grasp the laws that govern the development of human institutions, not to pass value judgements on these institutions. His detached empirical observations only affirmed in detail what Islam had revealed generally. This, to Ibn Khaldun, only strengthened his religious faith and further reaffirmed his conviction that philosophy and rational science could fulfill Islam's "dense formula."

Unlike Machiavelli, Ibn Khaldun never rated his "new science" and its empirical assessments to the ultimacy of value determination. He merely saw his science of culture as a body of scientific knowledge which resides in and helps to explicate political philosophy. And, since in Islam there is no church and state distinction, political philosophy was never separated from the scope of the Shari'a. Likewise, history was seen by Ibn Khaldun as something which fulfilled political philosophy under the divine law. Machiavelli's history had the task of value formulation and substantiation; Ibn Khaldun's history had a purely practical aim of enabling man to organize and to be ruled more wisely.

Both Machiavelli and Ibn Khaldun are realists. But, if Ibn Khaldun is a pragmatist or rationalist, he is different from Machiavelli in that he resides in a Platonic-Islamic tradition. Ibn Khaldun did not believe that reason alone was capable of explaining the causes of man, his nature, or his perfection. The knowledge of man only becomes relevant when man understands the true end of man as well as the degrees of perfection within the ideal. Only then could the knowledge of man measure the actual, see imperfection, and see the best way to actualize the best society. In this sense, history for Ibn Khaldun does not go beyond helping man in practice move towards goals already learned from the divine law and political philosophy. History only illustrates the continuing tension between trans-historical goals in political philosophy and the imperfect practice in actual communities.

FOOTNOTES

¹Thomas A. Spragens, Jr., Understanding Political Theory (New York: St. Martins Press, 1976), p. 104.

²Theodore Roszak quoted by Spragens, p. 104.

³William Ebenstein, Great Political Thinkers: Plato to Present (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), p. 288.

⁴Ibid., pp. 288-290.

⁵Machiavelli, The Discourses I, 3.

⁶Machiavelli, The Prince, 23.

⁷Ibid., 17.

⁸Harvey C. Mansfield, "Machiavelli's Political Science," American Political Science Review, 75 (June, 1981), p. 305.

⁹Paul Ricouer in Anthony Parel, ed., The Political Calculus (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1972), p. 47.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Machiavelli, The Discourses I, 30.

¹²Machiavelli, The Prince, I, 11

¹³Dante Germino quoted by Anthony Parel, ed., op.cit., pp. 80-81; see also Mansfield, p. 303.

¹⁴Strauss, pp. 229-281.

¹⁵S.M. Shumer, "Machiavelli: Republican Politics and Its Corruption," Political Theory, 7 (February, 1979), p. 18.

¹⁶David E. Ingersoll, "The Constant Prince: Private Interests and Public Goals," Western Political Quarterly, 21 (December, 1968), pp. 594-596.

¹⁷Machiavelli, The Discourses II, 55.

¹⁸Ibid., I, 2 and I, 7.

¹⁹Mansfield, p. 305.

²⁰Ann K.S. Lambton, State and Government in Medieval Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. xv-xvi.

- ²¹Morroe Berger, The Arab World Today (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1962), pp. 33-34.
- ²²Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins), pp. 1-5.
- ²³Erwin I.J. Rosenthal, Political Thought in Modern Islam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), p. 13.
- ²⁴Fuad Baali, Ibn Khaldun and Islamic Thought Styles (Boston: G.K. Hall and Co., 1981), pp. 321-322.
- ²⁵Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future (New York: Viking Press, 1971), p. 139.
- ²⁶Ibid., pp. 137-138.
- ²⁷Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, Vol. I, p. 98.
- ²⁸Mahdi, pp. 189-190.
- ²⁹Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, Vol. I., p. 264.
- ³⁰Mahdi, p. 201.
- ³¹Lambton, pp. 174-175.
- ³²Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, Vol. I., pp. 459-460.
- ³³Machiavelli, Prince, 25.
- ³⁴Ibid.
- ³⁵Ibid.
- ³⁶Ibid., 9.
- ³⁷Ibid.
- ³⁸Machiavelli, The Discourses I, 5.
- ³⁹Ibid., 11.
- ⁴⁰Ibid., 9.
- ⁴¹Ibid., 58.
- ⁴²Ibid., III., 29.
- ⁴³Mansfield, pp. 298-299, 305.
- ⁴⁴Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, Vol. I, p. 320.
- ⁴⁵Ibid., Vol III, p. 25.

- ⁴⁶Ibid., Vol. I, p. 473.
- ⁴⁷Erwin Rosenthal, pp. 85-86.
- ⁴⁸Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, Vol. III, chapt. 25.
- ⁴⁹Ibid., Vol. I, p. 373.
- ⁵⁰Ibid.
- ⁵¹Ibid., p. 342.
- ⁵²Machiavelli, The Discourses I, 58.
- ⁵³Strauss, pp. 298-299.
- ⁵⁴Machiavelli, The Discourses III, 41.
- ⁵⁵Machiavelli, The Discourses III, 41.
- ⁵⁶Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, Vol. I, pp. 393-394.
- ⁵⁷Mahdi, pp. 241-242.
- ⁵⁸Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, Vol. I, p. 323.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

The political careers of both Ibn Khaldun and Machiavelli reflected their political times and the concepts which forged those times. Both men discovered practical political problems in their communities. Each man eventually traced the practical problems ultimately to problems in the community's political concept. Both thinkers were inspired by the local conditions to question the relationship of fact to value within their societies. In Ibn Khaldun's Maghrib and Machiavelli's Italy, politics was in the process of becoming alienated from conceptual universals of Papal Christianity and Islam. The political nature of each world was moving towards the factionalization of these universals into local interests and powers.

At the same time that political practice was drifting from the prevailing conceptual standards, philosophy, as a rational rather than theological science, challenged the prevailing world views of Christianity and Islam.¹ Both Muslim and Christian scholars sought the

classical Greek practical discoveries. Philosophy intrinsically accompanied what both worlds acquired from Greek practical knowledge. Philosophy was first rediscovered by Muslims as a certain knowledge and a certain way through which rational knowledge should be gained. However, any system of knowledge outside the Christian or Islamic theologies was considered irrational. Philosophy assumed no preconditions, inquiring not only into things political, but also extending itself as a logical inquiry into all knowledge. Philosophy sought to understand the whole of knowledge, and the parts of the whole of knowledge, and the place of the parts within the whole.² Theology and philosophy which began from different premises of "seeing the world" had either to be reconciled or to be contested until a single validity would predominate.

Philosophy was, in Kuhn's terms, a "new problem" threatening either to bring down or to alter the prevailing religious schemes through which Machiavelli's and Ibn Khaldun's societies defined their worlds. Philosophy came as an irreconcilable anomaly to the paradigm of medieval Christianity. Because it could not be adequately justified with the prevailing religious world view, it ultimately established the conditions for paradigmatic revolution. To Islam, philosophy also came as an anomaly. Yet, unlike Christianity, Islam incorporated philosophy as a way to express further what was set forth in divine law. Machiavelli saw Christianity as never having the capacity to address his real world of how men do live. He perceived Christianity as an "imagined kingdom" in which the only applicability to his real world of politics was merely one of chance.³ On the other hand, Ibn Khaldun, along with other previous Muslim philosophers, saw philosophy and all the sciences which

spring from philosophy as fulfilling parts of Islam.⁴ Beyond being just a part of Islam, philosophy was seen by the Islamic philosophers as not only a completion of religion but also providing greater vitality for the religion.

Machiavelli created a new political paradigm which rejected Christian ethics to achieve his single goal, the foundation of the unified state of Italy. He once stated, "I love my country more than my soul."⁵ Machiavelli's paradigm reflected this aspiration. The goal was cohesiveness in Italy, and the path to this goal was pragmatism and the "science of the possible." He created his paradigm to take the state out of chaos and into stability. Machiavelli's new values were largely oriented towards moving the individual and community into a common psychology, fostering dynamic and positive attitudes.

Machiavelli drew on the Roman military notion of virtu in which both commander and soldiers were able to move under a plan against a hostile enemy. But in battle as in politics, fate and chance exist. Chance and contingency necessitated that the commander and his men be able to improvise on the original plan. Virtu meant having the audacity to reshape the plan to benefit an army in action.⁶ Machiavelli's political paradigm reflects his pragmatic approach to the art of the possible, practical within the challenges of the environment. Machiavelli's virtu was a refinement of behavior--both individual and community--which helped to constitute a system of values in action and values encouraging people to command their existence.⁷

Certain Muslim philosophers argued that philosophy complemented Islam. Because Islam is a religion which revitalized a secular spirit from the pragmatism of pre-Islamic social ways,⁸ it seems to incorporate

what Aristotle referred to as "nature and convention" into the religious ideal. The introduction of philosophy's rationality could be accepted in Islam to help deal with such difficulties as the interpretation of the Quran, the proper political organization, the nature of the temporal ruler's powers, and the administration of justice. Muslim philosophers saw God transmitting everything to the Prophet in one "dense formula" of the divine law. Thus, mortals were to spend their time and effort apprehending this "formula" by themselves and through their rationality.⁹ The Muslim philosophers argued that philosophy was a key component of the formula.

Ibn Khaldun and Machiavelli relied extensively on history to justify their views in political practice. As a partisan for Italy, Machiavelli became the "artist" with the unification of Italy as art object and value.¹⁰ As the artist, Machiavelli imposed this value on history with random abandonment of scientific objectivity for the sake of partisan creativity.¹¹ Not only was he interested in the creation of the state, but also the survival of that creation, which required political pragmatism. To Machiavelli, this meant ridding Italy of its fascination with "imagined kingdoms" (such as Christianity). To Machiavelli, in practice there must always be the possibility of achieving what is valuable, and the individual must always have the inspiration and sense of audacity (virtu) for achievement. Achieving the possible meant always having value intimately connected to practice. In fact, Machiavelli's values often took the form of "what is best in practice." Machiavelli's history thus became a "stockpile" from which evidence could be selected to generate new forms, substantiate values and provide commentary on practice.

Ibn Khaldun wrote that "partisanship" was certain to lead to erroneous recording and interpretation of history. This Muslim scholar, despite his religious tenacity, was devoted to detached scientific investigation of cause and effect in history. Ibn Khaldun, unlike Machiavelli, was not involved in the art of creating. Rather, he was more concerned with scientific discovery and understanding why people behave as they do.¹² But beyond just discovery, Ibn Khaldun was profoundly concerned with finding the proper relationship of history and political philosophy within the Islamic divine law. Subsequently, Ibn Khaldun regarded the study of history as an activity which sought to justify a unity of plan as a foundation for the multiplicity of events. Study of history could not only reveal the general principles unifying of ever-changing events, but could also instruct how best to manage practical affairs.¹³ Ibn Khaldun is probably the only great political thinker who not only saw the problems of the relationship of history and the science of society to traditional political philosophy, but also attempted to develop a science of society within the framework of traditional philosophy and based on its principles.¹⁴

The political paradigms within which both Ibn Khaldun and Machiavelli operated were politically prescriptive. Both men commented on like political matters such as the behavior of the political community, need for authority, and various dimensions of authoritative behavior. Machiavelli's paradigm, especially the state's creation being developed by a sense of individual and civic positive attitude (virtu), became a function of creating and maintaining a well-ordered state. Machiavelli's world, as well as his political philosophy, was highly fluid conceptually, where values take their bearings from what is "best in practice."

Ibn Khaldun, on the other hand, involved himself less with the formation of a new paradigm. As a Muslim, he regarded values as immutable and eternally justified in Islam. Having a legitimate basic paradigm was never an issue for Ibn Khaldun. Ibn Khaldun emerges more a sociologist of history, looking at historical events and discerning patterns, causes, effects, and laws as objectively as he could to understand how best to act politically.¹⁵ Ibn Khaldun never became obsessed with his "new science" forcing change on what was set forth conceptually by religious ideals. To most Muslim philosophers, including Ibn Khaldun, rational science was only a measure to fulfill what God and Islam had set forth: ". . . there is a kind of perception superior to our own; for our perceptions are created and cannot comprehend the vast range of beings. God's creation, being vaster than man's, is outside man's range of comprehension; He alone comprehends all . . ."¹⁶ For Ibn Khaldun, the scientific inquiry into history not only showed the causes and effects of people in the real world, but also substantiated divine revelation.

The limits of political paradigms and what they address may illustrate the greatest distinction in Machiavelli's and Ibn Khaldun's political philosophies. To Machiavelli, traditional political philosophy, religion and "imagined kingdoms" demonstrated no relevance to the world of real politics. Consequently, Machiavelli favored a paradigmatic "tightening of limits" to the point where only the "attainable" or "possible" prevailed. Machiavelli's world consisted of images of his own making, and those images were in time substantiated by how he creatively and selectively drew from history. In doing this, Machiavelli limited his community to one aspiration--attaining and maintaining the state.

As a pragmatist, Machiavelli sought to insure the actualization of the founding or "good" social order by lowering the standards of social action. He did this by redefining the terms of "best regime." No longer was the "best regime" to be seen in terms of how people ought to live. To Machiavelli, "ought" involved "imagined kingdoms" which only allowed a chance for achievement. Machiavelli's "best regime" referred to how men actually do live and to the objectives that all societies actually pursue. Machiavelli's political paradigm depends more on the success of achieving the practical rather than on the virtue of both its leaders and citizens. Machiavelli's state

does not exist in the proper order of the soul. It has no other source than the needs of society; it has no sounder and higher source in the needs of the mind . . . [Machiavelli] makes a decisive turn toward that notion of philosophy according to which its purpose is to relieve man's estate or to increase man's power or to guide man toward the rational society. The bond and the end of which is enlightened self-interest or the comfortable self-preservation of each of its members. The cave becomes the substance.¹⁷

Where Machiavelli limited his thinking to a paradigm of only practicality, Ibn Khaldun's paradigm incorporated both the ideal and the practical. Looking for practical politics in the ideal is the central theme of Ibn Khaldun's reflections on culture. Religion claims to know man's good in the world to come, while temporal governments are concerned exclusively with man's good on earth. Politically, Ibn Khaldun saw religion as a model for achieving what he called the "best regime." Good politics could only come about when the image of the best regime heads a hierarchy of related ends which includes the ends higher than the highest ends pursued by rational (or temporal) political regimes. This could not entail two separate schemes of ends, one of

which could be entrusted to a rational political regime and the other to a religious authority. Ibn Khaldun makes a relation between man's well-being in this world and his well-being in the next to a "vehicle" and a "destination." If his assertion that "he who loses the vehicle cannot arrive at his destination" is taken seriously, religion cannot afford to lead men to their ends in the world to come without assuring the safety of the vehicle by sitting in the driver's seat.¹⁸

Mahdi further explicates Ibn Khaldun's distinction of rational and religious regimes:

The common good is whatever contributes to the proper ordering of the various ends of man and, above all, whatever contributes to the well-being of the soul. There is then a clear distinction between the common good in rational regimes, where it meant merely whatever contributes to the well-being of the body, and to the preservation and continuous enjoyment of the benefits of social life, and the common good in the regime of Law, where it means the subordination of these ends to the well-being or the proper excellence of the soul and the enjoyment of true felicity. Secondly, there is a clear distinction between the content of moderation and justice in rational regimes and in the regime of Law. In the regime of Law, moderation means the limitation of the enjoyment of the goods of the body and the benefits of social life, not for the sake of the continuous enjoyment of these pleasures and of ensuring similar pleasures for other members of the community, but with the intention of avoiding all pleasures except those necessary for the attainment of true happiness and the excellence of the soul. And to be just in the regime of Law does not mean not to transgress the rights of others to enjoy the goods of the body and the benefits of social life, and deference to the laws that aim at providing the greatest pleasure for the community as a whole, but piety, deference to the rights of others to lead a pious life and perform their duties toward God, and obedience to the divine Law and the divine ruler. In the regime of Law moderation and justice are not earthly, but divine virtues.¹⁹

In referring to rational regimes, Ibn Khaldun did not mean they are what human reason at its best considers the most perfect of governments. They are rational because practical reason rather than man's lower

impulses supplies that principles which order man's social life. Ibn Khaldun's philosophy transcends the city. The worth of the rational regime depends ultimately on its openness to philosophy and to the Regime of Law.²⁰ If the ultimate end of people in their cities is "enlightened self-interest and comfortable self-preservation of each of its members," the cave or the city becomes the substance and the whole end into itself.

To Ibn Khaldun, the end of the regime of Law is the preservation of life, the preservation and the proper enjoyment of the benefits of social life, and the enjoyment of the world to come. Ibn Khaldun indicated the specific meaning of the "world to come" in contrasting it to the world of externals, the permanent and, above all, the final end--the true end and Truth. The good of the world to come is a religious expression whose philosophic equivalent and meaning is the good of the soul: the true happiness of man. Machiavelli did not extend his vision of what ought to be done beyond the practical. To Ibn Khaldun, the ultimate end of rational regimes is the well-being of man's body only. To Ibn Khaldun, perfecting the rational regime was important, but God gave people souls and the soul permitted people to comprehend the whole and his place within this universe:

Indeed, the purpose of human beings is not solely their mundane existence, for it is all vanity and sham, and its end is death and evanescence. And God says: "What! Did you think We have created you in vain . . .?" Truly the purpose of God in creating them is their religion which leads them to happiness in the life to come. "This is the path of God to Whom heaven and Earth belong." Laws then come to urge men to follow this path in all their affairs: in their worship and in their dealings. Even the state which is natural to human society was channelled in the direction of religion, so that everything could come under the supremacy of the Law.²¹

To Ibn Khaldun, the regime of Law reflected the "whole" within which the various activities and institutions, including those relating to man's duties to God exist as material parts. These parts do not enjoy actual existence apart from the whole. The Muslim philosophers followed Plato in considering the regime of Law as the proper political order. Here, in this context, the common good is whatever contributes to the proper ordering of the various ends of people, and above all whatever contributes to the well-being of the soul. There is a clear distinction of common good in rational regimes and regimes of Law; but the lower (rational regime) should always aspire to the higher (regime Law). In rational regimes common good merely means whatever contributes to the well-being of the body and to the preservation and continuous enjoyment of the benefits of social life. The common good in the regime of Law inspires the real world of man to seek, despite only the chance of actualization, the proper excellence of the soul and the enjoyment of True happiness.

FOOTNOTES

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²Majid Fakhry, A History of Islamic Philosophy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), pp. 16-25.

³Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, 15.

⁴Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, Vol. III, pp. 108 and 255.

⁵Machiavelli's letter to Vettori (April 16, 1527) quoted by Harvey C. Mansfield, "Machiavelli's Political Science," American Political Science Review, 75 (June, 1981), p. 305.

⁶Neal Wood, "Machiavellian Concept of Virtu Reconsidered," Political Studies, 15 (June, 1967), pp. 169-172.

⁷Wood, "Some Reflections on Sorel and Machiavelli," Political Science Quarterly, 83 (March, 1968), p. 81.

⁸Joseph Schacht, ed., The Legacy of Islam (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1974), p. 350.

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¹¹Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future (New York: Viking Press, 1971), p. 137.

¹²Charles Issawi, An Arab Philosophy of History (London: John Murray, 1950), p. 31.

¹³Ibid., pp. 33-36.

¹⁴Muhsin Mahdi, Ibn Khaldun's Philosophy of History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 289,

¹⁵Ann K.S. Lambton, State and Government in Medieval Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 154-155.

¹⁶Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, Vol. III, p. 29.

¹⁷Leo Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli (Glencoe: Free Press of Glencoe, 1958), pp. 294-296.

¹⁸Muhsin Mahdi, Ibn Khaldun's Philosophy of History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 248.

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 282-283.

²⁰Ibid., pp. 279-280.

²¹Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, Vol, I, p. 342.

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**IBN KHALDUM AND MACHIAVELLI:
AN EXAMINATION OF PARADIGMS**

by

JOHN H. MILLER

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AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S THESIS

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Two politicians--one North African Muslim, Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) and one a Renaissance Italian, Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527)--encountered very similar problems affecting their political communities. Though facing like problems, each man saw very different solutions to these problems. As politicians these men understood political problems in practical terms. But as political thinkers seeking to resolve these political quandaries, both men involved themselves in reformulating political paradigms which defined practical political affairs. Both men sought to criticize these paradigms by how they were reflected in real world practical political behavior. Aspiring to solve the dilemma of their times, one man moved to change completely the prevailing paradigm while the other merely reformed an existing paradigm. Machiavelli rejected idealism for realism, whereas Ibn Khaldun acknowledged the validity and importance of both. In these new formulations, each thinker prescribed political behavior in practical affairs. What these thinkers regarded as paradigmatically appropriate can be understood by critically examining what both men prescribed in practical affairs.

Each man argued what was both conceptually and practically preferable for his political community. These views are presented principally in Machiavelli's The Prince and The Discourses and in Ibn Khaldun's The Muqaddimah. Each man comments extensively on political features which are common to both worlds such as the need for a political community, what the society should expect of its members, and the role of authority. Both thinkers use history to justify their observations. However, as a consequence of having very different paradigmatic schemes, each thinker employs a different philosophy of history. How both men use history to prescribe practical affairs further reflects the values in each society's paradigmatic framework.